IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01867-COA TIFFANY GRIFFIN APPELLANT

v. GRENADA YOUTH LEAGUE APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/27/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. C.E. MORGAN III COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: GRENADA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: STEVEN CRAIG PANTER STACY EVERETT PEPPER ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: NAKIMULI ONI DAVIS-PRIMER J. STEPHEN KENNEDY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED FOR APPELLEE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/28/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., FAIR AND WILSON, JJ. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. On April 28, 2 0 1 2 , T i f f a n y G rif f in attended a charity baseball tournam ent held at
f ields owned a nd m aintained by the Grenada Youth League (GYL), a nonprof it corporation. Grif f in’s sons were on team s play ing in the tournam e nt. A s she walked down a grassy hill
f rom the parking lot to the ballf i elds, Grif

f in f ell and suf

f ered a b roken ankle. Grif f in sued
GYL on a prem ises liability theory in the Grenada County Circuit Court. She alleges that she
f e l l because she stepped i nto a one-inch-deep “ hole” t hat was obscured by grass t h a t w a s three or f our inches high. The record does not i nclude a n y p h o t o g r a p h s of the supposed“hole,” and GYL d e nies that there was a “hole” any where in the vicinity

. The circuit court subsequently granted sum m ary judgm ent f or GYL. The court acknowledged t hat there is a “dispute over whether there actually w as a h ole,” but the c ourt ruled “that a s a m atter of law the prem i ses was reasonably saf e and there was no dangerous condition or p eril that required a warning.” W e agree and theref ore af f i rm . FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. GYL owns and operates a twent y - t h r e e - a c re park in Grenada with a bout ten y outh b a s e b a l l and sof

tball f ields. GYL oversees y outh leagues and occasionally hosts y o u t h

tournam ents at the park. GYL has only one p aid em ploy ee and is other w i s e r u n by volunteers, including a volunteer board and president. ¶3. GYL’s president f or the 2012 season, Je f

f M c Wh o r t e r , a s k e d three or f our board

m em bers to serve on the grounds c om m ittee. Bef ore the season, the com m ittee inspected the park and did not identif

y any issues or needed repairs. ¶4. Most of GYL’s board m em bers are coaches, parents, or g randparents o f children who play baseball or sof

tball a t the park. Thus, m o st board m em bers regularly attend gam es and walk and inspect the p rem ises while at the park. I n addition, every board m e m ber has a key

to an equipm ent shed at the park, so any of them could easily

f ill a hole if

one were f

ound.
GYL hired a com

pany called Yard Pro to cut the g rass in t he park during the 2012 season. Yard Pro cut the grass on a weekly basis. ¶5. From Monday , April 23, to Saturday , April 28, 2012, GYL hosted its annual Frankie Bailey T ournam ent at the park. The tournam ent, nam ed in honor of a f orm er play er who died

2f

rom childhood cancer, serves as a f undraiser f

or both St. Jude Children’s R esearch Hospital

a n d G YL. There is n o adm ission f ee f or the tournam e n t, but attendees are encour a g e d t o

m ake charitable donations. Y ard Pro cut the grass the weekend bef ore the tournam ent began and again on W ednesday , April 25, 2012. ¶6. Grif

f in’s two sons play ed in GYL leagues and were play ing in the tournam e nt. Grif f in attended about s ix gam es during the tournam e n t, including on Friday , April 27, and she had been to the park m any tim es i n prior seasons. On April 28, Grif f in arrived a t the park around
11 a.m . She m ade a $5 donation when she entered and parked h er c ar i n a gravel parking lot
up a gently sloping grassy h i ll f r om the ballf

ields. The lot is f

r am ed by w ooden light poles laid sideway s on the ground to f orm a twelve- to eighteen-inch-high boundary around the lot. ¶7. A paved walkway r uns f r om the parking lot to t h e b a l l f ields, but Grif

f in decided to take a shortcut by

stepping over one o f the wooden poles a nd walking down the grassy hill

to the f i elds. There were no signs warning visitors not to walk down the hill, and McW horter acknowledged that p eople f requently walk down the hill. Grif f in was wearing f

