COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

DEBRA L. MCMENIMEN 

v. Record No. 1863-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

COUNTY OF STAFFORD FIRE & JANUARY 30, 1996 

 RESCUE EMERGENCY SERVICES 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' 

COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Michael A. Kernbach; Jack T. Burgess & Associates, 

on brief), for appellant. 

 (John M. Poma; Midkiff & Hiner, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Debra L. McMenimen ("claimant") contends that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission erred in finding she did not prove that 

her psychiatric condition was causally related to her February 18, 

1992 compensable injury by accident to her right arm. Upon 

reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 

10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). "General 

principles of workman's compensation law provide that '[i]n an 

application for review of any award on the ground of change in 

condition, the burden is on the party alleging such change to 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated 

for publication. 
 2 

prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.'" Great 

Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va. App. 459, 464, 359 S.E.2d 

98, 101 (1987) (quoting Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 

Va. App. 435, 438-39, 339 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1986)). Unless we can 

say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence sustained her 

burden of proof, the commission's findings are binding and 

conclusive upon us. Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 

697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). 

 The commission denied claimant's application on the ground 

that her evidence failed to prove that her psychiatric condition, 

suicide attempts and hospitalizations were causally related to her 

work-related injury. In so ruling, the commission found as 

follows: 

 At the hearing, [claimant's] treating 

psychiatrist, Dr. Martin H. Stein, changed his 

opinion and testified that [claimant's] 

chronic pain or reflex sympathetic dystrophy 

was the triggering condition which led to her 

disabling depression, phobia and selfdestructive behavior. However, on crossexamination, Dr. Stein stated, "I don't know, 

you know, its hard to know what the origin of 

the depression is . . . . I told you that's a 

hypothesis. I don't know if that is exactly 

the answer, okay?" We are not of the opinion 

that Dr. Stein opined with a degree of medical 

certainty that the etiology of the claimant's 

depression was her work-related injury. None 

of [claimant's] other physicians have opined 

that her psychiatric condition and/or self 

destructive behavior was causally related to 

her work-related injury. 

 The medical record establishes a plethora 

of other factors which may have contributed to 

the claimant's psychiatric problems. 

[Claimant] told her medical care professionals 

about her perceived harassment prior to her 

work injury which, in her opinion, continued 
 3 

after her injury. [Claimant] believed the 

County was "out to get her." She was afraid 

to go anywhere near her office. Additionally 

[claimant] believed her ex-husband was trying 

to kill her and her child. 

 These factual findings are consistent with the medical 

records, Dr. Stein's testimony, and claimant's testimony, and they 

support the commission's decision. In light of Dr. Stein's 

uncertainty, the change from his initial opinion concerning 

causation, and the numerous other stressors in claimant's life 

which may have caused her condition, the commission, in its role 

as fact finder, was entitled to give little weight to Dr. Stein's 

opinion. Moreover, as the commission correctly noted, none of the 

other physicians who examined or treated claimant opined that her 

psychiatric condition was caused by her work-related right arm 

injury. In fact, several of these physicians indicated that 

claimant's psychiatric condition was probably caused by other 

factors, including perceived harassment by her supervisor at work. 

 

 Based upon the lack of persuasive medical evidence showing a 

causal connection between claimant's psychiatric condition and her 

work-related injury, we cannot find as a matter of law that 

claimant met her burden of proving that her psychiatric condition 

was caused by her February 18, 1992 right arm injury. 

Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.