J-A21026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ADONIS ABREU MARTINEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2988 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 29, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-39-CR-0002122-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2024

Appellant Adonis Abreu Martinez appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas on August 29, 2022 for 

Indecent Assault - Person Less than 13 Years of Age and Corruption of Minors.1

Appellant challenges the constitutionality of Revised Subchapter H of the 

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”),2the trial court’s 

classification of Appellant as a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”), and the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On March 22, 

2022, at a guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth alleged that Appellant 

assaulted his live-in paramour’s 11-year-old daughter (“Victim”) on May 28, 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(7) and 6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively.

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.
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2021. N.T. Guilty Plea, 3/22/22, at 10. The Commonwealth included in its 

recitation of facts that Victim alleged that Appellant “assaulted her a total of 

seven times in the home.” Id. 

Appellant’s counsel disputed the allegations of prior conduct but 

acknowledged multiple incidents on May 28, 2021. Id. at 11. Upon clarifying 

questioning from the trial court, Appellant admitted to touching “the pubic hair 

on top of the vagina” and the “breast areas” of Victim on May 28, 2021. Id.

at 12. Following this exchange, the court accepted Appellant’s open guilty 

plea to one count each of Indecent Assault and Corruption of Minors, and the 

Commonwealth agreed not to pursue a charge of Aggravated Indecent 

Assault. Id. at 4, 12. The court ordered a presentence investigation report

(“PSI”) and an assessment by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board 

(“SOAB”) to determine whether Appellant met the criteria of an SVP.

On August 29, 2022, the court held an SVP and sentencing hearing. 

Initially, the court addressed Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of 

SORNA. Appellant relied upon the Chester County Court of Common Pleas’ 

decision holding Revised Subchapter H unconstitutional, following remand by 

the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 

2020).

3

 Unlike in Torsilieri, Appellant did not introduce any expert testimony 

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3 The Commonwealth has appealed the decision in Commonwealth v. 

Torsilieri, No. CR-1570-2016 (Chester County C.C.P. Aug. 22, 2022), to the 

Supreme Court, where the case is currently pending following argument in 

May 2023 at docket number 97 MAP 2022.
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to support his claims of unconstitutionality. Noting that the Chester County 

decision was not binding, the trial court denied Appellant’s SORNA challenge.

The court proceeded to the SVP hearing where the SOAB expert testified

that Appellant met the criteria for an SVP because he had a “mental 

abnormality” of Pedophilic Disorder and engaged in “predatory behavior.” N.T. 

Sentencing, 8/29/22, at 12, 19-20. Appellant’s counsel objected to the 

expert’s evaluation, asserting that it was improperly based upon allegations 

in “Children and Youth Records,” and the PSI to which he had not pled guilty, 

including allegations of assault spanning ten months and a threat to kill 

Victim’s mother if Victim told others about the abuse. Id. at 13-14, 21, 23-

24. Counsel also challenged the expert’s consideration of prior criminal 

complaints in 2008 and 2010, which did not result in convictions, and in 2019, 

which resulted in a guilty plea to a summary offense, none of which related to 

Victim. Id. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objections and classified 

Appellant as an SVP, concluding that the Commonwealth presented the 

requisite clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 15, 32-33. 

The same day, the court held a sentencing hearing at which Victim 

testified that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, 

and anxiety as a result of the abuse. Id. at 37. Appellant’s sister-in-law

testified in support of Appellant, and Appellant stated his remorse. Id. at 40-

46. Prior to imposing the sentence, the court indicated that it had reviewed 

the PSI, letters submitted in support of Appellant, and the testimony 

presented. Id. at 51-52.
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The court set forth the relevant sentencing guidelines given Appellant’s 

prior record score prior to imposing an aggregate sentence of 4 to 9 years’ 

incarceration. For Indecent Assault, the court sentenced Appellant to 2 to 5

years of incarceration plus 3 years of probation. For Corruption of Minors, the 

court imposed a consecutive sentence of 2 to 4 years of incarceration. In 

imposing the sentences, the court emphasized, inter alia, the significant 

impact the crimes had on the Victim, Appellant’s violation of his role as a 

father figure, and the seriousness of the offense. While the court did not 

consider Appellant’s 2008 and 2010 arrests, it found his 2019 convictions for 

disorderly conduct and harassment relevant as they involved “assaultive, 

aggressive behavior” and the “victimization of another female.” Id. at 53. 

