## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-1215/1218

___________ Arkansas Right to Life State * Political Action Committee and * David Sloan, * * Appellees, * * v. * * Brad Butler, In His Official * Capacity as State Attorney for * Benton County; Troy Burris, In * His Official Capacity as Chairman * and Member of the Arkansas * Ethics Commission; Rita Looney, * Appeals from the United States In Her Official Capacity as Member * District Court for the Western of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; * District of Arkansas. Ben Allen, In His Official Capacity * as Member of the Arkansas Ethics * Commission; Jack Kearney, In * His Official Capacity as Member * of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; * and Tom Alexander, In His Official * Capacity as Member of the Arkansas * Ethics Commission, * * Appellants/Defendants, * * Genevieve Stewart; Paul Kelly; * Association of Community * Organizations for Reform Now * Political Action Committee; and *The Honorable H. Franklin Waters, United States District Judge for t he Western 1 District of Arkansas. -2- Local 100, Service Employees * International Union Political * Action Committee, * * Intervenors as Defendants/Appellants. *

___________ Submitted: April 13, 1998 Filed: June 4, 1998

___________ Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge. Th e Arkansas Right to Life State Political Action Committee brought this sui t challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of a campaign finance reform measure a pproved by popular vote in Arkansas in 1996 and known as Initiated Act I. The district court entered p artial summary judgment invalidating one of the provisions of Ac t I, see Arkansas Right to Life State Political Action Committee v. Butler , 98 3 F. Supp. 1209, 1213, 1236 (W.D. Ark. 1997), and the defendants and the intervenors ( a s defendants) appeal. We affirm the judgment of the district court and remand the 1 case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Whilethis appeal was pending, the plaintiffs filed two motions. They moved, first , to dismiss the appeal of the intervenors on the ground that it was untimely. It is-3-

undisputed that the primary defendants filed a timely not ice of appeal on December 17, 1997, and that the intervenors filed a notice of appeal on December 29, 1997. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3) provides that if "one party timely fi les a notice of appeal, any other party may fil e a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed." Since December 29 is certainly within fourteen days o f December 17, we believe that the intervenors f iled their notice within the relevant time limit.
II. The p laintiffs also moved to dismiss the intervenors for lack of Article II I st anding. Intervenors, like any other party to a case, must meet the requirements o f Article III standing tobe eligible to litigate their claims in federal court: "While [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 24 [on intervention] promotes judicial economy by facilitating, wher e constitutionally permissible, the participation of interested parties in others' lawsuits, the fact remains that a federal case is a limited af fair, and not everyone with an opinion is invited t o attend." Mausolf v. Babbitt , 85 F.3d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1996)

. Article III standing must exist throughout the litigation.
Given ou r holding on the merits below, however, there is no longer an activ e dispute in the present case before this court. Whether the intervenors have standing to litigatetheir remaining claims before the district court is a matter for that court t o determine upon remand.
III. In the district court, the defen dants and the intervenors challenged the plaintiffs' standing to bring this case on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary "injury in fact," and the district court denied their motion to dismiss. See Arkansas Right to Life State Political Action Committee v. Butler , 972 F. Supp. 1187, 1189, 1192, 1194 (W.D. Ark. 1997). Standing is, of course, a threshold issue in every case before a-4-

federal court: If a plaintiff lacks standing, h e or she cannot invoke its jurisdiction. See Boyle v. Anderson , 68 F.3d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1173 (1996). In order to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, one must have suffered an "injury in fact," and such an injury must be concrete, particulariz ed, and either actual or imminent. Id. at 1100-01. Vague and conclusory allegations of harm are insufficient to create standing. See Renne v. Geary , 501 U.S. 3 12, 316 (1991); see also id. at 324.
Plaintiffs, however, are not required to expose themselves to arrest o r prosecution under a criminal statute in order to challenge a statute in federal court. See New Hampshire Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Gardner , 99 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1996). Instead, "[w]hen government action or inaction is challenged by a party who is a target or object of that action ... 'there is ordinarily little question that the actionor inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.' " Minnesota CitizensConcerned for Life v. Federal Election Com mission , 113 F.3d 129, 131 (8th Cir. 1997), quoting Lujan v. Defenders o f Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992).
We beli eve that the district court properly concluded that the plaintiffs are a target or object of the prohibitions contained in Act I. The plaintiffs allege in thei r verified complaint that they "would like to make contributions in excess of $100 to the candidates enumerated in Arkansas Code § 7-6-203(b)(1) and $300 to the candidates enumerat edin Arkansas Code § 7-6-203(b)(2)." Unlike the plaintiffs in Renne , 50 1 U.S. at 322, who did not allege an intention to engage in the proscribed conduct with sufficient specificity, the plaintiffs here have alle ged a specific intent to pursue conduct in violatio n of the challenged statute. We believe therefore that the district court was correct in concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the provision of Act I in question in this case.-5- IV. In a companion case, Russell v. Burris , ____ F.3d ____ (8th Cir. 1998), w e resolved the constitutional issue raised here. We declared the provision invalidated by the distr ict court's summary judgment in this case to be unconstitutional an d unenforceable . We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.