the filing fee (see Section 1915(b) (1) and (2)).

Because Complaint I and Complaint II seek to advance the
same Section 1983 claim, this opinion also reconfirms the
dismissal of this action by reason of Ferguson's failure to have
complied with the precondition established by Congress in 42
U.S.C. §1997e(a), under which no action such as this (complaining
of prison conditions) may be brought “until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” In that respect
Complaint §II asserts that no grievance procedure was available
at the County Jail. That is simply not true, and despite the
generous reading that is commanded for pro se pleadings by Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam) this Court is
not required to accept Ferguson's mistaken statement.

It is of course possible that Ferguson may want to try again
in the future if he is able to overcome that threshold hurdle of
administrative exhaustion. Because of that possibility, this
Court will again go above and beyond the line of duty by
reminding Ferguson of matters referred to in the Order but simply
ignored by his latest submissions:

1. As Order at 2-3 pointed out, “Cook County Jail” is
not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 action (or in any
other kind of lawsuit, for that matter). If Ferguson wanted
to try again, he would have to list individual Section 1983

defendants rather than the nonsuable County Jail. And in


address, “Joshua House,” as his “[p]lace of present confinement.”
And relatedly, Complaint III 45 has revealed that Ferguson has
been and is now continuing his state court custodial sentence,
now by transfer to a halfway house.

That being the case, it is plain (as it was not before) that
Ferguson is and has been a “prisoner” for purposes of the Act, so
as to have been subject to 28 U.S.C. §1915 (“Section 1915”) from
the outset. Accordingly this Court sua sponte amends the Order
pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1) by granting Ferguson's Application to
proceed without prepayment of the entire $150 filing fee (see
Section 1915(a)(1)), although he is now liable under Section
1915(b) (1) to pay that full fee in future installments. For that
purpose Ferguson is ordered to obtain and to file in this Court's
chambers, on or before April 19, 2002, duplicate copies
reflecting all transactions in his trust fund accounts for the
entire period beginning not later than July 25, 2001 and
extending at least through January 25, 2002 (see Section
1915(a) (2)), such statements to be obtained from all institutions
where Ferguson was confined during that period.* This Court can
then calculate the required initial partial payment that Ferguson

must pay, as well as providing for further payments on account of

2 Ferguson is advised that until he complies with the order
just set out in the text, no filing of any other lawsuit on his
part will be entertained unless he is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury (a concept that has been drawn from the
differently applicable provision of Section 1915(g)).

3


that respect, Ferguson is further advised that he cannot sue

supervisory people simply on the basis that they somehow

have legal responsibility for things that have been done (or
not done) by others under their supervision--instead some
direct involvement of each defendant is required.

2. Despite what Order at 3 expressly told Ferguson, he
has tendered only an original form of Complaint II. Once
more he is advised that if he does try again, any new
Complaint must be filed in enough counterparts to provide
(a) an original for the District Court's file, (b) a copy
for the Judge's chambers and (c) one copy for service on
each defendant.

Finally, this opinion turns to Complaint III. Ferguson
obviously appears to think that Case No. 02 C 1063 is an all-
purpose receptacle, capable of receiving any additional content
that Ferguson may seek to pour into it. Not so. Although
Complaint II may fairly be treated as an attempted continuation
of Complaint I, because it charges the same claimed violation of
Ferguson's constitutional rights, that is clearly not the case as
to the wholly independent claim that he has set out in
Complaint III. For that reason this Court has caused
Complaint III to be assigned a new case number, 02 C 2077, and a

separate memorandum order is being issued contemporaneously in


inate Onder Fox P( 00/9
Njgote Order FextP(06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Milton J. Shadur

ing Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 1063 DATE 3/22/2002
CASE Andre Ferguson vs, Cook County Jail
TITLE
[In the fotlowing box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g. plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the natare
MOTION: of the motion being presented. }

DOCKET ENTRY:

SN.

courtroom
deputy’s

(1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.] Hl
Q a Brief in support of motion due :
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due. :
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at |
—— —— !
6) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at . '
(6) im Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at _ H
(7) a Trial{set for/re-set for] on at
(8) QO (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs{by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) (General Rule2! CFRCP4I(a\(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).
qo) [Other docket entry] Ferguson’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief is denied. (7-1) This Court sua sponte ;
amends the Order pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) by granting Ferguson’s Application to Proceed without |
prepayment of the $150 filing fee. Ferguson is directed to obtain and to file on or before April 19 trust |
fund accounts for the entire period July 25, 2001 through January 25, 2002.
\
dl) oa [For further detail see order (on reverse side of/attached to) the original minute order.] :
No notices required, advised in open court. Document |
Number H
No notices required. umber of notices !
oY | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone. {Y AM MAR 2 6 ou i
Docketing to mail notices. Ar D |
Mail AO 450 form, |
Ke H
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. S :

date wniled noice

initials

Date/time-received iii ~*
central Clerk’s Office

mang deputy initials



conjunction with that new action.

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: March 22, 2002


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION BOCKETED

ANDRE FERGUSON, MAR 2 6 2002
Plaintiff,

v. No. 02 ¢ 1063

COOK COUNTY JAIL,

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Court's February 20, 2002 memorandum order (“Order”)
stated the reasons for, and therefore directed, the without-
prejudice dismissal of this action. But apart from that required
dismissal, the Order also sought to be especially helpful in
identifying for pro se litigant Andre Ferguson (“Ferguson”) a
host of problems posed by his then submitted, but incomplete,
attempted 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983”) Complaint
(“Complaint I”), which was based on the unhappy conditions to
which he had assertedly been subjected while he was a pretrial
detainee at the Cook County Jail.

Now, despite the detailed information and suggestions that
this Court had given to Ferguson in the Order, he has tried again
with another multi-defective form of Complaint (“Complaint II”),
to which he has affixed the same case number, accompanied by an
Application To Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees
(“Application”). Because of Ferguson's numbering of that new

filing and because its timing is beyond the short time period


specified by Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 59(e), it will be treated
as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the earlier dismissal.
Before this opinion turns to reminding Ferguson again of defects
that were referred to in the Order but that he has ignored in his
more recent filing, this Court will address the reasons for
denying his Rule 60(b) motion as well as its financial
consequences for Ferguson.

When Complaint II arrived in chambers, it still left a
number of relevant questions unanswered. But just as this Court
was in the process of preparing a memorandum order to let
Ferguson know about those matters (while at the same time
explaining why Complaint II did not justify the revival of this
already-dismissed action), still another complaint (“Complaint
III,” which names Jessie “Ma” Houston as defendant) came in by
mail. That new filing, which is dealt with in part at the end of
this opinion, has also provided some answers that enable this
Court to address Complaint II with finality and, to a partial
extent, Complaint III.

As the Order had pointed out, the address information that
Ferguson had included in Complaint I did not make clear whether
he qualifies as a “prisoner” so as to trigger the applicability
of portions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“Act”).
Although Complaint II also did not speak to that question in so

many words, its Paragraph I.D does refer to Ferguson's current