alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 10, 2019.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00997-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.R., A CHILD 

On Appeal from the 314th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2016-04856J 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

This is an attempted appeal from an order signed October 25, 2018. The 

October 25, 2018 order is not a final appealable judgment because it does not dispose 

of the parties or claims. Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. 

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). When orders do not 

dispose of all pending parties and claims, the orders remain interlocutory and 

unappealable until final judgment is rendered unless a statutory exception applies. 
2

Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001); Jack B. 

Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). 

On December 10, 2018, notification was transmitted to the parties of this 

court’s intention to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction unless appellant filed 

a response demonstrating grounds for continuing the appeal on or before December 

21, 2018. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). Appellant did not file a response. 

We dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jewell and Bourliot.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

KEVIN TRUDEAU, 

 Defendant. 

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Case No. 03-C-3904 

Hon. Robert W. Gettleman 

FTC’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A STATEMENT CONCERNING 

DEFENDANT’S LETTERS OF DIRECTION 

In light of the importance of this litigation and Defendant Kevin Trudeau’s proposal on 

Friday afternoon to send “Letters of Direction” to various persons and institutions concerning his 

assets, Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission respectfully requests leave to file a statement 

addressing this proposal prior to the imposition of Court-ordered coercive sanctions tomorrow. 

The proposed statement is attached hereto. 

The FTC has noticed this motion for the already-scheduled status conference Tuesday 

morning, when the FTC anticipates Trudeau will argue that these letters purge his contempt or, 

alternatively, that the Court should yet again defer sanctions for an indefinite time until he 

receives responses to these letters. The proposed filing addresses these new arguments, which 

the FTC respectfully urges the Court to reject. 

Dated: October 21, 2013 

David O’Toole (dotoole@ftc.gov) 

Federal Trade Commission 

55 West Monroe Street, Suite 1825 

Chicago, Illinois 60603-5001 

Phone: (312) 960-5601 

Fax: (312) 960-5600 

Respectfully Submitted, 

/s/ Jonathan Cohen 

Michael Mora (mmora@ftc.gov) 

Jonathan Cohen (jcohen2@ftc.gov) 

Amanda B. Kostner (akostner@ftc.gov) 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. M-8102B 

Washington, DC 20580 

Phone: 202-326-3373; -2551; -2880

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 2 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Jonathan Cohen, hereby certify that on October 21, 2013, I caused to be 

served true copies of the foregoing by electronic means, by filing such documents through the 

Court’s Electronic Case Filing System, which will send notification of such filing to: 

Kimball Richard Anderson 

kanderson@winston.com 

Thomas Lee Kirsch, II 

tkirsch@winston.com 

Katherine E. Rohlf 

kcroswell@winston.com

Blair R. Zanzig 

bzanzig@hwzlaw.com 

/s/ Jonathan Cohen 

Jonathan Cohen (jcohen2@ftc.gov) 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

Federal Trade Commission 

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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ramon Sanchez, Appellant.

—Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Ingrassia, J.), rendered May 6, 1980, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial (Isseks, J.), after a hearing, of defendant’s motion to suppress statements.

Judgment affirmed.

*686The record contains ample support for the finding by the hearing court that defendant’s admissions were voluntarily made *(see, People v Oates,*104 AD2d 907, 910).

Defendant contends that his admissions should have been suppressed due to denial of his right to counsel which attached when he requested counsel during custodial interrogation. However, the testimony of Investigator Purcell, which the hearing court found credible, indicates that although at one point during the interrogation defendant noted that he "had best” get an attorney, he stated immediately thereafter that he did not want an attorney and initialed a written statement to that effect before the interrogation continued. At most, defendant’s reference to an attorney was an indication that he thought it might be advisable to consult an attorney and was not an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel *(see, People v Cunningham,*49 NY2d 203). Absent an unequivocal assertion of his right to counsel by defendant, the admissions are admissible *(see, People v Johnson,*55 NY2d 931, *revg*79 AD2d 201*on dissenting opn at App Div,*at pp 203-204; *People v Pelkey,*100 AD2d 663). Additionally, defendant’s contention that admissions made by him were induced by misrepresentation is unsupported by the record.

We agree with the hearing court that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant. The complainant gave the arresting officers a detailed description of the robber, and of the car used in the robbery—including its license plate number. Shortly after the robbery, the police were able to locate the car through its license plate number at the registered owner’s residence. The owner of the car was able to establish that he had loaned the car to defendant and that he was elsewhere at the time of the robbery. He gave the officers permission to search his apartment, and defendant, who partially matched the description given by complainant, was found hiding in a closet. In light of these factors, the officers had reasonable cause to believe that defendant had in fact committed the crime *(see, People v Brnja,*50 NY2d 366; *People v Davidson,*110 AD2d 776). Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
#### I. S., Respondent, v R. S., Appellant.

—In a matrimonial action, the defendant husband appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Palella, J.), entered October 16, 1984, as denied that branch of his motion which was to strike scandalous and prejudicial allegations in the complaint and failed to determine that branch of his motion which was to dismiss the third cause of action as time barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Appeal from so much of the order as denied that branch of the motion which was to strike scandalous and prejudicial matter dismissed as no appeal lies therefrom as a matter of right.

Order otherwise modified by adding a provision granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which sought to dismiss the third cause of action as time barred to the extent that paragraph 12A of the complaint is dismissed. As so modified, order affirmed, insofar as reviewed.

The appellant is awarded one bill of costs.

In this matrimonial action, commenced on or about August 2, 1984, the defendant husband moved, *inter alia,*pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), to dismiss the third cause of action and paragraph 12A thereof set forth in the verified complaint upon the ground that certain allegations contained therein are barred by the Statute of Limitations. The plaintiffs complaint sets forth as one instance of cruel and inhuman treatment that, in 1974, the defendant disclosed to the plaintiff that he had contracted a venereal disease, to wit, herpes, and continued to be afflicted therewith.

Domestic Relations Law § 210 provides that no action for divorce may be maintained on a ground which arose more than five years before the date of the commencement of that action. Here, it is quite apparent that this alleged act of cruelty occurred considerably more than five years prior to *781the commencement of the action for divorce. Therefore, that portion of the plaintiffs complaint should have been dismissed as time barred under the Statute of Limitations set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 210.

Lastly, to the extent that Special Term denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to strike scandalous and prejudicial matter (CPLR 3024 [b]), leave to appeal therefrom was required pursuant to CPLR 5701 (b) (3). Inasmuch as such permission was never sought, the appeal from that portion of the order is dismissed *(see, Tudor v Riposanu,*93 AD2d 718). Lazer, J. P., Gibbons, Eiber and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jonathan Enrique ACOSTA-CORRALCO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-4156.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 28, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 24, 2011.

*634C. Carlyle Steele, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Andrew Burke Moorman, Sr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Ap-pellee.

Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Enrique Acosta-Corralco appeals from his convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 5 grams or more of cocaine base, and 50 grams or more of a substance or mixture containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from a residence pursuant to the execution of a search warrant. We affirm.

Acosta-Corralco pled guilty without entering a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. An unconditional guilty plea generally waives all antecedent, nonjurisdictional errors. *Tollett v. Henderson,*411 U.S. 258, 266-67, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); *Fields v. Att’y Gen.,*956 F.2d 1290, 1294-95 (4th Cir.1992). The right to challenge on appeal a Fourth Amendment issue raised in a motion to suppress is a nonjurisdictional defense and hence is lost by an unconditional guilty plea. *Haring v. Prosise,*462 U.S. 306, 320, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983). Thus, as the Government asserts, Acosta-Corralco waived his right to challenge on appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we affirm Acosta-Corral-co’s convictions. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Exhibit 99.1

                              AEROCENTURY IV, INC.

                    Certification of Chief Executive Officer
                  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted
            pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with this quarterly report of AeroCentury IV, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2002 (the "Report"), I, Neal
D. Crispin, President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify
as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350
of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:

              (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
              13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of
              1934, and

              (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
              all material respects, the financial condition and results of
              operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods
              indicated.



Date: November 14, 2002                     /s/  Neal D. Crispin
                                           -------------------------------
                                            Neal D. Crispin
                                            President, Chief Financial Officer
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH 

	NO. 2-0205-365459  -251   -CV

CURTAINWALL CONSULTING 	APPELLANTS

ENGINEERS, INC., MASOUD 

S. KHOSHNOUDI, AND HARVEST 

LANDSCAPE SERVICES, L.L.C.	

	V.

SARAH WEBB, M.D.	APPELLEE

InN tThHeE InNtTeErReEsStT oOfF D.J.D., A ChHiIlLdDEtTtTaArReEnNeE SeEsSsSiIoOnN	APPELLANT

	V.

FoOrRtT WoOrRtThH InNdDeEpPeEnNdDeEnNtT S	APPELLEES

SCHOOL DISTRICT, CECELIA SPEER, AND LOESTER POSEY

AND LOESTER POSEYcChHoOoOlL DiIsStTrRiIcCtT, CeEcCeElLiIaA SpPeEeErR, aAnNdD LoOeEsStTeErR PoOsSeEyY

	----------

	FROM THE 48TH48THE  DISTRICT DIS       342ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT        TARRANT COUNTY

	----------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

	----------

	On _____________________ March 7, 2006August 21, 2002, we notified appellants James T. Dayton, Jr.EETtTtAaRrEeNnEe SSEeSsSsIiOoNn that the trial court clerk responsible for preparing the record in this appeal informed the court that payment arrangements had not been made to pay for the clerk’s record as required by TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(a)(2).  We stated we would dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution unless appellants, within fifteen days, made arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record and provided this court with proof of payment.  

	Because appellants haves not made payment arrangements for the clerk’s record, it is the opinion of the court that the appeal should be dismissed for want of prosecution.   Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.  See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b), 42.3(b).

	Appellants shall pay all costs of the appeal, for which let execution issue.

								PER CURIAM 		 	

PANEL D D:	                                          DAUPHINOT, HOLMAN, and GARDNERLIIVINGSTON,   DAUPHINOT, and HOLMAN, AND AND and GARDNER,  JJ.

, JJ.

