2022 UT App 130

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF S.T., Z.T., AND J.P.,

PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

K.S.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20220029-CA

Filed November 17, 2022

Eighth District Juvenile Court, Vernal Department

The Honorable Ryan B. Evershed

No. 1175935

Sheleigh A. Harding, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, John M. Peterson, and Joseph A. 

Stewart, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this

Opinion, in which JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME and SENIOR JUDGE 

KATE APPLEBY concurred.

1

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 Following a bench trial, the juvenile court entered an order 

terminating K.S.’s (Mother) parental rights to her children, J.P., 

S.T., and Z.T. (collectively, the Children). Mother contends the 

court erred in determining the State made reasonable efforts to 

1. Senior Judge Kate Appleby sat by special assignment as 

authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(7).
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provide reunification services to her and in concluding 

termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the 

Children. Because Mother has not persuaded us that the juvenile 

court committed reversible error, we affirm its order terminating 

Mother’s parental rights.

BACKGROUND2

¶2 Mother is the biological mother of all three children. In 

March 2014, the biological father of the two oldest children died.

After his death, Mother began a relationship with R.P. (Father), 

who is the biological father to the youngest child.

¶3 Mother and Father have a history of illegal drug use, 

substance abuse, and domestic violence. In June 2019, they were 

involved in a domestic violence incident that took place in front 

of the Children. In response, the Division of Child and Family 

Services (DCFS) filed a petition seeking protective supervision 

services. In August 2019, the juvenile court adjudicated the 

Children as abused and neglected by Mother and Father; the 

Children were placed under the protective supervision of the 

State but were not removed from the home. The court ordered 

DCFS to provide protective supervision services to the family and 

to work with Mother and Father to create a Child and Family Plan 

(the service plan). Mother and Father also were ordered to 

“remain drug and alcohol free.”

¶4 DCFS prepared the service plan “with the input of the 

parents.” A disposition hearing was held in September 2019, 

during which the juvenile court reviewed the service plan and 

2. “We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile 

court findings.” In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, n.1, 463 P.3d 66

(quotation simplified).
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determined that the services offered by DCFS constituted 

“reasonable efforts” on the part of DCFS.

¶5 The Children remained under in-home protective custody 

from August 2019 until February 2020. During that time, the court 

held three review hearings. At each of these hearings, the court 

found that “DCFS had made reasonable efforts to provide services 

and finalize” the service plan. However, Mother and Father were 

continually non-compliant with the service plan. The couple had 

engaged in another physical fight in the presence of the Children,

and each had relapsed into using methamphetamine and refused

drug testing.

¶6 In February 2020, Mother was arrested for driving under 

the influence with the Children in the vehicle. Following Mother’s 

arrest, the guardian ad litem filed a Motion for Expedited 

Placement and Temporary Custody. At a shelter hearing on the 

motion, the juvenile court removed the Children from Mother and 

Father’s custody and placed them in the temporary custody of 

DCFS.

¶7 In March 2020, DCFS filed a new Child and Family Plan

(the Plan). The juvenile court held a second disposition hearing,

during which it found that Mother, Father, and DCFS had worked 

together to create the Plan that would address the issues in the 

case. Among other things, the Plan required that Mother and 

Father (1) remain drug and alcohol free, (2) participate in random 

drug testing, (3) attend NA/AA or any other approved group 

meetings on a weekly basis, (4) complete a substance abuse and 

mental health assessment and follow the resulting

recommendations, (5) have no new convictions or arrests and

work to resolve any current charges, (6) establish gainful 

employment and maintain stable housing for the Children,

(7) notify DCFS of any changes in living arrangements,

(8) maintain regular contact with their DCFS caseworker,

(9) attend all family team meetings and court hearings,
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(10) complete parenting classes recommended by DCFS,

(11) attend a trauma-informed parenting class, and (12) work with 

Family First or Peer Parenting to establish additional parenting 

skills. The court adopted the Plan, concluding that the 

reunification services outlined in the Plan constituted “reasonable 

efforts” by DCFS.

¶8 DCFS continued to provide reunification services to 

Mother and Father until February 2021. During the period when 

services were provided, the juvenile court held regular review 

hearings. At the conclusion of each hearing, the court specifically 

found that “DCFS had made reasonable efforts to provide 

services.”

¶9 In February 2021, the court convened a permanency 

hearing. During the hearing, the court found that “[r]easonable 

efforts were made by DCFS . . . to provide services and finalize 

the [Plan] and its permanency goal of reunification,” but “[t]he 

parents have failed to participate in, to comply with . . . , or to meet 

the goals of” the Plan. As a result, the court terminated all 

reunification services and changed the Children’s primary 

permanency goal to adoption.

