The ALJ discusses Mata's medical treatment in detail. In short review, Mata was
diagnosed with degenerative disk disease in February 1995, and over the next three years, was
treated conservatively with physical therapy, epidural injections, and medication. According to
Dr. Gorski, Mata was found to be reasonably comfortable as a result of this treatment. In
October 1999, an MRI indicated that there was a posterior bulge in the lumbar spine at the
location of Mata's September 1992 surgery, and an EMG in April 2000 showed that Mata's lower
extremities were normal. Mata was also diagnosed with a history of low back pain in

November 1999 and sciatica in December 2000.

The objective medical evidence conflicts with Mata's claim that he is disabled; therefore,
there is a credibility issue present in the case. The AL] examined many of the factors presented
in SSR 96-7p in order to evaluate Mata's claims of pain. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Mata
claimed that he could only sit for 20 minutes at a time, yet was repeatedly observed sitting for
longer periods during the hearing, even though he was invited to stand if necessary. Mata also
claimed that he has difficulty walking, yet he walked quickly when observed by Social Security
Administration personnel. Furthermore, every time Mata has undergone a functional capacity
evaluation he has shown clear signs of symptom magnification. In addition, the ALJ noted that
Mata was on Naprosyn, which he told Dr. Gorski helped to manage his pain. Finally, the ALY
examined Mata's daily activities and concluded that they could not be objectively verified from
the evidence presented nor did they agree with the medical evidence presented. The ALJ

concluded that Mata's claim of limited daily activities were outweighed by other factors.

Mata claims that the ALJ did not reach a reasonable conclusion because she did not
mention Mata's chiropractic care, the testimony of Mata's wife, or the medical evidence in exhibit

-13-


discomfort and pain with Naprosyn and reduced activities, and recommended that Mata consider
having a functional capacities evaluation. (Id.) In September 1996, Dr. Gorski refused to release
Mata to any type of work duties without a functional capacities evaluation. (R. at 274.)

In October 1996, Mata underwent a work capacity evaluation. (R. at 326.) Based on
Mata’s performance during the work capacities evaluation, the score team recommended that
Mata was within the light level, or the ten-twenty pounds category, and that Mata displayed
inconsistencies related to his claim of pain. (R. at 330.)

June 1997 progress notes from Woodstock Medical Center indicated that Mata's
condition was controlled with reduced activities and occasional use of some pain medication,
primarily Naprosyn once or twice daily. (R. at 331.) December progress notes indicated that
Mata reported that he experienced an increase in pain during a two-week period in December
1997, but the pain had resolved prior to Mata's visit to the doctor. (R. at 332.) Dr. Gorski
ordered an MRI because his physical examination revealed some motor weakness. (Id.) The
MRI revealed degenerative disk problems at L4-5, the area of Mata’s earlier diskectomy. (R. at
333.) In February 1998, Dr. Gorski noted that Mata’s back pain had been somewhat
progressively getting worse, but yet controlled with rest, decreased physical activities, and
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatories. (Id.) In March 1998, Mata reported he attempted to work for
one day but could not tolerate standing for an hour or two before experiencing severe pain in his
lower back. (Id.) In October 1998, Dr. Gorski completed a report of incapacity for the Illinois
Department of Public Aid, describing Mata as being more than fifty percent reduced in his

capacity to walk and stand and able to lift no more than ten pounds repeatedly. (R. at 339-42.)



1995). In other words, a hypothetical question need not incorporate every aspect of the
claimant's impairments so long as the record supports the conclusion that the vocational expert
considered the medical reports and documents. Herron, 19 F.3d at 337 (the ALJ did not err in
framing his question to the VE because the VE testified that he had reviewed the medical record

prior to the hearing).

As stated above, the ALJ properly determined that Mata could perform light work, and in
posing her question to the VE, the ALJ inquired as to what work Mata could do given his light
work requirements. This was a proper hypothetical question given the ALJ’s conclusion that
Mata could perform light work. Furthermore, the VE had an opportunity to review the file and
exhibits prior to the hearing. (R. at 43.) The VE was also present throughout the hearing and

heard the testimony of both Mata and his wife. (Id.)

The ALJ’s hypothetical question was reasonable, and, in addition, the ALJ could properly
rely on the VE’s testimony because the VE had a chance to review the file and was present

during the hearing.
Vv. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the Court affirms the Commissioner's final decision. The
Commissioner's motion for summary judgment is therefore granted, and the Plaintiff's motion

for summary judgement is denied.

ENTER ORDER:

Dated: October 24, 2003.

-17-



this Court must use is quite limited; the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed so long as it

is supported by substantial evidence. See Herron, 19 F.3d at 333.

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion ...."" Dray v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 10 F.3d 1306, 1310 (7th Cir.
1993) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The ALJ's finding must be
supported by more than a scintilla of evidence, but may be supported by less than the full weight
of the evidence. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992);
Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir. 1986). The reviewing court must consider all
evidence on the record; however, it may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or
substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, because the ALJ must resolve all factual issues and
evidentiary conflicts. Jones v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 522, 523 (7th Cir. 1993); Delgado, 782 F.2d at
82. Therefore, the critical question for this Court is not whether Mata was disabled but whether
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. If reasonable
minds could disagree on whether Mata is disabled, we must affirm the ALJ's decision denying

benefits. See Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).

Mata contests the ALJ's decision that he was not disabled under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. (R. at 20.) First, Mata claims that the ALJ improperly discounted his
testimony related to pain, arguing that the ALJ's decision was unreasonable because she ignored
Mata's chiropractic care for two years, the testimony of Mata's wife, and the medical evidence
contained in exhibit numbers sixteen (f) and twenty-two (f). The Commissioner responds that,
given the record as a whole, the ALJ reasonably weighed the evidence and concluded that Mata

could perform a limited range of light work. Next, Mata claims that the ALJ failed to obtain the

-9-



10.

11.

The claimant has not engaged in any disqualifying
substantial gainful activity.

The claimant has the following medically determinable
impairment: degenerative disc disease. The claimant's
impairment significantly limits his ability to perform basic
work activities.

The severity of the claimant's impairment does not meet the
requirements or equal the level of severity contemplated
under any listing included in Appendix 1 to Subpart P,
Regulations No. 4.

The claimant's complaints of disabling symptoms and
limitations are not entirely credible for the reasons set forth
in the body of this decision.

After carefully considering the entire record, a finding is
warranted that the claimant's medically determinable
impairments preclude the following work related activities:
lifting more than 20 pounds occasionally or more than 10
pounds frequently with the option to change position
between sitting and standing every 45 minutes to an hour
and crouching, bending or climbing no more than
occasionally. Based on those limitations, the claimant's
residual functional capacity is for a limited range of light
work,

The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant
work.

The claimant is within the "younger" age category.

The claimant is unable to communicate effectively
in English.

The claimant's past relevant work provided some skills, but
those skills do not transfer to other occupations within the
claimant's residual functional capacity.

Considering the effect of the claimant's additional
limitations on the occupational base of jobs contemplated
under rule 202.16 there is still a significant number of jobs
existing in the regional economy that the claimant can

-6-



Mata testified that he was treated by Dr. Nahra after Dr. Gorski moved. (R. at 30.) In
November 1999, Dr. Nahra stated in his progress notes on Mata that Mata could work at medium
level of physical activity. (R. at 353.) An April 2000 EMG Nerve Conduction Study of Mata's
lower extremities was essentially normal. (R. at 412.) Mata submitted evidence that indicated
he saw a chiropractor on a regular basis beginning in November 2000. (R. at 426-56.)

Meyer Klein testified as a VE at Mata’s administrative hearing. The ALJ posed a
hypothetical question, directing the VE to assume an individual with Mata's vocational
characteristics, including the inability to speak, read, or write English, who could: lift up to
twenty pounds occasionally; frequently sit, stand, or walk as required; occasionally bend, crouch,
or climb. (R. at 44.) The VE identified thousands of jobs in the Chicago region the hypothetical
individual could perform. (R. at 45.) When the ALJ added a limitation against twisting of the
trunk, the VE testified that the cafeteria attendant job would be eliminated and the other jobs
would be reduced by fifty percent. (R. at 46.) If the hypothetical individual was able to change
position from sitting to standing and vice versa every forty-five minutes to an hour, in addition to
the limitation set forth in the original hypothetical, the VE testified that the solderer job would be
eliminated and the other jobs would be reduced by twenty-five percent from the original numbers

cited. (id.)

II. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings
The ALJ made the following specific findings (as taken verbatim from her February 22,
2002 decision):
1. The claimant last met the disability insured status
requirement on December 31, 2000.

-5-



Copies have been mailed to:

MR. AGUSTIN G. GARCIA
Attomey at Law

53 West Jackson Boulevard
Suite 730

Chicago, IL 60604

Attorney for Plaintiff

MR. EDWARD J. KRISTOF
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
200 West Adams Street

30th Floor

Chicago, IL 60606

Attorney for Defendant


Step 1: Is the Claimant presently employed? If yes, the claim is
disallowed; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step two.

Step 2: Is the Claimant's impairment "severe," and expected to last
at least 12 months? If no, the claim is disallowed; if yes, the
inquiry proceeds to step three. °

Step 3: Does the impairment meet or exceed one of a list of
specific impairments? If yes, the Claimant is automatically
disabled; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step four.

Step 4: Is the Claimant able to perform her past relevant work
experience? If yes, the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds
to step five where the burden shifts to the Commissioner.

Step 5: Is the Claimant able to perform any other work within her
residual functional capacity in the national economy? If yes, the
claim is denied; if no, the Claimant is disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994). The ALJ
used this five-step process in making her findings, and determined at step three that Mata was not
disabled because the "severity of [his] impairment does not meet the requirements or equal the
level of severity contemplated under any listing included in Appendix 1 to Subpart P, regulations
No. 4." (R. at 19.) Furthermore, relying on Mata’s residual functional capacity and the VE's
testimony, the ALJ concluded, at step five, that Mata was not disabled because "there is still a
significant number of jobs existing in the regional economy that [he] can perform ...." (R. at

20.)

Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act grants federal courts the authority to review
final decisions of the Commissioner with the power to affirm, modify, or reverse, with or without

remand to the Commissioner for a rehearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, the scope of review

-8-



|

nited States District Court, Neptbers District of Minois

aT
Martin C. Ashman : ny ge {Other
02 € 5973 lll DATE 10/24/2003

Manuel Naf Jo Anne B. Barnhart

[In the following box (a) me ey new meee plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.] | | |
Bt
DOCKET ENTRY: idl
a) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above it |
Q) o Brief in support of motion due |
@) Oo Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due___.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon_ssetfor_
(5) QO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] setfor____at
6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to} [set forest for] on_____setfor__——sat_
(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for}on_ at. | U i
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to ny
(9) QO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice

ue costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
yt )

OOFRCP4(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41 1 FRCP41(a)(2).

do = [Other docket entry] | Enter memorandum pinion and order. Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment [15-1] is granted. Plaintiff's motion for ary judgment [12-1] is denied.

(1) mf [For further detail see order attached to the wi minute order.]
‘No notices required, advised in open court. i

No notices required.

| Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

| Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom
Is deputy’s

initials



Whenever the claimant's statements about pain are not substantiated by the objective medical

evidence, the adjudicator must make a finding of credibility of the claimant's statements based on

a consideration of the entire case record. Id. Specifically, the ALJ must consider:

1.

The individual's daily activities;

The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of
the individual's pain or other symptoms;

Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;

The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication the individual takes or has taken to alleviate
pain or other symptoms;

Treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or
has received for relief of pain or other symptoms;

Any measures other than treatment the individual uses or
has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat
on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every
hour, or sleeping on a board); and

Any other factors concerning the individual's functional
limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

Id. Specifically, the policy interpretation states that it is not sufficient for the ALJ to make a

single, conclusory statement that “the individual's allegations have been considered" or that "the

allegations are (or are not) credible." See Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000).

“SSR 96-7p requires the ALJ to consider the claimant's ‘statements about symptoms with the rest

of the relevant evidence in the case record' and to consider the entire case record, including

-1l-


testimony of a medical advisor as required by SSR 83-20, but the Commissioner claims that SSR
83-20 does not apply to this case because Mata was not found to be disabled. Finally, Mata
argues that the hypothetical question posed by the ALJ to the VE did not fully set forth Mata's
impairments. However, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly relied on the VE's
testimony because the hypothetical question was supported by the medical evidence in the record

as a whole. Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.

