UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JENNIFER HAMEN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-1394 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case arises from the kidnapping and detention of two United States citizens—and 

the murder of one of those citizens—by members of the Houthi militant group in Yemen. In 

October 2015, Mark McAlister and John Hamen were abducted from the airport in Sana’a, 

Yemen and transported to a detention facility. Hamen was killed sixteen days later. McAlister 

was held at that facility for over six months, and then released. Plaintiffs, who are all U.S. 

nationals, bring this suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran, invoking the state-sponsored 

terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a). They rely 

on another provision in the statute, § 1605A(c), to supply a federal cause of action, alleging that 

Iran provided “material support” to the Houthis, who used that support to engage in acts of 

hostage taking, torture, and extrajudicial killing. Plaintiffs allege that the Houthis have 

benefitted from and relied on training, funding, direction, and support from Iran and that, without 

Iranian aid, the Houthis could not have kidnapped and detained McAlister and Hamen or 

murdered Hamen. 

Iran has not answered or otherwise appeared in this action and, at Plaintiffs’ request, the 

Clerk of the Court entered a default. Plaintiffs now move for a default judgment against the 
2

Islamic Republic of Iran. Dkt. 31. As explained below, Plaintiffs have established their right to 

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for the entry of a default 

judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran will be granted. The Court will refer the matter to 

a special master to assist in evaluating Plaintiffs’ damages.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Mark McAlister, the estate of John Hamen, and eleven of their family members, 

bring this action against Defendants the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic 

for “provi[ding] material military and economic support” to the Yemeni militant group that 

abducted McAlister and Hamen, held them captive, and murdered Hamen, alleging that the 

“violence . . . [was] an expected and welcomed result of such support.” Dkt. 1 at 16–17 (Compl. 

¶¶ 94, 106). Plaintiffs effected service on the Islamic Republic of Iran in December 2017, Dkt. 

25, and Iran has not answered, filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, or 

otherwise appeared, Dkt. 26. In July 2018, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against

the Syrian Arab Republic. Dkt. 42. 

Plaintiffs now seek entry of a default judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. Dkt. 32. Entry of a default judgment is not 

automatic, however, and requires the Court to exercise its sound discretion. See Mwani v. bin 

Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Sanchez v. Devashish Hospitality, LLC, 322 F.R.D. 32, 36 

(D.D.C. 2017); Boland v. Yoccabel Const. Co., 293 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Jackson 

v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Most notably, the Court must—in all cases—

satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims and personal jurisdiction over 

the defendant. See Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“A default 

judgment rendered in excess of a court’s jurisdiction is void.”); Mwani, 417 F.3d at 6 (explaining 
3

that a court must “satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering judgment against 

an absent defendant”). 

In cases brought against a foreign state, however, the Court’s discretion to enter a default 

judgment is more narrowly circumscribed. By statute, no federal or state court may enter a 

default judgment against a foreign state or instrumentality “unless the claimant establishes his 

claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). This is the 

same standard that applies to default judgments against the United States under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 55(d). See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017); 

Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 328 F.3d 680, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In a case such as this, which 

alleges that a foreign state materially supported acts of terrorism, the district court must 

determine “how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide.” Han Kim v. 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014). And the Court 

must do so in light of both Congress’s purpose in enacting § 1605A—that is, to “compensate the 

victims of terrorism [so as to] punish foreign states who have committed or sponsored such acts 

and [to] deter them from doing so in the future,” id. at 1048 (citation omitted)—and the difficulty 

in obtaining “firsthand evidence and eyewitness testimony . . . from an absent and likely hostile 

sovereign,” Owens, 864 F.3d at 785. As a result, Plaintiffs carry the burden of (1) producing 

evidence sufficient to show that their claims fall within the state-sponsored terrorism exception 

to the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a); Owens, 864 F.3d at 784; (2) establishing that Iran was

served in accordance with the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a); and (3) demonstrating their right to 

relief under federal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), or state law, Owens, 864 F.3d at 808, by offering 

evidence “satisfactory to the court,” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).
4

Against this backdrop, the Court held a two-day hearing on liability, Dkt. 48 (Jul. 25, 

2018 Hrg. Tr.), Dkt. 49 (Jul. 26, 2018 Hrg. Tr.), and received additional evidentiary submissions, 

Dkt. 44-1, Dkt. 44-2, Dkt. 44-3, as well as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from 

Plaintiffs, Dkt. 53. In the course of the hearing, the Court applied the Federal Rules of Evidence, 

but did so on the understanding, first, that it has “the authority—indeed, . . . the obligation—to 

‘adjust [evidentiary requirements] to . . . differing situations,’” Han Kim, 774 F.3d at 1048

(quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (modifications in Han Kim), 

and, second, that the Court need not “step into the shoes of the defaulting party and pursue every 

possible evidentiary challenge,” Owens, 864 F.3d at 785. Expert testimony, moreover, is not 

only entirely proper, but often sufficient, see id. at 787–89, and even indispensable in “terrorism 

cases . . . because firsthand evidence of terrorist activities is difficult, if not impossible to 

obtain.” Id. at 787. Whether through expert testimony or other competent evidence, the Court 

must ultimately determine whether the Plaintiffs have “substantiate[d] [the] essential element[s] 

of jurisdiction” with admissible evidence. Id. at 786.

Based upon the record and the facts available for judicial notice, the Court now makes the 

following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiffs’ evidentiary presentation included testimony from eleven witnesses (including 

experts), and over a dozen exhibits (including government reports). The Court heard from 

Michael Pregent, a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and former intelligence officer and 

fellow at the National Defense University; Dr. Daniel Green, a Defense Fellow at the 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Jonathan Arden, a forensic pathologist who 

previously served as the Chief Medical Examiner of the Northern Virginia Region and First 
5

Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for the City of New York; and representatives from each of the 

families of the abducted or murdered Americans. See Dkt. 48 (Jul. 25, 2018 Hrg. Tr.); Dkt. 49 

(Jul. 26, 2018 Hrg. Tr.).

Based on the testimony of these witnesses and the exhibits admitted into evidence, the 

Court finds as follows: First, Iran provided the Houthis with significant support, either directly 

or indirectly through other proxies, in the form of training, weapons, and funding, as part of its 

larger strategy to use proxy groups to destabilize the region. Second, the Houthis would not have 

been in a position to effectuate the abduction of McAlister and Hamen from the Sana’a Airport, 

or the murder of Hamen, without the assistance of Iran. Third, the Houthis would not have 

attempted the kidnapping and hostage-taking of Mark McAlister and John Hamen without the 

backing of Iran. The Court ultimately concludes that, through these actions, Iran supported the 

hostage taking of McAlister and the murder of Hamen. The Court will discuss the factual 

foundation for each of these conclusions in turn. 

A. Iran’s Provision of Support to the Houthis

1. Overview of Iran’s Proxy Strategy

Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has sought to maintain influence over other

countries in the region, such as Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, by pursuing a strategy of 

“destabilizing” and “fractur[ing]” the governments in those countries. Dkt. 48 at 173–74

(Pregent).1

 One of the principal ways that Iran has sought to achieve this goal is by financing 

 1

 Many of the Court’s findings in this section are derived from the expert testimony of Michael 

Pregent and Dr. Daniel Green. Having considered the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 

702, the Court qualified Pregent as an expert on the IRGC Qods Force and Iranian efforts to 

influence political activity in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, Dkt. 48 at 172, and qualified Dr. 

