jury investigation, should be barred from testifying because:

under Garcetti, Mr. Hare's speech in connection with this matter
was not constitutionally protected; it is unnecessary to rehash
the particulars of the grand jury investigation; and given that
the defendants have stipulated that Mr. Hare was a whistle-
blower, the testimony is irrelevant to his claims. For reasons
already discussed above, the Court rejects these arguments and
denies the motion.

Next, the defendants move to bar evidence of comparisons to
unsimilarly situated individuals - in particular, those who were
not fired or who held different jobs than Mr. Hare. Mr. Hare has
alleged that the Village had a custom or policy of retaliating
against whistleblowers, and the Court has already ruled that he
may prove that claim through evidence establishing a series of
violations. The Court is not persuaded that the violations must
involve the exact same acts of retaliation as those alleged to
have been visited upon Mr. Hare, and will, accordingly, deny the
defendants’ motion. The Court cautions Mr. Hare, however, that
the leeway granted him on this issue is not unlimited; any parade
of violations must indeed involve retaliation by the Village
against whistleblowers.

In their last two motions in limine, the defendants seek to
exclude “hearsay statements not directed toward [Mr. Hare” and

“evidence of rumors.” Generally speaking, the Court intends to

20


point. But, Mr. Hare argues, he suffered an adverse action

despite the pension because he had to expend time and money to
fight the Village’s attempts to prevent his pension from being
awarded and to thwart the Village’s attempts to overturn the
pension decision. The Court agrees. The defendants have
attempted to define “adverse harm” too narrowly here; Mr. Hare
alleges that the Village’s conduct in connection with the pension
proceedings amounted to an adverse action in retaliation for his
constitutionally-protected speech, and he is entitled to bear
those allegations out at trial. The motion to bar evidence
relating to the pension hearings is denied.

Defendants next seek to bar evidence and testimony relating
to the evidence room. As explained in previous opinions, when he
was made Commander, Mr. Hare was put in charge of the evidence
room; in that capacity, he audited the room and noted various
problems and discrepancies. Mr. Hare alleges that, when he tried
to tell Chief Zitek about the problems and tried to get Chief
Zitek to let him take corrective measures, Chief Zitek was
dismissive and, basically, told him to drop the issue, The
defendants argue that, under Garcetti, Mr. Hare cannot rely on
his “speech” about the evidence room to establish a
constitutional violation. On this narrow issue, the Court agrees
that Garcetti really does make a difference. The “speech” about

the evidence locker would not be protected under Garcetti as it

14


caused by Chief Zitek’s conduct. Given the procedural history

of the pension matter, Mr. Hare cannot win on this argument.
Collateral estoppel - now more commonly called issue preclusion -
bars a party from relitigating the same issue that was necessary
to a prior final judgment; a party seeking to invoke the doctrine
must show that (1} the issue sought to be precluded was the same
as that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue was actually
litigated; (3} the determination of the issue was essential to
the final judgment; and (4} the party against whom estoppel is
invoked was fully represented in the prior action. E.g.,
Washington Group International, Inc. v. Bell, Boyd & Lloyd LLC,
383 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 2004). Although it is true that the
Village was fully represented in the proceedings dealing with the
intervention question - the question of whether the Village
should be allowed to intervene in Mr. Hare’s pension board
hearing - the issue about what caused Mr. Hare’s disability was
not resolved there; nor was it essential to that action. And
while the question may have been addressed during the pension
board proceedings, the Village was excluded from those
proceedings; indeed, Mr. Hare joined the pension board in barring
the Village from participating in those proceedings. The
question of whether Mr. Hare’s injuries, if any, were caused by
the alleged harassment and retaliation is still open in this

forum, and Mr. Hare’s second motion in limine is denied.


exciude ail hearsay statements, unless they fall within one of
the recognized exceptions; it intends to exclude evidence that is
irrelevant; and it intends to exclude evidence for which the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. These are just some of the directives of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Particular objections will be
addressed at trial; the motions, which are unclear to the point
of seeming absurd, are denied.
Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the Court grants, as
unopposed, Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence of E-
mails Between Karyn Stratton and Plaintiff [#133]; Defendants’
Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence and Testimony Relating to
Plaintiff’s Pension Reduction [#138]; Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Bar Evidence of Plaintiff's Notes of Chief Zitek’s
Alleged Wrongdoing [#147]; Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Bar
Evidence of Settlement Negotiations [#150]; Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence of Insurance Coverage [#153]; and
Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Suggestions of Individual
Defendants’ Indemnification [#154].

