### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N ove mb er

19, 200 8 S es sio n WI NSTON E. W OLFE, TRUST EE OF TH E WI NSTON E. W OLFE REV OCA BLE L IVIN G TR US T D ATE D D ECE MBE R 5, 1997 v. O.

MICH AEL J AEGE R, ET UX 

### . Direc t Appeal fromthe Chancer y Court for Fayett e County No. 14320 William C. Cole, Chancellor

No. W2008-00923-C OA-R3-C V - Filed Mar ch 19, 2009

Th is a pp e a l ari se s f

ro m a pr ivate c on de mnatio n a c tio n c omm e nc e d b y Pla int if f p ur su ant t o Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 54-14- 101, et. seq. After the jury of view f iled its report, but befor e the re po rt wa s a c te d u

po n b y the tr ial cou rt , Pl a int if

f m ov e d f or a vo luntary

no ns uit purs ua nt t o Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 41.01. The trial court grante d the nons uit, and Def endants filed
a Rule 60.02 motion for re lief fr om the judgme nt gr antingthe nonsuit. The trial cour t denied De fe nd ants ’ m oti on . We a ff ir m.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Righ t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t A ff ir me d; and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined. J. Payson Matthews, Somerville, Tenne ssee, f or t he appellants, O. Michae l Jaege r and w ife, Jane t A. Jae ger. Thomas M. Minor, S o m er v ille, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, Winston E. Wolf e, Truste e of the Winston E. WolfeRevoca ble Living Trust Dated D ece mber 5, 1997.

OP IN ION
The fa cts rele vant t o our di sposition of t his matter on appeal a re undisputed. In Dec ember 20 06 , Pl a int if

f/Ap pe lle e W i n s t o n

E

. W o lf e , T ru ste e of

the Wins ton

E. Wolf e Re vo c a ble L ivi ngTr

us t Dated D ece mber 5, 1997 (Mr . Wolfe), filed an action in the Fa y ette County

Chance ry Court pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annotated § 54-14-101, et seq ., a g a ins t th e own ers of tw o lo ts a djo ini nghis proper ty (collec tively , “De fenda

nts”). In his complaint, Mr. Wol fe a sserted he owned two tra cts of
rea l property

which adjoined a

nd wer e sepa

rate d by Def endants’ tr acts, a

nd t h at h is northwestern
mos t tr a c t w a s w ith out a c c e ss t o a pu bli c ro a d. Mr . Wo lf

e a sse rt e d t he so ut heast c or ne r o f h is landlocked tr act a djoined proper ty owned by Def endants/Appe llants O. Michael Jaeg er a nd J anet A.T h e p ro p e rtie s a p p a re n tly c u rr e n tly a re u se d a s a n a tu re a re a
. 1
-2- J aeg er ( “the Jaeg ers” ) and D efe ndants Adam E. Hohe nberg , e t al

. , (collec tively , “the Hohe nberg s”). 1 Mr . Wo lf e so ught an e a se me nt ac ro ss the Jae g e rs ’ p ro pe rt y wh ic h w ou ld p e rm it h im a c c e ss t o h is
so uth e a ste rn

tr a c t and a pu bli c ro a dw ay . M r. Wolf e pr ay e d th e c ourt

to a pp oint a jur y of vie w t o lay of f by me te s and bo un ds the land su ita ble fo r an e a se me nt an d to ass e ss dama g e s. De fe nd ants ans we re d a

nd de nie d th at th e ir

pr op e rt ie s sh ou ld b e us e d to c re ate an e a se me nt.
On Marc h 7, 2007, Mr. Wolfe moved the court to appoint a jury of view f or the purpose of la yin go f f an d ma r k in gane a s e me n t t

h r o u g h“ th e la

n d o r la n d s o f th e D e f

e n d an ts , e it

h e r o r b o th [. ]” Notwithstanding Mr . Wolfe’s Marc h 7 motion or the require ment of Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 54-14-103 that a ll owners of pr operty acr oss which an e ase m ent might be located be joined as parties, on Ma

rch 20 Mr . Wolfe and the Hohe nberg s filed a “stipulation” asser ting that Mr. Wolfe did not seek an e aseme nt throug h the Hohenbe rgproper ty and that, if such an ea sement we re awa rded, he would not acc ept it. Mr. Wolfe an d t h e Ho henber g s further “stipulated” that the proce eding s could g o forwa rd without fur t h er p articipation by the Hohenbe rg s but that, if the Ho he nb e rg s’ pr op e rt

y wa s a ff e c te d n otw ith sta

nd ingthe sti pu latio n, Mr

. Wolf e wo uld imm e diate ly move to suspend the proc eeding s in order to g ive the Hohenbe rg s the opportunity to participate . On Marc h 26, the J aeg ers f

iled a motion to strike the Marc h 7 stipulation, asser ting the stipul ation was the equivale nt of an attempt to dis miss the Hohenber g s in violation of section 54-14-103. Following a hearingon Marc h 30, on April 26, 2007, the trial cour t entere d an orde r a pp ointin ga

jur y of vie w f or the purp os e s of de te rm ini ng the ne c e ssi ty and loc atio n of an e a se me nt. The trial c ourt’s orde r provided that two qualified jurors would be designated by Mr. Wolfe and two by the J aeg ers, with a f

ifth juror to be de signated by the first four. The trial court appar ently did not enter judgm en t o n t h e J aeg ers’ motion to s trike. F ollowing the Jaeg ers’ motion to appoint an
a pp ra ise r a s re qu ir e d by se c tio n 54- 14 -1 03 (b ), on Ma y 11 the tr ia l c ourt

a pp ointe d a

n a pp ra ise r t o inspect and a

ppraise t h e J ae gers’ proper ty . Mr. Wolfe posted bond as re quired by section 54-14- 103(b) in Jul y

2007. The jury of view f

iled its report on September 17, 2007. In i t s re p ort, the jury of view
re co m m en d ed that the easeme nt be locate d acr oss a trac t which cr ossed both the J aeg er a nd Hohenbe rgproper

ties. On October 31, 2007, the J aeg ers moved the trial court to a pprove the re port of the jury

of view. In their motion, the J aeg ers a s s erte d that the time for f iling objec tions or exceptions to the jury of vi ew’ s repor t had passed, and the trial court accor dingly should approve the
re po rt

. On November 2, 2007, Mr. W olfe filed a notice of voluntary dismiss al pursuant to Te nnessee Rule of Civil Procedur e 41.01. The trial court g rante d the motion the same day . Subsequently , on November

7, the Hohenbe rg s filed a r esponse to the r eport of the jury of view. I

n their re sponse, the Ho he nb e rg s o bje c te d to the jur y of vie w’ s r e po rt

and re fe re nc e d th e Ma

rc h 7 sti pu latio n e nte re d into with Mr. Wolfe providing that, if their rights were in any way aff ecte d by the re port of the jury

of view, they

would have a

n opportunity

to be hea rd.-3-

On Janu ary 30 , 2 00 8, the Jae g e rs filed a mo ti on purs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Procedur e 41.01 and 60.02 ( “Rule 41.01" and “Rule 60.02,” respe ctively ) t o “vac ate or amend” the trial court’ s November

2, 2007, o rd er o f di smissal. In their motion, the J aeg ers a sserted the trial
c ourt ha d e rr e d b y

g ra nti ngMr . Wolf

e ’s mot ion fo r vol untary dis mis sa l un de r R ule 41 .0 1 b e c a

us e the motion was not permitted af ter the jury

retire d to consider its v er dict. They asser ted that the order of dismissal without prejudice ac cording ly was void, and that the trial court’s or der the ref ore should be vac ated or amende d to pr ovide that the ca use wa s dismis sed with prejudice . Mr. Wolfe filed a me morandum in opposition to t he Jaeg ers’ motion on March 18, 2008.

