decision is supported by substantial evidence. Micus v. Bowen, 979
F.2d 602, 604 (7% Cir. 1992).

However, Mr. Yourek also claims that the ALJ’s credibility
determination with respect to his testimony is insufficient as a
matter of law and patently wrong. While the credibility
determination of the ALJ is normally due deference, there must be
evidence that such a determination was actually made. Zblewski v.
Schweiker, 732 F.2d 75, 78 (7% Cir. 1984). For meaningful
appellate review, the ALJ must indicate the reasons for rejecting
certain lines of testimony. Id. at 79. The ALJ does not specify
her reasons for rejecting, at least in part, Mr. Yourek’s
testimony. The ALJ states that she gave his testimony some credit,
but does not go on to explain which parts of his testimony are not
credible or why those parts are not credible. Such a conclusory
determination is not sufficient. Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d
783, 787 (7° Cir. 2003). This case must therefore be remanded for
a re-evaluation of Mr. Yourek’s credibility and a redetermination
of his RFC.

Mr. Yourek argues that the ALJ failed to thoroughly explore
his literacy level. Mr. Yourek’s literacy level is relevant to
determining what work he might be able to perform. The ALJ rested
her decision that Mr. Yourek is literate on the following facts:

Mr. Yourek’s statement that he can read and write more than his own


traumatic disabilities, such as Mr. Yourek’s asthma, the ALJ should
consider three factors: “the applicant’s allegations, work history,
and medical and other evidence.” Lichter v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 430,
434 (7 Cir. 1987). Medical evidence is considered the primary
consideration of the three. Id. Mr. Yourek argues that the ALJ
was required to summon a medical expert to determine the onset of
his disability. However, determination of an applicant’s Residual
Functioning Capacity (“RFC”) is within the purview of the ALJ, not
medical experts.! Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7* Cir.
1995).

The ALJ considered Mr. Yourek’s medical history, his
testimony, and his work history, detailing that consideration in
her decision. The ALJ neither rejected medical conclusions
contained in Mr. Yourek’s records without other evidence, nor drew
her own conclusions without relying on medical evidence. See,
e.g., Armstrong v. Barnhart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 881, 885-86 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (noting that Seventh Circuit reversed cases where ALJ “played
doctor” by failing to address relevant evidence). This court will

not re-weigh the evidence that was before the ALJ, so long as her

1 Once the ALJ had found that the applicant has some medical
limitations, as was the case here, the ALJ must determine the
applicant’s RFC to determine whether the applicant can return to
his or her former work and/or perform any work in the national
economy, the fourth and fifth steps of the disability
determination.


name, his completion of the 11' grade in regular classes’, the
claims representative’s observation that Mr. Yourek had no
difficulty completing his application, Mr. Yourek’s testimony that
he was not a good reader but could read small words slowly, Mr.
Yourek’s ability to obtain a driver’s license, and his testimony
that he was able to write a note using complete sentences. While
this evidence is not inconsistent with a finding of literacy,
neither is it sufficient for such a finding once Mr. Yourek had
raised the possibility of illiteracy. See, e.g., Cole v. Apfel,
No. 98 C 6735, 2000 WL 290432, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2000)
(Coar, J.) (applicant’s 7° grade education not sufficient to
support a finding of literacy).

The ALJ had an obligation to develop a complete record once
Mr. Yourek had raised the issue of his potential illiteracy. See
Taylor v. Apfel, No. 00 C 3556, 2003 WL 21087955, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
May 13, 2003) (Anderson, J.). Neither the ALJ nor Mr. Yourek’s
attorney made any attempt to ascertain Mr. Yourek’s literacy level
by asking him to perform such tasks as reading a brief article or
writing a note. See Cole, 2000 WL 290432, at *4. Further, the ALJ
predicated her hypothetical to the vocational expert, regarding
work Mr. Yourek could be expected to perform, on his reading at a

fourth~grade level but provided no explanation as to how or why she

2 Mr. Yourek testified to completing the 9° grade and to
being assigned to special education classes.

5


2-ees orm (06/97)

nited States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

fgned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
L Ayes Sudge Elaine E. Bucklo than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 4995 DATE 9/28/2004
CASE Yourek vs. Barnhart
TITLE
ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.}

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) QO Brief in support of motion due

(3) 0 Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due.

(4) QO Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at

(6) Q Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .

mM oa Trial{set for/re-set for} on at

(8) Oo (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) (CO Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(i) OC FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) [Other docket entry] Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted and the case is remanded
to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with the opinion attached hereto.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Accordingly, judgment is entered in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant. Any pending motion in this case is terminated as moot.

(11) @f [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
3
No notices required. urnbe ofnoies
a | Notices mailed by judge’s staff. op 4 .
LoL (Ov
Notified counsel by telephone. ee oo octet
Docketing to mail notices. i\\
v | Mail AO 450 form. IPoca Laisa stn Tocthine Moy dis
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. vee at .
9728/2004
courtroom = TH Ed OY CUS Nee pacnsietree
MP deputy’s wr)
initials = ————
IOS" Dateltitue received in
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials



came to that determination. The ALJ’s determination of Mr.
Yourek’s literacy level was not supported by substantial evidence.
As the literacy issue is crucial to Mr. Yourek’s disability
determination, I remand for a re-evaluation of Mr. Yourek’s
literacy level.

Finally, Mr. Yourek argues that the hypothetical questions
asked of the vocational expert at Mr. Yourek’s hearing were
insufficient as a matter of law. Without deciding this issue, I
note that the reconsideration of Mr. Yourek’s credibility
determination, his RFC, and his literacy level will necessitate
reconsideration of the jobs in the national economy that he can
perform. Mr. Yourek’s case is remanded to the Social Security

Administration for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.
ENTER ORDER:
SE.
AKGGn8, Zz Erunhl»
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: September a 2004


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN YOUREK,
Plaintiff,
No. 03 C 4995

v.

JOANNE BARNHART, Commissioner of
Social Security,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On September 29, 2000, plaintiff John Yourek applied to the
Social Security Administration (“Administration”) for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits. His application was
initially denied and, at Mr. Yourek’s request, a hearing was held
on September 18, 2002. Administrative Law Judge Helen Cropper
(“ALJ”) found that for the period from March 1998 to December 2000,
Mr. Yourek was not disabled. The ALJ also found that Mr. Yourek’s
insured status had expired in December 1997. Because Mr. Yourek
was not insured at the time of his application, he had to show that
he was continuously disabled from before the expiration of his
insured status until twelve months prior to his application. As
Mr. Yourek was unable to make this showing, the ALJ denied his
application on November 12, 2002. On May 21, 2003, the Appeals
Council denied Mr. Yourek’s request for review. On July 18, 2003,
Mr. Yourek filed a complaint asking for judicial review of the

ALJ’s decision. Both Mr. Yourek and the Administration now move

D


for summary judgment. JI Grant Mr. Yourek’s motion and remand the
case for further proceedings. I pgeny the Administration’s motion.

A five~step process governs the determination of disability
Status. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a-f). The Administration must find “(1)
whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether he has a
severe impairment; (3) whether his impairment meets or equals one
listed by the Secretary; (4) whether the claimant can perform his
past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing
any work in the national economy.” Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329,
337 n.8 (7 Cir. 1994). I£€ the applicant reaches the fifth step,
the Administration bears the burden of proving the existence of
jobs in the national economy that the applicant can perform. Id.

Mr. Yourek argues that the ALJ’s decision was deficient in
four ways: first, that medical expert testimony was required to
determine the onset of Mr. Yourek’s disability and was not
obtained; second, that the ALJ’s credibility determination is
insufficient as a matter of law; third, that the ALJ improperly
determined that Mr. Yourek is not illiterate without literacy
testing; and finally, that insufficient evidence exists as to the
number of jobs available matching Mr. Yourek’s limitations and
vocational profile.

Mr. Yourek first argues that the ALJ failed to fully develop
the record by consulting a medical expert regarding his medical

limitations and the onset date of his disability. For non-