IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

ARNOLD RAY MANANSALA 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MARION FEATHER, Warden, FCI 

Sheridan, 

Respondent. 

HANNAH R. HORSFALL 

6594 S.W. Firlock Way, Apt. 1 

Portland, OR 97223 

Attorney for Petitioner 

NATALIE K. WIGHT 

Assistant United States Attorney 

District of Oregon 

1000 S.W. Third Ave, Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97204 

Attorney for Respondent 

MARSH, Judge 

Case No. 3:14-cv-00983-MA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Petitioner Arnold Ray Manansala, an inmate in the custody of 

the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) , currently housed at the 

Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Sheridan, Oregon, brings 

this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-00983-MA Document 19 Filed 04/01/15 Page 1 of 11
2241. For the reasons set forth· below, the court lac~s 

jurisdiction and this proceeding is dismissed. 

BACKGROUND 

On March 31, 2010, petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to 

defraud the United States and conspiracy to commit money laundering 

in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Florida (Pensacola Division). The sentencing judge adopted a PreSentence Investigation Report that contained a recommended 22-point 

enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) for 

the total amount of loss, and a six-point enhancement based on the 

number of victims. On July 29, 2010, petitioner received a belowGuidelines sentence of 60 months on count 1 (fraud conspiracy) and 

84 months on count 2 (money laundering conspiracy), to be served 

consecutively for a total of 144 months, plus three years postprison supervision. Petitioner did not directly appeal his 

conviction. Second Amended Petition (#13), ~ 4. Petitioner has 

not filed a prior petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. 

On March 12, 2014, petitioner filed his current § 2241 action 

in the Northern District of Florida. Because petitioner is 

incarcerated in Sheridan, Oregon, that court concluded it lacked 

jurisdiction to hear petitioner's§ 2241 claims, and it transferred 

the case to the District of Oregon. 

In his current § 2241 action, petitioner contends his Sixth 

Amendment rights were violated when the sentencing judge enhanced 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-00983-MA Document 19 Filed 04/01/15 Page 2 of 11
or increased his sentence based on facts that were not submitted to 

the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. According to 

petitioner, his sentence is illegal under Southern Union Co. v. 

United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) and United States v. Alleyne, 

133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Petitioner maintains that application of 

the enhancements without the necessary fact finding by the jury 

violates his Sixth Amendment Due Process rights. Second Amended 

Petition (#13) ~~ 25-27. 

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition because it is a 

disguised § 2255 action. Respondent contends that petitioner has 

failed to demonstrate that his action falls within the § 2241 

"escape hatchn or "savings clause, a and therefore, the court lacks 

jurisdiction and dismissal is appropriate. Respondent is correct. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Petitioner's§ 2241 Action is a Disguised§ 2255 Action 

As an initial matter, I must determine whether petitioner's 

action is a disguised § 2255 or whether he is entitled to bring his 

claims pursuant to § 2241. 1 Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 818 

1

The law of the case does not control the Northern District 

of Florida's characterization of petitioner's action as a§ 2241. 

The transferor court did not engage in any analysis of whether 

petitioner's action was properly brought under§ 2241 or§ 2255, 

or the escape hatch, prior to transferring the case to the 

District of Oregon. Response to 2241 Habeas Petition (#18) Ex. 

5. Accordingly, this court now undertakes the appropriate 

analysis. Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 818-19 & n.3 (9th Cir. 

2012). 

3 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-00983-MA Document 19 Filed 04/01/15 Page 3 of 11
(9th Cir. 2012); Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1046 

(9th Cir. 2011). A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the 

validity or constitutionality of his conviction or sentence must do 

so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence 

under 28 u.s.c. § 2255. Section 2255 typically provides the 

exclusive procedural mechanism for a federal prisoner to challenge 

the legality of his detention. Muth, 676 F.3d at 818; Harrison v. 

Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2008); Stephens v. Herrera, 

464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006). "Generally, motions to contest 

the legality of a sentence must be filed under § 2255 in the 

sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, 

location, or conditions of a sentence's execution must be brought 

pursuant to§ 2241 in the custodial court." Hernandez v. Campbell, 

204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, § 2255 provides an exception: a federal prisoner may 

file a § 2241 petition to challenge the legality of a sentence when 

the prisoner's remedy under§ 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to 

test the legality 6f his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). This 

exception is referred to as the "savings clause" or the "escape 

hatch." Muth, 676 F.3d at 818; Harrison, 519 F.3d at 956; 

Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864 n. 2. A prisoner may file a § 2241 

petition under the savings clause when he "'(1) makes a claim of 

actual innocence, and (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-00983-MA Document 19 Filed 04/01/15 Page 4 of 11
shot at presenting that claim.'" Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 

1192 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898). 

Petitioner fails to meet these requirements. First, 

petitioner fails to set forth a cognizable claim of actual 

innocence under§ 2255(e). In order to utilize the savings clause, 

petitioner must establish that in light of all the evidence, "'it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him.'" Muth, 676 F.3d at 819 (quoting Stephens, 464 F.3d 

at 898). Petitioner must demonstrate actual innocence, not mere 

legal insufficiency. Marrero, 682 F.3d at 1193 (citing Bousley v. 

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)). 

Here, petitioner asserts that the Guidelines were misapplied 

to the calculation of his sentence. Petitioner has introduced no 

new facts or evidence tending to show that he is factually innocent 

of his crimes of conviction. Thus, petitioner's challenge to the 

enhancements is a purely legal argument and does not fall within 

the savings clause of § 2255 (e) . Marrero, 682 F. 3d at 1193 

(petitioner's contention that he was not a career offender under 

the Guidelines did not satisfy claim of actual innocence under. 

§ 2255(e)); see, e.g., Frank v. Banks, No. CV 10-08535 JAK (SS), 

2011 WL 3477096, *3 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011), adopted, 2011 WL 

3476602 (Aug. 9, 2011) (holding petitioner's challenge to sentence 

did not satisfy savings clause because he did not claim to be 

actually innocent and collecting cases holding same) . 

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Case 3:14-cv-00983-MA Document 19 Filed 04/01/15 Page 5 of 11
Second, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he lacked an 

unobstructed opportunity to challenge his sentence. In determining 

this issue, the court must consider whether the legal basis for his 

claim arose after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first 

§ 2255 motion, and whether the law changed in any way relevant to 

his first § 2255 motion. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. Petitioner 

has failed to establish the second prong of the savings clause 

criteria. 

Pe ti ti oner concedes that he did not directly appeal his 

conviction, and he has not filed a previous § 2255 motion. 

Petitioner offers no rationale to support a contention that he was 

somehow prevented from timely pursuing his claims. Generally, 

"merely because § 2255's gatekeeping provisions prevent the 

petitioner from filing a second or successive petition," does not 

render the § 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective. Ivy v. 

Pontesso, 328 F. 3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, simply 

because petitioner might now be procedurally barred from pursuing 

a § 2255 action does not satisfy the second prong of the savings 

clause. See United States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 

2000) (holding that § 2255 remedy is not "inadequate or ineffective" 

because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations); 

accord Lorensten v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) (a 

court's denial of a prior§ 2255 motion is insufficient to render 

§ 2255 inadequate). 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-00983-MA Document 19 Filed 04/01/15 Page 6 of 11
Furthermore, petitioner's reliance on Alleyne and Southern 

Union are misplaced. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court extended the 

reach of its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 

(2000), and held that any fact that increases a mandatory minimum 

sentence is an element of the offense that must be proven to a jury 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155. Petitioner 

maintains that the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt the 

enhancements for actual loss and number of victims which lengthened 

his sentence, thus rendering his sentence is unlawful under 

Alleyne. 

The court need not resolve whether the enhancements applied in 

petitioner's case comport with Alleyne because petitioner has not 

established that Alleyne applies to his case. The Supreme Court 

has held that in general, "new constitutional rules of criminal 

procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become 

final before the new rules are announced.• Teague v. Lane, 489 

U.S. 288, 310 (1989). A new rule can be made retroactive if: (1) 

the new rule is substantive, or (2) the rule is a "watershed rule• 

of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and 

accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 

406, 416 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). Subsequent to 

petitioner's filing of this case, the Ninth Circuit determined that 

Alleyne is neither a substantive rule nor a watershed rule of 

criminal procedure, and therefore, does not apply retroactively. 

7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-00983-MA Document 19 Filed 04/01/15 Page 7 of 11
Hughes v. United States, 770 F.3d 814, 817-18 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Additionally, this court has determined that Alleyne does not apply 

retroactively to invoke savings clause jurisdiction. See, e.g., 

Hasan v. Feather, Case No. 3:14-cv-00209-TC, 2015 WL 533255, *3-4 

(D. Or. Feb. 5, 2015) (holding Alleyne does not apply retroactively 

to invoke savings clause jurisdiction to challenge sentencing 

enhancements); Pettaway v. Feather, Case No. 3:14-cv-00994-SI, 2015 

WL 128041, *2-3 (D. Or. Jan. 7, 2015) (Alleyne does not apply 

retroactively to invoke savings clause jurisdiction) ; Spears v. 

