NO. 07-09-00203-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL E 

JUNE 30, 2011 

XAN ROSS ORMON, APPELLANT 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; 

NO. 47,237-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, JUDGE 

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ., and BOYD, S.J.1

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 The trial court adjudicated appellant Xan Ross Ormon guilty of burglary of a 

habitation, revoked his order of community supervision, and sentenced him to four 

years confinement in prison. He appeals. We will affirm. 

Background 

 In October 2003, appellant plead guilty to an indicted charge of burglary of a 

habitation. The court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed appellant under an order 

 1

 John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by 

assignment. 
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of community supervision for five years. After the State filed its second motion to 

proceed to adjudication in March 2008, appellant’s community supervision was 

extended until October 2012. 

The State filed its third motion to proceed with adjudication of guilt in March 

2009. As grounds, the State alleged appellant violated four conditions of his community 

supervision order: he traveled beyond the geographic limitation of the order without 

court permission; he failed to pay the monthly supervision fee for January and February 

2009; he failed to pay restitution for July 2008 through February 2009; and he failed to 

pay delinquent probation fees for January 2009 and February 2009. 

At the hearing, appellant plead true to the violations alleged. The trial court then 

received evidence which included the testimony of a probation officer. According to the 

officer, appellant requested permission to travel to New Orleans, outside the geographic 

limitation of his community supervision order. The request was denied. The officer then 

attempted two home visits but was unable to locate appellant. Following investigative 

telephone calls and a visit to appellant’s workplace, the officer received a call from 

appellant. He admitted traveling to New Orleans. Concerning appellant’s claim that 

financial duress caused his payment arrearages, the probation officer testified that 

appellant offered to “overnight” the past due sums if allowed to travel to New Orleans. 

Appellant testified in his defense. He explained the purpose of his trip to New 

Orleans was to attend a business conference that he considered necessary to his 

continued employment. And he fell behind on restitution and fees because of 

insufficient income. After close of the evidence, the trial court sentenced appellant to 
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four years confinement in prison. In open court, following pronouncement of sentence, 

appellant offered to bring current his arrearages if allowed to remain on community 

supervision. The trial court declined the offer. Appellant now appeals. 

Analysis 

Through a single issue, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support 

revocation of community supervision. A community supervision revocation proceeding 

is neither a criminal nor a civil trial, but an administrative proceeding. Cobb v. State,

851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). We review an order revoking community 

supervision under an abuse of discretion standard. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 

493 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 

(Tex.Crim.App.1983). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is so clearly 

wrong that it lies outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree. 

Wilkins v. State, 279 S.W.3d 701, 703-704 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2007, no pet.). The trial 

judge is the sole trier of fact and determines the credibility of the witnesses and the 

weight given their testimony. Allbright v. State, 13 S.W.3d 817, 818-19 (Tex.App.--Fort 

Worth 2000, pet. refused). 

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s ruling. Cardona,

665 S.W.2d at 493; Allbright, 13 S.W.3d at 819. Hence a factual sufficiency review is 

inapplicable to revocation proceedings. Allbright, 13 S.W.3d at 818. See also Cherry v. 

State, 215 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2007, pet. refused) (collecting 

cases). Appellant makes an argument the evidence supporting revocation was factually 

insufficient, and in support cites Pierce v. State. 113 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex.App.--
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Texarkana 2003, pet. refused). We do not read Pierce to set forth a different standard 

for review of a revocation order than we have stated. To the extent appellant intends 

his issue to include a claim that the trial court abused its discretion because the 

evidence was factually insufficient to support revocation, we overrule the issue. 

The burden is on the State in a revocation proceeding to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is the same individual named in the 

judgment and order of community supervision, and the defendant violated a term of 

community supervision in the motion to revoke. Cobb, 851 S.W.2d at 873-74. This 

standard is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable 

belief that the defendant violated a condition of his or her community supervision as the 

State alleged. Martin v. State, 623 S.W.2d 391, 393 n.5 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (panel 

op.); Allbright, 13 S.W.3d at 819. 

A plea of “true” to even one allegation in the State’s motion is sufficient to support 

a judgment revoking community supervision. Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 

(Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Lewis v. State, 195 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 

2006, no pet.). Here appellant pled true to each violation alleged and the State offered 

undisputed proof that appellant traveled beyond the ordered area of supervision without 

court authorization. Further, appellant’s attempt to bargain for continued community 

supervision by offering to “overnight” payment of restitution and fees and pay the 

arrearages is some evidence belying his affirmative claim of inability to pay fees and 
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restitution. Finally, the punishment the trial court assessed is within the range 

authorized by statute.2

 

But as we discern it, the core of appellant’s issue is that, despite his plea of true 

to the violations the State alleged, the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him 

to confinement rather than continuing his community supervision. It is the general rule 

that as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be 

disturbed on appeal. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). 

See generally Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323-24 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) 

(describing essentially “unfettered” sentencing discretion of court). As we have noted, 

and as is clear from appellant’s testimony, this was the third hearing of a motion to 

proceed in his case. And, asked at this last adjudication hearing by the trial court about 

the circumstances of the burglary to which he plead guilty in 2003, appellant told the 

court he did not know anything about the offense because “I didn’t do it.” We find the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant’s community supervision 

and imposing a sentence within the range authorized by law. Appellant’s issue is 

overruled. 

 2

 Generally, burglary of a habitation is classified as a second-degree felony, 

punishable by a sentence of two to twenty years’ imprisonment and a fine not to exceed 

$10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 30.02(c)(2); 12.33(a),(b) (West 2011). 
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Conclusion 

 Having overruled appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 James T. Campbell 

 Justice 

Do not publish.