lip-f lops and
carry ing both a f

o lding chair and a bag holding a bat and batting helm et. ¶8. Grif

f in te s t i f i e d i n h e r deposition that she f ell a f ter stepping i nto a “ hole” that was
“m ay be an i nch [ deep], two inch e s max,” and “m ay be f our inches w ide.” Grif

f in testif ied that she did not see the “hole” because t he g r a s s w a s “overgrown,” by which she m eant “[ t]hree to f

our i nches” high. Grif

f in t estif ied that w hen she stepped into the hole, she rolled her ankle and f

ell to the ground. ¶9. McW horter was working at the concession stand when he was told t hat s o m eone had

3f

allen on t he hill. W hen McW h orter reached the hill, he was told that Grif f in had b roken her ankle, so he called f

or an am bulance. ¶10. Af ter Grif f in lef t i n an am bulance, M cW horter and another board m em ber survey ed the area in which she f

ell. McW horter testif

i ed that t he grass w as n ot overgrown and that they did not f i nd any “hole.” McW horter testif ied that if there had been a hole in the area, he w ould h a v e n o t i ced it because he walked t hrough t he area whenever h e went to the equipm ent shed. In addition, there had been no other reports of f alls or holes in the area. ¶11. On Septem

ber 9, 2 0 1 4 , G r i f

f i n f i l e d a com

plaint against GYL alleging, inter alia, negligence on a prem ises l iability theory

. Grif f i n alleged she “was a business invitee when she entered onto the property o wned by [ GYL].” She a l leged t hat she “was severely injured when she stepped into a drainage ditch.” At her deposition, Grif f in stated t hat s he actually stepped in a “hole,” not a “drainage ditch.” ¶12. On October 12, 2 015, GYL f iled a m otion f

or sum m ary judgm ent. In its m otion, GYL
arg u e d t h a t Grif

f in was a licensee, not a n invitee. In addition, GYL argued that even if Grif f in was an invitee, the prem ises was reasonably saf e and that it did not breach any duty to warn her of

hidden dangers. In response, Grif f in argued t hat she w as a “ public invitee” and that disputes of

f a ct on the issues of

duty and breach precluded sum m ary judgm ent. ¶13. On Novem

ber 30, 2015, the circuit court granted sum m ary judgm ent f or GYL. 1 The

court concluded that Grif

f i n was a public invitee and t hat there was a dispute of f act as to the

1 O n N o v em

b er 1 6 , 2 0 1 5 , t h e co u rt g ran ted s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t f

o r G Y L o n all n o n p rem i ses-liab ility

claim s in th e co m

p lain t an d o n G rif

f in ’s claim f o r p u n itiv e d a m ag es, all o f w h ich G rif

f in h ad co n ced ed at th e h earin g o n G Y L ’s m o tio n f o r su m m ary

j u d g m en t. 4existence of a “hole”; however, the court r uled “that as a ma t t er o f law the prem ises was reasonably saf

e and there was no dangerous condition or peril that required a w a r n i n g.” Grif f in f i led a tim ely

notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION ¶14. W e r eview an order granting sum m ary judgm ent d e n o v o . Pigg v. Express Hotel
Partners LLC , 991 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (¶4) (Miss. 2 008). The m ovant is e ntitled to sum m ary judgm ent if there i s no genuine issue of m aterial f act. G lover ex rel. Glover v. Jackson State
Univ. , 968 So. 2d 1267, 1275 (¶22) (Miss. 2007). B ut the m ere existence of disputed f acts does not preclude sum m a ry judgm ent: “The f ocal point of our standard f or sum m ary judgm ent is on material f acts[ ,]” by w h i c h w e me a n t h ose f acts “ that m atter

. . . in an
outcome determinative sense .” S i mmons v. Thompson Mach. of Miss. Inc. , 631 S o. 2d 798,
801 (Miss. 1994). “The exis t e nce of a hundred contested issues of f act will not thwart

sum m ary j udgm ent where there is no genuine dispute regarding the m aterial issues of f act.” Sanders v
. A d

v a n c e d Neuromodulation Sys. I nc. , 44 So. 3d 9 60, 9 65 (¶11) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Moss v. Batesville Casket Co. , 935 So. 2d 393, 399 (¶17) (Miss. 2006)). ¶15. On a m otion f

or sum m ary judgm ent, “[ t]he evidence i s viewed i n t h e l i g h t mo s t f avorable to the party opposing the m otion.” Davis v. H oss , 869 So. 2 d 3 97, 401 (¶10) (Miss. 2004). However, “[ t]he n o n-m o ving party m ay not rest upon m ere a llegations or denials in the pleadings but m

ust set f orth specif

ic f a cts showing that there are genuine i ssues f or trial.” Pigg , 991 So. 2d at 1199 (¶4) (quoting M assey v. T ingle , 867 S o. 2d 235, 2 38 (¶6) (Miss. 2004)). In other words, “ the non-m ovant cannot just sit back and rem ain silent, b ut he m ust

5r e b u t by producing signif icant probative evidence showing that t here are indeed genui n e issues f or trial.” McMichael v. Nu-W ay S teel & Supply I

nc. , 563 So. 2d 1371, 1375 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Newell v. Hinton , 556 So. 2d 1037, 1041 (Miss. 1990)). ¶16. To prevail in a p rem ises l iabil i t y c a s e , a p laintif f m u st prove the e lem ents of duty , breac h o f d u t y , d am ages, a nd proxim ate causation. See W ilbanks v. Hickman , 198 So. 3d 393, 397 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). Thus, to a v oid s um m a ry j udgm ent, Grif f i n m ust show there is a genuine issue of m aterial f

act as to each of

these elem ents. See id. ¶17. “W hen a person i s injured on the prem ises of another, t h e d u t y o w e d d epends on whether the person i s an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser at the tim e of the injury .” Rankin

v. Matthews , 197 So. 3d 9 33, 936 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). “ A landowner’s only duty to

a licensee is to ref

rain f r om willf ully or wantonly causing injury to him .” Id. at 937 (¶9). “A landowner owes the highest duty to an invitee[ , ]” Keith v. P eterson , 9 22 So. 2d 4, 9 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), but even so the landowner “is not an insurer of the i nvitee’s saf ety [ .]”
Caruso v. Picayune Pizza Hut Inc. , 598 So. 2d 770, 773 (Miss. 1 992). Rather, a landowner “owes a duty

to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to keep the prem ises in a reasonably saf e condition and, if

[ he] is aware of

a dangerous condition, which is not readily apparent
to the invitee, he is under a duty to warn the invitee of s u ch condition.” Jerry Lee’s Grocery Inc. v. Thompson , 528 So. 2d 293, 295 (Miss. 1988). Our Suprem e “Court has recognized

two classes of i nvitees: public invitee or business invitee.” Hudson v. C ourtesy Motors Inc ., 794 So. 2d 999, 1003 (¶11) (Miss. 2001). ¶18. “A public invitee is a person who is i nvited to enter or rem ain on land as a m em ber

6of

the public f

or a purpose f

or which the land is held open to the public . . . .” Id. “On the other hand, a licens e e i s o n e w h o enters upon the property of a nother f or his own convenience, pleasure or benef it p ursuant to the license or im plied p erm ission of t he owner.” Clark v. Moore Mem’l United Methodist Church , 538 So. 2d 760, 763 (Miss. 1989). The subtle distinction between a public invitee and a licensee is said to “ l i e [ ] i n t h e dif f erence between an invitation and m ere perm ission.” Id. at 764. 2 ¶19. The circuit court concluded that Grif f in was a “pub l i c i n v i t e e ” at the tim e of her
i n j ury , but GYL argues that she was a m ere licensee. If relevant and m aterial f a cts are in dispute, the plaintif

f ’s status “can be a jury question, but where the f acts are not in dispute, the classif

ication becom e s a question of law f or t he trial judge.” Hudson , 7 94 So. 2d at 1003 (¶11). H owever, f

or purposes of this a p p e a l , we m ay a s sum e that Grif f in was a public invitee. For even if she were an invitee, the circuit court correctly determ ined t hat G YL was entitled to sum m ary

judgm ent. ¶20. A landowner owes a n invitee a duty to keep the prem ises reasonably saf e and to warn the invitee of any dangerous conditions on the prem ises that a re not readily apparent. Jerry

