RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4256-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

WAYDE M. DELHAGEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted January 25, 2022 – Decided July 25, 2022

Before Judges DeAlmeida and Smith.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 20-

01-0012.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Lori Linskey, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Carey J. Huff, Special Deputy 

Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Wayde M. Delhagen appeals his sentence after pleading 

guilty to a third-degree burglary and four separate fourth-degree stalking 

offenses. He agreed to a sentence of five years' probation, with 364 days in 

the Monmouth County jail, and entry of a stalking restraining order for the 

protection of D.M.M., D.A.M., and C.M.1

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred at sentencing when it 

rejected defendant's application to amend the permanent restraining order to 

which he originally agreed. Defendant proposed an amendment to the 

restraining order that would restrict him from being within 1,500 feet of the 

victims' home.2 Defendant contends the trial court had the power to amend the 

restraining order because it was a term in the plea agreement. The restraining 

order prohibited defendant from entering a restricted zone around the victims' 

home in Neptune. We affirm. 

1

 We use initials to protect the privacy of the victims pursuant to Rule 1:38-3.

2

 The proposed amendment would allow defendant to reside at his aunt's house 

in Neptune, but he would remain at least 1,500 feet from the victims' home. 

Under the current restraining order, defendant is prohibited from entering or 

residing at either the victims' house or his aunt's house. 
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I.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of third-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 

2C:18-2, and four counts of fourth-degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.3 In 

exchange, the State agreed to a sentence of five years' probation subject to a 

term of 364 days in the county jail. Defendant was also required to attend 

mental health and substance abuse treatment, and to comply with all 

accompanying recommendations. Defendant signed and agreed to entry of a 

permanent restraining order pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.1. 4 The order 

contained certain restrictions, including a prohibition against defendant 

3

 During his plea allocution, defendant admitted that he burglarized D.A.M. 

and D.M.M.'s home. He testified that he entered the house through a bedroom 

window and took pieces of D.M.M.'s clothing. Defendant admitted that he did 

not live there, nor did he have permission to enter the victims' home. 

Defendant also admitted to sending multiple unwanted messages and making 

multiple unwanted phone calls to the victims, including: sending a digital 

message to C.M., threatening to rape her; sending multiple messages to J.M. 

containing inappropriate pictures of C.M., her daughter; sending threatening 

messages to J.M., demanding that she answer his communications, or that if 

she did not, "your daughter [C.M.] will pay instead"; sending messages to 

D.A.M. to tell her that he was coming to her house and including an image of 

her house to show that he knew where D.A.M. lived; and sending D.M.M., 

D.A.M.'s mother, unwanted messages that "her daughter [D.A.M.] was selling 

her body." Defendant testified during the allocution that he knew the victims 

would be threatened by these calls and messages. 

4

 Defendant's four stalking pleas operated as an application for a permanent 

restraining order limiting the contact of defendant with the victims. N.J.S.A. 

2c:12-10.1(a). The court conducted the required hearing under N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-10(b) during its plea colloquy with defendant and his counsel. 
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returning to a two city-block restricted zone around the victims' home and 

from having any contact with the victims and their families. The court asked 

defendant whether he understood that he could "no[t] return to the scene of 

[the victims' home]," and that he "agree[d] to consent to that restraining order 

at the time of sentence[ing] . . . ." Defendant responded that he understood.

The court also asked defendant whether he understood the conditions of 

the proposed plea agreement. Defendant replied that he understood. He 

indicated that he reviewed the plea forms with counsel, who answered all of 

his questions, and that he signed the agreement. Defendant stated to the court 

that he understood all of the consequences of his guilty plea. The court found 

defendant entered into the plea "knowingly, voluntarily, and certainly with the 

assistance of competent counsel." The court also found an "adequate factual 

basis" grounded in defendant's testimony, and it accepted the plea. 

At sentencing, defendant proposed an amendment to the agreed upon 

restraining order. 5 Defendant proposed modifying the restraining order to 

prohibit defendant from being within 1,500 feet of D.A.M. and D.M.M.'s 

residence. Defendant argued that his proposed modification gave the victims 

5

 Defendant did not seek to withdraw the guilty plea. Rather, defendant asked 

the court to amend the restraining order and then continue with sentencing. 
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more protection than the agreed upon restraining order, which prohibited 

defendant from entering a two city-block radius around the victims' home. 

The sentencing court denied the application, finding it did not have the 

discretion to modify the restraining order contained in the plea. The court 

found defendant agreed "to the entry of a stalking restraining order as to each 

of the victims, [and] specifically agreed to the terms . . . at the time of the plea 

agreement." The sentencing court concluded that it was not empowered to 

"literally take over the [plea] agreement and fashion its own terms, striking 

from the bargained-for agreement vital terms that provided substantial 

consideration for the initial agreement." The court sentenced defendant in 

accordance with the original plea agreement, including the terms of the 

original restraining order. 

Defendant appeals, contesting the sentencing court's rejection of his 

proposed amendment to the restraining order. 

POINT I 

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT IT 

LACKED DISCRETION TO ALTER THE 

LANGUAGE OF THE STATE'S PROPOSED 

RESTRAINING ORDER WAS [AN] ERROR, AS 

THE PLEA AGREEMENT DID NOT SPECIFY THE 

TERMS OF THE ORDER, AND THE ISSUANCE OF 

AN ORDER OF THE COURT IS A JUDICIAL 
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FUNCTION WHICH MAY NOT BE USURPED BY 

THE EXECUTIVE. 

II.

Plea bargaining is "firmly institutionalized" in New Jersey as a 

"legitimate, respectable and pragmatic tool in the efficient and fair 

administration of criminal justice." State v. Means, 191 N.J. 610, 618 (2007)

(citing State v. Taylor, 80 N.J. 353, 360-61 (1979)). The major benefit of plea 

bargaining is the "mutuality of advantage" it affords the defendant and the 

State. Ibid. The benefits include the defendant reducing their penal exposure 

and avoiding the stress of trial, while simultaneously allowing the State to 

punish wrongdoers and conserve judicial resources. Ibid.

All "plea-bargain jurisprudence recognizes the important interest of 

finality to pleas." Id. at 619 (quoting State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 416 

(1990)). Where a defendant does not move to withdraw their guilty plea, the 

terms and conditions of a plea agreement "must be meticulously carried out." 

State v. Jones, 66 N.J. 524, 530 (1975). A plea bargain is governed by 

contract principles and "informed by basic principles of contract law." Means, 

191 N.J. at 622. Ultimately, the plea-bargaining process is guided by "notions 
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of fairness," which "apply to each side in the plea bargaining process." State 

v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 134 (2003). 

Under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.1(a), a judgment of conviction for stalking 

operates "as an application for a permanent restraining order" limiting 

defendant's contact to their victim. A permanent restraining order hearing

shall be held at the time of the verdict or guilty plea—not at the time of 

sentencing. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.1(b).

III.

We note that defendant did not seek to withdraw from the plea 

agreement entirely. Instead, defendant sought leave to modify one term, the 

permanent restraining order. The sole issue before us is whether the 

sentencing court should have modified the terms of the valid plea agreement. 

On this record, the clear answer is no.

Where a defendant does not move to withdraw a guilty plea, the court 

may vacate the plea sua sponte if it determines that any of the plea agreement 

terms are unfair. R. 3:9-3(e). However, nowhere in Rule 3:9-3(e) is a trial 

court permitted to vacate or amend a plea. Rather, the only remedy to address 

an invalid plea agreement is to vacate the entire guilty plea and restore "both 
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parties to their positions prior to the trial court's acceptance of the plea." State 

v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218, 232 (2013). 

The sentencing court did not err in refusing to amend the restraining 

order contained in the plea agreement, as there was no factual or legal 

predicate to do so. The court recognized that if a plea is not vacated, then "the 

terms and the conditions of this plea bargain must be meticulously carried 

out." The trial court only had the power to vacate the entire plea, an option 

defendant rejected at sentencing. 

Defendant argues that the plea did not specify the precise terms of the 

order. Defendant therefore posits the sentencing court had the ability to "alter" 

the restraining order, essentially because the order was a blank canvas at 

sentencing. We disagree, as the record shows there was specificity in the 

restraining order. Defendant agreed to the restraints against entering two city 

blocks in Neptune, knowing they would prohibit him from living at his aunt's 

house.6 Defendant concedes that the restraining order terms "[were] presented 

. . . as . . . take it or leave it," and he took it. The terms and conditions of this 

guilty plea, agreed to by the parties and the court, "must be meticulously 

6

 Defendant has not argued before the sentencing court, or before us, that he is 

without housing options. The record shows defendant had an out-of-state 

address at the time of his plea and that he has alternate living arrangements if 

he cannot live with his aunt. 
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carried out." See Jones, 66 N.J. at 530; See also State v. Pennington, 154 N.J.

344, 362 (1998). We discern no reason to disturb the sentencing court's well 

supported order. 

To the extent that we have not addressed any remaining arguments by 

defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.