UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 03 C 6508

v. )

) Judge Robert W. Gettleman

BURNHAM MORTGAGE, INC., et al., ) Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff Freedom Mortgage Corporation’s objections

to the Bills of Costs of Defendants, Ticor Title Insurance Company (“Ticor”), Eric Vehovc, and

Exeter Title Company (“Exeter”) for the amounts of $20,772.44, $1,017.73 and $2,055.30,

respectively. Although the district court granted defendant Eric Vehovc leave to file a bill of costs,

defendant failed to do so. Therefore Vehovc’s bill of costs is not at issue here. 

Plaintiff objects to the following categories of charges in each bill of costs: photocopying,

exemplification, facsimiles, long-distance telephone and cellular phone calls, PACER and Westlaw

research, travel costs, and postage, Federal Express and UPS charges. Recoverable costs pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) are designated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). Plaintiff requests

the Court deny each defendant’s bill of costs in their entirety. Although the Honorable Robert

Gettleman granted defendants leave to join Ticor’s motion to file a reply to plaintiff’s objection, the

only defendant to file an objection was Ticor. The Court will, therefore, address only those

arguments presented by Ticor in support of its bill of costs. For the reasons set forth below,

plaintiff’s objections are sustained in part and overruled in part. Exeter’s Bill of Costs is reduced to

$21.00 [dkt 264] and Ticor’s Bill of Costs is denied in its entirety [dkt 267]. 
1

28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2000).

2

Angevine v. Watersaver Faucet Co., 2003 WL 23019165, *1 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 23, 2003) (citing Deimer v

.Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1993)).

3

Angevine, 2003 WL 23019165 at *7 (citing Shah v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 2003 WL 21961362

(N.D.Ill. Aug. 14, 2003)) (holding descriptions of quantities and what documents were copied aid the court in

determining the necessity of copying to the litigation). 4

Id. (citing Glenayre Electronics, Inc. v. Jackson, 2003 WL 21947112, *3 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 11, 2003)) (stating

“bare-bones” billing statements failed to provide required detail).

A. Photocopying and Exemplification Charges

Plaintiff argues that defendants, while entitled to recover photocopy and exemplification

charges, failed to record these charges in a manner that allows for proper judicial review. “Fees for

exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in [a] case” are recoverable costs.1

Yet a court can only impose costs upon a losing party when the expenses are allowed under 28

U.S.C. § 1920 and are “reasonable, both in amount and necessity to the litigation.”2 The invoices

provided by Ticor fail to identify the particular purposes of any photocopy or exemplification. Ticor

asserts that it should not be burdened with providing detailed descriptions of photocopying costs

arguing that it would make it economically impossible to recover those costs. Ticor exaggerates the

difficulty in providing sufficient descriptions of photocopies and ignores the Court’s need for the

most basic descriptive reporting in assessing whether a photocopy was truly necessary to the

litigation. The absence of entries describing what documents were photocopied, and for what

purpose, prohibits the Court from weighing in on the necessity of the photocopying and

exemplification charges.3 Therefore, the Court will not allow Ticor to recover the costs of

photocopying and exemplification.

Exeter’s Bill of Costs suffers from the same deficiencies in its description of photocopied

materials. The Bill of Costs fails to describe any of the types of documents photocopied or their use

in the litigation. Such lack of description is not recoverable.4 The itemized entry detailing Exeter’s

payment of $21.00 for a copy of the Court file from the Clerk of the Northern District of Illinois,
5

See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 38 F.3d 1429, 1440-41 (7th Cir. 1994)

(analogizing library research, which is clearly attorney’s fees, with similar research performed on a computer). 6

See Angevine, 2003 WL 23019165 at *7 (acknowledging that facsimile have been recovered under

attorney’s fees but holding that they are not recoverable as costs); Amati v. Woodstock, 1998 WL 299362, *5

(N.D.Ill. May 27, 1998) (stating facsimile charges are not mentioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and are not analogous

to copy charges). 7

See Telular Corp. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 2006 WL 1722375, *11 (N.D.Ill. June 16, 2006) (stating

telephone charges are not enumerated and thus, not enforceable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920).

8

See Tuf Racing Products, Inc. v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 1999 WL 669226, *4 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 27, 1999)

(stating travel expenses are professional services and recoverable as attorney’s fees).

9

See Telular Corp., 2006 WL 1722375 at *11.

however, adequately describes the necessity and purpose for the copying. Exeter may, thus, recover

the $21.00 in exemplification and photocopying expenses.

B. Computerized PACER and Westlaw Research

Plaintiff argues that computerized research on Westlaw and PACER should not be

recoverable via a bill of costs since such research is categorized as attorney’s fees. The Seventh

Circuit Court of Appeals has held that computerized research costs are attorney’s fees and not

recoverable under a bill of costs.5

 Ticor stipulated to this point as it is contemporaneously seeking

attorney’s fees in a separate motion. Ticor’s initial request of $14,978.52 for such research costs is,

therefore, moot. Plaintiff’s objection to Exeter’s research costs of $1,744.26 is sustained.

C. All Other Charges

Plaintiff argues that defendants’ costs for facsimiles, long-distance telephone calls, attorney

travel fees, and postage or delivery charges should not be recoverable under their bills of costs.

Facsimiles,6

 long-distance telephone charges,7 and attorney travel fees8 are all ordinary business

expenses and should be included in attorney’s fees. Neither Exeter nor Ticor attempts to refute

plaintiff’s claims that these charges should be excluded from their bills of costs. It should be further

noted that facsimile charges, telephone charges and travel expenses are not enumerated under 28

U.S.C. § 1920.9

 Plaintiff’s objections to Exeter’s telephone charges and Ticor’s facsimile, telephone

charges, and travel expenses are, therefore, sustained in their entirety.
10See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Richards, 1996 WL 515160, *2 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 6, 1996)

(citing Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. American Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 594 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (Ill.

App. Ct. 1992)) (holding fees paid to third-party messenger services are recoverable). 11See Telular Corp., 2006 WL 1722375 at *11; Angevine, 2003 WL 23019165 at *9.

12See AA Sales & Associates, Inc. v. JT&T Products Corp., 2001 WL 855867, *1 (N.D.Ill. July 27, 2001)

(holding defendant failed to explain why it was necessary to use a messenger service).

The last disputed category of recoverable costs includes Ticor’s charges for postage and

other delivery or messenger services. Ticor cites to authority that holds costs associated with

messenger services should be specifically recoverable in a bill of costs.10 More recent precedent

refutes Ticor’s request for messenger and postal charges, declaring Federal Express delivery

charges, messenger service charges and package delivery unrecoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.11

Plaintiff also appeals to the current practice of electronic document delivery, with parties no longer

needing to send materials by courier, messenger service, or Federal Express. For messenger service

costs to be recoverable in a party’s bill of costs, the party must explain why it was necessary to use

the service.12 In this case, counsel filed and delivered all pleadings to opposing counsel through the

federal courts’ CM/ECF and PACER systems. Ticor offers no explanation for incurring numerous

messenger charges in its response to the plaintiff’s objection. The Court, thus, sustains plaintiff’s

objections to the inclusion of postage, mailing, and messenger charges on Ticor’s Bill of Costs.

D. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s objections are sustained in part and overruled in part.

Plaintiff’s objections to Ticor’s Bill of Costs are sustained in their entirety. Exeter’s Bill of Costs

is reduced by $2,034.30, leaving a total of $21.00.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: October 3, 2008 _____________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE