the complaint only on Defendant Collier. The United States Marshal's Service is
appointed to serve Defendant with process. The Marshal is authorized to mail a request
for waiver of service to Defendant in the manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2) before attempting personal service on the defendant.

Fowler is instructed to file all papers concerning this action with the clerk of
court in care of the Prisoner Correspondent. In addition, Fowler must send an exact
copy of any filling to Defendant or to defense counsel once an attorney has entered an
appearance on behalf of Defendant. Every document filed with the court must include
a certificate of service stating to whom exact copies were mailed and the date of the
mailing. Fowler must provide the court with the original plus one copy of every
document filed. Any paper that is sent directly to the judge or otherwise fails to

comply with these instructions may be disregarded by the court or returned to Fowler.

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Dated: JAY 2 0 2003

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behalf, and he was not allowed to introduce a video tape as evidence. To state a
Section 1983 claim for a violation of the right to procedural due process a plaintiff
must allege that he was deprived of an interest protected by the Constitution or laws
of the United States without legal due process and the actor that caused the deprivation
isastate actor. Wright v. Associated Insurance. Cos. Inc.,29 F.3d 1244, 1249 (7th Cir.
1994). See also Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that
a pretrial detainee can be punished for misconduct while in pretrial custody, but, the
detainee is entitled to some type of “procedural protection” to ensure that his due
process rights are not violated). We note that although Fowler contends that his due
process rights were violated at the disciplinary hearing because he was not allowed to
introduce the video tape as evidence, Fowler does not allege that any of the named
defendants took part in the decision to preclude the introduction of the tape. Therefore,
we dismiss the complaint to the extent that it is based on the refusal to allow in the
video tape as evidence at the disciplinary hearing.

Fowler claims that he was denied due process because the disciplinary
comunittee relied on the false report prepared by Collier and witnesses refused to testify
on Fowler’s behalf. To satisfy a prisoner’s due process rights a prison disciplinary
board must: 1) provide the prisoner with written notice of the charge, 2) allow the

prisoner to appear at hearing, 3) allow the prisoner to call witnesses and present

-4.


not have violated Fowler’s constitutional rights by denying Fowler access to the law
library on April 3, 2002, or anytime thereafter, because the trial judge issued a court
order suspending Fowler’s library privileges on April 3, 2002. Boykin cannot be at
fault for refusing to admit Fowler into the library on March 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29
because, according to the trial court transcript provided by Fowler, the court order that
gave permission for Fowler to use the law library stated that he could use the library
until his next court date scheduled on March 18, 2002. It is also clear from the trial
court transcript that Fowler never requested that the time be extended to allow further
access to the library. Boykin was obligated to obey court orders and thus Fowler does
not state a meaningful access claim against Boykin.

B. Failure to State an Injury

Although the complaint contains allegations that Collier and Boykin wrongfully
attempted to deny Fowler access to the library, Fowler does not state a claim against
Boykin or Collier for a denial of meaningful access to the courts because Fowler does
not allege that he suffered any prejudice as a result of being denied access to the law
library. An inmate alleging that he was denied meaningful access to the courts must
show that he suffered an actual injury as a result of the impediment. Lewis, 518 U.S.
at 349, 354-55; Martin, 845 F.2d at 1456. It is not sufficient for inmates to merely

allege that they did not have access to the prison library. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.

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are indications from the complaint that Fowler’s right to call witnesses was hindered
by Collier as well. Therefore, we find that the procedural due process claim against
Collier stands.

II. Substantive Due Process Claim

If a prison guard files false charges against a prisoner, the filing of the false
“disciplinary charges can amount to a violation of substantive due process if the
charges were in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right.” Black, 22 F.3d
at 1402. To state a claim for retaliation a prisoner need only allege “a chronology of
events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.” Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d
1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1988). Retaliation against a prisoner for filing a grievance
may be unconstitutional because the filing of a grievance may constitute speech that
is protected by the free speech or petition clauses of the First Amendment or by the
right of meaningful access to the courts. Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009
(7th Cir. 2002); Geder v. Godinez, 875 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (N.D. Ill. 1995). See also
Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996).

