SBC “to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment action.” See
Wells v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 289 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2002). However,
even if the burden were to shift, SBC has offered non-discriminatory reasons for
terminating Raymond’s position. Raymond’s position was terminated as part of a
reduction in force brought about by economic conditions. (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) J 22);
see Paluck, 221 F.3d at 1012 (a RIF is a legitimate reason for terminating employees).
Furthermore, SBC used performance rankings, which placed Raymond last among her
team, and manager assessments, which indicated weaknesses in her understanding of data
products and her ability to sell, to select Raymond. (/d. § 42, 45.)

d. Pretext

Because SBC established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
termination, Raymond must establish “that the specific reasons given for including her in
the reduction were pretextual.” See Paluck, 221 F.3d at 1013. To prove pretext,
Raymond must show that SBC’s explanation of the adverse employment action had no
basis in fact, the explanation was not the “real” reason, or the reason given was
insufficient to support the action. See Holmes v. Potter, 384 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir.
2004). Furthermore, Raymond must “specifically refute the facts which allegedly support
the employer’s proffered reasons.” See Mills v. First Fed, Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 83 F.3d
833, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The issue is “whether
the employer’s stated reason was honest, not whether it was accurate, wise, or well-
considered.” Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000).

There is nothing to suggest that SBC’s stated reasons for including Raymond in

the RIF were pretextual. The undisputed facts establish that the specific criteria for an

14


is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
Accordingly, this Court must view the facts in a light most favorable to Raymond while
“drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor.” Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323
F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2003). However, Raymond must “set forth specific facts, more
than mere conclusions and allegations, sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial; ‘the
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment... .’” Balderston v.
Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48) (emphasis in original).

Local Rule 56.1 sets forth the obligations of each party moving for and opposing
summary judgment. LR 56.1. A moving party must serve and file any affidavits and
other materials referred to in Rule 56(e), a supporting memorandum of law, and a
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine
issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law. LR 56.1(a). A
party opposing a motion for summary judgment is required to serve and file any
opposing affidavits and other materials referred to in Rule 56(e), a supporting
memorandum of law and a concise response to the movant’s statement. LR 56.1(b). The
opposing party’s failure to controvert the moving party’s statement of facts results in the
moving party’s version of the facts being deemed admitted. LR 56.1(b)(3)(B). The
Seventh Circuit has repeatedly upheld strict enforcement of Local Rule 56.1. Bell, Boyd,
& Lloyd v, Tapy, 896 F.2d 1101, 1102-03 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing application of Local
Rule 12(m), the predecessor to Local Rule 56.1); see Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24

F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).


Even when viewed with evidence belonging to the third category, as discussed in
the section below, the facts deemed admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 fail to provide
sufficient circumstantial evidence of discrimination that would “entitle a jury to conclude
that the employer acted because of a forbidden animus.” Rogers, 320 F.3d at 754.

Therefore, Raymond must proceed under the indirect method of proof.

II. Indirect Method

Unlawful discrimination under Title VII or ADEA may be proved under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Krchnavy v. Limagrain Genetics Corp.,
294 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2002); see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-03. To
proceed under the indirect method, Raymond must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. See Krchnavy, 294 F.3d at 875. Once a prima facie case has been
established, the burden of production shifts to SBC to offer a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employment decision. See id. at 876. If SBC offers a non-
discriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to Raymond, and ultimately she must prove
the reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. See id.

a. Traditional Reduction in Force

To make a prima facie case of discrimination in a traditional reduction in force
(“RIF”) case, Raymond is required to establish: first, she is a member of a protected
class; second, she was performing at a level that met SBC’s legitimate expectations;
third, she was subject to an adverse employment action; and fourth, she was treated
differently than a similarly situated person outside the protected class. See Krchnavy,

294 F.3d at 875. SBC does not dispute that Raymond has established the first three

10


response because she failed to provide sufficient grounds to warrant reconsideration.
(Order of 10/4/04.) Accordingly, as stated on September 24, 2004, the Court will rule on
the motion for summary judgment without the benefit of Raymond’s response. (See
Order of 9/24/04.) However, Raymond’s failure to submit a timely filing does not
automatically result in a grant of summary judgment in favor of SBC because the Court
must still determine whether summary judgment is proper as a matter of law. Wienco,
Inc., 965 F.2d at 568.

