NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 122,555

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

SHANNA FRIDAY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Douglas District Court; SALLY D. POKORNY, judge. Opinion filed July 9, 2021. 

Affirmed.

Brenda J. Clary, of Law Office of Brenda J. Clary, of Lawrence, for appellant.

Jon Simpson, assistant district attorney, Suzanne Valdez, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, 

attorney general, for appellee.

Before POWELL, P.J., BRUNS, J., and STEVE LEBEN, Court of Appeals Judge Retired, 

assigned.

LEBEN, J.: Shanna Friday appeals the district court's denial of her claim that the 

attorney who represented her in a murder trial provided ineffective assistance. An edited 

video of her interrogation by police was shown to the jury, and Friday argues that her 

attorney should have done more to keep that video from being shown at trial.

But her trial attorney made a strategic decision that showing it was the best way to 

defend her; by doing so, the jury heard her statements about what happened even though 

she didn't testify at trial. Attorneys have wide latitude to make strategic choices like that, 
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and the district court concluded the attorney made a reasonable strategic choice. We 

agree with that conclusion.

Friday had also argued at one point that her trial attorney should have made 

additional arguments that the statements she made during the interrogation were coerced, 

not voluntary. But the district court reviewed that and found her statements were 

voluntary, and Friday does not challenge that conclusion here. Since the statements were 

voluntary—and thus admissible—and her attorney made a reasonable strategic decision 

to use them at trial, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Friday's trial 

attorney provided constitutionally adequate representation. We therefore affirm the 

district court's judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Friday was convicted in a jury trial of reckless second-degree murder in the 2008 

death of Jerry Deshazer. The district court sentenced her to 174 months in prison. She 

appealed, but the Kansas Supreme Court found no reversible trial errors and affirmed her 

conviction and sentence. State v. Friday, 297 Kan. 1023, 306 P.3d 265 (2013).

After a defendant has completed the direct appeal, he or she can bring further 

challenges in a habeas corpus proceeding. In a habeas action, the defendant can bring a 

claim that the defense attorney did an inadequate job at trial; that's the claim Friday made 

here.

Friday's habeas claim, as amended after an attorney was appointed to assist her, 

claimed her trial attorney's work had been inadequate in several respects. The district 

court found that none of them presented enough merit to warrant an evidentiary hearing. 

But Friday appealed that decision to our court, and we found that two claims should 

receive further review:
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(1) that the attorney did not adequately argue that Friday's statements in a videotaped 

police interrogation were involuntary and therefore inadmissible; and 

(2) that the attorney did not adequately argue even if Friday's statements were 

voluntarily made, the videotaped interrogation still should not be admitted because 

its content was objectionable for other reasons.

See Friday v. State, No. 115,234, 2016 WL 6920369, at *4-6 (Kan. App. 2016) 

(unpublished opinion).

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on those points. Two witnesses 

testified: Friday's trial attorney, Hatem Chahine, and Lance Flachsbarth, one of the two

police detectives who interrogated Friday. The court also reviewed both the version of the 

interview played for the jury and a full version (without redactions). 

One of the questions the district court had to resolve was whether Chahine's trial 

strategy—to allow presentation to the jury of Friday's videotaped statements—was 

reasonable. To consider that, we'll need to provide a bit of an overview of the charge 

against Friday and the other key evidence.

Friday was convicted of reckless second-degree murder. At the State's request, the 

trial court gave the jury an instruction that Friday could be convicted if she aided or 

abetted in the crime by assisting in its commission. See Friday, 297 Kan. at 1042. At that 

time, reckless second-degree murder was defined as the killing of a person committed 

"unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 

the value of human life." K.S.A. 21-3402(b). The trial court also instructed the jury that 

reckless conduct is "done under circumstances that show a realization of the imminence 

of danger to the person of another[] and a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of that 

danger." So her conviction meant that the jury agreed that she had at least aided in 

reckless conduct that caused Deshazer's death and showed extreme indifference to the 

value of human life. 
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There were three people who had been with Deshazer the evening before he was 

found dead: Jerod Buffalohead, Jarvis Jones, and Friday. Buffalohead and Jones testified 

at Friday's trial. Each of the three told a different story about what had happened, but 

some basic facts were pretty clear. Someone had beaten Deshazer badly, and they'd left 

him badly injured. Chahine had to create at least reasonable doubt about Friday's guilt. 

As an overview, Buffalohead would testify that Friday hit Deshazer in the face 

with a bottle—and that the bottle broke on his face. Jones would testify that Buffalohead, 

with encouragement from Friday, hit Deshazer five or six times while Deshazer was 

sitting in a chair. Friday told police that she had hit Deshazer in the face three times, but 

only after Buffalohead and Jones had beaten him. In Friday's direct appeal, our Supreme 

Court summarized their testimony and the initial police discovery of Deshazer's death:

"On February 2, 2008, Deshazer was found dead in a bathtub in his mobile home 

in Lawrence. His body was covered in blood, and according to the coroner, his face was 

'just bashed in.' The coroner determined the cause of death was blunt force injuries to the 

head, with additional contributing medical conditions.

"The night before Deshazer's death, he got together at his home with Jerod 

Buffalohead, Jarvis Jones, and defendant Friday. Buffalohead and Jones arrived around 

4:30 p.m., and Friday arrived around 5 p.m. All four drank alcohol together throughout 

the evening. Shortly after arriving, Buffalohead left and returned around 8:45 p.m.

"At one point, Friday got into a verbal altercation with Deshazer. Their argument 

never became physical, and they eventually cooled down.

"Shortly after Buffalohead returned to Deshazer's home, a physical altercation 

began. Buffalohead, Friday, and Jones each offered different versions of the episode that 

resulted in Deshazer's death.
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"Jerod Buffalohead

"According to Buffalohead's testimony for the defense, he heard arguing when he 

returned to the mobile home around 8:45 p.m. Somebody told Buffalohead that he owed 

Deshazer money, so Buffalohead offered to pay Deshazer. But Deshazer said 

Buffalohead did not owe him anything. While Buffalohead was getting ice, 'a fight 

started' between Friday and Deshazer. Buffalohead testified:

"'I'm not real sure how the fight started, but I heard a slap, I heard a thud on the 

ground and—

. . . .

"' . . . [w]hen I heard all that, I turned around and Jerry [Deshazer is] on, is on, 

not on top of her—I don't know if they fell, I don't know—

. . . .

"'. . . I don't know if they tripped, but I pulled [Deshazer] off of [Friday].'

"After Buffalohead pulled Deshazer from Friday, he sat Deshazer in a chair and 

Friday momentarily left the room. When she returned, she again argued with Deshazer. 

According to Buffalohead, 'Jerry had a small bottle and I think that was plastic, but 

he threw it and it was, it landed in between 'em or he threw it on the ground.'

"After Deshazer threw the bottle, Friday slapped him and they started fist 

fighting. Buffalohead then separated them. Jones also intervened and began hitting 

Deshazer. Buffalohead cussed at Jones for hitting Deshazer. Friday then hit Deshazer in 

the face with a bottle. According to Buffalohead, he tried to grab the bottle, but it 

shattered on Deshazer's head.

"Jones continued to punch Deshazer's face until Buffalohead pulled him away. 

When Deshazer then stood up from his chair and started to go after Jones, Buffalohead 

threw a blanket over Deshazer to calm him down. Deshazer tripped over the blanket; then 

Buffalohead and Jones picked him up and put him back in his chair. After Buffalohead 

asked Friday if she had called for help, he left to go to his parents' house.
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"Shanna Friday

"According to Friday's statements to police, at some point in the evening 

Buffalohead became angry at how Deshazer was treating Friday. So Buffalohead and 

Jones began beating Deshazer while he was sitting in a chair. They eventually threw a 

blanket over his head. Friday then punched Deshazer three times in the face, with 

Buffalohead and Jones moving out of her way. During the beating, Deshazer 'fought with 

his mouth' by 'talking shit.' According to Friday, Jones hit Deshazer with an ashtray, but 

she repeatedly denied anybody hit Deshazer with a bottle.

"After the physical altercation ended, Friday gave Deshazer water, some pills, 

and a blanket. She also tried to wipe him off. When she offered to call the police or an 

ambulance, he declined. Friday then lay on the couch and fell asleep. She awoke in the 

middle of the night and noticed Deshazer stumbling from one end of the home to the 

other. She also saw excrement. Friday apparently went back to sleep and left around 8 

a.m. Before she left, Friday asked Deshazer if he was doing OK and if he wanted her to 

call the police or an ambulance. Deshazer responded from the bathroom that he was OK 

and did not want Friday to call anyone for help.

"Jarvis Jones

"According to Jones' testimony for the State, before Buffalohead returned to the

home Deshazer said that Buffalohead owed him money. Friday then encouraged 

Deshazer to tell Buffalohead this when he came back. Buffalohead then walked in and 

asked, 'Tell me what?' So Friday told Buffalohead that Deshazer thought Buffalohead

owed him money. Buffalohead then stood over Deshazer, and Deshazer 'let the matter 

go.'

"Jones had little recollection of the remaining events because he testified he was 

drunk and had blacked out from the alcohol. The next thing Jones remembered was 

people yelling. He saw Buffalohead hit Deshazer five or six times while Deshazer was 

seated in a chair. While Buffalohead was the only person Jones saw hit Deshazer, Friday 

was egging Buffalohead on by saying, 'That's what you get, that's what you get.'

Buffalohead then threw a blanket or rug over Deshazer's head.
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"Jones soon passed out again. When he awoke at 2:30 a.m., Jones saw Deshazer 

moaning in his chair with his head back. Deshazer's face and chest area were bloody. 

Jones then saw Deshazer 'slump' out of his chair and crawl to his bedroom. Jones left, 

intending to return to his own home, but he ended up drinking with Deshazer's neighbor. 

At dawn, Jones left the neighbor's home and returned to Deshazer's where he fell asleep 

in a back bedroom.

"Finding the body and the police investigation

"Later that morning Jim Vincent arrived at Deshazer's home. Vincent could not 

find Deshazer and left. He returned an hour later and asked Nancy Kelch to look for 

Deshazer. Kelch found him dead in his bathroom.

"When police arrived, they found broken glass—including the neck of a whiskey 

bottle covered in blood and a broken ashtray—in Deshazer's home. DNA on the broken 

ashtray and on the neck of the broken bottle matched Deshazer, while DNA on the bottle 

mouth matched Buffalohead. The police also found several items covered in blood, 

including a comforter and pillow. They further noticed a vast amount of blood, including 

significant amounts on Deshazer's recliner, on his floor, and in his bathroom.

"The next day police found bloody clothes in a trash can outside of Friday's 

residence. Friday admitted the clothes belonged to her, including a jacket, a pair of shoes, 

athletic pants, a T-shirt, a pair of socks, and women's underwear. DNA on the bloody 

jacket matched Deshazer. Friday agreed to accompany police to their station where she 

was read her Miranda rights and questioned." Friday, 297 Kan. at 1027-31.

The district court found that Friday's statements to the police had been made 

voluntarily, so a motion to exclude them as involuntary would not have been successful. 

