alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 23

               Consent of Independent Certified Public Accountants


The Board of Directors
Peekskill Financial Corporation:


We consent to the  incorporation by reference in the Registration  Statements on
Form S-8 (No.  333-41933  and No.  333-41943)  of our report dated July 30, 1998
relating to the consolidated  balance sheets of Peekskill Financial  Corporation
and  subsidiary  as of June 30,  1998 and  1997,  and the  related  consolidated
statements of income,  changes in stockholders'  equity, and cash flows for each
of the years in the three-year  period ended June 30, 1998, which report appears
in the  June  30,  1998  Annual  Report  on  Form  10-K of  Peekskill  Financial
Corporation.


KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP

Stamford, Connecticut
September 28, 1998
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We herebyconsent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-40893, No. 333-80003, No. 333-122834 and No. 333-122835) of OYO Geospace Corporation of our reports dated December 11, 2009, relatingto the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule as of September 30, 2009 and 2008 and for each of the three fiscal years in the period ended September 30, 2009, and the effectiveness of internal control overfinancial reporting as of September 30, 2009, which appear in this Form 10-K. 

/s/ UHY LLP 

Houston, Texas 

December 11, 2009
Exhibit 31.3



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Timothy J. Steinkopf, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Secure Computing Corporation;



2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;



4. The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:



a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting;



5.
The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):



a) all significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal controls over financial reporting.



|                                                 
|-------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Timothy J. Steinkopf                         
|Timothy J. Steinkopf                             
|Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|March 12, 2004                                   



51
(14 Misc. Rep. 562.)

#### JUDSON v. FLUSHING JOCKEY CLUB. DUDLEY v. SAME.

(Common Pleas of New York City and County,

General Term.

December 4, 1895.)

Courts—Fictitious Action—Recalling Decision.

Where it appears, after the decision of a. ease on appeal, that the action was fictitious, the court will withdraw and cancel its opinion.

Action by Henry C. Judson against the Flushing Jockey Club, and by John C. Dudley against the same defendant.

Appeals dismissed.

Argued before DALY, G. J., and BOOKSTAYEB, BISCHOFF, PBYOB, and GIEGEBICH, JJ.

J. M. Marx, for appellant.

Benj. Steinhardt, for respondent.

Joseph T. Auerbach, Charles J. Patterson, and Delancey Nicoll, intervening for the state racing commission, the Jockey Club, the Coney Island Jockey Club, and the Westchester Bacing Association.

DALY, C. J.

The report of the referee shows that the controversy before the court was fictitious; that the transaction out of which it was supposed to grow—a horse race for stakes—was a pretended contest, arranged so as to form the basis of suits at law in which, without real adversaries before the court, an adjudication might be procured to use for other purposes than the enforcement of the right involved in the pretended suits.

Upon tbe intervention of third parties having interests that might be affected by a decision in those proceedings, we ordered a reference to ascertain the facts (36 N. Y. Supp. 126); and, the report of the referee bearing out the contention of such parties, it only remains for us to dismiss the proceedings in this court growing out of the pretended and collusive transactions referred to. In addition to the cases already cited by us on the question of the right of third parties to intervene, we refer to the case of Haley v. Bank, in the supreme court of Nevada on March 10, 1891, reported in 12 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 815, with note (26 Pac. 64), in which it was held that an attorney, as amicus curiae, may move to dismiss an action as collusive, and it is his duty to do so if he knows, or has reason to believe, that the action is fictitious.

We shall therefore enter an order dismissing the appeal from the district court in the case of Judson v. Flushing Jockey Club, and the appeal and the action in this court in Dudley v. Same Defendant, and direct that the opinions of this court in those cases be withdrawn from the files, and that the costs of the reference be paid by the parties to those appeals. All concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF UTILX CORPORATION FOR THE YEAR ENDED MARCH
31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           1,490
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   16,155
<ALLOWANCES>                                       282
<INVENTORY>                                      7,715
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                25,731
<PP&E>                                          32,029
<DEPRECIATION>                                  22,583
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  35,912
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,171
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            72
<OTHER-SE>                                      26,669
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    35,912
<SALES>                                         64,875
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                64,875
<CGS>                                           54,523
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   62,817
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    60
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (24)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,022
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (946)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,968
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,968
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .41
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .41
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Lichtenstein Loan Guaranty Litigation. Bank of America, N.A., et al., Respondents, v Lightstone Holdings, LLC, et al., Appellants. Line Trust Corporation Ltd. et al., Respondents, v David Lichtenstein et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[946 NYS2d 863]