The Court similarly grants in part Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Bar Evidence Not Disclosed During Discovery [#134]; the
Court grants the motion with regard to testimony and evidence

relating to Mr. Warschol, but otherwise reserves ruling.

21


to Bar Evidence of Grand Jury Investigation {#140]; Defendants’
Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence of Grand Jury Testimony [#141];
Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence and Testimony of
Jeff Walik [#142]; Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence
and Testimony of Joe Kretch [#143]; Defendants’ Motion in Limine
to Bar Evidence of Alleged Failure to Provide Legal
Representation [#145]; Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Bar Susan
Locander Testimony and Newspaper Articles [#146]; Defendants’
Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence and Testimony of Officer Joe
Page [#148]; Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence and
Testimony of Plaintiff’s Panic Attacks [#149}; Defendants’ Motion
in Limine to Bar the Testimony of Karyn Stratton [#151];
Defendants’ Motion in Limine to bar Evidence of Comparisons to
Unsimilarly Situated Individuals [#152]; Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Exclude Hearsay Statements Not Directed Toward
Plaintiff [#155]; Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude
Evidence of Rumors [#156]; and Defendants’ Motion in Limine to

Bar Evidence of Chief Zitek’s Alleged Money Skimming {#158].

Date: July 24, 2006

ENTER:
O Gone. Ke) s
ARLANDER KEYS t

United States Magistrate Judge

23



Locander, a free-lance reporter for Liberty Suburban Newspapers

who wrote a series of articles on the alleged corruption and
wrongdoing in Stickney and in the Stickney Police Department;
they also seek to bar evidence relating to the articles
themselves. The defendants argue that this evidence is
unnecessary, given that they have stipulated that Mr. Hare was a
“whistle-blower.” The Court disagrees; the stipulation does not
bar Mr. Hare from getting into the specifics of his whistle-
blowing; indeed, the facts relating to his whistle-blowing will
likely lie at the heart of the jury’s consideration of the
retaliation claims. The defendants also argue that the articles
should be kept out because they are hearsay. If, at trial, the
evidence is offered in a manner that would violate the hearsay
rule - which admittedly seems likely - the Court will sustain a
proper objection. The Court will not bar the evidence, however,
until it is able to determine definitively that it would, in
fact, constitute inadmissible hearsay.

The defendants next seek to bar evidence of Chief Zitek’s
alleged money-skimming activities. The defendants argue that,
because they have stipulated that Mr. Hare was a whistle-blower,
evidence of the alleged wrongdoing is unnecessary. The Court has
already addressed this argument: the stipulation does not make
the allegations of wrongdoing irrelevant; they are nonetheless

necessary to give the jury the full picture of what Mr. Hare
¥ g Pp

18


they started, etc. To the extent this motion covers evidence

beyond the panic attacks, the Court will address the issue when
and if it arises. For now, Mr. Hare’s sixth motion in limine is
denied.

Finally, Mr. Hare moves in limine to bar the defendants from
introducing any evidence, or from arguing that he improperly or
inadequately supervised the Stickney Police Department’s evidence
room. Here, Mr. Hare is referring to certain allegations by
Chief Zitek that Mr. Hare may have mishandled or discarded
evidence during the period when he was charged with supervising
the evidence room, Mr. Hare argues that such evidence is
irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. Not so. Mr.
Hare alleges that Chief Zitek harassed him and treated him badly
in retaliation for his whistle-blowing activities and his
decision to engage in constitutionally protected speech about
corruption in the police department and in the Village. The
defendants contend that, to the extent Chief Zitek treated Mr.
Hare badly, it was because he didn’t like him and didn’t like the
way he did his job. Evidence that Mr. Hare botched his job as
supervisor of the evidence room, if it exists, would be directly
relevant to the defendants’ theory of the case, and Mr. Hare has
not persuaded the Court that there is any legitimate reason to
keep it out. Mr. Hare cannot expect the Court to allow him to

