interest in speaking outweighs the interest of the state in
efficiently providing services. Id. Ms. Stancle makes clear that
the allegedly protected speech she is referring to is her written
grievance and her memo to Ms. Mercer, which she attaches to the
complaint. These documents clearly show that the matter at stake
was a personal, not a public concern. This speech concerned the
effect the CHA’s actions had on Ms. Stancle, not the public, and
was addressed solely to her superiors within the CHA, not to a
wider audience; these factors strongly suggest that the “speech was
not directed toward airing a matter of public concern.” Id. at 667.
Ms. Stancle’s argument that the speech was of public concern
because of the public policy interest in preventing workplace
violence is misplaced; this was a “private personnel dispute rather
than an issue in which the public at large would be interested.”
Id. The motion to dismiss is GranTzep as to Count I.

In Count III, Ms. Stancle alleges that she was discharged in
retaliation for filing a complaint about Mr. Woods’ abuse. But as
discussed above, Ms. Stancle did not engage in federally protected
activity when she complained of the abuse. Thus, firing her did not
violate any federal standard. Because Counts I and III are the only
counts in the complaint which even arguably raise federal
questions, and because both the plaintiff and the defendants are
Illinois citizens, the failure of both counts to present a

sustainable federal claim deprives this court of jurisdiction over


discharge (Count III), tortious interference with employment
expectancy (Count IV), and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (Count V). The defendants move to dismiss the complaint in
its entirety for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted. I Grant the motion.

On a motion to dismiss, I accept all facts in the complaint as
true and dismiss only if it appears beyond a doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no facts to support her claim. First Ins.
Funding Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 284 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2002).
However, a plaintiff may plead herself out of court by pleading
facts that undermine the allegations set forth in the complaint.
McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th Cir. 2000).
That is what Ms. Stancle has done with respect to her First
Amendment count (Count I). Although she cites to no federal
statute, I assume that Ms. Stancle intends to base this claim
against her employer on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides for a
cause of action for the deprivation of constitutional rights by
persons acting under color of state law. In order to withstand a
motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint must show
that (1) Ms. Stancle engaged in constitutionally protected speech
and (2) the CHA retaliated against her because of it. Wallscetti v.
Fox, 258 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2001). Speech by public employees
is constitutionally protected by the first amendment if: (1) it

addresses an issue of public concern; and (2) the employee's


the remaining claims. The motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts

II through V.

ENTER ORDER
Cane, Zz Bvushro

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: March | , 2004


Minwe Oréertinandassnon—
7

ac United States District Court, Northern District of Iinois
og sain Judge Elaine E. Bucklo Sitting Judge if Other
‘or Magistrate Judge * than Assigned Judge
4
‘CASE NUMBER 03 C 5806 DATE 3/9/2004
CASE Stancle vs. Chicago Housing Authority, et al.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) o Answer brief to motion due, . Reply to answer brief due
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) im} Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor at
(6) QO Pretrial conference[held/continued to) [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(7) Oo Trial{set for/re~set for] on at
(8) 0 [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
CFRCP4(m) (CO Local Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)\(1) 1 FRCP41(a)(2).
co) ff [Other docket entry] Defendants’ motion to dismiss complaint is granted. Accordingly, this case
is dismissed. Any pending motion in this case is terminated as moot. Enter Memorandum Opinion and
Order.
al) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. umber otis
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MINNIE P. STANCLE,
Plaintiff,

Ve
No. 03 C 5806
CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, SHARON
GIST GILLIAM, A. TISH MERCER, &
KEVIN KRUG,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Minnie P. Stancle was employed by defendant Chicago
Housing Authority (“CHA”) as special assistant to defendant Sharon
Gist Gilliam beginning in 1999. On May 5, 2003, Ms. Stancle
requested that Danny Woods, a CHA employee whose duties included
providing transportation to other CHA employees, drive her to an
official event. Ms. Stancle arrived at the agreed-upon pickup point
five minutes late, and Mr. Woods screamed at and verbally abused
Ms. Stancle for a long period of time during the drive. Ms. Stancle
feared a physical attack from Mr. Woods. The following day, Ms.
Stancle filed a formal written grievance complaining of the abuse
she had suffered from Mr. Woods. Upon receiving Ms. Stancle’s
complaint, defendant Kevin Krug, her supervisor, directed her to
withdraw it. On May 19, 2003, defendant A. Tish Mercer, the CHA
director of human resources, issued a memo to Ms. Stancle titled

“Written warning” and stating in part: “Management was not able to


determine culpability for the incident on May 5, 2003 because both
individuals denied accountability...It has been determined that the
May 5, 2003 incident is not the first time inappropriate behavior
has taken place between the individuals involved, therefore,
Management is recommending you contact the Employee Assistance
Program ... to seek services for Anger Management and Sensitivity
counseling.” The same day, Ms. Stancle responded with a memo
stating in part: “Danny Woods, as you suggested, should contact the
Employee Assistance Program...I, however, do not need or seek
counseling because I was the victim of the verbal abuse.” Ms.
Stancle was placed on paid administrative leave and directed to
schedule a meeting with a psychologist, or else her employment
would immediately be terminated. On June 12, 2003, Ms. Stancle
appeared at an employment hearing where she was presented with a
list of charges against her and offered the choice of termination
or resigning with three months’ pay in accordance with the terms of
a document releasing the CHA of liability. Ms. Stancle had three
weeks to decide which course of action to take. On June 30, 2003,
she informed Mr. Krug that she would not sign the release, and she
was fired.

Ms. Stancle then filed this five-count complaint against the
defendants, alleging wrongful termination in violation of her First
Amendment rights (Count I), wrongful termination in violation of

her rights under the Illinois constitution (Count II), retaliatory