—

claims related to Ms. Palmer-Boahene’s investigation fail. With
respect to the denial of a teaching position, Ms. Palmer-Boahene
can satisfy the third prong; denial of employment is a sufficiently
Material adverse action. Crady v. Liberty National Bank and Trust
Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7 Cir. 1993).

The evidence on the fourth prong of the prima facie case does
not establish defendant’s right to summary judgment on Ms. Palmer-
Boahene’s race discrimination claim. Ms. Palmer-Boahene claims
that two non-African-American women, Lynnel Kiely and Theresa
Tylka, were similarly situated and more favorably treated. Ms.
Kiely and Ms. Tylka were also faculty counselors who were
subsequently employed by City Colleges as faculty in the Social
Science department. The evidence is that they were initially told
that they could not be hired because they lacked the requisite
educational requirements. Ultimately, pursuant to a settlement,
they were hired and given time to complete the education credits
they lacked. There may be legitimate differences between these
women and Ms. Palmer-Boahene that have nothing to do with race, but
City Colleges has not met its burden of proof on this motion. City
College’s motion for summary judgment is denied on this claim.

—_ ORDER:

Lore Zz Buhl

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: March 4, 2004


Palmer-Boahene presents no direct evidence of discrimination, she
must proceed under the McDonnell-Douglas burden~shifting analysis.
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To
establish a prima facie case under that analysis, Ms. Palmer-
Boahene must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) she was meeting City Colleges’ legitimate business
expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and
(4) City Colleges treated other employees, not in the protected
class, more favorably. Ajayi v. Aramark Business Services, Inc.,
336 F.3d 520, 531 (7TM Cir. 2003).

As a woman and an African-American, Ms. Palmer-Boahene
established herself as a member of a protected class. She has more
difficulty establishing that she was meeting City Colleges’
legitimate business expectations, as one of the actions she
challenges is City Colleges’ decision to investigate complaints
about her professional competency.

To meet the third prong of the prima facie case, Ms. Palmer-
Boahene must show that the challenged actions resulted in some
material harm. An investigation does not constitute an adverse
employment action. Ajayi, 336 F.3d at 531 (threats of demotion not
sufficient). Although City Colleges found that Ms. Palmer-Boahene
was unable to perform her duties as a faculty counselor, it chose
not to recommend any discipline because of the previously-made

decision to eliminate all of the faculty counselor positions. The


ste Qoler Fosm (06/32) !
United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

navoe Maglorate Judge Blaine E. Bucklo “nan signed Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 8941 DATE 3/4/2004
CASE Palmer-Boahene vs. Board of Trustees
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party fiting the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
{OTION: of the motion being presented,]
‘OCKET ENTRY: i
) oOo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.] |
) Qo Brief in support of motion due____.
) Oo Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__
) o Ruling/Hearingon___ssetfor___—_aat
) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor at
) q Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor ss at_—
) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] ona
) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__at
) oOo This case is dismissed [with/without} prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) CO Local Rule 41.1 CJ FRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

0» [Other docket entry] © Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (41-1) is granted in part and
denied in part. The motion is granted as to City Colleges’ investigation of Ms. Palmer-Boahene and
denied as to her race discrimination in hiring claim

1) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom
MP deputy’s
initials > =
Datestimie received i
central Clerk's Officg/



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARTHA H. PALMER-BOAHENE,

pogkerea
Plaintiff, MAR - 5 2004
v. No. 02 C 8941

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CITY
COLLEGES OF CHICAGO, DIST. 508,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Marsha H. Palmer-Boahene claims that defendant Board
of Trustees of the City Colleges of Chicago, District 508 (“City
Colleges”), violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count I), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(Count II) by discriminating against her on the basis of race and
sex. Ms. Palmer~Boahene, an African-American female, alleges that
City Colleges investigated her incidents of misadvising students
because of her race, her sex, or both and that City Colleges denied
her employment in a teaching position after her counseling position
was eliminated because of her race. City Colleges now moves for
summary judgment on both counts. I grant that motion as to City
Colleges’ investigation of Ms. Palmer-Boahene. It is denied as to
her race discrimination in hiring claim.

Summary judgment is appropriate where the record and
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a “tT


of law. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rugg & Knopp, 165 F.3d 1087, 1090
(7 Cir. 1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56({c). Normally, I must construe
all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
However, in this case Ms. Palmer-Boahene has failed to comply with
Local Rule 56.1, which requires her to file

a concise response to the movant’s statement that shall

contain:

(A) a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving

party’s statement, including, in the case of any disagreement,

specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record,

and other supporting materials relied upon, and

(B) a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of

any additional facts that require the denial of summary

judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the

record, and other supporting materials relied upon.
Local Rule 56.1(b). All of the statements in City Colleges’ Rule
56.1(a) filing are therefore deemed admitted. Local Rule
56.1(b) (3) (B). See, e.g., Brasic v. Heinemann’s, Inc., 121 F.3d
281, 283-84 (7% Cir. 1997); Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d
1311, 1316-17 (7 Cir. 1995).

Ms. Palmer-Boahene claims that City Colleges discriminated
against her on the basis of both race and sex by investigating her

and on the basis of race for failing to rehire her in a teaching

position, in violation of both Title VII and § 1981.1 As Ms.

’ As Title VII and § 1981 discrimination claims are analyzed
in the same manner, I will deal with both counts at the same
time. See, e.g., Eiland v. Trinity Hospital, 150 F.3d 747, 750
(7 Cir. 1998).