2. Legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons

Even if Randall could establish her prima facie case, Unitech offers a nondiscriminatory
reason for Randall’s termination: Unitech was dissatisfied with Randall’s performance.
Specifically, Randall was terminated because of her failure to demonstrate satisfactory writing
abilities, poor attitude, and lack of knowledge of the software marketing industry. The
undisputed evidence provides clear factual support for Unitech’s asserted legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly emphasized “courts do not sit
as super personnel departments to second guess an employer’s facially legitimate business
decisions.” Wells v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc.,289 F.3d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, the
court finds that Unitech has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
Randall’s employment.

3. Pretext

Because Unitech has established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision,
Randall must show that the proffered reason is pretextual. Randall argues that defendant’s stated
reasons were pretext because: (1) Unitech treated Randall in a materially different fashion from
similarly-situated employees; (2) Unitech’s white male leadership group refused to treat Randall
as an equal; (3) Unitech employees made discriminatory comments; and (4) Unitech failed to
follow its own disciplinary policies and procedures.

“<A pretext for discrimination means more than an unusual act; it means something worse

ro

than a business error; pretext means deceit used to cover one’s tracks.’” Wells v. Unisource

Worldwide, Inc., 289 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257

13


Advani of the need to improve. Specifically, Parker complained of Advani’s inability to take
direction, lack of people skills, and lack of product knowledge. Parker sought Advani’s
termination and Nayar discussed alternatives to firing Advani with Parker. Advani later resigned
from the company.’

On June 21, 2001, Randall filed a charge with the Iilinois Department of Human Rights
(“IDHR”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that Unitech
discriminated against her based on her race and sex in regard to her dismissal. On January 18,
2002, in response to Randall’s request to withdraw the charge, the IDHR ordered the case closed.
On January 31, 2002, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. On February 13, 2002, Randall filed
the current complaint against Unitech. Count ] alleges discrimination based on race in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Count II alleges discrimination based on race in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981"). Count III alleges discrimination based on sex in
violation of Title VII. This court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Randall’s claims pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as all counts arise under federal law. This matter is currently before the
court on Unitech’s motion for summary judgment on all counts.

Il. DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, the court will dispose of Unitech’s motions in limine to establish

what evidence is admissible and, therefore, properly before this court in support of Unitech’s

summary judgment motion.

“Unitech objects to the facts relating to Parker and Advani as irrelevant. This same
argument is addressed in the discussion of Unitech’s motions in limine, infra Sect. ILA.

4


Discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII and § 1981 are analyzed in the same manner. Patton
v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch. Bd.,276 F.3d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 2002). As discussed previously, supra
Sect. I1.C.1 & 3, Randall has failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under
Title VII and that Unitech’s proffered reasons were pretextual. Therefore, the court finds
Randall’s § 1981 race discrimination claim equally unsuccessful. Thus, the court grants
defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs race discrimination claim under
§ 1981.

Therefore, the court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and Unitech is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all counts. Accordingly, the court grants Unitech’s
motion for summary judgment.

Ill. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court (1) denies Unitech’s motions in limine and (2) grants

Unitech’s motion for summary judgment on all counts. Final judgment in this case is entered

in favor of defendant Unitech Systems, Inc. and against plaintiff Karen Randall.

Date: FEB 06 2003 i

James H. Alesia :
United States District Judge

V7


policies for Randall, when it did so for other employees. Unitech argues in response that none
of these employees were similarly-situated to Randall.

This element of the prima facie case requires Randall to show that she was treated less
favorably than similarly-situated employees not in her protected class. Curry, 270 F.3d at 478.
For the plaintiff to demonstrate that another employee is similarly-situated, she must show that
there is someone who is directly comparable to her in all material respects. Grayson, 308 F.3d
at 819. In making this determination, “a court must look at all relevant factors, the number of
which depends on the context of the case.” Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617
(7th Cir. 2000). In a disciplinary case — where the plaintiff claims her employer disciplined her
more harshly than a “similarly-situated employee based on some prohibited reason — a plaintiff
must show that [she] is similarly-situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and
conduct.” Jd. This usually entails establishing that the “two employees dealt with the same
supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such
differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s
treatment of them.” Jd. at 617-18. At issue is whether Unitech treated differently other male or
non-A frican-American unit leaders who had similar performance problems to Randall.

