1992), A magistrate judge’s ruling on a nondispositive matter may only be reversed on a finding
that the ruling is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C,
§ 636(b)(1).

As an initial matter, it would have been helpful if Plaintiff had cited the relevant portions
of the transcripts of the two hearings to which she objected. She failed to do so, and as a result,
the Court has been forced to review all eighty pages of the hearing transcripts in order to rule on
her objections.

With regard to Plaintiff's request to limit her deposition to three hours, the Court does
not find Magistrate Judge Bobrick’s denial of her request for a time limit at the January 15, 2004
hearing was clearly erroneous, Pursuant to Rule 30(d)(2), “[ulnless otherwise authorized by the
court or stipulated by the parties, a deposition is limited {0 one day of seven hours.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 30(d\(2). On November 25, 2003, Defendant deposed Raymond for approximatcly seven
hours and the deposition was authorized to be continued per Magistrate Judge Bobrick’s
November 17, 2003 Order granting Defendant’s motion to compel. On January 15, 2004, at the
hearing on Plaintiff's motion for a protective order, the parties addressed in depth the issues that
were to be explored during Raymond’s continued deposition, including causation of emotional
distress, accompanying stressors, and mitigation of damages. Magistrate Judge Bobrick stated:
“As long as the attorney is nol asking repetitive questions or has become abusive, the deposition
has not become abusive in nature, I’m not going to give anybody a time limitation.” (1/15/04
Hr'g Tr. at 27-38.) He went on to say: “If therc’s unruly conduct with respect to the deposition,
T'm available to issue any order that’s necessary. If the inquiry is fundamentally fair, there is no
abusive discovery, burdensome discovery, it’s not repetitious, it’s going into relevant matters,
then the deposition has to go forward.” (Id. at 39.)

4


Defendant otherwise has abused the discovery process by being dilatory, she has not elaborated
or pointed to concrete examples, and accordingly the Court declines to address such vague
suggestions. Plaintiff simply fails to establish that an cxtension of discovery is necessary or
warranted, Accordingly, with the exception of issues specifically addressed in this
Memorandum Opinion and Order, discovery is closed. The Court denies Defendant’s request
for fees spent in responding to the instant motion. However, we must point out that nothing
Plaintiff has presented or argued even approaches a finding of clearly erroneous or contrary to

the law.

CONCLUSION
for the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion to Modify Magistrate’s
Rulings on Discovery (doc. no. 24-1] and grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's Motion for
an Extension of Discovery |doc. no, 24-2}.

SO ORDERED:

United States Judge


Plaintiff now seeks to: (1) modify Magistrate Judge Bobrick’s January 15 Order, which
set no time limit for Plaintiff's deposition, so that the second session of Plaintiff's deposition is
limited to three hours; (2) modify Magistrate Judge Bobrick’s January 27 Order, which
permitted discovery as to four years of Plaintiff's credit card statements, to limit such discovery
to one year of credit card statements; (3) modify Magistrate Judge Bobrick’s January 27 Order,
which permitted discovery as to four years of Plaintiff's and her husband’s gambling, to disallow

any such discovery; and (4) extend the discovery cut-off date.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Rule 72(a), a magistrate judge “to whom a pretrial matter not dispositive of a
claim or defense of a patty is referred to hear and determine shall promptly conduct such
proceedings as are required and when appropriate enter into the record a written Order setting
forth the disposition of the matter.” Ped. R. Civ. P. 72(a). A magistrate judge is authorized to
make independent decisions on “any pretrial matter” with the exception of eight specified
matters, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Although the list of eight dispositive motions under section 636(b)
is not exclusive, in “[rJeading section 636(b) and Federal Rule 72 together, the term ‘dispositive’
in Rule 72(b) generally refers to those orders resolving these cight listed matters.” See Adkins v.
Mid-American Growers, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 171, 175 0.3 (N.D. Ul. 1992).

