COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Annunziata, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman 

GARY J. STASKO 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 2835-00-2 PER CURIAM 

 APRIL 24, 2001 

VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION AND 

 VAN YAHRES TREE COMPANY, INC. 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 

Edward L. Hogshire, Judge 

 (Gary J. Stasko, pro se, on brief). 

 (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Lisa J. 

Rowley, Assistant Attorney General; Donald G. 

Powers, Assistant Attorney General; 

Francis McQ. Lawrence; St. John, Bowling & 

Lawrence, on brief), for appellees. 

 Gary J. Stasko contends that the Circuit Court of the City of 

Charlottesville (trial court) erred in affirming a decision of the 

Virginia Employment Commission (Commission) that disqualified him 

from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Stasko argues 

that the Commission wrongly determined that he left employment 

with Van Yahres Tree Company, Inc. (Van Yahres) without good 

cause. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, 

we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the trial court's decision. See Rule 5A:27. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
 "[I]n any judicial proceedings 'the findings of the 

commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the 

absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the 

court shall be confined to questions of law.'" Israel v. Virginia 

Employment Comm'n, 7 Va. App. 169, 172, 372 S.E.2d 207, 209 (1988) 

(citation omitted). "In accord with our usual standard of review, 

we 'consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

finding by the Commission.'" Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., Inc. v. 

Virginia Employment Comm'n, 24 Va. App. 377, 383, 482 S.E.2d 841, 

844 (1997) (citation omitted). 

 So viewed, the evidence established that Stasko worked for 

Van Yahres as an arborist and crew leader from February 18, 1996 

to January 12, 1999. When Stasko was first hired, Van Yahres paid 

him $10 per hour. In November 1996, Van Yahres began paying 

Stasko wages on a salaried basis instead of an hourly basis. Van 

Yahres initially paid Stasko $32,000 per year, and by January 

1999, his pay had risen to $35,000 per year. All other crew 

leaders with the company were paid hourly wages. Van Yahres also 

paid Stasko's health insurance premiums and gave him a total of 

three weeks vacation and sick leave annually. The company allowed 

Stasko to use their trucks for personal use. 

 On or about January 11, 1999, Van Yahres changed the method 

of payment of Stasko's wages from a salaried rate back to an 

hourly rate. At a hearing before the appeals examiner, David 

Rosene, Sales Manager for Van Yahres, testified that neither 

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Stasko nor the company had been "happy" with the "way things were 

going with his salary." After several days of discussion with 

Stasko, Van Yahres decided that an hourly pay rate was "the better 

way to go." Van Yahres converted Stasko's annual salary to an 

hourly wage of $15.50 per hour based on the average number of 

hours he worked per week in the previous year. The company also 

guaranteed Stasko would have forty hours of work per week in the 

winter, with additional overtime hours as they were available in 

the summer months. 

 Rosene stated that Stasko could earn more money at the hourly 

wage rate than he had earned while on salary. Rosene also 

testified that, other than changing the method of wage payment, 

there were no changes made with regard to Stasko's benefits or job 

duties. Stasko would also continue to report to the same 

supervisor. Rosene testified Stasko advised the company that he 

was not willing to work at the hourly wage rate, and he quit after 

giving about "five minutes" notice to the company. Rosene also 

stated that Stasko had had some "philosophical disagreements" with 

his immediate supervisor, and Rosene was unsure whether that was a 

factor in Stasko's decision to quit. 

 Stasko testified that he believed the change in method of 

payment was a demotion and involved a "lot of risk." Stasko had 

perceived his position with the company as one of "equal footing" 

with the officers of the company, and he stated the change to 

hourly pay was "a penalty." He testified that going from salaried 

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to hourly wages "hurt." Stasko also testified that, after Van 

Yahres changed the method of his wage payment, the officers of the 

company criticized him and attempted to "squeeze" him out of the 

company. 

 Stasko quit his job on January 12, 1999, without having 

secured other employment. He applied for unemployment benefits, 

and he indicated on the Commission claim for benefits form that 

his reason for separation was that he "voluntarily quit." Stasko 

also wrote in the explanatory remarks portion of the form, 

"Demotion contrary to company success." 

 The Commission denied Stasko's application for unemployment 

benefits. On this appeal, Stasko contends the trial court erred 

in affirming the ruling of the Commission. He argues that the 

work environment had become hostile, and the officers attempted 

to "squeeze" him out of the company. 

 Code § 60.2-618(1) states that "[a]n individual shall be 

disqualified for benefits upon separation from the last 

employing unit . . . if the Commission finds such individual is 

unemployed because he left work voluntarily without good cause." 

"Determining whether an employee voluntarily quit without good 

cause is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable on appeal." 

Snyder v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 23 Va. App. 484, 491, 477 

S.E.2d 785, 788 (1996). Determining good cause requires a 

two-part analysis. See id. at 491, 477 S.E.2d at 788. First, it 

must be determined whether the employee's dispute with his 

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employer is reasonable. If the dispute is reasonable, then it 

must be determined whether the employee made reasonable efforts to 

resolve the dispute before quitting his employment. See id. 

 "[B]efore relinquishing his employment 

. . . the claimant must have made every 

effort to eliminate or adjust with his 

employer the differences or conditions of 

which he complains. He must take those 

steps that could be reasonably expected of a 

person desirous of retaining his employment 

before hazarding the risks of unemployment." 

In other words, a claimant must take all 

reasonable steps to resolve his conflicts 

with his employer and retain his employment 

before voluntarily leaving that employment. 

Umbarger v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 12 Va. App. 431, 434-35, 

404 S.E.2d 380, 383 (1991) (citation omitted). An employee may 

not rely upon his own "unreasonable and purely subjective 

perception" to justify voluntary unemployment. Id. at 435, 404 

S.E.2d at 383. 

 The record supports the Commission's finding that Stasko 

voluntarily quit his position without good cause. Stasko admitted 

that his pay and benefits would have remained substantially the 

same after the change from a salaried wage to an hourly wage. 

Indeed, he testified that the determination of the hourly wage 

"wasn't a concern." The record also showed that Stasko would have 

had the same job duties, the same benefits, and he would have 

reported to the same supervisor after the change. Therefore, as 

the trial court found, "the proposed restructuring in [Stasko's] 

pay would have placed [him] in a position that was virtually 

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indistinguishable from his prior position from the viewpoint of 

annual earnings, fringe benefits, and position in the company's 

management structure." Even assuming, arguendo, that these 

circumstances involved a "reasonable employment dispute," the 

record shows that Stasko took no measure, reasonable or otherwise, 

to resolve that dispute before leaving employment. Cf. id. at 

437, 404 S.E.2d at 384. Accordingly, the Commission did not err 

in disqualifying Stasko from receiving unemployment benefits. 

 Affirmed.

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