J-S12001-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.J., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2400 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered October 27, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000518-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.Z.A.J., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2401 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered October 27, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000105-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.J., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2402 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered October 29, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000522-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.Z.Z.J., A 

MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
J-S12001-22

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APPEAL OF: J.C., FATHER

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: No. 2403 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered October 27, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000501-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.J., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2404 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered October 27, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000521-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.A.-S.J., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2405 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered October 27, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000502-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 6, 2022
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J.C. (Father) appeals from the decrees entered on October 27, 2021, 

which granted the petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human

Services (DHS), to involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his minor 

children, Z.Z.Z.J. (Child 1), born in April of 2011, Z.A.-S.J. (Child 2), born in 

November of 2008, and Z.Z.A.J. (Child 3), born in July of 2007, (collectively 

Children). Father also appeals from the orders that changed the goals for 

Children to adoption.1 Additionally, Father’s counsel has filed a petition to 

withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, 

we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the termination decrees 

and the goal change orders. 

The Anders brief filed by Father’s counsel contains a summary of the 

factual and procedural history of this matter as follows:

The family became known to DHS on 12/24/15 after a 

General Protective Services Report (GPS) of medical neglect for 

one of the [C]hildren. The report was determined to be valid.

Thereafter, DHS was unable to meet with the Mother[2] and the 

[C]hildren and could not access the family home. On 2/3/16, 

another GPS Report was received about another [C]hild 

experiencing academic difficulties in the first grade and missing 

school. This report was validated. On 3/3/16, DHS filed a Motion 

to Compel Cooperation which was granted, and an Order was 

entered requiring the Mother to permit DHS to enter the home 

and that the [C]hildren appear for the next court date. On 

____________________________________________

1

In the captions above, each child is also identified by the initials Z.J. Due to 

this confusion, we identify each Child, as did the trial court, using the terms 

Child 1, Child 2 and Child 3. 

2 Mother is not a party to this appeal. 
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4/11/16, DHS filed an Urgent Dependency Petition for all three 

[C]hildren. The Petition for one [C]hild was discharged but two of 

the [C]hildren were adjudicated dependent. On 4/18/16, an Order 

of Protective Custody (OPC) was obtained for two of the [C]hildren 

and they were placed with the Maternal Cousin. On 8/1/16, the 

two [C]hildren were reunified with the Mother with DHS

supervision in the home. The Dependency Petitions were 

discharged. On 2/1/18, the family was back in court for truancy 

after the School District of Philadelphia filed Petitions for two of 

the [C]hildren who had been missing excessive days of school. 

The [c]ourt ordered the [C]hildren to attend school and also 

ordered DHS to file Dependency Petitions. On 3/23/18, 

allegations were received that the Appellant (Father) had suffered 

a traumatic brain injury and that Mother was using the

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits to buy drugs. The 

[C]hildren were also still truant. On 3/26/18, pursuant to the 

court order Dependency Petitions were filed for the two truant 

[C]hildren. On 4/6/18, the two truant [C]hildren were adjudicated 

dependent. DHS supervision was implemented in the home. After 

a successful period of supervision, on 11/2/18, the [c]ourt 

terminated supervision of the two truant [C]hildren. On 3/6/19, 

a Child Protective Services (CPS) Report was received regarding 

the third [C]hild who was diagnosed with Obstructive Sleep

Apnea. There were allegations that the Mother had failed to obtain 

medical treatment for the [C]hild. This report was indicated, and 

Mother was identified as the perpetrator of abuse. In response to 

the indicated report DHS filed another Urgent Petition.

Subsequently, DHS learned that the other two [C]hildren were still 

truant from school. On 4/12/19, the [c]ourt adjudicated the third 

[C]hild dependent and awarded Temporary Legal Custody (TLC) 

to the Maternal Grandmother with DHS supervision in the home. 

After the adjudication of the third [C]hild, DHS learned that

Mother was about to be evicted from her home and the two truant 

[C]hildren had been moved into the Maternal Cousin’s home.

When DHS visited the Maternal Cousin’s home[,] it was learned 

that Mother had been leaving the [C]hildren home alone with no 

supervision. Another Urgent Petition was filed for the two truant 

[C]hildren on 6/26/19[,] and at the Adjudicatory Hearing on 

7/19/19 the two [C]hildren were adjudicated dependent. Father 

failed to attend this adjudicatory hearing. On 8/8/19 at a 

permanency review hearing, the [C]hildren were ordered to 

remain as committed and placed. The [c]ourt ordered the referral 

of the Appellant Father to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for a 

forthwith drug screen and three random screens prior to the next 
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court date. Once again Father did not attend the hearing. 

Visitation was ordered for the Father should he avail himself to 

DHS. On 10/3/19, a Single Case Plan (SCP) meeting was held. 

The objectives set forth for the Father were to maintain contact 

with the Community Umbrella Agency (CUA), attend CEU for drug 

screens and an assessment, attend parenting classes, [and] 

participate in supervised visitation. Father did not attend the 

meeting. On 12/13/19, at the permanency review hearing, it was 

announced that Mother had not been compliant and that she 

planned to sign voluntary relinquishments of her parental rights.

Father failed to attend this hearing as well and the [c]ourt 

continued to order the implementation of his objectives. At the 

next hearing on 3/6/20, the [c]ourt found that the Father was still 

non-compliant with his objectives. At the next permanency review 

hearing, Father once again failed to appear, although the [c]ourt 

did find that the Father was minimally compliant. At this 

hearing[,] the [c]ourt ordered a dual diagnosis assessment for the 

Father and also ordered an Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) 

referral so that Father could receive necessary services. There 

was a revised SCP on 10/14/20[,] and once again Father failed to 

participate in the SCP meeting. At that point, one of the 

[C]hildren’s goals [was] changed to adoption while the other two 

[C]hildren’s goals were changed to Permanent Legal Custody 

(PLC). On 1/8/21, a permanency review hearing was held 

virtually due to the Covid pandemic and once again Father failed 

to appea[r]. He was once again found to be minimally compliant 

with his objectives and once again the objectives were court

ordered. On 2/24/21, DHS filed a Petition To Terminate Father’s 

Parental Rights as to one child only. Another permanency review 

hearing was held virtually on 4/28/21 and Father failed to appear. 

On 7/21/21, another permanency review hearing was held and 

this time the Father appeared. The [c]ourt found that there was 

no compliance by the Father with his objectives and that there 

was no progress by the Father in alleviating the circumstances 

that necessitated the placement of his [C]hildren. Father’s SCP 

objectives were once again court ordered. On 9/3/21, there

having been no compliance by the Father, DHS filed Petitions to 

Terminate Father’s Parental Rights as to the two remaining 

[C]hildren. The Goal Change/Termination trial was held on 

10/27/21 and Father failed to attend. After hearing evidence in 

the case, the [c]ourt found that there was clear and convincing 

evidence to involuntarily terminate the Father’s parental rights as 

to all three [C]hildren under 2511(a)(1), (2) and 2511(b) and to 

change their permanency goals to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 
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[§] 6351. Predecessor Counsel filed timely appeals and 

[Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) Statements challenging the change of the 

permanency goals to adoption. Predecessor Counsel was then 

granted leave to withdraw and on 12/14/21 this counsel was 

appointed to represent Appellant Father on appeal. 

At the Goal Change/Termination trial Salenai Brasswell, 

Case Manager for CUA 7 Turning Points for Children, testified that 

one [C]hild had become involved due to a CPS Report on 3/19/19 

as a result of inadequate attention to the [C]hild’s needs: 

healthcare and hygiene; and because of a lack of parenting skills. 

The [C]hild had an issue with her tonsils. The [C]hild was 

adjudicated on 4/12/19 and TLC was granted to the Maternal 

Grandmother. The other two [C]hildren had become known to 

DHS in 2016 and in 2019 they came into care amidst allegations 

of domestic violence in the home and inadequate attention to their 

basic needs: education and healthcare. On 7/19/19, these two 

[C]hildren were adjudicated dependent. All of the [C]hildren had 

remained in care since [their] adjudications. A Single Case Plan 

was developed for the family. Father’s objectives were to keep in 

contact with the CUA Case Manager weekly, to attend CEU for 

random screens, to attend ARC for parenting and housing and to 

participate in supervised visitation. CUA communicated the 

objectives to the Father in person. Father never completed any

of his objectives, although for a brief period he was at an in[-

]patient program. Ms. Braswell rated Father’s compliance with his 

Single Case Plan objectives as minimal and his progress towards 

alleviating the circumstances that brought his [C]hildren into care 

as none. Ms. Braswell also opined that while there was a bond 

between the Father and his [C]hildren due to his sporadic visits 

with them, the bond was not a parental bond. None of the 

[C]hildren looked to the Father for their daily physical, medical or 

emotional needs, rather they looked to the resource parent to 

fulfill their needs. Ms. Braswell further opined that it would not 

cause the [C]hildren irreparable harm to terminate the Father’s 

parental rights and that it would be in all of the [C]hildren’s best 

interests to free the [C]hildren for adoption[.] 

