detaining ordinance arrestees after all procedures incident to the administrative processing of
their arrests have been completed; (2) whether the detention of a person, arrested for an
ordinance violation for a period of time in excess of two hours after all procedures incident to the

administrative] processing of the arrest have been completed violates that person’s Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights; (3) whether a person arrested for an ordinance violation is entitled

to be iommediately released on an I-Bond, when there are no pending arrest warrants against that
person and he or she is unable to pay the set amount of cash bond; (4) whether after standard
administrative procedures are completed for a person arrested for an ordinance violation, police
officers have 4 mandatory duty to release on I-Bond those individuals who are eligible and arc
not waiting fot probable cause determinations; (5) whether defendants Hillard, Griffin, Risley,
Kehoe, E. Johnson, and R. Johnson’s failure to release the individual plaintiffs and/or adopt
proper procediires and policies for releasing on I-Bonds individuals arrested on minor ordinance
violations after all administrative steps have been completed constitutes an utter indifference or
conscious disiegard for the rights of citizens not to be subject to unreasonable and excessive
detention; and (6) whether defendants Hillard, Griffin, Risley, Kehoe, E. Johnson, and R.

Johnson have [personal knowledge of the widespread and systematic delays in releasing plaintilfs

and other similarly situated persons on I-Bonds for ordinance offenses and whether they have
approved these delays.

Defendants do not argue that the questions set forth by plaintiffs are not common to the
proposed class, but instead meekly argue that “no common core of operative fact is at work here”
because the large number of police officers and police districts in the City of Chicago

demonstrates the reason for the differences in the amounts of time taken to effect the required



Defendants further argue that the issue of damages must be based on individual injurics,

and that deterfnination of these injuries requires individual complaints. “A class action,

>

[however,] will not be defeated solely because of some factual variations among class members

grievances.” H leastie v. Community Bank of Greater Peoria, 125 F.R.D. 669, 675 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (citing Patterson vy. General Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1980). Moreover,

i
“the possibility of individualized damage inquiries does not defeat class certification even if
!

individual hearings ultimately may be required.” Williams v. Rizza Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 2000
WL 263731 a *3 (N.D. IIL. Mar. 6, 2000).

Tn Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 173 (D.C. Cir, 1977), the plaintiffs were arrested for
protesting on line steps of the United States Capitol. The plaintiffs alleged that they “were held
from several hours to several days without being afforded due process of law,” in conditions that
were “inhumane in that there was severe overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, inadequate or
filthy bedding, insufficient food, and no medical care.” Id. at 174. The trial court certified as a
class “all pergons who were arrested while assembled on the Capitol steps on May 5, 1971.” Id.
The court di ided the plaintiffs into sub-classes based on the amount of time each person was
detained and awarded damages by sub-class. Id.

As in Dellums, the instant case can be divided into sub-classes based on length of
detention if plaintift succeed in establishing the class’s right to damages. Because the members
of the proposed class in the instant case have a common issue of law and fact that predominates

over any individual issues, and because the issue of individual damages can be dealt with if

necessary, the first requirement under Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied.



Fed. R. Civ. P f23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of
representation Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 1993). These
elements are alprerequisite to certification, and failure to meet one of the elements precludes
certification of the class. Joncek v. Local 714 Inter’l. of Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund,
1999 WL 755051 at "2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1999). Additionally, plaintiffs must satisfy one of the
conditions of Fed. R, Civ. P. 23(b). Roe v. Publishers Clearing House, Inc., 1999 WL 966977 at
*1 (NLD. I. Oct. 4, 1999), Plaintiffs argue that the proposed class meets the requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3),

Defen Jants do not dispute that plaintiffs have met the requirements of numerosity and
adequacy of rdpresentation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Defendants contend, however, that
plaintiffs cannot demonstrate commonality and typicality, and cannot satisfy the requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. Pi23(b)(3).

I. Rule 23(a)} Commonality and Typicality

Comnionality generally requires the presence of a question of law or fact common to the
class, Absolute commonality is not required, however; it is generally sufficient to have a
common nucleus of operative fact. Kort v. Diversified Collections Services, Inc., 2001 WL
1617213 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2001). Typicality is satisfied if a plaintiff's claim arises from
the same evel it, practice, or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class
members, and the claims are based on the same legal theory. Id. Commonality and typicality are
closely related, and finding one often results in finding the other. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that there are several questions of fact and Jaw common to the class.

These questions include: (1) whether the City of Chicago has a policy and practice of unlawfully



|
Telease of persons arrested for non-custodial violations, Defendants concede, however, that
commonality exists whenever there has been “standardized conduct by defendants toward
members of the putative class,” Allen v. City of Chicago, 828F, Supp. 543, 557 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
Plaintiffs sedation of a policy or standard course of conduct of delaying release after all
administrativg procedures have been completed, defeats defendants’ suggestion that certain
districts are tdo busy to effect the required release in a timely manner. Because the named
plaintiffs’ claim arises from the same practice or course of conduct that give rise to the claims of
the putative class members, and have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class

at large, the churt concludes that plaintiffs have demonstrated both commonality and typicality
under Rule 23(a).
Rule 23(b)(3)

The ctux of defendants’ objection to class certification is their attack on plaintiffs’ ability
to demonstrate the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Certification under this rule requires that: “1)

common questions must predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; and

2) class resolution must be superior to other methods for the fair and effective adjudication of the

controversy.”| Joncek, 1999 WL 755051 at *7.

Comrhon questions do not predominate over individual issues, according to defendants,
because determination of excessive delay is based on a reasonableness standard that must be
decided on a base by case basis. In support of this argument, defendants rely on County of
Riverside v. M cLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), itself a class action, in which the plaintiffs,
persons subject to a warrantless arrest, alleged that the defendants failed to provide a prompt

determination of probable cause which Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1 975), requires prior to


The second requirement under Rule 23(b)(3) is that “class resolution must be superior to
i
other availablé methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Defendants

argue that a rT is not the superior way to adjudicate the instant case because it will cause many

mini-trials when trying to establish each individual class member’s right to recover. As

discussed above, individual damages will not prevent class certification, and the class can be
divided into shb-classes if necessary.

In “en requiring each class member to bring a separate action would be a waste of
money and j' dicial resources. See Markham v. White, 171 F.R.D. 217, 224 (N.D, Ill. 1997).
Finally, a clas action is a superior method to resolve the instant case because individual class
members would be unlikely to bring individual cases because of lack of resources, leaving the
instant case ad their only opportunity for relicf. See Johnson v. Midland Career Institute, Inc.,
1993 WL 420054, at *7 (N.D, Ill. 1993).

CONCLUSION

For thé reasons stated above, the court grants plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and
certifies a clags defined as: All persons who, during the class period, were arrested on ordinance
violations which carry no jail time in the City of Chicago and who were detained for morc than
two hours after all administrative steps incident to the arrests, except non-discretionary

ministerial acts, were completed. Counsel are directed to address the issue of class notice al a

status hearing set for September 16, 2003, at 9:00 a.m.

ENTER: September 5, 2003 7
N |

Robert W, Gettleman
United States District Judge



_ Minute Onder Fora (06197)

[United States District Court, Northern District of IMinois

Nome sjauumsouee | Robert W. Gettleman | Suiesugeroe

CASE NUMBER 02 C 3139 DATE September 5, 2003
CASE Ronald Portis, etal v City of Chicago, ct al
TITLE

| [ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plainliff, defendant, 3¢d party plaintiff, and (b) state brictly the nature

f the motion being presented ,
MOTION: of the motion being presented

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) D Filed tnotion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion duc ___.

Q@) oO Answer briefto motion duc__—-- Reply to answer briefdue___.

4 oO Hearing

(5) oa Status|hearing

(6) oO Pro conferencc|held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on_ set for atl
(7) oO Trialfd et for/re-sct for]on at

(8) ao [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to ___at

(9) Oo This chse is dismissed | with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

a FREP4(m) O General Rule 21 (FRCP41(a)(1) 1 FRCP41(a)(2).

ao [Othe docket entry]
i
I

Memorandum opinion and order entered. Accordingly, the court grants

plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.

(11) [For further detail sec order attached to the original minute order.]

Doeuin int. |

No notices required, ddvised in open court
‘Number

No notices required. |

uniter of notices

sep 08 108

date duc

M

okays deputy initials

X | Notices mailed by

Notified counse! by tdlephone.

Docketing to mail nofices

Mai) AQ 450 form, ;
i

Copy to judge/magisthate judge.

courtroom unos J ah sig sn date mailed notice
Gps deputy’ yarn
initials Dan =
na hed Genus Ort €0 ensiing deputy ints
: da geaul ld

L-Us



extended prettial detention following warrantless arrest. McLaughlin held that “judicial

determination of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with

i
the promptne$s requirements of Gerstein. Id. att 56. The court noted, however, that 48 hours

could be too long if the delay was unreasonable, Examples of unreasonable delay given by the

Court included “ delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a
delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake.” Id.

The Court's last statement, according to defendants, demonstrates that any question of
excessive dele y must be decided on a case by case basis under a reasonableness standard which
precludes clags certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Defendants’ reliance on McLaughlin is
misplaced, hdwever, demonstrating either an error in comprehending or unwillingness to accept
the exact nature of plaintiffs’ claims. Mclaughlin involved a challenge to an alleged
unconstitutional delay by the defendants to provide the prompt judicial determination of probable

cause require by Gerstein. The instant case, however, involves the next step. Because under

Illinois law no probable cause hearing is necessary for non-custodial violations and defendants
are required th release plaintiffs, the case is more akin to a claim of excessive delay after a
judicial determination of no probable cause to detain, or after bail has been set, met, and all
administrative steps necessary for release have been completed. Thus, none of the justifications
for delay identified in McLaughlin, such as transporting a person from one facility to another,
availability of a magistrate for late night arrests, and obtaining the presence of the arresting

officer, are extant under the facts alleged. Therefore, the individualized examination required by

McLaughlin for determining the reasonableness of detention prior to probable cause hearings is

not required in the instant case.



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

|
RONALD PORTIS, MADRIC LANCE, and

EMMETT LYNCH, individually and on behalf
of a class,
Plaintiffs,
No. 02C3139
v.

: Judge Robert W, Geitleman
CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation;
SUPERINTENDENT TERRY G. HILLARD;
COMMANDER JOHN RISLEY; FRANCIS
KEHOE; COMMANDER EVERT L. JOHNSON;
and CAPTAIN ROBERT JOHNSON;

qurrerd

cp 08 ATS)

wee eee ew

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintifi's, Ronald Portis, Madric Lance, and Emmett Lynch, individually and on behalf of
all others simifarly situated, have brought a three count putative class action complaint against
the City of Chicago, Terry G. Hillard (“Hillard”), Joseph Griffin (“Griffin”), John Risely
(“Risely”), Frd cis Kehoe (“Kehoe”), Evert L. Johnson (“E. Johnson”) and Robert Johnson (“R.
Johnson’), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were unlawfully detained for
prolonged periods of time after completion of all administrative steps incident to their arrests for
non-custodial ordinance violations (“non-custodial violations”). Plaintiffs seek a “presumptive
temporal rule for the timely release” of such individuals who were held more than two hours
beyond the tinge they were eligible for release.

Plaintiffs have moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 for certification of a class defined as:

All persons who, during the class period, have been arrested on
ordinance violations which carry no jail time in the City of Chicago

OS



d who were detained in a cell for more than two hours after all
administrative steps incident to the arrests werc completed.

Defendants oppose, arguing that, (1) plaintiffs cannot satisfy the commonality and
typicality requ ements of I'ed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), and (2) the class is not maintainable under Fed. R.
Civ. P 23(b)(3). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion is granted.

FACTS
According to plaintiffs, each was arrested on separate occasions for a non-violent, non-

custodial, fine+only misdemeanor offense which, under Illinois Supreme Court rules, entitled

them to release from custody by the police upon the giving of an individual reconnaissance bond

(‘I-Bond”). Mh. Sup. Ct. R. 553(d). The offenses included disorderly conduct, peddling without
a license, tickét scalping, and soliciting donations. Plaintiffs were each arrested and brought to
the police station to complete the arrest process. After plaintiffs were processed at the police
station, they were detained between five and one half and fifteen hours before they were released
on an I-Bond. | Plaintiffs allege that the time they were held after the administrative steps for their
arrests were completed was excessive because all that was required for their release on the I-
Bond was the jwatch commander’s non-discretionary, ministerial completion of a form. Ina
previous opinion in this case, this court, in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, held that
plaintiffs “hat sufficiently alleged that the length of detention is unreasonable under the

\
circumstances.” Simack vy, City of Chicago, 2003 WL 924335 at *3 (N.D. IIL. 2003).

| DISCUSSION
Fed. |

. Civ. P, 23, which governs class actions, requires a two step analysis to determine

whether class|certification is appropriate. First, plaintiffs must satisfy all four requirements of