Affirmed and En Banc Majority Opinion and En Banc Dissenting O pinion s

filed May 18 , 202 3.

In The



## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 18

- 00967

- CV

WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC. AND SHIRAZ A. ALI , Appellant s
V.
JENNIFER BLA KE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS N E XT F RIEND FOR NATHAN BLAKE, A ND AS HEIR OF THE ESTATE OF ZAC K ERY BLAKE, DECEASED; AND ELDRIDGE MOAK, IN HIS CAPACITY AS GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE OF BRIAN N A BLAKE , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 127th District Court

Harris County, Tex as Trial Court Cause No. 2 015

- 36666



### E N B A N C D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N

A trucki ng company and its employee appeal the trial court ’ s $ 11 6 m illion judgme nt awarding personal

- injury damages to passengers in a p ickup truck
involved in a collision with a tract or

- trailer o w n ed by the c ompany and drive n by
its employe e

. This court should (1) adopt the “ A dmission Rule
, ” under which a n employer ’s admission that an employee was a ct i ng in the cour s e and sc ope of his2

employment when the employ ee allegedl y engaged in negligen t co n duct bar s a party allegedly injured by the employ ee ’s negligence from pursuing derivative
theorie s of negligence against the em ployer , subject to a n exemplary

- damage exception ; (2) c onclude that t he trial court erred in denying the employer ’ s motion
for d irect ed verdict a s t o all d erivative theorie s against it because t he em p loyer
admi tted that its employee w a s acti ng in the course and sc ope of his employment
and because the trial evidence was l e gally insufficient to support the plaintiffs ’

gross

- neg ligenc e all egation ; (3) rev e rse the trial court ’s judgment
, ( 4 ) render j udgment that the plaintiffs take nothing as to al l of their deriv ative the or ies of negligence against the employer , and ( 5 ) reman d the case to the t rial court for a
new trial. Instead, the e n ban c majority affirms the trial court ’ s judgment
, issuing

an opinion in which the en ban c majority erroneousl y concludes that even i f this

co urt chose to adopt the Admission Rule
, the p laintiff s in today ’ s case would fall
within the exempl ary

- damage exce ption to th is ru le because they pleaded gross negligence
, even tho ugh the evidence was legally insufficient to support a gross

neg ligence fin ding

. Therefore, I re spectfully dissent.

I. T HE W ERN ER P ART IES ’ F IRST I SSUE

In th e trial court bel ow, a ppelle es/plai ntiff s Jennifer Blake
, I ndividuall y and

a s N ext Fr iend for Natha n Blake , and as H e i r of th e E state of Zackery B lake,
De cease d, and Eldridge Moak, in his capacity as G uardi an of the Estat e of Bria nna Blake (collectiv ely th e “ Blake Parties ” ) sued a ppellant s / defen dant s S h iraz A. A l i
and Werner Enterpr i ses, Inc. (collectivel y the “ We rner Parties ” )

. In their liv e pleading, t h e Bla ke Parties asserted negligence cla im s again st Al i, alleging that Ali

en ga ge d in various act s o r omis sions that constituted n egligen ce

. The Bl ake Par ties
also a s serted negligence claim s against Werner

. In additi on to asserting that
Werner was vicarious ly li able for Ali ’ s neg ligen ce under th e doctrine o f respondeat3

superi or, the Blake Parties asserted various derivative theories of negl ige n ce

a ga i nst Werner. T he Blake P a rties alleged that Werner, in th e oper ati on and
maintenance of its vehicles and in it s hir ing, training, supervising, and directing of
i ts employees and ag ents, ow ed a duty to the m an d the public at la r ge to m ak e us e of Wern er ’ s property and carry o u t Werner ’ s operations in a reasona bly pr udent manner, using ordinary care , ski ll, and expe rtise as would an ordinarily prudent

comm ercial motor c arrier und er the same or simila r circumstanc e s , so as not t o

c a use f or es eeab le an d un re aso nable ri sks of harm t o others. The Blake Parties

assert ed th at Werner engaged in numerous acts or o mission s con stit uting negligence, i ncluding the follo wing:

• failing to adequat ely train Ali o n how to operat e an eighteen

- wheeler b y fai li ng to take vari ou s a ctions
,

• failing to a d equatel y superv ise Ali while he was operatin g Werner ’ s commercial motor vehicl e ,