It should be noted that this Court strictly enforces Local Rule 56.1 with regard to
SBC’s statement of facts. Accordingly, the facts contained in the second and third
sentences of paragraph 59 are not deemed admitted because SBC in support of that
portion of that paragraph cites to pages omitted from the materials submitted to this
Court in contravention of the local rule.

Raymond alleges that SBC discriminated against her based on her race and sex in
violation of Title VII and age in violation of ADEA. Title VII makes it “an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race . . . [or] sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ADEA makes it “unlawful
for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, SBC argues: (1) Raymond

cannot demonstrate direct evidence of discrimination and therefore must proceed under


When dealing with the filings of motions and other papers, the Court has the
ability to establish and enforce deadlines. Reales v. Conrail, 84 F.3d 993, 996 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding there was no abuse of discretion when the district court refused to accept
a one-day late response to a motion for summary judgment.) District courts have
substantial discretion in managing their dockets and “are entitled--indeed they must--
enforce deadlines.” /d. Ifa party opposing a motion for summary judgment fails to file a
timely Local Rule 56.1(b) statement, the uncontroverted statements in the moving party’s
statement are deemed admitted. LR 56.1(b)(3)(B); Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Assocs., 965
F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing Local Rule 56.1’s predecessor, Local Rule
12(m)).

With these principles in mind, the Court notes that Raymond has failed to comply
with her obligations under Local Rule 56.1 because she failed to file a timely response.
On May 25, 2004, the Court ordered SBC to file its motion for summary judgment by
August 2, 2004 and Raymond to respond to the motion by September 3. (Order of
5/25/04.) SBC filed its motion for summary judgment and Local Rule 56.1 materials on
August 2. On August 18, 2004, the Court granted in part and denied in part Raymond’s
motion for additional time to respond, which was requested in part due to Raymond’s
counsel’s lengthy vacation out of the country, and the due date for the response was
extended to September 21. (Order of 8/18/04.) On September 17, 2004, the Court
denied Raymond’s second motion for additional time to respond to SBC’s motion for
summary judgment. (Order of 9/17/04.) Raymond failed to file a response to SBC’s
motion for summary judgment on or before the due date of September 21. On October 4,

2004, the Court denied Raymond’s motion for reconsideration and leave to file a


In this case, there is no direct evidence of discrimination. As previously noted,
however, this does not preclude a finding of discrimination under the direct method using,
circumstantial evidence. Rogers, 320 F.3d at 754.

b. Circumstantial Evidence

The Seventh Circuit has distinguished three types of circumstantial evidence of
intentional discrimination, each of which may suffice by itself to establish discrimination,
or may be used in conjunction with one or both of the other categories. Troupe v. May
Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994); see Venturelli v. ARC Cmty. Servs.,
350 F.3d 592, 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying categories as to Title VII claim); Gorence v.
Eagle Food Ctrs., 242 F.3d 759,762 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying categories as to ADEA
claim.) The first category consists of “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or
written, behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the protected group,
and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be
drawn.” Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736. The second contains evidence that “employees
similarly situated to the plaintiff other than in the characteristic .. . on which an employer
is forbidden to base a difference in treatment received systematically better treatment.”
Jd. The final category consists of “evidence that the plaintiff was qualified for the job in
question but passed over in favor of (or replaced by) a person not having the forbidden
characteristic and that the employer's stated reason for the difference in treatment is
unworthy of belief, a mere pretext for discrimination.” Jd. The third category requires
substantially the same evidence as is required under the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Venturelli, 350 F.3d at

601.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
WANDA RAYMOND, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) 03 C 4509

v. )

) Judge Ronald A. Guzman
AMERITECH CORPORATION )
d/b/a SBC Ameritech, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Wanda Raymond has sued her former employer Ameritech Corp. doing
business as SBC (“SBC”) for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., as well as race and sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), §
2000¢ et seg. Before the Court is defendant SBC’s motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court grants the motion.

FACTS
Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, which this Court strictly enforces, the following
facts have been deemed admitted. On April 10, 1995, Wanda Raymond was hired by
SBC as an account manager. (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) J 13.) In December 1999, she was
transferred to the Alternate Channels Division to be a Distribution Manager (“DM”) on
the Illinois Authorized Distributor (“AD”) Sales Team (“Illinois AD Sales Team”). (/d. {|
14.) In 2001, the Illinois AD Sales Team reported to John Rozinsky, State Sales

Manager, who in turn reported to David Conley, Director of Sales for the Alternate


evidence indicates that Gottshalk ranked higher than Raymond over the three months
used for evaluation prior to the RIF and had better knowledge of data products and sales
skills, areas which SBC considered important to future business. (/d. J] 36, 39, 42.) The
differences in evaluation rankings and business skills possessed are substantial enough to
distinguish Raymond and Gottshalk. . See Sator, 388 F.3d at 279-80; Radue, 219 F.3d at
618.

Furthermore, in the case of Bob Cruickshank and Scott Adams, there is nothing
that indicates they were treated more favorably. Like Raymond, Conley selected
Cruickshank and Adams for layoff. (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) § 29.) Conley, the decision
maker in Raymond’s layoff, did not assist Cruickshank or Adams in finding new
positions and there is no indication that SBC provided them assistance that was not
available to Raymond or that Raymond expressed interest in transferring. (/d. §§ 62,70.)

Therefore, because the undisputed facts do not show anyone similarly situated to
Raymond and outside of the protected class who received better treatment, Raymond has
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the traditional RIF standard
for her Title VII and ADEA claims,

b. Mini-RIF

Although not suggested by the parties, the reduction in force in this case may be
characterized as what courts have called a “mini-RIF.” See Bellaver v. Quanex Corp.,
200 F.3d 485, 493-95 (7th Cir. 2000). Unlike a traditional reduction in force, where the
employer no longer needs the discharged employee’s duties performed, a mini-RIF
occurs when the discharged employee’s duties are assumed by others. Michas v. Health

Cost Controls of lll, Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2000). Whether the mini-RIF

12


elements, therefore only the fourth element will be discussed.

In order to meet the burden of demonstrating that another employee is similarly
situated, the employee must be directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material
respects. Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). Ata
minimum, a plaintiff is required to show that the other employee “possessed analogous
attributes, experience, education, and qualifications ....” Radue, 219 F.3d at 618. For
example, regardless of other qualifications, expertise with a product that the company
regards as central to its future business is sufficient to materially distinguish employees.
Sator vy. Spherion Corp., 388 F.3d 275, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2004).

In this case, there is very little evidence to determine which employees outside
the protected class, if any, are similarly situated to Raymond. The most likely employees
are Mike Gottshalk, Bob Cruickshank, and Scott Adams.

Gottshalk, Cruickshank and Adams are all male and therefore outside of the
protected class for the Title VII sex discrimination claim. (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) 94 29,
46.) For the Title VII race discrimination claim, no evidence is presented of Gottshalk’s
race, but Cruickshank and Adams are both white and therefore outside of the protected
class. (/d. § 29.) Cruickshank is older than Raymond and no evidence is presented of
Gottshalk’s age, therefore only Adams, who was thirty-six years old at the time of the
layoff, is outside the protected class for the ADEA claim. (/d.)

Raymond has not demonstrated that Cruickshank, Adams, or Gottshalk were
similarly situated to her at the time of the reduction in force. Although Cruickshank and
Adams had the same job title as Raymond, nothing was presented describing their

experience, education or qualifications. (/d.) As for Mike Gottshalk, the uncontroverted

11


the indirect method of proof; (2) Raymond fails to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination; (3) Raymond fails to show that SBC’s articulated reasons for her layoff

are a pretext for discrimination. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

I. Direct Method

Under the direct method of establishing a claim of discrimination, Raymond may
show that SBC’s decision to terminate her was motivated by her race, sex or age either
through direct or circumstantial evidence. Haywood, 323 F.3d at 529-30 (discussing
direct method in context of Title VII); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 616
(7th Cir. 2000) (discussing direct method in context of ADEA.) Therefore, SBC’s
assertion that if Raymond does not produce direct evidence of discrimination she must
proceed under the indirect method is incorrect. Rogers v. City of Chi., 320 F.3d 748, 754
(7th Cir. 2003) (“plaintiffs may proceed under the direct method provided that they
adduce either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence that would entitle a jury to
conclude that the employer acted because of a forbidden animus.”) (emphasis in
original).

a. Direct Evidence

Direct evidence is evidence which “if believed by the trier of fact, will prove the
particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or presumption.” Randle v.
LaSalle Telecommunications, Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1989). Successfully
establishing direct evidence of discrimination “essentially requires an admission by the
decision-maker that his actions were based on the prohibited animus.” Radue, 219 F.3d

at 616.


would have an easier time finding another job than Raymond because Gottshalk was a
“young guy” and “single.” (/d. {| 46-47.) Conley responded that he did not think those
were valid reasons to abandon the objective criteria he applied in selecting a DM for
layoff in Illinois. (/d. J 48.)

Accordingly, on November 16, 2001, Raymond was laid off. (/d. €§ 45, 50, 57.)
Raymond is an Asian-American female and was forty-six years old at the time of her
termination. (/d. J{ 1, 4.) Ata meeting that day, Conley did not explain to Raymond the
reason for her selection. (Jd. 51.) The Illinois AD Sales Team head count was reduced
by one DM and Raymond’s accounts were distributed among the remaining DMs. (/d. §
57.) Almost nine months later, on August 1, 2002, Ben Berg was hired as a DM on the
Illinois Sales Team. (/d. J 58.)

There are no indications that Conley ever acted inappropriately toward Raymond
on the occasions that they met in person or that anyone at SBC, including Conley, ever
made any age-, sex- or race-related remarks to Raymond or about Raymond. (/d. 44 55-

56.)

DI IN
Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIv, P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The Court’s function at the summary judgment stage is not to

“weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there


employee’s selection for layoff, as stated by Conley, were those actually used. (Def.’s
LR 56.1(a)(3) 9 32-48, 51-52.)

Raymond does not dispute that the stack rankings relied upon by Conley to select
her for the RIF ranked her second to last in August 2001, and last in September and
October 2001 among the Illinois DMs. (/d. 37.) Furthermore, there is no evidence that
her sales for those periods were under reported or that the stack rankings for Illinois DMs
were inaccurate. The use of three months’ stack rankings may not have been the wisest
method of evaluating long-term performance, but Raymond has failed to present
evidence that would allow a rational trier of fact to infer that SBC’s stated reasons were
lies. See Tincher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 118 F.3d 1125, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997).
Whether or not Rozinsky explicitly recommended to Conley that Raymond be laid off,
there is nothing to suggest dishonesty in Conley’s belief that: (1) Rozinsky assessed
Raymond as weak as to her knowledge of data products; (2) the ability to attain new
monthly revenue was increasingly important to SBC, which required strong data
knowledge and data sales skills; and (3) Rozinsky had indicated that as between
Gottschalk and Raymond, Gottschalk gave him a better opportunity to be successful in
the following year. (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) 99] 40-45; Def.’s Ex. C, Rozinsky Dep. at 12-
13.)

Finally, Raymond did not show that the RIF itself was a pretext. Raymond did
not dispute that the layoff was driven by business or economic reasons. (Def.’s LR
56.1(a)(3) { 23.) Although there is evidence that one DM was hired into the IIinois
Sales Team almost nine months after the RIF on August 1, 2002, nothing indicates that

the hiring process occurred during the RIF. See Paluck, 221 F.3d at 1013-14 (evidence

15


his team would be selected; rather, Conley indicated that one of Rozinsky’s DMs had to
be laid off. (Id. 431.)

Because none of the Illinois DMs were on PIPs, Conley considered the following
factors: the August and September 2001 month-to-date (“MTD”) stack rankings of DMs
by sales performance, the October 2001 MTD sales report, the input and recommendation
of Rozinsky, SBC’s business needs, and an employee’s skill set and ability to be
successful. (/d. § 32.) Stack rankings were the most important tool for measuring
performance calculated by ranking DMs based on sales in four weighted categories. (Id.
{4 17-18, 21.) Conley and Rozinsky discussed the performance of all DMs on the Illinois
AD Sales Team and reviewed the MTD stack rankings for the three months prior to
November. (/d. 9 35, 41-44.)

According to the stack reports, Raymond was ranked second to last of the DMs
on the Illinois AD sales team in August and was ranked last in September and October.
(/d. J§ 36-39.) The next lowest performing DM was Mike Gottschalk, who ranked third
from the bottom in August and second to last in September and October. (/d.) Based on
the stack rankings, Conley determined that Gottshalk and Raymond were the lowest
performing DMs. (/d. 440.) When discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the DMs
on the Illinois sales team, Rozinsky informed Conley that Raymond was weak in both her
understanding of data products and her ability to sell. (/d. J] 41-42.) When asked who,
between Gottshalk and Raymond, had more potential to help Rozinsky’s team be more
successful in the following year, Conley believed Rozinsky chose Gottshalk. (/d. 1 43-
44.) Shortly before Raymond was laid off, Rozinsky asked Conley whether he would

consider laying off Gottshalk instead of Raymond because Rozinsky believed Gottschalk


Channels Division. (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) J 11.) In addition to the Illinois AD Sales
Team, Conley had responsibility for the DMs on the authorized distributor sales teams in
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin. (/d. 4 10.) Conley and Brian Clark, sales
director for DMs in the Growth Channel and Enterprise Service Provider Channel, both
reported to Brian Jump, Vice-President of Mid-Markets. (/d. ] 12.)

On October 26, 2001, the President of Ameritech’s Business Communications
Services division informed employees by email that there was going to be a reduction in
force due to economic conditions. (/d. § 22.) In late October 2001, Jump informed
Conley and Clark that five DM positions had to be eliminated - four from Conley’s AD
channel and one from Clark’s channels. (/d. J§ 24-25.) Conley reduced one headcount
from each of the state teams in his group with the exception of Wisconsin, which already
had the fewest DMs. (/d. 9 24, 26-27.)

In late October 2001, Conley informed each state sales manager of the layoff and
asked whether anyone on their respective team was on a Performance Improvement Plan
(“PIP”). (id. §§ 26, 28.) The Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio AD sales teams each had a
DM on a PIP, and these individuals were selected for the layoff: Elana Schafer in
Indiana (African-American, female, born 6/26/60); Bob Cruickshank in Michigan (white,
male, born 10/21/50); and Scott Adams in Ohio (white, male, born 1/2/65). (Id. § 29.)
After Cruickshank and Adams were selected for layoff, positions in their respective states
became open. (Jd. {§ 61-62.) Cruickshank’s manager, Boykin, assisted Cruickshank in
finding another position. (/d. 4 63.)

Rozinsky first told his DMs that because no one was on a PIP, the Illinois Team

would not be affected. (Jd. 131.) However, Conley did not tell Rozinsky that none of


standard applies is not dependent on the number of employees who were terminated but
on whether the employer still needed the laid-off employee’s job responsibilities to be
performed. Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000). Under
the McDonnell Douglas/mini-RIF framework, the fourth element is met if the employee
was “constructively replaced” by other employees outside of the protected class.
Bellaver, 200 F.3d at 495,

In this case, when Raymond was terminated, her accounts were distributed in
some way among the remaining Illinois DMs: Melissa Pariani, Joel Selan, Adam Brady,
Greg Bednarz, Andy Ramirez, Linda Nilles, Mike Gottschalk, and Thomas Gaynes.
(Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) J 57; Def.’s Ex. 2.) Although nothing is presented to establish that
any of the remaining DMs were outside of the protected classes for Raymond’s Title VII
race and ADEA discrimination claims, it is reasonable to infer from their names that
most of the remaining DMs were males and therefore outside of the protected class for
the Title VII sex discrimination claim. However, there is nothing to indicate how
Raymond’s accounts were distributed - if, for example, the accounts were distributed
evenly among the entire team or whether a small number of employees received the bulk
of her accounts. Therefore, Raymond has not shown that she was constructively replaced
by an employee outside of the protected class and has failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination under the mini-RIF analysis for either her Title VII or ADEA
claim.

c. Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

Because a reasonable jury could not find Raymond established a prima facie case

of discrimination under Title VII or ADEA, the burden of production does not shift to

13


that hiring took place later in the year following a RIF without further explanation to
indicate that the hiring took place in the midst of the purported RIF did not demonstrate
pretext.); (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) § 58.)

Therefore, even if Raymond established a prima facie case, she still would not

prevail on her Title VII or ADEA based discrimination claims.

IIL. Failure to Rehire

When an employer hires new employees after a RIF, courts have analyzed the
case as a failure to rehire. See, e.g., Zaccagnini v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 338 F.3d
672, 674 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying failure-to-rehire analysis when employer hired new
employees few months after RIF instead of hiring laid-off employee). In this case,
however, Raymond has not claimed a failure to rehire. Although Raymond was informed
that she could reapply, there is no evidence that she did so. (/d. | 50.) Therefore, there is
no failure-to-hire claim associated with SBC’s hiring of Ben Berg on August 1, 2002

instead of rehiring Raymond. (/d. J 58.)

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants SBC’s motion for summary
judgment [doc. no. 42-1]. This case is hereby terminated.

SO ORDERED ENTERED: 3/o/ OS

HON. RONALD A. GUZM,
United States Judge

16