Interim Decision # 2019 

MATTER OF YANEZ-JAQUEZ 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-10532657 

Decided by Board January 16, 1970 

(1) A conviction of passing a forged instrument which resulted in a suspended sentence and probation under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure adopted effective January 1, 19661 is a final conviction upon which to 

predicate a ground of deportation under section 241(a) (4), Immigration 

and Nationality Act, as amended. 

(2) A permanent resident alien, fully aware that his Form 1-151 was required for readmission, who, without such Form willfully and deliberately 

departed to Mexico for a short visit (the purpose of which was characterized by criminal intent) thereafter returning to the United States by 

crossing the dry bed of the Rio Grande approximately one-half mile from 

the Service port of entry, thereby attempting to enter without inspection, 

made upon his return an entry upon which to predicate a ground of deportation [Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), inapplicable].* 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (4) [8 U.S.C. 1251]—Convicted of a 

crime involving moral turpitude, to wit, passing a 

forged instrument (1968), committed within five 

years after entry (1967), and sentenced to confinement therefor in a prison or corrective institution for a year or more. 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: 

Albert Armendariz, Esquire 

543 Magoffin Avenue 

El Paso, Texas 79901 

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Irving A. Appleman 

Appellate Trial Attorney 

Bernabe Q. Maldonado 

Trial Attorney 

(Brief filed) 

This case is before us on appeal from a special inquiry officer's 

order of June 16, 1969, directing that the respondent be deported 

from the United States to Mexico on the charge contained in the 

order to show cause. The appeal will be dismissed. 

Overruled. See 440 F.2d 701 (1971). 

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Interim Decision #2019 

The record relates to a 24-year-old unmarried male alien, a native and citizen of Mexico, who was admitted to the United States 

for permanent residence on July 19, 1955. He was assaulted and 

robbed in Juarez, Mexico, on or about May 4 or 5, 1963, following 

which he returned to his home in El Paso. The next day, he 

armed himself with an ice pick and planned to go back to Juarez 

to confront the persons who had robbed him. His mother tried to 

dissuade him, and refused to let him have his resident alien border crossing identification card (Form 1-151), which is used in 

lieu of a visa to reenter the United States after a temporary visit 

abroad, with certain exceptions not here pertinent. 

The respondent, on arriving in Juarez, Mexico, did not immediately locate his assailants. He testified that because of the presence in the area of numerous Mexican police, he crossed the dry 

bed of the Rio Grande to the American side, where he was sitting 

on the river bank watching for his assailants. See Exhibit 4. 

United States border patrol officers, who patrol the area along the 

river bank, noticed the respondent and took him to the United 

States Immigration Service port of entry about half a mile away. 

He claimed he was a lawful permanent resident of the United 

States. His mother brought his 1-151 to the Immigration Office, 

ind satisfied the officials there that the respondent had been lawFully admitted to this country for permanent residence. He was 

hen admitted, but was forthwith taken into custody by El Paso 

>olice for possession of the ice pick. 

On January 11, 1968, in the Fourth Judicial Court, El Paso, 

7exas, the respondent was convicted of the offense of passing a 

orged instrument, which is a crime involving moral turpitude. 

'he respondent was given a two-year prison sentence, suspended, 

nd was placed on adult probation for a period of two years. On 

une 7, 1968, an order was issued by the same court revoking the 

robation and ordering the respondent to serve two years in the 

tate Penitentiary, beginning February 23, 1968. He is now servig that sentence? 

The respondent's first contention is that the conviction on 

hich the Service relies is not of sufficient finality to support an 

-der of deportation. In support of this proposition, he relies on 

I The record of the respondent's conviction (Ex. 2) shows that the condims of his probation were that he would commit no offense against the 

ws of the State of Texas, any other State, or the United States, and that 

would make restitution; and that the reason for the revocation of his 

obation was that on February 23, 1968, the respondent had passed another 

-ged instrument. 

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Interim Decision #2019 

the precedent decision rendered by the Attorney General in Matter of L—R--, 7 1. & N. Dec. 318 (1957). We, however, reject 

this argument, finding That the decision under reference is not 

controlling here, for several reasons. 

In the first place, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was 

revised by the legislature in 1965 and a new Code of Criminal 

Procedure was adopted effective January 1, 1966; and the new 

code repealed all prior laws relating to criminal procedure, with 

certain exceptions which do not include the adult probation and 

parole law of 1967 or the suspended sentence law of 1913, which 

laws are involved in Matter of L—R--, ante. Second, under the 

new code, on facts substantially the same as those involved here, 

we upheld the special inquiry officer's order of deportation, for 

reasons which are equally applicable here.= Third, any doubts 

which might arise on this point are completely dispelled by the 

revocation of the respondent's probation and the requirement for 

his incarceration in accordance with the original sentence. 

The respondent's second contention, which we likewise reject, 

is that while the crime which serves as the basis for the respondent's deportation was committed within five years after his return to the United States on May 6, 1963, conviction therefor did 

not occur until after the expiration of five years from that date. 

We have previously ruled that section 241(a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act renders deportable an alien who commits a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after 

entry whether or not the conviction for such a crime occurs 

within the five-year period.' The rationale of that decision is 

clearly dispositive of all points raised by respondent in support of 

his arguments to the contrary in this case. Further discussion of 

this aspect of the case is unnecessary. 

We also find wanting the respondent's final contention that he 

did not make an "entry" into the United States on May 6, 1963 

within the contemplation of the decision of the Supreme Court in 

the case of Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). The evidence of record, as hereinbcfore summarized, convinces us clearly 

and unequivocally, that on May 6, 1963, the respondent was in 

.Juarez, Mexico, for a period of one and a half to two hours and 

thereafter returned to the United States within the city limits of 

El Paso, Texas, by way of crossing the Rio Grande at a point 

about one half mile west of the Sante Fe Street Bridge. The evi2 Matter of Gonzalez De Lure, 12 I. & N. Dec. 806 (1968). 

3 Matter of A—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 684 (1955). 

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Interim Decision #2019 

deuce of record also definitely demonstrates that the respondent 

was fully aware that his Form 1-151 was required for his readmission into the United States as a returning resident; that by 

going to Juarez from El Paso on May 6, 1963, the respondent was 

acting against the wishes of his mother who had taken his Form 

1-151 from him; and that he thereby willfully and deliberately 

subjected himself to the hazards of exclusion upon his return to 

the United States on that date. The record further reflects, without any shadow of a doubt, that the purpose of the respondent's 

visit to Juarez on the date in question was to get back from his 

assailants the watch, which they had stolen from him the prepious day, by means of an aggravated assault, if necessary, with 

L deadly weapon, to wit, an ice pick.' Finally, in this connection, 

he circumstances surrounding the respondent's visit to Juarez on 

/lay 6, 1963, and his return to the United States thereafter, lead 

o the inescapable conclusion that, at the time in question, he was 

ttempting to enter the United States without inspection, thereby 

mdering the Fleuti decision, ante, inapplicable in his case.* 

Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing, we conclude that the 

?cision of the special inquiry officer should be affirmed. Discreonary relief in the respondent's case is not available. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is 

:reby dismissed. 

ee Matter of Scherbank, 10 I. & N. Dec. 522 (BIA, 1964). 

'alter of Kolk, 11 I. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA, 1965). 

452