violated one or more of their established procedures, absent subjective knowledge of the decedent’s
suicidal intentions, their actions do not constitute a deliberate disregard of a possibility that the
decedent would take his own life).
2. Medical Needs After Discovery of Prisoner Hanging

The Estate also argues that Captain Hilbring, Officer Simmons and Aide Walker were
deliberately indifferent (9 Melvin Bradich’s serious medical needs after they discovered the suicide
attempt. With regard to this issue, a pretrial detainee’s due process rights are violated when an
official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee. Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 497, 106 (1976); Salazar, 940 I'.2d at 238. A plaintiff cannot establish a § 1983 claim

based upon inadequate medical care when the care provided is merely negligent. Estate of Cole By
Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 259 (7th Cir, 1996). In other words, the officer only deprives the
pretrial detainee of his due process rights if he intends for him to die or suffer grievously, or if the
officcr knows of a significant risk that the detainee will die or suffer grievously but is indifferent to
that risk. Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1006 (7th Cir, 1999); Salazar, 940 F2d, at 238.

In this case, there is no dispute that when the lockup personnel discovered Melvin Bradich
hanging in his ccll, he was in serious need of medical treatment. Thus, the issue before the court is
whether the individual Defendants acted with delibcrate indifference to Bradich’s serious need. Sec

Salazar, 940 F.2d at 238. The Estate argues that Hilbring, Simmons and Walker acted with

deliberate indifference to Bradich’s serious medical need by failing to promptly summon medical
assistance after discovering the decedent hanging in his cell. In support of its claim, the state
focuses primarily on two facts. First, it contends that the individual Defendants have judicially

admitted that the time of discovery was approximately 6:15 p.m. Second, the Estate asserts that

13



Bradich’s cell and attempted to free him from his ligature. When Bradich was freed from his
ligature, he appeared to be alive. At some time thereafter, Aide Walker ran to the front desk of the
station to summon an ambulance. Additionally, Captain Donald Hilbring, the 4th District’s Watch
Commander on duty at the time, arrived in the lockup to assist Simmons and Walker. Chicago Fire
Department paramedics Donna Parrott and Russell Lane were assigned to respond to Bradich’s
suicide attempt at approximately 6:25 p.m. Prior to their arrival, unidentified firefighters from
Chicago Fire Department Engine Company 81 arrived on the scene. When Parrot and Lane arrived,
Melvin Bradich was dead.
Ill. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is permissible when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
_, . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a maltcr of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The non-

moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must identify specific facts, see Comfield v.

Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir. 1993), that raise more than a

mere scintilla of evidence to show a genuine triable issue of material fact. See Murphy v. ITY
Technical Services, Inc., 176 F.3d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 1999).

Indeciding a motion for surnmary judgment, the court can only consider evidence that would
be admissible at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Sec Bombard v. Fort Wayne
Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). The court views the record and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P,

56(c); sce also Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140, 144 (7th Cir.1995). “In the light most favorable”

simply means that summary judgment is not appropriate if the court must make “a choice of


can be no § 1983 liability against the municipality, Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982,

990-91 (7th Cir. 1998).

In this case, Counts J and II of the Estate’s Second Amended Complaint allege violations of
§ 1983 against the City. Both claims allege that the City’s policies, practices and customs caused
the individual Defendants to violate Melvin Bradich’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
See Second Am. Compl. fff 1-84. Because the court has determined that no individual Defendant
violated Bradich’s due process rights in this case,* the City cannot be held liable under § 1983. See
Collignon, 163 F.3d at 990-91.
D. The Estate’s State Law Claims

When the court dismisses all federal claims before trial, the usual course of conduct is to
remand the state claims to the stale court unless there are countervailing considerations. See Wright

y. Associated Ins. Cos., Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994). Having dismissed all of the federal

claims, the court relinquishes pendant jurisdiction over any and all of the Estate’s state tort claims.

See 28 U.S.C, § 1367; see also ISI Intern., Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 316 F.3d 731, 733

(7th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 942 (7th Cir. 2001).

