NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MAKENZIE PAULY; FAIZA MARIE 

PAULY, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

STANFORD HEALTH CARE, FKA 

Stanford Hospital and Clinics, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-16823 

D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05387-SI 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 3, 2020**

Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Makenzie Pauly and Faiza Marie Pauly appeal pro se from the district 

court’s interlocutory order dismissing certain claims alleging violations of the 

Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”) and state law. We 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-16823 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We review de novo. Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Jones 

v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal under the applicable statute 

of limitations). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. 

Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal without leave to amend of Faiza Marie Pauly’s EMTALA claims 

was proper because plaintiff failed to bring these claims within the applicable twoyear statute of limitations or establish any basis for equitable tolling, to the extent 

applicable. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C) (establishing two-year statute of 

limitations for EMTALA claims); Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2013) (en banc) (setting forth elements of equitable tolling under federal law). 

Dismissal without leave to amend of Faiza Marie Pauly’s negligent infliction 

of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of 

process claims was proper because plaintiff failed to bring these claims within the 

applicable statutes of limitations or establish any basis for equitable tolling. See

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury 

claims), § 340.5 (limitations period for professional negligence claim commences 

three years after date of injury or one year after plaintiff’s discovery of injury, 

whichever occurs first); Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275-77 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (California’s “definitive three-pronged test” for equitable tolling); 
3 19-16823 

Estate of Yool, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526, 533 (Ct. App. 2007) (explaining general rule 

for accrual of a cause of action); Cantu v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 

151, 168 (Ct. App. 1992) (statute of limitations for personal injury applies to abuse 

of process claim).

The district court properly dismissed without leave to amend Makenzie 

Pauly’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim as time-barred. See Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 340.5; Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 369 P.3d 

229, 234 (Cal. 2016) (elements of professional negligence claim under § 340.5).

We reject as without merit plaintiffs’ contentions regarding the applicability 

of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 54(b).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Plaintiffs’ request for reassignment of the district judge, set forth in the 

opening brief, is denied without prejudice to raising it before the district court. 

AFFIRMED.