¶10 Thereafter, the State filed a Petition for Termination of 

Parental Rights. A two-day trial on the petition was held in 

October and November 2021, at the close of which the court found 

that the State had proved multiple statutory grounds for 

termination. The court then evaluated whether termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. On 

this point, the court made sixteen findings. Among other things, 

the court considered that the Children had been residing with the 

foster parents since November 2020. The court found that during 

that time, the Children and the foster parents “developed bonds 

of love and affection”; the Children “integrated into the home 

with the foster parents”; the foster parents “cared for the 

[C]hildren’s emotional, physical and mental needs”; and the 
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Children “look to the foster parents for parental guidance, love, 

and affection.” Overall, while in the foster parents’ home, the 

Children developed “much greater emotional ties with the foster 

parents than with Mother,” had made “remarkable strides . . . 

both emotionally and physically,” and “went from struggling 

academically and emotionally to thriving in both areas.”

¶11 In comparison, the court found that Mother was 

“unwilling or unable” to take steps to “improve the [C]hildren’s 

lives and ability to function in society” or to “care[] for the 

[C]hildren’s emotional, physical and mental needs.” Visitation 

with Mother had negatively affected the Children. Following 

parent time, they “would act out in sexual ways and act in a 

violent manner.” However, after the court discontinued parent 

time, “all the significant behavioral issues stopped.” Finally, the 

court recognized that although Mother had made “some recent 

efforts to adjust her circumstances, conduct, and conditions,” 

these recent efforts, which “were made over two years after the 

initial in-home case was opened,” were not “sufficient to make it 

in the Children’s best interest to . . . return them to her care.”

¶12 Based on these findings, the juvenile court concluded it 

was in the best interest of the Children to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights so the Children could be adopted by the foster 

parents.

¶13 The juvenile court also determined it was “strictly 

necessary” to terminate Mother’s parental rights to facilitate that 

adoption. During the court’s oral ruling at the termination 

hearing, it explained that it considered alternative placement 

options before concluding it was strictly necessary to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights. Specifically, the court considered 

placement with Mother, Father, and Mother’s family. However, 

because the Children could not be safely returned at that time to 

any of those individuals, “the only options” left would be to 

“terminate parental rights” or to “place [the Children] in the 
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permanent custody and guardianship of the foster parents.” The 

court memorialized this explanation in its written ruling, stating 

that prior to its strictly necessary determination, it “considered

other options for the [C]hildren including placement with a 

family member, guardianship with foster parents, and returning 

the [C]hildren to Mother and/or [Father].” However, “adoption 

with the foster parents” would best “satisf[y] the [C]hildren’s 

need for safety, stability, and permanency.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶14 Mother now appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating 

her parental rights and raises two issues for our review. First, 

Mother argues the juvenile court erred in concluding DCFS made 

reasonable efforts to reunite her with the Children. “A court’s 

determination that DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide 

reunification services involves an application of statutory law to 

the facts that presents a mixed question of fact and law, requiring 

review of the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error and 

its conclusions of law for correctness, affording the court some 

discretion in applying the law to the facts.” In re N.K., 2020 UT 

App 26, ¶ 15, 461 P.3d 1116 (quotation simplified). However, 

Mother acknowledges that she did not raise this argument below,

and she therefore asks us to review the court’s reasonable-efforts 

finding for plain error. In other words, she asks us to conclude 

that the reunification services provided by the State were so 

obviously insufficient that the court should have been aware of 

the deficiencies and plainly erred in concluding that DCFS had 

made reasonable efforts. To succeed on a claim of plain error, 

Mother must show that “(1) an error exists; (2) the error should 

have been obvious to the [juvenile] court; and (3) the error is 

harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 

more favorable outcome.” See In re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 12, 506 

P.3d 606 (quotation simplified).
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20220029-CA 7 2022 UT App 130

¶15 Second, Mother argues the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in determining that terminating her parental rights was 

in the best interest of the Children. “The best interest inquiry is a 

fact-like mixed determination of law and fact that is subject to 

deferential review.” Id. ¶ 17 (quotation simplified). “The juvenile 

court’s best interest analysis may be set aside if it is against the 

clear weight of the evidence.” Id. (quotation simplified).3

ANALYSIS

I. Reasonable Efforts

¶16 Mother first argues the juvenile court erred in determining 

that the State made reasonable efforts to provide services that 

would help her resolve her parenting deficiencies and allow her 

to regain custody of the Children. In particular, Mother contends

DCFS did not provide her with domestic violence services or 

sufficient mental health services, which were needed to address 

the “central issues” in this case. Mother concedes that she did not 

challenge the court’s reasonable-efforts determination below and 

asks us to review its conclusion for plain error. Thus, to succeed 

on this claim, Mother must show that a harmful error exists and 

3. Mother also argued the juvenile court erred in weighing her 

past parental fitness with her current parental fitness, and that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that 

statutory grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. As part 

of this argument, Mother asked us to overturn this court’s recent 

decision in In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, 463 P.3d 66. However, 

during oral argument before this court, Mother conceded that this 

case does not directly implicate the holding in In re J.M. and 

therefore withdrew her challenge as to this issue.
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that the error should have been obvious to the juvenile court. See 

In re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 12, 506 P.3d 606.

4

¶17 When the juvenile court orders DCFS to provide 

reunification services to a parent, the court must find that 

“reasonable efforts” were made to provide those services before 

the court may terminate the parent’s rights. Utah Code Ann. § 80-

4-301(3)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022). “A reasonable effort is a fair 

4. Utah appellate courts have recently questioned whether plain 

error review applies in civil cases. See, e.g., Cove at Little Valley 

Homeowners Ass’n v. Traverse Ridge Special Service Dist., 2022 UT 

23, ¶¶ 36–44, 513 P.3d 658; Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 

2022 UT App 23, ¶¶ 28–44, 507 P.3d 357. In Kelly, this court

concluded that “unless expressly authorized by rule, the plain 

error exception to our preservation rule does not properly extend 

to ordinary civil appeals.” 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 41 (emphasis added)

(citation omitted). The court noted, however, “that some civil 

cases involve significant interests on par with those at issue in 

criminal cases, such as . . . termination of parental rights,” but 

stopped short of determining whether plain error should apply in 

such cases. Id. ¶ 42 n.10; see also Cove, 2022 UT 23, ¶ 40 n.5 (“There 

may be civil cases where the interests implicated—parental 

termination cases, for example—present a compelling argument 

for plain error review.”).

In this case, although Mother raises a claim of plain error, 

none of the parties have challenged the application of plain error 

review in the context of a parental rights termination proceeding, 

and the matter has not been briefed for our review. Accordingly, 

we do not rule on the propriety of the plain error doctrine in 

termination cases generally. Moreover, “even if the doctrine of 

plain error does apply, [Mother] has failed to establish plain 

error.” See In re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 12 n.3, 506 P.3d 606. 

Therefore, “we simply hold that [Mother] has not carried her 

burden of showing plain error.” See id.
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20220029-CA 9 2022 UT App 130

and serious attempt to reunify a parent with a child prior to 

seeking to terminate parental rights.” In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 51, 

201 P.3d 985 (quotation simplified). “Reasonableness is an 

objective standard that depends upon a careful consideration of 

the facts of each individual case.” In re A.W., 2018 UT App 217, 

¶ 29, 437 P.3d 640 (quotation simplified). Because reasonableness 

determinations are fact-intensive, we afford the juvenile court 

“broad discretion in determining whether reasonable 

reunification efforts were made.” In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 52. 

“Generally, as long as DCFS has made a fair and serious attempt 

to reunify a parent with a child prior to seeking to terminate 

parental rights, [DCFS] has complied with its statutory 

obligation.” In re A.W., 2018 UT App 217, ¶ 29 (quotation 

simplified).

¶18 Here, at the second disposition hearing in March 2020, 

DCFS was ordered to provide reunification services to Mother. 

Prior to the hearing, Mother and DCFS worked together to create 

the Plan, which would address the issues in the case. And at the 

disposition hearing, Mother asked for additional amendments to 

the Plan, which the court approved. As amended, the Plan 

required, among other things, that Mother remain drug and 

alcohol free and participate in random drug testing, complete a 

substance abuse and mental health assessment and follow the 

resulting recommendations, have no new convictions or arrests,

establish gainful employment and maintain stable housing, notify 

DCFS of any changes in living arrangements, and maintain

regular contact with her DCFS caseworker. The court reviewed 

the Plan and concluded that the reunification services outlined in 

it constituted “reasonable efforts” by DCFS.

¶19 Mother has not met her burden on appeal to demonstrate 

that the omission of domestic violence services from the Plan and 

more robust mental health services would have been an obvious 

oversight that the court should have identified and remedied, and 

she therefore cannot show the juvenile court erred in concluding 
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20220029-CA 10 2022 UT App 130

that the State made reasonable efforts. First, despite domestic 

violence services not being required by the Plan, DCFS in fact 

provided such services. For example, at trial, Mother’s DCFS 

caseworker testified that the in-home services included services 

to deal with Mother and Father’s domestic violence incidents. 

And Mother and her DCFS caseworker had “multiple” 

conversations in which they discussed options about how Mother 

could leave Father, including that Mother could move into a 

women’s shelter. Mother’s caseworker also discussed with her the 

possibility of reaching out to work with a victim advocate. 

Eventually, Mother decided to go to the shelter, at which point 

her caseworker transported her there. Once at the shelter, Mother 

received treatment, “broke[] up” with Father, and obtained a 

protective order against him. Nevertheless, Mother continued to 

spend time with Father, visiting his home “multiple times” and 

eventually moving back into the same home.

¶20 Second, Mother’s claim that because of insufficient mental 

health services, her “mental health issue”—bipolar II disorder—

“was not timely discovered and was never treated” is not 

supported by the record. The Plan, which Mother helped to draft 

and agreed to comply with, required that she complete a 

substance abuse and mental health assessment and follow up 

with the recommendations from the assessment. Despite Mother’s 

agreement to follow the Plan, she was inconsistent in attending 

therapy throughout the case. From the start of the case, Mother’s 

group therapy attendance was “[i]ntermittent.” And although 

Mother’s individual therapy attendance at the beginning of the 

case was “pretty consistent,” there were periods when her 

therapist “didn’t hear from her or see her,” including a six-month 

period from June 2020 to December 2020. Then, in December 2020, 

Mother “re-engaged in therapy.” Approximately two months 

later, in February 2021, she was diagnosed with bioplar II 

disorder. Following her diagnosis, Mother began taking 
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medication and increased the frequency with which she attended 

therapy.

¶21 Moreover, even if there were additional domestic violence 

services or more robust mental health services offered that could 

have assisted in reunification, Mother did not request either of 

these things even though she had multiple opportunities to do so;

therefore, their omission cannot be considered obvious. See In re

J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 12. Mother and DCFS worked together to 

formulate the Plan, which was put in place to address all the 

issues that led to the Children’s removal and prevented Mother 

from being a fit parent. During this process, Mother indicated to 

DCFS that domestic violence was no longer an aspect of her 

relationship with Father. The juvenile court examined the Plan at 

the second disposition hearing and without any objection from 

Mother, approved it, finding that it constituted reasonable efforts

by DCFS. Following its adoption, the court reviewed the Plan at 

least seven times and concluded during each review that DCFS 

had engaged in reasonable efforts to provide services. At no point 

did Mother object to the court’s findings or indicate that she 

needed additional or different services. Mother’s “complaints 

about what [she] considers to be insufficient help from DCFS 

should have been brought to the attention of the juvenile court to 

address before the termination trial.” See In re N.K., 2020 UT App 

26, ¶ 20, 461 P.3d 1116; see also In re A.W., 2018 UT App 217, ¶ 31

(affirming a finding of reasonable efforts where the father ignored 

“several times in the record in which the juvenile court made an 

unchallenged periodic finding—before its termination order—

that DCFS had made reasonable efforts to provide him with 

reunification services”); In re A.C., 2004 UT App 255, ¶ 17, 97 P.3d 

706 (“The State has the obligation to make reasonable efforts, but 

it is the parent’s responsibility to demand services if they are not 

offered prior to the termination hearing.” (quotation simplified) 

(quoting In re G.C., No. 02-0307, 2002 WL 535453, at *2 (Iowa Ct.

App. Apr. 10, 2002))). In light of Mother’s participation in drafting 
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the Plan and her failure to notify the court that she needed 

additional or different services or to object to the court’s interim 

findings that DCFS was making reasonable efforts to reunify 

Mother and the Children, we cannot conclude that the court’s 

determination was in error, much less that any error would have 

been obvious.

¶22 Finally, beyond arguing that an obvious error existed, 

Mother has not demonstrated how any alleged errors were 

harmful. The record is replete with evidence that Mother failed to 

comply with the Plan. In the order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights, the juvenile court found, among other things, that 

(1) “Mother continued to use illegal drugs throughout the case 

and failed to fully participate in the drug testing as required”; 

(2) “Mother never had a significant period of time where she 

called in for testing, tested clean, and otherwise demonstrated 

that she was able to stay clean and sober”; (3) “Mother failed to be 

consistent with her substance abuse therapy during the case”; 

(4) Mother had “several interactions with law enforcement, 

including convictions and arrests”; (5) “Mother was an active 

participant in many of the [domestic violence] incidents” with 

Father and she “continued to reside with him or returned to a 

relationship with him”; (6) “Mother failed to establish a stable and 

appropriate home for the [C]hildren”; (7) “Mother failed to 

update DCFS of any change in living conditions throughout the 

case”; (8) “visitation with the [C]hildren was at times inconsistent 

or non-existent”; (9) Mother “failed to attend all hearings and 

family team meetings as required”; and (10) “Mother failed to 

complete a parenting class, or the Trauma-informed parenting 

class.” Because Mother has not shown how additional domestic 

violence services or mental health services would have prevented 

any of the foregoing failures, she has not persuaded us that she 

was prejudiced by any alleged error.

¶23 In sum, “the process of reunification is recognized as a two

way street which requires commitment on the part of the parents,
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as well as the availability of services from the State.” In re A.H., 

2021 UT App 57, ¶ 47, 493 P.3d 81 (quotation simplified). Here, 

DCFS offered Mother domestic violence services, and the delay in 

Mother’s diagnosis of bipolar II disorder was not the result of 

DCFS’s failure to provide adequate mental health services but 

was instead the result of Mother not attending therapy for a sixmonth period. “While DCFS’s provision of various services and

attempts to help [Mother] were reasonable, [Mother] bore the 

responsibility of participating in and completing those

services . . . .” Id. ¶ 48. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err 

in concluding that DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide 

reunification services to Mother.

II. Best Interest of the Children

¶24 Next, Mother argues the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in concluding that termination of her parental rights 

was in the best interest of the Children. Mother contends the 

court’s best interest analysis was “conclusory and clearly 

inadequate” inasmuch as the court did not assess whether there 

were placement options for the Children other than adoption.

¶25 “Because the relationship between parent and child is 

constitutionally protected, a court may only terminate parental 

rights upon a finding that termination is strictly necessary to the 

best interests of the child.”5In re N.K., 2020 UT App 26, ¶ 23, 461 

5. To terminate a parent’s rights, Utah law requires that both 

elements of a two-part test are satisfied. “First, the court must find 

that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination are 

present. Second, the court must find that termination of the 

parent’s rights is in the best interests of the child.” In re N.K., 2020 

UT App 26, ¶ 21, 461 P.3d 1116 (quotation simplified). Here, 

Mother challenged the court’s determination that statutory 

grounds for termination are present. However, during oral 

(continued...)
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P.3d 1116 (quotation simplified). In a case in which the child is not 

in the parent’s physical custody, the court conducting the best 

interest analysis must address certain specific considerations. See

Utah Code Ann. § 80-4-303(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022); see also In 

re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 20, 506 P.3d 606. These specific 

considerations include “the physical, mental, or emotional 

condition and needs of the child and the child’s desires regarding 

the termination”; “the effort the child’s parent or parents have 

made to adjust the parent’s or parents’ circumstances, conduct, or 

conditions to make it in the child’s best interest to return the child 

to the child’s home”; and “any other factor that the juvenile court 

considers relevant.” Utah Code Ann. § 80-4-303(1); see also In re 

J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 20.

¶26 Moreover, as part of the best interest analysis, the court

must “determine if termination is strictly necessary.” In re B.T.B.,

2020 UT 60, ¶ 55, 472 P.3d 827. This inquiry “requires courts to

explore whether otherfeasible options exist that could address the

specific problems or issues facing the family, short of imposing

the ultimate remedy of terminating the parent’s rights.” Id. ¶ 67

(quotation simplified). The court must assess whether an

alternative arrangement, such as a permanent guardianship, “can 

equally protect and benefit the children in the case before it.” In re 

J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 25 (quotation simplified). That assessment 

“requires analysis of the particularized circumstances of the case” 

and cannot be satisfied merely by the “categorical concern that a 

argument before this court, Mother conceded that the caselaw on 

which she based her challenge did not apply here and accordingly 

withdrew her challenge to the court’s statutory grounds 

determination. See supra note 3. As a result, we do not address the 

court’s conclusion that there are statutory grounds for 

termination and instead focus only on the court’s best interest 

determination.
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permanent guardianship is not as stable or permanent as an 

adoption.” Id.

¶27 Citing In re J.A.L., Mother contends the juvenile court’s best 

interest analysis was “conclusory and clearly inadequate.” In 

support, Mother points to the court’s finding that adoption by the 

foster parents would best “satisf[y] the [C]hildren’s need for 

safety, stability, and permanency,” and argues the court “did not 

analyze the particular circumstances of the case” but instead 

reached a “bare and summary conclusion” that “adoption is more 

safe, stable and permanent than permanent custody and 

guardianship.” Mother’s argument is unavailing.

¶28 First, Mother mischaracterizes the juvenile court’s best 

interest findings. In conducting the best interest analysis, the 

court correctly analyzed the Children’s needs and determined 

that terminating Mother’s parental rights was strictly necessary 

and in their best interest. Because the Children were not in 

Mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing, the court 

analyzed the “specific considerations” listed in Utah Code section 

80-4-303(1), as well as the availability of other feasible custody 

options. See id. ¶¶ 20, 24.

¶29 As to the first specific consideration, the court examined 

“the physical, mental, or emotional condition and needs” of the 

Children. See Utah Code Ann. § 80-4-303(1)(a). The court found 

that while the Children were living with the foster parents, they

made “remarkable strides . . . both emotionally and physically” 

and “went from struggling academically and emotionally to 

thriving in both areas.” The Children and the foster parents 

“developed bonds of love and affection for one another,” and the 

Children developed “much greater emotional ties with the foster 

parents than with Mother.” The foster parents “cared for the 

[C]hildren’s emotional, physical and mental needs,” and in turn 

the Children “look to the foster parents for parental guidance, 

love, and affection.” In addition, the court noted that parent time 
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with Mother had negatively affected the Children; following visits

with Mother, the Children “would act out in sexual ways and act 

in a violent manner.” However, after the court discontinued the 

parent time, “all the significant behavioral issues stopped.”

¶30 Next, the court considered the effort Mother made to adjust 

her “circumstances, conduct, or conditions” to make it in the 

Children’s best interest to return to her custody. See id. § 80-4-

303(1)(b). The court recognized that Mother had made “some 

recent efforts to adjust her circumstances, conduct, and 

conditions” but ultimately determined that her efforts, which 

“were made over two years after the initial in-home case was 

opened,” were not “sufficient to make it in the Children’s best 

interest to . . . return them to her care.”

¶31 Based on these findings, the court concluded it was in the 

best interest of the Children to terminate Mother’s parental rights. 

And after “consider[ing] other options for the [C]hildren 

including placement with a family member, guardianship with 

foster parents, and returning the [C]hildren to Mother and/or 

[Father],” the court concluded that in this case, “adoption with the 

foster parents” would best “satisf[y] the [C]hildren’s need for 

safety, stability, and permanency.” Accordingly, the court found 

it “strictly necessary to terminate . . . [Mother’s] parental rights so 

the [C]hildren may be adopted and receive the permanency they 

deserve.”

¶32 In sum, the juvenile court carefully conducted its best 

interest analysis in compliance with the relevant statutory 

provisions and current caselaw. Mother’s assertion that the court 

“did not analyze the particular circumstances of the case” 

mischaracterizes the court’s findings because it selectively 

addresses only one finding while ignoring the other fifteen, and 

Mother has not grappled with the court’s other findings 

supporting the conclusion that adoption is preferable in this case. 

When considered as a whole, the findings demonstrate that the 
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court satisfied its duty to analyze the particular circumstances of 

the case and to assess the feasibility of placement options other 

than adoption for the Children.6

CONCLUSION

¶33 Mother has not shown that the juvenile court clearly erred 

in determining that DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide 

reunification services, nor has she shown that the court’s best

interest determination was against the clear weight of the 

evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order

terminating Mother’s parental rights.

6. In cases such as this in which children have developed strong 

emotional ties with their foster parents and alternative placement 

options—such as a permanent guardianship—do not exist, the 

juvenile court may properly determine that termination of the 

parent’s rights is strictly necessary and in the children’s best 

interest. Where only one feasible custody option exists, the 

“categorical concern” that adoption is more stable than a 

permanent guardianship is not implicated. See In re J.A.L., 2022 

UT 12, ¶ 25; see also In re D.G., 2022 UT App 128, ¶ 8 n.2 (reasoning 

that where the juvenile court “was not presented with any feasible 

option for a guardianship placement,” the juvenile court’s finding 

that “termination of [the mother’s] rights was strictly necessary” 

was not against the clear weight of the evidence). Put simply, 

where only one option exists, the court has nothing to weigh.