present his case in full and then to hamstring the defendants

10


constitutional violation. 2006 WL at *2. In its summary
judgment ruling, the Court determined that Mr. Hare spoke, not as
an employee of the police department, but as a citizen. 414
F.Supp. at 855-56. Garcetti and Milis do nothing to change that.
Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, Mr. Hare did not “speak” as
part of his professional responsibilities; he wasn’t simply doing
his job.

The defendants apparently argue that, because he was working
so closely with the State’s Attorney’s Office - and, in
particular, with Karyn Stratton of the Office’s Public Integrity
Unit - he “spoke” as an employee of that office and in
furtherance of the job he was “hired” to do. Although inventive,
this argument is absurd. There is simply no evidence that Mr.
Hare was an employee of the State’s Attorney’s Office, and the
recent cases cannot be read to allow the inference that an
employment relationship is created by a few emails. Mr. Hare’s
third motion in limine is granted.

Mr. Hare next moves in jimine to bar the defendants from
raising the defense of qualified immunity with respect to John
Zitek. In ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge
Bobrick rejected the argument that the law was unclear as to
whether speech such as Mr. Hare’s would be protected. See Hare
v. Zitek, Memorandum Order dated January 17, 2002, p. 9. And

this Court reiterated as much in its summary judgment ruling. No


In his third motion in limine, Mr, Hare argues that this

Court has already ruled that his “speech” was constitutionally
protected under the Connick-Pickering test, and he moves in
dimine to bar the defendants from arguing otherwise. In
response, the defendants argue that two recent decisions - the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Cebellos,
126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Mills v. City of Evansville, Indiana, No. 05-3207, — F.3d —-, 2006
WL 1679408 (7th Cir. June 26, 2006), change the landscape with
regard to how §1983 First Amendment speech cases are decided.

Mr. Hare is correct that the Court has already determined,
as a matter of law, that his speech was constitutionally
protected. See Hare v. Zitek, 414 F.Supp.2d 834, 854-58 (N.D.
Tll. 2005). In Garcetti, which was decided just two months ago,
the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.” 126 S.Ct. at 1960. In Milis, which was decided
just one month ago, the Seventh Circuit applied Garcetti to hold
that a police officer who, while on duty and in uniform,
discussed with her superiors her opinion about the upcoming
implementation of an official policy, spoke as part of her job,

which meant, under Garcetti, that she could not prove a



alleges was going on in Chief Zitek’s department when the
harassment and retaliation is alleged to have occurred.

In their next motion in jimine, the defendants seek to bar
evidence relating to Officer Joe Page. Officer Page worked for
the Village of Stickney as a reserve officer; he was fired in
2001, and Mr. Hare apparently intends to have him testify at
trial in support of his claim that the Village had a policy or
custom of retaliating against employees who blew the whistle on
corruption. To the extent this is the case, the evidence would
be relevant to Mr. Hare's municipal liability claim; as the Court
said in its summary judgment ruling, Mr. Hare may prove the
existence of the alleged policy or custom through a series of
violations establishing a widespread practice. See Hare v.
Zitek, 414 F.Supp. 2d 834, 860-61 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Defendants’
motion to bar Officer Page from testifying is denied.

Defendants next seek to bar evidence and testimony relating
to panic attacks allegedly suffered by Mr. Hare. The motion is
denied. If Mr. Hare is claiming that the alleged harassment and
retaliation caused him to suffer panic attacks, and if the
defendants have evidence suggesting that the attacks began long
before the events alleged in this case, then that evidence may be
used to impeach Mr. Hare on his claim.

Defendants next seek to bar the testimony of Karyn Stratton;

they argue that Ms. Stratton, who would testify about the grand

19



for the information and that the information is not available

from another source. And, frankly, given that the defendants
apparently just dropped the matter when Ms. Locander invoked
privilege at her deposition, the Court questions whether they
will be able to do so. For now, Mr. Hare’s fifth motion in
limine is denied.

