intoxicated and needed assistance to walk.”

Plaintiff argues that the Defendant’s challenge was improper because it asked the Court to
consider the police report in evaluating jurisdiction. Plaintiff characterizes the police Teport as
inadmissible hearsay. He is simply wrong. First, the Court did not need to rely upon the police
report to allow D.T. Management to challenge jurisdiction. Defendant’s mere challenge of
jurisdiction — even without any evidence — in its Motion to Dismiss placed a burden on the
Plaintiff to produce competent evidence of jurisdiction. See McNutt, 298 U.S. at 190, 56 S.Ct. at
785 (where allegation of requisite jurisdictional amount was traversed by the answer, plaintiff
was required to come forth with competent evidence). Plaintiff has come forth with no evidence
supporting his claim of jurisdiction.

Second, it is proper for the Court to consider the police report in determining whether it
has subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. The Seventh Circuit has firmly held that in
jurisdictional determinations the Court may consider any evidence submitted on the issue, as well
as the jurisdictional allegations in the Complaint. See Grafon Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d
781, 783 (7" Cir. 1979). See also Chase v. Shop ‘N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424,
428 (7" Cir, 1997) (“the district court may look outside the pleadings to other evidence of
jurisdictional amount in the record.”); Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.L.C., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7
Cir. 1993) (district court properly looked at evidence in assessing subject matter jurisdiction).

Third, the police report is not inadmissible hearsay. Because this is a civil — not a
criminal — matter, a police officer’s statements of facts and observations in his report are
admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). See also Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d 901, 907 (24

Cir. 1991); Roth v. Nat'l Ry. Passenger Corp., No. 97 C 6503, 1999 WL 1270706 (N.D.IIl. Dec.



eee

jurisdiction.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278, 97 S.Ct. 568,
572, 50 L.Ed. 471 (1977). For the reasons stated above, subject matter jurisdiction does not
exist with respect to the case against Defendant Mejia. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the
case against him.
CONCLUSION
Defendant D.T. Management’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is granted. The Court also dismisses the Complaint against Defendant Mejia for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety against all

Defendants.
Dated: September 20, 2002 ENTERED
AMY J. SRXEVE

US. District Court Judge



to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590, 82 L.Ed. 845,

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
challenges that Plaintiff's Complaint does not meet the $75,000 amount in controversy
requirement. Where a party challenges the amount in controversy allegation, the plaintiff must
provide “competent proof” of the amount. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of
Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Rexford Rand Corp. v.
Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1218 (7" Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit interprets “competent proof” to
mean “proof to a reasonable probability that jurisdiction exists.” Rexford, 58 F.3d at 1218
(quoting NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 237 (7" Cir. 1995)); Shaw v.
Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d at 366-67 & n.2. (7" Cir. 1993).

B. D.T. Management’s Challenge to Jurisdiction

Although the Plaintiff has alleged in each count of the Complaint that the controversy is
“in excess of $75,000,” Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy this amount because he did
not sustain any calculable compensatory damages in the alleged altercation. D.T. Management
attaches to its Motion and relies upon the Ft. Lauderdale police report of the incident. Officer
Coffin, who issued the report, noted that he arrived at the Doubletree Oceanfront on October 10
while the EMS was treating Salmi. Officer Coffin noted that Plaintiff “Salmi had a small cut to
his forehead area. EMS advised later that it was a minor cut and only need a bandaid [sic].”
The report further noted that “[a]fter talking to both parties involved and witnesses and EMS it
was determined that Salmi [had a] small injury” and “did not have any other red marks on his

face.” The reporting officer concluded that it “[sJhould be noted that Salmi was extremely



29, 1999). Accordingly, to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000, the Court may consider the police report. Given that the police
report is the only evidence in front of the Court on jurisdiction, Salmi has failed to demonstrate
that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.

Cc. Punitive Damages Allegations

Plaintiff has not provided “competent proof” to meet his burden of demonstrating the
requisite amount in controversy. McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189, 56 S.Ct. at 785. Instead, he argues
that he satisfies the jurisdictional requirement because he is entitled to recovery of punitive
damages that could result in a verdict in excess of $75,000.

When considering punitive damages in assessing the jurisdictional amount in controversy,
the Court follows a two part inquiry. The Court must first determine whether punitive damages
are recoverable as a matter of state law. Risse v. Woodard, 491 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7 Cir. 1974).
If so, the Court has jurisdiction unless it is clear “beyond a legal certainty that the plaintiff would
under no circumstances be entitled to recover the jurisdictional amount.” Jd.; Cadek y. Great
Lakes Dragaway, Inc., 58 F.3d 1209, 1211-12 (7" Cir. 1995).

Illinois law generally does not favor punitive damages. Brandon v, Anesthesia & Pain
Mgmt. Assoc., Ltd., 277 F.3d 936, 946 (7" Cir. 2002). They may be awarded, however, where
“torts are committed with fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or when the
defendant acts willfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the
rights of others.” Jd. (quotations and citations omitted), Salmi has pled that the Defendants
acted “intentionally,” thus punitive damages are potentially recoverable under Illinois law if

Salmi can prove what he has alleged.



