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*********************************************** 
LORI BARNES ET AL. v. GREENWICH

HOSPITAL ET AL.

(AC 44055)

Prescott, Suarez and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, L and her husband, sought to recover damages from the

defendant physician, Z, her employer, and a hospital for, inter alia,

injuries L sustained during a colonoscopy procedure performed by Z.

The plaintiffs failed to attach an opinion letter written and signed by a

similar health care provider to their original complaint, as was required

by the applicable statute (§ 52-190a), and the defendants filed motions

to dismiss the complaint for that failure. In response, the plaintiffs filed

an amended complaint as of right pursuant to the applicable rule of

practice (§ 10-59), and attached such an opinion letter. The amended

complaint was filed and the opinion letter was dated after the expiration

of the applicable statute of limitations. Following oral argument, the

trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction as a result of the plaintiffs’ failure to attach an opinion letter

to their original complaint. On the plaintiffs’ appeal to this court, held

that the trial court did not err in its decision to grant the defendants’

motions to dismiss: the plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirement

set forth in § 52-190a (a), as they did not attach an opinion letter to

their original complaint, obtain an opinion letter prior to filing the action,

or file the amended complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of

limitations, and such noncompliance mandated dismissal of the action

under § 52-190a (c) when it was timely raised by the defendants; moreover, the plaintiffs were not entitled to amend their deficient complaint

as of right under the rule articulated in Gonzales v. Langdon (161 Conn.

App. 497), because the scope of that remedy was limited to curative

efforts initiated prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations,

allowing only for the amendment or substitution of an existing opinion

letter, and the plaintiffs’ amendment instead sought to introduce a new

opinion letter; furthermore, this court declined to extend Gonzales to

permit the plaintiffs to cure the defect because it determined that doing

so would have undermined the purpose of § 52-190a (a), which was to

prevent frivolous medical malpractice actions by ensuring that there

was a reasonable basis for filing a case.

Argued May 20—officially released September 14, 2021

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for medical malpractice,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the

court, Genuario, J., granted the defendants’ motions

to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which

the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Paul Ciarcia, with whom, on the brief, was Frank

N. Peluso, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Megan E. Bryson, with whom, on the brief, was Carol

S. Doty, for the appellee (named defendant).

Diana M. Carlino, for the appellees (defendant

Felice Zwas et al.).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. This appeal arises out of a medical

malpractice action brought by the plaintiffs, Lori Barnes

(Barnes) and Ray Barnes,1 against the defendants,

Felice Zwas, Greenwich Hospital, and the Center for

Gastrointestinal Medicine of Fairfield and Westchester,

P.C. (Center for Gastrointestinal Medicine),2

for an

injury Barnes sustained during a colonoscopy procedure. The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial

court dismissing their complaint for failure to attach a

written opinion letter authored by a similar health care

provider as required by General Statutes § 52-190a (a).

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court

improperly granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss

for failure to comply with § 52-190a because the

amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs as of right

pursuant to Practice Book § 10-59,3

to remedy their prior

failure to attach a written opinion letter, was filed after

the statute of limitations had expired and sought to

attach an opinion letter that did not exist at the time the

action was commenced.4 We disagree with the plaintiffs’

claim and affirm the judgment of the court.

On or about August 27, 2019,5

the plaintiffs commenced the present action6 against the defendants. The

return date was September 10, 2019. The plaintiffs’ complaint contained the following allegations. On June 14,

2017, Barnes underwent a colonoscopy procedure at

the Center for Gastrointestinal Medicine. During the

procedure, the physician, Zwas, punctured Barnes’

colon. An ambulance took Barnes to Greenwich Hospital where she underwent emergency surgery, and she

then remained in the intensive care unit for three days.

Barnes continued to experience ongoing medical issues

as a result of the puncture and underwent an additional

surgical procedure in April, 2019, to address those

issues.

In counts one and two of the complaint, the plaintiffs

alleged that Barnes’ injuries were caused by the defendants’ failure to exercise reasonable care and that the

medical treatment Barnes received was a deviation

from the standard of care ordinarily required by such

medical professionals. Ray Barnes further alleged, in

count three, a loss of consortium claim. Although the

plaintiffs attached to their complaint their attorney’s

good faith certificate of reasonable inquiry, they failed

to attach an opinion letter written and signed by a

similar health care provider as required by § 52-190a (a).

On September 20, 2019, Zwas and the Center for

Gastrointestinal Medicine filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint, pursuant to § 52-190a (c), for the failure to

attach a written opinion letter of a similar health care

provider. That same day, Greenwich Hospital also filed

a motion to dismiss on identical grounds. The two

motions primarily rely on the same substantive argu-
ments.7

On October 8, 2019, the plaintiffs responded by filing

an amended complaint as of right, pursuant to Practice

Book § 10-59, along with an opinion letter with an

attached curriculum vitae.8 The opinion letter is dated

October 6, 2019. On October 21, 2019, Zwas and the

Center for Gastrointestinal Medicine filed an objection

to the amended complaint. On December 9, 2019, the

plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the

defendants’ motions. The defendants filed replies. Oral

argument on the motions to dismiss was heard at short

calendar on January 27, 2020.

In a written memorandum of decision filed March

10, 2020, the court granted the defendants’ motions to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground

that the plaintiffs had failed to attach to the original

complaint a written opinion letter of a similar health

care provider as required by § 52-190a. The court further

reasoned that the plaintiffs’ attempt to cure the defect

by amending the complaint pursuant to Practice Book

§ 10-59 and attaching an opinion letter dated October

6, 2019, was unavailing because the letter was obtained

after the action commenced, after the defendants had

filed their motions to dismiss, and after the applicable

statute of limitations9 had expired on September 12,

2019. In calculating the expiration of the statute of limitations, the court relied on the plaintiffs’ allegation in

their complaint that they received a ninety day extension pursuant to § 52-190a (b).10 The court explained

that, in the present case, the limitation period expired

two years and ninety days after the date of the alleged

injury.11 This appeal followed.

The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted

the defendants’ motions to dismiss because the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, as of right pursuant

to Practice Book § 10-59, to which they attached the

requisite opinion letter authored by a similar health

care provider. Specifically, the plaintiffs maintain that,

under Gonzales v. Langdon, 161 Conn. App. 497, 128

A.3d 562 (2015), when a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action seeks to amend his or her complaint as of

right in order to attach the first and only opinion letter

the plaintiff has obtained, such amendment can be

sought after the statute of limitations has expired, and

the letter itself need not have been in existence at the

time the action was commenced nor prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. We disagree.

The following legal principles guide our review. ‘‘Our

standard of review in an appeal challenging the granting

of a motion to dismiss is well settled. A motion to

dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the

record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur

review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion and

resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will

be de novo. . . . When a . . . court decides a . . .
question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must

consider the allegations of the complaint in their most

favorable light. . . . In this regard, a court must take

the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including

those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,

construing them in a manner most favorable to the

pleader.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peters v.

United Community & Family Services, Inc., 182 Conn.

App. 688, 699–700, 191 A.3d 195 (2018).12

Section 52-190a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No

civil action . . . shall be filed to recover damages

resulting from personal injury or wrongful death

occurring on or after October 1, 1987, whether in tort

or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or

death resulted from the negligence of a health care

provider, unless the attorney or party filing the action

. . . has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the

circumstances to determine that there are grounds for

a good faith belief that there has been negligence in

the care or treatment of the claimant. . . . [T]he claimant or the claimant’s attorney . . . shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider,

as defined in section 52-184c . . . that there appears

to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a

detailed basis for the formation of such opinion. . . .’’

Moreover, § 52-190a (c) provides: ‘‘The failure to obtain

and file the written opinion required by subsection (a)

of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the

action.’’

Our Supreme Court has recognized that ‘‘[§] 52-190a

requires that the written opinion letter must have been

obtained prior to filing the action and that the good

faith certificate and opinion letter must be filed when

the action commences.’’ (Emphasis added.) Morgan v.

Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 396, 21 A.3d 451

(2011). ‘‘[T]he written opinion letter, prepared in accordance with the dictates of § 52-190a . . . is akin to a

pleading that must be attached to the complaint in order

to commence properly the action.’’ Id., 398. ‘‘Our legislature . . . specifically authorized the dismissal of a

medical malpractice action for the failure to attach an

opinion letter to the complaint.’’ Kissel v. Center for

Women’s Health, P.C., 205 Conn. App. 394, 431, A.3d

(2021).

‘‘Because the purpose of § 52-190a is to require the

opinion prior to commencement of an action, allowing

a plaintiff to obtain such opinion after the action has

been brought would vitiate the statute’s purpose by

subjecting a defendant to a claim without the proper

substantiation that the statute requires.’’ Votre v.

County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 113

Conn. App. 569, 585, 966 A.2d 813, cert. denied, 292

Conn. 911, 973 A.2d 661 (2009); id., 585–86 (The trial

court properly dismissed a medical malpractice action

where the plaintiff failed to attach a written opinion of
a similar health care provider to the complaint ‘‘because

it is clear that no opinion existed at the time the action

was commenced . . . . The plaintiff could not turn

back the clock and attach by amendment an opinion

of a similar health care provider that did not exist at

the commencement of the action. . . . [Thus] the

plaintiff did not and could not comply with the statutory

mandate requiring that the written opinion letter be

filed with the complaint when the action was commenced . . . .’’); see also Torres v. Carrese, 149 Conn.

App. 596, 611 n.14, 90 A.3d 256 (‘‘[a]lthough the plaintiff

may have obtained opinion letters from [similar health

care providers] after the action commenced, after the

defendants had filed their motions to dismiss, and after

the statute of limitations had expired, the court may

not consider those documents’’), cert. denied, 312 Conn.

912, 93 A.3d 595 (2014).

As this court explained in Peters: ‘‘In Gonzales . . .

this court recognized an . . . avenue of recourse available to plaintiffs to correct defects in an existing opinion letter. We held, as a matter of first impression, that

a plaintiff who files a legally insufficient opinion letter

may, in certain instances, cure the defective opinion

letter through amendment of the pleadings, thereby

avoiding the need to file a new action. Specifically, we

stated that if a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice

seeks to amend his or her complaint in order to amend

the original opinion letter, or to substitute a new opinion

letter for the original opinion letter, the trial court (1)

must permit such an amendment if the plaintiff seeks

to amend as of right within thirty days of the return

day and the action was brought within the statute of

limitations, and (2) has discretion to permit such an

amendment if the plaintiff seeks to amend within the

applicable statute of limitations but more than thirty

days after the return day. . . .

‘‘In Gonzales, this court reasoned that [t]he legislative

purpose of § 52-190a (a) is not undermined by allowing

a plaintiff leave to amend his or her opinion letter or

to substitute in a new opinion letter if the plaintiff did

file, in good faith, an opinion letter with the original

complaint, and later seeks to cure a defect in that letter

within the statute of limitations. Amending within this

time frame typically will not prejudice the defendant or

unduly delay the action. . . . In light of the numerous

references in Gonzales to the statute of limitations, we

conclude that the court intended to limit the scope of

its newly recognized remedy to those curative efforts

initiated prior to the running of the statute of limitations.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Peters v. United Community & Family Services, Inc., supra, 182 Conn. App.

701–702. Similarly, in Ugalde v. Saint Mary’s Hospital,

Inc., 182 Conn. App. 1, 12, 188 A.3d 787, cert. denied,

330 Conn. 928, 194 A.3d 1195 (2018), this court

explained that ‘‘[t]he holding in Gonzales permits
amendments to legally insufficient opinion letters only

if they are sought prior to the expiration of the statute

of limitations.’’

Furthermore, in Kissel, this court again emphasized

that, based on our case law, ‘‘it cannot be disputed that

regardless of the method employed to cure a defect

in an opinion letter filed pursuant to § 52-190a, such

correction must be initiated prior to the expiration of

the statute of limitations.’’ Kissel v. Center for Women’s

Health, P.C., supra, 205 Conn. App. 426. In that recent

case, this court considered, after a jury trial and verdict

rendered in favor of the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action, whether the trial court had improperly

denied the defendants’ pretrial motions to dismiss for

the plaintiff’s failure to comply with § 52-190a because

she failed to attach to her initial complaint an opinion

letter from a similar health care provider and her efforts

to cure this defect occurred outside of the limitation

period. Id., 397, 409. There, the trial court ‘‘found that

the opinion letter had been authored prior to the commencement of the action and that the failure to attach

it to the original complaint resulted from inadvertence

or oversight.’’ Id., 409. This court concluded, however,

that the trial court ‘‘lacked personal jurisdiction over

[the defendants] as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to

cure the § 52-190a defect within the statutory limitation

period and that the medical malpractice action, therefore, should have been dismissed.’’ Id., 411.

In the present case, it is undisputed that there was

no opinion letter attached to the original complaint,

and the plaintiffs did not obtain an opinion letter prior

to filing the action. No opinion letter existed until October 6, 2019, after the expiration of the statute of limitations on September 12, 2019, and the plaintiffs filed an

amended complaint on October 8, 2019, also after the

statute of limitations had expired on September 12,

2019. As such, the plaintiffs did not comply with the

requirement clearly set forth in § 52-190a (a), and such

noncompliance mandates dismissal of the action under

§ 52-190a (c) when timely raised by the defendants as

in this case. As this court pointed out in Votre, which

is factually analogous to the present case in that the

plaintiff there did not attach any opinion letter to her

original complaint and one did not exist at the time the

action was commenced, ‘‘allowing a plaintiff to obtain

. . . [an] opinion after the action has been brought

would vitiate the statute’s purpose by subjecting a

defendant to a claim without the proper substantiation

that the statute requires.’’ Votre v. County Obstetrics &

Gynecology Group, P.C., supra, 113 Conn. App. 585.13

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs contend that they were

entitled to amend their deficient complaint as of right14

under the first prong of Gonzales because ‘‘the action

was brought within the statute of limitations . . . .’’

Gonzales v. Langdon, supra, 161 Conn. App. 510. This
argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it fails

to account for the entirety of the language of the rule

articulated in Gonzales. The rule, as stated, only applies

‘‘if a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice seeks to

amend his or her complaint in order to amend the

original opinion letter, or to substitute a new opinion

letter for the original opinion letter . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) Id. Here, there was no ‘‘original opinion letter’’

to ‘‘amend’’ or ‘‘substitute.’’ Id. The amendment at issue

sought to introduce an opinion letter for the first time—

one that did not exist prior to the commencement of

the action nor prior to the expiration of the limitation period.

Second, as this court specified in Peters, the court

in Gonzales ‘‘intended to limit the scope of its newly

recognized remedy to those curative efforts initiated

prior to the running of the statute of limitations.’’ Peters

v. United Community & Family Services, Inc., supra,

182 Conn. App. 702. Moreover, this court’s holding in

Kissel leaves no room for doubt that where a plaintiff

in a medical malpractice action fails to attach an opinion

letter to the initial complaint and his or her efforts to

cure that defect are not initiated prior to the expiration

of the statute of limitations, the court lacks personal

jurisdiction over the defendant and the action is subject

to dismissal pursuant to § 52-190a (c). See Kissel v.

Center for Women’s Health, P.C., supra, 205 Conn. App.

411. Here, the plaintiffs’ curative effort—namely, the

filing of an amended complaint—was initiated only after

the statute of limitations had expired. Therefore, the

recourse identified in Gonzales is not available.

We decline to further extend Gonzales to apply to the

circumstances of the present case because the recourse

the plaintiffs seek is contrary to what ‘‘[o]ur Supreme

Court has concluded [is] the purpose of § 52-190a (a)

[which] is to prevent frivolous medical malpractice

actions by [ensuring] that there is a reasonable basis

for filing a medical malpractice case under the circumstances . . . and eliminat[ing] some of the more questionable or meritless cases . . . .’’ (Emphasis added;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzales v. Langdon, supra, 161 Conn. App. 518. That purpose would

be undermined if we permit plaintiffs, after the statute

of limitations has expired and after the opposing party

has spent considerable time and resources in connection with an ultimately successful motion to dismiss,

to recast a medical malpractice action in a form that,

if it had been timely filed, may demonstrate sufficient

merit to satisfy the requirements of § 52-190a (a). Also,

as we previously noted, ‘‘allowing a plaintiff to obtain

[a similar health care provider] opinion after the action

has been brought would vitiate the statute’s purpose

by subjecting a defendant to a claim without the proper

[timely] substantiation that the statute requires.’’ Votre

v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., supra,

113 Conn. App. 585.
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s decision

to grant the defendants’ motions to dismiss, as it is

undisputed that the plaintiffs failed to comply with § 52-

190a (a), and the rule articulated in Gonzales does not

apply in the present case to permit the plaintiffs to

remedy their defective complaint.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 We refer to Barnes and Ray Barnes collectively as the plaintiffs and

individually where appropriate.

2 We refer to Zwas, Greenwich Hospital, and the Center for Gastrointestinal

Medicine, collectively as the defendants and individually where appropriate.

3 Practice Book § 10-59 provides, ‘‘The plaintiff may amend any defect,

mistake or informality in the writ, complaint or petition and insert new

counts in the complaint, which might have been originally inserted therein,

without costs, during the first thirty days after the return day.’’

4 The plaintiffs also claim that the court improperly granted the defendants’

motions to dismiss because it failed to consider facts presented during oral

argument that the defendants fraudulently concealed the cause of action

pursuant to General Statutes § 52-595 and, thus, the statute of limitations

should have been tolled. We do not review this claim because the record

is inadequate. The plaintiffs raised this issue for the first time at oral argument to the trial court. There were no facts related to the issue of fraudulent

concealment alleged in the complaint, the amended complaint, or the memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Moreover, the

trial court did not address this issue in its memorandum of decision, nor

did the plaintiffs seek an articulation from the court. See White v. Mazda

Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610, 632, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) (‘‘[W]e

cannot consider this claim because the record is inadequate for our review.

