96-697

 No. 96-697

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

KEITH RIDLEY,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

GUARANTEE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

 Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,

 The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 John M. Morrison (argued), Meloy & Morrison,

 Helena, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Guy W. Rogers (argued) and Tiffany B. Lonnevik; Brown, Gerbase, 

 Cebull, Fulton, Harman & Ross; Billings, Montana

 For Amici Curiae:

 Ira Eakin and Michael G. Eiselein; Lynaugh, Fitzgerald & Eiselein; 

 Billings, Montana (for Montana Trial Lawyers Association)

 Mark Staples, Staples Law Office, Helena, Montana

 (for Montana Chiropractic Association)

 Heard: October 1, 1997

 Submitted: October 28, 1997

 Decided: December 24, 1997

Filed:

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 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 The plaintiff, Keith Ridley, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against 

the

defendant, Guarantee National Insurance Company, in the District Court for the First

Judicial District in Lewis and Clark County. Ridley sought a District Court judgment

that õ 33-18-201, MCA, of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act requires a

tort-feasor's insurer to pay the actual medical expenses of a tort victim as they are

incurred when liability is reasonably clear. The District Court concluded that an 

insured

does not have an obligation in all cases to pay an injured third party's medical 

expenses

in advance of full and final settlement, even though liability is reasonably clear, 

and

granted summary judgment to Guarantee National. Ridley appeals that decision. We

reverse the order and judgment of the District Court.

 The following issues are presented on appeal:

 1. Did the District Court err when it concluded that the issue raised by

Ridley's complaint was not appropriate for declaratory judgment pursuant to õõ 27-8-

201

and -202, MCA, of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act?

 2. Pursuant to õ 33-18-201, MCA, of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act,

does an insurer have an obligation to pay medical expenses as incurred by an injured

third-party tort victim when the liability of its insured is reasonably clear?

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 The factual record in this case is minimal. It consists of those allegations 

in Keith

Ridley's complaint which are admitted by Guarantee National and Ridley's affidavit. 

There are also a number of documents attached to Ridley's complaint, and additional

documents attached to briefs filed by Guarantee National in the District Court. 

There is

little foundation for these documents and it is unclear the extent to which they 

have been

or should be considered. However, based on the parties' allegations and the 

arguments

made in both the District Court and this Court, it appears that the following facts 

are

undisputed.

 Ridley was injured on November 2, 1995, when the automobile in which he was

a passenger collided with a vehicle operated by Kenneth Roope who was then insured

against liability by Guarantee National. The driver of Ridley's vehicle was 

attempting

to make a left-hand turn. Roope was attempting a pass to the left side of that 

vehicle. 

 In correspondence to Ridley's attorney, Guarantee National's claims adjuster

acknowledged that the company's insured was 90 percent at fault for the collision. 

Ridley's attorney later advised the same adjuster that his client could not afford 

the

medical treatment that had been prescribed for the injuries caused by the collision,

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including an MRI exam and physical therapy, and asked that those expenses be paid by

Guarantee National. He explained that because Guarantee National had admitted that 

it

was more than 50 percent at fault for the collision, it was liable to the claimant 

for all of

his damages pursuant to principles of joint and several liability, and advised 

Guarantee

National that after Ridley's condition had stabilized they would discuss full and 

final

settlement of his claims with Guarantee National.

 Guarantee National's adjuster advised Ridley's counsel that no medical expenses

would be paid in advance of final settlement of Ridley's claim.

 Ridley filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the District Court for the 

First

Judicial District in Lewis and Clark County, named Guarantee National as the 

defendant,

and asked the District Court to conclude, pursuant to õ 33-18-201, MCA (Montana

Unfair Trade Practices Act), that Guarantee National did have an obligation to pay

medical expenses where liability is reasonably clear regardless of whether a final

settlement had been agreed upon.

 In its answer, Guarantee National admitted that a collision occurred on

November 2, 1995, involving an automobile in which Ridley was a passenger and an

automobile operated by its insured. It also admitted that its insured had the 

majority of

fault for the accident and that it declined to pay for Ridley's ongoing medical 

expenses. 

However, it explained that its refusal was partially based on uncertainty about the 

causal

relationship between the accident and the extent of Ridley's injuries. As an 

affirmative

defense, Guarantee National alleged that there was no obligation pursuant to Montana 

law

for an insurer to pay medical expenses of an injured third party before full and 

final

settlement of that person's claim.

 Both parties moved for summary judgment. Ridley's motion was denied and

Guarantee National's motion was granted. 

 The District Court based its order on the following legal conclusions: 

 1. Section 33-18-201, MCA, of the Unfair Claims Practices Act, requires that

plaintiff prove that the insurer's conduct complained of occur "with such frequency 

as to

indicate a general business practice" and, therefore, even if Ridley's 

interpretation of the

statute is correct, Guarantee National is not required in every case to make advance

payment of medical expenses.

 2. In this case, Guarantee National denies a causal relationship between its

conduct and the full extent of Ridley's injuries; therefore, declaratory judgment 

will not

resolve all issues before the parties and is not appropriate pursuant to the Uniform

Declaratory Judgment Act.

 3. The Unfair Claims Practices Act does not require an insurer to pay an

injured party's medical expenses prior to final settlement in all cases, even where 

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liability

is reasonably clear.

 In response to Ridley's appeal, Guarantee National concedes that the District 

Court

erred when it concluded that he must prove a general business practice in order to 

state

a claim pursuant to the Unfair Claims Practices Act. Guarantee National concedes 

that

pursuant to õ 33-18-242(2), MCA, a third-party claimant has an independent cause of

action against an insurer for a violation of õ 33-18-201(6) and (13), MCA, without 

regard

to whether the insurer's alleged violations occurred with "such frequency as to 

indicate

a general business practice." Therefore, we will confine our review to the last two 

bases

for the District Court's order which granted summary judgment.

 ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court err when it concluded that the issue raised by Ridley's

complaint was not appropriate for declaratory judgment pursuant to õõ 27-8-201 and -

202, MCA, of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act?

 "When a district court determines that declaratory relief is not necessary or 

proper,

we will not disturb the court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion." Remington v.

Department of Corr. & Human Servs. (1992), 255 Mont. 480, 483, 844 P.2d 50, 51,

overruled on other grounds by Orozco v. Day (Mont. 1997), 934 P.2d 1009, 54 St. Rep.

200. However, we review the district court's conclusions on which its decision is 

based,

as we do all legal issues, to determine whether they have been correctly decided. 

See

Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., Inc. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d

680, 686.

 The District Court concluded that declaratory judgment could not be granted

without a justiciable controversy and, based on our decision in Brisendine v. 

Department

of Commerce (1992), 253 Mont. 361, 833 P.2d 1019, concluded that that requires "'a

controversy the judicial determination of which will have the effect of a final 

judgment

in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status, or legal relationships of one or 

more

of the real parties in interest.'" Brisendine, 253 Mont. at 364, 833 P.2d at 1021. 

The

District Court concluded that that type of relief could not be granted in this case 

because

there were factual issues regarding the insurer's liability in addition to the legal 

issue

raised by Ridley. Specifically, the District Court concluded that there was an issue

regarding the extent to which Guarantee National's insured caused the injuries for 

which

Ridley sought medical treatment.

 On appeal, Ridley contends (1) that there was no issue regarding causation based

on his uncontroverted affidavit that the injuries for which he was being treated were

caused by the collision in which he was involved on November 2, 1995; and (2) that 

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even

if there were factual issues regarding causation, he is still entitled, pursuant to 

õõ 27-8-

201 and -202, MCA, of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, to have legal issues

resolved when his rights, status, or legal relations are affected by statute.

 Guarantee National responds that the District Court did not abuse its discretion

when it refused to grant declaratory relief because a justiciable controversy is a

prerequisite to such relief, and a justiciable controversy requires that the judicial

determination being sought finally resolve the rights, status, or legal relations of 

the

parties. It contends that that cannot be accomplished in this case because 

regardless of

the court's interpretation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act, there remains an issue

regarding the extent of Guarantee National's liability for Ridley's medical 

benefits. 

