# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed December 27, 2018. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearin g.

________________ No. 3D17-452 Lower Tribunal Nos. 17-376 & 17-1770

________________ 

### Daniel Junior, etc., Appellant,

vs. 

### James LaCroix, Appellee. An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315(a) f rom the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Milton Hirsch, Judge. Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Michae l B. Valdes and Oren Rosenthal, Assistant County Attorneys, for appe llant. Woodward and Reizenstein, P.A., and Philip L. Reizenstein and Bhakti Kadiwar, for appellee. Chad A. Reader, William C. Peachey, Erez Reuveni and Vinita B. Andrapalliyal (Washington, D.C.), for the United States of Amer ica as amicus curiae

.

Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and SCALES, JJ. SCALES, J.2 Appellant Daniel Junior, the director of the Miami-Dade Count y Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (“Department”), appeals the trial court’s writ of habeas corpus that, inter alia : (1) ordered the release of the appellee James La Croix, notwithstanding that LaCroix was subject to a federal immigrati on detainer; and (2) declared Miami-Dade County’s policy toward federal immigration detainers to be

unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment of the United State Constitution. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the c onstitutionality of the subject federal immigration detainer, we reverse and quash the writ. 1

I. Facts A. LaCroix held in custody Twice in January of 2017, LaCroix was charged with driving wit h a suspended license while an habitual traffic offender, a third degree felo ny pursuant to section 322.34(5) of the Florida Statutes. LaCroix was out on felony bo nd for the first offense when he was arrested for the second offense. Upon this second arrest, he was placed in the custody of the Department. LaCroix pleaded guilty to each offense, and

1 Because LaCroix has been deported pursuant to the subject fede ral immigration detainer, LaCroix argues that Department’s appeal is moot. Notw ithstanding LaCroix’s mootness claim, we examine the legal appropriateness of the writ because the issues implicated by it are likely to recur. “It is well se ttled that mootness does not destroy an appellate court’s jurisdiction . . . when the qu estions raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur.” Holly v. Auld, 450 S o. 2d 217, 218 n.1 (Fla. 1984).3 on February 28, 2017, the trial court adjudicated him guilty an d sentenced him to

time served. Thus, as of February 28, 2017, LaCroix was eligible for releas e from jail. While he was in custody, however, the Department of Homeland Se curity (DHS) transmitted to Department a DHS Form I-247X, commonly known as a federal immigration detainer. In this form, an officer of the United St ates Immigration and Customs Enforcement represented that the federal government sus pected that LaCroix, a Haitian national, was “a removable alien.” As such, the form requested that Department maintain custody of LaCroix for an additional p eriod not to exceed forty-eight hours after the time he would otherwise be released from jail in order to allow DHS to take custody of him. On March 1, 2017, LaCroix was transferred into federal custody pursuant to the federal immigration detainer. LaCroix remained in the count y jail pursuant to this detainer request. At some point, LaCroix was deported from the United States. 2 B. The habeas corpus proceedings below On February 28, 2017, LaCroix filed in the trial court an “Emer gency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” LaCroix’s petition simply stated th at Department had failed to release LaCroix from jail after the expiration of his sentence. Immediately

2 The record is not clear as to precisely when LaCroix was trans ported from the county jail and deported.4 after receiving LaCroix’s petition, the trial court ordered Dep artment to file a response by March 2, 2017. Department met this filing deadline and, on March 2, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on LaCroix’s petition . Although LaCroix was no longer in Department’s custody, the trial court nonethel ess entered the instant writ of habeas corpus on March 3, 2017. Department timely appea ls C. Miami-Dade County’s policy toward immigration detainer reque sts LaCroix’s habeas corpus proceedings unfolded against the backgr ound of Miami-Dade County’s efforts to adjust to evolving federal immig ration policy. In 2013, the Miami-Dade County Commission passed Resolution No. R- 1008-13, which directed the County Mayor to implement a policy whereby D epartment would not honor a federal immigration detainer request unless: (i) th e federal government agreed to reimburse Miami-Dade County for all expenses related to the detainer request, and (ii) the inmate had either a conviction for a forc ible felony or a pending charge of a non-bondable offense. Because the federal governmen t and Miami-Dade County never came to agreement over the terms of this 2013 Reso lution, MiamiDade County ended its cooperation on federal immigration detain er requests. On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order tha t, in part, would terminate certain federal grant funding to local government “sa nctuary jurisdictions.” Even though Miami-Dade County had not declared itself a “sanctuary” county, given the discord with the federal governme nt over County5 Resolution No. R-1008-13, the County Mayor directed Department to begin honoring federal immigration detainer requests again. The Miami-Dade County Commission convened in special session on February 17, 2017, to consider to what extent Miami-Dade County should cooperate with the DHS on federal immigration detainer requests in light of the federal government’s apparent threat to restrict grant funding to Miami -Dade County. At this meeting, the County Commission adopted two Resolutions: (i ) to return to Miami-Dade County’s pre-2013 policy of cooperation on immigrati on detainer requests so long as the federal government showed probable caus e for the detainer (Resolution No. R-163-17); and (ii) to authorize an appropriate legal challenge in the event the federal government denied grant funding due to Mi ami-Dade County’s policy on federal immigration detainer requests (Resolution No. R-164-17). 3 D. The Tenth Amendment basis for the trial court’s grant of the writ In adjudicating LaCroix’s habeas corpus petition, the trial cou rt applied a Tenth Amendment analysis to Department’s continued incarceratio n of LaCroix. 4

