[Cite as Berdysz v. Boyas Excavating, Inc., 2019-Ohio-1639.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOHN C. BERDYSZ, ET AL., : 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, : 

 No. 107109 

 v. : 

BOYAS EXCAVATING, INC., ET AL., : 

 Defendants-Appellants. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 2, 2019 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CV-09-712005 and CV-14-826410 

 

Appearances: 

David Mack, Garfield Heights Law Director; Reminger Co., L.P.A., 

Holly M. Wilson, Gregory G. Guice, Brian D. Sullivan, for appellants. 

Cochran & Cochran, Edward W. Cochran; Weltman Weinberg & Reis 

Co., L.P.A., David Mullen; Connick Law, L.L.C., Thomas J. Connick; 

Weyls Peters, L.L.C., Timothy J. Weyls; Bisgaard, & Smith L.L.P., Ryan 

K. Rubin, Lewis Brisbois; Kushner & Hamed Co., L.P.A., Christian J. 

Grostic; and Gray, P.L.L.C., Anthony J. Trzaska, for appellees. 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.: 

Defendant-appellant the city of Garfield Heights (“Garfield Heights”) 

appeals the trial court’s decision to deny its claim that they are statutorily immune 
from plaintiffs-appellees’ claim. For the reasons set forth below, this matter is 

affirmed and remanded. 

I. Procedural History and Facts

The facts of this case can be found in Berdysz v. Boyas Excavating, 

Inc., 2017-Ohio-530, 85 N.E.3d 288 (8th Dist.), where Garfield Heights appealed 

the trial court’s December 2015 judgment granting the plaintiffs-appellees’ motion 

to certify this case as a class action. We affirmed the trial court’s decision in Berdysz. 

The facts are as follows: 

The plaintiffs-appellees in this action are John Berdysz, Colette 

Berdysz, John Drab, Marianne Eckhoff, Patricia Masa, Alberta Krupp, 

and Kathleen Tucciarelli. They are all residents of Garfield Heights and 

the gravamen of their complaint is that noxious odors in their 

neighborhood affected the use and enjoyment of their properties. 

In addition to Garfield Heights, numerous other defendants were 

named in the suit. The plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants revolve 

around the development of property in Garfield Heights that previously 

was the site of two landfills from the 1960s through the 1980s. In 2002, 

the waste materials on the property were disturbed as developers 

explored ideas for using the property. In 2005, the property was 

developed into the City View Center Shopping Center (“City View”). 

Residents in the neighborhood immediately surrounding the City View 

property complained of odors, and as a result, the Ohio Environmental 

Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued orders in March 2005 obligating 

Garfield Heights to take actions necessary for full compliance with 

environmental regulations. As of November 2014, most of the tenants 

in the shopping center had vacated; for example, Walmart closed in 

2009 because of “landfill gas intrusion.” 

The plaintiffs originally filed suit in 2009; there were over 85 named 

plaintiffs in the action. See Baczowksi v. Boyas Excavating, Inc., 

Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-09-712005. By 2013, only two plaintiffs 

remained in the action, and they voluntarily dismissed the case. The 

action was refiled in 2014 and is the case at hand. Five plaintiffs filed 
the action, and an amended complaint was filed adding two more 

plaintiffs. 

The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the case as a class action, and the 

trial court held a hearing on the motion. The issue was also extensively 

briefed by the parties. At the time of the hearing, all of the defendants 

except Garfield Heights were in settlement negotiations with the 

plaintiffs, and the city therefore was the only defendant who argued 

against class-action certification. 

The neighborhood that the plaintiffs sought to be included in the class 

action suit was the neighborhood immediately surrounding the City 

View property, and was defined as follows: 

 

The intersection of Transportation Boulevard and 

Antenucci Boulevard as the northwest point to the 

intersection of Antenucci Boulevard and Turney Road as 

the northeast point, south down the center line of Turney 

Road, and bounded on the south by the full length of 

Maple Leaf Drive. 

Further, the borders were defined as follows: 

to the west, the City View property itself; (2) to the north, 

an east-west section of Interstate 480, bounded by hills 

and barrier and walls; (3) to the west, Turney Road, a 

major north-south thoroughfare; and (4) to the south, an 

area of land, south of Maple Leaf Drive. 

As to the members of the class, the plaintiffs sought to have it include 

“all persons and entities (including trustees) that own or reside in a 

home within the class area which home was purchased by the class 

member prior to December 31, 2002.” There were approximately 220 

homes in the proposed class area that were purchased prior to 

December 31, 2002. The plaintiffs presented a list of the homeowners 

to the trial court. 

The plaintiffs also submitted an expert’s report from Golder Associates 

(“Golder”) for the trial court’s consideration. The report indicates that 

a primary source of odors from the [landfill] facility is likely from the 

direct discharge of collected gas from the blower units located near the 

fuel station, the unfinished building in the northwest corner of the site 
and the blowers used to extract and vent gas from beneath the shopping 

center buildings. 

The report further indicates that “[w]ind direction information * * * 

indicates a normal southwesterly wind that would potentially carry 

odors from these discharge locations towards the residences located 

northeast of the property,” and that the “landfill odors would be 

expected to constitute a nuisance to the surrounding area and the 

homeowners.” 

Additionally, the plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Craig Cantrell, a 

licensed Ohio real estate agent and broker and owner of Chestnut Hill 

Realty. For the purpose of the averments in his affidavit, Cantrell 

assumed the plaintiffs’ claim of noxious odors in their proposed class 

area to be true. Cantrell averred as follows: 

If in a residential neighborhood, there are noxious odors 

which have continued for a long period of time, a 

reasonable buyer will be willing to pay only a diminished 

price. Consequently, it is my opinion, to a reasonable 

degree of certainty, that the homes in the “class area” can 

be sold by a reasonable seller to a reasonable buyer only at 

a price of 30-35% below what these homes would sell for 

in the open market if there were no noxious odors; and 

that diminution in price will apply to the entire class area. 

The plaintiffs also submitted the affidavit of Lance Traves (“Traves”), 

an expert on prevailing winds and odor migration. Traves averred that 

“because the class area is so small and in such close proximity to the 

subject landfill, the odors emitted from the landfill that are subject to 

the prevailing winds would be expected to be distributed over the entire 

class area and detectable to all those in the class area.” 

Another expert report, prepared by GC Environmental, Inc. (“GCE”), 

was submitted by the city for the trial court’s consideration. In its 

report, GCE contradicted the findings of Golder, the plaintiffs’ expert, 

and found any odors on the City View property to be “de minimis,” did 

not detect any odors in the proposed class area, and concluded that it 

is “unreasonable to suggest that landfill gas would have been able to 

migrate to the [class] neighborhood.” 

At the hearing, testimony was taken from one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys 

about how he determined the potential class members. Further, one of 
the plaintiffs and class representatives, Kathleen Tucciarelli, testified 

about her experience living in the neighborhood with the alleged 

noxious odors. After the hearing, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ 

motion and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

Id. at ¶ 2-14. 

After this court affirmed the trial court’s decision to certify the class, 

Garfield Heights then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court 

denied the motion, and Garfield Heights filed this appeal assigning one error for our 

review: 

I. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ nuisance 

cause of action as the City of Garfield Heights is statutorily 

immune from such a claim. 

II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

As such, 

[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings presents only questions of 

law, which this court reviews de novo. Dearth v. Stanley, 2d Dist. 

No. 22180, 2008-Ohio-487, ¶ 24. Determination of a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is restricted solely to the allegations in the 

pleadings and any writings attached to the complaint. Peterson v. 

Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 165, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973). Dismissal is 

appropriate under Civ.R. 12(C) when, after construing all material 

allegations in the complaint, along with all reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party, the court finds that 

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would 

entitle it to relief. State ex rel Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 

Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). 

Riscatti v. Prime Properties Ltd. Partnership, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97254, 2012-

Ohio-2941, ¶ 9. 

Garfield Heights assert that they have political subdivision immunity 

against the appellees’ common law nuisance claim. The appellees, however, allege 
that Garfield Heights breached the contract with them. As a result, the appellees 

make two assertions that (1) Garfield Heights does not have a final, appealable order, 

and (2) Garfield Heights’ claim is barred by res judicata. 

A. Final Appealable Order and Political Subdivision Immunity

We must first constitute whether Garfield Heights has a final, 

appealable order. An appellate court has jurisdiction to review, affirm, modify, set 

aside, or reverse judgments or final orders. Ohio Constitution, Article IV, 

Section 3(B)(2); R.C. 2501.01. 

It is well-established that an order must be final before it can be 

reviewed by an appellate court. If an order is not final, then an 

appellate court has no jurisdiction. “Courts of appeals shall have such 

jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or 

reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the 

court of appeals within the district and shall have such appellate 

jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or 

reverse final orders or actions of administrative officers or agencies.” 

Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. See also, 

R.C. 2505.03. 

Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989). 

R.C. 2505.02(B) provides, 

An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or 

reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following: 

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect 

determines the action and prevents a judgment; 

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special 

proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after 

judgment; 

(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new 

trial; 
(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which 

both of the following apply: 

(a) The order in effect determines the action with 

respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a 

judgment in the action in favor of the appealing 

party with respect to the provisional remedy. 

(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a 

meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal 

following final judgment as to all proceedings, 

issues, claims, and parties in the action. 

(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be 

maintained as a class action; 

(6) An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to the 

Revised Code made by Am. Sub. S.B. 281 of the 124th general 

assembly, including the amendment of sections 1751.67, 2117.06, 

2305.11, 2305.15, 2305.234, 2317.02, 2317.54, 2323.56, 2711.21, 

2711.22, 2711.23, 2711.24, 2743.02, 2743.43, 2919.16, 3923.63, 

3923.64, 4705.15, and 5111.018 (renumbered as 5164.07 by H.B. 

59 of the 130th general assembly), and the enactment of sections 

2305.113, 2323.41, 2323.43, and 2323.55 of the Revised Code or 

any changes made by Sub. S.B. 80 of the 125th general assembly, 

including the amendment of sections 2125.02, 2305.10, 

2305.131, 2315.18, 2315.19, and 2315.21 of the Revised Code; 

(7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed 

pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code. 

The trial court’s denial of Garfield Heights’ motion for judgment on 

the pleadings does not constitute a final appealable order for the reasons set forth 

below. Generally, 

[a]n appellate court can review only final, appealable orders. Without 

a final, appealable order, an appellate court has no jurisdiction. See 

Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St. 3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, 

¶ 9; Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2); R.C. 2501.02. An 

order denying a motion to dismiss is generally not a final, appealable 
order. See, e.g., Maclin v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102417, 

2015-Ohio-2956, ¶ 9; DiGiorgio v. Cleveland, 196 Ohio App. 3d 575, 

2011-Ohio-5824, 964 N.E.2d 495, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.), citing Polikoff v. 

Adam, 67 Ohio St.3d 100, 103, 616 N.E.2d 213 (1993). However, 

R.C. 2744.02(C) provides that “[a]n order that denies a political 

subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an 

alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other 

provision of the law is a final order.” Thus, R.C. 2744.02(C) grants 

appellate courts jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to dismiss 

based upon immunity. Hubbell at ¶ 27 (“[W]hen a trial court denies a 

motion in which a political subdivision or its employee seeks immunity 

under R.C. Chapter 2744, that order denies the benefit of an alleged 

immunity and thus is a final, appealable order pursuant to 

R.C. 2744.02(C).”); Maclin at ¶ 9 (“While ordinarily we do not have 

appellate jurisdiction over the denial of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to 

dismiss because such orders are interlocutory in nature, the denial of a 

motion to dismiss based on political subdivision immunity is a final and 

appealable order subject to appellate court review.”); DiGiorgio at ¶ 11, 

15 (trial court’s order denying municipal defendants’ motion to dismiss 

is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2744.02(C), even if the order 

does not explain the basis for the court’s decision). 

Windsor Realty & Mgt., Inc. v. Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer Dist., 2016-Ohio4865, 68 N.E.3d 327, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). 

However, appellate review is limited under R.C. 2744.02(C) to the 

review of the appellant’s alleged errors involving the denial of immunity. 

[I]t does not authorize the appellate court to otherwise review the 

merits of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., 

Owens v. Haynes, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27027, 2014-Ohio-1503, ¶ 8-

9; see also Reinhold v. Univ. Heights, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100270, 

2014-Ohio-1837, ¶ 21 (“An appeal from a denial of summary judgment 

based on sovereign immunity is limited to the review of alleged errors 

in the portion of the trial court’s decision that denied the political 

subdivision the benefit of immunity.”), citing Riscatti v. Prime Props. 

Ltd. Partnership, 137 Ohio St. 3d 123, 2013-Ohio-4530, 998 N.E.2d 

437, ¶ 20; CAC Bldg. Props., LLC v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 91991, 2009-Ohio-1786, ¶ 9, fn. 1 (appellate court had jurisdiction 

to review city’s appeal only with respect to issues that were based on 

the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on immunity grounds; 
other issues city raised on appeal with respect to the denial of its 

summary judgment motion were not reviewable). Thus, when 

appealing a denial of a motion to dismiss based on immunity under 

R.C. 2744.02(C), a party cannot raise other alleged errors concerning 

the denial of its motion to dismiss that are based upon other alleged 

defenses or pleading deficiencies. See, e.g., Riscatti at ¶ 20 (“Although 

our prior decisions have interpreted R.C. 2744.02(C) broadly in favor 

of early appeal, they have always been tethered directly to the defense 

of immunity, not to other defenses”) * * *. 

Id. at ¶ 15. 

The appellees filed a breach of contract claim against Garfield 

Heights. 

The immunity set forth in R.C. Chapter 2744 does not apply to contract 

claims against a political subdivision. R.C. 2744.09(A) expressly 

provides: “This chapter does not apply to, and shall not be construed 

to apply to * * * [c]ivil actions that seek to recover damages from a 

political subdivision or any of its employees for contractual liability[.]” 

Id. at ¶ 17. 

Therefore, based on the plain language of R.C. Chapter 2744.09(A), 

immunity does not apply to Garfield Heights on the appellees’ claims for breach of 

contract. See Duncan v. Cuyahoga Community College, 2012-Ohio-1949, 970 

N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.) (denial of political subdivision’s motion for judgment 

on pleadings on plaintiff’s breach of contract claim not final and appealable under 

R.C. 2744.02(C) and 2744.09(A)). 

Garfield Heights, similarly to the issue the appellants in Windsor 

contended, argues that the appellees are attempting to fashion a simple common 

nuisance claim into a breach of contract claim. Garfield Heights may be correct that, 
on the facts here, the appellees cannot establish, as a matter of law, the existence of 

an enforceable contract. 

However, pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C), we have jurisdiction to consider 

only whether the trial court properly denied appellants’ motion to 

dismiss on immunity grounds, i.e., whether the trial court’s denial of 

appellants’ motion to dismiss denied appellants “the benefit of an 

alleged immunity from liability” — not whether the trial court correctly 

concluded that the allegations of the amended complaint were 

sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract as a matter of law * * *. 

Windsor at ¶ 19. 

This assignment of error is based “upon alleged defenses that are 

unrelated to immunity and the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dismiss 

those claims is not otherwise a final, appealable order.” Id. at ¶ 20. 

Therefore Garfield Heights’ sole assignment of error is overruled. 

B. Res Judicata

The appellees claim that Garfield Heights is barred from appealing 

this action because of res judicata. 

The issue of whether res judicata *** applies in a particular situation is 

a question of law that is reviewed under a de novo standard. Gilchrist v. 

Gonsor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88609, 2007-Ohio-3903, at ¶ 18, 

citing Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 166 Ohio App.3d 

268, 2006-Ohio-2018, 850 N.E.2d 127. A de novo standard of review 

affords no deference to the trial court’s decision, and we independently 

review the record to determine whether res judicata applies. Id. at ¶ 16. 

Res judicata makes a final judgment between parties conclusive as to 

all claims that were litigated or that could have been litigated in that 

action. Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 382, 653 N.E.2d 

226 (1995). 

Hempstead v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90955, 2008-Ohio5350, ¶ 6. 
As such, 

Res judicata requires a plaintiff to “present every ground for relief in 

the first action, or be forever barred from asserting it.” Grava. Res 

judicata applies to any claim meeting the following three elements: 

1) the plaintiff brought a previous action against the same defendant; 

2) there was a final judgment on the merits of the previous action; and 

3) the new claim was pursued in the first action, or it arises out of the 

same transaction that was the subject matter of the first action. 

Smith v. Bd. of Cuyahoga Cty. Commrs., Cuyahoga No. 86482, 2006-

Ohio-1073, at ¶ 16-18. 

Id. at ¶ 7. 

Garfield Heights is not barred from asserting immunity because of res 

judicata. Garfield Heights could not have appealed an issue that they did not raise 

to the trial court. In their first appeal, Garfield Heights questioned the trial court’s 

decision of certifying the class. At that time, the trial court had not denied Garfield 

Heights’ motion for judgment on the pleadings because the motion had yet to be 

filed. Although Garfield Heights brought a previous action against the same 

defendant, and there was a final judgment on the merits of the previous action, the 

new claim was not pursued in the first action. Therefore, res judicata is not at issue 

here. 

The trial court’s order denying Garfield Heights’ motion for judgment 

on the pleadings is affirmed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further 

proceedings. 

It is ordered that the appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 
 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, PRESIDING JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR