NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

AMANDA S., Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, R.R., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 13-0313

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015JD201100026

The Honorable Richard Weiss, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Offices of Heather C. Wellborn, P.C., Lake Havasu City

By Heather C. Wellborn

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Erika Z. Alfred

Counsel for Appellees
AMANDA S. v. ADES, R.R.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Amanda S. appeals from the superior court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her son, R.R., arguing the Arizona 

Department of Economic Security (“ADES”) failed to present sufficient 

evidence to terminate her parental rights. Amanda also argues the 

superior court should have admitted a home study into evidence at the 

termination hearing. For the following reasons, we disagree with 

Amanda’s arguments and affirm the superior court’s termination order. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2011, Amanda admitted herself into a hospital 

because she “was really bad into a breakdown” and was suffering from 

memory lapses or “blackouts,” hallucinations, and depression. R.R., who 

was then three years old, initially stayed with family friends, but ADES 

placed him in foster care on June 21, 2011.

¶3 On August 25, 2011, ADES filed a dependency petition 

alleging Amanda had neglected R.R. due to her untreated mental health 

needs, inadequate housing, and financial instability. Mother denied the 

allegations but stipulated to the need for a dependency and submitted the 

matter to the superior court, which found R.R. dependent and approved

family reunification as the appropriate case plan. 

¶4 On October 2, 2012, ADES reported to the superior court that 

Amanda had experienced an “emotional breakdown” on August 23, 2012 

and had been taken to a mental health facility because of concerns for her 

mental stability. ADES further reported Amanda had left an inpatient 

treatment facility against medical advice, had “struggle[d] to remain on 

her medication,” and had admitted she may never be able to parent R.R. 

due to instability. ADES thus recommended changing the case plan to 

severance and adoption. On November 20, 2012, the superior court

declined to change the case plan to severance and adoption but did 

approve concurrent case plans of family reunification and severance and 
AMANDA S. v. ADES, R.R.

Decision of the Court

3

adoption. On March 5, 2013, however, the superior court changed the 

case plan to severance and adoption. 

¶5 In March 2013, Amanda petitioned the superior court to 

return R.R. to her under Rule 59 of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the 

Juvenile Court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the superior court

denied the Rule 59 motion. 

¶6 At the subsequent termination adjudication hearing that

began on September 17, 2013, the parties stipulated to the admission of 

evidence from the Rule 59 hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 

superior court found ADES had presented clear and convincing evidence 

to terminate Amanda’s parental rights under Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(8)(c) (2014) (15 months out-of-home placement)

and that termination was in R.R.’s best interests.1 

DISCUSSION 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Termination Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c)

¶7 Amanda first argues ADES failed to present clear and 

convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(c) (15 months out-of-home placement). See A.R.S. § 8-537(B) 

(2014); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(c). We disagree. 

¶8 We review the superior court’s decision to terminate 

parental rights for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb its findings 

unless they are clearly erroneous with no reasonable evidence to support 

them. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d 

43, 47 (App. 2004). In termination proceedings, the superior court “is in 

the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). 

 1The court also found ADES had presented clear and 

convincing evidence to terminate Amanda’s parental rights under A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(2) (neglect), (B)(3) (mental illness), and (B)(8)(a) (nine months 

out-of-home placement). We do not address these additional grounds for 

termination because clear and convincing evidence supports termination 

under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 

Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002) (citations omitted). 
AMANDA S. v. ADES, R.R.

Decision of the Court

4

¶9 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), a court may terminate parental 

rights if 

[t]he child has been in an out-of-home 

placement for a cumulative total period of 

fifteen months or longer pursuant to court 

order or voluntary placement pursuant to § 8-

806, the parent has been unable to remedy the 

circumstances that cause the child to be in an 

out-of-home placement and there is a 

substantial likelihood that the parent will not 

be capable of exercising proper and effective 

parental care and control in the near future.[2]

The “circumstances which cause[d] the child to be in an out-of-home 

placement” are those that exist at the time of termination. See Marina P. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22, 152 P.3d 1209, 1213 (App. 

2007) (explaining the same phrase as it is used in A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a)). 

¶10 At the time of the termination hearing, R.R. had been in outof-home placement continuously for more than 26 months. The superior 

court found Amanda had been unable to remedy the circumstances that 

led to R.R.’s out-of-home placement and there was a substantial likelihood 

that she was not capable of exercising proper and effective parental 

control in the near future. ADES presented evidence at the Rule 59 and 

termination hearings that Amanda was unable to care for R.R. due to her 

mental illness, inadequate housing, and financial instability. The ADES 

case manager testified she was not compliant with her case plan because 

of her mental health medication management, inadequate housing, and 

financial instability. 

¶11 Additional evidence presented at the Rule 59 and 

termination hearings revealed the following: Amanda had been receiving 

mental health services, including being placed on mental health

medication, since she was a child. Her diagnoses were chronic and, at the 

time of the hearings, included mood disorder, not otherwise specified and 

 2The party seeking termination must also show “the agency 

responsible for the care of the child has made a diligent effort to provide 

appropriate reunification services.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). Amanda does 

not argue ADES failed to meet this requirement, and we therefore do not 

address it. 
AMANDA S. v. ADES, R.R.

Decision of the Court

5

borderline personality disorder. Amanda had been prescribed 

antipsychotic medication, but her medication use had been “very 

sporadic,” and she had a history of taking herself off of medication. At 

the time of the hearings, Amanda was still admittedly suffering from 

depression, had hallucinations as recently as May 2013, and had issues 

with memory lapses or blackouts as recently as November 2012.3 

¶12 Furthermore, Amanda’s medical professionals were 

concerned that she had the habit of “paint[ing] maybe a slightly rosier 

picture than things were” and that she was “superficially bright,” 

meaning she could project an image that may not have been accurate. 

Amanda’s psychological evaluation conducted on August 27, 2013 -- after 

the Rule 59 hearing but before the termination hearing -- by a licensed 

psychologist reported Amanda had “[s]erious mental illness that 

include[d] mood instability, psychotic symptoms, and depression, along 

with problematic personality patterns.” The psychologist further noted 

that her antipsychotic medication treatment “will likely need to continue 

for a prolonged and indeterminate period of time with a high probability 

of additional psychotic symptoms if medication treatment is 

discontinued” and noted that “despite recommendations for a number of 

years . . . [she] has not been consistent with medication treatment.” The 

psychologist’s prognosis that Amanda would be able to “discharge 

parental responsibilities in the foreseeable future appeared to be guarded” 

because of her problems with long-term medication compliance, 

discrepancies regarding the occurrence of blackouts, continued 

unemployment, financial instability, and associated difficulties attending 

to daily and basic needs. Moreover, R.R. required special care, and ADES

was concerned with Amanda being able to maintain her own mental 

health while caring for him. 

¶13 The record reflects that although Amanda had made great 

strides and commendable progress in working on her mental health 

needs, her progress happened much too late in the process. Even though 

Amanda was proactive in seeking services and had been attending 

 3The parties dispute whether Amanda had physically 

harmed R.R. during her blackouts. The case manager testified R.R. had 

told a case investigator that Amanda had bitten him while he was still in 

her care, and Amanda acknowledged she was concerned because R.R. 

said she had bitten him. However, Amanda testified the purported bite 

mark was a scrape from the neighbor’s steps, but she also admitted she 

did not know what had happened to R.R. during her blackouts. 
AMANDA S. v. ADES, R.R.

Decision of the Court

6

individual counseling and group sessions and receiving case management 

and therapy and medication management from her mental health 

providers, she had only been compliant in these areas since March 2013. 

And, in light of the care R.R. required, the superior court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding Amanda would not be capable of exercising proper 

and effective parental care and control in the near future because she did 

not adequately understand R.R.’s needs and her own mental health 

condition in order to appropriately care for him. 

¶14 The record also reflects Amanda’s housing was not 

appropriate for R.R. ADES obtained a home study on the home, and the 

evaluator recommended against placing R.R. in the home, in part, because 

of the care he required. Furthermore, Amanda’s financial situation was 

precarious; she was unemployed, although she sold crafts and baked 

goods to earn approximately $150 per month and received benefits from 

the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System and food stamps. 

¶15 Based on our review of the record, ADES presented clear 

and convincing evidence supporting the superior court’s termination 

under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). 

B. Best Interests

¶16 Amanda also argues ADES failed to present sufficient 

evidence termination was in R.R.’s best interests. When determining 

whether parental termination would be in the best interests of the child, 

the party seeking termination must show by a preponderance of the 

evidence “how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by 

the continuation of the relationship.” Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5, 804 P.2d 730, 734 (1990); see also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 

66(c). The superior court found termination was in R.R.’s best interests 

because R.R. was adoptable and he was receiving the care he needed. 

The court also found that returning R.R. to Amanda might cause him 

distress under the then-existing situation. Testimony from the case 

manager, along with other evidence, fully supports these findings. Again, 

on this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding termination 

was in R.R.’s best interests. 

II. Exclusion of the Home Study

¶17 Amanda further argues the superior court should have 

admitted a written home study she obtained on her home. Reviewing for 

abuse of discretion, we disagree. See Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, 82-83, ¶ 19, 107 P.3d 923, 928-29 (App. 2005).
AMANDA S. v. ADES, R.R.

Decision of the Court

7

¶18 The superior court excluded the home study because it was 

untimely disclosed and the court did not believe the study would be 

helpful in determining R.R.’s best interests. After the termination hearing 

date was set for September 17, 2013, the court imposed a disclosure 

deadline of September 4, 2013. On the second day of the severance 

hearing, September 23, 2013, Amanda sought permission to submit a 

home study into evidence, stating she had disclosed it to ADES on 

September 20, 2013, but had timely disclosed the evaluator as a witness 

and the parties contemplated the evaluator would provide a written home 

study. The court excluded the report as untimely, but it nevertheless 

allowed the evaluator to testify about her observations concerning the 

suitability of Amanda’s home. Under these circumstances, the court did 

not abuse its discretion in excluding the written home study. 

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

termination order.