DISCUSSION

L Summary judgment standard

Summary judgment is proper when the moving papers «ind affidavits show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); King v. National Human Res.
Comm., 218 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2000). Once a moving party has met its burden, the non-
movant must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 1999). The
court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Bay v. Cassens Transp., Co. , 2) 2 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir.
2000). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is sufficient to support a
reasonable jury verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
US. 242, 248 (1986); Jnsolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). If the
moving party meets this burden, the nonmovant must then respond by offering specific facts that
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
II. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment

Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination protects employees against unwelcomed
sexual advances that create an offensive or hostile work environment. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). A hostile work
environment occurs when sexual harassment is so severe or pervasive it alters the conditions of
employment, and creates an abusive work environment. Gleason v. Mesirow Financial, Inc., 118

F.3d 1134, 1143 (7th Cir. 1997). The harassment must "adversely affect the work performance


Further, Reynolds’ November 1, 2000 meeting with Sacchitella did not involve acts or
comments of a sexual nature. Indeed, the meeting was for disciplinary purposes, and Sacchitella
complained only that she was threatened with termination and spoken to in a “stern voice.” Def.
56.1 Facts at {{j 45-48; see Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2002) (looking
at the context of the purported harassing events). Sacchitella had a series of absences, and she
raised her voice to Haas that morning. Def. 56.1 Facts at §{] 35-38. Indeed, the disciplinary
meeting was not unique to Sacchitella — Reynolds conducted similar meetings with other trainees
that day. Jd. at 448.

Sacchitella fails to offer evidence that Reynolds’ dinner suggestion was a sexual advance,
rather than a friendly invitation. /d. at { 51; see Minor vy. Ivy Tech State College, 174 F.3d 855,
858 (7th Cir. 1999) (“It is no part of the function of Title VII to change a hand-ons management
style”). Haas’ use of the term “bitch” twice in Sacchitella’s vicinity only constitutes unpleasant
and crude behavior in the workplace. It is undisputed Haas did not use the vulgar term to refer to
Sacchitella. See LaBellarete v. Fraternal Enter, Ltd., No. 95 C 3189, 1996 WL 465397, at *4-5
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 1996) (use of the term “bitch” ten to twenty times at or around plaintiff did not
constitute hostile work environment).

To constitute a hostile work environment, the purported conduct must be extreme and the
workplace intolerable. See Minor, 174 F.3d at 875-58. Viewed in the light most favorable to

Sacchitella, she fails to raise a genuine factual dispute that she suffered from a severe or


It is undisputed Reynolds met with Sacchitella on February 5, 2001. He touched her hand
and made a sexually suggestive comment. Def. 56.1 Facts at ‘| 53. Because that incident
occurred within 300 days of the filing of Sacchitella’s EEOC charge, events before January 4,
2001 may be considered under Morgan. Accordingly, Sacchitella’s claims are not time-barred.
See e.g. Alexander v. CIT Tech. Financing Serv., Inc., No. 01 C 7217, 2002 WL 1926122, at *12
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2002) (events outside the 300-day period must be considered in a hostile work
environment claim after Morgan).

B. Actionable Hostile Work Environment

CSX asserts Reynolds, Haas, and Douthard’s conduct did not create a hostile work
environment as a matter of law. To determine a hostile or abusive work environment, the totality
of the circumstances must be taken into account. Harris v. Forklii Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
23 (1993). Courts should examine "the frequency of the discrirninatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." /d. These factors are evaluated
from a subjective and an objective point of view. /d. Sacchitella must subjectively perceive the
conduct as abusive. /d, Furthermore, a reasonable person must cbjectively find the conduct
creates a hostile work environment. Jd. at 23. "[A] certain amount of vulgar banter, tinged with
sexual innuendo is inevitable in the modern workplace, particularly from coarse and boorish
workers.” Gleason, 118 F.3d at 1144. “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious)” are not sexual harassment. furagher v. Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 778 (1998).


and the well-being of both a reasonable person and the particular plaintiff bringing the action."
Id. In order to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) she was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment in the form of
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2)
the harassment was based on sex; (3) the sexual harassment unreasonably interfered with
plaintiff's work performance in creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Parkins v. Civil Constr. Of Illinois,
Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir, 1998).

A. EEOC charge

CSX asserts conduct that occurred before January 4, 2001 is time-barred. Sacchitella filed
her EEOC charge on October 31, 2001. Under Title VII, a charge of discrimination must be filed
with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Ordinarily, failure to meet this deadline bars any subsequent civil rights
suit. Snider v. Belvidere Township, 216 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2000).

The Supreme Court recently held a hostile work environment claim is not subject to the
300-day bar where one discriminatory act occurred within the statutory period. National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 8. Ct. 2061, 2073 (2002). The Court recognized that
hostile work environment claims “are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature
involves repeated conduct.” Jd The Court held when “an act contributing to the claim occurs
within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered for

purposes of determining liability.” Jd. at 2074.


declining to find a hostile work environment, the court noted plaintiffs supervisor never touched
the plaintiff, did not invite her for sex, did not make threats, and did not expose himself.
Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431.

Koelsch, Saxton, Weiss, and Baskerville are instructive. Reynolds, Haas, and Douthard’s
conduct was clearly inappropriate. Nevertheless, none of the incidents were overtly sexual in
nature, threatening, or intimidating. Haas and Douthard’s comments about women in the railroad
industry were crude and insensitive. Nevertheless, distasteful or inappropriate remarks do not
constitute deeply offensive and intimidating acts. Brill v. Lante. 119 F.3d 1266, 1274 (7th Cir.
1997); see also Gleason, 118 F.3d at 1144-45 (no objectively hostile environment when male co-
worker referred to females as “bitchy,” and commented on female anatomy); Scott v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 211-214 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming summary judgment when
plaintiff was subjected to propositions, lewd comments, and a slap on the buttocks). Haas and
Douthard never touched Sacchitella, threatened her, or invited her for sex. See Adkins v. Kelly-
Springfield Tire Co., No. 97 C 50381, 2001 WL 219636, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2001) (hand
gestures simulating oral sex, and sexually suggestive names were not deeply offensive and
humiliating). Even unwanted touching was insufficient in Koelsch and Saxton. Reynolds’ single
and isolated touching of Sacchitella’s hand is insufficient to constitute a severe or pervasive act.
Cf. Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (a single incident of sexual assault may
be severe enough to constitute hostile work environment). The touching was not to an intimate
body part. Cf Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 266 (7th Cir. 2001) (a single touching to an intimate

body part may create a hostile work environment).


Minute Order Form (06/97)

me United States District Court, Northern District of Hlinois
Do
Remo ie Sues Suzanne B. Conlon tan esiened Jude
CASE NUMBER 02 C 1070 DATE 8/30/2002
CASE SHANNAH L. SACCHITELLA vs. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
TITLE

of the motion being presented.]

[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintilT, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

CFRCP4(m) OlLocal Rule 41.1 OO FRCP41(a)(1) C1 FRCP41(a)(2).

dl) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(ap) i) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) o Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue_

@ oO Ruling/Hearing on___set for__att

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set forlon___setfor___—_at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for]on__—_ssetffor_ sat.
”) Qo Trial[set for/re-set for]on___at

(8) Oo (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__—_at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

(10) | [Other docket entry] The motion for summary judgment [8-1] is granted. ENTER

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.
Stepers BOvloe

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required
io noti quir number of notices

Document
Number

Y | Notices mailed by judge’s staff. SEP - 4 2002

Notified counsel by telephone.

date dockeled

Docketing to mail notices

Mail AO 450 form. lo “9 dcketng depuy inal

Copy to judge/magistrate judge

8/30/2002

Ba Set y dae mled noice
courtroom (eg wai 2d t-

cB deputy’s pw
initials

i. J Dite/time received in
central Cletk’s Office mailing deputy initials



pervasive hostile work environment.’ Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted on her
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.
CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment is granted.

August 30, 2002 ENTER:

oy

United

. Conlon
tates District Judge

' Because Sacchitella fails to raise a genuine factual dispute that she was subjected to a
severe or pervasive hostile work environment, CSX’s argument cn the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense is moot.

10


The crux of Sacchitella’s hostile work environment claim concerns conduct by Reynolds,
Haas, and Douthard from November 2000 to February 2001. For purposes of summary
judgment, it is undisputed Sacchitella subjectively perceived the conduct as abusive.
Nevertheless, CSX argues the conduct did not create an objective hostile work environment.
Reynolds asked Sacchitella to join him for dinner, touched her hand, and made a sexually
suggestive comment. Haas made several derogatory comments acout women in the workplace.
Douthard commented that Sacchitella “smelled good” and was a “distraction.” Def. 56.1 Facts,
Sacchitella Dep., at 374-76, 381-82. No reasonable jury could conclude these incidents created a
severe or pervasive hostile work environment. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has rejected hostile
work environment claims on facts more severe than the CSX supervisors’ conduct.

In Koelsch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 706 (7th Cir. 1994), plaintiffs
supervisor rubbed his foot against her during company meetings, grabbed her buttocks, and asked
her out to dinner on two occasions. The court found those actions not severe or pervasive
enough to constitute a hostile work environment. Similarly, in Saxon v. American Telephone &
Telegraph, 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993), the court declined io rind a hostile work
environment where plaintiffs supervisor rubbed his hands over plaintiff's knees, forced her to
kiss him, and attempted to grab her from behind. In Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d
333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993), the court affirmed summary judgment where a supervisor called
plaintiff a "dumb blonde," put his hand on her shoulder several times, placed "I love you" signs
in her work area, and attempted to kiss her in a bar. Finally, in Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co.,
50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995), plaintiff's supervisor made grunting sounds when she passed,

stated he was lonely in his hotel room, and made other sexually suggestive comments. In


Sacchitella passed her conductor trainee examinations, and she was promoted to
conductor on January 22, 2001. On February 5, 2001, she was furloughed along with fifteen
male conductor trainees. Sacchitella’s sexual harassment claims arise from incidents involving
Reynolds, Haas, and Douthard from November 2000 to February 2001. On November 1, 2000,
Reynolds and Haas met with Sacchitella. They inquired about conversations she had with people
on trains, informed her she had “‘a bad attitude,” and noted that she could be terminated at any
time. Def. 56.1 Facts at 41-49. In November 2000, Haas informed Sacchitella that other
conductors did not appreciate her presence on trains because it would anger their spouses. Haas
insinuated that women had a “hard time” on the railroad, and referred to another female
employee as “bitch.” /d. at { 61. In December 2000, Reynolds stated he would like to meet
Sacchitella’s family, and suggested he and his wife have dinner with Sacchitella. That month,
Reynolds asked Sacchitella to join him for dinner. On February 5, 2001, Reynolds placed his
hand on top of Sacchitella’s hand while she was dispensing loticn and stated: “What are you
going to give me for the lotion?” /d. at {{ 52-53. Douthard told Sacchitella on more than one
occasion that she “smelled good” and she was a “distraction” /d , Sacchitella Dep. at 374-76.

Sacchitella admits her gender was not the cause of her furlough. Nor were Reynolds,
Haas, and Douthard involved in the decision to place Sacchitella on a leave of absence.
Sacchitella filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge on October 31, 2001,

and she received a right to sue notice.


was entirely deficient because it was not submitted in the proper format. See L.R. 5.2. The court
allowed Sacchitella to correct the deficiency in form. Sacchite-la submitted a properly formatted
response brief but also made substantive changes that inappropriately included a Rule 56.1
response and statement of additional facts, well-after CSX had filed its reply brief. Regardless,
Sacchitella’s untimely Rule 56.1 response does not lead to a diferent result. Sacchitella admits
the majority of CSX’s Rule 56.1 facts; her denials are not supported with citations to the record.
See Schulz v. Serfilco, Ltd., 965 F.2d 516, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1992). All denials without proper
citation to the record must be deemed admitted. See L.R. 56.1; Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform
Bad. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 577 (7th Cir. 2000). The court ignores Sacchitella’s untimely
Rule 56.1 statement of additional facts. /d. at 577 (district court has discretion to strictly enforce
the local rules).
B. Statement of Facts

All facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. CSX is a national railroad company.
Sacchiteila began her CSX employment as a conductor trainee on September 11, 2000. Her
direct supervisor was Paul Douthard, who reported to district superintendent Bobby Reynolds.
Douthard assigned trainees to railroad trains when there were fewer than five trainees on
location. When more than five trainees were present, Phil Haas, a CSX conductor and local
chairman of the United Transportation Union Local 1348, served as a trainee mentor and
prepared their train schedules. Sacchitella is a Local 1348 member. Douthard initially prepared
her train schedule. Haas assumed responsibility for the schedule during Sacchitella’s eighth

week of training.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
DOCKETED
SHANNAH L. SACCHITELLA, ) SEP 4 2002
Plaintiff, No. 92 € 1070
v. } Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Shannah L. Sacchitella sues CSX Transportation, Inc. (“OSX”) for hostile work
environment sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C, § 2000¢ ef seg. CSX moves for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND
A. Local Rule 56.1 violation

Sacchitella fails to comply with Local Rule 56.1. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the
moving party to file a statement of undisputed material facts. Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A) requires the
party opposing summary judgment to provide “a response to each numbered paragraph in the
moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the
affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon."

Sacchitella initially failed to submit a Rule 56.1 response. This failure results in the
binding admission of the truth of a Rule 56.1 statement. See L.R. 50.1(b)(3)(A); Curran v.
Kwon, 153 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 1998). However, Sacchitella’s summary judgment response

1