**1 SYLLABUS**  **This syllabus is not part of the Court’s**  **opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor**  **approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.**  C.R. v. M.T. (A-47-22 ) (0878 87 ) Argued October 24 , 2023
-- Decided April 22 , 20 24 WAINER APTER, J., writing for the Court. **In this appeal, t he Court considers the showing required to establish “the**  **possibility of future risk to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim” pursuant**  **to N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2)**  **in order to obtain a final protective order under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA)** 

**. Plaintiff**  **“ Clara**  **” testified that, in June**  **2018, she was sexually assaulted by**  **defendant “Martin .”**  **Clara applied for a temporary protective order (TPO), and then a final protective order (FPO), under SASPA. After hearing testimony, the trial**  **court made explicit findings under N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(1) and (2). The court found**  **that (1) Clara had been “subjected to nonconsensual sexual contact within the**  **meaning of SASPA” because her “extreme voluntary intoxication” made it impossible for her to consent to sexual contact; and (2)**  **there was a possibility of future risk to Clara’s safety or well** 

**- being because Martin had been subjected to**  **legal fees defending against the SASPA FPO and “may now harbor a grudge against [Clara] which would probably not**  **have occurred but for these proceedings.” The court therefore issued an FPO directing Martin to have no contact with Clara.**  **The Appellate Division reversed on the basis of the test the trial court had used to assess**  **consent under N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(1). 461 N.J. Super. 341, 350** 

**- 51**  **(App. Div. 2019). The Court reversed ,**  **holding that “the affirmative consent**  **standard . . . is the correct standard to be applied in determining whether sexual**  **activity” was consensual under SASPA. 248 N.J. 428 , 431, 445**  **(2021). The Court noted**  **that the trial court on remand could**  **expand upon its abbreviated discussion of N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(**  **2) . Id.**  **at 448. On remand, Clara testified that she continued, more than three years later, to**  **be intensely traumatized by the sexual assault. Martin did not testify, electing to**  **rely on his testimony from the initial hearing. The court found Clara’s testimony**  **from the first and second hearings “credible and believable” and Martin’s testimony from the first hearing “not credible” and “not truthful.” On the first factor, N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)(1), the court therefore held that consent to sexual contact “was not** **2**

**affirmatively and freely given.” Turning to N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2), the court noted**  **that “the statute only requires a possibility, as opposed to a probability .” The**  **court found**  **“a significant risk to [Clara’s] psychological well**

**- being should this order not**  **remain in effect” and**  **ordered the FPO previously issued to remain in effect.**
**T he Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that “plaintiff satisfied her**  **burden of demonstrating a predicate act as defined under ” N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)(1)**  **and that “there exists a possibility of future risk to her safety or well**

**- being as**  **required by ” the ordinary terms of** 

**- 16(a)(2). The Court granted**  **certification limited to the interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2). 254 N.J. 183 (2023).** 
HELD : **T he plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2) creates a standard that is**  **permissive and easily satisfied. Here, plaintiff testified that a sexual assault “destroyed” her, she was intensely traumatized, and she was “terrified” for her**  **safety. The family court found her testimony credible. Based on that testimony, the court held plaintiff had demonstrated a “possibility of future risk” to her “safety or**  **well**

**- being.”**  **The Court affirms.**
**1. “Any person alleging to be a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual**  **penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct ,**  **” who is not eligible for a restraining order as a “victim of domestic violence” under the Prevention of**  **Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA )**  **may apply for a protective order under SASPA. N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 14(a)(1),** 

**- 16. The standard for granting a SASPA**  **protective order differs depending on whether the applicant seeks a temporary or final order. Importantly, an FPO does not require a showing th**  **at it is “necessary to protect the safety and well** 

**- being” of the victim**  **like a TPO does, see**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 15(a)**  **; rather,**  **an FPO requires only the “possibility of future risk to the safety or**  **well**

**- being of the alleged victim**  **, ” N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)**  **(2). (p**  **p. 14-18)** 
**2. The permissive standards for a SASPA TPO and a PDVA temporary restraining**  **order (TRO) are nearly identical , as are the**  **procedures for seeking a PDVA final restraining order (FRO) and a SASPA FPO**  **. Notably, both**  **SASPA FPOs and PDVA FROs require consideration of a list of**  **non -**  **exhaustive factors, but SASPA**  **l ists only**  **two such factors -- “(1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual**  **contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness . . . ; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being of the alleged victim**  **, ” N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)** 

**-- whereas the**  **PDVA lists six , see**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:25**

**- 29(a). T**  **he Legisla ture could have duplicated**  **the second factor for a PDVA FRO --**  **“[t]he existence of immediate danger to person or property,” N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 29(a)(2)** 

**-- in SASPA**  **, but**  **it did not. In addition, the**  **consequences to a defendant of a PDVA FRO are drastically different from the consequences to a respondent of a SASPA FPO.**  **(pp. 1 8-**  **22 )** **3**

**3. Applying ordinary definitions of the terms used**  **in N .J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2**  **) , the**  **statute’s plain language requires a court to consider whether there is a chance that a**  **survivor may be exposed to physical danger, risk, or injury, or may be exposed to something emotionally unwelcome or unpleasant that could make the**  **survivor feel**  **uncomfortable, unhealthy, or unhappy. B**  **ecause the language of factor two is centered on the safety or well** 

**- being of the victim** 

**- survivor, a survivor’s own**  **testimony regarding possible future risks to their safety or emotional well**

**- being can**  **suffice. The Court’s**  **reading of the plain tex t of factor two as creating a lenient and**  **easy -**  **to**

**- satisfy standard is reinforced by context**  **: the**  **“possibility of future risk” required for a SASPA FPO is less demanding than**  **the “necessary” protection**  **required for a SASPA TPO or the “immediate danger”**  **required for a PDVA FRO. Applying**  **that standard ,**  **the Court defer**  **s to the trial court’s factual findings because**  **they are supported by substantial evidence and finds**  **no error in the court’s legal conclusion.**  **(pp. 22**

**- 26)** 
**4. The**  **Court explains why it is**  **not persuaded by Martin’s claims of error , why**  **it disagrees with the concurrence’s view of**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(**  **e) and (f) ,**  **and why it declines to adopt either the six PDVA factors or the**  **standard established for PDVA FROs**  **for use in the SASPA context**

**. Finally, the Court explains that its discussion**  **of Clara’s testimony is not intended to imply that such evidence of psychological**  **symptoms or treatment is necessary to satisfy N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2).**  **(pp. 2 6-**  **33)**
AFFIRMED . JUSTICE FASCIALE, concurring, **disagrees that a SASPA FPO requires victims to**  **speculate about the “possibility of future risk to [their] safety or well**

  ** being.”** **In Justice Fasciale’s view, once a victim proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a respondent committed a predicate act of “nonconsensual sexual**  **contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(1), the victim is automatically**  **entitled to an FPO prohibiting the respondent from contacting the victim and committing further predicate a**  **cts, see N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16**  **(e). Justice Fasciale regards the “possibility” of what may or may**  **not happen in the future , see**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2), a**  **s a**  **factor to consider when fashioning additional relief in the FPO under N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(f)**  **rather than an**  **element of proof that a victim must establish to obtain an FPO.**
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON , PIERRE
- LOUIS , and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE WAINER APT ER’s opinion. JUSTICE FASCIALE filed a concurrence.**1 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY**  **A- 47**  **September Term 20 22** 

**087887**

**C.R. ,**  **Plaintiff**

**- Respondent**  **,**

**v. M.T.**  **, Defendant** 

**- Appellant** 

**. On**  **certification to the Sup**  **erior Court, Appellate Division** 

**. Argued**  **October 24, 2023 Decided**  **April 22, 2024**
**Leah A. Vassallo argued the cause for appellant (Kennedy & Vassallo, attorneys; Leah A. Vassallo, on**  **the brief). Cheryl Turk Waraas argued the cause for respondent**  **( South Jersey Legal Services**  **, attorneys**  **; Kenneth M.**  **Goldman, Andrew Vazquez** 

**- Schroedinger, Douglas E.**  **Gershuny, on the briefs; and Lindsey Eveland, law**  **student, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21** 

**- 3(b),**  **on the**  **brief s**  **). CJ Griffin argued the cause for amicus curiae Partners for**  **Women and Justice (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden ,**  **attorneys ;**  **CJ Griffin, on the brief).** **2 Mary M. McManus** 

**- Smith**  **argued the cause for amicus curiae**  **Legal Services of New Jersey (Legal Services of**  **New Jersey, attorneys; Mary M. McManus** 

**- Smith,**  **Shoshana Gross, Monica Gural, and Dawn Miller, on the brief).** 

**JUSTICE WAINER APTER**  **delivered the opinion of the Court.**
**This case, now before us for the second time,**  **concerns the requirements for**  **a final protective order**  **under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA)**  **, N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 13 to** 

**- 21**  **(2023)**

**. 1**  **SASPA directs that in**  **determining whether to issue a**  **final protective order ,**  **“the court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors:**  **(1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact [or] sexual penetration** 

**. . . against the**  **alleged victim; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well**

**- being**  **of the alleged victim.” N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)** 

**. 2** 

**1 On July 24, 2023, Governor Murphy signed**  **L. 2023,**  **c. 127 into law,**  **substantially expanding SASPA and renaming it the Victim’s Assistance and Survivor Protection Act. Those amendments went into effect on January**  **1 ,**  **2024. Because the amendments are not at issue in this case, this opinion relies only on**  **the text of N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 13 to** 

**- 21**  **in effect prior to January 1**  **, 2024**

**. All**  **citations to N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 13 to** 

**- 21**  **are to the pre**

**- amendment language as**  **of December 31, 2023, and this opinion continues to refer to the**  **law as**  **SASPA.**

**2 Although the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act is survivor** 

**- centered,**  **the text of the law uses the word “victim” or “alleged victim” and not the word “survivor.”**  **See N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 13 to** 

**- 21. When quoting the statute, we use** **3**

**We hold that the plain language of N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2) creates a**  **standard that is permissive**  **and easily satisf**  **ied . Here, p**  **laintiff testified that**  **a sexual assault**  **“destroyed” her**  **, she was**  **intensely traumatized ,**  **and she was “terrified”**  **for her safety. The family court found her testimony credible. Based on that testimony, the**  **court held plaintiff had demonstrated a**  **“possibility of future risk” to her “safety or well** 

**- being.” We affirm.** 
**I.**
**A. We rely on the comprehensive discussion of the facts**  **and procedural history set forth in**  **our first opinion in this case, C.R. v. M.T.**  **( C.R. I**  **) , 248 N.J.**  **428 (2021) . We add here only**  **those details necessary to understand the**  **question presented and**  **events that occurred**  **after our remand**  **in C.R. I** 

**. On the evening of June 26, 2018, C**  **lara went**  **out to two**  **bar s**  **with her then** 

**- best** 

**- friend**  **Sylvia**

**. 3**  **Clara testified that**  **later that night, she was sexually**  **assaulted by Martin, Sylvia’s cousin, on the floor of Martin’s garage**

**. Martin**  **testified that the sexual**  **penetration was consensual.**  **Clara testified that it was**
**not. Martin never contacted or attempted to contact**  **Clara after the incident** 

**.**

**the word “victim” or “alleged victim.” Otherwise, we use both**  **“victim” and**  **“survivor .”**  **3 We refer to the parties and witnesses by the same pseudonyms used in**  **C.R. I** 

**. 4** 

**Clara applied for**  **a temporary protective order**  **(TPO) , and then a final**  **protective order (FPO)**  **, under**  **SASPA. After**  **hearing testimony from Clara,**  **Martin, and Sylvia ,**  **the trial court made explicit findings under N.J.S.A.** 
**2C:14**

**- 16(a)**  **(1) and**  **(2)**

**. 4**  **The court found that (1)**  **Clara had been “subjected to nonconsensual sexual contact within the meaning of SASPA” because her**  **“extreme voluntary intoxication” made it impossible for her to consent**  **to sexual contact**  **; and (2)**  **there was a**  **possibility of future risk to Clara’s**  **safety or well** 

**- being because Martin**  **had been subjected to legal fees defending against the SASPA FPO and**  **“may now harbor a grudge against [Clara]**  **which would probably not have occurred but for these proceedings.”**  **The court therefore issued a**  **n FPO directing**  **Martin to have no contact with Clara. Martin appealed.**  **The Appellate Division reversed and remand**  **ed, directing**  **the trial court to apply the**  **“ prostration of faculties” test to determine**  **whether Clara had been sufficiently intoxicated to be incapable of consent**  **ing to sexual activity**  **under N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)(1)** 

**. C.R. v. M.T.**  **, 461 N.J. Super. 341, 350** 

**- 51 (App. Div. 2019).**  **We granted Clara’s petition for certification ,**  **241 N .J. 329 (2020)**  **, and reversed the Appellate Division’s decision**  **, C.R. I**  **, 248 N.J. at 431.**  **Rather**

**4 Throughout this litigation, the parties and courts referred to N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(1)**  **and (2) as the two**  **required “prongs” of SASPA. We**  **call th e**  **two provisions “factors,” which more**  **precisely reflects the statute’s**  **plain text. 5** 

**than the “prostration of faculties”**  **test, we held that “the affirmative consent**  **standard articulated in ”**  **State in Interest of M.T.S. ,**  **129 N.J. 422 (1992) , “**  **is the correct standard to be applied in determining whether sexual activity**  **” was**  **consensual under SASPA.**  **C.R. I ,**  **248 N.J. at 445. Under**  **M.T.S. , “any act of**  **sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant without the affirmative and freely** 

**- given permission of the victim to the specific act of penetration**  **constitutes the offense of sexual assault.” 129 N.J. at 444. We**  **thus remanded**
**t o the trial court “for reconsideration of** 

**. . . whether the sexual activity was**  **consensual or nonconsensual” under N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)(1), “**  **utilizing the**
**M.T.S. affirmative consent standard.**  **” C.R. I**  **, 248 N.J. at 447.**  **Although the Appellate Division in C.R. I**  **had not addressed N.J.S.A.** 
**2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2)**  **, the possibility of future risk to Clara’s safety or well** 

**- being,** 

**see 461 N.J. Super. 341, we discussed it briefly, noting that it would be**  **relevant to the trial court’s reconsideration of the FPO on remand. 248 N.J. at**
**447**

**- 48. Recounting**  **the trial court’s reasoning, discussed above, that Martin had “through this process been subjected to legal fees and may now harbor a**  **grudge against [Clara] which would probably not have occurred but for these proceedings,” we stated:** 

**It cannot be that simply filing for a protective order is sufficient to create “the possibility of future**  **risk to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim”**  **noted in prong two. If that were so, prong two**  **would 6**  **be met in every**  **single SASPA case. That could not have been the Legislature’s intention.**  **Here, the factual findings that the trial court put on the record appear to counter**  **[Clara]’s establishing**  **prong two of SASPA, and the trial court relied on the simple fact that**  **[Clara] had sought a restraining order**  **to conclude that “it is more likely than not that a final restraining order is appropriate” in this case. We**  **remand so that the trial court may expand upon its abbreviated discussion of prong two and make**  **additional findings of fact that support a determination**  **either that the prong has been satisfied, or not, in deciding whether t**  **o issue the**  **final restraining order. [**  **Id. at 448.**  **]**
**B.**
**On remand before a different judge, Clara testified that she continued**  **, more than three years later,**  **to be intensely traumatized by the sexual assault.**

**Q. So since this time and after this event occurred [in**  **2018] , how has been your well** 

**- being? How have you**  **dealt with this issue? A. I am affected by what happened every day. I’ve**  **seen multiple therapists and I lay in bed at night and I can’t sleep because I still feel like I’m in the garage**  **sometimes. I have terrible intimacy issues. I can’t date because I**  **don’t trust anyone. I don’t**

**-- I have a hard time making**  **friends because I don’t trust my friends anymore. I**

**-- it destroyed me, honestly.**  **Like, I’ve lost my sense of self**

**- worth. I lost**  **everything. I feel like**

**-- some days, I feel like I’ll never**  **not be in that garage, honestly. Like, I wonder how I 7**  **can ever not be traumatized by this and I don’t think that’s a possibility.**  **Q. Besides the well** 

**- being that you’ve just explained,**  **if this were (inaudible** 

**-- recording issue), do you fear**  **for your safety and the possibility of harm from this Defendant?**  **A. I do. I really, I do. I think the only reason I have any sort**  **of peace of mind is because I know I have this temporary right now and I’m so terrified that if I didn’t**  **have it, he would be angry that I’ve spent three years just asking for this.**  **Just asking for a sense of security. I think he would definitely harass me for challenging it. I feel like every**  **time**

**-- I can’t even begin to explain the, like, terror that**  **I feel every day when I am unsure of my surroundings.**
**I can’t even**

**-- I have a hard time even going shopping**  **by myself because what if something happens? How will I defend myself? And if there’s no protective**  **order, then he has no consequences.**
**Martin did not**  **testify, electing to rely on his testimony from the initial hearing.**  **The court**  **found Clara’s testimony from the first and second hearings** 

**“ credible**  **and believable” and Martin’s testimony from**  **the first**  **hearing “not credible” and “not truthful.”**  **On the first factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(1)**  **, the** 
**court therefore**  **held that consent to sexual contact “was not affirmatively and**  **freely given .”**  **Turning to N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)(**  **2) , the court noted that “the statute only**  **requires a possibility, as opposed to a probability, of future risk to the safety or 8** 

**well**

**- being of the alleged Victim. The plain meaning of the word ‘possible’**  **subsumes the notion that an event may or may not occur**  **.” Acknowledging**  **that Martin had not attempt ed**  **to contact Clara in the more than three years**  **since the incident ,**  **the court found that did “not foreclose the possibility of risk** 
**to [Clara’s]**  **safety or her well**

**- being.”**  **The court detailed**  **Clara’s testimony**  **, set forth above**  **, about**  **the long**

  ** term effects of the incident, including that** **Clara had seen**  **multiple therapists,**  **had difficulty sleeping, had intimacy issues, and suffered ongoing consequences that were “real and traumatizing.” Without an FPO, the court**  **concluded that any progress Clara had “made in therapy could be eviscerated.”**  **Finding “ a significant risk to**  **[Clara’s] psychological well** 

**- being should this**  **order not remain in effect ,**  **” the court held that**  **Clara had sat**  **isfied N.J.S.A.** 
**2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2**  **). 5**  **It therefore ordered the FPO previously issued by the initial**  **trial court judge to remain in effect.** 

**5 The first trial judge explicitly stated that “plaintiff is tasked in this case with**  **proving both elements of SASPA**  **,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(1)**  **and (2)**  **, “by a preponderance of the evidence,” and made factual findings as to**  **each . The**  **remand judge likewise explicitly held that a survivor must prove “by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that there is the**  **possibility of future risk to [her] safety or well** 

**- being,” and that this “prong” was satisfied** 

**. 9**  **C. Martin appealed, arguing**  **that Clara**  **satisfied n**  **either N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)**  **(1) or (2) because the sexual activity was consensual**  **, he posed no threat**  **to Clara, and her fear of him was “irrational.”** 
**In an unpublished**  **opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial** 
**court , concluding that “plaintiff satisfied her burden of demonstrating a**  **predicate act as defined under the first prong of SASPA []**  **and [that]**  **there exists a possibility of future risk to her safety or well** 

**- being as required by the**  **Act’s second prong.” On the first factor, the appellate court noted the substantial deference owed to the Family Part’s findings of fact**  **“[b] ecause of**  **its special expertise in family matter s,”**  **and held that the**  **court’s conclusion**  **on the lack of consent**  **was “**  **supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence** 

**. ”**  **(quoting Cesare v. Cesare**  **, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)). Turning to the second factor, the court focused on the plain and ordinary**  **meaning of the terms in N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2).**  **Because the statute does not**  **define the words used in (a)(2), the Appellate Division relied on Merriam** 

**** **Webster’s Dictionary ,**  **observing that risk**  **i s defined as “possibility of loss or**  **injury”; safety as “the condition of being safe from . . . hurt, injury, or loss”; and well** 

**- being as “the state of being happy, healthy, or prosperous.”**  **The appellate**  **court concluded that in light of those definitions, and “in view of the 10** 

**trial judge’s credibility and factual findings, we are satisfied plaintiff demonstrated the possibility of the future risk of harm to her well** 

**- being or**  **safety. ”**  **We granted Martin**  **’s petition for certification limited to the**  **interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2)** 

**. 254 N.J. 183 (2023).**  **We also granted**  **leave to Legal Services of New Jersey**  **( LSNJ**  **) and Partners for Women and Justice**  **(Partners) to**  **participate as amici curiae.** 
**II. Martin submits**  **that the trial court’s interpretation of**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2)**  **on remand, which the Appellate Division**  **affirmed, set**  **s the**  **bar too**  **low because “u**  **nless one or the other party is dead, there is always a possibility, however miniscule, of future risk.”**  **That runs afoul of**  **our holding**
**in C.R. I**  **, Martin**  **maintains, because it means that “prong two would be met in** 
**every single SASPA case.”**  **Moreover, a ccording to**  **Martin , “[a]n irrational**  **fear does not warrant a restraining order,” and “**  **merely wanting a**  **restraining order for ‘peace of mind’**  **” does not “meet the requirements of prong two.”**  **Because there was “**  **absolutely no evidence**  **placed on the record” that he**  **posed “any threat” to**  **Clara or**  **anyone else, and**  **because the parties have had no** 
**contact since the incident,**  **Martin urges**  **, “t he Appellate Division erred as a**  **matter of law in**

**. . . render[ing] prong two meaningless**  **.” 11** 

**Clara counters that the courts below correctly construed the**  **statute’s “plain, unambiguous language**  **.” According to**  **Clara ,**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2)’s**  **“requirement” that “alleged victims . . . show the possibility of**  **future risk to their ‘safety or**  **well**

**- being’**  **” in order to obtain an FPO “ i**  **s satisfied by exactly the type of serious psychological trauma” that the trial** 
**court found she “compellingly demonstrated in this case**  **.” Martin**  **, Clara**  **argues, asks the Court to ignore the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2)**  **and “ apply the much more stringent test**  **[for a Final Restraining Order (FRO)**  **] under**  **[ the**  **] Prevention of Domestic Violence Act**  **[PDVA] , N.J.S.A.**  **2C:25**

**- 17** 
**to**

**- 35**  **.” Yet when the Legislature**  **enacted SASPA in 2015,**  **Clara maintains, it**  **intentionally chose not**  **to incorporate th**  **e more**  **rigorous requirements of the**  **PDVA, and it is “not a court’s ‘function to re**

**- write a plainly written**  **enactment.’” (quoting J.H. v. R&M Tagliareni, LLC, 239 N.J. 198, 214 (2019)**  **)**

**. Clara**  **also submits that SASPA**  **’s “broad and compelling remedial**  **purposes” are fully consistent with interpreting N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2)**  **to be satisfied by “future risk to the psychological well** 

**- being of sexual assault**  **survivors.” Amicus Partners for Women and Justice**  **asserts that while “the Court**  **may be concerned that in some cases a liberal standard will make the issuance of**  **[a SASPA FPO] perfunctory, it is what the Legislature intended.”**  **P artners** **12**

**urges us to apply the “perfunctory and self**

**- evident” standard established**  **for**
**PDVA FROs by the Appellate Division in**  **A.M.C. v. P.B. , 44**  **7 N.J. Super.**  **402, 417 (App. Div. 2016) ,**  **to SASPA**  **FPOs as well**  **, and thus**  **hold that**
**SASPA’s second factor**  **is automatically satisfied whenever the predicate act is “nonconsensual sexual penetration (**  **i.e. , rape) or other egregious acts of sexual**  **violence.” Partners**  **also emphasizes that a SASPA**  **FPO carries**  **consequences for a**  **respondent that are less significant than a PDVA**  **FRO**

**. Amicus LSNJ**  **submits that the Legislature**  **“molded SASPA to the contours of the PDVA” in certain ways, and the “hand** 

**- in** 

**- glove connections**  **between the two statutes makes for a sharp contrast where the Legislature incorporated dissimilar language and standards into SASPA.”**  **Focusing on one such distinction,**  **LSNJ contrasts a**  **PDVA FRO**  **, which requires that relief be “necessary to prevent further abuse,” with**  **SASPA’s consideration of**  **“the possibility of future risk**  **to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim**  **.”**
**LSNJ argues**  **this “**  **must be viewed as [a]**  **deliberate choice []**  **by the Legislature that represent**  **[s] the intent to achieve distinct standards.**  **” LSNJ**  **also encourages us to establish a list of factors that courts should consider in**  **determining whether N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2)**  **is satisfied**

**. 13**  **III.**
**A. We defer to a**  **trial court’s factual findings “when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence.”**  **Cesare , 154 N.J.**  **at 411**  **-12 (1998).**  **“ That**  **deference is especially appropriate ‘**  **when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.**  **’” MacKinnon v. MacKinnon**  **, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007) (quoting**  **Cesare , 154 N.J.**  **at 412**  **). We will therefore leave a**  **trial court’s factual findings undisturbed “unless they ‘**  **went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.**  **’” Ibid.**  **(quoting DYFS v. M.M.**  **, 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)**  **). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, owing no**  **de ference to the legal conclusions of the trial court or the Appellate Division.**  **State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018).**
**In cases of**  **statutory interpretation, we start with “the statutory language** 

**. ”**  **DiProspero v. Penn**  **, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). “We**  **ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance and read them in**  **context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.” Ibid.**  **(citation omitted). “[W]hen the language of a statute is clear on**  **its face, ” our “sole function . . .**  **is to enforce it according to its terms .”**  **Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 335 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting** **14**

**Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001) ). We “**  **may neither rewrite a plainly** 

**- written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature**  **intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.” Ibid.**  **(quoting O’**  **Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002) ).**  **In construing a statute’s plain language, we “strive[] for an interpretation**  **that gives effect to all of the statutory provisions and does not render any language inoperative, superfluous, void[,] or insignificant.’”**  **In re DiGuglielmo**  **, 252 N.J. 350, 360 (2022) (second alteration in original) (quoting**  **Sanchez v. Fitness Factory Edgewater, LLC, 242 N.J. 252, 261 (2020)).**
**Moreover ,**  **“ [w]**  **hen ‘the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’”**  **Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 419 (1999) (quoting**  **GE Solid State, Inc. v. Dir** 

**. , Div. of Tax’n, 132 N.J. 298, 307** 

**- 08 (1993)).** 
**B.**
**As we detailed in**  **C.R. I ,**  **SASPA , which was enacted in 2015**  **, allows**  **survivors of**  **sexual assault who cannot seek restraining orders under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act**  **of 1991 (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 17** 
**to**

**- 35**  **, to seek**  **temporary and permanent civil protective orders. 248 N.J. at** 
**441. Specifically, “**  **[a] ny person alleging to be a victim of nonconsensual**  **sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such 15** 

**conduct ,” who is not eligible for a**  **restraining order as a “victim of domestic**  **violence” under the PDVA, may**  **apply for a**  **protective order under SASPA** 

**. N.J.S.A. 2C:14**  **-1 4(a)(1)**  **, -**  **16**

**. The PDVA defines**  **“victim of domestic violence” as a person “who has**  **been subjected to domestic violence” by a spouse, former spouse, household**  **member, a person with whom the victim has or will have a child, or a person**  **with whom the victim ha**  **d a dating relationship. N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 19(d).**  **A person who is**  **“ subjected to sexual violence in a random encounter” or by**  **someone with whom they have “less than a dating relationship” therefore**  **cannot seek a restraining order under the PDVA**

**-- “SASPA was intended to**  **fill this void.” R.L.U. v. J.P.**  **, 457 N.J. Super. 129, 135 (App. Div. 2018).**  **The standard for granting a**  **SASPA protective order differs depending**  **on whether the applicant seeks a temporary or**  **final order**

**. TPOs**  **may be granted on an emergency and ex parte basis**  **“ when**  **necessary to protect the safety and well**

**- being of an alleged victim on whose**  **behalf the relief is sought.” N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 15(a).**  **In addition, a court “shall”**  **grant a TPO if it “**  **determines that the applicant is a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such**  **conduct, and qualifies for such relief” under N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 14.**  **See N.J.S.A.** 
**2C:14**

**- 15(b).**  **A TPO , which “shall be granted upon good cause shown**  **,” id.**  **at 16** 

**(d), may include “any relief necessary to protect the safety and well**

**- being of**  **an alleged victim ,”**  **id. at**  **(a). Examples of possible forms of relief include an**  **order prohibiting the respondent from having any contact with the victim or the victim’s family members, and an order prohibiting the respondent from**  **entering the victim’s home, school, or work**

**. Id.**  **at (e)(1**  **) to ( 6)** 

**. The standard for granting an FPO, by contrast, is a preponderance of the**  **evidence. Importantly,**  **an FPO does not require a showing that it is**  **“ necessary**  **to protect the safety and well**

**- being**  **” of the victim; it requires only the**  **“possibility of future risk to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim.”**  **The statute sets forth the procedure and requirements for obtaining an FPO in**
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a**  **):**

**A hearing [for an FPO] shall be held in the Superior Court within 10 days of the filing of an application [for**  **a TPO ] . . . .**  **At the hearing, the standard for proving the**  **allegations made in the application for a protective order shall be a preponderance of the evidence**  **. The court shall consider but not be limited to the following**  **factors: (1**  **) the occurrence of one or more acts of**  **nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, against the**  **alleged victim; and (2)**  **the possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being of the alleged victim** 

**. [**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)**  **(e mphasis added)**  **.] 17** 

**Although the s tatute**  **defines the terms**  **“ sexual contact,**  **” “ sexual penetration,**  **” and**  **“ lewdness**  **” used**  **in factor one, see**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 14(a)(1),**  **it does not**  **define any of the words**  **included in factor two**

**. The remainder of**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16**  **sets forth additional instructions for**  **FPOs. For example, a court may not deny an FPO due to the**  **“ alleged victim’s**  **failure to report the incident to law enforcement; the alleged victim’s or the respondent’s alleged intoxication; whether the alleged victim did or did not**  **leave the premises to avoid [the]**  **nonconsensual sexual contact . . . ;**  **or the absence of signs of physical injury to the alleged victim**  **.” N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(b).**  **And “ evidence of the alleged victim’s previous sexual conduct or**  **manner of dress at the time of the incident shall not be admitted” in any FPO proceeding.**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(**  **c ).** 
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(**  **e) then**  **sets forth a necessary precondition for the issuance of an FPO and what such an order must prohibit.** 

**A final protective order issued pursuant to this section shall be issued only after a finding or an admission is**  **made that the respondent committed an act of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or**  **lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, against the alleged victim. A final protective order shall:**  **(1) prohibit the respondent from having contact**  **with the victim ; and**  **(2) prohibit the respondent from committing any future act of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual** **18 penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such**  **conduct, against the victim. [N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(**  **e) .]** 
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(**  **f) lists additional relief**  **, identical to**  **restrictions that can be**  **imposed on a respondent as part of a TPO under**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 15(e)(2**  **) to (**  **6) , that an FPO may include** 

**. Finally,**  **pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(i)**  **, either party can file a petition**  **with the court “to dissolve or modify a final protective order.” In adjudicating**  **the petition, the court must**  **“ consider whether a material change in**  **circumstances has occurred ”**  **that would render the continuance of the FPO** 

**“ inequitable, oppressive or unjust taking into account** 

**. . . the**  **desire of the victim for the continuation of the protective order, the potential for contact**  **between the parties, the history of the respondent’s violations of the protective order or criminal convictions, and any other factors that the court may find**  **relevant .”**  **Ibid.**
**C. As earlier noted,**  **SASPA explicitly allows orders of protection only for**  **those who are “not eligible for a restraining order as a ‘victim of domestic violence’” under the PDVA** 

**. N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 14(a)(1).**  **As a complement to**  **the PDVA, SASP A**  **mirrors the PDVA in certain respects,**  **and diverges**  **from it**  **in others. Both bear mention here** 

**. 19** 

**Like SASPA, t he PDVA allows**  **survivors to “seek emergency, ex parte**  **relief**

**. ”**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 28(f)**  **. Under SASPA, that relief is a TPO; under the PDVA, it is a**  **temporary restraining order (TRO). See**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 15(a);** 
**2C:25**

**- 28(f).**  **The permissive**  **standards for a SASPA TPO and a**  **PDVA TRO are nearly identical:**  **a judge**  **may issue a PDVA TRO “when necessary to protect the life, health or well** 

**- being**  **of a victim ,”**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 28(f),**  **whereas a SASPA TPO may be issued “when necessary to protect the safety**  **and well**

**- being**  **of an alleged victim,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 15(a)** 

**. The procedures for seeking a PDVA final restraining order (FRO) a**  **nd a**
**SASPA FPO ar e also the same. Both require**  **that a hearing be held within ten**  **days of the filing of the application for a TRO or TPO. See**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 29(a);**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)** 

**. B**  **oth provide that at the hearing, the standard for**  **proving the allegations in the complaint or application shall be a**  **preponderance of the evidence**

**. See**  **ibid. And both provide**  **that “**  **[t]he court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors**  **.” Ibid.**  **(emphasis added)** 

**. However, SASPA then lists only two factors**  **tha t the court**  **shall consider**  **: “(1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual**  **contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness . . . ; and (2) the possibility of future 20** 

**risk to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim** 

**. ”**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)**  **(emphasis added)**

**. T**  **he PDVA, in contrast, lists six:** 

**(1 )**  **The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,**  **harassment and physical abuse; (2)**  **The existence of immediate danger to person or property;**  **(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and**  **defendant; (4)**  **The best interests of the victim and any child; (5)**  **In determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim’s safety; and**  **(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection**  **from another jurisdiction. [**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 29(a)**  **(emphasis added) .]** 
**Four of the six PDVA factors could not**  **have applied to SASPA because a SASPA FPO is available**  **only to a person who did not have a close prior**  **relationship with the alleged**  **perpetrator. However, the second factor for a PDVA FRO does not speak to a prior relationship between the parties, and the**  **Legislature therefore could have duplicated it**  **in SASPA. It did not. Instead, the**  **Legislature prescribed SASPA’s second factor**  **, instructing a court to**  **consider “the possibility of future risk to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged** **21**

**victim ,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2),**  **rather than “[t]**  **he existence of immediate danger to person or property**  **,” N.J.S.A.**  **2C:25**

**- 29(a)(2).**  **In addition, the consequences to a defendant of a**  **PDVA FRO**  **are drastically different from the consequences**  **to a respondent**  **of a SASPA FPO** 

**. Recall that a**  **SASPA FPO must only “(1) prohibit the respondent from having contact with the victim; and (2) prohibit the respondent from committing any**  **future act of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness . . . against the victim** 

**. ”**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(e). And it may include additional**  **relief barring the respondent from entering the victim’s ho me**  **, school, or wor k** 

**. S**  **ee id**  **. at (f)(1)**  **to (5)** 

**. Penalties in a**  **PDVA FRO, on the other hand, can be far more severe** 

**. A**  **defendant must “immediate [**  **ly ]**  **surrender**

**. . . any firearm,” and an FRO**  **must prohibit the defendant**  **from purchasing, owning, or possessing an y**  **weapons**
**. N.J.S.A.**  **2C:25**

**- 29(b)** 

**. An FRO**  **can then include nineteen additional forms of**  **relief , including**  **an order :**  **granting exclusive possession to a**  **plaintiff of a**  **home the p**  **laintiff and defendant had shared, while requiring the**  **defendant to continue making**  **payments on the home ;**  **direct ing**  **the defendant to pay money**  **damages to the plaintiff** 

**, including the cost of counseling, moving expenses, attorney**  **’ s fees, damages for pain and suffering**  **, and punitive damages**  **; granting**  **the plaintiff “temporary possession of specified personal property,”** **22**

**such as a car; “awarding temporary custody of a minor child”**  **to the plaintiff ;**  **requiring the defendant “to receive professional domestic violence**  **counseling”; and requiring the defendant**  **“ to undergo**  **a psychiatric**  **evaluation. ”**  **Id. at**  **(b)(1) to**  **(19).**
**IV. SASPA’s plain language and context lead us to conclude that Clara’s**  **testimony on remand was sufficient for the trial court to find the statute satisfied, and order the FPO to remain in effect. We therefore affirm the**  **judgment of the Appellate Division.**
**A. On its face, the**  **text of N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)**  **(2) ,**  **requiring a court to consider “the possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being of the alleged**  **victim ,**  **” creates a permissive standard that is easily satisfied** 

**. Because**  **SASPA does not define the words “possibility,” “risk,”**  **“safety,” or “well**

**- being,”**  **we afford the terms their “ generally accepted**  **meaning, according to the approved usage of the language.” See**  **N.J.S.A. 1:1**

**- 1**  **. L ike the Appellate Division, we turn to dictionary definitions for guidance** 

**. The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “possibility” as “a thing**  **tha t may happen or be the case.” New Oxford American Dictionary**  **1365 (3d ed. 2010). The word “possibility”**  **therefore does not require that something** **23**

**will definitely happen, will probably happen**  **, or even will l ikely happen**  **; it simply requires a chance that something “may happen or be the case.”**  **“Risk” is defined as “a situation involving exposure to danger” or “the possibility that**  **something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen.” Id.**  **at 1507. “Safety” is “the condition of being protected from or unlikely to cause danger, risk, or**  **injury.” Id.**  **at 1537. And “well**

**- being” is a “state of being comfortable,**  **healthy, or happy.” Id.**  **at 1961. The plain language of factor two thus requires a court to**  **consider whether there is a chance that a survivor**  **may be exposed to physical danger,**  **risk, or**  **injury, or may be**  **exposed to something emotionally unwelcome or unpleasant that could make them**  **feel uncomfortable, unhealthy, or unhappy.**  **And because the language of factor two is centered on the safety or well**

**- being**  **of the victim**

**- survivor**  **, a survivor**  **’s own testimony regarding**  **possible future risks to their safety or**  **emotional well**

**- being can suffice** 

**. Our reading of the**  **plain text of**  **factor two as creating a lenient**  **and easy**

  ** to**

**- satisfy standard is reinforced by**  **context**

**-- the ways in which the**  **Legislature intentionally distinguished a SASPA FPO from**  **both a SASPA**  **TPO and a PDVA FRO. As earlier noted,**  **a SASPA TPO may be granted**  **“ when necessary to**  **protect the safety and well** 

**- being of an alleged victim on whose behalf the** **24**

**relief is sought,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 15(a) (emphasis added)** 

**. T**  **he Legislature could have used the same language for a**  **SASPA FPO as well, requiring that it**  **be “necessary to protect” a victim**

**. It did not. Instead, an FPO requires**  **consideration only of the “possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being**  **of the alleged victim.” N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2) (emphasis added).**  **A “possibility of future risk” is less demanding than “necessary” protection.**  **We must respect that**  **legislative choice. See**  **State v. F erguson**  **, 238 N.J. 78, 102 (2019) (“Different words used in the same, or a similar, statute are assigned**  **different meanings whenever possible.” (quoting**  **In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54, 74 n.5 (2015))**  **). Similarly, in crafting SASPA, the**  **Legislature intentionally copied much**  **of the language of**  **the PDVA, including the opening sentences of N.J.S.A.** 
**2C:14**

**- 16(a). See**  **supra at _**  **__ (slip op. at**  **18**

**- 19**  **) ;**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 29(a).**  **But the**  **PDVA’s second factor requires courts to consider “the existence of immediate danger to person or property**  **,” N.J.S.A.**  **2C:25**

**- 29(a)(2), whereas**  **SASPA’s second factor requires consideration only of “the possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being” of the victim,**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a).** 
**W hil**  **e a “possibility” is something that may**  **occur in the future, in order to “exist**  **[] ,” something must be presently occurring. And a “future risk” to a**  **person’s “safety or well**

**- being,” is of course far less demanding than an** **25**

**“immediate danger” to that person. Rather than importing the PDVA’s second**  **factor, the Legislature thus used far broader language in SASPA. Especially**  **because the statutes are identical in so many other respects,**  **those differences**  **must be treated as deliberate. See**  **State v. Ryan , 249 N.J. 581, 599 (2022) (**  **“It is the Legislature’s prerogative to impose a requirement in one context but not**  **another; it is our duty to treat that distinction as meaningful. ”).**  **We must respect the Legislature’s decision**  **to create a standard for a SASPA FPO that is broad and permissive, both on its face and**  **as compared with a SASPA TPO and a PDVA FRO.** 
**B. Applying this analysis, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings**  **because they are supported by substantial evidence, and we find no error in the court’s legal conclusion.**  **Clara testified that she is “affected by what happened every day.” She**  **explained that she has seen multiple therapists, cannot sleep, has a hard time making friends or trusting people, and has “terrible intimacy issues**  **.” She**  **told the court that she feared for her safety, felt terrified each time she was unsure**  **of her surroundings, and had a hard time going shopping on her own. She**  **detailed how she had lost her “sense of self**

**- worth,” and how the sexual assault**  **had “destroyed [her,] honestly.” 26** 

**T he remand judge found her testimony**  **“credible and believable .”**  **The judge concluded that there was a “possibility of future risk**  **” to Clara’s “ safety**  **or well**

**- being” if the FPO put in place by the original trial judge were to be**  **dissolved or modified. H**  **e therefore ordered the FPO to remain in effect. We are not persuaded by Martin’s claims of error. Martin first argues**  **that requiring only a “possibility of future risk” to a victim’s safety or well**

  ** being runs afoul of our analysis in** **C.R. I , because “unless one or the other**  **party is dead, there is always a possibility, however miniscule, of future risk ”**  **and factor two would thus be met “in every single SASPA case**  **.” Martin m**  **isconstrues our statement**  **in C.R. I**  **that “ [i]**  **t cannot be that simply filing for a protective order is sufficient to create ‘the possibility of**  **future risk to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim**  **, ’”**  **or “prong two**  **would be met in every**  **single SASPA case.”**  **248 N.J. at 448**

**. That means**  **only that the procedural step of requesting an FPO**  **cannot, in and of itself, satisfy one of the two substantive factors that are considered to obtain an FPO. It**  **does not mean that negative consequences of sexual assault,**  **such as trauma, anxiety**  **, or fear, can be ignored simply because they may exist in**  **many SASPA**

**case s.**  **“Our courts have recognized that, in sexual assault cases, ‘the wellbeing of . . . victims demands heightened protection’ because there is a ‘likelihood of** **27**

**emotional trauma and mental distress.’” State v. Chambers**  **, 252 N.J. 561, 584 (2023)**  **(omission in original) (quoting**  **State v. D.R.H. , 127 N.J. 249, 259**  **(1992)). C.R. I**  **does not require courts to ignore the precise forms of trauma that victims of sexual assault are most likely to experience when analyzing** 
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)**  **(2)**

**. On the contrary, the plain language of the provision**  **makes clear that credible testimony about such emotional and psychological harm can be sufficient to satisfy**  **SASPA’s second fa ctor** 

**. Martin also**  **contends that “[a]n irrational fear does not warrant a restraining order**  **,” and that**  **Clara’s fears are unreasonable because he has not attempted to contact**  **her in the three years since the incident** 

**. But nothing in**  **the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2)**  **requires a survivor ’s belief**  **about the possibility of future risk to their safety or well** 

**- being**  **to be objectively reasonable.**  **The Legislature is familiar with a**  **reasonable person standard, and has chosen to employ it in many other statutes.**  **6 No**  **t so here. The word** 

**6 See, e.g.**  **, N.J.S.A. 2C:12** 

**- 10(b) (“A person is guilty of stalking . . . if he**  **purposefully or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety . . . .”);**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:21**

**- 25(a) (“A person**  **is guilty of a crime if the person**

**. . . transports or possesses property known or which a reasonable person would**  **believe to be derived from criminal activity**

**. . . . ”); N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 9(a) (“An**  **actor commits a crime of the fourth degree if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, and under circumstances in which a reasonable person** **28**

**“reasonable” does not appear in SASPA, and we “decline [respondent’s ]**  **invitation to read into [the law] a requirement that a [survivor’s] fear of encountering the [respondent] must be objectively reasonable under the**  **circumstances.” K.N.B. v. M.D.**  **, 259 A.3d 341, 351 (Pa. 2021)**

**. As the**  **Pennsylvania Supreme Court held regarding Pennsylvania’s Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act, “there is simply no textual**  **support for the conclusion that a . . . plaintiff’s fear of harm must be analyzed**  **using an objective, reasonable**

**- person standard.” Ibid.** 
**C. The concurring opinion**  **disagrees with this reading**  **of the statute, and**  **would hold that**  **“[o]nce a victim proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a respondent committed a predicate act of nonconsensual sexual contact,**  **sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct . . . the victim is automatically**  **entitled to an FPO” under**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16**  **(e). Post**  **at _**

**_ _**  **(slip op. at**  **2) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the**  **concurrence, “ the possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being of the**  **alleged victim” under N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2) is not relevant to whether a** 

**would know that another may expose intimate parts or may engage in sexual penetration or sexual conduct, he observes another person without that**  **person’s consent and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not expect to be observed.”).** **29**

**survivor can obtain an FPO under** 

**- 16(a)**  **; it is only “one factor to consider**  **when fashioning additional relief in the FPO**  **under N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(f).**  **”**
**Post at _** 

**_ _ (slip op. at 2).**  **No party or amicus has so argued before this Court**  **, t he trial court**  **, or**  **the Appellate Division. Perhaps that is because the**  **argument contravenes the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16**  **(a), (e), and (f)**

**. Had the**  **L egislature**  **wanted to prescribe that an FPO must automatically**  **issue anytime a judge finds, or a respondent admits to, a predicate act, it could**  **have said so in**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a). It also could have deleted large portions**  **of N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a), moved**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(e) up to the first provision,**  **and writ ten**  **it as :**  **“ A**  **final protective order shall be issued after a finding or an**  **admission is made that the respondent committed an act of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such**  **conduct, against the alleged victim.” It did not.**  **The w**  **ords “**  **a final protective order issued pursuant to this**  **section ,**  **” rather than “pursuant to this subsection**  **,” in**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(e),**  **most naturally refer back to N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a), which sets forth, in detail,**  **the who, what, when, where, why, and how of an FPO. And the words “ shall**  **be issued only after**  **a finding or admission is made ”**  **in N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(e)** **30**

**indicate that while the finding or admission of a predicate act is a necessary condition to the issuance of an FPO, it is not itself**  **sufficient. Similarly,**  **had the Legislature**  **wanted to mandate that a trial court consider “the possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being of the alleged**  **victim ,”**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)**  **(2), only**  **“ when fashioning**  **additional relief in the FPO**  **under N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(f)**  **,” post**  **at _**

**_ _ (slip op. at 2), it could have**  **done so. Again, it did not. S**  **imply put, there is no textual co**  **nnection between satisfying**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)**  **(2) and the imposition of additional relief**  **under N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(f).**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)**  **(2) does not mention subsection (f) and says nothing about additional forms of relief that an FPO**  **can include. Likewise, subsection (f) does not reference**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2)**  **or mention “the possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being of**  **the alleged victim .”**  **And subsection (f) explicitly allows for**  **all its**  **listed forms**  **of relief to**  **be applied in any FPO**  **, not merely**  **where a court finds “the**  **possibility of future risk to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim**  **.”**
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2)**  **, (f). The concurrence asserts that its interpretation**  **is compelled by “[a] full**  **reading of SASPA ’s text**  **.” Post**  **at _**

**_ _ (slip op. at 12). But the**  **concurrence actually**  **gives short shrift to the words in N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)**  **to (d)**  **, reads the** **31**

**word “only” out of subsection**  **(e) , and reads the words “the possibility of**  **future risk to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim” into subsection (f).**  **We d ecline to adopt that approach.** 
**We also decline**  **LSNJ’s invitation to adopt a list of factors**  **for courts to consider in determining whether**  **a survivor**  **has shown “**  **the possibility of future risk to the**  **[ir] safety or well** 

**- being” under**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2).**  **Had the Legislature wanted to import**  **into SASPA the six factors listed in**  **the**
**PDVA ,**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 29(a)(1**  **) to ( 6),**  **it could have done so. Similarly,**  **although the**  **L egislature set forth four factors for a court to consider**  **in determining**  **whether a SASPA FPO should be dissolved or modified under** 
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(i), including “the potential for contact between the parties**  **” and “**  **the history of the respondent’s violations of the protective order or criminal convictions,**  **” it did not include any of those factors in the list of what**  **a court “shall” consider in deciding whether**  **to issue an FPO to begin with ,**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(**  **a) . We therefore do not**  **add those factors, or any others**  **the Legislature**  **did not include**  **, to N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(**  **a) (2)** 

**. See, e.g.**  **, DiProspero**  **, 183 N.J. at 492 (“We cannot ‘write in an additional qualification which the**  **Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own enactment**

**. . . .’”**  **(quoting Craster v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Newark, 9 N.J. 225, 230 (1952))**  **)**

**. 32** 

**We likewise do not reach Partners ’**  **request, echoed by LSNJ, to apply**  **the “perfunctory and self**

**- evident” standard established for PDVA FROs by the**  **Appellate Division in A.M.C. v. P.B.**  **, 447 N.J. Super.**  **at 417**  **, to SASPA FPOs,**  **and to therefore hold that SASPA’s second factor is automatically satisfied**  **whenever the predicate act is “nonconsensual sexual penetration (i.e., rape) or other egregious acts of sexual violence.”**  **Clara did not include such a request**  **in her briefing to this Court or any court.**  **“[A]s a general rule, the Court ‘does**  **not consider arguments that have not been asserted by a party, and are raised for the first time by an amicus curiae.’”**  **State in Int. of A.A. , 240 N.J. 341,**  **359 n.1 (2020) (quoting State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 421 (2017) )** 

**. A**  **nd the issue**  **raised by Partners is not necessary to decide this case, as**  **Clara clearly put**  **forth sufficient evidence to show a “possibility of future risk” to**  **her “safety or**  **well**

**- being”**  **under N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)**  **(2). We make one final comment.**  **Because three years elapsed between the issuance of the initial FPO and the second FPO hearing, Clara was able to**  **provide testimony during the remand hearing about mental health treatment she had been receiving and how the sexual assault was still impacting her life**  **several years later.**  **The concurrence expresses concern that the unique**  **procedural posture of this case, in which Clara was able to testify with “the benefit of hindsight,” “illustrates how**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2)’s s**  **tandard will 33** 

**not always be ‘easily satisfied.’” Post at _** 

**_ _ (slip op. at 27)** 

**. We disagree.** 
**O ur discussion of**  **Clara’s testimony,**  **see supra**  **at ___ (slip op. at**  **6- 7, 25**  **) , is**  **not intended to imply that such evidence of**  **psychological symptoms or treatment is necessary to satisfy N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)**  **(2). Indeed, because an FPO hearing is**  **generally required to take place within ten days of the filing of** 

**an application for a SASPA TPO,**  **see N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2)**  **, a survivor will**  **likely not yet have received any mental health treatment. Expert testimony or**  **documentation of psychological treatment is therefore**  **not required. Neither ,**  **of course, is evidence of symptoms over a period of years.** 
**V. We have every confidence that trial judges will ably consider “the**  **possibility of future risk to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim” in**  **accordance with the**  **plain language of**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2)**  **and the guidance provided in this opinion.**  **For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.**  **CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, PIERRE** 

**- LOUIS, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE WAINER APTER’s opinion.**  **JUSTICE FASCIALE filed a concurrence. C.R.,**  **Plaintiff**

**- Respondent,** 

**v. M.T.,**  **Defendant**

**- Appellant.** 

**JUSTICE FASCIALE**  **, concurring.**
**I disagree with the notion that to obtain a final protective order (FPO) under the**  **Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA)**  **, N.J.S.A.** 
**2C:14**

**- 13 to** 

**- 21**  **(2023)**

**-- now known as the**  **Victim’s Assistance and Survivor Protection Act (VASPA)** 

**-- a victim must speculate about whether there exists a**  **“possibility of future risk to [their] safety or well**

**- being.”**  **1 The plain language** 

**1 L**  **ike the majority, I use SASPA throughout this opinion instead of VASPA**

**. In July 2023, Governor Phil**  **ip D. Murphy signed legislation amending SASPA**  **to broaden its protective scope for victims of alleged sexual contact and other predicate acts.**  **See Office of the Governor,**  **Press Release: Governor Murphy**  **Signs Legislation Expanding Access to Temporary Protective Orders (**  **July 24, 2023)**  **, https://www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/562023/approved/20230724c.s**  **html . The amendment**  **became effective January 1,**  **2024. Just like SASPA, VASPA “**  **[a] uthorizes issuance of protective orders for certain victimized**  **persons in situations for which domestic violence statutes do not apply due to lack of familial or dating relationship between victim and offending actor.”**  **S. 1517**  **Synopsis (**  **Second Reprint, Feb. 10, 202 2**  **). It also**  **adds two predicate acts** 

**-- stalking and cyber** 

**- harassment** 

**-- and expressly defines “emotional** **2**

**of S**  **ASPA requires no such conjecture. O**  **nce a victim proves by a**  **preponderance of the evidence that a respondent committed a predicate act of “nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration,**  **or lewdness, or any attempt**  **at such conduct,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)**  **(1) ,**  **the victim is automatically entitled**  **to an FPO prohibiting the respondent from contacting the victim and committing further predicate acts**  **, s ee**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(e)** 

**. The “possibility”**  **of what may or may not happen in the future**

**-- even if “permissive and easily**  **satisfied,” a**  **nte at ___ (slip op. at**  **3)**

**-- is simply**  **one factor to consider when fashioning additional relief in the FPO**  **under N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(f**  **). It is not an**  **element of proof that a victim must establish to obtain an FPO.**  **This is a unique case because the victim**  **here testified at two FPO**  **hearings that were**  **over three**  **years apart and**  **before different FPO judges.**
**Two FPO**  **hearing s**  **occurred because the re was a remand** 

**. See**  **C.R. v.**  **M.T.**

**distress” in the context of “stalking.” L.**  **2023, c.**  **127, § 2**  **( codified at**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 14**  **) . Pertinent to this case,**  **VASPA did not change the burden of proof a**  **victim must surmount to obtain final protection but indeed expanded protections for victims who could not get relief previously under the**  **Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25**

**- 17**  **to**

**- 35** 

**. Given**  **that VASPA did not change any provision relevant to the issuance of**  **an FPO, my interpretation of SASPA applies in full force to**  **VASPA. And because the**  **VASPA amendments are not at issue in this case,**  **as the majority stated,**  **this opinion too**  **relies on the text of N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 13 to** 

**- 21 in effect prior to January 1, 2024. All citations to N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 13 to** 

**- 21**  **are to the pre**

**- amendment language as of December 31, 2023** 

**. 3** 

**( C.R.**  **I) , 248 N.J. 428 (2021)** 

**. At**  **the first FPO hearing in 2018**  **, approximately** 

**one month**  **after the**  **occurrence of**  **the predicate act, the initial FPO judge**  **found that there exist**  **ed “**  **the possibility of future risk to the safety or well**

  ** being of the alleged victim** **,” id.**  **at 436, despite citing no evidence. The judge**  **instead relied**  **only on the filing for a protective order**  **to make that finding** 

**. Ibid.**  **That is why the Court in**  **C.R. I**  **stated that “[i]**  **t cannot be that simply filing for a protective order is sufficient to create**  **‘ the possibility of future risk**  **to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim**  **’ noted in**  **[factor] two.**  **” Id.**  **at 448**  **(quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2))** 

**. 2**  **Instead of concluding that there existed sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that there is a “possibility of future risk to the safety or**  **well**

**- being of the**  **alleged victim,” t**  **he Court in**  **C.R. I**  **correctly determined that**  **the “**  **factual findings that the [initial FPO judge] put on the record appear to**  **counter plaintiff ’**  **s establishing ”**  **that there is a “possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being of the alleged victim.**  **” Ibid.**  **(emphasis added). The C**  **ourt therefore**  **remand ed**  **“ so that the trial court may** 

**. . . make additional findings of** 

**2 I agree with the majority that**  **SASPA ’s plain text supports the conclusion**  **that N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(1) and (2) are “factors” and not “prongs,” contrary**  **to the parties’ contentions. Ante at**  **___ (slip op. at**  **4 n.4 ).**  **But I disagree that**  **the second factor**

**-- N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2)** 

**-- needs to be proven by a victim**  **as an element before the issuance of the FPO. C**  **onsideration of**  **factor two is not an element of proof to obtain the FPO**  **; instead ,**  **it is relevant to fashioning**  **additional protection under**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(f)** 

**. 4** 

**fact [on**  **factor two]**  **that support a determination either that the [factor]**  **has been satisfied, or not, in deciding whether to issue the final [protective]**  **order**

**. ”**  **Ibid. (emphasis added).**  **Although the majority here**  **determined that “the plain language of**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2) creates a standard that is permissive and**  **easily satisfied,” a**  **nte at ___ (slip op. at**  **3) , the**  **first FPO judge’s inability to**  **point to such evidence belies that determination and prompted, in part,**  **C.R. I’s remand instructions.** 
**O n**  **remand, a different judge, over**  **three years later, heard**  **additional testimony from the victim, who instead of**  **speculating about the**  **“ possibility of**  **future risk to [her]**  **safety or well**

**- being,**  **” testified specifically**  **about how the predicate act**  **, which occurred over three years prior,**  **impacted her** 

**. After**  **hearing this new testimony, the second judge decided to keep the original FPO in effect, which included additional protections under N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(f).**  **That procedure is highly uncommon. As I will later explain, this irregularity**  **underscores two critical points: (1)**  **victims will likely struggle to produce evidence**  **shortly after a predicate act occurs that demonstrates there exists a “possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being of the alleged**  **victim,” and (2) final protection under SASPA is not dependent on**  **speculation that there exists a “possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being of the**  **alleged victim .”** **5**

**I would thus hold that**  **t he victim**  **here is entitled to the**  **FPO solely**  **because she proved at the**  **first FPO hearing**  **the occurrence of a predicate act under**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(1)** 

**. No other proof was required for her to**  **obtain the minimum protection available under SASPA and mandated**  **by N.J.S.A.** 
**2C:14**

**- 16(e)** 

**. Furthermore, i**  **t is equally clear to me that the victim**

**-- who**  **amplified her testimony three**

**- plus years later at a remand hearing** 

**-- is entitled**  **to additional relief under N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(f)**  **, not based on**  **the initial FPO record, but rather,**  **on the**  **subsequent findings made by the remand judge that**  **she suffered a “possibility of future risk to [her] safety or well** 

**- being” under** 
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2).**  **3**
**I therefore**  **write separately.**

**3 This Court reviews the interpretation of statutes de novo. Ante**  **at ___ (slip op. at 13) (quoting State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018)).**  **In doing so, the Court’s role is to discern and effectuate the Legislature’s intent**  **which first**  **involves analyzing the plain text of the statute, and then resorting to extrinsic**  **sources if the text is ambiguous** 