On cross-examination, Father’s counsel brought out that 

Father had been visiting sporadically and that he would still be 

able to see the [C]hildren after termination of his parental rights 

and adoption[.]
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During the trial Judge Fernandes specifically inquired of the 

Child Advocate TPR [(Termination of Parental Rights)] Counsel 

about whether she had met with the [C]hildren, who were 13, 12 

and 10, and what needed to be reported. The Child Advocate 

indicated that she had met with the [C]hildren twice, that the 

[C]hildren stated that they all wanted to remain where they were, 

and that if they couldn’t go home to the parents, they were happy

to be adopted. The [C]hildren also reported that they did want 

to continue to visit with their parents and that they did want to 

continue with phone contact[.] 

The testimony of the CUA Case Manager Braswell 

constituted the proof from which Judge Fernandes reached his 

conclusions. No other witnesses were presented by DHS or the 

parents. Father did not appear at the hearing and Father’s counsel 

presented no evidence. At the conclusion of the case, Judge

Fernandes ruled that there was clear and convincing evidence to 

terminate the Father’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(1) 

and (2) and 2511(b) and that it was in the best interests of all 

three [C]hildren to change the goals to adoption. The [c]ourt cited 

that while there was a bond with the Father it was not a parental 

bond and that there would be no irreparable harm to the 

[C]hildren by terminating the Father's parental rights[.] 

Anders brief at 9-14 (citations to the record omitted). 

Initially, as noted above, Father’s counsel filed an Anders brief and a 

petition to withdraw. Before reaching the merits of Father’s appeal, we must 

first address counsel’s request to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 

874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“‘When faced with a purported Anders

brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without 

first passing on the request to withdraw.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1997)). “In In re V.E., ... 611 A.2d 

1267 ([Pa. Super.] 1992), this Court extended the Anders principles to 
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appeals involving the termination of parental rights.” In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 

3 (Pa. Super. 2014). To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must: 

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the 

[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel 

or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy 

of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 

2009)). With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform 

the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court 

has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the 

letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth 

v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, an Anders brief must comply with the following 

requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. 
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In the instant matter, counsel has filed a petition to withdraw, certifying 

that he has reviewed the case and determined that Father’s appeal is wholly 

frivolous. Counsel also has filed a brief that includes a summary of the history 

and facts of the case, issues raised by Father, and counsel’s assessment of 

why those issues are frivolous, with citations to relevant legal authority. 

Attached to his petition to withdraw, counsel has included a copy of his letter 

to Father, advising him that he may obtain new counsel or raise additional 

issues pro se. Accordingly, counsel has substantially complied with the 

requirements of Anders and Santiago. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 

A.3d 777, 781 (Pa. Super. 2015) (observing that substantial compliance with 

the Anders requirements is sufficient). We, therefore, may proceed to review 

the issues outlined in the Anders brief. In addition, we must “conduct an 

independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional, nonfrivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 

A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote omitted). 

Counsel’s Anders brief lists the following in the section entitled 

Statement of Questions Involved:

1. Is there anything in the record that might arguably support 

the appeal that obviates a conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous and that would support the Father’s contention 

that it would not be in the best interests of his [C]hildren to 

change the permanency goals to adoption or to terminate 

his parental rights under the Adoption Act?

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

changed the permanency goals to adoption in the absence 

of clear and convincing evidence that reunification is not 
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viable and that adoption would best serve the [C]hildren’s 

needs and welfare?

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by involuntarily 

terminating the Father’s parental rights under Sections 

2511(a)(1), (2) and 2511(b)? 

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

sufficiently inquire about the [C]hildren’s desire to maintain 

an ongoing legal relationship with the Father and to ensure 

that the [C]hildren understood the termination of Father’s 

parental rights and wanted to be adopted?

Anders brief at 7-8. 

We begin with Father’s claim that the goal for Children should not have 

been changed to adoption in that this change “was not in the best interest for 

[Children’s] intellectual, moral and spiritual well[-]being.” Id. at 22. Father

also contends that he was making progress toward alleviating some of the 

conditions necessitating Children’s placement and that he has a bond with 

Children. 

In addressing this issue, we are guided by the following:

In cases involving a court’s order changing the placement goal ... 

to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. In re 

N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. 2006). To hold that the trial 

court abused its discretion, we must determine its judgment was 

“manifestly unreasonable,” that the court disregarded the law, or 

that its action was “a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” 

Id. (quoting In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967, 973 (Pa. Super. 2004)). 

While this Court is bound by the facts determined in the trial court, 

we are not tied to the court’s inferences, deductions and 

conclusions; we have a “responsibility to ensure that the record 

represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge 

has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record.” In re 

A.K., 906 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 2006). Therefore, our scope 

of review is broad. Id.
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In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

Furthermore, this Court has stated: 

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent 

children are controlled by the Juvenile Act[, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-

65], which was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal 

Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”). The policy underlying 

these statutes is to prevent children from languishing indefinitely 

in foster care, with its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and 

long-term parental commitment. Consistent with this underlying 

policy, the 1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as required by 

the ASFA, place the focus of dependency proceedings, including 

change of goal proceedings, on the child. Safety, permanency, 

and well-being of the child must take precedence over all other 

considerations, including the rights of the parents. 

In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations and footnotes 

omitted; emphasis in original). 

Pursuant to section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when considering a 

petition for goal change for a dependent child, the juvenile court is to consider, 

inter alia: (1) the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the 

extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which 

necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of 

the current placement goal for the children; and (5) a likely date by which the 

goal for the child might be achieved. In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 977. The best 

interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial 

court. Id. at 978. As this Court has held, “a child’s life simply cannot be put 

on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the 
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responsibilities of parenting.” In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 824 (quoting In re 

Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

The trial court’s opinion provides the following factual determinations 

and reasoning in response to Father’s argument concerning the goal change 

for Children to adoption:

Father’s SCP objectives throughout the life of the case included: 

complying with court orders, contacting CUA on a weekly basis, 

attend[ing] CEU for random drug screens, attend[ing] ARC for 

parenting and housing programs, and participat[ing] in visitation. 

Father was aware of his objectives, having been informed of them 

by the CUA Case Manager in person. Father did not maintain 

consistent contact with the CUA Case Manager throughout the life 

of the case. The CUA Case Manager referred Father for a dual

diagnosis assessment; Father did not complete the assessment. 

The CUA Case Manager consistently sent Father to complete 

random drug screens at the CEU; Father did not complete any 

random screens. Father claimed to be involved in a drug and 

alcohol treatment program at the hearing prior the TPR trial, but 

the CUA Case Manager never received any documentation of a 

treatment plan or confirmation of his enrollment. The CUA Case 

Manager referred Father to ARC for housing and parenting 

programs; Father did not complete either program. The CUA Case 

Manager did not have information as to whether Father currently 

has safe and stable housing. Father’s visits never graduated past 

supervised at the agency. Father also did not consistently attend 

visits throughout the life of the case. Father attended a visit on 

October 6 but had not been complying with confirming Wednesday 

visits on Mondays as required. The CUA Case Manager reported 

that Children become upset when they do not have visits with their 

parents and that this disrupts their daily lives. Father’s visits were 

consistent in August 2021, but in September 2021 Father became 

inconsistent again. The CUA Case Manager testified that Child 2 

and [Child] 3 share a bond with Father, but it is not a parental 

bond. The CUA Case Manager testified that it was in all three 

Children’s best interest to be released for adoption. Reasonable 

efforts were made to assist Father with his SCP objectives. 

However, after thirty-one months, there had been no progress in 

alleviating the circumstances necessitating Children’s removal 

from Father’s care. The record established by clear and
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convincing evidence that the court’s change of permanency goal 

from reunification to adoption was proper.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 1/14/2022, at 21-22 (citations to the record 

omitted). Our review of the record reveals that it supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that changing the goals for Children to adoption would best serve 

their needs and welfare. Thus, Father is not entitled to any relief as to the 

change of goal to adoption. 

We next address Father’s issue concerning the termination of his 

parental rights. We review such an order in accordance with the following 

standard:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must 

stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury 

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879 

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented 
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and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts 

in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights 

is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, 

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination 

of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. 

With regard to Section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts 

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:
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Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we 

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in 

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent 

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

As noted above in its opinion, the trial court terminated Father’s parental 

rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b). We need only agree with 

the trial court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as section 

2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under 

sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent.

***
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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations 

omitted). 

Father contends that he is “trying his best to cure the conditions that 

led to the placement of his [C]hildren and that he would someday become a 

good parent.” Anders brief at 24. He further argues that he is working 

toward completing his objectives and that he has a bond with Children. Father 
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also complains that no services were provided relating to his brain injury. In 

response to Father’s arguments relating to section 2511(a)(2), the trial court 

explained its findings and conclusions in a discussion similar to its goal change 

reasoning, stating:

Children have been involved with DHS on multiple occasions, but 

the most recent set of dependency issues began in 2019. Child 3 

has been continuously in DHS since April 2019. Child 1 and 2 

have been continuously in DHS care since July 2019. Children 

were adjudicated dependent and committed to the care of DHS 

due to inadequate attention to Children’s basic, medical, and 

hygiene needs, as well as educational and domestic violence 

concerns. Father’s SCP objectives throughout the life of the case 

included: complying with court orders, contacting CUA on a 

weekly basis, attend[ing] CEU for random drug screens, 

attend[ing] ARC for parenting and housing programs, and 

participat[ing] in visitation. Father was aware of his objectives, 

having been informed of them by the CUA Case Manager in 

person. Father did not maintain consistent contact with the CUA 

Case Manager throughout the life of the case. The CUA Case 

Manager referred Father for a dual diagnosis assessment; Father 

did not complete the assessment. The CUA Case Manager 

consistently sent Father to complete random drug screens at the 

CEU; Father did not complete any random screens. Father 

claimed to be involved in a drug and alcohol treatment program 

at the hearing prior [to] the TPR trial, but the CUA Case Manager 

never received any documentation of a treatment plan or 

confirmation of his enrollment. The CUA Case Manager referred 

Father to ARC for housing and parenting programs, [but] Father 

did not complete either program. The CUA Case Manager did not 

have information as to whether Father currently has safe and 

stable housing. Father’s visits never graduated past supervised 

at the agency. Father also did not consistently attend visits 

throughout the life of the case. Father attended a visit on October 

6 but had not been complying with confirming Wednesday visits 

on Mondays as required. The CUA Case Manager reported that 

Children become upset when they do not have visits with their 

parents and that this disrupts their daily lives. Father’s visits were 

consistent in August 2021, but in September 2021 Father became

inconsistent again. The CUA Case Manager testified that Child 2 

and 3 share a bond with Father, but it is not a parental bond. 
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Children do not turn to Father for their daily medical or emotional 

needs. Children also do not turn to Father for safety and stability, 

care or comfort. 

The CUA Case Manager reported Father was minimally compliant 

with his SCP objectives and no progress had been made to 

alleviating the circumstances necessitating Children’s dependency

placement. Father attended only one court hearing throughout 

the life of the case[,] ... did not attend the TPR hearing to provide 

evidence or testimony and was aware of his SCP objectives. 

Father has had ample opportunity to put himself in a position to 

adequately parent and care for Children, but his repeated and 

continued incapacity has not been mitigated. Father has displayed 

an inability or unwillingness to remedy the causes of his 

incapacity. Father is unable to [meet] Children’s basic needs. The 

testimony of the CUA Case Manager was credible. Father has 

demonstrated an unwillingness to acknowledge or remedy the 

causes of his incapacity to parent in order to provide Children with 

the essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for 

their physical and mental well-being. Termination under 23 

Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2) was proper.

TCO at 14-15 (citation to the record omitted). With regard to section 2511(b), 

the trial court explained: 

Children also do not turn to Father for safety and stability, care or 

comfort. Child 3 is involved in autism services and is doing well 

in her kinship home. The CUA Case Manager testified it would not 

do any irreparable harm to terminate Father’s parental rights to 

Child 3. Child 3 looks to her kinship parent to meet all of her

needs and views [her] as her parent, not Father. The CUA Case

Manager testified similarly as to Child 2 and [Child] 1, in that it 

would also not cause irreparable harm to them to terminate 

Father’s parental rights. The trial court found that there was a 

bond between Father and Children, but it was not a parental bond. 

The trial court noted that due to the Children being slightly older,

the court took no issue with Children continuing to have 

supervised contact with Father, but that termination of parental 

rights was still in Children’s best interest. The record establishes 

by clear and convincing evidence that termination would not sever 

an existing and beneficial relationship between Father and 

Children. The trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights 
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to Children under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b) was proper. 

Id. at 20 (citations to the record omitted). Again, after a thorough review of 

the record in this matter, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse it 

discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 

2511(a)(2) and (b). The testimony provided at the termination/goal change 

hearing supports the court’s findings and conclusions as to Children’s needs 

and welfare. Children will not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental 

rights are terminated. 

Accordingly, our independent review of Father’s claims demonstrates 

that they do not entitle him to relief. Moreover, our review of the record does 

not reveal any non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel. See Flowers, 113 

A.3d at 1250. Therefore, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. We also

affirm the trial court’s decrees terminating Father’s parental rights and the 

orders changing Children’s goals to adoption. 

Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 

Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/6/2022