evidence, and the purpose or flagrancy of the official misconduct. The government bears the burden
of persuasion. See Kaupp, 538 U.S. at__.

In the instant case, the Government concedes that given the timing of the warrantless entry,
the timing of the Miranda waiver, and the executed consent to search, the post-arrest statements
made by the Defendant and the pills recovered during the consent search must be suppressed if the
warrantless arrest is found to be unlawful. Having found that the warrantless arrest was illegal, the
statements made by the Defendant and the pills recovered during the consent search are suppressed.

After the initial warrantless entry and search, the Government obtained a search warrant for
the Oleander premises. The Government contends that if the initial search was unlawful, the
documents from the Defendant’s residence that were secured and not searched prior to the issuance
of the subsequent warrant should not be suppressed under the independent source doctrine. The
Government does not contend that the independent source doctrine would apply to the ecstacy pills
seized from the Defendant’s residence on March 5, 2003.

The independent source doctrine allows the introduction of evidence that is discovered
initially during an unlawful search if the evidence is discovered later through a source that is
untainted by the initial illegality. See United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900, 906 (7th Cir. 2000) (May).
For example, if the police discover items x and y during an illegal search and later discover item z
during an independent legal search, item z is admissible because it was derived from an independent
source. See May, 214 F.3d at 906. Furthermore, if during the untainted legal search, the police
discover not only item z but also rediscover items x and y, x and y as well as item z are admissible.
See May, 214 F.3d at 906.

A two-part test determines whether the evidence was obtained by independent lawful means:

i3


house on Oriole, and appear to enter the front door. The Defendant was then seen exiting the front
area carrying a construction-type trash bag that he threw into a nearby dumpster. The Defendant and
Ogonowski deny that the Defendant was in the Jeep.

Agents then observed a white Lexus drive by the Defendant’s Oriole house and circle the
block a few times. Two white males were inside the white Lexus. The agents identified the driver
of the Lexus as Ogonowski. Ogonowski parked the Lexus behind the Jeep that the Defendant had
been driving. The Defendant was standing in the street when the Lexus parked.

Ogonowski exited the Lexus and met with the Defendant behind the Jeep. The passenger of
the Lexus exited the Lexus and entered the driver’s side of the Jeep. The Defendant ran towards the
front door of his Oriole house with Ogonowski following him. The Lexus passenger then exited the
Jeep, walked back to the Lexus, leaned into the passenger side of the Lexus, shut the door and went
to the front door area of the Defendant’s Oriole house. The three individuals were out of the agents’
view for about three minutes and then appeared to come from the Defendant’s Oriole house.
Ogonowski entered the driver’s side of the Lexus, and the Defendant got into the passenger side of
the Lexus. The Lexus passenger entered the Jeep and drove south. The Lexus pulled away after the
Jeep was out of sight and headed to the Defendant’s residence on Oleander, about a half block away.

At the Defendant’s Oleander residence, Ogonowski stopped the Lexus and popped the trunk.
The Defendant exited the Lexus, stood next to the car, and looked up and down the street for a few
moments. The Defendant then reached into the trunk of the Lexus and pulled out a duffel bag. The
Defendant went towards his Oleander residence. Before entering his residence, the Defendant tuned
and looked around carefully. Ogonowski stayed a few moments and then pulled away from the

residence when the Defendant was inside. At this time, the Jeep circled the blocks around the


a substantial chance of criminal activity. See United States v. Schaafsma, 318 F.3d 718, 722

(7th Cir. 2003 (Schaafsma). When determining whether probable cause exists in a given situation,
the court examines the totality of the circumstances in a commonsense manner. See Schaafsma,
318 F.3d at 722.