**. State v. S.B.**  **, 230 N.J. 62, 67**

**- 68**  **(2017); DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)**  **; see also**  **Young v. Schreing Corp.**  **, 141 N.J. 16, 25 (1995) (“In the interpretation of a statute our overriding goal has consistently been to determine the Legislature’s intent.”**  **(quoting Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 515 (1994))**  **)**

**. Notably,**  **Partners for Women and Justice argue in its merits brief**  **that based on a plain reading of SASPA**  **, N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2) is not a required element of proof for the issuance of**  **an FPO**

**. 6**  **I. In 2015, Governor Christopher J. Christie**  **signed SASPA into law effective May 7, 2016. Unlike the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of**  **1991 (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25**

**- 17 to** 

**- 35, which protects victims of domestic**  **violence, SASPA protects “**  **[a] ny**  **person alleging to be**  **a victim of**  **nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct**  **, and**  **who is not eligible for a restraining order as a**  **‘ victim of**  **domestic violence ’**  **as defined by the**  **” PDVA** 

**. N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 14(a)(1)**  **(emphases added). 4**  **SASPA allows**  **those who are n**  **ot protected under the** 
**PDVA to “ file an application with the Superior Court . . . alleging the**  **commission of such conduct or attempted conduct and seeking a temporary**  **protective order [(**  **TPO )]**  **.” Ibid.** 
**II. Preliminarily,**  **I briefly discuss**  **the PDVA and S**  **ASPA given**  **the natural tendency to**  **compare the elements of proof for the issuance of a PDVA final** 

**4 The PDVA**  **defines a “[**  **v] ictim of domestic violence**  **” as “any person who is**  **18 years of age or older or who is an emancipated minor and who has been subjected to domestic violence by a spouse, former spouse,” household**  **member, someone with whom**  **“ the victim**  **has had a dating relationship**  **, ” or**  **“any person, regardless of age, who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has a child in common” or plans to have a**  **child and “one of the parties is pregnant.” N.J.S.A. 2C:25**

**- 19(d).** **7**

**restraining order (FRO) with that of a**  **n FPO under**  **S ASPA** 

**. As the majority**  **correctly point s**  **out, “SASPA mirrors the PDVA in certain respects, and diverges from it**  **in others.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 18**  **). FROs under the**  **PDVA and FPOs under S**  **ASPA (1) protect victims against prescribed predicate acts; (2) require alleged victims to establish by a preponderance of the**  **evidence the occurrence of one or more predicate acts; and (3) require the FRO**  **or FPO judge to “**  **consider ”**  **certain “**  **factors. ”**  **However, other than**  **those general**  **similarities, the PDVA and**  **SASPA are incomparable** 

**. Under the PDVA,**  **and unlike**  **SASPA ,**  **the Legislature “did not intend that**  **the commission of one of the enumerated predicate acts of domestic violence [would]**  **automatically mandate**  **[] the entry of a domestic violence restraining**  **order.” Silver**  **v. Silver**  **, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 126**

**- 27 (App. Div. 2006)**  **(emphas e**  **s added)**

**. The text of**  **S ASPA**  **is different . I**  **t states that an**  **“ [FPO]**  **issued pursuant to this section shall be issued only after a finding or an admission is made that the respondent committed**  **” a predicate act.**  **N .J.S.A.** 
**2C:14**

**- 16(e) (emphasis added).**  **Importantly , an FRO under the PDVA is aimed at providing prospective**  **relief against predicted future acts of harm; it is geared towards ending the**  **cycle of domestic violence. See**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:25**

**- 18 (explaining**  **that ,**  **when it enacted**  **the PDVA, the Legislature inten ded**  **“to assure the victims of domestic 8** 

**violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide”). That is precisely why**  **, in the context of the PDVA, FRO judges must determine**  **whether an FRO is “ necessary**  **to prevent further abuse.”**  **See N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 29(b) (emphas**  **e s added). Thus, to obtain an FRO under the PDVA**  **, a victim** 
**must not only prove that a predicate act occurred**  **but also that an FRO is**  **“necessary**

**. . . to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent**  **further abuse.” Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127. In contrast, a SASPA victim need not prove a “second prong”**  **or “factor” as a prerequisite to obtaining**  **an FPO**

**. Under**  **S ASPA,**  **contrary to the majority’s view,**  **t he issuance of an FPO does not require a victim**  **to also demonstrate, beyond proving the commission of a predicate act, that without**  **an FPO there exists a “possibility of future risk to the [victim’s] safety or well**

  ** being** **.” A nte**  **at ___ (slip op. at 3, 22 ).**  **And SASPA**  **definitely does not require**  **a victim to show that the FPO is “necessary** 

**. . . to protect the victim from an**  **immediate danger or to prevent further abuse .”**  **Silver , 387 N.J. Super. at 127.**  **Rather, S**  **ASPA provides that an alleged victim is automatically entitled to an**  **FPO after establishing only that a respondent committed one or more predicate**
**acts. See**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(e). Therefore, the**  **elements of proof, the analytical framework, and the overall structure of**  **S ASPA and the PDVA**  **differ, and cannot be conflated** 

**. 9**  **A. Notably**  **, an FPO under S**  **ASPA is accomplished in two different sequential stages:**  **first is**  **the initial TPO stage which has**  **a “good cause”**  **burden of proof, and then second is**  **the FPO stage which has a heavier burden**  **of proof “by a preponderance of the evidence .”**  **Although our focus here is on the proofs necessary at the second stage (obtaining**  **an FPO ), I**  **dissect each**  **stage not only**  **to inform**  **litigants and s**  **uperior c**  **ourt judges**  **about the significant**  **differences , but also**  **to emphasize**  **th at**  **consideration of the**

**“ possibility of future risk to**  **the safety or well** 

**- being**  **of the alleged victim ,”** 
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2),**  **is to be**  **considered to fashion additional relief in the FPO,**  **not as a required element of proof**  **for an FPO** 

**. 1.**  **At the first stage, an alleged victim of a predicate act under S**  **ASPA must apply for an emergency ex parte TPO.**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 15. N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 15**  **(d) provides that a TPO “shall be granted upon good cause shown**  **and shall remain in effect until a judge of the Superior Court issues a further order.”**  **(emphasis added) . At this TPO stage, unlike at the FPO stage, the**  **immediate focus is the emergent nature prompted by the alleged predicate act and the**  **need to protect the victim pending a final hearing. See**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 15(a).** **10**

**And unlike in the context of a n**  **FPO, there are two different grounds that a superior court judge can rely on to issue a TPO** 

**. The first available ground on which to grant a TPO is discretionary** 

**. See** 
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 15(a). N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 15(a) provides**  **that**

**[a] judge**  **of the Superior Court may enter**  **an emergency ex parte order**  **when necessary to protect the safety and well** 

**- being of an alleged victim**  **on whose behalf the relief is sought. The court may grant any relief**  **necessary to protect the safety and well**

**- being of an**  **alleged victim. [(emphas**  **e s added).]**  **Under th at**  **ground ,**  **a judge may**  **issue a**  **TPO and “**  **grant any relief necessary to protect the safety and well** 

**- being of an alleged victim**  **.” Ibid.**  **In contrast, the second available ground to grant a TPO is mandatory** 

**. See**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 15(b). N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 15(b) provides**  **that**

**[t] he court shall, upon consideration of the application,**  **order emergency ex parte relief in the nature of a [TPO] if the court determines that the applicant is a victim**  **of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or**  **lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, and qualifies for such relief pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:14**  **-14 ].**  **[(emphases added).] Under th**  **at ground**  **, a judge must**  **issue a**  **TPO if that judge determines that the applicant is**  **indeed a victim of a predicate act under S**  **ASPA**

**. 11** 

**After deciding that**  **a TPO**  **is warranted, the judge may turn to N.J.S.A.**
**2C:14**

**- 15(e) which sets**  **forth a non**

**- exhaustive list of initial available** 
**emergency protections that a TPO judge**  **may impose**  **, pending a final hearing**  **, to**  **protect the safety and well**

**- being of the**  **alleged victim** 

**. After an emergency ex parte TPO has been issued on either of the two**  **abovementioned grounds**  **, N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 15(a) or (b), and after the TPO judge**  **has fashioned any**  **appropriate temporary emergency relief pending an FPO**  **hearing, stage two quickly occurs** 
**. An**  **FPO hearing then**  **“shall be held in the Superior Court within 10 days of the filing of**  **” a TPO application.**  **N.J.S.A.**
**2C:14**

**- 16(a).** 
**2. At the second**  **stage, i.e.,**  **the FPO**  **stage ,**  **an alleged victim must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (compared to the TPO stage’s easier**  **“ good** 

**cause ”**  **standard ) the “allegations made in the application for a protective**  **order.” N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a). Applications for protective orders pertain to**  **facts supporting the victim’s allegation that a respondent**  **committed one of the predicate acts under**  **S ASPA** 

**. See**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 14(a)(1) (defining the**  **predicate acts). In general,**  **as in all bench trials, an FPO judge will consider a multitude**  **of factors when conducting the final hearing, such as credibility of the 12** 

**witnesses, physical evidence, and so on. Without limiting an FPO judge’s ability to weigh the relevant evidence at the final hearing,**  **S ASPA**  **identifies only**  **two non**  **- exhaustive**  **“factors” that an**  **FPO judge must “consider.”**
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(1) and (2)**  **explain that**

**[t] he court**  **shall consider but not be limited to the**  **following factors**  **: (1) the occurrence of one or more acts of**  **nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such**  **conduct, against the alleged victim; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or**  **well**

**- being of the alleged victim.**  **[(emphas e**  **s added).] A full reading of**  **S ASPA**  **’s text requires**  **an FPO judge to**  **“ consider**  **” each factor**  **for different reasons: factor one deals with the predicate act and relates to the**  **relief that must be issued under N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(e); factor two concerns**  **possible future risk to the victim’s safety or well** 

**- being and relates to**  **N.J.S.A.**
**2C:14**

**- 16(f)’s permissive additional relief.**  **As to the first mandatory factor**  **, N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)(1) requires an**  **FPO judge to “consider” “the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such**  **conduct, against the alleged victim.” The parties and amici agree that an FPO 13** 

**cannot be issued unless the judge finds, or an admission is made, that a respondent**  **committed at least one predicate act enumerated under S**  **ASPA**

**. That finding controls.**  **In comparison to the initial**  **TPO stage where a TPO judge has the authority to issue a TPO on two different grounds** 

**-- one**  **discretionary “when necessary to protect the safety and well**

**- being of an**  **alleged victim,” N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 15(a),**  **and one mandatory when “the court**  **determines that the applicant is a victim” of a predicate act, N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 15(b)** 

**-- the Legislature emphasized that an FPO judge shall rely on only one**  **ground at the final hearing. See**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(e). N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(e)**  **provides that an FPO**

**shall be issued only after**  **a finding or an admission is**  **made that the respondent committed**  **[a predicate] act**  **of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or**  **lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, against the alleged victim.**  **[(emphases added).] And unlike what is required to obtain an FRO under the PDVA** 

**-- that both**  **a predicate act occurred and the FRO is necessary to prevent further abuse** 

**--**

**once an**  **FPO judge in a S**  **ASPA case**  **finds that a respondent**  **committed one of the predicate acts, or there is such an admission,**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(e)**  **requires that**  **the FPO “shall be issued” and shall**  **automatically:**

**(1) prohibit the respondent from having contact with**  **the victim; and 14**  **(2) prohibit the respondent from committing any future**  **act of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such**  **conduct, against the victim. No speculation is required about what may or may not happen in the future.**  **The FPO must be issue**  **d. As to the second factor**  **, N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2) requires that an FPO**  **judge also “consider” “the possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being**  **of the alleged victim.” SASPA does not define the words “consider,” “possibility,” “future,” “risk**  **,” “safety,” or “well** 

**- being.”**  **I a gree with the**  **majority that we must afford those terms their “generally accepted meaning .”** 
**Ante at ___ (slip op. at 22**  **) ( quoting**  **N.J.S.A. 1:1**

**- 1)** 

**. To “consider” means**  **to**

**“ think carefully**  **about (something), typically before making a decision[;] . . . [to] take (something)**  **into account when making an assessment or judgment**  **.” New Oxford American Dictionary**  **370 (3d ed. 2010). Under**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(e)**  **, an FPO “**  **shall be issued only after a finding or an admission is made that the respondent committed” a predicate act. If the Legislature intended that** 

**an FPO**  **be i**  **ssue d**  **only after the FPO judge finds**  **that a predicate act**  **occurred plus**  **an additional finding that**  **there exists a “possibility of future risk to the [victim’s] safety or well** 

**- being,” it would have said so.**  **See DiProspero**  **, 183**
**N.J. at**  **492 (“We cannot ‘write in an additional qualification which the 15** 

**Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own enactment . . . .’” (**  **quoting Craster v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Newark**  **, 9 N.J. 225, 230 (1952))). No such language is included in SASPA** 

**. B.** 
**W hy**  **then did the Legislature requir**  **e FPO judges to, among other** 

**“ factors**  **,” “consider” the “possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being**  **of the alleged victim”? I**  **t is my view that under SASPA,**  **an FPO judge “**  **shall consider**  **” the “possibility” of such “future risk,” and any other relevant**  **evidence, when fashioning enhanced relief authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(f).**  **My view is supported by the text of SASPA, the**  **definition of “**  **consider ,” and**  **how the Legislature used the word “consider”**  **in the PDVA** 

**. N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(f) provides:**  **In addition to any relief provided to the victim under**  **[ N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(e)**  **, an**  **FPO] issued pursuant to this**  **section may include, but is not limited to, the following**  **relief: (1**  **) an order prohibiting the respondent from**  **entering the residence, property, school, or place of employment of the victim or the victim’s**  **family or household members, and requiring the respondent to stay away from any specified place**  **that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by the victim or the victim’s family or**  **household members; (2)**  **an order prohibiting the respondent from having any contact with the victim or others,** **16 including an order forbidding the respondent**  **from personally or through an agent initiating any communication likely to cause annoyance or**  **alarm including, but not limited to, personal, written, or telephone contact, or contact via**  **electronic device, with the victim or the victim’s family members or their employers, employees,**  **or fellow workers; an employee or volunteer of a sexual assault response entity that is providing**  **services to a victim; or others with whom communication would be likely to**  **cause annoyance or alarm to the victim;**  **(3) an order prohibiting the respondent from**  **stalking or following, or threatening to harm, stalk or follow, the victim;**  **(4) an order prohibiting the respondent from**  **committing or attempting to commit an act of harassment, including an act of cyber** 

**** **harassment, against the victim; and (5)**  **any other relief that the court deems appropriate.**  **[(emphases added).]**
**Th ose**  **added protections provide more relief to the victim beyond the**  **automatic protection issued after a finding is made that**  **a predicate act**  **occurred**

**-- i.e.,**  **prohibiting a respondent from contacting the victim, N.J.S.A.**
**2C:14**

**- 16(e)(1), and from committing further prohibited acts, id.**  **at (e)(2**  **). A**  **n FPO judge**  **has broad discretion to grant additional protections based on all the evidence**  **introduced at the hearing, whether premised on the nature and facts 17** 

**of the predicate act, a “**  **future risk to [**  **a victim’s ]**  **safety or well**

**- being,**  **” or any**  **other consideration under the facts of each case.** 
**R eference to considering “factors” is not new when it comes to**  **protective and restraining orders. As I pointed out, the PDVA requi**  **res FRO**  **judges to “consider”**  **“ factors**  **.” I**  **n the PDVA context, like here, consideration of enumerated “factors” is also**  **for different purposes. Specifically, under the PDVA, the Legislature directed that FRO judges**  **“shall consider but not be limited to [six] factors.”**  **N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 29(a)**  **(1 ) to**  **( 6)** 

**. 5**  **To obtain an FRO under the PDVA, a victim need not establish each**

**5 These non** 

**- exhaustive factors are:** 

**(1 )**  **T he previous history of domestic violence between**  **the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse;**  **(2) T**  **he existence of immediate danger to person or property;**  **(3) T**  **he financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant;**  **(4) T**  **he best interests of the victim and any child; (5)**  **I n determining custody and parenting time the**  **protection of the victim’s safety; and (6)**  **T he existence of a verifiable order of protection**  **from another jurisdiction. [N.J.S.A. 2C:25** 

**- 29(a)(1**  **) to**  **( 6).]** **18**

**numbered factor. Rather, w hen determining whether a victim has proven a**  **predicate act under the PDVA, FRO judges consider primarily two of those six**  **factors ,**  **s ee**  **Silver , 387 N.J. Super.**  **at 126 (explaining that the FRO judge**
**“must consider the evidence in light of whether there is a previous history of**  **domestic violence [ (**  **factor one )**  **], and whether there exists immediate danger to person or property [**  **( factor two**  **) ]”). And when determining whether**  **the “relief**  **[is] necessary to prevent further abuse,” N.J.S.A.**  **2C:25**

**- 29(b)**  **, which is**  **an additional**  **element that is not expressly**  **required under S**  **ASPA ,**  **FRO judges consider all six factors**  **, see**  **Silver , 387 N.J. Super.**  **at 127. Thus, as illustrated by the definition of “consider,**  **” and its use in both**  **the PDVA and SASPA, t**  **he language in**  **S ASPA**  **that “[t]he court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors,” on its own, does not expressly set**  **forth the grounds for issuance of an FPO. Rather, it merely sets forth circumstances the judge should “think**  **carefully about” or “take** 

**. . . into**  **account” when fashioning additional**  **relief in the order.**  **See New Oxford**  **American Dictionary at**  **370.**
**III. Although the text is clear, the legislative history and New Jersey’s**  **existing public policy also support my reading of**  **SASPA**

**. In enacting**  **S ASPA**  **, the Legislature focused on victims**  **of nonconsensual sexual predicate acts. 19** 

**New Jersey has increased protections for sexual assault victims**

**. See**  **State v. Chambers**  **, 252 N.J. 561, 58 3-86**  **(2023) (**  **“Our courts have recognized that, in sexual assault cases, ‘the wellbeing of . . . victims demands heightened**  **protection’ because there is a ‘likelihood of emotional trauma and mental**  **distress.’” (**  **omission in original)**  **(quoting State v. D.R.H., 127 N.J. 249, 259**  **(1992))). S**  **ASPA further provides for that enhanced protection**

**. In line with those**  **goa ls,**  **S ASPA**  **“help[s] better respond” to sexual assault victims.**  **A. Judiciary Comm** 

**. Meeting**  **on Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015, A. 4078**  **(Jan. 15, 2015) (statement of Valerie Vainieri Huttle)**  **, https://njleg.state.nj.us/archived** 

**- media/2014/AJU** 

**- meeting** 

**- list/media** 

**** **player?committee=AJU&agendaDate= 2015** 

**- 01** 

**- 15** 

**- 10:00:00&agendaType=M&av=A**  **. According to Assemblywoman Valerie**  **Huttle, S**  **ASPA’s lead sponsor**  **, “a critical issue [is] helping victims become**  **survivors and helping them heal ”**  **and therefore**  **S ASPA**  **is designed to help**  **accomplish those goal s**  **and ensure that**  **survivors feel safe. Ibid. Accordingly**  **, S**  **ASPA imposes a “minimal burden and confusion for the courts.” Ibid** 

**. Given**  **this legislative history, it**  **is of no surprise**  **that to obtain an FPO, a victim need**  **only prove that a predicate act occurred, not that at some time in the future the**  **victim might experience the “possibility**  **of future risk to [their] safety or well**

  ** being.”** **Any other reading**

**-- even if the standard is “permissive and easily** **20**

**satisfied,” a**  **nte at ___ (slip op. at**  **3)**

**-- would contravene the Legislature’s**  **intent and impose more “burden[s]” and “confusion” on the courts and**  **litigants**

**. Moreover, the**  **legislative history surrounding VASPA emphasize s**  **VASPA’s focus on protecting victims and ensuring straightforward access to legal remedies.**  **Assemblywoman Michele Matsikoudis commented about the 2023 amendment**  **s that “[t]he law is now on the side of victims seeking**  **protection through the courts. Victims who have been targeted by strangers, neighbors and acquaintances will finally be able to experience the**  **peace of mind**  **that protective orders provide.” Office of the Governor, Press Release**  **: Governor Murphy Signs Legislation Expanding Access to Temporary**  **Protective Orders (July 24, 2023) (emphasis added). Elaborating on the**  **benefits of VASPA’s protection s**  **, Senator Linda Greenstein stated that “[t]his law will empower victims to take legal action and obtain a [protective]**  **order, providing them with a crucial tool to proactively protect themselves before a**  **stalking situation escalates.” Ibid.**  **Consistent with S**  **ASPA ’s and VASPA**  **’s purpose and New Jersey’s public**  **policy to protect victims of sexual violence, academic research also supports the need to provide accessible legal remedies in the form of protective orders**  **for victims. Studies show that victims of sexual assault perceive orders of 21** 

**protection as**  **effective and crucial to their safety. See**  **Jane K. Stoever,**  **Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection Orders**  **, 67 Vand. L. Rev.**  **1015, 1066 (2014). For instance, “o**  **btaining a protection order is deeply empowering because it entails asserting one’s own**  **needs, standing up to the abuser, and enlisting a potent institutional ally.” Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic**  **Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship ?**  **, 29 Cardozo L. Rev.**  **1487, 1515 (2008). “Moreover, victims often report that civil protection orders were instrumental in helping them recover and improve their**  **overall feelings of well**

**- being after an attack.” Shawn**  **E. Fields, Debunking**  **the Stranger**

**- in** 

**- the** 

**- Bushes Myth:**  **The Case for Sexual Assault Protection Orders**  **, 2017 Wis. L. Rev.**  **429, 460 (2017) (quoting Hayley Jodoin,**  **Closing the Loophole in Massachusetts Protection Order Legislation to Provide Greater**  **Security for Victims of Sexual Assault: Has Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258E Closed**  **I t Enough?**  **, 17 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc.**  **102, 111 (2012))** 

**. IV.**  **Application of those legal principles to the facts of this case is**  **straightforward ,**  **although with one**  **caveat : u**  **nlike a typical S**  **ASPA case ,**  **in which**  **an FPO judge conducts one hearing**  **and the record on appeal pertains to** **22**

**that hearing**  **, here**  **the victim testified at two FPO hearings before different**  **FPO judges over**  **three years apart from each other**  **. The predicate act**  **occurred**
**on June 26 into June 27, 2018. On July 2, 2018, the victim filed for and**  **received a TPO under S**  **ASPA . Thereafter,**  **as previously explained, the first FPO judge conducted a final hearing on August 2, 2018. The second FPO**  **judge, i.e.,**  **the remand judge, conducted a second final hearing on November**  **8, 2021**

**. At**  **the firs t FPO**  **hearing ,**  **the victim did not testify about the “possibility of**  **future risk to**  **[ her**  **] safety or well** 

**- being**  **,” besides her one statement**  **explaining that she filed for a**  **n ex parte TPO**  **because she “[did not] feel safe**  **without it.” The**  **victim was not questioned**  **about “future risk”**  **nor did she produce**  **evidence that would satisfy the test proffered by the majority today** 

**--**

**“ whether**  **there is a chance that a [victim] may be exposed to physical danger,**  **risk, or injury, or may be**  **exposed to something emotionally unwelcome or unpleasant that could make**  **[her] feel uncomfortable, unhealthy, or unhappy**  **.”**
**Ante at ___ (slip op. at 23**  **). And based on the testimony that was provided, t**  **he first FPO judge found i**  **t was clear that**  **respondent did not call, text, contact, or interact with the victim after the predicate act occurred** 

**. Thus, at the first FPO**  **hearing, there was**  **no showing that the victim may, in the future, be “exposed**  **to physical danger, risk, or injury,” or “exposed to something emotionally 23** 

**unwelcome o r**  **unpleasant that could make [her] feel uncomfortable, unhealthy,**  **or unhappy .”**  **See i**  **bid. As this Court stated**  **in C.R. I**  **, the “factual findings [at the first FPO**  **hearing] appear to counter [the victim’s]**  **establishing [the second factor]**  **of**
**SAS PA.**  **” 248 N.J. at 448** 

**. There**  **were no facts identified by the judge to find**  **that there exist**  **ed a “possibility of future risk to the safety or well** 

**- being of the**  **alleged victim”; instead, the facts appeared**  **contrary to such a finding. Ibid.**  **If the victim had**  **presented evidence to show that there is a “possibility of future risk to [her] safety or well** 

**- being,”**  **there would have been**  **no reason to remand the case on this issue.**  **6 Instead, in its remand instructions, th**  **e Court**  **instructed the trial court to “make additional findings of fact that support a determination** 

**6 Similarly, even if the first FPO judge did not make a finding on factor two of**  **SASPA, had the record contained evidence that factor two was satisfied, the C.R. I.**  **Court would not have needed**  **to remand for additional findings of fact**  **on this factor. See**  **A.M.C. v. P.B. , 447 N.J. Super. 402, 418, 422 (App. Div.**  **2016) (reversing**  **without a remand the trial judge’s decision not to issue an FRO under the PDVA because the record supported issuance**  **of the FRO );**  **J.D. v. A.M.W.**  **, 475 N.J. Super. 306, 315**  **(App. Div. 2023) (reversing the decision not to issue an FRO under the PDVA and remanding for entry of the**  **FRO because the record contained**  **“ample evidence**  **” that the plaintiff needed the**  **FRO to prevent further abuse) ;**  **c f.**  **J.S. v. D.S. , 448 N.J. Super. 17, 23** 

**- 24 (App.**  **Div. 2016) (vacating an FRO under the PDVA and remanding the matter for a determination of whether the predicate act of domestic violence occurred**  **because courts “have an obligation to ensure the FRO was legitimately entered” and nothing in the record supported keeping the FRO in effect).**  **Although these are PDVA cases, the principle**  **that an appellate court can reverse**  **without remanding and issue an FRO if supported by credible evidence in the record**  **, appl**  **ies in equal force to SASPA**  **FPOs**

**. 24** 

**either that the [second factor]**  **has been satisfied, o r**  **not, in deciding whether to issue the [FPO].**  **” C.R. I**  **, 248 N.J. at 448.**  **The first FPO judge**  **in fact appropriately**  **entered the FPO after finding the**  **victim “ha[d] been subjected to nonconsensual sexual activity.”**  **Adhering**
**to N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(e)(1) and (2), the judge prohibited respondent from**  **having “contact with the victim,” and from committing further acts of “nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt**  **at such conduct, against the victim.” It was error, however, for the first FPO**  **judge to find there**  **existed a “possibility of future risk to the**  **[ victim’s**  **] safety**  **or well**

**- being” only**  **because respondent has “**  **been subjected to legal fees and may now harbor a grudge against [the victim] which would probably not have**  **occurred but for these proceedings**

**. ” Exercising discretion**  **under N.J.S.A.**
**2C:14**

**- 16(f)(3) and (4), he**  **p rohibited respondent from “stalk[ing],**  **follow[ing][,] or harass[ing] the victim.” 7**  **But as the Court stated in C.R. I**  **,**

**“ [i]**  **t cannot be that simply filing for a protective order is sufficient**  **” to satisfy** 
**N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2)**  **, the**  **“possibility of future risk to the safety or well**

  ** being of the alleged victim.** **” 248 N.J.**  **at 448. A finding based on**  **N.J.S.A.**

**7 The record is unclear about whether the first FPO judge included further**  **protection in accordance with N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(f)(1) (barring respondent**  **from specific locations) and N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(f)(2) (prohibiting respondent**  **from specific types of contact). 25** 

**2C:14**

**- 16(a)(2)**  **must be grounded in credible evidence since it allows a judge**  **to enter further protections in the FPO**

**. Thus, I would hold that at**  **the FPO stage, the “possibility of future risk**  **to the safety or well**

**- being of**  **[an] alleged victim”**  **exists if (1**  **) in the future ,**  **(2) the**  **alleged victim may**  **face either**  **(a) a risk to safety** 

**-- physical injury, loss, or**  **damage ,**  **or (b) a risk to**  **their well** 

**- being** 

**-- injury to the state of being happy or**  **healthy. And that finding then impacts the judge’s discretion to impose**  **additional relief in the FPO under N.J.S.A. 2C:14**

**- 16(f).** 
**T he victim**  **here had the rare opportunity to testify again at a second FPO**  **hearing**

**. I**  **nstead of having to speculate about the “possibility of future risk to [her] safety or well** 

**- being,”**  **she testified about how the incident affected her three years and three**  **months later, an opportunity**

**-- as the majority**  **correctly points out** 

**-- that is typically unavailable for SASPA victims. Ante**  **at ___ (slip op. at 32** 

**- 33**  **). Her testimony the second time around crystalized the impact of**  **the incident. Looking back on the occurrence of the predicate**  **act, t he victim**  **explained how she:**  **(1) will always be**  **“ traumatized**  **” by what happened**  **; (2) has “terrible intimacy issues” and “can’t date**  **”; and (3) has trouble sleeping**  **and making friends due to her trust issues**

**. A**  **s to her “well** 

**- being”**  **she elaborated:** **26 I am affected by what happened every day** 

**. I’ve seen**  **multiple therapists and I lay in bed at night[,] and**  **I can’t sleep**  **because I still feel like I’m in the garage sometimes.** 

**. . . I have a**  **hard time making friends because**  **I don’t trust my friends**  **anymore.**
**. . . it destroyed me, honestly.**  **Like, I’ve lost my sense of self** 

**- worth**  **. I lost everything. I feel like** 

**-- some days, I feel like I’ll never**  **not be in that garage, honestly. Like, I wonder how I can ever not be traumatized by this and I don’t think**  **that’s a possibility**

**. [(emphases added).]** 
**In response to being asked, “**  **d o**  **you fear for your safety and the possibility of harm**  **from [respondent] ,”**  **the victim explained:** 

**I do. I really, I do. I think the only reason I have any sort of peace of mind is because I know I have this**  **temporary right now and I’m so terrified that if I didn’t have it, he would be angry that I’ve spent three years**  **just asking for this. Just asking for a sense of security. I think he would**  **definitely harass me for challenging it. I feel like every time** 

**-- I can’t even begin to explain the, like, terror that**  **I feel every day when I am unsure of my surroundings**

**. I can’t even** 

**-- I have a hard time even going shopping**  **by myself because what if something happens? How will I defend myself? And if there’s no protective**  **order, then he has no consequences**

**. . . .**  **He could harass me over the Internet. He could come to my residence, come to my work, find me anywhere** 

**. [(emphas**  **e s added).]** **27**

**As opposed to speculating about the possible risk to her safety or well** 

**- being**  **, t**  **he victim’s testimony amplified, albeit**  **more than three**

**- years later, the actual**  **risk to her “safety” or**  **“well**

**- being.”**  **Th us, the**  **victim’s inability to provide**  **evidence at the first FPO hearing ,**  **coupled with the additional**  **testimony she provided**  **at the second FPO hearing ,**  **underscores the difficulty of proving the**  **“possibility of**  **future risk to**  **[ a victim’s**  **] safety or well** 

**- being”**  **by a preponderance of the evidence**  **ten days after application for**  **an emergency ex parte TPO.**  **Contrary to the majority’s holding, having the benefit of hindsight in this case illustrates how N.J.S.A. 2C:14** 

**- 16(a)(2)’s standard will not always**  **be “easily satisfied.” Ante at** 

**___ (slip op. at**  **3, 22 ).**  **8**

**8 It is unsurprising that,**  **in cases where a TPO was filed shortly after a**  **predicate act occurs, a victim may lack proof showing the “possibility of future**  **risk to the safety or well**

**- being of the alleged victim**  **.” It**  **is common for victims**  **of sexual violence to experience post** 

**- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),**  **depression, anxiety, increased suicide risk, disordered eating, substance abuse, difficulty functioning, and other psychological conditions.**  **See Amy C.**  **Graham et al.**  **, Sexual Assault, Campus Resource Use, and Psychological**  **Distress in Undergraduate Women, 36 J. Interpersonal Violence, 10361, 10362** 

**- 63 (2021) (generally discussing the psychological effects of sexual**  **assault on women). Moreover, women who were drinking alcohol prior to a sexual assault** 

**-- like the victim here** 

**-- are**  **more likely to experience**  **psychological distress**

**. Id.**  **at 10363; see also**  **Karen Rothman et al.**  **, Sexual**  **Assault Among Women in College: Immediate and Long**

**- Term Associations**  **with Mental Health, Psychological Functioning, and Romantic Relationships ,**  **36 J. Interpersonal Violence, 9600, 9602, 9615 (2021) (emphasizing that**  **sexual assault is “consistently linked” with PTSD “within days” of the event, unreliable memory, fear and anxiety, suicidality, and depression); Emily R.** **28**

**Nevertheless, and l**  **ike the first FPO judge, the remand judge also found that**  **respondent committed one or more predicate**  **acts . The remand judge**  **recognized SASPA’s**  **lenient standard and requirement to “consider” the**  **“possibility of future risk to the [**  **victim’s ]**  **safety or well**

**- being**  **.” Relying on**  **this new testimony , the remand judge stated:** 

**the [v]ictim testified that she has seen several therapists to deal with the trauma that she has endured. She has**  **ongoing difficulty sleeping. She has intimacy issues. The long** 

**- term effects are real and traumatizing to her.**  **It is clear that without the [FPO], any efforts she has**  **made in therapy could be eviscerated. Her testimony that the only peace of mind she has is the security that**  **this order has provided to her, with the attendant consequences to [respondent] should he violate the**  **[FPO], is legitimate and truthful. There is a significant risk to her psychological well** 

**- being should this order**  **not remain in effect. Thus, in line with my reading of SASPA, there is sufficient credible evidence**  **to support the finding that there is a risk to the victim’s “safety” and “well**

  ** being,” which supports the continued** **added protections afforded by**  **N.J.S.A.**
**2C:14**

**- 16(f)** 

**.**

**Dworkin et al.**  **, Associations Between Sexual Assault and Suicidal Thoughts**  **and Behavior: A Meta**

**- Analysis, 14**  **Psych. Trauma: Theory, Rsch., Prac.,**  **& Pol’y**  **, 1208, 1211 (2020) (same).**  **Such psychological consequences impact a victim’s ability to present evidence by a preponderance of the evidence in**  **support of an FPO. 29**  **V.**
**In sum ,**  **it is my view that to obtain an FPO,**  **S ASPA**  **does not require a**  **victim to also**  **demonstrate, beyond proving the commission of a predicate act, that without an FPO there exists a “possibility of future risk to the [victim’s]**  **safety or well**

**- being**  **.” The victim here established by a preponderance of the**  **evidence ,**  **at both**  **FPO hearings ,**  **that respondent committed one or more predicate acts**  **. The judges then correctly found that the victim is entitled**  **to an FPO prohibiting the respondent from contacting the victim and committing**  **further predicate acts under N.J.S.A.**  **2C:14**

**- 16(e)** 

**. The “possibility” of what**  **might or might not happen in the future is simply one factor among many others**  **that the judge “shall consider” when fashioning additional relief in the FPO; it is not an element of proof** 

**. That**  **is exactly why the remand**  **judge , after**  **he aring more testimony,**  **allowed the additional restrictions under N.J.S.A.** 
**2C:14**

**- 16(f)(3) and (4) to remain in effect.**  **Accordingly, I would uphold the FPO and those referenced additional**  **restrictions**

**.**