a

Because Louis' problem in attempting to enter the federal
courthouse door is thus jurisdictional, a sua sponte dismissal by
this Court is called for. As our Court of Appeals has
reconfirmed in Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 325 (7TM Cir.

1998):

It is axiomatic that a federal court must assure itself
that it possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter
of an action before it can proceed to take any action
respecting the merits of the action. “The requirement
that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter
'spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial
power of the United States' and is ‘inflexible and
without exception.'” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012 (quoting
Mansfield C.& L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382).

Nothing more need be added to confirm the legal
frivolousness of Louis' present federal action (although no view
is expressed here, of course, as to whether she has a viable
claim that can be advanced in a state court of competent
jurisdiction). Hence both this action and the Complaint are
dismissed with prejudice, with the Application thus being denied

and the Motion thus also being denied (in the latter respect, on

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

mootness grounds) .

Date: June 7, 2002


Ste Order Form (06/97)

vy

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Milton I. Shadur

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 4024 DATE 6/7/2002
CASE Myrlene Pierre Louis vs. Direct Loan Services
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) a Brief in support of motion due
(3) QO Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) Qo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) ao Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(7) im Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) a {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) im This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) CGeneral Rule21 COFRCP41(a\(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

do) =f (Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Both this action and the Complaint

are dismissed with prejudice, with the Application thus being denied and the Motion thus also being

denied (in the latter respect, on mootness grounds). (2-( ) 3- r)
(il) oi [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document
Number.

No notices require
‘a d number of notices

JUN 1 9 2002,

date docketed

Y | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone,

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
SN deputy’s

Pay SN
initials

pet

Cathie faeeivd a

centrat Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials



ia ie:
EE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT yun 19.2002
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS ,
EASTERN DIVISION
MYRLENE PIERRE LOUIS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 02 C 4024
)
DIRECT LOAN SERVICES, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Myrlene Pierre Louis (“Louis”) has tendered a self-prepared
Complaint against Direct Loan Services (“Direct”), accompanying
her Complaint with Clerk-of-Court-supplied forms of an
Application To Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (“Application”)
and of a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (“Motion”). But
because of the obvious jurisdictional deficiency in Louis'
substantive claim, this sua sponte memorandum opinion and order
disposes of her action at its inception.

For any litigant to obtain in forma pauperis status, he or
she must not only make an adequate showing of indigency but must
also advance a non-frivolous federal claim (in the sense defined
by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) and further
refined in Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992))--in
that respect, see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324. Here the Application
reveals that Louis is not currently employed and, although it
shows her as receiving $490 monthly in SSI benefits and having

$890 in the bank, the very nature of her claim (stemming from a

{


large student loan that is growing with interest accumulations
and that she cannot afford to pay from her limited income) shows
that Louis would qualify solely in financial terms for the relief
that is sought by the Application. But Louis plainly fails to
clear the second hurdle.

What the Complaint reveals’ is that Louis incurred
substantial student loans in connection with her college
education beginning more than a decade ago and that Direct now
owns those loans, having purchased them some time ago. Because
Louis has been diagnosed with a disability stemming from
schizophrenia and manic depression (as already noted, she is
receiving SSI income), she wants to have the loans cancelled.

But Louis' difficulty in seeking to bring that claim here is
that she is obviously unaware that federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction, authorized to consider only such cases as
Congress may prescribe. And in that respect the fact that the
student loans originated under a federally enacted program does
not make a federal case out of Louis' claim against the private
party, Direct, that holds and owns her promissory notes. Nor has
Louis alleged anything that would bring this action within the
other possible fount of federal subject matter jurisdiction,

diversity of citizenship.

* For present purposes this Court assumes the truth of
everything that Louis claims (although of course it makes no
factual findings in that respect).

2