on May 21, 2001, a hearing was held; an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) Administrative Judge found that Carr was not discriminated against.

The Post Office’s racial animus has similarly affected a number of other African-
American probationary PTF carriers, while only affecting one white PTF carrier. Such adverse
treatment has led to both the termination of and resignation of a disproportionate amount of
black PTF carriers.

Defendant Potter contends that Carr’s disparate impact claim should be dismissed for
failure to raise this claim at the administrative level.

The general purpose of Section 717 of the 1972 Title VII extension is to remedy the
discrimination of federal employees through the creation of a dispute resolution system which
requires that the aggrieved party pursue administrative relief before filing in federal district
court; and, before filing in federal district court, a complaining party must exhaust his
administrative remedies. West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 219 (1999); Brown v, General Services
Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976). To raise a claim in subsequent litigation, a claim, generally,
must first be raised at the administrative level. Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 864
(7th Cir. 1985) (Babrocky). Specifically, a complaining party who believes that they have been
subjected to discrimination must initially consult a Counselor before filing a complaint in federal
district court. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a) (2003).

Title VI plaintiffs must initially bring a charge with the appropriate administrative body,
ie, EEOC, EEO, before pursuing a claim in federal court; and thus, Title VII claims cannot be
brought if they were not included in the plaintiff's EEOC complaint. Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 864.
An exception to this general rule, which allows a claim not included in the EEOC complaint to
be pursued in federal court, exists when that subsequent claim is “reasonably related” to the

4


Carr’s present disparate impact claim and his claims within the EEO complaint. Accordingly,
Count I is dismissed.

In light of the above, Potter’s assertion that Carr failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted need not be reached. For the foregoing reasons, Potter’s Motion to Dismiss is

granted. Count J is dismissed.

Dated: 4, 203 Lprrit_,

J ond W. DARRAH
United States District Judge



On two different occasions, Carr witnessed the verbal abuse of fellow employees by
Cain. After each occasion, Cain called Carr into his office and verbally abused him and made
threats about his continued employment. White employees were not subject to similar threats or
abuse by Cain.

After Carr received his first violation for exceeding his allotted street time in March
2001, he met with Cain, who verbally abused him. On March 22, 2001, Carr received his second
violation after a Street Supervision/Observation Report noted that he was not carrying his
satchel, dog spray, or scanner while delivering mail. Following the receipt of this violation, Carr
met with Cain and was again subjected to verbal abuse and threats of dismissal.

In March 2001, Carr received all “satisfactory” marks from Bonner on his 60-day
evaluation. On April 3, 2001, Carr received his third violation after he spent seven hours, as
opposed to the regular five and a half to six hours, to finish a mail route that day. This mail
Toute was not Carr’s usual route, and he was not given the assistance promised to him. Carr met
with Cain the following day, where he was criticized for not calling in by 3:00 p.m. to report that
he was going to be late. During the course of this meeting, Cain dressed in Civil War attire and
gave Carr all satisfactory marks except for one on his 80-day evaluation. Cain and Carr
discussed the fact that, while Carr had been late twice, he had received no customer complaints.

On April 6, 2001, Carr met with Bonner and Ann Henderson, another supervisor, and
was terminated by the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). The letter of termination stated
that Carr received numerous customer complaints for failure to provide timely delivery and that
he failed to follow instructions to call the office by 3:00 p.m. when he could not finish his route

on time. After Carr filed a complaint with the USPS Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)


claim that was included in the EEOC charge. Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 864. To be reasonably
related, a factual relationship must exist between both claims; specifically, a claim in a Title VI
plaintiff's complaint and an EEOC charge are reasonably related when the subsequent claim can
be reasonably expected to be developed from an investigation of the EEOC charge’s allegations.
Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994).

Courts will give Title VII pro se plaintiffs leeway in regards to the administrative
specificity requirement in EEOC complaints. The basis for this liberal construction is to give
pro se plaintiffs leeway by construing their allegations in light of the strongest arguments that
they may suggest when deciding whether the claims in the complaint are encompassed by the
EEOC charge. Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998).

In his EEO complaint, Carr asserted that his civil rights were violated, that he was
exposed to a hostile work environment, and that he experienced an abuse of power by the
management of the Evanston Post Office. Specifically, Carr stated that his delivery manager,
Cain, created the hostile work environment and that Cain’s discriminatory behavior violated his
civil rights, as well as those of other black employees. Carr further contended that management
failed to follow proper procedures as described in the Daily Operations Handbook. For
remedies, Carr sought reinstatement without probation, back pay covering the period between
his removal and his reinstatement date with interest, the choice to transfer to a postal facility in
the south suburbs, removal of all adverse action documented in his EEO complaint, and that all
parties involved be appropriately disciplined.

Disparate treatment, which requires proof of discriminatory motive, occurs when an
employer treats some employees less favorably than others because of their race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin. Scherr v.. Woodland Sch. Community Consol. Dist., 867 F.2d 974,

5


Miu gQréee Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

ay

ni Magura Jude John W. Darrah “ban Asigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 5273 DATE 7/2/2003

CASE MICHAEL D. CARR vs. JOHN E. POTTER

TITLE

[in the following box (2) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) a} Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
@) a Answer brief to motion due__. Reply to answer briefdue__-
(4) ia] Ruling/Hearingon___setfor_—_at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—setfor__—_at
(© Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—setfor__——sat__—
(7) Qa Trial[set for/re-set for]on____at
(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
OFRCP4(m) (CLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a\(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Ml [Otherdocketentry) Status hearing held and continued to 8/27/03 at 9:00 a.m. Enter memorandum

opinion and order. Potter’s assertion that Carr failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
need not be reached. For the foregoing reasons, Potter’s motion to dismiss is granted. Count I is

dismissed.

a [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Notified counsel by telephone,
Docketing to mail notices. ’
Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

ayisia st
1uno9 ha

courtroom : - Wt bu
1G mys 20:L Rd 2- Il
DatGyifefacavddid TI

initials
central Clerk's Office



979 (7th Cir. 1988) (Scherr). On the other hand, disparate impact, which does not require proof
of discriminatory motive, concerns employment practices that, without the justification of
business necessity, harshly and disproportionately affect one group more than another; these
employment practices are facially neutral in the way that they treat different groups. Scherr, 867
F.2d at 979.

Even though Carr was a pro se Title VII plaintiff during the EEO process, and is to be
afforded some leeway in regards to the administrative specificity requirement in EEO
complaints, his disparate impact claim still must be reasonably related to the claim in his EEO
complaint.

During the EEO process, Carr claimed that his civil rights were violated, that he was
exposed to a hostile work environment, and that he experienced an abuse of power by the
management of the Evanston Post Office. Carr’s EEO complaint did not allege that any facially
neutral employment practices of the Evanston Post Office harshly affected black employees
more than white employees. Carr points to the racial animus of a single employee, Cain, as the
cause of the civil rights violations he and others suffered. In his EEO complaint, Carr contends
that other African-American employees were only affected by Cain’s discriminatory behavior
and not by any facially neutral employment practices of the Evanston Post Office. Carr stated
that the problem was Cain’s racial animus not the review process. Furthermore, contrary to a
claim of disparate impact, Carr’s EEO complaint suggests that the review process, the
employment practice involved in the EEO complaint, would have protected him and others from
Cain’s racial animus if they were followed.

Based on the above, Carr’s disparate impact claim is not reasonably related to the claim
that was included in the EEO complaint. No reasonable factual relationship exists between

6


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL D. CARR, ) pocKETED
Plaintiff, } sur 03 0
)
v. ) NO: 02 C 5273
)
JOHN E. POTTER, in his official ) Judge John W. Darrah
capacity as Postmaster General, )
)
Defendant. y

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Michael D. Carr (“Carr”), filed suit against Defendant, John E. Potter
(“Potter”), in his official capacity as Postmaster General of the United States of America,
alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e¢ seq.
Presently pending before the Court is Potter’s Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Second
Amended Complaint, which asserts a claim for disparate impact resulting from intentional
discrimination.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court reviews all facts alleged in the complaint and
any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Marshall-
Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff is not
required to plead the facts or the elements of a claim, with the exceptions found in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (Swierkiewicz);
Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2002). A filing under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure need not contain all the facts that will be necessary to prevail. It should be “short and



plain”, and it suffices if it notifies the defendant of the principal events. See Hoskins v. Poelstra,
320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2003). Dismissal is warranted only if “it appears beyond a doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claims that would entitle it to relief.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The “suit should not be dismissed if it is possible
to hypothesize the facts, consistent with the complaint, that would make out a claim.” Graehling
v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995). The simplified notice pleading
relies upon liberal discovery and summary of motions to define disputed issues and facts and to
dispose of unmeritorious claims. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513.

A reading of Carr’s complaint supports the following summary of the alleged conduct of
the parties.

Carr, an African-American male, was employed by the Evanston Post Office from
January 2001 until his termination in April 2001. After completing two weeks of training, Carr
became a 90-day part-time flexible (“PTF”) carrier. Carr, as well as other black employees,
received numerous phone calls from Martin Cain (“Cain”), a customer service manager at the
Evanston Post Office, asking Carr how quickly he could get to work; then, after reporting to
work, Carr’s supervisors improperly noted him as being late to work. White mail carriers did
not receive similar calls.

Carr received four satisfactory marks and one unsatisfactory mark from Lorinne Bonner
(“Bonner”) on his 30-day evaluation in February 2001. In that same month, an Operating Plan
was first received by Evanston Post Office PTF carriers which required carriers to call their
supervisors by 3:00 p.m. if they could not finish their street assignment in the allotted time;

failure to do so would result in the receipt of a violation.