3 As Department’s initial brief points out, the meaning and impl ications of the January 25, 2017 Executive Order; the federal government’s immi gration detainer policies; federal grant guidelines as they relate to local gove rnment compliance with federal immigration law; and the status of Miami-Dade County’s own compliance with the relevant federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1373, all continued t o evolve in the months after the trial court granted the writ of habeas corpus to LaCr oix. Our focus, though, is on the trial court’s action of March 2-3, 2017.6 The trial court found that because the federal government has e xclusive dominion over immigration and deportation, Department cannot be “command eered” to perform the federal function of detaining prisoners for deporta tion purposes. In other words, DHS could not “conscript” Department officers and facili ties to continue LaCroix’s custody after his state sentence expired. The trial c ourt also found that President Trump’s Executive Order coerced Department compliance based on the threat of lost grant funding to Miami-Dade County if Department declined to cooperate with federal immigration detainer requests. Finally, the trial court found that LaCroix had standing to seek habeas corpus relief based on a Tenth Amendment

violation. II. Analysis 5 We quash the subject writ on the authority of Ricketts v. Palm Beach County Sheriff, 985 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), which held that a State trial court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a federal immigratio n detainer. In the Ricketts case, the Palm Beach County Sheriff arrested R icketts for a third degree felony and held him in the county jail. After Rick etts attempted to post

4 The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides : “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peop le.”

5 Our standard of review for a writ of habeas corpus is de novo . State v. S.M., 131 So. 3d 780, 784 (Fla. 2013).7 bond, the Sheriff refused to accept the bond because the Sherif f had received a federal immigration detainer request. Ricketts sought habeas co rpus relief from the circuit court, asserting that he was illegally detained without judicial oversight or a showing of probable cause. Id. at 592. The trial court denied R icketts’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and the Fourth District affirmed. Id. at 592-93. The Fourth District, citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), stated: “[ A] state court cannot adjudicate the validity of the federal detainer, as the area of immigration and naturalization is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the fede ral government.” Id. at

593. The Court in Ricketts recognized that, once a person in custod y becomes subject to a valid federal immigration detainer, he or she no l onger is held in the custody of the state. Id. On the date of his petition for habea s corpus relief, LaCroix’s physical location was a county jail cell, but his custodial sta tus was established under federal authority. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdicti on over a person in custody pursuant to valid federal authority. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 523-24 (1858). LaCroix seeks to distinguish Ricketts by arguing that Ricketts challenged his detention on due process grounds rather than on a Tenth Amendme nt basis. We note, parenthetically, that LaCroix did not raise the Tenth Amendment in his petition either, though the trial court based its grant of the writ on a Tenth Amendment8 rationale. In any event, LaCroix’s effort to distinguish Ricket ts is immaterial in light of the overriding jurisdictional issue in this case. Simply put , irrespective of whether the challenge to the federal immigration detainer is based on a n alleged due process violation or a Tenth Amendment violation, a state court cannot adjudicate the validity of a federal immigration detainer. 6 Reversed; writ of habeas corpus quashed. Fernandez, J., concurs.

6 Because we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction t o adjudicate the validity of the federal immigration detainer, we need not, and therefore do not, reach the issue of whether LaCroix has standing to assert a Tenth Ame ndment “commandeering” challenge.9 Daniel Junior, etc., v. James E. LaCroix Case No. 3D17-452 Rothenberg, C.J., specially concurring. Although I completely agree with the excellent analysis perfor med and the conclusion reached in the majority opinion, I write to address the highly unusual and troubling procedural evolution of this case. After posting a bond and obtaining a release from custody foll owing a felony arrest, the defendant, James E. LaCroix (“LaCroix”), was arrest ed on January 28, 2017 and charged with having committed another felony. Based u pon the new felony arrest while out on bond, LaCroix’s bond was revoked and he remained in custody. On the following day, January 29, 2017, the Departmen t of Homeland Security (“DHS”) submitted a Request for Voluntary Transfer for m (“DHS Form I247X,” “voluntary immigrations detainer request,” or “federal d etainer”) to MiamiDade County (“the County”). The voluntary immigration detainer request states that LaCroix had been deemed an immigration enforcement priority by DHS because “in the judgment of a designated senior DHS official, his [] remova l would serve an important federal interest.” The voluntary immigration detaine r request further provides that: there was a finding of probable cause that LaCro ix is a removable alien; his identity had been confirmed; a final order of remova l had been issued; and requests that the County detain LaCroix for a period of time no t to exceed forty-10 eight hours beyond the time LaCroix would otherwise be released to allow DHS to assume custody of LaCroix. LaCroix remained in custody from January 28, 2017 to February 28, 2017. On February 28, 2017, LaCroix appeared before Judge Milton Hirs ch. During LaCroix’s appearance, Judge Hirsch accepted LaCroix’s guilty pl eas to both felony cases, adjudicated LaCroix guilty, and sentenced LaCroix to cre dit for time served. At the hearing, and after LaCroix’s plea, LaCroix’s counsel in formed Judge Hirsch that, due to a federal detainer, LaCroix would not be re leased and thus he

intended to file an emergency motion for LaCroix’s release. Judge Hirsch advis ed LaCroix’s to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus rather t han a motion for LaCroix’s release, and although no motion or petition had yet been filed , Judge Hirsch stated that he would enter an order directing Daniel Jun ior, the Director of the Department of Corrections (“the Department”), to respond wi thin two days. Immediately thereafter, and while still at the hearing, Judge H irsch produced and issued a previously prepared ord er with copies for distribution . In this order, Judge Hirsch made findings regarding mootness; made claims as to what LaCroix would allege even though no motion or petition had been filed, no all egations had yet been made, and no defenses had yet been raised; ordered Daniel Junio r to respond in writing on or before noon on March 2, 2017 if he intended to op pose the petition; and set a hearing for March 2, 2017 at 1:00 p.m.11 Judge Hirsch’s order specifically states that LaCroix alleges “that he is charged with no Florida crime and serving no county sentence.” The order then finds, “If that is so, the county has neither the authority nor , presumably, the desire to continue to hold him in its custody.” Lastly, the order cla ims that LaCroix is (will be) alleging “that in continuing to hold him, the county acts a s an agent for ICE, a federal entity.” As directed by the trial court, LaCroix’s counsel filed an eme rgency petition for writ of habeas corpus, not an emergency motion for release. The unsworn petition challenged the legality of LaCroix’s continued detenti on beyond the expiration of his sentence. The petition, however, made no cla im that the County was acting as an “agent for ICE,” as the trial court’s order co ntended it would allege. On the next morning, March 1, 2017, and within twenty-four hou rs of LaCroix’s plea, LaCroix was released by the County and transfer red into the custody of federal immigration officials. On March 2, 2017, as directe d by the trial court, the County filed a response to the petition. In its response, the County attached a copy of DHS Form I-247X (the voluntary immigration detainer req uest), which stated that a finding of probable cause had been made by immigr ation officials, LaCroix’s identity had been confirmed, an order for LaCroix’s r emoval had been issued, and LaCroix’s detention was at the request of the feder al detainer form. The County additionally informed the trial court that LaCroix had a lready been12 transferred into federal immigration custody and put the trial court on notice that an appellate court decision, which was binding authority on the tr ial court, had already determined that the state court lacks jurisdiction to determine the issue raised in the petition: the validity/legality of the federal detainer. Speci fically, the County cited to Ricketts v. Palm Beach County Sheriff, 985 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), which held that: (1) Ricketts could not “secure habeas corpus r elief from the state court on the legality of his federal detainer” because “[t]he c onstitutionality of his detention pursuant to both the I-247 and I-203 federal forms is a question of law for the federal courts,” id. at 592-93; and (2) “a state court cann ot adjudicate the validity of the federal detainer, as the area of immigration and natural ization is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.” Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)). In its response, the County noted that, although the Third Dis trict had not yet spoken on the issue, the Fourth District had in Ricketts; Ricke tts was “an on-allfours decision that dismissed a virtually identical petition”; and the trial court was required to render a similar dismissal, even if the trial court disagreed with that

outcome. After receiving the County’s response, with the attached copy of the federal detainer form, the trial court conducted the scheduled hearing on March 2, 2017. At the hearing, which was very brief, as reflected by the thirteen pages of transcript,13 LaCroix’s counsel argued that LaCroix was being unlawfully deta ined by the County because he had completed his sentence and because his detention was based upon nothing more than a request by the federal government without p robable cause. However, as the County had already provided proof that LaCroix was no longer being detained by the County and that his detention for twenty- four hours was based not only on probable cause, but on confirmation of his identity and a final order of removal, this argument was without merit. LaCroix’s counsel also raised, for the first time at the heari ng, that the Tenth Amendment barred the County’s voluntary cooperation with ICE on immigration detainers. In response, the County reiterated the arguments ma de in its written response and additionally informed the trial court that the fin al order of removal referenced in the detainer request means that LaCroix had alrea dy gone through the adjudicative process, his claim had been heard, and a final ord er was issued stating

that LaCroix shall be removed from the United States. The County additionally argued that, although there are procedu ral safeguards which protect individuals from being held indefinitely, federal law authorizes the federal government and state and local agencies and detention f acilities to cooperate with each other. If an individual wishes to attack the legalit y or constitutionality of a federal detainer request, he or she must do so in federal cou rt, with notice to the federal government and by providing the federal government with an opportunity to14 defend against the claims. That was not done in this case. Th e petition made no constitutional challenge; the petition was filed in state court , which has no authority to adjudicate such claims; and no notice was given to the feder al government. Lastly, the County argued that Ricketts controls and that LaCro ix had cited to no case that had concluded contrary to the Fourth District’s decis ion in Ricketts. Thus, the County argued that the petition should be dismissed for lac k of jurisdiction. Following the hearing, the trial court issued its order granti ng the petition. The order, which is longer that the hearing transcript, relies on “facts” wholly outside the record with no evidence to support them, makes findings on arguments not raised in the petition or at the hearing, and in many instances, it is factually incorrect. In fact, the order states that much of its findings are based on t he trial court’s independent investigation and review of Miami Herald newspaper articles. The order begins with its research regarding the size of the C ounty’s correctional system and the number of incarcerated individuals. It then discusses historical data the trial court pulled from Miami Herald newspa per articles that discussed the number of detainer requests issued in 2012, and t he vote by the MiamiDade County Commission in 2013 to no longer honor such requests . Next, the order cites to a Miami Herald newspaper article that referenced an ex ecutive order signed by President Donald Trump, which the article claimed threatened to cut federal grants to counties and cities that do not cooperate fully with Immigration and15 Customs enforcement and forced the County Mayor to immediately reverse the County’s policy and to order county jails to comply with these detention requests. The trial court then found that the County’s correctional facil ities and personnel “have been conscripted to lock him [LaCroix] up for and on beha lf of the federal government and to do so at the county’s expense.”

The trial court’s order builds on its unsubstantiated theme of coercion by claiming, again without evidentiary support and even in the abs ence of such a claim by LaCroix, that the Department’s detention of LaCroix was achi eved by “financial starvation,” rendering the Department “the cat’s paw of ICE.” In addition to these unsubstantiated claims, the order contends that LaCroix had arg ued that the Department’s detention of him was in violation of the “anti-com mandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.” The order then makes findings that are contrary to the unrefut ed evidence submitted at the hearing. For example, the order finds that th e detainer request was

founded on mere belief by ICE that it had a basis to “inquire further as to LaCroix’s status.” The detainer request was submitted with the County’s written response to the trial court’s directive and contrary to the trial court’s o rder, it unequivocally states that a finding of probable cause for removal had been ma de and a final order of removal has been issued. Additionally, at the hearing, coun sel for the County reiterated that a finding of probable cause for removal had bee n made, LaCroix had16 been given a hearing before an immigration judge, and thereafte r the immigration judge issued a final order for LaCroix’s removal from the Unite d States. Upon the issuance of that order, federal authorities had the right to se ize LaCroix. The County’s cooperation simply provided ICE with the option of pic king LaCroix up from the county jail within forty-eight hours of his plea, rath er than seizing him as he left the courtroom. Thus, the trial court’s order is factua lly incorrect. Lastly, I feel compelled to address the trial court’s failure to follow binding precedent, as this is not the first time this trial judge has f ailed to do so. See State v. Washington, 114 So. 3d 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). Just as in Wash ington, the trial court failed to follow binding state precedent, and instead, re lied on non-state, nonbinding opinions to support its position. In Washington, this Court reminded the same trial judge that “[t]he decision[s] of the district courts of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are overruled by [the Flor ida Supreme] Court.” Washington, 114 So. 3d at 185 (quoting Stanfill v. State, 383 S o. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980)). “Thus, in the absence of interdistrict conflict, distr ict court decisions bind all Florida trial courts.” Washington, 114 So. 3d at 185 (quot ing Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992)). In Ricketts, the Fourth District unequivocally held that “a st ate court cannot adjudicate the validity of the federal detainer, as the area of immigration and naturalization is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the fede ral government.”17 Ricketts, 985 So. 2d at 593 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 , 225 (1982)). “The constitutionality of his detention pursuant to both the I-247 a nd I-203 federal forms is a question of law for the federal courts.” Id. at 592-93. As the opinion explains: Once appellant posts bond on his state charges or his state sen tence expires, he will be “released” from state custody and then book ed on the federal immigration detainer. At that point, the sheriff w ill not be holding appellant pursuant to state authority but pursuant to f ederal authority, and the legality of the detainer and the process by which he is held will be a question for the federal courts. Id. at 593 (footnote omitted). Just as in Ricketts, LaCroix completed his state sentence, he w as booked on a federal immigration detainer, and he was being held pursuant to federal authority when the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed. And, in this case, LaCroix was released to federal custody prior to the hearing. Thus, La Croix’s attacks upon the legality and/or constitutionality of his temporary detentio n by the County pursuant to the federal detainer was not properly raised in the state circuit court and should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court’s findings of coercion are also not supported b y the record. The trial court’s order claims that the County was coerced into cooperating with the federal government. However, the County, which was ordered to respond to the petition, made no such claim and the record on appeal demonstra tes the opposite. In response to concerns by the County Mayor and the County Comm issioners regarding the potential loss of certain federal funds if declar ed a “sanctuary18 jurisdiction,” the County Commission called for a special meeti ng to be held on February 17, 2017 to discuss the County’s policy regarding fede ral immigration detainer requests. Prior to the meeting, a legal opinion was r equested and received from the County Attorney’s Office. In its opinion, the County Attorney advised, among other things, that the Tenth Amendment of the United Stat es Constitution protected the County from being compelled to enforce a federal regulatory program, and any cooperation between the County and the federal governme nt with respect to immigration enforcement “must, as a matter of law, be voluntary .” The opinion also advised that the County had not been designated a sanctuary jur isdiction, the current definition of sanctuary jurisdictions did not include the Count y, and the vast majority of the County’s federal funding was not at risk whether or not the County decided to revise its federal detainer policy. At the Commission meeting on February 17, 2017, the County Comm ission considered six separate resolutions offering differing levels o f cooperation with the federal government regarding immigration detainer requests. Af ter its discussion, the County Commission voted to return to its pre-2013 policy an d honor federal detainer requests, provided a finding of probable cause for rem oval had been made. Further, the County states in its answer brief before this Cour t that, “To date, no grants issued by the Department of Justice and Homeland Securit y—nor any other19 federal department—have been conditioned on voluntary complianc e with ICE immigration detainers.” Although the Tenth Amendment protects states and local governme nts from being “commandeered” or compelled to enact and enforce a federa l regulatory program, it does not foreclose the federal government from “enc ourag[ing] a State [or local government] to regulate in a particular way, or . . . hold out incentives to the States as a method of influencing a State’s policy choices. ” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161, 166 (1992); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203, 206 (1987) (holding that the federal government “may attac h conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upo n compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives” ). Notably, the County, itself, has not alleged coercion, and if t he County wished to make such a claim, its challenge would be in federal court.

Conclusion In my opinion, the trial court impermissibly crossed the line b etween neutral arbiter of the facts to that of an advocate, preparing and issu ing an order before the filing of any motion or petition by LaCroix based on arguments not made by LaCroix. The trial court’s order granting LaCroix’s petition a lso misstated the record evidence, improperly relied on non-record “evidence” cul led from non-20 authoritative newspaper articles and failed to apply binding pr ecedent. Thus, for the reasons articulated in the majority opinion and in this special ly concurring opinion, I agree that reversal of the trial court’s order is mandated.