productive home activity: Henderson said he cooked, and sometimes helped clean and do
laundry. R. 166. In addition, he went to church once a month, watched TV, and read the
paper. R. 166. He had come by two buses to the appointment unaccompanied. R. 168.
Dr. O'Donnell diagnosed Henderson with a low average or borderline IQ and an
unspecified personality disorder. R. 170. Dr. O’Donnell opined that Henderson could
manage his own funds. R. 169.

E. Kuester, M.D. reviewed all of the medical and psychiatric records for the Social
Security Administration in September 1999. R. 176-177. Dr. Kuester concluded that
Henderson had slight restrictions in daily living and maintaining social function, often had
deficiencies in concentration, but never had had an episode of deterioration in a work or
work-like setting. R. 183. On the other hand, he was moderately limited in his ability to
understand, remember and carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention and
concentration for extended periods of time, interact appropriately with the general public,
be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions, and set realistic goals or
make plans independently of others. R. 185-6. Dr. Kuester opined that Henderson could
perform simple repetitive tasks in a work setting but should not plan extensively, make
critical decisions, operate hazardous machinery, or deal with the public. R. 188.

Thomas A. Rizzo, Ph.D. is a consultative psychological examiner who assessed
Henderson in April, 2000. Based on a series of tests he found that Henderson had a
verbal IQ of 77, performance IQ of 73, and full scale |Q of 75. R. 207. These tests
indicate that Henderson functions at a borderline normal intellectual capacity. R. 207. In
reading, spelling, and arithmetic, Henderson’s capabilities are more restricted and he
functions at a mild mentally retarded level. R. 207. Dr. Rizzo opined that Henderson can

4



functioning and markedly limited in accepting instructions and criticism from supervisors.
In addition, the VE indicated that if Dr. Rizzo's opinion was indeed accurate, plaintiff could
not perform his previous work as a bus driver and courier.

Although medical evidence should be taken into account in a judge's decision,
medical testimony need not be unequivocally accepted. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870
(7th Cir. 2000). On the contrary, a medical opinion can be rejected outright if it is

inconsistent with other evidence. Knight v. Mater, 55 F.3d 309, 314 (7th Cir. 1995).

In this case, ALJ McGuire had a legitimate basis to reject part of Dr. Rizzo's opinion
because Dr. Rizzo's opinion directly contradicted plaintiffs demonstrated capacity to work.
Dr. Rizzo described Henderson as having marked limitations in his ability to accept
instruction and respond to criticism, a charge unsupported by any other doctor or employer.
This diagnoses is not supported by the other examining doctors, who each found lesser

degrees of limitation.

More importantly, however, is plaintiff's six and a half years of satisfactory work.
Each job generally lasted more than a year and plaintiff's work produced only a few minor
complaints. In weighing the opinion of a psychiatrist who examined the plaintiff for two
hours against almost six and a half years of successful work, it was not unreasonable for
the ALJ to place more importance on plaintiffs experience, especially because a judge is
entitled to weigh a plaintiffs demonstrated experience more heavily than medical or other
assessments. See Young v. Sullivan, No. 91 C 7703, 1992WL212588 (N.D.III, Aug. 27,
1992) *8.

Furthermore, Drs. Kuester, Hudspeth and O'Donnell's opinions are all consistent



Veal v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1987). This court may not re-weigh the
evidence, re-evaluate the facts, or substitute its own judgment in determining whether a
claimant is or is not disabled. Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 1994). “Where
confticting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled,
the responsibility for the decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's]
designate, the ALJ). Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987). This Court may
not reconsider an ALJ’s credibility determination. Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F. 2d 598, 601-2
(7th Cir. 1991). Thus, a plaintiff's proof must show that no reasonable person, based upon
the record as a whole could have found as the Commissioner did. Rucker v. Shalala, 894
F.Supp. 1209, 1213-14 (S.D. Ind. 1995).

Vi. Analysis

Andre Henderson contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that he was not
disabled. In particular, Henderson claims that the ALJ made procedural errors that warrant
reversal and remand. First, Henderson alleges that the ALJ's decision is not supported by
substantial evidence because it disregarded critical medical testimony. Second,
Henderson alleges that the ALJ erred procedurally in inadequately articulating the reasons
for his rejection of Henderson's application.

The ALJ must undertake a five-step process to determine whether an adult claimant
is disabled under the Social Security Act, and thus unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental ailment. 42
U.S.C.§§423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual is considered disabled only if he is

neither able to perform any of his previous work, nor any other work existing in significant



remember locations and work-like procedures and can understand short and simple
instructions but is moderately limited in understanding and remembering detailed
instructions. R. 210. Furthermore, according to Dr. Rizzo, Henderson is moderately limited
in interacting appropriately with the public and peers and is markedly limited in his ability
to accept instruction and respond to criticism. R. 210.
IV. Vocational Expert’s testimony

Rochelle Hosieth is a vocational expert who testified at the administrative hearing.
R. 72. In responding to a hypothetical posed by ALJ McGuire, Ms. Hosieth opined that a
person who could lift and carry 20 Ibs. occasionally, 10 Ibs. frequently, stand, walk, sit for
six hours, push and pull without limitation and do simple and routine tasks but needed to
be in a well-ventilated environment and avoid fumes, odors and dust, and was illiterate with
no functional math skills could do Henderson's past work. R. 72. The VE testified that an
individual could not perform Henderson's past work if he had the limitations suggested by
Dr. Rizzo. R. 73.
V. Standard of Review

In reviewing the Commissioner's final decision, this Court must accept the ALJ's
findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Although
a minuscule amount of proof is not enough to qualify as substantial evidence, the standard
only requires enough “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Diaz v. Charter, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1995) quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1972). If the record contains such support, the

court must affirm the decision of the Commissioner unless she has made an error of law.



Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 (Step 3). R. 21. At step four, the ALJ found that Henderson's
past relevant work as a courier and bus driver did not require work precluded by his RFC
diagnosis or by his asthma, hypertension, and borderline [Q. R. 21. Finally, the ALJ
determined that Henderson's impairments were not so severe as to prevent him from
performing all types of work (Step 5), and thus found that Henderson was not “disabled.”

A. ALJ’s alleged failure to give due weight to the opinions of examining

medical professionals.

The plaintiff argues that if ALU McGuire had given due weight to Dr. Rizzo's
testimony, the evidence would mandate a finding that plaintiff was disabled and could not
perform his past work. Specifically, plaintiff claims that ALJ McGuire ignored Dr. Rizzo's
findings outright, and undervalued the opinions of Dr. Kuester and VE Ms. Hosieth.
According to the plaintiff, given this evidence, any reasonable person would have found
plaintiff was disabled.

Contrary to plaintiff's argument, a reasonable person could have found plaintiff not
disabled, in particular because of the medical and vocational expert's testimony. As a
preliminary matter, we bring attention to the fact that it is irrelevant to our analysis whether
an ALJ undervalued certain expert opinions. A court cannot reweigh expert testimony, it
can only decide whether the weight given the experts was reasonable or not. Luna, 22
F.3d at 689. Therefore, we will only examine whether the ALJ's weighing of the evidence
was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.

First, the plaintiff alleges that the court unreasonably ignored Dr. Rizzo's findings.

Dr. Rizzo opined that plaintiff was moderately limited in many aspects of work related



Minute Order Form (06/97)
»

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Namectarimet suis | ‘Michael T. Mason Sang ele rte

CASE NUMBER 01 C 9621 DATE 1/31/2003
CASE Henderson vs. Barnhart
TITLE

{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon___—ssetfor__—_—saatt
(5) is Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___——ssetfor__— saat
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___——ssetfor_— ss at_
(7) Oo Trial{set for/re-set for]on__at.
| (8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at
| (9) i) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) (CLocal Rule 41.1 OCOFRCP41(a)(1)  FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) {Other docket entry] | Enter memorandum opinion and order.

(il) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff,

Notified counsel by telephone.

FEB — 8 2003

uo | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. 1803 j5)y, sin:
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. ONS SO "gy
_ 6s ‘] I id lg :
col m ih 7
MF éeputy’s oa HIP Ey
init Sr tS a
central Clerk’ Office



731, 735 (7th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In particular, the ALJ
“need not provide a written evaluation of every piece of evidence that is presented.” Pugh
v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271, 1278 (7th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

It is true that the ALJ did not explicitly address the minutia of Dr. Rizzo’s comments
or of Dr. Kuester’s opinions. However, there was no need to do so, as generally, the ALU
explained his rationale enough to build a logical bridge for later review. As we explained
above, the ALJ generally accepted the majority of the medical opinions regarding plaintiff's
abilities, the limitations found were consistent with plaintiffs demonstrated past work
history, and no expert witness stated that plaintiff could not work.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the holding of the ALJ is affirmed.

ENTER:
MICHAEL T. ee

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: January 31, 2003

11



with a finding that Henderson is not disabled. They, like Dr. Rizzo, found moderate
limitations in several areas, consistent with plaintiff's abilities, and never opined that plaintiff
cannot work.

In addition, there is very scant evidence in the record that plaintiffs condition
deteriorated after his dismissal from the last job. Since 1999, plaintiff failed the bus
licensing exam - very questionable “proof" of plaintiff's deteriorating condition. Similarly,
the previously undiagnosed personality disorder alluded to by Dr. O’Donnell is poorly
supported by the rest of the record and entirely unexplained by Dr. O’Donnell’s opinion.
Therefore, it was reasonable for the ALJ to assume that plaintiffs mental limitations were
similar to those that existed while he was working.

Plaintiffs physical limitations, including asthma, high blood pressure, and obesity
had possibly worsened since his initial work experiences. However, plaintiff's physical
impairments were only slight and by no accounts serious enough to prevent work; no
doctor opined that Henderson was unable to perform any work because of physical
limitations.

Therefore, we find ALJ McGuire's decision was entirely reasonable and supported
by substantial evidence.

C. The ALJ's alleged inadequate reasoning in his opinion.

Next, plaintiff argues that ALJ McGuire did not adequately explain his reasons for
denying plaintiff benefits and that his opinion is filled with inconsistencies. The ALJ's
decision, to be upheld, must build a logical bridge between the evidence and the result.
Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887. The reasons for his conclusions may be minimally articulated

as long as in their entirely they permit a meaningful review. Bumett v. Bowen, 830 F.2d

10


numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(2)(A), 1238(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1520(e), (f), 416.920(e)(f). The standard five-step processes set forth in the
regulations is as follows:

(1) Js the claimant presently unemployed?

(2) Is the Claimant's impairment or combination of impairments severe?

(3) Do his or her impairments meet or exceed any of the specific impairments
listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 which the Secretary
acknowledges to be conclusively disabling?

(4) If the impairment has not been listed by the Secretary as conclusively
disabling, given the claimant's residual function capacity, is the claimant
unable to perform his or her past relevant work?

(5) __ Is the claimant unable to perform any other work in the national economy
given his or her age, education, or work experience?

Wark v. Social Sec. Admin., No. 98 C 1905, 2000 WL 1029170 at *4 (N.D.IN.
Jul. 26, 2000) citing, Reg. §416.920(a)-(f); Young v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992).

Under the five part sequential analysis, “[a]n affirmative answer leads to either the
next step, or on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative
answer at any point, other than Step 3 ends the inquiry and leads to a finding that the
claimant is not disabled.” Zalewski v. Heck, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). The
claimant bears the burden of proving Step 4. See Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th
Cir. 1995). At that step, the plaintiff must demonstrate his residual functional capacity
(RFC) and that his RFC does not allow him to do his past work. See CFR §404.1520(e).

In undertaking the five-step process, ALJ McGuire first determined that Henderson
had engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of disability but not since
the termination of his courier job. (Step 1). R. 21. Next, the ALJ determined that
Henderson has a combination of impairments supported by the record and considered
severe. (Step 2). R. 21. However, the ALJ found that Henderson did not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that met or were equal to one listed in 20 C.F.R.


company, although his work was acceptable, his bus driver's license had expired and he
could not pass the exam to have it reinstated. R. 55-56. At the time of the hearing,
Henderson held a regular driver's license but not a bus driver's license.

