For the reasons stated above, American Eagle’s motion for summary judgmentis GRANTED
and Christner’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice, terminating the case, All other pending
motions are terminated as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sf de Lad : 4
Dated e Honofgéle William J. Hibbler

13



position as ground support supervisor, but never informed American Eagle that he was seeking
reinstatement to his position as an accommodation for his disability. Because of the incident with
Ishak, American Eagle declined to place Christner in a supervisory position. After failing to land
another position within the company, American Eagle terminated Christner in July 1999 at the
conclusion of his medical leave.

Christner had filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) on July 10, 1998, a year prior to his termination. In his charge, Christner
complained that American Eagle: (1) harassed him after his 1996 injury; (2) discriminated against
him based on his disability when it demoted him in April 1997; and (3) refused to accommodate his
disability when it failed to reinstate him as a ground support supervisor or comparable management
position in March 1998 when his doctor cleared him to work light duty. Christner did not indicate
in his July 1998 EEOC charge that American Eagle had retaliated against him. After receiving a
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Christner filed this suit alleging that American Eagle refused to
accommodate his disability when his doctor cleared him to return to light duty in March 1998 and
that American Eagle retaliated against him for filing a claim with the EEOC by refusing to restore
him to a ground support supervisor position.

Il. Standard of Review

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary
judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, ifany, show that there is no genuine issues as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Anderson v, Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Bragg v. Navistar Int'l Trans, Corp., 164F.3d
373 (7th Cir, 1998). In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the Court construes the
facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92. F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 1996).



Christner alleges merely that he cannot engage in sexual relations in certain positions. An HIV-
positive woman who risks transmitting the disease to a potential child or her spouse is substantially
limited in the life activity of sexual reproduction or sexual relations. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
Buta mere change in the frequency of sexual relations is not substantially limiting. Contreras, 237
F.3d at 764. And an impairment that affects only a narrow category of jobs does not substantially
limit the major life activity of working. Peters, 311 F.3d at 843; Contreras, 237 F.3d at 764-65;
Sanchez y, Llenderson, 188 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 1999); Lieson v. City of Shelbyville, 153 F.3d
805, 808 (7th Cir, 1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630,2(j). Finally, Christner offers no evidence to demonstrate
that the disruption of his sleeping habits affect his day-to-day activities. Cf Steel v. Thiokol Corp.,
241 F.3d 1248, 2154 (10th Cir. 2001). The limitations about which Christner complains simply do
not rise to the level required by the ADA to be considered “substantially limiting.”

Christner also argues that his doctors sent American Eagle notices of his physical
impairment, including “disability certificates,” and thus he is an individual with a record of a
disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), and that American Eagle regarded him as having a disability,
42 U.S.C, § 12102(2)(C). The fact that Christner’s doctors sent American Eagle notices of
Christner’s visits, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate that it regarded him as being
disabled. Gorbitz v. Corvilla, Inc., 196 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1999). The “regarded as" prong is
fulfilled only if either "(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity
mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major
life activities." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). In other words, “if the
condition that is the subject of the employer's belief is not substantially limiting, and the employer
does not believe that it is, then there is no violation of the ADA under the 'regarded as' prong of the
statute.” Mack v. Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 781-82 (7th Cir.2002). As explained above,

Christner has not pointed to any evidence to show that his condition is substantially limiting and

further failed to submit any evidence to show that the employer believed that it was. Although the



“discriminate” includes not only the disparate treatment of an employee because of that disability,
but also the failure to make reasonable accommodations to the physical limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Rauen v. United States Tobacco Mfg., Lid.,
319 F.3d 891, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2003). Christner raises only a failure to accommodate claim.
American Eagle argues that it is entitled to summary judgment for three reasons: (1) Christner’s
failure to accommodate claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) Christner is not
disabled for purposes of the ADA; and (3) American Eagle did not fail to accommodate Christner.

American Eagle first argues that Christner’s claims are untimely. In order for a plaintiff to
file a suit under the ADA, the plaintiff must file the charge with the EEOC within 300 days from
when the alleged discrimination occurred. Conley v. Village of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703 (7th Cir.
2000); Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d 1021, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000). The statute of limitations runs
from the date the plaintiff learns of the injury or of the wrongful act by the defendant, Thelen v.
Marc's Big Boy Corp. 64 F.3d 264, 267 (7th Cir, 1995). Christner filed his claim with the EEOC
on July 10, 1998. But many of the discriminatory acts about which Christner complains occurred
more than a year before the date he filed his EEOC claim. In his EEOC claim, Christner complains
about harassment that occurred in March 1996—more than two years prior to the filing of his claim.
He also complains about his demotion that occurred in April 1997—more than a year prior to the
filing of his claim.

Christner admits that the 1996 and 1997 acts are not the subject of this suit. (Pl. Mem. Opp.
Summ. J. at 4), Instead, Christner asserts that his claim of discrimination is based on American
Eagle’s alleged March 1998 refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation to allow him to return
to his position as a ground support supervisor. American Eagle argues that any refusal to allow him
to return to the position of a ground support supervisor is not a fresh act of discrimination and
because it removed Christner from his management position in April 1997, not March 1998,
American Eagle’s argument is not convincing, After American Eagle demoted Christner, it offered

him the opportunity to apply for other jobs. According to Christner, he desired to return to his



‘The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact and that the judgmentas a matter of law should be granted in the moving party’s favor.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Larimer v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 137 F.3d 497
(7th Cir, 1998). A question of material fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of
an issue in the case. The Supreme Court has instructed that the facts which are considered material
in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling the given case or issue,
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party
“must go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine
[material] issue for trial. Jd.

TI, Analysis
A, American Airlines and AMR Corp.

As noted earlier, Christner sued not only his former employer, American Eagle, but two
related, corporate entities—American Airlines and AMR. American Airlines and AMR have filed
a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Christner was employed by American Eagle,
and not by them. The ADA prohibits discrimination by employers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
Christner, however, was not an employee of either American Airlines or AMR; he was an employce
of American Eagle. Christner submits no evidence to support a claim that American Airlines and
AMR can be held liable under any of the theories of imposing liability on corporate parents or
affiliates that the Seventh Circuit announced in Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d937, 941 (7th Cir.
1999). Indeed, Christner ignores American Airlines’ and AMR’s motion and puts forth no argument
ag to why either should be liable when he was employed by American Eagle. Because Christner was
employed by American Eagle and not American Airlines or AMR, the Court GRANTS summary
judgment in favor of American Airlines and AMR.

B. Discrimination Claim
The ADA prohibits an employer from “discriminating against a qualified individual with a

disability because of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. §12112(a), The ADA provides that the term



prevent him from playing sports, carrying groceries, having sexual intercourse in “certain positions,”
adjusting the collar of his shirt, sleeping without pain, and working as a mechanic.

For the most part, Christner’s alleged limitations do not rise to the level of a major life
activity. The Supreme Court has ruled that a person is not disabled unless their impairment restricts
him or her from doing activitics of central importance to daily life. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams 534 U.S. 184, 192 (2002). For example, participating in sports or carrying groceries are
not major life activities because they are not of central importance to daily life. Moore, 221 F.3d at
951. Although performing manual tasks, Zoyota Motor Mjg., Ky., Inc., 534 US. at 200-01, lifting,
Mack y. Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2002), working, Contreras, 237 F.3d at 762,
sleeping, Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1999), and sexual reproduction or relations,
Bragdon y. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998); Contreras, 237 F.3d at 764, are all major life
activities, Christner cannot establish that he is “substantially limited” in performing any of them.
First, in support of his claim, Christner cites not a single piece of evidence, other than his own self-
serving deposition testimony. Cf Stein v. Ashcroft, 284 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 2002) (bald, self-
serving statements in affidavits insufficient to create issue of triable fact); Contreras, 237 F.3dat 764
(same). Christner fails to point to any evidence to demonstrate that he has received or even sought
treatment for any of these limitations. Cf Stein, 284 F.3d at 726 (failure to submit medical
documentation of alleged limitations fatal to plaintiffs complaint).

But even accepting Christner’s self-serving and conclusory assertions, he still cannot be
considered substantially limited in the major life activities of performing manual tasks, lifting,
working, sexual relations, or sleeping. The Supreme Court observed that when addressing the major
life activity of performing manual tasks, “the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable
to perform a variety ef tasks central to most people's daily lives,” not whether the claimant is unable
to perform a specific task. Toyota Motor Mfz., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 200-01. Here Christner alleges

merely that he cannot “adjust the collar of his shirt.” But that is a far cry from not being able to

perform the variety of manual tasks necessary to care for himself’ on a daily basis. Similarly,



“Minute Order Form (96/97)

SNy United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
(

Name of Assigned Jud, ‘Wi i Sitting Judge if Oth
ie Maginrate Judge William J. Hibbler thar Anigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C211 DATE 05/28/2003
CASE Christner v. American Eagle ct al.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e-g., plaintiff, defendane, 3ed party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the
nacure of the motion being presented]

MOTION:
American Eagle’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #13)
American Airlines’s and AMR’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #14)
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
6) ©  Answerbriefto motiondue _. Reply toanswerbrief due _,
(4) a Ruling/Hearingon_esetfor_ at.
(6) a Status hearing [held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on set for at ‘
(6) a Pretrial conference [held/continued to] [set for/re-setfor]on set for at.
(7) Q ‘Trial [set for/re-set forlon___at
(8) a (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto at
(9) Qo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs [by/agreement/pursuant to]
CFRCP4(m) General Rule 21 CFRCP41()(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) @ [Other docket entry] . Enter memorandum opinion and order. For the attached reasons, the Defendants’ motions

to for summary judgment are GRANTED, terminating case. Any other pending motions are terminated as moot.

ay oO [For further detail see order on the reverse side of the original minute order,]

No notices required, advised in open court,

No natives required. number of notices

IMAY 3.02003

docketing deputy initials

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone,

Docketing to mail notices.

Sas

Mail AO 450 forme)

Copy to judge/ magistrate judge.

dave mailed noice
courtroom

yuc deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office sailing deputy initials



1996—long before allegedly becoming disabled, so it cannot possibly be a request to accommodate
his disability. As for Christner’s second request, it is true that he asked American Eagle to restore
him to a position as a ground support supervisor. But he never informed American Eagle that he
wanied a position as a ground support supervisor as an accommodation for an alleged disability. He
believed that American Eagle erred in demoting him and should have restored him to a prior
supervisory position. This is not a request for an accommodation, it is an appeal of a disciplinary
action. Indeed, Christner’s deposition testimony reveals he never told anyone at American Eagle that
he needed help looking for a job that was within any alleged restrictions created by his physical
impainnent. Because Christner never requested any sort of accommodation from American Eagle,
his failure to accommodate claim necessarily fails.

A final word on Christner’s failure to accommodate claim, The Court is well aware of the
oft-quoted mantra that courts do not sit as “super-personnel departments” in discrimination cases.
See, e.g., Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 820 (7th Cir. 2002), But Amcrican Eagle’s decision to
put Christner on medical leave in order to allow him to have an additional two ycars to find a
position within the company strikes the Court, at a minimum, as poor business judgment. Although
American Eagle presents its decision to put Christner on medical leave as an altruistic gesture to
grant a beleaguered and demoted cmployee additional time to find another job, it raises a specter of
doubt concerning American Eagle’s reasons for its actions because it suggests that American Eagle
did perceive Christner to have some sort of disability. If American Eagle belicved that Christner’s
head-butting incident warranted demotion, or even termination, it likely would have been better
served to send that message clearly. At the same time, the entire premise of Christner’s suit rings
false. According to Christner, the April 1997 decision to demote him was a pretext to cover
American Eagle’s discrimination and failure to accommodate him. But this makes no sense.
Christner complains about a failure to accommodate that occurred in March 1998—nearly a year
afier the allegedly pretextual decision to demote him. If Christner truly believed that the April 1997

decision was a pretext to cover American Eagle’s discrimination against him, he ought to have

11



“disability certificates” indicate that Christner was unable to work, they are not conclusive evidence
that Christner was disable, for they are too vague. For instance, the certificates do not specify the
duration Christner would be unable to work. Furthermore, the doctor’s notes, which are fare more
precise than the disability certificates, state that Christner was “unable to perform regular duties.”
Accordingly, the doctor’s record does not provide evidence that Christner was substantially limited
in the life activity of working; instead it demonstrates only that he was unable to perform the tasks
ofa specific job for an indeterminate period of time, which as noted above, is insufficient to establish
that a person is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Because Christner cannot establish that
he is substantially limited in a major lite activity, he is not “disabled” for purposes of the ADA and
cannot prevail on his failure to accommodate claim.

But there is an even more fundamental flaw in Christner’s failure to accommodate claim:
Christner never requested a reasonable accommodation. Generally, an cmployee must request a
reasonable accommodation before the employer’s duty to provide one is triggered. See, e.g,
Jovanovic y. In-Sink-Erator Div, of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 2000);
Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1013
(7th Cir. 1997); Bultemeyer v. ort Wayne Community Schools, 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir.1996)
(observing that employee with mental disability cannot always be expected to ask for an
accommodation); Wilcox v. American Stores, No. 01 C 2138, 2002 WL 31654938, *7 (N.D. Il. Nov.
22, 2002); Houston y. Sidley & Austin, No. 98 C 5559, 2001 WL 1000739, *3 (N.D. Ll. Aug. 28,
2001). Christner argucs that he did request two reasonable accommodations: (1) that American
Eagle provide him with clerical assistance who could help him with his responsibilities as the
Ground Support Director; and (2) that American Eagle restore him to a position as a ramp or ground
support supervisor. These indced are requests, but they are not requests for an accommodation.
First, Christner’s request for a clerical assistant has nothing to do with his disability; Christer never
explains why having a clerical assistant would address the limitations created by his arm injury.

Moreover, Christner requested the assistant shortly after becoming the ground support director in

10



position as a ground support supervisor and could have done so had American Eagle provided a
reasonable accommodation. American Eagle’s alleged refusal to provide such an accommodation
would be a distinct and separate discriminatory act from an allegedly discriminatory decision to
demote him in the first instance. Thus, to the extent that Christner’s claim is for a refusal to
accommodate him after his doctor cleared him to work light duty in March 1998, his claim is not
time barred.

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person with a disability by
refusing to make reasonable accommodations to the physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 572
(7th Cir. 2001). As a threshold requirement in establishing a prima facie case for failure to
accommodate, a plaintiff must establish that he has a disability as defined by the ADA, Moore vy.
J.B. Hunt Trans., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also Wright v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 204 F.3d 727, 730

oe

(7th Cir. 2000). To be substantially limited in general, a person must be “‘either unable to perform
a major life function, or [be] significantly restricted in the duration, manner, or condition under
which the [person] can perform a particular major life activity, as compared to the average person
in the general population.”” Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 843 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 762 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). The
analysis for determining whether a person's impairment substantially limits a major life activity has
three facets: 1) the nature and severity of the impairment; 2) the duration of the impairment; and 3)
the permanent or long-term impact resulting from the impairment. Furnish v. SVI Sys., Ine., 270

F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2002), Christner argues that he is disabled because his 1996 injury

substantially limits his performance of manual tasks because he cannot fully straighten either of his

arms or bend his arms so that he can touch his shoulders. Christner claims his physical limitations



as a ramp supervisor as ‘marginal.’ The 1994 review stated that the Christner, ‘does not take
direction well’ and that he ‘lets emotions get the better of him when dealing under stress.’ More
importantly, Kelleher and Terrazas learned that Christner had previously had charges lodged against
him for improper behavior. In October 1994 Mario Saladino, a mechanic who reported to Christner,
accused Christner of making racially derogatory statements and addressing him with clenched fists.
After considering the evidence from the investigation and based on Christner’s past record, Kelleher
and Terrazas determined that Christner should be demoted from his management position.
Kelleher and Terrazas informed Christner of their decision to demote him and gave him sixty
days to find a non-management position. It is normal practice for American Eagle to provide a
manager with sixty days to find another position within the company when they are demoted from
a management position. Christner challenged his demotion through American Eagle’s internal

appeal procedures. [is appeal was denied after a review of the facts from the April 1997 incident.

But here is the twist that forms the basis of Christner’s claims in this suit. In 1996, Christner
had suffered an on-the-job injury when he fell off the back of a tow truck. Although Christner
required surgery on both arms as a result of the accident, he missed but four days of work and never
requested a medical leave. Kelleher and Terrazas knew about Christner’s 1996 injury, but were not
aware of the nature or extent of those injuries. Nevertheless, Kelleher and Terrazas wanted to ensure
that Christner had ample opportunity to find another position within American Eagle so they decided
to allow Christner to go on medical leave if he did not find a position within the normal sixty day
period. Amcrican Eagle’s medical leave policy allows an employee up to two years to identify a
position that they are physically able to perform before they are terminated. To assist Christner’s
job search, Terrazas informed Christner that he could use the computer in his office to search for a
new position within the company. Christner never used the computer in Terrazas’ office nor did he

apply for another position at American Eagle during the sixty-day period or the additional two-ycar

medical leave. During the medical Icave, Christner did request that he be allowed to return to his



included scheduling employees, addressing payroll issues, scheduling and managing work
completion, processing equipment repair orders, ordering parts, handling billing from outside
vendors, keeping personnel records, procuring vehicles for use in ground support, disposing of
obsolete equipment, disciplining employees and oversceing compliance with OSEIA and EPA rules
in the ground support facility. The majority of Christner’s responsibilities as the ground support
director involved office work.

The single event that led to Christner’s termination occurred on April 9, 1997. On that day,
mechanic Jerry Ishak, an employee whom Christner supervised, returned to work from a medical
leave of absence. Ishak had taken a brief medical leave after he suffered a head injury at work.
Christner did not believe that Ishak had sufficient medical verification to justify the leave.
According to Ishak and at least one other Simmons employee, Christner chastised him in front of
other Simmons employees, calling him pathetic and stating “J don’t know what hurt more, your head
or the pain in my asshole.” Chnistner denies mocking Ishak, but adinits that shortly after seeing Ishak
that morning, he banged his head into a metal file cabinet, leaving a dent in the file cabinct. Ishak
claims that Christner remarked that “[he was] not running to medical.” Christner denies that
statement but admits that he told Ishak, “See, no bump, no bruise, and I’m not taking two weeks off.”

After Christner’s demonstration, Ishak filed a complaint with his union representative,
alleging that he was harassed and intimidated by Christner’s statements and actions. Ishak’s union
representative forwarded his complaint to Kathleen Kelleher, Senior Representative, Employee
Relations for American Eagle at O’Hare. Kelleher along with Christner’s immediate supervisor
Larry Terrazas then conducted an investigation of the April 9 incident, The investigation included
taking witness statements and conducting interviews with the relevant parties including Christner
and Ishak, Two witnesses corroborated the head-butting incident, one of whom corroborated the
derogatory statements that Ishak alleged Chrismer to have made. Kelleher and Terrazas also
reviewed Christner’s employee record, which revealed a less-than-stellar performance history. For

example, in April 1994, Christner received a performance review that rated his overall performance



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTIIERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN CHRISTNER,

DOCKET Ep

MAY 3 9 ns

Plaintiff

v. 02 C 0211

AMERICAN EAGLE AIRLINES, INC,
a Delaware Corporation and
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

a Delaware Corporation, and AMR Corp.

The [Honorable William J. Hibbler

ee

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

John Christner sued his former employer, American Eagle Airlines, Inc., its corporate parent,
AMR Corporation, and an affiliate, American Airlines, Inc., alleging that they failed to accommodate
his disability and retaliated against him for objecting to discrimination in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 1201 ef seg. The Defendants move for summary
judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of all
Defendants.

I. Factual Background

Christner began working for Simmons Airlincs! on December 9, 1991 and was based at
Chicago, Ilinois, O’Hare International Airport. Christner began with Simmons’ flect scrvice and
his responsibilities entailed handling passenger luggage in the bag room. Shortly thereafter,
Christner became the Icad agent in the bag room and from that position Simmons promoted him to
crew chief in the ramp area by October 1992. In October 1994, Christner became a ground support
supervisor, and in 1996 was made the ground support director. As the ground support director,

Christner supervised the day-to-day operations of the ground support facility. His responsibilities

‘ Simmons became American Hagle Airlines in April 1998 as the result of a merger.

1

a



pursued this lawsuit then. In any event, it matters not because, as explained above, Christner has not
pointed to any evidence to demonstrate that he was a qualified individual with a disability, nor has
he pointed to any evidence demonstrating that he even requested a reasonable accommodation, much
less that American Eagle refused to grant onc. Accordingly, American Eagle’s motion for summary
judgment on Christner’s failure to accommodate claim is GRANTED.
Cc. Retaliation Claim

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, Christner must demonstrate that
(1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse cmployment action; (3) he was
meeting his employers legitimate employment expectations; and (4) other similarly situated
employees who did not engage in protected activity were treated more favorably. Stone v. City of
Indianapolis Public Utilities Div., 281 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 2002). Christner’s retaliation claim
is frivolous. Christner alleges that American Eagle did not reverse its decision to demote him and
return him to his management position after he filed his charge of discrimination. But it is well
scttled that a refusal to undo a violation is not a fresh act of discrimination (or retaliation), Delaware
State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); Pitts v. City of Kankakee, [l., 267 F.3d 592, 597 (7th
Cir. 2001). Here, Christner filed a the July 1998 EEOC charge because American Eagle refused to
restore him to a position of ground support supervisor. American Eagle’s continucd refusal to
restore him to that position is not a fresh act of discrimination that can support a retaliation claim.
Otherwise, every filing of an EEOC charge would create a cause of action for retaliation in the event
that the charge was not settled to the satisfaction of the employee. Christner admitted as much in
his deposition, testifying that he was unaware of any actions by American Eagle against him because
ofhis “opposition to discrimination.” Accordingly, American Eagle’s motion for summary judgment
on Christner’s retaliation claim is GRANTED.

TV, Conclusion

12