• ass ig nin g and disp atching A l i, who d i d not h av e t he tr ai nin g and experien ce to opera t e a commercial motor vehicle safely under wi nter

- drivi ng condit ions, to operate a commercial motor vehicle as part of a driver tea m on
a “ Just in Time ” run, which Wern er knew o r s hould have known would requi r e A l i t o ope rate th e Wer ner tract or

- trailer wi thout super v ision ( because hi s trainer, Ackerman
, would ha ve to be s le ep ing most of the time Ali was driving ) through a large part of west Texas where freezing rain , ice accumulat ion
, an d e x t remely ha z ard ous driving con d it ion s we re predic t ed,

c reating an u nreasonably dangerous situati on that posed an extreme risk of seri ous in jur y or death to others
,

• failing to monitor the weather and road conditions on Int erstate 20 af ter Ali and Ackerm an se t out on t he r un from Dallas to Ke tt le m an City,

• fail ing to advis e Ali of th e extremely hazard ous road and w eather conditio ns in wh ich he wa s dri ving,

• failing to instruct Ali to take Intersta te 4 0 rather than Interstate 20 due to the hazardous road a nd we ather cond itions predicted f o r and e xi sti ng on I nters tate 20,

• fa iling to in s truct Ali t o slow to a cr awl and exit the road way as s oon as it4

was safe to do so upon encounter in g the icy road conditions
, and

• prohibiting Ali from m onit oring the C B ra d io and O utside Air Te mp erature gauge fo r r oad a n d weather c ondit ions

. Th e Blake Parties a lso a lleg ed that W erner ’ s c ond uct consti tuted gross n eglig ence th at was a proxim ate c ause of the occurrence in question
, result ing in damages to
Jennifer Blake and her three children
, Nathan, Brianna , and Zackery (c olle ct i ve ly
the “ Blakes ” )

. Th e Blake Par ties sought a ctual damages agai n st Al i an d W er ner , as well a s exe m

plary damages against We rner. During tri al Werner stipulat ed that Ali was a cting in the cour se and scope of his employment at Werner. After the close of al l the ev id ence , the tr ial court
denied various m o tions for di rected verdict a sserted by th e W erner Parties,
includ ing a motion for direc ted verdict as to the d erivative

- l iability th eories of

rec ove ry against Werner on the gr o unds th at Werne r admitted Ali w a s act in g in th e

cour s e and s cop e of his employm e nt at Werner and there wa s no evidence that
Werne r was grossly negligen t.
Th e jury a nsw er ed ye s to each of th e four liability que stions. In response to Quest ion 5, the jury found the following perce n t age s of respon sibi lity: 70% for Werner acting through its e mp loyees other than Ali , 14% for A li, an d 16% for
Salinas. Bec ause the jury did not unani m ously answer “ yes ” to any of the first three questions, the jury did not answer any of the q uestion s regarding gross negl igen ce and exe mplar y damages. The tria l court rendered a final judgment
based o n the jury ’ s liabil ity and damage findings and base d on the perce n t age s of responsibility found by the jury i n response to Quest ion 5

. The amounts of actual
da mag es plus prejudg ment interest awarded in the trial court ’ s ju d gment against
Werner t otal approx imate l y $9 2 mi llion. After adding post

- judgment interest , the

t otal amount of the judgment against Werner currently exceed s $ 11 6 mil lion. On appe al th is case was submitted to a thr ee

- ju stice panel with oral5

argument on Oc to ber 23, 201 9. M o r e than t w enty mo nths l ater in July 2021, f i ve justices o n this court vo ted sua sponte to order e n banc consideration in the fir st i nstance , without the issuance of a ny panel opinio ns , even tho ugh the panel h ad

g ener ated a ma

jority opinio n and a dissenting opinion, each of which st oo d ready
to be issued

. S ee Werner Enterprises v. Blak e , N o. 14

- 18

- 00967

- CV, 2021 WL 3164005, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Jul. 27, 2021 ) ( published en banc order)

. T he en b anc majority did not g iv e any r eason s for u sing this exceedingly

rare p r oced ur e at such a la te s ta ge of the procee dings. See id

. Th e court granted the parties leave to suppleme nt their appellate brie fing before this case was submi tted
to the en banc court on October 28, 2021