On September 7, 2022, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion raising 

the same issues he presents on appeal. On November 2, 2022, the trial court 

denied the post-sentence motion, setting forth its reasoning in an extensive 

footnote.

4

On November 30, 2022, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. After 

Appellant timely complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the trial court issued its 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on December 28, 2022, which incorporated the 

reasoning in its November 2, 2022 order.

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4 As the footnote spans five pages, when citing the court’s analysis, we 

reference the page of the order on which the relevant language appears. 
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Appellant raises eleven questions for our review, challenging the 

constitutionality of SORNA, his SVP designation, and the discretionary aspects 

of his sentence. 

A. SORNA challenges

Appellant raises the following questions challenging SORNA for our 

review:

1. Whether that portion of the sentence imposing SORNA

registration requirements should be vacated because SORNA

(Revised Subchapter H) violates both the Pennsylvania and 

federal constitution in the following ways:

A. Whether SORNA (Revised Subchapter H) denies the Appellant 

due process under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it 

creates an irrebuttable presumption that those convicted of 

enumerated offenses “pose a high risk of committing additional 

sexual offenses” depriving those individuals of their fundamental 

right to reputation without notice and an opportunity to be heard?

B. Whether SORNA (Revised Subchapter H) denies the Appellant 

procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution because it 

unlawfully restricts liberty and privacy without notice and an 

opportunity to be heard? 

C. Whether SORNA (Revised Subchapter H) violates substantive 

due process under the state and federal constitutions, U.S. Const. 

Amend. XIV; Pa. Const. Art I, § 1, because SORNA deprives 

individuals of inalienable rights and fails to satisfy strict scrutiny?

D. Whether the recent amendment to SORNA, Revised Subchapter 

H, is in all material respects identical to SORNA and therefore a 

punitive law? 

E. Does SORNA (Revised Subchapter H), as a penal law, violate 

the separation of powers doctrine because it usurps the exclusive 

judicial function of imposing a sentence?
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F. Whether SORNA (Revised Subchapter H) contravenes the 5th, 

6th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and 

the corresponding protections of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

because as a criminal punishment, SORNA cannot be imposed 

without due process, notice and opportunity to contest its 

imposition, and ensuring that each fact necessary to support the 

mandatory sentence and a sentence beyond the authorized 

statutory maximum is submitted to a jury and proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 

466 (2000) and Alleyne v. United States, 1570 U.S. 99 (2013)?

G. Whether the imposition of lifetime sex offender registration for 

all Tier I offenses under SORNA, Revised Subchapter H. is a cruel 

and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?

H. Whether Appellant’s sentence of lifetime registration pursuant 

to SORNA, Revised Subchapter H, is illegal as it is not a sentencing

alternative authori[z]ed by Section 9721 of the Judicial Code and 

the trial court therefore lacked authority to impose such a 

sentence?

I. [Whether] Appellant’s sentence of lifetime registration pursuant 

to SORNA is illegal as the statutory maximum for a felon[y] of the 

third degree as codified at Section 1103(3) of the [Crimes] Code 

is seven (7) years[?]

Appellant’s Br. at 6-7 (unnecessary capitalization removed). 

These questions are not only similar to those raised in Torsilieri, but 

they are also nearly verbatim to those presented in Commonwealth v. 

Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d 1210, 1213-14 (Pa. Super. 2023).

5

 

In Villanueva-Pabon, this Court observed that the Supreme Court “in 

Torsilieri ma[de] clear the importance of the scientific evidence as it 

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5 The only substantive differences are the tier referenced in Issue G and the 

statutory maximum in Issue I. We additionally observe that, like the present 

case, we issued Villanueva-Pabon after the Supreme Court heard argument 

in Torsilieri. Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at 1216 n.11.
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pertained to each of the constitutional issues raised[.]”6 Id. at 1217. 