In Zimmerman vy. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit
dealt with a set of facts similar to the ones before us. In Zimmerman, the appellate
court evaluated a district court’s 28 U.S.C. § 1915A review, which is the type of

review now before us. 226 F.3d at 571, 573. In Zimmerman, the plaintiff inmate

-6-


documentary evidence to the extent that it does not interfere with other institutional
interests, and 4) provide the prisoner with a written statement of reasons for the
disciplinary board’s ultimate decision. Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 n.9 (7th Cir.
1994), If a prisoner alleges that a disciplinary hearing ruling is based on false
testimony by prison officials, then the prisoner may state a claim for a violation of his
procedural due process rights. See id. at 1402 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that prisoner
stated a claim alleging a violation of his procedural due process rights where he alleged
that prison guards filed false disciplinary charges which were repeatedly approved by
disciplinary board despite the fact that the charges were “not supported by some
evidence.”).

Fowler claims that the disciplinary board based its ruling on the false report
submitted by Collier. In addition he also alleges that the tier guard saw Collier throw
out the materials but told Fowler that he would not get involved. Fowler also alleges
that another prisoner saw Collier throw out the materials. A reasonable inference from
the complaint is that neither the tier guard or the other prisoner testified at the
disciplinary hearing. Perhaps Fowler could have called them as witnesses and chose
not to, but we have no such information before us. The fact that the tier guard refused
to come forth on Fowler’s behalf and the fact that the other prisoner did not testify

raises concerns that they felt pressured not to speak out on Fowler’s behalf. Thus, there

5.


that it was likely that Fowler would lose his library privileges and with the intent that
Fowler lose the privileges.

Prisoners have a constitutional right to “adequate , effective, and meaningful”
access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822. There is no absolute rule
that prisoners must be allowed access to a law library. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 350-51, 356 (1996) (stating that a law library is only one possible way to ensure
that prisoners have meaningful access to the courts) (also stating that even if a library
is provided, prisoner’s are only entitled to limited access to the library to pursue certain
types of claims and not to “transform themselves into litigating engines capable of
filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.”); Smith
vy. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317, 323 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that, while inmates
do have a right of meaningful access to the courts, that right does not encompass any
unfettered right of access to prison law libraries); Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451,
1456 (7th Cir. 1988) (indicating that inmate was not denied meaningful access to the
courts because there was no prison law library and stating that the right to meaningful
access is generally satisfied if the inmate is represented by counsel and he cannot
“point to any claim that he was unable to pursue.”).

A. Court Orders and Claim Against Boykin

Fowler maintains that he was wrongfully denied access to the jail law library by
Boykin on March 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and continually after April 3, 2002. Boykin could

-8-


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Hlinois

Ni i e Sitting J oO
ame of signed swig | Charles P. Kocoras _| Siting Judea ther
CASE NUMBER 03 C 1426 DATE 5/20/2003
CASE Fowler vs. Boykin et al
TITLE

of the motion being presented.)

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

DOFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).

serving documents.

di [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) im) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) ao Ruling/Hearingon___—ssetfor_——sat_

(5) a Status hearing set for 7/8/2003 at 9:30 A.M..

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor__——at_
a” oa Trial[set for/re-set for]on___at

(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at

(9) Qa This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

(10) MH [Otherdocketentry]) ENTERMEMORANDUM OPINION: We dismiss the denial of meaningful access

to the court claim alleged against Collier pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Also, all claims against defendants
1 Boykin, Sheahan and O’Reilly are dismissed. We also dismiss the complaint to the extent that it alleges a
procedural due process claim based on the alleged refusal to allow Fowler to introduce the video tape from the
law library at the disciplinary hearing. The procedural due process claim and substantive due process claim
against Collier remains. The Clerk shall issue summons for service of the complaint only on defendant Collier.
The U.S. Marshal’s Service is appointed to serve defendant with process. Clerk of Court is directed to transmit
a certified copy of this order to the U.S. Marshal’s Service. Plaintiff is given instruction regarding filing and

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

umber of notices
Notices mailed by judge's staff. AY 2 3
Notified counsel by telephone. date docked
¢ | Docketing to mail notices. coo 6
: Wrore ‘ETH
Mail AO 450 form. FILES ES uN

dockoyng uty initials

Copy t e/magistrate judge.
opy to jugge/magis rate judge

\ courtroom CLERS
SCT deputy’s U.S. DISTRICT COURT

initials . !
Date/time received in ;
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials

OS HAY 20 Pi be 03

date mailed notice



as to why Fowler wanted to go to the library is found in a grievance filed on March 31,
2002, that he provides as an exhibit in which he states that he has “a very important
legal matter that must be done.” Fowler does not allege in his complaint that he
suffered any legal setbacks as a result of the access denial or specify what claims he
was unable to bring as a result. Even if we assume that the above statement
accompanied by his claim that he was denied access to the library was sufficient to
state that he was unable to pursue a claim, we will not speculate that the claim was a
non-frivolous claim of the type covered by the injury rule. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-55.
Therefore, we dismiss the meaningful access claims against Boykin and Collier.
IV. Michael F. Sheahan

Fowler has alleged no facts establishing Michael F. Sheahan’s (“Sheahan”)
direct, personal involvement, as required by Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561
(7th Cir. 1995). Nor has Fowler shown that the alleged violation of his constitutional
rights occurred at Sheahan’s direction or with his knowledge and consent. /d. The
mere fact that Sheahan is the Sheriff of Cook County is insufficient to establish
liability, as the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to actions filed under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pacelli v. DeVito, 972 F.2d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 1992). Sheahan is
not even mentioned in the body of the complaint. Therefore, the complaint must be

dismissed as to defendant Sheahan.

-1i-


Rather inmates must show an actual injury by indicating that the lack of access
“frustrated” or “impeded” “non-frivolous” legal claims, id. at 351-354, and that the
claims that were frustrated involved “direct appeals from the convictions for which
they were incarcerated” or “civil rights actions . . . to vindicate basic constitutional
rights.” Jd. at 354. Thus, to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or, as in this case, a
28 U.S.C. § 1915A review that requires reference to the 12(b)(6) standard, the
complaint, when viewed under the liberal standards of Rule 12(b)(6), must allege that
the inmate was prejudiced by the alleged impediment to the legal system. May v.
Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 2000); Ciay v. Rice, 2001 WL 1380526, *6 (N.D.
Ill. 2001); Jones v. Sheahan, 2000 WL 1377114, *4 (N.D. IIL. 2000); Speights v. State,
2000 WL 263700, *3 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Lewis v. Sheahan, 35 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637-38
(N.D. Ill. 1999). See also Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating
that if a denial of access to the courts “had no effect on legal relief sought by the
plaintiff, [then] no right has been violated.”).

Fowler merely complains that he was denied access to the law library. He does
not state that he could not file a particular claim or motion or respond to claims or
motions brought against him because of his inability to use the law library. We have
no way of knowing why Fowler wanted access to the law library and we are not

required to resort to utter speculation to fill in the gaps in his complaint. The only clue

-10-


brought a Section 1983 action and alleged that the prison librarian denied him access
to the prison library. Id. at 573. In the case before us, Fowler asserts that Boykin
initially denied him access on March 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29, 2002. The plaintiff in
Zimmerman alleged that he filed a grievance against the librarian and that the librarian
continued to deny him access to the library in retaliation for the filing of the grievance.
id. Fowler has made the same allegations in the case before us. However, Fowler’s
case is distinguishable because, unlike in Zimmerman, there was a court order
prohibiting Boykin from allowing Fowler into the library after April 3, 2002. Also, the
exhibits submitted by Fowler clearly indicate that the order giving him permission to
use the library expired on March 18, 2002. Therefore, we find that there is no
retaliation claim stated against Boykin. Fowler does allege that Collier searched his
cell fifteen minutes after Fowler gave Collier the grievance against Boykin and filed
the false charges against Fowler. These allegations are sufficient to allege that Collier
filed false charges in retaliation for the filing of the grievance. Therefore, the
retaliation claim against Collier stands.