Guarantee National contends that the District Court correctly decided, based on our

decision in Brisendine, to deny Ridley the relief he sought.

 Section 27-8-201, MCA, of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, provides, in

relevant part, as follows: "Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions 

shall have

power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further 

relief is

or could be claimed."

 Section 27-8-202, MCA, of the same Act, provides:

 Any person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are

affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction

or validity arising under . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights,

status, or other legal relations thereunder.

 This Court's role in the construction of a statute is simply to declare what is 

stated

by the plain terms of the statute and not to insert what has been omitted. Section 

1-2-

101, MCA. The plain language of õ 27-8-202, MCA, provides that persons whose rights,

status, or other legal relations are affected by statute may ask the courts of this 

state to

construe that statute for the purpose of declaring those rights. Section 27-8-201, 

MCA,

makes clear that that right to have statutes construed is not dependent on whether 

further

relief "is or could be claimed." In other words, it is not a basis for denying 

declaratory

relief that all of the "rights, status, or other legal relations" of the parties 

cannot be

decided in the same proceeding.

 The facts in Brisendine are distinguishable from those in this case and we 

conclude

that the District Court erred when it relied on that decision to deny declaratory 

relief.

 In Brisendine, the plaintiff was a denturist whose proposal to associate

professionally with a dentist had been rejected by the Board of Dentistry based on 

its

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interpretation of õ 37-4-103, MCA. Before the Board issued its final decision, 

Brisendine

filed a complaint in district court for a declaratory judgment to the effect that õ 

37-29-

103, MCA, did not prohibit him from entering into a business association with a 

dentist. 

The district court dismissed his complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., on 

the

ground that it did not present a justiciable controversy. On appeal, we held that

Brisendine's complaint lacked sufficient specificity regarding his proposed business

association to enable the Court to render a judgment which was anything other than

advisory, and that the more appropriate procedure would be to exhaust his 

administrative

remedies before the Board and then appeal the Board's decision, if adverse, to the 

district

court. However, we did not hold that before a party is entitled to declaratory 

relief, he

or she must establish that the relief sought will resolve all issues between the 

parties.

 In this case, Guarantee National has denied Ridley's claim on several bases--one

being that it has no legal obligation to pay Ridley's medical expenses prior to a 

final

settlement of all of his claims. While there may also be a factual dispute regarding

causation and the extent of Guarantee National's ultimate liability, it does Ridley 

no good

to further document the relationship between the collision with Guarantee National's

insured and his injuries so long as Guarantee National operates under the assumption 

that

it has no obligation to pay for even those medical expenses clearly caused by its 

insured,

absent Ridley's willingness to settle all other claims for damages related to the 

collision. 

 Furthermore, Guarantee National has some basis at the present time for asserting

that it has no obligation to pay for Ridley's medical expenses. In two separate 

federal

district court decisions, there has been a determination that insurers are not 

obligated

pursuant to õ 33-18-201, MCA, to pay medical expenses incurred by third-party tort

victims prior to a final settlement of that person's claims. See Young v. Simenson 

(D.

Mont. June 6, 1987), CV-87-062-GF; Jensen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (D.

Mont. 1990), 8 Mont. Fed. Rep. 262. Because of these decisions, Ridley correctly 

points

out that even if he incurred medical expenses due to the negligence of Guarantee

National's insured, and even if its insured's liability for those damages is 

reasonably clear

and Guarantee National still refuses to pay for those expenses, he cannot enforce his

rights to compensation pursuant to õ 33-18-242, MCA, because of the following 

provision

in subparagraph (5) of that statute: "An insurer may not be held liable under this 

section

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if the insurer had a reasonable basis in law or in fact for contesting the claim or 

the

amount of the claim, whichever is in issue." Section 33-18-242(5), MCA. In other

words, based on the federal decisions, even if they are incorrect, Ridley's rights 

under

the Act are unenforceable. 

