In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-3702 

RUSSELL ARMFIELD, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

SONJA NICKLAUS, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:17-cv-03331 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2020 — DECIDED JANUARY 11, 2021 

____________________ 

Before MANION, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

MANION, Circuit Judge. Russell Armfield, along with Kimothy Randall and Tyrene Nelson, was charged with first-degree murder in Illinois state court for the 2004 shooting death 

of Al Copeland in southwest Chicago. 

The jury convicted Armfield. He appealed the conviction 

on the grounds that a transcript disclosed inadvertently to the 

jury violated his constitutional rights under the Sixth 
2 No. 18-3702 

Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. He lost. He then pursued a collateral attack in state court alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. He lost again. He then filed for federal habeas relief via 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied relief 

and Armfield appeals. 

Although Armfield’s positions have been well briefed and 

argued by appointed counsel, we affirm denial of habeas relief on Armfield’s Confrontation Clause claim because the 

state’s strong case against him renders any constitutional error harmless. We also reject Armfield’s ineffective assistance 

claim; he cannot show trial counsel’s shortcomings resulted 

in prejudice. 

I. Background

Around 6:00 pm on August 17, 2004, Kimothy Randall 

opened fire on Al Copeland’s vehicle while Copeland drove 

by. Copeland’s car was struck by gunfire, as was a bystander’s 

vehicle. No one was injured. Russell Armfield and Tyrene 

Nelson were present. 

Later that evening, between 8:00 and 9:00 pm, while riding 

with Armfield and Nelson in a car driven by Randall’s girlfriend, Randall spotted Copeland again. Randall told his girlfriend to drive to his residence, where Armfield and Nelson 

armed themselves. They tracked down Copeland as he drove

away from his own girlfriend’s home. As Copeland approached an intersection, Randall gave the signal: shoot 

Copeland. Armfield and Nelson sprang from their car, ran toward Copeland, and fired multiple shots into his vehicle, killing him. 

The state charged Armfield, Randall, and Nelson with

first-degree murder. Armfield and his codefendants 
No. 18-3702 3

proceeded to trial before two juries—one jury for Armfield 

and Randall, the other for Nelson. The two trials, though separate, occurred simultaneously before the same judge, with 

the juries and defendants shuffling in and out depending on 

the evidence presented.1 

No doubt this arrangement contributed to the mishap at 

the center of this habeas petition. During deliberations, the 

Armfield/Randall jury requested a transcript of certain witnesses’ testimony. The court, by mistake, tendered a trial transcript containing the prosecutor’s opening statements from 

Nelson’s case. The Armfield/Randall jury had not heard this 

version. Therein, the prosecutor referenced a videotaped 

statement from Nelson that purported to implicate all three 

defendants in the murder:

And, ladies and gentlemen, you’re also going to 

see a statement given to a Cook County assistant state’s attorney that was videotaped of 

[Nelson] confessing to shooting Al Copeland 

and laying out essentially the same facts that I 

just told you. You will see him tell you how he 

and his partners murdered Al Copeland in his 

own words. 

1 Trial courts sometimes employ this practice to increase efficiency. 

Simultaneous trials can circumvent the need for duplicate presentation of 

overlapping evidence. But their use does not come risk-free. Here, the trial 

court’s confusion between two transcripts spawned years of postconviction litigation in state and federal court. Whatever resources the trial court 

hoped to save were cancelled out long ago by the tax on judicial economy.

We take this opportunity to implore trial courts to exercise caution and 

diligence when holding simultaneous trials. The mistake at the center of 

this case was completely avoidable.
4 No. 18-3702 

Supp. App’x at 164. 

Neither this snippet nor Nelson’s confession were presented as evidence of Armfield’s involvement. For that, the 

state leaned primarily on eyewitness testimony rather than 

physical evidence. 

Two witnesses placed Armfield, Nelson, and Randall at 

the 6:00 pm shooting scene. One of those witnesses actually 

saw Randall pull the trigger and believed Armfield acted as a 

lookout. 