In this appeal, Friday "does not directly challenge the . . . conclusion that her statement to 

detectives was voluntary and admissible." Rather, she argues that her "counsel's decision 

to abandon the [voluntariness] inquiry in favor of using the video" was unreasonable.
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But the district court also found that Chahine's strategy was a reasonable one:

"Mr. Chahine testified . . . that it was a deliberate strategy to have the jury hear 

Ms. Friday's statement. Ms. Friday did not want to testify, but she felt she had made a 

compelling argument for innocence, or at least an argument that she was less culpable 

than others who were present on the night of the victim's death, and she wanted the jury 

to hear her version of the events. Mr. Chahine combined her statement to the detectives 

with the testimony of Mr. Buffalohead. Buffalohead admitted he hit the victim. Pictures 

of his hands and blood on his clothes corroborated his admission. His DNA was found on 

the broken bottle. Buffalohead attempted to give Friday a self-defense claim by testifying 

the victim hit her. . . . The strategy here was to shift the blame to Buffalohead and 

Chahine made some very strong points with Buffalohead's admissions. This then forced 

the State in its cross-examination to make Buffalohead out to be a liar and also point to 

him as the killer. This gave Chahine talking points in his closing to paint Buffalohead, 

not as a contributor to the death of the victim, but [as] the person solely responsible for 

his death.

"In the cross-examination of Jones, Chahine got Jones to admit he had blood on 

him; that Buffalohead cut the victim's head, not Friday; that Buffalohead hit the victim[;] 

and finally, Jones admitted to the jury that at the preliminary hearing, he testified Friday 

had nothing to do with killing the victim. This presentation of the events was strategically 

thought out by Mr. Chahine. Mr. Chahine may not have received an acquittal for his 

client, but his performance was effective[;] it was reasonable and strategic decisions were 

made to weave a consistent narrative for the jury by combining the testimony of Jones 

and Buffalohead with that [from the videotaped interrogation] of Ms. Friday. The fact 

that it was not a winning strategy does not mean counsel was ineffective."

Friday then appealed to our court.

ANALYSIS

Well-established rules apply when a defendant seeks to set aside a conviction 

based on the claim that the defense attorney provided representation so ineffective that it 
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was below constitutionally required standards. The defendant has the burden to show two 

things: (1) that the attorney's work was below minimum standards and thus

constitutionally deficient; and (2) that the attorney's substandard work prejudiced the 

defendant. Mattox v. State, 293 Kan. 723, 725, 267 P.3d 746 (2011). The second part of 

that test ordinarily requires showing a reasonable probability that the result of the trial 

would have been different but for the attorney's substandard work. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Mattox, 293 

Kan. at 725-26. In sum, what is often called the Strickland test requires two showings—

constitutionally deficient representation and prejudice to the defendant. If those showings 

are made, we set aside the conviction and send the case back for a new trial with proper 

representation for the defendant.

With the background facts and these rules in mind, we return to the specific claims 

that we determined in the earlier habeas appeal merited further review: (1) that the 

attorney did not adequately argue Friday's statements to police were involuntary and thus 

inadmissible; and (2) that the attorney did not adequately argue in the alternative that 

even if the statements had been voluntarily made, they still should not have been 

admitted for other reasons. 

The first one can be quickly dismissed. In the habeas hearing, the district court 

found that Friday's statements were voluntary—the same finding the district court had 

made at trial after what Friday now argues was lackluster advocacy. But there wasn't 

lackluster advocacy at the habeas hearing, and Friday doesn't argue on appeal that the 

district court's voluntariness finding was in error. That precludes relief under Strickland

because even if the advocacy on this point was so lackluster before trial to have been 

constitutionally deficient, there still would have been no prejudice to Friday: her 

statement was voluntary and thus admissible, anyway. Friday tries to avoid this result by 

arguing that "a vigorous but unsuccessful challenge" might have "prompt[ed] a beneficial 

plea offer" or otherwise altered the case. But that's too speculative to support a claim of 
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prejudice under Strickland. See United States v. Rendon-Martinez, 497 Fed. Appx. 848, 

849 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion); Koch v. State, No. 119,886, 2019 WL 

3367319, at *3 (Kan. App. 2019), rev. denied 312 Kan. 892 (2020). 

The second point is at the heart of this appeal. Chahine said that he decided that he 

could better present Friday's defense with her videotaped statements than without them. 

An attorney's strategic decisions are essentially unchallengeable if the attorney made an 

informed decision based on a thorough investigation of the facts and applicable law. The 

decision must be reasonable, and it falls below minimum constitutional standards only if 

no competent attorney would have adopted that strategy. Wilson v. State, 51 Kan. App. 

2d 1, 14-15, 340 P.3d 1213 (2014). 

On this claim, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, so we must 

accept its factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. But whether the 

attorney's work met or fell below the Strickland requirements is a legal issue that we 

review independently, with no required deference to the district court. Khalil-Alsalaami 

v. State, 313 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 5, 486 P.3d 1216 (2021); Wilson, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 14.

The district court accepted Chahine's testimony that he made a strategic choice to 

use the videotaped interview, so we must do so too. We must determine whether that 

choice was sufficiently reasonable that a competent attorney could have adopted it. 

Earlier in the opinion, we quoted the district court's rationale for concluding that 

Chahine's strategic choice was a reasonable one. We agree with the essential points made 

there. Even though Friday didn't testify, the jury heard directly from her. In a case in 

which it was significant whether she had been indifferent to the value of Deshazer's life, 

the jury heard her say that she gave him water and a blanket after the fight had ended and 

that she had offered to call an ambulance. The jury heard a version of events in which her 

conduct was less harmful to Deshazer than other evidence suggested, and conflict 
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between the versions could have led to reasonable doubt of her guilt. Chahine used pieces 

of Friday's statements to police and the other evidence presented at trial to present a 

coherent defense.

Even so, Friday argues that Chahine's strategy ignored "the negative impact of the 

visual cues and unredacted material" in the videotape shown to the jury. She's right that 

some portions of the interview that could (and likely should) have been edited out were 

left in, and these portions included detectives making facial expressions indicating 

disbelief of Friday or direct statements of disbelief. But the argument Friday made in her 

habeas claim, now at issue in this appeal, is not that a few portions of the videotape that 

should have been redacted weren't. Rather, Friday's argument is that Chahine should have 

argued for the entire videotape to be excluded. We conclude that Chahine made a 

reasonable strategic decision to allow that videotape to be played at trial so that the jury 

could hear directly from his client.

Had the issue been that a few additional edits should have been made in the 

videotape played for the jury, that still would not have been a successful argument under 

Strickland. Even if we assume that the defense attorney's failure to get those other edits

violated the Strickland performance standard, we still would not find Strickland 

prejudice. That requires a reasonable probability that the trial's outcome would have been 

different but for the attorney's substandard work. A reasonable probability in this context 

is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the proceeding's outcome. Khalil-Alsalaami, 

313 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 23. Friday has not made that showing here.

Friday makes one more claim of error about the district court's ruling. At the very 

end of the district court's written opinion, the court's conclusion that Strickland prejudice 

is absent said: "This Court cannot say with any certainty that the outcome of the trial 

would have been different if the jury had heard a more thoroughly redacted video 

statement." Friday argues that the district court misstated the legal standard here. As 
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we've already discussed, the court must find "a reasonable probability" that the result 

would have been different, not "certainty."

But the district court had cited the proper standard earlier in its written opinion. So

we think the later statement was just a shorthand way of saying that the court could not

say with any level of certainty (including the reasonable-probability standard it had cited 

earlier in the opinion) that the outcome would have been different. Ultimately, it doesn't 

matter, though, since we have to review the Strickland conclusions independently, and 

we have found no prejudice on this point.

In sum, Friday does not challenge on appeal whether her statements to police were 

voluntary and admissible. Instead, her argument is that her attorney should have tried to 

keep them out as a matter of trial strategy. But the attorney testified that he concluded 

that her best defense was to have her videotaped statements played to the jury, and we 

agree with the district court that this was a reasonable decision. The district court 

dismissed Friday's habeas challenge, and we affirm the district court's judgment.