The Government argues facts known before the Defendant’s arrest on March 5 support a
finding of probable cause. At the time of the arrest, the agents knew that the Defendant had made
prior drug dealings and that the Defendant and Ogonowski had prior financial and other criminal
relationships. The agents knew that the Defendant had previously possessed drugs for distribution
in a prior residence and that he had possessed drug distribution records in the residence in which he
was arrested. However, this information, if it can be said to support the conclusion asserted by the
Government, involved conduct by the Defendant which had occurred at least several weeks earlier
when it was discovered during an inspection of trash at the Defendant’s residences. The Government
also argues that the day before the Defendant’s arrest, Gabiga had informed the agents that she knew
that the Defendant dealt with Jarge quantities of drugs and stolen vehicles. However, the last time
she could remember such alleged transactions was in December 2002, three months prior to the
arrest. Also, while the Government submitted evidence that the agents knew that the Defendant
gave directions by cell phone to a cooperating individual earlier on the day of Defendant’s arrest to
the restaurant location that was the site of the drug buy, there is no evidence that during this
telephone conversation any drugs or illegal matters were discussed.

Furthermore, the agents never saw the Defendant, Ogonowski, or the third individual enter
any of Defendant’s residences and retrieve any type of bag or parcel. While the agents observed the

Defendant retrieve one duffel bag from the Lexus, the presence of this bag is reasonably consistent


Immediately following Ogonowski’s arrest, some of the agents returned to the Defendant’s
Oleander residence. While there were several agents posted at the various doors to the Oleander
house, four agents went to the front door to advise the Defendant that he was to be arrested. The
Defendant was at the window north of the front door of his residence when the agents first arrived.
The Defendant started closing the blinds to the windows south of the front door. As is standard
operating procedure, the agents had their guns drawn. The agents identified themselves as law
enforcement officers and informed the Defendant that he was under arrest. The agents observed the
Defendant look out the clear glass doors of the residence and then run to the back of the home. The
Defendant did not respond to the agents.

While the agents repeatedly instructed the Defendant to open the door and submit to the
arrest, the Defendant ran back and forth from the front of the home to the back of the home a number
of times. The agents continued to advise the Defendant that he was under arrest. The Defendant
stated something about a warrant and asked, “What are you going to do, shoot me?” The Defendant
continued to run back and forth from the front and back of his home. Within 2 or 3 minutes of their
arrival, the agents made a forced entry of the Defendant’s residence.

Upon entering the Defendant’s residence, Agent James Muha told the Defendant to get down
on the ground; and he placed the Defendant in handcuffs. The agents returned their guns to their
holsters upon restraining the Defendant.

Other agents that entered the home, including Agent Thomas Mazurski, conducted what was

described as a “protective sweep” of the residence. Agent Mazurski went into the basement as part


Defendant’s two homes.

The agents next observed Ogonowski traveling west on Higgins Road. After driving past the
parking lot where the Jeep was first spotted, Ogonowski parked in a parking lot further down on
Higgins Road, and he met with the cooperating individual for about three minutes. Ogonowski told
the cooperating individual that he wanted him to follow Ogonowski to “the house” to do the deal.
The cooperating individual refused and indicated that he wanted to do the deal “here”. Ogonowski
then drove out of the restaurant parking lot, traveling in the direction of the Defendant’s residence
on Oleander and the two homes on Oriole.

Ogonowski was next observed about 12 or 13 minutes later when he was seen driving
westbound on Higgins Road when he entered the parking lot and parked the Lexus. Agents did not
observe Ogonowski from the time he left and later returned to the parking lot.

In the parking lot, the cooperating individual walked up to Ogonowski’s vehicle with empty
hands and stopped at the driver’s side window for a moment. The cooperating individual then
walked around the car, opened the passenger door, and leaned into the vehicle. The cooperating
individual took a package from the front passenger side area of Ogonowski’s vehicle.

The cooperating individual then walked back towards his vehicle carrying a black plastic bag.
He opened the trunk of his vehicle, placed the bag in the trunk, and closed the trunk. At this point,
the agents arrested Ogonowski and retrieved the plastic bag from the trunk of the cooperating

individual’s vehicle.’ The plastic bag contained approximately 9,000 pills of ecstacy.

'The exact status of the person who received the package of ecstasy is unclear. The
Government refers to him as a “cooperating individual” in its brief. However, the affidavit
attached to the Complaint against the Defendant recites that this person was a white male who
fled after putting the package of ecstasy in the trunk and was never apprehended.

5


not sign the consent, eventually the agents would come back later with a warrant and conduct the
search.

After the consent form was signed, Agent Mazurski asked the Defendant if there were any
narcotics in the home. The Defendant informed the agents that there was a jar of pills in an upstairs
bedroom. The Defendant showed the agents where the jar of pills was located upstairs, The
Defendant stated that the jar of pills represented all the different types of pills he had received over
a period of time.

During the Defendant’s conversations with the agents, the Defendant spoke English and did
not appear to have difficulty speaking, reading, or understanding English. The Defendant spoke in
a conversational tone during the conversations. The Defendant was not re-handcuffed until he was
leaving the residence to be placed in a vehicle. The agents never redrew their weapons after the
Defendant was restrained.

Motion to Quash Arrest

“fSJearches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”
Payton y. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). However, such searches and seizures are permitted
when probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 637
(2002).

Probable cause exists “when the facts within the officer’s knowledge and of which the officer
has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing the
suspect has committed or is committing an offense.” United States v. Sawyer, 224 F.3d 675, 678-79

(7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause does not require an actual showing of criminal activity but merely


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Nofthern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge John W, Darrah Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 CR 251 - 1 through 6 DATE 1/21/2004
CASE USA vs. Piotr Misolek
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon__ssetfor_ at.

6) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__set for___at

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____——setfor_ att

(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for]on___—_aatt

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to____at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 COFRCP41(a)(1) OM FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) [Other docket entry] In court hearing held. For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum

opinion and order, defendant Piotr Misolek’s motion to quash arrest warrant [28-1] is granted and
defendant Piotr Misolek’s motion to suppress evidence [28-2] is denied. Enter Memorandum Opinion
and Order. Status hearing set for 1/27/04 at 10:00 a.m. as to defendant Piotr Krasinski only. Time is
ordered excluded to 2/17/04 as to all defendants pursuant to 18:3 161(h)(8)(A)(B). (X-T).

(il) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required,
req number of notices.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. i

vw | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. aL an.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice
courtroom

MF deputy's . . a
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initiais



Exigent circumstances exist when there is a compelling need for official action and there is
no time to secure a warrant. Such circumstances include when the police have an objective and
reasonable belief that evidence is about to be destroyed or that there is a risk of danger to the police
or other persons inside or outside the home. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).

The government bears the burden of demonstrating that its agents had an objectively
reasonable belief that exigent circumstances existed at the time of the warrantless entry in a
defendant’s home. See United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477, 482 (1998) (Marshall). The
exigent circumstances must exist at the time of the warrantless entry; it cannot be based on evidence
discovered during the search. See United States v. Jenkins, 329 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 2003). The
court analyzes the situation from the perspective of the officers at the scene. Accordingly, the court
asks, “not what the police cou/d have done but rather whether they had, at the time, a reasonable
belief that there was a compelling need to act and no time to procure a search warrant.” Marshall,
157 F.3d at 482.

The facts, as more thoroughly discussed above, show that the agents did not have an
objectively reasonable basis, from the totality of the circumstances, to believe that exigent
circumstances existed that required their warrantless entry into the Defendant’s residence. The
agents concluded that the Defendant had a history of drug trafficking and had previously had drugs
inside a different residence. However, the most recent date of which the agents had reason to believe
drugs had been in the home was December 2002. While the agents believed that the Defendant took
a duffel bag into his residence on March 5, 2003, it is undisputed they knew he was returning from
an out-of-town trip. In addition, while the Defendant provided directions to the location where

Ogonowski would later deliver the drugs, no discussion of pills, drugs, drug delivery or any other

11


with the fact that the Defendant had just returned from out of state travel, which was also known by
the agents. Nothing was presented by the Government which would reasonably connect the
Defendant with the presence of the drugs in the Lexus occupied only by Ogonowski later during the
delivery to the cooperating individual.

Most significantly, the agents did not follow nor in anyway observe Ogonowski during the
12 or 13 minutes after he left the restaurant parking lot and before he returned to the scene of the
drug delivery with the drugs. There is no evidence that Ogonowski went to any of the Defendant’s
two residences to retrieve these drugs. Lastly, while Ogonowski wanted to conduct the drug
transaction at “the house,” there was no specific indication as to which of the houses on
Oriole/Oleander he was referring. It is at least equally reasonable to conclude that Ogonowski’s
reference to “the house” was to his own home on Oriole, which is within a block of where the
Defendant was arrested. Importantly, the agents had Defendant’s Oleander residence under
surveillance at this time, yet, presented no evidence that Ogonowski returned to the Defendant’s
Oleander residence during this 13-minute period after first meeting with the cooperating individual
and before returning to the restaurant parking lot to deliver the drugs.

Based on these facts, probable cause cannot be found to arrest Defendant at his home on
March 5, 2003.

While the Government, in its briefs, seems to concede that the legality of the entry into the
Defendant’s Oleander residence requires a finding of probable cause for his arrest, it also argues
alternatively that exigent circumstances support the entry.

Assuming arguendo, that probable cause did exist, exigent circumstances did not exist to

compel entering the Defendant’s home without a warrant.

10


of his protective sweep. Upon returning from the basement, Agent Mazurski escorted the Defendant
from the living room into the kitchen. During this time, Agent Mazurski un-handcuffed the
Defendant.

In the kitchen, Agent Mazurski advised the Defendant that he was under arrest, read aloud
each line of the form, and had the Defendant read each line of the Miranda form aloud. After he
read each line of the form, the Defendant initialed each line. He then signed the bottom of the form
indicating that he understood each line. Agents Mazurski and Muha also signed the form. The form
indicates that it was executed at 7:25 p.m., approximately 17 minutes after the agents entered the
residence.

While in the kitchen, Agents Mazurski and Muha interviewed the Defendant. The Defendant
was asked about certain individuals; at which time, he produced a telephone number for an
individual named Angelo. The Defendant stated that he could order pills from Angelo at that time
but that it would take approximately two days to get the pills.

Another agent retumed from the basement and advised the agents that there was a section of
the basement floor that appeared to have been redone. Agent Mazurski asked the Defendant if they
could search the area because the agents had received information that the Defendant had installed
a safe in his basement. The Defendant took the agents into the basement and told the agents that he
could break up the floor if they wanted. At this time, Agent Mazurski read a consent form to the
Defendant. The Defendant then read the form and asked that the agents not destroy any of the house.
Agent Mazurski told the Defendant that he would add a statement indicating such on the form. After
adding the requested language, the Defendant and Agents Mazurski and Muha signed the consent

form. Before the Defendant signed the consent form, Agent Muha told the Defendant that if he did


Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The Defendant and Ogonowski drove continuously to Chicago, Illinois,
arriving in Chicago on March 5, 2003. While driving to Chicago, Ogonowski and Defendant gave
directions to a Hooters restaurant on Higgins Road to a cooperating individual via a cell phone.

On March 5, 2003, federal agents believed that the Defendant and Ogonowski would be
involved in the sale of a large quantity of ecstasy. The agents had been working with the assistance
of a cooperating individual, who was attempting to make a purchase of 10,000 pills. The
Government did not obtain a search warrant based on these facts.

Facts Known to Government Agents After 5 p.m. on March 5, 2003

At approximately 5:00 p.m., agents took three surveillance posts: (1) near the Defendant’s
main residence of 5768 Oleander, (2) at Ogonowski’s main residence at 4221 Osceola, and (3) ata
location near Cumberland and Higgins Road. In addition to the Defendant’s main residence on
Oleander, the Defendant owned a house he was rehabbing at 5832 Oriole. In addition to
Ogonowski’s main residence on Osceola, he owned a house he was rehabbing at 5840 Oriole. The
two houses on Oriole were within a block of Defendant’s Oleander residence.

At approximately 5:50 p.m., a Jeep Cherokee with a Canadian license plate pulled into a
parking lot at the Cumberland/Higgins location. A white male was alone in the driver’s seat of the
Jeep. The Jeep stayed at that location until approximately 6:18 p.m. The driver did not leave the
vehicle and appeared to be talking on a cell phone for approximately half of the time.

After leaving the parking lot, the Jeep proceeded east on Higgins Road in the general
direction of the Defendant’s residence on Oriole Avenue. A few moments later, the Jeep was
observed driving past the Defendant’s Oriole house, making a u-turn, and parking in front of the

Defendant’s Oriole house. Agents then observed the Defendant exit the Jeep, walk towards his


(1) whether the officer’s decision to seek the warrant resulted from what he had seen or seized during
the unlawful search and (2) whether the illegally obtained evidence caused the magistrate to issue
the search warrant. If the answer to both these inquiries is no, the evidence need not be suppressed
despite the fact that it was initially unlawfully obtained. See May, 214 F.3d at 906. Here, there is
no evidence that the agent’s decision to seek the warrant resulted from what had been seen or seized
during the unlawful search.

As to the second inquiry, the court generally determines whether probable cause to search
is established without the illegally obtained evidence. See United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309,
1316 (7th Cir. 1993). There is no showing that the subsequent warrant was based on facts obtained
from the illegal search. Accordingly, those items that were rediscovered in the subsequent legal
search are not suppressed pursuant to the independent source doctrine.

Lastly, the Defendant contends that the McLaughlin rule was violated. As explained in
Gerstein y. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1975), the Fourth Amendment requires that a “fair and
reliable” determination of probable cause be made by a judicial officer “either before or promptly
after arrest.” Judicial determinations of probable cause that are made within 48 hours of arrest are
presumptively reasonable, and such presumption can only be overcome if the defendant can prove
that his probable cause hearing was delayed unreasonably. See Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 56 (1991) (McLaughlin).

Here, the Defendant was arrested in the late evening of March 5, 2003. The complaint for
this arrest was docketed as case number 03 CR 238. On March 7, 2003, initial appearance
proceedings were held and a preliminary examination and detention hearing was scheduled for

March 10, 2003. On March 10, 2003, the magistrate judge determined that probable cause had not

14


For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Quash Arrest is granted. Defendant’s

Motion to Suppress Evidence is granted in part and denied in part.

7

United States District Judge

Dated: 4 4 iF} 200y

16


Facts Known to Government Agents before 5 p.m. on March 5, 2003

Agents, working with several confidential sources, were investigating individuals, including
the Defendant, believed to be involved in the distribution of controlled substances and stolen motor
vehicles.

On February 19, 2003, agents conducted “trash pulls” at the Defendant’s residence of 5768
Oleander in Chicago. Items recovered in the trash pull included twelve pages of what appeared to
bea drug ledger. FBI Agent James Muha avers that the ledger contained “details of pill and money
amounts and customer names.” The factual basis for this conclusion is not provided in Muha’s
affidavit. Other items recovered included copies of ten checks all drawn on one checking account
in amounts payable ranging from $1,000 to $9,000 and an Illinois Department of Revenue vehicle
tax record for a 2002 Cadillac Escalade.

On March 4, 2003, Marzena Gabiga gave a proffer interview to the U.S. Attorney for the
Northern District of Illinois regarding her knowledge of drug trafficking and stolen vehicles in the
Chicago area. Several agents were also present at the proffer interview. Gabiga stated, in pertinent
part, that she met the Defendant two or three years ago and that she learned that the Defendant made
money by selling ecstasy that he obtained in Canada. As recently as December 2002, Gabiga
received ecstasy pills from the Defendant at his Oleander residence. Gabiga also became involved
in stolen cars with the Defendant in December 2002. The Defendant told Gabiga that he had
received approximately 20,000 to 25,000 pills from his Canadian source at one time and that she had.
delivered packages from the Defendant to people at a Hooters Restaurant near Cumberland and
Higgins in Chicago, Illinois.

Also on March 4, 2003, the Defendant and Andrzej Ogonowski, a co-defendant, left


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 03 CR 0251

vy. )

) Judge John W. Darrah
PIOTR MISIOLEK, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant, Piotr Misiolek, was charged in a three-count superseding indictment of knowingly
and intentionally distributing a controlled substance; transporting vehicles known to have been
stolen; and receiving, possessing, concealing, storing, selling, and disposing of motor vehicles which
had crossed a state boundary after being stolen.

Subsequently, Defendant filed a Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence; and the
parties filed briefs in support of their respective arguments. An evidentiary hearing on the motions
was held, which consisted of the testimony of two of the arresting agents.. Following the hearing,
the parties submitted argument in post-hearing memoranda and responses.

The facts underlying the arrest and the search of the Defendant’s residence at 5768 Oleander
on the evening of March 5, 2003, are generally not in dispute and are summarized below based on

the parties’ briefs and the evidentiary hearing.


illegal activity was discussed during that conversation. Most significantly, even though Ogonowski
was arrested with approximately 9,000 ecstacy pills, the agents did not know where Ogonowski went
to retrieve the pills: and the Government presented no evidence that he returned to the Defendant’s
residence (which was under surveillance) to do so or which otherwise connected the Defendant to
the pills.

The Defendant’s refusal to let the agents into his home without a warrant also fails to support
the Government’s assertion that the Defendant may have been preparing to destroy evidence without
some showing that such evidence was known to be in the home. These facts fail to demonstrate that
the agents had a reasonable belief that there was a compelling need to act and no time to procure a
search warrant ~ a reasonable belief that evidence was about to be destroyed.

Furthermore, the Defendant’s one statement, “What are you going to do, shoot me?” fails to
demonstrate a reasonable belief that there was a risk of danger to the police or other persons. Other
than the stray remark, there was no evidence that the Defendant was known to possess any type of
weapon or that he previously presented any type of physical danger to others.

Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion to Quash Arrest is granted.

Motion to Suppress Evidence

The Defendant moves to suppress evidence that was seized subsequent to his arrest based
upon the illegality of his arrest.

Evidence that is obtained following an illegal arrest must be suppressed unless there is
sufficient evidence demonstrating a purge of the unlawful arrest. See Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626,
____ (2003) (Kaupp). Relevant considerations include the observance of Miranda warnings, the

presence of intervening circumstances, the temporal proximity of the arrest and the obtained

12


been established and dismissed the complaint against the Defendant. That same day, the
Government added details to its initial affidavit in support of the complaint. These details were
omitted from the initial affidavit in an attempt to prevent the premature disclosure of the existence
of a cooperating individual in the investigation. Based upon the supplemented affidavit, a different
magistrate judge issued a complaint upon a probable cause affidavit. This complaint was docketed
as case number 03 CR 251. The Defendant had his initial appearance on the second complaint on
March 11, 2003; at which time, a preliminary examination was scheduled for March 14, 2003. On
March 14, 2003, a finding of probable cause was entered against the Defendant.

The above facts show that the Defendant had an initial appearance within 48 hours of his
initial arrest and the second complaint filed against him. However, the probable cause hearing did
not occur until 5 days after his arrest and 4 days after the second complaint. This delay is a violation
of the standards set forth in McLaughlin, and the Government does not provide an excuse for such
delay. See United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 590-92 (7th Cir. 1999) (Fullerton). However,
while the delay in bringing the Defendant before a magistrate to determine probable cause violates
the rule articulated in McLaughlin, the suppression of evidence is not the proper remedy for this
violation as none of the evidence that the Defendant seeks to suppress was obtained pursuant to the
McLaughlin violation. See United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 590-92 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
suppression of evidence was not the proper remedy for the McLaughiin rule violation).

Based on the above, the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence is granted in part and

denied in part.

15