Routine discovery motions are considered to be “nondispositive” within the meaning of
Rule 72(a). Jd.; see Thomas E. Hour, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, $25 (2d Cir. 1990);
Johnson vy. Old World Craftsmen, Ltd., 638 F. Supp. 289, 291 (N.D, Ml. 1986). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure grant magistrate judges broad discretion in resolving discovery
disputes. Heyman v. Beatrice Co., No, 89 C 7381, 1992 WL 245682, at *2 (N.D, ill. Sept. 23,

3


Due to the potentially wide range of issues as to which Raymond had yet to be deposed,
it is clear that Magistrate Judge Bobrick’s denial of a time limitation was not clearly erroneous
or contrary to law, Further, Magistrate Judge Bobrick emphasized that if Defendant's inguiries
at Raymond’s continued deposition were (o become abusive, burdensome, or repetitious, he
would entertain objections if such an occasion arose, which is the appropriate way to treat such
issues.

Next, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Bobrick’s January 27, 2004 Order, which
permitted discovery as to four years of Plaintiff's credit card statements, and instead seeks to
limit such discovery to one year of credit card statements. She also objects to any discovery as
to casino records of her or her husband’s gambling losses.

“A party cannot inject his or her psychological treatment, conditions, or symptoms into a
case and expect to be able to prevent discovery of information relevant to those issues.” Santelli
v, Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D, 306, 309, (N.D. Ul. 1999). “{D]amages must be proportional to
the injury actually caused by the defendant(.]” Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of Ind.,
Inc., 103 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir, 1996); see Avitia v. Metro, Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219,
1229 (7th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff testified at het deposition that since 1990, she and her husband had $60,000 in
credit card debt from their gambling. She also testified that afler the layoff, she told a social
worker she was struggling with financial problems due in part to her bankruptcy and debts from
gambling. Raymond further testified that she gambled after the layoff to pay her bills.

Plaintiff testified that she and her husband helped finance their gambling through cash
advances on their credit cards. Defendant sought discovery of Plaintiff's credit card statements
and casino records for the purpose of determining whether her and her husband’s gambling

5


Se

Minaig Quer Fore (06/97)

: United States District Court, Northern District of Minois
M of . it ir
ange Magatrate Judge Ronald A, Guzman Stat Antged Jade
CASE NUMBER 03 C 4509 DATE 5/6/2004
CASE WANDA RAYMOND vs. AMERITECH CORPORATION
TITLE

[in the following box (a} indicate the purty filing the motion, e.g, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
‘of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

a Qo Filed motion of { use listing in “Motion” box above. }

(2) Q Brief in support of motiondue

Q) a Answer brief to motiondue_____. Reply to answer briefdue___.

(4) Q Ruling/Hearing on setfor at.

(3) o Status hearing[held/continued to) [sct for/re-set for} on____— set for at

(6) a Pretrial conference(held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on set for at
(ea) 5 Trialf{set for/re-set for}un ss aat_

(8) B {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to ___at__

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

DFRCP4(m) [Loca] Rule 4).1 COFRCP41(a(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

go [Other docket entry] © ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court denies
Plaintiff's motion to modify Magistrate Judge’s rulings on discovery [doc. No. 24-1] and gtants in part
and denies in part Plaintiff's motion for an extension of discovery [doc. No. 24-2}.

(qi) {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.)

No notices required, advised in open court. Document’
Number

. wired.
No notices required, nusaber of notices

|_| Notices mailed by judge's staff. HAY 07 2004

Notified counsel by tclephone. ate

¥ | Docketing to maif notices,
Mail AO 456 farm. ; : aoe dias

Copy to judge/magistrate judge,

dats nailed notice
courtroom

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initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's ORice cilia pty iis



caused or exacerbated her emotional distress. On January 15, 2004, Magistrate Judge Bobrick
limited discovery as to her credit card statements to one year prior to the layoff. On January 27,
2004, at the hearing on the motion to quash the subpoenas relating to casino records, he revisited
the issue because whether casino records were discoverable for the purpose of determining cause
or exacerbation of emotional distress mirrored whether credit card statements were discoverable,
Such reconsideration was not clearly erroneous given the identical purposes for which such
discovery was sought. He stated that the period of discovery would be three years before and
one year afler the layoff with respect to casino records and credit card statements. In addition to
damages for emotional distress, Raymond seeks $50,000 in damages because she alleges that her ,
layoff caused her to draw down on her 401(k) benefits, which resulted in tax penaltics. Whether
the Raymonds’ financial problems, including gambling debts, contributed to Plaintiff's damages
is clearly an issue that Defendant should be allowed to explore. Merely because Plaintiff avers
that she did not begin to have financial problems or seek counseling until after the layoff is an
insufficient basis to disallow such relevant discovery. Plaintiff testified that her and ber
husband’s gambling debts were amassed over several years. The Court finds that the discovery
period of three years prior and one year subsequent to the layoff as set by Magistrate Judge
Bobrick is clearly reasonable given the specific facts of this case. Accordingly, discovery as to
Plaintiff's casino records and the discovery period as to such records and her credit card
statements is not contrary to law or clearly erroneous.

Lastly, Plaintiff seeks an extension of discovery because Defendant “almost refused to
produce key witnesses” including David Conley, the decision maker, who was available only
two days in February 2004. (PI.’s Mot. Modify § 29.) It appears from Defendant’s response
that the parties agreed to depose Conley in March 2004. Although Plaintiff opines that

6


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF [LLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETED
7 2004
WANDA RAYMOND, ) MAY 0 7 200
)
Plaintiff, )
) Judge Ronald A. Guzmin
v. )
) 03 C 4509
AMERITECH CORPORATION d/b/a )
SBC Ameritech, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this employment discrimination suit, Plaintiff Wanda Raymond has raised objections,
pursuant to Fed, R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 72, to Magistrate Judge Edward A. Bobrick’s Order of
January 15, 2004 that granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's motion for protective order
and his January 27, 2004 Order that denied Plaintiff's motion to quash. For the following
reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiff's objections and holds that neither order was clearly

erroneous or contrary to law,

FACTS

After SBC Ameritech Jaid off Raymond and terminated her employment, she sued her
former employer for age, race and sex discrimination, alleging she suffered emotional distress
caused by defendant’s alleged discriminatory treatment of her. During discovery, SBC
Ameritech learned that since 1990, Raymond and her husband had $60,000 in credit card debt
from their gambling, that prior to her layoff she had three mortgages on her home and had

borrowed $30,000 from her sister, and that Raymond and her husband declared bankruptcy in


December 2001, one month after her layoff, despite her carnings of $100,000 and her husband’s
receipt of almost $15,000 in social security benefits in 2001, When Raymond sought counseling
from a social worker after her layoff, she indicated that she was struggling with her husband’s
debilitating neurological condition and financial problems associated with her lack of income,
the bankruptcy, and her debts due in part to gambling.

On January 15, 2004, Magistrate Judge Edward A. Bobrick granted in part and denied in
part Raymond’s motion for a protective order. He denied the motion with tespect to: (1)
Raymond’s personal medical records to the extent that there is any indication of her reporting
emotional stress or any diagnosis of serious disease; (2) inquities about stressors that may have
an impact on her emotional state, such as her husband’s illness, her financial problems, and her
inability to find a suitable position afler the layoff; (3) production of one year’s worth of
Raymond’s credit card records for the purposes of determining whether her emotional distress
was caused by her and her husband's gambling debts; and (4) inquiries at Raymond’s deposition
regarding her employment after the layoff for the sole purpose of mitigation. He granted the
motion with respect to inquiries about sexual behavior and also held that defendant was not
permitted to subpoena her subsequent employers. Although Raymond requested that he limit the
length of her deposition, he denied the request stating that there had been no showing that the
discovery process had become abusive or burdensome.

On January 27, 2004, Magistrate Judge Bobrick denied Raymond’s motion to quash
subpoenas of casino records from gambling facilities. He limited the scope of the subpoenas to
documents relating to three years prior and one year subsequent to Raymond’s fayoff and also
modified the scope of production of Raymond’s credit card records to match that of the

gambling facility records.