NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT W. BOYLAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-35391 

D.C. No. 3:17-cv-05504-BAT 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 6, 2020**

Seattle, Washington

Before: NGUYEN and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and SIMON,*** District 

Judge.

Robert Boylan appeals the Commissioner’s denial of his application for 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for the 

District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 8 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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disability insurance benefits. We set aside a denial of such benefits only when an 

ALJ’s decision is based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 653–54 (9th Cir. 2017). We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

1. Boylan complains that the ALJ only gave “some weight” to the opinion 

of his examining psychologist, Dr. Alexander Patterson. The ALJ justified this 

weight because Dr. Patterson’s opinion was vague as to Boylan’s exact functional 

limitations. It is true that Dr. Patterson qualified his opinion of Boylan’s 

impairments by stating that they “may” or “appear[]” to limit Boylan’s functions. 

Cf. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing a physician’s 

opinion that the claimant experienced “some diminution in her concentration skills” 

as “fall[ing] short of an informed opinion”). And contrary to Boylan’s assertions, 

the ALJ had no duty to develop vague evidence when the evidence in the record was 

adequate for the ALJ’s proper evaluation. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 

459-60 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the record was replete with other medical evidence, 

including the opinions of three non-examining state agency physicians and Boylan’s 

own testimony, which the ALJ used to assess his residual functional capacity

(“RFC”). 

In any case, even if the ALJ erroneously discounted Dr. Patterson’s findings,

any error was harmless. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 
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2008). The ALJ concluded that Boylan’s RFC reflected Dr. Patterson’s reports of 

moderate impairments in Boylan’s ability to interact with people and manage work 

stress due to anxiety. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion since the 

RFC determination limited Boylan to simple tasks, only occasional interaction with 

the public, and no collaborative decision-making or teamwork. See Rounds v. 

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that the ALJ 

has the responsibility to translate and incorporate clinical findings into a succinct 

RFC). 

2. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s decision to discount 

Boylan’s Department of Veteran Affairs disability rating. An ALJ may disregard 

the VA’s disability determination based on “persuasive, specific, [and] valid 

reasons.” Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the ALJ 

reasoned that Boylan’s minimal treatment history and consistently normal mental 

status examinations cast doubt on the VA’s disability rating. This issufficient reason 

to reach an independent assessment of Boylan’s disability rather than relying on the 

VA’s determination. 

3. Boylan also challenges the ALJ’s consideration of the remaining 

medical evidence. Boylan takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that none of his 

treatment providers placed any restrictions on him that indicate he suffers from 

permanent disabling physical and mental impairments. But Boylan concedes that 
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the ALJ’s finding is true and fails to show how he was improperly prejudiced by the

finding. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s decision to give “some 

weight” to the opinions of the three non-examining state agency physicians. While

Boylan criticizes the ALJ for relying on the physicians’ opinions since they did not

review any evidence after October 2015, the ALJ specifically explained she 

considered new evidence as part of the RFC. Boylan does not show how any of this

new evidence contradicts the ALJ’s RFC determination. Moreover, nothing 

contradicts the ALJ’s conclusion that the opinions of the non-examining physicians 

and Dr. Patterson were all consistent with the RFC. 

4. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s specific, clear, and 

convincing reasons to discount Boylan’s testimony. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 

1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons 

for doing so.”) (simplified). The ALJ explained that Boylan’s testimony regarding 

his physical and mental impairments conflicted with the medical evidence, his 

treatment history, and his activities of daily living. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). For example, the ALJ noted that no physical 

evaluation showed the atrophy that would necessarily result from Boylan’s claim of

staying in bed for the majority of the day. With regard to Boylan’s claimed mental 

health impairments, the ALJ pointed out that Boylan received no treatment for nearly 
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three years after his alleged onset date and only minimal and conservative treatment, 

including no counseling, thereafter. Lastly, while Boylan correctly points out that 

“disability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in 

the face of their limitations,” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998), 

the ALJ properly used the inconsistency between Boylan’s claimed activities and his 

purported limitations to discredit his testimony. 

5. Given that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions 

regarding the medical evidence and Boylan’s testimony, we find no error in the RFC 

determination. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175–76.

AFFIRMED.