The HONORABLE ROBERT R. BEEZER, United States Circuit Judge for the 1 Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-3432

___________ PACCAR Financial Corporation, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. Daniel A. Mackey, Glenn Garrett, * * Appellants. *

___________ Submitted: June 11, 1997

Filed: September 4, 1997

___________ Before WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEEZER, 1 Circuit Judge.

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.The Honorable John T. Maughmer, Chief United States Magistrate Judge fo r 2 the W estern District of Missouri, before whom the case was tried by consent of th e parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). -2- Gl en Garrett and Daniel Mackey appeal from the district court’s judgmen t 2 awarding PACCAR Financia l Corp. (PACCAR) deficiency judgments against Garrett and Mackey following the sale of repossessed collateral. We affirm.
I. PACCAR entered into six equipment lease agreements w ith Southwest Missouri Tran sit, Inc. (Southwest), a Missouri trucking company. Mackey and Garrett wer e joint guarantors under three of the leases, and Mackey alone was guarantor for th e three o ther leases. In October of 1991, Southwest filed for bankruptcy and defaulted on the l ease agreements with PACCAR. The bankruptcy court ordered Southwest to return to PACCAR twenty-four pieces of leased equipment (two trailers and twentytwo Pet erbilt trucks). PACCAR held private sales of some of the equipment and a public sale of the remaining equipment. PACCAR filed suit in district court to recover the deficiency between the amount obtained from the sales and the amounts still owing on the leases. Garrett and Mackey allege d that the sales were not commercially reasonable because PACCA R insufficiently

advertised some of the sales and refused to accept a higher bid on some of the equipment. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of PACCAR on the issue of liability. Prior to tri al, the parties stipulated that the total amount of the deficienc y on all six leases was $413,986.33. The parties also stipulated as to th e issues to be resolved by the court:

Th e parties stipulate and agree that [sic] following legal issue s remain to be decided by the Court:We note that present counsel did not represent Garrett and Mackey during the 3 proceedings in the district court. -3-

1. Was the a dvertisement of the sale of the nine 1987 Peterbil t trucks commercially unreasonable? 2. Was the sale of the ten of [sic] 1989 Peterbilts, Model 379 , commercially unreasonabl e because plaintiff [PACCAR] allegedly failed to accept an alleged offer of $45,000 per truck? 3. If the sales were commercially unreasonable, should plaintiff be denied the entire deficiency, or should plaintiff be awarded a partia l deficiency? The court adopted the parties’ stipulation of facts, concluded that PACCAR’s efforts in selling the collateral we re commercially reasonable, and entered judgment in fav or of PACCAR in the amount of $69,483 against Garrett and Mackey, jointly and severally, and against Mackey for $344,503.33.
II. G a rrett and Mackey contest the deficiencies entered against them as to four of the six leases. They argue for the first time on appeal that they were not provide d adequ ate notice of the sales. Having failed to include this issue as a part of th e stipulation, Garrett and Mackey may not now raise it on appeal. See In re Texas Gen. Petroleum

Corp. , 52 F.3d 1330, 1337 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1995) (stipulation as to issues to be decided by the trial court binds the parties on appeal); Wilson v. Bailey , 934 F.2d 301, 305 (11th Cir. 1991) (same). 3 Garre tt and Mackey also contend that the sales were not commerciall y reasonable because PA CCAR inadequately advertised the sales and failed to accept a higher bid on some of the equipment. In this diversity action, we apply Missouri law. See Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Every aspect of the sale o f collateral “including the metho d, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially-4-

reasonable.” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 400.9-504 (West 1994). Whether the sales wer e commerc ially reasonable is a question of fact. See Commercial Credit Equip. v

. Parsons , 820 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). We review such findings of fact for clear error, see City Nat’l Bank v. Unique Structure s, Inc. , 49 F.3d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1995), a standard of review that is equally applicable to findings entered on a stipulation. See SMP Sales Management, Inc. v. Fleet Credit Corp. , 960 F.2d 557, 559 (5t h Cir. 1992) (“The trial court’s findings based on depositions and stipulations ar e entit led to the same standard of review that they would receive if based on oral , courtroom testimony.”). See also Sawyer v. Swift and Co. , 836 F.2d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1988) ( “[T]he clearly erroneous standard apples to all cases where the trial court makes findings of fact.”).
The district court concluded that PACCAR’s methods of advertising the sale s were commercially reasonable, finding that PACCAR had advertised the sales in the Joplin Glo be , which the court described as a “large newspaper in the southwes t Missouri area,” had posted notices of the sales at the truck dealership where the trucks were mai ntained, and had sent facsimile notices of the sales to more than 300 othe r dealersh ips across the country. The district court also held that the sales were no t commercially unreasonable simply because a higher price might have been obtained for som e of the equipment. Based on the facts before us, we cannot say that thes e con clusions are clearly erroneous. See Jefferson Bank and Trust Co. v. Horst , 59 9 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980 ) (rejecting debtor’s contention that sale was not commercially reasonable because the creditor obtained only one bid and did no t advertise the sale, and concluding that “‘the fact that a better price could have bee n obtained by a sale at a differe nt time or in a different method from that selected by the se cured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner.’ [Mo. Ann. Stat.] § 400.9-507(2)”). The judgment is affirmed.-5-

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.