i i i i i i



### MEMORANDUM OPI NIO N No
. 04 -0 9- 00 12 8- CR R u s s e l l R ay NE LSON , Appellant
v . The STA TE of

Te xas , Appellee F ro m th e 63 rd

Judic ia l D ist

ri c t Co ur t, E dw ard s Co un ty , T e xas Tr ia l Co ur

t N o. 15 21 -C R Honora ble Thomas F. L ee , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini , J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini , J ustice

Steven C. Hilbig , J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d , J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Febr uary 10, 2010 AFF I RMED A jury convicted Russell Ray

Nelson of thef

t in an amount g reater than or equa l to $1,500.00
and le ss t ha n $20 ,0 00 .0 0. Th e e vid e nc e sh ow e d Ne lso n wa s adv anc e d $2, 92 5. 00 to i ns ta ll a se pti c tank but did not complete the job. I n one issue, Nelson argues the evidenc e wa s leg ally insufficient to s up po rt his c on vic tio n be c a

us e the State of

fe re d n o e vid e nc e of

any c ri min a l in te nt t o a

pp ro pr iate the monies adva

nced to him. After revie wing all of t he evidence in the light most favora ble to the04
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- 2- verdic t, we conc lude a r ational jury could have found Nelson had the require d intent to commit t heft bey ond a re asonable doubt. We, therefor e, af firm the trial c ourt’s judg ment of convic tion. B ACKG ROUND I n Jun e 20 04 , A nto nio Ga rc ia and Ne lso n re a c he d an a g re e me nt fo r N e lso n to ins ta ll a se pti c tank on Gar cia’ s la n d in Edwards County , Texas, for $2,925.00. On June 14, 2004, Garc ia wire d $2,925.00 to Nelson’s acc ount a s pay ment for Nelson’s service s and other rela ted fee s. On J une 28, 2004, Gar cia r ece ived a se pti c tank pe rmit application from Ne lson by fax. Garc ia filled out the permit application and faxed it back to Ne lson on June 29, 2004. This pe rmit application was ne ver filed. On Septembe r 7, 2004, Ne lson tra nsported a backhoe to Garc ia’s prope rty and told Gar cia he would return the next day to beg in working on the septic tank. N el s o n appea red the next day

and,
a ft e r d ig g ingon the land wi th a ba c kh oe , inf or me d Garc ia he ha d hit ro c k an d w ou ld n ot b e a ble to complete the job f

or the a g ree d-upon price. W h en Ga rcia asked N elson to return the $2,925.00 alre ady paid, Nelson said he no longe r had the money and could not re turn it. Nelson explained he was having some persona l problems and his business was s t ru ggl ing. U nsatisfied with Nelson’s
e xpla na t i o n s , G ar c i a f

i l e d a f o r m a l c o mp l a i n t w i t h t h e s h e r i f f ’ s o f f i c e , w h i c h e v e n tu a l l y l e d to Nelson’s indictment in this case. L EGA L S UF F I CI E NCY S T ANDARD I n a sse ssi ngle g a l su ff

ic ie nc y we c on sid e r al l of the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to the ve rd ic t and

de te rm ine wh e the r, ba se d on that e vid e nc e and the re a so na

ble inf e re nc e s th e re fr om,
ratio na l juro rs c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of th e off ense be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 18 -1 9 ( 19 79 ); Vi lla rre al v . S tate , 2 8 6 S. W. 3 d

3 2 1 , 3 2 7 ( T e x.04
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- 3- Crim. App. 2009). Under

this standard, jurors a

re pe rmitted to drawmultipl e re asonable infere nces as long as each inferenc e is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Ho op e r v . S tate , 214 S.W .3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). I n conducting a lega l sufficie ncy revie w, t he appe llate cour t may not
re- weig h the evidence and substitut e it s judgme nt for that of the jury
. Kin g v . S

tate , 29 S.W .3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). T HE F T B Y D E CE P T I ON A p e rs on c omm its the of

fe ns e of the ft if he un lawf

ull y a pp ro pr iate s p ro pe rt

y wi th i nte nt t o deprive the owner

of prope rty . T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31.03(a) (Ve rnon Sup p . 2 009). Appropriation of prope rt y is unlawful if it is without t he owne r’s e ffe ctive conse nt. T EX . P EN AL C ODE ANN . § 31.03(b)( 1) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). Consent is not effe ctive if it is induced by dece ption. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 3 1. 01 (3 )( A) (V e rn on Sup p. 20 09 ). “ De c e pti on ” is d e fi ne d a s: (A) c reating or

confirmingby

words or c onduct a false impression of law or f act that is likely to affe ct the judgment of another in the tra nsaction, and that the actor does no t be lie ve to b e tr

ue ; (B ) fa iling to cor

rec t a fa lse impression of law or fac t t h at i s l i kely

to affe ct the judgme nt of another

in the transac tion, that the actor previously cre ated or confirme d by wo rd s o r c on du c t, a

nd that th e a c tor

do e s n ot n owbe lie ve to b e tr ue ; (E) pr omisi n g p er fo rmanc e that is likely to affe ct the judg ment of anothe r in the tran s ac tion and that the ac tor does not intend to perf orm or knows will not be perf ormed, except that failure to perfor m the promise in issue without other evidenc e of intent or knowledg e is not sufficie nt pr oof that the actor did not intend to perform or knewthe promise would not be pe rfor med. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31.01(1)( A),(B ), & (E) ( Ver non Supp. 2009). Whe n a c on tr a c t is inv olv e d, the of fense of th eft re qu ir e s p ro of of mor e tha n a n in te nt t o deprive the owner of prope rty and the subseque nt appropriation of the proper ty
. Ba k e r v . S tate , 98604
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- 4- S.W .2d 271, 274 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, pet. ref’d). I f no more tha n intent and appr opriation
are shown, nothing illeg al is a ppare nt be cause a contr actingparty ty pically has the rig ht to deprive the owner of prope rty

albeit in return f

or consider ation. Id
. Thus, when a contra ct is involved, theft “re quires proof

of the fa lse prete x t or fra ud in order to be come a

viable cr iminal prosecution.” Id
. Wit hout such proof, the re is nothing more than a civil c laim in c ontrac t and it is not appropriate f or criminal prose cution. Id . Stated another way , if money was volunt arily g iven t o the ac cused pur suant to a contra ctual ag ree ment and ther e is insufficient e vidence in the rec ord to show the money was obtained by

dece ption, the conviction cannot stand. Ph ill ips v . S tate , 6 40 S.W .2d 293 , 2 9 4 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1982). To constitute theft, the evidenc e must show the acc used intended to deprive the owner of the proper ty at the time the proper

ty was take n. See W

ils on v . S tate , 6 63 S.W. 2d

83 4, 83 6- 37 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1984) (“ Relevant intent to deprive the owner of proper ty is the acc used’s intent at the time of the taking .”). B eca

use cr iminal intent is seldom susceptible to dir ect proof, it may be infe rre d from the conduc t and words of

the ac cused a

nd the surroundingcirc umstances. Ha rt v . S tate , 89 S.W .3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ; Cor on ad o v . S tate , 508 S.W .2d 373, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Bake r , 986 S.W .2d at 274-75. T HE T R I A L E VI DE NCE At tr ia l, t he c omp la ini ngwi tne ss, Ga rc ia , te sti fi e d he ow ne d land in E dw ard s Co un ty , T e xas. I n J une 2004, Ga

rcia hired Ne lson to inst all a septic ta nk on this l an d
. Du ring their initial discussions, which took place during the first part of J une 2004, Ne lson quoted Garc ia $2,925.00 for the job and told Gar cia a permit application was requir ed. Ne lson assured Ga rcia he would take car e04
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- 5- of the pe rmit application. Nelson also told Gar cia to wire the $2,925.00 to Nelson’s a ccount a nd provided Ga

rcia the ac count information. Ga rcia wired the money to N elson’s acc ount on June 14, 2004. On J une 28, 2004, Ga rcia rec eived a

permit application from Nelson by fax. The fa x showed the application was sent from D & M L and Company
. The application said it should be mailed back to Nelson and provide d an addr ess for this purpose. Garc ia fil led out the application, which asked for a leg al desc ription of the land. Gar cia, howeve r, did not provide the full leg al descr iption on the permit application. I nstead, Ga rcia filled in the leg al desc ription as only “Indian Cree k Ranch.” On J une 29, 2004, Ga

rcia faxed th e p er m i t ap p lication back to D & M L and Company . Gar cia a nd Nelson had subse quent conve rsations about t he job, but Nelson neve r told him the permit application was not prope rly

completed. T w o w i t n e s s e s , S a m F i s h an d B e t h e l S t an l e y , t e s t i f

i e d a b o u tt h e s e p t i c t an k

p e r m it
a pp licatio n p ro c e ss. F ish , a se pti c tank

ins ta lle r a

nd a sit e e va luator

in E dw ard s Co un ty , s a id excavation and other

installation work could not beg in until after the pe rmit application was
c omp le te d a

nd the sit e wa s e va luate d b y

a sit e e va luator . F ish

we nt o n to te sti fy

that a ft e r t

he pe rm it
a pp lic a tio n a

nd sit e e va luatio n we re do ne , th e do c ume nts ne e de d to be a pp ro ve d b y

the sit e ins pe c tor , St anle y . St a

nle y re vie we d th e pe rm it a

pp lic a tio n a

nd the sit e e va luatio n a

nd , if the se documents we re in orde r, issued a construction permit. At the time of construc tion, St anley came out to t he sit e and

c he c ke d to se e if

the wo rk wa s in c on fo rm ity

wi th the pe rm it a

pp lic a tio n and

the sit e evaluation. Fish testified it was the la

ndowner ’s obligation to fill in the leg al desc ription of the land and to p ro pe rl y

c omp le te the pe rm it a

pp lic a tio n. F ish a lso te sti fi e d he wo uld no t take it up on him se lf to04
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- 6- sear ch the courthouse records for a leg al description and fill it in on a per mit application. Fish furthe r testified that, under

this application proce ss, excavation and construc tion on a septic tank c ould not be g in u nti l th e pe rm it w a s is su e d; h ow e ve r, befo re th e perm it issu e d a te st h ole c ou ld b e du g to de te rm ine wh e the r o r n ot r oc k w a s p re se nt. F ish te sti fi e d h e did

no t thi nk Ne lso n a sk e d h im t o p e rf or m a sit e e va luatio n o n th e Ga rc ia land in 2004. Two y ear s later, however , Fish was hired to install the septic tank on the Ga rcia land. Fish wa s paid $7,000.00 for this job—$2,500.00 to jackhamm er t h ro u gh the subsurfa ce r ock and $4,500.00 for installing the septic tank. F is h t est ified that a la rg e par t of the Ga

rcia projec t was transportingthe equipment to the land and digg ing the test hole. Fish also testified he would not have made a $2,900.00 bid on the Gar cia job. Stanley , a state- licensed septic tank inspector, a lso testified about the steps in the septic tank p e r mi t a p p li c a ti o n p r o c e s s . F ir s t, th e p r o p e rty o w n e r f il le d o u t th e a

p p li c a ti o n an d p a id

the application fe e. Second, the site evaluation was perf ormed b y a site eva luator. Third, a ll of the pa pe rw or k w a s su bmi tte d to Stanle y

fo r h is r e vie w and for th e iss ua nc e of a c on str uc tio n p e rm it. Th e re a ft e r, the pr op e rt

y ow ne r s e le c te d a

lic e ns e d in sta lle r t o ins ta ll the se pti c sy ste m a c c or din g to the c on str uc tio n p e rm it. Stanley further testified that normally

the per mit application and the applica tion fee wer e provided to him at t he same time. Stanley went on to state t hat t he permit application neede d to be completely

filled out; St anley

did not acce pt permit applications without the l ega l descr iption. More o v e r , anin s ta ll e r

c o u ld n o t g o f o r w ar d le g a ll y u n ti l t h e p e r mi t a p p li c a ti o nw a s c ompleted.04
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- 7- Acc ording to Stan l ey , he wa s a contra ct employ ee f or Edwa rds County

and he c harg ed $275.00 for e ach site inspection. Pursuant to Stanley ’s arr ang ement with the county , he paid a $15.00 fe e to th e c ounty

wh e n h e su

bmi tte d e a c h p e rm it a

pp lic a tio n. Stanle y

a lso te sti fi e d th a t e a c h s ite evaluator cha

rg ed a se parate, additional fe e. Ad dit ion a lly , St anle y

te sti fi e d th a t no pe rm it a pp lic a tio n w a s f

ile d f or the G arc ia

land in 2004; however , Fish filed a permit application and a si t e ev al u at i o n for the G arc ia land in 2006. Ac c or din g to S tanle y , a

se pti c tank

wa s in sta lle d o n th e Ga

rc ia land in 20 06 , and F ish wa s the sit e
e va luator and ins ta lle r o n th is j ob . St anle y te sti fi e d th a t an ins ta lle r c ou ld, pr ior to o bta ini nga

pe rm it, diga te st h ole . St anle y

fu rt he r t e sti fi e d a

te st h ole wa s a

le g iti mate pa

rt of the pr oc e ss an d th e pe rm it application did not need to be completed a nd approve d befor e a te st hole was dug . Stanley testified that su bs ur fa c e ro c k w a s a

pr ob le m in

Ed wa rd s Co un ty

and a pr ov isi on

a dd res si ngthi s conting ency

—a “r ock cla

use”—w as “ma

ndatory .” Ac cordingto Stanley , an installer would not contra ct to do a job without including a rock c lause. Finally , Nelson’s bank rec ords wer e admitted in evidenc e. The se bank r ecor ds showed that Nelson’s a ccount r ece ived a wir e tra nsfer in the amount of $2,925.00 on J une 14, 2004; howeve r, by J une 29, 2004, the a ccount ba lance was only $249.48. D I S CUS S I ON Ne lso n a rgue s th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s ho w h e ha d th e re qu ir ed in ten t to commit theft by

dece ption for two re asons. Fir st, Nelson contends the uncontrove rted e vidence showed he did not commit a crime bec ause he substantially perf ormed the contra ct. Second, Ne lson contends the e vidence showed the entire matter wa s nothing more than a c ontrac t dispute and there04
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- 8- was no evidence fr om which the jury could have rea sonably

inferr ed he a

ppropriate d the monies advanc ed to him throug h malfea sance , tricker y , or dec eption. 1. Sub stantial Pe rform ance? Nelson conte nds the uncontrove rted e viden c e s h o w e d h e s u b s ta nti a ll y p e r f ormed the c ontrac t and this substantial perfor mance neg ates a

ny intent to commit thef

t throug h dece ption. See J acobs

v . S tat e , 230 S
. W
. 3 d 225, 231-32 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2006, no pet.) (“ I f a c ontrac t is partially

or substantially perf

ormed, then intent to commit thef t thr oug h dece ption is not shown by the evidenc e.”) . Nelson ar g ues t he evidence was uncontroverted that, by transportinga bac khoe to Garc ia’s land a

nd digg ing a

hole, Nelson substantially perf ormed the c ontrac t. We disagr ee. T he
natur e and e xten t of Ne lso n’ s per fo rm anc e wa s con tr ov e rt e d at tri a l. F ish te sti fi e d th a t th e ro a d to Ga rc ia ’s land

wa s “ dif fi c ult ro a d” wi th lot s of hill s and g ull ie s and it p ro ba bly too k N e lso n h ours to haul the bac khoe up to Gar cia’ s land. Additionally , Fish testified Ne lson did part of the job by hauling the equipment to Gar cia’ s land and digg ing the hole. On the other hand, Ga rcia testified the
wo rk pe rf or me d b y Ne lson was no min a l. A c c or din g to G arc ia , th e ro a d to his land wa s w e llmaintained and N elson could not have s p en t much time hauling the bac khoe to his land. Additionally , acc ording to G arc ia, Nelson spent only twenty to thirty minutes digg ing a

nd excavated
on ly a bo ut t hr e e bu c ke tf

uls of dir t. The jury is the exclusive judge of

the fa cts and the c redibility of the witnesse s. Penagraph

v . S tat e , 623 S.W .2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The jury is entitled to acce pt one ver sion of the fac ts a nd reje ct another , or reje ct any part of a w itness’s testimony
. Id . Her e, the jury could have reje cted F ish’s testimony

that Nelson’s wor

k was substantial and acc epted Gar cia’ s testimony that04
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- 9- the work perfor

med by Nelson wa s minim al. Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the
ve rd ic t, a ratio na l jury

c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly c on c lud e d th a t N e lso n d id n ot p art ia lly or su bs tanti a lly pe rf or m th e c on tr a c t. 2. A Me re C ontractDispu te? Nex t, Nel so n c on te nd s th e e vid e nc e sh ow e d th e e nti re matte r w a s a me re c on tr a c t di sp ute and the State failed to present a ny evidenc e fr om which the jury could have rea sonably

inferr ed he
a pp ro pr ia t e d t h e m o n i e s a d

v a n c e d h i m th ro ug h ma lf

e a sa nc e , tr ic ke ry , o r d e c e pti on . In e va luatin g thi s contention, we must pay particula r attention to Nelson’s conduct and wor ds at the time the money
was a dvance d to him. See W ilson , 663 S.W .2d at 836-37 (noting the re levant inquiry in evaluating criminal intent in a theft c ase is the a ccuse d’s intent at the time of the taking)
. First, Ne lson emphasizes evidence which showed that Gar cia f ailed to prope rly

fill out the leg al desc ription on the permit application. Nelson contends thi s evidenc e showe d Gar cia hinder ed Nelson’s a

bility to perfor m the job, a

nd there fore , no criminal intent could be infe rre d from Ne lson’s fa i l u re t o file the pe rmit application. Howe ver, the evidenc e showe d that Nelson told Garc ia he would take c are of filing the per mit applicat i o n , b u t despite this repre sentation, failed to do so. Mo re ov e r, the e vid e nc e sh ow e d N e lso n n e ve r i nf or me d Ga rc ia that he ne e de d to c or

re c t th e pe rm it application, nor did he inform Gar cia of any defic iency in the permit application which would hinder installation. Additi onally , the evidenc e showe d the per mit application faxed to G arc ia itemized the allocation of the funds adva nced. A ccor ding to the pe rmit applicatio n , t h e $ 2 ,925.00 advanc ed included an a

pplication fee of $275.00, a site e valuator’ s fee of $150.00, and a n installer’s fe e of $2 ,5 00 .0 0. Ho we ve r, the e vid e nc e sh ow e d N e lso n p a id n e ith e r t he a pp lic a tio n fee, no r the sit e04
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- 10- evaluator’s fe e. The permit applicatio n al so listed Fish as the site eva luator. Ne verthe less, the evidenc e showe d Fish wa s not asked by Nelson t o perf

orm a si te eva luation on the Gar cia land a nd did n o t rec eive a

site evaluator’s fe e fr om Nelson. Fr om this evidence, a rational jury

could have inferr ed that Ne lson, by

his c onduct and words at the time he took the money from Ga rcia , had the require d intent to commit t heft by dece ption. Second, Ne lson contends a r ational jury could not have r easona

b l y inferr ed the r equire d int e nt f ro m hi s f a ilure to f oll owthe pe rm it a

pp lic a tio n p roce du res be c a us e wh e n h e we nt o ut t o Gar cia’ s land in September 2004 he was mer ely digg ing a test hole. But the jur

y was not require d to inf e r that Garc ia wa s mer e ly dig g ing a te st hol e . Garc ia te sti fi e d that whe n Ne lso n c a me ou t to his land on September 7, 2004, Nelson indicate d “he w ould be bac k the following day to commence the work on the se ptic tank.” Thus, the jury was not require d to conclude that Nelson was mer ely digg ing a test hole. Third, Nel s o n co n t ends t he evide nce show ed his contra ct with Gar cia c ould have be en def en d ed under the doctrine of “imprac ticability .” Ne lson points t o evidenc e that subsurfa ce r ock
w a s a c o mm o n p r o b le m in th e ar e a an d th a t, w h e n F is h e v e n tu a ll y in s ta ll e d th e s e p ti c ta n k o nthe Gar cia land in 2006, he also found roc k on the Gar ci a l an d an d char g ed Ga rcia additional money beca use of the r ock. This sa

me evidenc e, howe ver, c ould be interpre ted to support the jury ’s finding of the re qu ir e d c ri min a l in te nt. A r a tio na l jury c ou ld have c on c lud e d th a t $2 ,9 25 .0 0 w a s n ot a g enuine bid for the installation job, particula rly in light of the abse nce of any provision addre ssing subsurfac e roc k. Thus, the agr eeme nt itself further supported a rea sonable infe renc e that Ne lson had
n o i n t e n t i o no f

f u l f i l l i n g h i s c o n t r a c tu a l o b l i g a t i o nw h e nh e t o o k G ar c i a ’ s m o n e y.04
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- 11- B a se d o n N e lso n’ s f

a ilure to f

ile the pe rm it a

pp lic a tio n in

a c c or da nc e wi th his repr esentations, Nelson’s failure to pay the required fees in acc ordanc e with the represe ntations on the per mit application, Nelson’s fa ilure to c ontact the site e valuator, N elson’s unusually low bid, and Ne lso n’ s f

a ilure to i nc lud e a

“ ro c k c la us e ” in th e con tr act , a

ratio na l jury

c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly inferr ed that Nelson had no intention of fulfilling his c ontrac tual obligation whe n he took Gar cia’ s money . After examining all of the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t, we conc lude
a rational jury

could have found the e x istence of more than a

mere contract dispute. We hold the
e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly

su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the jur y ’s find in g t hat Ne lso n o bta ine d th e fu nd s in question by

dece ption. Nelson’s sole issue is theref ore ove rruled. C ONCL US I ON The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed. Kar en Ang elini , J ustice
DO NO T PU B L I SH