IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

PONDEROSA FIRE DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of 

Arizona; UTILITY SOURCE, L.L.C., an Arizona limited liability company; 

TOWNHOMES AT FLAGSTAFF MEADOWS HOMEOWNERS 

ASSOCIATION, an Arizona non-profit corporation; FLAGSTAFF 

MEADOWS PROPERTY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, an Arizona nonprofit corporation; THE FLAGSTAFF MEADOWS UNIT 3 

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, an Arizona non-profit corporation; and 

BELLEMONT 276 L.L.C., an Arizona limited liability company, 

Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.

COCONINO COUNTY, ARIZONA, a political subdivision of the State of 

Arizona; COCONINO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, the duly 

elected governing board of Coconino County, Arizona; COCONINO 

COUNTY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, a department of Coconino 

County, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0545

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County

S0300CV201200366

The Honorable Dan R. Slayton, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Freeman Huber Law PLLC, Flagstaff

By Shelton L. Freeman and Matthew J. Mansfield

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees
2

Gammage & Burnham PLC, Phoenix

By Cameron C. Artigue and Christopher L. Hering

Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

Mangum Wall Stoops & Warden PLLC, Flagstaff

By Michelle D’Andrea

Counsel for Amicus Curiae City of Flagstaff

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Wayne J. Peck

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Maricopa County

Holloway Odegard & Kelly PC, Phoenix

By Ellen M. Van Riper

Counsel for Amicus Curiae League of Arizona Cities and Towns

OPINION

Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Maurice Portley joined.

G O U L D, Judge:

¶1 We are asked to decide whether Coconino County, Arizona, 

the Coconino County Board of Supervisors (“Board”), and the Coconino 

County Community Development Department (collectively “the County”) 

have the discretion to call performance bonds posted by a developer to 

ensure completion of subdivision improvements pursuant to Arizona 

Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) section 11-821(C) and Coconino County 

Subdivision Ordinance No. 82-3 (“Ordinance”), section 4.14(A)(2) (May 3, 

1982). We hold that A.R.S. § 11-821(C) and Ordinance § 4.14(A)(2) allow 

the County to exercise discretion in deciding when, and under what 

circumstances, it may call the performance bonds. Accordingly, we reverse 

the trial court’s judgment. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Empire Residential Construction, L.P. (“Empire”) subdivided 

land and developed Flagstaff Meadows, a residential community, in 

Coconino County. The subdivision consists of three Units; Units 1 and 2 

contain completed single-family homes and townhomes. In 2006, Empire 
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Opinion of the Court

3

applied to the Coconino County Planning and Zoning Commission to 

develop Unit 3 into a residential community for single-family homes and 

multiple-family residences. The Board voted unanimously to approve 

Empire’s application. 

¶3 On October 17, 2006, the Board issued a resolution approving 

Empire’s proposed Unit 3 preliminary plat, including the requirement that:

In accordance with Section 4.14 of the Subdivision Ordinance, 

all improvements must be completed prior to submittal of a 

final plat or a cash deposit, letter of credit, performance bond, 

or other acceptable financial security shall be required for the 

costs of any improvements and construction not completed, 

plus a 10% contingency. This includes, but is not limited to, 

all roadways, drainage structures, utilities, traffic control 

signs, street identification signs, fencing, park improvements, 

pedestrian trails, and landscaping.

Based on the Board’s resolution, in October 2007, Empire acquired four 

subdivision bonds totaling $4,396,241.32. The bonds consisted of

$3,364,428.10 for subdivision improvements, $196,998.22 for emergency 

evacuation route improvements, $660,000.00 for fire station additions, and 

$174,815.00 for landscaping improvements. The Board approved the final 

plat in October 2007. 

¶4 Empire began construction of the subdivision improvements

and, upon completion of the emergency evacuation route improvements,

the County released the corresponding $196,998.22 bond. However, before 

it could complete the remaining subdivision improvements, Empire 

declared bankruptcy and abandoned Unit 3. At the time Empire 

abandoned Unit 3, the subdivision’s infrastructure was not finished; there 

were no functional internal roads or utilities. In addition, no construction 

of homes had begun, and no lots had been sold to consumers. The 

remaining subdivision bonds totaled more than $4 million. 

¶5 Following a series of trustee’s sales, Bellemont 276, L.L.C. 

(“Bellemont”) eventually purchased Unit 3 in March 2011 with the intent of 

constructing residences on the subdivided lots and selling them to the 

public. Bellemont applied to the County for a building permit to begin 

construction. Bellemont also requested the County call the outstanding 

Unit 3 subdivision bonds. Over the next several months, the County 

negotiated with Bellemont regarding the cost of finishing the Unit 3

improvements; during these negotiations, the County also sought to protect 
PONDEROSA, et al. v. COCONINO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

4

itself from the risk of potential litigation costs that might be incurred in

calling the bonds. 

¶6 The negotiations did not produce an agreement and the

County ultimately passed a resolution not to call the bonds. In support of 

this resolution the County found, among other things, that improvements 

in Unit 3 were “essentially unconstructed,” “there [were] no current 

residents suffering from lack of infrastructure,” “the public infrastructure 

covered by the surety bonds is not needed to serve a substantial public 

interest,” calling the bonds “would primarily benefit only the single current 

owner of the subdivision property [Bellemont] rather than substantially 

benefiting the general public or the neighborhood,” and that “litigation is 

likely to result from a call . . . plac[ing] the County general fund at risk.” 

¶7 Because there was no plan in place to complete the necessary 

improvements/infrastructure, the County rejected Bellemont’s application 

for a building permit. In response, Bellemont filed a complaint alleging that 

it had acquired Unit 3 with the expectation the bonds would be called to 

pay for the remaining improvements and infrastructure. Bellemont 

requested declaratory relief, a writ of mandamus compelling the County to 

call the bonds, and monetary damages. 

¶8 Several parties joined Bellemont as plaintiffs in its complaint, 

alleging their interests were also harmed by the County’s refusal to call the 

bonds. Townhomes at Flagstaff Meadows Homeowners Association and 

Flagstaff Meadows Property Owners’ Association (“HOAs”), representing

the adjacent lot owners of Units 1 and 2, complained about the undeveloped 

status of Unit 3. The HOA’s argued they were being denied the right to live 

in the “completed subdivision” represented in the public report each 

resident received when purchasing their property. Ponderosa Fire District 

(“Ponderosa”) asserted it was denied improvements to its fire station that 

had been included in the Unit 3 final plat. Utility Source, L.L.C. 

(“USource”) argued that its investment in the infrastructure of Flagstaff 

Meadows as a whole could not be sustained without completion and 

occupation of Unit 3 absent a substantial increase in fees for the property 

owners in Units 1 and 2. 

¶9 Appellees requested a hearing for the County to show cause 

why Appellees were not entitled to declaratory and mandamus relief.1 At 

 

1 Because Appellees’ complaint included a claim for monetary 

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the County sought to remove the case to 
PONDEROSA, et al. v. COCONINO, et al.

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5

the hearing, Appellees sought a declaration from the court that the 

County’s duty to call the bond was a mandatory, ministerial act, and, based 

on this declaration, a writ of mandamus compelling the County to call the 

bonds. Appellees argued the County lacked discretion to refuse to call the 

bonds for Unit 3. Appellees conceded that the lots were all owned by 

Bellemont, and none had been sold or committed to individual 

homeowners. The County responded that it had the discretion to decide 

whether to call the bonds. The County also objected, on procedural

grounds, to any grant of relief at the show cause hearing. 

¶10 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Appellees’ 

application and ordered the County to (1) adopt a resolution stating the 

improvements were not finished and (2) send the resolution to the surety. 

Based on the terms of the surety bonds, this order constituted an order 

compelling the County to call the bonds.2 

¶11 Following the hearing, the court issued a writ of mandamus

pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2021, requiring the County to issue a resolution 

calling the bonds. The County complied, passing a resolution calling the 

bonds. After the court entered a judgment with Rule 54(b) language, the

County filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

¶12 The only claims involved in this appeal are Appellees’ claims 

for declaratory and mandamus relief regarding the County’s discretion to 

call the bonds. We are not asked to decide whether Appellees may bring 

claims for monetary damages based on the County’s refusal to call the Unit 

3 bonds. Moreover, this case only involves the County’s discretion to call 

the subdivision bonds; it does not address the County’s discretion, if any, 

 

the federal district court. Upon receipt of the County’s application for 

removal, the district court accepted jurisdiction of claims five and six, the 

claims for monetary damages, and remanded Appellees’ claims one 

through four, the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.

2 The surety bonds state: “Surety, upon receipt of a resolution of the 

Obligee [County] indicating that the improvements have not been installed 

or completed, will complete the improvements or pay to Obligee [County] 

such amount up to the Principal amount of this bond which will allow the 

Obligee [County] to complete the improvements.” 
PONDEROSA, et al. v. COCONINO, et al.

Opinion of the Court

6

to discharge, waive, or release the bonds or to use the bond monies for some 

purpose other than completing the Unit 3 improvements. 

I. Standard of Review

¶13 We review the construction of statutes and ordinances de 

novo. State ex. rel. Montgomery v. Harris, 234 Ariz. 343, 344, ¶ 8, 322 P.3d 

160, 161 (2014); Files v. Bernal, 200 Ariz. 64, 66, 22 P.3d 57, 59 (App. 2001). 

II. Show Cause Hearing

¶14 The County argues the order to show cause procedure used 

by Appellees was improper because it denied it a full and fair opportunity 

to conduct discovery and present evidence. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(d).

However, the County fails to identify what additional discovery or 

evidence would have been helpful in opposing Appellees’ application for 

declaratory and mandamus relief. Moreover, the issue presented at the 

show cause hearing involved a pure issue of law concerning the 

construction of A.R.S. § 11-821(C) and Ordinance § 4.14(A)(2). The record 

reflects that the County was given an adequate opportunity to brief this 

legal issue and present its arguments at the hearing.

III. Standing

¶15 Appellees lack standing to call the bonds or to make a claim 

directly against the surety. Norton v. First Fed. Sav., 128 Ariz. 176, 180, 624 

P.2d 854, 858 (1981). Appellees acknowledge that only the County, as the 

obligee, may call the bonds. Id. However, Appellees are not suing the 

surety or seeking to collect damages against the bonds. Rather, Appellees 

are seeking, by means of combined declaratory and mandamus relief, to 

compel the County to call the bonds. 

¶16 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1832, a party “whose rights, status, or 

other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract 

or franchise may have [a court] determine[] . . . any question of construction 

. . . arising under” the statute or ordinance, “and obtain a declaration of [his] 

rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” Canyon Del Rio Investors, 

L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaff, 227 Ariz. 336, 341, ¶ 18, 258 P.3d 154, 159 (App. 

2011). “[A] justiciable controversy exists if there is an assertion of a right, 

status, or legal relation in which the plaintiff has a definite interest and a 

denial of it by the opposing party.” Keggi v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,

199 Ariz. 43, 45, ¶ 10, 13 P.3d 785, 787 (App. 2000) (internal citation omitted).
PONDEROSA, et al. v. COCONINO, et al.

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7

¶17 Section 12-1832 grants Appellees standing to pursue their 

claim for declaratory relief. Appellees allege their interests are affected by 

the County’s refusal to call the bonds based on A.R.S. § 11-821(C) and 

Ordinance § 4.14(A)(2). Accordingly, Appellees properly seek a declaration 

of their rights under the statute and Ordinance.

¶18 Appellees also seek mandamus relief. A writ of mandamus 

allows a “party beneficially interested” in an action to compel a public 

official or board “to perform an act imposed by law.” A.R.S. § 12-2021; Sears 

v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 68, ¶ 11, 961 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1998). The term “party 

beneficially interested” is “applied liberally to promote the ends of justice.” 

Barry v. Phx. Union High School, 67 Ariz. 384, 387, 197 P.2d 533, 534 (1948); 

see Armer v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 478, 480, 543 P.2d 1107, 1109 (1975). 

¶19 An action for mandamus “does not lie if the public officer is 

not specifically required by law to perform the act.” Board of Educ. v. 

Scottsdale Educ. Ass’n, 109 Ariz. 342, 344, 509 P.2d 612, 614 (1973). A 

mandamus action may only be brought if the statutory duty imposed on 

the public official or board is purely “ministerial.” El Paso Natural Gas Co. 

v. State, 123 Ariz. 219, 221, 599 P.2d 175, 177 (1979). A ministerial duty is 

one that specifically describes the manner of performance and “leaves 

nothing to the discretion” of the public official or board. Id. In contrast, “if 

an action of a public officer is discretionary that discretion may not be 

controlled by mandamus.” Collins v. Krucker, 56 Ariz. 6, 13, 104 P.2d 176, 

179 (1940).

¶20 Appellees claim they are “beneficially interested” in the 

County’s refusal to call the bonds, because the bond monies are necessary 

to finish the Unit 3 improvements. However, we need not decide the issue 

of Appellees’ standing to bring a mandamus action, because even if we 

assume Appellees have standing, mandamus relief is not appropriate in 

this case. 

IV. Construction of A.R.S. § 11-821(C)

¶21 We begin our analysis with A.R.S. § 11-821(C). Section 11-

821(C) provides, in relevant part, that subdivision regulations adopted by 

a county board of supervisors:

. . . shall require the posting of performance bonds, assurances 

or such other security as may be appropriate and necessary to 

ensure the installation of required street, sewer, electric and 

water utilities, drainage, flood control and improvements 
PONDEROSA, et al. v. COCONINO, et al.

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8

meeting established minimum standards of design and 

construction. 

¶22 Appellees argue that the County’s interpretation of 

Ordinance § 4.14(A)(2) contravenes the plain language of A.R.S. § 11-

821(C). When there is a conflict between a statute and an ordinance, the 

statute controls. Thomas and King, Inc. v. City of Phx., 208 Ariz. 203, 207, ¶ 11, 

92 P.3d 429, 433 (App. 2004); see City of Tempe v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 201 Ariz. 

106, 109, ¶ 9, 32 P.3d 31, 34 (App. 2001) (“When an ordinance regulates an 

area that is also regulated by state statute, the ordinance may parallel the 

statute or even reach beyond the parameters of the statute so long as the 

ordinance does not conflict with the statute.”).

¶23 Bellemont interprets the language in A.R.S. § 11-821(C) as 

stating that once a bond has been posted, the final plat approved, and the 

original developer defaults, the obligation to construct and pay for 

improvements is transferred from the original developer to the County.3

According to Bellemont, to interpret the statute otherwise renders the bond 

requirement meaningless and allows the County to abandon unfinished 

subdivisions. We disagree. 

¶24 In construing a statute, we look to the plain language of the 

statute, giving effect to every word and phrase, and assigning to each word

its plain and common meaning. Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464, ¶ 11, 80 

P.3d 269, 271 (2003); Cochise Cnty. v. Broken Arrow Baptist Church, 161 Ariz. 

406, 409, 778 P.2d 1302, 1305 (App. 1989). If a statute’s language is clear and 

unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory

interpretation, unless doing so would lead to impossible or absurd results. 

Harris, 234 Ariz. at 345, ¶ 13, 322 P.3d at 162; Bilke, 206 Ariz. at 464, ¶ 11, 80 

P.3d at 269; State v. Flores, 160 Ariz. 235, 239, 772 P.2d 589, 593 (App. 1989). 

If a statute’s language is ambiguous, we attempt to determine the legislative 

intent by interpreting the statute as a whole, considering its place in the 

relevant statutory scheme, as well as the statute’s “subject matter, historical 

background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” Harris, 234 

 

3 In support of this argument, Bellemont states that upon approval of 

the final plat, ownership of the streets and rights of way in Unit 3 was 

transferred to the County. We disagree. Although the County approved 

the streets in the final plat, this action did not transfer ownership of the 

streets to the County; ownership is not transferred to the County until it 

determines the streets are “fully completed” in accordance with the final 

plat. A.R.S. § 11-822(C); West v. Sundance Dev. Co., 169 Ariz. 579, 583, 821 

P.2d 240, 244. (App. 1991)
PONDEROSA, et al. v. COCONINO, et al.

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9

Ariz. at 345, ¶ 13, 322 P.3d at 162 (internal citations omitted); see CSA 13-101 

Loop, LLC, v. Loop 101, LLC, 233 Ariz. 355, 360-61, ¶¶ 14-17, 312 P.3d 1121, 

1126-27 (App. 2013). 

¶25 In determining whether the County has discretion to call the 

bonds under A.R.S. § 11-821(C), we are also guided by the principle that

counties, like cities, have no inherent powers; a county’s authority is limited 

to those powers expressly or impliedly delegated to it by the state 

constitution or statutes. Associated Dairy Prods. Co. v. Page, 68 Ariz. 393, 395, 

206 P.2d 1041, 1043 (1949); Home Builders Assoc. of Cent. Ariz. v. City of 

Maricopa, 215 Ariz. 146, 149, ¶ 5, 158 P.3d 869, 873 (App. 2007). Thus, in 

performing its duties under A.R.S. § 11-821(C), the County possesses “all 

powers that may be fairly implied from, and are necessary for, the complete 

exercise of [its] express powers” under the statute. City of Phx. v. Phx. Civil 

Serv. Bd., 169 Ariz. 256, 259, 818 P.2d 241, 244 (App. 1991). 

¶26 The primary purpose of the bond posting requirement in 

A.R.S. § 11-821(C) is to protect the public from bearing the costs of necessary 

subdivision improvements by requiring the developer to install and pay for 

such improvements. Norton, 128 Ariz. at 179, 624 P.2d at 857 (“Performance 

bonds which insure the proper completion of street, sewer and water 

utilities by subdivision developers protect the city from the necessity of 

spending its citizens’ money to fulfill the developers’ responsibilities.”); see 

West, 169 Ariz. at 583-84, 821 P.2d at 244-45 (noting that purpose of a 

developer posting a bond under A.R.S. § 11-806.01(G), the predecessor 

statute to A.R.S. § 11-821(C), was to ensure that the developer performed 

its obligation to construct necessary subdivision improvements). 

¶27 Bellemont concedes that developers have the obligation to 

install required subdivision improvements. Bellemont asserts, however, 

that there is currently no developer or subdivider to complete the 

improvements for Unit 3. Bellemont claims that it is not a developer or 

subdivider; rather, it is “just a county property owner.” Bellemont further 

contends that Arizona law and the Ordinance place no requirement on it, 

as a property owner, to complete the improvements simply because it owns

multiple lots in the subdivision. 

¶28 We conclude Bellemont is a developer and subdivider for the 

purposes of A.R.S. § 11-821(C) because it purchased Unit 3 with the intent 

to construct residences on the lots and sell them to the public. The 

Ordinance and relevant state statutes all define a subdivider as including 

subsequent developers who seek to construct residences on subdivision lots 

and sell them. Both section 2.1 of the Ordinance and A.R.S. § 32-2101(55) 
PONDEROSA, et al. v. COCONINO, et al.

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define a “subdivider” as anyone “who offers for sale or lease six or more 

lots . . . or who causes land to be subdivided . . . or who undertakes to 

develop a subdivision.” See Alaface v. Nat’l Inv. Co., 181 Ariz. 586, 592-93 & 

n.2, 892 P.2d. 1375, 1381-82 & n.2 (App. 1995) (noting that definition of 

“subdivider” under A.R.S. § 32-2101, includes subsequent developers who 

were not the original subdividers).

¶29 With this statutory purpose in mind, we examine the 

language of A.R.S. § 11-821(C). The statute provides that the County 

regulations “shall” require the posting of a bond, assurance or other 

security. A.R.S. § 11-821(C). Next, the statute mandates that the bond, 

assurance or security posted by the developer must be “appropriate and 

necessary” to “ensure” the installation of the “required” infrastructure.

¶30 When read together, all of these terms plainly require the 

County to “ensure” that the amount of the bond posted by a developer is 

sufficient to cover the cost of necessary subdivision improvements. The 

statute does not, however, specify when a county is required to call a bond. 

Where a statute is silent on an issue, “we will not read into [it] something 

which is not within the express manifest intention of the Legislature as 

gathered from the statute itself,” nor will we “inflate, expand, stretch or 

extend the statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions.”

See Martin v. Althoff, 27 Ariz. App. 588, 591, 557 P.2d 187, 190 (1976) (citation 

omitted).

¶31 We conclude the County’s decision not to call the bonds at 

this time was a proper exercise of its necessary and implied power under 

A.R.S. § 11-821(C). The legislative purpose of the statute is to require 

developers such as Bellemont to pay for the cost of subdivision 

improvements. Here, the County determined that calling the bonds did not 

serve this interest; rather, the County decided, in its discretion, to forego 

calling the bonds and require Bellemont to pay for the cost of the Unit 3

improvements. 

¶32 In support of this conclusion, we note that Bellemont’s 

construction of A.R.S. § 11-821(C) would lead to absurd results. Under 

Bellemont’s interpretation of the statute, whenever a developer abandons a 

subdivision, a county has a mandatory duty to call the bond, regardless of 

the circumstances. This leaves counties with an open-ended obligation to 

finish all abandoned subdivision improvements, with no discretion to 

consider any factors that may arise after the final plat is approved. For 

example, counties would be required to call a bond and finish 

improvements for a subdivision that may lay vacant for many years. 
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Indeed, if the County was obligated to call the bonds and finish the Unit 3 

improvements as Bellemont contends, then it was required to do so 

immediately upon Empire’s default in 2008 – despite the fact that six years 

later, the Unit 3 subdivision still remains vacant. This court is charged with 

construing statutes to avoid such absurd results. Harris, 234 Ariz. at 345, ¶ 

13, 322 P.3d at 162; Bilke, 206 Ariz. at 464, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d at 269. 

¶33 We therefore conclude the County exercised its discretion 

under the statute by seeking to have Bellemont install the required 

subdivision improvements rather than calling the bonds. 

V. Construction of Ordinance Section 4.14(A)(2)

¶34 Ordinance § 4.14(A)(2) states the following regarding 

subdivision performance bonds:

The Final Plat will be submitted to the Board for approval if 

the construction and improvements have been accepted or if 

a cash deposit or other financial arrangement acceptable to 

the County have been made between the subdivider and the 

Board. In the event the subdivider fails to perform within the 

time allotted by the Board, then after reasonable notice to the 

subdivider of the default, the County may do or have done all 

work and charge subdivider’s deposit with all costs and expenses 

incurred. (Emphasis added.) 

¶35 The County argues that the use of the word “may,” rather 

than “shall,” is permissive and implies discretion. Ordinance § 2.1. 

Bellemont argues that the use of the word “may” limits the County’s 

discretion to either call the bonds and finish the project itself, or use the 

bond monies to hire others to complete the project; the language does not, 

however, provide the County with the discretion to refuse to call the bonds. 

¶36 We conclude Ordinance § 4.14(A)(2) allows the County to 

exercise its discretion in calling the bonds. The use of the word “may” in 

the Ordinance is a permissive term, and implies discretion. Section 2.1 of 

the Ordinance states that for the purposes of the Ordinance, the “word 

‘shall’ is mandatory; the word ‘may’ is permissive.” See Walter v. Wilkinson, 

198 Ariz. 431, 432, ¶ 7, 10 P.3d 1218, 1219 (App. 2000) (holding that use of 

the word “may” in a statute generally indicates permissive intent, while 

“shall” generally indicates a mandatory provision).

¶37 Further, this construction is consistent with A.R.S. § 11-

821(C), which provides the County with discretion in deciding when, and 
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under what circumstances, to call a bond. Supra, at ¶¶ 31-32. Finally, a 

construction that provides the County with discretion to call bonds 

promotes the purpose and intent of Coconino County in enacting the 

Ordinance, which is “[t]o ensure that the costs of providing” subdivision 

improvements “are borne fairly and equitably by the subdivider rather than 

by property owners of the County at large.” Ordinance § 1.1. Supra, at ¶ 

26.

VI. Attorneys’ Fees

¶38 Because we reverse, Appellees’ request for attorneys’ fees on 

appeal is denied. Appellees are not a prevailing party, and therefore are 

not entitled to an award of fees pursuant to either A.R.S. § 12-2030(A) or the 

private attorney general doctrine. See Arnold v. Ariz. Dept. of Health Servs.,

160 Ariz. 593, 609-10, 775 P.2d 521, 537-38 (1989). 

CONCLUSION

¶39 For the reasons discussed above, we conclude the County

exercised its discretion under A.R.S. § 11-821(C) and Ordinance § 4.14(A)(2) 

in refusing to call the Unit 3 bonds. As a consequence, the trial court erred 

in issuing its mandamus order compelling the County to call the bonds. We 

therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment, and remand this case to the trial 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.