alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Memorandum of Amendments to the Company's 2003 Directors Stock Plan



 Exhibit 10-b-16 
 ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC. 
 MEMORANDUM OF AMENDMENTS 
 TO THE ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC. 
 2003 DIRECTORS STOCK PLAN 
 Amend Section 8(a) of the Plan to read in its entirety as follows: 
  

	 	 (a)
	 Minimum Award. 


  

	 	 (i)
	 Each person who is a Non-Employee Director shall receive up to fifty percent (50%) of his or her annual retainer fee for service on the Board (or the
applicable pro rata portion thereof) by delivery of a whole number of Shares determined by dividing the portion of the retainer fee to be paid in Shares by the Fair Market Value of the Shares on the date when payment is made (or on the next
preceding day that Shares were traded if they were not traded on such date) and rounding up to the next higher whole number. Such percentage of the annual retainer fee to be paid in Shares (Annual Retainer Share Amount) shall be fixed from time to
time by the Board pursuant to a resolution adopted by a majority of the whole Board. Upon the delivery of Shares under this Section 8, the recipients shall have the entire beneficial ownership interest in, and all rights and privileges of a
shareowner as to, those Shares, including the right to vote the Shares and to receive dividends thereon. Each Non-Employee Director may elect each year, not later than December 31 of the year preceding the year in which the annual retainer
award of Shares is to be made, to receive the award in the form of Restricted Stock Units in a number equal to the Annual Retainer Share Amount. 


  

	 	 (ii)
	 On and after the first day of Rockwell Automation’s 2004 fiscal year, each Non-Employee Director shall receive the Shares to which he or she is entitled
pursuant to Section 8(a)(i) on the first business day of Rockwell Automation’s 2004 fiscal year and each subsequent fiscal year (or, if later, the first business day during that fiscal year on which such person serves as a Non-Employee
Director). 


 Amend the heading for Section 8 of the Plan by deleting the phrase “Restricted Shares” and
inserting in lieu thereof the term “Shares”.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Postal Service

# AGENCY:

                        Postal ServiceTM.                    

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

# DATES:

*Date of required notice:*                         August 12, 2021.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Sean Robinson, 202-268-8405.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The United States Postal Service® hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on July 29, 2021, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a                     *USPS Request to Add Priority Mail Contract 715 to Competitive Product List.*                     Documents are available at                     *www.prc.gov,*                     Docket Nos. MC2021-117, CP2021-119.                

Sean Robinson,

Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.

[FR Doc. 2021-17163 Filed 8-11-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 29, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-50336 Summary Calendar

ARNULFO CHAPA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus R.P. INGRAM; BOB INGRAM REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS; R.E. JENKINS, JR.; ROGELIO ESTRADA; KAREN DUTY; ISABEL TREVINO; KAMAL K. PATEL; MANUELA ESTRADA; NELDA TREVINO; THREE JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANIES, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 1:03-CV-453-JN

-------------------- Before JONES, BARKSDALE and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Arnulfo Chapa seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this appeal from the district court’s dismissal of his civil suit, which invoked diversity jurisdiction and raised claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) as well as state law. The district court denied Chapa’s motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal and certified that the appeal was not taken in good faith. Chapa challengesNo. 04-50336 -2- the district court’s certification decision pursuant to Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Chapa first argues that he should not be considered a citizen of Texas, the state where he lived prior to his incarceration, because he does not intend to reside there once he has served his sentence. Chapa’s conclusional assertions on this issue are insufficient to rebut the presumption that he is a citizen of Texas. See Polakoff v. Henderson , 370 F. Supp. 690, 693 (N.D. Ga. 1973), aff’d , 488 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1974) (adopting district court’s reasoning). Chapa’s argument that he raised a viable RICO claim is likewise unavailing. Chapa’s assertions are insufficient to show a continuing enterprise, which is a necessary element of a RICO claim. See Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp. , 818 F.2d 423, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1987). Chapa has not shown that he will raise a nonfrivolous issue on appeal or that the district court erred in certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, Chapa’s motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED and his appeal is
DISMISSED. Baugh , 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Certificationof the Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to**

**18U.S.C. Section 1350,**

**as****Adopted Pursuant to**

**Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connectionwith the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of PRAECIS PHARMACEUTICALSINCORPORATED (the “Company”) for the quarter ended September 30, 2005 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),I, Kevin F. McLaughlin, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, herebycertify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

1.  TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Kevin F. McLaughlin |                    |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Name:                   | Kevin F. McLaughlin     |
| Title:                  | Chief Executive Officer |
| Date:                   | November 4, 2005   |
|                         |                         |  |

 

----
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16
- 4730

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. ANDREW DAVID OWENS , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. James C. Fox , Senior District Judge. ( 5:13

- cr - 00069

- F

- 1 )

Submitted : June 29, 2017 Decided: July 14, 2017

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. Terry F. Rose, Smithfield, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May

- Parker, First Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appelle e.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Andrew David Owens appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 21 months’ imprisonment followed by 18 years’ supervised relea se. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Webb , 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v. Th ompson , 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Thompson , 595 F.3d at 546

- 47. “A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post

- conviction sentence, but it still must provide a sta tement of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson , 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted). Owens claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain the reasons for imposing the ter m of supervised release

. Having reviewed the record, we find that the district court’s explanation, although brief, was sufficien t

.3 Accordingly, we reject Owens’ challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his revocation sentence and affirm. We den y Owens’ pro se motion to file a supplemental brief and to reconsider the order denying Owens’ motion to replace counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this Court an d argument would not aid the decisional
process. AFFIRMED
#### Cornelia Wholesale Grocery Company *v.*Hogsed Brothers.

April 17, 1915.

Hill, J.

Suit was brought, alleging that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $174.16, with interest from July 2, 1912, on an open account a copy of which was attached to the petition. The debit side of this account covered about four pages of typewritten matter, which, under the headings “Date,” “Amount,” “Days,” contained entries not intelligible on inspection by this court. There was also attached a typewritten page of credits, equally lacking in clearness. The total of the debits claimed appeared to aggregate $563, including a charge for interest. The total of the credits, including an allowance for interest, appeared to aggregate $389.20. The case being in default, a verdict was taken in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant for $389.20, with 7 per cent, interest thereon from July 5, 1912, to the date of the verdict, which was March 3, 1913. Judgment was entered accordingly. On November 10, 1913, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the verdict and judgment by changing the finding from the amount stated to $174.16, with interest at 7 per cent, from July 2, 1912. *Eeld,*that under such facts there was no error in overruling the motion to amend. The plaintiff having apparently taken a verdict by default, not for the amount alleged to be due it, but for the amount of credits which appeared in its open account to be due its adversary, it could not at a later term of court, in effect, take an entirely new verdict for an amount which would have been the difference between the aggregate of the debits set out in its account against its adversary and the credits due to such adversary, with interest from an earlier date than that specified in the verdict, under the. name of amending the verdict and judgment.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Fish, G. J., absent.*

Lumpkin, Beck, and Atkinson, JJ.,

concur in the foregoing ruling on the facts stated; but do not go to the extent of holding broadly that if a petition. claimed a specific amount, and the jury found more than was claimed, the plaintiff could not write off the excess, or have a verdict and judgment amended for that purpose. But the facts of this case do not require such a holding.

*368Motion to amend verdict. Before' Judge Jones. Habersham superior court. March 11, 1914.

*John J. Eimsey*and *Samuel Kimzey,*for plaintiff.

*J. W. II. Underwood*and *W. A. Charters,*for defendants.
Exhibit 32.2

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

|   | Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 I hereby certify that: |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | I have reviewed the Annual Report on Form 10-K; |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|

 

to the best of my knowledge, this Annual Report on Form 10-K (i) fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d); and (ii) the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of Tengasco, Inc. and its subsidiaries during the period covered by this Report.

 

Dated: March 16, 2009

 

|   | s/Mark A. Ruth |
|--------|----------------|

|   | Mark A. Ruth, |
|--------|---------------|

|   | Principal Financial and Accounting Officer |
|--------|--------------------------------------------|
Exhibit 10.3


 


WAIVER


 


In
consideration for the benefits I will receive as a result of my employer’s
participation in the United States Department of the Treasury’s TARP Capital
Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily waive any claim against the United States
or my employer for any changes to my compensation or benefits that are required
to comply with the regulation issued by the Department of the Treasury as
published in the Federal Register on October 20, 2008.


 


I acknowledge
that this regulation may require modification of the compensation, bonus,
incentive and other benefit plans, arrangements, policies and agreements
(including so-called “golden parachute” agreements) that I have with my
employer or in which I participate as they relate to the period the United
States holds any equity or debt securities of my employer acquired through the
TARP Capital Purchase Program.


 


This waiver
includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United States or any state
related to the requirements imposed by the aforementioned regulation, including
without limitation a claim for any compensation or other payments I would
otherwise receive, any challenge to the process by which this regulation was
adopted and any tort or constitutional claim about the effect of these
regulations on my employment relationship.


 


[signatures begin on following page]


 


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2
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED January 19, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-60268 Summary Calendar

HAREGEWOIN MAMO DESTA, Petitioner,

versus JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

-------------------- Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A75 356 010

-------------------- Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Haregewoin Mamo Desta petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ’s) decision to deny her application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as well as the BIA’s rejection of her claim under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Desta argues that the BIA erred in determining that she had not established a well-foundedNo. 03-60268 -2- fear of future persecution or that it was more likely than not that she would be tortured if she were returned to Ethiopia. This court will uphold the factual findings that an alien is not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Chun v. INS , 40 F.3d 76, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1994). The substantial evidence standard requires that the decision be based on the evidence presented and that the decision be substantially reasonable. Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS , 78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996). The BIA’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, and the record does not compel a contrary conclusion as to either Desta’s INA claims or her CAT claim. See id. Accordingly, Desta’s petition for review is DENIED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                             829
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   829
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<BONDS>                                              0
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<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        10,025
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     2,397
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,015
<CGS>                                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,116
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (3,101)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (3,101)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
II

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1304

For the relief of Belinda McGregor.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 22, 1997

Mr. HATCH introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

For the relief of Belinda McGregor.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENCE.

4 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for pur5 poses of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

6 1101 et seq.), Belinda McGregor shall be held and consid7 ered to have been lawfully admitted to the United States

8 for permanent residence as of the date of the enactment

9 of this Act upon payment of the required visa fee.

10 SEC. 2. REDUCTION OF NUMBER OF AVAILABLE VISAS.

11 Upon the granting of permanent residence to Belinda

12 McGregor as provided in this Act, the Secretary of State
2

S 1304 IS

1 shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by one number

2 during the current fiscal year the total number of immi3 grant visas available to natives of the country of the alien’s

4 birth under section 203(a) of the Immigration and Nation5 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1153 (a)).

Æ
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kenroy Jones, Appellant.

[946 NYS2d 885]

*1078Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Freehill, J.), rendered April 2, 2010, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.

Ordered that Steven A. Feldman’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted, and he is directed to turn over all papers in his possession to new counsel assigned herein; and it is further,

Ordered that Richard L. Herzfeld, Esq., 104 W 40th Street, 20th Floor, New York, N.Y., 10018, is assigned as counsel to perfect the appeal; and it is further,

Ordered that the People are directed to furnish a copy of the certified transcript of the proceedings to the new assigned counsel; and it is further,

Ordered that new counsel shall serve and file a brief on behalf of the appellant within 90 days of the date of this decision and order on motion and the People shall serve and file their brief within 120 days of the date of this decision and order on motion; by prior decision and order on motion of this Court, the defendant was granted leave to prosecute the appeal as a poor person, with the appeal to be heard on the original papers (including the certified transcript of the proceedings) and on the briefs of the parties, who were directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other.

Upon this Court’s independent review of the record, we conclude that nonfrivolous issues exist, including, but not necessarily limited to, whether the defendant’s right to counsel was adversely affected by his attorney taking a position adverse to him *(see People v Graves,*95 AD3d 1034 [2012]; *People v Vega,*88 AD3d 1022, 1022 [2011]; *People v Dixon,*63 AD3d 957, 957 [2009]). Accordingly, assignment of new counsel is warranted *(see People v Stokes,*95 NY2d 633, 638-639 [2001]). Angiolillo, J.P., Florio, Leventhal and Lott, JJ., concur.