28 U.S.C. §1257 gives the United States Supreme Court the sole
federal jurisdiction to review state court judgments.

Because a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is involved,
the Rooker-Feldman problem may properly be raised by this Court

on its own motion (see, e.g., Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 752

(7 Cir. 1993)--indeed, Ritter is startlingly similar to
Elysee's claim here, for that case also involved a foreclosure
proceeding that had assertedly deprived the plaintiffs there of
their property without due process of law. For a more expansive
explanation of Rooker-Feldman and the absence of federal subject
matter jurisdiction where that doctrine is implicated, see Garry
v.Geils, 82 F.3d 1362 (7 Cir. 1996).

What has been said to this point compels dismissal of this
action for the want of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Although anything more is therefore unnecessary to the outcome a
brief mention may also be made of a nonjurisdictional
problem--the statute of limitations--that Elysee might have to
confront even if jurisdiction were present. It is firmly
established that a two-year statute of limitations applies to
Tllinois-based Section 1983 actions. In this instance, even
though the foreclosure sale of Elysee's real estate did not take
place until November 15, 1999 (so that his November 15, 2001
filing of this action fell on the second anniversary of that

date), that sale simply implemented the judgment of foreclosure


culminated in a judgment of foreclosure on July 28, 1999 and a
foreclosure sale on November 15, 1999. But one crucial problem
that he faces in that respect is that not one of his targeted
defendants is a “state actor” ~-someone who acted “under color of
law” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (“Section
1983”)--except for a defendant whom he identifies as “Clairassa a
clerk, possibly a lawyer working as clerk for the court” (Count
TI 925) .? And all that Elysee charges her with is having
telephoned the mortgagee's lawyers to apprise them of Elysee's
being in court on October 28, 1999 to try to vacate the judgment
of foreclosure. That is simply too gossamer a thread to tie
Clairassa to a violation of Elysee's constitutional rights, or to
tie the host of other defendants to a claim of constitutional
deprivation under Section 1983.

But even were that not the case, Elysee could still not look
to this federal court for relief because his claimed damages stem
entirely from the judgment of foreclosure in the Circuit Court of
Cook County and the ensuing foreclosure sale. And the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413

(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462 (1983)) prohibits the review of such state court

decisions by a federal district court, in principal part because

° Elsewhere Elysee refers to the same person as “Clairesa
(a Clerk working for Judge Jaffe)” (in the case caption) and as
“Clairessa” (in Count II 424).


that had been entered some 3-1/2 months earlier. In those terms
it might well be viewed that Elysee's property deprivation had
taken place more than two years before he filed suit, rather than
on the date of sale. But that question need not be answered for
present purposes, given this opinion's earlier independent
holding that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.

Accordingly Elysee's current motion for reinstatement of
this action is denied. Although for reasons other than the more
simplistic one stated in the Order, it remains true that this

federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction over Elysee's

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

purported action.

Date: December 5, 2001


Minute Onder Form 06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
ior Magistrate Judge Milton I. Shadur than Acsigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 8839 DATE 12/5/2001
CASE Erold Elysee vs. Chicago Trust Co., et c.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.]

qu)

for reinstatement of this action is denied. Although for reasons other than the more simplist

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Qa Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) QO Ruling/Hearingon__set fora

(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___——ssetffor__— at

(6) Q Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on ss set forts

(7) oOo Trial[set for/re-set for]on at.

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto ss at__

(9) aq This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
QFRCP4(m) O General Rule21 OO FRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) WM [Other docketentry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Accordingly Elysee’s current motion

ic one stated

in the Order, it remains true that this federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction over Elysee’s

purported action.

a [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court

No notices required. umber of notices

Doeunient
‘Number

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone, ES. " 6. 2001
Docketing to mail notices. a
Mail AO 450 form. doclluihe deus als

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

177572001
_ 9 date maited not
courtroom: 2 late maited notice
SN deputy’s SN
initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office railing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Y,
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS X, Nop
EASTERN DIVISION on y)

ee,
EROLD ELYSEE, Uy
Plaintiff,
v. No. 01 ¢ 8839

CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY, etc.,
et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Court's November 19, 2001 memorandum order (“Order”)
swiftly dispatched what then appeared to be an unintelligible
one-page pro se Complaint by Erold Elysee (“Elysee”), because no
federal subject matter jurisdiction was established (or even
meaningfully suggested) by that brief document. Now Elysee has
come forward with a photocopy of his actual Complaint, which is
some 18 pages in length,+ explaining that some physical mishap
had caused the mistaken bobtailed submission. Elysee
understandably asks this Court to take a fresh look at the matter
in light of what he has actually alleged against the host of
defendants identified in his Complaint.

Unfortunately, Elysee's detailed account of his grievances
does no better in terms of getting him inside the federal
courthouse door (in the figurative rather than the literal sense)

than his earlier submission. Federal subject matter jurisdiction

2 It turns out that what had been delivered earlier and was
photocopied as an exhibit to the Order was just the first page. La

oS


is still lacking for more than one independent reason. This
memorandum order identifies two such reasons, although either one
is enough to require dismissal of Elysee's Complaint and this
action.

Before the jurisdictional flaws are addressed, it may be
noted parenthetically that Elysee purports to invoke a
scattershot set of bases for his claims--not always with
accuracy. Thus he refers to the United States Constitution's
Fifth Amendment (which applies only against the federal
government, not involved in this action) and to its Twenty-fourth
Amendment (which prohibits the use of any poll tax or other tax
to impair the right to vote in federal elections--an obvious
typographical error, with the Fourteenth Amendment being intended
instead). But those errors don't create a problem, for a
litigant's mistaken reference to theories of recovery doesn't
matter if the facts alleged actually state a viable federal
claim. This Court has therefore given careful consideration to
Elysee's allegations to see whether any federal-question claim
can be discerned.?

In brief, Elysee complains that he has been deprived of his
property--real estate located at 3731 West Grand Avenue, Chicago,

Illinois--by a state court mortgage foreclosure proceeding that

2 There is no diversity of citizenship involved, so that

the potential alternative source of federal jurisdiction is
unavailable.