COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

June 9, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP2025 Cir. Ct. No. 2014FA1440

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

GARRETT G. RIPLEY,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

LAURA S. RIPLEY,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Brown County: 

JOHN ZAKOWSKI, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2018AP2025

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Laura Ripley appeals a judgment of divorce

containing no award of child support, which was entered following a denial of 

Laura’s motion for reconsideration on the child support issue.1 Laura argues the 

circuit court lacked authority to deviate from the percentage standard for child 

support established by statute and the administrative code because Garrett Ripley 

did not request a deviation. She also argues the court did not sufficiently explain 

why it was deviating from the percentage standard. Finally, she argues the court 

erred in some fashion when addressing her request for variable expenses during 

the reconsideration proceedings. We reject Laura’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Laura and Garrett were married in 2010. One child, John, was born 

in 2011, and the parties separated in 2013.2 John suffers from a chronic 

esophageal disease for which he has received a combination of dietary restrictions 

and medical treatment. He has other medical conditions as well, and although 

Laura and Garrett agreed that he has made substantial progress with treatment, the 

circuit court recognized that John continues to require significant observation and 

supervision. Temporary orders, including an order issued following mediation, 

established that Laura had primary physical placement of John, with Garrett 

having placement on alternating weekends and certain weekdays. 

¶3 Following a contested divorce hearing that spanned multiple days in 

2016 and 2017, the circuit court issued a written decision in which it ordered joint 

 

1

 Because the parties share a surname, we will refer to them by their given names.

2

 We use a pseudonym for the child out of an abundance of caution.
No. 2018AP2025

3

legal custody of John. The court noted John’s physical placement was a disputed 

issue between the parties. After considering the factors identified in WIS. STAT.

§ 767.41(5) (2017-18),

3

the court rejected Garrett’s “fifty-fifty” proposal and 

decided to continue the placement as outlined in the temporary orders, with one 

minor modification. This decision resulted in John being placed with Laura 

sixty-two percent of the time and his placement with Garrett thirty-eight percent of 

the time. 

¶4 The circuit court adopted the terms of a partial marital settlement 

agreement on other issues, which included the parties’ agreed-upon property 

division and agreement to waive maintenance. By stipulation, the court set 

Garrett’s gross annual income at approximately $68,500 from all of his 

employment and Laura’s gross annual income at approximately $58,600 from her 

work at the Red Cross. 

¶5 Notably, beyond a few passing references during the settlement and 

placement discussions, neither party advanced any argument concerning child 

support during the hearing. In the circuit court’s written decision, it declined to 

order any child support. Its reasoning was tied to the temporary orders:

Child Support: At the time of the final hearing, there was 

no child support order in place. The final placement order 

closely mirrors the temporary placement order. The court 

has considered the totality of the circumstances and does 

not believe a child support order is necessary at this time. 

No child support is ordered.

 

3

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2018AP2025

4

The court also observed that John was covered under both parties’ health 

insurance policies. 

¶6 Laura filed a motion for reconsideration in which she raised two 

issues. First, she requested a review of the child support order, asserting that she 

was paying the “vast majority” of John’s expenses, including daycare. Laura 

noted Garrett was earning more income than her and John had expensive medical 

needs. Second, Laura noted the circuit court’s decision was silent regarding how 

the parties were to divide variable expenses and uninsured medical expenses. She 

requested an order requiring the parties to share John’s variable expenses in 

proportion to the placement schedule and to split John’s uninsured medical 

expenses evenly. 

¶7 At the outset of the hearing on the reconsideration motion, the 

parties stipulated as to how John’s variable expenses and uninsured medical 

expenses were to be divided. Laura later presented exhibits showing her 

calculations of child support based on the guidelines. Laura asserted that given the 

placement schedule, the guideline amount of child support was $420 per month 

using her income as of the date of the final hearing, or $365 per month using her 

income at the time of the reconsideration hearing. She also stated she had 

significant daycare expenses that varied between approximately $200 and $400 

per month. Garrett opposed any modification regarding child support. 

¶8 The circuit court stated that during the final hearing, the parties were 

focused on placement and John’s medical needs and “the monetary aspect of the 
No. 2018AP2025

5

child support ... was kind of pushed to the background.”4 According to the court, 

it had considered the child support guidelines under WIS. ADMIN. CODE ch. 

DCF 150 at the time of its decision, and the “numbers [it] crunched” did not 

generate a recommended amount of child support as high as $365 per month. The 

court also noted that its placement decision was, in part, predicated upon the 

notion that daycare was not an issue because John’s grandmother could care for 

John for free while Laura worked. Laura responded that John’s schedule had 

changed somewhat with school starting, and that his grandmother had always been 

paid to watch John. This information prompted the court to observe that it had 

never been made aware of daycare expenses at the time of trial. 

¶9 The circuit court also expressed some frustration about being 

presented with new information concerning the parties’ health insurance policies. 

The court stated that at the time of its original decision, it was comfortable with 

having double insurance because of John’s particular medical needs. However, 

the Red Cross had recently proposed a new health insurance plan to Laura, and it 

was undisputed that Garrett’s insurance plan was a zero-deductible plan that cost 

approximately $400 per month for John’s portion and “covers almost everything.” 

