Nicholas J. Henderson, OSB No. 074027 

Email: nhenderson@portlaw.com 

Motschenbacher & Blattner, LLP 

117 SW Taylor Street, Suite 200 

Portland, Oregon 97204-3029 

Telephone: (503) 417-0508 

Facsimile: (503) 417-0501 

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

THE LANCE AND LINDA NEIBAUER 

JOINT TRUST, by and through LANCE 

NEIBAUER, as trustee, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

MICHAEL J. KURGAN, an individual, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 6:14-cv-01192-MC 

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 

AND MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW 

CAUSE WHY DEFENDANT MICHAEL 

KURGAN SHOULD BE HELD IN 

CONTEMPT 

RULE 7-1 COMPLIANCE 

The Attorney for Plaintiff hereby certifies that he has made a good faith effort to confer 

with Defendant to resolve the subject of this motion, but was unable to resolve the dispute. 

LR 7-2 and 26-3(b) CERTIFICATION 

This brief complies with the applicable word count and page count limitations under 

LR7-2(b) and 26-3(b) because the Memorandum contains 1,795 words, including headings, 

footnotes, and quotations, but excluding the caption, table of contents, table of cases and 

authorities, signature block, exhibits, and any certificates of counsel. 

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Nicholas J. Henderson, OSB No. 074027

Email: nhenderson@portlaw.com

Motschenbacher & Blattner, LLP

117 SW Taylor Street, Suite 200

Portland, Oregon 97204-3029

Telephone: (503) 417-0508

Facsimile: (503) 417-0501

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

THE LANCE AND LINDA NEIBAUER

JOINT TRUST, by and through LANCE

NEIBAUER, as trustee,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MICHAEL J. KURGAN, an individual,

Defendant.

Case No. 6:14-cv-01192-MC

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

AND MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE WHY DEFENDANT MICHAEL

KURGAN SHOULD BE HELD IN

CONTEMPT

RULE 7-1 COMPLIANCE

The Attorney for Plaintiff hereby certifies that he has made a good faith effort to confer

with Defendant to resolve the subject of this motion, but was unable to resolve the dispute.

LR 7-2 and 26-3(b) CERTIFICATION

This brief complies with the applicable word count and page count limitations under

LR7-2(b) and 26-3(b) because the Memorandum contains 1,795 words, including headings,

footnotes, and quotations, but excluding the caption, table of contents, table of cases and

authorities, signature block, exhibits, and any certificates of counsel.

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 1 of 15
MOTION 

Plaintiff The Lance and Linda Neibauer Joint Trust, by and through Lance Neibauer, as 

Trustee ("Plaintiff"), respectfully requests that this Court enter an order: 1) compelling 

Defendant Michael Kurgan ("Defendant") to respond to questions posed at his debtor's exam for 

which he has improperly asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and 2) 

setting a hearing for the Defendant to appear and show cause, if any, why he should not be found 

in civil contempt of the Court's Order entered on December 6, 2017 (Dkt. No. 95) (the 

"December Order"). Should the Court find that Defendant has violated the December Order, the 

Court should impose compensatory civil sanctions by ordering that Defendant pay Plaintiff's 

attorney's fees and impose a coercive civil sanction of an escalating monetary penalty that 

converts to imprisonment until the Contemnor purges the contempt. This motion is supported by 

the Declaration of Nicholas J. Henderson (the "Henderson Decl.") filed herewith, the pleadings 

and papers on file herein, and the below Memorandum of points and authorities. 

MEMORANDUM 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This is the second Motion for Contempt and Motion to Compel brought by the Plaintiff to 

force the Defendant's compliance with the Plaintiff's regular and usual post judgment discovery 

efforts. In the Court's previous Order finding the Plaintiff in contempt, the Defendant was 

ordered to fully and accurately respond to the Interrogatories posed to him and to sit for a 

judgment debtor exam. Order Granting Motion for Contempt, December 6, 2017, [Dkt. No. 96] 

(the "December Order"). The Plaintiff was awarded $40,538.50 in fees and $3,409.91 in costs as 

a sanction. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney's Fees, May 8, 2018 [Dkt. No. 103]. 

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MOTION

Plaintiff The Lance and Linda Neibauer Joint Trust, by and through Lance Neibauer, as

Trustee (“Plaintiff”), respectfully requests that this Court enter an order: 1) compelling

Defendant Michael Kurgan (“Defendant”) to respond to questions posed at his debtor’s exam for

which he has improperly asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and 2)

setting a hearing for the Defendant to appear and show cause, if any, why he should not be found

in civil contempt of the Court’s Order entered on December 6, 2017 (Dkt. No. 95) (the

“December Order”). Should the Court find that Defendant has violated the December Order, the

Court should impose compensatory civil sanctions by ordering that Defendant pay Plaintiff’s

attorney’s fees and impose a coercive civil sanction of an escalating monetary penalty that

converts to imprisonment until the Contemnor purges the contempt. This motion is supported by

the Declaration of Nicholas J. Henderson (the “Henderson Decl.”) filed herewith, the pleadings

and papers on file herein, and the below Memorandum of points and authorities.

MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION

This is the second Motion for Contempt and Motion to Compel brought by the Plaintiff to

force the Defendant’s compliance with the Plaintiff’s regular and usual post judgment discovery

efforts. In the Court’s previous Order finding the Plaintiff in contempt, the Defendant was

ordered to fully and accurately respond to the Interrogatories posed to him and to sit for a

judgment debtor exam. Order Granting Motion for Contempt, December 6, 2017, [Dkt. No. 96]

(the “December Order”). The Plaintiff was awarded $40,538.50 in fees and $3,409.91 in costs as

a sanction. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, May 8, 2018 [Dkt. No. 103].

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 2 of 15
After the December Order was entered, the Defendant delivered supplemental 

interrogatory responses and sat for a deposition. See Declaration of Nicholas J. Henderson Ex 1 

(the "Supplemental Responses") and Ex. 2 (the "Deposition Transcript"). During the course of 

the Deposition, the Defendant continually—and as argued below, wrongfully—refused to answer 

questions on the basis of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. By refusing to 

answer the questions posed during the Deposition, the exam was functionally useless. 

The Defendant improperly asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 

to create the appearance of compliance with the Court's December Order. He attended the 

deposition, but continued his past bad faith gamesmanship by frivolously asserting privilege and 

refusing to answer. In response, the court should: 1) Order that the Defendant's assertion of 

privilege is improper and that he should answer the questions posed to him, as well as any follow 

up questions and 2) Order that the Defendant be held in contempt for his failure to materially 

participate in the Debtor's exam as required by the December Order. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 

The Plaintiff obtained a judgment against the Defendant in December 2014, and has been 

in the process of executing on that judgment for the past three and a half years. In order to 

facilitate that process, Plaintiff served Defendant with document requests and interrogatories and 

has attempted to schedule the Defendant's deposition, all for the specific purpose of identifying 

Defendant's assets and ability to pay the judgment. As was previously outlined in Plaintiff's 

Motion to Compel Production of Documents (Dkt. No. 63), Defendant refused to comply with 

Plaintiff's production requests, citing a discovery stay previously issued by the Court during the 

underlying litigation while the Court considered Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. On 

February 12, 2016, the Court entered an Order, granting Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production 

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After the December Order was entered, the Defendant delivered supplemental

interrogatory responses and sat for a deposition. See Declaration of Nicholas J. Henderson Ex 1

(the “Supplemental Responses”) and Ex. 2 (the “Deposition Transcript”). During the course of

the Deposition, the Defendant continually—and as argued below, wrongfully—refused to answer

questions on the basis of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. By refusing to

answer the questions posed during the Deposition, the exam was functionally useless.

The Defendant improperly asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination

to create the appearance of compliance with the Court’s December Order. He attended the

deposition, but continued his past bad faith gamesmanship by frivolously asserting privilege and

refusing to answer. In response, the court should: 1) Order that the Defendant’s assertion of

privilege is improper and that he should answer the questions posed to him, as well as any follow

up questions and 2) Order that the Defendant be held in contempt for his failure to materially

participate in the Debtor’s exam as required by the December Order.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

The Plaintiff obtained a judgment against the Defendant in December 2014, and has been

in the process of executing on that judgment for the past three and a half years. In order to

facilitate that process, Plaintiff served Defendant with document requests and interrogatories and

has attempted to schedule the Defendant’s deposition, all for the specific purpose of identifying

Defendant’s assets and ability to pay the judgment. As was previously outlined in Plaintiff’s

Motion to Compel Production of Documents (Dkt. No. 63), Defendant refused to comply with

Plaintiff’s production requests, citing a discovery stay previously issued by the Court during the

underlying litigation while the Court considered Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On

February 12, 2016, the Court entered an Order, granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 3 of 15
of Documents (the "February Order"). The Defendant completely ignored the February Order, 

refused to produce any of the documents or interrogatory answers that he was ordered to provide, 

and has refused to schedule his deposition. In response, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Show 

Cause, and the Court entered the December Order finding the Defendant in contempt and 

ordering him to respond to the interrogatories and to sit for a debtor's exam. 

III. ARGUMENT 

A. The Defendant Should be Compelled to Answer the Questions Posed to Him 

at His Deposition 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that any party to a civil action is entitled to 

all information relevant to the subject matter of the action unless the information is privileged. 

FRCP 26(b)(1). The privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked in civil as well as 

criminal proceedings. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972), Campbell v. Gerrans, 

592 F.2d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 1979). Through the operation of both the Federal Rules and the 

Constitution, a party is shielded from compulsory discovery in a civil action if a risk of selfincrimination is involved. However, there are limits to this protection. 

Whether the Court can compel the Defendant to answer a specific question and can 

impose a contempt sanction depends largely on whether the Defendant justified his assertion of 

the Fifth Amendment privilege. For the privilege to be properly asserted it must be "evident from 

the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to 

the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because 

injurious disclosure could result." Hoffman v. United States, 341 US 479, 486-87 (1951) "(T)he 

privilege normally is not asserted properly by merely declaring that an answer will incriminate." 

Brunswick Corp. v. Doff 638 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1981). The trial court must make this 

determination from the facts as well as from the court's "personal perception of the peculiarities 

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of Documents (the “February Order”). The Defendant completely ignored the February Order,

refused to produce any of the documents or interrogatory answers that he was ordered to provide,

and has refused to schedule his deposition. In response, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Show

Cause, and the Court entered the December Order finding the Defendant in contempt and

ordering him to respond to the interrogatories and to sit for a debtor’s exam.

III. ARGUMENT

A. The Defendant Should be Compelled to Answer the Questions Posed to Him

at His Deposition

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that any party to a civil action is entitled to

all information relevant to the subject matter of the action unless the information is privileged.

FRCP 26(b)(1). The privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked in civil as well as

criminal proceedings. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972), Campbell v. Gerrans,

592 F.2d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 1979). Through the operation of both the Federal Rules and the

Constitution, a party is shielded from compulsory discovery in a civil action if a risk of selfincrimination is involved. However, there are limits to this protection.

Whether the Court can compel the Defendant to answer a specific question and can

impose a contempt sanction depends largely on whether the Defendant justified his assertion of

the Fifth Amendment privilege. For the privilege to be properly asserted it must be “evident from

the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to

the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because

injurious disclosure could result.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 US 479, 486–87 (1951) “(T)he

privilege normally is not asserted properly by merely declaring that an answer will incriminate.”

Brunswick Corp. v. Doff, 638 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1981). The trial court must make this

determination from the facts as well as from the court’s “personal perception of the peculiarities

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 4 of 15
of the case." Id. at 487. If no threat of self-incrimination is evident, the defendant then bears the 

burden of showing the danger of incrimination. United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1240 (9th 

Cir.). 

At the start of the deposition, the Defendant's attorney stated on the record that he had 

"gone ahead and looked at a couple of documents that were filed in the case, including Judge 

McShane's order, and based upon some findings in there, it struck me that there would be a 

number of questions that would likely be asked today where it would be advisable for Mr. 

Kurgan to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege." Deposition Transcript 5:6-5:12. Thereafter, 

the Defendant asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to approximately half of the 

questions posed to him without offering further elaboration as to the basis of his assertion. See 

table infra. The Plaintiff objected timely to the assertion of privilege. Deposition Transcript 

14:21. 

A witness may not claim the privilege of the Fifth Amendment out of fear that he will be 

prosecuted for perjury for what he is about to say. United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th 

Cir. 1977). The shield against self-incrimination in such a situation is to testify truthfully, not to 

refuse to testify on the basis that the witness may be prosecuted for a lie not yet told. 

The Defendant asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to answer 67 questions 

in the course of his deposition. The table below lists all of the questions to which no answer was 

provided on the basis of the Fifth Amendment. 

Question Answer Page 

What is your residence address? I am going to decline to answer that and 

assert my Fifth Amendment. 

6:8 

Do you rent any real property currently? I'm going to decline to answer that under 

the Fifth Amendment. 

6:14 

Are you currently employed? I decline to answer that on the Fifth. 6:18 

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of the case.” Id. at 487. If no threat of self-incrimination is evident, the defendant then bears the

burden of showing the danger of incrimination. United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1240 (9th

Cir.).

At the start of the deposition, the Defendant’s attorney stated on the record that he had

“gone ahead and looked at a couple of documents that were filed in the case, including Judge

McShane’s order, and based upon some findings in there, it struck me that there would be a

number of questions that would likely be asked today where it would be advisable for Mr.

Kurgan to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege.” Deposition Transcript 5:6–5:12. Thereafter,

the Defendant asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to approximately half of the

questions posed to him without offering further elaboration as to the basis of his assertion. See

table infra. The Plaintiff objected timely to the assertion of privilege. Deposition Transcript

14:21.

A witness may not claim the privilege of the Fifth Amendment out of fear that he will be

prosecuted for perjury for what he is about to say. United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th

Cir. 1977). The shield against self-incrimination in such a situation is to testify truthfully, not to

refuse to testify on the basis that the witness may be prosecuted for a lie not yet told.

The Defendant asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to answer 67 questions

in the course of his deposition. The table below lists all of the questions to which no answer was

provided on the basis of the Fifth Amendment.

Question Answer Page

What is your residence address? I am going to decline to answer that and

assert my Fifth Amendment.

6:8

Do you rent any real property currently? I'm going to decline to answer that under

the Fifth Amendment.

6:14

Are you currently employed? I decline to answer that on the Fifth. 6:18

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 5 of 15
Question Answer Page 

And did you complete this set of 

interrogatories yourself? 

I assert the Fifth amendment. 8:14 

Did you participate in the preparation of these 

interrogatories? 

I assert the Fifth Amendment. 8:17 

Is all of the information in this document 

marked as Exhibit 3 true and correct, to the 

best of your knowledge? 

I'm going to assert the Fifth Amendment. 8:20 

Is that your signature? I'm going to assert the Fifth Amendment. 9:3 

And Interrogatory No. 1 asks for your full 

name, your social security number, and your 

current residential address. On that page, it 

lists 134 Rutland 11 Boulevard, West Palm 

Beach, Florida 33405. Is that your current 

residence address? 

I assert the Fifth Amendment. 9:8 

Have you ever resided at 134 Rutland 

Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida 33405? 

I assert the Fifth Amendment. 9:14 

Have you ever entered into a lease agreement 

regarding that location? 

I'm going to assert the Fifth Amendment. 9:17 

Are you currently a chief executive and 

operating officer? 

I'm going to assert the Fifth. 9:25 

For the job title listed here, that you said is 

correct, what company were you a chief 

executive, slash, operating officer for? 

I assert the Fifth. 10:3 

Do you currently receive a salary from any 

source? 

I assert the Fifth. 10:7 

Do you currently own stock in Service Wing 

Healthcare? 

I assert the Fifth. 10:21 

What about Service Wing Solutions? I assert the Fifth. 10:24 

Precision Approach? I assert the Fifth. 11:2 

And Matseco? I assert the Fifth. 11:3 

When did it cease operation? I take the Fifth. 11:19 

When did it begin operations? I assert the Fifth 12:3 

How many shareholders did Service Wing 

Healthcare have when it was organized? 

I'm going to assert the Fifth. 12:5 

So what is Service Wing Healthcare doing to 

pursue litigation to recover its investment? 

That's the Fifth, and it's also 

attorney/client. 

12:25 

Who is Service Wing Healthcare's attorney Again, Fifth and attorney/client 13:7 

And you are the shareholder in Service Wing 

Healthcare? 

I assert the Fifth. 13:20 

For Service Wing Healthcare's investment that 

you described, what is the investment? 

I'm going to take the Fifth. 13:24 

Is it your understanding that there are 20 

million shares of Service Wing Healthcare 

I'm going to decline to answer that on the 

Fifth. 

14:13 

outstanding? 

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Question Answer Page

And did you complete this set of

interrogatories yourself?

I assert the Fifth amendment. 8:14

Did you participate in the preparation of these

interrogatories?

I assert the Fifth Amendment. 8:17

Is all of the information in this document

marked as Exhibit 3 true and correct, to the

best of your knowledge?

I'm going to assert the Fifth Amendment. 8:20

Is that your signature? I'm going to assert the Fifth Amendment. 9:3

And Interrogatory No. 1 asks for your full

name, your social security number, and your

current residential address. On that page, it

lists 134 Rutland 11 Boulevard, West Palm

Beach, Florida 33405. Is that your current

residence address?

I assert the Fifth Amendment. 9:8

Have you ever resided at 134 Rutland

Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida 33405?

I assert the Fifth Amendment. 9:14

Have you ever entered into a lease agreement

regarding that location?

I'm going to assert the Fifth Amendment. 9:17

Are you currently a chief executive and

operating officer?

I'm going to assert the Fifth. 9:25

For the job title listed here, that you said is

correct, what company were you a chief

executive, slash, operating officer for?

I assert the Fifth. 10:3

Do you currently receive a salary from any

source?

I assert the Fifth. 10:7

Do you currently own stock in Service Wing

Healthcare?

I assert the Fifth. 10:21

What about Service Wing Solutions? I assert the Fifth. 10:24

Precision Approach? I assert the Fifth. 11:2

And Matseco? I assert the Fifth. 11:3

When did it cease operation? I take the Fifth. 11:19

When did it begin operations? I assert the Fifth 12:3

How many shareholders did Service Wing

Healthcare have when it was organized?

I'm going to assert the Fifth. 12:5

So what is Service Wing Healthcare doing to

pursue litigation to recover its investment?

That's the Fifth, and it's also

attorney/client.

12:25

Who is Service Wing Healthcare's attorney Again, Fifth and attorney/client 13:7

And you are the shareholder in Service Wing

Healthcare?

I assert the Fifth. 13:20

For Service Wing Healthcare's investment that

you described, what is the investment?

I'm going to take the Fifth. 13:24

Is it your understanding that there are 20

million shares of Service Wing Healthcare

outstanding?

I'm going to decline to answer that on the

Fifth.

14:13

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 6 of 15
Question Answer Page 

Mr. Kurgan, how many shares in Service 

Wing Healthcare, Incorporated, do you 

currently own? 

I'll assert the Fifth. 15:10 

Have you ever owned shares in that company 

before? 

I'll assert the Fifth. 13:13 

Assuming you acquired shares in Service 

Wing Healthcare, Incorporated, did you 

inquire them in your own name or jointly with 

your wife? 

I'll assert the Fifth. 13:16 

I apologize if I already asked this. Mr. 

Kurgan, do you have a current source of 

income? 

I'm going to decline to answer that on the 

Fifth. 

17:12 

Do you currently own any stocks in 

corporations? 

I decline to answer that on the Fifth. 17:16 

Are you an officer of any corporation? I decline to answer that on the Fifth. 17:24 

Are you a director of any corporation? I will assert the Fifth. 18:1 

Okay. Please tell me about joint accounts. I'm going to assert the Fifth on that. 18:22 

Mr. Kurgan, does anyone owe you money? I assert the Fifth. 18:24 

Mr. Kurgan, how do you pay for your ongoing 

living expenses? 

I assert the Fifth. 19:5 

How have you paid for your living expenses 

in the last year? 

I assert the Fifth. 19:8 

Who pays the premiums for that policy? I assert the Fifth on that. 20:20 

Mr. Kurgan, have you filed tax returns in the 

last 4 years? 

I assert the Fifth. 20:24 

Have you owned any automobiles in the last 4 

years? 

I assert the Fifth. 21:2 

Mr. Kurgan, do you have any credit cards? I assert the Fifth. 21:5 

Other than the judgment that you owe to my 

client, do you have any other debts that you 

owe? 

I'm aware of other judgments in the 

public record, and I would assert the Fifth 

of any other private debts that I have. 

21:21 

Did you purchase a vehicle with a loan from 

First Florida Credit Union? 

I assert the Fifth. 22:21 

Mr. Kurgan, do you have any intention to pay 

my client's judgment? 

Under advice of counsel, I'm going to 

assert the Fifth. 

22:24 

Do you have sufficient assets to pay my 

client's judgment? 

I truly did want to answer that question, 

but under the advice of counsel, I'm going 

to assert the Fifth. 

23:3 

Am I correct that you used to own a 2011 

Land Rover Range Rover? 

I assert the Fifth. 23:20 

Have you ever leased a Mercedes-Benz? I assert the Fifth. 24:4 

Have you leased any vehicles in the last 4 

years? 

I assert the Fifth. 24:6 

What is Precision Approach? I'm going to assert the Fifth. 24:9 

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Question Answer Page

Mr. Kurgan, how many shares in Service

Wing Healthcare, Incorporated, do you

currently own?

I'll assert the Fifth. 15:10

Have you ever owned shares in that company

before?

I'll assert the Fifth. 13:13

Assuming you acquired shares in Service

Wing Healthcare, Incorporated, did you

inquire them in your own name or jointly with

your wife?

I'll assert the Fifth. 13:16

I apologize if I already asked this. Mr.

Kurgan, do you have a current source of

income?

I'm going to decline to answer that on the

Fifth.

17:12

Do you currently own any stocks in

corporations?

I decline to answer that on the Fifth. 17:16

Are you an officer of any corporation? I decline to answer that on the Fifth. 17:24

Are you a director of any corporation? I will assert the Fifth. 18:1

Okay. Please tell me about joint accounts. I'm going to assert the Fifth on that. 18:22

Mr. Kurgan, does anyone owe you money? I assert the Fifth. 18:24

Mr. Kurgan, how do you pay for your ongoing

living expenses?

I assert the Fifth. 19:5

How have you paid for your living expenses

in the last year?

I assert the Fifth. 19:8

Who pays the premiums for that policy? I assert the Fifth on that. 20:20

Mr. Kurgan, have you filed tax returns in the

last 4 years?

I assert the Fifth. 20:24

Have you owned any automobiles in the last 4

years?

I assert the Fifth. 21:2

Mr. Kurgan, do you have any credit cards? I assert the Fifth. 21:5

Other than the judgment that you owe to my

client, do you have any other debts that you

owe?

I'm aware of other judgments in the

public record, and I would assert the Fifth

of any other private debts that I have.

21:21

Did you purchase a vehicle with a loan from

First Florida Credit Union?

I assert the Fifth. 22:21

Mr. Kurgan, do you have any intention to pay

my client's judgment?