‘the Estate also contends that unnamed firefighters violated Melvin Bradich’s due
process rights by failing to give him C.P.R. prior to the arrival of the paramedics. However, the
Estate offers no evidence which would allow the court to draw a reasonable inference on this
issue. Although the evidence shows that firefighters arrived before the paramedics and that they
were not administering C.P.R. when the paramedics entered the cell, this alone is not enough to
show that these firefighters acted with deliberate indifference. See Murphy, 176 F.3d at 938
(speculation, without cvidentiary support, will not defeat a motion for summary judgment).

17



intoxication with its accompanying incoherence does not, by itself, infer knowledge of a significant
suicide risk to a prison official); see also Payne, 161 F.3d at 1042 (holding that intoxication and
frequent cursing are not enough to establish a subjectively known risk of suicide).

The Estate also argues that Bradich was unable to walk without assistance and distressed at
the time he entered the lockup. However, there is no admissible evidence to support either
contention. The only evidence suggesting that Bradich could not walk without assistance is the
deposition testimony of Michael Bradich, the decedent’s brother. Michael Bradich testified that
Officer Harold Hanley told him he observed the decedent when he entered the police station and that
he was being held up by the arresting officers. In his deposition, Officer Hanley did not recall saying
this to Micheal Bradich, Thus, this statement is inadmissible hearsay and is not to be considered in
a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); see also Bombard, 92 F.3d at 562,

Similarly, to show that the decedent was distressed, the Estate relies on evidence suggesting
that Officers Hroma and Baker took Bradich to his home after the urrest for the purpose of using him
as a “snitch” in a drug sting operation, The Estate argues that these officers forced Bradich to call
and set up a drug dealer in exchange for his release. Even if true, there is no evidence to support the
theory that Bradich was distressed as a result of his own intentional conduct after deciding to
cooperate with the officers. Sec Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir, 2003) (noting
that confidential informants often engage in risky undercover work in exchange for leniency,
including the risk of being “bumped off by a drug dealer with whom onc is negotiating a purchase
or sale of drugs .. .”). Although Robert Bradich testified that Melyin Bradich was previously

concemed about police officers pressuring him to give up a “crack house,” there is no evidence



whether the facts, when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the official’s

conduct violated a constitutional tight. See id. at 201; see also Knox, 342 F.3d at 657. Tf the

plaintiff presents a constitutional injury, the second step is to determine whether the right was clearly
established at the time. See id. The second step “must be undertaken in light of the specific context
of the case, not as a general proposition. ...” Id. “[T]he right allegedly violated must be defined
at an appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established.” Id.
at 202 (quoting Wilson v, Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). “The concern of the immunity inquiry

is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular

[official] conduct. ...” Saucier, 121 S. Ct, at 2158. “Ifthe [official’s] mistake as to what the law

requires is reasonable , . . the [official] is entitled to the immunity defense.” Id.

In this case, all individual Defendants assert that they are entitled to the defense of qualified
immunity, Because the Estate’s § 1983 claims differ as to some of the individual Defendants, the
court will analyze the qualified immunity defenses in two sections. First, it will address the Estate’s
claims that certain Defendants violated Melvin Bradich’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious risk of suicide prior to discovering the hanging.
Second, the court will address the Estate’s claims that certain Defendants violated Melvin Bradich’s
Fourteenth Amendment duc process rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs after discovering the hanging.

1. Suicide Risk Prior to Discovery of Prisoner Hanging

Under § 1983, a pre-trial detainee establishes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by

demonstrating: (1) the defendants were aware of a substantial risk of serious injury to the detainee;

and (2) the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the known danger, Cavalieri y. Shepard,


inferences.” See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); sec also First Nat’) Bank
of Arizona v, Cities Service Co,, 391 U.S. 253, 280 (1968); Wolf v. Buss (America) Inc . 77 F.3d

914, 922 (7th Cir. 1996), The choice between reasonable inferences from facts is a jury function.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

When the defendant moves for summary judgment, the court must view the record and all
inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Payne v Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir.

2003); Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Communication Workers of Am., 220 F.3d 814, 821 (7th

Cir. 2000). This includes evidence provided in the plaintiff's self-serving affidavit, provided such
evidence is admissible at trial. Payne, 337 F.3d at 773. However, the inferences construed in the
plaintiff's favor must be drawn from specific facts identified in the record that support the plaintiff's
position. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922-23 (7th Cir. 1994), Under this
standard, “[cJonclusory allegations alone cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Thomas
y. Christ Hospital and Medical Center, No. 02-3373, -- F.3d --, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 7921, at *11

(7th Cir. April 25, 2003) (citing Lujan v, Nat’l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).

B. Qualified Immunity

Individual government officials sued under § 1983 may assert the defense of qualified
immunity. See gencrally Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). This defense protects “government
agents ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Knoxv. Smith,
342 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Harlow y. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

To determine whether an official is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, the court

must undertake a two-step inquiry. See Saucier, $33 U.S, at 2156, The first step is to determine


IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, both the Individual Defendants’ and the City’s Motions for
Summary Judgment are granted in part and denied in part; and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment is denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Lb 4 Be f/

Charles R. Norgle, District Judge //
DATED; z / v, Oy

United States District Court


supervision and care during his confinement. Put another way, the Estate argues that based on the
citcumstances, these individual Defendants should have known that Bradich was likely to commit
suicide and failed to provide adequate measures to prevent the occurrence. The court will first
address the Estate’s claims against the arresting officers, [Iroma and Baker, It will then address the
Estate’s claims against the lockup personnel, Simmons and Walker.

(a) Officers Hroma and Baker

The parties do not dispute that Melvin Bradich had no known history of suicidal thoughts or
tendencies prior to his arrest on October 23, 1999. However, the Estate argues that based on the
specific circumstances presented to the arresting officers on the day of the decedent’s arrest, his
significant risk of suicide was obvious. See PI.’s Resp. to Individual Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., at
17. To support this assertion, the Estate argues that Officers Hroma and Baker witnessed the
decedent’s emotional and physical collapse while in their custody. Specifically, the Listate argues
that by the time the decedent arrived at the lockup, he was incoherent, unable to walk without
assistance, unable to cooperate in the fingerprinting process and distressed. Sce id, at ]8.

The evidence, however, when construed in the light most favorable to the Estate, does not
support this claim. Bradich was drinking alcohol and possibly using heroin prior to his arrest,
Assuming that he was in fairly good physical condition and oriented as to time and place al the time
of his arrest, the Estate presents no admissible evidence which shows that his condition had
deteriorated to such a level that would make a significant risk of suicide obvious to these officers.
For example, the Estate relics on evidence showing that Bradich was incoherent when he entered the
lockup at approximately 5;00 p.m. Even if true, this is not enough to infer a known risk of suicide.

See Estate of Hocker by Hocker v. Walsh, 22 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that



| Minute Order Por (0697)

es / ‘United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois
7 : F
Name of Astigned Jud; ; Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Tudge Charles Norgle than Assigned Fudge
CASE NUMBER 00 C 7998 DATE 2/17/2004
CASE Bradich vs. City of Chicago, et al.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (bh) state bricfly he nature
‘ MOTION: of the mation being presented.]
Motions for Summary Judgment ‘|
DOCKET ENTRY;
q) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.)
(2) im Brief in support of motion due _
(3) im} Answer brief to motion due. _. Reply to answer brief duc____.
(4) aq Ruling/Hearing onset ffor__aat _
(5) im} Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on __—s_ssetfor__— at
(6) q Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on __set for _at 7
(7) im] Trial[set for/re-sct for} on _ at
(8) a {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to _ at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
OFRCP4A(m) O Local Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).
ao TOther docket entry] Before the Court are the Individual Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment |72-1], the City of Chicago’s Motion for Summary Judgment [76-1], and Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment [69-1]. For the reasons stated in the attached order, Defendants’ motions [72-
1] [76-1] are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; Plaintiffs motion [69-1] is DENIED as moot. The
Clerk shall enter judgment pursuant to Rule 58 for all Defendants on Counts I-VI of Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint. Because the court dismisses all federal claims, it relinquishes pendant jurisdiction
over any and alj of the Estate’s state tort claims. Sce 28 U.S.C. § 1367; sec also [ST Intern.. Inc. v. Borden
Ladner Gervais LLP, 316 F.3d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez v. City of Chicagg, 239 F.3d 939, 942
(7th Cir. 2001). (See Attached Opinion and Order.)
(dil) @ [For further detail sce order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, ndvised in open court. Document:
No notices required, iber
umber of notices
Notices maited by judge's staff.
Nite cous by telephone FEB.1.9.2004
W | Docketing w mail notices, .
ae Mail AO 450 form,
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

vourtroom:
deputy’s

initials _|
Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office

snaiiny deputy ital



Officers Hroma and Baker were aware of a substantial risk of suicide, Assuming the decedent’s
emotional and physical condition had deteriorated significantly while he was in their custody, absent
knowledge ofa history of suicide attempts or any indication that Bradich was suicidal on the day of
his arrest, knowledge of a significant suicide risk cannot be inferred from the circumstances of this
case, See Camic, 712 F.2dat 1146 (holding that “[k]nowing [the decedent] was behaving violently,
or in a ‘freaky’ manner is not synonymous with having reason to know (hat the violence might
become self-directed.”) (emphasis in original); see also Brooks v City of Chicago, No. 88-8609, 1992
WL 373034, at *4 (N.D. lll. Dec. 8, 1992) (holding that absent the intention to commit suicide, “the
fact that [the decedent] was acting belligerent and intoxicated is not synonymous with having reason
to know that he was suicidal.”),

Therefore, based on all of the reasons stated above, the evidence does not show that Officers
Hroma and Baker were aware of a substantial risk of suicide. As such, the Estate fails to show that
these officers committed a Constitutional violation by being deliberately indifferent to the decedent’s
known risk of suicide. See Matos, 335 F.3d at 557 (requiring subjective knowledge of a suicide risk
to prevail on a claim under § 1983). Absent such a showing, the court need not consider the second
prong of Officer Hroma and Baker's qualified immunity defense, and these Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment on the Fstate’s § 1983 claims. See Boncher v. Brown County, 272 F.3d 484,
488 (7th Cir. 2001).

(b) Officer Simmons and Detention Aide Walker

The Estate also argues that Officer Simmons and Detention Aide Walker knew of Melvin
Bradich’s significant risk of suicide when he entered the lockup and failed to take any steps to limit

this risk, See Pl.’s Resp. to Individual Defs.” Mot. for Summ, J., at 21. Specifically, the Estate

11



showing that Officers Hroma and Baker knew of this pressure, or that Melvin Bradich was
contemplating suicide as a result. See P],’s Ex. 41, at 59-61.

Additionally, the Estate argues that because Melvin Bradich was unable to cooperate in the
fingerprinting process, Officers Hroma and Baker should have known of Bradich’s substantial risk
of suicide. Detention Aide Walker testified that while searching Bradich, he determined that Bradich
was not steady enough to be fingerprinted. In doing so, Walker decided not to fingerprint Bradich
before placing him in a cell. Assuming this is true, this evidence shows al most that Bradich was
too intoxicated to be fingerprinted at the time Olficers Hroma delivered him to the lockup. It does
not show that Bradich was a substantial risk of suicide. See Payne, 161 F.3d at 1042 (holding that
intoxication is not enough to establish a known risk of suicide).

Additionally, the Estate argues that Officers Hroma and Baker’s denial of using Bradich in
a sting operation, despite evidence to the contrary, evidences of a cover-up showing thal they were
aware of Bradich’s significant risk of suicide. See Pl,’s Resp. to Individual Defs.’ Mot. for Summ.
J., at 20. Even assuming that Hroma and Baker did use Bradich in an attempted sting operation, and
that they lied about it after the fact, this still does not show that they were aware of a substantial risk
of suicide in this case. Although this evidence when construed most favorably to the Estate may
show that these officers are attempting to hide wrongdoing, it in no way shows that they were awarc
ofa substantial risk of suicide prior to Melvin Bradich’s death. See Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88,
91 (7th Cir, 1997) (stating thai a violation of departmental procedure, by itself, is not enough to show
a subjectively known risk of suicide).