Green as an expert on terrorism, insurgency and counter-insurgency issues generally in the 

Middle East, and particularly as it relates to Iran and its activities in Yemen, Dkt. 49 at 41. 
6

and supporting local groups known as “proxy organizations,” which Iran, in turn, uses to

“strategically carry out Iran’s goals.” Id. (Pregent). By using these groups as surrogates, Iran is

able to achieve its goals in the region, while simultaneously denying responsibility for the 

actions of its proxies.

The Iranian military body responsible for identifying and training proxy organizations is 

known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (“Qods Force”). Id. at 173–74 

(Pregent). The Qods Force is the “external operating body” of the Iranian government, id. at 174 

(Pregent), and “focuses on conducting foreign operations which support insurgents and 

terrorists,” Dkt. 32-4 at 8 (Green Aff. ¶ 33). The commander of the Qods Force, General Qasem 

Soleimani, reports directly to the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khomeini. Dkt. 48 at 174 

(Pregent). 

The Qods Force coordinates with proxy militant groups to conduct terrorist attacks by 

providing weapons, training, funding, and guidance. Id. at 179–80 (Pregent); Ex. 10 at 3.

2 Once 

the Qods Force develops a relationship with a group, it supplies weapons, which range from 

small arms such as AK-47s to sophisticated weaponry such as antitank weapons and explosively 

 2

 Under the public records exception to the hearsay rule, “a record or statement of a public 

office” is admissible if it contains “factual findings . . . from a legally authorized investigation” 

and does not “indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(8); see also Owens, 864 

F.3d at 792. Exhibit 10 is a press release, entitled “Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities 

and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” Ex. 10 at 1, that 

describes U.S. Government actions “to counter Iran’s . . . support for terrorism,” id. at 1. 

“Pursuant to the ‘broad approach to admissibility’ under Rule 803(8), a court may also admit 

‘conclusion[s] or opinion[s]’ contained within a public record,” and, “[o]nce proffered, a public 

record is presumptively admissible, and the opponent bears the burden of showing it is 

unreliable.” Owens, 864 F.3d at 792 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169

(1988)). As the press statement contains summaries of U.S. government actions and lawful 

government investigations and bears no indicia of unreliability, the Court admits it into evidence 

under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). For the same reasons, the Court concludes that Exhibit 11, which is 

a press release entitled “Treasury Sanctions Hezbollah Leadership,” Ex. 11 at 1, is admissible. 
7

formed penetrators, depending on the group’s training and capability. Dkt. 48 at 180–81

(Pregent); Dkt. 49 at 63–64 (Pregent). The Qods force also trains proxies to use those weapons, 

both in the home countries of the proxies and in other areas in the region. Dkt. 48 at 182–83 

(Pregent). 

In addition to military support and training, the Qods Force “exports” to its proxies a 

“collection of behaviors[,] tactics, and capabilities,” Dkt. 49 at 111 (Green), which includes other 

terrorism techniques such as “bomb making” and “assassination and kidnapping,” Dkt. 48 at 182 

(Pregent). Of particular relevance here, Iran encourages its proxy groups to kidnap “high value 

targets” by providing “incentives” in the form of “a bounty or reward.” Id. at 191–92 (Pregent). 

The “highest value target” to Iran is an American. Id. (Pregent). The Qods Force also typically 

exercises control over its proxies’ efforts to kidnap Americans because such operations and 

subsequent negotiations are complex and can potentially implicate Iran if not strategically 

executed. Id. at 16–18 (Pregent). 

According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Qods Force has supported militant 

groups including the Taliban, Hamas, and—most relevant here—the Lebanese Hezbollah 

(“Hezbollah”). Ex. 10 at 3. As a result of these activities, the State Department has designated 

Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, see U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism,

available at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited August 7, 2019), and the 

Treasury Department has designated the IRGC’s Qods Force as providing support for terrorism, 

Ex. 10 at 1, 3. 

2. Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s role as an Iranian proxy force is relevant to this case in two respects. First, it 

serves as an example of how Iran cultivates militant organizations in other countries and employs 
8

them as surrogates—a model that Iran applied to the Houthis in Yemen. Dkt. 48 at 185–86

(Pregent). Second, Hezbollah served as a liaison between Iran and the Houthis to provide 

training and regular financial support. 

The Qods Force has developed Hezbollah as a proxy for over 20 years. See id. at 185 

(Pregent). As a result of that ongoing and established relationship, Hezbollah is today regarded 

as the “gold standard” for what Iran hopes to achieve with proxy militias in Afghanistan, Syria, 

Iraq, and Yemen. Id. at 184–85 (Pregent). In particular, Hezbollah is directed by the Qods Force 

to conduct external operations on Iran’s behalf, and, in order to facilitate those efforts, Iran 

provides Hezbollah with a budget of roughly $200 million per year. Id. at 185–86 (Pregent). 3

 

Hezbollah’s “3800 Unit” is responsible for Hezbollah’s training activities that support the proxy 

militias—including the Houthis—and the 3800 Unit develops a closer relationship with the 

proxies through proximity and frequent interactions. Id. at 190 (Pregent). To further strengthen 

Hezbollah’s relationship with other proxies, it often distributes funding to these groups at Iran’s 

direction. Id. at 191 (Pregent). The Qods Force also maintains oversight over Hezbollah and its

3800 Unit by sending advisers to oversee the Unit and to meet with proxy leadership. Id. at 192 

(Pregent). 

Also relevant here, the Unit’s training of proxy groups typically includes not only 

weapons training, but also training in kidnapping and hostage-taking techniques, focusing on 

American targets. Dkt. 49 at 16 (Pregent). Notably, Hezbollah trains proxy groups to target 

lower profile Americans (i.e., not high-ranking officials or diplomats) such as enlisted soldiers 

 3

 To the extent these dollar figures “recite potentially inadmissible facts,” the Court concludes 

that they appropriately “disclose” a portion of “the factual basis for” the admissible expert 

testimony. Owens, 864 F.3d at 790. The same is true with respect to various other “potentially 

inadmissible facts” referenced in Plaintiffs’ expert testimony and reports. Id.
9

and contractors, to avoid triggering a military response. Id. at 16–17 (Pregent). Specific 

techniques include using American accents either to gain access to the target or to interrogate the 

detainee. Id. at 18 (Pregent).

Based on this evidence, and consistent with numerous other decisions from this Court, 

the Court finds that Hezbollah is an Iranian proxy. See, e.g., Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

320 F. Supp. 3d 48, 60 (D.D.C. 2018); Friends of Mayanot Inst., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 

313 F. Supp. 3d 50, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2018); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 

46, 53 (D.D.C. 2003); Stern v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F. Supp. 2d 286, 292 (D.D.C. 2003).

3. The Houthis

a. Origins

The Houthis originate from the Saada Governorate region in the northwest of Yemen,

near the border of Saudi Arabia. The group began as a localized insurgency, which protested the 

Yemen government’s economic discrimination and political marginalization of the region. Dkt. 

49 at 43–44 (Green); Dkt. 32-4 (Green Aff. ¶ 20). The Houthis, like many northern Yemenis, 

subscribe to the Zaidi Shia religion, which differs from the Iranian Shia religion and from the 

religion of most Yemenis, which is Sunni. Dkt. 49 at 44 (Green). The Houthis are named for 

one of its leading families—the al-Houthis—and adopted that family name when the group’s 

first leader, Hussain al-Houthi, was killed by government forces. Hussain al-Houthi “embrace[d] 

the radical elements of Iranian foreign policy” since travelling there in 1986, including “a rabid 

opposition to the United States and Israel.” Dkt. 32-4 at 6 (Green Aff. ¶ 24). Before his death, 

Hussain al-Houthi popularized the Houthi chant, known as the “sarkha,” of “God is great! Death 

to America! Death to Israel! A curse upon the Jews! Victory for Islam!” Dkt. 51-1 at 1 (Green 
10

Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 5–6). These words also appear in Arabic on patches worn by Houthi soldiers. Dkt. 

