## IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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### T H E 

### S T A T E O F 

### T E X A S A N D T H E 

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### D E P A R T M E N T O F 

### T R A N S P O R T A T IO N 

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v . 

### N I C O

- W F 1 , L

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. , R E S P O N D E N T

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O N P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W F R O M T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

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Argued October 16, 2012

J U S T I C E M E D I N A delivere d the opinion of the Court. J U S T I C E J O H N S O N did not participate in the de cision. This appea l questions the vali d ity of cer tain conditions a g rantor place d on a dedicated public-stree t ease ment. The ease ment in question provides for a 100-foot-w ide public rig ht of way , but the instrument dedica ting the land also provides that the street’ s curb lines are to be fiftee n fee t inside the street’ s boundary lines. The issue is whether this curb- line condition limit s the dedication such that only

the seve nty -foot ar ea be tween the curb lines c an be use d for ve hicular tra ffic. The court of appea ls con cl u d ed t h at the curb- line condition eff ectively limit ed the public

ease ment in this way . ___ S.W .3d ___ (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2010) (mem. op.). The
court further sug g ested that the State would have to use its eminent domain power s, if the publicroadw ay neede d to be improved or widened beyond the exis ting curb l i n es . W e d o not ag ree ,

howeve r, that the State must condemn proper ty alre ady dedica

ted for a public street befor e widening the exis ting roadw ay . Be cause we conclude that the State has the rig ht t o i m p ro v e the exis ting

ro ad wa y t o the boundary of the dedicated street line notwithstanding the curb- line condition, we

reve rse the c ourt of appe als’ judg ment and re mand the ca se to the trial cour t. I NI CO-WF1, L .L .C., owns a building that f ronts Arroyo Boule vard in L os Fr esnos, Texas. The building has bee n there since the 1930s. Part of the building—primar ily its attached c oncre te awning , columns, raised por ch, and ste ps—ext ends seve ral fe et into Arroy o Boule vard’ s 100-foot p u b l ic right of way

. No part of t he buil ding, however , intrudes bey ond the boul evar d’s curb l i n e, which is fiftee n fee t inside the outer edg e of the dedica ted stree t line. Since 1951, Arroyo Boule vard has been a part of the state highw ay sy stem, desig nated as FM 1 8 4 7

. Whil e considering proposed improvements to FM 1847, the Texas Depa rtment o f Transpor tation (TxDOT) discovere d that NI CO’s building encr oache d about ten fee t onto the public rig ht of way . I n 2007, Tx DOT officia lly asked NI CO to abate the encr oachme nt. When NI CO failed
to r emedy the situation, the State and Tx DOT filed suit. NI CO answer ed and f iled a counter claim for decla ratory judgme nt, asser

ting that its building did not encr oach on Arroy o Boule vard beca

use the public dedica

tion limit ed the road’ s width to the exis ting curb line. NI CO also soug ht awa rd of its attorney ’s fe es and c osts, as did the State. The streets of L os Fr esnos wer e dedica ted to public use in 1928. The dedica tion incorporated

a rec orded subdivision plat, titled “Map of Unit A of the T o wn s i t e of Fr esnos,” which showed
2Arroyo Boule vard and the town’s other streets. The plat specifie d the widt h of t he various streets and indicated wher e the curb lines should be place d in rela tion to those streets’ outer boundary lines. Reg arding Arroyo Boule vard, the dedication provided that its boundary li n es wer e to be 100 fee t apar t with curb lines fiftee n fee t inside the outer boundarie s, leaving seventy fee t betwee n the curb lines. NI CO interpre ts the dedication to include a seventy -foot public roadw ay ease ment bounded

