alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Mohammed Z. Islam, Appellant, v Apjeet Singh Makkar, et al., Respondents.

[944 NYS2d 897]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Agate, J.), entered May 13, 2011, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

*1278The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that as a result of the subject accident, he sustained injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine, as well as his right knee and right shoulder. The defendants provided competent medical evidence establishing, inter alia, prima facie, that those alleged injuries did not constitute a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Cantave v Gelle,*60 AD3d 988 [2009]; *Morris v Edmond,*48 AD3d 432 [2008]; *Rodriguez v Huerfano, 46*AD3d 794, 795 [2007]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for a cessation of his medical treatment, rendering his treating physicians’ conclusions regarding causation speculative *(see Pommells v Perez, 4*NY3d 566, 574 [2005]; *Hall v Hecht,*92 AD3d 721 [2012]), and, thus, failed to raise a triable issue of fact. In addition, the plaintiff testified at his deposition that he returned to work as a cab driver two weeks after the accident, which, under the circumstances, demonstrated that his injuries did not prevent him from performing substantially all of the material acts constituting his usual and customary daily activities during at least 90 out of the first 180 days following the accident *(see Cantave v Gelle,*60 AD3d at 989; *Scott v Hing Chee Leung,*287 AD2d 612 [2001]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.E, Balkin, Belen and Austin, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 4.1


 


See Transfer Restrictions on Reverse Side


 


	No. SPECIMEN	SPECIMEN Shares


 


PASITHEA THERAPEUTICS CORP.


 


Incorporated Under the Laws of the State of Delaware


 


Common Stock, $0.0001 Par Value Per Share, Cusip
No. 70261F 103


 


THIS CERTIFIES THAT **Specimen** is
the owner of **SPECIMEN (SPECIMEN)** fully paid and nonassessable shares of Common Stock, $0.0001 Par Value Per Share,
of Pasithea Therapeutics Corp. transferable on the books of the Corporation by the holder in person or by duly authorized attorney upon
surrender of this certificate properly endorsed. This certificate and the shares represented hereby are issued and shall be subject to
all of the provisions of the Certificate of Incorporation and amendments thereto filed or to be filed or recorded in the office of the
Secretary of the State of Delaware and to the provisions of the By-Laws of the Corporation as now or hereafter amended.


 


WITNESS the signatures of the duly authorized officers
of Pasithea Therapeutics Corp.


 


Dated: _____________


 


	 	 	 
	Chief Executive Officer	 	Secretary


 






    A-1


     


    

 


THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED, OR ANY STATE SECURITIES LAWS. THEY MAY NOT BE SOLD, OFFERED FOR SALE, PLEDGED OR HYPOTHECATED
IN THE ABSENCE OF A REGISTRATION STATEMENT IN EFFECT WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITIES UNDER SUCH ACT OR AN OPINION OF COUNSEL SATISFACTORY
TO THE COMPANY THAT SUCH REGISTRATION IS NOT REQUIRED OR UNLESS SOLD PURSUANT TO RULE 144 OF SUCH ACT.


 


For value received, __________________________ hereby sells, assigns
and transfers unto __________________


 


(PLEASE INSERT SOCIAL SECURITY OR OTHER IDENTIFYING
NUMBER(S) OF ASSIGNEE(S))


	 
	(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPEWRITE NAME AND ADDRESS, INCLUDING ZIP CODE, OF ASSIGNEE)
	 
	 
	 


 


Shares represented by the
within Certificate, and does hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint Attorney to transfer the said shares on the books of the within
named Company with full power of substitution in the premises.


 


	Dated	 	 	 


 


	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	Shareholder
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	NOTICE: THE SIGNATURE(S) TO THIS ASSIGNMENT MUST CORRESPOND WITH THE NAME AS WRITTEN UPON THE FACE OF THE CERTIFICATE IN EVERY PARTICULAR, WITHOUT ALTERATION OR ENLARGEMENT OR ANY CHANGE WHATEVER.
	 	 	 	 
	Signature(s) Guaranteed: 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	By:	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 


THE SIGNATURE(S) MUST BE GUARANTEED BY AN ELIGIBLE
GUARANTOR INSTITUTION (BANKS, STOCKBROKERS, SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS AND CREDIT UNIONS WITH MEMBERSHIP IN AN APPROVED SIGNATURE GUARANTEE
MEDALLION PROGRAM, PURSUANT TO S.E.C. RULE 17Ad-15 OR ANY SUCCESSOR RULE).
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 20, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-41794

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JESUS JORGE MELHAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-97-CR-106-2

--------------------

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges 

PER CURIAM:*

Jesus Jorge Melhan’s supervised release was revoked, and he

appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss the revocation

petition. Melhan argues that the almost five-year delay in

executing the violator’s warrant violated his Sixth Amendment

right to a speedy trial.

The Sixth Amendment provides an accused the right to a

speedy trial “[i]n all criminal prosecutions[.]” The revocation

of supervised release is not a criminal proceeding. United
No. 02-41794

-2-

States v. Marmolejo, 915 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus,

“the execution of a warrant for violation of supervised release

is not subject to the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial

requirement.” United States v. Tippens, 39 F.3d 88, 89-90 (5th

Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED.
#### Claire Reed et al., Respondents, v Frederick Friedman, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

—In a medical malpractice action, defendant Frederick Friedman appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ramirez, J.), dated September 6, 1984, which denied his motion to dismiss the complaint as against him pursuant to CPLR 3216 for want of prosecution and granted plaintiffs’ cross motion pursuant to CPLR 2005 excusing their delay in filing a note of issue.

Order reversed, on the law, with costs, motion granted, cross motion denied, and complaint dismissed as against appellant.

Plaintiffs’ failure to submit an affidavit of merit by a medical expert competent to attest to the meritorious nature of their claim requires unconditional dismissal of the complaint *(see, Salch v Paratore, 60*NY2d 851; *Canter v Mulnick,*60 NY2d 689; *Stolowitz v Mount Sinai Hosp.,*60 NY2d 685; *Vernon v Nassau County Med. Center,*102 AD2d 852). The affidavit of plaintiff Claire Reed with the supporting exhibits is not sufficient to establish that the defendant doctor committed malpractice *(see, Gilligan v Miller,*99 AD2d 767). In any event, in this case, where the alleged malpractice occurred almost 11 years ago, the illness of plaintiffs’ attorney, which was proffered as an excuse for plaintiffs’ failure to comply *662with the 90-day notice served pursuant to CPLR 3216, is not sufficient because the delay in issue occurred after the period of recuperation from the illness suffered by plaintiffs’ attorney *(cf. Berman v Brunswick Hosp. Center,*94 AD2d 736). Mollen, P. J., Gibbons, Thompson and Brown, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Catherine Opray, Respondent, v Patrick Fitzharris, Appellant.

[944 NYS2d 263] —

In a child custody proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Lechtrecker, Ct. Atty. Ref.), dated December 21, 2010, as, after a hearing, in effect, awarded custody of the subject children to the mother.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

“In adjudicating custody and visitation rights, the most important factor to be considered is the best interests of the child” *(Matter of Awan v Awan,*63 AD3d 733, 734 [2009]; *see Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982]). “Factors to be considered in determining those best interests include the parental guidance provided by the custodial parent, each parent’s ability to provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual development, each parent’s ability to provide for the child financially, the relative fitness of each parent, and the effect an award of custody to one parent might have on the child’s relationship with the other parent” *(Matter of Berrouet v Greaves,*35 AD3d 460, 461 [2006]; *see Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d at 172-173; *Matter of Carrasquillo v Cora,*60 AD3d 852, 853 [2009]). Stability and the child’s desires are also relevant considerations *(see Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer,*55 NY2d 89, 94 [1982]). “Since custody determinations depend to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, the findings of the Family Court will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” *(Matter of Conforti v Conforti,*46 AD3d 877, 877-878 [2007]).

“[S]hared responsibility for and control of the child’s upbringing is not properly ordered where, as here, the parents have evidenced an inability to cooperate on matters concerning the child” *(Bliss v Ach,*56 NY2d 995, 998 [1982]; *see Braiman v Braiman,*44 NY2d 584 [1978]). Here, contrary to the father’s contention, the Family Court’s determination that an award of sole legal custody to the mother was in the best interests of the children had a sound and substantial basis in the record *(see Matter of Nell v Nell,*87 AD3d 541, 542 [2011]; *Matter of Gorniok v Zeledon-Mussio,*82 AD3d 767, 768 [2011]; *Matter of O’Connell v McDermott,*80 AD3d 701, 701-702 [2011]).

*1021The father’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Skelos, J.E, Balkin, Leventhal and Austin, JJ., concur.
#### EMANUEL HAHN V. THE UNITED STATES.

(107 U. S. B., on appeal from 14 C. Cls. R., 305.)

A person was surveyor of customs at the port of Troy, N. Y., a port of delivery and not a port of entry, in the collection district of the city of New York, from June 13, 1872, to May, 1876.

At various times during, the period from June 13, 1872, to June 22, 1874, there was a surveyor of customs at the port of New York, which was a port of entry, and surveyors of customs at two other ports, which were ports of delivery and not ports of entry, all of said ports being in said collection district. .

In accordance with the uniform practice of the Treasury Department, under ‘ section 1 of the *'Act of March*2, 1867, ch. 188 (14 Stat. L., 546), the'Secretary of the Treasury distributed to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor at the port of New York, as such officers, and not as informers or seizing officers, one-fourth part of the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred at the port of New York between June 13,1872, and June 22, 1874, and paid no part thereof to the surveyor at Troy.

He sued the United States in the Court of Claims in May, 1877, claiming to share equally with the collector and the naval officer at tlifc port of New York, and all the surveyors in the district, in said one-fourth, under the provisions of section 1 of said act.

Said provisions had been repealed by section 2 of the *Act of June*22,1874, ch. 391 (18 Stat. L., 186), and Congress had not interfered with such construction while the act was in force, and the claimant had raised no question in regard to such construction until March, 1874, and had been informed by the Treasury Department, in June, 1874, that it adhered to such construction, and he had not complained again until March, 1877, but had permitted moneys to be distributed under such construction until he sued.

*760The Court of Claims held that as such construction did not appear unreasonable, and might well have been reached in the exercise of a sound judgment, all the circumstances of the ¡case were such, regarding the statute as ambiguous, as to justify the application of the principle of interpretation, that the, contemporaneous construction of those who had been called upon to carry the law into eifect was entitled to great respect, and it refused to interfere with such construction, and the claimant’s petition was dismissed.

Held by the Supreme Court:

This court, being satisfied with the decision or the Court of Claims, and with the grounds above stated as assigned by it therefor, affirm the judgment of the court below.

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Blatchford.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett M cKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse

 Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street

 Chicago, Illinois 60604

Office of the Clerk

Phone: (312) 435-5850

www.ca7.uscourts.gov

FINAL JUDGMENT

November 10, 2009

BEFORE:

 MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

 DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

 JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No.: 07-2651 

DIANE BOND, 

Plaintiff

v.

EDWIN UTRERAS, ANDREW SCHOEFF, CHRIST SAVICKAS, ROBERT

STEFMILLER, and JOSEPH SEINITZ, in their individual capacities;

PHILLIP CLINE, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department,

TERRY HILLARD, Former Superintendent of the Chicago Police

Department, and LORI LIGHTFOOT, Former Chief Administrator of the

Office of Professional Standards, in their official capacities; and 

CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendants - Appellants

v.

