alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CERTIFICATIONS  UNDER  SECTION  906


     Pursuant  to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a)
and  (b)  of  section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of
the undersigned officers of Force Protection Corporation, a Colorado corporation
(the  "Company"),  does  hereby  certify,  to  such  officer's  knowledge, that:

    The  Quarterly  Report  for  the  quarter  ended  March  31, 2004 (the "Form
10-QSB") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in
the  Form  10-QSB  fairly  presents,  in  all  material  respects, the financial
condition  and  results  of  operations  of  the  Company.

    Dated:  May  17,  2004

                           /s/  Michael  Watts
                           --------------------
                           Michael  Watts,  Chief  Executive  Officer


    Dated:  May  17,  2004
                           /s/  Thomas  Thebes
                           -----------------
                          Thomas  Thebes,   Chief  Financial  Officer
NUMBER 13-20-00402-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF C.M.D., MINOR CHILD

On appeal from the 377th District Court

of Victoria County, Texas.

ORDER

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Perkes

Order Per Curiam

This is an appeal of a final order terminating parental rights. The second amended 

notice of appeal of S.G. was filed on September 29, 2020, and appellant’s brief was due 

October 19, 2020. Appellant S.G. has filed an amended motion for extension of time,

providing the reason for her request therein. Appellant seeks thirty days of additional time 

to file the brief.

Appeals in parental termination and child protection cases are governed by the 

rules of appellate procedure for accelerated appeals but include additional expedited 
2

deadlines and procedures. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4; TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2(a). The 

intermediate appellate courts are directed to ensure “as far as reasonably possible” that 

appeals in such cases are brought to final disposition within 180 days of the date the 

notice of appeal is filed. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2(a). Accordingly, it is the policy of this 

Court to limit extensions of time in such cases absent truly extraordinary circumstances. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(d).

We GRANT IN PART appellant S.G..’s amended motion for extension of time and 

ORDER appellant’s brief to be filed on or before November 9, 2020. No further extensions 

of time will be granted absent truly exigent and extraordinary circumstances.

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the

23rd day of October, 2020.
##### 



Exhibit 31.02
 HARTFORD LIFE, INC.
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ENACTED BY SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Hartford Life, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    [Paragraph omitted in accordance with SEC transition instructions contained
in SEC Release 34-47986];c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; andd)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that
has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrants internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):
 a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and
 b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting.
  /s/ Lizabeth H. Zlatkus
 48
EXHIBIT 32.1

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

The following statement is provided by the undersigned to accompany the
foregoing Report on Form 10-K pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and shall not be deemed filed pursuant to any provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any
other securities law.

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Report on Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Section 78) and that the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Broadway
Financial Corporation as of and for the year ended December 31, 2008.



|                     |  |     |  |                                                                      
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|                     |  |    
|Date: March 31, 2009 |  | By: |  | /s/ Paul C. Hudson                                                   
|                     |  |     |  | Paul C. Hudson Chief Executive Officer Broadway Financial Corporation
#### SHERMAN v. ADIRONDACK RY. CO. et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

July 30, 1896.)

Action by George C. Sherman against the Adirondack Railway Company and others. The nature of the action, and the disposition made of prior motions relating to changing place of trial, appear in the reported case of Sherman v. Railway Co., 92 Hun, 39, 36 N. Y. Supp. 692. In the order granting motion to change the place of trial from Jefferson county to Essex county, it appears that, at the time the motion was heard at special term, the following concession was made by the attorneys for the respective parties: ,That the respective answers of the moving parties were served on the plaintiff’s attorneys on the 19th day of January, 1895, and on the attorneys for the defendants Babcock and Strauss February 13, 1896; and that the notice for a demand to change the place of trial from Jefferson to Essex county on behalf of the moving parties was served on the attorneys for said defendants Babcock and Strauss February 27, 1896; and on the same day said notices of a demand to change the venue' were duly returned by the attorneys for said defendants Babcock and Strauss, with the objection that the said demands were not served in time. In the order which denied the motion to change the place of trial, at the instance of Strauss and Babcock, to the county of Albany, it appears that the counsel for the respective parties were heard; and that there was read “the printed volume served on the motion by the defendants railway companies and Young and a majority of the forest commission to change the venue from Jefferson to Essex county, served February 13, 1896”; and that thereafter the motion was denied. Mullin,„ Griffin & Walker, for appellant Sherman. C.A. Dolsontad J ames A. Ward, for appellants Strauss and Babcock.

Lewis E. Carr and Edgar T. Brackett, for respondents.

HARDIN, P. J.

We think the special term properly followed the doctrine laid down by the general term in Sherman v. Railway Co., 92 Hun, 39, 36 N. Y. Supp. 692. See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 982—984, 986, 987: Gorman v. Iron Co., 32 Hun, 71; Home v. City of Buffalo, 49 Hun, 76, 1 N. Y. Supp. 801; Thompson v. Heidenrich, 66 How. Prac. 391; McConihe v. Palmer, 76 Hun, 116, 27 N. Y. Supp. 832. We think the orders should be sustained. Each order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-60044

Summary Calendar

Henok Hundessa Jola,

Petitioner,

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A215 911 845

Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Henok Hundessa Jola, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, seeks review of 

a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen

his immigration proceedings.

Review of a motion to reopen is disfavored. Lara v. Trominski, 216 

F.3d 487, 496 (5th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we review such denials under a 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 26, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 22-60044 Document: 00516624128 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/26/2023
No. 22-60044

2

“highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Id. This standard requires 

a ruling to stand, even if we conclude that it is erroneous, “so long as it is not 

capricious, racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or 

otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any 

perceptible rational approach.” Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir. 

2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Board did not abuse its discretion by denying Jola’s motion. A 

successful motion to reopen must be based on evidence that is both material 

and previously unavailable. See I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).

Here, Jola has not shown that evidence relating to translation errors was 

previously unavailable. Nor has he shown that the new evidence he submitted 

with his motion materially relates to the specific negative credibility factors 

that initially doomed his claim. And while Jola disputes the merits of the 

negative credibility factors directly, those arguments are not properly before 

us. See Guevara v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 2006).

Jola also has not shown that reopening is warranted based on the 

actions of his prior counsel. Ineffective assistance requires “a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” See Diaz v. Sessions, 894 F.3d 222, 

228 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, 

Jola has not shown that the actions of his prior counsel directly relate to the 

specific negative credibility factors that the Board relied on.

Jola’s petition is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.

Case: 22-60044 Document: 00516624128 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/26/2023
105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1161

AN ACT

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to authorize

appropriations for refugee and entrant assistance for fiscal years 1998 and 1999.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 1161 ES

1 SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR

2 REFUGEE AND ENTRANT ASSISTANCE.

3 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section

4 414(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

5 1524(a)) is amended by striking ‘‘fiscal year 1995, fiscal

6 year 1996, and fiscal year 1997’’ and inserting ‘‘each of

7 fiscal years 1998 and 1999’’.

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

9 subsection (a) shall take effect October 1, 1997.

Passed the Senate September 10, 1997.

Attest:

Secretary.
105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1161

AN ACT

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to

assistance for fiscal years 1998 and 1999.authorize appropriations for refugee and entrant
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 03 CR 1084

)

DOUGLAS M. THIGPEN, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Douglas Thigpen (“Thigpen”) has just submitted a letter that

he captions “Rule 35 Sentence Reduction & Interstate Compact

Transfer,” accompanied by some supporting materials. This

memorandum order is issued (1) to advise Thigpen that this Court

has no jurisdiction to provide him with the relief that he seeks

and (2) to send Thigpen’s materials on to the United States

Attorney’s office, with a copy of his letter (but not the

accompanying materials) being sent to his trial counsel Gareth

Morris, Esq.

As for the jurisdictional issue, Fed. R. Crim. P. (“Rule”)

35(b), which addresses the possible reduction of a criminal

sentence if a defendant has “provided substantial assistance in

investigating or prosecuting another person,” is specifically

made applicable only if the government brings a motion seeking

such reduction. In the absence of such a motion, the court is

without power to provide a criminal defendant with any such

relief.
As for the second purpose served by this memorandum order,

this Court is of course not in a position to consider an ex parte

communication such as Thigpen’s (this should not be misunderstood

as a criticism of Thigpen, who as a non-lawyer may well be

unaware of that prohibition). Accordingly the material is being

sent to the United States Attorney’s office for its consideration

of the matters raised by Thigpen, while copies of his letter and

this memorandum order are of course transmitted to his trial

counsel as an informational matter.

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: June 8, 2009
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 6189

JOSHUA PATERNOSTER

- COZART , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. RONALDO MYERS , Superintendent of Hampton Roads Regional Jail , Respondent

- Appellee , and
HAMPTON CITY CIRCUIT COURT; LINDA BACHELOR SMITH, Clerk; HAMPTON SHERIFF ’ S OFFICE; B. J. ROBERTS, Sheriff , Defendants

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk

. Mark S. Davis , District Judge. ( 2:16

- cv
- 00633

- MSD

- LRL )

Submitted : July 31, 2017 Decided: August 25, 2017

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER , and SHEDD , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Joshua Paternoster

- Cozart, Appellant Pro Se.2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM:
Joshua Paternoster

- Cozart seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A
certificate of a ppealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable ju rists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v.
Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on proced ural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the r ecord and conclude that the issue
Paternoster

- Cozart sought to raise was litigated in a previous § 2254 petition, and he accordingly has not made the requisite showing. Thus , we grant the motion for party
substitution and replace Bob McCabe with Ronaldo Myers , deny the motion to appoint counsel and expedite decision, deny the motion for a certificate of appealability, deny the
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately4 presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. DISMISSED
II

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1431

To suspend temporarily the duty on a certain chemical.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 7, 1997

Mr. HELMS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To suspend temporarily the duty on a certain chemical.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SUSPENSION OF DUTY.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following

7 new heading:

‘‘ 9902.30.91 2-amino-4-(4-aminobenzoyl

amino)-benzenesulfonic acid

sodium salt (CAS No.

167614–37–1) (provided for

in subheading 2930.90.29) .... Free No change No change On or before

12/31/2000 ’’.

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

9 this section applies to articles entered, or withdrawn from
2

•S 1431 IS

1 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after

2 the date of enactment of this Act.

Æ
______________________________________ 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

Civil Case No. ____________ 

____

v.

_____________________________ 

Plaintiff(s), 

_____ APPLICATION FOR SPECIAL 

ADMISSION – PRO HAC VICE 

Defendant(s). 

Attorney requests special admission pro hac vice in 

the above-captioned case. 

Certification of Attorney Seeking Pro Hac Vice Admission: I have read and understand the 

requirements of LR 83-3, and certify that the following information is correct: 

(1) PERSONAL DATA:

Name: 

(Last Name) 

Firm or Business Affiliation: 

(First Name) (MI) (Suffix) 

Mailing Address: 

City: 

Phone Number: 

State: 

 Fax Number: 

Zip: 

Business E-mail Address:

U.S. District Court–Oregon Application for Special Admission - Pro Hac Vice 

Revised March 1, 2014 Page 1 of 3

KERRY D. AUSTIN, on behalf of himself

and all others similarly situated,

UNION BOND & TRUST CO., et al.

JOHN F. EDGAR

EDGAR JOHN F.

EDGAR LAW FIRM LLC

1032 Pennsylvania Avenue

Kansas City MO 64105

(816) 531-0033 (816) 531-3322

jfe@edgarlawfirm.com

3:14-cv-00706

Case 3:14-cv-00706-YY Document 8 Filed 04/30/14 Page 1 of 3
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Silverleaf Resorts, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended September 30, 2000 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Robert E. Mead, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.



Dated:  November 19, 2002                              /s/ ROBERT E. MEAD
                                                       -------------------------
                                                       Robert E. Mead
# C_2019131EN.01005601.xml

| 8.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 131/56 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 131/56

---

Action brought on 18 February 2019 — Rezon v EUIPO (imot.bg)

(Case T-101/19)

(2019/C 131/65)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Parties

Applicant: Rezon OOD (Sofia, Bulgaria) (represented by M. Yordanova-Harizanova, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: application for the EU figurative mark imot.bg — application for registration No 17 203 316

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 November 2018 in Case R 999/2018-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision and order registration of the mark at issue; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision and order registration of the mark at issue;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs of the present proceedings and the costs incurred before the Board of Appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the present proceedings and the costs incurred before the Board of Appeal.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

The Board of Directors and Stockholders

Wolverine Tube, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the
registration statement (No. 333-141815) on Form S-8 of Wolverine Tube, Inc. and subsidiaries of our report dated March 28, 2008, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Wolverine Tube, Inc. and subsidiaries as of
December 31, 2007 and 2006, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders equity and comprehensive income (loss), and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2007, and the
related financial statement schedule, which report appears in the December 31, 2007, Annual Report on Form 10-K of Wolverine Tube, Inc. and subsidiaries.

As discussed in note 2 to the consolidated financial statements, effective January 1, 2006, the Company changed its method of accounting for share-based payments and, effective December 31, 2006, its method of accounting for
defined pension and postretirement benefit plans.



/s/ KPMG LLP




|                   
|-------------------
|Birmingham, Alabama
|March 31, 2008