were willful participants in joint activity with the state or its
agents. Hanania v. Loren-Maltese, 212 F.3d 353, 356 (7th Cir.
2000). However, a vague and conclusory allegation that a conspiracy
existed is not sufficient to state a claim; a complaint must
contain factual allegations suggesting that defendants reached a
meeting of the minds. Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Ctr., 188 F.3d
857, 860 (7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing a conspiracy charge where the
complaint included only a bare allegation and failed to specify how
er when the defendants allegedly reached an agreement, its terms,
or its scope). Furthermore, these claims are time-barred by the
two-year statute of limitations governing § 1983 actions, which
began to run, at the latest, on the date of Ms. Prince’s arrest and
confinement, July 17, 2001, Booker v, Ward, 94 F.3d 1052, 1056 (7th
Cir. 1996).

The failure of the federal claims deprives this court of
subject-matter jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
However, even if this court had jurisdiction to hear them, Counts
IX and XVIII would still fail. In Count Ix, Ms. Prince argues that
American Express breached its contract with her when it failed to
reimburse her for checks which had been stolen by defendant John
Day. However, the purchase agreement Ms. Prince submits as Appendix
L to the complaint clearly states that American Express will
replace lost or stolen checks only if the checks “have not been

taken by court order or government action.” Ms. Prince alleges


Chicago Motor at all except in its heading; thus, it fails to state
a claim against Chicago Motor, Count XIX alleges that Chicago Motor
employee Mr. Dallman maliciously and falsely accused Ms. Prince of
theft in order to cover up his own theft from his employer. An
employer is not responsible for the intentional torts of its
employees unless they are acting in furtherance of the employer’s
business, Mitchell v. Norman Jones Constr. Co., 684 N.E.2d 872, 878
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997), and Mr, Dallman’s alleged attempt to cover up
his crime against his employer was not in furtherance of its
business. Furthermore, this claim is time-barred. Chicago Motor’s
motion to dismiss is Granrep as to all counts.

Defendants John Day and Jesse Harris move to dismiss the
claims against them. As discussed above, Counts I, II, III, and
XVIII against all defendants are time-barred by the 2-year statute
of limitations on § 1983 claims and Illinois personal injury
actions. The failure of these claims deprives this court of
subject-matter jurisdiction over the remaining counts, Counts X,
XV, XVI, and XIX, which are based in state law. Furthermore, even
if this court had jurisdiction, some of these counts would still
fail, Counts XV and XVI, for defamation and false light in the year
2003, fail because public officials such as police officers “enjoy
absolute immunity from suit for defamation and ‘kindred torts’

arising from statements made in the course of their official

duties.” Horstman v. County of DuPage, 284 F, Supp, 2d 1125, 1136



this court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the remaining state-
law claims. However, even if this court had jurisdiction to hear
it, Count XIV would still fail. Ms. Prince attempts to avoid the
statute of limitations as to the failure to protect claim by
alleging that the police failed to protect her from apparently
unrelated incidents of stalking and the unauthorized use of her
credit card. These additional allegations, which are undated, fail
to save Count XIV because police “departments have no
constitutional duty to protect private persons from injuring each
other, at least not where the police department has not itself
created the danger.” Hernandez v. City of Goshen, 324 F.3d 535, 538
(7th Cir, 2003) (police had no duty to investigate credible threats
that an employee was planning to kill his co-workers), citing
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989), The motion to dismiss all claims against the City of
Chicago and the Chicago Police Department is GRANTED.

Defendants Block, Mr. Hardy, and Ms. Emigholz move to dismiss
the claims against them. As discussed above, Counts I, II, IfI, and
XVIII are time-barred by the 2-year statute of limitations cn §
1983 claims and Illinois personal injury actions. The additional
counts which name Block defendants are Counts IV (invasion of
privacy), XI (failure to supervise), XII (failure to protect), and
XVII (false charge forgery in 2003). Counts XVI and XVII (false

light and defamation) also name Mr. Hardy. The failure of the


that the checks were stolen by John Day, an employee of the State
of Illinois, in connection with his employment as a police officer
in a state building. Because the checks were taken by government
action, the terms of the contract do not entitle Ms. Prince to
reimbursement. As to Count XVIII, since Ms. Prince’s conspiracy
claims fail, she cannot impute the acts of other defendants to
American Express. The only acts American Express stands accused of
committing in its own right is failing to reimburse Ms, Prince
where it had no contractual duty to do so. This cannot support a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This claim
is time-barred as well under the two-year statute of limitations
for tort actions in Illinois. Dahl v. Fed, Land Bank Ass/’n of W,
Ill., 572 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ill. App. Ct, 1991). American Express’
motion to dismiss is GranTEp as to all counts.

Defendant City of Chicago (“City”) moves to dismiss the claims
against it and its non-suable sub-entity, the Chicago Police
Department. The Counts which affect the City are I, II, ITI, and
XVIII, which apparently attempt to state a claim against all
defendants, and Count XIV, which alleges that the city failed to
protect her from the other defendants’ conspiracy against her as
well as from other acts committed by non-defendant parties. As
discussed above, Counts I, II, ILI, and XVIII are time-barred by
the 2-year statute of limitations on § 1983 claims and Illinois

personal injury actions. The failure of the federal claims deprives


Day. “There is no such thing as intentionally wrongful retention,
training, or supervision. .., There is no common law duty to
retain, train, or supervise employees in a particular way.” Arnold
v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (N.D. Ill.
2002). The failure to protect claim appears to be similarly
premised on the idea that Block should have prevented its employees
from cooperating with Mr. Day’s investigation and that Block
employees should have told Ms. Prince that Mr. Day sought
information about her. Ms. Prince provides no support for the
notion that her employer or co-workers had any duty to protect her
from an investigation into her alleged forgery or from arrest; her
bare allegation that they did have such a duty is not sufficient to
state a claim. Block, Mr. Hardy, and Ms. Emigholz’s motion to
dismiss is GRANTED as to all counts.

Defendant Chicago Motor moves to dismiss the counts against
it. As discussed above, Counts I, II, III, and XVIII against all
defendants are time-barred by the 2-year statute of limitations on
§ 1983 claims and Illinois personal injury actions. The failure of
the federal claims deprives this court of subject-matter
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Even if this
court had jurisdiction to hear the state claims, those claims would
be dismissed. Chicago Motor is named in Counts XV (false charge
theft in year 2903) and XIX (malicious prosecution). Count XV

complains of the acts of CMS and its employees and fails to mention


ee __

1» Minute Order Fagin (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Jud lai Sitting Judge ff Othe
vor Atagiewate jude Elaine E. Bucklo than Aasitaed Suge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 5160 DATE 4/13/2004
CASE Prince vs. Campbell], et al.
TITLE

{in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state bricfly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

MOTION;

DOCKET ENTRY;

(1) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.)

(2) a Brief in support of motion duc

(3) a Answer briefto motion due___. Reply to answer brief duc.

(4) im} Ruling/Hearingon_ set for__sat_

(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] {set for/re-set for] on setfor at -
(6) Q Pretrial conference[held/continued to] {set for/re-sct for]on____—_setfor_— at
i) a Trial[set for/re-set for}on ss at__

(8) iat [Bench/Jury trial) [Hearing] held/coptinuedto__—_at_

(9) 0 This case is dismissed (with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agrcement/pursuant to]

QFRCP4(m) Local Rule 41.1 COFRCP41(ay(1) ( FRCP4{(a)(2),

(go) {Other docket entry} Various defendants’ motions to dismiss the first amended complaint, treated by the
court as motions to dismiss the second arnended complaint, are granted for failure to state a claim, or Jack of
jurisdiction or as time- barred, Accordingly, all defendants except Jason Dallman, Doris Doe, Dorothy
Campbell and First Consumer Bank are dismissed from this action. Enter Memorandum Opinion and

Order.
(il) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in apen cout, | Document
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(N.D. Till. 2003), citing Harris v. News-Sun, 646 N.B.2d 8, 11 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995). Mr. Day and Mr. Harris’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED as to all counts.

ENTER ORDER:
Sp

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: April (D> , 2004


federal claims deprives this court of subject-matter jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims. However, even if this court
had jurisdiction to hear the state claims, most of these counts
would still fail. Ms. Prince fails to state a claim for invasion of
privacy. Based on the allegations in the complaint, Ms. Prince
appears to be attempting to allege that her privacy was violated
via public disclosure of private facts when Block employees gave
her personnel file and work schedule to Mr. Day in the course of
his investigation of her alleged theft. Public disclosure, in the
context of the invasion of privacy tort, means communicating the
private information to the public at large or to a smaller group of
people with whom the plaintiff has a special relationship.
Roehrborn v. Lambert, 660 N.&.2d 180, 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). Mr.
Day is a single individual and has no special relationship with Ms.
Prince. Furthermore, no cause of action will lie if the information
publicized was a matter of legitimate public concern, Larsen v.
Suburban Med. Ctr., No, 98 C 183, 1998 WL 684204, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Sep. 23, 1998), and the identity and whereabouts of an individual
suspected of a crime are of legitimate concern to a law enforcement
officer like Mr. Day. Ms, Prince also fails to state a claim
against Block for failure to supervise its employees or to protect
her. The failure to supervise claim appears to be premised on the
idea that Block should somehow have anticipated and prevented its

employees from sharing any information about Ms, Prince with Mr.


Se

of the deficiencies pointed out in the motions to dismiss. I
therefore treat the motions to dismiss the first amended complaint
as motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. Those motions
are GRANTED as discussed below.

On a motion to dismiss, I accept all well-pleaded allegations
in the complaint as true, and grant the motion only if the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support her claim. Thompson
v, Ill. Dep’t of Prof. Regulation, 300 F,3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.
2002). However, a plaintiff can plead herself out of court by
pleading facts that undermine the allegations set forth in her
complaint. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th
Cir. 2000). Most of the counts in the complaint allege acts by “the
defendants”; however, I have attempted to distinguish which counts
complain of acts by which defendants.

American Express moves to dismiss the claims against it for
failure to state a claim. Ms. Prince’s federal claims against
American Express fail. Counts I (unlawful arrest), II (false
imprisonment), and III (conspiracy to violate Ms, Prince’s civil
rights), are alleged against all defendants under the theory that
all defendants conspired in a grand scheme against Ms. Prince. To
state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a private
actor such as American Express, a plaintiff must allege that: 1)
state officials and private individuals reached an understanding to

deprive her of her constitutional rights; and 2) the private actors



false report to that effect to the Illinois Department of Central
Management Services (“CMS”), which policed the 100 W. Randolph
building where Chicago Motor was located, Mr. Dallman gave CMS and
its employee, defendant John Day, Ms. Prince’s membership and
credit card information. Mr. Day then concocted a false charge of
credit card fraud and circulated it to a number of people,
including her employer, defendant H&R Block Tax Services (“Block”).
Defendants Steve Hardy and Rebecca Emigholz, managers at Block

gave Mr. Day Ms. Prince’s confidential employee file and work
schedule. Mr. Day then called FCNB to report the false charge of
eredit card fraud, preventing Ms. Prince from accessing her bank
account,

Next, Mr. Day, defendant and CMS employee Jesse Harris,
defendant and Block employee Doris Doe, Mr. Hardy, and Ms. Emigholz
agreed to kidnap Ms. Prince from a tax class she was teaching. She
was removed from the class at 203 N. LaSalle in Chicago and taken
to the 100 W. Randolph building. There, she was arrested and
imprisoned. At a preliminary hearing on the felony charges, a
finding of no probable cause was entered. On July 24, 2003, Ms.
Prince filed this suit seeking financial restitution from the
various defendants, Several defendants moved to dismiss the claims
against them. Rather than responding to those motions to dismiss,
Ms. Prince made a motion to amend her complaint, which I granted.

However, the 19~count second amended complaint fails to cure many


Se

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

INGRID PRINCE,
Plaintiff,
ve

DOROTHY CAMPBELL, JOHN DAY, JESSE
HARRIS, AAA CHICAGO MOTOR CLUB,
JASON DALLMAN, H&R BLOCK TAX
SERVICES, REBECCA EMIGHOLZ, STEVE
HARDY, FIRST CONSUMERS NATIONAL
BANK, AMERICAN EXPRESS, CITY OF
CHICAGO AND CHICAGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT, and DORIS DOE,

No, 03 C 5160

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ingrid Prince has filed a complaint against numerous
corporate and individual defendants in connection with an alleged
conspiracy to frame, kidnap, and maliciously prosecute her. Ms
Prince’s version cf events is as follows. On or about April 27,
2001, she visited the store of defendant AAA Chicago Motor Club
(“Chicago Motor”), renewed her membership, and purchased 3400 worth
of traveler’s checks bearing the imprint of defendant American
Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. (“American Express”),
with a credit card issued by defendant First Consumers National
Bank (“FCNB”). Later, defendant Jason Dallman, a Chicago Motor
employee, stole money from his employer and attempted to cover up
his wrongdoing by forging paperwork that made it appear that Ms.

Prince was responsible for the missing money. Mr, Daliman made a