* Minute Order Form (9697

* a
/\ United States District Court, Northern District of Iinois
La.

wv ee Moglawate se Amy J. St. Eve Set hatined Souge
ASE nyo 02 C 2741 DATE 9/20/2002

fri ITLE

Salmi vs. Hilton Hotel

[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

[e33)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) Q Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Q Brief in support of motion due____-

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon____——ssetfor saat

(5) D0 Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___——ssetfor at

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—setfor___—_at__—.

” o Trial[set for/re-set for] on__at

(8) Q [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without} prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
OOFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 CIFRCP41(a(1) CFRCP41(a)(2).

(10) WW [Otherdocketentry] Defendant DT Management’s motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted. The Court
sua sponte dismissed the complaint against defendant Hugo Mejia for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety. Status hearing set for 10/ w is stricken. Any
pending dates are stricken. Any pending motions are denied as moot.

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.}

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone,

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
TH! deputy’s
initials

Date/time réceived in
central Clerk’s Office



Plaintiff cannot meet the second part of the Risse inquiry, however. Even assuming
Salmi can recover punitive damages, “[w]hen a claim for punitive damages makes up the bulk of
the amount in controversy, and may even have been colorably asserted solely to confer
jurisdiction, we should scrutinize that claim closely.” Anthony v. Security Pacific Financial
Serv., Inc., 75 F.3d 311, 315 7 Cir. 1996). Plaintiff does not establish by a reasonable
probability that he suffered more than minor injuries during his altercation at the Doubletree
Oceanfront. If Plaintiff can recover punitive damages in this case, he would have to recover
multiple times his actual damages to satisfy the $75,000 amount. Such a recovery certainly
would “stretch[] the normal ratio, and would face certain remittur.” Jd. at 317-318 (citing
DeRance, Inc. v. PaineWebber, Inc., 872 F.2d 1312, 1329-30 rec Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff's mere
hope for an extreme punitive award cannot be the sole basis for jurisdiction. See id. at 318 (no
subject matter jurisdiction where average class action plaintiff would have to recover more than
17 times the compensatory damages amount through punitive damages to reach requisite
amount). With no competent evidence offered to support his claim for compensatory and
punitive damages in excess of the requisite $75,000, Plaintiff has failed to establish proof to a
reasonable probability that subject matter jurisdiction exits. Accordingly, Salmi’s Complaint is
dismissed.

D. Defendant Hugo Mejia

‘Defendant Mejia did not join in the Motion to Dismiss.' Federal courts, however, are

“obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal

' No one has appeared for Defendant Mejia in this case. It is unclear if he has been
served,



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
SCOTT SALMI, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 02 C 2741
v. ) .
) Honorable Judge Amy J. St. Eve
D. T. MANAGEMENT, INC., )
and HUGO MEJIA, individually, ) Mi)
and as its employee and agent, ) HETg
) SEP »
Defendants. ) a £002

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant D.T. Management has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant
argues that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to meet the $75,000 amount in
controversy requirement necessary to sustain diversity jurisdiction in this Court. For the reasons
set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Scott Salmi is a resident and a citizen of the State of Illinois. (R. 6-1, Second
Am. Compl. { 3.) Defendant D.T. Management, Inc. is an Arizona corporation which owns the
Doubletree Oceanfront Hotel (“Doubletree Oceanfront”) on Sea Breeze Boulevard in Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida. (Id. J 4-5.) Defendant Hugo Mejia was employed by D.T. Management as
the doorman at the hotel. (/d. { 7-8.)

Plaintiff alleges that on March 9, 2002, he was staying at the Doubletree Oceanfront with

a friend. (R. 6-1, Second Am. Compl. f 10-11.) Salmi claims that when he returned to the hotel



that evening, he could not enter the locked door to his hotel room. (/d. { 11.) Plaintiff further
alleges that he requested assistance ftom Defendant Hugo Mejia, who was on duty at the
Doubletree Oceanfront. (/d. [{] 12-13.) Instead of assisting him, Salmi contends that Mejia
assaulted him while in the hotel elevator. (Jd. | 14.) Salmi also claims that he did not provoke
Mejia. (/d. J 16.)

Plaintiff subsequently filed this suit against Defendants D.T. Management, Inc. and Hugo
Mejia alleging negligence, intentional acts, assault and battery. (R. 6-1, Second Am. Compl.)
He seeks to recover punitive damages in connection with his Complaint. (Id. J 87.) Plaintiff
seeks jurisdiction in this Court based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. §1332. (Id. qi.)

Defendant challenges Salmi’s suit on the basis that he cannot satisfy the $75,000 amount
in controversy requirement mandated under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (R. 10-1, Mot. to Dismiss.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff only suffered minor inquires at the Doubletree Oceanfront as a
result of his intoxicated state, and therefore, he cannot meet the “in excess of $75,000” threshold
requirement. (Id.)

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They may entertain cases only where
jurisdiction is authorized by the Constitution or by statute. Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111
F.3d 1312, 1316 (7" Cir. 1997). Where, as here, diversity jurisdiction is invoked, jurisdiction
exists where the parties are of diverse citizenship and where the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. If subject matter jurisdiction is uncontested, federal courts will

accept as true a plaintiff's allegations concerning the amount in controversy unless it “appear[s]