Finally, even assuming that everything the Estate claims regarding the condition of Melvin

Bradich prior to entering the lockup is truc, the Estate still has not met its burden of showing that

10



321 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2003); Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1041 (7th Cir.
1998). Under the first prong of this inquiry, the issue in suicide prevention cases is whether the
government official subjectively knew that the detainee was going to commit suicide. See Matos

ex rel Matos v. O'Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that a plaintiff must show that

the defendant had actual knowledge of the detainee’s risk of suicide); see also Cavalieri, 321 I'.3d
at 620. Although knowledge can be inferred from the obviousness of the risk, see Payne, 161 F.3d
at 1042, the standard requires a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that suicide would
occur, See id, (stating that plaintiff must show facts which impute subjective knowledge of a high
suicide risk to jail personnel) (quotations omitted); see also Estate of Boncherv. Brown County, 272
F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that defendant’s must be aware of the likelihood that the
detainee posed a “genuine suicide risk.”).

Once the plaintiff establishes that the official was aware of the detaince’s substantial risk of
suicide, the court must consider, under the second prong of the analysis, whether he acted with
deliberate indifference to the known risk. See Matos, 335 F.3d at 557; see also Payne, 161 F.3d
1041. This requires the plaintiff to show that each individual defendant intentionally disregarded

that risk. Matos, 335 F.3d at 557. Because criminal recklessness is a proxy for intent, only

intentional or criminally reckless conduct amounts to deliberate indifference. Salazar v. City of
Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1991). Thus, the plaintiff is required to show more than mere
or gross negligence — but less than purposeful infliction of harm — on behalf of the government
official. See Matos, 335 F.3d at 557.

In this case, the Estate argues that Defendants Hroma, Baker, Simmons and Walker, through

their deliberate indiffcrence to Bradich’s risk of suicide, violated his right to reccive adequate



conducting an investigation, [Troma and Baker arrested Bradich, who was the subject of an
outstanding arrest warrant for driving under the influence (“DU! Warrant”). Upon searching
Bradich, Officers Hroma and Baker discovered that he was in possession of a controlled substance.
Specifically, Bradich possessed a barbituate called Alprozolam (commercially sold as Xanax).

Although it is unclear as to what time Bradich arrived at the 4th District police station, it is
undisputed that Officer Hroma delivered Bradich to the district’s lockup facility at approximately
5:00 p.m. At this time, Police Officer Ronald Simmons and Detention Aide Craig Walker were the
only two members of the Police Department assigned to the lockup facility. Officer Hroma did not
communicate to Simmons or Walker that Bardich was a heroin addict or that he needed any special
attention. Upon accepting custody of Bradich, Aide Walker proceeded to search him. Determining
that Bradich was intoxicated and unable to hold still long enough to be fingerprinted, Walker
escorted Bradich to a cell located within one of the lockup facility’s cell blocks.? The officers placed
Bradich in a cell which could be viewed from a video monitor.

After Bradich was placed in his cell, arrestee Calvin Stinson entered the lockup for
processing. Stinson, who estimates that he was in the lockup for approximatcly ten minutes,
observed several officers in the lockup playing cards and watching television, Stinson did not report
any other relevant observations or any unusual behavior regarding his visit to the lockup. It is also
undisputed that Thomas Osborne, who was in the cell adjacent to Bradich’s cell, did not report any
unusual behavior by Bradich prior to the hanging.

Some time after Stinson left the lockup, Officer Simmons and Aide Walker observed Bradich

on the video monitor hanging from the bars of his cell, Simmons and Walker immediately ran to

3 The parties dispute whether Bradich needed physical assistance to get to his cell.

3


although it took only “seconds to free the Decedent from his ligature,” see Pl.’s Resp. to Individual
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., at 31, an ambulance was not summoned until approximately 6:24 p.m.
See Second Am. Compl. 472. Thus, the Estate argues that Defendants’ approximate nine Tninute
delay in summoning an ambulance is evidence of deliberate indifference to the decedent’s serious
medical needs.

The court rejects the Estate’s argument. Even construing the evidence in favor of the Estate,
there is no evidence in the record that shows thal these Defendants acted with deliberate indifference
to the decedent's serious medical needs. To the contrary, the record is replete with evidence showing
that the Defendants acted diligently in attempting to assist the decedent upon discovering him
hanging in his cell. Although there are some inconsistencies in the testimony of the individual
Defendants regarding exactly who did what and when, these inconsistencies ate not material to the
issue at hand,

The evidence clearly shows that upon discovering Bradich hanging in his cell, both Officer
Simmons and Aide Walker immediately ran to his cell block to assist him. When Simmons and
Walker arrived at the cell, they were unsuccessful in their attempts to untie the ligature.
Additionally, they were unable to open the ccll door because Bradich had tied the ligature in such
a way which prevented them from doing so. ‘The evidence also shows that either Simmons or
Walker then ran to the kitchen to get a knife. When one of these Defendants returned with the knife,
both Defendants individually attempted to cut the ligature. At some point while this was occurring,
Captain Hilbring entered the lockup, Simmons eventually cut Bradich frec from his ligature and

removed it from his neck. The evidence also shows that Walker ran to the front desk to summon an

14


Bradich is unfounded. Plaintiff misconstrues the evidence as a statement meaning that Simmons
gave Bradich cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (“C.P.R."). However, Captain Hilbring told
investigators that Officer Simmons attempted to revive Bradich after he was released from his
ligature. This is consistent with Simmons and Walker’s testimony that Simmons slapped and yelled
at Bradich in an effort to revive him. Furthermore, the fact that each Defendant could not remember
exactly what happened or exactly what time these traumatic events occurred is not material. What
is material is that each Defendant’s account of the incident shows that these officials worked
diligently to free Melvin Bradich from his ligature and to summon medical assistance.

Therefore, the Estate has failed to show that Captain Hilbring, Officer Simmons or Detention
Aide Walker were deliberately indifferent to Melvin Bradich’s serious medical needs after
discovering him hanging in his cell. Absent such showing, the court need not consider the second
prong of these individual Defendants’ qualified immunity defense. See Boncher v. Brown County,
272 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2001). As a result, Hilbring, Simmons and Walker are entitled to
summary judgment on the Estate’s § 1983 claims.
C. The Estate’ Claims against the City of Chicago

To prevail against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “‘deliberate action

attributable to the municipality directly caused the deprivation of federal rights.’” Erake v. City of
Chicago, 210 F.3d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v, Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 415 (1997)). When the plaintiff's claims against the municipality are premised only on the fact

that the municipality’s policies and practices caused the individual defendants to violate the

plaintiff's Constitutional rights, and the court determines that no such violation has occurred, there

16



I, INTRODUCTION

On October 23, 1999, Melvin Bradich was arrested by members of the Chicago Police
Department (“Police Department”). Shortly after his arrest, Bradich committed suicide in the Police
Department's 4th District lockup.

On October 19, 2000, Melvin’s mother, Delores Bradich, filed a Complaint as Administrator
of Melvin’s Estate (the “Estate”) in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, against the City of
Chicago (“City”) and several individual members of the Police Department. The Estate’s Complaint
alleged, among other things, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 21, 2000, Defendant
City removed the Estate’s Complaint to this court. On October 11, 2002, afler two years of
discovery, the Estate filed its Second Amended Complaint once again alleging, among other things,
violations of 42 U.S.C, § 1983. Essentially, the Estate alleges that both the City and the individual
Defendants violated Melvin Bradich’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by acting with
deliberate indifference to his health and well-being while he was in the Police Department’s custody.

TL. UNDISPUTED FACTS?

Prior to October 23, 1999, Bradich, who had a history of alcohol and drug abuse, had becn
arrested twenty-three times by members of the Chicago Police Department. There is no record of
Bradich ever attempting suicide during any of these arrests, or that family members or anyone else
advised appropriate law enforcement officials that there was a risk of suicide.

On October 23, 1999, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Police Officers John Hroma and James

Baker observed Bradich on the street at 11144 S. Greenbay Ave., in Chicago, Illinois. Afler

?The undisputed facts are taken from the Parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements, All
disputed facts are noted in text and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
See Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140, 144 (7th Cir. 1995),

2


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DELORES BRADICII, on her own behalf,

as survivor of MELVIN BRADICH, deceased,
n and as Administrator of the Estate of MELVIN

BRADICH,

DOCKETED

FEB 19 2004
Plaintiff, Case No. 00 C 7998

Vv

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
. ) Honorable Charles R. Norgle
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal 5)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

corporation, CAPTAIN DONALD HILBRING,
DETECTIVE JOHN HROMA, DETECTIVE
JAMES BAKER, POLICE OFFICER RONALD
SIMMONS, and DETENTION AIDE CRAIG
WALKER,

Defendants,

OPINION AND ORDER
Charles R, Norgle, District Judge.
Before the Court are Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment! and Plaintiffs Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, all brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the
following reasons, Defendants’ motions are granted in part and denied in part; Plaintiff's motion is

denied as moot.

