In addition to exhausting the remedies available in state court, a habeas petitioner is
procedurally barred from raising claims in a federal habeas court that he did not raise in the state
court proceedings. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848 (holding that a petitioner’s failure to present
three claims to the Illinois Supreme Court for discretionary review resulted in a procedural
default of those claims). Fair presentment of a constitutional claim requires a habeas petitioner
to present both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles to the state court before
bringing the claims to a federal habeas court. Cf. Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 916 (7th
Cir. 1999) (discussing exhaustion of claim) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277 (1971)).
Thus, a habeas petitioner procedurally defaults, or waives, any claim raised for the first time in
federal court.

Also, federal habeas courts cannot review claims that the state court has disposed of on
state law grounds. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 846, 860 (2002); see also Lambrix v.
Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1997) (noting that where “the state law determination is
sufficient to sustain the decree, any opinion . . . on the federal question would be purely
advisory.” (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945)). Put another way, federal
habeas relief is not available if the state court decision rests on state law that “is independent of
the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” See Coleman v. Thompson, 501
USS. 722, 729 (1991).

A federal court may not grant habeas relief on a defaulted claim unless the petitioner can
demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of
federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 450-52 (2000); Coleman, 501


Pryor’s sentence became final on January 4, 2000, which is the last day he could have
filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court following the Illinois
Supreme Court’s October 6, 1999 denial of his petition for leave to appeal. See Sup. Cr. R.
13(1). Pryor’s Apprendi claim is therefore barred under the time constraints explained in Curtis,
294 F.3d at 844 and McReynolds, 397 F.3d at 481, Pryor’s fifth and final claim for relief under §
2254 therefore fails.

Ill. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Pryor’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus — Person in State

Custody is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Yoke Axe ia

CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, Ks ge
United States District Court

Dated: May 25, 2007

10


fired the fatal shot. However, the State presented the following facts demonstrating Pryor’s
criminal culpability. Pryor and several other Gangster Disciples beat Mendez because they
thought he was a member of a rival gang. Joyner was a Gangster Disciple. Two witnesses
testified that Joyner was involved in the beating. These witnesses also testified that Joyner
walked away from the scene of the beating, retrieved the murder weapon from Pryor’s car,
immediately returned, and shot Mendez in the head. (As the court has noted, there was
conflicting testimony as to whether Joyner retrieved the gun from Pryor’s car.) Pryor’s
contention that this evidence could not reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is meritless. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19. His first claim for relief under § 2254
therefore fails.

2, Systematic Exclusion of African-Americans from the Jury Pool

Pryor, an African-American, asserts that A frican-Americans were systematically excluded
from the jury pool in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. There is no question that the
Constitution requires juries to be selected from a “fair cross section of the community.” Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). This requirement is “fundamental to the jury trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The exclusion of minority groups such as A frican-
Americans from a jury pool raises “at least the possibility that the composition of juries would be
arbitrarily skewed in such a way as to deny criminal defendants the benefit of the common sense

judgment of the community.” Lochhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986).

Tn order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement, the
defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group
in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons
in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury-selection process.


USS. at 750; Anderson v. Cowen, 227 F.3d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 2000). With the above principles
in mind, the court examines Pryor’s Petition.
B. Pryor’s Claims for Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Respondent concedes that Pryor has exhausted his state court remedies. Pryor asserts the
following grounds for federal habeas corpus relief: (1) the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he aided and abetted the offender, (2) he was denied a fair trial because of
the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury pool, (3) he was denied his 5th, 6th,
and 14th Amendment rights because of the State’s unreasonable application of state laws
contrary to federal laws, (4) his attorney was ineffective during the appeal of his post-conviction
proceeding, and (5) his sentence violated the rule laid down in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000).

1. Insufficient Evidence to Convict

Once an individual has been convicted of a crime, and that conviction has been affirmed
on direct appeal, federal courts are instructed to use the following well-established standard of
review when examining the sufficiency of the evidence. If the “record evidence could reasonably
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” the conviction should not be overturned.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). “{T]he relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319; see
also Ford v. Ahitow, 104 F.3d 926, 936-37 (7th Cir. 1997).

In this case, there is no question that a rational trier of fact could have found Pryor guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. At trial, it was undisputed that Pryor did not kill Mendez; Joyner


(1967) necessarily implicates the merits of an appeal, because the premise of the motion is that
the appeal is frivolous.”). The Appellate Court granted the motion to withdraw, and affirmed the
trial court. Pryor now argues that counsel was ineffective for filing this motion to withdraw.
Such a claim, however, is not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(i) (“ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral
post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section

2254.”); see also Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Once trial and direct

appeals have run their course, neither the sixth amendment nor federal law guarantees effective
assistance of counsel for collateral proceedings.”). Pryor’s fourth claim for relief under § 2254
therefore fails.

5. Apprendi Claim

Finally, Pryor asserts that his sentence violates the rule laid down by the Supreme Court
in Apprendi v. New Jersey: “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). The Seventh

Circuit has held that Apprendi “does not disturb sentences that became final before June 26,

2000, the date of its release.” United States v. Curtis, 294 F.3d 841, 844 (7th Cir. 2002); see also

Lambert v. McBride, 365 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has also held that

Booker “does not apply retroactively to criminal cases that became final before its release on

January 12, 2005.” McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2005); see also

United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir. 2005).



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
PRIEST EUGENE PRYOR, )
)
Petitioner, ) 04 C 6490
)
v. )
) Honorable Charles R. Norgle
NEDRA CHANDLER, )
)
Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

CHARLES R. NORGLE, District Judge

Before the court is Petitioner Priest Eugene Pryor’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus —
Person in State Custody, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the following reasons, the
Petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Petitioner Priest Eugene Pryor (“Pryor”) is incarcerated at the Dixon Correctional Center
in Dixon, Illinois, where he is in the custody of Respondent Nedra Chandler, the Warden of that
facility. On April 30, 1999, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Pryor’s conviction and forty-
seven year sentence for first-degree murder. As part of its decision to affirm, the Appellate Court
summarized the facts as developed at Pryor’s jury trial in the Circuit Court of Kane County. The
following facts must therefore be presumed to be correct for the purposes of this court’s habeas

review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).


Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); see also United States v. Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d

459, 463 (7th Cir. 1999).

Respondent concedes that African-Americans are a “distinctive group.” However, Pryor
has not provided the court with any information that would indicate A frican-Americans were
underrepresented in Kane County venires, or that any such underrepresentation was the result of
the “systematic” exclusion of African-Americans from the jury selection process. See Duren,
439 U.S. at 364. Pryor’s second claim for relief under § 2254 therefore fails.

3. The State’s Application of State Laws in Contravention of Federal Laws

Pryor asserts that the State unreasonably applied state law in contravention of federal law.
However, he fails to identify which state laws the State allegedly applied unreasonably. He also
fails to explain why the State’s application of these laws was unreasonable. Finally, he fails to
identify which federal laws the State allegedly contravened. “The lack of development of this
argument and absence of supporting case law speaks to the paucity of the argument. Arguments

that are not adequately developed or supported are waived.” United States v. Jones, 224 F.3d

621, 626 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Pryor’s third claim for
relief under § 2254 therefore fails.

4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Collateral Attack

During the appeal of Pryor’s post-conviction petition, his appointed counsel filed a
motion to withdraw, asserting that there were no reasonable grounds on which to base an appeal.

See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), Wilkinson v. Cowan, 231 F.3d 347, 351 (7th

Cir. 2000) (“[A]ny motion to withdraw pursuant to Finley or Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738



28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court
precedent “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]
Court on a question of law” or “if the state court confronts facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to
[it].” Owens v. Frank, 394 F.3d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 405 (2000)). A state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established
Supreme Court law if the state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s
cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular prisoner’s case” or “if the state
court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it
should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it

should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; see also Owens, 394 F.3d at 496. In order for a state

court decision to be considered “unreasonable” under this standard it must be more than
incorrect, it must lie “well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion.”
Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Schultz v. Page, 313 F.3d 1010,
1015 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The state court decision is reasonable if it is minimally consistent with the
facts and circumstances of the case”).

Before reviewing the Illinois courts’ decisions, however, the court must determine
whether Pryor fairly presented his federal claims to the state courts. Section 2254 requires a
habeas petitioner to exhaust the remedies available in state court prior to pursuing federal habeas
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Any claim not presented to the state’s highest court is

deemed procedurally defaulted. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)

(indicating that “a petition for discretionary review in Illinois’ Supreme Court is a normal,
simple, and established part of the State’s appellate review process”).

4


1997. Various witnesses testified to the events of the evening of October 27, 1994. During its
closing argument, the State asserted that Mendez’s death occurred as a result of the Gangster
Disciples “protecting their territory.” The State argued that Pryor and other members of the
Gangster Disciples joined together to beat and kill Mendez. The jury’s verdict was guilty on all
seven counts. The court sentenced Pryor to forty-seven years imprisonment.
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion issued on April 30, 1999.
On October 6, 1999, the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Pryor then filed a
petition for post-conviction relief. The Circuit Court denied this petition on August 7, 2002. The
Illinois Appellate Court affirmed on October 3, 2003. On January 28, 2004, the Illinois Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal.
Pryor filed the instant § 2254 Motion in the Northern District of Illinois on September 27,
2004. The Motion is fully briefed and before the court.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Decision
Pryor’s Petition is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which sets a high hurdle for habeas relief. The statute
states:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.



On the night of October 27, 1994, Pryor was riding in a car with three other people on
East New York Street in Aurora, Illinois. Pryor, a member of the Gangster Disciples street gang,
observed other members of the Gangster Disciples on foot. These individuals motioned for
Pryor’s car to stop, and the driver complied. Pryor exited the car and observed a group of
Gangster Disciples attacking Armando Mendez (“Mendez”).

According to the testimony of Gangster Disciples and codefendants Darryl Bailey and
Kevin Scott, several Gangster Disciples had observed Mendez standing on a nearby street corner
during the evening in question. Bailey, Scott and other Gangster Disciples suspected Mendez was
a member of the Latin Kings, a rival gang. One of the Gangster Disciples, Patrick Kirkwood,
asked Mendez if he was a “King,” and instructed Mendez that if he was not, he should “throw
down the crown,” i.e. invert the Latin King hand sign in disrespect. Mendez apparently refused
to do so, and Kirkwood punched him in the face. Mendez then attempted to flee towards a
nearby gas station. Several Gangster Disciples chased and caught Mendez, and began to beat
him. Pryor participated in the attack, punching Mendez, kicking him, striking him with his
elbow, and throwing him to the ground. Mendez was also struck several times with a metal
garbage can. Another Gangster Disciple, Lamar Joyner, then shot Mendez in the back of the
head, killing him. Two witnesses testified that Joyner obtained the murder weapon from Pryor’s
car. Other witnesses testified that Joyner arrived on the scene with the weapon already in his
possession.
B. Procedural History

On November 15, 1994, Pryor was indicted on seven counts of first-degree murder. A

jury trial was held in the Circuit Court of Kane County during late January and early February