Initially, Randall argues she was similarly-situated to Advani, a female of Indian national
origin, because they had similar performance problems, Randall asserts she and Advani were
similarly-situated equals, “despite Plaintiff's nominal higher title.” However, Randall states she
and Parker both acted as supervisors to Advani. Despite Randall’s contradictory arguments,

Randall and Advani held different positions with different responsibilities. It is undisputed that


the record and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Bennett v. Roberts, 295 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2002).

The burden is on the moving party to show that no genuine issues of material fact exist.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Once the
moving party presents a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings but must
set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57; Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th
Cir. 1989). The non-moving party “‘must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Selan y. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving
party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Unitech argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on
all of Randall’s claims.

Cc. Race and sex discrimination claims under Title VII

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Discrimination may be established in either of two ways — through


A. Motions in limine

Unitech seeks to exclude evidence of the following: (1) Advani’s employment at Unitech
after Randall’s termination; (2) the working relationship between Advani and Parker; (3) any and
all severance agreements entered into by former Unitech employees; (4) the written warning
issued to James Beebe and his subsequent resignation from Unitech; (5) Unitech’s Strategic Plan;
(6) the fact that Unitech did not issue Randall a written warning before her termination; (7) the
fact that Unitech did not place or consider placing Randall in a different position before
terminating her; and (8) the fact that Unitech did not make arrangements for Randall to resign
rather than terminating her.

With regard to Unitech’s motions in limine numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, the court
finds that — for reasons further explained infra Sect. II.C.1.b — even if the court considered this
evidence, the court would still grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the
court denies as moot Unitech’s motions in limine numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8.

With regard to Unitech’s fifth motion in limine, Randall makes no reference to Unitech’s
strategic plan in her response nor has any such document been submitted to the court. Thus, the
court denies Unitech’s fifth motion in limine to exclude the strategic plan.

B. Summary judgment standard

A motion for summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists for trial when, in viewing


86. The parties do not contest that Randall — an African-American female — belongs to a
protected class. Nor do the parties dispute that Randall suffered an adverse employment action
when she was fired. However, Unitech contends that Randall has failed to establish elements
two and four of her prima facie case.
a. Unitech’s legitimate expectations

Randall argues that the legitimate expectations prong of the prima facie case is not
necessary to the analysis where, as is argued here, an employer applied its legitimate
expectations in a disparate manner. The Seventh Circuit has stated that when an employee
concedes she failed to meet her employer’s expectations but claims that she was disciplined more
severely than other rule-breakers, it “makes little sense” to evaluate whether she was meeting her
employer’s legitimate expectations. Curry v. Menard, Inc., 270 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2001)
(discussing Flores v. Preferred Technical Group, 182 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1999)). Rather,
where the plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to raise an inference that the employer applied
its legitimate employment expectations in a disparate manner, the second and fourth prongs of
a prima facie case merge, allowing the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case by demonstrating
that similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably. Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 F.3d
808, 818 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, the court will proceed to evaluate Randall’s evidence of
similarly-situated employees.

b. Similarly-situated employees
To show disparate treatment of similarly-situated employees, Randall cites to the

treatment of Advani and Parker, as well as the company’s failure to follow its disciplinary



i

V

Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge James H. Alesia Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 1061 DATE February 6, 2003
CASE Karen Randall vs. Unitech Systems, Inc.
TITLE

Un the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___._ Reply to answer brief due.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearing ons setfor__— at.

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for]on___—ssetffor__— at

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor__—— at.
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set forjon__—_at

(8) Qo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to_____at

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

OOFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 COFRCP41(a)(1) CM FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Ml [Otherdocketentry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. The court: (1) denies defendant’s
motions in limine [8-1] and (2) grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment [4-1]. Judgment
is entered in favor of defendant Unitech Systems, Inc. and against plaintiff Karen Randall.

ai ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. number of notices
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone. FEB.0.2.2003
wv | Docketing to mail notices, . \
av | Mail AO 450 form. apy dosrerifg deppiy itiats y

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice
courtroom <

cw deputy’s
initials

mailing deputy initials



Market Development Group. Randall complains that Parker had a larger salary and had
authority over Advani and Miller. These differences in salary and authority demonstrate Parker
was not hired to fill Randall’s position, but to fill the higher-ranking, Group Leader position.
Thus, Randall and Parker held different positions with different responsibilities as Randall was
Market Unit Leader and Parker was Group Leader of Market Development. Therefore, Randall
and Parker were not similarly-situated employees. See Patterson, 281 F.3d at 680 (finding
plaintiff was not similarly-situated to employee who had different job responsibilities). Further,
Randall has failed to prove that she and Parker engaged in similar conduct. There is no evidence
Parker had similar performance problems to Randall with regard to poor attitude, writing skills,
and software marketing knowledge. See Radue, 219 F.3d at 619 (finding plaintiff failed to show
employees were similarly-situated where there were material differences in conduct). Thus, the
court finds that because Parker and Randall had different positions and did not engage in similar
conduct, they were not similarly-situated.