48 at 52–53 (McAlister).

Until the early 2000s, the Houthis remained a localized insurgency. Dkt. 49 at 43–44 

(Green). In 2004, however, the government of Yemen launched a military campaign against the 

Saada Governorate region, and the al-Houthi family in particular, which triggered a period of 

“six wars” between the Houthis and the Yemen government. Id. at 45–46 (Green). Even at this 

early stage in the Houthis’ history, Iran supported and exerted influence over the group, but,

Iran’s influence was limited at the time, and the Yemen government remained strong. Id. at 46–

47, 96 (Green). The six wars officially came to an end in 2010, when, after much death and 

destruction, both sides signed a peace accord. Id. at 46 (Green). 

In 2011, the Arab Spring movement took hold in Yemen, which led to broad-based 

demonstrations against the government, which, coupled with “poor governance, corruption, and 

incompetence[,] . . . contributed to a general collapse of government control throughout the 

country.” Dkt. 32-4 at 7 (Green Aff. ¶ 30); Dkt. 49 at 48 (Green). In 2012, Ali Abdullah Saleh 

resigned as President of Yemen, and a provisional government, backed by the United Nations 

and international community, took control until Saleh’s former vice-President, Abdrabbuh 

Mansur Hadi, was elected about a year later. Dkt. 49 at 49–51 (Green). Saleh retained power 

and influence, however, particularly in his home province in the north of Yemen, with sections 

of the Yemen military remaining loyal to him. Id. at 50, 54 (Green). 

During this political transition, Iran took steps to “deepen its relationship with the 

Houthis and to expand its assistance to the group.” Dkt. 32-4 at 8 (Green Aff. ¶ 31); see also 

Dkt. 49 at 6 (“[T]he IRGC-Qods Force increase[d] the Houthis’ capabilities during the 2010–

2011 uprisings . . . .”). With Iran’s backing, the Houthis took up arms against Yemen’s 
11

government and began to infiltrate Yemen’s capital city of Sana’a. Dkt. 49 at 54 (Green). 

During this time, the Houthis—enabled by Iran—also joined forces with former President Saleh, 

forming a coalition with the goal of isolating and marginalizing the Yemen government under 

Hadi’s authority. Id. at 54 (Green). In 2014, the Houthis attacked Sana’a, seizing the city and 

forcing President Hadi to flee to the south of Yemen. Id. at 53–54 (Green). The Houthis 

solidified their control of the city by seizing the homes of opponents who had fled, undertaking 

an assassination campaign against prominent leaders, and initiating a detention program against 

potential opponents. Id. at 55–56 (Green). When the Houthis’ took control of Sana’a, the United 

States withdrew its diplomatic personnel in February 2015. Id. at 54–55 (Green). By the time 

Mark McAlister and John Hamen flew to Sana’a on October 20, 2015, the city and its airport 

were firmly under Houthi control. Id. at 55 (Green). 

b. Iran’s Provision of Funding, Weapons, and Training

There is ample evidence that Iran has facilitated arms shipments to the Houthis since at 

least 2009. Id. at 58–64 (Green); Dkt. 32-4 at 13 (Green Aff. ¶¶ 49–50). The evidence 

submitted at trial showed that numerous shipments originating in Iran and carrying Iranian-made 

weapons—ranging from small arms to advanced weaponry—have been recovered on their way 

to Houthi territory. Dkt. 49 at 58–64 (Green). Arms shipments including ammunition, rocketpropelled grenade launchers, 122 millimeter rockets, C4 plastic explosive blocks, electrical 

equipment that can be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices, AK-47s, unmanned 

aerial vehicles, and explosively formed penetrators, have been intercepted on their way to Houthi

territory. Id. at 58–59, 63 (Green). The weapons shipped, moreover, have become increasingly 

sophisticated over time. Dkt. 49 at 63 (Green). 
12

There is also evidence of the use of Iranian-made weapons: Iranian-made SCUD missiles 

were fired at Saudi Arabia from Houthi-controlled territory, id. at 65–66 (Green); id. at 7–12

(Pregent); the Houthis used an Iranian “Shark 33” attack boat to attack the Saudis, id. at 13–14 

(Pregent); and the Houthis used Iranian-made sea mines in southern Yemen, id. at 66 (Green). 

Iran has continued to supply arms and arms-related material to the Houthis despite agreeing not 

to do so as part of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with the United States and 

United Nations. Id. at 70–85 (Green). There is also no indication that Iran provided support of 

this type to any group in Yemen other than the Houthis, id. at 14 (Pregent), confirming the 

conclusion that the arms shipments were intended for the Houthis. The repeated nature of the 

shipments and the variety and sophistication of armaments, moreover, reflect a significant, longterm commitment on behalf of Iran to militarily support the Houthis. Dkt. 32-4 at 14 (Green Aff. 

¶ 51). Iran has also provided financial support to the Houthis. There is evidence, for example, 

that Iran directed Hezbollah’s 3800 Unit to provide the Houthis $50,000 per month, or about 

$600,000 per year. Dkt. 48 at 187–91 (Pregent).

In addition to providing financial support and weapons, Iran has provided training to the 

Houthi militants, either directly or through Hezbollah. Since 2009, Houthi militants have 

received training at Hezbollah training camps, Dkt. 49 at 15 (Pregent), including in Lebanon, 

Syria, and Iraq, id. at 96 (Green). Beginning in 2011, Iran assigned Qods Force officer Abdul 

Reza Shahlai as the leader of its efforts to “advise, assist, resource, and train the Houthis,” Dkt. 

32-4 (Green Aff. ¶ 32); Dkt. 49 at 53, 64, 96 (Green). In 2013 and 2015, select Houthis 

participated in combat in Syria after having undergone training in Hezbollah training camps. 

Dkt. 49 at 15–16 (Pregent). In October 2014, several 3800 Unit members were captured in 
13

Yemen while training the Houthis. Id. at 18–19 (Pregent). Hezbollah leaders have also 

confirmed training the Houthis in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iran. Dkt. 32-4 at 11 (Green Aff. ¶ 43). 

There is also evidence that Iran trained the Houthis on hostage taking and kidnapping 

techniques. Although kidnapping was used as a political tool in Yemen prior to Iran’s influence, 

those tactics predominantly involved kidnapping other Yemenis. Dkt. 49 at 68–69 (Green). In 

2015, however, the Houthis took at least four civilian Americans hostage prior to the kidnapping 

of McAlister and Hamen. Dkt. 51-1 at 1 (Green Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 1–4); Dkt. 49 at 108 (Green). 

Plaintiffs’ experts agree that due to the risk and complexity of kidnapping Americans and 

holding them hostage, the Houthis would not have taken Americans and other foreigners hostage

without the backing of Iran. Dkt. 49 at 69 (Green); id. at 21–22 (Pregent). 