on ei t h er s i d e by a fiftee n-foot public rig ht-of-w ay ease ment. The State, howeve r, contends that Arroyo Boule vard ha s been de dicated a s a 100-f oot-wide public stre et. Both the State and NI CO filed motions for partial summary judgme nt, urg ing their respe ctive interpre tations. The trial court denied the State’s motion and g rante d NI CO’s, concluding that “the rig ht-of-w ay ease ment for public roadw ay purposes . . . of Arroyo Boule vard (now FM 1847)” was subject to a curb line condition that limit ed “the width of the roadw ay to a maxi mum of seventy fee t” and that NI CO’s building wa s theref ore “ not a n encr oachme nt into the rig ht-of-w ay ease ment [t he State] was entitled to u s e and possess for public roadw ay purposes[.] ” The issue of NI CO’s attorney ’s fee s was tried to the court. The court’s final judgme nt incorpora ted its ruling s on the two summary judgme nt motions and its awa rd of a ttorney ’s fe es to NI CO. The co urt of appea ls aff

irmed the trial court’s judgme nt. ___ S.W .3d ___. The court of appea ls also held that the State’s public ease ment for the roadw ay was limit ed to the seventy fee t betwee n the curb lines. Id

. at ___. The court of appea ls further conclude d that NI CO’s building did
not en cr oach on the public rig ht of way beca use the fiftee n fee t betwee n the curb and outer street

3lines “wa s not dedicate d for a ny public use wha tsoever.” Id

. The S tate filed a petiti on for r eview challeng ing those holdings. I I Whil e the court of appe als conc ludes that the public ea sement ends a t Arroy o Boule vard’ s curb line, NI CO conce des here that it does not. The State simil arly ar gu es t h at the dedication

cre ating Arroyo Boule vard includes the fiftee n fee t bey ond the curb lines notwithstanding the court of appea ls’ conclusion to the contra ry . We ag ree with the parties that the dedica tion here established

a 100-foot street ease ment for Arroyo Boule vard, not the seventy -foot ease ment the court of appea ls found. A street dedication is setting land apar t f or public use as a passag ewa y . See City of Uvalde

v. Stova l l , 2 7 9 S

. W

. 889, 890 (Tex. Civ. App.–San Antonio 1925, writ ref ’d). When a street is dedicated to the public, the g overnme ntal entity taking control of the street ordinarily acquir es only

an ease ment that it holds in trust for public benef it. Humble Oi l & Ref. Co. v. Blankenburg , 235 S.W .2d 891, 893 (Tex. 1951). The easement, however , car ries with it the right to use and c ontrol

as much of the surfa ce and subsurfac e of the street as may be rea sonably neede d for street purposes. Hill Farm, Inc. v. Hill Cnty. , 436 S.W .2d 320, 321 (Tex. 1969). These purposes, of course , include transporting people and proper ty , but a public street may also be used as a passag ewa y for utilit ies and other public purposes. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Shell Pipe Line Corp. , 591 S.W .2d 798, 799 (Tex. 1979). I n short, a street includes the whole width of th e p u b l i c rig ht of way . Joseph v. City of Austin , 101 S.W .2d 381, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.–Austin 1936, writ ref’d) . I t includes sidewalks and
4parkw ay s, which “a re a part of the street itself.” Jones v . City of Mineola , 203 S.W .2d 1020, 1022 (Tex. Civ. App.–Texarkana 1947, writ ref ’d); see also City of San Antonio v. W ildenstein , 109 S.W

. 231, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.–San Antonio 1908, writ ref ’d) (“Sidewa lks are uniformly reg arde d as part of the street.” ). And it includes “the paveme nt, shoulders, g utters, curbs, and other are as within the
street lines.” B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 1434 (7th ed. 1999). The Transpor tation Code simil arly define s a stree t as more than a mere roadw ay

for ve hicular tra ffic. 1 The L os Fr esnos townsite plat clea rly set Arroyo Boule vard’ s boundary lines 100 fee t apar t. The curb- line condition did not purport to alter the street’ s outer boundarie s, n o r d id it serve to reduc e the are a dedicated for the public street. The court of appea ls acc ording ly err ed in concluding that the public-stree t ease ment was define d by a curb- line condition rathe r than the street’ s boundary line as dedic ated. I I I Although NI CO conce des that the public rig ht of way here is 100 fee t, it never theless contends that the g rantor did not intend to dedica te the public ease ment entirely for vehicular traff ic. I t submits that the g rantor limit ed the State’s use of the entire ease ment for this purpose throug h the curb- line condition. NI CO thus conclude s t h at the State holds a 100-foot-w ide rig ht-of-w ay

ease ment subject to a c ondition, which limi ts the ease ment’s use a s a roa dway to seventy

fee t.

T E X . T R A N S P . C O D E § 3 1 6

. 0 0 1 ( 1 ) ( “ ‘ M u n i c i p a l s t r e e t ’ m e a n s t h e e n t i r e w i d t h o f w a y h e l d b y a m u n i c i p a l i t y 1 i n f e e o r b y e a s e m e n t o r d e d i c a t i o n t h a t h a s a p a r t o p e n f o r p u b l i c u s e f

o r v e h i c u l a r t r a v e l

. ” ) ; I d

. § 3 1 6

. 0 0 1 ( 3 ) ( “ ‘ S i d e w a l k ’ m e a n s t h e p o r t i o n o f a m u n i c i p a l s t r e e t b e t w e e n t h e c u r b l i n e s o r l a t e r a l l i n e s o f a r o a d w a y a n d t h e a d j a c e n t p r o p e r t y l i n e s t h a t i s i m p r o v e d a n d d e s i g n e d f o r o r i s o r d i n a r i l y u s e d f o r p e d e s t r i a n t r a v e l

. ” ) ; I d

. § 5 4 1

. 3 0 2 ( 5 ) ( “ ‘ H i g h w a y o r s t r e e t ’ m e a n s t h e w i d t h b e t w e e n t h e b o u n d a r y l i n e s o f a p u b l i c l y m a i n t a i n e d w a y a n y p a r t o f w h i c h i s o p e n t o t h e p u b l i c f

o r v e h i c u l a r t r a v e l

. ” ) ; I d

. § 5 4 1

. 3 0 2 ( 1 6 ) ( “ ‘ S i d e w a l k ’ m e a n s t h e p o r t i o n o f a s t r e e t t h a t i s : ( A ) b e t w e e n a c u r b o r l a t e r a l l i n e o f a r o a d w a y a n d t h e a d j a c e n t p r o p e r t y l i n e ; a n d ( B ) i n t e n d e d f o r p e d e s t r i a n u s e . ” )

. 5The State, of course , disag ree s about the condition’s eff ect, althoug h it does not dispute that the g rantor probably intended limit ing vehicular traff ic to only a p ar t o f t h e ea sement. But even assuming that to be the g rantor’ s intent, the fac t remains that he de dicated the entire 100- foot are a to public use as a street. The State argues that rea ding the curb- line condition to limit its authority over the entire public stre et ea sement contra venes w ell-established public policy to the contra

ry . The establishment, desig n, construction, and control of public streets are primarily g overnme ntal functions over which the g overnme nt has full authority

. See Tex. Dep’ t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley , 146 S.W .3d 637, 645 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Robbins v

. Limestone Cnty. , 268 S.W

. 915, 918 (Tex. 1925) (“Public roads are state proper ty over which the state has full control and authority .”)) ; see also Mission v. Popplewe ll , 294 S.W .2d 712, 715 (Tex. 1956) (“[T]he leg al title
to city s t re et s b el o ng s to the state, which has full control and authority over them[.] ”). As mentio n ed , Ar ro y o Bo ulevar d is now a part of the state highw ay sy stem. By statute, the Texas Depa rtment of Transpor

tation has “exclusive and direc t control of all improvement of the state highw ay sy stem.” T E X . T R A N S P . C O D E § 224.031(a)

. Texas courts have long rec og nized, howeve r, that dedica ting land for public use may include

rea sonable restric tions and limit ations. Griffit h v. Allison , 96 S.W .2d 74, 77 (Tex. 1936). But limit ations imposed by the dedicator cannot be “re pug nant to the dedica tion or ag ainst public policy .” Roaring Springs T o w n -S i t e C o . v. Paducah Tel. Co. , 212 S.W

