### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444

NO. 03-03-00030- CR

Da vid Wa yne Ca se y, Jr ., App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE CRIM INAL DISTRICT CO URT OF DALLAS COUNTY NO. F- 0036 978- SH , HO NORAB LE JANICE L. WARDER, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N The opinion and judg ment dat ed De ce mber 2, 2004, a re w ithdrawn. The State’s motion for rehe aringis overrule d.

Appellant David Way

ne Casey , J r., and c odefe ndant S cott Cannon wer e jointly tried for se x ual assault ag g ravated by the administration of g amma hy droxy buty rate (GHB ), a “ date r ape” drug
. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 2 2.021(a) (1)( A)(i) , (2)( A)(vi) (West Supp. 2004-05). The jury found Cannon not g uilty

and convicted appellant of the lesser included off ense of sexual assault, for2

which it assessed a

twenty -y ear

prison term. Se e id . § 22.011(a) (1)( A). We hold that the evide nce is leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt to su s t ai n t h e j u ry ’s ver dict, but that the trial court e rre d by
a dmi tti ng c e rt a in pho tog ra ph s in evi de nc e and by c omm e nti ng on the we ig ht of the e vid e nc e in i ts jur y c ha rg e . We wi ll r e ve rs e the c on vic tio n a nd re mand fo r a ne w tri a l.
Backg ro und The c omplainant, K.T., wa s employ ed as a “s h o t g irl” at a Dallas topless bar . She
was at the bar on the night of April 24, 2000, but not worki n g. Ar o u n d 7 : 3 0 p.m., she ca lled appellant, with whom she w as ac quainted, to ask what he was doingthat night
. Ab o u t two hours later, a ppellant ar

rived at the club with his friend Cannon. K.T ., appellant, a nd Cannon rema ined at the bar for a n h o u r. Al l t h re e we re dr inking, but K.T. te stified that she wa s not intox icated. Ap pe lla nt t old K. T. that he and

Cann on we re pla nn ingto g o to a

pp e lla nt’ s h ou se to w a tc h v ide os , and he invited he r to join them. She acc epted the invitation, and she followed in her own ca r as they drove to a ppellant’s house. The thre e ar

rived at appellant’s house at about 11:00 p.m. a nd wer e soon joined by
a p p e l l an t ’ s h o u s e m a t e , J e s s i e D i a z , w h o ar r i v e d w i th a f

e m a l e c o mp an i o ni d e n t i f

i e d o n l y a s B r a n dy. K. T. , appe lla

nt, and Cann on we re dr ink ingbe e r, bu t so me on e su g g e ste d th a t th e y dr ink sh ots
. L eavingK.T. alone in the living room, the othe rs went to the kitchen to pre pare the shots. K.T. te sti fi e d th a t by

thi s tim e , sh e wa s be g inn ing to fe e l un c omf or ta ble and pla nn e d to le a ve a t th e fi rs t op po rt un ity . T he g ro up re tur

ne d f ro m th e kit c he n a

nd Di a z ha

nd e d he r a sh ot of vo dk a . K. T. did not car e f o r v o d k a , b u t s h e d e c id e d to dr ink th e s h o t an d th e n le a v e . M o me n ts a f te r dr inking the3

vodka, howe ver, K .T. beg an to feel strang e. When she tried to stand, her vision became blurred a

nd sh e pa sse d o ut. K.T.’s memory of the ne x t severa l hours was sketc hy , as she dr ifted i n and out of consciousness. She r emember ed vomiting and de fec ating on herse lf, and be ing move d from the living room to the hallway
. She rec alled people standing over he r and he aringappellant a nd Cannon discuss what to do with her. At one point, she beca me awa re that she was naked and that appellant was be tween he r leg s penetra ting her with his penis. Cannon was wa lking ba ck and f orth, as if he had a c amcor der. K .T. testified that she also reme mbere d Cannon pene trating her w hile appellant
watc he d. She re c a lle d f

la sh e s th a t c a

us e d h e r t o s qu int

he r e y e s. K.T. reg ained full consciousness at 4:30 a.m. She was naked and ly ing on the floor of appe llant’s bedroom. She we nt to the bathroom, which woke up appellant. He told her that she had thrown u p o n herse lf and that he had wa shed her clothes. He r shirt was still wet, so she borrowe d a shirt from a

ppellant. K.T. g ot dressed a nd left the house. She sa

w no one e lse there
. K. T. te sti fi e d th a t sh e sti ll f e lt s ic k a nd “ fo g g y .” She mana g e d to dr ive to C hr is Nunn ’s ho us e . N un n w a s K .T .’ s o n- a g a in, off -again bo y fr ie nd . N un n h a d in tr od uc e d K .T . to appellant and Cannon, but had later advised he r to avoid them. K.T. ha d been told by appellant that Nunn c a lle d w hil e sh e wa s a sle e p a nd kn e w that sh e sp e nt t

he nig ht at a

pp e lla nt’ s h ou se . K .T . to ld Nunn wh a t ha d h a

pp e ne d to her
. Nunn c a lle d th e po lic e and the n d ro ve K. T. to P ark land