F oll ow inga

he ari ngon

Marc h 2 0, the tr ia l c ourt

e nte re d f ina l ju dgme nt i n th e matte r o n Apr il 1, 20 08 , d e nyingthe Jae g e rs ’ R ule 60 .0 2 mo tio n. Th e Jae g e rs fi le d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l to thi s Court on April 7, 2008.
Issues Presented
Th is i ssu e a s p re se nte d b y the Jae g e rs fo r o ur

re vie w i s: May the Plaintiff, in a private condemnation suit , enter an order of dismissal, without prejudice , afte r the Jury

of View has re tired to consider its verdict, re ache d a dec ision
and fi le d it s r e po rt

or ve rd ic t w iththe Court

. Mr . Wo lf e pr e se nts the iss ue a s: Whether the Plaintiff/Appellee , in a private condemnation action, may take a volun t ar y d ismiss al or non-suit of sa id action subsequent to the f iling of the repor

t of the jury

of view but be fore any

other a ction is taken.
Mr. Wolfe raise s the followingadditional issue:
Whether the De fenda

nts/Appellants failed to timely reque st relief f rom the Orde r of Dismissal entered by

the trial cour

t on November

2, 2007.
Stan dard of Revie w
We r e v ie w a tr ia l c o urt’ s d e c is io n to g r an t o r d e ny e it h e r a mo ti o n to a lt e r o r ame nd a jud g me nt u

nd e r R ule 59 .0 4 o r a

mot ion fo r r e lie f f

ro m a jud g me nt u

nd e r R ule 60 .0 2 und e r a

n a bu se of discre tion standard. Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co. , 8 54 S.W. 2d 94 , 9 7 (T e nn . 1 99 3) . An a bu se of di scr eti on oc c ur s whe n a tr ia l c ourt

a pp lie s a n in c or re c t le g a l st and ard , o r whe re its de c isi on is contra ry to log ic or re asoningand ca uses an injustice to the c omplaining pa rty

. Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (citation omitted).
Anal y sisThe r ec or d t r ans m i t t ed t o t hi s Cour t on a ppea l i ncl udes onl y t he t ec hni ca l r ec or d a nd not t r ans cr i pt s of 2 h e a rin g s b e fo re th e trial c o u rt. -4- We first addre ss Mr. Wolfe’s asser tion on a ppeal that the J aeg ers’ J anuar y 30, 2008, motion to amend the tria l court’s judg ment g rantingMr. Wolfe’s Rule 41.01 motion for voluntary dismiss al was, in substance , an untim el y Ru l e 5 9

. 0 4 motion to alter or amend. Mr . Wolfe asserts that we should uphold the t ri al court’s or der f or this rea son alone. Upon r eview of the re cord, w e find nothing to indicate that Mr. Wolfe raise d this issue in the trial court. It is well settled that issues that 2
are not raised in the trial court ca nnot be ra ised for the first time on appea l. E.g., Barnes v. B arnes , 19 3 S. W.3 d 4 95 , 5 01 (T e nn . 2 00 6) . A c c or din g ly , we de c lin e to a dd re ss M r. Wolf

e ’s argume nt t

hat, despite its style, the Jaeg ers’ motion was not a proper Rule 60.02 motion, but an untim ely Rule 59.04 motion.

We nextturn to whether

the trial cour

t erre d by denying the J aeg ers’ Rule 60.02 motion. Rul e 60 .0 2 p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art : On motion and upon such terms a s are just, the court may relieve a p ar t y

or the party ’s l ega l repre sentative fr om a final judg ment, order or proc eedingfor the followingrea sons: (1) mistake, inadve rtenc e, surprise or excusable neg lect; (2) f raud (whe ther he retofor e denominate d intrinsic or extrinsi c), misre prese ntation, or other misconduct of an adver se party ; ( 3) the judg ment is void; (4) the judg ment has bee n satisfied, re lease d or dischar g ed, or a prior judg ment upon which it is based has bee n re ve rs e d o r o the rw ise va c ate d, or it i s n o lo ng e r e qu ita

ble that a ju dgment sh ou ld have pr ospective a

pplication; or (5) an y other re ason justifying r elief f rom the op e ratio n o f t

he jud g me nt.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60

. 0 2 (2 0 0 8 ). The Jaeg ers do not identify the subsections of Rule 60.02 unde r which they seek relief. Howeve r, although they asser t the trial court’ s judgme nt was a “ mistake,” the J aeg er’ s also asser

t that, under the supr eme c ourt’s dec ision in La c yv. Cox , 152 S.W .3d 480, (Tenn. 2004) , the trial cour t’s order gra n t i n g M r. W olfe’s Rule 41.01 motion is void where Mr

. Wolfe filed his motion afte r the jury of view had filed its report. We do not rea d Lacyas standing for the pr oposition t hat, althoug h a trial c ourt in a jury trial has no “a uthority” to grant a

voluntary dismiss al without prejudice afte r the jury has retired t o deliberate, s uch an order is “void.” Howe ver, in consideration of the J aeg ers’ p l ea d i n gs an d its arguments in this C ourt and the tria l court, we perc eive the Jaeg ers’ motion to be a motion for relief from the judg ment under Rule 60.02( 3) and (5 ). Thus , w e tur

n to the su

bs tanti ve iss ue pr e se nte d b y thi s a pp e a l. The g ravamen o f th e is s u e p r e s e n te d b y th is c a s e , a s w e p e r c e iv e it , is th e a p p li c ati o n of Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 41.01, and the limitations thereto, to a conde mnation proce eding filed pursua

nt to Tennessee Code Annotated § 54- 14-101, et. seq. Rul e 41 .0 1 p ro vid e s: (1) Subject to the provisions of Rule 23.05, Rule 23.06, or Rule 66 or of a ny statut e , a nd e xce pt whe n a mot ion fo r summary jud g me nt m a de by an a dv e rs e pa

rt yT enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed § 5 4 -1 4 -1 1 4 a s it e x isted w h e n th is m a tter w a s b e fo re th e tria l c o u rt su b se q u e n tly 3

w as a m ende d by c hapt er 1082 of t he Publ i c A ct s of

2008, e ff ec t i ve J une 3, 2008. The s ec t i on a s i t e xi s t ed pr i or t o t he 2 0 0 8 a m e n d m e n ts p ro v id e d :
Ei t her pa r t y m ay w i t hi n t hi r t y ( 30) days appe al t o t he c our t fr om t he fi ndi ng of t he j ur y of

vi ew, a nd dem and a t r i al by a j ur y a nd, upon gi vi ng s ec ur i t y f or c os t s , m ay h ave a new t r i al be f or e a j ur y of t w el ve ( 12) pe r s ons t o be s um m oned and i m pane l ed by t he cour t i n t he us ual w ay.

T h e se cti o n as am en d ed effe cti v e Ju n e 3 , 2 0 0 8 p ro v i d es:

( a ) W i t h i n t h i r t y ( 3 0 ) d a y s , e i t h e r p a r t y ma y a p p e a l t o t h e c o u r t fr o m t h e f i n d i n g of t h e j u r y o f

v i e w, an d de m an d a t ri al b y a jury a n d , u p o n g i v i n g secu ri t y fo r co st s, m ay h av e a n ew tr i al b efore a j u ry of t w el ve ( 12) pe r s ons t o be s um m oned and i m pane l ed by t he cour t i n t he us ual w ay. ( b) The de m and f or a t r i al by a j ur y i n ac cor danc e w i t h s ubs ec t i on (a ) s hal l be t he exc l us i ve (c o n tin u e d ...) -5- is pending , the plaintiff shall have the rig ht to take a voluntary nonsuit to dismiss an action without prejudice by filing a written notice of dismiss al at any time before the trial of a cause and serving a copy of the notice upon all parties, a nd if a pa rty has not alre ady been se rved w ith a summons and complaint, the plaintiff s hall also serve a copy of the complaint on that party ; or by an ora l notice of dismissal made in open
c ourt duri ngthe tr ia l of

a c a us e ; or in jur

y tr ia ls at any tim e be fo re the jur y re tir e s to consider its ver dict and prior to the r uling of the cour t sust aininga motion for a direc ted ver dict. I f a co u n t erc laim has bee n pleade d by a def endant pr ior to the service upon the defendant of plaintiff' s motion to di smiss, t he def endant may