Villanueva-Pabon, however, “produced no scientific evidence whatsoever to 

support his claims that underlying legislative policy infringes on appellant’s

rights[.]” Id. at 1218. This Court, therefore, concluded that Villanueva-Pabon

failed to demonstrate that Revised Subchapter H “clearly, palpably, and plainly 

violated the constitution[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks removed). 

The same reasoning applies in this case as Appellant did not seek to 

present any evidence to support his constitutional challenges. Accordingly, 

we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s challenges to Revised 

Subchapter H.

B. SVP Designation

Appellant next questions “[w]hether the trial court erred by designating 

the Appellant as a Sexually Violent Pred[a]tor?” Appellant’s Br. at 7. 

Appellant specifically challenges the SOAB expert’s SVP recommendation to 

the extent it relies upon Victim’s allegations rather than facts to which 

Appellant admitted guilt. Appellant’s Br. at 55-57.

A challenge to an SVP designation is a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence for which “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review 

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6

In Torsilieri, the Supreme Court had remanded for an evidentiary hearing 

to determine whether a scientific “consensus has developed to call into 

question the [following] legislative policy decisions impacting offenders’ 

constitutional rights[,]” specifically: “(1) that all sexual offenders pose a high 

risk of recidivation and (2) that the tier-based registration system of Revised 

Subchapter H protects the public from the alleged danger of recidivist sexual 

offenders.” 232 A.3d at 584-85.
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is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 218 (Pa. 2006)

(citation omitted). “[W]e view all evidence and reasonable inferences 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. We will reverse 

a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not 

presented clear and convincing evidence that each element of the statute has 

been satisfied.” Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

Revised Subchapter H defines an SVP as an individual who, after 

December 20, 2012, committed specified crimes set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9799.14, including Indecent Assault - Person Less than 13 Years of Age, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7), and Corruption of Minors, id. § 6301(a)(1)(ii), and “who 

is determined to be a sexually violent predator under section 9799.24 (relating 

to assessments) due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder that 

makes the individual likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.12. The referenced Section 9799.24 establishes the SVP 

assessment process, which requires the SOAB expert to consider numerous 

factors and prepare a report. Id. § 9799.24(b), (d).

This Court recently addressed the issue raised by Appellant: whether 

the SOAB expert, when evaluating an offender to determine whether he is an 

SVP, may consider allegations to which the offender did not plead guilty. 

Commonwealth v. Aumick, 297 A.3d 770, 777 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc).

In so doing, this Court observed that the SOAB expert is subject to 

Pennsylvania’s general rules regarding expert witnesses, including Pa.R.E. 
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703, which provides that facts or data relied upon by an expert “need not be 

admissible” “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those 

kinds of facts or data[.]” Aumick, 297 A.3d at 777 (quoting Pa.R.E. 703). 

The Court additionally highlighted the statutory provisions requiring the SOAB 

expert to address specific factors and directing various government entities to 

provide the SOAB with records and information relevant to the SVP 

assessment. Id.; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b), (c). Given these statutory 

provisions, the Court concluded “that the legislature intended that the SOAB 

[expert] consider more than the limited facts included in a plea colloquy” in 

making the SVP assessment and preparing the report for the court. Aumick, 

297 A.3d at 782. According, the Court held that the SOAB expert in that case 

was “permitted to consider the affidavit of probable cause, criminal 

information, criminal complaint, preliminary hearing transcript, and the 

investigative reports prepared by Child Protective Services[.]” Id. at 781.

Following Aumick, Appellant’s claim fails.7 As the trial court held, the 

SOAB expert was not restricted to relying only on admitted facts but instead 

could consider “documents containing hearsay, such as the Lehigh County 

Children and Youth records.” Trial Ct. Order at 4. Moreover, viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that 

the trial court did not err in finding that the Commonwealth “proved by clear 

and convincing evidence that the [Appellant] met the criteria for [an SVP]”

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7 We observe that Appellant submitted his brief prior to our issuance of 

Aumick.
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based upon the testimony and report of the SOAB expert, which supported 

the conclusion that Appellant suffered from Pedophilic Disorder which 

“predispose[d] him towards committing sexual crimes” and that his behavior 

“was predatory in nature[.]” Id. at 5. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s 

classification of Appellant as an SVP.

C. Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

Finally, Appellant presents the following question:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in imposing an unreasonable 

sentence outside the sentencing guidelines when[ ]the trial court’s 

reasons for its diversion from the guidelines do not support such

a sentence beyond the aggravated range?

Appellant’s Br. at 7.

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are not appealable 

as of right. Commonwealth v. Schroat, 272 A.3d 523, 527 (Pa. Super. 

2022) Rather, an appellant must satisfy the following four criteria to invoke 

our jurisdiction:

(1) fil[e] a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserv[e] the 

issue at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion; (3) comply[]

with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a separate section of the 

brief setting forth a concise statement of the reasons relied upon 

for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence; 

and (4) present[] a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), or sentencing norms.

Schroat, 272 A.3d at 527. Here, Appellant has satisfied the first three 

elements by filing a Notice of Appeal, preserving the issue in his Post-Sentence 

Motion, and including a separate Rule 2119(f) Statement in his Brief to this 
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Court. Thus, we consider whether Appellant has presented a substantial 

question for review.

“A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 692 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation 

omitted). We have found that a substantial question exists when an appellant

asserts that “the sentencing court relied on an impermissible factor and 

ignored mitigating evidence when imposing an aggravated-range sentence[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 916 (Pa. Super. 2020); see also 

Commonwealth v. Durazo, 210 A.3d 316, 320 (Pa. Super. 2019) (finding 

substantial question based upon allegation that the court “exceeded the 

recommended range in the sentencing guidelines without providing an 

adequate basis”). 

We conclude that Appellant presents a substantial question because he 

claims that the court “did not provide adequate reasons” for imposing a 

sentence “outside the aggravated range” and instead improperly relied upon 

the “seriousness of the offense and victim impact without consideration of 

[his] mitigating factors.” Appellant’s Br. at 59. 

When reviewing a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence, 

this Court will not disturb a sentence “absent a manifest abuse of discretion[,]” 

which requires not merely an error of judgment but, rather, “that the 
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sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for 

reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly 

unreasonable decision.” Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1176 

(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). 

Nevertheless, an appellate court “shall vacate” a sentence when “the 

sentencing court purported to sentence within the sentencing guidelines but 

applied the guidelines erroneously” or when the court imposes a sentence that

is “outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(1), (3). While not defined in the Sentencing Code, the 

concept of an unreasonable sentence “connotes a decision that is ‘irrational’ 

or ‘not guided by sound judgment.’” Commonwealth v. Velez, 273 A.3d 6, 

12 (Pa. Super. 2022) appeal denied, 283 A.3d 792 (Pa. 2022) (citation 

omitted).

In reviewing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, this Court should 

“consider the nature and circumstances of the crime; the history and 

characteristics of the defendant; the sentencing court’s findings as well as the 

[sentencing] court’s opportunity to observe the defendant, including through 

presentence investigation; and the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 9 (citing 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)). 

In turn, the sentencing court in imposing a sentence should consider

“the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the 

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative 

needs of the defendant[,]” in addition to the sentencing guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S. 
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§ 9721(b). We reiterate, however, that the guidelines are “purely advisory” 

and “not mandatory.” Velez, 273 A.3d at 10. A court may sentence outside 

the guidelines if it states it reasons on the record and “does not exceed the 

maximum sentence allowed by statute.” Id. Where a presentence report 

exists, we “presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. 

Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). 

Appellant presents several claims that his sentence is unreasonable. 

First, Appellant asserts that the sentence should be vacated because the court 

intended to impose a sentence in the aggravated range, but instead imposed 

a sentence that ”went well beyond the aggravated ranges” on each count.

8

 

Appellant’s Br. 62-64. This claim is belied by the record as the court set forth 

the correct sentencing guidelines, including the aggravated range and the 

maximum sentence prior to imposing the sentence.9 While the trial court 

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8 Specifically, Appellant observes that the court imposed a minimum 

incarceration sentence for indecent assault that is “12 months beyond the 

aggravated range of sentence” and the minimum sentence imposed for 

Corruption of Minors is “6 months beyond the aggravated range sentence.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 10-11.

