fails to produce any evidence that she received a decreased credit
score or that it has harmed her in any way.
c. Causation

Because Ruffin-Thompkins has failed to adduce any evidence of
actual damages, she obviously cannot show a causal link between the
inaccuracy in her report and her alleged damages. Even if Ruffin-
Thompkins had shown damages, however, her claim would have been
extinguished by her failure to raise a genuine issue of material
fact on the causation element. Under the FCRA, she must produce
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the
inaccuracy in her credit report was a substantial factor that
brought about damages. Philbin, 101 F.3d at 968. Ruffin-
Thompkins, however, presents no evidence whatsoever that the
inaccuracy in her report was a factor at all in her alleged
damages.

Having failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on
three out of the four elements of a § 1681le(b) claim, Ruffin-
Thompkins’s claim cannot stand and Experian’s motion for summary
judgement must be granted.

2. Section 1681i (a)

Ruffin-Thompkins also asserts that Experian is liable under
§ 1681i(a). That section states in relevant part:

If the completeness or accuracy of any item of
information contained in a consumer’s file at a

consumer reparting agency is disputed by the
consumer and the consumer notifies the agency

-13-


2003, that representative generated a Consumer Dispute Verification
form (the “CDV”), and sent it to US Bank. A CDV identifies the
consumer and the basis for the consumer's dispute and. asks the
creditor to verify or amend the reported information. In this
case, the CDV described the dispute as “claims company will change
or delete.” US Bank returned the CDV to Experian on January 9,
2003, stating that the account had been closed at the customer’s
request and that it had a zero balance. US Bank did not delete the
account. On January 16, 2003, Experian mailed confirmation of the
results of the investigation to Ruffin-Thompkins. The confirmation
summary indicated that the US Bank account would remain reported as
a Paid/Repossession but that Experian had added the comment,
“[a]ccount closed at consumer's request,” to her credit report.
The summary also informed Ruffin-Thompkins that if she disagreed
with the outcome of the investigation, she could contact the
creditor directly or could add a statement to the credit file
disputing the accuracy or completeness of the account information.

Despite this offer, Ruffin-Thompkins made no further contact
with Experian. Instead, on January 30, 2003, she filed the instant
action against the company. On April 5, 2003, pursuant to US
Bank’s instructions, Experian deleted the US Bank account from
Ruffin-Thompkins’s file and sent her a Revised Disclosure to inform

her of the deletion.


trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In such a situation, there can
be “‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id.
at 323.
4. Punitive Damages

Because Ruffin-Thompkins’s claim under the FCRA_ cannot
survive, it follows, a fortiori, that the Court must deny her claim
for punitive or statutory damages. Even if she had survived
summary judgment, however, her request for such damages would fail.
Section 1681n of the FCRA provides that “[a]ny person who willfully
fails to comply with any requirement imposed under [the Act] with
respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer” for actual or
punitive damages. § 1681n(a). To demonstrate willful
noncompliance with the FCRA, Ruffin-Thompkins need not show malice
or evil motive, but must show that Experian “knowingly and
intentionally committed an act in conscious disregard for the
rights of others.” Philbin, 101 F.3d at 970 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Acts such as “willful concealment,
misrepresentations, or systematic deprivation of consumers’ rights”
could justify statutory or punitive damages. Lee, 2003 WL
22287351, at *7, Ruffin-Thompkins has not produced any evidence of

intentional systematic noncompliance, willful concealment, or


reasonableness of an agency’s procedure is resolvable on summary
judgment.

In judging the reasonableness of Experian’s procedures, the
Court must weigh “the potential harm from inaccuracy against the
burden of safeguarding against such inaccuracy.” Philbin, 101 F.3d
at 965. In Henson, the Seventh Circuit held that a credit
reporting agency was not liable under the FCRA for reporting
inaccurate information obtained from a court’s judgment docket
absent prior notice that the information was incorrect. Henson v.
CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). It reasoned
that verifying such information would be unduly burdensome and
inefficient. Id. This reasoning has been extended to excuse
credit reporting agencies from independently verifying information
provided by creditors unless the agencies have prior knowledge that
the information might be inaccurate, Zahran, 2003 WL 1733561, at
*5, or that the source is unreliable. Field v. Trans Union L.L.C.,
No. 01 C 6398, 2002 WL 849589, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2002)
Ruffin-Thompkins does not contest the fact that Experian did not
learn of the inaccuracy in the US Bank account on her credit report
until it received her letter on December 23, 2002. She adduces no
evidence that prior to receiving that letter, Experian otherwise
knew that the information it had received from US Bank was
inaccurate or that US Bank was an unreliable source of information.

As a matter of law, therefore, summary judgment must be granted on

-9-



B. Count I ~ FCRA

Ruffin-Thompkins brings this suit pursuant to several sections
of the FCRA. Specifically, she alleges that Experian: (1)
willfully and negligently failed to maintain reasonable procedures
to assure maximum ‘possible accuracy in its credit report in
violation of § 168le(b); (2) willfully and negligently failed to
conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of the disputes and failed to
delete the inaccurate information from her file after investigation
in violation of 1681li(a); and (3) willfully and negligently failed
to note her dispute on her report in violation of 168li(c). As
discussed in detail below, she has raised no genuine issues of
material fact on any of these claims.

1. Section 1681e(b)

Section 168le(b) of the FCRA provides that “[w]henever a
consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall
follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of
the information concerning the individual about whom the report
relates.” § 168le(b). In order to avoid summary judgment on her
claim, Ruffin-Thompkins must raise a genuine issue of material fact
as to each of the following four elements: (1) that the consumer
credit report contained inaccurate information about the US Bank
account; (2) that the inaccuracy was due to Experian’s failure to
follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy;

(3) that she suffered actual damages; and (4) that her damages were



II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fep. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact
is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law; a dispute is “genuine” where the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc,, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The burden is initially upon the movant to demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In assessing the movant’s
claim, the Court must view all the evidence and any reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. Miller v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
203 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000). Once the moving party has met
its burden, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere
allegations” contained in its pleading, but rather “must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Fep. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., Inc., 914
F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German

Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1989).



misrepresentations. Accordingly, her claim for statutory or

punitive damages must fail.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Experian’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED. Ruffin-Thompkins’s action is dismissed in its

Mfao_

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court

entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: Agi, VA CZ

- 18 -


binding on this Court and, respectfully, the Court disagrees with
its outcome. Drawing on the Third Circuit’s Philbin decision,
Parker concluded that where the plaintiff's report was undisputedly
incorrect, the question of whether the defendant’s reporting
procedures were reasonable was one for a jury. Parker, 124 F.
Supp. 2d at 1225. This conclusion, however, does not necessarily
follow from Philbin. In Philbin, the Third Circuit reviewed the
approaches taken by other courts of appeals to the question of
whether a plaintiff need provide any proof beyond the “mere fact of
an inaccuracy” for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that a
credit reporting agency had not followed reasonable procedures.

Philbin, 101 F.3d at’ 964-66. While the court did not decide among
the various approaches (set forth by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734
F.2d 47 (D.D.C. 1984) (per curiam), by the Ninth Circuit in Guimond
v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1995), and
by the Eleventh Circuit in Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.,
936 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1991)), it explained that under any
approach, a defendant can prevail at the summary judgment stage if
it adduces evidence that “demonstrates as a matter of law that the
procedures it followed were reasonable.” Philbin, 101 F.3d at 965.
Regardless, Crabill is binding precedent on this Court, and as

mentioned, it also suggests that in limited situations, the


Minute Order Form (06/97), gy

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

N: of Assigned Judy 7 Sitting Jr if Other

ane sia | Harry D.Leinenweber | Swine one

CASE NUMBER 03 C 683 DATE 12/31/2003
CASE ‘= Mary Ruffin-Thompkins vs. Experian Information Systems, Inc.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented}

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

() ia Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

Q) Oo Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due

(4) Q Ruling/Hearingon____—_ssetfor_ at.

(5) a Status hearing[hetd/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—__ssetffor____at.

(6) im Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—s—ssetfor saat.
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for]on___—_—aat.

(8) Q [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___—__at

(9) Qa This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(aX1} OO FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) ol [Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Experian’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is-GRANTED. Ruffin-Thompkins action is dismissed in its entirety.

aly g [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document}:

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. J

| Docketing to mail notices. ,

v | Mail AO 430 form.

guns i 7M! sia'sin

yd

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom eel ood £u
WAP deputy’s . :
initials

OL. (Paterizng resbided in

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matter. Experian modified the account according to US Bank’s
response and mailed confirmation of the results of the
investigation to Ruffin-Thompkins. It received no objection from
Ruffin-Thompkins. Given how little information Ruffin-Thompkins
provided Experian on the dispute, the procedure Experian employed
to assure the accuracy of its credit report was reasonable as a
matter of law. Lee, 2003 WL 22287351, at *4.
b. Damages

Even if Experian’s procedures were unreasonable, Ruffin-
Thompkins’s claim would fail because she has not shown that there
is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered any
damages. In her complaint, Ruffin~-Thompkins alleges that she: (1)
was denied credit by various stores and banks; (2) incurred out-of-
pocket expenses associated with disputing the information on her
credit report; (3) suffered mental anguish and emotional distress
from having incorrect, derogatory information about her transmitted
to other people; and (4) received a decreased credit score which
could hamper her ability to obtain credit in the future. [In her
response to Experian’s interrogatories, Ruffin-Thompkins alleges
that she received denials from Car Max, Amcore Bank, Premier Bank
Card, Providian Financial, and Cortrust Bank. As support for this
allegation, she points to her credit report, which indicates that
Car Max, Premier Bank Card, First National Credit Card (not one of

the companies named in her interrogatory response), and Cortrust

-1l1-



Ruffin-Thompkins’s § 168le(b) claim as it relates to pre-
December 23, 2002 inaccuracies on her report.

Experian’s post-December 23, 2002 procedures were also
reasonable as a matter of law. Because post-December 23, 2002
Experian was reinvestigating disputed information, an analysis of
the reasonableness of the procedures it employed to assure maximum
possible accuracy of the credit information on the US Bank account
under § 168le(b) involves an analysis of those procedures under
§ 168li(a). This is so because § 168li{a) governs reinvestigations
of disputed information. The Court will assess the reasonableness
of the reinvestigation in the next section in further detail.
Briefly, however, it is clear that upon learning of a possible
inaccuracy in Ruffin-Thompkins’s credit report, Experian followed
a procedure that was reasonable as. a matter of law to assure
maximum possible accuracy. Experian reviewed the materials sent by
Ruffin-Thompkins and generated a CDV that described the dispute as
“claims company will change or delete.” It then forwarded the CDV
to US Bank for investigation. US Bank returned the CDV to Experian
a week later and reported that the account had a zero balance and
had been closed at the customer’s request. It did not order
Experian to delete the account entirely. As discussed, there is no
evidence that Experian knew that US Bank was not a reliable source
of information, and it was reasonable to assume from US Bank’s

response that it had performed a complete investigation into the

-10-



caused by the inaccuracy. Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d
957, 963 (3d Cir. 1996); Zahran v. Trans Union Corp., No. 01 C
1700, 2003 WL 1733561, At *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2003). Experian
does not suggest that the US Bank entry on Ruffin-Thompkins’s
credit file had no inaccuracies. Accordingly, the Court’s inquiry
begins with the second element of the § 168le(b) claim.
a. Reasonable Procedures

The FCRA does not. impose strict liability for inaccurate
entries. Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 158 F.3d 890, 896
(Sth Cir. 1998). Instead, Ruffin-Thompkins must show that the
“inaccuracy resulted from a negligent or willful failure to use
reasonable procedures when the report was prepared.” Id.
Reasonable procedures are those “that a reasonably prudent person
would undertake under the circumstances.” Lee v. Experian Info.
Solutions, No. 02 C 8424, 2003 WL 22287351, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 2, 2003) (quoting Philbin, 101 F.3d at 963). While the
determination of whether a procedure is reasonable is a question
for the jury in most cases, if the reasonableness of the procedure
is beyond question, summary judgment is appropriate. Crabill v.
Trans Union L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2001).

Ruffin-Thompkins suggests that, pursuant to Parker v. Parker,
124 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1225 (M.D. Ala. 2000), she may stave off
summary judgment merely by showing an inaccuracy in her credit

report. As a district court opinion, of course, Parker is not



wished to dispute. On October 14, 2002, Experian issued a response
to Ruffin-Thompkins that explained that “[u]sing the information
provided the following item was not found: Grossinger City
Toyota.” According to Ruffin-Thompkins’s complaint, on October 21,
2002, she sent a letter directly to US Bank with copies to various
parties including Experian, in which she requested that the
repossession notation be removed from her account. Experian denies
this because Ruffin-Thompkins never produced the document in the
course of discovery despite Experian’s request for such materials.
Whether or not Experian received this letter. is immaterial,
however, because Ruffin-Thompkins does not mention it in her
Response to Defendant Experian Information Solution’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (the “Response”) and does not contend that it
placed Experian on notice of the inaccuracy in her account.

On December 23, 2002, Experian received another letter from
Ruffin-Thompkins that stated that she was disputing US Bank’s
report. She enclosed the same letter from her attorney to
Grossinger that she sent with her October 3, 2002 letter and a
letter from her attorney informing her of a settlement with
Grossinger.

Experian handled Ruffin-Thompkins’s request for a
reinvestigation by following an established procedure for handling
consumer disputes. It forwarded her letter to one of its customer

service representatives for review and. processing. On January 2,

A


directly of such dispute, the agency shall
reinvestigate free of charge and record the
current status of the disputed information, or
delete the item from the file in accordance with
paragraph (5), before the end of the 30-day period
beginning on the date on which the agency receives
the notice of the dispute from the consumer.
15 U.S.C.A. § 16811i(a) (1) (A).

Because the potential for liability under this section does
not arise until the consumer reporting agency receives consumer
notification about a potential inaccuracy in a credit report,
Experian is not liable for failing to reinvestigate any inaccuracy
before December 23, 2002. Lee, 2003 WL 22287351, at *6. As a
result, the Court will focus only on whether Experian’s
reinvestigation procedures after that date were reasonable as a
matter of law.

Under § 1681i(a)(1)(A), upon learning of a potential
inaccuracy in a consumer’s credit report, the credit reporting
agency has a duty to reinvestigate to assure that the information
is correct. Id. In certain circumstances, that duty includes
going beyond the initial source of information and conducting an
independent investigation. Henson, 29 F.3d at 287. Whether the
credit reporting agency must take such additional steps depends on
two factors: (1) “whether the consumer has alerted the reporting
agency to the possibility that the source may be unreliable or the

reporting agency itself knows or should know that the source is

unreliable”; and (2).“the cost of verifying the accuracy of the

-14-



“account closed at consumer’s request.” Neither Ruffin-Thompkins’s
letter requesting a reinvestigation nor the attached documentation
provided much -information about her situation. Without any
explanation, her letter merely asserted that she was disputing US
Bank’s report. The attached materials, letters from her attorneys,
made no reference to US Bank. It is unclear what additional steps,
if any, Experian could have taken given the scant amount of
information Ruffin-Thompkins provided it. Moreover, Ruffin-
Thompkins did not dispute. the accuracy of the changes that Experian
made on her account at the end of its investigative process. In
the absence of any indicators of unreliability, Experian’s CDV
procedure satisfied its obligation under 168li(a) as a matter of
law. Lee, 2003 WL 22287351, at *7 n.11. Accordingly, Experian’s
motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.
3. Section 1681i(c)

In her complaint, Ruffin-Thompkins alleges that Experian also
violated § 1681li(c)of the FCRA by willfully and negligently failing
to note her dispute of the inaccurate information on her credit
report. She has failed entirely to address this claim in her
Response. Accordingly, she has not demonstrated that there is a
genuine issue for trial on this claim. Summary judgment is
mandatory “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that. party will bear the burden of proof at

-16-



Grossinger had fraudulently entered into a contract with Ruffin-
Thompkins for the purchase of a car. Eventually, Ruffin-Thompkins
filed a lawsuit against Grossinger in the Circuit Court of Cook
County. In July 2002, that case settled, with Grossinger agreeing
to pay off the balance of Ruffin-Thompkins’s loan and voiding her
contractual obligation to purchase a car.