JAMIE KALVEN, 

Intervenor - Appellee

and

TONI PRECKWINKLE, et al.,

Intervening Appellees

Originating Case Information:

District Court No: 1:04-cv-02617

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

District Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow 

The district court’s order granting Kalven’s petition to intervene and lifting the protective

order is VACATED and the case is REMANDED with instructions to dismiss the petition

for lack of standing. Because the aldermen also lack standing, this court’s prior order

granting their motion to intervene in this appeal is VACATED, the motion is now DENIED

and the aldermen are DISMISSED from the appeal. The above is in accordance with the

decision of this court entered on this date. Each side is to bear its own costs.

Case: 1:04-cv-02617 Document #: 322 Filed: 03/01/10 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:3402 Case: 07-2651 Document: 00711338782 Filed: 03/01/2010 Pages: 1 Case: 07-2651 Document: 68 Filed: 11/10/2009 Pages: 1
#### In the Matter of Phyllis Nuchman, Appellant, v Joel I. Klein, Chancellor, New York City Department of Education, et al., Respondents.

[946 NYS2d 113]—

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Cynthia S. Kern, J.), entered March 14, 2011, which, among other things, denied the petition seeking to vacate a posthearing arbitration award, dated August 2, 2010, finding petitioner guilty of various specifications and imposing a penalty of four months’ suspension of petitioner’s employment as a New York City schoolteacher without pay and benefits, and dismissed the proceeding brought pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a (5) and CPLR 7511, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The arbitration award was made in accord with due process, and was not arbitrary and capricious, irrational, or lacking in evidentiary support *(see City School Dist. of the City of N.Y. v McGraham,*17 NY3d 917, 919 [2011]). Even if respondent Department of Education had failed to comply with the time requirements set forth in article 21 (C) (3) of the collective *646bargaining agreement, dismissal of the disciplinary charges against petitioner was not required. Indeed, article 21 (C) (3) merely provides for the removal of a contested writing from an employee’s personnel file or record in the event the procedural requirements of the article are not followed, and does not preclude the filing of formal disciplinary charges pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a (see *e.g. Hazen v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y.,*75 AD3d 471 [2010], *affd*17 NY3d 728 [2011]).

To the extent that the record permits review, the hearing officer carefully considered all of the evidence, and its credibility findings in favor of respondents’ witnesses are entitled to deference *(see Matter of Douglas v New York City Bd./Dept. of Educ.,*87 AD3d 856, 857 [2011]).

The penalty imposed does not shock our sense of fairness *(see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County,*34 NY2d 222, 233 [1974]). Concur — Saxe, J.P., Sweeny, Acosta and Freedman, JJ. [Prior Case History: 2011 NY Slip Op 30694(U).]
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###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:*                         Center for Scientific Review Special Emphasis Panel; AREA/REAP: Cardiovascular and Respiratory Sciences.                    

*Date:*                         August 30, 2021.                    

*Time:*                         1:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate grant applications.                    

*Place:*                         National Institutes of Health, Rockledge II, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual Meeting).                    

*Contact Person:*                         Xiang-Ning Li, MD, Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, Center for Scientific Review, National Institutes of Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5112, MSC 7854, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301-435-1744,                         *lixiang@csr.nih.gov.*

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.306, Comparative Medicine; 93.333, Clinical Research, 93.306, 93.333, 93.337, 93.393-93.396, 93.837-93.844, 93.846-93.878, 93.892, 93.893, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: July 29, 2021.

Melanie J. Pantoja,

Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2021-16509 Filed 8-2-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Silverleaf Resorts, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2002 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Harry J. White, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.


Dated: November 25, 2002                            /s/ HARRY J. WHITE, JR.
                                                 -------------------------------
                                                       Harry J. White, Jr.
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#### GASS, Respondent, v. ASTORIA VENEER MILLS, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 11, 1907.)

Action by John H. Gass against the Astoria Veneer Mills.

No opinion. Motion to-resettle order granted, without costs.