Grand jury testimony and a police statement from Randall’s sister revealed how the defendants obtained guns just 

before they killed Copeland, though she recanted that story at 

trial. 

Three more witnesses detailed the defendants’ involvement in the fatal 9:00 pm shooting. Copeland’s girlfriend and 

a bystander watched Armfield and Nelson shoot Copeland. 

The latter positively identified Armfield and Nelson as the 

shooters; he knew them from the neighborhood. Randall’s 

girlfriend (the driver) told police and the grand jury Randall 

instructed Armfield and Nelson to shoot Copeland, and that 

when Armfield returned to the car, he admitted to firing his 

weapon. Like Randall’s sister, she recanted this account on 

the stand. 

Finally, the state introduced evidence regarding a subsequent shooting in March 2005 involving Nelson, following 

which police confiscated one of the firearms used in 

Copeland’s murder. Armfield played no part in this shooting.

Neither Armfield nor Randall put on a defense, and none 

of the three defendants testified before the Armfield/Randall 

jury. 
No. 18-3702 5

The jury convicted Armfield of first-degree murder.2 He 

received a sentence of 33 years’ imprisonment. Armfield appealed on grounds that disclosing the reference to Nelson’s 

confession deprived him of a fair trial, along the lines of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The state appellate 

court acknowledged the error in allowing Armfield’s jury access to opening statements from a separate trial. It nonetheless 

held this error non-reversible and further determined it to be 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois Supreme 

Court denied review. 

Armfield next launched a state collateral attack on the conviction. The basis: his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in multiple respects, including by failing to move to exclude testimony about the March 2005 shooting that did not 

involve Armfield. The state appellate court rejected his claim 

for failure to satisfy prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Illinois Supreme Court denied review. 

Armfield filed for federal habeas relief. The district court 

concluded the state appellate court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent to Armfield’s Confrontation 

Clause claim or the related harmlessness analysis. Nor did the 

state court’s prejudice determination unreasonably apply 

Strickland. We granted Armfield’s request for a certificate of

appealability on these two issues. 

2 The jury was also asked to determine whether Armfield personally 

discharged a firearm during the commission of the offense. The jury found 

he did not. 
6 No. 18-3702 

II. Discussion

We review the district court’s denial of federal habeas relief de novo, “but our inquiry is an otherwise narrow one.” 

Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2018) (en banc). 

A federal court may grant habeas relief following an adjudication on the merits in state court only if that decision (1) 

“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2254(d)(1)–(2); Schmidt, 911 F.3d at 476–77. 

This standard is difficult to meet. “Unreasonable means 

more than incorrect.” Winfield v. Dorethy, 956 F.3d 442, 451 

(7th Cir. 2020). The inquiry is “whether the decision was unreasonably wrong under an objective standard.” Dassey v. 

Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 302 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 

On both Armfield’s claims, the Illinois Appellate Court issued the “last reasoned decision on the merits,” so we afford 

its analysis deference so long as that analysis is reasonable. 

Gage v. Richardson, 978 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 2020). Habeas 

relief is warranted only if Armfield shows the state court’s determinations were “so lacking in justification that there was 

an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Given this demanding standard of review, we cannot award Armfield the relief 

he seeks. 
No. 18-3702 7

A. Confrontation Clause 

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees 

a criminal defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, so that he may cross-examine their testimony and allow the jury to weigh their credibility. Douglas v. 

Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418–19 (1965). 

Armfield’s jury received information that Nelson made a 

videotaped statement implicating Armfield in the murder. Yet 

Nelson did not testify at Armfield’s trial. This information 

reached the jury as would an ex parte affidavit or deposition, 

thus depriving Armfield of the opportunity to rebut Nelson 

through cross-examination. Armfield argues the disclosure

amounted to a violation of his constitutional rights and 

should result in habeas relief. 

The state appellate court acknowledged the “unquestionabl[e] ... error by the trial court.” Short App’x at 35. But it held 

the error did not create a constitutional violation contemplated by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Armfield 

claims this ruling was contrary to and unreasonably applied 

Supreme Court precedent, and that it rested on unreasonable 

determinations of fact. 

i. Constitutional violation? 

In Bruton, at a joint trial for armed robbery, an investigator 

testified to a codefendant’s confession that implicated petitioner. 391 U.S. at 124. The codefendant did not testify. The 

Court held the admission violated petitioner’s constitutional

right to cross-examine his codefendant. Id. at 126. This, despite jury instructions prohibiting the confession’s consideration toward determining petitioner’s guilt. The jury could not 
8 No. 18-3702 

reasonably be expected to ignore the confession, which added 

substantial strength to the prosecution’s case. 

The Bruton Court also placed great emphasis on the confession being admitted into evidence; it was not merely paraphrased through attorney statements or argument. Rather, 

the jury received its entire substance, as was true in Douglas, 

where the prosecutor read a codefendant’s confession into the 

record “under the guise of cross-examination to refresh [the 

codefendant’s] recollection” after the codefendant refused to 

answer questions about the crime. 380 U.S. at 416. That confession inculpated petitioner. Though reading the codefendant’s confession did not technically qualify as testimony, doing so risked the jury equating it with evidence and created 

an inference that the codefendant actually made the statement. The inference could not be tested on cross-examination 

because the prosecutor was not himself a witness; nor could 

the codefendant be cross-examined on a statement “imputed 

to but not admitted by him.” Id. at 419. This procedure denied 

petitioner his right of confrontation. 

The situation in Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), presented far less a threat to petitioner’s confrontation rights.3 In 

that case, the prosecutor summarized anticipated testimony 

from petitioner’s codefendant (who had already pled guilty

to the same offense) during opening statements. The summary itself “was not emphasized in any particular way,” but 

it referenced a confession made by the codefendant. Id. at 733. 

That testimony never materialized; the codefendant invoked 

his right against self-incrimination when he took the stand. 

3 The state appellate court did not consider Frazier, but the district 

court did. 
No. 18-3702 9

Even if it had, the statement “was not a vitally important part 

of the prosecution’s case,” and the jury was instructed that 

opening statements must not be considered as evidence. Id. at 

735. 

These facts led the Frazier Court to conclude no constitutional violation had occurred. In so holding, the Court rejected the same general argument Armfield makes: the reference to his codefendant’s confession in opening statements—

albeit in Nelson’s trial, not his own—“placed the substance of 

[Nelson’s] statement before the jury in a way that ‘may well 

have been the equivalent in the jury’s mind of testimony.’” Id.

at 734 (quoting Douglas, 380 U.S. at 419). 

Resolving Armfield’s Confrontation Clause challenge 

boils down to determining on which side of the Bruton/Frazier

line his case falls. 

Armfield maintains his conviction flies in the face of Bruton as well as analogous Supreme Court precedent addressing 

the use of redacted codefendant confessions at joint trials. For 

example, Armfield argues while the summary of Nelson’s 

confession did not mention Armfield by name, that quasi redaction would still permit the jury to consider it against him.

The prosecutor’s summary stated “[Nelson] and his partners 

murdered Al Copeland.” Having just sat through three days 

of testimony corroborating the state’s theme that Armfield, 

Randall, and Nelson acted as a team, a juror at Armfield’s trial 

“need only lift his eyes to [Armfield], sitting at counsel table,” 

to figure out the identity of Nelson’s “partners.” Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 193 (1998) (holding confession redactions 

that obviously refer to defendant fall within Bruton’s protective rule); but see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) 

(“[T]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission 
10 No. 18-3702 

of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to 

eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to 

his or her existence.”). 

Armfield further distinguishes his case from Frazier by 

claiming his jury received the substance of Nelson’s confession, i.e., how Nelson and his partners murdered Copeland. 

Because his jurors had already heard testimony about the 

murder’s details, Armfield argues the disclosure of the fact 

that Nelson confessed validated those facts in their minds. 

On the flipside, Armfield’s jury was not exposed to Nelson’s confession itself. The wayward transcript contained 

only opening statements from Nelson’s trial; it did not include

evidence that Armfield’s jurors did not observe. 

Moreover, the allusion to Nelson’s confession was generic 

and fleeting, occupying only seven lines of transcript text toward the end of the prosecutor’s monologue. Nelson’s confession (and the fact that he gave one) played no part in the prosecution’s case-in-chief against Armfield. In addition, the trial 

judge instructed Armfield’s jury to consider only evidence in 

the form of witness testimony, exhibits, and stipulations; the 

judge then gave a clear follow-up instruction that opening 

statements are not evidence.4 These instructions did not present the same concerns outlined by the Court in Bruton. See 

Frazier, 394 U.S. at 736 (“Even if it is unreasonable to assume 

that a jury can disregard a coconspirator’s statement when 

4 Query whether the jury would interpret this second instruction to 

prohibit treating opening statements from Nelson’s trial as evidence, or 

whether that instruction carried such force at all. We need not answer 

these questions given our holding.
No. 18-3702 11

introduced against one of two joint defendants, it does not 

seem at all remarkable to assume that the jury will ordinarily 

be able to limit its consideration to the evidence introduced 

during the trial.”). 

We need not answer whether the state appellate court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent or rested its decision on an unreasonable interpretation of the facts when it 

held the transcript mix-up caused no reversible constitutional 

error. Even were Armfield’s Confrontation Clause rights violated, any such violation was harmless. 

ii. Harmlessness

Federal habeas relief “is appropriate only if the prosecution cannot demonstrate harmlessness.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 

U.S. 257, 267 (2015). And Armfield does not argue the jury’s 

receipt of Nelson’s trial transcript constitutes “the rare type of 

error” that overrides the harmlessness requirement. See id.

(citing Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 23 (2014)). 

Procedural posture determines how we assess harmless 

error. Courts reviewing cases on direct appeal may find a constitutional violation harmless only if the error was “harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ayala, 576 U.S. at 267 (quoting 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Collateral proceedings like this one require more from the habeas petitioner. Armfield is “not entitled to habeas relief based on trial 

error unless [he] can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). In other 

words, relief is proper only if the federal court has “grave 

doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.’” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). 
12 No. 18-3702 

We employ Brecht’s “actual prejudice” test even if the state 

appellate court reviewed the matter through Chapman’s harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt lens. Jones v. Basinger, 635 

F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Ayala, 576 U.S. at 268–

70 (explaining the Brecht standard subsumes § 2254(d)’s requirements when a federal habeas petitioner challenges the 

state court’s Chapman finding). We employ a de novo review of 

the entire record, asking “whether a properly instructed jury 

would have arrived at the same verdict, absent the error.” 

Czech v. Melvin, 904 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2018). 

Note: harmless-error review is distinct from assessing

whether there was enough evidence at trial to support a verdict. Jensen v. Clements, 800 F.3d 892, 902 (7th Cir. 2015). The 

question here is whether the error “had or reasonably may be 

taken to have had” a substantial influence on the jury’s decision. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946). When 

sizing up the state’s case, we look at the case’s overall 

strength, not just the evidence in the state’s favor. Jensen, 800 

F.3d at 906. For cases involving Confrontation Clause errors, 

we examine factors like the importance of the disclosed statements to the prosecution’s case, whether the disclosure was 

cumulative, the presence of corroborating evidence, and the 

extent of cross-examination permitted. Id. at 904. 

