rahi ean

Counts XVI-XVIII

On July 24, 1998, Carr announced a hunger strike to protest his continuing
confinement in segregation, which continued until he was released on July 28. He
complains that he was not released and that procedures for dealing with hunger strikers
were not followed so as to bring his hunger strike to the attention of medical personnel
and the prison administration. It is unclear what claim Carr is attempting to raise. As
his confinement was not in violation of the Constitution, he has no federal claim against
those who, for whatever reason, did not act to release him from segregation. Since Carr
does not allege that his hunger strike put him in serious danger, there is no issue of
medical neglect, and Carr does not complain that he was not force-fed. He does
complain that he was not released, but his refusal to eat did not affect his right to be
released from segregation one way or the other.

Carr was eventually released when the superintendent of the segregation unit, B.
Smith, and Captain Manning leaned of his hunger strike. Carr complains that while
Smith and Manning pretended to be surprised at his illegal detention, they took no
action against their subordinates for failing to inform them of it.

Carr’s repeated allegations that supervisory personnel failed to discipline their
subordinates for violations of IDOC regulations do not state a claim. Apart from the
fact that the subordinates’ actions did not violate Carr’s constitutional rights, failure to
investigate or discipline a subordinate will not normally support a claim against the
superior, since failure to discipline a subordinate after the fact cannot have caused the
plaintiffs injury. See Vukadinovich v. McCarthy, 901 F.2d 1439, 1444 (7th Cir. 1990);
Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 847 (7th Cir. 1989). A private citizen has no

legal interest in the criminal prosecution of another for a breach of a duty owed to

-13-


Bed ae a

BB

Defendant Lieutenant S. Lohiser (“Lohiser”) was controlling the gate, and after
observing Carr talking with Neal, refused to let Carr proceed with the other inmates to
the law library. Lohiser radioed defendant Lieutenant Foster that a “refusal” was being
returned to the cellhouse. Carr claims that this interference with his movement
constituted “corporal punishment” in violation ofprison rules. He infers that Lohiser
intended to punish him for speaking with Neal, in violation of his right to freedom of
expression.

A prisoner may not sue in federal court for violations of prison rules that do not
amount to a constitutional violation. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of liberty without due process
oflaw. A prisoner lawfully in custody has no right to liberty but may nevertheless have
protected liberty interests created by the Due Process Clause or state law. The Supreme
Court in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), sharply limited the cases in which state
laws or regulations will give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause and enforceable in federal courts. The Court disavowed the practice of finding
that prison officials' noncompliance with state law or prison regulations deprived
inmates of liberty interests, pointing out that prison regulations were not intended to
confer rights on inmates. To make prison regulations enforceable by inmates in federal
court discourages the state from enacting regulations to limit the discretion of
correctional officers and “[leads] to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day
management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little offsetting
benefit to anyone.” Jd. at 482. Although the state may create protected liberty interests,

they are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and


est

medication was with his personal property and was not brought to the segregation unit.
Three times Carr asked defendant officer Tyree to send for a medical technician. Tyree
said he would, but no one appeared. Later that morning a nurse, defendant Jan Leigh,
was passing out prescribed medications, but she ignored Carr’s calls forhelp. Carr took
off his shoe and began beating it on the metal panel outside his door. Defendant
Lieutenant Price responded to the racket but apparently did not send Leigh to Carr,
because she left without seeing him. Carr made no further attempts to seek medical
attention through the rest of the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. shift, and made no attempts during the
3-11 shift Friday evening, because, he alleges, previous experience had taught him that
the medical technician on that shift, Allen Dantzler, would do nothing for him.

On Saturday morning, Carr asked defendant Harris to contact a medical
technician to confirm that medication had been prescribed for him and have some sent
from the pharmacy. Harris said she would send a medical technician but did not do so.
About 7:58 p.m. Saturday evening Carr saw Dantzler on the gallery and called out to
Sergeant Gross. Carr explained to Gross that he needed medication and had some in his
personal property, but his personal property hadn’t arrived yet. Gross brought Dantzler
over to Carr's cell. Dantzler said he was only passing out prescribed medication and
would not get Carr's medication for him but suggested that itmight be retrieved from
personal property. Correctional officer Anyaso took it upon himself to locate Carr's
personal property and found it had not been taken from the cellhouse where Carr had
been assigned before being taken to segregation. Anyaso retrieved Carr's pain
medication and he received it about 10 pm. Saturday.

Deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs constitutes

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s

-9-


security prisons are necessarily tightly disciplined places, and the right to seek redress
of grievances is not the right to make a nuisance of oneself if one feels wronged. Even
in the outside world, the right of free speech is limited by reasonable restrictions on
time, place and manner. The First Amendment right to seek redress does not afford
prisoners the right to challenge a disputed order up the chain of command before
obeying it. Lohiser's insistence on obedience was not retaliation.

Count III

After Carr disobeyed his order not to speak to Griffin, Lohiser escorted Carr to
the segregation unit, “placing the stigma of guilt on plaintiff in the eyes of Stateville
staff, a Mrs. Gereldine Rucker from Joliet C.C. also in Joliet, Illinois, and the inmates
looking out the inmate dining room windows as he and Lohiser passed by.” Carr
complains that because Lohiser didnot write a disciplinary report charging Carr with
an offense, Carr was not given a hearing to clear himself of any charges.

This is frivolous. Defamation is not a deprivation of liberty within the meaning
of the due process clause. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Hernandez v. Joliet
Police Department, 197 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1999). In any event, Carr has been
convicted of multiple murders and could hardly have been stigmatized by Lohiser’s
treating him as having violated a disciplinary rule.

Count IV

Carr complains that an unnamed reviewing officer should have reported to the
warden that no disciplinary report had been written against Carr within three days of his
being sent to segregation. The officer's neglect of duty infringed no legally protected

interest of Carr's.


significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Id. at 484.

Accordingly, although IDOC regulations prohibit “corporal punishment and
disciplinary restrictions on diet, medical or sanitary facilities, mail, or access to legal
materials,” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.20(c), Lohiser's turning Carr away from the law
library does not give rise to a federal claim. Being turned back from the law library is
hardly an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life. Carr does not allege that this incident prevented him from presenting a legal claim

to a court, so his constitutional right of access to the courts was not infringed. Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996); Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir.
1998).
Count IT

As Carr was being escorted by Lohiser back to his cellhouse, Carr saw defendant
Captain Griffin, Lohiser's superior. Lohiser told Carr that ifhe spoke to Griffin, Lohiser
would take him to segregation. Carr called out to Griffin anyway and complained that
Lohiser had kept him from going to the law library. Griffin was indifferent and refused
to listen to Carr's complaint. This does not give rise a claim against Griffin; if Lohiser's
conduct did not violate the Constitution, neither did Griffin's indifference to it.

A prison official may not punish a prisoner for exercising his First Amendment
right to present grievances to prison supervisors or to the courts, even if the punishment
would otherwise raise no constitutional concerns. Zimmerman, 226 F.3d at 573.
Nevertheless, Lohiser's ordering Carr not to speak to Griffin raises no First Amendment
claim. Lohiser did not threaten to punish Carr for complaining through proper channels

but only ordered him not to bother Griffin at that particular moment. Maximum-

-5-


vanishingly small... . [WJhen the entire sanction is confinement in

disciplinary segregation for a period that does not exceed the remaining

term of the prisoner's incarceration, it is difficult to see how after Sandin

it can be made the basis of a suit complaining about a deprivation of

liberty.
Carr's arbitrary placement in segregation may have offended his sense of fairness, but
it does not offend the Constitution.
Count VIII

Carr complains that when he was sent to segregation his property was packed in
his absence in violation ofprison rules. During the twelve days in segregation he did
not have a change of underwear or deodorant and was denied unspecified items other
segregation prisoners were allowed to have for entertainment.

Carr had no constitutional right to observe the packing ofhis property. While the
denial of clean clothes over an extended period could implicate the Eighth Amendment,
“extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,9 (1992). “Because routine discomfort is ‘part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society,’ only those
deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure oflife's necessities’ are sufficiently
grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Jd. (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). These deprivations for a limited time do not rise
to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.

Counts [X-XI
Carr alleges that early in the morning of July 17, 1998, he awoke with arthritis

pain in his left hip. He had been prescribed medication for arthritis pain, but his

-8-


‘Minute Order Form (06/97)
a

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge or] CHARLES P, KOCORAS Sitting Judge if Other
Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 5203 DATE DEC 20 20m
CASE William Carr (#A-75014) v. Leora Harry, et al.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the
nature of the motion being presented.]

