Secretary of State to release information in connection with matters of motor vehicle theft only if it
is sought “to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the
Automobile Information Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1231 et seq.), the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401
et seq.), and chapters 301, 305, and 321-331 of title 49.” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (emphasis added).
The purpose of title I of the Anti Car Theft Act is to reduce motor vehicle theft and related violence.
See P.L. 102-519. The purpose of title IV of that Act is to prevent stolen vehicles from being
exported to other countries. See id. Plaintiff’s allegations establish that he does not seek vehicle
information in furtherance of either of those goals.*

Plaintiff says that we read that paragraph too broadly. In his view, each of its phrases stands
alone. Thus, he argues, the statute requires the Secretary of State to release information sought in
connection with matters of motor vehicle . . . theft or in connection with matters of motor vehicle
emissions or in connection with matters of motor vehicle product alterations, and so on. Under this
interpretation, the phrase “to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of
1992, the Automobile Information Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1231 et seq.), the Clean Air Act (42
U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), and chapters 301, 305, and 321-331 of title 49” applies only to the last category

of information listed: “[matters of] removal of non-owner records from the original owner records

‘The purposes of the other statutes cited in that provision are: (1) to ensure that each new car has a
label containing the VIN number, price, place of manufacture, and similar information (Automobile
Information Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1232); (3) to protect and improve air quality (Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7401); (4) to reduce traffic accidents through the use of motor vehicle safety standards,
to create a national motor vehicle title information system to prevent introduction of stolen vehicles
into commerce, to assist consumers by developing damage susceptibility information for passenger
cars, to reduce loss from damage to motor vehicles through the use of bumper standards, to prohibit
odometer tampering, to create fuel economy standards and to prevent vehicle theft by creating theft
prevention standards (49 U.S.C. §§ 30101, 30502, 32302, 32501, 32701, 32902, 33102). Plaintiff
does not allege, nor did he argue, that he requested information to further any of these goals.


Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Secretary of State’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the
federal claims asserted against him is granted and those claims are dismissed with prejudice. The
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims asserted against all
defendants, which are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. The motion to dismiss
of ABT and the Johnsons is dismissed as moot. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against Patrick J.

Maguire is denied. This is a final and appealable order.

ENTER: — —— a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
PAUL E. PLUNKETT

patep: _JUN 18 2004


acivil action in a United States district court.”) The Court cannot expand by implication the limited
cause of action Congress expressly provided in the statute. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v, Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (“{I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a
statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others
into it.”).

Even if the DPPA does not provide a cause of action, plaintiff says it does create substantive
rights that can be vindicated through section 1983, He contends that the following provision vests
him with the right to receive title history information from the Secretary of State:

[information that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph,

social security number, driver identification number, name, address . . . , telephone

number, and medical or disability information} shall be disclosed for use in

connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle
emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories, performance
monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers, and
removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle
manufacturers to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act

of 1992, the Automobile Information Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1231 et seq.), the

Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), and chapters 301, 305, and 321-331 of title

49...

18 U.S.C. §§ 2721(b), 2725(3). Plaintiff says his requests to the Secretary fall within this provision
because he seeks the information to investigate, or prevent,’ the conversion of his interest in cars sold
to satisfy mechanic liens.

There are two problems with this argument. First, it equates conversion ofa security interest

with motor vehicle theft, two very different kinds of misconduct. Second, it ignores the modifier

found in the last sentence of the paragraph. Read with the modifier, that provision requires the

5Though plaintiff's allegations support the inference that he requests title histories on vehicles in
which he already owns an interest, at oral argument plaintiff admitted that he usually seeks such
information before he purchases an interest in a car.

3



of motor vehicle manufacturers.”

Plaintiff's argument, however, is fatally undercut by the rest of that provision, which permits,
but does not require, the Secretary of State to disclose motor vehicle information “for use in
connection with matters of motor vehicle . . . theft.” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(2). If, as plaintiff
contends, the first part of the provision requires the Secretary to release motor vehicle information
for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle theft, the second part, which permits its release
for that purpose, would be pointless. “[W]e have a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision
so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment.” In re Lifschultz Fast Freight
Corp, 63 F.3d 621, 628 (7" Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The only
interpretation that gives meaning to both parts of that provision is that the Secretary is required to
release information when it is requested for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle theft to
carry out the purposes of the statutes listed, and is permitted to release such information when it is
requested in connection with all other matters of motor vehicle theft. Because the DPPA does not
vest plaintiff with any enforceable right to the information he seeks, the Secretary of State’s failure

to provide it cannot be the basis for a section 1983 claim. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.

National Sea Clammers Ass’n., 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981) (noting that section 1983 action cannot be
premised on violation of a statute that does not create enforceable rights).
In short, plaintiff does not have a viable DPPA or section 1983 claim against the Secretary

of State. His federal claims are, therefore, dismissed.’

SBecause plaintiff seeks only prospective injunctive relief and his federal claims, though not viable,
are not so frivolous as to deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction, they are dismissed pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1). See Dame v. State of Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 137 F.3d
484, 488 (7" Cir. 1998) (“{SJuits against state officials secking prospective equitable relief for
ongoing violations of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”), Health Cost

5



Minute Order Form (06/97)

A United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
f Assigned Jud; Sitti judge if Or
or Magistrate Judge Paul E. Plunkett than Assigned Judge
€asE NUMBER 03 C 5206 DATE 6/18/2004
CASE Kenneth A. McCready vs. Jesse White, et al.
TITLE

Uin the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) im} Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) i} Brief in support of motion due

(3) im) Answer brief to motion due__. Reply to answer briefdue_

(4) Qo Ruling/Hearing on__set for__—_ at.

(5) o Status hearing(held/continued to] {set for/re-set for] on__setfor__—_at.

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—setfor__—sat_
(7) Qa Trial{set for/re-set for]on______at

(8) ag [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to_____at

(9) im This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) Local Rule 41.1 OO FRCP41(a)(1) © FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) of [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendant Jesse White’s Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the federal claims asserted against him (16-1) is granted, and those claims are
dismissed with prejudice. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims
asserted against all defendants, which are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. Defendants
Automotive Body and Tire Center, Inc., Krystyna Johnson and Phil Johnson’s motion to dismiss (13-1) is moot.
Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against Patrick J. Maguire (28-1) is denied. This is a final and appealable order.

(ll) {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document
Number

No notices required. ,
turber-of notice;

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

N21 20

Notified counsel by telephone. J ” gate docketed
oY | Docketing to mail notices. Pr
¥_| Mail AO 450 form. — i ry int

Copy to judge/magistrate judge. a

courtroom date sled notice
cw deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in ;
genteal Clerk? sfOffice railing deputy initials

isl heb



State Claims

Having dismissed plaintiffs federal claims, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state-law claims he asserts against the defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district
court[ ] may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . if [it] has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction.”)

Motion for Sanctions

Rule 11 prohibits attorneys from, among other things, misrepresenting the law or the facts
in papers presented to the Court. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b). It does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from
interpreting the law and the facts in a manner favorable to his client. Id. Mr. Maguire has done only

the latter. Thus, the Court has no basis for sanctioning him.

Controls v. Skinner, 44 F.3d 535, 537 (7" Cir. 1995) (“When both the subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal court and the substantive claim for relief are based on a federal statute, dismissal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction is proper only when the allegations of the complaint are frivolous.”).



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
KENNETH A. MCCREADY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 03 C 5206

) Paul E. Plunkett, Senior Judge
ILLINOIS SECRETARY OF STATE )
JESSE WHITE, AUTOMOTIVE BODY )
AND TIRE CENTER, INC., KRYSTYNA )
JOHNSON and PHIL JOHNSON, )
)
Defendants. )

HOCK Er
UN 2 .
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER i 2004

Kenneth McCready has sued defendants for their alleged violations of a variety of federal and
state laws. The case is before the Court on defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint
and plaintiff’ 's motion for sanctions. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the federal
claims asserted against the Secretary of State, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

state-law claims asserted against all defendants and denies the motion for sanctions.

Background’
Plaintiff is in the business of, among other things, buying commercial paper on motor

vehicles, Plaintiff reviews the newspaper advertisements for mechanic lien sales and then attempts

‘The facts in this section are drawn from the amended complaint and plaintiff's statements at oral

argument.
1 L-


to purchase the interest of the lender through whom the owner financed the vehicle purchase. Once
plaintiff has obtained that interest, he attempts to purchase the vehicle at the mechanic lien sale.
Plaintiff alleges that he has been thwarted in this process by the Secretary of State, who has
refused to provide him with a title history of the vehicles advertised for sale in violation of both
federal and state law. The private defendants have also impeded his efforts, plaintiffs says, by
refusing to provide him with information about the sales and falsifying documents they submit to
the Secretary of State about vehicles they sell. Plaintiffseeks injunctive relief against all defendants

and damages from Automotive Body & Tire Center (“ABT”) and the Johnsons.

Discussion

Motion to Dismiss — Federal Claims

Plaintiff charges the Secretary of State with violations of the Drivers Privacy Protection Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq. (“DPPA”) and 42 U.S.C. § (‘section’) 1983.’ The DPPA, as its name
implies, is designed to protect the privacy of personal information contained in motor vehicle
records. The statute provides criminal penalties for the misuse of such information, but provides a
private right of action for damages as well. That right of action, however, is only against individuals
and only in favor of individuals whose personal information from motor vehicle records has been
improperly disclosed or used. See 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) ( “A person who knowingly obtains,
discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted

under this chapter shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring

Plaintiff asserts no federal claims against defendants Automotive Body & Tire Center and Krystyna
and Phil Johnson, but contends that the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-
law claims he asserts against them. (See Pl.’s Resp. ABT & Johnson Mot. Dismiss at 4)

2