* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.HECTOR JAVIER MACIASVALENCIA, Defendant - Appellant. No. 09-10474 D.C. No. 5:06-cr-00010-RMW-2
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Howard R. Lloyd, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted February 28, 2011 ** San Francisco, California Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges. Hector Javier Macias-Valencia (“Maci as”) appeals his 132-month sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to di stribute and attempted possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of meth amphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

# FILED
MAR 02 2011 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and 846. We affirm under the deferential clear error standard. See United States v. Asagba , 77 F.3d 324, 325-26 (9th Cir. 1996). A district court’s method of approximati ng the relevant quantity of drugs under the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo. United States v. Chase , 499 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007). The determinati on of the quantity of drugs involved in an offense is a factual finding reviewed for clear error. United States v. Dallman , 533 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2009) (as amended); Asagba , 77 F.3d at 325. In a reversesting where no actual drugs are seized, the agreed-upon quantity serves as the approximated quantity for de termining the offense level, excluding any amount a defendant like Macias is able to establis h by a preponderance of the evidence that he “did not intend to . . . purchase, or was notreasonably capable of . . . purchasing.” See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Application Note 12 (1995). We remanded Macias’s first sentencing app eal so that the district court could determine whether this exclusion applied here, noting in particular that: (1) DEA Agent Alvarez, an experienced agent handli ng the transaction, believed the defendants only intended to purchase one-half pound at that time; and (2) Macias and his brother had only $4,689 with them, which could buy only slightly more than one-half pound of methamphetamine at “market” pri ces, according to Agent Alvarez.1 One pound equals approximately 454 grams. A half-pound of methamphetamine mixture with a 60 percen t purity level equals approximately 136 grams of actual methamphetamine, which would yield a sentencing range of 121 to 151 months, based on Macias’s criminal hist ory, in contrast to the 151 to 188 month range calculated by the district court. 3 The district court considered this ev idence but ultimately was persuaded by an audio recording of Macias’s conduct at the buy-bust that Macias had the intent to consummate the transaction for one pound “e ither by subterfuge or by . . . getting an advance,” and that there was no evidence s howing Macias was incapable of executing his intent given his experience and sophi stication participating in drug deals. Under our deferential standard of review, we cannot say this was clear error. The sentence is also substantively reas onable, as Macias’s 132-month sentence, which the district court reduced from 151 months to account for Macias’s rehabilitation efforts, alrea dy falls within the Guidelines range for an offense involving only one-half pound of methamphetamine. 1 See United States v. Grissom , 525 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2008). AFFIRMED.