Feather, Case No. 3:13-cv-01743-JE, 2014 WL 2893279 (June 25, 

2014) (same). 

In Southern Union, the Supreme Court held that the rule of 

Apprendi applies to the imposition of criminal fines. Southern 

Union, 132 S.Ct. at 2357. Courts have likewise determined that 

Southern Union does not apply retroactively. See, e.g., United 

States v. Anderson, No. 2:01-cr-0180 LKK DAD P., 2014 WL 1839386, 

*2 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2014), adopted 2014 WL 3890311 (Aug. 7, 2014). 

Clearly, neither Alleyne or Southern Union aid petitioner. 

In short, I conclude that petitioner's action is in essence a 

challenge to the legality of his sentence "disguised" as a§ 2241. 

Because· petitioner has failed to demonstrat.e that he is actually 

innocent or that he has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at 

presenting his claim, and because petitioner has not established 

8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-00983-MA Document 19 Filed 04/01/15 Page 8 of 11
that Alleyne or Southern Union apply, he cannot bring his claim 

under the savings clause of§ 2255(e). Accordingly, petitioner is 

not entitled to invoke § 2241, and the petition is dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

II. Petition Will Not Be Transferred 

As noted above, petitioner filed this action as a § 2241 in 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Florida. The sentencing court determined it lacked jurisdiction to 

decide the matter as a § 2241, and tran~ferred the action to this 

court. However, the interests of justice are not served by 

returning this action to the Northern District of Florida. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1631; see also Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 865, n. 6 (28 U.S.C. 

§ 1631 allows transfer of § 2255 motion to cure want of 

jurisdiction) . 

At the time petitioner filed the instant § 2255, it was timebarred. Petitioner was sentenced on July 29, 2010, and his 

conviction became final after his opportunity to appeal lapsed. 

Pe ti ti oner admits he did not file a direct appeal. Under the 

AEDPA, petitioner had one year within which to file a § 2255 

action. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (providing one year statute of 

limitation). Petitioner did not file any action until his § 2241 

on March 12, 2014. 

Petitioner does not allege any grounds for a. delayed 

commencement of the statute of limitations or any basis for tolling 

9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-00983-MA Document 19 Filed 04/01/15 Page 9 of 11
of the statute of limitations, nor does my review of the record 

reveal any such basis. Examples of extraordinary circumstances 

that prevent timely filing include inadequate prison libraries, a 

prisoner's lack of access to his files, and egregious attorney 

misconduct. See Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 

2005) . Petitioner does not allege and the record does not support 

a finding that extraordinary circumstances impeded his ability to 

file a § 2255 motion. Additionally, there is no suggestion that 

Petitioner has been diligently pursuing his rights in this case. 

Petitioner's motion is time-barred and the circumstances do not 

justify equitable tolling. Thus, it appears that the instant 

action filed on March 12, 2014, was well after the statute of 

limitations expired. 

Additionally, a transfer to the Northern District of Florida 

is not the interests of justice because petitioner has failed to 

establish that the change in the law under Alleyne or Southern 

Union would be applied retroactively. To be sure, the Eleventh 

Circuit has determined that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to 

invoke savings clause jurisdiction under § 2255 ( e) . Chester v. 

Warden, 552 Fed. App'x. 887, 891 (11th Cir. 2014). Petitioner has 

provided no reason to believe that the Nor.thern District of Florida 

would hold otherwise. See Gentile v. Fox, No. CV 14-1726-GAF(RNB), 

2014 WL 3896065, *8-9 (C. D. Cal. July 11, 2014) (finding inmate 

failed to establish jurisdiction under savings clause, Alleyne did 

10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-00983-MA Document 19 Filed 04/01/15 Page 10 of 11
not apply retroactively, and refusing to transfer case to Northern 

District of Florida); see also Clark v. Busey, 959 F.2d 808, 812 

(9th Cir. 1992) ("Transfer is also improper where the plaintiff 

fails to make a prima facie showing of a right to relief, because 

the interests of justice would not be served by transfer of such a 

case."). 

In short, the interests of justice do not warrant transferring 

petitioner's action to the sentencing court for further 

proceedings. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner's Second Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#13) is DISMISSED for lack of 

jurisdiction. The court declines to issue a Certificate of 

Appealability on the basis that petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this I day of APRIL, 2015. 

Malcolm F. M~rsh " 

United States District Judge 

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