It’s obvious Armfield had no chance to cross-examine Nelson (or anyone) about Nelson’s statement to police. The short 

summary of Nelson’s confession can also be considered 

mostly cumulative; the disclosed opening statement indicates 

the confession “lay[s] out essentially the same facts” as those 

making up the state’s theory against Armfield. The summary 

filled no gaps in the state’s evidence. 
No. 18-3702 13

The bigger question here is what role, if any, the inadvertent disclosure played in the government’s case. Based on the 

detailed, consistent testimony from several independent witnesses confirming Armfield’s involvement, we cannot conclude the disclosure of Nelson’s confession had or reasonably 

may have had a substantial influence on the jury’s decision. 

Two separate witnesses placed all three defendants at the 

6:00 pm shooting. Willie Williams spotted Nelson pushing 

Randall in a wheelchair. Williams knew both men from the 

neighborhood. He watched as Nelson handed Randall a pistol. He saw Randall open fire on a gray Chevrolet. Williams 

also noticed a third man, later identified as Armfield, standing 

in a nearby alley. To Williams, it seemed Armfield was acting 

as a lookout. 

Yakirah Robinson was driving her own car close to the 

gray Chevrolet. She saw Randall in a wheelchair with Nelson 

standing behind him. She saw Armfield nearby, too. She 

heard close-range gunshots and sped off without seeing who 

fired them. When she reached safety, Robinson noticed her 

car had been struck by at least one bullet. She made a police 

report and watched as Al Copeland spoke with law enforcement. His vehicle, a gray Chevrolet Cavalier, had also been 

shot. 

Three hours later (around 9:00 pm) and a few blocks from 

the first shooting, Calshaun Vinson observed Copeland driving away from a restaurant. Vinson had known Copeland

since childhood. Vinson also saw all three defendants in a 

black car. He could see Randall in the front passenger seat

with Nelson and Armfield in the rear. He could tell Randall’s 

girlfriend, Ayeshia Floyd, was driving. Vinson knew the three 

defendants. 
14 No. 18-3702 

The vehicle in which Vinson was riding came to a stop. 

From there, he could see Copeland’s car approach a nearby 

intersection. Vinson watched Armfield and Nelson exit the 

black car and run toward the intersection. He saw them shoot 

at Copeland’s car. 

Copeland had just dropped off Kawana Jenkins and her 

three children at Jenkins’s home. As Copeland drove away, 

Jenkins saw a young man flag him down. She saw Copeland 

open his car door. She saw the young man open fire on 

Copeland. She saw Copeland accelerate away, but as he 

reached an intersection, another individual emerged and began shooting at Copeland. Copeland crashed. Jenkins ran to 

his car and found him slumped over. 

The assailants shot Copeland five times. He died before 

reaching the hospital. 

Physical evidence collected from the murder scene supported this two-shooter narrative. Investigators found bullet 

fragments and spent cartridge cases of two different calibers, 

9mm and .40 caliber, fired from two different guns. The spent 

cases were found at different positions; the 9mm cases were 

grouped in the middle of the street, and the .40-caliber cases 

were grouped several addresses away, on the sidewalk. 

In March 2005, Floyd gave a statement to investigators 

about Copeland’s murder and testified before a grand jury. 

With Floyd on the stand at trial, the state introduced her 

grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes. Floyd told 

the grand jury that, around 9:00 pm on August 17, 2004, she 

was driving a car with Randall in the front passenger seat and 

Nelson and Armfield in the rear. 
No. 18-3702 15

Floyd stated, after Randall spotted Copeland, he called his 

sister and asked her to retrieve a hooded sweatshirt and some 

urine bags5 from his house. Floyd drove the trio to Randall’s 

home. There, Randall’s sister, Sinquis Prosper, brought the requested items to the car. Floyd observed Randall’s sister cradling the sweatshirt with two hands. 

Floyd informed the grand jury she then drove the defendants to the vicinity of Jenkins’ home, where Randall watched 

Copeland drop off Jenkins and her children. Floyd witnessed 

Randall instruct Armfield and Nelson to “take care of business.” Floyd understood this to mean Armfield and Nelson 

should shoot Copeland. 