—Appeals having been taken to this Court by the above-named appellants from an amended order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, New York County (Melvin L. Schweitzer, J.), entered October 27, 2011, and from orders, same court and Justice, entered on or about September 29, 2011 and September 30, 2011, and said appeals having been argued by counsel for the respective parties; and due deliberation having been had thereon, and upon the stipulation of the parties hereto dated May 25, 2012 and June 7, 2012, it is unanimously ordered that said appeals be and the same are hereby withdrawn in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid stipulation. Concur — Saxe, J.P., Friedman, Renwick, DeGrasse and Richter, JJ.
## In T he Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07 - 2 0 - 00 32 2 - CV IN RE ROBERT JAMES BACK , RELATOR OPINION ON ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

### February 8 , 2021 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. Robert James Back petitions for a writ of mandamus directed at the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. Through it, we are asked to reverse or void the Board's deci sion revoking his parole. We dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction. This court's authority to issue original writs of mandamus is limited. It may issue same only when necessary to 1) enforce its jurisdiction or 2) address acts of a district, sta tutory county, statutory probate county, or county judge or associate judge appointed under C hapter 201 of the Family Code . T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 22.221(a) – (b) ( West Supp. 2020 ). Our jurisdiction does not extend to the regulation of anything or anyone else. Glover v. Tex

. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles , No. 07 - 96 - 0375 - CV, 1996 Tex. App.LEXIS 4867 , at *2 (Tex. App. — Amarillo Nov . 1, 1996, orig. proc eeding ). The Board falls

outside the scope of those positions; thus, we have no jurisdiction to entertain mandamus relief against it. Id. The petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Per Curi a m
#### Mitsue TAKAHASHI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, Merced Office, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-15547.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 25, 2011.

Mitsue Takahashi, Livingston, CA, pro se.

Jeffrey Pierce Davis, Esquire, Dowling Aaron & Keeler, Inc., Fresno, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

*971Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Mitsue Takahashi appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her employment action on statute of limitations and res judicata grounds. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose,*420 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir.2005). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Takahashi’s claims under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) as time-barred. *See*42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (at most 300-day time limit for filing an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge under Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (same for ADEA); *Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell,*202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir.2000) (“[Fjailure to file an EEOC charge within the prescribed 300-day period ... is treated as a violation of a statute of limitations^]”), *overruled on other grounds by Socop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S.,*272 F.3d 1176, 1194-96 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). Moreover, the district court properly determined that Takaha-shi’s Title VII and ADEA claims were also barred by res judicata. *See Kay v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes,*504 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir.2007) (stating requirements for res judicata under California law).

Takahashi’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION FROM OCWEN ASSET INVESTMENT
CORP.'S CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND STATEMENT OF 
OPERATIONS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                     138,472,627<F1>
<SECURITIES>                                89,520,700
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             291,831,251
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,629,437
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       191,250
<OTHER-SE>                                 285,010,564
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               291,831,251
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             8,061,782<F2>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,346,726<F3>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               304,560
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              6,410,496
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          6,410,496
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 6,410,496
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.33
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.33
<FN>
<F1>Tag 10 includes cash and amounts due from depository institutions of $10,850,
interest bearing deposits of $8,461,777 and repurchase agreements of
$130,000,000.
<F2>Tag 27 includes interest income on repurchase agreements and interest bearing
deposits of $4,150,857, securities available for sale of $3,497,356, discount
loans of $340,966, loans of $5,565 and operating income of $67,038.
<F3>Tag 29 includes management fees of $1,060,914 and loan expenses of $285,812.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1347 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1347

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To permit the city of Cleveland, Ohio, to convey certain lands that the 
                  United States conveyed to the city.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS.

    For purposes of this section, the term ``fair market value'' shall 
have the meaning provided that term by the Secretary of Transportation, 
by regulation.

SEC. 2. AUTHORITY TO GRANT WAIVERS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law and 
subject to section 47153 of title 49, United States Code, and section 
3, the Secretary of Transportation may waive any of the terms contained 
in the deed of conveyance described in subsection (b).
    (b) Deed of Conveyance.--The deed of conveyance described in this 
subsection is the deed of conveyance issued by the United States and 
dated January 10, 1967, for the conveyance of lands to the city of 
Cleveland, Ohio, for use by the city for airport purposes.

SEC. 3. CONDITIONS.

    (a) Fair Market Value or Equivalent Benefit.--As a condition to 
receiving a waiver under this section, the city of Cleveland, Ohio, may 
convey an interest in the lands described in section 2(b) only if the 
city receives, in exchange for the interest--
            (1) an amount equal to the fair market value of the 
        interest; or
            (2) an equivalent benefit.
    (b) Use of Amounts or Equivalent Benefits.--Any amount or 
equivalent benefit that is received by the city of Cleveland shall be 
used by the city for--
            (1) the development, improvement, operation, or maintenance 
        of a public airport; or
            (2) lands (including any improvements to those lands) that 
        produce revenues that are used for airport development 
        purposes.

            Passed the Senate November 8, 1997.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
105th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1347

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

To permit the city of Cleveland, Ohio, to convey certain lands that the 
                  United States conveyed to the city.
```
#### In the Matter of Ray D. Purse, Respondent, v Racquel Crocker, Appellant.

[944 NYS2d 648]—

In a child custody proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Lechtrecker, Ct. Atty. Ref.), dated June 23, 2011, as, after a hearing, granted the father’s petition for sole custody of the subject child.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In adjudicating custody and visitation rights, the most important factor to be considered is the best interests of the *1217child *(see Matter of Awan v Awan,*63 AD3d 733, 734 [2009], citing *Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982]; *see also Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer,*55 NY2d 89, 94 [1982]). Among the factors to be considered when evaluating the child’s best interests are “ ‘the parental guidance provided by the custodial parent, each parent’s ability to provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual development, each parent’s ability to provide for the child financially, the relative fitness of each parent, and the effect an award of custody to one parent might have on the child’s relationship with the other parent’ ” *(Craig v Williams-Craig,*61 AD3d 712, 712 [2009], quoting *Matter of Berrouet v Greaves,*35 AD3d 460, 461 [2006]; *see Matter of McGovern v Lynch,*62 AD3d 712 [2009]; *Matter of Carrasquillo v Cora,*60 AD3d 852 [2009]). In particular, interference with the relationship between a child and the noncustodial parent is “an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the [offending party] is unfit to act as custodial parent” *(Daghir v Daghir,*82 AD2d 191, 194 [1981], *affd*56 NY2d 938 [1982] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, contrary to the mother’s contention, the Family Court properly determined that the best interests of the child would be served by awarding the father sole custody *(see Matter of Caravella v Toale,*78 AD3d 828 [2010]; *Matter of Zeis v Slater,*57 AD3d 793 [2008]). The determination was supported by the record, including the testimony of the parties, which established, among other things, that the mother and her family deliberately interfered with the father’s relationship with the parties’ son by omitting the father’s name from the child’s birth certificate, not including the father in the planning of the child’s christening and first birthday party, and seeking police intervention to prevent the father from gaining access to the child. Furthermore, despite the mother’s contention that the father was potentially violent and an unfit parent, the hearing testimony established that, prior to the commencement of this proceeding, the father had been, without incident, regularly taking care of the parties’ son during the day while the mother was at work. Since the Family Court’s determination has a sound and substantial basis in the record, it will not be disturbed *(see Matter of Plaza v Plaza,*305 AD2d 607 [2003]). Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Austin, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joseph Bell, Also Known as Giovanni Bell, Also Known as Anthony Jordan, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Herbert Altman, J.), rendered on February 7, 1983, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur&emdash;Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Ross, Carro and Kassal, JJ.