¶10 Ultimately, the circuit court observed that given the parties’ 

stipulation, the only issues that remained for decision were whether it should 

 

4

 Laura represents on appeal that she requested child support throughout the circuit court 

proceedings. In fact, her motion for a temporary order and accompanying affidavit requested 

family support in the form of maintenance. Additionally, her pretrial brief referenced child 

support only once as a heading with the notation, “Per Guidelines. Both parties continue to carry 

health insurance insuring John.” Laura cites to no other document in the appellate record 

supporting the notion that the issue of child support was argued. Indeed, our review of her 

post-trial brief in the circuit court shows she focused almost exclusively on the placement issue, 

with no mention of child support. 
No. 2018AP2025

6

reconsider child support and what to do about the daycare expenses. After a brief 

off-the-record discussion, the court noted that if the parties used only Garrett’s 

health insurance for John, Laura was effectively benefiting by about $200 per 

month.5 Additionally, the court stated that if it used the mean value of the 

amounts Laura had paid in daycare expenses and discounted it for Garrett’s share 

of placement, Garrett’s obligation would be approximately $100 per month. 

Assuming the validity of Laura’s proposed $365 calculation under the guidelines, 

the court recognized that there was a deviation and that Garrett was still receiving 

a small financial benefit under this proposal. However, the court stated it was 

working with the information it had before it and trying to come up with a fair 

solution that maintained the finality of its prior decision, recognized the new 

information the parties had presented, and dealt with Laura’s reasonable requests 

for additional financial assistance. 

¶11 Following the hearing, the circuit court entered a written order 

memorializing its decision on Laura’s motion for reconsideration. Specifically, 

the court adopted the parties’ stipulation regarding variable expenses and 

uninsured medical expenses, and it ordered Garrett to contribute $100 per month 

during the school year (i.e., excluding June, July and August) toward Laura’s cost 

of daycare. The court reaffirmed both the placement schedule from its earlier 

 

5

 It is unclear precisely what amount Laura would save by not having to provide health 

insurance for John under this arrangement. The circuit court remarked that there was “new 

information” in the form of the recent Red Cross health insurance offering, and it stated the 

parties “should be able to as responsible parents ... communicate and just show the plans and 

crunch the numbers and figure out what’s best for them financially and for John.” The court 

stated it believed that “both parties ... have John’s best interests at heart.” Toward the end of the 

hearing, after the off-the-record discussion with the parties, the court stated the parties’ attorneys 

were “going to exchange information on the insurance and if their insurance numbers are way out 

of whack then they can provide information to the Court and if the Court feels it needs to adjust 

variable expenses so that it’s more fair to the parties I’ll do that.” 
No. 2018AP2025

7

decision and its decision not to award child support. The court also directed the 

parties to exchange health insurance information to determine the best coverage 

for John, and it stated it would revisit the contribution for daycare expenses if the 

financial impact of the parties’ insurance decision was substantially different from 

what the parties presented at the hearing. The court also entered a written 

judgment of divorce memorializing that no child support was ordered. Laura now 

appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Child Support

¶12 Laura’s primary argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred by 

failing to order child support consistent with the guidelines. We review a 

determination of child support for an erroneous exercise of discretion. LeMere v. 

LeMere, 2003 WI 67, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d 789. We will uphold a 

discretionary decision as long as the court examined the relevant facts, applied a 

proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a 

conclusion a reasonable judge could reach. Id. Additionally, Laura’s argument 

implicates the proper interpretation of Wisconsin’s child support statute, WIS.

STAT. § 767.511, which presents a question of law. See Teschendorf v. State 

Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶9, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258.

¶13 Laura first argues the child support statute “clearly dictates that a 

party must request a deviation before the circuit court can deviate from the 

applicable child support guidelines.” It is true the statute creates a presumption 

that the court will determine child support by using the percentage standard 

established by the administrative code. See WIS. STAT. § 767.511(1j). It is also 

true that the statute speaks in terms of a “request by a party” in discussing when 
No. 2018AP2025

8

the court may deviate from the percentage standard and the factors that it may 

consider. See § 767.511(1m). 

¶14 In this case, Laura’s bare reference to the statutory language does 

not establish that the circuit court lacked authority to consider sua sponte whether 

to deviate from the percentage standard. As a general matter, when fashioning 

child support, the statutes provide a form of equitable authority. See Cook v. 

Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 183, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997). The court “must be free to 

[exercise such equitable authority] in the manner most consistent with the needs of 

the children and the resources of the parents in each case.” Id. These principles 

are all the more important here, where the issue of child support was not pressed 

by either party and the circuit court was not presented with any guideline 

calculations by the parties until after the contested divorce hearing, despite the 

parties having well-developed opinions on what John’s placement should be.

¶15 As a result, we cannot conclude, in this case, that the circuit court’s 

decision to consider sua sponte whether a deviation from the percentage standard 

was appropriate constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion. The parties 

essentially left the court without guidance on the issue. Moreover, once the issue 

of child support was pushed to the forefront by Laura’s motion for 

reconsideration, Garrett’s position that no child support was appropriate was 

clearly a “request by a party” for a deviation. See WIS. STAT. § 767.511(1m). 