 For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court erred as a matter of law

when it held that the relief sought by Ridley did not present a justiciable 

controversy, and

that the District Court abused its discretion when it declined to render a 

declaratory

judgment in this matter pursuant to õõ 27-8-201 and -202, MCA, in order to resolve 

the

respective rights and obligations of the parties, as established by Montana's Unfair 

Claims

Practices Act.

 ISSUE 2

 Pursuant to õ 33-18-201, MCA, of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act, does

an insurer have an obligation to pay medical expenses as incurred by an injured

third-party tort victim when the liability of its insured is reasonably clear?

 Section 33-18-201, MCA, provides in part that:

No person may, with such frequency as to indicate a general business

practice, do any of the following:

 . . . .

 (6) neglect to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and

equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably

clear;

 . . . .

 (13) fail to promptly settle claims, if liability has become reasonably

clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to

influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage

. . . .

 Ridley contends that Guarantee National is liable for medical expenses caused by

its insured when liability is reasonably clear, without regard to whether a final 

settlement

has or can be agreed upon, because subsection (6), by its plain language, makes no

reference to final settlement of all claims, but refers instead to "settlements." He

contends that Guarantee National has the same obligation pursuant to subsection (13)

because Guarantee National's obligation to pay medical expenses is a "portion" of 

its duty

pursuant to the liability coverage it provided to its insured which cannot be 

withheld as

leverage to influence settlement of its obligation for other portions of coverage 

such as

lost wages, lost earning capacity, or pain and suffering. He contends that when this

Court held otherwise in Juedeman v. National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co.

(1992), 253 Mont. 278, 833 P.2d 191, it misapplied subsection (13).

 Guarantee National responds that it has no obligation to pay medical expenses

incurred by a third-party claimant prior to final settlement of that person's claim, 

even

if liability is reasonably clear, because the Montana Legislature did not intend 

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piecemeal

compensation for each aspect of a claimant's injury; the Federal District Court, on 

two

separate occasions, has held that the Unfair Claims Practices Act does not impose 

such

an obligation; and õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, was specifically found inapplicable to these

circumstances in Juedeman. See Juedeman, 253 Mont. at 281, 833 P.2d at 193. 

Finally,

Guarantee National notes that an amendment was offered to the Unfair Claims Practices

Act through House Bill No. 433 in the 1995 session of the Montana Legislature, which

would have imposed an obligation to pay medical expenses prior to final settlement 

where

liability is reasonably clear, but that that amendment was not adopted. Therefore, 

the

Legislature obviously did not intend to impose such an obligation.

 The District Court, even though it concluded that a declaratory judgment should

not be granted, concluded that the statute does not, as a matter of law, require 

that an

insurer, in all cases, pay an injured third party's medical expenses in advance of

settlement, even when liability is reasonably clear. Other than its previously 

discussed

rationale that declaratory relief was not appropriate, and other factual issues 

regarding

causation remain to be decided, the District Court gave no further explanation for 

its

conclusion.

 We hold that the District Court erred when it concluded that the statute in 

question

does not require an insurer to pay an injured third party's medical expenses until 

final

settlement, even when liability is reasonably clear. We conclude that both 

subsections

(6) and (13) of õ 33-18-201, MCA, by their terms, impose such an obligation. This 

does

not mean that an insurer is responsible for all medical expenses submitted by an 

injured

plaintiff. Liability must be reasonably clear for the expense that is submitted. 

That is,

even though liability for the accident may be reasonably clear, an insurer may still 

dispute

a medical expense if it is not reasonably clear that the expense is causally related 

to the

accident in question.

 Although the U.S. District Court for the State of Montana, in two separate 

cases,

has held otherwise, those decisions offer no rationale for the legal conclusion 

arrived at

and, as we have previously held, we are not constrained by the federal judiciary's

decisions when they interpret Montana law. See Boreen v. Christiansen (1994), 267

Mont. 405, 416, 884 P.2d 761, 767. 

 As pointed out in Black's Law Dictionary, the word "settle" has different legal

connotations in different situations: "[T]he term may be employed as meaning to 

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agree,

to approve, to arrange, to ascertain, to liquidate, to come to or reach an 

agreement," and

other things. Black's Law Dictionary 1372 (6th ed. 1990). It is defined in 

Webster's

Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1078 (1984), where relevant, as "to adjust 

differences

or accounts." No definition offered by either party requires that a "settlement" 

resolve

all disputes or all claims between two parties.

 We conclude that the language of õ 33-18-201(6), MCA, imposes no such

requirement. In fact, the reference to "settlements," rather than a "final 

settlement,"

would suggest that the Montana Legislature anticipated that an insurer may have more

than one obligation arise from the same incident. 

 Neither are we persuaded by Guarantee National's argument that because the 1995

Legislature declined to amend the Unfair Claims Practices Act by adding a specific

requirement to pay medical expenses prior to final settlement of claims it can be 

inferred

that no such requirement is intended by the Act. 

 First, the proposed amendment was tabled at the request of its sponsors after 

it was

amended to the point where its supporters concluded that it was less protective than 

the

existing law. Hearing on H.B. 443 before the Montana Senate 1995 Legislature 

Judiciary

Comm. at 4, 54th Legislature Regular Session (1995) (minutes of motion and vote to

table H.B. 443). Second, at least one representative of the insurance industry 

testified

that the amendment was not necessary because the obligation to compensate a third 

party

when liability is reasonably clear already exists. Hearing on H.B. 443 before the

Montana Senate 1995 Legislature Judiciary Comm. at 3, 54th Legislature Regular 

Session

(1995) (describing testimony of Greg VanHorsen, representative of State Farm 

Insurance

Companies). Finally, even if some occurrence during the 1995 Legislature arguably

supported Guarantee National's position, the views of a subsequent legislative body 

form

a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one. See Waterman S.S. 

Corp. v.

United States (1965), 381 U.S. 252, 268, 85 S. Ct. 1389, 1398, 14 L. Ed. 2d 370, 380.

 Furthermore, our interpretation of subsection (6) is more consistent with the

purpose of õ 33-18-201, MCA, which is to assure prompt payment of damages for which

an insurer is clearly obligated. It is also more consistent with this state's 

public policy,

as established by the "mandatory liability protection" provisions of Montana law 

found

at õõ 61-6-301 to -304, MCA. We have held that "[i]t is clear that the mandatory

liability insurance law seeks to protect members of the general public who are 

innocent

victims of automobile accidents." Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis (1988), 231 Mont. 166,

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170, 752 P.2d 166, 169. 

 One of the most significant obligations that innocent victims of automobile

accidents incur and for which mandatory liability insurance laws were enacted, is the

obligation to pay the costs of medical treatment. If the insurer has no obligation 

to pay

those expenses in a timely fashion, even though liability is reasonably clear, then 

the

protection provided by Montana's mandatory liability laws would be of little value. 

 Medical expenses from even minor injuries can be devastating to a family of

average income. The inability to pay them can damage credit and, as alleged in this 

case,

sometimes preclude adequate treatment and recovery from the very injuries caused. 

Just

as importantly, the financial stress of being unable to pay medical expenses can 

lead to

the ill-advised settlement of other legitimate claims in order to secure a benefit 

to which

an innocent victim of an automobile accident is clearly entitled. We conclude that 

this

is not what was intended by the Montana Legislature when mandatory liability 

insurance

laws and unfair claims practice laws were enacted. 

 We also conclude that the leveraging of undisputed claims in order to settle

disputed claims is exactly what the Montana Legislature sought to prohibit when it

enacted õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, of the Unfair Claims Practices Act. We conclude that

our holding in Juedeman does not control the outcome in the case and that language 

from

Juedeman which appears to be inconsistent with this holding was dicta and unnecessary

to our conclusion in that case.

 In Juedeman, the plaintiff, whose son was seriously injured in a one-vehicle

accident, demanded payment of the insured's policy limits for his injuries. The 

insurer

conditioned payment on her release of any future loss of consortium claim. She sued 

the

insurer for bad faith pursuant to õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, on the grounds that the 

insurer's

condition constituted "leveraging" in violation of that section. We held that she 

had not

established a claim as a matter of law because the insurer agreed to pay the policy 

limits

in exchange for a release of all claims related to her son's bodily injury. We 

based our

conclusion on the district court's holding that the plaintiff's loss of consortium 

claim

arose from her son's injury and, therefore, was subject to the same per person policy

limits for bodily injury. We held that since she did not contest that district 

court ruling,

the insurer could not have violated subsection (13) because it had a right to 

condition

payment of the policy limits on a release of all claims for which the limits were 

being

paid. See Juedeman, 253 Mont. at 281, 833 P.2d at 193. Those facts do not apply to

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this case.

 However, the Juedeman opinion gratuitously included the following additional

language, which was unnecessary to its primary conclusion:

Leveraging under õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, requires an insurer's

manipulation of two coverages. The insurer must withhold prompt

settlement of a reasonably clear liability claim under one coverage, in order

to influence a claim arising out of another coverage. Here, Erich's bodily

injury claim and Juedeman's claim for loss of consortium fall within the

same policy coverage. Here, Farmers Union offered to settle both claims

falling under that coverage for the maximum amount allowed under the

policy. Thus, we hold the court properly found that Farmers Union did not

violate õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, and properly granted defendant's motion for

summary judgment.

Juedeman, 253 Mont. at 281, 833 P.2d at 193 (emphasis added).

 Although our discussion of "coverages," in the context of the facts in Juedeman,

is understandable because of the nature of the policy involved in that case (it 

provided

$100,000 bodily injury per person and $300,000 per occurrence), it has incorrectly 

left

the impression that subsection (13) is inapplicable where payment of one obligation 

due

pursuant to a portion of coverage is withheld in order to leverage settlement of a

disputed claim made pursuant to the same coverage. That result is clearly not 

warranted

by the plain language of the statute. As pointed out by the dissenting opinion in

Juedeman:

 The majority then goes on to reason that because Erich's claim and

Cindy's claim arose under the same coverage that leveraging did not occur

under subsection (13). However, subsection (13) prohibits leveraging of

a claim "under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to

influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy

coverage." 

Juedeman, 253 Mont. at 285, 833 P.2d at 195 (Trieweiler, J., and Hunt, J., 

dissenting).

 The dissent to Juedeman pointed out that the gratuitous language predicating

subsection (13) on more than one "coverage" was inconsistent with our prior decision 

in

Harris v. American General Life Insurance Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 393, 658 P.2d 1089. 

 In that case, the defendant insurer had issued a $10,000 life

insurance policy to the plaintiff's son. An additional $10,000 of coverage

was available if the son died by accident. Plaintiff's son died under

circumstances that suggested the possibility of suicide.

 The defendant sent plaintiff a check for the amount due under the

basic policy, but conditioned payment on a release of claims due under the

accidental death portion of the policy. Plaintiff filed suit for payment under

both portions and for punitive damages. After suit was filed . . . defendant

mailed the check back to the plaintiff without the restrictive endorsement. 

However, after a jury trial a verdict was returned denying recovery under

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the accidental benefits portion of the policy, but awarding $30,000 in

punitive damages to the plaintiff. This Court sustained the punitive damage

award under the same õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, with which we are

concerned in this case. We did so based on the defendant's refusal to pay

under an undisputed portion of the policy without a release from liability

under the disputed portion. . . . The controlling facts were that one claim,

which was undisputed, was withheld to leverage resolution of another claim

that was disputed.

Juedeman, 253 Mont. at 286, 833 P.2d at 196 (Trieweiler, J., and Hunt, J., 

dissenting).

 We conclude that õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, applies to an insurer's failure to pay 

one

type of damages for which liability has become reasonably clear in order to influence

settlement of claims for other types of damages made pursuant to the same policy, and

to the extent that there is language in Juedeman which suggests that the claims must 

be

made pursuant to separate types of coverage, that language is overruled.

 For these reasons, we reverse the order and judgment of the District Court and

remand this case to the District Court for entry of a declaratory judgment 

consistent with

this opinion. 

