further until 1993. Id. at 43. She earned $484.50 in 1993,
$6,124.41 in 1994, and $1,603.21 in 1995. Id.

The record also contains two letters. The first is a letter
from Ms. Yonts dated May 29, 2001; in it, Ms. Yonts explains that
she had always lived with her mother and depended on her mother’s
income to survive, and that she was trying to hold things
together since her mother’s death, for her own sake and for the
sake of her two daughters, ages 3 and 12. Record at 29. She also
begged to have her case heard and resolved quickly, before she
“loses everything.” Id. The second letter, written November 21,
2001, is from Ms. Yonts’ attorney to the ALJ; it explains that a
portion of Ms. Yonts’ 1994 “earnings” ($233.68) constituted
vacation pay, which, according to the attorney, should not have
been included in the SSA’s underlying substantial gainful
activity analysis. Record at 59.

The ALJ issued her decision on February 21, 2002, finding
that Ms. Yonts was not entitled to benefits because she engaged
in substantial gainful activity after reaching the age of 22.
Record at 8~9. The crux of the ALJ’s decision is as follows:

A review of claimant’s earnings record reveals that she

earned $6124.41 in 1994 and $1603.21 in 1995. The

claimant asserts that the figure for 1994 is inflated

due to the inclusion of commissions earned in 1993 as

well as $233.68 vacation pay for 1994 (Exhibits 4, 23).

Nevertheless, by her own admission, the claimant earned

over $500 in January, July, August, September, and

December 1994. Moreover, this was true despite the
receipt of vacation pay (Exhibit 21).


including whether the work being done is comparable, in terms of
the amount of time, energy, skill and responsibility involved, to
work being done by unimpaired people in the community. Id.
§404,1574(b) (6) (iii). The regulations further provide that,
“[i]f£ your work as an employee . . . was continuous without
significant change in work patterns or earnings,. and there has
been no change in the substantial gainful activity earnings
levels,” the substantial gainful activity question is determined
by “averag[ing] your earnings over the entire period of work
requiring evaluation... .” 20 C.F.R. §404.1574a(a) (West 2004).

As explained, the ALJ determined that Ms. Yonts had engaged
in substantial gainful activity exclusively because she earned
more than $500 in several months in 1994. There is no indication
that the ALJ ever calculated or considered average monthly
earnings for the period of employment. This was improper under
the regulations.

In response to Ms. Yonts’ challenges, the Commissioner
argues that the ALJ actually determined that Ms. Yonts’ average
monthly earnings fell somewhere between the SGA and non-SGA
thresholds, and that the ALJ then went on to consider the other
factors articulated in §404.1574(b) (6) (iii), ultimately
concluding that Ms. Yonts performed work comparable to that of an
unimpaired telephone receptionist. See Defendant’s Memorandum in

Support of Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 13-14.



the Seventh Circuit, an ALJ must “build an accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusions so that [the Court]
may afford the claimant meaningful review of the SSA’s ultimate
findings.” Blakes ex rel. Wolfe v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 569
(7th Cir. 2003). It is not enough that the record contains
evidence to support the ALJ’s decision; if the ALJ does not
rationally articulate the grounds for that decision, the Court
must remand. Steele, 290 F.3d at. 941.

Here, the ALJ determined that Ms. Yonts “earned over $500 in
January, July, August, September and December 1994,” then
concluded that “the claimant engaged in substantial gainful
activity subsequent to her attainment of the age of 22 and is
therefore not entitled to childhood insurance benefits based on
disability.” Record at 8. Ms. Yonts asks the Court to reverse
the decision below because the ALJ’s findings about her earnings
were simply wrong - both in terms of mathematical calculations,
and in terms of what the Social Security rules and regulations
instruct.

Ms. Yonts first challenges the ALJ’s finding that she earned
more than $500 in December 1994. With her motion for summary
judgment she included a chart summarizing her earnings, and,
according to that chart, she earned only $418.04 in that month.
See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Her Motion for Summary

Judgment, Exhibit A. The Commissioner, having raised no



Record at 8. In short, the ALJ denied Ms. Yonts’ claim because
she earned more than $500 in five months in 1994. Having made
this finding concerning Ms. Yonts’ work activities, the ALJ
determined that she need not reach the question of how Ms. Yonts’
brief (and apparently illegal) marriage might affect her
eligibility for benefits. Id. at 8. °

The ALJ’s decision became the final agency decision when the
Appeals Council denied review on March 26, 2003. See 20 C.F.R.
§416.1481. Ms. Yonts then filed this lawsuit, seeking review of
the decision to deny her benefits. The parties consented to
proceed before a magistrate judge, and the case was reassigned to
this Court on September 9, 2003. Thereafter, both parties moved
for summary judgment. Ms. Yonts asks the Court to reverse the
Commissioner’s denial of her claim for benefits, or, in the
alternative, to remand the case to the Commissioner for further
proceedings. The Commissioner has filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment, asking the Court to affirm the ALJ’s findings.

Di ‘

An ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by
substantial evidence and free of legal error. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
Where, however, “the Commissioner's decision lacks evidentiary
support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful

review, the case must be remanded." Steele, 290 F.3d at 940. In


(C) was dependent upon such individual . .. at
the time of [her] death ....

42 U.S.C. §402(d)(1). The ALJ appears to have assumed that Ms.
Yonts satisfied the criteria set forth in subparagraphs (A) and
{C) above; she also seems to have assumed that Ms. Yonts’ mother
was fully or currently insured at the time of her death. And
neither the Commissioner nor Ms. Yonts challenges these
assumptions. This appeal challenges only the ALJ’s decision to
deny benefits based upon Ms. Yonts’ work at Service Merchandise,
and the underlying determination that such work constituted
“substantial gainful activity” that prevented her from satisfying
the disability criteria in subparagraph (B) above.

For purposes of determining whether a claimant seeking
survivor benefits is disabled, the regulations teach that a
claimant’s earnings play a significant role in the analysis: the
regulations provide that, during the relevant time period,
monthly earnings averaging more than $500 will ordinarily show
that the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity
(this is the “SGA threshold”); conversely, monthly earnings
averaging less than $300 will ordinarily show that the claimant
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity (this is the non-
SGA threshold). 20 C.F.R. §§404.1574(a) (1), (b)(2)-(3) (West
2004). For average monthly earnings that fall between the two
thresholds, the regulations instruct the Commissioner to consider

other information, beyond just the amount of the earnings,



lg
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Mint Onder Form (¢ $447)

Su United States District Court, Northern District of Hlinois

Name of Assigned Ji Sitti if Other
_ Magiseate Idee Aslander Keys han Assied Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 3420 DATE 5/4/2004
CASE Patricia Yonts vs. Jo Anne Barnhart
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

Opinion.

(11) @

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(ly o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

@G) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due__.

(4) o Ruling/Hearingon__setfor___—at__—.

(5) oa Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—setfor__—_—at

(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor__——at__.

() Oo Trial{set for/re-set for] on__at

(8) im} {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__—_at___.

(¢)) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) CiLocal Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(aX(1) 0 FRCP41(aX(2).

ao) =f [Other docket entry] Memorandum Opinion and Order entered. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment [#16] is hereby granted; Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [#18] is hereby
denied. The Court remands the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
Alc

(For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required.

Mail AO 450 form.

‘No notices required, advised in open court.
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

mu

(2909 LOIMISIO SI
a9

courtroom
deputy's . oa
initials

f- ATH Ag



Exhibit A. In other words, if averaged, Ms. Yonts’ earnings fall
between the $500 SGA threshold set forth in §404.1574(b) (2) and
the $300 non-SGA threshold set forth in §404.1574(b) (3). But
that alone, does not dictate that Ms. Yonts is entitled to
benefits. Rather, the fact that her average earnings fall
between the SGA and non-SGA thresholds means that factors besides
earnings must be considered. Here, the ALJ looked at Ms. Yonts’
earnings and stopped. Because she never considered the factors
enumerated in §404.1574 (b) (6) (iii), the record is largely silent
on whether, for example, Ms. Yonts’ job at Service Merchandise
was comparable to work being done by unimpaired people in the
community.

Nor was the issue of Ms. Yonts’ impairment ever fully
developed in the record; indeed, because the ALJ focused the
hearing exclusively on earnings, the record contains no medical
records and only a few brief mentions of Ms. Yonts’ bipolar
affective disorder. These issues, and any other issues necessary
to resolve the question of whether Ms. Yonts was disabled within
the meaning of §402(d) (1) (B), and whether she otherwise satisfies
the criteria of §402(d), must be addressed on remand. On the
record before it, the Court is unable to say whether or not Ms.
Yonts is entitled to child’s insurance benefits.

Depending on how the Commissioner decides the substantial

gainful activity and disability questions on remand, she may or

ii


e

If that were truly the case, the Court would likely affirm the
ALJ’s decision. The problem is that the ALJ’s decision gives no
indication that she applied the regulations in this manner, that
she ever calculated average monthly earnings, or that she ever
considered the other factors specified in §404.1574(b) (6) (iii).
Based on the record before it, the Court finds that the ALJ’s
focus on individual months, her failure to average monthly
earnings across the entire period of work, was inconsistent with
the SSA’s regulations, and the case must be remanded.

Ms. Yonts argues that, because she is in such dire
straights, teetering on the brink of losing her home, the Court
should reverse and award benefits without remanding the case.
Although the Court is sympathetic to Ms. Yonts’ plight, it
declines to grant Ms. Yonts’ request. An award of benefits
without remand is appropriate "’when no useful purpose would be
served by further administrative proceedings, or when the record
has been fully developed and there is not sufficient evidence to
support the ALJ's conclusion.’" Criner v. Barnhart, 208 F.Supp.
2d 937, 958 (N.D. I11.. 2002) (quoting Holden v. Shalala, 846
F.Supp. 662, 669-70 (N.D. Ill. 1994)). That is not the case
here.

The parties agree that Ms. Yonts’ average monthly earnings,
not including vacation pay, were around $460.00 during the year

1994. See Commissioner's Brief, p. 3; Ms. Yonts’ Brief, p. 6 and

10



challenge or objection to the chart, appears to agree with the
figures and information provided therein. That Ms. Yonts. earned
less than $500 in December is of little consequence, however,
because her chart shows that the ALJ actually erred in her favor
with regard to the month of June 1994. Thus, although the ALJ
may have gotten the particulars wrong, she was correct in
concluding that Ms. Yonts earned more. than $500 in five months in
1994,

The real issue in this case is not whether the ALJ's
calculations of monthly earnings were correct, but whether the
ALJ was right to look at the individual months in the first
Place. On this score, Ms. Yonts argues that the ALJ improperly
failed to average her earnings across the actual period of time
she worked, opting instead to look at each individual month in
the period. Ms. Yonts argues that, if the ALJ had looked at an
average of her monthly earnings, as provided in the regulations,
she could not have concluded that Ms. Yonts performed substantial
gainful activity.

The Social Security Act provides for a “child’s insurance
benefit” to

fe]very child. . . of an individual who dies a fully

or currently insured individual, if such child-
(A) has filed an application for child’s insurance

benefits,
. (B) at the time such application was filed was
unmarried and. . . is under.a disability (as defined

in section 423(d) of this title) which began before he
attained the age ef 22, and


Record at 157. Ms. Yonts testified that she finally left her job
in mid-1995; she took. a medical leave of absence and never went
back. Id. at 158.

In addition to her work history, Ms. Yonts testified briefly
about her personal life. She testified that she was married
briefly when she was 18 years old, but that, despite her
marriage, she continued to live with her mother. Record at 159.
She testified that she married Charles Yonts on October 25, 1975,
and that they separated a couple of months later, after she
learned that he was actually still married to another woman; she
testified that their divorce was final in 1977 or 1978. Record
at 159-60.

In addition to Ms. Yonts’ testimony and the arguments of
counsel, the ALJ considered documentary evidence submitted before
and during the hearing. That evidence includes divorce records,
confirming both that Charles Yonts’ marriage to Pearlie Yonts,
which began on December 18, 1971, was officially ended on March
23, 1976, and that Charles Yonts’ marriage to Patricia Yonts, the
claimant, began on October 25, 1975 and officially ended on
September 14, 1979. See Record at 138-40. And it also includes
payroll records, both pay statements from Service Merchandise and
a summary of Ms. Yonts’ “PICA Earnings” covering the years from
1974 to 1995. Id. at 63-135, 43. According to the latter

summary, Ms. Yonts earned $320 in 1974, then earned nothing


Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) because of that disorder;
she began receiving SSI in 1993 and continued to receive it at
least through the date of the hearing.’ Record at 155-56.

With respect to her work history, Ms. Yonts testified that
she vaguely recalled working when she was younger for a week or
two, but that she had not otherwise worked until October of 1993,
when she secured a job at Service Merchandise because her
“psychiatrist thought it might be good therapy for [her] to try
to get out into the world around people.” Record at 156. She
testified that Service Merchandise initially hired her as a
seasonal employee, and she spent the first two months on the job
working at the jewelry counter, helping out during the busy
holiday season. Jd. at 161-62. She testified that, after the
holidays, the store kept her on because “they liked me”; she was
then given the task of answering phones and transferring calls to
the appropriate department within the store, and, in that job,
she sat in an upstairs room, away from the shopping public. Id.
at 161, 163-64.

Ms. Yonts testified that, because of her bipolar disorder,
she had trouble handling her job at Service Merchandise; she
testified that, each day she worked, she felt “sick to my

stomach, shaking, overwhelming feeling that I needed to be home.”

It is not clear from the record whether Ms. Yonts’ SSI
payments continue to date. But her SSI claim is not before the
Court; this case concerns only her claim for survivor benefits.

2



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

PATRICIA YONTS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 03 C 3420

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social
Security,

Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On December 11, 2000, after her mother died, Patricia Yonts
applied for survivor’s benefits as a disabled adult child; she
was almost 43 years old when she filed the application. The
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her application
initially on December 19, 2000, because it found that she had
engaged in substantial gainful activity after attaining the age
of 22. Record at 14-15. That decision was affirmed on
reconsideration on January 17, 2001. Record at 18-19. Ms. Yonts
then requested a hearing, and the case was assigned to
Administrative Law Judge Maren Dougherty, who heard the matter on
December 7, 2001.

At the hearing before the ALJ, Ms. Yonts, who was
represented by counsel, testified that she suffers from a bipolar

affective disorder. She testified that she had received


may not be required to reach the question of what impact, if any,
Ms. Yonts’ marriage may have had on her eligibility to receive
benefits. To the extent it becomes an issue, however, the Court.
notes simply that the Act and regulations do not appear to
dictate that marriage forever destroys a claimant’s eligibility
to receive benefits under §402({(d); on the contrary, the language
of §402(d) (1) (B) would. seem to suggest that the relevant inquiry
is whether the applicant was married at the time she filed her
application, not whether she had ever married at any time in the
past.
Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Ms. Yonts’
motion for summary judgment and denies the Commissioner’s motion.
The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Given Ms. Yonts’ dire situation, as recognized by the
ALJ, the Commissioner is urged to handle the remand of this

matter as expeditiously as possible.

Dated: May 4, 2004

ENTER:

QO ba.s boys

ARLANDER KEYS =
United States Magistrate Judge

12