elec t to proce ed on such c ounterc laim in the capa city of a pla intiff. (2) Notwithstandingthe provision s o f t h e prece ding pa ragraph, a notice of dismiss al operates as an adjudication upon the merits when f iled by a plaintiff who ha s tw ic e dis mis se d in

any c ourt an a c tio n b a se d o n o r i nc lud ingthe same c la im. (3) A voluntar

y nonsuit to di s m iss an action without prejudice must be followed by

an orde r of voluntar

y dismiss al sig ned b y

the cour t and enter ed by

the
c le rk . T he date of e ntr

y of the or de r w ill g ov e rn

the ru nn ingof pe rt ine nt t ime pe ri od s. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(2008). The Jaeg ers asser

t that, unde r Rule 41.01, Mr. Wolfe had no rig ht to a voluntary dismiss al without prejudice unde r Rule 41.01 bec ause he filed his Rule 41.01 motion after the jury of vi ew ha d retire d to consider its verdic t. The Jaeg ers r ely on Lacy v. Cox for the pr oposition t hat the trial
c ourt ’s or de r gra

nti ngMr . W ol fe’s mo tio n is vo id whe re the mot ion wa s f ile d b e yon d th e tim e p r o v id e d b y th e Ru le

. T h e Ja e g e r s f urth e r a s s e rt th at, under

Cunningham v. Mem

phis Railroad Terminal Co. , 126 Tenn. 343 (T enn. 1 9 1 2 ), and it s prog eny , a plaintiff may obtain a voluntary dismiss al without prejudice only when the plaintiff had decide d to a bandon the enter

prise for which condemnation was soug ht. Mr. Wolfe, on the other ha nd, asser ts that, under Rule 41.01, Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 54- 14-101, et seq ., and An de rso n v . S mi th , 521 S.W .2d 787 (Tenn. 1975) , he may obtain a voluntary dismiss al wit hout prejudice at any time prior to the re tirement of the jur y in a new trial by jury as provided by

Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 54-14- 114. 3(

. . . cont i nued) 3

r em edy f or r el i ef

f r om t he fi ndi ng of

a j ur y of vi ew and no ot her a ppea l f r om t he fi ndi ng s hal l l i e. The j ur y m us t e i t her a ffi r m t h e fi n d i n g o f t he j ur y of vi ew or s et a par t a di ff er ent qua nt i t y of l and or pr oper t y f or i ngr es s or e gr es s t o t he l and of t he pet i t i oner ; but , i n no e vent , s hal l t he par t y pe t i t i oni ng fo r a rig h t o f w ay p u rsu an t t o t h i s p art b e left w i t h o u t a su ffici en t o u t l et o f i n g ress an d eg ress.

T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed § 5 4 -14 -11 4 (20 0 8 ).

Sect i on 54-14-112 w as am ended i n 20 08 t o provi de: 4 i f an o b j ec t i o n i s fil ed b y t h e o w n er o r o w n ers o f l an d selected b y t h e ju ry o f v i ew , t h e o b j ec t i o n m u st be s er ved up on al l par t i es t o t he act i on
. Furt her, t he pers on m aki ng t he ob j ect i on m ust pre pare a pl at t hat c ont ai ns a n a l t er nat i ve r out e t o t he one i dent i fi ed by t he j ur y of vi ew. The pl at s hal l be s er ved on al l par t i es an d fi l ed w i t h t he court w i t hi n t hi r t y (30) days of t he ob j ect i on
. T he al t er nat i ve r ou t e t hat t he per s on pr opos es t o s ubs t i t ut e f or t he i dent i fi ed r out e s hal l be c l earl y m ar ked on t he pl at

