MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, STAY PROCEEDINGS; AND 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

David B. Markowitz, OSB No. 742046

DavidMarkowitz@MHGM.com 

Peter H. Glade, OSB No. 790480 

PeterGlade@MHGM.com 

Lisa A. Kaner, OSB No. 881373 

LisaKaner@MHGM.com 

Dallas S. DeLuca, OSB No. 072992 

DallasDeLuca@MHGM.com 

Harry B. Wilson, OSB No. 077214 

HarryWilson@MHGM.com 

MARKOWITZ, HERBOLD, GLADE 

 & MEHLHAF, P.C. 

Suite 3000 Pacwest Center 

1211 S.W. Fifth Avenue 

Portland, OR 97204-3730 

Tel: (503) 295-3085 

Fax: (503) 323-9105 

 On Behalf of Oregon Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum 

 Special Assistant Attorneys General For 

Defendant Oregon Health Insurance 

Exchange Corporation 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

PORTLAND DIVISION 

ORACLE AMERICA, INC., a Delaware 

Corporation, 

Plaintiff,

 v. 

OREGON HEALTH INSURANCE 

EXCHANGE CORPORATION, a Public 

Corporation, dba COVER OREGON; and 

DOES 1-25, inclusive,

Defendants.

CV No.: 3:14-cv-01279-BR

Defendant Cover Oregon’s

MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE 

ALTERNATIVE, STAY 

PROCEEDINGS; 

AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 

12(b)(7), and 19

Request for Oral Argument

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AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

L.R. 7-1 COMPLIANCE ................................................................................................................ 1

MOTION......................................................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 7

I. The Court should dismiss this action because Oracle failed to join the State of 

Oregon, a necessary and indispensable party. .................................................................... 7

A. Rule 19 standard. .................................................................................................... 8

B. The State of Oregon is a required party under Rule 19(a). ..................................... 9

C. Joinder is not feasible. ........................................................................................... 15

D. Because the State is a necessary party and cannot be joined, and 

because the state court proceeding can provide complete relief, the 

Court should dismiss this action under Rule 19(b). .............................................. 15

II. The Court should stay this action under the Colorado River doctrine. ............................ 18

III. Oracle’s claims do not meet the federal standard for pleading breach of 

contract or quantum meruit relief. .................................................................................... 22

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 24

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PROCEEDINGS; AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 Page 

Cases 

Am. Int’l Underwriters, (Philippines), Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co. 

 843 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................19, 20 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal 

 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................22, 23 

Behrens v. Donnelly 

 236 F.R.D. 509 (D. Haw. 2006) .......................................................................................9 

Bell Atlantic v. Twombly 

 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................22, 23 

Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Cmty. v. California 

 547 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008) .........................................................................................13 

Century Indem. Co. v. Marine Grp., LLC 

 No. 08-1375-AC, 2009 WL 3125477 (D. Or. Sept. 29, 2009) .....................................23 

Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States 424 U.S. 800 (1976) .............................................................................1, 7, 18, 19, 20, 22 

D.A. Osguthorpe Family P’ship v. ASC Utah, Inc. 

 705 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2831 (2013) ..............................................................................20 

E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co. 

 400 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2005) .....................................................................................8, 15 

E.E.O.C. v. Peabody W. Coal Co. 

 610 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) .............................................................8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15 

Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm.

 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) ...........................................................................................9 

Expeditors Int’l of Wash., Inc. v. Expeditors (Japan), Ltd.

 224 F.R.D. 661 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ..............................................................................15 

Fierle v. Perez

 350 F. App’x 140 (9th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................18 

Holder v. Holder

 305 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2002) .........................................................................................19 

Hood v. Astrazeneca Pharms., LP 

 744 F. Supp. 2d 590 (2010) ...........................................................................................15 

Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego

 No. 3:12-CV-00927-HA, 2012 WL 4863214 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2012 .......................17, 18 

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PROCEEDINGS; AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity 

 910 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) .....................................................................................9, 10 

Moor v. County of Alameda 

 411 U.S. 693 (1973) .......................................................................................................15 

Nakash v. Marciano 

 882 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1989) .................................................................................18, 19 

Navigators Ins. Co. v. K & O Contracting, LLC

 No. 3:12-CV-01324-ST, 2013 WL 1194722 (D. Or. Jan. 10, 2013) 

 report and recommendation adopted No. 3:12-CV-01324-ST, 2013 WL 1194715 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2013) ............................17 

R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co. 

 656 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................18, 19 

Rienhardt v. Kelly 

 164 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1999) .....................................................................................20 

Starr v. Baca

 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) .......................................................................................22

Tansy v. N. Pac. Ins. Co. 

 No. 04-6375-AA, 2005 WL 1334546 (D. Or. June 2, 2005) .........................................10 

Tick v. Cohen 

 787 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986) .......................................................................................8 

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna 

 914 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1990) .......................................................................................21 

United States v. Bowen 

 172 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 1999) .........................................................................................12 

Verizon Nw., Inc. v. Main St. Dev., Inc.

 693 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Or. 2010) ..............................................................................24 

Williams v. L.A. Job Corps 

 520 F. App’x 551 (9th Cir. 2013) ..................................................................................23 

Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co. 

 668 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................22, 23 

Statutes and Other Authorities 

Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 

Procedure: Civil 3d § 1359 (2004) .......................................................................................9 

28 U.S. C. § 1332 ...............................................................................................................15 

42 C.F.R. Ch. IV ..................................................................................................................5 

Fed R Civ P 12(b)(6)..................................................................................................1, 7, 22 

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Fed R Civ P 12(b)(7)..............................................................................................1, 7, 8, 11 

Fed R Civ P 19 .........................................................1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 

L.R. 7-1 ................................................................................................................................1 

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PROCEEDINGS; AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

L.R. 7-1 COMPLIANCE 

Pursuant to L.R. 7-1, counsel for defendant Oregon Health Insurance Exchange 

Corporation (“Cover Oregon”) certifies that the parties made a good-faith effort to resolve the 

dispute by conferring by telephone, but have been unable to resolve it. 

MOTION 

Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant 

Cover Oregon moves this Court to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for failure to join an indispensable 

party, the State of Oregon. 

Alternatively, Cover Oregon moves the Court to stay this proceeding under the Colorado 

River doctrine pending adjudication of the state court action among these parties. 

Lastly, Cover Oregon moves for an order dismissing Oracle’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

These motions are based on the memorandum of law, and the Declaration of Lisa A. 

Kaner in support of this motion, along with all the papers and pleadings on file in this action. 

INTRODUCTION 

In June 2014, Oregon Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum began an extensive 

investigation under the Oregon False Claims Act into Oregon’s failed health insurance exchange 

website. Plaintiff Oracle America, Inc. was at the heart of that investigation. (Declaration of 

Lisa A. Kaner (“Kaner Decl.”) ¶ 3.) Over the past three years, the State of Oregon (“State”) and 

Cover Oregon entered into multiple contracts for the purchase of hundreds of millions of dollars 

in Oracle products and services that ultimately failed to perform as promised. Oracle has 

presented the State and Cover Oregon with over $240 million in false claims under those 

contracts. Oracle’s conduct constitutes not just false claims, but a pattern of racketeering activity 

that has cost the State and Cover Oregon hundreds of millions of dollars. 

While stalling on responding to the Attorney General’s Civil Investigative Demand, and 

knowing that the Oregon Attorney General’s lawsuit was inevitable (see Kaner Decl. ¶ 4), Oracle 

filed this federal lawsuit to trumpet its feigned blamelessness, split apart the true plaintiffs 

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(Cover Oregon, the State, and the Attorney General) by casting Cover Oregon as a defendant, 

when Cover Oregon has claims that vastly exceed Oracle’s, and increase the State’s litigation 

costs by simultaneously litigating in two courts. Because of multiple lawsuits, Cover Oregon 

and Oracle face a substantial risk of inconsistent results. Further, absent the State as a party here, 

the Court cannot grant the injunctive relief that Oracle seeks against Cover Oregon without 

impairing the State’s interest in the work product and impeding the State’s ability to meet its 

federal obligations. 

The Attorney General, along with the State and Cover Oregon, have filed their state court 

lawsuit to recover losses caused by Oracle’s fraud, racketeering, false claims, and breach of 

contracts. Cover Oregon respectfully requests that this Court either dismiss Oracle’s claims 

here, for failure to join the State as an indispensable party and for failure to state a claim, or stay 

this case pending resolution of the state court lawsuit. 

BACKGROUND 

The following background relies on the Oracle complaint in this proceeding (“Fed. 

Compl.”) and the state court complaint filed in the Marion County Circuit Court by the Oregon 

Attorney General, the State of Oregon, and Cover Oregon against Oracle and others (“State 

Compl.”). Citations to these complaints are not offered to prove the allegations but to 

demonstrate that Oracle’s claims are intertwined with, and a subset of, the claims filed in state 

court by the Attorney General, the State of Oregon, and Cover Oregon. 

In 2010 when Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), 

the State was already working on a project (the “Modernization Project”) to modernize its 

computer systems to provide easy web-access to Oregonians and State case workers for critical 

programs which serve Oregon’s most vulnerable citizens, such as Medicaid, Temporary 

Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”), Employment Related Day Care (“ERDC”), and the 

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”). (Fed. Compl. ¶¶ 6-7, Dkt. #1.) The 

State chose to meet the requirements of ACA by creating its own health insurance exchange 

(“HIX”). (State Compl. ¶ 37, attached as Ex. 1 to the Kaner Decl.).) In 2010, the State was 

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awarded a federal “Early Innovator” grant that provided a unique opportunity to combine the 

State’s Modernization Project with its work to create a HIX (the “HIX Project”). (Id. ¶¶ 44-48.) 

The State’s goal was to have a single integrated technology platform on which to build and 

operate a HIX along with Oregon’s Medicaid, TANF, SNAP, and ERDC social service 

programs. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46.) 

Following a vendor fair and analyses of the vendor responses to an extensive 

questionnaire, the Oregon Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and the Oregon Health 

Authority (“OHA”) (collectively “the State”) held a series of meetings with Oracle throughout 

2010 and 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 4 & 39-42.) Oracle made presentations, provided demonstrations, and 

answered questions that convincingly addressed all of the State’s concerns about Oracle’s ability 

to meet the State’s needs for the combined Modernization and HIX projects with the proposed 

“Oracle Solution.” (Id. ¶ 4.) 

Oracle made false statements to the State about the “Oracle Solution” when it said it 

could meet the State’s needs for the combined Modernization and HIX Projects with Oracle 

products that worked “out-of-the-box.” (Id. ¶¶ 12, 35, 57-60 & 164-167.) Oracle made false 

statements when it said its products were “flexible,” “integrated,” worked “easily” with other 

programs, and would provide “the most comprehensive and secure solution with regards to the 

total functionality necessary for Oregon.” (Id. ¶¶ 3, 35 & 164.) 

Oracle’s fraudulent representations induced the State to sign the first contract in June 

2011 for Oracle to build a single platform for both the health insurance exchange and to 

modernize the State’s social services technology. As soon as the first contract was signed, 

Oracle took control of both Projects. (Id. ¶¶ 5 & 169.) 

The State initially intended to hire an independent “Systems Integrator” to manage the 

Projects and implement the “Oracle Solution.” Oracle, which was secretly dead set against the 

State hiring an independent Systems Integrator, convinced the State that a systems integrator 

would unnecessarily delay the Projects and instead recommended that the State hire Oracle 

Consulting Services to direct the Projects. (Id. ¶ 5.) Oracle convinced the State to spend 

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millions of dollars more to use Oracle Consulting Services to design, plan, and manage the 

Projects. (Id. ¶ 6.) Oracle, in essence, became the Systems Integrator, bringing on project 

managers and taking the lead in proposing system architecture, selecting software and hardware, 

and managing the Projects. (Id.) In 2013 alone, Oracle charged Cover Oregon millions of 

dollars for the work of Oracle employees that provided project management. From 2011 on, 

Oracle was the technical lead on both Projects and was responsible for the development of the 

technology. Oracle not only was responsible for all technology, it tightly controlled access to the 

development environments, so that the State and Cover Oregon had to rely on Oracle’s stagemanaged demonstrations and reports to learn about Oracle’s progress on the Projects. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 

102, 103 and 106.) 

In 2013, the State transitioned the HIX Project to Cover Oregon, a newly created public 

corporation responsible for running Oregon’s health insurance exchange. (Id. ¶ 7.) Cover 

Oregon needed to launch the exchange to the public on October 1, 2013, to ensure that 

Oregonians would be able to enroll in health insurance online in time to meet federal deadlines. 

(Id.) As part of the transition, in the spring of 2013 Oracle presented Cover Oregon detailed 

spreadsheets showing that, because of work Oracle already performed under the State contracts, 

the HIX Project was nearly 80% complete. (Id.) Further, Oracle assured Cover Oregon that the 

exchange would be ready to launch on October 1, 2013. (Id.) Relying on Oracle’s statements 

about the work already performed under the prior State contracts and on Oracle’s assurances that 

the exchange would be ready to launch on October 1, Cover Oregon entered its own contracts 

with Oracle to complete the HIX Project. (Id.) 

Oracle failed to deliver. First, Oracle asked Cover Oregon to reduce the scope of the HIX 

Project, to which, in order to meet its October 1, 2013 launch date, Cover Oregon had no choice 

but to agree. (Id. ¶ 8.) Even with a reduced scope, Oracle was unable to fulfil its promises. 

Despite the scope reduction and the tens of millions of dollars Oracle received for additional 

services, the HIX remained at approximately 80% complete through early August 2013 when 

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Oracle stopped providing estimates of the percent complete. On October 1, Oregon’s health 

insurance exchange was not ready for public launch. (Id.) 

Despite Oracle’s failure, its executives continued to demand full payment while 

promising the exchange would be ready to launch, first by mid-October, then by the end of 

October, then in December, then January 2014, then February. Again and again, Oracle broke its 

promises, missing every date. Without the website portal that the State and Cover Oregon had 

already paid Oracle more than $100 million to build, Cover Oregon and the State each had to 

hire temporary employees to manually enroll Oregonians in health insurance and other programs 

by processing paper applications. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

Though most of Oracle’s work is shoddy and incomplete, Cover Oregon is currently 

using a limited portion of the back-end of the HIX to make Medicaid eligibility determinations 

based on Modified Adjusted Gross Income (“MAGI”) under the ACA. Cover Oregon and the 

State intend to continue to use this portion in the future (id. ¶ 155), and it is Cover Oregon’s use 

of Oracle’s work product for determining Medicaid eligibility, and the State’s future use, that 

Oracle here seeks to enjoin. (Fed. Compl.¶ 42 & Prayer for Relief ¶ C.) Enjoining the use of 

that portion of Oracle’s work would prevent Cover Oregon and the State from making timely 

MAGI Medicaid determinations, and federal law requires them to make those timely 

determinations. See 42 C.F.R. ch. IV, subchap. C, part 431, subpart A & part 435, subparts J & 

M. Making timely Medicaid determinations is critical to the State and to the public; MAGIeligible Oregonians are from the lowest socioeconomic population and are in the greatest need of 

health care benefits. Despite the fact that Cover Oregon and the State have already paid for this 

work, Oracle claims here it is owed more. 

Oracle wilfully refused to fix its defective work under the warranties it gave to the State 

and to Cover Oregon and continually demanded to be paid for that defective work. (State 

Compl. ¶¶ 1 & 11.) Realizing Oracle would never live up to its obligations, Cover Oregon began 

work to transition to a federally run health care exchange website. The State and Cover Oregon 

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must have a system in place by November 15, 2014, when federally imposed deadlines require 

open enrollment for health insurance to resume for all Oregonians. 

From the first misrepresentations to the State up through the fraud perpetuated on Cover 

Oregon, Oracle’s false statements and omissions harmed both the State and Cover Oregon. (Id. ¶ 

14.) Not only were Oracle’s claims false, Oracle’s work was abysmal and the cost was 

extraordinary. The State and Cover Oregon paid Oracle approximately $240 million for a health 

insurance exchange that never worked and a modernization program that never got off the 

ground. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) The State and Cover Oregon have spent, and will spend, tens of millions 

of dollars fixing or compensating for Oracle’s failures, including millions of dollars to process 

paper applications for Medicaid and health insurance eligibility determinations and enrollment 

processes for last year’s open enrollment period. Going forward, Cover Oregon and the State 

will need to transition to the federal health insurance exchange and independently assess and 

repair Oracle’s failures to provide a single platform to modernize the State’s social service 

programs and provide a health insurance exchange. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

Oracle has never offered to return a penny of the $240 million it fraudulently caused the 

State and Cover Oregon to pay. Instead, Oracle filed this lawsuit riddled with false and 

irrelevant allegations against Cover Oregon claiming that Cover Oregon owes it an additional

$23 million for a “solution” that never worked (id. ¶ 16), and seeking to enjoin Cover Oregon 

and the State (though not naming the State as a party) from using the technology for which they 

paid. (Fed. Compl. ¶ 42 & Prayer for Relief ¶ C.) 

Oracle’s claims are a subpart of the issues pending in state court. There, Cover Oregon 

and the State seek damages from Oracle based on (i) Oracle’s fraud in inducing them to sign 

contracts with Oracle and to pay Oracle under those contracts, (ii) Oracle’s racketeering 

activities, and (iii) Oracle’s breaches of contract, implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and 

warranty. The Attorney General seeks damages, penalties, and injunctive relief based on (i) 

Oracle’s racketeering activities and (ii) Oracle’s and its employees’ violations of the Oregon 

False Claims Act. 

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

The Court should dismiss Oracle’s claims because the State of Oregon is a necessary and 

indispensable party to this litigation and cannot be joined without destroying subject matter 

jurisdiction. The relief Oracle seeks here will negatively affect the State’s interests and could 

potentially subject Cover Oregon and the State to inconsistent results. Oracle’s claims can be 

pleaded as counterclaims in the pending state court proceeding, where all necessary parties are 

already present and where all issues raised by this lawsuit, which are factually intertwined with 

the claims already pending in state court, can be resolved in an efficient, complete, and 

consistent manner. 

Alternatively under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, the Court should stay 

Oracle’s claims until the state court proceeding is completed. See Colorado River Water 

Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (announcing new doctrine of 

abstention to prevent duplicative litigation between state and federal courts). In addition to the 

benefits identified above, the Court’s application of the doctrine here will prevent Oracle’s forum 

shopping and will promote judicial efficiency by avoiding simultaneous litigation in two courts. 

Finally, the Court should dismiss Oracle’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because 

Oracle has failed to meet the federal pleading requirements.

I. The Court should dismiss this action because Oracle failed to join the State of 

Oregon, a necessary and indispensable party. 

