With regards to the City’s second contention, that Unterschuetz’s claim is barred by the
Illinois Tort Immunity Act’s one-year statute of limitations, the analysis is different. The City
maintains that the current action, whether in tort of for breach of contract, is clearly barred and
thus we should dismiss this action with prejudice. In their argument the city concedes that when
all federal claims have been disposed of, a district court may remand the remaining state claims
for further proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Yet, they maintain, where state law is clearly
established, a district court should nevertheless rule on those claims in the interests of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

The supplemental jurisdiction statute codified judge-made principles of pendent jurisdiction.
See Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir.1993). Pendent
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966). While there are "unusual cases in which the balance of factors to be considered under
the [supplemental] jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity--
will point to federal decision of the state-law claims on the merits," the district judge is given
broad power in determining whether such circumstances apply and, thus, whether it is
appropriate to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims. Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher &
Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 727-28 (7th Cir.1998). In fact, the district court’s discretion to
relinquish supplemental jurisdiction is “almost unreviewable,” especially when all federal claims
have been dropped from the case before trial and only state law claims remain. Kennedy, 140
F.3d at 728. (quoting Huffman v. Hains, 865 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1989)). At that point, the
state’s interest in applying its own law along with its greater expertise weighs heavily in favor of

relinquishing state law claims. Jd.


retaining the state law claim was appropriate where litigation was over one year old and
discovery had already been completed).

We do not see, and the City has failed to show, how retaining this claim will advance any of
the principles behind section 1367(c). The resolution of this dispute involves deciding matters of
pure state law. This case has been before the district court for less than six months. There is no
evidence that exercising jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim will advance judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, or comity. Therefore, this court exercises its discretion, not in
exercising jurisdiction to rule on the claim, but rather in dismissing it for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City’s motion to dismiss is granted for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. [Docket No. 5]. Unterschuetz’s remaining claim is hereby dismissed without

prejudice. He is free to refile his case in the Circuit Court of Cook County.

IT IS SO ORDERED enrerrp: (2//4/24,

HON. RONALD A. GUZMAN
United States District Judge


those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of
Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987). However, once all federal claims have been
dismissed, the District court may decline to extend jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court’s decision as to whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction should be based on the course that “best serves the principles of economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendant jurisdiction doctrine.” Chicago v.
International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, (1997).

With the federal due process claim dismissed the issue becomes whether or not this Court
should exercise its discretionary power and exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claim. The City asks us to render judgment, maintaining that Unterschuetz’s claim is barred
either because he has failed to properly allege breach of contract in his pleadings pursuant to the
section 5/2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, or alternatively because his action is
barred by the Illinois Tort Immunity Act’s one-year statute of limitations. Initially we note that
the City’s first contention is regarding a matter of Illinois Civil Procedure, which governs court
procedure in Illinois state courts alone and is inapplicable in a district court. The Rules of
Decision Act requires a district court to apply the law of the several states, except where the
Constitution or other acts of Congress require otherwise. 28 U.S.C. §1652 (2000), See also Erie
Railroad y. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Thus, since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are enacted pursuant to that statute, they take precedent when applicable. Rule 8 requires a
plaintiff only to set forth a short and plain statement of facts upon which a claim may be based,
unless it is a special matter like those enumerated in Rule 9. Moreover, leave to amend is to be

freely granted under Rule 15, thus reinforcing the general notion of a liberal pleading scheme.


a

Generally speaking, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court
should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving them on the
merits, United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726 (1966). In fact, “it is the well- established law of
this circuit that the usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims
whenever all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial." Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193
F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir.1999); see also Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 273, 277, n.2 (7th Cir.
1994), (holding that dismissal of federal claims at the pleading stage usually counsels in favor of
relinquishing state claims, for at that point judicial resources have not been too heavily taxed);
see also Wright v. Associated Ins. Companies, Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994).

However, there is a “no brainer” exception to this rule, which states that if an interpretation
of state law that knocks out the plaintiff's state claim is obviously correct, the federal court
should retain and decide it “rather than burdening the state courts with a frivolous case.” Van
Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997); See also Brazinski, 6 F.3d at
1182 (holding that retention of a state law claim is appropriate when the correct disposition of
the claim is “so clear as a matter of law that it can be determined without further trial
proceedings and without entanglement with any difficult issues of state law...”).

In the present case, the City alleges that the Illinois law is so clearly established—the Tort
Immunity Act’s one-year of statute of limitations applies to any civil action and not just those in
tort. 745 ILL. Comp. STAT. 10/8-101. It then conclusively states that judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity would be served by our retention of this claim, basing their
entire argument on the straightforward nature of Illinois law on this point. If this were the case,

there would be no difficulty rendering judgment on the state claim because the law would be


Minate,Order Form (06/97)

ee \ hea States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

N: f Assigned Jpids itting Ju er

amet awina ase | Ronald A. Guzman _| its Jue Or

CASE NUMBER 01 C 5304 DATE 12/14/2001
CASE WILLIAM UNTERSCHUETZ vs. RICHARD RICE, et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented. ]

(1)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) o Ruling/Hearingon____setfor___at.