. I f t he pet i t i on er or any o t her part y w ho ow ns t he l and on w hi ch al l or part of t he al t er nat i ve r ou t e i s l ocat ed ob j ect s t o t he al t er nat i ve r ou t e, t he on l y r em edy a vai l abl e t o t he pet i t i on er or ot her part y at t he t r i al
cour t l eve l i s t o dem and a t r i al by j ur y pur s uant t o § 54- 14- 114. A n appe al f r om a n a dver s e dec i s i on a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t l e v e l ma y b e a p p e a l e d b y a n y p a r t y t o t h e a c t i o n a s p r o v i d e d b y l a w.
S ec t i o n s 5 4 -1 4 -1 1 2 an d 1 1 3 w ere u n affe cted b y t h e 2 0 0 8 am en d m en t s. 5
-6- We turn fi rs t t o the J aeg ers’ assumption that a jury of view is a “

jury” for the purposes of Rule 41.01. I t is not. The historical jury of view a s p ro vided for by the conde mnation statutes
curr ently codified at T en n essee Code Annotated § 54- 14-101, et. seq ., was “ mere ly for the information of the [county] court and e xpa rte .” Ha wk

ins v . J us tic es o f Tro us da leCou nty , 80 Tenn. 351 (1883). The jury

of view’ s repor

t m ay be conte sted by

any party to the condemnation action. Tenn. C ode Ann. § 54- 14-112(a )(2008)

. I f no objec tion is filed, or following a hearing on a

n 4 objection, the trial c ourt may confirm the r eport of the jury of view, or

set it aside and or der a

nother “wr it of inquiry .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 54-14-112(b). The trial court also may modify the re port and g rant the e aseme nt as it deems prope r. Tenn. Code Ann. § 54-14-113. Wit hin 30 day s from the trial 5 court’s or der on the jury

of view’ s repor

t, either pa

rty may appea l to the court and de mand a “tr ial befor e a jury of t welve (12) persons to be summoned and impane led by the cour t in the usual way .”S ec t i o n 5 4 -1 4 -1 1 4 p ro v i d es: 6

W i t hi n t hi r t y ( 30) da ys , e i t her pa r t y m ay appe al t o t he cour t f r om t he fi ndi ng of

t he j ur y of

vi ew, a nd dem and a t r i al by a j ur y a nd, upon gi vi ng s ec ur i t y f or c os t s , m ay have a n ew t r i al be f or e a j ur y of t w el ve ( 12) pe r s ons t o be s um m oned and i m pane l ed by t he cour t i n t he us ual w ay.
A s am en d ed i n 2 0 0 8 , sec t i o n 5 4 -1 4 -1 1 4 cu rren t l y fu rthe r p ro v i d es:

( b) The de m and f or a t r i al by a j ur y i n a cc or danc e w i t h s ubs ec t i on ( a) s hal l be t he exc l us i ve r em edy for rel i ef f

rom t h e fi n d i n g of a j u ry o f vi ew an d no o t h er ap p eal fr o m t h e fi n d i n g s h al l l i e. T h e j u ry m u st e ith e r a ffirm th e fin d in g o f th e ju ry o f v ie w o r se t ap a rt a d iffe re n t q u a n tit y o f la n d o r p ro p e rty f or i ngr es s or e gr es s t o t he l and of t he pet i t i oner ; but , i n no e vent , s hal l t he par t y pe t i t i oni ng f or a r i ght
o f w ay p u rsu an t t o t h i s p art b e left w i t h o u t a su ffici en t o u t l et o f i n g ress an d eg ress.

T en n
. C o d e A n n
. § 5 4 -14 -11 4 (20 0 8 ).

-7- Tenn. Code Ann. § 54- 14-114(a ) ; see H aw kin s v. J

us tic es o f Tro us da leCou nty , 80 Tenn. 351 6 (1883)( observingthat the re port of the jury of view doe s not determine the rights of the parties)

. The Jaeg ers’ argument that the supreme court’s de cision in Lacyc ontr ols he re a c c or din g ly is mispl ace d. The Lacycourt he ld that a trial cour t “has no a uthority” to enter

a Rule 41.01 voluntary dism i s s al wi thout prejudice a fter the jury has re tired to deliberate. Lacy v. Cox , 152 S.W .3d 480, 488 (Tenn. 2004)

. It held t hat t he dismissal in that case must be de emed to have been w ith prejudice. Id. at 49 0

. The rule in Lacywould be applica ble in a trial by

jury upon appea l as provided by Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 54-14- 114.
We turn nextto whether

the trial cour

t may g rant a plaintiff’s mot ion for voluntary dismiss al without pr ejudice under Rule 41.01 afte r the jury of view ha s filed its report, but bef ore the trial court has ac ted on the re port, in a private condemnation procee ding unde r sec tion 54-15-101, et. seq . The supreme court addre ssed the time-fra me in which a Rule 41.01 dismiss al is permissible in Anderson
v . S mi th , 521 S.W .2d 787 (Tenn. 1975) . Sy nthesizi ngear lier rules se t forth in Cunningham v. M e m p h is R a il wa y Te rminal Co. , 149 S.W . 103 (Tenn. 1912) , and Ra gla nd v . D av ids on Cou nty Board of Education , 312 S.W . 855 (Tenn. 1958) , the Anderson court he ld:
The c ondemner

has t he right to take a nonsuit at any time prior to the ca se being submitt ed to the trier of fac t f or decision, unless the c ondemner has take n possession of the proper

ty under court order issued under c ircumstance s leavingnothing to be decide d by the court except the compensation to be paid the owne r for the land take n.
Anderson , 521 S.W

. 2d at 791. The r ule in Anderson c le arl y

re ite ra te s and e xpand s u

po n th e ru le set forthin 1 92 6 b y

thi s Co ur t in H u ff v

. D e p a r tm e n t o

f H ig h wa y s &P u b li c W

o r k s o f t h eS ta teof Tennessee

, 3 Tenn. App. 277 (Te nn. App. 1936). In Hu ff , we he ld that a nonsuit without prejudice may not be gr an te d

a f te r th e la n d to b e c o n d e mn e d

h a s b e e nd e c r e e d

to th e p la inti f

f an d ti tl e has vested in the plainti ff/petitioner. Id . The Anderson court e x panded upon our holding in Hu

ff to pr ov ide that a

pla int if f d oe s n ot h ave a

ri g ht to a no ns uit

wi tho ut p re

jud ic e wh e n th e no ns uit

wo uldThe s ec t i on a s a m ende d i n 2008 pr ovi des t hat t he de m and f or t r i al by a j ur y s hal l be t he exc l us i ve r em edy f or 7 rel i ef f rom t h e fi n d i n g of a j u ry o f vi ew
. T en n
. C o d e A n n
. § 5 4 -14 -11 4 (b)(20 0 8 ). -8- “depr ive the def

endant of some rig ht that became vested during the pendenc y of the c ase.” Anderson , 521 S.W .2d at 790. The Anderson court held that the plaintiff in that ca se lost the rig ht to t ake a vo luntary no ns uit wh e n it ob ta ine d a cou rt or de r f or po sse ssi on

of the pr op e rt

y re g ard le ss of the e x tent to which it actually exercised a

ny authority over the proper

ty

. Id. at 791.

In the ca se now before us, the J aeg ers do not asse rt that Mr. Wolfe obtained or exercised possession of, title to, or authority over the proper ty acr oss which he sought an ea sement. Rather , the J aeg ers a

rgue that the matter

was submitted to the trier of fac t and could not be nonsuit ed without prejudice when the jur

y of view filed its repor

t. We must disag ree for two rea sons. First, as noted above, a jury of vi ew in a condemnation proce eding is not the equivalent of a jury in a jury trial for the purposes of

Rule 41.01. Second, rea ding the body of case law toge ther, we do not a g ree that the filing of the jury of view’ s repor

t submit s the matter to the trier of fac t for the pur

poses of limiting the ri g ht t o a

Rul e 41 .0 1 v olu

nta ry dis mis sa l.

In Cunningham v. Mem

phis Railw ay Terminal Co. , the cour t identified the three points in a condemnation suitwhich cut o ff the pla intiff’s right to a voluntary nonsuit: (1) when the jury of view’s r eport ha s been c onfirmed without exception or appe al and the la nd decr eed to the pla intiff; (2 ) whe re an a

pp e a l is br ou g ht on ly on

the iss ue of

dama g e s whe re po sse ssi on ha s b e e n d e c re e d to th e pla int if

f a nd ; ( 3) wh e n th e matte r i s “ fin all ys u b mi tt e d to th e ju

r y o r th e tria l c o urt f

or deter mination.” Anderson , 5 2 1 S

. W

. 2 d at7 9 0 ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d)( ci t i n g Cu n n in g h a m v

. M e m p h isR

. R. Term. Co. , 1 4 9 S

. W

. 1 0 3 (T en n
. 1 9 1 2 ))

. R ea d i n g Anderson and Cunningham toge ther, a voluntary nonsuit under Rule 41.01 may be taken afte r t he jury of view ha s filed its report until the trial cour t has conf irmed the report i f no exceptions have been made, or if an ex ception has been made , afte r the cour t has confir m ed o r m o dified the re port followinga hea ringand bef

ore the plaintiff has exercised a

uthority over the proper

ty

. Id. ; se eals o , Te nn . Code Ann. § 5 4- 14 -1 12 & 11 3; Barge v. Sadler , 7 0 S.W.3 d 683 (T e nn . 200 2) (c ourt ha s no aut ho ri ty un de r statut e s to gr ant pe tit ion in p ri vate c on de mnatio n ac tio n unti l af te r the jur y of vie w ha s subm itt e d its r e po rt ); Huff v

. Dep’ t of Highways , 3 T e nn . App . 2 77 (T e nn . App . 1 92 6) (h old inga no ns uit may be take n befo re ju ry

ha s r e tir e d to consider its ver dict unless repor t of jury of view is conf

irmed without exception or appea l and land has bee n decr eed to pe titioner). Simpl y stated, the plaintiff’s rig ht to a voluntary nonsuit is ex tinguished upon a n order of the court de privingthe prope rty owner o f t h e fre e and c omplete use of his prope rty

. Anderson , 521 S.W .2d 787, 791 (Tenn. 1975). After the court has disposed of exceptions or objec tions, if any , and
en t er ed i t s o rd er o n th e re p o rt o f th e j ury o f v i ew , th e re m edy av ai l ab l e t o ei th er p arty , i n cl u d i n g a dissatisfied plaintiff, is not a nonsui t but an appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 54- 14- 114. See Pound v. Fowler , 133 S.W. 2d 48 6 ( Te nn . 1 93 9) (s tatut e a uth or izin ga

pp e a l mu st b e str ic tly 7 construed; a

ppeal must be take n within 30 day s of the order disposing of exceptions or objections). Ad dit ion a lly , w e mus t di sa g re e wi th t he Jae g e rs ’ a sse rt ion

that Mr . Wo lf

e los t hi s r ight t o o bje c t to the re port of the jury

of view wher e he failed to do so within 30 da y s. Section 54-14-112 provide sSe ct i on 54- 14- 112 a s am ende d i n 2008 pr ovi des t hat , i f an obj ec t i on i s fi l ed by t he ow ner or ow ner s of l and 8

se le c te d b y th e ju ry o f v ie w , th e o b je c tio n m u st b e se rv e d u p o n a ll p a rtie s a n d th a t a p la t i n d ic a tin g a n a lter n a te ro u te
m us t be fi l ed w i t h t he cour t a nd s er ved on a l l pa r t i es w i t h i n 3 0 da ys of t he obj ec t i on. Tenn. Code Ann. § 54- 14- 1 1 2 (a)( 2 0 0 8 ). -9- that any pa rt y may fi le ob

je c tio ns to t

he re po rt , b ut s pe c if

ie s n o ti me wi thi n whic h th e ob je c tio n mu st be filed. Where the statut e p re s cribe s no time for the takingof the a ppeal f rom a jury

of view’ s 8 repor t, it mus t be taken w ithin a rea sonable time unless circ umstances indicate the intent to waive the right to appeal. Officer v. E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co. , 239 S.W .2d 999, 1001 (Tenn. 1951)

. Hol din g In light of the fo re g oin g , we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

de nyingthe Jae g e rs ’ R

ule 60.02 motion. C osts of this ap p ea l are taxed to the Appellants, O. Michae l J aeg er a nd J anet A. J a e g e r , an d

t o th e i r s ur e ty, f o r w h i c he x e c ut i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER , JUDGE