Ill. Right of Meaningful Access to Courts Claim

Fowler claims that Boykin and Collier denied him access to the prison library.
Although Collier did not have the ability to deny Fowler access to the library, Fowler’s

complaint can be read to allege that Collier purposefully filed the false report knowin g

-7-


found guilty by the disciplinary board, the trial judge entered an order denying Fowler
access to the prison law library. By minute order of March 5, 2003, we denied Fowler
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Fowler has now paid the full statutory filing fee
as directed.
LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a district court is required to conduct a prompt
initial review of civil actions brought by prisoners against governmental entities or
employees. The review is to be done before docketing or “as soon as practicable after
docketing.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss the complaint to the extent
that it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted[,] or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). We also note that Fowler has filed his complaint pro
se and thus his complaint is entitled to a liberal reading. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972)(stating that a pro se complaints are held to a less stringent
standard than those prepared by attorneys).

DISCUSSION

I. Procedural Due Process Claim

Fowler claims that he was denied due process at the disciplinary hearing because

Collier’s false report was relied upon, witnesses were pressured not to testify on his

~3-


denied access to the prison law library by Marvin Boykin (“Boykin”), the librarian,
despite the fact that the trial judge had issued an order allowing Fowler access to the
law library until his court date on March 18, 2002. Fowler claims that he filled out a
grievance and gave the grievance to Sergeant Collier (“Collier”), and that fifteen
minutes later Collier searched Fowler’s cell in retaliation for the filing of the grievance.
Collier found pages ripped from books in the law library and other materials from the
law library in Fowler’s cell. Fowler claims that he showed Collier legal materials on
the counter in the common area and told Collier that he obtained the materials found
in his cell from the counter rather than from the library. Fowler further alleges that
Collier took the materials from the counter, threw them in the trash can, and refused
to acknowledge that she ever saw the materials on the counter. The prison guard on
the tier at the time of the incident allegedly saw Collier throwing out the materials, but
told Fowler that he could not “get involved.” Fowler also claims that another prisoner
saw Collier throwing the materials in the trash can. Fowler was charged with taking
law library materials and damaging library materials and was found guilty in a
disciplinary hearing before a disciplinary hearing board. Fowler claims that his due
process rights were violated at the disciplinary hearing because he was not allowed to
introduce as evidence a video tape from a security camera in the law library which

Fowler contends would prove that he is innocent. On April 3, 2002, after Fowler was

2-


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
PETER FOWLER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) 03 C 1426
)
MARVIN BOYKIN, Law Library Supervisor; )
SGT. ANE) COLLIER, Badge No. 922; )
LAWRENCE X. O'REILLY, Assistant State's )
Attorney; MICHAEL F. SHEAHAN, Sheriff of — )
Cook County, )
a)
Defendants. ) QOcHeTe
an 2 1 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

This matter is before the court on the 28 U.S.C. § 1915A review of Plaintiff
Peter Fowler’s (“Fowler”) complaint. For the reasons stated below we dismiss the
complaint in part.

BACKGROUND

Fowler, a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Correctional Center, has brought
this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). Fowler
claims that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by interfering with his access

to the courts and by denying him due process. Fowler alleges that he was repeatedly,


V. Lawrence O’Reilly

The only involvement of defendant Lawrence O’Reilly (“O’Reilly), a Cook
County Assistant State’s Attorney, was to seek a court order revoking Fowler’s law
library privileges. According to both the complaint and the attached transcript of the
state court proceedings, O’Reilly was informed by jail officials that Fowler had
destroyed law library property and created a disturbance there. Ona prior occasion the
trial judge had issued an order allowing Fowler access to the prison law library.
O’Reilly stated that he was also informed that Fowler had been going to the library
after the expiration of the judge’s prior order. O’Reilly was thus acting on a request
from jail officials. O’Reilly’s actions did not violate any of Fowler’s constitutional
rights. Therefore we dismiss all claims against O’Reilly.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the denial of meaningful access to the
courts claim alleged against Collier pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § [915A(b)(1). Also, all
claims against Defendants Boykin, Sheahan, and O’Reilly are dismissed. We also
dismiss the complaint to the extent that it alleges a procedural due process claim based
on the alleged refusal to allow Fowler to introduce the video tape from the law library
at the disciplinary hearing. The procedural due process claim and the substantive due

process claim against Collier remains. The clerk shall issue summonses for service of

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