damages is time-barred; the usual rule is that where both legal and
equitable remedies are available (as under §§ 1981 and 1982), and
the legal claim is barred, so too is the equitable claim. Nemkov v.
O’Hare Chicago Corp., 592 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1979). The motion to

dismiss Ms. McCarroll’s claim under §§ 1981-1982 is GRANTED

ENTER ORDER:

Lone C Buhl

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: February L , 2004


1999) (Moran, J.). Notice of one incident of discrimination against
one individual is not the same as notice of an ongoing, widespread
pattern of disparate treatment based on race, such as_ the
plaintiffs allege here. As the notice requirement was not met, the
plaintiffs other than Mr. Whiteside cannot sustain their individual
claims, and thus they cannot serve as class representatives, though
it is possible that they may recover as class members if the
plaintiff class is certified. See Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., 94
F. Supp. 2d 856, 861 (N.D. Oh. 2000) (holding that named plaintiffs
who did not file claims with the state civil rights commission
could not seek relief in federal court under § 2000a and thus could
not serve as class representatives). The motion to dismiss the
claims brought by Ms. Blanchard, Ms. Gray, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Lawson,
Ms. McCarroll, Mr. Polk, Ms. Smith, and Kerry Stewart under § 2000a
is GRANTED.

One named plaintiff is all that is required to pursue a class
action. Defendants offer no explanation why Mr. Whiteside could not
potentially serve as that representative. Therefore, the motion to
strike class allegations is DENIED.

Plaintiffs admit that Ms. McCarroll’s action for damages under
§§ 1981-1982 is time-barred, but argue that the claim need not be
dismissed, because she may still seek injunctive relief. Again,
plaintiffs cite to no authority to support the proposition that

equitable relief is available to a plaintiff whose claim for


Minthe Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

Name of Assigned Jud; i: Sitting Judge if Othe
aoe Magistrate Judge Elaine E. Bucklo than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 2032 DATE 2/2/2004
CASE Blanchard, et al. vs. Speedway
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
aM oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
Q@) Q Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due :
(4) Qo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(7) Qo Trial[set for/re-set for) on at
(8) Qa [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Q This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
OFRCP4(m) Local Rule 41.1 OOFRCP4i(a\(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).
ao = [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss §2000a claims of all plaintiffs other than Perry Whiteside (55-1) and denying their motion to
strike the class allegations (55-2). The motion to dismiss with respect to Ms. McCarroll’s claim under §§
1891-1982 is also granted.
(11) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

‘No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counset by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom
MPI deputy’s
initials

central Clett’sOffice



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

LENORE BLANCHARD, LANITA GRAY,
KENNETH JOHNSON, CHRISTOPHER
LAWSON, DEBRA MCCARROLL, BRUCE
POLK, ISABELLA SMITH, KERRY

STEWART, and PERRY WHITESIDE,
No. 02 C 2032

Plaintiffs,
Vv. 2
SPEEDWAY SUPERAMERICA, LLC, en Q,
Oo Le,
Defendant a,
: ?

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs are African-American customers of defendant
Speedway Superamerica, LLC (“Speedway”), a gas station chain, who
were allegedly obliged to pay for gasoline before filling their
tanks (“pre-payment”) while white customers were allowed to fill
their tanks and pay afterwards. The plaintiffs seek relief on
behalf of themselves and a yet-to-be-certified class of African-
American customers under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (Count I) and 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (Count II). Speedway moves to dismiss the § 2000a
claims of all plaintiffs other than Perry Whiteside for failure to
comply with state notice requirements, to strike the class
allegations corresponding to that claim, and to dismiss plaintiff
Debra McCarroll’s claim under Count I under the statute of
limitations. I Grant the motions to dismiss, but Deny the motion to

strike.

bP


§ 2000a states that no civil action may be brought under the
section “before the expiration of thirty days after written notice
of such alleged [discriminatory] act or practice has been given to
the appropriate state or local authority.” Named plaintiffs in
class action suits must meet notice and exhaustion requirements,
even though class members need not. Robinson v. Sheriff of Cook
County, 167 F.3d 1155, 1156 (7th Cir. 1999) (class member who never
filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC could not serve as
class representative in a Title VII case). Both Illinois and
Indiana, where the incidents alleged in this case took place, have
laws prohibiting racial discrimination and agencies designed to
investigate and remedy such discrimination. Stearnes v. Baur’s
Opera Opera House, 3 F.3d 1142, 1144-5 (7th Cir. 1993); Swarn v.
Pizza King, No. IP 01-1150~-C-T/K, 2001 WL 1712507, at *2 (S.D. Ind.
Dec. 6, 2001).

It is undisputed that of the named plaintiffs, only Mr.
Whiteside filed a notice with a local anti-discrimination agency
before this lawsuit was filed. Plaintiffs argue that this notice
from Mr. Whiteside is sufficient to notify the state as to all
named plaintiffs, but do not cite to a single case where a court
has waived the notice requirement. The purpose of the notice
requirement is to provide the state with an opportunity to remedy
the discrimination before costly and time-consuming litigation is

pursued. Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 764, 770 (N.D. Ill.