‘The individual Defendants have collectively filed their Motion for Summary Judgment,
while the City of Chicago has filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment. The court addresses
both of these motions in this order.

[(O2.



asserts that the decedent was clearly intoxicated, incoherent, physically incapacitated and distressed
upon artival to the lockup. See id, at 21-22. The court has already determined that the evidence in
this case only shows at most that the decedent was intoxicated and incoherent at the time he entered
the lockup.’ Sec Part IIT.B.1.(a). This is not enough to show a known risk of suicide. See Hocker,
22 F.3d at 1000, However, even if the court were to assume that everything the Estate argues here
is true, it still is not enough to infer knowledge of the decedent’s significant risk of suicide to Officer
Simmons or Aide Walker. Absent a showing of a history of suicide attempts or any indication that
Melvin Bradich was suicidal on the day of his arrest, knowledge of such a risk cannot be inferred

from the circumstances. See Camic, 712 F.2d at 1146; see also Brooks, 1992 WL 373034, at *4.

Similarly, the Estate focuses on evidence which it claims shows that Simmons and Walker
altered evidence and gave inconsistent versions of the cvents to support its claim that these
individuals had knowledge of Bradich’s substantial risk of suicide. See Pl.’s Resp, to Individual
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ, J., at 22-24. The court need not determine whether the evidence supports
these claims because, even if true, these acts do not show that these Defendants had knowledge of
Bradich’s substantial risk of suicide. Sce Mathis, 120 F.3d at 91 (emphasizing that violations of
departmental procedures are not enough to show a subjectively known risk of suicide), At most this
evidence, if true, shows that Simmons and Walker were attempting to hide some wrongdoing on
their part. However, it does not show that they knew Bradich was a substantial suicide risk prior to

placing him in his cell. See Brooks, 1992 WL 373034, at 4 (stating that even if the defendants

“Although the evidence shows that Simmons stated that Bradich was “incoherent” when
he entered the lockup, the evidence also supports the fact that Bradich had the capacity to ask
Officer Simmons a question regarding the nature of his charges and to answer his other
questions. See Individual Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C, at 43; see also Pl.’s Resp. to
Individual Defs.’ Mot. for Summ, J., Ex. 9, at 3.

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ambulance. At some point prior to the arrival of the Firefighters, Captain Hilbring confirmed that
an ambulance was summoned.

The Estate’s contention that the evidence shows it only took the Defendants “seconds to free
the Decedent from his ligature . , .” is not supported by the record. Rather, the evidence shows that
the Defendants worked diligently to free Bradich from his ligature, an effort that (ook numerous
attempts and undoubtedly much more time than a few seconds.

Moreover, although the Estate argues that there was an inexplicable nine minute delay in
summoning medical assistance, see Second Am. Compl. § 72, it does not deny that these times are
at best estimates, Although the paramedics believe they received the assignment at approximately
6:25 p.m., the Estate offers little evidence to show that help was not summoned prior to that time.
There is no evidence showing that the call was dispatched immediately after it was reccived at the
call center. Additionally, paramedic Donna Parrott testified that she relies on several clocks when
working in the ambulance, and that her watch is set about three minutes ahead of the dispatcher’s
clock. See City of Chicago LR $6.1, Ex. E, at 23. However, even when construing these facts in
the light most favorable to the Estate, there is still no evidence that shows any of these Defendants
intended for Bradich to die or suffer grievously or were indifferent to his serious medical need. See
Salazar, 940 F2d. at 238.

Plaintiff s arguments based on evidence tampering and cover-ups also fail to raise a genuine
issue of material fact, They are either irrelevant to our inquiry or unsupported by the record. For
example, whether the decedent used his shirt, shoelaces or belt. as a ligature is irrelevant to this issue
of whether the Defendants provided Bradich with prompt medical assistance. Also, the Estate’s

claim that Captain Hilbring lied to investigators about Simmons using life saving techniques on

15