2 In C la rk , th e M ississip p i S u p rem e C o u rt h eld t h at “a ch u r ch m em b er w h o d o es n o t ex ceed th e sco p e o f a ch u rch ’s i n v itatio n , is an in v itee w h ile atten d in g a c h u rch f o r ch u r ch serv ices o r r elated f

u n ctio n s .” C la rk , 5 3 8 S o . 2 d at 7 6 4 . T h e C o u rt reaso n ed : “R elig io u s b o d ies

. . . e x p ressly an d im p lied ly in v ite m em

b ers to co m e an d atten d th e ir serv ices an d f u n c t io n s. T h ey h o ld th eir d o o rs o p en to th e p u b lic. W h ile th ey d o n o t c h arg e ad m issio n f ees . . . , c h u rch e s d o d e p en d o n co n trib u tio n s . . . in o r d er th at th ey m ay c o n tin u e to b e o p en to th e p u b lic.” Id

. ; s ee a lso A lexa n d er v. Ja ckso n C ty. H

isto rica l S

o c’y In c. , 2 2 7 S o . 2 d 2 9 1 , 2 9 2 ( M iss. 1 9 6 9 ) (h o ld in g th at v isito rs w h o p aid f o r ad m issio n to a h isto rical site u n d er th e care an d c o n t r o l o f a lo cal h isto rical so ciety w ere “p u b lic in v itees”); C i t y o f M ilto n v. B r o xso n , 5 1 4 S o . 2 d 1 1 1 6 , 1 1 1 8 (F la. 1 st D ist. C t . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) (h o ld in g th at a sp ectato r at a so f tb all g a m e at a city

p ark w as a p u b lic in v itee).

7Lee’s Grocery , 528 S o. 2d at 295. Unless t h e d a ngerous condition w as created by the

landowner’s own n egligence, t h e plaintif f m ust prove that the landowner had actual or constructive knowledge o f t he condition. Id. ; J ones v. W al-Mart Stores E. LP , 187 So. 3d 1100, 1103 ( ¶12) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2016); Stanley v
. Boyd Tunica I nc. , 29 So. 3d 95, 97 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Thus, “regardless of the invitee’s precise theory of prem ises liability , proof that her injury was caused by a ‘dangerous condition’ is a n e ssential elem e nt of her claim .” J o nes , 187 S o. 3d at 1104 (¶12) (citing Stanley , 2 9 So. 3d at 97 ( ¶10) )

. “ In other words, a p roperty owner cannot be f ound liable f

or the p laintif

f ’s injury where no d angerous condition exists.” Stanley , 29 So. 3d at 97-98 ( ¶10) (quotation m arks om itted); see also, e.g. , Adcock v
. Wa l

- M

art Stores E. LP , No. 3:10-cv-313-DPJ-FKB, 2011 W L 3 047623, at *3 (S.D. M iss. July 25, 2011) (“It is axiom atic that no liability attaches absent a d a ngerous condition.” (collecting cases)). The landowner “is n ot an insurer against a l l injuries[ ,]” and

m ere proof tha t t he invitee f e ll and was injured while on the p rem ises is insuf f icient to establish liability

. J

erry Lee’s Grocery , 528 So. 2d at 295. ¶21. In the present case, Grif f in argues that sum m ary

judgm ent should have been denied because the hole that allegedly caused her t o f a l l w a s a “ dangerous condition,” and a

reaso n a b le inspection of the prem ises would have revealed i ts existence. T hus, Grif f in
argues, GYL at least had constructive knowledge of t he hole and s hould h ave repaired it or warned her of i t

. S h e a lso argues that GYL’s own claim s that it r egularly inspected the
prem ises support an inf

erence that it had actual knowledge of the hole. ¶22. W e conclude that Grif f in’s claim f

ails as a m atter of

law because the alleged “hole”

8sim

ply was n ot a “dangerous condition” within t he m eaning of M ississippi prem ises liability law. W e recently addressed a sim ilar issue in the context of a trip-and-f all in a p arking lot.
W e o bserved that sidewalks or parking lots of ten “contain c racks and c hanges in elevation,” and we held that such “m inor im perf e ctions or def

ects” are not “hazardous conditions” f or
purposes of a prem i ses liability claim

. Jones , 187 S o . 3d at 1104 ( ¶14) (quoting Knight v. Picayune Tire S

ervs. Inc. , 78 So. 3d 356, 359 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. A p p . 2 0 11)). A long line of Mississippi cases holds t hat cracks and uneven pavem ent a r e not d angerous c onditions; they

are s im ply issues that invitees “m ay norm ally expect to encounter as they traverse a parking lot or sidewalk.” Id. a t 1106 (¶17). “ No p roperty owner c a n b e e x p e c t ed to m aintain its sidewalks in a perf

ectly level condition, and where the def ect consists of som e slight variation between two a djoining p aving blocks, no liability is im posed.” Id. at 1104 (¶14) (quoting Bond v. City of Long Beach , 908 So. 2d 879, 881-82 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). ¶23. The sam e reasoning a pplies—ind e e d , with e ven greater f o rce—to the present case. If a crack or uneven spot in a m anm ade sidewalk or parking lot is not a dangerous condition, it necessarily f

ollows that a very m inor i ndentation or depressi o n o n t h e side of a grassy , gently sloping hill also is not a dangerous condition. Grif f in testif ied that the alleged “hole”

was “m ay be an inch [ dee p ] , two inches m ax,” and “ m ay be f our inches wide.” To accept Grif f in’s argum ent that such a “hole” am ounts to a dangerous cond i t i o n w o uld i m pose on landowners a duty to m aintain all open lawns and f ields in a perf

ectly level condi t i o n. Mississippi law does not require that of a land o w n e r, e ven in paved areas of t he prem ises.
See Jones , 187 So. 3 d a t 1104 (¶14). No open, grass-covered space is going to be perf ectly

9level, not even a f airway on a golf course. Cf. Hoffman v. City of New O rleans , 771 So. 2d 217, 219 (La. Ct. App. 2000) ( “ O n e c a n h ardly expect a public b aseball outf ield to be as

s m ooth and even as the green of a golf course. Like any grass covered f ield it is bou n d t o contain d ips and inclines no m atter what m aintenance is perf orm ed.”). Mississippi law does not im pose liability

based on a m inor indentation on the side of a park’s grassy hill. ¶24. Grif

f in also a lleges that she did not see the hole because the g r a s s i n t h e a r e a was “overgrown.” H owever, in her deposition she adm itted that t he gras s , w h ich had been

m owed only three d ay s prior to h er f all, was only “[ t ]hree to f our in c h e s ” h i g h , which is hardly u nusual. A one-inch-deep indentation is not t ransf orm ed into a dangerous condition sim ply because three to f

our inches of

grass grows in the area. 3 ¶25. Because t h e “ h o l e” that caused Grif f i n’s injury was n ot a dangerous condition, her claim f ails as a m atter of law. J ones , 187 S o. 3d at 1104 (¶12). Moreover, even if we

assum ed t hat it was a dangerous condition, GYL would be entitled to sum m ary j udgm ent because G rif

f in produced no e vidence t hat would support a reasonable i nf erence that GYL created the hole or that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the hole. See Jones v.

3 G rif f in relies h eav ily o n A lexa n d er , su p ra , b u t its f

acts are d istin g u ish ab le. In t h at case, th e p lain tif

f w as in j u red w h e n sh e step p ed in to a f iv e-in c h -d eep h o le su rro u n d in g o n e o f sev eral p o sts th at th e d ef en d an t Jack so n C o u n ty H ist o r i c a l S o c iety h ad p l aced in th e g ro u n d to m ark t h e b o u n d ary b etw een th e p ark in g l o t an d th e law n o f t h e O l d S p an ish F o rt i n P ascag o u la. A l exa n d

er , 2 2 7 S o . 2 d at 2 9 2

. T h e h o le w as co n cealed b y a “ t y p e o f craw lin g g rass [ th at] h ad g ro w n u p aro u n d th e p o st,” w h ile “[ t] h e rem a in d e r o f th e y ard w as sm o o th l y m o w ed

. ” I

d

. M ississip p i caselaw d istin g u ish es b etw e en “n a t u rally o ccu rrin g d ef ects,” s u ch as th e h illsid e in d e n tatio n at issu e in th is case, an d u n u su a l o r u n e x p e cted co n d itio n s c reated b y th e d ef en d a n t, su ch a s th e h o le a t t h e O l d S p an ish F o rt, w h ich m ay g iv e ri s e t o l i a b ility

. S

e e Jo n e s , 1 8 7 S o . 3 d at 1 1 0 5 (¶1 6 ) (q u o tin g C ity o f N a tch ez v. Ja ckso n , 9 4 1 S o . 2 d 8 6 5 , 8 6 9 -7 0 (¶¶5 -9 ) (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 6 )). 1 0Imperial Palace of Miss. LLC , 147 So. 3d 318, 319-21 (¶¶5-12) (Miss. 2014). T here was no evidence, f

or exam p le, that any other visitor had stum bled in the area, that GYL had received prior com plaints a bout the hill, or that the “hole” at issue had ex i s t e d f or any signif

icant length of tim e. ¶26. Likewise, there is no m erit to G rif f in’s a rgum ent that there is a t r i a b le issue of f act wi t h r e s p e ct to GYL’s alleged f ailure to conduct reasonable inspections. GYL, of course,

m aintains that it did conduct reasonable i nspections of t he park, and there is no evidence to the contrary

. But in any event, Grif f in also “f ailed to pu t f

orth any proof that r easonable inspections would have led t o the discovery of the [ one-inch-deep hole],” which, given the lack of evidence presented, “could have been c reated

. . . only m inutes prior to the injury .” Id. a t 322 (¶15). Thus, Grif f in f ai l e d t o p r esent e vidence creating any genuine issue of

m aterial f act as to GYL’s actual or constructive knowledge of the hole or that a r easonable inspection would have r eveale d t h e h ole. Accordingly , GYL was entitled t o sum m ary judgm ent f

or this reason as well.
CONCLUSION ¶27. Grif

f in was injured when s he tripped and f ell as she w alked down a grassy h ill while wearing f lip-f lops and carry ing a f

olding chair and baseball equipm ent. She w as on GYL’s property , but a landowner is not an insurer or strictly liable f or all injuries that occur on its property , so m ere proof that an invitee f ell and was injured on the prem ises is not suf f icient

to create liability

. Grif

f in’s claim f

ails as a m atter of law because the alleged one-inch-deep indentation, or “hole,” that supposedly caused her to f all is not a dangerous condition. Under

1 1Mississippi law, a landowner is not expected or required to k eep open, grass-covered lawns

or f ields in a perf

ectly l evel condition. Moreover, Grif f in presented no e v idence that GYL had actual or constructive knowledge of the hole or that a reasonable inspection w ould have uncovered it. Theref

o re, the c i r c u i t court properly granted GYL’s m otion f or sum m ary judgm ent. ¶28. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GRENADA C O UNTY IS AFFIRMED. A LL COSTS O F THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C .J., IR

V I N G A N D G R I F F I S , P . J J . , B A R N E S , I S H E E , C A RLTON, FAIR, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.

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