DELIVERED:  		DO NOT PUBLISH

		TEX. R. APP. P.  47.3(a)

March 2330, 2006
#### In the Matter of Daughtry A. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Massiel E., Appellant, et al., Respondent.

[941 NYS2d 888]

In a neglect proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the mother appeals from (1) an amended order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Olshansky, J.), dated December 8, 2010, which, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, inter alia, determined that she neglected the subject child, and (2) an order of protection of the same court, also dated December 8, 2010, which directed her not to interfere with the paternal grandmother’s care and custody of the subject child for the period up to and including December 7, 2011.

Ordered that the appeal from the order of protection is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The appeal from the order of protection has been rendered academic by the expiration of the time limits contained therein (see *Matter of Bibolova v Radu,*82 AD3d 1222 [2011]).

“ ‘[A]dmissions by a party of any fact material to the issue are always competent evidence against him, wherever, whenever or to whomosoever made’ ” *(People v Caban,*5 NY3d 143, 151 n [2005], quoting *Reed v McCord,*160 NY 330, 341 [1899]). Contrary to the mother’s contention, the Family Court did not violate her right to due process by allowing the case worker for the petitioner agency to testify regarding statements the mother made after the petition was filed regarding material facts which occurred prior to its filing, as the mother’s admissions constituted competent evidence against her *(see People v Caban, 5*NY3d at 151 n; *Reed v McCord,*160 NY at 341).

The petitioner agency established a prima facie case of neglect against the mother by introducing evidence demonstrating that, while the subject child was under her care, he sustained injuries which ordinarily would not occur absent an act or omission of the appellant *(see*Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [ii]; *Matter of Philip M.,*82 NY2d 238, 243-244 [1993]; *Matter of Alanie H. [Crystal D],*69 AD3d 722, 723 [2010]). In response, the mother failed to rebut the presumption of culpability with a credible *879and reasonable explanation of how the child sustained the injuries *(see Matter of Kaitlynn I.,*64 AD3d 654, 655 [2009]; *Matter of Arielle LL.,*294 AD2d 676, 677 [2002]). Accordingly, the finding of neglect was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

The mother’s remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.E, Angiolillo, Belen and Cohen, JJ., concur.
#### Brooks O.S., Appellant, v Huntington Union Free School District, Respondent.

[945 NYS2d 577]

— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mayer, J.), dated December 27, 2010, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and *732(2) a judgment of the same court (Pascale, J.), entered January 19, 2011, which, upon the order, is in favor of the defendant and against him, dismissing the complaint and awarding costs to the defendant.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action *(see Matter of Aho,*39 NY2d 241 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment *(see*CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

In support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendant made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant’s motion failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Angiolillo, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Miller, JJ., concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MALBCO HOLDINGS, LLC, a

Washington Limited Liability Company, No. 03:14-cv-00947-PK

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BHUPENDRA PATEL and NILA PATEL; ORDER

HEETAN PATEL and HEETAL PATEL-MANANI;

and MUKESH PATEL, 

 Defendants.

HERNANDEZ, District Judge,

On January 13, 2015, Magistrate Judge Papak issued an Order (#41) in which he granted

in part and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses. On January 27,

2015, Bhupendra Patel, Nila Patel, Heetan Patel, and Heetal Patel-Manani filed objections to the

Order. The matter is now before me pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).

In accordance with Rule 72(a), "[w]hen a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's claim

or defense is referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must

promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating

1 - ORDER

Case 3:14-cv-00947-HZ Document 58 Filed 03/19/15 Page 1 of 2
the decision." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The standard of review for an order with objections is

"clearly erroneous" or "contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (applying the "clearly

erroneous or contrary to law" standard of review for nondispositive motions). If a ruling on a

motion is not determinative of "a party's claim or defense," it is not dispositive and, therefore, is

not subject to de novo review as are proposed findings and recommendations for dispositive

motions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).1

I have carefully considered Defendants' objections and conclude they do not provide a

basis to modify the Magistrate Judge's Order. 

CONCLUSION

The Court AFFIRMS Magistrate Judge Papak's Order [41].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this day of , 2015.

 

MARCO A. HERNANDEZ

United States District Judge

1

 In their Objections, Defendants suggest that my review should be de novo, the standard

used when the matter before the Magistrate Judge disposes of a claim or defense. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). The case law, none of it controlling on this Court, is

conflicting. E.g., Int'l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Southgate, No. 2:11–CV–14719, 2012 WL

2367160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2012) (motion to strike affirmative defenses is

dispositive), adopted, 2012 WL 2367170 (E.D. Mich. June 21, 2012); Gagan v. United

Consumers Club, Inc., No. 2:10–CV–026 JD, 2012 WL 729943, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2012)

(court characterized motion to strike affirmative defenses as non-dispositive and reviewed

magistrate judge's decision under a clearly erroneous/contrary to law standard).

I need not revolve the conflict because even construing Judge Papak's Opinion & Order as

a Findings & Recommendation and reviewing it under the de novo standard used for dispositive

issues, I reach the same conclusion and adopt his recommendation to grant in part and deny in

part the motion to strike affirmative defenses. 

2 - ORDER

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