or law of the United States. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535, rev’d on other grounds, Daniels 474 U.S. at

330-31.

Ciesla next asserts that the availability of state tort remedies to redress Panfil’s claims satisfy
due process requirements. Indeed, Panfil’s allegations for his § 1983 due process claim form the basis
for his pendent state claims of wrongful arrest and detention. A due process claim for deprivation of
a liberty interest is not stated if an adequate state law remedy is available. Hood v. City of Chicago,

927 F.2d 312, 314 (7" Cir. 1991); Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 882 (7" Cir. 1984); Weber

v. Village of Hanover Park, 768 F. Supp. 630, 635 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Baltz v. Shelley, 661 F. Supp.
169, 181 (N.D. Ill. 1987). Without any legal support, Panfil responds that Ciesla’s attempt to shield
himself from liability under the Local Governmental & Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act,
745 ILCS 10/1-102 et seq., would effectively prevent him from seeking relief in a state court. This
argument has no merit. Bolden v. Carter, No. 94 C 7603, 1995 WL 591447, at * 4 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
22, 1995); see 745 ILCS § 10/1 et seq.; Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1405-06 (7" Cir.
1990) (qualified immunity does not render state law remedy inadequate). Because Panfil has adequate
state law remedies for his § 1983 due process claims, they are dismissed without prejudice. Thus, the
court will not address Ciesla’s claim that Panfil should have brought his claim for unlawful seizure
under the Fourth, not the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. The city
To state a claim against the city under § 1983, Panfil must plead that his constitutional injury

resulted from a municipal policy. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 692

(1978). Respondeat superior liability is not permitted against a municipality. Id. To plead an injury

results from a municipal policy, Panfil must allege either that the city had “an express policy” that,


IV. State claims of wrongful arrest and detention [Count IIT}
Finally, because Panfil's federal claims are defective, the court will not entertain his pendent
state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
CONCLUSION

The motion to dismiss is granted.

ENTER:

le B. Conlon
May 23, 2001 United States District Judge


1999). An arrest is not unconstitutional if the information Ciesla relied upon later proves to be
erroneous because probable cause is assessed based on the information available at the time of the
arrest. McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183 (7" Cir. 1984). In fact, Ciesla is allowed reasonable
mistakes in his determination of probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).

Panfil was arrested on a valid warrant. Thus, the city and Ciesla argue Panfil cannot maintain
his § 1983 claims, unless he can prove Ciesla lacked probable cause to arrest him despite the warrant.

Myatt _v. City of Chicago, 816 F. Supp. 1259, 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Panfil contends Baker is

distinguishable because there the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant that named him as the
suspect. Daniel Panfil was arrested on a warrant issued in the name Dale Panfil. But “aliases and false
identifications are not uncommon.” Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803 (1971); see Brown vy.
Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 (7" Cir. 1987). Because of this, the city and Ciesla argue that officers
who in good faith believed the arrestee is their suspect, even after the arrestee produced identification
to show he was not, cannot be held liable. Hill, 401 U.S. at 803-04. Panfil argues that Hill found the
officers’ disregard of the arrestee’s identification reasonable because his answers about firearms in
plain view were evasive. Jd. at 804 n.9. Here, there is no evidence that Panfil was evasive or
uncooperative. Panfil argues reasonable men could differ as to whether his arrest by Ciesla was proper
because he readily produced identification to prove he was not the wanted suspect and pleaded with
Ciesla that he was innocent. Pl. Resp. B at 7. Panfil argues Ciesla ignored the evidence in front of
him to arrest the wrong person. Jd. at 8.

Ciesla’s arrest of Panfil pursuant to a valid warrant was reasonable. Daniel Panfil and his
brother, Dale Panfil, have similar first names, the same last name, and are the same gender and race.

Panfil himself acknowledges he matched the physical description in the warrant. Jd. at 7. Although


when enforced, caused a constitutional deprivation; or that the city had “a widespread practice” that,
although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, was so permanent and well-settled
as to constitute a “custom or usage” with the force of law; or that the constitutional injury was caused
by a person with “final policy-making authority.” McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7"
Cir. 1995). Further, the city asserts that nothing Panfil alleged can be construed as a municipal policy
because the essence of his complaint is that he was arrested and held on a valid warrant for his brother.
Without more, the city contends this is an isolated incident that cannot form the basis of a § 1983
municipal policy claim. Board of County Comm’r of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
403-06 (1997) (plaintiff must show that through city’s deliberate conduct it was the “moving force”
for the alleged injury). Panfil fails to allege that a municipal policy caused his constitutional injury.
Panfil acknowledges this deficiency, but responds that he is “now prepared to allege that the City has
a widespread practice at some of its district police stations of not fingerprinting arrestees upon being
processed and said practice is so permanent and well-settled at some of those stations that it is a
custom or usage with the force of law.” Pl. Resp. A at 3. Panfil cannot amend his complaint in a

response to a motion to dismiss. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7" Cir.

1984); Solon v. Kaplan, No. 00 C 2888, 2001 WL 123769, at *4 (N.D. Il. Feb. 13, 2001).

3. Valid warrant, probable cause, and indefinite detention

There is no unconstitutional deprivation of liberty, and thus, no cognizable claim under § 1983,
if Panfil was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant or probable cause. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 143-44 (1979). Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within Ciesla’s
knowledge were sufficient to warrant a prudent person’s belief that an offense has been committed.

Edwards v. Cabrera, 58 F.3d 290, 291 (7" Cir. 1995); see Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7" Cir.


of time pursuant to a valid warrant in the face of repeated protests of innocence may support a
constitutional claim. 443 U.S. at 144. Indeed, an extended detention on the basis of misidentification
can sustain a § 1983 claim. Johnson v. Chicago, 711 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (N.D. Til. 1989); Almeida,
No. 98 C 1550, 1998 WL 781109, at *4-5. These circumstances include, at a minimum, a period of
detention exceeding three days and repeated claims of innocence. Baker, 443 U.S. at 144-45 (three

days over holiday weekend cannot support constitutional claim); Johnson, 711 F. Supp. at 1470;

Almeida, No. 98 C 1550, 1998 WL 781109, at *4-5. Panfil alleges that he protested innocence, but
the city held him at most two days before transferring him to McHenry County’s custody. Compl. at
411 5-9. Detention of two days is insufficient to sustain Panfil’s § 1983 claims.

Panfil argues that by parsing the amount of time he spent in the custody of each defendant, he
could be indefinitely held for periods of two days without any claim for a due process violation,
regardless of everything else, including his innocence. Panfil cites no statutory or case law to support
his speculative argument, and this is not the case.

Il. —§ 1988 [Count I]

The city and Ciesla argue that Panfil fails to allege any constitutional violation in Count II, but
merely, requests attorneys’ fees. Panfil responds that Count II is properly alleged and should not be
dismissed. As discussed supra, Panfil has adequate state remedies to pursue his claims of wrongful
arrest and detention, and thus his federal due process rights in Count I are satisfied. Further, Panfil
fails to state a § 1983 claim against the city in Count I. Count II is therefore dismissed because it
incorporates by reference the defective allegations of Count I, adding only a request for reasonable

attorneys’ fees.


.
Mitte Order For (05/97)

«5

United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Othe
or Magistrate Judge Suzanne B. Conlon ‘than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 00 € 8011 DATE 5/23/2001
CASE DANIEL PANFIL vs. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature of
the motion being presented,]
MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:
(3) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) a Brief in support of motion due
(3) o Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due
(4) 0 Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Co Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) i) Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(7) Qo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Qa This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) (General Rule21 CO FRCP41(a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) «off [Other docket entry] Defendants City of Chicago and Gerald Ciesla’s motions to dismiss [11-1],
[12-1] are granted. The Fifth Amendment claims are dismissed with prejudice, and the Fourteenth
Amendment claims are dismissed without prejudice. The court declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction
over the state claims against the City of Chicago and Gerald Ciesla for wrongful arrest and detention.
ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. S 2 Dene
dl) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required

v¥ | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone,

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
SB deputy’s
initials

one bbe
O FCA BOCKETING

OI MAY 24 PH 5:01

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office

5/23/2001

date mailed notice

jd

malting deputy initials



Panfil protested his innocence and produced his license to show he was not his brother, it was
reasonable for Ciesla to take Panfil in for further investigation. See Brown, 823 F.2d at 169. This is
especially so because Panfil was in an automobile. If Ciesla let him go, it might have taken a long time
to find him again if he were the person named in the warrant. See Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697,
699 (7" Cir. 1987).

Panfil cites Hernandez v. City of Chicago, No. 99 C 6441, 2001 WL 128246 (N.D. IIL. Feb.
9, 2001), to argue that given the information before Ciesla, he should have investigated Panfil’s claim
of innocence. But law enforcement personnel do not have a constitutional duty to “investigate

independently every claim of innocence” or “perform an error-free investigation.” Baker, 443 U.S.

at 146; Almeida v. Sheahan, No. 98 C 1550, 1998 WL 781109, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1998).
Hernandez states only that a police officer cannot ignore information he discovered that reveals his
mistake and then not promptly release the arrestee from custody. Panfil asserts that Hernandez applies
to his situation because of the similarity in facts. But in Hernandez the plaintiff, Emiliano Hernandez,
alleged in his complaint that he protested he was not Enrique Hernandez, and his family members came
to the police station where he was held with copies of his passport, social security card, and resident
alien card to show he was not Enrique. Jd. at *4, Panfil contends that he too protested he was
innocent, produced his license, and the entire contents of his wallet with other forms of identification,
and his father accompanied Panfil to the police station and pleaded that Panfil was not the person in
the warrant. Pl. Resp. A at 10-11. However, Panfil alleged in his complaint only that he protested
he was not guilty and produced his license to show he was not Dale Panfil. Compl. at { 6.

Panfil asserts that the existence of a valid warrant and probable cause in this case does not bar

his § 1983 claim. He argues that Baker left open the possibility that detention after a prolonged period



the city. Thus, they are state actors. Panfil recognizes in his responses that his Fifth Amendment
claims against the city and Ciesla are predicated on the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to state
actors. Panfil’s Fifth Amendment claims against the city and Ciesla must be dismissed.

B. Fourteenth Amendment

Construing the complaint ina light most favorable to Panfil, he attempts to plead a due process
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Panfil alleges defendants unreasonably seized him and
deprived him of liberty without due process of law while acting under color of state law. Compl. at
q 122

1. Ciesla

Ciesla cites Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 528-38 (1981) and Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331-32 (1986), to argue that Panfil’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails because he does not
allege more than in a conclusory fashion a deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process
of law. Neither cited case concerns allegations essential to survive a motion to dismiss, and neither
supports Ciesla’s proposition. Panfil contends that pursuant to Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993), he has adequately plead a
claim for due process. Leatherman determined there is no heightened pleading standard for § 1983
actions brought against a municipality and its agents. 507 U.S. at 167-69. All Panfil must allege to
state a § 1983 claim is that the conduct complained of was committed by a person under color of state

law, and this conduct deprived Panfil of his rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution

? Panfil admits he did not plead a Fourth Amendment or a Fourteenth Amendment violation
for denial of access to the courts. Pl. Resp. B at 3-4.

3


Department, arrested Panfil pursuant to the McHenry County warrant. Panfil informed Ciesla that he
was Daniel Panfil, not Dale Panfil, and produced a driver’s license that identified him as Daniel Panfil.
Ciesla transported Panfil to the Chicago Police Department Jefferson Park (16 District) station.
Panfil was processed and then transported to the Cook County Jail. On December 26, 1999, Panfil
was transported to the McHenry County Jail and taken before a magistrate the next morning. He
pleaded not guilty. While in defendants’ custody, Panfil was allegedly denied access to medication
prescribed for his recently operated throat, causing bleeding. Panfil was released six days after his
arrest.
DISCUSSION

1. Motion to dismiss standard

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court considers whether relief is possible under any set of
facts consistent with the complaint’s allegations. Pokuta v. TWA, 191 F.3d 834, 839 (7" Cir. 1999).
A motion to dismiss will be granted only if no set of facts would warrant relief. Frieri v. City of
Chicago, 127 F. Supp.2d 992, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2001). A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the
complaint, not its merits. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7 Cir. 1990).
Il. § 1983 [Count I]

A. Fifth Amendment

The city and Ciesla argue that Panfil’s § 1983 claim under the Fifth Amendment must be
dismissed because they are not federal actors and Panfil does not allege their actions were taken under
color of federal law. Monitor v. City of Chicago, 653 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (Fifth
Amendment protection applicable to federal, not state action); Jackson v. Elrod, 655 F. Supp. 1130,

1133-34 (N.D. IIL. 1987). The city isa municipal corporation, and Ciesla works as a police officer for


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
DANIEL PANFIL, )
Plaintiff, } No. 00 C 8011
v. } Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al. }
Defendants. }

DOCKETED

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERy AY 25 2004

Daniel Panfil sues the City of Chicago (“the city”), Gerald Ciesla, individually and in his
representative capacity as a Chicago police officer, Keith Nygren, individually and in his capacity as
the Sheriff of McHenry County, and the County of McHenry (collectively “defendants”) for civil rights
violations by depriving him of his liberty without due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count
I), recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Count II), and pendent state claims
of wrongful arrest and detention (Count III). The city and Ciesla move to dismiss.’

BACKGROUND
The court accepts well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in

Panfil’s favor. Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673, 675 (7" Cir. 2000). In late

1999, the Circuit Court for McHenry County, Illinois, issued a warrant for the arrest of Dale Panfil,

the brother of Daniel Panfil. On December 24, 1999, Ciesla, an officer of the Chicago Police

' The city and Ciesla filed separate motions to dismiss; the court addresses both motions.
Citations to the city and Ciesla’s motions to dismiss are indicated as “Def. Br. A at__” and Def. Br.
Bat__” respectively, and Panfil’s responses correspond to the city and Ciesla’s motions, bearing the
citation “Pl. Resp. A at__” and “PI. Resp. B at__.”