### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Ma rch 30, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1162 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ D. C. Docket N o. 05-00530 -CV -T -27-TB M THERESA MARIE SCHINDLER SC HIAVO, inc ap ac itate d e x r el , Ro be rt S ch ind le r an d Mary S ch ind le r, he r pare nts and n ex t f ri en ds, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us MIC HAEL SCHIAVO, as guardian of the person of T he re saMari e Sc hin dle r Sc hiavo, inc ap ac itate d, JUD GE GE ORG E W . G RE ER , THE HOSPICE OF THE FLO RIDA SUNCOAST, INC., D ef en dants -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ ON PETITION FOR EXPEDITE D REHEARING EN BANC

(O pin ionMarc h 25 , 200 5)2

Befo re EDMONDSON, Ch ie f Ju dg e, TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, BIRCH, D U BIN A , BL A CK , CA RN E S, BA RKE T T , H U L L , MA RC U S, W IL SO N , and PR Y O R, * C ir cu it Judg es . O R D E R : T he Co urt havin g be enpol le d a t the r eque st o f one of the m em be rs of the Co urt and a

m aj or ity of the Ci rc uit

Jud ge s w ho are in re gul ar a ct ive se rv ic e not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, F ederal R ules of Appellate Pr ocedure; E le ve nthCi rc uit

Ru le 35- 5) , the E m er ge nc y P et iti on f

or Re he ar ing E n B an c is DENIED.

/s / J . L. E DMONDSON CHIEF J UDGE

____ ____ ____ ___ * Judg e Willi am H . Pr y or Jr. d id n ot p art ic ipate in t he c on sid e ratio n o f t

he Pe tit ion

be c a us e he is rec overingfrom surg ery perf ormed on Monday , 28 Marc h 2005.3

BI RC H , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , spe ci al ly

c onc ur ri ng: I concur in the denial of re hearing en banc in this case because any further act io n b y ou r co ur t o r th e d is tri ctco ur t, wo ul d b e im pr op er, as I ex pl ai n b el ow. A n a xio m in the stu dy

of lawis that “ hard

f ac ts m ak e ba d law . ” T he tr ag ic ev en ts tha t have a ff

lic te d M rs . S ch iavo and tha t have be en c om poun de d by

the resulting p assionate inter-fam ily struggle and m edia focus certainly qualify as

“ hard f ac ts. ” A nd, w hil e the m em be rs of he r fam ily

and the m em

be rs of Co ngr es s ha ve a ct ed

in a w ay that i s bo th f

er ve nt and s inc er e, the ti m e ha s c om e fo r d i s p a s s i o n a t e d i s c h a r g e o f du t y. A p o p u l a r

e p i t h e t d i r e c t e db y s o me me mb e r s o f s o c i e t y, i n c l u d i n g s o me m em be rs of Co ngr es s, tow ar d th e j udi ci ar y inv olv es the de nunc ia tio n of “ ac tiv ist j udge s. ” G en er al ly , the de fi nit ionof an “ ac tiv ist

j udge ” is o ne w ho d ec ide s th e out co m e of

ac ontro ve rs y

be fo re him

a cc or din g to pe rs ona l c onvi ct ion , e ve n on e sincerely held, as opposed to th e dictates of the lawas constrained by legal pr ec ed en t and, ult im at el y , our Co nst itu tio n. I n r es olv ing the S ch iavo c ontro ve rs y it is m y j udgm en t tha t, de spi te sin ce re and a ltr uis tic m oti va tio n, the le gis la tiv e an d executive branches of our governm ent have acted in a m anner dem onstrablyat odds with our Founding Fathers’ blueprint for the gov ernance of a fr ee people — our Constit ution . Since I have sworn, as have they , to upholdand defend thatThe c ourt is duty -bound to question at any time in a proce edingthe bona fides of its 1 jurisdiction. Ortiz v. Fibre board Corp., 527 U .S. 815, 831, 119 S.C t. 2295, 2307 (1999); National Solid W astes Mg mt. Ass’n v. Alabama Dep’ t of Env’t Mg mt., 924 F.2d 1001, 1002 (11th Cir. 1991). Given the r apid deve lopments and sensitiviti es in this case, the need f or deliberative study

nece ssitated the delay

in my questioning our

jurisdiction. The e ntire text of Pub. L . 109-3 is attache d as an a ppendix t o this concurr ence . 2 See D.C. Court of Appe als v. Fe ldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1311-15 3 (1983); Rooker v. F idelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S. Ct . 149, 150 (1923). Unde r the Rooker-F eldman doctr ine, fe dera l district and circ uit courts lack jurisdiction to revie w the fina l judgme nts of state cour

ts. See Ver izon M d. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3, 122 S. Ct . 1753, 1759 n.3 (2002); Na rey v. Dea n, 32 F.3d 1521, 1524- 25 (11th Cir. 19 94 ). Th e do c tr ine a

pp lie s whe re “ (1 ) t

he pa rt y in f e de ra l c ourt

is t he same a s th e pa

rt y in s tate court; (2) the prior state court rulingwas a final or c onclusive judg ment on the merits; (3) the party seekingrelief

in fede ral c ourt had a

rea sonable opportunity

to raise its fede ral c laims in the state cour t proce eding ; and (4) the issue befor e the f eder al cour

t was either

adjudicate d by

the state cour t or was inextricably

intertwined with the state c ourt’s judg ment.” Amos v. Gly nn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003) ( internal c itations omitted). We are mindful that ther e exists an ex ception to Rooker- Fe ldman when a fede ral 4 Covenant, I m

ust respectfully

concur in the denial of the request for r ehearing en banc. I conclude that Pub. L .109-3 (“ the Act” ) is unconsti tutio nal and, there fore, this court and th e district court are without jurisdiction in th is case under that 1 special Ac t and shou ld refuse to exerc ise anyj ur isd ic tio n th at w e m ay oth er w ise have in this case. Under the first am ended com plaint in this case (the initial com plaint was im

properly groundedon habeas corpus) a basis for j urisdictio n was Pu b. L . 109 -3 . T he se co nd am en de d c om pla int a dopt ed oth er , ind ep en de nt 2 ground s for j urisdictio n, including the Am ericans W ith Disabilities Act (“ AD A” ), Th e C i v i l Ri g h t s Ac t(4 2 U.S .C . § 1 9 8 3 ) a n dTh e R eh ab i l i t at i o n Ac to f 1 9 7 3 . We h a v e h e l dth a tth e R o o k e r - F e l d man d o c t r i n e i s ju r i s d i c t i o n a l . C l e a r l y, 3statute authorizes fede ral a ppellate r eview of

final state c ourt dec isions. S ee D ale v. Moore , 121 F.3d 624, 627 ( 11th Cir. 1997). Howeve r, neither the ADA nor