Ho sp ita l. Se me n r e c ov e re d d

ur ingK. T. ’s ph y sic a l e xami natio n c on ta ine d a pp e lla nt’ s DN A. No DN A l ink

to Cannon was f

ound. No trac e of G HB was found in K.T .’s blood or urine, but a tox icolog ist testified that the drughas a ha lf-life in the body of only twenty minutes to an hour.4 A war rant to sea

rch a ppellant’s house was executed on J une 25, 2000, the da y afte r the alleg ed assa

ult. A soft drink bottle c ontaining six ty -four g rams of a liquid identified as GHB was found in the ref

rig erator’s fre ezer compar tment. A Polaroid came ra and four Polaroid photog raphs
o f K
. T
. w e r e f

o u n d i nt h e k i t c h e n . O n e o f t h e s e p h o t o g r a p h s s h o w s K
. T
. l yi n g n a k e d i nt h e h a l l w a y, and the other s are closeups of K .T.’s vag inal are a. Two 3 5 m m. camer as we re f ound in Diaz’s bedroom. One of these c amer as conta ined expo s ed fi l m that, when deve loped, showed: (1) photogr a p h s o f an u n id e n ti f

ie d , n a k e d w o ma

n ; ( 2 ) p h o to g r a

p h s o f Ca

n n o n v o mi ti n g ; ( 3) a photogr aph of D iaz having se x ual interc ourse with an unide ntified woman; (4) a photog raph of appellant makinga hand sig n and another showing hi m urinating ; and (5) photogr aphs of Cannon ly ing on a bed with an unidentified naked woman a nd an unidentified ma

n. No camcorde r wa s found in the house. Cann on

te sti fi e d in

his ow n be ha lf

. H e sa id t

hat K .T . h a d b e e n “ ve ry

fr ie nd ly ” wi th appellant at the bar, sitting next to him a nd resting her hand on his shoulder. When they arr ived at appellant’ s residenc e, C annon noti ced that K.T. t ook a soda bottle with her into the hous e. K.T. sat
n ex tt o ap p el l an to nt h e c o u ch as t h ey wa t ch edv i d eo s . Ac co rd i n g t o C an n o n , “T h ey we re t o u ch i n g, fee ling, just kind of half kissing ty pe thing .” Diaz and his companion arrive d, and Diaz later poured sh ots of vo dk a fo r ev e ryon e . K. T. dr ank he r sho t with no a pp are nt ill ef

fe c ts, bu t she did

a pp e a r t o be “kind of

buzz ed” a

nd she “be came more ag g ressively touching and feeling .” After about a n hour,
a pp e lla nt a nd K. T. we nt t o a

pp e lla nt’ s b e dr oo m. Cannon testified that he was too intox icated to dr ive, so he de cided to spend the night in appellant’s spa

re be droom. As he pa ssed the hal f- o p ened door to appellant’s be droom, he saw5

appellant a

nd K.T. embra cing . Ca n n o n s ai d he wa s awakened in the middle of the nig ht by

the sound of K.T. vomiting in the ha l l
. Cannon wiped the vomit from K.T.’ s fac e with a towe l, then woke a ppellant, t old him to take care of K.T., and went back to bed. Cannon testified that he did not take a ny photogr aphs or videos of K.T., and that he did not see a ny one else d o s o . He denied touching K.T. “in a

ny sexual way .”

Sufficiency of

the Evidence When the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence to sustain a criminal conviction is challeng ed, we must deter

mine whether

a rational trier of f

act c ould have f

ound t h e essential ele ments of the offe nse beyond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 32 4 (1 9 7 9 ) ( l egal
su ff ic ie nc y ); Gr iff in v . S tat e , 614 S.W .2d 155, 158-59 (Tex
. Crim. App. 1981) (leg al suffic iency ); Zun iga v . S

tat e , 144 S.W .2d 4 7 7 , 4 8 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (fa ctual suff iciency ). In a leg al
su ff ic ie nc y re vie w, we loo k at al l the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t and

a ssume that th e tr ie r o f f

a c t r e so lve d c on fl ic ts i n th e te sti mony , we ig he d the e vid e nc e , and dr e w r e a so na ble infere nces in a

manner that supports the verdic t. Gr iff in , 614 S.W .2d at 159 (c i t i n g Jack son , 443 U.S. at 318-19). In a fa ctual suff iciency revie w, we look at the eviden ce i n a n eu t ral li g ht and consider the testimony of defense w itnesses and the e x istence of alternative hy

potheses. Orona v. Sta te , 8 36 S.W. 2d

31 9, 32 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 92 , no pe t.)
. Al tho ug h du e de fe re nc e sti ll mus t be a c c or de d th e fa c t f

ind e r’ s d e te rm inatio ns , p art ic ula rl y tho se c on c e rn ingthe we ig ht a nd c re dib ili ty of t he evidence, w e may

disag ree with the result in order to preve nt a manife st injust ice. Johnson

v . S tat e , 23 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The evidence will be dee med fa ctually insufficient to s us ta in t

he c on vic tio n if

the pr oo f o f guil t is too we a k o r t he c on tr ary evi dence is t oo str on g to6

support a finding of g uilt beyond a rea sonable doubt. Zuniga , 1 44 S.W. 3d a t 48 4- 85 ; see J

ohnson , 23 S.W .3d at 11.

Appellant ar g ues that bec ause the jury did not co n vict him of ag g ravated sexual assault, the jury nece ssarily found that he did not administer GHB to K .T. He then a sserts without
c itatio n of a

uth or ity that “ if K. T. re a lly wa s un de r the inf lue nc e of GH B , sh e vo lun tari ly ing e ste d it , and the a utomatic statutory

consent e lement is eliminated.” But as the j ury was corre ctly instructed by the trial cour

t, a s exual assault i s without consent if the ot her person has not consented and the actor knows the other pe rson is unconscious or phy sically unable to re sist. Tex . Pen
. C o d e Ann. § 22 .0 11 (b )( 3)
. Un de r se c tio n 22 .0 11 (b )( 3) , se xua l int e rc ours e is wi tho ut c on se nt wh e n a sse nt i n fac t is not given a

nd the ac tor knows th at t h e v i ct i m ’s impairment is such that resistanc e is not
rea sonably

to be expected. El lio tt v . S tat e , 858 S.W .2d 478, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) . I n El lio tt , the evidenc e wa s held sufficie nt to prove lack of conse nt where the victim of the sexual assault was unconscious due to voluntar y intox ication. Id
. Ap pe lla nt a lso ur g e s th a t K .T
. ha d a mot ive to l ie a

bo ut h e r c on du c t on

the nig ht i n question. He po i n t s t o K. T .’s testimony that she and N unn had bee n dating for some time, that marria g e had be en discussed, a nd that she still loved Nunn even thoug h they had broken up. K.T. acknow ledg ed during cross-examination that Nunn “wouldn’t be ha ppy ” if he lear

ned that she ha d sexual interc ourse with a

ppellant. Appellant sug g ests that K.T. falsely acc used him of assaulting her in order to pr eser

ve her hopes of r euniting w ith Nunn. T he jury , howeve r, is the exclusive judge of th e c r e d ib il it

y o f th e w it

n e s s e s an d th e w e ig h t to b e g iv e n th e ir te s ti mony . See Tex . Code Cr im. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979); Bo nh am v . S tat e , 680 S.W .2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);7

Cas te lla no v . S

tat e , 8 10 S.W. 2d 80 0, 80 7 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 91 , n o p e t.) . D ue de fe re nc e mus t be g iven to the j ury ’s decision to cre dit K.T.’s testim ony insofar as she denie d consenting to sex ual int e rc ours e wi th a

pp e lla nt. Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favor able to the ve rdict, we hold that the jury could rationally

find bey ond a re asonable doubt that appellant had se x ual i n t er co u rs e with K.T. wi tho ut h e r c on se nt i n f

a c t and wh e n h e kn e w that K .T. wa s unc on sc iou s o r p hy sic a lly un a ble to resist. We further

hold that the jury ’s verdic t is not ma nifestly unjust e ven whe n all the evidenc e, including Ca

nnon’s def

ensive t es t imony , is considere d in a neutra l light. A dec ision is not manifestly

unjust merely

beca use the fa ct-finde r re solved conf l i cti ng views of the e vidence in the State’s favor. Ro ise v . S

tat e , 7 S.W .3d 225, 233 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref ’d). Point of err or three is overrule d.
Pho tog ra phs I n his first point of error , appellant c ontends t h at t wenty -seve n photogr aphs we re
e rr on e ou sly

a dmi tte d in

e vid e nc e . App e lla

nt a rgue s tha t no found a tio n wa s la id f or the ph oto g ra

ph s, they wer e not proper ly authenticated, most of them had no re levanc e other than to prove c hara cter confor m i t y , an d the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice a

rising f rom the admission of the photog raphs substantially outweig hed any probative value they might have had. See Tex. R. Evi d. 403, 404(b), 90 1. Th e State ’s br ie f do e s no t sp e c if ic a lly a dd re ss the a dmi ssi bil ity of any of the ph oto g ra ph s in question. I nstead, the State broadly asser ts that a ll the photogr aphs wer e proper ly admitted to prove the manner , means, a

nd circ umstances of

the alleg ed off

ense.8 The trial c ourt’s dec ision to ad m it or exclude evidenc e is revie wed f or an a buse of discretion. Mo ntgom e ry

v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on re h’g ). As
a g e n e r a l r

u l e , a p h o t o g r a p h i s a d m i s s i b l e i f

i ti s r e l e v an tt o a

m a t e r i a l i s s u e an d

i s ana c c u ra te repr esentation of its subj ect a s of a g iven time. De Lun a v . S tat e , 71 1 S.W. 2d

44 , 4 6 (T ex . C ri m. App. 1986). The re quirement of a uthentica ti o n a s a c o n d it io n p r e c e d e nt t o a d

mi s s ib ility

is satisfied by e vid e nc e su ff

ic ie nt t o s up po rt

a fi nd ing that the ma tte r i n q ue sti on is w hat it s p ro po ne nt c la ims
. T e x. R. E v id
. 9 0 1 ( a )
. A p h o to g r a p h ma y b e a u th e n ti c a te d b y an y w it

n e s s w h o has per sonal knowledg e that it acc urate ly repr esents the scene or eve nt it purports to portray
. Ke ph ar t v . S

tat e , 87 5 S. W.2 d 3 19 , 3 21 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Dr on e v . S tat e , 906 S.W
. 2 d

6 0 8 , 6 1 1 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1995, pet. ref ’d). Evidence of ot her crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the de fenda nt’s
c ha ra c te r i n o rd e r t o s ho w a c tio n in c on fo rm ity

to t hat c ha ra c te r. Te x. R. E vid . 4 04 (b ). Th is r ule inc or po rate s the fu

nd a me nta l ten e t of our c ri min a l justi c e sy ste m tha t an ac c us e d may be tr ie d o nly for the of fense of which he is acc used and not for his cri m i n al propensities. Ra nk in v . S tat e , 974 S.W. 2d 70 7, 71 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). A d e fe nd ant m ay no t be tri e d f or so me c oll a te ra l c ri me or for being a cr iminal ge nera lly
. W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 662 S.W .2d 344, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Relevant evidenc e may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. T ex. R . Evid. 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicia l when it has an undue t en d ency

to sugg est that a de cision be made on an improper basis, commonly , but not
nece ssarily , an emotional one. Va sq ue z v . S tat e , 67 S.W .3d 2 2 9 , 2 4 0 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).Th e a pp e llate re c or d c on ta ins bla c k- and -w hit e ph oto c op ie s o f a ll the ph ot og ra ph ic e xhibi ts. 1 I t is otherwise cle ar f

rom the re cord that the actua l exhi bits were in c olor. 9 Fa ctors that should be considere d in a pply ing rule 403 a

re the probative va lue of the e vidence , the potential of the e vidence to impress the jury in some irrational way , the time ne eded to de velop the evidenc e, and the proponent’s ne ed for the evidenc e. Mo ntgom e ry , 810 S.W .2d at 389-90. In the
c o n te xt o f th e a d mi s s io n o f p h o to g r a p h s , c o u rts a ls o c o n s id e r th e n u mb e r o f p h o to g r a p h s , th e ir s iz e and deta il, whether the y

are in color or blac k-and -w h i t e, whe ther they are g ruesome, a

nd whether any bodies are clothed, nake d, or alter ed by autopsy
. Narv aiz

v . S tat e , 8 4 0 S. W. 2 d 4 1 5 , 4 2 9 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1992).
State’s exhibits 13 , 14 , and 15

During the sea

rch of appellant’ s house, police found four Polaroid photogr aphs in the kitchen. One of these photog raphs, State’ s exhi bit 16, shows K.T
. ly ing unc onscious on the floor in the hallway of the house. She is na ked, and there is a towel next to her head. A ppellant does not complain of the admission of this photog raph, to w hich there was no trial objec tion. The other thre e Polaroid photogr aphs ar e close-ups of a w oman’s g enital ar ea. K .T. identified the photog raphs a s “[m] y clitoris and pre tty much m y vag ina.” Eig ht-by -eig ht enlar g ements of these three photogr aphs
wer e admitted as State’ s exhi bits 13, 14, and 15. 1

Appellant conc edes that these photog raphs were identified by K.T. Neverthele ss, he
c on te nd s th a t a

pr op e r f ound a tio n w a s n ot la id fo r t he e xhibi ts b e c a

us e the y we re no t c on ne c te d to him. That is, the re is no evidenc e that appellant took the photogr aphs or knew that they wer e made
.Appellant does not c halleng e the a dmissibi lity of these thr ee photog raphs unde r rule 404( b). 2 10 Appellant also urg es that any probative va lue these photogr aphs may have had was outwe ighe d by their unfa irly

prejudicia l nature. 2 K.T. ’ s te s timony

reg ardingher me mory

of a c amcor der a

nd flashes sug g ested that she was photogra

phed on the ni g ht in question. I t is rea sonable to conclude that exhibi ts 13, 14, and 15
we re take n a t or a

bo ut the tim e e xhibi t 16 wa s take n. Ev ide nc e that K. T. wa s p ho tog ra ph e d w hil e she wa s naked a

nd unconscious wa s essential to understa nding the context and circ umstances of the alleg ed assa

ult. I t was, in other wor ds, same transac tion context ual evidenc e. Se e Cam ac ho v . S tat e , 86 4 S. W.2 d 5 24 , 5 32 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); Ma y es v . S tat e , 8 16 S.W. 2d 79 , 86 n. 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ). Al tho ug h th e re is n o e vid e nc e that a pp e lla nt p e rs on a lly

too k th e ph ot og ra

ph s in question, they

wer e found in ope n view in his kitchen on the day afte r the off

ense a nd thus tended to confirm K.T.’ s testimo n y . T h e t ri al cour t did not abuse its discretion by concludingthat an adequat e foundation for admission of the photogr aphs wa s laid and that the photog raphs we re rele vant. Althoug h the close- up photogr aphs of K.T .’s g enitals wer e tasteless and the introduc tion of all three photogr aphs wa s repe titive, we cannot state under the circumstances that the trial court abused its discr etion by

concludingthat the probative value of the photog raphs outwe ighe d the dang er of unfair pr ejudice.
State’s exhibits 71 throu gh 76 and 78 The o th e r p h o to g r a

p h s a t is s u e w e r e o n a r o ll o f f il m ta k e n f r o m a 3 5 mm. camer a found in Diaz’s bedroom. Exhibit s 74, 75, and 76 show a young woman ly ing na ked on a c ouch or11

b e d
. S h e a

p p e ar s t o b e a s l e e p o r

u n c o n s c i o u s . E x h i b i t7 1 i s a c l o s e - u p o f t h e w o m an ’ s g e n i t a l s . In exhibi t 72, a man is inserting a long object into the woman’ s vag ina. I n exhibi t 73, the same ma n is pushing a dr ink can in to the woman’s va g ina. I n exhibi t 78, a diffe rent man is per forming cunnilingus on the woman. The re is no evide nce r eg ardingthe identities o f t h e wom an and me n sh ow n in the se ph otograp hs. T he re a lso is n o e vid e nc e a s to wh e re , w he n, or by wh om t he se photogr aphs we re taken, althoug h there is indirect evidenc e (discussed below) that the photogr aphs
wer e re cent. Comments made dur ing a hear ing on the admis sibili ty of the photog raphs sug g est that the y we re take n in

Di a z’s be dr oo m. At trial, the S t at e argued that these photogr aphs we re a dmissibl e to “show the motivation, to keep a photog raph of a woman who i s naked and who they are sexually

assaulting .” The c ourt admitted the photog raphs without spec ify in g a gro und. The c ourt did state that the photogr aphs show “w hat appe ars to be a n unconscious g irl being sexually abused in the Defe ndant’s house,” that they

“appe ar to have been taken in J essie Diaz’ room who w as there at the time of the offe nse that we wer e [sic] trying,” and that they “ar e of a simil ar nature” to the Polaroid photogr aphs of K.T. previously admitted in evidenc e. We infer that the court de termined that these photogr aphs
wer e admiss i b l e to prove that appellant a nd his codefe ndant administered G HB to K.T. or, as the State argued, to prove their motive for ha ving done so. Evidence that appellant or Cannon had drug g ed and se x ually assaulted a

nother
woman wa s not admissibl e under rule 404(b) so le ly

to p ro ve a pr op e ns ity

fo r s uc h c on du c t. Mo re ov er, th ere is no e vid e nc e tha t th e se ph oto g ra

ph s are wh a t th e State c la ime d th e m to be —p ho tog ra

ph s o f a wo man w ho ha d b e e n d ru g g e d b y

a pp e lla nt o r C ann on , a

nd the n s e xua lly12

assaulted. See Tex. R. Evi d. 901(a)
. Even if it is assumed that these photog raphs we re not posed and the woman pictured is unc onscious, there is no evidence that she had be en g iven GHB or any other drug , nor is there any evidenc e that either appellant or Cannon wer e in a ny way responsible for her intoxi cation. And e ven if the photog raphs wer e taken in D iaz’s bedroom in appe llant’s house, there is no evidence that either a ppellant or Cannon took the photog raphs or knew of their existence. Thus, the phot og raphs were not probative evidence that either appellant or Cannon had drug g ed K.T. for the pur

pose of makingsexually

expli cit photogr aphs of he r. Th e s e p h o to g r a

p h s , p arti c u la

r ly th o s e s h o w in g th e ma n in s e rti n g o b

je c ts in to the woman’s vag ina, are lewd, vulga r, and disg usting. Remar

ks by the cour t during the trial show that the photog raphs e licited a strong , neg ative, emotional reac t i on among the jurors. B eca use the p hotogr aphs had no r eleva nce be y ond proving the bad c hara cter of the unidentified me n in the photogr aph s an d of the unidentified pe rson who took them, we must conc lude that the probative value of the photogr aphs was far exceede d by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice a

nd that the trial cour

t abused its discre tion by

overr uling a ppellant’s rule 403 objection.

State’s exhibits 77 and 82 th rough 97

The re maining photog raphs found on the exposed roll of film were introduced a s State’s exhibit s 77 and 82 throug h 97
. E x h i b i t 7 7 was identified a s a photog raph of Diaz having sexual int erc ourse with an unide ntified woman, probably in D iaz’s be droom. Ther e is no evidenc e as to when or

by whom the photog raph w as take n.13 E x h i b i t s 8 2 t h r o u g h 9 2 ar e p h o t o g r a p h s o f C an n o nt a k e ni na

p ar k i n g l o t o r dr i v e w a y, pe rh a ps ou tside app ell ant ’s ho us e . D ia z al so a pp e ars in o ne of

the ph oto g ra

ph s. Cann on

is ob vio us ly ill , a nd in m os t of

the ph oto g ra

ph s h e is s itt ing , ly

ing , o r c ra

wl ing on the g ro un d. Som e of the photog raphs show him vomit i n g. C annon testified that he believed that these photog raphs
we re take n o n th e nig ht o f h is b ir thd ay in O c tob e r 1 99 9, wh e n h e be c a me ve ry int oxic a te d a

nd ill
. The photog raphe r wa s not identified.

Ex hibits 95, 96, and 97 show C an n o n ly ing in a bed. The rec ord sug g ests that the loc a tio n w a s p ro ba

bly Di a z’s be dr oo m. C ann on is w e ari ngon ly

his un de rw e ar. An oth e r man is a lso
on the be d, and

a wo man is lyingbe tw e e n th e tw o men . Th e wo man is nake d a nd is d e lib e rate ly
e xpos ing he r va g ina

fo r t he c a me ra . Ca

nn on te sti fi e d th a t th e wo man w a s a da nc e r n a me d Cr

y sta l; the other ma

n he identified only as Adrian. Cannon believed that these photogra phs wer e also take n on the night of

his birthday , while he wa s intox icated. O nce a g ain, there is no evidence as to who too k th e ph oto g ra

ph s. Ex hibits 93 and 94 are photog raphs of appellant. In exhibi t 93, he is shown standing in h is k itc he n ma

kin g a ha nd g e sture that wa s de sc ri be d a s a g angsig n. I n e xhibi t 94 , a pp e lla nt i s urinating on the side of a

building, per

haps hi s house. There is no evidenc e as to whe n or by whom the photog raphs we re taken.

These se ventee n photogr aphs we re of fer ed and admitted as a g roup. The State ur g ed their admission on the ground that they connec ted appe llant and Cannon to the photog raphs of the
un c on sc iou s w oma

n th a t ha d pre vio us ly be e n intr od uc e d as exhi bit s 71 thr ou g h 7 6 a nd 78 , a nd to show when the latter photog raphs ha d been taken. The State rea soned t hat because the photogr aphs of the un c on sc iou s wo man we re the la st e xpos ur e s on the ro ll, the y mus t ha ve be e n ma de re c e ntl y14

beca use in the prof

fer ed photog raphs appellant and Cannon appea red muc h the same a s they did at trial. The c ourt ruled that the photog raphs we re a dmissibl e to show ap p el lant’s and Cannon’ s “knowledg e of what is on the roll of film ” and to show the relationship betwee n appellant, Cannon,
an d D ia z. The sequence of t he photogra phs on the roll of film may show that the photog raphs of the unc onscious woman wer e rec ent. B ut the mere fac t that photogr aphs of a ppellant and Cannon
wer e on the same roll of film does not tend to prove that either a ppellant or Cannon was awa re of the ph oto g ra

ph s o f t he un c on sc iou s w oma

n o r t o c on ne c t e ith e r o f the m to t he a c tiv iti e s d e pic te d in those photog raphs. The fac t that Cannon and Diaz are both in one of the photogr aphs does not tend to prove that appellant took that photog raph, much less that he took any of the other

photogr aphs on the ro ll o f f

ilm
. Aside fr om the one photogr aph of Cannon and Diaz tog ether , these photog raphs a re not probative of t he re lationship between a ppellant, Cannon, and D iaz. I n any event, that relationship was not a contested issue at the trial. The evidenc e wa s undisputed that appellant and Cannon wer e fr iends , t h at Diaz was a ppellant’s housemate, and that a ppellant, Cannon, and D iaz
wer e at the house with K.T. on the nig ht in question.

Proof of the e vents d ep icted in these se ventee n photogr aphs—Diaz having sexual intercour se, Cannon intox icated and vomiting, Cannon in be d with an obviously consenting woman, appellant ur inating a g ainst a wa ll and flashing a g angsign—did not have any tendenc y to make the exis tence of a fac t of conseque nce in this cause more or le ss probable. See Tex. R. Evid. 401. The admission of these photogr aphs improperly encour ag ed the jury to convict appe llant on the basis of15

his, his codefe ndant’s, and his house mate’s debauc hed char acte r. The admission of the exhibit s was an abuse of the trial c ourt’s discre tion. See Tex. R. Evi d. 403, 404(b).
Har m The State a

rg ues that any

err or in the admission of the cha lleng ed photog raphs wa s harmless
. I n fa ct, the State asse rts that “the de fense used these e x hibits t o its advantag e” by “off eringevidenc e that t h e photogra phs were mere ly

indicative of the deca dent lifestyle in which [K. T.] pa rt ic ipate d. ” Th is i s a

re fe re nc e to t e sti mony

by a de fe ns e wi tne ss t

hat th e us e of

GH B is
common among persons who work at topless ba rs, that such persons often “par ty ” in th e manner shown in the photog raphs, a nd that she had se en similar photog raphs of persons in the “ industry .” The State a lso notes that in their arguments to the jury , defe nse counsel soug ht to minimi ze the eff ect of the ph oto g ra

ph s b y su g g e sti ngthat th e ph oto g ra ph s sh ow e d the mor a ls of a ll the pr inc ipa ls i n th is
case , including K .T. Def

ense c ounsel had no choic e but to deal with these exhibi ts after they wer e admitted over the ir objections. We a re not persuade d that eff

orts by the def ense to sug g est that K.T. took part in the “de cade nt lifesty le” de picted in the exhibi ts le ssened the har m to appellant ar ising from their e rrone ous admission.

The State fur

ther a rg ues that Cannon’s a cquittal and app el l an t ’s conviction for the le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e de mon str a te that the jur y wa s no t a ff

e c te d by the ob

je c tio na ble ph oto g ra

ph s. Whil e it is impossible to state with c erta inty why the jury returne d these ve rdicts, the likely rea son for Cannon’ s acquittal wa s the absenc e of D NA or a ny other phy sical evide nce linking him to the alleg ed off

ense. Whateve r t h e j ury

may have thoug ht of Cannon’s cha rac ter a s sugg ested by

the ph oto g ra ph s, it w a s a

pp are ntl y no t pr e pa re d to c on vic t hi m so le ly on the ba sis of

K. T. ’s a dmi tte dly16

vag ue memory . The jury ’s failure to f ind that a ppellant administered GHB to K .T. may possibly be explained by

the abse nce of

the drugin her blood or ur ine, or the jury may have be lieved that K.T.’ s intox ication—whet

h e r b y G H B o r s o me o the r intox icant—wa s voluntary . The pre judice to appe llant arising from the inadmissi ble phot og raphs went to the consent issue: by improperly

sug g esting that he wa s the sort of per son who would take se x ual adva ntag e of a

n intox icated w oman, the ph oto g ra ph s li ke ly re mov e d a

ny do ub t th e jur

y mig ht hav e had a s to wh e the r K .T . c on se nte d to
se xua l in te rc ours e wi th a

pp e lla nt. Given the number

and natur e of the photog raphs, the a bsence of any

probative va lue bey ond char acte r conf

ormity , and the very

rea l dang er of

unfair pr ejudice unde r the c ircumstance s shown by the re cord, w e hold that t he erroneous admission of S tate’s ex hibits 71 throug h 78 and 82 thr ough 97 affec te d a

pp e lla nt’ s su bs tanti a l r ig hts . T e x. R. A pp . P. 44 .2 (b ). Poi nt o f e rr or on e is
su sta ine d in

pa rt
. Jury Char ge I n point of err or two, appe llant contends the trial c ourt erro n eo u s ly commented on the weig ht of the evidenc e in its jury char g e. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 (West S upp. 2004-05). The complaine d -o f er ro r occ urre d in the application par ag raph f or ag g ravated sexual
a s s a u l t , i nw h i c h t h e c o u rti n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y: Now if y ou find from the e vidence bey ond a re asonable doubt t h at
. . . [ap pe lla nt], a c tin g a lon e or

a s a pa rt y , d id .
. . kn owin g ly

or int e nti on a lly

c a us e p en et ration of the female sexual orga n of [K.T.], wit hout the consent of [K.T.], by

. . . th e se xua l or g an o f [a pp e lla nt], and [ap pe lla nt], a c tin g a lon e or

a s a party , d id administer or provide a drug , namely : [ GHB ] t o [K.T.] , thev ic tim of th e off e ns e ,17

with the intent of fac ilitating the commissio n o f the offe nse, then y ou will find the de fe nd ant guil ty

of a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult , a s c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt. (Emphasis adde d). Appe llant’s objection to the emphasized phra se wa s overr uled. The char g e we nt
on to i ns tr uc t th e jur

y that if it f ound a pp e lla nt n ot guil ty

of a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult , it wa s to consid e r w h e th e r h e w a s g u il ty

o f s e xu a l a s s a

u lt
. T h e c h ar g e c o n ta in e d a s e c o n d a p p li c a tion para g raph f

or the lesse r off

ense. A cha rg e that assumes the truth of a controverte d issue is a comment on the we ight of the e vidence and is err on eous. W ha le yv . S tat e , 717 S.W .2d 26, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Th e re we re tw o se ri ou sly c on tr ov e rt e d is su e s in

thi s c a us e : di d K .T . c on se nt t o s e xua l in te rc ours e with appellant and did a

ppellant administer GHB to K.T. Appellant contends that the application para g raph, by

ref err ing to K.T . as the victim, err oneously assumed that K.T. did not c onsent to the intercour se. Tal

k ing ton v . S

tat e , 682 S.W .2d 674, 675 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1984, pet. r ef’ d). Th e State argue s th a t Talkington is disti ng uishable bec ause the only contested issue in that case was c onsent. Her e, the jury had to dec ide both the conse nt issue and the drug issue. The State argues that the a

pplication para g raph w as structure d in such a wa y as t o require the jury

to find a lac k of conse nt to se x ual intercour se bef ore it dete rmined whe ther the dr ug had bee n administered, and points out that the ref ere nce to K.T . as the victim occ urre d in that p o rt i o n o f t he application para g raph de aling with the latter issue. The State rea sons that bef o re re ac h i ng that point in the application par ag raph , the jury would have a lrea dy

found that K.T. wa s the victim of a sexual assault, and ther efor e the r efe renc e to her as a vic tim was not error
.18 I n deter mining whe ther a

n instruction is a comment on the weight of the evidenc e, we must consider

the cour t’s char g e as a

whole. Russ e ll v . S

tat e , 7 49 S.W. 2d

77 , 7 9 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1988). The State’s arg ument ignor es t he fact t hat t he charg e conta ined two sepa rate application para g raphs. The first, at issue her e, only asked the j u ry t o d ec ide whethe r appe llant was g uilty of ag g ravated sex u al as s au l t. The sec ond, to be re ache d if the jury found appe llant not guilty of the g re a te r o ff

e ns e , a sk e d th e jur

y to de c ide wh e the r a

pp e lla nt w a s g uil ty

of se xua l a ssa

ult . B y the tim e the jury rea ched this sec ond application parag raph, which it clea rly did beca

use it found appe llant g uilty of the lesser included offe nse, it had bee n eff ectively instructed by

the cour t that K.T. was the vic timof a se xua l a ssa

ult
. The State a lso arg ues that re fer ring to K.T. in the cha

rg e as the “victim of the off ense”
wa s r e qu ir e d b y

the e x pr e ss t e rm s o f t

he a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult statut e , w hic h p ro vid e s th a t a
se xua l a ssa

ult is a g g ra vate d if the a c tor a dmi nis te rs GH B or oth e r dr ug s “ to t he vic timof

the of fe ns e with th e in te n t o f f

a c il it a ti n g th e c o mm is s io n o f th e o f f e n s e . ” T e x. Pe n . Code Ann. § 22 .0 21 (a )( 2) (A )( vi)
. B ut the wo rd “ vic tim ” is us e d thro ug ho ut s ub se c tio n 2 2. 02 1( a )( 2) (A ) s imp ly to refe r to the per son sexually assaulted. We do not understand the statute to require an express jury finding that the per son assaulted was a “victim,” but only to r equire that the per son drug g ed be the person sexually

assaulted. I f the a

pplication para g raph ha d require d the jury to find that appellant administered GHB to K .T. with the requisite intent, w ithout refer ring to K.T. as “the victim of the offe nse,” it would have confor med to the statute without commenting on the w eig ht of the evide nce. We hold that the trial court’s char g e commented on the w eig ht of the evide nce a nd that a pp e lla nt’ s o bje c tio n w a s e rr on e ou sly ov e rr ule d. The c ha

rg e e rr or wa s c le arl y

c a lc ulate d to19

injure appe llant’s ri g hts and was ther efor e har mful. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 36.19 (West 1981); Al

ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g ). Point of er ror two is sustained.
Conclu sion

Be cause of our disposition of points of error one, two, and thr ee, w e d o not rea ch
a pp e lla nt’ s r e ma ini ngpo int s o f e rr or . T he jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n is re ve rs e d an d th e c a us e is
re mand e d to the dis tr ic t c ou rt fo r a ne w tri a l.

__________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Reverse d and Remande d Filed: Mar ch 10, 2005 Pub lis h