SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4973-14T4

BRIAN D. ASARNOW,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF LONG BRANCH, a municipal

corporation of NJ; ADAM SCHNEIDER, 

Mayor; MARY JANE CELLI, Councilwoman;

HOWARD WOOLLEY, Administrator;

KEVIN HAYES, Director of Building &

Development; MICHELLE BERNICH, 

Zoning Officer; TERRY JANECZEK, 

Chairperson, Zoning Board; MICHAEL 

IRENE, Zoning Board Attorney; ZONING 

BOARD; EDWARD BRUNO and E&L PAVING,

INC.; RAYMOND GRIECO and ATLANTIC 

PAVING (& COATING), LLC; JOE ROSARIO 

& ROSARIO CONTRACTING CORP., d/b/a 

ROSARIO MAZZA DEMOLITION AND RECYCLING 

CO.; CUSTOM LAWN SPRINKLER CO., LLC,

Defendants-Respondents,

and 

R. BROTHERS CONCRETE, LLC, RICHARD 

BRAHA and SEASHORE DAYCAMP,

Defendants.

_________________________________________

Submitted January 23, 2017 – Decided

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

September 18, 2017
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Before Judges Sabatino, Nugent, and Currier.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L4039-11.

Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for 

appellant (Michael Confusione, of counsel and 

on the brief).

Ansell, Grimm & Aaron, PC, attorneys for 

respondents City of Long Branch, Adam 

Schneider, Mary Jane Celli, Howard Woolley, 

Kevin Hayes, Michelle Bernich, Terry Janeczek, 

Michael Irene and Zoning Board of Adjustment 

(Barry M. Capp, of counsel and on the brief).

Paul R. Edinger, attorney for respondents 

Edward Bruno and E&L Paving, Inc., Ray Greico 

and Atlantic Paving (& Coating), LLC, Joe 

Rosario and Rosario Contracting Corp., and 

Custom Lawn Sprinkler Co., LLC.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Brian D. Asarnow appeals from an October 3, 2014 

order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants City of 

Long Branch and public officials Adam Schneider, Mary Jane Celli, 

Howard Woolley, Kevin Hayes, Michelle Bernich, Terry Janeczek, 

Michael Irene, and Long Branch Zoning Board of Adjustment ("Zoning 

Board"), ("public defendants"). Plaintiff also appeals from trial 

court orders vacating defaults against certain defendants and from 

a June 11, 2015 order memorializing a jury verdict entered in 

favor of defendants Edward Bruno, E&L Paving, Inc., Ray Greico, 

Atlantic Paving and Coating, LLC, Joe Rosario, Rosario Contracting 
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Corp., Rosario Mazza Demolition and Recycling Co., and Custom Lawn 

Sprinkler Co., LLC ("private defendants"). 

Plaintiff has owned property in Long Branch since 1995 and 

has used the property as an office, a lab, for light manufacturing, 

and rental space. Private defendants owned an adjacent lot. Bruno 

purchased the property in the 1960s to operate an asphalt paving 

business, E&L Paving, Inc., and he leased the property to other 

contractors throughout the years. In 2009, Bruno rented the 

property to Greico, Rosario, and their respective contracting 

companies. The land straddles an industrial zone, a commercial 

zone, and a residential zone. 

On August 3, 2009, E&L and Atlantic Paving obtained a zoning 

permit to operate a paving company and contractor's yard. In 

response to the permit, plaintiff commenced a letter writing 

campaign to have it revoked, writing letters to the City's Mayor 

and Business Administrator. On January 27, 2010, the City Director 

of Building and Development and Fire Marshal sent a "Notice of 

Violation" to Atlantic Paving, asserting it had exceeded the use 

of the August 2009 permit. On April 30, 2010, plaintiff filed a 

verified complaint in lieu of prerogative writs seeking to: void 

the August 2009 permit issued to E&L and Atlantic Paving; compel 

Long Branch to enforce the Notice of Violation; and provide 

plaintiff unfettered access to his property. Asarnow v. City of 
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Long Branch, A-0999-10 (App. Div. May 6, 2013). He asserted the 

public defendants' issuance of the permit was "ultra vires." 

Subsequently, public defendants filed a motion to dismiss. 

On August 27, 2010, the trial judge granted defendants' motion, 

concluding plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and 

comply with Rule 4:69-5. Plaintiff appealed. Asarnow v. City of 

Long Branch, No. A-0999-10 (App. Div. May 6, 2016). We affirmed. 

In October 2011, while plaintiff's appeal was pending, he 

filed a ten-count complaint against the public and private 

defendants, which included claims for nuisance, intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, interference with prospective 

economic advantage, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy,

Section 1983 violations, and breach of contract. The private 

defendants initially failed to respond to the complaint, prompting 

the entry of default. Edward Bruno and E&L Paving moved to vacate 

default. The trial court granted their motion. The trial court 

granted the remaining defendants' motions and vacated the defaults 

against them.

After discovery, the public defendants moved for summary 

judgment. On October 3, 2014, in a comprehensive oral opinion, 

the court granted the motion for many reasons, including the entire 

controversy doctrine, the Tort Claims Act, the statute of 
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limitations, and plaintiff's failure to present a prima facie case 

for each of his respective claims. 

Trial commenced in May 2015 against the private defendants 

based on plaintiff's claims for nuisance and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. During the trial, the court's 

evidentiary rulings included denying the admission by plaintiff 

of evidence concerning zoning violations, a website hacking, and 

an alleged "arson," finding that the probative value of such 

evidence would be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice and 

risk of jury confusion. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of 

the private defendants. This appeal followed. 

Plaintiff raises the following arguments:

Point I

The trial court erred in precluding plaintiff 

from introducing before the jury at trial 

evidence of prior and ongoing zoning 

violations by the private defendants and 

evidence that defendants' activities on their 

adjoining properties exceeded those permitted 

during the time period in question, and in 

precluding other key evidence relevant to 

proving plaintiff's nuisance claim against 

the private defendants. Precluding this 

evidence at trial deprived plaintiff of a 

fair trial on his nuisance claim and warrants 

reversal and remand for a new trial. 
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Point II

The trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment to the City of Long Branch and its 

public officials and denying [p]laintiff's 

summary judgment for injunctive relief. 

Point III

 

The trial court erred in granting the motion 

to vacate default by defendants Raymond 

Greico, Atlantic Paving [&] Coating, LLC, Joe 

Rosario, Rosario Contracting Corp., and Custom 

Lawn and Sprinkler Company.

Point IV

The trial court erred in allowing the 

opposition appraiser's methodology which 

prejudiced [p]laintiff's damages claim; 

defendants should not be permitted to violate 

case law and professional standards upon any 

remand.

We affirm the grant of summary judgment to the municipal 

defendants substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Jamie 

S. Perri in her comprehensive oral opinion. Plaintiff's remaining 

claims concerning the order vacating default and alleged trial 

errors are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following 

comments.

Motions to "vacate default[s] 'should be viewed with great 

liberality,'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 410 

N.J. Super. 501, 508 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Marder v. Realty 

Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div. 1964)) and trial 
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courts are vested with sound discretion to grant or deny such 

motions but should resolve all doubts in favor of a party seeking 

relief, Mancini v. EDS ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting 

Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993). When we review a trial court's 

exercise of discretion, "[t]he question is only whether the trial 

judge pursued a manifestly unjust course." Gittleman v. Cent. 

Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 103 N.J. Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 

1967), rev'd on other grounds, 52 N.J. 503 (1968). We cannot 

conclude from our review of the record that the trial court pursued 

a manifestly unjust course in vacating default here.

Similarly, we review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for 

an abuse of discretion. Villanueva v. Zimmer, 431 N.J. Super.

301, 310 (App. Div. 2013); Benevenga v. Digregorio, 325 N.J. Super.

27, 32 (App. Div. 1999) (citing State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 131 

(1991)), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 79 (2000); Bitsko v. Main 

Pharmacy, Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 267, 284 (App. Div. 1996) (citing 

Ratner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 241 N.J. Super. 197, 202 (App. Div. 

1990)). We will not reverse a trial court's evidentiary rulings 

absent a palpable abuse of discretion, that is, the court's 

decision "was so wide of[f] the mark that a manifest denial of 

justice resulted." Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 

492 (1999) (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982)). 

Applying those standards, we find that none of the trial court's 
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evidentiary rulings require such findings of manifest injustice. 

Consequently, the outcome of the trial should not be set aside.

Affirmed.