the informant’s credibility which entitled the government to offer evidence concerning his
cooperation in other cases in order to rebut the attack. See United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d
1232, 1242-43 (7th Cir. 1996). The fact that Henderson’s case was the first in which the
informant actually participated in a drug deal as an informant is without consequence. First of
all, the informant had given information on other subjects by that time. More importantly, this
case cannot logically be distinguished from Lindemann based on the particular spot in the
sequence of events in which the informant dealt with the defendant. Henderson’s argument may
bear on the weight to be given to the evidence of the informant’s cooperation in other cases, but
it does not preclude its admissibility. Finally, the fact that the informant did not testify is
likewise of no consequence; Henderson attacked the informant’s credibility, and that attack

warranted the admission of curative evidence whether or not the informant testified at trial.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies defendant’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal [docket item 51-1] and his motion for new trial [docket item 50-1]. All remaining

motions were previously ruled upon before or during trial and are therefore terminated.

MATTHEW F. KE Y
United States District Judge
Date: November 4, 2002


’

Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

{Assigned Jud Sitting Judge if Oth
sandr Magistrace Judge Matthew F. Kennelly than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 CR 1135 DATE 11/4/2002
CASE USA vs. Rodney Henderson
TITLE

of the motion being presented.]

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) QO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) QO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon____setfor__—_at

(5) 0 Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____——ssetfor__—_—at

(6) ia Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—s set for at 7
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at

(8) Qo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__—_at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a)(1) CIFRCP41(a)(2).

previously ruled upon before or during trial and are therefore terminated.

al [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

(io) [Other docket entry] For the reasons set forth on the attached order, the Court denies defendant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal (51-10 and his motion of new trial (50-1). All remaining motions were

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counset by telephone.

NOY, 0..6..5002

~ | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge. Lunes dolsie ‘sn
or deputy "Ssh Wd S- AGN 20 —
initials
GEeasaats rain



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
vs. ) Case No. 001 CR 1135
)
RODNEY HENDERSON } 0 CHETED

NOY 6 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

Defendant Rodney Henderson has moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, arguing that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he distributed cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1). His motion presents
what would be a good argument to a jury as to why it should acquit him. But in ruling on a
motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court does not re-weigh the evidence as a thirteenth juror;
rather we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government,
would have permitted a reasonable jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See,
e.g., United States v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1997). The evidence in this case
meets that standard. Among other things, the evidence would have permitted the jury reasonably
to find the following:

- Henderson had telephone conversations with the government’s cooperating informant to

set up a drug deal;

- the informant and his car were checked before he met with Henderson to make sure that

he had no drugs on him;

- the informant briefly entered a barbershop where Henderson was working and had a

5")


conversation with him in which Henderson asked, “You got the money?”;

- the two men entered the informant’s truck, and Henderson then exited, went into an

apartment building, and returned to the truck;

- Henderson then left the truck and returned to the barbershop;

- the informant’s car, which was constantly under surveillance and which no one other

than the informant and Henderson had approached, was searched at another location and

was found to contain crack cocaine.

In sum, even though the informant did not testify, and no witness testified that he had
seen Henderson carrying anything or giving anything to the informant, a jury reasonably could
find beyond a reasonable doubt based on inferences from the circumstantial evidence that
Henderson in fact distributed crack cocaine to the informant. Henderson was able to make a
straight-faced argument to the jury that the informant had previously planted the drugs in the
barbershop and then simply retrieved them at the time of the purported exchange, but the jury
was not required to accept that argument — among other things, the particulars of the exchange
were not set up until just a couple of hours before it actually happened, making Henderson’s
alternative scenario highly unlikely.

Henderson has also moved for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
33. He argues that the Court erred in permitting the government to “bolster” the credibility of the
informant, who did not testify at trial, by offering evidence that he had participated in othér cases
that had resulted in guilty pleas by his targets in those cases. The Court rejects this argument. At
trial, Henderson attacked the informant by arguing that he had planted the drugs in order to get a

better deal for himself. The Court agrees with the government that this amounted to an attack on