Armfield and Nelson exited the vehicle and headed toward Copeland. Floyd heard several gunshots and then saw 

Armfield and Nelson running back to her car. Armfield had a 

gun in his hand and Nelson was holding his side as if carrying 

a gun. They got back in Floyd’s car. Armfield, complaining 

about Nelson’s hesitancy, exclaimed: “[He] didn’t want to 

shoot until I started to shoot.” 

Prosper testified at trial, too. She attested to the phone call 

and visit from her brother occurring shortly before 9:00 pm 

on August 17, 2004. She also confirmed Randall arrived in a 

car driven by Floyd, with Armfield and Nelson sitting in the 

rear. She gave Randall the requested sweatshirt and urine 

bags. Prosper told police and the grand jury the sweatshirt 

contained hard, heavy objects in its pockets. Though Prosper

did not look inside the pockets, she believed they contained 

guns; she knew Randall kept guns in the house. The state

5 For Randall’s medical condition. He is paralyzed. 
16 No. 18-3702 

introduced Prosper’s police statement and grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes. 

Despite these accounts, the prosecution’s case against 

Armfield did not go unchallenged. No physical evidence tied 

Armfield to either the 6:00 pm or the 9:00 pm shooting. No 

suitable latent fingerprints were left on any of the cartridge 

cases found at the murder scene. Police did confiscate a 9mm 

pistol after responding to a March 2005 shooting involving 

Armfield’s codefendant, Nelson (more on that, below). Although forensic analysis matched that gun to the 9mm cartridge cases recovered from the murder scene, Armfield had 

nothing to do with the events surrounding the pistol’s confiscation. 

The state’s witnesses had their share of credibility issues. 

Williams did not identify Armfield at the scene until he 

picked Armfield from a police photo lineup in April 2005—a 

full eight months after the shooting. Nor did he even recognize Armfield in the courtroom at trial. Williams also admitted to testifying while on heroin. 

Vinson spoke to police the night of Copeland’s murder,

but he did not provide his full account until being charged 

with a felony firearm offense in March 2005. He received no 

promises for cooperating yet his gun charge was dismissed. 

Prosper and Floyd each recanted at trial and told the jury 

they had been threatened by police to lie. Prosper testified the 

police and a state’s attorney instructed her to falsely claim she 

felt heavy, hard objects in the sweatshirt, or else face jail. She 

claimed the entirety of her grand jury testimony was fabricated other than the fact that she delivered urine bags and a 

sweatshirt to her brother on August 17, 2004. 
No. 18-3702 17

Floyd stated police gave her a bogus series of events to 

memorize and regurgitate before the grand jury. She purported to comply only after investigators threatened her with 

a first-degree murder charge and 12 years’ imprisonment on 

three unrelated drug counts. Per Floyd’s revised story, she 

and the three defendants spent the day Copeland died driving around smoking marijuana. Floyd confirmed the encounter with Prosper involving urine bags and a sweatshirt, but 

she denied everything else she had told police regarding 

Copeland’s murder. She claimed those additional events did 

not happen. She also testified she could not remember what 

she told the grand jury, adding it was all a lie anyway. 

Floyd and Prosper’s claims of coercion conflicted with 

their grand jury testimony, in which they stated no promises 

or threats had been made in connection with their willingness 

to talk with investigators. The government also put on witnesses who denied Prosper and Floyd’s accusations of threats 

from law enforcement. The jurors had the opportunity to 

weigh those rebuttals against the allegations. They knew of 

Prosper and Floyd’s close relationships with Randall and 

could infer from them a motive to protect him. They also 

heard a portion of Floyd’s grand jury testimony in which she 

explained Randall abused her and she was scared he could 

have her harmed or killed. 

Armfield contends the flaws in the state’s case made the 

question of his guilt a razor-thin call. The jury, after all, deliberated for nearly fourteen hours. At one point the jurors informed the judge they reached an impasse and had to be instructed to keep deliberating. He also points to the jury’s conclusion that he did not fire a weapon during the murder as 

proof that it rejected evidence to the contrary, such as Vinson 
18 No. 18-3702 

and Floyd’s accounts. Since the jury discredited those key witnesses, there was little left of the prosecution’s case and the 

disclosed opening statements from Nelson’s trial must have 

tipped the scale against him, he claims. 

We disagree. First, that the jury determined Armfield did 

not discharge a weapon does not mean the jury rejected 

Vinson and Floyd’s testimony entirely. Nor does the special 

verdict bear on Armfield’s guilt for first-degree murder because he still faced accomplice liability. The jury found him 

guilty of that crime; he participated directly in bringing about 

Copeland’s death. In other words, even if the jury discounted 

testimony that Armfield himself fired at Copeland, that does 

not elevate the disclosed summary of Nelson’s confession automatically (or at all); the special verdict does not tell us

whether the disclosure had a “substantial and injurious” influence on the jury’s ability to find Armfield guilty of murder. 

More significant is the weight of evidence against Armfield. Multiple unconnected witnesses corroborated the 

state’s theory: Armfield acted as part of a three-man crew that 

tried to kill Copeland once, failed, tried again only hours later, 

and succeeded. Two bystanders placed him, along with Nelson and Randall, at the scene of the 6:00 pm attempt on 

Copeland’s life. Two more witnesses—one bystander and one

accomplice—confirmed Armfield and Nelson’s roles as trigger men in the 9:00 pm shooting and additionally placed Randall at the scene. Physical evidence and an additional witness 

supported the two-shooter theory. Another witness identified 

all three men together, only minutes before the fatal shooting, 

when delivering them a sweatshirt containing what she believed to be guns. For all their personal credibility baggage, 

the witnesses’ narratives were consistent in substance and 
No. 18-3702 19

detail. Vinson’s testimony and Floyd’s grand jury statements

were especially damning. 

The trial evidence alone spanned almost 450 pages of transcript. Not once did the state discuss or even hint at Nelson’s 

confession. Only during deliberations was Armfield’s jury exposed to a summary of Nelson’s confession—a summary lasting two sentences, made during opening statements (not evidence) in another trial, that revealed no new details about the 

murder. Review of the entire record leaves us with no “grave 

doubt” about harmlessness. The disclosure was inconsequential next to the evidence, and a “properly instructed jury 

would have arrived at the same verdict” absent the disclosure. Czech, 904 F.3d at 577. Armfield’s Confrontation Clause 

claim warrants no habeas relief. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Armfield also maintains he received ineffective assistance 

of counsel because his trial attorney did not move to exclude 

evidence concerning a shooting that happened in March 2005. 

Armfield raised this claim in a collateral postconviction proceeding. The state appellate court denied him relief. Armfield 

now insists the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in 

concluding trial counsel’s error did not prejudice his case. 

At trial, Tykima Walker testified that on March 18, 2005, 

she drove her two children to the Cook County jail to visit one 

of the children’s fathers. Three men in another vehicle, a 

Grand Prix, followed her. She identified one of them as Nelson. At some point along the way, they began shooting at her 

car. When Walker arrived at the jail, Nelson and another of 

the Grand Prix occupants exited their car and followed her 

inside. 
20 No. 18-3702 

Officer Frank Ramaglia responded to reports of a person 

with a gun in a white Grand Prix. He located the Grand Prix, 

parked. At this point, only one individual remained in the car: 

a Calvin Armfield—not our petitioner, Russell Armfield. 

Ramaglia testified he placed Calvin Armfield in custody and 

retrieved three firearms from the car: a .380-caliber machine 

pistol; a .40-caliber pistol; and a 9mm pistol. Forensic ballistics 

analysis determined the 9mm pistol had been used in 

Copeland’s murder. The jury viewed all three guns while the 

prosecutor had Ramaglia verify chain of custody. 

Strickland v. Washington provides the clearly established 

federal law for Armfield’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Pursuant to Strickland, Armfield 

must show (1) counsel’s performance “fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 688, 

694. Failure to prove either deficient performance or prejudice 

defeats a petitioner’s claim. Winfield, 956 F.3d at 452. 

For prejudice, a reasonable probability is one “sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. The “likelihood of a different result must be substantial, 

not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. 

The state appellate court did not address whether trial 

counsel performed deficiently under Strickland’s first prong. 

We need not address performance either if resolving the claim

on prejudice will do. McNary v. Lemke, 708 F.3d 905, 914 (7th 

Cir. 2013). But the state court indeed assessed prejudice, and 

our review is “doubly” deferential at this stage. Richter, 562 

U.S. at 105. 
No. 18-3702 21

Here, even if counsel’s failure to object was sub-standard, 

that failure did not prejudice Armfield’s case. 

As with Armfield’s briefing of harmlessness, much of his

argument for prejudice rests on his view that the state brought 

a weak case against him. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (“[A]

verdict ... weakly supported by the record is more likely to 

have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”). Granted, the state’s evidence against Armfield 

was not one-sided, but it was both robust and compelling. We 

discussed the evidence’s strength (and shortcomings) in the 

preceding section and need not repeat ourselves. 

In addition, Armfield highlights the Illinois Appellate 

Court’s adoption of its earlier assessment of Armfield’s case 

on direct appeal. On direct appeal, the state court incorrectly 

determined police recovered the 9mm pistol used in 

Copeland’s murder from petitioner’s car, not that of Calvin 

Armfield. Armfield argues this mistake constitutes an unreasonable determination of fact that should result in habeas relief. 

But nothing indicates the jury made that same mistake. 

Early on in closing arguments, while referring to Armfield 

and Randall, the prosecutor said “they” are so bold as to shoot 

up the area around the Cook County jail. That was technically 

incorrect; only Nelson took part in the shooting near the jail.

Armfield and Randall had nothing to do with it. The misstatement, however, was minor, and we can find no prejudice resulting from it. Indeed, the prosecutor made sure to include

Calvin Armfield’s first name when later getting into the particulars of the March 2005 shooting, distinguishing that individual from petitioner. At one point, the prosecutor began to 

refer to Calvin Armfield as petitioner’s brother. Defense 
22 No. 18-3702 

counsel objected and the judge sustained the objection, explaining, “There is no testimony about what relation the one 

bore to the other.” Supp. App’x at 574. Given this context, 

there was little room for the jury to confuse the two. Nor was 

the jury likely to associate the .380- and .40-caliber guns recovered in March 2005 with Copeland’s murder. Nothing 

linked those weapons to the fatal August 2004 shooting in any 

way, and the jury’s exposure to them was momentary and 

procedural at most. 

Relatedly, Armfield implies trial counsel’s failure to object 

allowed the state to unfairly lump him in with “superpredators” brazen enough to shoot up an area with heavy law enforcement presence near the jail and courthouse. The prosecution didn’t need to reference the March 2005 shooting for 

the jury to draw that conclusion. Armfield fit the bill thanks 

to his role in two shootings on the same day on the public 

streets of the same neighborhood. 

The state appellate court did not apply Strickland’s prejudice test unreasonably. Considering the strength of the prosecution’s evidence against the secondary value added by the 

March 2005 shooting, there exists no substantial likelihood of 

a different result here. 

III. Conclusion

The Illinois Appellate Court reviewed Armfield’s conviction twice: once on direct appeal (his Confrontation Clause 

challenge), and again through collateral proceedings (his ineffective assistance of counsel challenge). In neither instance 

did the state court resort to an unreasonable analysis that 

would permit federal habeas relief. The state’s case against 

Armfield was strong, with multiple, independent witnesses 
No. 18-3702 23

swearing to the same events and implicating him as a key 

player in Al Copeland’s murder. Thus, Armfield cannot overcome harmlessness or make a showing of prejudice, as required for his two claims. The district court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED.