UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

LEE GORDON LAMB, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM, et al., 

Defendants. 

McSHANE, District Judge. 

2:14-cv-0910-MC 

ORDER 

Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

alleging that defendants violated his due process rights in 

the course of defending a previously dismissed case, Lamb v. 

Franke, et al., 2: 12-cv-00367-MO. Plaintiff seeks damages, unspecified "permanent injunctions," that defendants employment 

be "terminated," and, reinstatement of his previously 

dismissed lawsuit. Defendants now move to dismiss (#12). 

Plaintiff has not filed a response to defendants' motion. 

Plaintiff alleges in Claim One that "1st and 14th 

Amendment Due Process" was violated by defendant Vincent when 

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Case 2:14-cv-00910-MC Document 24 Filed 02/05/15 Page 1 of 6
she allegedly filed a "declaration containing false statements 

in 2:12-cv-00367-MO." 

To establish a claim for deprivation of due process under 

the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff must demonstrate ( 1) a 

liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution, 

(2) a deprivation of that interest by the government, and (3) 

a lack of opportunity for process. Board of Regents v. Roth, 

408 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1972). Thus, the first step in any due 

process analysis is determining whether a protected liberty or 

property interest has been implicated by the defendant's 

conduct. 

Plaintiff has failed to identify a protected liberty or 

property interest in being free from opposing counsel filing 

a declaration - even an allegedly perjurious one. 

Assuming arguendo that plaintiff could establish that 

defendant Vincent's filing of an allegedly false affidavit 

implicated a liberty interest cognizable under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was 

denied any specific procedural due process right in his former 

litigation and therefore fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment 

due process claim. Nor has Plaintiff alleged any facts that 

would implicate the First Amendment. 

In addition, defendant Vincent is absolutely immune from 

liability in damages for her conduct in discharging her 

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Case 2:14-cv-00910-MC Document 24 Filed 02/05/15 Page 2 of 6
official litigation-related duties. See, Bly-Magee v. 

California, 236 F. 3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001); Read v. Haley, 

3:12-cv-02021-MO, 2013 WL 1562938, at *9 (D. Or. Apr. 10, 

2013). Although prosecutorial immunity would not necessarily 

preclude prospective injunctive relief, plaintiff has not 

identified the nature of the "permanent injunctions" he seeks 

or explained how a judgment against defendant Vincent would 

entitle him to the other relief he seeks. 

In Claim Two, plaintiff alleges that Vickie Reynolds 

violated the First and Fourth Amendments by preparing a false 

declaration in his previous case. As discussed above, 

plaintiff has failed to identify a liberty or property 

interest that gives rise to due process rights under the 

circumstances of this case. Nor has plaintiff explained how 

an allegedly false statement in an affidavit implicates the 

First Amendment. 

Plaintiff also appears to allege in Claim Two that the 

prison grievance process is deficient or inadequate. However 

those allegations are inscrutable and fail to state a claim. 

Moreover, they appear to concern the merits of plaintiff's 

previous case, and are therefore not appropriate for 

consideration by this court. 

Plaintiff alleges in Claim Three that Oregon Attorney 

General Ellen Rosenblum knowingly and intentionally turned the 

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Case 2:14-cv-00910-MC Document 24 Filed 02/05/15 Page 3 of 6
case over to defendant Vincent and intentionally and 

recklessly allowed her to file a perjurious declarations. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Rosenblum "thereby 

established herself as a defendant under respondeat superior 

liability." Complaint (#2) p. 5. 

To establish a § 1983 claim against an individual 

defendant, a plaintiff must establish personal participation 

by the defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation. 

Ashcroft v. Igbab, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). 

It is well settled that respondeat superior is not a 

proper basis for liability unde~ 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. 

Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978); King v. 

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987). A supervisor may 

be liable based on his or her personal involvement in the 

alleged deprivation, or if there is a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor's alleged wrongful conduct 

and the alleged deprivation, Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 

64 6 (9th Cir. 198 9) , but a "supervisor is only liable for 

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the 

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew 

of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor 

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Ybarra v. 

·Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 

(9th Cir. 1984); see also, Jane Doe A v. Special School 

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Case 2:14-cv-00910-MC Document 24 Filed 02/05/15 Page 4 of 6
District, 901 F.?d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990) ("The individual 

defendants are subject to personal liability only if it can be 

proved that they: 1) received notice of a pattern of 

unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates; ( 2) 

demonstrated deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization 

of the offensive acts; 3) failed to take sufficient remedial 

action; and 4) that such failuie proximately caused injury."). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would subject to 

defendant Rosenblum to respondeat superior liability~ 

Therefore, she is entitled to be dismissed as a defendant. 

Plaintiff also names Steve Franke as a defendant 

apparently because he was a defendant in the previous case. 

In order to state -a claim against a named defendant, 

plaintiff must allege specific facts about that defendant and 

identify how that defendant's conduct violated his. rights. 

See, Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Johnson v. Duffy, 58 8 F. 2d 7 4 0 ( gth 197 8) . The absenc'e of any 

factual allegations aga'inst a named defendant will entitle 

that defendant to have the complaint dismissed as to him, 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Polk v. Montgomery County, 

548 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D. Md. 1982). 

Plaintiff has not made any specific factual allegation· 

concerning defendant Franke. The~efore, defendant Franke is 

entitled to be dismissed as a defendant. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00910-MC Document 24 Filed 02/05/15 Page 5 of 6
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (#12) is allowed. 

Plaintiff's Motions ( #20), ( #22) , and ( #23) are denied as 

moot. The Clerk of the court is directed to enter a judgment 

dismissing this action with prejudice. 

Any appea~ £rom this order or a judgment dismissing this 

case wou~d be £rivo~ous and not taken in good £aith. 

Therefore, p~ainti££' s in £orma pauperis status is hereby 

revoked. 

DATED this ~ day of February, 2015. 

Michael McShane 

United States District Judge 

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