9 During the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated the following sentencing 

guidelines, which the parties acknowledged as accurate. N.T. Sentencing, at 

33-34. For Indecent Assault, the standard range was RS to 9 months’ 

incarceration, with an aggravated range of 12 months, and a maximum 

sentence of 5 years, plus a mandatory 3 years of probation. Id. For 

Corruption of Minors, the standard range was 3 to 12 months’ incarceration, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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stated during sentencing that it was imposing sentences “in the aggravated 

range,” it clarified that statement in its order denying Appellant’s postsentence motion and explaining its reasons for sentencing Appellant “beyond 

the aggravated range” on both counts. N.T. Sentencing, at 54-55; Trial Ct. 

Order at 4. As the court was aware of the accurate sentencing guidelines and 

expressed its reasons for exceeding them, we find this claim has no merit. 

Appellant next argues that the sentence should be vacated as 

“unreasonable” pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3). Appellant’s Br. at 65-

71. He contends that the court’s reasons for imposing sentences outside the 

standard range, specifically the impact of the crimes on Victim, the fact that 

Appellant served as a father-figure to Victim, and the multiple incidents of 

abuse in one day, do not support upward deviation from the guidelines. He 

argues that these factors are common in cases “of this type” and thus would 

have been considered in setting the guideline ranges. Id. at 65. Accordingly, 

he asserts, the court cannot rely on these factors to exceed the standard 

range. 

Appellant also urges the court to find the sentence “unreasonable” based 

upon his “history and characteristics[.]”. Appellant’s Br.at 67-69 (quoting 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)(1)). Appellant cites in support his remorse, his work 

history, and his “spotless” criminal record other than one summary 

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with an aggravated range of 18 months, and a maximum sentence of 7 years. 

Id. Thus, the total potential maximum sentence was 6 to 12 years of 

incarceration. Appellant’s aggregate term of incarceration is 4 to 9 years.
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harassment and disorderly conduct conviction. Id. at 68. He also emphasizes 

that the PSI recommended a sentence at the top of the standard range for 

each count, rather than above the aggravated range. Id. at 70. After careful 

review, we reject Appellant’s claim that the sentences were unreasonable.

The trial court explained that, in imposing the sentence, it considered 

the factors set forth in Section 9721 and reviewed the PSI, which included

information relating to Appellant’s asserted mitigation factors, specifically his 

“employment history, his family support, and his minimal prior record.” Trial 

Ct. Order at 3. While acknowledging Appellant’s mitigating factors, the court 

reiterated its reasons for sentencing Appellant “beyond the aggravated range”

for Indecent Assault: 

(1) the impact on [V]ictim in that she has been diagnosed with 

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, she takes medication regularly, 

and she attends therapy twice a week; (2) the relationship of 

[Appellant] to [V]ictim in that he was the live-in boyfriend of 

[V]ictim’s mother, thereby placing him in a “father figure” role; 

and (3) the seriousness of the offense in that it was comprised of 

a series of sexual events throughout the day.

Id. at 4. Similarly, in regard to the Corruption of Minors sentence, the court 

repeated the first reason and added its consideration of “the seriousness of 

the offense in that it entailed sexual touching of the genitalia by a ‘father 

figure’ who was three times [V]ictim’s age.” Id. The court also highlighted 

Appellant’s “previous assaultive behavior towards his girlfriend” in 2019. Id. 

We conclude that the sentencing court did not impose an unreasonable 

sentence. Rather, the court accurately stated the sentencing guidelines, 

considered the sentencing factors, acknowledged the mitigation factors
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presented in the PSI and during the sentencing hearing, and articulated its 

reasons for deviating from the guidelines on the record. Further, we reject 

Appellant’s suggestion that these factors are so common to the crimes of 

Indecent Assault and Corruption of Minors that we should assume that they 

were taken into account by the drafters of the Sentencing Guidelines. Given

the sentencing court’s developed reasons for imposing aggravated sentences

with reference to the facts of this case and the impact on Victim, we conclude 

that the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 2/16/2024