evidence in this case will support because no one know enough about what the evidence will
show.” (Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion To
Remand, pgs. 1-2). Such an argument, however, is untenable. J.C. Penney does not have the
burden of piercing the plaintiff's complaint in order to determine whether the amount of relief
sought by the plaintiff is actually the amount recoverable. Finally, as noted by the Shaw Court,
“fi]t seems unfair to defendants if a plaintiff can simply wait to see if her case is removed and
then, once it is, have it sent back to state court by agreeing to a stipulation that the amount in
controversy will not surpass {the jurisdictional amount].” Shaw, 994 F.2d at 366.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion to remand is denied.

Enter:

Deut]

David H. Coar

United States District Judge

Dated: April 25, 2002


‘Minute Order Form (06/97)

ra

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

David H. Coar

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 1054 DATE 4/25/2002
CASE Angel Lark vs. J.C. Penney Company, Inc.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) im] Brief in support of motion due
(3) oa Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) im) Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) ia] Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on_____setfor = at__
(6) Qo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] {set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] heid/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) O General Rule 21 CI FRCP41(a)(1) [I FRCP41(a)(2).
qo) of [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, the
plaintiff's motion to remand is denied. [Doc. # 4]. * Doudl

(1) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. number of notices,

Document
Number

APR 3.0 2002

date docketed

conde Bra

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

\2—

courtroom
deputy’s
initials

vg(ic)

““Date/time teceived
central Clerk’s Of

trailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
Angel Lark, ) APR 3g Zuu2
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 02 C 1054
v. )
) HONORABLE DAVID H. COAR
J.C. Penney Company, Inc., )
} apr 30 200t
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before this court is plaintiff's, Angel Lark (“Lark” or “plaintiff’) motion to remand this
matter to Circuit Court of Cook County, Law Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). For the
following reasons, the plaintiff’s motion is denied.

Background

On December 27, 2001, Lark filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, alleging negligence (Count I), negligent hiring (Count II), imputed negligence (Count
III), assault and battery (Count IV), and false arrest and imprisonment (Count V). On February
13, 2002, defendant, J.C. Penney Company, Inc. (“J.C. Penney”), filed a Notice of Removal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), based on diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy in
excess of the jurisdictional amount.

On March 8, 2002, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand to the Circuit Court of Cook

County. On March 14, 2002, this court held a hearing on plaintiffs Motion to Remand. This

)


court denied the portion of the plaintiff's Motion which was based on diversity of citizenship and
ordered the parties to brief the issue of the amount in controversy.
Discussion

The plaintiff argues that he sought an uncertain amount of relief in his complaint, and
therefore, his lawsuit does not meet the federal jurisdictional requirements under 28 U.S.C.
§1332(a). This court disagrees.

Generally a case that could have been originally brought in the district court is removable
upon petition. (Cite). Title 28 Section 1441 provides that “any civil action brought in a State of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.” Title 28 Section 1332 provides that a
district court has original jurisdiction if an action is between citizens of different States and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

Further, in the Seventh Circuit, the federal court in a removal action determines the
amount in controversy by merely looking at plaintiff's state court complaint. Shaw v. Dow
Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7" Cir. 1993). And for the purposes of determining the amount
in controversy, the plaintiff is in the best position to know how much her claim is worth, and
courts should deem plaintiff's request for damages to have been made in good faith. Id. at 367.

In this case, Lark’s complaint plainly states that the amount in controversy is greater than
$75,000. Specifically, the plaintiff prayed for punitive damages in excess of $250,000 in three
counts of her state court complaint. Now, however, the plaintiff claims that “the prayer for

punitive damages was made in error” and that “no one can say for sure what damages the