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides an inde pendent sourc e of f eder al jurisdiction so as to fall within this ex ception. See id. at 628 (c oncludingthat the ADA doe s not override Rooker-F eldman); Ha son v. Offic e of Prof ’l Med. Conduct, 314 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 (S.D.N.Y . 2004) (a pplying Rooke r-F eldman to bar c la ims br ou g ht u

nd e r t he Re ha bil itatio n A c t) . M or e ov e r, Pub .L . 1 09 -3 do e s n ot f a ll w ith in t

his exception beca

use it is unconstitut ional under the separ ation of powe rs doctrine as explained here in. 5 application o f that doctrine shoul d have been m ade in this case, the e ffec t of which would have been to decline to exercise any j urisdictio n that we or the district court did have und er

the A D A , the Ci vil Ri ght s A ct or the Re habil itatio n A ct

of 197 3. Si nc e the pa ssa ge of

P ub. L . 109 -3 on the m or nin g of Marc h 21 , 200 5, it s co nst itu tio na lity

ha s be enpr es um ed . S ee S ch iavo ex r el . Sc hin dle r v. S ch iavo, N o. 8:0 5- CV -5 30- T -2 7T BM ( M. D . F la . Mar. 22, 200 5) a t 3; S ch iavo exre l. Sc hin dle r v. S ch iavo, N o. 05- 1155 6 ( 11th C ir . Marc h 23 , 200 5) a t 5. I n th e ins tant ap pe al , our

c ourt and the dis tr ic t c ourt c ont inu e to i ndul ge thi s pr es um pti on and decline to address the consti tutio nality of the lawwhich purports to grant federal j ur isd ic tio n. S ee S ch iavo ex. r el . Schindler v. S chiavo, N o. 05-11628 (11th Cir. Marc h 25 , 200 5) . Jur isd ic tio n, how ev er , is a pr er equis ite to the le git im at e ex er ci se of j udi ci al pow er , and the re fo re w e m ay not hy pothe tic al ly

a ssu m e j ur isd ic tio n to avoid resolvi ng hard jurisdictional questi ons. See Steel C o. v. Citizens for a Be tte r E nv’ t, 523 U . S. 83, 93- 94, 118 S . Ct . 100 3, 101 2 ( 1998 ); E x P ar te6

Mc Card le , 74 U . S. 506 , 514 ( 1869 ) (“ W ith out j ur isd ic tio n th e co urt c an not pr oc ee d a t a ll in any

c au se . ”) . I w ri te se parate ly to expla in h owvari ous provisi ons of Pub. L. 109-3 are an unconstitu tional in fringem ent on the core pr inc ipl es of

se paratio n of

pow er s and h owthi s dy

na m ic nul lif

ie s th e ex er ci se of fed eral juri sd ic ti on in th is cas e. A. Pu b. L. 109-3 and the Separation of Powers It is ax iom at ic that the F ram er s e sta bli she d a c onst itu tio na l de sig n ba se d on the pr inc ipl es of

se paratio n of

pow er s. S ee Marb ur

y v. Ma dis on, 5 U . S. 137 , 176 (1 803) ( not ing that se paratio n of pow er s is one of

the gov er

nm en ta l pr inc ipl es “ on which the w hole Am erican fabric has been e recte d”). T he Fram ers established thr ee c oe qua l bu t se parate br an ch es of gov er nm en t, e ac h w iththe abil ity to ex er ci se c he ck s and b al an ce s onthe tw o othe rs . A nd t o pr es er ve thi s dy na m ic , the

“ Co nst itu tio n m an da te s th at ‘ ea chof the thr ee ge ne ra l de partm en ts o f gove rn m en t [m ust r em ai n] e nti re ly

f re e fr om the c ontro l or

c oe rc ive inf

lue nc e, dir ec t or ind ir ec t, of

e ith er of the oth er s. ’ ” Mi str etta

v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 488 U . S. 361 , 380 , 109 S. Ct . 647 , 659 ( 1989 ) (quot ing H um phr ey ’ s E xe cu tor

v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 295 U. S. 602, 629, 55 S. C t. 869, 874 (1935)). B ecause of the im portant const itutio nal ro le a ssi gne d to the j udi ci ar y by the F ram er s insa fe guard ing the Co nst itu tio n and the r igh ts o f ind ivi dua ls, se e Fe de ra lis t N o. 78 ( A . H am ilt on) , the e xe cu tio n of thi s7

constitu tional m andate is particularly im portant when legislative acts encroach uponthe ind ep en de nc e of the j udi ci ar

y . S ee I N S v. Ch adha , 462 U . S. 919 , 961 , 103 S. Ct . 276 4, 278 9 ( 1983 ) (P ow el l, J. c onc ur ri ng) ( ci tin g F ed er al ist

N o. 48 f or the pr opos iti on tha t the F ram er s e nshr ine d inthe Co nst itu tio n se paratio n of powers principles because of past legislative interfer ence w ith the judiciary ); N orthe rnP ipe lin e Co . v. Maratho n P ipe lin e Co . , 458 U . S. 50, 60, 102 S . Ct . 285 8, 28 66 (19 82 ) (“ [T]he in de pe nd en ce o f th e jud ic ia ry [m us t] be jeal ou sl y

gu ard ed .”). Ac cordingly , w e risk im

periling ou r constituti onal design if w e do not in quire as to whether P ub. L . 109-3 infringes on the ind ependence of the j udiciary gu aran te edby A rti cl e III o f th e Uni te d S ta te s C on st it ut io n. A rt ic le I II pr ovi de s th at

the “ j udi ci al P ow er

of the U nit ed

S ta te s, sha ll be vested in on e suprem e Court, and in such in ferior Courts as the Congress m ay fro m ti m e to ti m e o rd ai n a nd est ab li sh .” U.S. C ON ST . ar t. I II , § 1. I n de fi nin g th e ex te nt o f fe de ra l j udi ci al pow er , A rt ic le I II pr ovi de s th at “ j udi ci al P ow er

sha ll ex te nd to all Cas es , in Law and Equ it y , ari si ng un de r th is Co ns ti tu ti on , th e Laws of the U nit ed

S ta te s, and T re at ie s m ad e, or w hic h sh al l be m ad e, und er the ir Aut ho rit y ” an d t o c ert ai n o th er en um erat edcas es an d c on tro ve rs ie s. Id . at § 2. These pr ovisi ons have led courts to the unrem arkable conclusion th at “ [f] ederal co urts are c ourts o f lim ite d j ur isd ic tio n” and m ay onl y e xe rc ise j ur isd ic tio n8

al low ed und er the Co nst itu tio n w he n “ au tho ri ze d by . . . statut e. ” K okko ne n v. Gua rd ia n Li fe In s. Co . of Am ., 51 1 U.S. 3 75 , 37 7, 1 14 S. Ct. 1 67 3, 1 67 5 (1 99 4) . Consist ent with this dynam ic outlin ed by Ar ticle III , and pu rsuant to its Article I po wers , see U.S. C ON ST . art. I, § 8, the U nited States Congress has vested federal co urts w ithor igi na l j ur isd ic tio n to he ar c la im s “ ar isi ng unde r the Co nst itu tio n, laws, or treaties of the United State s,” 28 U .S .C. § 1331 , and claim s in which ce rt ai n am ount

in co ntr ove rs y

and d ive rs ity

of c iti ze nshi p c ri te ri a ar e m et , se e 28 U.S.C. § 1 33 2. A ga ins t the se m ost

e le m en tary

of c onst itu tio na l pr inc ipl es , S ec tio n 1 o f Pu b. L . 109 -3 —w hic h st at es that the U nit ed S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the Mi ddl e D istri ct of F lor ida sha ll ha ve j ur isd ic tio n to he ar asui t r eg ar din g a lle ge d vi olatio ns of rights held byMrs. Schiavo “ under the Constit ution or law s of the United St at es ”— is n ot f

ac ia lly unc onst itu tio na l. I f the A ct onl y pr ovi de d f

or j ur isd ic tio n co nsi ste nt w ithA rt ic le I II and 2 8 U . S. C. § 13 31, the A ct w oul d no t be in vio la tio n of the pr inc ipl es of

se paratio n of

pow er s. T he A ct , how ev er , goe s f urthe r. S ec tio n 2 of the Ac t provides th at the district court: (1) shall engage in “ de novo ” re view of Mrs. Schiavo’ s constit ution al and feder al claim s; (2) shall not cons ider w hether these claim s wer e previously “ raised, considered, or decided in State court proceedings”; (3) shall not eng age in “ abstention in favor of State court9

proceedings”; and (4) shall not decide the case on the basis of “ whether rem edies av ai la ble in the S ta te c ourts h av e be ene xhaust ed . ” P ub. L . 109 -3 , § 2. B ec au se the se pr ovi sio ns c onst itu te le gis la tiv e dic ta tio n of howaf ed er al c ourt sh oul d ex er ci se it s j udi ci al f

unc tio ns ( known a s a“ ru le of de ci sio n” ), the A ct

inv ad es the pr ov in ce o f th e jud ic ia ry

an d v io la te s t he sep arat io n o f po wers pri nc ip le . A n a ct of Co ngr es s vi olate s se paratio n of pow er s if

it r equir es f

ed er al c ourts to exercise their A rticle II I power “ in a m anner re pugn ant to the text, structure, an d tr ad iti ons of

A rt ic le I II . ” P laut v . S pe ndthr if t F ar m , I nc . , 514 U . S. 211 , 218 , 115 S. Ct . 144 7, 145 2 ( 1995 ). B y se tti ng a part ic ular standard

of r ev ie win the district court, Se ction 2 of the Act purports to direct a fe deral court in an ar ea traditionallyleft to the feder al court to decide. See Fla. Progress Corp. v. Com m ’ r, 348 F. 3d 9 54, 959 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ( not ing that the standard of r ev ie wis fo r the court to determ ine). In fac t, the e stablish m ent of a standard of re view often dictates the rule of decision in a case, which is bey ond Con gress’ s constit ution al pow er . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. K le in, 80 U . S. 128 , 146 ( 1871 ) (n oti ng tha t C ongr es s m ay not pr es cr ibe a“ ru le of

de ci sio n” f

or apart ic ular ca se ). I n a ddi tio n, “ the se paratio n- of

-p ow er s do ctri ne r equir es that a br an chnot

im pa ir anothe r in the pe rf orm an ce of

it s c onst itu tio na l du tie s. ” L ovi ng v . U nit ed S ta te s, 517 U . S. 748 , 757, 116 S . Ct . 173 7, 174 3 ( 1996 ). B y de ny ing f

ed er al c ourts the a

bil ity toIn his dissenting opinion, J udg e Tjoflat que stions why we have not cited a

ny case s for 4 the proposition that Congre ss cannot, in a statute, w ithdraw our a bility to use the doctrine s of abstention, exhaustion and waiver . As we ha ve explained, the Ac t is unprece dented in natur e. 10 exercise a bstentio n or inqui re a s to exhaust ion or waiver under S tate law , the A ct ro bs f ed er al c ourts o f j udi ci al doc tr ine s lo ng- es ta bli she d f or the c ondu ct

of pr ude nti al de ci sio nm ak ing . S ee U ngaro -B en ag es v. D re sdne r Bank A G , 379 F . 3d 1227 , 123 7 n. 13 ( de sc ri bin g a bst en tio n a s a“pr

ude nti al ” doc tr ine ); D unc anv. W al ke r, 533 U . S. 167 , 178 -7 9, 121 S . Ct . 212 0, 212 7- 28 ( 2001 ) (d isc uss ing the j ur isp ru de nti al m er its of

S ta te r em edy

e xhaust iondoc tr ine s) ; L ab at v. Be nne tt, 365 F. 2d 69 8, 707 (5th Cir. 1966) (discussing courts’ use of the doctrine of w aiver). In short, cer tain provis ions o f Se ction 2 of the Act attem pt to “ ‘ direct[] what part ic ular ste ps s ha ll be take n inthe pr ogr es s of aj udi ci al inquir

y , ’ ” Pl au t, 514 U . S. a t 22 5, 115 S . Ct . a t 14 56 ( quot ing T HO M AS C OO L EY , C ONS T I T UT I ONAL L I M I TATI ON S 94- 95) . B ec au se thi s is vio la tiv e of the f undam en ta l pr inc ipl es of separation of powers e nshrined in our Constitu tion, they are unconst itutio nal. S ee Plaut, 514 U. S. at 240, 115 S. C t. at 1463 (finding un constitu tional a congressio nal act w hich im

ping ed on the ind ependence of the j udiciary by requiring federa l co urts t o r eo pe n f

ed er al j udgm en ts) ; K le in, 80 U . S. a t 14 7 ( inv al idatin g le gis la tio n because “ it passed the lim it which separate s the legislativ e fr om the j udicial pow er ” by

dic ta tin g ar

ule of de ci sio n inape ndi ng c as e) . Manif es tly , be ca

use the 4My

re a din gof

Pla ut, 51 4 U .S. 21 1 ( 19 95 ), de mon str ate s th at un pr e c e de nte d c on g re ssi on a l a c ts can be lackingin constituti onal proprie ty absent prior

prec edent. More over, I

do not sugg est that the provision of a standa

rd of r eview is in a g ener al sense a “rule of dec ision.” Rather, it is the abrog ation of such standa rds in a singlec a se , n ot i n a c ate g or y of c a se s li ke ha

be a s c or pu s c a se s. Th e Ac t r e fe re nc e s th e pa rt ie s b y name , d e signate s th e fo rum f or the dis pute , s e ts a

tim e 5 lim it o n d e c isi on -m akin g , a nd su sp e nd s p re vio us jud g me nts , a ll s o th at th e fe de ra l ju dic iary is instructed as to how to c onduct this specific c ase. Ihasten to note that the pr ovisions in S ection 2 of the Act ca nnot be construe d as 6 limit ations of the exerc ise of jurisdiction. Section 1 of the Ac t gr ants jurisdiction; S ection 2 purports to do more by

direc ting the district c ourt how to execute its judicial function. Acc ording ly , the provisions of Section 2 ca nnot be save d by

cre atingthe fiction that they are permissible limit ations on the exercise of fede ral jurisdiction under Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850) a nd its proge ny . 11 A ct appl ie s to onl y

thi s c as e it

la ck s th e ge ne ra lity

and p ro spe ct ivi ty

of le gis la tio n 5 that c om ports w iththe ba sic te ne ts o f the se paratio n of pow er s. Insum , w hil e Co ngr es s m ay gr an t j ur isd ic tio n to af

ed er al c ourt c onsi ste nt w ithA rt ic le I II a s it

did in Se ct ion1 of

the A ct , it

m ay not “ as sum e[ ] af

unc tio n 6 that m ore properly

is entrusted to” the judiciary . See IN S, 462 U.S . at 963, 103 S. Ct . a t 27 90 ( Po w el l, J. , c onc ur ri ng) . B y arr oga tin g vi ta l j udi ci al f unc tio ns t o it se lf in the passage of the provis ions o f Se ction 2 of the Act, Congress viol ated core constitu tional separation prin ciples, it prescr ibed a “ rule of decision” and acted u n c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y. B. Pu b. L. 109-3 and Severability Re co gni zi ng tha t the pr ovi sio ns o f Se ct ion2 of the A ct are unc onst itu tio na l, it rem ains to be determ ined whether such unconsti tutio nality renders the entire Ac t12

a nul lity und er the doc tr ine of

non se ve ra

bil ity . “ T he standard

f or de te rm ini ng the se ve ra bil ity of an un co nst itu tio na l pr ovi sio n is w el l e sta bli she d: Unle ss i t i s evident that th e L egislature would not have enacted those prov ision s which are w ith in i ts p ow er , ind ep en de ntl y of that w hic h is not , the inv al id p ar t m ay be dr oppe d if

w ha t i s le ft

is fu lly ope rativ e as alaw . ” N ewY ork v. U nit ed S ta te s, 505 U . S. 144 , 186 , 112 S . Ct . 240 8, 243 4 ( 1992 ) (i nte rn al quo ta tio ns and c itatio ns om itted). I n m ost cases wher e unconstit ution al sections of a statute have been se ve re d th e le gis la tio n ha s c ont ai ne d ase ve ra bil ity c lause . S ee , e . g. , I N S, 462 U. S. at 932, 103 S. C t. at 2774 . The a bsence of a sever ability

provisio n, howe ver, shou ld not be construed to create a presum ption against severability . See Ne w York, 5 05 U.S. at 1 86 , 11 2 S . Ct. at 24 34 . Whil e the ha ste in w hic h th e A ct w as pa sse d of

fe re d li ttl e tim e fo r the f

ull de ve lop m en t of

c ongr es sio na l f

ind ing s, ac om

pr eh en siv e re vie wof

the a va ila

ble le gis la tiv e his tor

y sur ro undi ng the pa ssa ge of

the A ct r ev ea ls tha t C ongr es s m an if es tly w oul d no t have pa sse d an a ct w hic h a llo w ed

f ed er al c ourts t o gi ve de fe re nc e to S ta te c ourt f ind ing s or

e xe rc ise it s di sc re tio n to inv oke abst en tio n or ex haust iondoc tr ine s. S ee 151 C ONG . R EC . H 1731 ( da ily e d. Mar. 20, 200 5) (s ta te m en ts o f Sp eake r H as te rt ( R- Il l. )) ( re fe re nc ing the a va ila bil ity of de nov o re vie wby not ing that he sup porte d th e A ct be ca use it w oul d a llo wthe “ ca se [ to13

be ] tr ie d ane ww he re the j udge c anr ee va luate and r ea sse ss [ Mr s. S ch iavo’ s] m ed ic al c ondi tio n” ); id. ( state m en ts o f Re p. S tup ak ( D -M ic h. )) ( re fe re nc ing the av ai la bil ity of the doc tr ine s of

S ta te c ourt w ai ve r, abst en tio n, and e xhaust ionby not ing that the A ct

a llo w s af

ed er al j udge to re vie wthe c as e “ w ith out be ing prej udiced by

any of the inform ation from

the Florida State case”) . Ha d this b een the ir int en t, af

ed er al c ourt c oul d have f

ru str at ed the ir pur pose to obt ai n astay

of the S ta te c ourt or de r. S ee 151 C ONG . R EC . S3 100 (d ai ly e d. Mar. 20, 200 5) (s ta te m en ts o f Ma

j or ity L ea de r Fr ist

( R- T en n. )) ( not ing that i n pa ssi ng the le gis la tio n he “ as sum e[ d] . . . the F ed er al c ourt w oul d gr an t a stay ba se d onthe fa ct s of thi s c as e be ca

use Mr s. S ch iavo w oul d ne ed to be a liv e in o rd er

f or the court to m ake its determ ination ”). T he United State s Suprem e Court has stated that the m ost

“ re le vant i nqui ry

in ev al ua tin g se ve ra

bil ity is w he the r the statut e w ill function in a m anner consistent with the intent of Congress.” Ala ska Airlines, Inc. v. Br oc k, 480 U . S. 678 , 107 S . Ct . 147 6, 148 0 ( 1987 ). H er e, in the abse nc e of Section 2, a

feder al court could nul lify congression al intent, and theref ore the A ct is n ot s ubj ec t t o se ve ra

bil ity . A s su ch , the c onst itu tio na l i nf irm ity of S ec tio n 2 o f the Act renders the entire Ac t a nullity . Thus, under the A ct and the RookerFe ldm andoc tr ine , the dis tr ic t c ourt l ac ke d aj ur isd ic tio na l ba sis to re nde r its de ci si on an d we l ackjuri sd ic ti on on ap pe al .14

C . C on cl us ion The separ ation of powers im plicit in o ur constitu tional desig n was c reate d

“ to a ssure , a s ne ar ly

a s po ssi ble , that e ac h br an chof gov er nm en t w oul d c onf

ine its el f to i ts a ssi gne d r es pons ibi lity . ” I N S, 462 U . S. a t 95 1, 103 S . Ct . a t 27 84. B ut w he n th e fe rv or

of pol iti ca l pa ssi ons m ove s th e E xe cu tiv e an d th e L eg isl at ive br an ch es to ac t i n w ay s in im ic al to ba sic c onst itu tio na l pr inc ipl es , it is the duty

of th e jud ic ia ry

to in te rv en e. If

sac rif ic es to the ind

ep en de nc e of t

he judic iar

y are pe rm itt ed tod ay , pre ce de nt i

s esta bli she d fo r th e co nst itu tio nal tra nsgr es sio ns o

f to mor ro w. See New Yo rk , 50 5 U.S. at 18 7, 1 12 S. Ct. at 24 34 . Accor di ng ly, we m ust c onsc ie nti ousl y

guard the ind ep en de nc e of

our j udi ci ar y and s af eg uard the Constitu tion, even in the face of the unfathom able hum an tragedy that has befallen Mr s. S ch iavo and h er

f am ily and the r ec en t e ve nts r el at ed to he r pli ght

w hic h have tro ub le d t he co ns ci en ces of m an y . Real iz in g t hi s dut y , I co nc lu de th atPub. L. 109- 3 is an un co nst itu tio na l i nf ri nge m en t onc or e te ne ts unde rl y ing our constitu tional sy stem . Ha d Congress or the Florida legislature, in their legislat ive ca pa ci tie s, be enable to co nst itu tio na lly a m en d a ppl ic ab le law , w e w oul d have be enc onstra ine d to appl y that l aw . S ee Ro be rt son v. S eattl e A udob on S oc ’ y , 503 U. S. 429, 441, 112 S. Ct. 1407 , 1414 (1992). By optin g to pass Pub . L . 109-3 ins te ad , how ev er , Co ngr es s c hose to ove rs te p c onst itu tio na l bo undari es int o th e15