Finally, Randall argues she was treated differently from other employees because she was
denied the benefit of Unitech’s disciplinary policies. However, the mere fact that employees
may have been covered by the same discipline policy does not make them similarly-situated for
Title VII purposes. Hull v. APCOA/Standard Parking Corp., No. 99 C 2832, 2000 WL 198881,
at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2000). Further, none of these employees were similarly-situated to
Randall. First, Randall points out that she was not issued a written warning, whereas, James
Beebe (“Beebe”), a white male, received a written warning for a sexual harassment complaint.

However, Beebe was not similarly-situated to Randall as they did not engage in similar

11


Advani was employed as a Product Marketing Specialist, whereas, Randall was hired as Market
Unit Leader. As Market Unit Leader, Randall was a member of the leadership group and,
therefore, was expected to perform the duties associated with that group. Randall has offered
no evidence that Advani was part of the leadership group or that Advani’s position entailed
similar responsibilities. Therefore, Randall and Advani were not similarly-situated employees.
See Patterson v. Avery, 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding plaintiff was not similarly-
situated to employee who had different job responsibilities). In addition, Advani and Randall
experienced their performance problems while being supervised by different supervisors.
Although both Advani and Randall were initially supervised by Nayar, Advani was supervised
by Parker when she experienced performance problems and resigned.’ Thus, the respective
problems of Advani and Randall were addressed by two different supervisors. Therefore,
Randall and Advani were not similarly-situated. See Radue, 219 F.3d at 618 (finding employees
under different supervisors were not similarly-situated because supervisors may exercise their
discretion differently). Thus, the court finds that Advani and Randall were not similarly-situated
because they had different positions and different supervisors.

Next, Randall argues that she and Parker, a white male, were similarly-situated because

they applied for the same position and each served as the highest-ranking employee within the

‘Yn plaintiff's memorandum, Randall claims that both she and Advani were supervised
by David M. Smith. Unitech disputes this and plaintiff provides no supporting citation to the
record. Thus, the court rejects plaintiff's unsupported assertion. See Mary A. ex rel. Hadac v.
Harrison, No. 99 C 2907, 2001 WL 503034, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2001) (stating unsupported
assertions of fact are insufficient to defeat summary judgment) (citing //bardt v. Sara Lee Corp.,
118 F.3d 1151, 1152 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997)).

10


direct evidence of discriminatory motive or intent or through the indirect burden-shifting method
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Simmons v. Chi. Bd. of
Educ., 289 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, Randall does not argue that there is any direct
evidence of discrimination and relies upon the McDonnell Douglas approach. Thus, the court
will examine Randall’s case under the burden-shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas. See
Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2002) (analyzing race and sex discrimination
claims together under Title VII).

Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination. Gordon v. United Airlines, 246 F.3d 878, 885 (7th Cir. 2001). If
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden
shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for discharging the plaintiff. /d. at 886. If the defendant meets its burden, the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered reason for the adverse action was a pretext
for discrimination. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). Unitech argues that it is
entitled to summary judgment because Randall cannot establish a prima facie case, and even if
she could, she cannot prove that Unitech’s reasons for terminating her employment were
pretextual.

1. Prima facie case

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) she
belongs to a protected class; (2) she performed her job according to her employer’s legitimate
expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly-situated

employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably by the defendant. Jd. at 885-



Problems arose between Randall and some of the other Unitech employees. There were
complaints that Randall was attempting to act as a supervisor to Mary Miller (“Miller”) and
Rakhi Advani (“Advani”) when Randall did not have supervisory authority. Group Leader for
Team Development Tim Augustine (“Augustine”) felt that Randall was condescending to Advani
and another employee. Randall complained to Nayar and Augustine that Miller and Advani were
not completing their work. Randall claims that Nayar and Augustine did not support her in
dealing with Miller and Advani. Additionally, Randall complains that the leadership team
resisted providing her with requested information. Randall also states David P. Smith, referred
to her as “you people,” and Mahmood Qadri, while emphasizing his Mideast descent, told her
“but you, you know, you came from Africa.”?

Nayar made the decision to terminate Randall’s employment. Nayar’s reasons for firing
Randall included: her lack of writing skills, her lack of knowledge of the software marketing
industry, and her poor attitude. On April 17, 2001, Randall met with Augustine and Human
Resources Consultant Kathy Chang and was informed of Unitech’s decision to terminate her
employment. At that meeting, Augustine told Randall there was not a good fit between the
position expectations and her skill set.

In September of 2001, Unitech hired Andrew Parker (“Parker”), a Caucasian male, as the

Group Leader of Market Development. Parker had authority over his team members, including

Advani. Parker raised concerns with Advani’s performance and steps were taken to inform

*Unitech raises an objection that these statements are irrelevant. As discussed infra Sect.
ILC.3, even if the court considered this evidence, the court would still grant defendant’s motion
for summary judgment. Thus, the objection is moot.

3


F.3d 723, 730 (7th Cir. 2001)). To show pretext, Randall bears the burden of demonstrating that
Unitech’s stated reasons for its decision are dishonest, rather than merely in error. Grayson v.
O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 818 (7th Cir. 2002). To meet this burden, Randall may provide
“evidence tending to prove that the employer’s proffered reasons are factually baseless, were
not the actual motivation for the discharge in question, or were insufficient to motivate the
discharge.’”” Gordon v. United Airlines, 246 F.3d 878, 888-89 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Adreani
y. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1998)). Randall must squarely
rebut the articulated reasons for her discharge. Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343,
349 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, Randall’s burden is to show that Unitech lied when it stated that it
believed Randall had poor writing skills, lacked knowledge of the software marketing industry,
and had a poor attitude.°

First, in order to demonstrate Unitech’s stated reasons did not actually motivate her
discharge, Randall argues that Unitech treated her in a materially different fashion from
similarly-situated employees, The court rejects this argument because, as discussed previously,
supra Sect. II.C.1.b, Randall failed to provide evidence of similarly-situated employees.

Second, Randall contends the real reason for her termination was that Unitech’s white
male leadership group refused to treat her as an equal. In support of her argument, Randall cites

the leadership’s resistance to share information necessary to complete her work. The only

“Unitech argues that an inference of nondiscrimination arises from the fact that the same
person, Nayar, hired and fired Randall. The Seventh Circuit has stated that it “emphatically
rejected the ‘same-actor inference’”” in Johnson v. Zema, 170 F.3d 734, 745 (7th Cir. 1999).
Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2001).

14


individually.’ Unitech reasons that because Randall did not possess the abilities and expertise
necessary to perform her job duties, termination was the appropriate course of action. Even if
a discipline procedure is in place, “the fact that an employer did not follow a progressive
discipline program, without some doubt raised as to his genuineness for not doing so, fails to
demonstrate pretext.” Barakat, 970 F. Supp. at 640 (citing Anderson v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 965
F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1992)). Because Randall offers no other evidence of pretext, she has
failed to offer evidence to call into doubt the genuineness of Unitech’s decision to terminate her
rather than utilize other disciplinary methods. Thus, any failure by Unitech to follow its
disciplinary policies with respect to Randall is insufficient to demonstrate pretext. Therefore,
the court finds that Randall has failed to establish that Unitech’s proffered reasons are mere
pretext. Accordingly, the court grants Unitech’s motion for summary judgment.

In sum, Randall has failed to establish elements two and four of her prima facie case and
has failed to show that Unitech’s proffered reasons were pretextual. Therefore, the court grants
Unitech’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's race and sex discrimination claims
under Title VII.

D. Race discrimination claim under § 1981

Section 1981 proscribes discrimination based on race and ethnicity in the “making,

performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,

privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b).

7Unitech submitted a copy of Unitech’s “team member discipline process” to the IDHR.
This policy has never been published by the company and was not followed with respect to
Randall.

16



members as well as members of the leadership group. Ultimately, unit leaders are supervised
by the group leader.

On December 18, 2000, Randall, an African-American female, began her employment
as a Market Unit Leader in Unitech’s Market Development Group. Randall was a member of
the leadership group and a member of the Solutions Management team within the Market
Development Group. Her duties as Market Unit Leader included: (1) generating significant
revenue and profits from Unitech’s Information Integrity solutions; (2) actively collaborating
with other leadership group members in the growth and profitability of Unitech; and (3)
Solutions Management. Randall’s job responsibilities also included writing and making
presentations. As part ofher orientation Randall completed a ninety-day training program which
was designed to orient Randall to the company and assist her with her job duties and projects.”

Randall initially interviewed for the position of Group Leader of the Market Development
Group. However, Unitech’s President and Company Leader, Madhavan Nayar (“Nayar”), made
the decision to hire Randall as Market Unit Leader based upon her qualifications. Nayar acted
as the Group Leader of Market Development while the position remained vacant and supervised

Randall and the other members of the Market Development Group.

Unitech cites dissatisfaction with Randall’s presentation at the conclusion of her training.
Randall moves to strike these statements on the basis of relevance and vagueness. Randall
argues Nayar, who made the decision to terminate Randall, did not mention the training
presentation as part of his reasons for dissatisfaction. In granting defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, the court did not consider this evidence. Therefore, the court denies as moot
plaintiff's motion to strike.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
KAREN RANDALL, )
Plaintiff, }
v. } Case No. 02 C 1061
UNITECH SYSTEMS, INC., } Judge James H. Alesia
Defendant. }
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court are: (1) defendant’s motions in limine and (2) defendant’s motion for
summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). For the following
reasons, the court: (1) denies defendant’s motions in limine and (2) grants defendant’s motion
for summary judgment on all counts.

I. BACKGROUND'

Plaintiff Karen Randall (“Randall”) brought this suit against defendant Unitech Systems,
Inc. (“Unitech”) alleging race and sex discrimination. Specifically, Randall claims Unitech
discriminated against her because of her race and sex when Unitech terminated her employment.

Unitech is an information integrity software business comprised of six groups, which, in
turn, are divided into self-managed teams. A group leader supervises one or more teams and

collaborates with other group leaders. Some groups also have unit leaders, which are team

‘Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts— taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1
statements -- are undisputed.

LY


misconduct. A sexual harassment allegation is unrelated to allegations of poor writing skills,
lack of software marketing knowledge, and poor attitude. See Patton v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch.
Bd., 276 F.3d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding employee facing sexual harassment allegations
was not similarly-situated to employees terminated for mismanagement). Second, Randall
contrasts her situation to those of the white males supervised by David M. Smith who were
placed on probation. Randall has not provided any information on the positions these employees
held or the behavior for which they were placed on probation. Thus, Randall has failed to meet
her burden of demonstrating these employees were similarly-situated. Radue, 219 F.3d at 617
(stating plaintiff must show that she is similarly-situated with respect to performance,
qualifications, and conduct). Third, Randall argues she was treated differently from Kevin Eng
and Thomas Kopp, non-African-American males who were permitted to resign by mutual
agreement with severance packages. Again, Randall provides no information as to the positions
Kevin Eng and Thomas Kopp held — other than referring to them as “leadership group”
employees — or the reasons for their resignations. Thus, Randall has failed to prove she was
similarly-situated to these employees. The court concludes that Randall has failed to establish
that any Unitech employees were similarly-situated to her.

Therefore, the court finds that Randall has failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII. Thus, the court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment

as to plaintiff's race and sex discrimination claims under Title VII.

12


specific information Randall refers to is David P. Smith’s anticipated timeline for product
development. However, the reasons for Randall’s termination ~ unsatisfactory writing skills,
poor attitude, and lack of knowledge of the software marketing industry — are entirely distinct
from inability to complete her work due to lack of information about product development.
Therefore, Randall has failed to demonstrate pretext on this basis.

Third, Randall also refers to comments made by David P. Smith, referring to plaintiff as
“you people,” and Mahmood Qadri, telling plaintiff “but you, you know, you came from Africa”
while emphasizing his Mideast descent. However, these remarks are insufficient to establish
discriminatory intent because they were not made by Nayar, who made the decision to fire
Randall. See Jones v. Union-Pac. R.R. Co., 302 F.3d 735, 743 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that
a plaintiff cannot prove discrimination with statements by nondecision makers). Also, Randall
failed to show any causal connection between the remarks and the decision to terminate her. See
Barakat v. Taco Bell, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 634, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (stating that a “[p]laintiff must
establish a causal connection between the remarks and the decision”) (citing Price Waterhouse
y. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)). Therefore, these comments are insufficient evidence to
show pretext.

Fourth, Randall cites to Unitech’s failure to follow its own disciplinary policies and
procedures to demonstrate that Unitech’s reasons for firing her were pretextual. Unitech argues

that it has no established discipline procedure, and explains that each situation is dealt with

15