This court does not consider claims raised for the first time during an oral

argument in the trial court when the trial court did not address the issue

in its decision and the appellant failed to obtain an articulation from the

trial court.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)).

5 The return of service, which was filed on August 30, 2019, indicates that

Zwas and the Center for Gastrointestinal Medicine were served with the

writ, summons, and complaint on August 26, 2019, and Greenwich Hospital

was served with the same materials on August 27, 2019. See Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 553, 848 A.2d 352 (2004) (‘‘[i]n Connecticut, an action

is commenced when the writ, summons and complaint have been served

upon the defendant’’).

6 On July 9, 2019, in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Barnes

commenced a prior medical malpractice action against Greenwich Hospital

and the Center for Gastrointestinal Medicine, based on the same alleged

conduct as in the present case. Barnes v. Greenwich Hospital, Superior

Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-19-6042697-S.

See Carpenter v. Daar, 199 Conn. App. 367, 370 n.2, 236 A.3d 239 (‘‘[t]his

court may take judicial notice of court files in other cases’’), cert. granted,

335 Conn. 962, 239 A.3d 1215 (2020). Greenwich Hospital and the Center

for Gastrointestinal Medicine each filed a motion to dismiss, which the court

granted on October 15, 2019.

7 As the trial court pointed out in its memorandum of decision, the defendants also argued that this action should be dismissed on the basis of the

prior pending action doctrine. On October 15, 2019, however, the first action

filed by Barnes against the defendants, Greenwich Hospital and the Center

for Gastrointestinal Medicine, was no longer pending because it had been

dismissed by the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, who

found that the plaintiff had pleaded a medical malpractice claim but had

failed to comply with § 52-190a.

8 As the trial court recognized in its memorandum of decision: ‘‘The proposed new opinion letter provides that: ‘I have had the opportunity to review

the records provided of Lori Barnes. She sustained a 7 cm colonic perforation

during a procedure that was scheduled to be a routine colonoscopy exam.

I have been provided documents that indicate that the attending physician

was distracted during the procedure. Giving complete and total attention

during the performance of a procedure is a standard of care. A physician

who has a lack of attention during a procedure is a deviation. It is reasonable

to state that this lack of attention during the procedure led to the large
perforation that occurred during the procedure and to its sequelae.’ Also

attached on a separate page is a curriculum vitae which provides in relevant

part that the author is: ‘Board Certified—American Board of Gastroenterology—1993.’ ’’

9 General Statutes § 52-584 provides in relevant part that the statute of

limitations for a medical malpractice action is ‘‘two years from the date when

the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable

care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be

brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of . . . .’’

10 General Statutes § 52-190a (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon petition

to the clerk of any superior court or any federal district court to recover

damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, an automatic

ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted to allow

the reasonable inquiry required by subsection (a) of this section. . . .’’

11 Aside from the plaintiffs’ assertion that the statute of limitations was

equitably tolled because the defendants fraudulently concealed the cause

of action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-595; see footnote 4 of this opinion;

the plaintiffs do not claim that the trial court erred in calculating the expiration of the statute of limitations.

12 This is the standard that applies when, as in the present case, ‘‘a trial

court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss

on the basis of the complaint alone. . . . If, however, the complaint is

supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in

support of the motion to dismiss . . . [or] other types of undisputed evidence . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint. . . . Rather, those

allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary

undisputed facts]. . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with

counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the

action without further proceedings. . . . If, however, the defendant submits

either no proof to rebut the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations . . . or only

evidence that fails to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff

need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint,

but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein. . . .

‘‘Finally, where a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss

in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts.

. . . Likewise, if the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits

of the case, a court cannot resolve the jurisdictional question without a

hearing to evaluate those merits. . . . An evidentiary hearing is necessary

because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based

on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Devine v. Fusaro, 205 Conn. App. 554,

562 n.8, A.3d (2021), quoting Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651–54,

974 A.2d 669 (2009).

13 We note that the plaintiff in Votre did not attempt to amend her complaint

to add an opinion letter. Votre v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group,

P.C., supra, 113 Conn. App. 584. In this way, that case is distinguishable

from the present one, although that difference does not affect our analysis.

14 It is undisputed that the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint ‘‘during

the first thirty days after the return day,’’ which, as mentioned previously,

was September 10, 2019. Practice Book § 10-59.