Although Iran has denied assisting the Houthis, id. at 76 (Green), Iran’s Supreme Leader 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated in May of 2015 that “Yemen, Bahrain and Palestine are 

oppressed, and we protect oppressed people as much as we can.” Id. at 87 (Green). Similarly, 

Iranian Brigadier General Masoud Jazayeri, the deputy chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, 

stated in March of 2016 that “[t]he Islamic Republic felt its duty to help . . . the people of Yemen 

in any way it can and to a level necessary.” Id. at 88 (Green). In 2014, an unnamed senior 

Iranian official stated that “[t]he Qods Force had a ‘few hundred’ military personnel in Yemen to 

train Houthi fighters.” Id. at 88 (Green). In light of the evidence as whole, these statements

show that Houthi support was authorized by Iranian officials at the highest level. 

Without Iranian backing, the Houthis would not have been able to exert power or control 

outside of their home province of Saada; would not have been able to seize the capital city of 

Sana’a or to maintain control of the city; and would not have developed the tactic of taking 

American nationals hostage. Id. at 112–13 (Green); id. at 20–22 (Pregent). 
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B. Abduction of Mark McAlister and John Hamen

John Hamen III and Mark McAlister worked for a private contractor, Advanced C4 

Solutions (“AC4S”), which was under contract with the United States Department of State for 

the maintenance and operation of the Sheraton Hotel property adjacent to the U.S. Embassy in 

Sana’a. Dkt. 32-1 at 1–2 (McAlister Decl. ¶¶ 6–7). When Yemen’s civil war and armed conflict 

made Sana’a unsuitable for a commercial enterprise, Sheraton provided the hotel to the State 

Department to use as lodging for Embassy employees and guests. Id. at 2 (McAlister Decl. ¶¶ 8–

9). The State Department, in turn, contracted with AC4S to improve the building’s physical 

security and upgrade communications. Id. at 2 (McAlister Decl. ¶ 9). Although the United 

States evacuated its diplomatic personnel in February 2015, the United Nations was given 

control of the Sheraton property and continued construction to house United Nations’ personnel. 

McAlister worked for AC4S as a Quality Control Manager and had previously travelled 

to Yemen two times in 2014 and 2015 to oversee construction on the Sheraton. Dkt. 48 at 48–54

(McAlister). On both previous trips, McAlister and his team were forced to leave due to the 

escalating military conflict in Sana’a. Id. at 40–54 (McAlister). Hamen was hired by AC4S to 

do security work on the Sheraton project, id. at 56 (McAlister), after he retired from 22 years of 

service in the U.S. Army, Dkt. 49 at 208 (Jennifer Hamen). The October 2015 Yemen trip was 

Hamen’s first overseas trip with AC4S. 

Upon McAlister and Hamen’s arrival in Sana’a at approximately 4:00 p.m. on October 

20, 2015, they were met by the hotel manager, they had their visas stamped, and they went

through passport control. Dkt. 48 at 59 (McAlister). As they were about to enter the area of the 

airport where they could retrieve their luggage, McAlister and Hamen were stopped by a man 

asking for their passports. Id. at 60 (McAlister). After looking at the passports, the man asked 
15

McAlister and Hamen: “American?” and McAlister replied in the affirmative. Id. The man then 

told McAlister and Hamen to wait in an area behind them with “four or five chairs.” Id. 

McAlister and Hamen waited in that area for “approximately two hours.” Id. at 61 (McAlister). 

While they waited, a British passenger was also detained in the same area but was allowed to 

leave after a short while. Id. at 60–61 (McAlister). At some point, Hamen noted that the hotel 

manager and other personnel that were going to escort them from the airport were gone. Id. at 61 

(McAlister). During this time, McAlister also observed that the man who had told them to wait 

was “on the phone quite a bit.” Id. at 61 (McAlister). After “approximately two hours,” three 

soldiers in camouflage with AK-47s arrived. Id. (McAlister). McAlister recognized the soldiers 

as those who were loyal to President Saleh and who were now allied with the Houthis. Id. at 62–

63 (McAlister). At this point, the man who had told them to wait took McAlister and Hamen to 

another area in the airport where the man searched their luggage. Id. at 61–62 (McAlister). 

After the search, three more Houthi guards arrived at the airport, tied McAlister and 

Hamen’s hands behind their backs, and blindfolded them. Id. at 64 (McAlister). The Houthi 

guards then escorted McAlister and Hamen out of the airport and put them into a van. Id. at 64–

65 (McAlister). The inside of the van was lined with woven wire, and a Houthi guard who spoke 

English sat across from McAlister and Hamen. Id. at 65 (McAlister). After about 20 minutes in 

the van, they arrived at a detention facility where their handcuffs and blindfolds were removed, 

and their captors, while threatening them with tasers, told them to remove their clothing and to 

reveal the passwords to their phones and computers. Id. at 66–67 (McAlister). McAlister and 

Hamen were then blindfolded again and separated. Id. at 67 (McAlister). McAlister never saw 

Hamen again. 
16

C. Detention of Mark McAlister

McAlister was detained by the Houthis from October 20, 2015 to May 1, 2016—for a 

total of six months and eleven days.

4

 See id. at 58, 77 (McAlister). He was initially held in a 

concrete room that was twelve feet by nine and a half feet wide, with no light or windows inside 

the room. Only a faint light shone through rebar at the top of the door, illuminating the top of the 

cell. Id. at 71–72 (McAlister). The room had no toilet—just a hole in the floor—and a rubber 

bucket. Id. at 72 (McAlister). 

For the first three weeks, McAlister was interrogated at least three or four times a day, id. 

at 73–76 (McAlister), and the interrogations continued throughout his captivity. McAlister lost a 

substantial amount of weight in the first three weeks of his detention. Id. at 74 (McAlister); Dkt. 

46-1 at 45–46 (Al-Junaid Dep.). During his six months of detention, McAlister was only 

allowed outside three times for approximately one hour each time. Dkt. 48 at 77 (McAlister). 

He was never given any new clothes and only had a bar of soap with which to wash his clothes. 

Id. at 84 (McAlister). As a result of these conditions, McAlister developed depression, anxiety, 

and claustrophobia, and suffered psychological breakdowns and episodes of extreme anxiety. Id. 

at 78–80; Dkt. 46-1 at 48–50 (Al-Junaid Dep.). 

McAlister was released by the Houthis on May 1, 2016. Dkt. 48 at 77 (McAlister). 

Before his release, McAlister was taken to a safe house near the border of Saudi Arabia, where 

he was held in a room with a man on the telephone. Id. at 87 (McAlister). McAlister asked who 

the man on the telephone was talking to and was told that the man was “negotiat[ing]” “for [his] 

release.” Id. When McAlister reached the border, the man who was on the telephone walked to

 4

 The Amended Complaint alleges that “Mark McAlister was released into United States 

government custody on April 29, 2016.” Dkt. 29 at 13 (Amd. Compl. ¶ 75). This discrepancy—

two days—is immaterial for the purposes of the Court’s present analysis.
17

the border and met with a Saudi on the other side while McAlister waited in the car. Id. 

McAlister was eventually escorted across the border and taken to a hospital in Saudi Arabia (to 

make sure nothing had been “implanted in” him), and he was later released to “diplomatic

security and the FBI.” Id. at 88–89 (McAlister). 

McAlister was never told the details of the negotiations leading to his release. He was 

told by the Chief Executive Office (“CEO”) of AC4S that he was released in exchange for 

monetary and other consideration. Id. at 89 (McAlister). Another detainee heard the Houthi 

guards who detained McAlister and Hamen bragging to other prisoners that they were detaining 

two Americans, and that they would get “something in exchange, as they had done before.” Dkt. 

46-1 at 41–42, 44 (Al-Junaid Dep.). 

D. Death of John Hamen

On or about November 6, 2015, John Hamen was strangled to death using a ligature. 

Dkt. 48 at 119–126 (Arden). This conclusion is supported by the positioning of the ligature mark

on Hamen’s neck, the pinpoint hemorrhages on the surface of his eyes or inside his eyelids, and 

the positioning of his tongue and teeth. Id. at 114–23 (Arden). In particular, the ligature mark 

was below Hamen’s Adam’s apple and angled slightly upward at the back of his head, id. at 

117–18 (Arden), which is consistent with a cause of death of strangulation, not suicide, id. at 

121–23 (Arden). In addition, the size of the mark indicates that something narrow, like rope, 

was used to strangle Hamen. Had Hamen sought to commit suicide, he likely would have only 

had access to wider objects such as bedsheets, towels, or clothing. Id. at 123–24 (Arden). 

Hamen’s body also had other injuries, including lacerations on the front and back of his 

skull that indicate he was subjected to blows from a blunt object, id. at 128–32 (Arden); four 

broken ribs consistent with crushing blows such as being stomped on or slammed against a wall 
18

or the floor, id. at 132–34 (Arden); and contusions and abrasions on his face, back, chest, 

abdomen, shoulder, elbow, and shins, id. at 134–138, 141 (Arden). It is unclear, however, 

whether many of these wounds were inflicted at the time of death—for example, if Hamen was 

being forcibly held down during strangulation—or whether the wounds were inflicted before 

death. Id. at 139–41 (Arden). In any event, based on the testimony, the Court concludes that 

Hamen was deliberately killed by his captors by strangulation by ligature. His death was 

intended and was not the result of an accident or unrelated struggle.

Hamen was identified by his tattoos in a hospital in Sana’a and his body was returned to 

the United States. Dkt. 49 at 218–19 (Jennifer Hamen).

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1604, a foreign state, 

including its instrumentalities, is immune from suit in state or federal court unless the case falls 

within an express statutory exception. See Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2004). For present purposes, the sole relevant 

exception is found in the “state-sponsored terrorism exception,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, which both 

confers subject-matter jurisdiction to hear certain terrorism-related claims under state or federal 

law and recognizes a federal cause of action against those foreign states subject to the exception, 

see Owens, 864 F.3d at 764–65. The FSIA also addresses personal jurisdiction and specifies 

precise procedures that a plaintiff must follow—at times with the assistance of the Clerk of the 

Court and the U.S. Department of State—to effect service on a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1608. 

For different reasons, the Court must satisfy itself that an FSIA plaintiff has cleared each 

of these hurdles, even if the defendant fails to appear. First, because the FSIA deprives courts of 

subject-matter jurisdiction in the absence of a relevant exception, a failure to appear does not 
19

waive the defense, and the courts are “obligated to consider sua sponte” whether they have 

jurisdiction to hear the case and to order any relief. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 

(2012); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 n.20 (1983) (even 

where a defendant foreign state does not appear, the Court “still must determine that immunity is 

unavailable”). Second, with respect to the substance of the plaintiff’s state or federal law claims, 

the FSIA precludes courts from entering a default judgment against a foreign state unless 

satisfied that the plaintiff has established her right to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e); see also 

Owens, 864 F.3d at 784–86. And, because “the entry of a default judgment is not automatic,” 

courts must “satisfy [themselves] that [they have] personal jurisdiction before entering judgment 

against an absent defendant.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 6. 

Each of these inquiries implicates a slightly different standard of proof. To establish 

subject-matter jurisdiction, an FSIA “plaintiff bears [the] initial burden of production to show an 

exception to immunity, such as § 1605A, applies,” but, if the plaintiff does so, and the defendant 

does not appear, “jurisdiction attaches.” Owens, 864 F.3d at 784. Having cleared this initial 

hurdle, however, “the plaintiff must still prove [her] case on the merits.” Id. To do so, the 

plaintiff must “establish” her right to relief, which does not “relieve[] the sovereign of the duty to 

defend” but, nonetheless, requires that the plaintiff offer admissible evidence sufficient to 

substantiate the essential elements of her claim. Id. at 785–86 (quotations omitted). Finally, to 

establish personal jurisdiction over a defaulting defendant, the plaintiff must make “a prima facie 

showing of [personal] jurisdiction.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 6–7.

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Liability for § 1605A(c) Claims

“[T]he [federal] district courts . . . have original jurisdiction” over “any nonjury civil 

action against a foreign state” asserting “any claim for relief in personam with respect to which 
20

the foreign state is not entitled to immunity under” the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). The Court, 

accordingly, has subject-matter jurisdiction over the present “nonjury civil action” against Iran if, 

and only if, the conditions for the waiver of immunity found in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A are satisfied. 

As explained below, Plaintiffs have carried their burden of establishing the Court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction.

Under the state-sponsored terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1), a foreign state 

is not immune from the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts in cases in which

[1] money damages are sought against a foreign state [2] for personal injury or 

death [3] that was caused by [4] an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft 

sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for 

such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is [5] 

engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting 

within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.

28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). The exception, moreover, applies only to suits in which two 

requirements are met. First, the claimant or victim must be a U.S. national, a member of the U.S. 

armed forces, or a U.S. government employee or contractor at the time the act of terrorism 

occurred. Id. at § 1605A(a)(2). Second, the foreign state must be designated as a state sponsor 

of terrorism both at the time the act occurred (or was so designated as a result of the act) and at 

the time the lawsuit was filed (or was so designated within the six-month period preceding the 

filing of the suit).5

 Id.; see also Owens, 864 F.3d at 763.

 5

 Section 1605A(a)(2) also requires that the foreign state have received “a reasonable 

opportunity to arbitrate the claim,” but only if the act of terrorism “occurred in the foreign state 

against which the claim has been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii). That requirement 

is inapplicable to the facts of this case because none of the alleged acts of terrorism occurred in 

Iran.
21

Most of the conditions for subject-matter jurisdiction are easily addressed. First, 

Plaintiffs seek only monetary relief and attorneys’ fees. See Dkt. 29 at 20–21 (Am. Compl. 

Prayer). Second, although the claims brought by the estate of John Hamen differs in certain 

respects from those brought by the family members, all of the claims seek to recover “for 

personal injury” or “death.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). Third, Iran was designated as a state 

sponsor of terrorism in 1984, see 49 Fed. Reg. 2836–02 (Jan. 23, 1984) (statement of Secretary 

of State George P. Shultz), and has remained designated as a state sponsor of terrorism to this 

day, see U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, available at 

https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited August 7, 2019). This long-standing 

designation of Iran as a state-sponsor of terrorism is sufficient to satisfy the designation

requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Fourth, at the time the relevant acts 

occurred, McAlister and Hamen were both U.S. nationals.

As a result, the only substantial jurisdictional question left for the Court is whether 

McAlister’s injuries and Hamen’s injuries and death were “caused by . . . act[s] of torture, 

extrajudicial killing, . . . hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such 

an act” by an “official, employee, or agent of” Iran. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). For the reasons 

explained below, the Court concludes as follows: (1) the Houthis committed acts of “hostage

taking” within the meaning of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and 

“extrajudicial killing” within the meaning of the Torture Victim Protection Act; (2) Iranian 

officials or their agents provided “material support or resources” for these acts within the 

meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; and (3) Iran’s provision of material support caused McAlister 

and Hamen’s injuries and Hamen’s death, as well as the associated injuries suffered by their 
22

family members. Plaintiffs, accordingly, have established that their claims fall within the statesponsored terrorism exception of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1).

