No. 2-- 06--0879 Fil ed: 10-24-07

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ TH E B IG ELO W GRO UP , I NC. , B IG ELO W- ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court AU ROR A, L LC, J OHN P RUSK

O, DA RREN ) o f Ka ne Co un t y. J. FINNEGAN an

d APRIL K . FINNEGAN, ) MICHAEL PF ILE and HEATHER SPRING, ) MICH AEL HA MMO ND an d K IRSTEN ) HA MMO ND, VER DIE SA MK O, PETER ) N. ROS CH, A

NGEL A K OK KIN OS, K

RISTI ) STONE a nd R YA N STONE, DEK

AL VIN ) EPPS an d CHA RLEN E EPPS, MI CHA

EL ) SAN DERS a nd J AN A B LUM BERG , KEITH ) P. CAMPB ELL and NI COLE CAMPBE LL, ) BRYAN and J. SIROTA, NICK MARASCO ) and L AURE N MARAS CO, and S HE RMAN ) CARTER and MARSHA CA RTER, )

) Plai ntif fs-Appel lan ts, )

) v. ) No. 04-- MR--488 ) DA VID J . RICK

ERT, K ane Coun ty C oll ector, ) Ho no r ab le ) Mic ha el J
. Co lwe ll, Defe ndan t-Appell ee. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CEO' MA

LL EY de l i v er ed th e op i ni on of th e c our t:No. 2-- 06--0879

1 Bi gel ow-Aurora, LLC, Jo hn Pr usk o, Dar re n J . and Ap ril K. Finnega n, Micha el Pfile and Heather Sprin g, Mich ael and K irsten Ham mond, Verdie Sam

ko, Pet er N. Rosch, Angela Kokkin os, Kr ist i an d R yan S t o ne , De ka lvin and C harl ene Epps, Mi chael Sande rs an d Jan a Bl um berg, K ei th P. and Nic o le C amp be ll, B ryan a nd J. Sir o t a, Nic k and L aur en Ma ra sco , a nd S her man and M ar sha Carter. -2- Plai ntif fs, the B i gel

ow Group, In

c. (Bi gel ow), et al. , 1 t imely

appe al the tri al cou rt' s dec i si on to grant summary

judgm ent in f avor o f def

endant, Kane County Collecto r David J. Ri cker t, on plaint iff 's compl ai nt, whi ch sough

t an injunc ti on a

gai ns t de f en da nt' s p racti ceof

ref us i ng to al l ow pr op er t y tax p ayment byspecifi cation an d a declaration that defen dant's ref usal to acceptpayment by sp ec i f i ca ti on violated t he Proper ty Tax Code (Co de) (35 I LCS 200/1 et seq. (West 2004)), the due pro cess cl auses of the U

ni ted St ates and Il

l i n oi s C on sti

tuti on s (U. S. C on st. , a

men d. X IV ; Il l . C on st. 1970, art. I, §2) , a nd

t he eq ual pr ot ect ion g uar ant ees of t he Unit ed S t at es a nd I lli nois C ons t itu t ions ( U. S. Co nst . , ame nd
. XI V; I ll. C o nst . 19 70 , ar t . I , §2 )
. Fo r t he r ea so ns t ha t fo llo w, we affir m. Tho ugh t he pa rt ies' cr os s-mo t ions for summary judg ment include t ra nscr ipt s o f dep os itio ns f rom o ffic i al s i

nv olv ed i n the tax ass essmen

t and col l ection proce ss a s we l l as othe r docum en tary evi dence, the part ies do not co ntest the relev ant facts. Accordingl

y, onl y a bri ef recitation of tho se f ac ts i s n ec es sa ry f oran understandi

ng of the issues presen

ted in thi s appeal . Bigel

ow, a housebuilde

r that so ld ho mes t o t he ind ivi du al pl ai n ti f f s, wa s i n th e p ra cti

ce of di v i di n g i ts d ev el opm en ts i n to several l ots (e ac h of

which r ece ived it s o wn pr op er t y index number (P IN ) fro m the Au r o r a T o wn ship
ass ess or), dividingthose lot s into subp ar cels, building a ho me on e ach s ubpa rc el, a nd t hen se lli ng t he
su bp ar ce ls t o it s cu st omer s. T he as sess or wo uld as sign an ind ivid ual PIN to ea ch su bp arc el upon re co rd ing i ts c onv ey an ce . The cus tomers

wou l d l ater pa y the f ul l yea r' s p rop er t y tax b ill fo rt he irNo. 2-- 06--0879

-3-

re spe ct ivesubp ar cel, bu t, a t th e c l osi n g of th e s al e of each su b pa rc el, B i ge l ow w oul

d g i v e i ts cu st o mer s a cr ed it fo rt he po r t io n o f t he yea rBig elo w h ad o wn ed t he pr o pe r t y. In Kan e County, if a parce l i

s di vi ded after Septemb er 10 of

a g i ve n y ea r, the n ew PIN s f or t he div ide d p ar ce ls d o no t be co me e ffec t ive fo rt ax at io n p ur po se s u nt il t he nex t asse ssm en t ye ar. Norm ally, t hen, si

nce sub parcel s sold b

y B ige low af

ter Sept em

ber 10 would n

ot be ass ign

ed in div idua l PI Ns ( and, inste ad, t he lot co nt aining all of t he sub parce l s woul

d rem ai n un der one PIN), Bi gel ow, as owner of the lot, would h av e b een re qui re d to p ay

th e y ea r' s ta x es f or th e en ti rel ot, including t ax es fo ran y alr ea dy-s ol d su bpar cels w ithin t he lot . I n pr eviou s year s, d efenda nt ac com m oda ted Bi ge l owby al lowi ng tax pay men t by spe ci f i cation, a procedur

e by whi ch taxp ay ers wh o own se pa ra te p orti on s of a l arger p rop er

ty (with a s in

gle PIN) may

specify their i ndi vi dual tax l i ab i l i ty f orthei r porti ons of

the p arce l

and pay thei r taxe s se parate l y . Howev

er, in 200 4, defend ant stopped acc ept ing

pay me nt by specifi cation. (In hi

s deposition, which was a tt ached t o d efenda nt 's
m oti on for summary judg ment, defend ant st at ed t hat Bigelo w wa s t he only taxpay er that requested
orus ed pa y men t b y sp ec i f i ca ti on pri or to h i s dec i si on to stop acc epti

ng i t.) Thus, i

n 2004 an d 2005, for any subp ar cels Bige low s old aft er Sep t ember 1 0 o f the pr eviou s year , d efenda nt sent Bi gel ow a bill for t axes on t he und ivided lo t s co nt aining t he su bp arc els. B i ge l ow t hen co llecte d t axes fro m the hom eowners i n ord er to satisf y the tax liabilit y o n t he pr o pe r t y, b ut it did so o nly aft er se ve r al p ar ce ls
were pl ac ed i n a ta x sa l e d ue to th ei r ta x de li n qu en cy an d a f te r i n ter es t and p enalt ies o n t he delin quency had b een i

ncurred. Pla int iffs fil

ed a co mplaintse ek

i n g to re cov

er th ei r i n terest an d p en al ty da mag es an d al so t o requi re d efen da nt to a cc ep t pa y men t by sp ec i f i ca ti on, bu t, af ter b oth p arti

esf i l ed moti ons f orNo. 2-- 06--0879

-4-

sum mary j udg men t, th e tri al cou rt en tere d sum mary j udg men t i n f av orof d efenda nt . Aft er t he trial court deni

ed thei r motion to reconsider, pl ai ntif fs tim el y a ppeal ed. All of pla in tif fs ' appel la te arguments are di

rected at the p ropr

i ety of the tri al cou rt' s dec i si on to grant sum

ma ry judgme

nt in fav or o f def endan t. "Summ

ary j udgmen

t is proper where, when viewed in the l

igh t most fav

orable to the nonmovi

ng party, t he pl eadings, depositions, admi ssions, and af f i dav i ts on f i l e rev eal that the re is no genui ne issue as to any

ma terial fact and t hat t he moving pa rty i s e n ti tl ed to a j udgm

en t as a m atter of l aw." Nort hern Il

li nois Emergen cy Phy si ci ans v . Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd. , 216 Ill . 2d 294, 305 (2005). "The fun ction of a rev

ie win g court on appeal f rom a g ra n t of su m mar y j udgm en t i s l i m i ted to deter m i n i n g w h eth er th e t r ial co ur t co rr ec t ly concl uded that no genui

ne i ssue of m

aterial fact was ra ised a nd, if none w as r aised , w het her judg ment as a matter o f l

aw was cor rectly entered." Am erica n Fam il y M utual Ins uranceCo. v. Page , 366 I ll. App. 3d 11 12 , 11 15 ( 20 06 )
. T he pr o pr iet y o f at r ial c o ur t 's de cis io n t o gr an t su mmar y judgm en t presents a question of law, which we rev ie w de no vo . Page , 366 Ill . App. 3d at 1115. At the outset , we n ote th

at def en da n t dev otes a c on si dera b l e p orti on of h i s a pp el l ate b rief to t he argu men t th at, regardless o f t he mer it s o f pla int iffs' co nt en t io ns, we sho uld no t co nsid er t he m, because pla

in tif fs did n ot follow theprop er p roc edure under the Code f or t ax obj ections. See 35 ILCS 200/23--5 (West 2004) (o utli ni ng procedure for pay

me nt of taxes un

der prot es t )
. Pla int iffs
res pon d that th i s p roce dur

e doesnot a

ppl y , b ec au se

the y are not obje cting to eithe

rthe i m pos i ti on orthe a m ount of taxe s b ut rather t o de f

en da nt' s m eth od of col l ec ti ng taxes . How ever, wedo n ot reach t his issue, beca use , a s discu ssed below , e ven as suming t his ac ti on to b e a prop er v eh i cl e f or plai ntif fs' complai nt, we r eject plai

ntif fs' arguments on their meri

ts.No. 2-- 06--0879

-5-

Plai ntif fs' first ar gument is tha t defend ant 's refusa l to all ow paym ent by specifi cation v iolates his dut ies und er t he Co de
. Pla int iffs c o nt en d t ha t de fen da nt 's " ut t er r efu sa l t o ac t ev en o n r ea so na ble request s" is

an "abdi cation of hi s duties" under the Code, because it consti tut es hi s f ai lure to make
a policy to review requests for pay me nt by specifi cation. Bef

ore deter mi

ni ng whet her

defend ant 's act ions violat e t he Co de a s plaint iff s co nt end, we no t e o ur disag re ement wi th th ei r ch ara cteri za ti on of t he fact s. D efenda nt do es, in fact , ha ve a p olicy re gar ding payment by sp ec i f i ca ti on: he doe s n ot al l owit i n an y i nstance. The

refore, defen

dant is not "refus[i

ng] to act " on pl aintif

fs ' requ es ts f

or payment by

spe ci f i cation; rathe

r, he i s deny i ng th ei r reque sts. Likew ise, d efenda nt 's policy is not, as pla int iffs contend, a "ref

usa l to exe r cis e h is d isc r et io n. " D efe nd an t 's p o licy is an ex er cis e o f his discr et ion; t he p o licy simply lea ds t o a r es ult pla int iffs do no t fav o r . T he qu es t io n p r es en t ed he r e is whether this poli cy v iolates the Co de. Th at que st ion t ur ns o n ou r int er pr et at ion o f the re levant provisi on of the Code. Section 20–210 of the Code, which governs paym ent by speci

fi cation, pro vides as foll

ows: "Taxes pay abl e i n i nstallm ents; pay me nt under spec if ication. Except as o therwise pr ovid ed in S ect ion 2 1- -3 0, cur re nt taxes sh al l b e pay abl e i n 2 equal in stall me nts. *** The col l ec tormay rece ive ta xes o n par t of a ny pro per t y charg ed w ith t axes when a particul

ar sp ec i f i ca ti on of the part is f

urni shed. If t he t ax o n t he r emainder of t he pr op er t y remains unpai d, the c oll

ector sh al l en ter that spec i f

i ca ti on i n h i s or he r return, so th

at the p art on whi ch t he t ax r ema ins u np aid may be cle ar ly kn o wn . T he t ax may be pa id on an un div ide d shareof property . In

tha t ca se , th e c ol l ec tor sh

al l de si gnateon h

i s or her recor d upon whose undi vi ded share the tax h

as been pai d." (Emphasi s added.) 35 IL CS 200/20- -210 (West 2004)
.No. 2-- 06--0879

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The car dinal ru le of st at ut or y inter pr et at ion is t o a sce rt ain and g iveef f ec t to t he legislat ive i n ten t, a nd th e b est i ndi cation of the l egi slati ve i nten t is the l anguag e us ed i

n the statute. In re A ppl i ca ti on of t he County Treasurer , 3 51 I ll. App. 3d 2 44, 248 (2 004 ). A co ur t must give statutory la nguageits pl

ai n an d ordinary

me ani ng, and a c ourt cann

ot read li mi tations or co nd it io ns

i nto a sta tute wh en none are ex pres sed
. In re Appl

ic ation of the C ounty Treasurer , 351 Ill . App. 3d at 248. "W here the la

nguage is unam

bi guous, t he statute must be gi ven eff ect wi th out res ort to ot her ai

ds of constr uction." Krautsack v. A nd ers on , 223 Il

l . 2d 541 , 553 (2 006). Th e word "ma y" o r din ar ily connotes di scre

tion
. Krautsack , 223 Ill . 2dat 554. Though plai ntif fs criticize defen

dant's rel ia nce on the " mere f

act the statute sa

y s ' may rece i ve ,' " they

do not con

test that the ab ove statutory la nguageunam

bi guously confers to coll ectors t he di scretion to all ow o r r efuse payment by spe cificatio n. Accordin

gly , based on the pl

ai n l anguage of

section 20--210, we concl ude that
co llecto rs ha ve disc re t ion unde r t he Co de t o a cce pt or deny pa yment by spe cificatio n. Furth er, ev en if t he ab o ve st at ut o ry lang ua ge we r e a mbig uo us , an d w e w er e fo r ce d t o co nsu lt
ex t r insic aid s t o co nst ruc t io n su ch as leg isla t ive hist o ry and de ba t e, we wo uld reach th e s am e r es ul t. See Adv in cul a v. Uni

ted Blood Servic es , 176 Il l. 2d 1, 19 ( 19 96 ) ( "V alu ab le c o nst ruc t io n a ids in i nterpreti ng a n a m bi guous s tatute are the provi sion' s legi slati ve history and deb ates" ). Reg ar ding the l

egi slati ve history , "[w ]he re t he legislat ur e has made a mate rial chang e in a statut e, *** t he presumption i s that 't he am endm ent was intended to c hange the l aw.' " Boa rd of Trustees of South

ern Il l i n oi s U n i v er si ty v . D ep ar tmen t of Hu man Ri gh ts , 159 Il l . 2d 206 , 213 (1 994), quo t ing Stat e of Illi

nois , Secretary of State v. Mikus ch , 13 8 I ll. 2d 2 42, 252(19 90) . Se cti on 20--210
was am ended, ef fecti ve Jul y 24, 2003 (Pub. A

ct 93- -3 66 , § 5, eff

. Ju ly 24, 2 003 ). Pr ior t o t he
am en dm en t, the statute provi

ded that "[t]h e col

l ector sha ll

re ceive t axe s on p art of an y pr opertyNo. 2-- 06--0879

2 Defend ant testi f

i ed i n h i s dep osi

ti on th at the deci sion t o s t op allowing p ayment by sp ec i f i ca ti on wa s a re ac ti on to thi s statu

tory am en dm en t. -7- ch ar ge d w it h t ax es wh en a p ar t icu lar sp ec ifica t io n o f t he pa r t is furni shed." (Emphasi s added.) 35 ILCS 200/20--210 (West 2002). With Pub li c Act 93--366, the legisla tur e r ev i se d th e statu te to provide, as quote d a

bov e, th at " [t]h e c ol l ec tor ma

y re ce i v e ta x es on pa rt of an y pr ope rty ch arge d w i th taxes when

a particul ar spe ci f i cation of the p art i s f

urni shed." (Em

phasi s ad ded.) 35 IL CS 20 0/20-- 210 (W est 200 4). 2 W e m

us t pr es um e th at th e l eg i sl atu resu b sti tute d th e l an gu ag e i n di ca ti n g th at a col l ec tor"m ay re ce i v e" pa y men t b y sp ec i f i ca ti on to ef f ec t a ch an gef rom the pri or law tha t a c ol l ec tor "s ha ll r ec eiv e" pa yment by sp ec ifica t io n. E sp ec ially gi ven that the word"shal

l" is comm only deem ed
mandatory

( e.g. , Esmail v. D epa rt ment of Revenue , 37 1 I ll. A pp . 3d 77 8, 78 1 ( 20 07 ) ) an d " may" is ge ne r ally de eme d d isc r et io na ry, w e p r es ume that the chan ge th e legi slature i

nten ded w as to con

vert t he ac ce pta n ce of pa y men t b y sp ec i f i ca ti on f rom a m an da tory du ty to a di scretionary

deci si on when it ena cted the current versi on of secti on 20--210. T he leg isla t ive de ba t e s ur r o un din g P ub lic Act 93--366 suppor ts o ur view. Senator Jacobs, t he spo nso r o f the bill

t hat led t o t he abo ve amend ment, des cr ibed t he bill as follows just befo re t he Senate voted to pass i

t into law: "[ T his bill ] is an i ni tiative of the Ill

in ois County Treasu rers' As sociation. The bi ll resolves pr oblems e nco unt er ed bycoun ty tre asu rerswh en , f or a n ex am pl e, a p rop er

ty own er gr an ts
an in terest in a property and the n presents thatspe cificatio n t o t he t re asu re r a nd r equ est s t he pr ope rty t ax bill b e b r o ke n u p a mo ng st all t ho se wit h in t er es t in t he pr o pe r t y. Cu rr en t ly a
cou n ty treasurer must allocate the t ax bil l a mongs t t he i nterest-holders. Thi s pl aces an administr at ive bur den o n so me of t hos e municipalities in pre par ing multiple t ax bills for t heNo. 2-- 06--0879

-8-

sam e propert y, an

d this wil l l eave i t t o a decisi

on of the county treasurer's dis cretion." 93d Il l . Gen . As sem., Senate Proce edi ngs , May 6, 2003 , at 178 (statem

en ts of S enator Jac obs)
. Based on t he abo ve, we c onc lude t hat sec t ion 2 0- -2 10 o f the Code gr an ts coll ectors di screti

on as to wh ethe r to al l ow pay

men t by spe ci f i cation. Thus, a poli

cy of ref usi ng such pa yment is not by itsel f a v iolation of a col

le ctor 's duti es under the statute. Plai ntif fs' sec ond ar gument on a ppe al is tha t defend ant 's po licy of refus ing t o a cce pt payment by specifi cation consti

tut es an abu se o f his official discre t ion, just ify ingjudi ci al in tervention. Bas ed
on t hei r premi se t ha

t cou rts m ay ove rtur n a n of f i ci al de ci si on w he re i t con sti tutes an ab us e of discr et ion, plaint iff

s t hen co nt est t he val

idi ty of se veral of def endan t's j ustif ic ations f or his pol ic y of
re fusing pa yment by sp ec ifica t io n, an d t he y u rg e us t o r ever se d efenda nt 's de cision ba sed on t he purport ed fl aws i n def endan t's rational

e. We decl

in e to do so. For t he reasons we di scuss b el ow, add re ssing plai

ntif fs' ar gument s o n t he validity o f defend ant 's re aso ningwou l d ta ke usdow n a p ath
we ca nno t , an d s ho uld no t , t r av el. I ll ino is la w, as i t is com monl y e xpressed, gi

ves s uperfi ci al credence to plai

ntif fs ' proposed app ro ach. A ty

pi cal cas e, Arno ld v. E ngelbr echt , 164 Ill. App . 3 d 70 4 ( 198 7) , d esc ribes t he judi ciary 's role i n reviewin

g offi cial decisi ons as foll

ows: "N o r mall y, dis cretionary

acts of a publ

ic off ic ia l i n exercis in

g hi s duties

are not subj ect to re view by

t he judiciar y in an injunct ion ac t ion. An exception to this rule arises in a case wh en th e pub l i c of

f i ci al ' s a cts ar e ar bitr ar y and ca pr icious and he t hus a buse s his discr et ion. [Ci tation .] Ad dit io na lly, inju nc t ive r elie f will lie t o co nt r o l dis cr et io na ry ac t io ns o f pu blic offi cials if fraud, cor rupt ion or gro ss in justice i s shown." Ar no ld , 164 Ill . App. 3d at 707.No. 2-- 06--0879

-9-

See a l so, e.g. , Lo ca l 18 94 v. Ho lsa pp le , 201 Ill . App. 3d 1040, 10 49 ( 19 90 ) ( "I nju nc t ive r elie f will be granted

when a p ub l i c of

f i ci al 's ac ts a re a rb i trar y an d c ap rici ousan d he a bu se s h i s d i screti on, or if fraud , co rr upt ion, o r gr oss inj ust ice are show n to under lie his discret ionary act ions") ; I llino is Fe de rati on of Te ach ers v . Board

of Trustees , 191 Ill . App. 3d 769, 773 (19 89)(discreti ona ry ac ts of pu blic o fficia ls reviewabl

e onl y i f un la wful or if "the publ ic off ic ia l' s acts are arbi

trary and capri

ci ous and he thu s a bu se s h i s d i screti on or i f f rau d, c orru ption, orgr os s injust ice und er lyi ng the d i scre tion ary act is s ho wn ")
. He r e, pla int iffs d o no t as se r t t he pr es en ce o f fr au d, co rrup t io n, or g ross in jus tice; rathe r, t he y co nt en d t ha t de fen da nt 's p o licy is ar bit r ar y and ca pr icio us be ca us e h is reasons f or implementing i

t are un sou nd . W e there f

ore f ocu s ou r i nq ui ry on t he meaning o f the phr

ase "arb i trary
an d c ap rici ous " i n th i s c on tex t. I nit iall y, we mus t diffe r en t iat e b et we en t wo t ype s o f jud icia l re vie w: jud icia l re vie w o f a q ua sijudi ci al ad m i n i strati v e act, and j udicial

revi ew of a di scre tion ary off i cial act. Tho ugh c ase s re viewing
ac ts of off ic ia l di scretion often i

ntermi ngle the standards f

or both (s ee, e.g. , Dorfm

an v . Gerber , 29 I ll. 2d 19 1, 19 6 ( 19 63 ) ( invo king bo t h st and ar ds in re view ing a n ac t o f o ffi cia l dis cr et io n)) , t he dif feren ce is critical
. Mo st administr at ive discr et ion in qu asi-jud icial act s is t emper ed by t he
con strai n ts of j udic ia

l rev ie w(see 735 ILCS 5/3--101 et seq. (West 2006) (Adm in is trat iv e Revi ew Law )), und er wh i ch a court m ay reverse an agen cy determ i na tion wh ere, int er alia , its f

actual f in din gs areagai nst the manife st weigh

t o f the ev

ide nce ( e.g. , Ci

ty of Be l vi de re v . Il l i noi s S tateLa

bor Relat ions Board , 181 Ill . 2d 191, 205 (1998)). However, here, pl ai n tif fs do not appeal

from an administr at ivede term

i na ti on pursuant to an adjudi catory proceedin

g; rather, they

chal le nge defend ant 's pure appli

cation of of

fi ci al dis cretion. Thus , we f

oc us o ur inquiry o n t he issue of t he ext ent of j udi ci al rev i ew of a p ure l y di screti ona ry of f i ci al de ci si on, an d n ot on the is sue of t he ext entNo. 2-- 06--0879

-10-

of jud icia l r evi ew of

an adj udicatory

agen cy determ i na tion . See R . Li

nc oln, Exe cut ive Dec isionmaking by

Local L egi sl atures in

Florida: Justi ce, Judi ci al

Review & t he Nee d fo r Le gislat ive Ref orm , 25 Stet son L. Rev. 627, 671 (1996) (dis tingui shi ng be tween origi

nal actions agai

n st a n off i cial and j udicial

revi ew of

quas i -j udi

cial ex ecuti ve action) (h

erei naf ter, Li nc oln ). We t ra ce t he "a rbit ra ry and cap ricio us" langua ge in t he ab o ve ca se s t o o ur su pr eme co ur t 's de ci si on in People ex

rel. W oll v. Graber , 39 4 I ll. 3 62 ( 19 46 )
. As t he su pr eme co ur t st at ed in Graber : "The ge ne r al d o ct r ine is w ell e st ab lishe d t ha t an o ffice rt o wh o m pu blic d ut ie s ar e confi ded b y l aw i s n ot s ub j ec t to t he co nt ro l of t he co ur t s in the exer cise o f the judg ment a nd di scre ti onwhi ch the law giv es t o him as a p ar t o f his o fficia l fun ct io ns; t he r ea so n fo rt his being that t he l

aw r eposes thi s di scretion in h im for that occasion and not in the court s. [Ci tations.] Wh

ere a sta tute gi ve s a di screti ona ry pow er to a

n of f i cer, u pon hi s ow n op i ni on of certai n f ac ts, i t i s a sou nd rul e of con stru cti on tha t he i s th e s ol e a nd excl us i ve j udg e of t he
ex is tence of t hos e fact s. [ Cita t ions. ] T he co ur t s ar e ca re ful of enc ro aching u po n t he di scre tion ary po wer of a public o ffi

cer , a nd if rea so nable do ubt ex i sts as to the que sti on of di screti on or want of it , t he co ur t s will hesita t e t o int er fere , p re ferr ing ra t her t o e xt end t he be ne fit of t he doub t in

f av or of th e of

f i cer. [ Cita t ion. ] T he co ur t s do not sit in judg ment upon questions of

adm i nistrati ve di scre tion . A court cann

ot substi tut e i ts discretion for that of ex ecuti ve off i cers in matters belongin

g to the pro per jurisdi

ction of the officers. [Ci

tation .] It cannot, u nder the guise of exerti ng j udic ia l power, assum

e to exercise the di

scretion wh

ic h t he peopl e, ac tin g through thei r repre sen tativ es i n C ongre ss, h

av e lodged i

n adm i nistra ti ve o ffi cers a n d agen

ts. The p owe

rsof gov er n men t, b oth Na ti on al an d S tate , a redi v i de d i n to three depa

rtme nts]- -l egi slati

ve , ex ec uti

ve an d ju dic ial. Ne it he ro f t he se de pa r t men t s isNo. 2-- 06--0879

-11-

su b ordi n ate to or ca n ass um e overl ords hi p of ei ther of the othe rs. The dom

ai n of the j udiciary is in t he field o f t he ad minist r at io n of j ustice unde r t he law. It inter pr et s, c ons t ru es a nd applie s the la

w, but it d oe s no t inter fere wit h t he co nduc t of g ove rnment by en teri ng i nto a field of c onf

l i ct f or the con

tro l of exec ut ive di screti on b y j udi ci al ac ti on. It doe s n

ot int er med dle wi

th th e e xe cu ti on of di screti ona ry pow ers ve ste d i n th e e xe cu ti ve or administr at iveoff

ic ers, in the absen

ce of ab use or arbitrary

or capricious exerci se of such power on the part of the offi cers." Graber , 394 Ill . at 370-71. Though m uc h of the ab ove excerpt l eadsusto be lieve t ha t co ur t s ma y no t , in a lmo st all circumstances, in

terfere wi th off ic ia l di scretion, the last quot ed sentenc e, which wo uld al low j udic ia

l in terference in casesof a rbit ra ry o r c apr icious use of o ffi cial po wer , se ems at first blush t o c ont ra vene most of the pri

nci ple s that precede it. Gi

ven this ap par ent co nt ra dict ion, we mus t foc us o n t he pri nc i plesun de rl y i ng j udi ci al rev i ew of of f i ci al di screti ona ry ac ti on t o d et er mine pre cisely what t he
su pr eme co ur t meant when it indicat ed, in the a bove co nt ext , t hat suc h act ion may be que st ioned by the judi ciary

where it is arb itrary or capricious. The po we ro f t he ju di cia ry t o review the di screti ona ry de ci si on a t i ss uehe re tu rn s on princi ple s o f sepa ra t ion o f the po wer s o f the t hre e br anche s o f go ver nment. Unde r t he I lli no i s Co nst itu t ion, "[t ]he le gis la tive, ex ecutive and j udic ia

l b ranche s ar e s ep ar at e" an d " [ n] o br an ch sha ll exercise powers proper ly

bel ongin g to another." Ill . Const. 1970, art . II, §1. The co ns ti tution provides th e l eg i sl atu re"th e ex cl us i v e p owe r to rais e reven

ue by l aw" (Ill . Cons

t. 1970, a rt. IX, §1), and the l eg i sl atu re, i n tu rn , i m pos ed on t he co unt y collect or t he po wer and du ty to co l l ec t property taxes as part of the propert y tax executi on schem

e (see 35 ILCS 200/ 20--5 ( West 2006)("[e]v

eryNo. 2-- 06--0879

-12-

*** col l ec tor ** * s ha

l l pre pa re ta x bi l l s" ); se e al so T o wn o f t he Cit y o f Pe o r ia v. O' Con nor , 85 I ll. 2d 195 , 197-2 07 (19 81) (de scri bi ng Property

Tax Code)). Wh eret he legislat ur e leave s a mat t er t o e xecu t ive discr et ion, whi ch, as di scussed

abo ve, t he l egi slature did h

ere when it adopted the amen

ded ve rs i on of se cti on 2 0-- 210

of the C ode, the

j udiciary ma y not i nterf erewith s uch di scretion un

der no r mal c irc ums t an ce s w it ho ut o ffen din g t he pr inc iple of separation of

powers. See People v . Sales , 19 5 I ll. App. 3d 160, 162 (1 990 ) ( t rial co ur t 's o rd er ing Secre tary of State t o exerci se di scretion i n a particul

ar way violated the s ep ar ation of powers doctri ne ); se e al so People v . City of Chi cago , 23 4 I ll . 416, 421 (1908), quo ting City o f Auro ra v. Sc ho eb er lein , 230 Ill . 496, 504 (1907) (judici al review of ev

ide nce i n i nve stigati ons of ci

vi l s ervice com m i ss i on " 'would be the exerci se of executi ve pow ers , wh

i ch the se pa rati on of depa rtm en ts of t he go ver nment precl

udes the c ourt from

ex ercisi ng' "); Unit ed S t at es v. Geo rg e S. Bus h & Co. , 310 U.S. 371, 380, 84 L. Ed. 12 59, 1262 -63, 6 0 S. Ct . 944, 946 (1 940 ) ( "Fo r t he judiciar y to pr obe t he
re aso ningwh ich un de r lie s [a n applic ation of adm in is trat iv e di scretion] would a

mount to a clear i nv as i on of t he legislative and exec ut ive domains"); In re A ppl i ca ti on of Tex asCo. , 27 F. Supp. 847, 850 (E.D . I ll. 193 9) ("T he exe cut ive official, in t he pr op er discha rg e o f his dut ies und er t he
constituti on, i s as i nde pen den t of the courts as he i s of the l egi slature" ). Though an act of off

ic ia l di scretion i s subj ect to some j udic ia l rev ie w, a court exerci si

ng such reviewm ust heed th

e l i ne sep arati ng th e power s of

the j udiciary

fro m the p ow er s o f the re maining branch es o f go ver nment . T he r o le o f t he j udi ciary is limi t ed t o c ons t ru ing t he co nst itu t ion and det er mini ng whet her its p ro visions ha ve bee n disre gar ded by any of t he br anche s o f go ver nment ( Rockv. Th om

ps on , 85 Ill . 2d410, 41 8 (198 1)) an d to in terpreti ng th e lawsof the state. It

stands to rea son , th en , th at a

cou rt sh oul d c onc ern i tse l f wi th d i screti ona ry ac ts of the othe r bran ch esofNo. 2-- 06--0879

-13-

go ver nment o nly wh er e s uc h a ct s ma y vio lat e t he law o r wh er e t he emp o we r ing leg isla t ive ac t ca lls f orsuch j udic ia

l review. It is i

n thi s context that the

ab ove -quoted

exce ption aris es to allow review of an o ffi cial act wher e it is a rbit ra ry o r c apr icious , o r w her e t her e is a sho wing of frau d, co rr upt ion, ille ga lit y, or gr os s injust ice. In t his co nt ext , it is po ssible t o r eco ncile the abo ve r efer ence t o t he "arb i trary or c ap rici

ous " stan da rd wi th th e p ri n ci pl e th at c our ts may not indepe ndent ly evaluat e t he factual ba sis fo ran ac t o f o fficia l dis cr et io n o nly i f the phra se " arb i

trary and capri ci ous" is in terpret ed
ve ry na rr o wly. The "arbi trary or caprici

ous" standard m

ust be appl

ie d in li gh t of th e lim ited purvi ew pr escri bed t he jud icia ry by t he se pa r at io n o f po we r s d o ct r ine
- - t he jud icia ry mus t limit it se lf t o infringing on off ic ia l di scretion onl

y w here that dis cretion can

be shown to have v

iolated the law. See In re A ppl i ca ti on of Tex asCo. , 27 F. Supp. at 850 ("T he judiciar y can o nly i nquir e whe t her t he means util iz ed in the execution of a power grantedar e fo rbidd en by the co nst itu t ion. It canno t go beyond t hat i nqu i ry wi thout i ntren chi ng u pon the dom

ai n of another de

partm en t of govern

men t"). T h e si tuat ions co mmonly recit ed a s allow ing judicial inte rfer ence wit h t he ap plicat ion o f official discre t ion-
-cases of ill

egality, fraud, or arbitrary

or capricious de cis io n ma kin g- - ca n a ll be s ee n t o fall wit hin t his sing le i nqu i ry into t he le gality

of the off ic ia l de ci si on. This

ide a i s m ost readil y a pparent when

applie d to the concept that o ff

ic ia l di scretion m

ay be overturned whe

re exerci sed

i l l egal l y (or, si m i l arl y , wh ere exerci sed f raudu l en tly ), bu t the "a rbi trary o rca pr icio us " s t an da r d in th i s c on tex t m ay also b e s een

to c on tem pl ate revi ew on

l y f or le gal i ty. Cf. A

ppl i ca ti on of Tex asCo. , 27 F. Su pp . at 85 0 ( if administr at iveoff

ic ia ls exerci se di scretion "i

n such an arbi trary or unjus

t and dis crim

in ating m ann er as cl ea rl y to de n y to individuals t heir [ co nst itu t ional r ight s], t he co ur t s may inter vene, and they ma y ho ld unc onsti tution al an y attem pt upon th

e part o f t he leg isla t ur e t o ve st in ad minist r at ive o fficia lsNo. 2-- 06--0879

-14-

a dis cr et io n t ha t is e ss en t ially a r bit r ar y in ch ar ac t er ")
. I nd ee d, if it were not interpretedin s uc h a wa y, and th e " ar

b i tra ry or c ap rici

ous " stan da rd werei n ste ad to b e i n ter pr ete d i n th i s c on tex t to re f er to a dec ision " 'no t sup po rt ed by fact s' " (Linco ln, 25 St et so n L. R ev. at 673 , q uo t ing Agrico Chem ic al Co. v. D epa rt ment of

En vi ron men tal Re gul ati on , 365 So. 2d

759 , 7 63 ( Fla. 1 978 )) , c ou rt s wo uld be forced t o en t er t ain br o ad , es se nt iall y de no vo , revi ew of acts of ex ecutive di scr etion to det er mine whether t he y w ere war ra nt ed by t he fact s. T his is pre cisely the t ype o f "inter meddl[ ing] w ith t he
execution of discretionary powers vested in the executiv e" ( Gr ab er , 3 94 I ll. at 370 -7 1) t hat t he
se pa rati on of powers doctr in

e di ctat es co urts must avoi d. Whateve r the phrase m

eans i n other context s, "a rb it ra ry o r c ap ric io us " a bus e o f exe cu t ive p o we r in t he c o nt ext o f re view o f o f fi ci al di screti on mus t be understood t o refer

on l y to i l l egal cond uct. A b se n t a b roader leg i sl

ati v e m an da te f orreview, it is thi s ty

pe of arbi trary off ic ia l de ci si on that t he j udic ia ry m ay overturn without i nf ri ngi ng on th e p ower of

the l eg i sl ati ve or th e e xe cu

ti ve br an ch of govern men t. (Th e i nte ns i ty of the j udi cial i nqu i ry wou l d h ei gh ten to the extent the l egi sl ature pro vi des f or more searchi

ng revi ew by, for exam

ple , enactin

g standards under wh

ic h the off ic ia l dis cretion m

ust be exerci

sed or making th e o fficia l de cis io n su bje ct t o t he Ad minist r at ive Re vie w L aw , be ca us e s uc h a pr o visio n w o uld simu lt an eo us ly

dec re ase t he o ffi

cial's discr et ion and demo nst ra t e legislat ive intent t o invo lve the j udi ciary i n the dec i sion). Wh en re viewing an

act of off i cial di scre tion f or abu se, wi

thout di rection f rom th e legi slature to e xam ine t he de ci si on m ore c l ose l y , a c ourt m

ay ove rtur n th e d ec i si on on l y where i t doe s n ot
com port wi th th e l aw b ec au se i t con tra v en es a statu te or con sti tution ( or doe s n

ot com por t wi th t he
re levant en

ab l i n g s tatu te ). Abs en

t som e ev i den ce

of i l l eg al i ty , a cou rt w i l l b e s atisf i ed th at an executi ve decisi on was not arb i

trary or capri cious, an d i t wi l l not i nqu i re f ur th er i n to th e p rop rietyNo. 2-- 06--0879

3 Here, our review is even

more l im ited (i f that i s possi

ble) than that wh i ch the s uprem e court descri bed in D.T. , be cau se w e do not have o ve r sig ht o f ap plic at io ns o f o fficia l dis cr et io n in t he sa me way we ha ve ove rs i gh t of l ower cou

rts' appl i ca ti ons of judi ci al discr et ion. The dis cu ss io n o f Greer bel ow il lus trat es thi s di ff

erence. -15- of t he re aso ning behind t he deci si on ( so l ong asthe rea son i ng an d de ci si on are not, themsel

ves, i l l egal ). In t his sens e, our supreme court's statement that abuse of dis cretion "i s the m

ost deferentia

l stan dard of revi ew--next to no review at

all " ( In re D.T. , 21 2 I ll. 2 d 3 47 , 35 6 ( 20 04 ) ) is p ar t icu lar ly ap t. 3 Our

view is co nsist ent wit h t he su pr eme co ur t 's de cision in Greer v . I lli nois H ou sing Deve lop ment A

uth ori ty , 122 Il l . 2d 462(1988 ). The

re, a gr oup of hom eowners l i vi ng n ear a propo sed developm

ent broug ht suit against

t he Housin

g Devel opmen t Authority on the ground that t he A uthori ty ha d v i ol ate d i ts d utiesby prov i di ng f un di ng f ora de velop ment f

or l ow i n com e te n an ts and had arb i

traril y changed i

ts poli cy . Greer , 122 Ill . 2d at 470-86. The Authority respo nded by arguin g, among other thi

ngs, that its decisi on was not subj ect to judi ci al revi ew. Greer , 122 Ill . 2d at 486. The suprem

e court, whi

ch was cal le d upon to review an

adm in is trat iv e deci si on (rather than an act of pure off

ic ia l dis cretion, as i s at iss

ue here), noted the disti

nction between

rev i ew ab i l i ty , or the area of j udic ia

l rev ie w, and standard of rev

ie w, or t he l

evel of j udic ia l i nvol vem ent in that area. Greer , 122 Ill . 2d at 495-96. The suprem e court began by

determi ni ng whether the agency de term i na ti on was revi ewab l e, w hich was a qu est ion o f sta t ut or y inter pr et at ion d irect ed a t t he que sti on of w hether the legi slature in

tended the type

of decision at i ssue to be re vi ewabl e. Greer , 122 I ll. 2 d a t 49 7. T ho ug h " it is c lea rt ha t mo st ag en cy a ct io ns a r e p r es ume d r ev iew ab le in the absen ceNo. 2-- 06--0879

-16-

of som e e xpres s statutor

y proh i bi ti on of re view, or at least in the ab senc e of la nguage wh

i ch com m i ts t he deci sion to unre

vi ewabl e age

ncy di scre ti o n," co ur t s must loo k t o s ever al fact or s t o d et er mine legislat iveintent i

n th i s reg ard. Greer , 122 Ill . 2d at 497, citing Ab bott Laboratories v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 14 1, 18 L . Ed. 2d 68 1, 687, 8 7 S. Ct. 150 7, 1511 (1967 ). "Whet her , a nd to wh at exten t,
a relev an t statute prec l

udes j udicial revi ew i s to be d

eterm i ne d by i ts ex pres s languag e, the

structure of the statutory s ch em

e, i ts obj ecti ve s, i ts l egi slati

ve history , an d t he nat ur e o f the administr at ive
ac ti on i nv olv ed." Greer , 122 Ill . 2d at 497-98, ci ting Bl ock v. Com m un i ty Nu tri ti on In sti tute , 467 U.S. 340, 345 , 81 L. Ed. 2d 270, 275-76, 104 S. Ct. 2450, 2453-54 (1984). "Of particul ar im port ance is whet her t he st at ut e c o nt ain s s t an da r ds , go als , o rcr it er iab y wh i ch a c our t m ay ev al ua te agency action." Greer , 122 Ill . 2d at 498, citing Ci tizen s to Preserve Overto n Park, Inc. v. Volpe , 401 U .S. 402, 4 10, 28 L . Ed. 2d 13 6, 150, 9 1 S. Ct. 814 , 820 (1 971). The express l

anguage an

d le gis la tive h is to ry b ehi nd section 20 --2 10 of

th e C ode ar e b oth dis cussed ab ov e, an

d th ey i n di ca te t he le gis lat ur e's int ent t o lea ve t o t he d iscr et io n o f aco llecto r t he de ci si on as to whether to accept pa ym ent by speci

fi cation. The Co de pro vides no standard s, goa ls,
orcr iter ia by

wh ich t o ev alu at e a co llec t o r 's d ec isio n in t his r eg ar d. Fu r t he r , t his is not th e ty peof agency det er minatio n re viewed in Greer ; ra t he r, t he issue in this ca se is r eview o f an o ffi cial's di scre tion ary deci si on as to how t o perform hi s dutie s. We

conc l ude, then , that, un

der Greer , defen dant's appl

ic ation of discretion h

ere is not reviewa

ble for the purpose of determi ni ng whether his pur po rt ed r eas oning is sound or wise. Of

course, as noted above, even w here the l egi sl ature does
n ot prov i de

f or a n y j udi ci al re v i ew , c our

ts m us t i n terce de i n ca se s of i l l eg al i ty . Though t he ab o ve co nc ep t io n o f jud icia l re vie w o f o fficia l dis cr et io n is r ar ely if e ve rex plic it ly articulated in I llino is cas e law, it is o fte n impli citly o bser ved. Fo r e xample, in Ar no ld , the c ourt statedNo. 2-- 06--0879

-17-

that an o ffi

cial dec ision may be re ver sed wher e "t he publ ic off ic ia l' s acts are arbi

trary and capri

ci ous and he thus abuse s h i s discre tion ." Ar no ld , 164 Ill . App. 3d at 707. Ho wever, the court t hen up he ld t he of f i ci al ac ti on as " an

exerc i se of [defen dant's] di scretion an

d personal

judgm ent." Ar no ld , 164 I ll. App. 3d a t 707 . Like wise, in Il l i noi s F edera

tion of Te ach

ers , the c our

t n ote d th at off

ic ia l di screti on ma y b e overturned where arbi traril y or caprici ously

exercised, but it then rev ie w ed th e off ic ia l action i n qu esti on to determ

i ne wh ethe r i t exc eede d the

off i cial 's l egal authority
. I llino is Fed eration of Teachers , 191 Ill . App. 3d at 773-74. Two cases upon whi

ch pl ai ntif fs rely , both in their wri tt en bri efs and at oral argument, also implic it ly obse rve the a bove pri nc i pl es. In Howell

v. Sny der , 326 Ill . App. 3d 450 (2001), a prisoner chal le nged t he po licy o f t he Dir ec t o ro f t he De pa r t men t o f Co rr ec t io ns ( DO C) t o de ny g o o d- t ime
cr ed it ag ai

ns t the sente nc e of an y i nm atewh o en tere d pr i son wi th a pri or ch arg e or c onv

i cti on of do mes t ic ba

ttery or a pen di ng order of

protecti on. Ho we ll , 32 6 I ll. Ap p. 3d a t 451-52. The a

pp el l ate courtnote d that the D i

rector' s p ol i cy

of den y i ng c redi t "m ay gi ve ri se to a cl

ai m f or ma ndam us wh ere it amounts to a refusal

to exercise discretion." Ho we ll , 326 Ill . App. 3d at 453. The court t hen observed t ha t t he Dir ec t o r 's a bilit y t o ap ply p o li cie s "is no t unlimi t ed, " and it r eco unt ed bo t h t he constitutional

lim its o n t he Di

re ctor' s a uth ori ty an d th e statu te g ov er n i n g g ood- ti

me cre di t. Ho we ll , 326 Ill . App. 3d at 4 53. Because the relev ant statut e assi

gned the Di

rector purvi ew over the conduct of pri sone rs onl y whi l e i n D OC custody, and not b ef ore then , the c ourt co nclude d t hat "t he Dir ect or 's unwri tt en pol i cy vi ol ate s th e s tatute , an

d a cc ordi ngl y the Di rector 's appl

ic a tion of the polic

y constitutes a r efusa l to exer cise d iscre t ion fo r w hich ma ndam us wo uld li

e." Ho we ll , 326 Ill . App. 3d at 454.No. 2-- 06--0879

-18-

Though pl ai nti f f s h ere se izeon and an al ogize the l

anguage fr o m Ho we ll

t hat a po licy m

ay give rise t o a c laim w he r e " it amo un t s t o a r efu sa l t o exerci se d iscr et io n, " a full r ea ding o f Ho we ll dem onstrates th at i

t al l owe d j udi ci

al i n terf er en ce wi th t he Dir ect or 's po licy because t he policy violated t he relev an

t ena bl i ng s tatute. This i s con si sten

t wi th the approac h w e detai l ab ove. F urthe r, the c ourt in Ho we ll expr essly disavo wed plaint iff s' ar gument when

it reasoned

that "the appli

cation of a pol

ic y 'across the board' do es not t ransform i t into a no ndi scretionary poli cy." Ho we ll , 326 Ill . App. 3d at 453. The sec ond c ase

upon w hi ch pl ai ntif f s rel y , Guzzo v. Sny

der , 326 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 10 58 (20 01), emp lo ye d a simil ar analysis. T her e, as in Ho we ll , a prisoner ch al le nged the Di

rector 's po licy o f denying go o d- t ime c r ed it t o inma t es w ho had be en arrested f

or dome sti c b attery . Guzzo , 32 6 I ll. Ap p. 3d a t 1060. Th

e court in Guzzo no t ed t ha t t he fo r mula t io n o f a g o o d- t ime p o licy w as wit hin t he Dire ct or 's dis cretion, but t hat t he disc re t ion wa s "r est rict ed" by bot h t he ena bling sta t ut e and t he related pa r t s o f t he I llino is Ad minist r at iv e Code
. Guzzo , 32 6 I l l . A pp . 3d at 1 06 2. Th e a

pp el l ate courtheld that the Directo r's poli cy was an abuse of off

ic ia l di scretion, both bec ause i

t was unwri

tt en desp it e the

A dm i ni stra ti ve Code' s r eq

ui rem en t tha t ag en ci escl ea rl y de f i ne the i r s tan da rds f or exer cising discretion and because it vio late d t he r equ irement t hat any fact or s t he Di rector con siders be connected wi

th the purposes of encouragi ng i nm ate service and prom

ot in g pri son dis ci pli ne. Guzzo , 326 Ill . App. 3d at 1062-63. T he court further hel d that ma ndam us was appro priate because t he Director's poli

cy was "not an art icul

ated st andard and [was] not i n accorda nc e wi th [DO C] rul

es." Guzzo , 32 6 I ll. A pp . 3d at 10 64
. Ag ain , t his dec ision wa s base d o n t he of f i ci al ' s f ai l ur e to a dh er e to the la ws that authorized the di scretion b ei ng ch al le nged.No. 2-- 06--0879

4 Because pla

in tif fs do not chal

le nge def endan t's deci si on as ill

egal , we do not consider what happ ens when

an executi ve of f ers no e xp l an ati on i n th e f ac e of a l eg al ch al l en ge to hi s or her exercise of d iscre t ion. -19- We li mi t o ur revi ew of def

end ant's discretion i

n accordance wi

th the above-di scussed princi ples. Defend ant has o ffered seve ra l reas one d bas es fo r his de cision, including administr at ive ef fic ien cy. Pla int iffs d o no t as se r t t ha t t ho se ba se s ma de his deci sion i l l egal or that the

y were pr et ext f oractual bas es that m

ade h i s deci sion il l egal . Pl aintif

fs que st ion t he wisd om o f his decisio n and argue that his b as es we r e in co rr ec t . Bu t r eg ar dle ss wh et he rde fen da nt 's d ec isio n w as wis e o rhis bases correc t , d efenda nt has w ithin his discr et ion t he po wer t o a cce pt or dec line payment by sp ec i f i ca ti on as long as he does n

ot violate the l aw. Plai

ntif fs have not conjured an

y a ll eg at ion o f i l l eg al i ty att endi ng defen dant's exercise

of di scretion h

ere, and wi

thout such an

al l eg ati on ( an d pr oof t he r eo f) , pla int iffs' ch alle ng e t o t ha t ex er cis e o f dis cr et io n mu st fail. 4 Based on the above discussi

on, we re j ec t pl ai n ti f f s' argu men t th at def en da n t' s dec i si on n ot to acceptpay

me nt by specifi cation m us t be r eve r se d o n t he ba sis t ha t it co nst it ut ed an ab us e o f his official discr et ion. For t he sa me re as on , w e r ej ec t pl ai n ti f f s' argu men t th at s um mar y j udgm en t wa s i n appr opri ate because t he r e w as at lea st a q ue st io n o f fac t as t o t he viabilit y o f de fen da nt 's r at io na le for denying payment by sp ec ifica t io n. T he ab o ve pr inc iple s d ict at e t ha t de fen da nt 's d ec isio n ne ed o nly be leg al. Thus, an y pur porte d qu es ti on of f act as to th e v i ab i l i ty of de f en da n t' s rea son i n g i s i rre l ev an t. In sh ort, in o rd er t o pr ec ipit at e ju dic ial r evie w o f de fend ant 's d iscr et io nar y ac t , p laint iffs would ha ve to assert
m ore th an th at th ey di sa gr ee wi th defen dant's deci

si on; they mus t assert t hat it i s unl

awful and thus exceeds hi s di scretion. They

have not done so here.No. 2-- 06--0879

-20-

Plai ntif fs' t hir d a r gu men t o n a pp ea l is t ha t de fen da nt fun da men t ally misunder st ands payment by specifi cation b ecause h

e equates it wi

th a partial

pay me n t. Eve n assu ming such a mi sun der st anding could am ount t o gro unds to in

terfere wi th defen dant's polic

y, we woul

d rejec t plai ntif fs' argum en t. Plai ntif fs in si st that pay

men t by spe ci f i cati on i s "n ot si m pl y a parti al pay men t,"
as def endan t sugge sts. Ho weve r, we a gr ee w ith d efenda nt 's de scr ipt ion o f payment by spec ifi cat ion. As pla in tif fs note, section 20--210, quot ed abo ve, des cr ibes pa yment by spe cificatio n as "t axes on part of an y prop erty char ged wi

th tax es w

hen a particul ar sp eci f i cation of the p art i s f

urni shed." ( E mph as is adde d.) 35 I LC S 20 0/2 0-- 210 (Wes t 200 4). By

de f i ni ti on, pa y men t by sp ec i f i ca ti on en t ails pa y men t on a porti on of a particul

ar propert y, an

d, therefore, i

t en tai l s a pa rti al pa y men t of t he tax on th e p rope rty . Pl ai nti f f s u rge tha t pa y men t by sp ec i f i ca ti on r eq uir es pa yment o f "t he full
amou nt of taxes attributabl e to [ a] Subparcel ." Howev er , t he su bp arcel s are not div ide d for tax purpo ses, and, theref

ore, a ful l pa

y ment o n a su bp ar ce l is a p aymen t o f t he t ax fo r o nly pa rt o f a pr operty , or, pu t an oth er wa y , i s on l y a p ar ti al pa y men t. Fin ally, plaint iff

s ass er t t hat defend ant 's pol i cy of ref us i ng pa y men t by sp ec i f i ca ti on violates guarantees o f du e p r o ce ss an d e qu al pr ot ect ion pr o vid ed by t he Un it ed St at es an d I llino is Consti tutions . The e ss en

ceof pla int iffs' du e p r o ce ss ar gu men t is that defenda nt's ref usal to accept payment by sp ec ifica t io n be ar s no r at io na l re lat io nsh ip t o t he st at e in t er es t in c o lle cting pr operty taxes. See Crocker v. Fi

nley , 99 Ill . 2d 444, 456 (1984) (legi sl ative act vi olates due process i f i t do es not be ar a r ea so na ble re latio nship t o t he pu b l i c i n terest so ug

h t to b e p rote cte d, a

n d d ue pr oce ss l i m i ts t he po lice po we ro nly t o t he ex t en t it is ar b i tra ri l y or u n re as on ab l y us ed ). P l ai n ti f f s a ttem pt to in voke t he r at io na l-b as is t es t no r mally asso ciat ed w ith su bst ant ive due pr oc ess r eview o f a legislat iveact ion. Howev er, our employi

ng that type of rev

ie w here woul d underm

in e all that we h

ave s ai d a boveNo. 2-- 06--0879

5 Nic hola s inter pr et ed t he Un

i ted State s C ons

ti tution, not

the Il l i noi s Consti

tution . Howev

er, pla int iffs draw no dis

tinction between the s

ubstanti ve due process ri

ghts they create, and we th

eref ore consider them i n tan dem
. See People v . Ki

zer , 365 Ill . App. 3d 949, 960-61 (2006) (co ncl udin g that due pr o ce ss cla us e o f Unit ed St at es Co nst it ut io n an d d ue pr o ce ss cla us e o f Il l i noi s C ons ti tution shoul d be cons i dered

i n l ockstep ).
-21- regar din g the

l i m i tations on judi ci al i nte rf ere nc e w i th e xe cu ti ve di screti on. Plai nti f f s' pos i ti on overlooks the fun

dam ental dif feren ces between

substanti ve due process rev

ie wof an ex

ecutive, as opposed to a le gi slati

ve , action. "[W ]hen

a p l ai n ti f f ch al l en ge s th e v al i di ty of a l eg i sl ati v e act, substan t ive d ue pr oce ss ty pi ca l l y deman dsth at th e act b e rati

on al l y re l ate d to s om

e l eg i ti mate go ver nment purpo se." Ni ch ol as v . Pe n n sy l v an i a S tate Un i v er si ty , 227 F.3d

133, 14 2 (3rd C i

r. 2000 ). "In contrast, when

a pl ai ntif f ch al le nge s a non-legi slati

ve state act ion ***, we must look, as a t hr es ho ld matte r, to w h eth er t he pr op er t y inter est being de pr ived is 'funda menta l' under t he Cons tituti on." Nic hola s , 227 F.3d

at 142. "If the i

nterest is n

ot 'f undam ental ,' *** the governm

ental
ac ti on is e ntirely

out side the am

bi t o f sub stantive process." Nic hola s , 227 F.3d at 142. Here, plaint iff s make no a rg ument t hat t he r igh t t o pa y t ax es by sp ec ifica t io n is fun dam ental . Therefore, their substantive due process argument fails. 5 As fo r p laint iff

s' equa l prote cti on a rgu men t, "[ t]h e th

res hol d i nq ui ry i n e qua l prote cti on an alys is is wh

ether sim il arly situated per sons are t reate d dissi mi larl y." Brazas v. Propert y Tax Appeal Board , 339 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 97 8, 984 ( 2003)
. Here, de f en da nt trea ts al l tax pa yers si m i l arl y--h e doesnot al l owpayment by spec ifi

cat ion, regardles s of wh

o requests it. Therefore, pl ai nti f f s' eq ual prote cti on argument fai

ls.No. 2-- 06--0879

-22-

Fo r the f ore goi n g r ea son s, we af f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e tr i al cou rt. Af fi rmed. CA LL UM a nd Z ENOF F, J

J., con cur.