****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and inthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************DIEGO MURCIA v. WALT GEYER ET AL. (AC 35906)
Gruendel, Sheldon and Flynn, Js. Argued April 14—officially released June 24, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Housing Session at Bridgeport, Rodriguez, J.)
Walt Geyer and RaShanda Johnson-Geyer, self-represented, the appellants (defendants).
Kent M. Miller, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion SHELDON, J. The defendants, Walt Geyer and RaShandaJohnson-Geyer, appealfromthetrialcourt’sjudgment, in this summary process action, in favor of the plaintiff, Diego Murcia, on his claim of nonpayment of rent arising from a lease agreement between the plaintiff landlord and themselves. We conclude that the recordbeforeusisinadequatetoreviewthe defendants’ claim on appeal, and thus we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The plaintiff, in his summary process complaint datedJune 25, 2013, alleged that he and the defendants had entered into an oral agreement to rent the premises of ‘‘604 Center St Ext. Apt 1, Bridgeport, CT 06604’’ for a term of one year. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had agreed to pay, on the first day ofeach month, the amount of$950 to him, but theyhadnotpaidthe rentdue onJune 1, 2013, asagreed upon in the lease. On June 20, 2013, the plaintiffserved upon the defendants a notice instructing them to quit possession ofthe premises on or before June 24, 2013. The defendants, however, remained in possession of the premises beyond June 24, 2013. As a result, the plaintiff commenced this summary process action. Thereafter, on June 26, 2013, the defendants filed their answer to the plaintiff’s summary process complaint, in which they raised five special defenses: (1) rentwas offeredto the plaintiffonJune 19, 2013, which
was before the date on which they received the notice to quit; (2) no rent was due under Connecticut law because there were ‘‘housing, zoning, building and fire code violations’’ and the ‘‘residence was found to be totally illegal on the basis of having no history of requiredpermits’’; (3) the defendants notifiedthe plaintiff and Bridgeport’s building department of these allegedviolations; (4) the evictionwasbroughtinretaliation for the defendants’ notification ofpublic officials
or agencies complaining about the condition of their apartment; and (5) the defendants had not received a ninety day letter before the notice to quit was served upon them.
The matter was tried before the court, Rodriguez, J., on July 15, 2013. The plaintiff and both defendants testifiedandpresentedevidenceattrial. Thedefendants testified as to the plaintiff’s failure to correct several housing code violations, including removing litter, garbage, rubbish and overgrowth from the front, left and back yards; repairing or replacing the front porch and stairs; repairing open and exposed electrical wiring on the rear porch and stairs; repairing a defective outlet in the bathroom; repairing the living room windows to make them weather tight; and the conducting of an inspection by a licensed electrical contractor to verifythat the first floor electrical supply is separate from all other apartments and in proper operating condition. The court continued the case in order to provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to correct these alleged violations. On July 31, 2013, the plaintiffpresented evidence to the court that he had corrected all of the previously described violations. The court later, and without filing an accompanying memorandum of decision, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for immediate possession of the premises. Thereafter, on August 2, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to open thejudgment, whichwas deniedbythe court onAugust 5, 2013, also without filing an accompanying memorandum of decision. This appeal followed.
The defendants’ onlyclaim on appealisthatthe court abused its discretion by renderingjudgment in favor of the plaintiff based on the evidence before it. Specifically, theyclaimthatthe evidence clearlydemonstrated thattheplaintiff’sbasisfortheirevictionwasretaliatory innature arising fromtheirreporting ofseveralhousing code violations to the Building Department of the City ofBridgeport. To the contrary, the plaintiffargues that the evidence supported the court’s renderingjudgment for possession ofthe premises in his favor due to nonpayment of rent.
We must consider first whetherwe have an adequate recordforreviewofthe defendants’ claim. We conclude thatwe do not. The court’s renderingjudgment in favor of the plaintiff in this summary process action constitutesanappealablefinaljudgment, and, ‘‘therefore, pursuanttoPracticeBook § 64-1 (a), the courtwasrequired to state, either orally or in writing, a decision that encompassed its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties and the factual basis therefor.

. . . If an oral decision is rendered, a signed transcript of the oral decision should be created and filed for use in any appeal. If the court fails to file an oral or written decision, the appellant, who has the duty to provide an adequaterecordforappellatereview; seePractice Book § 61-10; must file a notice to that effect with the appellate clerk in accordance with Practice Book § 64-1 (b).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gordon v. Gordon, 148 Conn. App. 59, 66–67, 84 A.3d 923 (2014).
In the present case, the court did not file a written memorandum of decision explaining its ruling, nor did it prepare and sign a transcript of an oral ruling. The defendants did not file a notice pursuant to Practice Book § 64-1 with the appellate clerk’s office, nor did they file a motion asking the court to articulate the factual and legal basis for its ruling. See Practice Book § 66-5. Although the record before us includes the trial transcript, we cannot readily identify any portion of it that encompassesthecourt’sfactualfindingswithrespectto the defendants’ claim ofretaliatory eviction. Cognizantthat we must make every reasonable presumption in favor ofthe correctness ofthe court’s decision, we are constrained to conclude, on the basis of our review of the limited record provided to us, that the court acted reasonablyand didnot abuse its discretioninrendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff.1
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Pursuant to Practice Book § 61-10, which was amended October 18, 2012, to take effect January 1, 2013, ‘‘this court will not decline to review

aclaimonappealsolelyonthebasisofaparty’sfailuretoseekanarticulation. See Practice Book § 61-10 (b). As stated in the commentary to the rule, however, the new subsection (b) that was created by the amendment was not intended to preclude this court from declining to review an issue where the record is inadequate for reasons other than solely the failure to seek

an articulation, such as, for example, the failure to procure the trial court’s decision pursuant to [Practice Book §] 64-1 (b)

. . . . Practice Book § 61- 10, commentary.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gordon v. Gordon, supra, 148 Conn. App. 68 n.10. The newsubsection also inno wayaltersthe responsibilityofan appellant to ensure that the appellate record is perfected for proper presentation of all claims raised. See Macricostas v. Kovacs, 67 Conn. App. 130, 133, 787 A.2d 64 (2001) (‘‘The duty to provide this court with a record adequate for review rests with the appellant.

. . . It is incumbent upon the appellant to take the necessary steps to sustain its burden of providing an adequate record for appellate review. Practice Book § [60-5]

. . . . It is not the function of this court to find facts.

. . . Our role is

. . . to review claims based on a complete factual record developed by a trial court.

. . . Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court

. . . any decision made by us respecting [the defendant’s claims] would be entirely speculative.

. . . Where the transcript does not reveal the basis of the court’s factual conclusion, we will not review the appellant’s claims.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). In the present case, we do not decline to review the defendants’ claim, rather we review the claim on the record provided. Nor is our resolution founded solelyuponthe defendants’ failure to seek an articulation, butupon their failure to procure a memorandum of decision.