Under advice of counsel, I'm going to

assert the Fifth.

22:24

Do you have sufficient assets to pay my

client's judgment?

I truly did want to answer that question,

but under the advice of counsel, I'm going

to assert the Fifth.

23:3

Am I correct that you used to own a 2011

Land Rover Range Rover?

I assert the Fifth. 23:20

Have you ever leased a Mercedes-Benz? I assert the Fifth. 24:4

Have you leased any vehicles in the last 4

years?

I assert the Fifth. 24:6

What is Precision Approach? I'm going to assert the Fifth. 24:9

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 7 of 15
Question Answer Page 

Was that your response to Interrogatory No. 

21? 

I assert the Fifth. 25:2 

At the time that the Exhibit 3 was sent back to 

me, by you, did you own stock in those four 

companies? 

I assert the Fifth. 25:5 

Have you ever owned stock in Precision 

Approach? 

I assert the Fifth 25:9 

Does Precision Approach currently operate? I'm going to assert the Fifth. 25:12 

Does Precision Approach have regular 

revenue? 

I assert the Fifth. 25:14 

Are you a director or officer for Precision 

Approach? 

I assert the Fifth. 25:16 

How long have you lived in Florida? I decline to answer that and assert the 

Fifth. 

27:6 

Where did you live before you moved to 

Florida? 

I decline to answer that and assert the 

Fifth. 

27:9 

What did you do with the funds that you 

received, when you sold the property at 265 

North Shore Drive? 

I assert the Fifth. 27:25 

What is your relationship to Richard Pickett? I'm going to assert the Fifth. 28:10 

What is your relationship to the other 

plaintiffs in the lawsuit? 

I haven't had time to review it, but I'll 

assert the Fifth 

28:14 

Who is Gene Lee? I'm going to assert the Fifth. 28:16 

Are you currently represented by the 

Law Offices of David Harris? 

Based on the allegation in Judge 

McShane's order, we're going to invoke 

the Fifth. 

29:17 

Service Wing Solutions was hired by Pitney 

Bowes? 

I assert the Fifth at this point. But I never 

was personally hired by any company for 

Pitney Bowes. 

33:5 

What is your role in Service Wing Solutions? I assert the Fifth 33:9 

Is Service Wing Solutions still operational? I think this was asked and answered, but I 

assert the Fifth and let my previous 

answer stand. 

33:11 

Is Matseco still operational? I assert the Fifth. 33:14 

Have you applied for any loans or lines of 

credit in the last 4 years? 

I assert the Fifth. 33:18 

Have you made payments on any loans in the 

last 48 months? 

I assert the Fifth. 33:24 

The Defendant's refusal to answer questions on such a broad range of topics seriously 

calls into question his genuine and good faith assertion of the privilege. He refused to answer 

general questions—"How long have you lived in Florida" and specific questions—"Have you 

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Question Answer Page

Was that your response to Interrogatory No.

21?

I assert the Fifth. 25:2

At the time that the Exhibit 3 was sent back to

me, by you, did you own stock in those four

companies?

I assert the Fifth. 25:5

Have you ever owned stock in Precision

Approach?

I assert the Fifth 25:9

Does Precision Approach currently operate? I'm going to assert the Fifth. 25:12

Does Precision Approach have regular

revenue?

I assert the Fifth. 25:14

Are you a director or officer for Precision

Approach?

I assert the Fifth. 25:16

How long have you lived in Florida? I decline to answer that and assert the

Fifth.

27:6

Where did you live before you moved to

Florida?

I decline to answer that and assert the

Fifth.

27:9

What did you do with the funds that you

received, when you sold the property at 265

North Shore Drive?

I assert the Fifth. 27:25

What is your relationship to Richard Pickett? I'm going to assert the Fifth. 28:10

What is your relationship to the other

plaintiffs in the lawsuit?

I haven't had time to review it, but I'll

assert the Fifth

28:14

Who is Gene Lee? I'm going to assert the Fifth. 28:16

Are you currently represented by the

Law Offices of David Harris?

Based on the allegation in Judge

McShane's order, we're going to invoke

the Fifth.

29:17

Service Wing Solutions was hired by Pitney

Bowes?

I assert the Fifth at this point. But I never

was personally hired by any company for

Pitney Bowes.

33:5

What is your role in Service Wing Solutions? I assert the Fifth 33:9

Is Service Wing Solutions still operational? I think this was asked and answered, but I

assert the Fifth and let my previous

answer stand.

33:11

Is Matseco still operational? I assert the Fifth. 33:14

Have you applied for any loans or lines of

credit in the last 4 years?

I assert the Fifth. 33:18

Have you made payments on any loans in the

last 48 months?

I assert the Fifth. 33:24

The Defendant’s refusal to answer questions on such a broad range of topics seriously

calls into question his genuine and good faith assertion of the privilege. He refused to answer

general questions—“How long have you lived in Florida”—and specific questions—“Have you

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 8 of 15
applied for any loans or lines of credit in the last 4 years?" He refused to answer questions about 

general assets— "Have you owned any automobiles in the last 4 years?"—and questions that 

could lead to the discovery of hidden assets—"Mr. Kurgan, have you filed tax returns in the last 

4 years?" Indeed, according to the Defendant, revealing how his most basic needs of food—"Mr. 

Kurgan, how do you pay for your ongoing living expenses?"—and shelter—"What is your 

residence address?"—are protected by the Fifth amendment. He has even refused to confirm the 

presence of his signature on the amended Interrogatory responses. Deposition Transcript at 9:3 

("Q: Is that your signature? A: I'm going to assert the Fifth Amendment.") 

It is not evident how each question to which the Defendant asserted the Fifth Amendment 

is potentially injurious. Other than the oblique reference to the Court's findings in the December 

Order, no explanation for the Defendant's refusal to answer is given. It is also not evident how 

the findings in the December Order create a basis for the lawful assertion of the Defendant's 

Fifth Amendment right during the course of his deposition. In addition to finding that the 

Defendant had willfully evaded compliance with the Court's previous order, the Court found that 

the Defendant's objections to the initial interrogatory requests were made too late and were 

therefore waived. December Order 5. In comparing the initial and revised interrogatory 

responses, there are few if any substantive changes between the two sets of answers other than to 

answer questions to which there was a previously overruled objection. 

It is plainly apparent that the Defendant's refusal to answer nearly all of the meaningful 

questions at his deposition has defeated the Court's December order requiring him to appear at a 

deposition. Last December, the court noted that it had "grown weary of Kurgan's 

gamesmanship" after evading compliance for the previous 10 months. December Order at 4. 

Despite this strong admonition and the threat of requiring the Defendant's appearance in court 

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applied for any loans or lines of credit in the last 4 years?” He refused to answer questions about

general assets— “Have you owned any automobiles in the last 4 years?”—and questions that

could lead to the discovery of hidden assets—“Mr. Kurgan, have you filed tax returns in the last

4 years?” Indeed, according to the Defendant, revealing how his most basic needs of food—“Mr.

Kurgan, how do you pay for your ongoing living expenses?”—and shelter—“What is your

residence address?”—are protected by the Fifth amendment. He has even refused to confirm the

presence of his signature on the amended Interrogatory responses. Deposition Transcript at 9:3

(“Q: Is that your signature? A: I'm going to assert the Fifth Amendment.”)

It is not evident how each question to which the Defendant asserted the Fifth Amendment

is potentially injurious. Other than the oblique reference to the Court’s findings in the December

Order, no explanation for the Defendant’s refusal to answer is given. It is also not evident how

the findings in the December Order create a basis for the lawful assertion of the Defendant’s

Fifth Amendment right during the course of his deposition. In addition to finding that the

Defendant had willfully evaded compliance with the Court’s previous order, the Court found that

the Defendant’s objections to the initial interrogatory requests were made too late and were

therefore waived. December Order 5. In comparing the initial and revised interrogatory

responses, there are few if any substantive changes between the two sets of answers other than to

answer questions to which there was a previously overruled objection.

It is plainly apparent that the Defendant’s refusal to answer nearly all of the meaningful

questions at his deposition has defeated the Court’s December order requiring him to appear at a

deposition. Last December, the court noted that it had “grown weary of Kurgan’s

gamesmanship” after evading compliance for the previous 10 months. December Order at 4.

Despite this strong admonition and the threat of requiring the Defendant’s appearance in court

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 9 of 15
with the assistance of the United States Marshal, the Defendant's games continue. It is clear that 

the court's prior order compelling the Defendant to sit for a deposition and imposing the Plaintiff 

costs in this action was not enough to bring about meaningful compliance by the Defendant. The 

Court should issue an order requiring the Defendant to appear in Court in person in the District 

of Oregon, with the assistance of the United States marshals if necessary, to sit for a deposition. 

Requiring the Defendant's attendance with the immediate possibility of confinement for his 

further dilatory conduct is necessary to wrest the truth from him. 

B. The Defendant Should be Held in Contempt for His Continual Failure to 

Follow this Court's Orders. 

Courts have several sources of authority to hold non-compliant parties in civil contempt. 

First, courts may rely on their inherent power to hold a party in civil contempt in order to enforce 

compliance with lawful court orders. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990); 

Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). Second, a fmding of civil contempt may be 

premised on 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), which provides that "[a] court of the United States shall have 

power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its 

authority, and none other, as . . . [d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, 

rule, decree, or command." See also United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430 F.2d 

998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1970) (18 U.S.C. § 401(3) provides "general statutory authority for . . . both 

civil and criminal contempt sanctions"); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 855 F.2d 

874, 876 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1988). "[W]hen a court imposes fines and punishments on a contemnor, 

it is not only vindicating it's legal authority to enter the initial court order, but it is also seeking 

to give effect to the law's purpose of modifying the contemnor's behavior to conform to the 

terms required in the order." Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 

821, 827 (1994) (quoting Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 635 (1988)). 

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with the assistance of the United States Marshal, the Defendant’s games continue. It is clear that

the court’s prior order compelling the Defendant to sit for a deposition and imposing the Plaintiff

costs in this action was not enough to bring about meaningful compliance by the Defendant. The

Court should issue an order requiring the Defendant to appear in Court in person in the District

of Oregon, with the assistance of the United States marshals if necessary, to sit for a deposition.

Requiring the Defendant’s attendance with the immediate possibility of confinement for his

further dilatory conduct is necessary to wrest the truth from him.

B. The Defendant Should be Held in Contempt for His Continual Failure to

Follow this Court’s Orders.

Courts have several sources of authority to hold non-compliant parties in civil contempt.

First, courts may rely on their inherent power to hold a party in civil contempt in order to enforce

compliance with lawful court orders. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990);

Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). Second, a finding of civil contempt may be

premised on 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), which provides that “[a] court of the United States shall have

power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its

authority, and none other, as . . . [d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order,

rule, decree, or command.” See also United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430 F.2d

998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1970) (18 U.S.C. § 401(3) provides “general statutory authority for . . . both

civil and criminal contempt sanctions”); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 855 F.2d

874, 876 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1988). “[W]hen a court imposes fines and punishments on a contemnor,

it is not only vindicating it’s legal authority to enter the initial court order, but it is also seeking

to give effect to the law’s purpose of modifying the contemnor’s behavior to conform to the

terms required in the order.” Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.

821, 827 (1994) (quoting Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 635 (1988)).

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 10 of 15
To hold a party in contempt, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the 

party violated a specific and definite order and that it had sufficient notice of its terms and the 

fact that it would be sanctioned if it did not comply. See In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1190-91 (9th 

Cir.2003) ("The standard for finding a party in civil contempt is well settled: The moving party 

has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the contemnors violated a 

specific and definite order of the court."). "In civil contempt proceedings[,] the contempt need 

not be willful." McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct. 497, 93 L.Ed. 

599 (1949). The standard is met here. 

The evidence discussed above establishes by clear and convincing evidence that 

Defendant has disobeyed the Court's December Order. The December Order required the 

Defendant to sit for a deposition, which was effectively defeated because the Defendant refused 

to answer any material question based on a bad faith assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 

There was no justifiable basis for Defendant to violate the Court's December Order. 

C. The Court Should Order Civil Sanctions and Order Defendant/Contemnor 

to Pay Additional Attorney Fees Incurred by Plaintiff. 

A court's contempt powers are broadly divided into two categories: civil contempt and 

criminal contempt. Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 815 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2016). In 

distinguishing between criminal and civil contempt, the Court must look to the sanction's 

"character and purpose." Id. at 629, citing Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827. "The purpose of civil 

contempt is coercive or compensatory, whereas the purpose of criminal contempt is punitive." Id. 

(internal citations omitted). The civil contemnor is said to "carr[y] the keys of his prison in his 

own pocket," whereas the criminal contemnor "is furnished no key, and he cannot shorten the 

term by promising not to repeat the offense." Id., quoting Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828-29. 

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To hold a party in contempt, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the

party violated a specific and definite order and that it had sufficient notice of its terms and the

fact that it would be sanctioned if it did not comply. See In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1190–91 (9th

Cir.2003) (“The standard for finding a party in civil contempt is well settled: The moving party

has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the contemnors violated a

specific and definite order of the court.”). “In civil contempt proceedings[,] the contempt need

not be willful.” McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct. 497, 93 L.Ed.

599 (1949). The standard is met here.

The evidence discussed above establishes by clear and convincing evidence that

Defendant has disobeyed the Court’s December Order. The December Order required the

Defendant to sit for a deposition, which was effectively defeated because the Defendant refused

to answer any material question based on a bad faith assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

There was no justifiable basis for Defendant to violate the Court’s December Order.

C. The Court Should Order Civil Sanctions and Order Defendant/Contemnor

to Pay Additional Attorney Fees Incurred by Plaintiff.

A court’s contempt powers are broadly divided into two categories: civil contempt and

criminal contempt. Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 815 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2016). In

distinguishing between criminal and civil contempt, the Court must look to the sanction’s

“character and purpose.” Id. at 629, citing Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827. “The purpose of civil

contempt is coercive or compensatory, whereas the purpose of criminal contempt is punitive.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). The civil contemnor is said to “carr[y] the keys of his prison in his

own pocket,” whereas the criminal contemnor “is furnished no key, and he cannot shorten the

term by promising not to repeat the offense.” Id., quoting Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828–29.

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 11 of 15
A court may wield its civil contempt powers for two separate and independent purposes: 

(1) "to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order"; and (2) "to compensate the 

complainant for losses sustained." Id., quoting United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 

(1947); see also Ohr ex rel. NLRB v. Latino Express, Inc., 776 F.3d 469, 479-80 (7th Cir.2015) 

("A civil contempt order can serve to coerce a party to obey a court order, or it can be intended 

to compensate a party who has suffered unnecessary injuries or costs because of contemptuous 

conduct." (collecting cases)); "The test ... is 'what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by 

imposing the sanction?' " Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 778 (9th 

Cir.1983) (quoting Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 370). Civil compensatory sanctions are remedial, and 

typically take the form of unconditional monetary sanctions, whereas coercive civil sanctions, 

intended to deter, generally take the form of conditional fines. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & 

Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911). A coercive civil penalty is, by nature, "avoidable through 

obedience." See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827. Thus, an imprisoned contemnor "`carries the keys of 

his prison in his own pocket.' He can end the sentence and discharge himself at any moment by 

doing what he had previously refused to do." Id. at 442. 

In the December Order, the Court held that "the proper sanction is that Kurgan is liable 

for all fees and costs plaintiff incurred in bringing this motion and in seeking to obtain discovery 

under rule 69." December Order at 4. The Court awarded the Plaintiff this sanction on May 8, 

2018. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees [Dkt. No. 103]. Clearly, the sanction 

awarded was not sufficient to ensure good faith compliance with the December Order. 

The Plaintiff only seeks to enforce its rights and to collect its judgment and coercive 

sanctions are best situated to achieve that goal. Defendant has been violating the February Order 

since it was entered on February 12, 2016, and his attendance at his long overdue deposition did 

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A court may wield its civil contempt powers for two separate and independent purposes:

(1) “to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order”; and (2) “to compensate the

complainant for losses sustained.” Id., quoting United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04

(1947); see also Ohr ex rel. NLRB v. Latino Express, Inc., 776 F.3d 469, 479–80 (7th Cir.2015)

(“A civil contempt order can serve to coerce a party to obey a court order, or it can be intended

to compensate a party who has suffered unnecessary injuries or costs because of contemptuous

conduct.” (collecting cases)); “The test ... is ‘what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by

imposing the sanction?’ ” Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 778 (9th

Cir.1983) (quoting Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 370). Civil compensatory sanctions are remedial, and

typically take the form of unconditional monetary sanctions, whereas coercive civil sanctions,

intended to deter, generally take the form of conditional fines. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove &

Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911). A coercive civil penalty is, by nature, “avoidable through

obedience.” See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827. Thus, an imprisoned contemnor “‘carries the keys of

his prison in his own pocket.’ He can end the sentence and discharge himself at any moment by

doing what he had previously refused to do.” Id. at 442.

In the December Order, the Court held that “the proper sanction is that Kurgan is liable

for all fees and costs plaintiff incurred in bringing this motion and in seeking to obtain discovery

under rule 69.” December Order at 4. The Court awarded the Plaintiff this sanction on May 8,

2018. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees [Dkt. No. 103]. Clearly, the sanction

awarded was not sufficient to ensure good faith compliance with the December Order.

The Plaintiff only seeks to enforce its rights and to collect its judgment and coercive

sanctions are best situated to achieve that goal. Defendant has been violating the February Order

since it was entered on February 12, 2016, and his attendance at his long overdue deposition did

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 12 of 15
not cure his contempt. The Defendant's actions demonstrate his disregard and disrespect for the 

judicial system. 

The Defendant's past conduct demonstrates that accumulating civil sanction penalties, 

without more, is unlikely to be successful in coercing compliance. As a result, Plaintiff 

recommends that the Court impose an escalating monetary civil contempt penalty that converts 

to imprisonment if the Contemnor does not fully comply with the December Order. Specifically, 

the Plaintiff proposes that the Court again award the Plaintiff its costs and attorney's fees in 

enforcing compliance with the Court's Orders (to be determined upon motion in accordance with 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)), award the Plaintiff an additional $5,000 as a sanction for the 

Defendant's bad faith conduct, and impose an escalating monetary sanction in the following 

amounts, until the Defendant fully complies with the Court's previous Orders: 

• Days 1-7: $500 per day 

• Day 8-14: $1,000 per day 

• Day 15-21: $2,000 per day 

• Day 22-28: $5,000 per day 

• Day 28 and beyond: $10,000 per day, plus imprisonment 

Given the Defendant's long-lasting refusal to comply with previous Orders, irrespective of the 

accumulation of civil penalties, an escalating monetary civil contempt penalty that converts to 

imprisonment is an appropriate coercive civil contempt sanction that should remain in place until 

the Contemnor purges the contempt. 

CONCLUSION 

Plaintiff, The Lance and Linda Neibauer Joint Trust, by and through Lance Neibauer, as 

Trustee, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 1) compelling the Defendant to 

appear at court in person in the District of Oregon, to sit for a deposition and 2) setting a hearing 

for Defendant Michael Kurgan to appear and show cause, if any, why he should not be found in 

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not cure his contempt. The Defendant’s actions demonstrate his disregard and disrespect for the

judicial system.

The Defendant’s past conduct demonstrates that accumulating civil sanction penalties,

without more, is unlikely to be successful in coercing compliance. As a result, Plaintiff

recommends that the Court impose an escalating monetary civil contempt penalty that converts

to imprisonment if the Contemnor does not fully comply with the December Order. Specifically,

the Plaintiff proposes that the Court again award the Plaintiff its costs and attorney’s fees in

enforcing compliance with the Court’s Orders (to be determined upon motion in accordance with

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)), award the Plaintiff an additional $5,000 as a sanction for the

Defendant’s bad faith conduct, and impose an escalating monetary sanction in the following

amounts, until the Defendant fully complies with the Court’s previous Orders:

 Days 1-7: $500 per day

 Day 8-14: $1,000 per day

 Day 15-21: $2,000 per day

 Day 22-28: $5,000 per day

 Day 28 and beyond: $10,000 per day, plus imprisonment

Given the Defendant’s long-lasting refusal to comply with previous Orders, irrespective of the

accumulation of civil penalties, an escalating monetary civil contempt penalty that converts to

imprisonment is an appropriate coercive civil contempt sanction that should remain in place until

the Contemnor purges the contempt.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff, The Lance and Linda Neibauer Joint Trust, by and through Lance Neibauer, as

Trustee, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 1) compelling the Defendant to

appear at court in person in the District of Oregon, to sit for a deposition and 2) setting a hearing

for Defendant Michael Kurgan to appear and show cause, if any, why he should not be found in

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 13 of 15
civil contempt. Should the Court find that Defendant has violated the Court's Order, the Court 

should impose compensatory civil sanctions by ordering that he pay Plaintiffs attorney fees and 

assess a coercive civil sanction involving an escalating monetary civil contempt penalty that 

converts to imprisonment until Defendant purges the contempt. 

Dated: June 26, 2018 

MOTSCHENBACHER & BLATTNER, LLP 

/s/ Nicholas J. Henderson 

Nicholas J. Henderson, OSB #074027 

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff 

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civil contempt. Should the Court find that Defendant has violated the Court’s Order, the Court

should impose compensatory civil sanctions by ordering that he pay Plaintiff’s attorney fees and

assess a coercive civil sanction involving an escalating monetary civil contempt penalty that

converts to imprisonment until Defendant purges the contempt.

Dated: June 26, 2018

MOTSCHENBACHER & BLATTNER, LLP

/s/ Nicholas J. Henderson

Nicholas J. Henderson, OSB #074027

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 14 of 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on June 26, 2018, I served the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 

TO COMPEL AND MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFENDANT 

MICHAEL KURGAN SHOULD BE HELD IN CONTEMPT: 

Michael J. Kurgan 

6538 Collins Ave. Unit 288 

Miami Beach, FL 33141 

(858) 408-9330 

PRO SE DEFENDANT 

[X] Via First Class Mail 

[ ] Via Facsimile 

[ ] Via Hand Delivery 

[ ] Via ECF Notification 

[X] Via Electronic Mail to: n461bb@gmail.com 

DATED: June 26, 2018 

MOTSCHENBACHER & BLATTNER, LLP 

/s/ Mary Perry 

Mary Perry, Legal Assistant 

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff 

PAGE 1 — CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 26, 2018, I served the foregoing PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO COMPEL AND MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFENDANT

MICHAEL KURGAN SHOULD BE HELD IN CONTEMPT:

Michael J. Kurgan

6538 Collins Ave. Unit 288

Miami Beach, FL 33141

(858) 408-9330

PRO SE DEFENDANT

[X] Via First Class Mail

[ ] Via Facsimile

[ ] Via Hand Delivery

[ ] Via ECF Notification

[X] Via Electronic Mail to: n461bb@gmail.com

DATED: June 26, 2018

MOTSCHENBACHER & BLATTNER, LLP

/s/ Mary Perry

Mary Perry, Legal Assistant

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

Case 6:14-cv-01192-MC Document 105 Filed 06/26/18 Page 15 of 15