A. There Is Substantial Evidence In The Record To Support
The ALJ’s Conclusion That Mata Was Not Disabled Because
He Could Perform A Limited Range Of Light Work.
Mata claims that the ALJ improperly discounted his testimony related to pain in that the

ALJ did not discuss all relevant evidence; specifically, Mata claims that the ALJ ignored Mata's
chiropractic care for two years, the testimony of Mata's wife, and the medical evidence contained
in exhibit numbers sixteen (f) and twenty-two (f). Furthermore, Mata states that the evidence
related to the seven factors required by SSR 96-7p has been ignored or misrepresented in the

ALJ's decision.

SSR 96-7 is a policy interpretation ruling that addresses the ALJ's responsibility in
making a credibility finding regarding a claimant's statements about pain or other symptoms and
its functional effects. Hert v. Barnhart, 234 F. Supp. 2d 832, 838 (N.D. Ill. 2002). According to
SSR 96-7p, a claimant's statements about his symptoms is not enough to establish the existence
of a physical impairment, but once it has been determined that an underlying physical or mental
impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the pain, the adjudicator must evaluate the
extent to which the pain limits the claimant's basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).

-10-



perform; specifically, so[l]derer (937 jobs), production
assembler (2,250 jobs), packing line worker (1,875 jobs)
and cafeteria attendant (3,750 jobs).

12. The claimant is not under a "disability" for purposes of
titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.

(R. at 19-20.)

IV. Discussion
Social Security regulations require that a claimant suffer from a disability within the
meaning of the Social Security Act in order to receive DIB. Disability is defined as:

[t]he inability to do any substantial gainful activity’ by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
To meet this definition, you must have a severe impairment(s),°
that makes you unable to do your post relevant work .. . or any
other substantial gainful work that exists in the national

economy. ... If we find that you cannot do your past relevant
work, we will use the same residual functional capacity assessment
and your vocational factors of age, education, and work experience
to determine if you can do other work.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); see also 42 U.S.C. §416(1)(1). Thedetermination of disability involves

both medical and vocational issues and requires a five step process. The five steps are:

5 Substantial Gainful Activity means work that: (1) involves doing significant and
productive physical or mental duties; and (b) is done (or intended) for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1510.

6 A Disabling Impairment is defined as “an impairment (or combination of impairments)
which, of itself, is so severe that it meets or equals a set of criteria in the Listing of Impairments
in appendix 1 of this subpart or which, when considered with your age, education, and work
experience, would result in a finding that you are disabled under § 404.1594." 20 C.F.R.

§ 404,1511(a).

-7-



Mata's injuries initially began in May 1990 when Mata fell at work while running away
from a malfunctioning machine. (R. at 183.) Mata underwent surgical correction of a herniated
disc in 1992, but re-injured his back at work in February 1995. (R. at 326-27.) Mata
subsequently teceived conservative treatments including physical therapy and injections, which
brought little relief. (Id.) In March 1995, Mata's treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Gorski,
teleased Mata to return to light duty. (R. at 280.) :

In August 1995, Mata was seen for a physical capacity evaluation. (R. at 307.)
According to Mata's demonstrated performance, his physical abilities fell between the light and
light-medium work levels. (1d.)

In September 1995, occupational health specialist Dr. Krieger examined Mata ona
follow-up visit and stated Mata could return to his past work if Mata was provided with an
elevated stool. (R. at 305-06.) Dr. Krieger also recommended a lifting restriction of twenty-five
pounds. (R. at 306.) In October 1995, Dr. Krieger suggested that stress relief mats on the
concrete floor at Mata's work station could be of some benefit. (R. at 304.) Mata indicated he
received relief from Flexeril, which had not earlier been effective, and based on this fact,

Dr. Krieger prescribed Flexeril for Mata. (R. at 301, 305.)

In January 1996, Dr. Gorski suggested that further diagnostic studies should be obtained
if Mata wished to consider surgery. (R. at 276.) Alternatively, Mata could live with the
discomfort and limit his activities to light to medium labor. (Id.) In March 1996, Dr. Gorski
Teported that Mata appeared to be managing reasonably well with Naprosyn, and if Mata was
reasonably comfortable with Naprosyn, there was not any obvious immediate need for surgical

intervention. (R. at 275.) In June 1996, Dr. Gorski reported that Mata was able to control his

-3-



numbers sixteen (f) and twenty-two (f). The ALJ recognized that Mata did claim that he suffered
from debilitating back pain, but in evaluating the evidence, the ALJ found that the medical
evidence outweighed Mata's claims. As for Mata's chiropractic care and the testimony of his
wife, both of these pieces of evidence are consistent with Mata's claim of debilitating back pain,
which was discussed by the ALJ. The ALJ does not have to discuss specific reasons for rejecting
Mata's wife's testimony if the issues raised by Mata's wife were discussed when the ALJ
discussed Mata's testimony. See Herron, 19 F.3d at 337 (the ALJ did not err in failing to
mention reasons for rejecting claimant's wife's testimony because the ALJ discussed the issues
taised by the wife's testimony in the decision). Furthermore, Mata's claim was examined using
the guidelines set forth in SSR 96-7p in which the ALJ is not required to discuss Mata's
chiropractic care. There is no reason to think that the ALJ would have come to a different
conclusion had she mentioned Mata's chiropractic care or Mata's wife's testimony, which both
supported Mata's claim of pain, because it is clear that the ALJ rejected Mata's claims of
debilitating pain. Both of these pieces of evidence support only Mata's claim and do not
diminish the weight of the objective medical evidence provided; therefore, the ALJ's decision is

reasonable.

Furthermore, the ALJ did make reference to exhibit numbers sixteen (f) and twenty-two
(f), so it is clear that the ALJ considered these exhibits. Exhibit number sixteen (f) contains the
records from Dr. Gorski that predate February 1995. The ALJ refers to Mata's "lumbar
laminectomy and diskectomy at levels LA/5 in September 1992..." (R. at 17.) Furthermore, the
ALJ makes four other references to Exhibit 16(£); in fact, it is the most relied upon exhibit in the

decision. As for exhibit 22(f), the ALJ makes reference to Dr. Gorski's opinion that no additional

-14-



determine the onset date of disability when the claimant is found to be disabled. Key v.

Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1997).

Mata relies on Floress v. Massanari, 181 F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. Ill. 2002), to illustrate
that the district court may remand the case if the ALJ should have obtained the testimony of a
medical advisor. However, the claimant's argument in Floress was that the onset date of
disability was incorrectly determined. The court noted that if the medical evidence failed to
indicate a precise onset date, the ALJ should refer to a medical advisor to assist in determining
the date. Jd. at 939. In this case, the ALJ did not conclude that Mata was disabled; therefore, it
is not necessary for her to make a determinative finding of the onset date of disability, and she

did not err in failing to obtain the testimony of a medical advisor.

(on The ALJ's Hypothetical Question To The VE Was Reasonable
and Therefore Properly Relied Upon.
Mata's final argument is that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the VE did not take into

account all of Mata's medical restrictions. An ALJ does not have to include every one of the
claimant's impairments in his hypothetical question to the VE regarding the jobs the claimant
could reasonably perform. Ehrhart v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 969 F.2d 534, 540 (7th
Cir. 1992). "All that is required is that the hypothetical question be supported by the medical
evidence in the record." Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, a
showing that "the vocational expert reviewed the claimant's medical evidence and was present
during the claimant's administrative hearing testimony" supports a finding that the hypothetical

question is supported by the medical evidence. Ragsdale v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir.

-16-



Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, which requests this Court to affirm the ALJ's

decision.*

1. Procedural History

On October 25, 2000, Mata applied for DIB and SSI alleging he has been disabled since
February 15, 1995. (R. at 111.) On January 16, 2001, both of Mata's applications were denied,
and on April 4, 2001, Mata's request for reconsideration was also denied. (R. at 64, 72.) On
April 18, 2001, Mata requested a hearing before an ALJ. The ALJ's hearing was conducted on
January 31, 2002, where Mata testified as did Sylvestria Yen, Mata’s wife, and Meyer Klien, a
Vocational Expert ("VE"). (R. at 21-49.) On February 22, 2002, the ALJ issued her decision
which stated that Mata was not disabled and therefore not eligible for DIB or SSI. (R. at 13-20.)
On March 19, 2002, Mata requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. (R. at
9-10.) On August 2, 2002, the Appeals Council denied Mata's request for review and the ALJ's

decision became final. (R. at 7-8.) Mata now seeks judicial review of that decision.

I. Facts and Medical History
Mata was born on February 10, 1957, and was forty-five years of age when the ALJ
issued her decision. (R. at 25.) Mata testified that he has a sixth grade education, was educated
in Mexico, and cannot read English but can write more than his name in English. (R. at 25, 131.)
Mata also testified that he has worked as a machine operator, but indicated that he has been

unable to work since February 1995 due to back pain. (R. at 26, 132.)

* The parties have consented to have this Court conduct any and all proceedings in this
case, including the entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Local R. 73.1(b).

-2-



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
MANUEL MATA, )
Plaintiff, } Case No. 02 C 5973
v. } Magistrate Judge Doe: E TEN
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, ; Manin “ Ashman OCT 2 7 2093
Commissioner of Social Security, )
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Manuel Mata, seeks judicial review of the final decision of Defendant, Jo
Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), who
determined that Mata was not entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB")! and
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)®. Before this Court is
Mata's Motion for Summary Judgment, which requests this Court to reverse and remand the

Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision that Mata was not entitled to DIB or SSI, and the

‘ Disability Insurance Benefits provide a minimum level of benefits to persons under age
65 who: a) have a disability as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505; and b) qualify as fully insured by
having sufficient Social Security earnings as provided in 20 C-F.R. § 404.130. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.320(b).

? Supplemental Security Income provides financial assistance to needy individuals who
are 65 years of age or older, are blind, or are 18 years of age and permanently and totally
disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1382.

3 “Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made
after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action
commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of a notice of such decision .... Such
action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which

the plaintiff resides... ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).



objective medical evidence, and other relevant evidence in coming to a credibility
determination." Hert, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 838-39 (quoting SSR 96-7p {ff 1-4). However, SSR
96-7p does not require an ALJ to analyze and elaborate on each of the seven factors set forth
when making a credibility determination. Brider v. Apfel, 18 F. Supp. 2d 900, 907 (N.D. Ill.
1998). SSR 96-7p requires an ALJ to "build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to
his conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. In assessing alleged contradictions in the ALJ's
determination of credibility, a reviewing court is to apply a commonsensical reading to determine
if the finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Shramek v. Apfel,

226 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2000).

This Court will not overrule the ALJ's credibility findings unless they are patently wrong,
because the ALJ is in the best position to see and hear the witnesses. Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d
424, 431 (7th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the ALJ is afforded special deference. Shramek, 226 F.3d at
811. In this case, the ALJ reasonably weighed the evidence in accordance with SSR 96-7p and
reasonably concluded that Mata could perform a limited range of light work; therefore, the ALJ's

decision is affirmed.

The ALJ concluded that Mata could lift no more than 20 pounds occasionally and more
than 10 pounds frequently with the option to change position between sitting and standing every
45 minutes to an hour; and only occasionally could crouch, bend, or climb. (R. at 16.) This
constitutes a finding of light work. The ALJ made this reasonable determination after reviewing

” Mata's alleged symptoms, the medical evidence, and Mata's daily activities.

-12-



surgery was needed. Dr. Gorski also noted in this exhibit that Mata was unable to tolerate
standing for a full days work and that he has chronic pain. These pieces of information were
addressed elsewhere in the opinion; furthermore, Dr. Gorski's statements are inconsistent with
the other medical evidence in the record, and it is within the ALJ's discretion to accord less
weight to Dr. Gorski's opinion under the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). See
Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (noting that treating physician's opinion will be given controlling
weight unless it is unsupported by medical evidence and inconsistent with other substantial

evidence in the record, such as the claimant's daily activities).

The ALJ reasonably examined the evidence and came to a reasonable conclusion
supported by substantial evidence that Mata could perform light work and was therefore not

disabled.

B. The ALJ Did Not Need To Obtain Testimony Of A Medical
Advisor Under SSR 83-20 Because Mata Was Not Disabled.
Mata argues that the ALJ erred by not obtaining the testimony of a medical advisor. SSR

83-20 governs determination of the onset date of disability in Title H and XVI cases. Perkins v.
Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1997). SSR 83-20 describes the relevant evidence to be
considered in establishing the onset date under the Social Security Act. Jd. at 1295. When
determining that an individual is disabled, the ALJ must also establish the onset date of the
disability, as the onset date is critical in many cases because it can be determinative of whether or

not an individual is eligible for any benefits. Jd. In other words, the ALJ only needs to

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