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

Justice Karla M. Gray, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 I concur in the Court's opinion on issue one. I also concur in the result the 

Court

reaches under issue two and its analysis and holding on õ 33-18-201(13), MCA. 

Because

this case can be resolved on the basis of õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, I would not address õ

33-18-201(6), MCA. The Court having done so, however, I must respectfully dissent

from the Court's interpretation of õ 33-18-201(6), MCA, and its result thereunder.

 With regard to õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, the Court presents a comprehensive

analysis of the statute, the inapplicability of Juedeman to this case, and the 

inherent

irrelevance of both House Bill No. 433--which was not enacted--and its legislative

history. The Court then concludes that õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, applies to an insurer's

failure to pay one type of damages for which liability has become reasonably clear in

order to influence settlement of a claim for another type of damages made pursuant 

to the

same policy. This conclusion is little more than a "plain meaning" approach to the

wording of õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, which clearly provides for--and establishes

requirements pertaining to the settlement of--claims under different portions of the

insurance policy coverage. Given the nature of this action and the record before 

us, the

Court quite properly does not hold--or even suggest--that Guarantee National's 

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liability

for the medical expenses submitted to date by Ridley is reasonably clear at this 

point or

that Guarantee National has failed to promptly settle such a claim for medical 

expenses

on which its liability is reasonably clear in order to influence settlements under 

other

portions of the insurance policy coverage. I concur in the Court's opinion with 

regard

to õ 33-18-201(13), MCA.

 With regard to the Court's interpretation of õ 33-18-201(6), MCA, however, I

cannot agree. As discussed above, õ 33-18-201(13), MCA, provides a sufficient basis

on which to resolve this case; I would do so and stop there. Since the Court 

addresses

subsection (6), MCA, and in my view does so erroneously, it is appropriate that I 

state

the basis of my dissent from that portion of the Court's opinion.

 The Court advances a relatively abbreviated interpretation of the language

contained in õ 33-18-201(6), MCA, essentially concluding that the use of the plural

"settlements," rather than the singular "settlement," means that the Legislature 

anticipated

that an insurer may have more than one obligation arise from the same incident. I 

submit

that the Legislature's "anticipation" vis-a-vis more than one obligation was 

addressed by

the Legislature in subsection (13) of õ 33-18-201, MCA, as discussed above, but that 

the

mere use of the plural "settlements" in subsection (6) does not relate to that

"anticipation." Indeed, the plural usages throughout õ 33-18-201, MCA, follow 

clearly-

-and, in my view, only--from the introductory portion of that statute, which is the 

"with

such frequency" language not at issue here. That is, õ 33-18-201, MCA, begins by

providing that "[n]o person may, with such frequency as to indicate a general 

business

practice, do any of the following. . . ." It is this "frequency" language which 

results in

the remainder of the statute being written in the plural form, as to "coverages," 

"claims,"

"settlements" and the like. The plural language does not, in my view, support the

Court's implicit interpretation that subsection (6) is essentially identical to 

subsection 

(13). Indeed, if that were so, there would be no need for two different subsections 

in the

same statute, containing substantially dissimilar language. 

 It is my view that subsection (6) requires an insurer to attempt in good faith 

to

effectuate a prompt, fair, equitable and final settlement of an overall claim for 

which

liability has become reasonably clear. Subsection (13), on the other hand, does not

address a good faith attempt to fully and finally settle an entire claim. Instead, 

it

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requires an insurer to promptly settle a claim under one portion of the policy 

coverage,

if liability is reasonably clear, rather than use that unsettled claim as leverage 

in settling

claims under other portions of the coverage. Moreover, in my opinion, the Court's

"purpose" and "policy" discussions within the context of its analysis of õ 33-18-201

(6),

MCA, are more consistent with giving subsection (6) a meaning different from 

subsection

(13). 

 At the bottom line, however, and notwithstanding my disagreement with the

Court's interpretation of õ 33-18-201(6), MCA, I agree that this is an appropriate 

case

for declaratory judgment. I also agree that such a judgment should be entered in 

Ridley's

favor on the basis of õ 33-18-201(13), MCA. On those matters, I join the Court in

reversing the District Court.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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