. 147, 148-49 (Tex

. 1919) (holding void a restric tion rese rving to the dedica tor the exclusive rig ht to construct telephone lines in the public rig ht of way

); see also Scott v. Cannon , 959 S.W .2d 712, 718 (Tex. App.–Austin 1998, pet. denied) (noting that owner of dedica ted land “re serve s no rig hts that are incompatible with the
6full enjoy

ment of the public”). When a dedica tion includes a condition that is inconsistent with the g rant or contravenes public policy , the dedica tion is never theless eff

ective even though the condition is not. See City of Fort W orth v. Ryan Props., Inc. , 284 S.W .2d 211, 214 (Tex. Civ. App.–For t Worth 1955, no writ). The 1928 de dication her e purpor ted to rese rve a

number of r ights to the g rantor, suc h as: [T] he rig ht to occupy and use said streets, boulevar ds and alley s for purposes of constructing , maintaining and operating ditches, g utters, pipe-lines and culver ts, and other appurte nance s for draina ge purposes, pipelines and conduits with nece ssary appurte nance s for the distribution and sale of water , g as or oil f or railroa ds or other lines of transporta tion for the car riag e of fre ight or passeng ers, for lines of poles and wires, or conduits, or the purposes of the distribution and sale of light or power , and for tele phone or te leg raph pur poses. The g rantor further rese rved the rig ht “to excavate and g rade and otherw i s e i m p ro v e all streets, boulevar ds and alley s and to temporar ily interfe re with the use of same while so doing.” Most if not all of these rese rvat i o n s are inconsistent with the dedica tion to the public. See, e.g. , City of Beaumont v. Calder Place Corp. , 183 S.W .2d 713, 716 (Tex. 1944) (holding g rantor’ s rese rvation of owner ship and control of water and sewe r mains void afte r annexation by city ); Roaring Springs Tow n -Site Co. , 212 S.W

. at 148-49 (re jecting dedica tor’s rese rvation to use streets to construct telephone, te leg raph, a

nd elec tric poles and w ires as void a nd repug nant t o the publ ic dedication); Harlingen Irrigation Dist. Cameron Cnty. No. 1 v. Caprock Comm. Corp. , 49 S.W .3d 520, 532 (Tex. App.—Corpus Chris t i 2 001, pet. denied) (holding invalid a condition requiring that any improvements to the public roadw ay be approve d by the dedica tor); accord W

. Tex. Utils. Co. v. City of Spur , 38 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1930) (deny ing c ontrol of public stree ts a nd rig ht of way s to pr ivate elec tric utility

for installation of poles a nd lines).
7The substantive principle from these case s is that a g rantor cannot dedica te land for a public

purpose and y et reta in control over such land i n d er o gat i on of the public rig ht convey ed. The question in this case is whether the curb- line condition violates this p ri nciple. Under NI CO’s application of the condition, we conc lude that it does. NI CO interpre ts the curb- line condition a s fre ezing the public’s use of the street to w hen it

was dedicated. But the public’s future use of a street ease ment is not depende nt on the usag e prev ai l i n g wh en the street opened. See City Comm’rs of Port Arthur v. Fant , 193 S.W

. 334, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.–Bea

umont 1916, no writ). Moreove r, the public rig ht ext ends to the entire width of the dedicated street, Joseph , 101 S.W .2d at 385, and includes portions not previously used or used for other street pur

poses. See R

yan Props. , 284 S.W .2d at 213. Whenever public convenie nce or

nece ssity dictates, a public rig ht of way may be put to its dedica ted purpose. Joseph , 101 S.W .2d
at 384. Clearly , an eig hty -four -y ear -old condition purporting to fix the curb lines perma nently in L os Fr esnos, Texas, is a restric tion that impairs state control and public use of the dedica ted street. See McCraw v. Cit

y of Dallas , 420 S.W .2d 793, 796 (Tex. Civ. App.–Dallas 1967, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (“L and dedicated for the use of the public as a s t re et may continue to be used by the public as a street, not only in the manner in which streets are ordinarily used at the time of dedica tion, but also
to acc ommodate the most rec ently invented vehicles and to confor m to m odern plans for traff ic

acc eler ation and contr ol.”). The circ umstances here are not unlike those in another case decide d by this same court of appea ls. See Harlingen Irrigation Dist. , 49 S.W .3d 520. I n that case , the deed convey ing the public

ease ment contained a restric tion that require d the g rantor’ s approva l of any co n s t ru cti on on the
8ease ment. Id

. at 532. The court of appea ls held the condition void beca use it “interf

er[ed] with the state’s fre edom to devote t h e ro adwa y s to the wants and convenie nce of the public” and

“ im p e r mi s s ibly limit [ed] the state from exercising its jurisdiction as to construction on th e r o a d w a y . ” Id

. at 532, 534. The curb- l i n e condit ion in this case prese nts a simil ar impediment to the State’s control and authority over Arroyo Boule vard. An d wh en a condition in the street’ s dedica tion is inconsistent with the g rant or void as ag ainst public policy , the dedica tion preva ils over the invalid condition. Town of

Palm Valley v. Johnson , 17 S.W .3d 281, 287 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2000), pet. denied, 87 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam); Ryan Props. , 284 S.W .2d at 214. Be cause the curb- line condition purports to co n t ro l the construction and use of Arroy o Boule vard, it is repug nant to the State’s control and authority over the public street and is void. The
court of appea ls acc ording ly err ed in af fi rm ing NI CO’s favor able judgme nt premised on the condition’s assumed validity

. I V Finally , the matter of the State’s motion for summary judgme nt rema ins. The State asser ted in its motion that a part of NI CO’s building interfe red with the public’s use of FM 1847, constituting an obstruction and nuisa

nce the State was e ntitled to remove. I ndeed, a ny structure that interfe res with the public’s prese nt or future u s e o f a dedica ted street is a nuisance per se and subject to

remova l. Joseph , 101 S.W .2d at 384; Ryan Props. , 284 S.W .2d at 215. A few y ear s befor e Arroyo Boule vard’ s dedica tion, a Texas appellate court aptly discussed the law’ s intolerance of enc roac hments upon the public rig ht of way :

9[A] ny perma nent structure or purpre sture which materia lly encr oache s upon a public street and impedes t rave l is a nuis ance per s e, an d m ay be abated, notwit hstanding space is left for the passag e of the public. This is the only safe rule, for, if one person can perma

nently use a highw ay for his own private purposes, so m ay al l, and if it wer e left to the jury to deter mine in ever

y case how far such an obstru ct i o n m i ght encr oach upon the way without being a nuisance , there would be no cer tainty in the law and what was at first a matter of a small conseque nce woul d s o on become a burden, not only to adjoining owner s, but to all the taxpay ers and the trave ling public as we ll. Thus ex pedienc y forbids any

other rule

. Dozier v. City of

Austin , 253 S.W

. 554, 556 (Tex. Civ. App.–San Antonio 1923, writ dism’d w.o.j.). That NI CO’s building encr oache s sever al fee t upon Arroyo Boule vard’ s 100-fo o t -wide public

ease ment is n o t i n d i s p ute. The court of appea ls acc ording ly err ed in aff irming the denial of the State’s summary

judgme nt motion t hat soug ht the remova l of the purpr esture. 2 * * * * * The court of appea ls’ judgme nt is reve rsed. Be cause the State’s summary judgme nt motion does not dispose of all issues raised by its pleading s, the cause is rema nded to the trial co u rt for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

___________________________ David M. Medina J ustice Opinion delivere d: November 2, 2012

A p u r p r e s t u r e i s “ a n e n c r o a c h m e n t u p o n p u b l i c r i g h t s a n d e a s e m e n t s , t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n t o p r i v a t e u s e o f t h a t 2 w h i c h b e l o n g s t o t h e p u b l i c . ” H i l l F a r m , 4 3 6 S

. W

. 2 d a t 3 2 1

. 1 0