Most recently, in Levett v. Chicago Bd, of Educ., No. 99 C
7536, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 315 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2001), Judge
Holderman certified a class of plaintiffs who were allegedly
stopped and searched without cause when attempting to enter Lincoln
Park High School. The requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) were met
because the plaintiffs “established that the potential class is
seeking a remedy for a common legal grievance and those alleged
grievances all center around that same occurrence of events.” Id.
at *11.

To counter this line of cases, the defendants cite a variety
of cases where certification was denied to classes of prison
inmates subjected to an ongoing series of strip searches during a
period of several years, Klein v. DuPage County, 119 F.R.D. 29
(N.D. Ill. 1988), debtors under the protection of the bankruptcy
court, Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir.
2001), etc, I find that the facts at hand are far more similar to
those of Patrykus, Johns, and Levett than to those of the cases the
defendants urge me to follow, and I adopt the reasoning of those
three cases.

The defendants further argue that Patrykus, Johns, and Levett
are distinguishable because the court in those cases evaluated the
suitability of the certification before discovery, whereas
discovery has already proceeded in this case. This distinction does

not render this line of cases any less applicable to this case, The



sued seeking compensatory and punitive damages as well as
injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. The court dismissed the
defendants’ “attempt to derive significance from potential
variations ... in the extent of injuries to the plaintiffs,”
holding that the requirements of 23(b) (3) were met because “common
questions of fact concerning the defendants’ alleged behavior and
of law concerning the constitutionality of defendants’ behavior
clearly predominate.” Id at 363.

Similarly, Johns v. DeLeonardis, 145 F.R.D, 480 (N,D, Ill.
1992) (Plunkett, J.), involved an alleged police raid on a Gypsy
community center in Chicago. The plaintiffs complained that the
defendant police officers detained the attendees at a community
meeting and searched them, and filed suit “primarily seeking money
damages.” Id, at 481, 484. Citing Patrykus, Judge Plunkett found
the requirements of 23(b)(3) had been met because there was “an
essential common factual] link between all class members and the
defendant for which the law provides a remedy.” fd. at 485.
Further, the fact that each plaintiff might have suffered a
different injury did not make class certification inappropriate.
“Though the members of the [class] may have differing damages due
to the varying injury done to them during the ... search, the
extent of damages is not an issue at this stage of the proceeding.”

Id.


requirements of Rule 23 remain the same at every stage of
litigation. The defendants are unable to point to a single case in
this circuit where a district court denied certification to a class
of plaintiffs in a mass search case at any point in the suit.
Next, the defendants contend that four of the named
plaintiffs, Anthony Jackson, Kareem, and Jareem Jackson, and Andre
Williams, should be precluded from serving as class representatives
under Rule 23(a) (3) because their claims are unique or subject to
unique defenses. They point out that Anthony Jackson, alone among
the named plaintiffs, was arrested at the field house, that Mr,
Jackson’s sons, Kareem and Jareem, watched their father being
arrested, and that Andre Williams has witnessed several incidents
of extreme violence during his life. The test for typicality under
23(a) (3) is whether the named plaintiff’s claim “arises from the
same event ... that gives rise to the claims of other class members
and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory ...
[S]imilarity of legal theory may control even in the face of

differences of fact.” De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713
F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation omitted). The
four disputed plaintiffs clearly meet this standard. They present
the same argument as the other members of the class: that they were

detained and searched without probable cause by Chicago police

officers in violation of their constitutional rights at the

Stateway Gardens Field House on the evening of February 22, 2001.



E—————————E——————

Minute Order Form (06/97)
‘ 7 United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
serie Magistrate Judge Elaine E, Bucklo “that Asigaed sudge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 3228 DATE 4/15/2003
CASE Williams, et al. vs. Brown, et al.
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state bricfly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
(ly im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above, |
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due.
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion duc. __ Reply to answer briefdue
(4) aq Ruling/Hearing onset for at
(5) Qo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on ___—_setfor__— sat
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__— set for ats
(7) va) Trialjset for/re-set for] onal _
(8) ia {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___— at
() oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs| by/agreement/pursuant lo}
COFRCP4(m) C1 Local Rule 41.1 C1 FRCP41(a)(1)  FRCP41(a)(2).
ao [Other docket entry) Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order denying defendants’ motion to

decertify class(125-1), Defendants’ motion for leave to file supplemental authority on motion for
summary judgment is granted,

(di @f (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
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Despite the defendants’ argument to the contrary, none of these
four is subject to a unique defense that would destroy typicality.
Mr. Jackson’s arrest took place some minutes after he was allegedly
detained and searched, and thus it offers no defense to the
defendants.

Finally, throughout their thirty-page motion, defendants argue
at length that the class ought to be decertified because the named
plaintiffs cannot prove actual injury. Whether the evidence
adequately supports the plaintiffs’ claims is a question properly
addressed in the defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment,
not in the motion for decertification. The only question before me
is whether the plaintiffs have met the requirements of Rule 23,

They have. Therefore, the motion for class decertification is

DENIED.
ENTER ORDER:
a
ots
Este Lr kE«
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: April 167, 2003



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION . _
Patasbid

ANDRE WILLIAMS, et al. APR * 6 2003

Plaintiffs,
Vv.

No. O1 C 3228
LIEUTENANT ERNEST BROWN, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case arose from the alleged detention and search of
numerous residents of the Stateway Gardens neighborhood during a
basketball tournament on February 22, 2001. The named plaintiffs,
spectators at the event, claim that they were injured when police
forced them to submit to these unlawful searches, and filed this
class action seeking damages and other relief. The class was
certified by agreement of the parties over a year ago. The
defendants now move to decertify the class. The motion is Dentrn,

The party seeking to maintain class certification bears the
burden of showing that certification is appropriate. Trotter v.
Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177, 1184 (7th Cir. 1984). Rule 23 states that
certification is appropriate when:

“(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common

to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative

parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the class.”



Fep. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition, the case must meet the
requirements of one of the three options described in Rule 23(b).
The relevant option here is clearly Rule 23(b) (3), which states
that a class action may be maintained if “the court finds that
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods.”
The defendants attack certification on the grounds that the
requirements of Rule 23(b) (3) have not been met because individual
questions of injury and causation dominate the claim. The Seventh
Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue of whether class
certification is appropriate in mass-detention cases, although such
cases have appeared before the Circuit without attracting criticism
or comment. See, e.g., McGann v. N.E. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R.
Corp., 8 F.3d 1174, 1176 (7th Cir. 1993) (involving a class of
state employees who were allegedly detained and searched by police
officers when they attempted to leave the employees’ parking lot
after work). However, courts have repeatedly certified classes in
mass police-detention cases with similar facts. The first such case
cited by the plaintiffs, Patrykus v. Gomilla, 121 F.R.D. 357 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (Conlon, J.), concerned an alleged police raid on a
Chicago gay bar. According to the plaintiffs, police officers
entered the bar and compelled approximately 50 class members to lie

on the floor and submit to searches. Id. at 360. The plaintiffs

2