Adeguacy of Representation

The class representatives must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”. Fed.
R. Ciy. P. 23(a). In determining adequacy of class representation, the court considers whether (1)
any conflicts of interest exist between the named plaintiffs and the class members and (2) whether
the named plaintiffs’ counsel will adequately protect the interests of the class. Gaspar v. Linvatec
Corp., 167 F.R.D, 51, 58 (N.D. Ill. 1996).

Defendant does not argue that Plaintiffs’ counsel would not provide adequate class
representation. Plaintiffs’ counsel is experienced in multi-plaintiff litigation, and the Court cannot
identify any conflicts between Plaintiffs and the class members or an inadequacy in Plaintiffs’
counsel’s ability to protect the interests of the class.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Plaintiff seeks class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class
action may be maintained if “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to the available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3).

As discussed above, the questions of law and fact to the members of the class are similar to
the proposed class members and would predominate over questions affecting individual class
members, Furthermore, a class action is superior to the available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication ofthis controversy. Accordingly, the Court finds that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)
are met.

While the Defendant did not dispute class certification as a general matter, Defendant does



For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification is granted. The
certified class shall be defined as:

All persons who (i) were employees of Arthur Anderson LLP on or
about Appril 22, 2002, and before December 22, 2002; (ii) were at
job sites at 33 West Monroe Street in Chicago, 225 North Michigan
Avenue in Chicago, and St. Charles, Illinois; (iii) were terminated
without at least 60 days’ advance notice from their positiong; and (iv)

oan

received less than 60 days’ “job sear

Dated: Capes d, z, 2003

ited States District Judge



Plaintiffs allege that, without receiving proper notice, 635 employees were terminated at the
33 West Monroe site; 146 employees were terminated at the 225 North Michigan Avenue site; and
369 employees were terminated from the St. Charles site. Defendant does not dispute the number
of employees. The numerosity requirement is satisfied.
Commonality and Typicality

Commonality exists if the class members share common questions of law or fact. The
requirement is usually satisfied when a common nucleus of operative facts unites a class. Rosario
v, Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir, 1992). The presence of some factual variations among
the class members does not defeat commonality so long as there is at least one question of law or fact
common to the class. Rosario, F.2d at 1017.

The typicalityrequirement of Rule 23(a)(3) is closely related to the commonality requirement
of Rule 23(a)(2). Ruiz v. Stewart Associates, Inc., 171 F.R.D, 238, 242 (N.D. Ill. 1997). A
plaintiff's claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of action that gives
rise to the claims of other class members and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.
Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated the WARN Act by failing to pay employees
60 days’ pay after the reduction in force. The alleged failure to pay certain wages arises from the
same events and courses of action, and the claims are based on the same legal theory. Accordingly,
commonality and typicality exist in the instant case. See Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1017-18; Ladegaard
vy. Hard Rack Concrete Cutters, Inc., 2000 WL 1774091 at * 4-5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2000) (certifying
class action for alleged unlawful failure to pay employees for certain categories of work performed

during a particular period of time).


dispute the scope of the proposed class. Defendant argues that the scope of the proposed class must
be limited to the employment site of the representative Plaintiffs - 33 West Monroe.

The WARN Act requires employers of 100 or more full-time employees to give at least sixty
days’ advance notice of plant closings and mass layoffs to affected employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
A “mass layoff” is defined as “a reduction in force which — (A) is not the result of a plant closing; and
(B) results in an employment loss at a single site of employment during any 30-day period...” 29 U.S.C.
§ 2101(a)(B)(3). (Emphasis added). Furthermore, the WARN Act provides for aggregating the number
of laid-off employees. Section 2102(d) states: “For purposes of this section, in determining whether a
plant closing or mass layoff has occurred or will occur, employment losses for 2 or more groups af a
single site of employment, each of which is less than the minimum number of employees specified in
section 2101(a)(2) or (3) of this title...” 29 U.S.C. § 2102(d). (Emphasis added).

In order for there to be a violation of the Act, a mass layoff or plant closing must have occurred
at an individual employment site. However, while the WARN Act limits mass layoffs and plant closings
to individual sites, the WARN Act does not require that a person seeking to enforce the WARN Act be
cmployed at the site of the mass layoff or plant closing. The Act provides that:

A person seeking to enforce such liability, including a representative of

employees or a unit of local government aggrieved under paragraph (1)

or (3), may sue either for such person or for other persons similarly

situated, or both, in any district court of the United States...
29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5). The WARN Act, by giving a representative of employees or a unit of local
government the right to file suit under the Act, makes clear that employment at the site of the mass layoff
or plant closing is not a prerequisite for enforcing the Act on behalf of “other persons similarly situated”.

In the instant case, “other person similarly situated” includes those employees at the other Illinois

employment sites.



Minute Qydee Forma (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

ame of Assigned Sitti if Other
sendy Magistrate Judge John W. Darrah than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C2689 DATE 8/12/2003
CASE NANCY J. ROQUET vs. ARTHUR ANDERSON LLP
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature.

of the motion being presented.)

MOTION;
L
DOCKET ENTRY:
(70) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) a Brief in support of motion due __
(3) ao Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___.
(4) o Ruling/Hearingon_sset fora
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on set fora
(6) QO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—ssetfor_—at_
(7) oOo Trial{set for/re-set for] on __—_at
(8) Qo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continucd to at
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) ClLocalRule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) WE [Otherdocketentry] Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class
certification is granted.
al) ff (For further detail sec order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. umber of tices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone,

hUG 4.8, 2003,

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. 44unGa fosia ‘sn

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Copy to judge/magistrate judge. .

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Furthermore, contrary to Defendant’s contention, the Bledsoe v. Emery Worldwide Airlines, 258
F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Ohio) (Bledsoe) court did not find that class certification under the WARN Act
was restricted to individual employment sites. Instead, the court provisionally denied certifying the class
to include individuals from other employment sites because “no such individuals are contemplated by
the Second Amended Complaint, and the Plaintiffs make no attempt to qualify the parameters of their
proposed broadened definition.” 258 F. Supp. 2d at 800. Accordingly, Bledsve is inapposite of the
instant case.

Lastly, there is no issue in the instant case that requires the participation of a previous
employee of the other two employment sites. The application of the WARN Act to each of those
sites is solely a matter of numbers - - specifically, whether Defendant terminated within a 90-day
period either 1/3 of its workforce (with a minimum of 50 employees) or 500 employees at each of
those additional sites. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(3); 29 U.S.C. § 2102(d), These numbers are
undisputed. The only remaining issue is whether it was reasonably foreseeable by February 22,

2002, that Defendant would be required to initiate a mass lay-off. This issue applies to all three

employment sites.



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
NANCY J. ROQUET and CORETTA ROBINSON, +)
Plaintiffs, ‘ No. 02 C 2689
vy. } Judge John W. Darrah
ARTHUR ANDERSON LLP, }
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, Nancy J. Roquet (“Roquet”) and Coretta Robinson (“Robinson”), brought a class
action suit against Defendant, Arthur Anderson LLP (“Anderson”), alleging Defendant violated the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 2101-2109. Presently
before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Ccrtitication.

The underlying facts are fully set forth in this Court’s previous dispositions addressing the
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs’ Cross-
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Existence of Mass Layoff. Accordingly, they
need not be repeated here.

Plaintiffs’ proposed class is “all persons who (i) were employees of Arthur Anderson LLP
on or about Appril 22, 2002, and before December 22, 2002; (ii) were at job sites at 33 West Monroe
Street in Chicago, 225 North Michigan Avenue in Chicago, and St. Charles, Illinois; (iii) were
terminated without at least 60 days’ advance notice from their positions; and (iv) received less than

60 days’ ‘job search’”.

POCKETED

Avg 18 2003



To receive class certification, Plaintiffs must satisfy all four elements of Rule 23(a), which
include: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
Plaintiffs must also satisfy at least one of the three provisions under Rule 23(b).

The propriety of class certification is a separate issue than whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail on the merits of its claims, See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177
(1974). However, “[t]he proposition that a district judge must accept all of the complaint’s
allegations when deciding whether to certify a class cannot be found in Rule 23 and has nothing to
recommend it.” Szabo v, Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (Szabo).
Before certifying a class “ a judge should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary
under Rule 23.” Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676, For example, a district court would not be free to accept
an allegation of 10,000 class members for purposes of numerosity in the face of a dispute on that
point. See Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676. Accordingly, the Court does not determine the substantive
strength or weakness of the allegations in the complaint but rather the merits of the allegations only
as they bear on the suitability of a class action suit under Rule 23(a) and (b). See Rahim v. Sheahan,
2001 WL 1263493 at * 10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2001).

Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be so numerous that joinder of all the members is
impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Plaintiff need not demonstrate the exact number of class
members so long as a conclusion is apparent from good-faith estimates ( Peterson v. H & R Block
Tax Servs., 174 F.R.D. 78, 81 (N.D. Ill. 1997)); and the court is entitled to make “common sense
assumptions” in order to support a finding of numerosity (Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc., 100

F.R.D. 781, 785 (N.D. Ill. 1984)).