Experian is a consumer reporting agency as defined by
15 U.S.C. § 168la(f). As such, it gathers consumer credit
information from other sources that it uses to generate credit
reports. These reports are available to the consumer or to other
parties upon request. Experian enters the story because despite
the settlement between Grossinger and Ruffin-Thompkins, US Bank,
the lender for the loan in that case, reported the account to
Experian as a “Repossession/Past Due 30 Days.” Upon learning of
this negative notation, on October 3, 2002 Ruffin-Thompkins wrote
to Experian requesting that “repossession of an automobile be
deleted immediately from my credit report.” In her letter, she
explained that she never had an account with Grossinger and that
her lawsuit against the company had been settled in her favor. She
enclosed an incomplete credit report dispute form and a letter from
her attorneys to Grossinger stating their intent to represent
Ruffin~Thompkins in her action against it. Neither Ruffin-
Thompkins’s letter to Experian nor the enclosed documents mentioned

US Bank. None of the documents specified the account that she


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS FIL ED
EASTERN DIVISION
DEC 3 1 2003

MARY RUFFIN-THOMPKINS,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 03 C 683
v.
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
EXPERIAN INFORMATION SYSTEMS,

meee DOCKETED

Defendant. JAN 0 2 2004

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Mary Ruffin-Thompkins (“Ruffin-Thompkins”), a
resident of the Northern District of Illinois, brings a one-count
action against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”),
an Ohio corporation that is authorized to do business in Illinois,
alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”),
15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seg. (2003). Before the Court is Experian’s
Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. For the following reasons, the Court grants the
motion.

T. BACKGROUND

The following facts are either undisputed or taken in the
light most favorable to Ruffin-Thompkins. This case has its roots
in a dispute that Ruffin-Thompkins had with Grossinger City Toyota
(“Grossinger”). While the facts of the underlying dispute are not

entirely clear, it appears that it involved allegations that

JUDGE HARRY D. LEINENWEBER
U.S, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

I5



Bank requested her credit history. All but one of the requests for
her credit history, however, took place well before December 2002,
when Experian’s period of potential liability began. While Premier
Bank Card requested her report in January 2003, the reason for its
request is unclear. Indeed, Experian submits an August 6, 2003
response to a subpoena for records from the Vice President and
Cashier and Custodian of Records for Premier Bank, which indicates
that the bank has no records of active or closed accounts for
Ruffin-Thompkins or of any active or closed credit cards or denied
credit applications. Moreover, despite the fact that credit
applications and letters denying her credit would have been in her
custody, Ruffin-Thompkins provides no documentary evidence to
Support her claim that these entities denied her credit
applications.

Similarly, Ruffin-Thompkins adduces no evidence of any
emotional distress or mental anguish. “When an injured party
provides the only evidence of emotional distress, she must
reasonably and sufficiently explain the circumstances of the
injury, and not rely on mere conclusory statements.” Field, 2002
WL 849589, at *6. This she has failed to do. Finally, it appears
that she has abandoned her claims for damages relating to out-of-
pocket expenses or to a decreased credit score. She fails to make
any mention of out-of-pocket expenses let alone to set forth

specific facts regarding the nature of those expenses. She also

-12-



source versus the possible harm inaccurately reported information
may cause the consumer.” Id. at 287.

As described in detail above, after learning of the possible
inaccuracy in Ruffin-Thompkins’s credit report, Experian reviewed
the materials that. she submitted. From those materials it
generated a CDV that it forwarded to US Bank for investigation.
Experian then modified the account according to -US_ Bank’s
instructions and mailed confirmation of the results of the
investigation to Ruffin-Thompkins. The entire reinvestigation was
completed within the statutorily required time period.

Experian was not obligated under the Henson factors to
undertake further independent investigation.  Ruffin-Thompkins had
not alerted Experian to the possibility that US Bank was an
unreliable source of information and she has adduced no evidence
that Experian knew that US Bank was unreliable source of
information. Indeed, Kimberly Hughes, a specialist in consumer
affairs at Experian, testified in her deposition that subscribers
such as US Bank have proved to be very reliable reporters. In this
situation, there was no suggestion from US Bank’s response that it
had conducted anything but a thorough and complete investigation.
Even though Experian had indicated that Ruffin-Thompkins believed
the account would be changed or deleted, US Bank did not order the
account deleted. Instead, it noted that the account was closed

with a zero balance and asked Experian to change the account to

-15-