¶16 Next, Laura argues the circuit court “further erred in its 

determination to deviate from the child support guidelines as there was an 

inadequate explanation for the deviation.” If we were presented only with the 

court’s explanation in its written decision—which it seems was based solely upon 

the lack of a request for temporary child support—we might well agree. At the 
No. 2018AP2025

9

reconsideration hearing, however, the court explicitly stated that it had considered 

whether the percentage standard was appropriate when crafting its earlier decision. 

At that hearing, the court further developed the reasons for its deviating from the 

percentage standard, which, again, was the first time the parties fully presented 

their positions on the child support issue.

¶17 Laura contends this subsequent explanation was still inadequate. In 

particular, she criticizes the circuit court for not clearly articulating the amount it 

determined was required by the percentage guidelines. Although we agree the 

court could have more clearly stated what its calculation showed, we cannot find 

reversible error on this basis. Neither party presented the court with any guideline 

calculations until after its initial decision. Additionally, although the court 

remarked that the “numbers” it used generated a result that was lower than the 

$365 proposed by Laura at the reconsideration motion hearing, it appears the court 

assumed the validity of Laura’s $365 proposal when determining whether further 

modification of child support was warranted.

¶18 Ultimately, at the reconsideration motion hearing, the circuit court 

referred to many of the factors to be considered for deviating from the percentage 

standard set forth in WIS. STAT. § 767.511(1m). For example, it referred to the 

parties’ incomes when discussing what it had earlier calculated for the guideline 

amount, to John’s periods of placement with each parent, to John’s health, and to 

the parties’ health insurance situation. These are proper considerations when 

determining whether a deviation is warranted. See § 767.511(1m)(b), (e), (ej), (f). 

Although Laura does not believe the court gave adequate or proper consideration 

to any of these factors, it is clear they underlie the court’s determination that a 

deviation was appropriate. We therefore perceive a reasonable basis for the 

court’s exercise of discretion.
No. 2018AP2025

10

¶19 Moreover, the circuit court attempted to achieve a result very similar 

to what Laura was proposing for child support by addressing the parties’ expenses 

for health insurance and daycare. The court’s determinations in this regard were 

informed by new information the parties presented at the reconsideration motion 

hearing, such as the fact that John’s grandmother was not providing child care free

of charge, as had been implied during the trial. While we have some concerns 

with the court fashioning relief in terms of variable expenses rather than as part of 

an award of child support, see Zawistowski v. Zawistowski, 2002 WI App 86, 

¶¶16-17, 253 Wis. 2d 630, 644 N.W.2d 252, Laura neither raised this argument 

below nor develops any such argument here, see United Airlines, Inc. v. DOR, 

226 Wis. 2d 409, 411 n.1, 595 N.W.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting that arguments 

not raised on appeal will not be addressed). Additionally, Laura does not present 

any argument that the $100 per month Garrett was ordered to contribute to her 

daycare expenses should have instead been included in a child support order. 

¶20 Given the foregoing, our determination that the circuit court did not 

erroneously exercise its discretion in this case is informed by a few factors. The 

relatively unique procedural posture is first and foremost, insofar as the parties did 

not litigate the issue of child support until the reconsideration motion proceedings. 

Second, at that reconsideration hearing, the court’s explanation, while not as 

thorough as we might prefer, contained a sufficient basis for us to conclude the 

court considered the proper facts and reached a reasonable conclusion. Third and 

finally, the legal basis for the court’s order is clear, and our determination that the 

court applied the proper standard of law is informed by the arguments the parties 

made below and on appeal.
No. 2018AP2025

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II. Variable and Daycare Expenses

¶21 Laura’s argument on this point is unclear. Her brief-in-chief argues 

the circuit court erred by failing to “order variable costs in the same proportion 

with the shared placement order.” But at the reconsideration motion hearing, the 

parties stipulated to do just that, and the stipulation is reflected in the decision and 

order dated January 11, 2018, which was entered following the reconsideration 

motion hearing. Only John’s uninsured medical expenses, if any, were to be 

evenly divided, and Laura makes no specific argument regarding that provision. 

Additionally, the court recognized that Garrett’s “Cadillac” insurance plan could 

save Laura insurance expenses. 

¶22 In any event, Laura’s argument on this point is undeveloped. See 

State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). Laura 

may be arguing the circuit court erred by failing to include the terms of the parties’

stipulation in the “hereby ordered” section of the January 11, 2018 decision and 

order, or she may be arguing the court erred by failing to incorporate its 

January 11 decision into the judgment of divorce. Either way, the January 11 

decision itself clearly adopts the parties’ stipulation regarding variable expenses 

and requires Garrett to pay thirty-eight percent of John’s variable costs. Because it 

appears to us that there is an existing order that adopted the parties’ stipulation 

regarding variable expenses, Laura has no basis to appeal this issue. See 

Fosshage v. Freymiller, 2007 WI App 6, ¶15, 298 Wis. 2d 333, 727 N.W.2d 334

(2006). 

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.