IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-60883

MIN KUMAR GURUNG, 

 Petitioner

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A201 254 577

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JONES and HIGGINSON, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Petitioner Min Kumar Gurung (“Gurung”) petitions this court for review 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (“BIA”) decision affirming the 

Immigration Judge's (“IJ”) denial of his petition for asylum under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(A) & (B)(i), withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A),

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 30, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the following 

reasons, we DENY the petition.

In December 2010, Min Kumar Gurung, a native and citizen of Nepal, 

was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant with authorization to 

remain until March 28, 2011. He overstayed his authorization and was served

a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging that he was subject to removal.

Gurung admitted the factual allegations in the NTA and conceded 

removability, but he filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, 

and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Gurung’s 

claims were based on his testimony—which the IJ found credible—that he had 

been the victim of violence and extortion by Maoists in Nepal. 

Gurung testified that after he had returned to Nepal from working in 

Malaysia, the Maoists began demanding money and political support. He also 

testified that in January of 2006, he was beaten “a little bit” after rejecting 

demands for payment and his political support. Beginning in February 2007, 

Gurung began working in Qatar, but his family continued to receive demands 

for money from the Maoists. On September 10, 2010, Gurung visited his family 

in Nepal and received a letter from the Maoists demanding payment and 

political support. On October 4, 2010, Gurung was kidnapped and beaten by 

Maoists for refusing their demands. He left Nepal for Spain five days after his 

kidnappers left him on the side of a road. Gurung asserts that the Maoists had 

been motivated by his involvement with the Nepali Congress (“NC”), a prodemocracy political party.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court only reviews the order of the BIA and will consider the 

underlying decision of the IJ only if it had some impact upon the BIA’s decision. 

Sharma v. Holder, 729 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2013). The BIA’s factual 

determination that an alien is ineligible for asylum is reviewed under the 

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substantial evidence standard. Id. Under that standard, this court will not 

reverse the BIA’s decision unless the evidence not only supports a contrary 

conclusion, but compels it. Majd v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 2006). 

“The petitioner has the burden of showing that the evidence is so compelling 

that no reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion.” OrellanaMonson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Gurung has essentially waived all arguments on appeal by inadequately 

briefing his asylum claim and failing entirely to address the district court’s 

rulings on relief under CAT and withholding of removal.1 

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant’s brief to 

contain “argument, which must contain ... appellant’s contentions and the 

reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on 

which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). In this circuit, “[a] 

party that asserts an argument on appeal, but fails to adequately brief it, is 

deemed to have waived it.” United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446 (5th 

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

In order to be eligible for asylum, Gurung must qualify as a refugee. 

Sharma, 729 F.3d at 411 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A), (B)(i)). An alien 

qualifies as a refugee if he (1) is outside of his country and is unable or 

unwilling to return to, or avail himself of the protection of, that country 

because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution and 

(2) demonstrates that his “race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central 

1 By completely failing to address the CAT and withholding of removal issues, Gurung 

abandoned the issues on appeal. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993).

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reason for the persecution.” Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d at 518 (citing 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 

2005, Congress added the “one central reason” language through the REAL ID 

Act to increase the nexus requirement. Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 864 

(5th Cir. 2009).

It is arguable whether Gurung’s brief even addressed the nexus 

requirement, an essential element of his asylum eligibility. The BIA denied 

asylum based, in part, on Gurung’s failure to show he was persecuted on 

account of his political opinion. Gurung’s brief makes only two arguments: 

(1) Gurung’s experiences amount to persecution; and (2) a political group 

qualifies as a particular social group. The latter is another protected ground, 

parallel to “political opinion,” and the former is only one element of asylum 

eligibility. In addition to showing that he fits within a protected ground and

suffered harm rising to the level of persecution, Gurung must also establish 

that he has met the nexus requirement: that his protected ground was at least 

“one central reason” for his persecution. Gurung concludes Part I—the portion 

of the brief arguing that he suffered harms that met the definition of 

persecution— with a short discussion that could be read as a nexus argument. 

There is no indication to the reader that a new element is being discussed or 

any other explanation of the relationship between that information and the 

content that had preceded it. If that short discussion is not a nexus argument, 

then Gurung has waived the nexus issue by failing to brief it. Yohey, 985 F.2d 

at 224–25.

Even if Gurung’s brief is construed as addressing nexus, the issue has

still been inadequately briefed. Briefs must include an “argument, which must 

contain ... appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to 

the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. 

App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Briefs are inadequate if they fail to cite any relevant case 

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law from this court and fail to apply the proper test for the disputed issue. See

e.g., U.S. v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 568 n.63 (5th Cir. 2009). Gurung’s brief

neither cites nor applies the correct test for this issue. Since the passage of the 

REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) has defined the nexus requirement in 

terms of the protected ground being at least “one central reason for persecuting 

the applicant.” Shaikh, 588 F.3d at 864. As the only two cases cited by 

Gurung’s brief were decided before the passage of the REAL ID Act, the brief 

fails to address the “central reason” standard. Moreover, the question whether 

a protected ground was at least one central reason for the persecution is highly 

factual. Gurung’s brief fails to include a single record citation indicating there 

is a sufficient nexus between his political opinions and his persecution. Given 

these omissions, Gurung has inadequately briefed the “one central reason” 

issue.2

Even were we to overlook the deficiencies of his brief, Gurung’s petition 

would still be denied on the merits. Under the substantial evidence standard, 

this court will only reverse a BIA ruling if the evidence not only supports a 

contrary conclusion, but compels it. The record in this case does not compel 

the conclusion that Gurung’s persecution was on account of his political 

opinion. First, any harm suffered by Gurung for refusing to join the Maoists 

cannot support an asylum application. See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

478, 482, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992) (holding that forced recruitment by 

guerillas was not persecution based on victim’s political beliefs). The only 

harms otherwise contained in the record are the Maoists’ extortion attempts 

and the related violence, but the record does not compel a finding that 

Gurung’s political opinions were one central reason for the Maoists’ extortion. 

2 Underscoring the inadequacy of the briefing, Gurung chose not to submit a reply 

brief even after Respondent argued for waiver in its response brief.

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The record contained evidence that extortion was commonplace across the 

country and that the Maoists targeted civilians who had recently returned 

from work abroad. Further, the record showed that even though Gurung had 

been politically active for a number of years, he only began facing extortion 

attempts after he returned from working in Malaysia. Therefore, the record 

does not compel reversal of the BIA. 

Accordingly, the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals

decision is DENIED. 

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