1) 6

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:
1) ao Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
2) im} Brief in support of motion due
3) o Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due___-
(4) im) Ruling/Hearing on set for sat
(5) Qo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on __ set for at
K6) a) Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____—s set for at_
(7) im Trial{set for/re-set for] on __at
8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) © GeneralRule 21  OFRCP4i(a\(1) Ci FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) a {Other docket entry] Enter memorandum opinion and order. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis [3-1] is granted. As plaintiff has neither available funds nor income to pay an initial partial filing fee,
the initial filing fee is waived, When funds exist, the trust fund officer at the correctional facility where plaintiff is
confined shall make deductions from plaintiffs trust fund account and payments to the Clerk of Court as set forth in the
attached order. The clerk shall send a copy of this order to the trust fund officer at Menard Correctional Center. This
action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon ch nig may p granted.

WP)

INo notices required, advised in open court.

lo notices required.

INotices mailed by judge’s staff.

INotified counsel by telephone.

v ocketing to mail notices.

VY [Mail AO 450 form.
‘opy to Jndgsfqueistate judge.

béurtroom
Lieputy's
jinitials

O
ca

umber of notices

date docketed
2...

date mailed notice

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office

smuiling deputy initials



The Seventh Circuit held that this “gratuitous cruelty” violated the Eighth Amendment.
167 F.3d at 162.

Carr had been prescribed pain medication, indicating that his condition had been
recognized as objectively serious. On the other hand, Carr’s admission that he did not
seek treatment for an entire shift because he thought that the medical technician on that

shift would do nothing for him argues against the objective seriousness of his condition;

_ it is unlikely that someone in serious pain could endure it for the length of time Carr

opted not to ask for assistance because he did not think it would be forthcoming from
the medical technician on duty. -

Be that as it may, an Eighth Amendment claim requires not only that Carr’s
medical need have been objectively serious. It requires deliberate indifference to his
condition, which entails two things: (1) a “knowledge element,” i.e., the defendants
must have actually known that Carr’s pain was objectively serious; and (2) a “response
element,” either inaction or “woefully inadequate action” under the circumstances.
Hudson vy. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1998). As the Seventh Circuit

recognized, seriousness and the perception of seriousness lie on a continuum, as does

the immediacy of the response required. Arthritis pain, while it should not be left

untreated, is not a medical emergency; to the layperson it suggests discomfort rather

than agony. Carr told correctional officers that he had the necessary medication in his
personal property, but it had notbeen delivered to the segregation unit; it would have
been reasonable to wait a reasonable time for Carr’s medication to arrive rather than
obtain a fresh supply.

Between the time Carr awoke in pain early Friday morning and approximately

8 p.m. Saturday, when officer Anyaso left to locate Carr’s medication, Carr was

-ll-


prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976); Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001). “Because society does
not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate
indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those
needs are ‘serious.’” Hudson, 502 U.S. at 9. An objectively serious medical need is
“one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Wynn, supra (internal quotations omitted).

Not every refusal of medical treatment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that

Medical “need” runs the gamut from a need for an immediate intervention

to save the patient’s life to the desire for medical treatment of trivial

discomforts and cosmetic imperfections that most people ignore. At the

top of the range a deliberate refusal to treat is an obvious violation of the

Eighth Amendment [citations], and at the bottom of the range a deliberate

refusal to treat is obviously not a violation. [Citations] Where to draw the

line between the end points is a question of judgment that does not lend

itself to mechanical resolution.
Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160, 1161-62 (7th Cir. 1999). Severe pain alone can
amount to a “serious medical need” such that refusal of pain medication violates the
Eighth Amendment. Id.; Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996). The
plaintiffin Ralston had been prescribed medication to control pain caused by radiation
therapy for cancer. The treatment caused sores in his mouth and throat, making it

painful to swallow, but the defendant refused to let the plaintiff have his medication.

-10-


se a

Counts V-VII

After Lohiser delivered Carr to the “bull pen” in the segregation unit, Carr asked
several officers to contact supervisory personnel so that Carr could protest his improper
confinement. They refused to do so, and Carr spent twelve days in segregation.

Carr has no claim against any of the defendants with respect to his confinement
in disciplinary segregation. The Supreme Court held that because conditions in
disciplinary segregation were not significantly different from those in nonpunitive
administrative segregation or protective custody, the respondent's thirty-day term in
segregation “did not work a major disruption in his environment,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at
486, and due process of law was not required. After Sandin, unless prison discipline
amounts to an atypical and significant hardship, it can be imposed fairly or unfairly,
with or without due process of law, as far as the Constitution is concerned. Even
though state law or regulations may grant prisoners certain procedural rights, they do
not create liberty interests enforceable in federal court.

Following Sandin, the Seventh Circuit held in Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246,
1248 (7th Cir. 1995), that conditions in segregation at Stateville do not constitute an
atypical and significant hardship, and in Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 760-62 (7th
Cir. 1997), that seventy days in segregation at Stateville did not implicate any protected
liberty interest. Because it is established that a prisoner can be transferred without due
process protections to another institution where conditions are harsher and more
restrictive, Meachum vy. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, (1976), the Seventh Circuit observed in
Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 1997), that

[w]hen Sandin is interpreted in light of the transfer cases, it becomes

apparent that the right to litigate disciplinary confinements has become

-7-


court may address the timeliness of the complaint on its own motion if it appears the
plaintiffhas pleaded himselfout of court. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 793
(7th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has recently held that the limitations
period is tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies as required by 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Johnson v. Rivera, No. 99-2093, — F.3d —,
2001 WL 1512936 (7th Cir. Nov. 29, 2001). Carr alleges that certain defendants
conspired to obstruct his pursuit of administrative remedies, so the timeliness of the
complaint may turn on disputed issues of fact. Accordingly, we do not consider the

timeliness of the complaint and instead address the complaint on its merits.
LEGAL STANDARD

A district court is required to review complaints filed by prisoners against

__ governmental entities or their officers or employees and dismiss any portion of the

complaint it finds frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ I9I5A. In determining whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief may
be granted, the court applies the standard employed in deciding a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), taking all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226
F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000).
Count I

On July 16, 1998, Carr was following a line of inmates to go to the law library
and stopped to ask Correctional Officer B. Neal whether she remembered packing Carr's
personal property on June 18, 1998, when Carr was taken to disciplinary segregation.

After failing to obtain information from Neal, Carr ran to catch up to the line.

-3-


is tt hs,

tee A Bla A he cl

society, Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83 (1981); Johnson v. City of Evanston, 250
F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2001), and, by extension, a citizen has no right to have a state
employee disciplined for misconduct,

Counts [X-XXI

The foregoing principles also bar these counts. Carr alleges that while he was
in segregation he did not receive permitted items of personal property that were
supposed to be sent to him and that when he was released from segregation, much of his
personal property was missing, only to turn up later. Carr states that he is “making no
property claim in this matter as he subsequently received most of, but not all of it, back
on two separate occasions.” Carr’s claim seems to be that defendants conspired to
avoid responsibility for taking, losing or mislaying his property, and forged his
signature on receipts to show that he received property when he had not. Again,
whether this misconduct is viewed as criminal or merely a violation of IDOC
procedures, Carr has no right to have the defendants disciplined for it. Carr does not
allege any damages as a result of the loss or detention of his property. Unless the
unauthorized loss or detention of his property resulted in some other constitutional
deprivation, Carr has no claim in federal court, as he has an adequate state-law remedy.
Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1999); Stewart v. McGinnis,
5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1993).

Counts XXTI-XXXII

These counts allege, in extreme detail, Carr’s attempts to utilize and exhaust his
administrative remedies through IDOC’s prescribed grievance procedure. These
allegations do not state a claim for the simple reason that there is no constitutional right

to a grievance procedure. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430-31 (7th Cir. 1996).

-14-


then dismissed Carr's appeal and this suit was reinstated. Carr is granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis!

The thirty-two counts in Carr's lengthy complaint represent steps in Carr's
narrative, rather than separate legal theories. Carr's complaint arose from an abuse of
power by a correctional officer, who, becoming irritated with Carr, sent him to the
disciplinary segregation unit without charging himwith an offense. Carr remained in
segregation for twelve days. Because his personal property was not immediately sent
to the segregation unit, for two days he was without pain medication for his artbritis.
Unable to get anyone to listen to his pleas that he was being improperly confined, Carr
was released from segregation only by announcinga hunger strike. Thereafter, Carr had
difficulty in recovering all of his personal property and met with frustration seeking
redress through the institutional grievance procedure.

