B. Adequate Remedy at Law

Respondent argues that if Woodsen’s injunction is denied, Woodsen still has
an adequate remedy at law available to him. Woodsen disagrees and argues that if
we deny his injunction motion, he has no adequate remedy at law. Respondent
notes that Woodsen is “not prevent[ed] from filing a [§] 1983 action.” (Resp’t
Resp. 5). Woodsen has an adequate remedy at law because, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, prisoners may bring a claim for right of access to the courts. Smith, 60 F.3d
at 320. Accordingly, Woodsen’s contention that he has no adequate remedy at law

available to him is without merit.

C. Public Interest

Whether the injunction is in the best interest of the pubic is a strong element
that a court must weigh before denying or granting an injunction motion. AM
General Corp., 311 F.3d at 803-04. Woodsen argues that the public interest is not
“served” by the conduct of the Menard agents. (Pet.’s Inj. Mem. 3). However, we
found earlier that Woodsen has failed to establish that the conduct of Menard agents
violated his right of access to this court, and we also find that Woodsen has failed to
establish that an injunction would be in the best interest of the public.

As explained in the above analysis, Woodsen has failed to establish any of


965 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.1992)).

Woodsen has attached a declaration to his injunction motion in which he
alleges that agents at Menard do not always respond to his requests for access to the
Menard law library and other available legal resources. (Pet’r. Decl. 2-5).
However, Woodsen’s declaration also indicates that Woodsen has had access to
Menard law library on a regular basis. (Pet’r. Decl. 2-5). Further, Woodsen admits
that he receives assistance from prison law clerks and has had access to other legal
resources at Menard. (Pet’r. Decl. 2-5). For example, Woodsen cites to numerous
dates when he visited the Menard law library and explains that on one occasion a
Menard paralegal assigned to the Menard law library personally visited him in his
cell to assist him in an inquiry. (Pet’r. Decl. 3 {’s 11). Woodsen has failed to
establish that Menard and its agents have impeded Woodsen’s access to this court
and we find that the evidence indicates that Woodsen has had “meaningful” access
to this court. See Smith, 60 F.3d at 322 (explaining that prisoners are only entitled
to “meaningful access” to the courts). Woodsen’s own admissions rebut the
allegations set forth in his injunction motion. Woodsen has failed to sufficiently
establish that any Menard agents have violated his right of access to this court.
Jenkins, 977 F.2d at 268. Therefore, we find that Woodsen has not shown that he
will likely be able to succeed on the merits of a claim for right of access to the

court.


the required elements for injunctive relief. Therefore, we deny Woodsen’s

injunction motion.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, we deny Woodsen’s injunction motion.

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan f ‘ :

United States District Court Judge

Dated: March 30, 2005


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.
DWAYNE M. WOODSON,

Petitioner,
No. 04 C 4733

Vv.

CHARLES L. HINSLEY, Warden,

were ve reve Se

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Petitioner Dwayne M. Woodsen’s
(“Woodsen”) “Emergency Motion For Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction” (“injunction motion”). For the reasons stated below, we

deny Woodsen’s injunction motion.

BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2004, Woodsen, a prisoner at the Menard Correctional Center


(“Menard”), filed a petition for writ of habeas corpuswith this court. Woodsen has
since filed an injunction motion and argues that he has been denied access to this
court. Specifically, Woodsen argues that certain agents of Menard have prevented
him access to the law library and other legal resources, which has affected his ability
to “prepare pleadings for filing” in this court. (Pet.’s Inj. Mot. 2). Woodsen
requests that the court find the conduct of the agents at Menard unconstitutional and

issue an injunction to rectify their conduct. (Pet.’s Inj. Mot. 3).

DISCUSSION

A prisoner seeking an injunction, either through a temporary restraining order
or a preliminary injunction, has the burden of establishing: 1) a likelihood of success
on the merits, 2) that the movant has no adequate remedy at law, and 3) that the
movant will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction request is not
granted. AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 803-04 (7th
Cir. 2002); Ell Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir.
2000); Dugan v. Briley 2004 WL 783200, at *2 (N.D.III. 2004). If the movant meets
the above burden, then the court must consider the potential irreparable harm to the
non-movant if the court were to grant the preliminary injunction and the court must
consider whether the preliminary injunction is in the best interest of the pubic. AM

General Corp., 311 F.3d at 803-04. If the court in assessing the likelihood of


success on the merits factor, determines that the plaintiff has a “greater than
negligible chance of winning” then the court should turn to a “sliding scale” analysis
and balance the likelihood of success and the potential harms caused by granting or

not granting the injunction motion. /d.

A. Reasonable Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Respondent argues that there is not a likelihood that Woodsen will succeed
on the merits of his claim. While it is well settled that prisoners have a “right of
access” to the courts, such a right does not include “unfettered direct access to law
libraries” at the prison. See Smith v. Shawnee Library System 60 F.3d 317, 322
(7th Cir. 1995)(stating that “prison security is an important and legitimate
consideration when setting regulations for access to prison libraries.”). In order to
establish that a violation of “right of access to the courts” exists, a prisoner must
first prove that the “prison officials failed ‘to assist in the preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.’ ” See Jenkins v. Lane, 977
F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir.1992)(quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, (1977). In
addition, the prisoner must establish “‘some quantum of detriment caused by the
challenged conduct of state officials resulting in the interruption and/or delay of the

plaintiff's pending or contemplated litigation.”” See id.(quoting Shango v. Jurich,