1. The Houthis’ Acts of Hostage Taking and Extrajudicial Killing

The state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA defines the terms “hostage taking,” 

“torture,” and “extrajudicial killing” by reference to the Convention Against the Taking of 

Hostages, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205, and the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1350, respectively. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(2) & (7). To support a finding of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, the Court need only find that one of the three statutory acts were present as to each 

of the victims. Dkt. 50 at 5–7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1); see also Cronin v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233–34 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that “[e]ither” finding 

of hostage-taking or torture “would support a finding of liability”), abrogated on other grounds 

by Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004). As discussed 

below, the Court concludes that Hamen was the victim of extrajudicial killing within the 

meaning of the TVPA and that McAlister was the victim of hostage taking within the meaning of 

the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. As a result, the Court need not reach the 

questions whether Hamen was also the victim of torture or hostage taking, or whether McAlister 

was also the victim of torture. 

a. The Extrajudicial Killing of John Hamen

The state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA looks to the TVPA to define 

“extrajudicial killing.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7). Under the TVPA, “extrajudicial killing” 

means

a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a 

regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 

recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does 
23

not include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried 

out under the authority of a foreign nation.

TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73 (emphasis added). As the D.C. Circuit has 

explained, this definition “contains three elements: (1) a killing; (2) that is deliberated; and (3) is 

not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.” Owens, 

864 F.3d at 770. Applying this test, the Court concludes that Hamen was the victim of an 

extrajudicial killing. 

First, Hamen was killed by the Houthis during his captivity. As discussed, the size and 

positioning of the ligature mark on Hamen’s neck, the pinpoint hemorrhages on the surface of his 

eyes or inside his eyelids, and the positioning of his tongue and teeth, are all consistent with 

homicide, not suicide. Dkt. 48 at 114–23 (Arden). In addition, other circumstances of Hamen’s 

death—in particular, his other injuries and the fact that he was looking for opportunities to 

escape—all support the conclusion that Hamen was brutally murdered and did not end his own 

life. 

Second, Hamen’s killing “[c]learly [was] not authorized by a prior judgment affording 

judicial guarantees o[f] due process.” Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp. 3d 186, 202

(D.D.C. 2017); see Owens, 864 F.3d at 770. Nor was it “lawfully carried out under the authority 

of a foreign nation.” TVPA, § 3(a). Unlike the definition of “summary executions” under 

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 6 U.N.T.S. 3113, 75 U.S.T.S. 85, moreover, the 

state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA does not require participation of a state actor; it 

is sufficient that a state actor provided material support for an extrajudicial killing committed by 

a nonstate actor. Owens, 864 F.3d at 770–78. The nonstate actor, however, must have acted 

“deliberately.” Han Kim, 774 F.3d at 1050–51. 
24

“A ‘deliberated’ killing is simply one undertaken with careful consideration, not on a 

sudden impulse.” Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 174 F. Supp. 3d 242, 263 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 596 (1993); 4 The Oxford English Dictionary 414 

(2d ed. 1989); Black’s Law Dictionary 492 (9th ed. 2009)), aff’d, 864 F.3d 751. The evidence 

offered by Plaintiffs satisfies this requirement. The autopsy report shows that Hamen was either 

brutally beaten before he was strangled—thereby causing his fractured ribs and extensive 

bruising—or that he sustained these injuries as a result of being held down as he was strangled. 

See Dkt. 48 at 123, 132–41 (Arden). Either scenario indicates that Hamen’s captors deliberately 

and viciously harmed him prior to his death. Depending on how pressure was applied, moreover, 

the strangulation could have gone on for “a minute or so,” id. at 127–28 (Arden), allowing 

Hamen’s captors ample opportunity to spare his life had they intended to do so. All of these 

facts support the conclusion that Hamen was deliberately strangled by his captors and that they 

made the calculated decision to end his life. The fact that Hamen’s captors may have, at some 

point, planned to keep him alive so that they could bargain for his release does not undercut the

fact that they eventually decided to put him to death. See Fritz, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 70, 83–84

(finding that the murder of U.S. soldiers constituted extrajudicial killings even though they were 

originally “abducted to be used in an effort to compel . . . [the] release [of] detainees”). 

The Court, accordingly, concludes that Hamen was a victim of an extrajudicial killing 

within the meaning of the TVPA. 

b. The Hostage Taking of Mark McAlister

The FSIA’s definition of “hostage taking” is borrowed from Article 1 of the International 

Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h). Under that treaty, “hostage 

taking” means
25

seiz[ing] or detain[ing] and threaten[ing] to kill, to injure or to continue to 

detain another person . . . in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an 

international governmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a 

group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 

condition for the release of the hostage . . . .

International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 1, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 

205 (emphases added). Thus, to show that the hostage taker had the requisite purpose of

detaining the individual, “the plaintiff must ‘suggest[ ][a] demand for quid pro quo terms 

between . . . [the hostage-taker] and a third party whereby [the hostages] would have been 

released.” Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 470 F.3d 356, 360 (D.C. Cir. 

2006) (first and second alterations in original).

The Court concludes that the Houthis committed an act of “hostage taking” when they

seized and detained Mark McAlister. There is sufficient evidence indicating that the Houthis 

abducted McAlister “in order to compel a third party” to make an exchange or payment as a 

condition of McAlister’s release. First, McAlister and Hamen were specifically targeted as 

hostages at the Sana’a airport because they were American: They were initially singled out when 

a Houthi guard saw their American passports and confirmed that they were American, and a

British national was permitted to leave the airport whereas McAlister and Hamen were not. Dkt. 

48 at 60–61 (McAlister). The Houthi guards at the detention facility bragged to other prisoners 

that they were detaining two Americans and that they would get “something in exchange [for 

them], as they had done before.” Dkt. 46-1 at 41–42, 44 (Al-Junaid Dep.). During McAlister’s 

detention, the State Department was concerned about making his continued detention public 

because it would have increased his value to the Houthis. See Dkt. 49 at 149 (Crystal 

McAlister). Right before his release, McAlister witnessed an individual making a series of 

telephone calls, and his captors told him that the calls were to negotiate his release. Id. at 87 

(McAlister). The CEO of AC4S also later told McAlister that he was released in exchange for 
26

monetary and other consideration. Id. at 89 (McAlister). Hostage-taking for ransom is also 

consistent with Houthi tactics, Dkt. 49 at 104 (Green); four other Americans had been abducted 

by the Houthis within the year prior to McAlister and Hamen’s abductions, Dkt. 51-1 at 1 (Supp. 

Green Aff. ¶¶ 1–4); and other Americans in Yemen have only been permitted to leave the 

country after the payment of a ransom, Dkt. 48 at 157–60 (Sealed Witness). 

Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that the Houthis committed “hostage taking” 

within the meaning of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages with respect 

to McAlister. Although the evidence also indicates that the Houthis likely committed acts of 

hostage taking with respect to Hamen as well, the Court need not reach this issue, as the Court’s 

finding that the Houthis committed an extrajudicial killing of Hamen is sufficient to support 

liability. 

2. Iran’s Provision of Material Support for the Houthis’ Acts of Hostage Taking and 

Extrajudicial Killing

The Court further concludes that Iran provided the Houthis with material support for the 

acts described above. The FSIA’s definition of “material support or resources” is borrowed from 

18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which defines “material support or resources” in relevant part as:

any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary 

instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert 

advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, 

communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, 

personnel . . . , and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.

18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). The evidence set forth above demonstrates that Iran provided 

“material support or resources” to the Houthi militants in the form of weapons, financial support, 

and training, both directly and indirectly through Hezbollah. See generally supra Part II.A.3. 

Plaintiffs have presented a litany of evidence that Iran has provided the Houthis with weaponry

since at least 2009. Dkt. 49 at 63-66 (Green); id. at 10–14 (Pregent). Plaintiffs also presented 
27

evidence that Iran has provided financial assistance to the Houthis through Hezbollah. Dkt. 48 at 

187–91 (Pregent); Ex. 11 at 1. And, finally, Iran has assigned a Qods Force officer as the leader 

of its efforts to “advise, assist, resource, and train the Houthis,” Dkt. 32-4 at 8 (Green Aff. ¶ 32);

Dkt. 49 at 53, 64, 96 (Green), and has facilitated the Houthis’ training with Hezbollah’s Unit 

3800 in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, Dkt. 49 at 96 (Green); Dkt. 48 at 191 (Pregent). 

Plaintiffs have offered evidence that, without Iranian financial, military, and political 

support, the Houthis would not have been able to exert power or control outside of their home 

province of Saada; would not have been able to seize or maintain control of the capital city of 

Sana’a; and would not have developed the tactic of taking foreign nationals hostage. Dkt. 49 at 

112 (Green); id. at 20–22 (Pregent). Even more to the point, Plaintiffs have offered evidence 

that, without Iran’s backing, the Houthis would not have attempted to kidnap an American, nor 

would they have been able to do so without Iran’s support. Id. at 16–17 (Pregent); id. at 69 

(Green).

3. Causation

The only remaining requirement for finding a waiver of sovereign immunity under 

§ 1605A is a showing that the injuries and deaths at issue were “caused by” Iran’s provision of 

material support to the Houthis. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). The D.C. Circuit has held that this 

statutory language, like the similar language that previously appeared in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)

(repealed), “requires a causal connection” as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Kilburn, 376 

F.3d at 1127; see also Owens, 864 F.3d at 794–99. The Court of Appeals has rejected the 

contention that the plaintiff need establish “but for” causation, however, and has held that the 

statute “require[s] only a showing of ‘proximate cause.’” Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1128; see also

Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897 F.3d 266, 273 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Anti-
28

Terrorism Act’s “‘by reason of’ language demands a showing of proximate causation.”). An

FSIA plaintiff, accordingly, need not show that the defendant state “specifically knew of or 

intended its support to cause” a particular terrorist act. Owens, 864 F.3d at 798.

Under long-established law, proximate cause requires “some reasonable connection 

between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered.” 

Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 263 (5th ed. 1984)); 

see also Owens, 864 F.3d at 794 (quoting same). The proximate cause inquiry “contains two 

similar but distinct elements.” Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1128. First, Plaintiffs must show that Iran’s 

provision of support to the Houthis was “a ‘substantial factor’ in the sequence of events that led 

to the” hostage taking of McAlister and the extrajudicial killing Hamen. Id. (quoting Rothstein v. 

UBS, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)). Second, Plaintiffs must establish that McAllister’s 

kidnapping and Hamen’s death were “‘reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural 

consequence’ of [Iran’s] conduct.” Id. (quoting Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 91).

The Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy this standard. 

The support Iran provided the Houthis was not only a “substantial factor” but a necessary 

precondition to the Houthis kidnapping of McAlister and Hamen. Without Iran’s support, the 

Houthis would not have had control of the Sana’a airport in October 2015. See Dkt. 49 at 53–54, 

112 (Green); id. at 20–22 (Pregent). Prior to Iran’s support, the Houthis were “localized” to their 

home province, Dkt. 49 at 44 (Green), and would not have had the resources to seize Sana’a, id. 

at 53–54 (Green). Iran’s support put the Houthis in a position of power to commit acts of 

terrorism like the ones at issue in this case. 

Beyond increasing the Houthis’ influence in Yemen, Iran also provided the training and 

political backing necessary to enable and to embolden the Houthis to target and to kidnap 
29

Americans and to negotiate for their release. Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the Qods 

Force, either directly or through Hezbollah, “exports” to its proxies a “collection of behaviors[,] 

tactics, and capabilities,” id. at 111 (Green), which includes training in “assassination and 

kidnapping training,” Dkt. 48 at 182–83 (Pregent), and, in particular, the “taking of international 

hostages,” Dkt. 49 at 107 (Green). There is also evidence that the Houthis have adopted the full 

range of those tactics, see id. at 96–107 (Green), including abducting 982 people for ransom and 

engaging in 796 documented cases of torture between September 2014 and August 2015, id. at 

101 (Green); Ex. 39 at 4–5, 16. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that, beginning in 2015, the 

Houthis began kidnapping Americans, in particular, and holding them for ransom, Dkt. 51-1 at 1 

(Green Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 1–4) (attesting that there have been four previous Houthi kidnappings of 

U.S. citizens); Dkt. 49 at 108 (Green), after the maturation of Iranian military and political 

backing, Dkt. 49 at 112–13 (Green). Plaintiffs’ experts convincingly opined that the abduction

of McAlister and Hamen were “consistent” with Iranian tactics. Dkt. 49 at 110–11 (Green); Dkt. 

49 at 16 (Pregent). 

In addition to training, Iran has provided the political backing and tactical support 

necessary for the Houthis to execute a high-stakes abduction of Americans. Plaintiffs presented 

evidence that, due to the risk and complexity of kidnapping Americans and bargaining for their 

release, the Houthis would not have attempted to do so without the support of Iran, Dkt. 49 at 69 

(Green); id. at 16–17, 21–22 (Pregent), and that Iran would have been made aware of any 

hostage-taking the Houthis carried out, id. at 21–22 (Pregent). Even more to the point, Plaintiffs 

have presented evidence that the Qods Force encourages its proxies to kidnap Americans by 

providing “kidnapping incentives” in the form of a “bounty or reward for . . . high value targets.” 

Dkt. 48 at 191–92 (Pregent); Dkt. 49 at 22 (Pregent). And, from Iran’s perspective, the “highest 
30

value target [a proxy] can kidnap would be an American.” Dkt. 48 at 192 (Pregent). With 

respect to the hostage taking of Mark McAlister, the fact that the Houthi negotiator would “make 

a phone call, he’d wait, then he’d answer the phone, then he’d make another phone call,” Dkt. 50 

at 24 (Closing Statement); see also Dkt. 48 at 101 (McAlister), together with the expert 

testimony that the Qods Force provided training to the Houthis on international hostage taking,

and that the Houthis would not have proceeded without Iranian approval, evinces a likelihood 

that the negotiator was conferring with an Iranian or Hezzbollah contact to strategize about or to 

seek approval for the terms of McAlister’s release. And with respect to the extrajudicial killing 

of John Hamen, Iranian assistance in kidnapping Americans was a “substantial factor” in the 

sequence of events leading to Hamen’s death. See Dkt. 50 at 17 (Closing Statement).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Iran’s support was a “substantial factor” in the 

hostage-taking of Mark McAlister and the extrajudicial killing of John Hamen. 

For similar reasons, the hostage-taking of McAlister and murder of Hamen were

“‘reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence’ of [Iran’s] material support.” 

Owens, 864 F.3d at 798 (quoting Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 91). In assessing reasonable 

foreseeability, the Court must consider “the broader context” of Iran’s conduct. Id. In this 

respect, it is clear that Iran’s assistance made it possible for the Houthis—a militant group that

chants “Death to America” and has a history of kidnapping local dissenters and holding them for 

ransom—to become a regional power and to assume a position of control where it could execute 

abductions and killings of U.S. citizens. In the years preceding the abductions of McAlister and 

Hamen, moreover, Iran provided training (either directly or through Hezbollah), which included 

“assassination and kidnapping training,” Dkt. 48 at 182–83 (Pregent), and, in particular, the 

“taking of international hostages,” Dkt. 49 at 107 (Green). Iran also encourages their proxies to 
31

kidnap Americans. Dkt. 48 at 191–92 (Pregent); Dkt. 49 at 22 (Pregent). That one of Iran’s 

proxies acted to abduct and detain Americans is not only a “reasonably foreseeable” “natural 

consequence,” Owens, 864 F.3d at 798, but a desired result of Iran’s training and directives. 

That one of the Americans was also brutally killed was, “by any reasonable measure, a 

foreseeable consequence of Iran’s support.” See Fritz, 320 F. Supp. at 86. Finally, although 

specific intent is not required to establish causation, Owens, 864 F.3d at 798, Plaintiffs have 

submitted evidence that, even if Iran had not been involved at “the hour of the kidnapping,” it 

would have been notified once McAlister and Hamen were in the Houthis custody and the 

Houthis could not have “h[e]ld Americans without the IRGC-Qods Force allowing it” to do so. 

Dkt. 49 at 20–22 (Pregent); see also id. at 69 (Green). 

Having determined that Iran provided material support for the Houthis and that this 

support “caused” the hostage-taking of McAlister and extrajudicial killing of Hamen, the Court 

finds that this case falls squarely within the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA.6 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). As a result, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not entitled to foreign 

sovereign immunity, and the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1605A(a)(1). 

4. Federal Cause of Action

Having concluded that the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, little else is 

required to show that Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the federal cause of action the

Congress enacted in 2008 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. See Pub. L. No. 

 6

 The fact that most of the Plaintiffs in this case are “third-party claimant[s]” rather than “the 

legal representative[s] of [the] victim[s] [who were] physically injured” does not divest this 

Court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Owens, 864 F.3d at 807. “Who in particular may bring a 

claim against a foreign sovereign is a question of substantive law, wholly separate from the 

question of [federal courts’] jurisdiction.” Id.
32

110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 338–44 (2008) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)). There is almost 

total “overlap between the elements of [§ 1605A(c)’s] cause of action and the terrorism 

exception to foreign sovereign immunity,” Foley, 249 F. Supp. at 205, and a plaintiff who offers 

proof sufficient to establish a waiver of foreign sovereign immunity under § 1605A(a) has also 

established entitlement to relief as a matter of federal law—with one minor exception. For the 

“personal injury or death caused by” any of the acts described in the state-sponsor of terror 

waiver of foreign sovereign immunity and over “which the courts of the United States may 

maintain jurisdiction under [§ 1605A] for money damages,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), a foreign 

state designated as a sponsor of terrorism is only liable to “a national of the United States,” “a 

member of the armed forces,” “an employee [or contractor] of the [U.S.] Government . . . acting 

within the scope of the employee’s employment,” or “the legal representative of ” any such 

person. Id. Because all the Plaintiffs are U.S. nationals or representatives of U.S. nationals, 

Plaintiffs have, for the reasons described above, carried their burden on demonstrating that they 

are entitled to relief under § 1605A(c).

B. Personal Jurisdiction

The Court also concludes that it has personal jurisdiction over the Islamic Republic of 

Iran. Under the FSIA, the Court has personal jurisdiction over a foreign state “as to every claim 

for relief over which the [Court] ha[s] jurisdiction . . . where service has been made under section 

1608.” 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Thus, “[i]n order to sue a foreign state or one of its political 

subdivisions, a plaintiff must effect service in compliance with” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). Barot v. 

Embassy of the Republic of Zam., 785 F.3d 26, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

Section 1608(a) sets forth four methods of service in descending order of preference:
33

(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with any 

special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state 

or political subdivision; or

(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the summons and 

complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on 

service of judicial documents; or

(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by sending a copy of 

the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation 

of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail 

requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of 

the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state 

concerned; or

(4) if service cannot be made within 30 days under paragraph (3), by sending 

two copies of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with 

a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any 

form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by 

the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State in Washington, District of 

Columbia, to the attention of the Director of Special Consular Services—

and the Secretary shall transmit one copy of the papers through diplomatic 

channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk of the court a 

certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were 

transmitted.

28 U.S.C. § 1608(a).

The first two mechanisms of effecting service—by delivery of the summons and 

complaint either “in accordance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff 

and the foreign state” under § 1608(a)(1) or “in accordance with an applicable international 

convention on service of judicial documents” under § 1608(a)(2)—were not available to 

Plaintiffs in this case. No “special arrangement” governs service between Plaintiffs and Iran, and 

“Iran is not party to an ‘international convention on service of judicial documents,’” Ben-Rafael 

v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39, 52 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

As a result, Plaintiffs attempted service under the third alternative, which requires service 

by mail from the Clerk of the Court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign 

state. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3). On June 21, 2017, Plaintiffs initiated service to Iran under 
34

§ 1608(a)(3). Dkt. 20. The Clerk of Court mailed the relevant documents to Iran on June 26, 

2017. Dkt. 21. Plaintiffs notified the Court that the mailing was returned as undeliverable. Dkt. 

24 at 2.

Finally, Plaintiffs served Defendants under § 1608(a)(4). Dkt. 23. That provision 

requires service by mail from the Clerk of Court to the Secretary of State, who must then 

transmit the required material through diplomatic channels to the foreign state. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1608(a)(4). The Department of State must then send “the Clerk of the Court a certified copy of 

the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted.” Id. Plaintiffs provided the 

Clerk with the relevant documents and requested service pursuant to § 1608(a)(4) on July 27, 

2017. Dkt. 22. The Clerk mailed these materials to the State Department on August 8, 2017. 

Dkt. 23. On January 26, 2018, the State Department notified the Clerk that the documents had 

been delivered to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Dkt. 25. As the Department explained, 

“[b]ecause the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations with the government of 

Iran,” the documents were transmitted to the Embassy of Switzerland in Iran, which then 

transmitted the materials to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 27, 2017. Id. at 

1, 4. The Swiss Embassy reported that the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “refused” to 

accept the documents that same day. Id. at 4. After the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to 

respond, the Clerk entered a default. Dkt. 27. 

Plaintiffs efforts to serve Iran satisfied the requirements of § 1608(a)(4). Because 

Plaintiffs accomplished service under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4) on the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 

Court possesses personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
35

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established their right to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c).

7

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, Dkt. 31, will be 

GRANTED. A separate order will issue. The Court will also enter a separate order appointing a 

special master to hear Plaintiffs’ damage claims and to report to the Court regarding the 

appropriate award.

 /s/ Randolph D. Moss 

 RANDOLPH D. MOSS 

 United States District Judge

Date: August 7, 2019

 7

 Plaintiffs assert state law claims for the wrongful death of Hamen. See Dkt. 29 at 18–19 (Amd. 

Compl. ¶¶ 115–21). In light of the Court’s finding of liability under the FSIA, and because these 

claims are redundant of their federal law claims and do not provide any additional right to 

recover, the Court declines to reach them.