(5) Qa Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor____at

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—setfor__ se at__

(oO) im Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at

(8) Oo (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) General Rule 21 CIFRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).

Oe! [Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: the City’s motion to

dismiss is granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Unterschuetz’s remaining claim is hereby

dismissed without prejudice. He is free to refile his case in the Circuit Court of Cook County.

| [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counse! by telephone,
Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. nu

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom g bee te re
TBK deputy's
initials

Date/time received in -
central Clerk's Office nailing deputy initials



straightforward and clear. Unterschuetz’s claim would be plainly barred, and in the interests of
judicial economy, this litigation should end there.

The City’s contentions, however, seem to overlook two important things. First, the Tort
Immunity Act states in section 2-101(a) that “nothing in this Act affects the liability, if any, of a
local public entity or public employee based on ...Contract.” 745 ILL. Comp. STAT. 10/2-101,
Second, there is the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision in Dewitt v. McHenry County, 691
N.E.2d 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), rejecting the defendant’s contention that the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act’s one-year statute of limitations, section 8-101, applies to an action for breach of
contract. Dewitt, 691 N.E.2d at 391-92. The Dewitt court found that nothing in the history or
structure of the Act indicated that the Illinois Legislature was concerned with allowing a
governmental entity to limit its liability for breaching a contract, and thus it was unwilling to
apply section 8-101. Jd. at 392. Thus, we do not see how this case can fall into the “no brainer”
exception. Rather, in the interests of comity, the Illinois state courts seem to be the appropriate
venue to resolve this dispute.

Further, there have been no other “judicial resources” expended aside from the City’s motion
to dismiss. The action was removed to this court on July 10, 2001 and briefs relating to the
motion were filed between August 8 and September 6, 2001. What’s more, Unterschuetz has
voluntarily dismissed two of his three claims. In this circuit, courts which have chosen to extend
supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims have done so where the litigation had been
pending for quite some time, and at least some discovery was had. See e.g. Horowitz v. Bd. of
Educ. of Avoca School District No. 37, 260 F.3d 602, 617 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that where
litigation was over two years old, and Illinois defamation law was straightforward, district

court’s decision to retain state law claims was appropriate); Timm, 32 F.3d at 277 (holding that


“

bOCKETED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DEC 17
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 2001
EASTERN DIVISION
WILLIAM UNTERSCHUETZ, )
)
Plaintiff, ) 01 C 5304
)
v. ) Judge Ronald Guzman
)
RICHARD RICE, COMMISSIONER OF )
THE CITY OF CHICAGO DEPT. OF =)
WATER, INDIVIDUALLY AND )
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND _)
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, DEPT. OF )
WATER )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff, William Unterschuetz,
originally brought this action on June 11, 2001, in a three-count complaint in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, against Richard Rice, the Commissioner of the City of Chicago Department of
Water individually and in his official capacity, and against the City of Chicago, Department of
Water itself, alleging wrongful discharge and deprivation of due process under the Illinois and
United States constitutions. On July 10, 2001, pursuant to title 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the
Department of Water filed removed this action to the district court because plaintiffs complaint
was based in part on a claim arising out of the United States constitution. Unterschuetz has now
voluntarily dismissed his wrongful discharge claim against Commissioner Rice and his due
process claims. With no federal claims remaining, the City now asks this court to rule on the
remaining state law claim. For the reasons set forth herein, the city’s motion to dismiss is

granted, and this case is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.


FACTS

On March 15, 2000, the Department of Water placed William Unterschuetz on involuntary
administrative leave as a caulker, on charges that he continued to work for the city after he
ceased to live within its borders. On May 4, 2000, he was terminated. After appealing the
decision, with four separate hearings, he was reinstated on March 2, 2001. Three months later,
Unterschuetz commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Cook County. In Counts I and II,
Unterschuetz alleged that both Richard Rice, individually and officially in his capacity as
commissioner of the City of Chicago, Department of Water, and the City of Chicago, wrongfully
discharged him. In Count III, he alleged that Commissioner Rice and the Department of Water
violated his rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions.

On July 10, 2001, pursuant to title 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the Department of Water filed removed
this action to federal court because plaintiff's complaint was based in part on alleged violations
of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Jurisdiction in this court is initially founded upon the federal Due Process claim against the City
of Chicago, Department of Water, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. Thus, the remaining state law
claims fall under supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1367(a), as they form part of the same

case or controversy.

DISCUSSION
The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted only if it appears that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts entitling them to relief.
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957). The Court must accept all pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, and must view