Oracle’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) because Oracle failed to 

join the State as a defendant under Rule 19. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7) (“failure to join a party 

under Rule 19” constitutes grounds for dismissal). The State, by and through OHA and DHS, is 

a necessary and indispensable party to this litigation, but the Court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over Oracle’s claims against the State. Oracle contorts its claims in an attempt to 

bring an action against Cover Oregon alone for the purpose of manufacturing federal jurisdiction 

based on diversity. However, allowing Oracle to proceed against Cover Oregon alone will create 

a substantial risk of inconsistent rulings about the obligations and liabilities of Cover Oregon and 

Oracle, will be judicially inefficient, and will subject the State, Cover Oregon, and Oregon’s 

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citizens to substantial prejudice. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this action so that 

Oracle’s claims against Cover Oregon can proceed in the existing state court litigation involving 

all parties. 

A. Rule 19 standard. 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that a court must engage in “‘three successive inquiries’” 

in determining whether a case must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join an 

indispensable absent party under Rule 19. E.E.O.C. v. Peabody W. Coal Co. (“Peabody III”),

610 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co. (“Peabody 

II”), 400 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

First, a court must determine whether an absent party is “necessary” to the proceeding 

under Rule 19(a)(1). Rule 19(a)(1) provides that an absent party is necessary if: 

(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete 

relief among existing parties; or 

(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the 

action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s 

absence may: 

 (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s 

ability to protect the interest; or 

 (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of 

incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations 

because of the interest. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). If any one of the three prongs of Rule 19(a)(1) is satisfied, “that 

nonparty (or ‘absentee’) is now referred to as a ‘person required to be joined if feasible.’” 

Peabody III, 610 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Peabody II, 400 F.3d at 779). 

Second, the court must determine whether joinder of the absent party is feasible – and if 

joinder is feasible, the absent party is required to be joined. Peabody III, 610 F.3d at 1078. 

Under Rule 19(a), “joinder is not feasible . . . when joinder would destroy subject matter 

jurisdiction.” Peabody II, 400 F.3d at 779 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1); also Tick v. Cohen, 

787 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th Cir. 1986) (same rule)). 

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Third, if joinder is not feasible, the court “must determine whether, in equity and good 

conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). Four factors are relevant to this inquiry: 

(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s 

absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties; 

(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided 

by: (A) protective provisions in the judgment; (B) shaping the 

relief; or (C) other measures; 

(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be 

adequate; and 

(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the 

action were dismissed for nonjoinder. 

Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has stressed that “‘[t]here is no precise formula for determining 

whether a particular nonparty should be joined under Rule 19(a)[, but rather the] determination is 

heavily influenced by the facts and circumstances of each case.’” Peabody III, 610 F.3d at 1081 

(quoting N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Makah 

Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The inquiry is a practical one and fact 

specific . . . and is designed to avoid the harsh results of rigid application.”) (citing Provident 

Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118–19 (1968); Eldredge v. 

Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 662 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 

1981)).1

 

B. The State of Oregon is a required party under Rule 19(a). 

The first of the three inquiries under Peabody III is to determine whether an absent party 

is necessary for the case to proceed. “To determine if the absent party is necessary to the suit, 

the court must undertake [a further] two-part analysis” under Rule 19(a). Makah Indian Tribe, 

 1

 To perform this fact-specific analysis under Rule 19, the Court may rely on evidence 

outside the pleadings. See Behrens v. Donnelly, 236 F.R.D. 509, 512 (D. Haw. 2006) (“In order 

to determine whether Rule 19 requires the joinder of additional parties, the court may consider 

evidence outside of the pleadings.”) (citing McShan v. Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 

1960); Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: 

Civil 3d § 1359 at 68 (2004)).

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910 F.2d at 558. First, the court must determine whether “complete relief is possible among 

those already parties to the suit” – a determination that “is independent of the question whether 

relief is available to the absent party.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

19(a)(1)(A) (joinder is required where, “in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord 

complete relief among existing parties”). 

Second, the court must determine whether the absent party has an interest in the litigation 

and, if so, whether “that interest will be impaired or impeded by the suit” or whether the “risk of 

inconsistent rulings will affect the parties present in the suit.” Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 

558-59 (emphasis in original); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B) (where an absent party 

“claims an interest relating to the subject of the action,” joinder is required if “disposing of the 

action in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability 

to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring 

double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest”). The “interest” 

requirement is not limited to a legal interest. Rather, it is broadly construed, and must “‘be 

determined from a practical perspective, not through the adoption of strict legal definitions and 

technicalities.’” Tansy v. N. Pac. Ins. Co., No. 04-6375-AA, 2005 WL 1334546, at *4 (D. Or. 

June 2, 2005) (Aiken, J.) (quoting Aguilar v. L.A. Cnty., 751 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Also, the interest requirement may be “‘broadly construed in order to require joinder of all 

conditionally necessary parties.’” Tansy, 2005 WL 1334546, at *4 (quoting Lopez v. Martin 

Luther King, Jr. Hosp., 97 F.R.D. 24, 29 (C.D. Cal. 1983)). 

While each determination of whether an absent party is required under Rule 19(a) is 

unique, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Peabody III is illustrative. Peabody III involved claims 

brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) against Peabody 

Western Coal Company (“Peabody”) alleging that Peabody’s policy of “maintain[ing] a 

preference for employing Navajo workers” at mines it leased from the Navajo Nation (the 

“Nation”) constituted unlawful employment discrimination against non-Navajo Indians. 

Peabody III, 610 F.3d at 1074. Peabody’s policy, set forth in a “Navajo employment preference 

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provision” in its leases with the Nation, was required by the Secretary of the Interior (the 

“Secretary”) in order for the leases to be approved by the Department of the Interior. Id. at 1074-

75, 1080. In its action against Peabody and the Nation, the EEOC sought both damages and an 

injunction of Peabody’s preferential hiring treatment of Navajo Indians. Id. at 1075-76. 

Peabody and the Nation each filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7), arguing that the 

Secretary of the Interior was a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. Id. at 1076. 

The Peabody III court determined that the Secretary was a required party under all three 

prongs of Rule 19(a)(1). First, the court held that, because “the Secretary insisted that the 

disputed employment preference provision be included in the leases between Peabody and the 

Nation” and “is ultimately responsible for its continued inclusion in the leases,” it could not 

accord “complete relief among the existing parties” under Rule 19(a)(1)(A). Peabody III, 610 

F.3d at 1081. Looking to the practical implications of the relief sought by the EEOC, the court 

reasoned that if the EEOC succeeded in its claim for damages, “Peabody will be obliged to pay 

damages for having engaged in conduct that was mandated by the Secretary” without any 

opportunity to seek indemnification from the Secretary due to sovereign immunity. Id. The 

court also recognized that, because Peabody was unable to modify the leases without approval of 

the Secretary, if the EEOC were to succeed in its claim for injunctive relief “Peabody may be 

obliged by the court to disregard the preference provision, while the Secretary would remain free 

to insist that Peabody honor it, upon pain of losing the leases.” Id. Put another way, in light of 

the relief being sought by the EEOC, the court simply could not fashion relief that the plaintiff 

sought without the Secretary as a party in the litigation. 

Second, under Rule 19(a)(1)(B), the Ninth Circuit determined that the Secretary had an 

“interest in the legality of the lease provisions” and, as a result, an interest in the litigation. Id. at 

1081-82. The court then determined that the Secretary’s interest would be impaired or impeded 

under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) if the end result of the litigation “would require him to modify the 

terms of leases he approves for entities conducting business on the Navajo reservation.” Id. at 

1082. The court also looked to the practical reality of both Peabody and the Nation being “put 

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. . . between the proverbial rock and a hard place” by having to “choose between complying with 

the injunction or risking cancellation of the leases for violating terms mandated by the Secretary” 

if the EEOC succeeded in its claims for injunctive relief. Id. As a result, a judgment in EEOC’s 

favor would put Peabody and the Nation at risk of inconsistent obligations because of the 

Secretary’s interest, and the Secretary qualified as a required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) as 

well. Id. 

The State qualifies as a required party here under each of those three prongs as well, and 

Cover Oregon and Oracle are at substantial risk of inconsistent obligations. Oracle seeks both 

damages and injunctive relief. It seeks damages because it alleges that Cover Oregon did not 

pay for work that Oracle allegedly performed. Oracle also seeks an injunction against Cover 

Oregon using and transferring that work product. (Fed. Compl. ¶ 42, Prayer for Relief ¶ C.) 

Additionally, Oracle seeks an injunction against parties that it has not joined to the complaint: it 

asks this Court for “an order enjoining Cover Oregon . . . and those persons in active concert or 

participation with it[.]” (Fed. Compl. Prayer for Relief ¶ C.) 

First, under Rule 19(a)(1)(A), without the State as a party, this Court cannot grant Oracle 

the injunctive relief it seeks. Cover Oregon has already transferred some of the work product to 

the State. Just like Peabody had no control over the Secretary in Peabody III, Cover Oregon has 

no means of controlling the State’s use of Oracle’s work product, such that Oracle’s prayer for 

injunctive relief could not be enforced against the State because the State is not a party here. 

Thus, the Court cannot accord “complete relief among the existing parties,” and the State is a 

required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(A). 

Next, the State has an interest relating to the subject of this action that makes it a 

necessary party under the second and third prongs, Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii). The State, as 

demonstrated by its state court complaint, plainly has an interest in this litigation.2

 The Ninth 

 2

 As a threshold matter, the State has already claimed such an interest in its filing in state 

court. See United States v. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 689 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Joinder is ‘contingent . . . 

upon an initial requirement that the absent party claim a legally protected interest relating to the 

subject matter of the action.’”) (quoting Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 

1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

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Circuit has developed “general principles” as to whether an absent party possesses the required 

interest under Rule 19(a)(1)(B). Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian 

Cmty. v. California, 547 F.3d 962, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2008) (“an interest that ‘arises from terms in 

bargained contracts’ may be protected, but we have required that such an interest be 

‘substantial.’ An interest in a fixed fund or limited resource that the court is asked to allocate 

may also be protected.”) (internal citations omitted). 

The State’s interest makes it a required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B). The State’s interest 

fits squarely among the substantial interests the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged. It has a strong 

– and, for Oregon’s citizens, critical – interest in continuing to use that piece of the Oracle work 

product that functions to make Medicaid determinations. Indeed, the State must continue to meet 

the requirements of ACA and, beginning in November 2014, will take over from Cover Oregon 

the responsibility to make Medicaid determinations. Further implicating the State’s substantial 

interest in this proceeding is that the injunctive relief that Oracle seeks will require the Court to 

separate the work that the State and Cover Oregon paid for (and for which Oracle does not seek 

an injunction) and the work that Oracle alleges it performed for Cover Oregon but was not paid. 

Even if the State somehow were not permitted to use work product that Cover Oregon has 

already shared with the State, the State itself has paid Oracle over $130 million for the integrated 

platform developed under the State contracts which included Medicaid eligibility functions. The 

State has a strong interest in preserving its ability to use that work product. Sorting out what 

portion of the work product the State paid for and what portion Cover Oregon paid for, and for 

what portion, if any, Oracle is entitled to additional payment, must be determined in a single 

proceeding because both the State and Cover Oregon have substantial interests at risk and should 

not be subjected to inconsistent results. 

The State’s interest in the litigation satisfies both prongs of Rule 19(a)(1)(B). Under 

Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i), the injunction Oracle seeks against use and transfer of the work product will 

impede the State’s interest in using the work product that it has already paid for to determine 

Medicaid eligibility and to modernize its services to the public. The services Oracle rendered 

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were supposed to be for the benefit of Cover Oregon and the State. It was Oracle’s original 

fraudulent representations to the State that resulted in the first contract in June 2011 for Oracle to 

build a single platform for both the health insurance exchange and the modernization of the 

State’s social services technology. The State’s interest will be impaired or impeded if it is 

somehow restricted from making use of Oracle work product, whether transferred from Cover 

Oregon or obtained directly from Oracle by the State. 

Under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii), an injunction of the nature sought by Oracle would put Cover 

Oregon at risk of inconsistent obligations by forcing Cover Oregon to choose between 

complying with the injunction sought by Oracle, on one hand, and assisting the State in meeting 

federal ACA and Medicaid requirements – and, in the process, helping Oregon’s citizens – by 

making use of the limited piece of Oracle’s “work product” that works. 

Further, the damages sought by Oracle in this action risk creating inconsistent obligations 

for Oracle and Cover Oregon because of the Attorney General’s interest in Oracle’s claims for 

payment for its work. In the state court action, the Attorney General, in the name of the State 

and Cover Oregon, seeks damages from Oracle under the Oregon False Claims Act and ORICO. 

The State’s claims under the False Claims Act and ORICO address the same issues that Oracle 

alleges in this action: whether Cover Oregon owes Oracle money for Oracle’s work (as Oracle 

alleges) under the contracts between them, or, as the Attorney General alleges, Cover Oregon 

owes Oracle nothing and instead Oracle is liable because of its false claims and racketeering 

activities concerning those same contracts. (State Compl. ¶¶ 1, 206-277, 364-383.) Both Cover 

Oregon and Oracle would be subject to inconsistent obligations if Oracle prevails in this 

proceeding and the State prevails in the state court action; alternatively, Oracle could be subject 

to double obligations if Cover Oregon prevails in its mandatory federal court counterclaims and 

the State prevails on its claims in state court. Because of those possible outcomes, the State’s 

interests in the contracts and payments at issue in this proceeding leave Oracle and Cover 

Oregon subject to a substantial risk of inconsistent or multiple obligations and, hence, the State is 

a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). 

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C. Joinder is not feasible. 

In the second inquiry under Peabody III’s interpretation of Rule 19, the court must 

determine whether joinder of the absent party is feasible. Where joinder of a party would 

destroy subject matter jurisdiction, it is not feasible under Rule 19. See Peabody II, 400 F.3d at 

779. 

Here, joinder of the State in this litigation is not feasible. Oracle brings its claims based 

on diversity jurisdiction. Because the State is not a citizen of any state for purposes of the 

diversity statute, and 28 U.S. C. § 1332 by its express terms does not extend to the State, the 

State cannot be joined without destroying diversity jurisdiction. E.g. Moor v. County of 

Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973) (“There is no question that a State is not a ‘citizen’ for 

purposes of the diversity jurisdiction.”); Hood v. Astrazeneca Pharms., LP, 744 F. Supp. 2d 590, 

597 (2010) (remanding Mississippi Attorney General’s claim on behalf of the State for violation 

of the state’s consumer protection act, because the State’s lack of citizenship destroys diversity 

jurisdiction); see also Expeditors Int’l of Wash., Inc. v. Expeditors (Japan), Ltd., 224 F.R.D. 661, 

668 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (“The law is settled that indispensable parties cannot be nominal parties 

and their citizenship cannot be disregarded for the purpose of determining whether diversity 

jurisdiction exists.”). 

D. Because the State is a necessary party and cannot be joined, and because the 

state court proceeding can provide complete relief, the Court should dismiss 

this action under Rule 19(b). 

In the third inquiry under Peabody III’s interpretation of Rule 19, if joinder is not

feasible, the court “must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should 

proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). 

Here, the State is an indispensable party to this litigation and, as a result, the Court should 

dismiss Oracle’s complaint. As set forth above, Rule 19(b) provides that, where joinder is not 

feasible, the court will look to four factors to determine whether an action should nevertheless 

proceed without a required absent party, or should be dismissed: 

(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s 

absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties; 

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(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided 

by: (A) protective provisions in the judgment; (B) shaping the 

relief; or (C) other measures; 

(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be 

adequate; and 

(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the 

action were dismissed for nonjoinder. 

Id. Each of these four factors militates in favor of dismissal. 

Under Rule 19(b)(1), the Court should consider whether, in the absence of the State, the 

State or Cover Oregon or Oracle may be prejudiced by proceeding here. As explained above, the 

State and Cover Oregon have an interest in ensuring the continued use of those portions of 

Oracle’s defective work that have been salvaged in order to fulfill the State’s and Cover 

Oregon’s continuing federal obligations to process Medicaid applications, make eligibility 

determinations, and be ready in November for open enrollment for health care for all 

Oregonians. 

Without the State as a party in this action, there is the potential for prejudice to the State 

and to the existing parties on the questions of who paid for what work, whether anything is owed 

to Oracle at all, and whether Oracle has an obligation to return the millions of dollars paid to it 

by both the State and Cover Oregon.3

 Under Rule 19(b)(2), a court should consider whether any 

prejudice to the absent party could be lessened or avoided in crafting relief. Under Rule 

19(b)(3), a court should consider whether it can provide adequate relief to the plaintiff without 

the absent party. Here, it would be difficult for the Court to structure relief that meets those two 

criteria in this lawsuit between Oracle and only Cover Oregon. Because Oracle seeks to enjoin 

use of work product that was paid for by both Cover Oregon and by the State, the Court cannot 

craft relief that is both adequate to Oracle (i.e., grants Oracle’s request for an injunction) and 

does not prejudice the State; alternatively, an injunction may be inadequate for Oracle because it 

 3

 Oracle has an obligation to return monies paid by both Cover Oregon and by the State 

based on the pending state court claims for fraud, false claims, ORICO, and breach of contract, 

already filed by the Attorney General, the State, and Cover Oregon. 

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likely is not enforceable against the State, an absent party. Similarly, it is not possible for the 

Court to craft relief on Oracle’s damages claims that avoid or lessen the possible prejudice to 

Cover Oregon and the State that will arise from the substantial risk for inconsistent results 

between this action and the State court action. Oracle’s breach of contract claims here and the 

State’s ORICO and OFCA claims in state court are intertwined and create the substantial risk of 

inconsistent results. 

Further, the overlap in issues between the two actions also militates in favor of dismissal. 

In considering Rule 19(b)(2) and (3), the Court should consider the interests of the Court and the 

public to create an efficient, consistent and effective system for complete resolution of all interrelated disputes. See Navigators Ins. Co. v. K & O Contracting, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-01324-ST, 

2013 WL 1194722, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 10, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12-

CV-01324-ST, 2013 WL 1194715 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2013) (“Maintaining this action without [the 

absent party] disserves not only the parties, but also the interests of the courts and the public in 

‘complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies.’”) (quoting Provident 

Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968)); Kramer v. City of Lake 

Oswego, No. 3:12-CV-00927-HA, 2012 WL 4863214, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2012) (dismissing 

plaintiff’s claim where state court could resolve “issues raised by this lawsuit in an efficient, 

complete, and consistent matter”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, Advisory Committee Notes (1966) (“The 

interests that are being furthered here are not only those of the parties, but also that of the public 

in avoiding repeated lawsuits on the same essential subject matter.”). 

Lastly, under Rule 19(b)(4), the state court provides an adequate forum for complete 

relief. This Court, under similar circumstances, has dismissed cases where an absent party 

would destroy diversity and the Rule 19(b) factors militate in favor of dismissal. See, e.g. 

Navigators Ins. Co, 2013 WL 1194722, at *4; Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego, 2012 WL 

4863214 at *4 (dismissing plaintiff’s claim for failure to join the State of Oregon as a necessary 

party, holding: “Most important among the factors this court has considered is that in state court, 

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there exists a perfectly capable forum, where all necessary parties may be joined, that can resolve 

the issues raised by this lawsuit in an efficient, complete and consistent matter.”). 

Because the State is a necessary and indispensable party that cannot be joined to this 

federal court proceeding, and because the state court proceeding provides an adequate forum for 

delivering complete, consistent, and efficient resolution of all inter-related claims, Cover Oregon 

seeks dismissal of Oracle’s claims. 

II. The Court should stay this action under the Colorado River doctrine. 

In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976), the 

Supreme Court established an abstention rule applicable to situations when parallel state and 

federal litigation are pending. Because the claims in this proceeding are parallel to, and a subset 

of, the state court lawsuit and because all parties cannot be joined here in federal court, Cover 

Oregon requests that this action be stayed to allow the state court action to proceed first under 

the doctrine from Colorado River and subsequent Ninth Circuit case law interpreting it. Though 

federal courts generally possess an “unflagging obligation[4] . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given 

them [,] . . . in rare cases . . . the presence of a concurrent state proceeding [will] permit the 

district court to dismiss a concurrent federal suit for reasons of wise judicial administration.” 

R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Colorado 

River, 424 U.S. at 818) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The instant matter presents such 

circumstances. 

To apply the Colorado River abstention doctrine, “[a]s a threshold requirement, the 

federal and state court actions must be substantially similar.” Fierle v. Perez, 350 F. App’x 140, 

141 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). Here, this lawsuit is a subpart of the state 

lawsuit. Oracle’s claims are essentially mirror images of a portion of Cover Oregon’s claims, 

although the state court case is more extensive. Both lawsuits involve the same parties, Cover 

Oregon and Oracle (though the state court case also involves the State and the Oregon Attorney 

 4

 The concept of an “unflagging obligation” “somewhat overstates the law because in 

certain circumstances, a federal court may stay its proceedings in deference to pending state 

proceedings.” Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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General), and are about the same disputed contracts and services (though the state court case also 

involves the prior related contracts between Oracle and the State), and both cover the same series 

of events. (Compare Fed. Compl. ¶¶ 6-37 (Oracle alleges history of Oracle’s relationship with 

the State and Cover Oregon from 2009 through 2014) with State Compl. ¶¶ 31-155 (same).) 

Oracle’s claims against Cover Oregon can be presented as counterclaims in the state court case. 

The fact that this federal court action is a subset of the more comprehensive state court action 

demonstrates that the two actions are substantially similar. See Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 

1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We should be particularly reluctant to find that the actions are not 

parallel when the federal action is but a ‘spin-off’ of more comprehensive state litigation.”). 

To decide whether a particular case warrants a Colorado River stay or dismissal, the 

Ninth Circuit has recognized eight relevant factors: 

(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at 

stake; 

(2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; 

(3) the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation; 

(4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; 

(5) whether federal law or state law provides the rule of decision 

on the merits; 

(6) whether the state court proceedings can adequately protect the 

rights of the federal litigants; 

(7) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and 

(8) whether the state court proceedings will resolve all issues 

before the federal court. 

R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 978-79 (line breaks added). These factors “are subjected to a flexible 

balancing test . . . .” Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 870 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The first factor, jurisdiction over property, does not apply here as no property is at stake. 

Oracle claims money damages, and “money . . . is not the sort of tangible physical property 

referred to in Colorado River.” Am. Int’l Underwriters, (Philippines), Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 843 

F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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The second factor, the inconvenience of the federal forum, also does not apply, as federal 

or state court are equally convenient, though as discussed herein, the federal court cannot provide 

complete relief for all disputes arising from this complicated set of facts. 

The third factor is the avoidance of piecemeal litigation and here it militates towards 

dismissal to avoid duplicative efforts and possibly different end results. See Am. Int’l 

Underwriters, 843 F.2d at 1258. Crucially, “the ‘paramount’ consideration in Colorado River

was . . . ‘the danger of piecemeal litigation.’” D.A. Osguthorpe Family P’ship v. ASC Utah, Inc., 

705 F.3d 1223, 1234 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2831 (2013) (quoting Moses H. 

Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983)). In addition to avoiding 

piecemeal litigation, “the Colorado River Doctrine was adopted to avoid duplicative litigation.” 

Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Colorado River and 

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996)). 

This “paramount” consideration applies here: this federal proceeding is a piece of the 

total case, which includes both common law and statutory claims by the State of Oregon and the 

Oregon Attorney General (in addition to claims by Cover Oregon) against Oracle, several of its 

employees, and its partner Mythics, Inc. The breach of contract claims between Oracle and 

Cover Oregon are just a piece of the more extensive set of claims in the state court action, and 

many of the fact issues in this federal proceeding will be (re)litigated in the state court action. 

There will be overlapping issues between the two actions, namely whether Oracle has a valid 

basis to demand payment from Cover Oregon or whether, as the plaintiffs in the state court 

action allege, Oracle has no basis for further payment and instead owes money to Cover Oregon 

and the State for fraudulent inducement, racketeering, breach of contract, and false claims. 

(State Compl. ¶¶ 184-234 & 278-383.) Under the Colorado River doctrine, piecemeal and 

duplicate litigation should be avoided, and, here, piecemeal and duplicate litigation are precisely 

what will occur if this Court does not stay this lawsuit. Since the state and federal lawsuits cover 

the same factual issues, simultaneous adjudication will result in the duplication of efforts, 

increased litigation costs, judicial inefficiency, and the possibility of conflicting results. 

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The order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction is the fourth factor, but it should not 

tip the scales against abstention. Though Oracle filed its lawsuit in federal court first, it did so 

only after the Governor asked the Attorney General to hold Oracle responsible, after the 

Attorney General launched a False Claims Act investigation, and after Oracle knew that the 

Attorney General intended to pursue the State’s claims.5

 (See Kaner Decl. ¶ 4.) 

The fifth factor is whether federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on the 

merits. Here, state law will apply to all claims. Further, Oracle’s claims will overlap with the 

Attorney General’s claims under the Oregon False Claims Act, which may present new and 

unique issues, since that Act is a relatively new statute in Oregon. Where the case “involves 

routine issues of state law—misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract—

which the district court is fully capable of deciding,” this factor is neutral. See Travelers Indem. 

Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1370 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, the overlap with the Attorney 

General’s claims under the Oregon False Claims Act weighs in favor of the state court 

proceeding first. 

The sixth and eighth factors – whether the state court proceedings can adequately protect 

the rights of the federal litigants and whether the state court proceedings will resolve all issues 

before the federal court – unequivocally weigh in favor of a stay of this action. Oracle’s claims 

will be decided as part of Cover Oregon’s and the State’s claims for breach of contract, breach of 

warranty, fraud, and ORICO violations, as well as the Attorney General’s claims under the False 

Claims Act and ORICO against Oracle in state court, where Oracle can bring its federal claims 

as counterclaims. The Oregon state court lawsuit will resolve all issues before this Court while 

protecting the rights of the federal litigants. 

Finally, the seventh factor is the avoidance of forum shopping. Here, Oracle knew the 

State, the Attorney General, and Cover Oregon intended to pursue their claims in state court, 

where jurisdiction resides over all the claims. Rather than wait to be sued after the Attorney 

 5

 Over the past several weeks, Oracle has paid for its counsel Orrick, Herrington & 

Sutcliffe LLP to represent its former employees when the Attorney General sought to obtain their 

sworn statement as part of her false claims investigation. (Kaner Decl. ¶ 4.) 

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General completed her false claims investigation,6 Oracle filed this federal lawsuit to split the 

plaintiffs apart by casting Cover Oregon as a defendant, when Cover Oregon has claims that 

vastly exceed Oracle’s, and to increase the State’s litigation costs by requiring Cover Oregon, the 

State and the Attorney General to simultaneously litigate the same set of facts in two courts. 

Oracle’s forum shopping should be stopped, and the claims dismissed. 

In sum, although courts apply the Colorado River abstention doctrine cautiously, it is an 

important rule that prevents the waste of judicial resources, and it should be applied in this case. 

The Court should stay this proceeding pending the outcome of the state court case, where all 

claims arising from the facts alleged here can be resolved. 

III. Oracle’s claims do not meet the federal standard for pleading breach of contract or 

quantum meruit relief. 

The Court should also dismiss Oracle’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), because Oracle 

has failed to meet the standards for pleading a claim set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 

(2009), and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).7

 Following the sea change in federal 

pleading with Iqbal and Twombly, a plaintiff cannot plead generally and expect its complaint to 

survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-62. Rather, to 

survive dismissal, the factual allegations “must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such 

that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and 

continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). “Threadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” 

“[n]or does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement.” Iqbal, 5565 U.S. at 678. Simply put, a plaintiff’s claims “must be supported by 

factual allegations.” Id. at 679; see also Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 

 6

 While preparing Oracle’s complaint to file here, Oracle’s counsel sought to delay the 

Attorney General’s investigation both by delaying Oracle’s production in response to the 

Attorney General’s Civil Investigative Demand to Oracle and by seeking to delay the Attorney 

General’s Civil Investigative Demand to obtain the sworn testimony from two former Oracle 

employees. (Kaner Decl. ¶ 4.) 

7

 This Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not rely on the Kaner Declaration. 

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PROCEEDINGS; AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

(9th Cir. 2012) (“A complaint need not state ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but must contain 

sufficient factual matter to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). 

Oracle has not met this standard. In its claim for breach of contract, Oracle has failed to 

identify any of the alleged “work product that Oracle’s personnel produced and for which Cover 

Oregon has not paid” (Fed. Compl. ¶ 37) with any specificity whatsoever. It has not identified a 

single Purchase Order or invoice provided to Cover Oregon that Cover Oregon has failed to pay. 

To the contrary, despite having attached to the complaint reams of exhibits, none of them set 

forth the services Oracle alleges were rendered for which it has not been paid. Oracle’s 

complaint contains merely “the broadest of generalities” – which is not enough under Iqbal and 

Twombly. Century Indem. Co. v. Marine Grp., LLC, No. 08-1375-AC, 2009 WL 3125477, at *4 

(D. Or. Sept. 29, 2009) (dismissing claim for breach of contract “contain[ing] only the broadest 

of generalities,” on the basis that such claims as pleaded were “insufficient to meet the standard 

articulated in Twombly and [Iqbal]”); see also, e.g., Williams v. L.A. Job Corps, 520 F. App’x 

551, 551 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (holding that district court “properly dismissed 

[plaintiff’s] action alleging breach of contract, harassment, discrimination, defamation, and 

wrongful termination because [plaintiff] alleged so few facts that the court could infer only the 

possibility of misconduct” (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 and Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 

(9th Cir.1998)).

Oracle’s quantum meruit claim is similarly flawed. Again, Oracle fails to describe 

adequately which alleged “services” are the subject of its quantum meruit claim. Oracle’s 

complaint does not identify which specific services were provided, who provided them, when 

they were provided, or any other factual allegations that might elevate this claim beyond the 

level of mere “naked assertions devoid of [facts].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Moreover, while “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” are not 

enough under Iqbal and Twombly, Oracle has not even managed to do that for its quantum 

meruit claim. “The elements of [quantum meruit under Oregon law] are a benefit conferred, 

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PROCEEDINGS; AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

awareness by the recipient that a benefit has been received, and judicial recognition that, under 

the circumstances, it would be unjust to allow retention of the benefit without requiring the 

recipient to pay for it.” Verizon Nw., Inc. v. Main St. Dev., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1275 (D. 

Or. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In its quantum meruit claim, Oracle 

alleges only that it provided services to Cover Oregon that Oracle values at $23 million, and that 

it was not paid for those services. Oracle has not pleaded that Cover Oregon is aware that it 

received any such “benefit.” Oracle also has failed to allege any facts that, under the 

circumstances, it would be unjust to allow Cover Oregon to retain the “benefit” without making 

further payment. Therefore, the Court should dismiss Oracle’s claims. 

CONCLUSION 

Cover Oregon respectfully requests that Oracle’s claims be dismissed for failure to join 

the State, which is a necessary and indispensable, or alternatively, stay this lawsuit until the state 

court proceeding is completed, in which all parties are present and where all claims can be 

efficiently, consistently and completely adjudicated. 

Additionally, Cover Oregon respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Oracle’s 

complaint for failure to state a claim. 

DATED this 22nd day of August, 2014. 

By: /s/ Lisa A. Kaner

David B. Markowitz, OSB No. 742046 

DavidMarkowitz@MHGM.com 

Peter H. Glade, OSB No. 790480 

PeterGlade@MHGM.com 

Lisa A. Kaner, OSB No. 881373 

LisaKaner@MHGM.com 

Dallas S. DeLuca, OSB No. 072992 

DallasDeLuca@MHGM.com 

Harry B. Wilson, OSB No. 077214 

HarryWilson@MHGM.com 

Tel: (503) 295-3085 

Fax: (503) 323-9105 

On Behalf of Oregon Attorney General 

Ellen Rosenblum 

Special Assistant Attorneys General For 

Defendant Oregon Health Insurance Exchange 

Corporation

399567_2

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