and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden to prove that no genuine issue of material fact
exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Once the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

The non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must identify specific facts that
raise more than a mere scintilla of evidence to show a genuine triable issue of material fact. See
Murphy v. ITT Technical Services, Inc., 176 F.3d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e). “Conclusory allegations alone cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.” See Thomas

vy. Christ Hosp. and Medical Center, 328 F.3d 890, 893-94 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v. Nat’]

Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990)).

Local Rule 56.1 requires both the moving and non-moving parties to submit a statement of
material facts, including “specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other
supporting materials relied upon.” Local Rule 56.1(a)(3); Local Rule 56.1(6)(3)(B). Further,
evidence submitted at summary judgment must ultimately be admissible at trial under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, all
facts not properly supported by the record evidence must be disregarded. Brasic v. Heinemunn’s,
Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 284 (7th Cir.1997).

The court views the record evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “In the light most


the Quality Control department and viewed Weyneth as less valuable than other employees. As
Prociuk stated in his affidavit: “I chose Emst Weyneth because all the other employees in quality
control had also had the experience and training in working in other parts of the factory, and, as a
result, were more flexible.” Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) Statement, Ex. Prociuk Aff. 7. As the Seventh
Circuit has stated, in RIF cases “we deal with small gradations, with an employer’s subjective
comparison of one employee to another, and it is incumbent upon us to remember that what is at
issue is not the wisdom of an employer’s decision, but the genuineness of the employer’s motives.”
Testerman, 98 F.3d at 304. Weyneth has not cast doubt of the genuineness of Micromatic’s motives
in selecting him for lay off.

Furthermore, in Weyneth’s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement he states: | 119 “Walter
Prociuk decided to terminate [Weyneth} because he was a single purpose inspector. That was the
only reason for choosing [Weyneth] over the other inspectors.” Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement
| 119. This statement belies any argument that Micromatic would not have terminated Weyneth but
for his age. See Testerman, 98 F.3d at 301 {indicating that “[i]n looking for discriminatory motive
under the ADEA, the relevant inquiry is whether age ‘tipped the balance,’ that is, whether age was

a ‘but for’ cause of the decision to fire the plaintiff’).

Therefore, Weyneth has failed to show that Micromatic’s justification for its decision to
terminate his employment was factually baseless, was not the actual motivation for the termination,
or was insufficient to motivate the termination. See Schuster, 327 F.3d at 574. As such, Weyneth
fails to show that Micromatic’s stated reason for his termination was pretextual, and his claim under

the ADEA fails.


order to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory termination under the ADEA, Weyneth is
required to present enough evidence to create a triable issue of fact on each of the following
elements: 1) he is a member of the class protected by the statute; 2) he reasonably performed to his
employer’s expectations; 3) he was terminated; and 4) the position remained open or he was replaced
by someone substantially younger. See, ¢.g., Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th
Cir. 2000). “Where, as here, an employee is terminated pursuant to a reduction in force, the fourth
element can also be satisfied by showing that similarly situated, substantially younger employees
were retained.” Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Michas
vy. Health Cost Controls of Illl., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2000).

If Weyneth can make out a prima facie case, the burden would shift to Micromatic to

articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Weyneth. If Micromatic is able to
do so, then Weyneth must present sufficient evidence to convince a rational jury that Micromatic’s
justifications were pretextual. See Lesch, 282 F.3d at 473 (citing Beatty v. Wood, 204 F.3d 713, 717
(7th Cir. 2000)). To show pretext in a RIF case, Weyneth must establish that an improper motive
tipped the balance in favor of discharge or that Micromatic did not honestly believe in the reasons
it gave for firing him. See Schuster, 327 F.3d at 574. Despite the well-known burden-shifting nature
of this approach, “‘the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiffremains at all times with the plaintiff.’” Testerman, 98 F.3d at 303
(quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)); Jackson v. E.J. Brach
Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 982 (7th Cir. 1999).
Ill. DISCUSSION

As the Seventh Circuit has stated: “It is not always necessary to march through this entire



favorable” simply means that summary judgment is not appropriate if the court must make a “choice
of inferences.” See Wolf v. Buss (America) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 922 (7th Cir. 1996). The choice
between reasonable inferences from facts is a jury function. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
B. ADEA

The ADEA prohibits an employer from “discharg{ing] any individual . . . because of such
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2003). “When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment,
‘liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the
employer’s decision.”” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000)
(quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). In other words, “ the plaintiff's
age must have actually played a role in the employer’s decision-making process and had a
determinative influence on the outcome.” Id.; see also Schuster v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 327

F.3d 569, 573 (7th Cir. 2003). A claim of discrimination in violation of the ADEA may be proven

through direct evidence of the employer’s discriminatory motive, or through the indirect,

burden-shifting approach articulated by the Supreme Court in McDo: las Corp. v. Gree:
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See O’Connor v. Consol, Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)

(assuming that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to ADEA
age-discrimination cases); Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 395 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1998) (same).

Because there is no direct evidence of age discrimination in this case, Weyneth has proceeded
using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Under McDonnell Douglas, in order to

permit this case to go to a jury, it is Weyneth’s initial burden to make out a prima facie case. In



pretextual,

Weyneth cannot dispute that Micromatic’s business was reduced at the time of his lay off,
that four other employees from other departments were laid off along with him or that more than a
dozen employees were laid off in the latter half of calendar year 2001. Yet, Weyneth claims that
there was no need to lay off an employee from the Quality Control department, and that he should
not have been chosen over other employees in the Quality Control department. However, Weyneth
offers no evidence to support this argument, and such unsupported arguments are improper at the
summary judgment stage. See Thomas, 328 F.3d at 893-94 (“Conclusory allegations alone cannot
defeat a motion for summary judgment.”). Weyneth simply second guesses Micromatic’s business
judgment. Although Weyneth might like this court to review the merits of Micromatic’s business
decisions, “this court does not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s
business decisions.” Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986).

While it is undisputed that Weyneth had more experience and performed better as an
inspector than the other employees in the Quality Control department, it is also undisputed that he
lacked experience in other departments of Micromatic’s factory. Kolpa performed various other
duties in the factory, including sorting, aside from her duties as an inspector. Korycki performed
various other duties in the factory, including painting and maintenance, aside from his duties as an
inspector. Lastly, Freeman performed various other duties in the factory, including sorting and filing
paperwork, aside from her duties as an inspector. “On the issue of pretext our only concern is the
honesty of the employer’s explanation, O’Conner v. DePaul Univ., 123 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir.
1997), and Weyneth has not cast doubt on the honesty of Micromatic’s reason for his termination.

The harsh reality is that Micromatic simply made a decision to terminate one employee in



Minute Order Form (06/97)

\Qea States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

u le?
re
Name of As Sitting Judge if Oth
wocettmuentiie | Charles R. Norgle it ne Oe
CASE NUMBER 02 C 6763 DATE 5/13/2004
CASE Weyneth vs. Micromatic Spring and Stamping, Inc.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
Micromatic’s Motion for Summary Judgment
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(©) a Trial(set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CUFRCP4(m) ClLocalRule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) (FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) [Other docket entry} | Micromatic’s Motion for Summary Judgment brought pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure is granted. See attached. The Clerk shall enter judgment pursuant to Federal.
Rule of Civil Procedure 58. It is so ordered.
al) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.
Notices mailed by judge’s staff. MAY 17 2008
Notified counsel by telephone. date docteted

X | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom
deputy's
initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office



IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court grants Micromatic’s Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

hate,

CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, Jugge
United States District Court

DATED: S=/ F Z,

10


process if a single issue proves to be dispositive.” Lesch, 282 F.3d at 473 “Here, as is often true,
that issue is pretext or the lack thereof.” Id. Assuming arguendo that Weyneth can establish the
existence of a prima facie case, Micromatic has indicated a legitimate business justification for
Weyneth’s termination - Weyneth was laid off because all other employees within the Quality
Control department had training and experience in other departments within the factory, whereas
Weyneth did not.

To meet his burden of showing pretext, Weyneth must establish that an improper motive
tipped the balance in favor of discharge or that Micromatic did not honestly believe in the reasons
it gave for firing him. See Schuster, 327 F.3d at 574. “Pretext may be proven directly with evidence
that an employer was more likely than not motivated by a discriminatory reason, or indirectly by
evidence that the employer’s explanation is not credible.” Id, (internal quotations and citation
omitted). Weyneth presents no direct evidence of pretext, and proceeds to attempt to demonstrate
pretext indirectly.

“A plaintiff-employee may proceed indirectly by attempting to show that the employer’s
‘ostensible justification is unworthy of credence’ through evidence ‘tending to prove that the
employer’s proffered reasons are factually baseless, were not the actual motivation for the discharge
in question, or were insufficient to motivate the discharge.’” Id. (quoting Testerman v. EDS Tech.
Prods. Corp., 98 F.3d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1996)). “Whether a court finds sufficient evidence to create
an issue of material fact depends upon the entire record.” Id. “When a plaintiff uses the indirect
method of proof, no one piece of evidence need support a finding of age discrimination, but rather

the court must take the facts as a whole.” Huff v. UARCO, Inc., 122 F.3d 374, 385 (7th Cir.1997)

(citation omitted). Weyneth cannot show that Micromatic’s justification for his termination is


than the other employees in the Quality Control department; however, he lacked experience in other
departments of Micromatic’s factory.

In the spring of 2001, Prociuk decided that it would be necessary to effect a reduction in force
(“RIF”) from Micromatic’s various departments as a result of a decrease in Micromatic’s business
over the past year. Prociuk chose lay off one employee from the Quality Control department,
Weyneth. On May 1, 2001, Prociuk called Weyneth into his office and told him that he was being
let go as a result of a decrease in Micromatic’s business. Also on May 1, 2001, Prociuk laid off four
other employees from Micromatic’s various departments: Bogumila Siewa, age 48; Tadeusz
Zagrodny, age 37; Alberto Landeros, age 25; and Luis Castillo, age 49. Throughout the remainder
of 2001, Prociuk laid off an additional ten employees from Micromatic’s various departments.

Weyneth was age 62 at the time of his lay off. According to Weyneth, he was laid off based
upon his age. According to Micromatic, he was laid off because all other employees within the
Quality Control department had training and experience in other departments within the factory,
whereas Weyneth did not.

Weyneth timely filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), and received a Right to Sue letter on September 5, 2002. Thereafter,
Weyneth filed this Complaint alleging that Micromatic discriminated against him in violation of the
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seg. Micromatic has filed a motion for summary judgment, which is fully
briefed and ready for ruling.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A, Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,


the relevant decision-maker in this case. In July of 1994, Weyneth interviewed with Micromatic for
a position as an inspector in the Quality Control department. Following the interview, Prociuk
offered Weyneth the job, which he accepted. At the time Weyneth was hired he was 56 years of age.

Throughout his employment with Micromatic, Weyneth’s basic job duties as an inspector in
the Quality Control department remained the same, though his title was changed on occasion. The
general job duties of an inspector included ensuring that manufactured parts met the specifications
for manufacture prior to shipment. Weyneth met Micromatic’s reasonable expectations of him, and
was never disciplined. Weyneth was a good employee, worked well with other employees and found
the general work atmosphere to be good.

Seven years after he was hired, in the spring of 2001, there were a total of three full-time
employees, including Weyneth, and one part-time employee in the Quality Control department. The
two other full-time employees were Maria Kolpa (“Kolpa”), age 38, and Bogdan Korycki
(“Korycki”), age 44, and the part-time employee was Kathleen Freeman (“Freeman”), age 38. Kolpa
was transferred to the Quality Control department in 1998, prior to which time she had worked as
an employee of Micromatic in various other departments for a number of years. Aside from her
duties as an inspector in the Quality Control department, Kolpa performed various other duties in
the factory, including sorting. Korycki was hired by Micromatic in October of 2000. Aside from
his duties as an inspector in the Quality Control department, Korycki performed various other duties
in the factory, including painting and maintenance. Freeman, the part-time employee, was hired by
Micromatic in June of 1999. Aside from her duties as an inspector in the Quality Control
department, Freeman performed various other duties in the factory, including sorting and filing

paperwork. It is undisputed that Weyneth had more experience and performed better as an inspector



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
ERNST WEYNETH, )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 02 C 6763
)
v. ) Honorable Charles R. Norgle
)
MICROMATIC SPRING AND ) BGCHETEN
STAMPING, INC., an Illinois corporation, ) MAY 17 2004
Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

CHARLES R. NORGLE, District Judge

Plaintiff, Ernst Weyneth (“Weyneth”) brings this cause of action against Micromatic Spring
and Stamping, Inc. (“Micromatic”) alleging disparate treatment in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Before the court is
Micromatic’s Motion for Summary Judgment brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.

I, BACKGROUND!
Micromatic manufactures springs and other parts that are used as components in items

manufactured by other companies. Walter Prociuk (“Prociuk”) is Micromatic’s Vice President, and

1 The court takes the undisputed facts from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements, and notes disputed
facts within the text. Local Rule 56.1 is designed to conserve judicial time and resources. See Bordelon v. Chicago
School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[t]hese rules assist the court by
organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating Precisely how each side proposed to prove
a disputed fact with admissible evidence” (citation omitted); Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 582-87 (N.D. Il.
2000) (discussing at length the requirements of Local Rule 56.1). Given the importance of Local Rule 56.1, the
court has the discretion to either strictly apply or overlook violations of Local Rule 56.1. See Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v, Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2002); Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 527. In this instance, both parties are
admonished for their failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1. However, the parties’ violations of Local Rule 56.1 do
not materially affect the court’s ability to decide the dispositive issue in this case, and the court will overlook both
parties’ violations of Local Rule 56.1 and proceed to decide this case with justice and fairness to the parties.

[J