Subsequently, in 1999, Henderson obtained work as a courier. R. 115. His duties
at this job included picking up laboratory specimens from doctors’ offices along a specified
route. R. 42-43, 169-171. Henderson worked 4-5 hours per day 5 days a week. This job
ended when a background check revealed that Henderson had a criminal record. R. 43-

44, By his own testimony, he would most likely still have that job if not for the background
check. R. 58.

Henderson also testified that he has asthma and experiences shortness of breath
with exertion. R. 44-45. The asthmatic symptoms do not appear if he is sitting, unless the
environment is smoky, hot, or stuffy. R. 44-45. He typically uses an over the counter
inhaler to control any symptoms. R. 45. ~
ill, Plaintiff's medical examinations

Peter Biale, M.D. is a consultative examiner who assessed Henderson in August
1999. R. 161. He observed that Henderson exhibited occasional wheezing and rapid
breathing as a result of minor exertion. R. 161. He opined that Henderson’s shortness of
breath could be due to obesity or to chronic pulmonary disease. R. 162. A pulmonary
function test showed moderate obstruction in the lungs, low vital capacity, but only mild
restriction post-dilation. R. 173. Henderson's blood pressure readings were very elevated
and he was advised to go to the hospital. R. 161.

John O'Donnell, M.D. is a psychiatrist who examined Henderson in August 1999 for
the Social Security Administration. R. 165. He noted that Henderson engaged in some

3



Commissioner. R. 78-81. On December 16, 1999, Henderson filed a request for hearing.
R. 82. Thereafter, on September 5, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Michael R. McGuire
held a hearing during which the plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a Vocational Expert
(VE) appeared and testified. R. 23-24. Subsequently, ALJ McGuire issued a written
opinion on September 5, 2000 denying plaintiff benefits. R. 16-22. ALU McGuire held that
the plaintiff was not disabled because he still had the ability to perform his previous jobs
as a courier and bus driver despite his impairments. R. 21. The Appeals Council denied
plaintiffs appeal. R. 6-12. Therefore, the ALJ's decision stands as the Commissioner's
final judgment. See Zurowski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
tl. Plaintiff's Testimony

At the time of the hearing, Henderson was 34 years old, single, and lived with his
mother and sister. R. 35-36. He had completed high school in a special education program
and had attended special education classes during part of elementary school. R. 37.

After graduating from high school, Henderson worked as a bus driver for three
separate bus companies between 1993 and 1999, for a total of approximately six and a
half years. R. 52-55. The work required passing a written exam to obtain a bus drivers
license. R. 55. His duties included picking up children along a specified route for two
hours in the morning and 2 hours in the afternoon, five days a week during the school year.
R. 41-42.

Ultimately, Henderson was dismissed from each of the jobs. According to his
testimony, at the first company, he neglected to notice that someone had placed a gas can
on the top of the bus. R. 52-53. At the second company, he was falsely accused of

writing a note to a student; the accusation was later retracted. R. 42, 56. At the third

2



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DOCKETED

ANDRE HENDERSON,
FEB 3 2003
Plaintiff,
No. 01 C 9621
v.
Mag. Judge Michael T. Mason
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration,

ww SS SS SS SS

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Michael T. Mason, United States Magistrate Judge:

The plaintiff, Andre Henderson (“Henderson”) has brought a motion for summary
judgment seeking judicial review of the final decision of defendant Jo Anne B. Bamhart,
who denied Henderson's claim for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security
Income benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§416(i), 423(d), 1382(c).
Henderson now appeals that decision in federal court as permitted by section 405(g) and
section 1383(c)(3), which grant federal courts the power to review the Social Security
Commissioner's final decisions. Both sides now move for summary judgment under Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff also alternatively requests a remand
for a new hearing. For the foregoing reasons we affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
I Procedural History

Henderson first filed for Social Security benefits on June 22, 1999, asking for
disability benefits dating back to April 15, 1998. R. 132, 216." His claim was denied by the

1 All citations to the record take the form of “R. xx", which indicates the page number.

AD