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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41710

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GROVER EDWARD RYE, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 863

Filed: December 15, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Canyon County. Hon. Molly J. Huskey, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LANSING, Judge

Grover Edward Rye, Jr. was required to register as a sex offender and to update his 

registration information. When he left a homeless shelter, Rye failed to notify the sheriff that he 

had moved. On appeal, Rye argues that because he became homeless, a specific statute 

pertaining to homeless sex offenders governs this case, in lieu of the generally applicable 

registration statute. 

I.

BACKGROUND

Rye was previously convicted of sexual battery of a sixteen or seventeen-year-old. As a 

result, he was required to register as a sex offender. At the time he was placed on the sex 

offender registry, Rye was residing at a homeless shelter. Thereafter, he ceased living at the 
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shelter,1 but failed to notify the sheriff of this change. As a result, he was charged with failure to 

update his registration information; i.e., his address, within two days of moving as required by 

Idaho Code § 18-8309.2 

In an oral motion, Rye argued that he was not subject to criminal liability under Idaho 

Code § 18-8309 because he was homeless. He argued that homeless sex offenders were subject 

to alternative registration requirements set forth in I.C. § 18-8308. The district court rejected this 

argument because I.C. § 18-8308, by its express terms, applies only to a “sexual offender who 

does not provide a physical residence address at the time of registration” and Rye had provided a 

physical address at the time of registration. Thereafter, Rye entered into a conditional plea 

agreement under which the State agreed to dismiss other charges and Rye preserved the right to 

appeal the district court’s interpretation of the statutes. The court accepted the plea and Rye was 

convicted. The district court imposed a unified sentence of three years with one and one-half 

years fixed, but suspended the sentence, placing Rye on probation.

II.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Rye argues that the district court erred in its analysis of the I.C. §§ 18-8308

and 18-8309. Although mindful of the plain language of I.C. § 18-8308, Rye argues that 

requiring compliance with only I.C. § 18-8308 would be better public policy and better 

interpretation of the statutes.

This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State 

v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a 

statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without 

engaging in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 

(1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of 

the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 

978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to 

resort to legislative history, or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 

 

1 Like the district court, we conclude that the reason Rye ceased living at the shelter is 

disputed, but immaterial. 

2 The State also filed other charges that are not at issue in this appeal. 
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3 P.3d at 67. When this Court must engage in statutory construction because an ambiguity 

exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. State v. 

Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). To ascertain the intent, not only 

must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public 

policy behind the statute and its legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give an 

ambiguous statute an interpretation that will not render it a nullity. Id. 

In this case, we are bound by the plain language of the statutes and have no occasion to 

apply the other tools of statutory construction. The statute under which Rye was convicted, I.C. 

§ 18-8309, states: 

If an offender subject to registration changes his or her name, street 

address or actual address, employment or student status, the offender shall appear 

in person within two (2) working days after the change at the office of the sheriff 

of the county where the offender is required to register and notify the sheriff of all 

changes in the information required for that offender in the sex offender registry. 

Under the plain meaning of the statute, a move out of a homeless shelter is a change in residence 

that requires notification of the sheriff.3

 Therefore, Rye violated the statute when he failed to 

notify the sheriff of this change of residence within two days.

Idaho Code § 18-8308(4) states:

A sexual offender who does not provide a physical residence address at 

the time of registration shall report, in person, once every seven (7) days to the 

sheriff of the county in which he resides. Each time the offender reports to the 

sheriff, he shall complete a form provided by the department that includes the 

offender’s name, date of birth, social security number and a detailed description 

of the location where he is residing. The sheriff shall visit the described location 

at least once each month to verify the location of the offender.

(emphasis added). We find no error in the district court’s determination that this provision does 

not apply because Rye provided the address of his physical residence at the time of registration 

and subsequently moved out of that residence. Although the reporting requirements of 

Section 18-8308(4) may have applied to Rye after he became homeless, that statute did not 

relieve him of the obligation to also comply with I.C. § 18-8309 upon leaving his former 

residence.

 

3 Rye does not argue that a homeless shelter is not a residence within the meaning of the 

statute. 
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As stated above, when statutes are unambiguous we are not authorized to resort to other 

tools of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, we are precluded from considering Rye’s 

arguments relating to public policy. Therefore, finding no error, we affirm the judgment of 

conviction.

Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.