Lastly, the statutory language of Title VII only permits a plaintiff to recover
punitive damages “against a respondent (other than a government, government
agency or political subdivision) ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). Therefore, a
plaintiff may not recover punitive damages if the defendant is a government
agency. Baker v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1997); Paxson v. County
of Cook, filinois, 2002 WL 1968561 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23 2002). Because the CFTC
is a federal agency, plaintiff's punitive damages claim is dismissed as a matter of
law.

Defendant's motions to dismiss (1) plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1981, (2) plaintiff's claim under 28 U.S.C. 1343(a)(3), (3) plaintiff's claim that the
CFTC violated her first amendment rights, and (4) plaintiff's claim for punitive

damages are all granted. It is so ordered.

ENTER:

Me. T. ie

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: July 18, 2003



agency, and therefore the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim must be dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.

Similarly, the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) is limited to situations
in which the alleged Civil Rights violation occurs “under the color of State law.”
Section 1343(a)(3) is not applicable when the defendant is a federal agency
subject to federal law. Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1976);
Seber v. Unger, 881 F.Supp. 323, 327 (N.D. Ill. 1995). The CFTC is a federal
agency, and therefore the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) must also be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

With regards to the First Amendment, the plaintiff does not explicitly state
any such claim in the complaint. Nonetheless, even if the complaint were
construed to properly state a First Amendment claim, the facts do not suggest
that plaintiff's right to free speech was ever violated by the CFTC. The complaint
refers to the freedom of speech when it depicts plaintiff's confrontation with her
supervisors on or about July 12, 1999; she verbally accused them of passing her
up for promotion because of her race. Compl. If] 33, 34. However, the
complaint does not allege that CFTC attempted in any way to abridge this
exercise of free speech. Rather, the references to free speech merely relate to
the Title VII retaliation claim; she claims that her supervisors retaliated against
her after the confrontation because she exercised her free speech. Therefore,
even if we accept as true every allegation in the complaint, it fails to proffer
enough factual evidence to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for

violation of the First Amendment.



Minute Order Farm (06,97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Michael T. Mason Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 8696 DATE 7/18/2003
CASE Arnold vs, Newsome
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the matian being presented.)

(1)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

ql) Oo Filed motion of { use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion duc

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer briefdue_

4 a Ruling/Hearing on____,_ set for__at

(5) O Status hearing[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for]on__—sset for__—_sat

(6) Qa Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__— set for at

(7) o Trial{set for/re-set for]on___at

(8) im} [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at__

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a\(1) C1 FRCP41(a)(2).

ao @ [Other docket entry} For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order,

defendant’s motion for partial dismissal of complaint [3-1] is granted. Status hearing set for 8/26/03 at

9:00 a.m. in courtroom 2214. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order.

i {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required, ier uf not

a
Bilis

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. JUL 2 1 2903

date dochoted
Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

TiwaNS
courtroom per a ay ate muiled notice
KF deputy’s a 7
initials
Date/time received in
céntrul Clerk's OMice ‘tailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CAMILLE ARNOLD

Plaintiffs,
No. 02 € 8696
v.

JAMES NEWSOME, as Chairman and not
Individually, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION, an agency of
United States Government,

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Michael T. Mason, United States Magistrate Judge:

This case was brought by Camille Arnold, an attorney employed by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, (hereafter referred to as the “CFTC")
against defendant, James Newsome, as CFTC Chairman, and not individually,
alleging racial discrimination during the course of her employment. Plaintiff
claims her CFTC supervisors failed to promote her because she is African-
American, and in addition retaliated against her when she complained about the
alleged racial discrimination. In her complaint plaintiff asserts subject-matter
jurisdiction for employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (‘Title
VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). Defendant does not contest
subject-matter jurisdiction under Title VIl but does move to strike the 42 U.S.C.
81981 and 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3) claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). Defendant also moves to dismiss both plaintiffs First

Amendment and her punitive damages claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Magistrate Judge Mason a



Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
For the following reasons, we grant defendant's partial motion to dismiss.'

In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the court “must accept as true all of the plaintiffs well-
pleaded factual allegations and the inferences reasonably drawn from them.”
Gibson v. Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520-21 (7th Cir. 1990). Dismissal is
appropriate only if it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Further, “the purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test
the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits.” Triad Assocs., Inc. v.
Chicago Hous. Authority, 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 1989) (reversed on other
grounds),

First we consider subject-matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 42
U.S.C. § 1981 is only applicable to establish racial discrimination where the
defendant is not the federal government; Title VII is the exclusive remedy for
employees claiming racial discrimination by their federal employers. Brown v.
General Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976); Espinueva v. Garrett, 895
F.2d 1164, 1165 (7th Cir. 1990); Lewis v. Henderson, 2003 WL 118238, *5 (N.D.

ll. Jan. 14 2003). Arnold was a federal employee working for CFTC, a federal

' Arnold (or her attorney), never filed a response to the motion to dismiss. Three weeks
after the response was due, Arnold called this Court’s chambers and was told that we had not
received a response, and that defendant had filed a cursory reply noting that fact. We waited an
additional four weeks after that phone call before issuing this opinion.

2