NO. 07-09-00203-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL E JUNE 30, 2011

XAN ROSS ORMON, APPELLANT

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NO. 47,237-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, JUDGE

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ., and BOYD, S.J. 1

MEMORANDUM OPINION The trial court adjudicat ed appellant Xan Ross Ormon guilty of burglary of a habitation, revoked his order of community supervision, and sentenced him to four years confinement in prison. He appeals. We will affirm.
Background
In October 2003, appellant plead guilty to an indicted charge of burglary of a habitation. The court deferr ed adjudication of guilt and pl aced appellant under an order

1 John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Se venth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.2 of community supervision for five years. After the State filed its second motion to proceed to adjudication in March 2008, appellant’s community supervision was extended until October 2012.
The State filed its third motion to proc eed with adjudication of guilt in March 2009. As grounds, the State a lleged appellant violat ed four conditions of his community supervision order: he traveled beyond the geogr aphic limitation of the order without court permission; he failed to pay the monthl y supervision fee for January and February 2009; he failed to pay restitution for July 2008 through February 2009; and he failed to pay delinquent probation fees fo r January 2009 and Fe bruary 2009.
At the hearing, appellant plea d true to the violations all eged. The trial court then received evidence which included the testimony of a probation officer. According to the officer, appellant requested permission to travel to New Orleans , outside the geographic limitation of his community s upervision order. The request wa s denied. The officer then attempted two home visits but was unable to locate appellant. Fo llowing investigative telephone calls and a visit to appellant’s workplace, the officer received a call from appellant. He admitted traveling to New Or leans. Concerning appellant’s claim that financial duress caused his payment arrearages , the probation officer testified that appellant offered to “overnight ” the past due sums if allowed to travel to New Orleans.
Appellant testified in his defense. He explained the purpose of his trip to New Orleans was to attend a business conferenc e that he considered necessary to his continued employment. And he fell behi nd on restitution and fees because of insufficient income. After close of the evid ence, the trial court s entenced appellant to3 four years confinement in prison. In open court, following pronounc ement of sentence, appellant offered to bring current his arr earages if allowed to remain on community supervision. The trial court declined the offer. Appellant now appeals.
Analysis
Through a single issue, appella nt argues the evidence wa s insufficient to support revocation of community supervision. A co mmunity supervision revocation proceeding is neither a criminal nor a civil trial, but an adm inistrative proceeding. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of discretion standard. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is so clearly wrong that it lies outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree. Wilkins v. State, 279 S.W.3d 701, 703-704 (Tex.App.--Ama rillo 2007, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and dete rmines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given their testimony. Allbright v. State, 13 S.W.3d 817, 81 8-19 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2000, pet. refused).
We review the evidence in the light mo st favorable to the court’s ruling. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Allbright, 13 S.W.3d at 819. Hence a factual sufficiency review is inapplicable to revocation proceedings. Allbright , 13 S.W.3d at 818. See also Cherry v. State, 215 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex.App.--Fort Wo rth 2007, pet. refused) (collecting cases). Appellant makes an argument the evidence supporting revocation was factually insufficient, and in support cites Pierce v. State . 113 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex.App.--4 Texarkana 2003, pet. refused). We do not read Pierce to set forth a different standard for review of a revocation order than we have stated. To the ext ent appellant intends his issue to include a claim that the tr ial court abused its discretion because the evidence was factually insufficient to suppor t revocation, we overrule the issue.

The burden is on the St ate in a revocation proceeding to prove by a preponderance of the evidence t hat the defendant is the same individual named in the judgment and order of communi ty supervision, and the def endant violated a term of community supervision in the motion to revoke. Cobb, 851 S.W.2d at 873-74. This standard is met when the greater weight of the credible ev idence creates a reasonable belief that the defendant violat ed a condition of his or her community supervision as the State alleged. Martin v. State, 623 S.W.2d 391, 393 n.5 (Tex .Crim.App. 1981) (panel op.); Allbright, 13 S.W.3d at 819.
A plea of “true” to even one allegation in the State’s motion is sufficient to support a judgment revoking co mmunity supervision. Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Lewis v. State, 195 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2006, no pet.). Here appellant pled true to eac h violation alleged and the State offered undisputed proof that appellant traveled beyond the orde red area of super vision without court authorization. Further, appellant’s a ttempt to bargain for continued community supervision by offering to “overnight” pay ment of restitution and fees and pay the arrearages is some evidence belying his affirma tive claim of inability to pay fees and5 restitution. Finally, the punishment the trial court a ssessed is within the range authorized by statute. 2
But as we discern it, the core of appellant ’s issue is that, despite his plea of true to the violations the State al leged, the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to confinement rather than continuing his comm unity supervision. It is the general rule that as long as a sentenc e is within the proper range of punishmen t, it will not be disturbed on appeal. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex .Crim.App. 1984). See generally Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323-24 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (describing essentially “unfettered” sentenci ng discretion of court). As we have noted, and as is clear from appellant’s testimony, this was the th ird hearing of a motion to proceed in his case. And, asked at this last adjudication hearing by the trial court about the circumstances of the burglary to whic h he plead guilty in 2003, appellant told the court he did not know anything about the offens e because “I didn’t do it.” We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appella nt’s community supervision and imposing a sentence within the range authorized by law. Appellant’s issue is overruled.

2 Generally, burglary of a habitation is classified as a second-degree felony, punishable by a sentence of two to twenty years’ imprisonment and a fine not to exceed $10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 30.02( c)(2); 12.33(a),(b) (West 2011).6 Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James T. Campbell Justice Do not publish.