Next, Mr. Hare moves in limine to bar the defendants from
referring to any psychiatric condition suffered by Mr. Hare prior
to the events alleged in this lawsuit. The defendants oppose the
motion, arguing that they should be entitled to elicit and
introduce evidence about when Mr. Hare began experiencing the
panic attacks he says were triggered by the events alleged in his
complaint. At this point, it is unclear whether the “psychiatric
condition” evidence involves something more than the panic
attacks Mr. Hare discussed at his deposition. But certainly with
regard to these attacks, the defendants are entitled to explore
the question of when, exactly, Mr. Hare began suffering the
attacks - if he experienced the attacks before any of the alleged
events occurred, then that would be probative evidence that Chief
Zitek’s conduct did not cause them. Although evidence of this
nature is surely unfavorable to Mr. Hare, the Court is not
persuaded that the prejudicial nature substantially outweighs its
probative value, which is the test under Rule 403. Accordingly,

the Court will allow evidence relating to the panic attacks, when


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RICHEY A. HARE, SR.

Plaintiff, No. 02 C 3973

vs.

JOHN ZITEK, individually and in his
official capacity as Chief of
Police of the Stickney Police
Department, DONALD TABOR,
individually and in his official
capacity as President of the
Village of Stickney, and THE
VILLAGE OF STICKNEY, a municipal
corporation,

Magistrate Judge
Arlander Keys

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Richey Hare joined the Stickney Police Department in 1986.
In 2002, he sued the department, as well as the Village of
Stickney, Stickney’s Chief of Police (John Zitek}, and Stickney’s
Mayor (Donald Tabor}, alleging that these defendants retaliated
against him because he uncovered and exposed corruption within
the Police Department and within the Village. Specifically, he
claims that the defendants harassed and intimidated him, going so
far as to attempt to trump up a sexual assault case against him,
all in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, and in furtherance of a
conspiracy to violate 42 U.S.C. $1983. The case is set for trial
on August 7, 2006. The purpose of this Memorandum Opinion and

Order is to resolve, to the extent possible at this juncture, the


Mr. Warschol, a witness Mr. Hare unsuccessfully sought to depose
after discovery had closed. Mr. Hare has indicated that he does
not oppose the motion to bar this evidence, and the Court
therefore grants the motion to this extent. Mr. Hare objects,
however, to a blanket prohibition on issues and evidence that may
not have been raised in discovery. The Court agrees that such a
ban is inappropriate until such time as the Court can determine
what the evidence is; the Court, therefore, will reserve for
trial any further ruling on undisclosed evidence.

Turning to the contested motions, the defendants first move
to bar evidence that the Village of Stickney “blackballed” Mr.
Hare, that is, that the Village attempted to prevent Mr. Hare
from obtaining new employment, The defendants argue that such
evidence is irrelevant to the question of whether Mr. Hare made
reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages and that the
prejudicial nature of such evidence would outweigh its probative
value. In particular, the defendants argue, the only issue
relevant on the mitigation issue is what efforts Mr. Hare made to
get a job; they argue that whether he actually got the job in the
end, and, if not, why, are not relevant on mitigation. As the
Court sees it however, the question of mitigation would include
whether Mr. Hare obtained other employment and, if not, why. Did
he simply choose not to accept other job offers? Or were there

no other job offers to accept? And, if not, did the defendants

12


from offering evidence in rebuttal, simply because he doesn’t
like the way the evidence makes him look. Mr, Hare’s counsel can
explore on cross-examination the evidence relating to Mr. Hare's
performance with regard to the evidence room, and it will be up
to the jury to determine who is telling the truth about the
reasons for the harassment and mistreatment. Mr. Hare’s seventh
motion in limine is denied.
B. Defendants’ Motion In Limine

The defendants filed 27 motions in limine. As to several of
the motions - (1) defendants’ motion in limine to bar evidence of
e-mails between Mr. Hare and Karyn Stratton; (2) defendants’
motion in limine to bar evidence and testimony relating to Mr.
Hare's pension reduction; {3) defendants’ motion in limine to bar
evidence of settlement negotiations; (4) defendants’ motion in
limine to exclude evidence of insurance coverage; (5) defendants’
motion in limine to bar evidence of Mr. Hare’s notes of Chief
Zitek’'s alleged wrongdoing; and (6) defendants’ motion in limine
to exclude suggestions of individual defendants’ indemnification
- Mr. Hare raises no objection, and the Court will, therefore,
grant them.

Similarly, with regard to one other motion - defendants’
motion to bar evidence not disclosed during discovery - Mr. Hare
opposes the motion only in part. In their motion, the defendants

specifically seek to exclude testimony and evidence relating to

11



matter how much the defendants press the point, the Court is not
persuaded that Garcetti changes anything about the constitutional
Standards at play in these circumstances. Moreover, even if
Garcetti did change the legal landscape, it wasn’t decided until
May 30, 2006, and the defendants have not explained how it could
be used to excuse conduct that happened years earlier, when the
constitutional standards were clearly established. Mr, Hare's
fourth motion in limine is granted.

Fifth, Mr. Hare moves in limine to prohibit the defendants
from asking certain questions of Susan Locander, a reporter for
Life Newspaper who wrote several articles about Mr. Hare, the
defendants, and the events at issue in this lawsuit. In
particular, Mr. Hare argues that, because of “the reporters’
privilege,” the defendants should be prohibited from asking Ms.
Locander to reveal the identities of her sources for those
articles. But, as the defendants correctly point out, the
Seventh Circuit has declined to recognize a federal “reporters’
privilege.” See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 {7th
Cir. 2003}. Having said this, the Court is mindful that there
are necessarily concerns about forcing a reporter to disclose her
sources; it is not something the Court would do lightly. The
Court will require Ms. Locander to answer sensitive questions -
including questions about her sources - only if the defendants

can establish, via proffer at trial, that they have a real need



The Court grants, over objection, Mr. Hare’s First, Third
and Fourth Motions in Limine.* The Court also grants, over
objection, Defendants’ Motion in Limine to bar Evidence and
Testimony of Officer Mark Kozelka [#144]; and Defendants’ Motion
in Limine to Bar Evidence and Testimony of Tom Kadolph and
Carroll Kadolph [#157]. And the Court grants in part Defendants’
Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence and Testimony Relating to the
Evidence Room [#139]; Mr. Hare may not argue at trial that Chief
Zitek retaliated against him because of his findings with regard
to the evidence room, but testimony and evidence on this issue
may be offered to give context to the relationship between Mr.
Hare and Chief Zitek.

The Court denies Mr. Hare’s Second, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh
Motions in Limine. The Court also denies Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Bar Evidence of “Blackballing” [#130]; Defendants’
Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence and Testimony Relating to Don
Kreger [#131]; Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence and
Testimony Relating to Robert Rivkin [#132]; Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Bar Evidence and Testimony Relating to the Stickney

Police Pension Board Hearing [#137]; Defendants’ Motion in Limine

*Mr. Hare’s Motions in Limine were not separately docketed with
the Court; rather, they are all included in the docket entry for the
Proposed Pre-Trial Order, docket #135. It is the Court’s
understanding that the docketing department was planning to work with
plaintiff's counsel to correct this problem, but, at the time this
Opinion was issued, the motions were not yet separately docketed.

22


Although the defendants may be right that the Pension Board is

the same source, i.e., not a collateral source, as the Stickney
Police Department, the Police Department will not be on the hook
for damages here; indeed, Mr. Hare has voluntarily dismissed the

Village of Stickney Police Department as a named defendant. And

the defendants that potentially will be on the hook for damages -
namely, the Mayor, the Chief and the Village - are separate and
distinct entities from the Pension Board.' Moreover, given the
purpose behind the collateral source rule, the Court finds that
an offset is inappropriate, as it would gut any deterrent effect
potentially derived from an award. See also United States Can
Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 254 F.3d 626, 631-35
(7th Cir. 2001) (generally discussing the policy behind the
collateral source doctrine). Accordingly, the Court grants Mr.
Hare’s first motion in limine; the defendants may not seek a
reduction in any award based upon the disability pension benefits
paid.

Next, Mr. Hare moves in limine to bar the defendants from
presenting evidence of his disability, including evidence on the
cause of his disability. Mr. Hare argues that the defendants are

collaterally estopped from arguing that his disability was not

'The defendants concede in one of their motions in limine
that the Stickney Police Pension Board is a different entity from
the Village. See Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Bar Evidence
and Testimony of Tom Kadolph and Carroll Kadolph, {3.

4


was unquestionably made in the course of Mr. Hare carrying out
his job duties. The Court will grant defendants’ motion in
limine and bar Mr. Hare from arguing at trial that Chief Zitek
retaliated against him because of his findings with regard to the
evidence room. Testimony and evidence on this issue may still be
offered, however, to give context to the relationship between Mr.
Hare and Chief Zitek.

In their next two motions, the defendants seek to bar
evidence relating to the grand jury investigation into the
alleged corruption in Chief Zitek’s police department and
evidence of grand jury testimony. The defendants understandably
want to keep this evidence out - it makes Chief Zitek, and the
Village, look bad. But this evidence goes to the heart of Mr.
Hare’s retaliation claim, and the Court is not persuaded that
whatever prejudice the defendants may suffer because of its
introduction outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Mr.
Hare did not work for the State's Attorney’s Office; he was not
an employee speaking out on corruption as part of his job
description. And Garcetti therefore does not apply. The motion
to bar evidence of the grand jury investigation and the motion to
bar evidence of grand jury testimony are denied.

In their next two motions in limine, the defendants seek to
bar evidence and testimony of Jeff Walik and Joe Kretch, two of

the Stickney police officers who joined Mr. Hare when he blew the

15


defendants that whatever evidence and testimony Mr. Kozelka and
Ms. Kadolph could offer would be largely irrelevant and
relatively prejudicial. If it turns out that these witnesses
could actually offer testimony or evidence that would support Mr.
Hare's custom or policy claim against the Village - his claim
that the Village had a custom or policy of retaliating against
whistleblowers - the Court may reconsider the issue. For now,
however, the Court will grant the defendants’ motions to bar
these witnesses from testifying at trial.

Next, the defendants seek to bar evidence of the Village’s
alleged failure to provide Mr. Hare with legal representation in
connection with the grand jury proceedings dealing with the
alleged corruption in the Village and in the police department.
The defendants argue that such evidence should be barred because
Mr. Hare never asked for an attorney. Although this may prove to
be a valid defense to Mr. Hare’s retaliation claim, it is not
sufficient justification for barring evidence in limine. Mr.
Hare has alleged that, in retaliation for his whistle-blowing,
the Village provided an attorney to represent everyone who was
summoned to appear before the grand jury except him; it will be
up to the jury to decide whether he has met his burden with
regard to this aspect of his retaliation claim. Defendants’
motion in limine is denied.

The defendants next move to bar the testimony of Susan

17


benefits he has received or will receive in the future. Mr. Hare
argues that the “collateral source rule” should apply to restrict
the defendants from reducing any damages because it was the
defendants’ actions that rendered Mr. Hare psychologically
disabled and benefit eligible in the first place. The defendants
argue that the collateral source rule does not apply here,
because the Stickney Police Pension Board is not a collateral
source, but merely a pension administrator for the Stickney
Police Department. The defendants also argue that, even if the
collateral source rule did apply, the Court can and should
exercise its discretion to allow the jury to hear evidence
regarding Mr. Hare’s pension benefits so that the jury will have
an accurate picture of Mr. Hare’s financial situation and to
prevent any damages award from including “double recovery.”

“The purpose of the collateral source rule is ‘not to
prevent the plaintiff from being overcompensated but rather to
prevent the tortfeasor from paying twice.'” Flowers v. Komatsu
Mining Systems, Inc., 165 F.3d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1999) {quoting
Perry v. Larson, 794 F.2d 279, 286 (7th Cir. 1986)). “[A]
tortfeasor is not permitted to credit compensation that his
victim receives from another (“collateral”) source as a
consequence of the tort.” Halek v. United States, 178 F.3d 481,
483 {7th Cir. 1999) (citing Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 131

Ill.2d 308, 137 I1l.Dec. 579, 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 {1989}.


parties’ motions in limine.

Discussion

Generally speaking, district courts have the power to
exclude evidence in limine as part of their inherent authority to
Manage trials. See Pease v. Production Workers of Chicago and
Vicinity Local 707, No. 02 C 6756, 2003 WL 22012678, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 25, 2003) (citing Farley v. Miller Fluid Power Corp.,
No. 94 C 2273, 1997 WL 757863, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1997);
Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984}). But motions
in limine should be granted only if the evidence is clearly not
admissible for any purpose. See Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T?
Technologies, Ine., 831 F.Supp. 1398, 1400 {N.D. Till. 1993). If
there is any question on the issue, rather than barring the
evidence before trial, the Court should reserve ruling on
questions of admissibility until they actually arise, in the
context of the trial. See, e.g., Scarboro v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
91 FLR.D. 21, 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Hawthorne Partners, 831
F.Supp. at 1401.

Here, each side has filed multiple motions in limine. The
Court considers each below.

A. Mr. Hare's Motions In Limine

Mr. Hare has filed seven motions in limine., He first asks
the Court to bar the defendants from arguing that any damages

awarded should be reduced because of the disability pension

2


have something to do with that? To decide whether Mr. Hare is
entitled to back pay damages, the jury should be permitted to
consider the entire picture on this issue, and the Court will,
therefore, deny the defendants’ first motion in limine.

In separate motions, the defendants seek to bar evidence and
testimony relating to Don Kreger and Robert Rivkin, both partners
at Schiff Hardin, the law firm that, until last month, served as
corporation counsel for the Village of Stickney. The defendants
argue that such evidence is privileged, given the attorney-client
relationship. It is certainly likely that the attorney-client
privilege may come into play if Mr. Kreger and/or Mr. Rivkin
testifies at trial. And, to the extent evidence and testimony is
covered by the privilege, the Court will sustain proper
objections. But the mere fact that Mr. Kreger and Mr. Rivkin
represented the Village for a time does not mean that every piece
of evidence relating to them will automaticaily be kept out on
privilege grounds. For now, the Court declines to issue the
blanket ban defendants seek; the motions in limine regarding Mr.
Kreger and Mr. Rivkin are denied.

The defendants next seek to bar evidence and testimony
relating to the Stickney Police Pension Board Hearing. The
defendants contend that, because Mr. Hare was ultimately awarded
a duty-disability pension, he suffered no adverse action and

therefore should not be able to introduce evidence to press the

13


whistle on the alleged corruption in Chief Zitek’s department.
Just as the Court rejected the notion that Mr. Hare was an
employee of the State’s Attorney’s Office, so to it rejects the
notion that Officers Walik and Kretch were employees of the
State’s Attorney's Officer. The Court denies defendants’ motions
in limine with regard to these witnesses.

Next, the defendants seek to bar evidence and testimony of
Officer Mark Kozelka, who worked under Mr. Hare at the Stickney
Police Department and apparently claims that his work shift was
changed because he signed another party's election petition. In
a separate motion, the defendants seek to bar evidence and
testimony of Tom Kadolph, who worked for the Stickney Fire
Department until he was fired, and Carroll Kadolph, Tom’s mother,
who just happened to sit on the pension board that awarded Mr.
Hare his duty-related disability; Ms. Kadolph apparently believes
that her son was fired because she voted in favor of the pension
award. Mr. Hare does not oppose the motion to bar Tom Kadolph;
he does, however, object to the defendants’ efforts to bar
evidence and testimony from the other two individuals. Based on
the limited arguments before the Court, it is not clear that
either of these people were whistleblowers; thus, it is not clear
that they could add anything of relevance to Mr. Hare’s claim
that the Village had a policy of retaliating against

whistleblowers. At this point, the Court agrees with the

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