verification” of an inmate's membership in a “faith group" and the requirements of that faith. One
can imagine various ways in which these matters could be verified, including by a plausible affidavit
provided by the inmate himself. Nevertheless, it was apparently so interpreted by Chaplain
Peterson, and when Plaintiff did not present the requested proof, his request was denied. Such
a reading of the regulation could well run afoul of the First Amendment, whose protections are not
limited to members of established denominations, Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Security,
489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989), or, for that matter, to members of religious groups having clergy. See,
e.g., Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2000)(inmate's idiosyncratic sabbath observance, based
on personal interpretations of Old Testament passages, entitled to First Amendment protection).
Although input from a member of the clergy may be useful in assessing the sincerity of an inmate's
beliefs, the state may not rely on a clergy person's determination as to whether an inmate is a
member of a "faith group," entitling him to First Amendment recognition of religious practices
associated with that group. See Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 1999)(plaintiff, who
considered himself Jewish, was entitled to receive kosher diet even though prison chaplain, a rabbi,
found that plaintiff had not shown that he was a Jew under Jewish religious law). Nor would a
clergy person's interpretation of a faith group's religious requirements be dispositive. An
individual's understanding of the demands of his or her religion is entitled to First Amendment
protection, even if that understanding is not shared by others professing the same religion.
Thomas v. Review Bad. of indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).

In any event, even if the verification requirement were constitutional in the context of prison
administration, its alleged inconsistent application is not. If other inmates are entitled to declare
themselves to be "Hebrew Israelites" and receive a vegetarian diet without further verification,
Plaintiff should have been able to declare his Vaishnavite affiliation and receive the same
treatment:

In providing [inmates a reasonable opportunity to practice their religion] the efforts

4


not allege the stated reason for this "notice for disposal,” but the court infers that inmates were no
longer permitted to have shavers with trimmers. On December 11, Plaintiff sent a written
response to the notice asking that the "razorhead" be returned to him and the rest of the shaver
be destroyed. Plaintiff explains that he did not remove the trimmer himself because IDOC
regulations forbid inmates to modify items purchased from the commissary. On December 20,
2001, an officer in the personal property office advised Plaintiff that his response was not yet in
their file. Plaintiff never received a response to his request, nor did he receive the razorhead from
his shaver.

On December 26, 2001, Plaintiff ordered a new shaver from the Stateville commissary.
Plaintiff received the new shaver on February 22, 2002, after his transfer to Menard. Plaintiff
discovered that the new shaver was identical to the old one except that the trimmer had been
removed. Thus, because the trimmer could have been removed from his old shaver, he had been
compelled to buy a new one unnecessarily.

Having not yet heard a response to his original request, Plaintiff filed a written grievance
on February 14, 2002. His correctional counselor responded on March 12, 2002, stating that his
grievance could not be resolved at Menard since it involved property confiscated at Stateville. On
March 14, 2002, Plaintiff sent a written inquiry to his counselor asking what he needed to do to
proceed with his grievance. After receiving no response, Plaintiff finally filed an appeal with the
ARB on June 16, 2002, which was rejected as untimely.

Plaintiff alleges that at the time his shaver was confiscated, other inmates had been allowed

to keep their shavers with trimmers. The razorhead to his old shaver had value (razorheads are

s IDOC regulations provide that when unauthorized or excess property is confiscated,
an inmate is given 30 days in which to request that the property be destroyed, that it be made
available for pickup at the institution, or that it be shipped out of the institution at the inmate's
expense. If the inmate notifies officials in writing that he has filed a grievance concerning the
confiscation, the property is to be held pending resolution of the grievance. 20 Ill. Admin.
Code § 501.230


Plaintiff seeks an injunction that will protect his rights at IDOC institutions other than
Stateville. Defendant Snyder would be a proper party to such an injunction. Nevertheless, he will
not be retained as a party for this purpose. Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to Menard
Correctional Center on January 25, 2002. He does not allege that his dietary needs have not been
metat Menard. No system-wide policy is alleged, and it appears from the IDOC regulation quoted
above that requests for religious diets are considered on a case-by-case basis by the warden and
institutional chaplain.

A plaintiff seeking an injunction "must show a significant likelihood and immediacy of
sustaining some direct injury." Sierakowski v. Ryan, 223 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2000)(citing City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)). In Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031 (7th Cir. 1993),
the plaintiff claimed his property had been confiscated during cell "shakedowns" at Stateville.
Although no longer at Stateville, he sought injunctive relief against IDOC, claiming that IDOC
procedures governing shakedowns were neither adequate nor followed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants, finding that plaintiff's conclusory
assertion of a substantial likelihood of future harm was not enough to confer standing to seek an
injunction against IDOC. Here, the bare possibility that the warden of another IDOC institution will
refuse to accommodate Plaintiff's religious dietary restrictions is similarly speculative, and does not
warrant retaining Snyder as a Defendant.‘

E. Official Capacity Claims

Snyder must be dismissed for the additional reason that Plaintiff has sued Snyder solely

4 In Goodman v. Carter, No. 2000 C 948, 2001 WL 755137 (N.D.IIl. 2001), a suit
brought by an adherent of Wicca seeking, among other things, a vegetarian diet, Judge Lindberg
declined to dismiss plaintiff's official-capacity claims for injunctive relief, stating that the plaintiff
should be able to obtain an injunction binding on the state, rather than only IDOC personnel at
Stateville, so that he would not have to bring a fresh action to establish his rights against a different
warden in the event he were transferred to another institution. Here, however, Plaintiff has already
been transferred without encountering the same difficulties, arguing against the need for a system-
wide injunction


of prison administrators, when assessed in their totality, must be evenhanded.
Prisons cannot discriminate against a particular religion. [Citations] The rights of
inmates belonging to minority or non-traditional religions must be respected to the
same degree as the rights of those belonging to larger and more traditional
denominations.
Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1991).* Taking plaintiff's allegations as true,
Defendants’ refusal to allow plaintiff the diet given to the "Hebrew Israelites" appears to have been
unreasonable and discriminatory. Plaintiff has stated a claim under the First Amendment.

Gc. Plaintiff's First Amendment Claim Against
Defendants Ruffin, Tucker and Snyder

Plaintiff may proceed, however, only against Chaplain Peterson and Warden Briley, the
officials who actually made the decision to deny plaintiff a vegetarian diet. Defendant Ruffin, the
grievance officer, merely recommended to Britey that plaintiff's grievance be denied. There is no
constitutional right to a grievance procedure, Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir.
1996), so her recommendation that the grievance be denied was not a new constitutional violation.
The same is true of Defendant Tucker, who recommended to Defendant IDOC Director Donald
Snyder on behalf of the ARB that the denial be upheld. While Snyder himself presumably had the
power to reverse Briley's decision, and so can be said to be responsible for the continuing
infringement of Plaintiff's rights, the Court of Appeals has held that the director of a state
correctional agency is not personally responsible for any constitutional violation within the prison
system solely because the grievance procedure made him aware of it and he failed to intervene.

Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1006 (7th Cir. 1982). These Defendants are accordingly

dismissed.
D. Injunctive Relief
8 The court notes that while Vaishnava Hinduism is little-known in this country, it is

not an obscure or novel sect. Vaishnava (the worship of Vishnu as the prime deity) is a major
religion in India, and information concerning its beliefs and practices is readily available in libraries
and on the Internet. See, e.g., http//www.vaishnava.com.

5



willing to purchase the same or a similar calculator that had been modified to disable the computer
interface. Defendant Sheila M. Love, writing for the ARB, with Defendant Snyder's approval,
denied Plaintiffs appeal. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have thereby deprived him of the
“opportunity and joy of learning calculator programming and finding solutions for some complex
mathematical problems." Complaint {| 17.

It goes without saying that Plaintiff has no constitutional right to purchase or possess a
caiculator, any claim must be based on disparate treatment. Plaintiff does not allege that the
refusal to sell him the calculator was a result of racial or other class-based discrimination. It is
possible, under certain circumstances, to state a claim under the Equal Protection clause as a
“class of one,” where plaintiff alleges that he has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference in treatment Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2001).
Even if Plaintiff could state a claim under this theory, however, he has sued the wrong Defendants.
Plaintiff does not deny the truth of Ruffin's statement that "the graphic calculators have computer
hookup availability and will no longer be sold.” The court infers that by the time Plaintiff's grievance
reached Ruffin (and after her, Defendants Briley, Love and Snyder) the calculator was equally
unavailable to all prisoners, perhaps in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Defendants had no obligation to permit Plaintiff to buy an article not available to other inmates or
to make arrangements for him to purchase a calculator having the computer interface specially
disabled. This claim is accordingly dismissed.

B. Electric shaver

Plaintiff alleges that he had purchased a Norelco shaver with trimmer from the Stateville
commissary. On December 10, 2001, while Plaintiff was detained in segregation he received a

“notice for disposal” of his shaver issued by unknown-named Defendant "John Doe." Plaintiff does


ll.
‘Minste Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge or
Magistrate Judge

Sitting Judge if Other

REBECA R. PALLMEYER
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER

VW 2002 C 6807 DATE| January 21, 2003

CASE
TITLE

Shree M. Agrawal (IDOC #K-69770) v. Kenneth R. Briley, et al.

MOTION:

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the
nature of the motion being presented.)

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1). Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due.

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due

(4) QO Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for} on set for at

(7) Oo Trial(set for/re-set for] on at

8) a) (Bench/Sury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) 0 This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

CG FRCP4(m) O General Rule 21 © FRCP41(a)(1) 1 FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) (Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. As plaintiff has paid the
filing fee, the clerk shall file the complaint. After initial review the court determines that Plaintiff
may proceed with his religious discrimination claim against Defendants Briley and Peterson. All
other claims and Defendants are dismissed. The clerk shall issue summons to Defendants Briley
and Peterson and the U.S. Marshal is appointed to serve them or obtain waiver of service as
provided by Rule 4(d), Fed.R.Civ.P. Defendants shall be served with a copy of the Memorandum
Opinion and Order together with the summons and complaint.

(dil) For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.

INo notices required, advised in open court.
INo notices required.
umber of notices
INotices mailed by judge’s staff.
INotified counsel by telephone. q
Y__ [Pocketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

[Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

‘ourtroom: v4 date mailed notice

Kicputy’s

initials

fone a

© ‘Datestime receivedin
central Clerk’s Office

mailing deputy initials



sold separately at the commissary), and could have been removed in less than a minute. Because
he was deprived of a shaver for a time, Plaintiff had to let his beard grow, subjecting him to ridicule,
and when he was finally able to shave it off he had to pay for a new ID photograph.

Plaintiff has no equal protection claim, because nothing in the complaint suggests that
“John Doe" intentionally singled out Plaintiff for disparate treatment, whether because of Plaintiff's
race, religion, or even his individual personal characteristics. See Schroeder v. Hamilton School
District, 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 435, 71 USLW 3155 (Oct. 21,
2002). Simply put, the failure of "John Doe" to do something not provided for in the regulations—to
return a part of the shaver to Plaintiff—does not indicate the kind of discriminatory animus that
would support an equal protection claim.

Plaintiff's claim for the deprivation of his property as such—"John Doe's" failure to return
the razorhead as requested—does not state a federal constitutional claim. Although state officials
may not deprive prisoners of property without due process of law, Plaintiff may not sue "John Doe"
in federal court under § 1983 because Plaintiff has an adequate state remedy in the Illinois Court
of Claims. Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1999); Stewart, 5 F.3d at 1036.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's First Amendment claim against Defendants Peterson and Briley shall proceed.
All other claims and Defendants are dismissed with prejudice, except that Plaintiff's claim with
respect to the disposal of his electric shaver is dismissed without prejudice to any remedy he may
have in the Illinois state courts.

ENTER:

. Belteg-
Dated: January 20, 2003 Que.

REBECCA R. PAYCMEYE
United States DistkictJudge

10



in his official capacity. A suit against a state official in his official capacity is effectively a suit
against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). A state is not a "person"
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,
68-69 (1997), Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 8181 (7th Cir. 2000), and the Eleventh
Amendment generally bars suits in federal court against state officials in their official capacities
when the state is the real party in interest. Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 717 (7th Cir. 2002)
There is an exception to that rule where a state official is sued in his or her official capacity to
enjoin the official's prospective violation of federal law, id. at 717-18; Ameritech Corp. v. McCann,
297 F.3d 582, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2002), but, as stated above, injunctive relief would be inappropriate
here. Even if the court were to construe Plaintiff's claim as brought against Snyder in his individual
capacity, such a claim would be dismissed for the reasons set forth above. All Official-capacity
claims against other Defendants are dismissed as well.
Plaintiff's Property Claims

A Calculator

Plaintiff alleges that between August 23 and October 30, 2001, he unsuccessfully sought
to buy a graphic calculator from the commissary that he alleges other inmates were permitted to
purchase. On October 30, 2001, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining of this disparate treatment.
His counselor, Louis Brick, who is not named as a Defendant, falsely told him the calculator was
not yet available. At the next evel, Defendant Ruffin recommended denial of Plaintiff's grievance,
stating that "the graphic calculators have computer hookup availability and will no longer be sold,"
and that “the list of items sold by commissary is generated by the Director's office and is outside
the jurisdiction of this facility." Plaintiff asserts that the second statement was false. Defendant
Briley concurred in the denial of the grievance, and Plaintiff appealed to the ARB, stating that the

graphic calculator sold to other inmates also had computer hookup availability, and that he was


day by Stateville's warden, Defendant Kenneth Briley. On February 25, 2002, Plaintiff's final appeal
was rejected by Defendant Nancy S. Tucker on behalf of the IDOC Administrative Review Board
(ARB) with the concurrence of the Director of IDOC, Defendant Donald N, Snyder, Jr.

B. Plaintiff's First Amendment Claim Against Defendants Peterson and Briley

A prisoner retains his or her First Amendment right to practice his religion, subject to prison
regulations that do not discriminate between religions and are reasonably related to legitimate
penological objectives. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1999).* It is settled that
observance of religiously mandated dietary restrictions is a form of religious practice protected by
the First Amendment. Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1990)(citing cases).

IDOC’s handling of inmates’ requests for special diets for religious reasons is addressed
by 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 425.70:

A committed person may submit a written request to the facility chaplain to receive

an alternative diet for specific religious reasons. The request must contain written

verification that the committed person is a member of a faith group that requires

adherence to a particular diet and the specific requirements of the diet. Eligibility to

receive an alternative diet for specific religious reasons shall be determined by the

facility chaplain who shall ordinarily confer with a religious leader or faith

representative of the faith group at issue. The facility chaplain and the religious

leader or faith representative may interview the committed person.

This regulation does not expressly require that a recognized clergy member provide the "written

2 Going beyond the requirements of the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq. (RLUIPA), declares that institutions
receiving federal financial assistance may not "impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise" of an institutionalized person unless it is the “least restrictive means" of furthering "a
compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA provides that "a person may
assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). Plaintiff is no longer at
Stateville, and it is unclear whether this provision of RLUIPA authorizes a claim for damages as well
as injunctive relief. To the court's knowledge, no court has so held, although Judge Crabb's recent
opinion in Charles v. Verhagan, 220 F.Supp.2d 937, 953-54 (W.D. Wis. 2002), finding the
defendants had qualified immunity from monetary damages, implies that damages are available.
Because the court concludes that Plaintiff has stated a claim under the First Amendment without
the benefit of RLUIPA, it is unnecessary to address the question at this stage.

3


will not receive adequate nutrition if he only eats those portions of the normal prison diet that are
not religiously forbidden to him.

On January 1, 2001, Plaintiff submitted a written request to the chaplain at Stateville,
Defendant Peterson, asking to receive the special diet served to members of the "Hebrew Israelite"
faith. This is a vegetarian diet conforming to Plaintiff's religious requirements although it does not
include milk products, which Plaintiff's faith permits him to eat. Plaintiffs request was denied. On
January 21, 2001, Plaintiff submitted a "Religious Diet Agreement Form," stating that he is a Hindu
and requesting the Hebrew Israelite diet, but on January 30, 2001, his request was again refused.
Peterson told Plaintiff that he could receive the Hebrew Israelite diet only if he changed his listed
religious preference to Hebrew Israelite. Plaintiff filled out the appropriate form, changing his
religious preference from "unknown" to “Hindu.”

On January 31, 2001, Plaintiff filed a formal grievance. He was told that his grievance was
pending before the Religious Review Board, but there was no decision by the Board.' On
March 17, 2001, Peterson told Plaintiff that "it will be helpful if you can have a representative of
[the] Hindu Temple that you came from to write a letter indicating a vegan diet is a requirement of
your religious practice." On March 18, 2001, Plaintiff's institutional counselor told him that, “per
Chaplain Peterson," Plaintiff was required to obtain a letter from his "church, mosque or clergy from
a Hindu Temple" stating that he is a practicing Hindu and that a vegetarian diet is required.
Peterson never informed Plaintiff how to contact a Hindu priest to obtain such a letter. No such
verification was required of those claiming to be of the "Hebrew Israelite" faith

Nine months after it was filed, Plaintiff's grievance was denied on September 20, 2001, by

a grievance officer at Stateville, Defendant Carmen Ruffin, and the denial was approved the next

' IDOC regulations provide for a multi-denominational Religious Practice Advisory

Board comprised of legal, administrative, and chaplaincy staff to make recommendations
regarding, among other things, prisoners' requests for religious diets. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 425.40.

2



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SHREE M. AGRAWAL,
Plaintiff,
No. 02 C 6807

v.
Judge Rebecca R. Pa!llmeyer

DOCKETED

JAN 2 2 2003

KENNETH R. BRILEY, CHAPLAIN PETERSON,
GEORGIA SCHOENAUER, CARMEN RUFFIN,
NANCY S. TUCKER, SHEILA M. LOVE,
DONALD N. SNYDER, JR., JOHN DOE,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Shree M. Agrawal, a prisoner in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC) at Menard Correctional Center, has filed this pro se civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant prison officials violated his constitutional rights during his
incarceration at Stateville Correctional Center. The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, requires the court to review complaints filed by prisoners against governmental officials
and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.
In determining whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court
accepts the allegations of the complaint as true and considers them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff asserts three
claims, one pertaining to the practice of his religion and two relating to the deprivation of certain
items of personal property.

Plaintiff's First Amendment Claim
A. Facts
Plaintiff is a Vaishnava Hindu whose religious beliefs require that he abstain from meat and

eggs as well as food contaminated by contact with them. Plaintiff requires a special diet, since he