completely discombobulated. From what we are able to discern based on our own reading of the
complaint, Evans feels her civil rights were violated when the defendants allegedly attempted to
prevent her from attending meetings of the Police District Advisory Counsel. However, Evans
has not identified any particular civil rights which were violated. Instead, she offers a story filled
with disjointed allegations which purportedly support the argument that the defendants violated
the plaintiff's civil rights. Nevertheless, this Court cannot allow a lawsuit that is based on legal
conclusions, inferences or allegations unsupported by the facts as presented in the pleadings to
proceed past this initial stage. See Will County Carpenters, 675 F.2d at 883. Furthermore, her
allegations of defamation of character and police brutality are simply not supported by any facts
in the complaint. There is virtually nothing in the complaint which can serve to assist the
defendants in preparing a defense to her accusations. Therefore, we must dismiss this complaint
for failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8.

That being said, however, we will dismiss this case without prejudice and allow Evans
the opportunity to correct the deficiencies in her complaint. If that is her desire, we offer the
following suggestions. First, clearly identify and list the civil or constitutional rights that have
been violated. Designate each of these violations as a separate count in the complaint. For
example, if the defendants have violated her civil rights and she wants to pursue a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then she must allege that the defendants deprived her of a federal right
and that the defendants who deprived her of this right acted under the color of state law. See
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920 (1980); Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648,
650 (7th Cir. 2001). Similarly, allegations of defamation of character and police brutality should

be asserted as separate counts. Second, once the counts have been delineated, it would be


In order to determine if a particular complaint satisfies this relatively relaxed standard, we
must review the plaintiffs statement of the claim to determine whether the plaintiff has set forth
facts supporting a cause of action that would entitle her to relief. Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d
242, 244 (7th Cir. 1988). However, we are not required to accept legal conclusions, inferences,
or allegations unwarranted by the facts as presented in the pleadings. Mid-Am. Reg’l Bargaining
Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters Dist. Council, 675 F.2d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 1982). The accepted
standard for determining the sufficiency of a complaint does not permit dismissal “unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which
would entitled [her] to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957).

In a very recent case, the Seventh Circuit was confronted with a pro se complaint that the
defendant argued should be dismissed because it violated Rule 8 in that it contained repetitious
and irrelevant matter. Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 2001). The court
held that it was inappropriate to dismiss a case simply because it contained “superfluous matter.”
Id. at 820. Rather, the court instructed that a district court, when confronted with a motion to
dismiss based on Rule 8, should determine if the complaint is adequate “to put the defendant on
notice of the plaintiff's claim.” Jd. (citing Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 163). That being said,
however, the court continued by raising a distinction between a properly drafted complaint that
contained extraneous material and one that is simply unintelligible. In the case of the latter, the
court stated that dismissal in such a circumstance is “unexceptionable” because “such a
complaint fails to give the defendant the notice to which he is entitled.” Jd.

In the present case, we find that Evans’ complaint can only be characterized as

unintelligible. The complaint is like a road with so many twists and turns that the reader ends up


advisable for Evans to explain in clear and concise statements why the actions are impermissible.
\ At this stage, it would be helpful to provide facts specific to each particular count which would

enable the defendants to properly prepare a defense against the allegations. Finally, once this is

complete, Rule 8(a) requires a statement of the relief Evans seeks (we should note that we feel

Evans has satisfied this particular requirement in her present complaint).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff's

complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The plaintiff's request for court ordered

mediation is denied as moot. This case is terminated.

It is so ordered.

bd CA

/ Wayne R. Andersen
United States District Court

Dated: [f-18-Rob|



_ Minye Order Form (06/97)

nited States District Court, Northern District of Iinois

Namco Aiend nile | Wayne R. Andersen | tie adr Oe
CASE XUMBER 1C 6194 DATE 12/18/2001

CASE Linda Evans vs. City of Chicago, et al

TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature.

MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) o Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__.
(4) i] Ruling/Hearing on setfor_ at
(5) Qo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___——ssetfor_— at
(6) im Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—setfor_ sat.
(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at
3) O [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at _
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule 21 CIFRCP41(a)\(1) CI FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Ml [Otherdocketentry] Enter MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: We grant [9-1], [8-1]
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). The plaintiff’s request for
court ordered mediation is [12-1] denied as moot. This case is terminated.

dl) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court,
No notices required. Bice
Notices mailed by judge’s staff,

Document.
Number.

Notified counsel by telephone,

7 | Docketing to msitnotices. ay
| Mail AO 450 form,

Copy to judge/magistrate judge,

i ub tt pe
cou Ure Fe Se g§
TSA deputy’s

\ initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LINDA EVANS, )
)
Plaintiff, )

) Judge Wayne R. Andersen
v. )

) No. 01 C 6194

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint
filed by plaintiff Linda Evans for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the defendants’
motion to dismiss is granted. } i 7 ey

BACKGROUND DEC 21 200t'

Plaintiff Linda Evans is a resident of the City of Chicago, Illinois. The defendants in this
case are the City of Chicago, the Chicago Police Department, and a number of individual
Chicago Police officers including Commander Michael Shields, Sargent Doris Haynes, Officer
Linda Griffith, Officer Delores Gibson-Edwards, and Officer Thurston Daniels. Evans filed the
instant pro se complaint on August 13, 2001. From what is identified on the face of this
complaint, Evans apparently argues that the defendants engaged in a “pre-meditated conspiracy”

to commit numerous illegal acts, most of which she claims are hate crimes. Additionally, Evans

has alleged she was the victim of a variety of untoward acts perpetrated by the individual


defendants. Specifically, she has alleged that Commander Shields and Sgt. Haynes violated her
“human rights to be of service to [her] community” by rigging a local election. Officer Griffith is
accused of “abuse of authority, attempting to make a false arrest, defamation to [her] character,
threats not to attend future meetings, police brutality and misconduct, and endangering the lives
and safety of [Evans] and others.” Officer Gibson-Edwards allegedly abused her position as a
police officer, placed “handcuffs that were pinching,” tried to make a false arrest, and assisted
another officer who purportedly “was in the wrong.” Finally, Evans has alleged that Officer
Daniels engaged in the tort of violating the duty “to serve and protect.”

DISCUSSION

In considering the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all allegations set forth in
the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Evans. See Lachmund v. ADM
Investor Services, Inc., 191 F.3d 777, 782 (7" Cir. 1999). A motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), will only be granted if it appears that Evans could not prove any set of facts in support
of her claims entitling her to relief. See Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580,
597 (7" Cir. 2001); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957).

In this case, the defendants argue that we should dismiss Evans’ complaint because it
violates the liberal pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 8 requires
that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), that will “give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S, 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (1993).