As the events giving rise to the complaint transpired in July 1998, this action
appears to be barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions

arising in Illinois Although limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, the district

' As Carr has neither available funds nor income to pay an initial partial filing fee
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), the initial filing fee is waived. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The trust fund officer at the correctional facility where Carr
is confined shall collect monthly payments from Carr's trust fund account in an
amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the account and
forward monthly payments, identifying Carr's name and the case number of this
action, to the Clerk, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, IL
60604, attn: Fiscal Dept., each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the
full $150 filing fee is paid.

? While § 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations, a federal court
must adopt the forum state's limitations period for personal injury claims. Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). The limitations period for § 1983 actions arising
in Illinois is two years as set forth in 735 ILCS § 5/13-202. Henderson v. Bolanda,
253 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 2001).

-2-


aeeeeso RE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2p S,
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS O, Ge
EASTERN DIVISION 2,

%
WILLIAM CARR, #475014, )
)
_ )
Plaintiff, )
)

vs. § 01 C 5203
)
LEORA HARRY, et al., J
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:

Plaintiff William Carr (“Carr”), a prisoner in the custody of the Ilinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC) at Menard Correctional Center, filed this pro se
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number of IDOC employees at Stateville
Correctional Center, where Carr was formerly housed. The court initially denied Carr's
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, as it appeared from Carr's
representations in his complaint that he had brought three prior federal suits that had
been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g). When Carr did not prepay the filing fee, this action was dismissed.
Carr then filed both a notice of appeal and a motion to reconsider. After obtaining court
records that showed that Carr had incurred only two dismissals rather than three, this

court indicated that it would grant Carr's motion to reconsider. The Court of Appeals

q


Oo lh la ais a as

ie ie encom cee eS UR

neglected for perhaps forty hours, including one eight-hour shift in which he made no
attempt to seek help. While Carr should have received his medication sooner,
defendants’ response was not “woefully inadequate.” The neglect Carr alleges did not
amount to wanton infliction of pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Counts XII-XIII

Earlier that Saturday, a hot July day, defendant Harris had been passing out ice
to the segregation inmates, but Carr had no container to hold ice. Harris did not get
Carr a container for ice. Carr also complains that on Saturday he was unable to use his
depilatory to shave because he hadn’t received his personal property, and he couldn’t
shave with a razor because it irritates his skin. Asa result he had to cope with “chronic
itching from newly grown facial hair.” The following Wednesday, Carr could not

shower because he did not have shower shoes to protect him from acquiring a fungus

infection or from slipping and falling on the wet floor. These minor, temporary

incidents of discomfort do not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
Counts XIV-XV

Carr alleges that he passed a note to defendant DelPriore, a casework supervisor,
complaining that Lohiser had taken him to segregation in retaliation for complaining to
Griffin that Lohiser had deprived bim ofhis law library time, and that the following day
Carr made the same complaint to an unnamed correctional counselor. Neither did
anything about it. But as Carr’s confinement in segregation was not a constitutional
violation, their failure to remedy it-assuming it was within their power to do so-did not

violate the Constitution, either.

-12-


ia.

a

While persons acting under color of state law may not deprive inmates of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, the state is not required to provide an internal procedure
to redress such deprivations, and the failure of state officials to follow procedures
prescribed by state law and regulations is not a separate infringement of Carr’s
constitutional rights.

Carr’s allegations that defendants conspired and falsified documents in order to
obstruct and delay his exhaustion ofadministrative remedies would be relevant in the
event that defendants sought to bar another, substantive, claim on the ground that Carr
had not exhausted available administrative remedies. Because Carr has not alleged a
substantive claim it is unnecessary to consider these allegations further.

CONCLUSION

Taking Carr’s allegations as true, it appears that IDOC rules were violated or
ignored and Carr suffered injusticeand discomfort as a result. Nevertheless, Carr has
a claim in federal court only if his treatment violated the Constitution, and the court
finds it did not. This suit is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge

Dated: __ December 20, 2001

-15-