SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0332-20

DONNA M. DELVALLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DANIEL J. QUINN, and

DONNAJEAN E. KAFADER,

Defendants-Respondents.

__________________________

Submitted October 26, 2021 – Decided November 9, 2021

Before Judges Fisher and Currier.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-2150-17.

Lueddeke Law Firm, attorneys for appellant (Karri 

Lueddeke, on the briefs).

Maggs McDermott & DiCicco, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent (James A. Maggs, of counsel; Victoria J. 

Adornetto, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Plaintiff Donna DelValle was employed as a medical staff manager by 

Atlantic Medicine & Wellness, LLC, from 2012 to 2016. Defendant Daniel 

Quinn was a patient of Dr. Vladimir Berkovich, one of Atlantic's physicians.

The other defendant, DonnaJean Kafader, is not an Atlantic patient but she has 

had an intermittent dating relationship with Quinn over the course of many 

years; in addition, her adult daughter, Michelle Navas, is a patient of Dr. 

Berkovich. Quinn viewed himself as having a stepfather/stepdaughter 

relationship with Navas.

This suit has its genesis in the undisputed fact that Kafader heard, and told 

Quinn, that members of Atlantic's staff referred to Quinn as a "creepy perverted 

stepdad" because he accompanied Navas to her appointments, often entering and 

remaining in the consultation room with Navas when she met with Dr. 

Berkovich. Kafader learned of this office gossip from Linda Husserl, who was 

not employed by or a patient of Atlantic but is plaintiff's sister.

Upon hearing from Kafader what Husserl told Kafader, Quinn spoke to 

Dr. Berkovich and, in response to the doctor's questions, advised that Husserl 

was the source of his information. In depositions, both Quinn and Dr. Berkovich 

acknowledged Quinn sought nothing but a halt to the gossip. Atlantic's partners 

met and discussed the matter, believed a breach of office confidence had 
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occurred, determined plaintiff was the cause of the breach, and terminated her 

employment.

Plaintiff commenced this action against only Quinn and Kafader, alleging 

defamation, tortious interference with an economic advantage, and the tort of 

outrage. After discovery closed, defendants successfully moved for summary 

judgment, and the complaint was dismissed.

Plaintiff appeals, arguing only that the judge erred in dismissing her claim 

of defendants' tortious interference with her economic advantage. We find 

insufficient merit in plaintiff's arguments to warrant further discussion in a 

written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), adding only the following few comments.

To maintain her tortious interference claim, plaintiff was required to 

prove: (1) a reasonable expectation of economic advantage; (2) defendants acted

intentionally and with malice in interfering with plaintiff's reasonable 

expectation; (3) defendants' interference caused the loss of the economic benefit; 

(4) and if there was no interference it was reasonably probable plaintiff would 

have received the anticipated economic benefit. See Printing Mart-Morristown 

v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 750-52 (1989); Harris v. Perl, 41 N.J. 455, 

462 (1964). The reference to the word "malice" in the second element does not 

mean that the defendant acted with "ill will toward the plaintiff," only that the 
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defendant inflicted the harm "intentionally and without justification or excuse." 

Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 751.

In adhering to the Brill1standard, the trial judge assumed the truth of 

plaintiff's factual assertions, provided her with the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences, and therefore accepted plaintiff's allegations that: she was terminated 

because of Quinn's conversation with Dr. Berkovich; her employment would 

have continued but for that conversation and Atlantic's investigation that 

followed without Quinn's further involvement, and all the other elements of the 

cause of action were adequately supported – except one.

The judge found no admissible evidence and that it was not otherwise 

reasonably inferable from the evidence that defendants Quinn and Kafader acted 

intentionally or with ill will. Instead, the judge observed that Quinn had 

expressed surprise when he learned of plaintiff's termination and that he had no 

plan or intention of causing her termination. We agree the evidence on this 

element was so one-sided as to warrant the entry of summary judgment in 

defendants' favor.

For example, Quinn testified that he only wanted the staff to stop joking 

about his relationship with Navas. Indeed, the one-sided evidence demonstrated 

1 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).
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that Quinn never mentioned plaintiff's name in connection with his complaints 

to Dr. Berkovich, that he did not seek a termination of plaintiff's employment, 

and that he was surprised about her firing. Plaintiff acknowledged in her 

discovery responses that her termination was based on a breach of confidence

and that she had no evidence to suggest Quinn made such an allegation when he 

spoke with Dr. Berkovich. And Dr. Berkovich testified at his deposition that it 

wasn't Quinn's complaint that prompted plaintiff's termination; that step was 

taken only after Atlantic investigated and concluded there was a breach of 

confidence. There is simply no direct evidence, or a reasonable inference to be 

drawn, that Quinn intentionally or maliciously acted.

Kafader was also entitled to summary judgment. While it was her 

conversation with Husserl that formed the basis for Quinn's complaint to Dr. 

Berkovich, Kafader never spoke to Dr. Berkovich or anyone else at Atlantic 

about the situation.

We affirm for these reasons and substantially for those reasons set forth 

by Judge Linda Grasso Jones in her written opinion.

Affirmed.