alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1506

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 12, 1997

Referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, and in addition

to the Committee on Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions

as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

AN ACT

To amend the Professional Boxing Safety Act (P.L. 104–

272).

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 (15

4 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.) is amended by—

5 (1) redesignating section 15 as 16; and

6 (2) inserting after section 14 the following:
2

S 1506 RFH

1 ‘‘SEC. 15. PROTECTION FROM EXPLOITATION.

2 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—No person described in para3 graph (4), (5), (6), or (9) of section 2 may require a boxer

4 to employ, retain, or provide compensation to any individ5 ual or business enterprise (whether operating in corporate

6 form or not) designated by that person as a condition of—

7 ‘‘(1) such person’s working with the boxer as a

8 licensee, manager, matchmaker, or promoter;

9 ‘‘(2) such person’s arranging for the boxer to

10 participate in a professional boxing match; or

11 ‘‘(3) such boxer’s participation in a professional

12 boxing match.

13 ‘‘(b) ACTION TO ENFORCE CONTRACT.—In any ac14 tion brought against a boxer by any such person, individ15 ual, or business enterprise to recover money for acting as

16 a licensee, manager, matchmaker, or promoter for the

17 boxer, the amount awarded may be reduced or denied, not18 withstanding any agreement to the contrary, as violative

19 of public policy if that person, individual, or enterprise is

20 found by the court or administrative body before which

21 the action was brought to have violated subsection (a) with

22 respect to the boxer in connection with the subject of the
3

S 1506 RFH

1 action. Nothing in this subsection affects the enforcement

2 of this Act under section 10.’’.

Passed the Senate November 9, 1997.

Attest: GARY SISCO,

Secretary.
EXHIBIT 23.1





                 CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS



We have issued our report dated December 20, 2002, accompanying the
consolidated financial statements included in the annual report of YoCream
International, Inc. on Form 10-K for the year ended October 31, 2002.  We
hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the
Registration Statements of YoCream International, Inc. on Forms S-8 (File No.
333-09695, effective August 26, 1996, and File No. 333-59960, effective April
22, 2002).


                                             \s\ GRANT THORNTON LLP

Portland, Oregon
January 28, 2003
#### CERTAIN INTERESTED UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S, LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE NO. 9214, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael HALIKOYTAKIS, d.b.a. Hali Plaza, Edith Halikoytakis, d.b.a. Hali Plaza, Defendants-Appellants, *329Camilla Bernhardt, et al., Defendants.

No. 11-12068

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Sept. 15, 2011.

Matthew L. Litsky, Jason A. Herman, Jeffrey S. Pekar, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

William D. Horgan, Banker Lopez Gassier, PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is a declaratory judgment action. Appellee Certain Interested Underwriters etc. (“Underwriters”) brought the suit against appellant Michael and Edith Hali-koytakis d/b/a/ Hall Plaza (“Hall Plaza”), an Underwriters’ insured, to obtain a declaration that the insurance policy it issued to Hall Plaza provided no coverage for the claims asserted against Hall Plaza in a personal injury lawsuit brought against it and Point Builders, Inc., by Camilla Bernhardt and Brian Bernhardt in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida. The Bernhardts’ claims stem from injuries Camilla Bernhardt received when she fell on the sidewalk across the street from Hall Plaza’s premises. The Bernhardts’ complaint alleged that Point Builders caused the sidewalk to be damaged by trucks and equipment it was using in performing certain construction work for Hall Plaza on Hall Plaza property, i.e., the removal of a retention pond, the installation of a storm-water drainage system, and the construction of a parking area. Point Builders was performing the work under a contract with Hall Plaza and damaged the sidewalk (where Camilla Bernhardt fell) while storing Point Builders’ heavy equipment on a vacant lot located across the street from Hall Plaza’s property and adjacent to the sidewalk.1

This appeal is from the summary judgment the district court granted in Underwriters’ favor. The court held the insurance policy at issue, as modified by endorsements including 'the Designated Premises Endorsement, was effectively converted into a premises liability policy, a policy that did not afford Hall Plaza coverage for Camilla Bernhardt’s off-premises injury. We agree with the district court’s holding. We also agree with the district court’s holding that Hall Plaza breached the Independent Contractors Special Condition by failing to be named as an additional insured on its contractor’s liability policy. As this condition states, “[f|ailure to comply will invalidate this insurance.”

We find no basis for setting aside the district court’s judgment. It is

AFFIRMED.

1

. After responding to the Bernhardts’ complaint, Hall Plaza filed a cross-claim against Point Builders, seeking indemnification.
#### Kareem Jabbar STANSBURY, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-16231.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 22, 2011.

Kareem Jabbar Stansbury, Sr., Bradford, PA, pro se.

Bureau of Prisons Regional Counsel, Stockton, CA, Jesse Gonzalez, USPA-U.S. Penitentiary, Atwater, CA, Mark J. McKeon, Esquire, Assistant U.S., USF-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Fresno, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Federal prisoner Kareem Jabbar Stans-bury, Sr., appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action under *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,*403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging violations of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A or 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000); *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Stansbury’s Eighth Amendment claim because Stansbury failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. *See Hearns v. Terhune,*413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir.2005) (listing elements of conditions-of-confinement claim and explaining that the duration of the deprivation is relevant); *Le-Maire v. Maass,*12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir.1993) (“The Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health.... ”).

The district court properly dismissed Stanbury’s due process claim because it was duplicative of his Eighth Amendment claim. *See Graham v. Connor,*490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (where a specific Amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection” against a particular sort of governmental conduct, “that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims”).

Stansbury’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

We do not consider Stansbury’s retaliation claim raised for the first time on appeal. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999).

*941Stansbury’s request for appointment of counsel, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

§

IN RE: No. 08

- 19

- 00132

- CV

§

IES RESIDENTIAL, INC . AND

JEREMY SERNAS,

Relators. §

§

§ AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDI NG

IN MANDAMUS

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the Relators’ petition for writ of mandamus against

the Honorable Sergio H. Enriquez, Judge of the 448th District Court of El Paso County, Texas,

and concludes that Relators’ petition for writ of mandamus should be denied . We therefore deny

the petition for writ of mandamus, in accordance with the opinion of this Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 21ST DAY OF MAY, 2019.

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
#### Michael MORENO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-35864.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 15, 2011.*

Filed July 20, 2011.

D. James Tree, Tree Law Office, Yakima, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David Robert Johnson, Assistant Regional Counsel, Nancy Albert Mishalanie, SSA-Social Security Administration Office of The General Counsel, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GILMAN **, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, Senior Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Michael Moreno appeals from the district court’s judgment that affirmed the final decision by the Commissioner denying his application for supplemental securi*164ty income under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s judgment upholding the denial of benefits, *Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,*554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm the district court.

The ALJ did not err in concluding that Moreno’s impairment did not meet or equal an impairment in Listing 1.02A, which describes a claimant as disabled if he has an “inability to ambulate effectively,” which is defined as “an extreme limitation of the ability to walk.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix A 1, Listings 1.02A, 1.00B.2.b(l). An example of ineffective ambulation is “the inability to walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix A 1, Listing 1.00B.2.b(2). Moreno argues that because the ALJ, in his assessment of Moreno’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), limited Moreno to walking on even terrain, the ALJ erred when he concluded that Moreno could ambulate effectively and therefore failed to satisfy the criteria in Listing 1.02A. However, the RFC did not state that Moreno was incapable of walking on uneven surfaces, only that he should avoid doing so in his employment. None of Moreno’s examining or treating physicians indicated that Moreno could not walk on uneven terrain, or that he was unable to ambulate effectively. Instead, his physicians described him as being able to walk and stand for up to six hours a day.

The ALJ’s determination that Moreno was capable of performing sedentary work with additional limitations was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ did not include an option to recline and elevate the leg and foot because the only evidence of such a limitation came from Moreno, whom the ALJ found to be less than credible, and Dr. Francis, whose testimony the ALJ properly discredited as inconsistent with the assessments of Moreno’s examining and treating doctors. *See Thomas v. Barnhart,*278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir.2002); *Lester v. Chater,*81 F.3d 821, 832 (9th Cir.1995).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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  Exhibit 10(a)    
    


[Sutherland
Asbill and Brennan LLP Letterhead] 


November 24,
2008 


Board
of Directors

Protective Life and Annuity Insurance Company

2801 Highway 201 South

Birmingham, Alabama 35223 


Directors: 


        We
hereby consent to the reference to our name under the caption "Legal Matters" in the statement of additional information filed as part of Post-Effective Amendment
Number 2 to the Registration Statement on Form N-4 (File No. 333-146506) filed by
Protective Life and Annuity Insurance Company and Variable Annuity Account A of Protective Life with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In giving this consent, we do not admit that we are in the
category of persons whose consent is required under Section 7 of the Securities Act of 1933. 



					
	 	 	Sincerely,
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	By:	 	/s/ Stephen E. Roth






  Stephen E. Roth





1











QuickLinks


Exhibit 10(a)
105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1455

AN ACT

To provide financial assistance for the relocation and expansion of Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology, Providence, Rhode Island.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Haffenreffer Museum

5 Restoration Act of 1997’’.
2

S 1455 ES

1 SEC. 2. RELOCATION AND EXPANSION OF HAFFENREFFER

2 MUSEUM OF ANTHROPOLOGY.

3 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

4 (1) MUSEUM.—The term ‘‘Museum’’ means the

5 Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology at Brown

6 University in Providence, Rhode Island.

7 (2) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘‘Director’’ means

8 the Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife

9 Service.

10 (b) RELOCATION AND EXPANSION OF MUSEUM.—

11 The Director shall make a grant to Brown University in

12 Providence, Rhode Island, to pay the Federal share of the

13 costs associated with the relocation and expansion of the

14 Museum, including the design, construction, renovation,

15 restoration, furnishing, and equipping of the Museum.

16 (c) GRANT REQUIREMENTS.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—To receive a grant under

18 subsection (b), the Museum shall submit to the Di19 rector a proposal for the use of the grant.

20 (2) FEDERAL SHARE.—The Federal share of

21 the costs described in subsection (b) shall be 20 per22 cent.
3

S 1455 ES

1 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is

2 authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section

3 $3,000,000, to remain available until expended.

Passed the Senate November 7, 1997.

Attest:

Secretary.
105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1455

AN ACT

To provide financial assistance for the relocation

thropology, Providence, Rhode Island.and expansion of Haffenreffer Museum of An-
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1534 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1534

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to delay the commencement of 
the student loan repayment period for certain students called to active 
                       duty in the Armed Forces.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 13, 1997

Mr. Torricelli introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
         referred to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to delay the commencement of 
the student loan repayment period for certain students called to active 
                       duty in the Armed Forces.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DELAY IN COMMENCEMENT OF REPAYMENT PERIOD.

    (a) Federal Stafford Loans and Federal Direct Stafford/Ford 
Loans.--Section 428(b)(7) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
U.S.C. 1078(b)(7)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(D) There shall be excluded from the 6 month period that 
        begins on the date on which a student ceases to carry at least 
        one-half the normal full-time academic workload as described in 
        subparagraph (A)(i) any period not to exceed 3 years during 
        which a borrower who is a member of a reserve component of the 
        Armed Forces named in section 10101 of title 10, United States 
        Code, is called or ordered to active duty for a period of more 
        than 30 days (as defined in section 101(d)(2) of such 
        title).''.
    (b) Federal Perkins Loans.--Section 464(c) of the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087dd(c)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
    ``(7) There shall be excluded from the 9 month period that begins 
on the date on which a student ceases to carry at least one-half the 
normal full-time academic workload as described in paragraph (1)(A) any 
period not to exceed 3 years during which a borrower who is a member of 
a reserve component of the Armed Forces named in section 10101 of title 
10, United States Code, is called or ordered to active duty for a 
period of more than 30 days (as defined in section 101(d)(2) of such 
title).''.
                                 <all>
```
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-1749

___________________________ Marvin Suar-Chich lllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner

v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States

lllllllllllllllllllll Respondent

____________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

____________ Submitted: October 12, 2021 Filed: October 18, 2021 [Unpublished]

____________ Before BENTON, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Guatemalan native and citizen Marvin Suar-Chich petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA dismissed his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). After careful consideration, we deny the petition for review.As an initial matter, we conclude this court’s precedent forecloses Suar-Chich’s

challenge to the agency’s jurisdiction over his removal proceedings. See Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 985-86 (8th Cir. 2019); see also Tino v. Garland, No. 20-3508, --- F.4th ---, 2021 WL 4256185, at *1 n.2 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 2021) (per curiam). Even assuming Suar-Chich did not waive review of his claims by failing to meaningfully challenge the BIA’s decision, see Chay-Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2004), we also conclude the agency properly denied asylum.See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1) (asylum eligibility requirements). SuarChich did not claim he had been persecuted in the past, see Uli v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 2008), and assuming his proposed particular social group was cognizable, as the BIA did, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that he failed to show his membership in that group “will be at least one central reason” for his feared persecution, see § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Silvestre-Giron v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1114, 1119 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2020) (standard of review). The agency concluded his group membership would be incidental to the gangs’ criminal motive for monetary gain, and the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. See Garcia-Moctezuma v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 863, 868-69 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that under the “one central reason” standard, a protected ground need not be the sole reason for persecution, but it cannot be “incidental or tangential” to the persecutor’s motive); Cambara-Cambara v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2016). The record also does not compel the conclusion that Suar-Chich would be persecuted on account of an imputed anti-gang political opinion. See Gomez-Rivera v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 995, 999 (8th Cir. 2018); Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 578-79 (8th Cir. 2009). Because Suar-Chich failed to prove eligibility for asylum, it follows that he failed to meet the higher burden of proof for withholding of removal. See Sow v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2008). Finally, we conclude the agency properly denied CAT relief. See id.; see also Cambara-Cambara, 837 F.3d at 827.

-2-For these reasons, we deny the petition for review. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

-3-
#### In the Matter of Bernard J. Lipinskas, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.

— Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Murray, J.), entered October 31, 1984, which denied claimant’s application pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) for permission to file a late claim.

After conducting a careful review of the record, we find that the Court of Claims did not abuse its discretion by denying claimant’s application *(see, Simpson v State of New York,*96 AD2d 646). The order should, therefore, be affirmed.

Order affirmed, without costs. Kane, J. P., Casey, Weiss, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.
## NICHOLAS “ NICO ” LAHOOD Criminal District Attorney Bexar County, Texa s January 8 , 2015

Honorable Christopher A. Prine , Clerk
First Court of Appeals District
301 Fannin Street Houston, Texas 77002

RE: Joseph Arreola v. The State of Texas Appellate Case No. 01 -14-00558- CR

Tr ial Court Case No. 2012

- CR -4258
Dear Mr. Prine :

The Appellants counsel in the instant case has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,87 S. Ct. 1402,18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). It i s asserted therein
that no reversible error exists in the instant case. The State waives the right to file an Appellee’s brief in response at this time, however, stands ready to respond should the Court find it necessary.

Thank you in advance for your con sideration.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Mary Beth Welsh Mary Beth Welsh Assistant Criminal District Attorney Bexar County, Texas
Paul Elizondo Tower
101 W. Nueva (210) 335 -2782
S.B.N. 00785215 cc: Kimberly Dufour Gardner mwelsh@bexar.org Attorney at Law 10 Ledge Lane San Antonio, Texas 78212 Attorney for the State ACCEPTED 01-14-00558-CR FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 1/8/2015 2:47:22 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK