from fault.’" Pharma Bio, Inc. v. TNT Holland Motor Exp., Inc, 102 F.3d 914, 916
(7* Cir. 1996) (quoting Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Transcon Lines, 757 F.2d 171,
176 (7th Cir.1985)). See also American Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc. 325 F.3d 924, 929 (7 Cir. 2003)(stating that the Carmack Amendment
“provides shippers with the statutory right to recover for actual losses to their
property caused by carriers.")(quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 211 F.3d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 2000)). Watkins argues that there are
genuinely disputed facts regarding whether or not Plaintiffs gave notice to Watkins
of the loss by filing a claim with Watkins in a timely fashion. The Carmack
Amendment provides the following:

[a] carrier may not provide by rule, contract, or otherwise, a period of less
than 9 months for filing a claim against it under this section and a period of
less than 2 years for bringing a civil action against it under this section. The
period for bringing a civil action is computed from the date the carrier gives a
person written notice that the carrier has disallowed any part of the claim
specified in the notice.

49 U.S.C. § 14706(e)(1). Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14706(e) and 49 C.F.R. §
370.3(c), a claimant shipper generally “must file a written or electronic claim with
the carrier within at least nine months.” Neely v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, 2003 WL
23648655, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Watkins claims that it picked up the projectors on
April 30, 2001, and did not receive a claim form from Sharp until March 19, 2002.
Watkins argues that since Plaintiffs did not provide Watkins with written notice of

the claim within the required period, Plaintiffs’ claim is barred.


make reference to various facts in their briefs, neither side included more than a
cursory statement of facts in their briefs. In addition, neither Watkins nor Plaintiffs
have complied with Local Rule 56.1 and filed statements of facts and responses.
Without being presented with all the pertinent facts and without clarification as to
which facts are contested facts as is required by Local Rule 56.1, we cannot make a
proper ruling on Watkins’ motions. Having failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1,
we deny Watkins’ motion for summary judgment without prejudice. See Waldridge
v. American Hoechst Corp. 24 F.3d 918, 920, 922 (7* Cir. 1994)(stating a local rule
pertaining to summary judgment “is more than a technicality”); Ammons v. Aramark
Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004)(stating “that a district court
is entitled to expect strict compliance with Rule 56.1.” and that “[s]ubstantial
compliance is not strict compliance.”).

Watkins must file any other motion for summary judgment by November 1,
2004. If Watkins does not file a motion for summary judgment by that date, we shall
enter final judgment in this action and terminate the case. Watkins is warned that a
failure to abide by the requirements of Local Rule 56.1 in regards to a future motion
for summary judgment will result in a denial of the motion with prejudice. Plaintiffs
are also warned that a failure to follow court rules and procedures could result in
sanctions. If Watkins files a motion for summary judgment, the answer brief will be

due on November 15, 2004, and the reply brief will be due on November 22, 2004.


provided for in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A “genuine issue” in the context of a
motion for summary judgment is not simply a “metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v, Philip Morris, Inc, 216
F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must consider the record as a whole, ina
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences that
favor the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport
Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

1, Plaintiffs’ ion for Judgment

Plaintiffs argue that Watkins was the initial carrier who had control and
custody of the projectors when the loss occurred and thus Watkins is liable for the
loss. Plaintiffs argue that Watkins is liable under the Carmack Amendment, 49
U.S.C. § 14706, to the Interstate Commerce Act. The Seventh Circuit has stated that
“[t]he Carmack Amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme Court and this
Court to provide that ‘a common cartier is liable for all losses which occurred while

the goods were being transported by it, unless the carrier can demonstrate it is free


Watkins cites Hopper Paper Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co, 178 F.2d 179, 182
(7 Cir. 1950). In Hopper the court noted that the “statute is a limitation law, . . .that
. .. Was not intended to operate as a statute of limitation. . . and that the general rule
in cases . . . is, that failure to give notice of a claim for damages or loss in
accordance with a stipulation in a contract for the shipment of goods is excused, or is
inapplicable, where the carrier has or is chargeable with actual knowledge of all the
conditions as to the damages that a written notice could give.” Jd. However, the
court in Hopper did not rule that written notice is required. The court explained that
in the case before it, since the “defendant and its agents were fully aware and
cognizant of the existence of all the facts concerning the [damage,]. . . a formal
notice by plaintiff to the defendant could not have accomplished anything more.” Id.
The court held that the defendant carrier could “not use the provisions of the bill of
lading to shield itself from the liability imposed upon it by the statute and the
common law for its negligent destruction of the shipper's property.” Id.

Watkins claims that it picked up the projectors on April 30, 2001, and did not
receive a claim form from Sharp until March 19, 2002. Plaintiffs argue that there is
sufficient evidence that Watkins was aware of the loss of the projectors and the facts
surrounding the loss long before the nine month period expired. Plaintiffs state that
“[iJn the instant matter there is no dispute that WATKINS had actual knowledge that
the shipment was lost and/or had been stolen since the disappearance of the

shipment.” (P. Mot. Reply 7). These circumstances in the instant action are similar



CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment. We also deny Watkins’ partial motion for summary judgment without

prejudice.

Samuel Seid Ot

United States District Court Judge

Dated: October 7, 2004


‘Minute Order Form (06/97)
a

United States District Court, Northern District of linois

Name of Assigned Jud; 7 i Sitting Judge if Oth
ror Magistrate dudge | __Sumuel Der-Yeghiayan than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 2741 DATE 10/7/2004
CASE Mitsui Sumitomo vs. Watkins Mtr Line
TITLE
[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(YD QO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}
(2) Qa Brief in support of motion due :
@) Qo Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due. :
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(”) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Qa [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to)
DFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.2 OFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).
ao @ {Other docket entry] Status hearing held and continued to 01/27/04 at 9:00 a.m. For the reasons
stated in the attached memorandum opinion, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted and
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is denied without prejudice. The defendant is given
until 11/01/04 to re-file a partial summary judgment motion.
(il) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
wv | Docketing to mail notices. Memorandum
opinion distributed in open Court
Mail AO 450 form. L299 I3Y41sia “sa
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. a
92:9 hy e-
. 92:8 HY e- 190 hOG2
MW deputy’s co
or wie
inlle Danese received in
central Clerk’s Office

xb



to those in William Wrigley, Jr. Co. v. Stanley Transp., Inc, 121 F.Supp.2d 670
(N.D. Ill. 2000). In Wrigley the plaintiff's goods were stolen from the carrier’s
truck. Jd. at at 671. The court in Wrigley held that since the defendant carrier was
aware that the products in question had been stolen, the carrier had actual notice
which was sufficient to meet the requirement elucidated inHopper. Id. at 672.
Similarly, in the instant action, Watkins admits pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 to
numerous facts that indicate that Watkins’ employees were aware that the projectors
were lost long before Sharp filed a claim. Watkins admits to the existence of various
documents that were prepared by Watkins’ employees documenting the
disappearance of the projectors. Watkins also admits that Thomas Madigan, an
employee of Watkins, reported the disappearance of the projectors to the Lyons
Police Department prior to the nine month period. ( P Mot. R SF 23, 24). Thus,
based on this and other evidence, no reasonable trier of fact could find that Watkins
did not have sufficient notice of the disappearance of the projectors prior to the end
of the nine month period. Therefore, we grant Plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment.

Il. Watkins’ Motion For Summary Judgment

Watkins argues that under the terms of the bill of lading and incorporated
tariff for the projectors Plaintiffs’ recovery is limited to $25.00 per pound. We

cannot make proper ruling on Watkins’ motion at this juncture. Although the parties


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIV GO RETED

EASTERN DIVISION
OLT 8 ~ 2004

MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE CO.
LTD., a/s/o SHARP ELECTRONICS
CORP., and SHARP ELECTRONICS
CORP.,

v. No. 03 C 2741

)

)

)

)

)
Plaintiffs, )
)
WATKINS MOTOR LINES, INC., )
)

)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co.,
Ltd.’s (“Mitsui”) and Sharp Electronics Corp.’s (“Sharp”) renewed motion for
summary judgment and on Defendant Watkins Motor Lines, Inc.’s (“Watkins”)
partial motion for summary judgment to limit liability. For the reasons stated below,
we grant Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. We also deny Watkins’ partial

motion for summary judgment without prejudice.

BACKGROUND
The majority facts in this action are not contested. Defendant Watkins is

1

5


engaged in business as a motor carrier. Plaintiffs hired Watkins to transport a
shipment of projectors and allege that on April 30, 2001, Watkins received from
Sharp a shipment of twenty-three projectors with an invoice value of $85,100.
Watkins failed to deliver the projectors to the intended destination. Watkins
contends however, that it is not liable because Sharp did not file a claim with
Watkins in a timely fashion. Watkins also claims that under the terms of the bill of
lading and incorporated tariff for the projectors, Watkins has only limited liability

for the loss.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment the
moving party must identify “those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This initial
burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by
pointing out “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.”/d. at
325. Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest

on the allegations or denials in the pleadings, but, “by affidavits or as otherwise