pr ov in ce o f th e jud ic ia ry . Suc h a n Act can no t b e co un te na nc ed . Mor eo ve r, we are boun d by

the Rooker-Fe ldm an doctrine not to exerc ise any other j urisdictio nal ba se s to ove rr ide af

ina l st at e j udgm en t. S houl d th e ci tiz en s of F lor ida de te rm ine that i ts l awsho uld

be c hange d, it

sho uld be don e le gis la tiv el y . W er e the c ourts t o change the law, as the petitioners and Cong ress invite us to do, an “ activist judge” cr iti ci sm w oul d be va lid .16 A P P EN D IX 109t h CON GRE SS 1st S es sio n S. 686 Fo r the r el ie f of

the pare nts of

T he re saMari e Sc hiavo.

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- IN THE SENAT E OF THE UNITED STAT ES Marc h 20 , 200 5 Mr . F ri st ( fo r him se lf

, Mr . Mart ine z, and M r. S an tor um ) intro duc ed

the fo llo w ing bil l; w hic h w as r ea d tw ic e, c onsi de re d, r ea d th e thi rd ti m e, and passed

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ANAC T Fo r th e rel ie f of

th e p aren ts of Th eres a Ma rie Sch ia vo . Be it enac ted by

the Senate and House of Representatives of the U nited St at es of A m er ic a in C ongr es s a sse m ble d,

SECTION 1. RELIEF OF THE PARENTS OF THERESA MARIE SCHIAVO. T he U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida17

sha ll ha ve j ur isd ic tio n to he ar , de te rm ine , and r en de r j udgm en t onasui t or cl ai m by or on b eh al f of

T he re saMari e Sc hiavo f or the a lle ge d vi olatio n of an y r igh t of T he re saMari e Sc hiavo unde r the Co nst itu tio n or law s of the U nit ed S ta te s r el at ing to the w ith hol din g or w ith dr aw al of

f ood, f lui ds, or m edical treatm ent necessary to sust ain her life.

SEC. 2 . PROCEDURE.

A ny pare nt o f T he re saMari e Sc hiavo s ha ll ha ve standi ng t o br ing asui t unde r thi s A ct . T he sui t m ay be br ough t a ga ins t any

oth er pe rs on who w as a party to State court procee ding s relating to the withhold ing or withdrawa l of f ood, f lui ds, or m ed ic al tr eatm en t ne ce ssary to sus ta in the li fe of Ther esa Mar ie Schiavo, or who m ay act pursuant to a State c ourt order au tho ri zi ng o r dir ec tin g th e w ith hol din g or w ith dr aw al of

f ood, f lui ds, or m ed ic al tr eatm en t ne ce ssary to sus ta in h er

li fe . I n su chasui t, the D istri ct Co urt sh al l de te rm ine de nov o any c la im of avio la tio n of

any r igh t of T he re saMari e Sc hiavo w ith in the sc ope of thi s A ct , notw ith standi ng any prior State c ourt determ ination and regardless of whether such a claim has pr ev iou sly

be enr ai se d, c onsi de re d, or de ci de d inS ta te c ourt pr oc ee din gs.18

The D istrict Court shall entertain and determ ine the suit withou t any delay or abstention in favor of State court proceedings, and regar dless of whether re m ed ie s ava ila

ble in the S ta te c ourts h av e be ene xhaust ed . SE C. 3. RE LI EF . A ft er ade te rm inatio n of

the m er its of

asui t br ough t un de r thi s A ct , the District Court shall issue such declaratory and injunctive relief

as m ay be ne ce ssary

to pr ote ct

the r igh ts o f T he re saMari e Sc hiavo unde r the Co nst itu tio n and l aw s of

the U nit ed

S ta te s r el at ing to the w ith hol din g or withdraw al of food, f

luids , or m edical treatm ent necessary to sust ain her life.

SEC. 4 . TIME FOR FILING. N otw ith standi ng any

oth er ti m e lim itatio n, any

sui t or c la im und er thi s A ct sha ll be ti m el y

if f ile d w ith in 3 0 day s a ft er

the da te of

e na ctm en t of thi s A ct . SE C. 5. N O C HA

NG E O F SU BST AN TI VE RIG HT S. N oth ing in thi s A ct

sha ll be c onstru ed

to cr eate sub stanti ve r igh ts n ot19

oth er w ise se cure d by

the Co nst itu tio n and l aw s of the U nit ed

S ta te s or of the se ve ra l S ta te s.
SEC. 6 . NO EFFECT ON ASSISTING SUIC IDE. N oth ing in thi s a ct

sha ll be c onstru ed

to co nf er a ddi tio na l j ur isd ic tio n on any court to consid er any

claim relate d-- ( 1) to assistin g suicide, ( 2) a State lawregar ding assisting suicide.

SEC. 7 . NO PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION. Nothing in this Act shall constitu te a pre cedent with re spect to future le gis la tio n, inc lud ing the pr ovi sio n of pr ivate r el ie f bil ls. SEC. 8 . NO EFFECT ON THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT OF 1990 . N oth ing in thi s a ct

sha ll af fe ct the r igh ts o f an y

pe rs on unde r the Patie nt S el f- D et er

m inatio n A ct

of 199 0.

SE C. 9. SENS E O F T HE CO NG RE SS.20

It is the Sense of the Congress that the 10 9th Cong ress should consider pol ic ie s r eg ar din g th e status and l eg al r igh ts o f inc ap ac itate d in div idu al s w ho are inc ap ab le of

m ak ing de ci sio ns c onc er nin g th e pr ovi sio n, w ith hol din g, or withdraw al of foods, fluid, or m edical car e.21

CAR NE S and H UL L, Circuit Judges, concurring in the denial of rehear ing en banc.

W e w ri te br ie fl y

f or the pur pose of r es pond ing to Judg e T

j of la t’ s op ini on di ss en ti ng fro m

th e d en ia l o f reh eari ng en ba nc . The plaintiffs’ positi on concerning Cou nt 8 of the am ended com plaint has be enf lui d th ro ugho ut the se pr oc ee din gs. Jud ge T j of la t’ s in te rp re ta tio n of

the ir la te st c ont en tio n is that the y are arg uin g th er e w as ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce be fo re the state c ourts t o su

ppor t by c le ar and c onvi nc ing e vid en ce the f ind ing s of

tho se co urts. A s he und er stands the pla int if fs ’ la te st arg um en ts, “ [t ] he r el ev an t qu es tio n he re is w he the r a ratio na l f ac tf ind er c oul d have f

ound by c le ar and c onvi nc ing ev ide nc e that M rs . S ch iavo w oul d have w an te d nu tr iti on and h y dr at ionto be w ith dr awn un de r the se c ir cum stanc es . ” T ha t i s no t the w ay w e unde rs tand the ar gum en ts tha t the pla int if fs have put

f or w ar d inthe ir

c ur re nt s ugge sti on f

or re he ar ing e n banc . H ow ev er , e ve n if Jud ge T j of la t’ s un de rs tandi ng o f tho se ar gum en ts i s c or

re ct and the que sti on p re se nte d is the one he ha s art ic ulate d, thi s Court is correc t in deny ing rehearing en banc. Assum ing, as Judge Tj oflat m ay , that the D ue Proce ss Clause requires clear and convin cing evidence, there wa s abundan t testim ony before the state trial court22

to prove bythat evidentiary standard that Mrs. S chiavo would have wanted nutri tio n and h y dr at ionto be w ith dr awn un de r the se c ir cum stanc es . S om e of that ev ide nc e is s et

out a t so m e le ngth inthe tr ia l c ourt’ s de ta ile d or de r of F eb ru ar y 11, 2000 . Whil e the re w as som e co nf lic t i n th e ev ide nc e, c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio ns a r e wi t h i n th e p r o v i n c e o f th e f a c t f i n d e r . S e e An d e r s o n v . C i t y o f B e s s e merC i t y, 470 U.S . 564, 575, 105 S. Ct. 1504 , 1512 (1985) (special defere nce is due wher e a trial court’ s finding s are base d on th e cr edibilit y of w itnesses, “ for only

the trial j udge c anbe aw ar e of

the vari at ion s inde m eanor and t one of

voi ce that be ar

so he av ily on the li ste ne r’ s un de rs tandi ng o f an d be lie f in wha t i s sa id” ); I nw ood L ab . , I nc . v. I ve s L ab . , I nc . , 456 U . S. 844 , 856 , 102 S . Ct . 218 2, 218 9 ( 1982 ) (“ D et er m ini ng the w ei ght

and c re dib ili ty

of the e vid en ce is the spe ci al pr ovi nc e of the tr ie r of

f ac t. ”) ; U nit ed

S ta te s v. P ine ir o, 389 F . 3d 1 359, 136 6 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) (“ Su chac re dib ili ty

f ind ing is w ith in the pr ovi nc e of the f ac tf ind er . ”) . I t i s no t the ro le of a n app el la te co ur t t o s eco nd -g ue ss cred ib il it y de te rm in at io ns . On ap p ea l fr o m

th e s t at e t ri al co u rt ’s d ec i s i o n an dfi n d i n g s , F l o ri d a’s Second District C ourt of Appeal did care fully reviewthe rec ord and determ ined that the que sti on the tr ia l c ourt de ci de d:

wa s whether T heresa Marie Sc hind ler Sc hiavo, not after a fe ww ee ks i n a

c om a, but

a ft er te n y ears in a pe rs ist en t vegetative state that has robbed her of m ost of her23 cere brum and all but the m ost ins tinctive of neurolog ical func tio ns, w ithno h ope of am ed ic al c ur e but

w ith suf fi ci en t m one y

and s tr en gthof

body to liv e ind ef ini te ly , w oul d c hoos e to c ont inu e the c onst an t nur sin g c ar e an d th e supp ortin g tu be s inhop es that a m ir ac le w oul d so m eh owr ec re at e he r m iss ing br ai n tissu e, or w hether she would wish to perm it a natural de ath pr oc es s to take it s c our se and f or he r fam ily m em be rs and l ove d on es to be f re e to c ont inu e the ir lives. A fter due c onsid eration we conclude that the trial j udge ha d c le ar

and c onvi nc ing e vid en ce to an sw er thi s que sti on a s he did . In re Gu ard ia ns hi p o f Sch ia vo , 78 0 S o. 2 d 1 76 , 18 0 (F la . 2dDCA 20 01 ). Even assum ing th at this ty pe of sufficiency

of the evidence issue is a proper one f or an e n banc de te rm inatio n, the re is no s ubst an tia l qu es tio n inthi s c as e about whether a r ational factfinder c ouldhave found, as the Florida court did, that there w as clear

and convin cing evidence that Mrs. S chiavo would no t have wanted nutri tio n and h y dr at ionc ont inu ed in the se c ir cum stanc es . G ive n th e cr ed ibi lity de te rm inatio ns tha t the state tr ia l c ourt w as auth or iz ed to an d di d m ak e, the evidence clear ly

wa s sufficient to m eet the clear and convincing evidence st an da rd , whi ch th e Fl or id a co ur ts ha d i m po se d a nd di d app ly in t hi s ca se .The pa nel in its first opinion on t his matter appe ars to have conflated injunctive re lief 1 under the All Writ s Act, which ha s nothing to do with the merits of a n appea l, with an ordinary preliminary

injunction, which require s a showingof a substantial likelihood of succ ess on the merits. See Schiavo v. Schiavo, __ F .3d __, 2005 WL648897 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2005). Whil e Ithi nk

that th e pla int if

fs have state d a

pla us ibl e c la im, Iam no t c e rt a in t he y wi ll 2 succe ed on the mer its. One rea son for my uncer tainty is the hurried pa ce of

this li tigation. To g ive the plaintiffs c laims the rea soned attention they deser ve, and to de velop the ce rtainty the law demands, we should rehea r this case en banc . The United States Supre me Court encour ag es such caution in life-a

nd-death situations, s uch as in its fede ral ha beas jurisprude nce. T he Court has said that “[i] f the district cour t cannot dismiss the petition on t he mer its before the sche duled execution, its i s obligated to addre ss the merits and must issue a stay to preve nt the case from becomingmoot” when the pr isoner dies. L onchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996). 24 T JO FL A T , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , dis se nti ng f

ro m the de nia l of

r eh eari ng e n banc , in w hic h W IL SO N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , j oin s:

I. I w oul d gr an t r eh eari ng e n banc . S o th at w e can c onsi de r the m er its of thi s ap pe al , I w oul d di re ct

the dis tr ic t c ourt t o is sue an in j unc tio n un de r the A ll Wri ts A ct , 28 U . S. C. § 16 51( a) . O the rw ise the appe al w ill be co m e m oot . S ee S ch iavo v. Sc hi av o, _

_ F .3d__ , 20 05 W L 66 52 57 (11 th Cir . Mar. 2 3, 2 00 5) (Tjofl at , J., dissent ing from

the denial of rehearing en banc). 1 T he pla int if

fs have nowstate d apla

usi ble c la im

that the D ue P ro ce ss C lause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent requires clear and convincing evidence of an ind ivi dua l’ s w ish es be fo re astate c ourt m ay or de r w ith dr aw al of

li fe -s ust ai nin g nutritio n, hy dration, or other m edical attention. See generally Cruzan v. Missouri 2Simi larl y , b e c a us e the pla int if

fs have state d a

pla us ibl e c la im, we sh ou ld i ssu e an in jun c tio n to avoid the ca se fr om becomingmoot when Mrs. Schiavo pe rishes. 25 D ep ’ t of H ea lth , 497 U . S. 261 ( 1990 ) (h old ing that a state m ay

r equir e cl ear an d convin cing evidence of an incom petent’ s wishes to the withdraw al of lifesus ta ini ng tre atm en t) ; S an tos ky v. K ram er , 445 U . S. 745 ( 1982 ) (h old ing that a state m ust su pport allegation s of neglect by clear and convin cing evidence before it m ay te rm inate pare nta l r igh ts) ; A ddi ngt on v . T ex as , 441 U . S. 418 ( 1979 ) (h old ing that the c le ar

and c onvi nc ing e vid en ce standard is re qui re d inc ivi l com m itm ent proceedings). I f such a right exists, it is not enou gh to si m ply say th atth e st at e st atut e d oe s, i n fa ct , req ui re cl ear a nd co nv in ci ng ev id en ce. In Jackson v. Vir ginia, 443 U. S. 307 (197 9), a collateral attack on a stateco urt c ri m ina l c onvi ct ion , the state tr ia l c ourt ha d st at ed that i t w as appl y ing the constitu tionallyrequired re asonable dou bt standard, but the defendant argued that his c onst itu tio na l r igh ts w er e none the le ss v iol at ed be ca use the re w as ins uf

fi ci en t ev id en ce i n t he reco rdfora rat io na l fa ct fin de r to co nv ic t h im un de r th atst an da rd . T he Co urt a gr ee d and h el d th at “ the r el ev an t qu es tio n is w he the r, a ft er vie w ing the evidence in the light m ost favorable to the prosecution , any rational trier of fac t could have foun d the essential elem ents of the crim e bey ond a reasonable doub t.” Id. at 319. Sim ilarly , in the ca se at hand, while it is clear that the state c ourtJudg e s Ca rn e s and Hu ll a re fi rm ly c onvin c e d th at “ the e vid e nc e c le arl y wa s su ff ic ie nt t o 3 me e t th e c le ar a

nd c onvin c inge vid e nc e sta

nd ard , whic h th e F lor ida

c ourt s h a d im

po se d a nd did apply in this case.” Ante, at 23. My contention is that we c annot make this dete rmination now. Instead, the district c ourt should make this determination only afte r a f ull and car eful re view of the e vid e nc e , whic h c ann ot o c c ur un de r c ur

re nt t ime c on str a int s. In Bonne r v. City

of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir.1981) (en ba nc), this cour

t 4 a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll d e c isi on s o f t he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit ha nd e d d own p ri or

to October 1, 1981. 26 pur porte d to use the c le ar

and c onvi nc ing e vid en ce standard , the pla int if fs arg ue that there is sim

ply insufficient evidence to sup port its findi ngs un der that standard . T he r el ev an t qu es tio n he re is w he the r a ratio na l f ac tf ind er c oul d have found byclear

and convin cing evidence that Mrs. S chiavo would have wanted nutritio n and hy dration to be withdrawn under these circ um stances. T he plaintiffs carr y ahe av y bur de n, but

I do n ot b el ie ve that this que sti on c anbe de te rm ine d in thi s e xpe dit ed

f as hio n w ith out

ahe ar ing on the m er its . 3 T hus, “ w e ce rt ai nly

c an not say that [ the pla int if

fs have ] no l ike lih ood of pr ev ai lin g onthe m er its . A s lo ng a s th is f ac tor is pr es en t t o so m e de gr ee , it is not even necessary

that a substanti al likelihoo d of success be shown. W here the other fa ct or s are str ong, asho w ing of som e lik el iho od o f suc ce ss o n th e m er its w ill j ustify tem porary injunctive relief

.” Productos Carnic, S. A. v. Ce nt. A m . B eef & Seaf ood Trading Co., 621 F.2d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1980 ). T he other fac tors are 4 str ong in this c as e. S ee S ch iavo v . S ch iavo, __ F . 3d _ _, 200 5 W L 648 897, a t *1 7-27

18 ( 11th C ir . Mar. 23, 200 5) ( W ils on, J. , dis se nti ng) . A cc or din gly , I w oul d gr an t a pr el im inary

inj unc tio n. II. Judg e Bi rc h no warg ue s th at thi s c ourt l ac ks j ur isd ic tio n to e nte rt ai n th is ca se due to co nst itu tio na l i nf irm iti es in the le gis la tio n e nabli ng f ed er al r ev ie wof thi s c as e. I n part ic ular, he ide nti fi es f our pr ovi sio ns o f the a ct

that “ co nst itu te legislative dictatio n of how a f ederal c ourt sho uld exercise its j udicial function s.” A nte , a t 9. I be lie ve that i t i s f ull y w ith in C ongr es s’ s po w er to dic ta te standard s of rev ie w and to waiv e in sp eci fic cas es no nc on st it ut io na l ab st en ti on do ct rin es . In de ed , if Co ngr es s c an not

do s o, the f

at e of hun dr ed s of

f ed er al statut es w oul d be ca lle d in to s er iou s qu es tio n. I w ishto dis pe l any que sti ons ab out

our j ur isd ic tio n in this case. U nde r A rt ic le I II , Co ngr es s ha s th e pow er both to e sta

bli sh f ed er al c ourts an d, e xc ep t a s to the or igi na l j ur isd ic tio n of the S upr em e Co urt, to m ak e ex ce pti ons an d r eg ulatio ns a s to the ir j ur isd ic tio n. U . S. Co nst . art . I II . T he Suprem e Court has rec ogni zed, at least in som e contexts, that Congress also has the pow er to re qui re f

ed er al c ourts t o e nte rt ai n c au se s of a ct ionthe y

w oul d no t otherwise have e ntertained for prudential reasons. C f. Raines v. By rd, 521 U. S. 811, 820 n. 3 ( 1997 ) (“ It

is se ttl ed that C ongr es s c an not

e ra se A rt ic le I II ’ s st an din g28

re qui re m en ts b y

statut or ily

gr an tin g th e ri ght

to sue to a pla int if

f w ho w oul d no t oth er w ise have standi ng. . . . W e ac know le dge , tho ugh, that C ongr es s’ de ci sio n to gr an t a p art ic ul ar p la in ti ff t he rig ht to ch al le ng e an Act’s co ns ti tu ti on al it y . . . el im inate s any

pr ude nti al standi ng l im itatio ns and s ign if ic an tly le sse ns the r isk

of unwanted conflict with the L egislative Branch w hen that plaint iff brings suit.” (citation om itted)). T his is not

ac as e, to use se paratio n- of -p ow er s parl an ce , of

Co ngr es s

“ ar ro ga tin g” pow er

to its el f, nor

is it a ca se in w hic h on e br an chof gov er nm en t ha s “ im pa ir [e d] anothe r in the pe rf orm an ce of

it s c onst itu tio na l du tie s. ” L ovi ng v . United States, 517 U.S . 748, 757 (1996) (em phasis add ed). Instead, Congress has pr es cr ibe d apart ic ular ap pr oa chto a part ic ular pr obl em in the ge ne ra l do m ai n of fe de ra l j ur isd ic tio n, w ith out pr es um ing to dic ta te —i n any r es pe ct —our pe rf orm an ce of

ac ourt’ s e sse nti al f

unc tio n: “ to s ay

w ha t the lawis. ” Marb ur y v. Madison, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (180 3) (Mar shall, C. J.). It is in this do m ain that th e Supr em e Co ur t h as jealo us ly gua rd edou r po wer ag ai ns t i nt ru si on by Con gr es s. See, e. g., Dic kerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 432 (200 0) (“ W e hold that Miranda, being a consti tutio nal decision o f this Court, m ay not be in effect ove rr ule d by an A ct of Co ngr es s, and w e de cl ine to ove rr ule Mi randaour se lve s. W e the re fo re hol d th at

Mi randaand i ts p ro ge ny in thi s C ourt go ve rntheJ udg e B irch attempts to define standar ds of re view as “ rules of de cision,” but Ifind no 5 basis for this in the ca se law. The rules Cong ress ha s established her e g o to the extent of our authority to assess the mer its of claims, without authorizi ngany new c laims or elements ther eof to guid e our d e te rm inatio n o f f e de ra l qu e sti on s. As su c h, Con g re ss’ s r ule s a re jur isd ic tio na l in nature . See, e.g ., Sosa v. Alvare z-Machain, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2755 (2004) (“N or would the distinction between jurisdiction and c ause of action have been e lided by the dra fters of the [J udiciary] Act or those who voted on it. As Fishe r Ames put it, ‘there is a substantial differ ence betwee n the jurisdiction of courts a nd rules of de cision.’ 1 Annals of Cong . 807 (Ga les ed. 1834).” ). F ur the rm or e , to ho ld t

hat Co ngre ss m ay

no t e sta bli shno r a lte r s tand ard s o f r e vie w w ou ld wre ak havoc on dozens of fede ral statutes that do just that in numerous contexts. S ee, e .g ., 5 U. S.C. § 5 52 (p ro vid ingfo r d e no vo re vie w o f f e de ra l a g e nc y

de te rm inatio ns of

fe e s f or re qu e sts of re cords of

notice and c omment proce eding s). Of c ourse, the ha

beas c orpus statutes ar e a subse t of this string of c ases. Sec tion 2254 revie w, in particula

r, pre scribes not just any

standard of

revie w, but one re g ardingthe degree of defe renc e to be a ffor ded fina l state adjudications. 28 U.S.C . § 2254(d). Indeed, le avingaside whatever eff ect this might have on our a bstention 6 doctrines—whic h Ideal with in note 7, infra —de novo re view of state deter minations of fede ral qu e sti on s se e ms c on so na

nt w ithtr a dit ion a l r e latio ns be tw e e n f e de ra l and

state c ourt s, pa

rt ic ula rl y in l ig ht o f t

he fa c t th at Co ngre ss n e e d n ot v e st t he po we r t o a dju dic ate fe de ra l qu e sti on s at a ll i n state cour ts in the first place. See Martin v. Hunter ’s L essee , 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 336-37 (1 81 6) (S tor

y , J.) (“ At a ll e ve nts , whe the r t

he on e c on str

uc tio n o r t

he oth e r p re va il, it i s ma

nif e st that th e jud ic ia l po we r o f t he Un ite d St ate s is un avo ida bly , in so me c a se s, e xclu siv e of a ll s tate authority , and in all others, may be made so at the ele ction of congress.” ). Separ ate que stions might ar ise if, upon re viewingthe merits of the c ase, w e dete rmined that the pa rties had c alled up on the dis tr ic t c ourt

to r e vie w a

state c ourt

jud g me nt o f s tate law. Se e Murd oc k v . M e mph is, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 625-28 (1875). In fac t, the abstention doctrine a pplicable in this case —the so-ca lled Rooker-F eldman 7 d o ct ri n e— d o es n o tev en ri s e t o th e l ev el o f “ p ru d en t i al , ” i . e. , co urt -m ad e, d o ct ri n e. Al th o u gh 29 adm iss ibi lity

of state m en ts m ad e dur ing c ust odi al int er ro ga tio n inboth st at e an d federa l courts.”) . H er e, Co ngr es s ha s a tte m pte d on ly w ha t ha s lo ng b ee n e sta

bli she d to be within its po we r to dictate: our standard of review , the eff ect of a prior state court 5 j udgm en t onthat r ev ie w , the appl ic at ionof pr ude nti al abst en tio n do ctri ne s, and 6 7Judg e B ir c h d e sc ri be s th is d oc tr ine a s “ jur isd ic tio na l,” he c on c e de s a s h e mus t th at “ the re e xists an exception to Rooker-F eldman whe n a fe dera l statute authorizes fede ral a ppellate r eview of final state c ourt dec isions.” See ante, a t 4 n.3. That is beca

use Rooker did not establish a c on sti tut ion a l ( or

e ve n p ru de nti a l) ba

r t o f e de ra l r e vie w o f f

ina l st ate c ourt

de c isi on s; i ns te a d, it rec og nized a statutory

bar to such r eview. See Rooker v. F idelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) ( “Unde r the leg islation of Congre ss, no court of the United States other than this court could enter

tain a proc eedingto reve rse or modify the judg ment for e rror s of that cha rac ter. J udicial Code, § 237, as a mended by

Act Sept. 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). To do so would be a n exercise of

appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is st rictly

orig inal.” (e mphasis added) ); cf. V erizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’ n o f M d. , 5 35 U. S. 6 35 , 6 44 n. 3 ( 20 02 ) ( “ Th e Roo ke r- F e ldm an d oc tr ine me re ly rec og nizes that 28 U.S.C . § 1331 is a g rant of or igina l jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise a

ppellate jurisdiction over

state-c ourt judg ments, which Cong ress ha s rese rved to this C ourt, see § 1257( a). The doctrine ha s no application to judicial revie w of e x ecutive action, includingdeter

minations made by

a state a dminist rative a g ency .”). Thus, it wa s completely

within Congre ss’s power to make an e x ception to the g ener al rule r eg ardingthe power of the district cour

ts to review f

inal state cour

t decisions, and it is clear from the f

ace of the statut e that Co ngre ss i nte nd e d to do so . Jud g e B ir c h d oe s n ot e xpla in why , und e r t he se circ umstances, it is of any moment whether

Congr ess provided suc h an exception in the body of the Amer icans with Disabilities Act or the Re habilitation Act of 1973. Congr ess’s author ity

over e x haustion require ments was re cog nized in P atsy v. Boa rd of 8 Reg ents of F lorida, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982) ( “[P] olicy considerations alone ca

nnot justi fy judicially imposed exhaustion unl ess exhaustion is consist ent with cong ressional intent.” (empha sis added)) . 30 the e ff ec t of e xhaust ionr equir em en ts. I kno wof no c as e barr ing Co ngr es s f ro m 8 s o d i c t a t i n g , an dJ u d g e B i r c h d o e s n o tc i t e an y. I n d e e d , qu i t e t o th e c o n t r a ry, Judg e Bi rc h c ite s c as es e sta bli shi ng tha t bo th o ur

abst en tio n and e xhaust ion doctrines are prudential. See ante, at 10. I f none of these dictates by itself goes be y ond Co ngr es s’ s po w er to de te rm ine the j ur isd ic tio n of f ed er al c ourts, I kno wof no do ctrine that could convert their aggregation int o a separation-of-powe rs vio la tio n.