. By a 5

- to

- 4 vote, the en banc court
ordered this s ubmis sion to be with out oral argume nt , denying without explanation
the Werner Parties ’ r equ est for oral argument to the en banc court. In i ts opinion today, the en banc majorit y continu es to m aint ain its silence as to wh y the court went directly to e n ban c cons id eration without oral argument and without allow ing the pan el opinions to issue. I d is agree with the en banc major ity that the en banc
cri ter ia are satisfied, but even pres uming that t he en banc criteria are satis fied, th e en banc majority has not ex plain ed why it did not let the panel opinions issue and then grant en banc recon sideration, which has been th e s tandard practice of th is

court i n such situations. I disse nt e d to the gra nt of en banc consi deration in the first
instance for the reasons state d in my Dissent to Order and in Chief Justice Christopher ’ s Dissent to Order , which I j oined. S ee Werner Enterprises , 2021 WL 3164005, at *1

– 2 ( Christ opher, C.J., dissent t o order ); id . at * 2

– 15 ( W ilson
, J.,
dissent t o order)

. Under their first appel late i ssue, the Wer ner Parties argue that (1) th e tr ial
evidenc e is legally and factually insu ffi cient to show that A l i owe d an y duty to the
Blakes ; (2) the e v idenc e is legally and fact u all y insuf ficient t o sup port any finding that Ali was negligent at the time of th e occurrenc e in question or on December 30,6

2014 (t he “ Ac cident Date ” ) ; (3 ) the eviden ce is legally and fact ually insufficient to

sup po rt a finding that any neglige nce of Ali proximate l y caused the injuries in question
, the a ccident in q uestion
, or th e occ urrence in question ; and (4) Zaragoza

“ Tr ey ” Salinas
, I II ’ s losing control of his p ickup truck 1 was the sole pro x imate
cause of t he a ccident in q uestion

. I agree with and join Part I of Ch ief Justice Christopher ’ s en banc dissentin g opinion , in wh ich she addresses the se points

. See

ante at 2

– 3 (Christopher, C.J., e n banc dissenting opinion )

. Though I do not agree

w ith the en b anc majority ’ s analy sis of these arguments, I agree that t he argume nts lack me rit and that the f

irst issue s hould be overr ul ed.
II. T HE B LAKE P ARTI E S ’ DE RIVATIVE THEORIE S OF NEGLIGENCE A G AI NST W ERNER FAIL AS A MAT T ER O F LAW UNDER THE A DMISSION R ULE . In t h ei r third issue, the Werner Parties note that the Supreme C ourt of Texas
ha s not yet ruled definitiv ely on the ex istence, e le men ts, a n d scope of neg li genc e theories again st an employ er for t he negligent trai n i n g, ne glig ent supervision
, negligen t hiring, o r n egligent ret ention of an emplo yee, or for related neglige nce theorie s , althou gh intermediate court s of appeals have done so

. See J BS Carriers v. Was hington
, 564 S.W.3d 830 , 842 (Tex. 20 1 8). The Werne r Parti es a ssert that,

eve n pr e su min g suc h th eori es generally are viabl e , the negl igence theories against
Werner based on the acts or omis sions of Werner em ployees other than Ali tha t the
tri al cou rt submitted to the jury in Question 1 or Question 2 ( t h e “ Q u esti on 1 & 2
Theories ”) fa i l as a matt e r o f law for various reasons

. In arg uin g one of these reasons, the Werne r Pa rties assert that th is court shou ld ad opt the r ule that the Q u est i on 1 & 2 Theo ries fai l e d as a matter o f law because Werner admitted a t tri al

t hat Al i was act i ng in th e cour s e a nd sc ope of his em ployment at Wer ner, thus

1 S alinas was driv i ng at a spe ed of 5 0 to 60 miles p er hour while it w as sl eeting w he n Salinas l ost contr o l of h is t r uck due to ice on th e roadway

. Salinas ’s t r uck cros s e d the gra ssy median d ividing t he eastb ound and westbound la nes of I nt er state 20 and ente r ed the westbound lanes.7

subject ing Werner to vicarious liabilit y under the doctrine of resp on deat su per ior
for all damag e s p rox im ately ca u se b y Al i ’ s negl igence. In this opinion the term
“Admissio n Rule ” re fer s t o the following rule : if a n empl o y er admi ts that an employee was a ct i ng in the cour s e and sc ope of his employment when the employ ee allegedly engaged in negligen t c o ndu ct , t hat admis sion bar s a part y allegedly inju red by the employ ee ’s ne g l igenc e fr om pursuing derivative the o rie s of negl ig ence again st the em ployer

. 2
Befo re addressing w h ether this court should ado pt the A dmissio n Rule, it is helpful t o specify some n o men cla tu re for the anal ysis

. Un der the theory of

respo ndeat superior, an emplo y e r is vica riously liable f or the neg l igent a cts o r omiss ions of its e mployee if t he employee ’ s negligent act s o r omiss ions we re within the co urs e and s cope of the employee ’ s em p loy men t. See In eos USA v. Elmgren
, 505 S.W.3d 555
, 565 (Tex. 2016)

. Thus, w hen a n em ployee acts negl igently wi t hin t he cour se and scope of em pl oyment, resp ondeat superior permits a person in

jured by that negligent c onduct to sue the employee ’ s employer
di r e ct ly to r ecover a ll damag es to the injured perso n proxim ately caused by t h e
emp loye e ’ s negligence

. See id

. Vicar iou s

- li ability theories such as re spondeat superior are not the only

means by which an injured party may seek to hold an employer liable for the negl i gen t co n duct of an employee

. Injured parties may also seek this e nd by

ass erting various d erivat ive t heor i es of l iability

. See Nat ’ l Union Fire Ins. Co

. v. Merchant s Fast Moto r Line s , 939 S .W .2d 139, 142 (Tex. 199 7)

. Derivative
th eo ries are like v i ca

rious th eories in that under both theori e s, t h e inju red party
may hold a n employer liabl e for t he negligen t co nduct of an employee

. See Blaine

v. Nat i onal

- Oilwell, L.P. , No. 14

- 09

- 0 0 7 11

- CV, 201 0 W L 4951779 , at * 8

– 9 (Tex.

2 Some cou rt s ref

er to t h i s r u le as the M

cH af f i e Rule
, b as ed o n the S upreme C o urt of Miss o uri ’ s opi nio n in McH

a ffie v. B unch
, 891 S.W .2d 82 2, 8 25

– 27 (Mo. 1995).8

App.

— Houston [14 th Dist. ] Oct. 3 0, 2018
, no pet.)

. Thus, vicarious and derivati v e theo ries are both depend ent o n a finding that t he employee ’ s negligence proximately cause d damage to the injured part y. See id

. But, deriva tive t heor ies are
different because they involve th e additi onal r e q ui remen t that the injure d party
prove s ome type o f neg lige n ce by the emplo yer separate f rom the e mployee ’ s negligence
, which is not requ ire d with vicarious theories like respondeat sup erior.
See id

. Under derivative theor i es like negl igent tr aining, neg l ige nt su pervision
, negligent hiring, and ne g l igent ret ention
, an emplo ye r may be lia ble for t he neglig en t acts o r omi ssions of an employee if the empl oyer engaged in certain negl igent c onduct. 3 S ee id. (neg ligent hiring
, neglig ent train ing, and neglige nt

r ete ntion theories) (mem. op.) ; Verinakis v. M ed ica l Pr ofi l es, Inc. , 98 7 S.W.2d 9 0
, 9 7

– 98 (Tex . App.

— Houst on [1 4t h Dis t.] 1998
, pet. denied) (neg ligent hiring and negligent superv ision t heories)

. B ecause these theo ri es require n egligent conduct by the e mpl o yer , the emp lo yer ’ s liability under th ese t h e ories is not vicarious. S ee Blaine
, 201 0 WL 4951 779 , at * 8

– 9 ; Verin ak is , 987 S.W .2d at 97

– 98

. T hese theories only ope rate to ma ke the employ er liable for an employee ’s negligence
,

an d even if an empl oyer eng age s in negl igent cond u ct under these theories, a n inj ured par ty cannot re cover dama g es against t he em plo ye r if the emplo yee ’ s

ne gligence did not proximat ely cause damage to the injured par ty. See Al ford v. Singleton , No. 14

- 1 7

- 005 04

- CV, 20 18 WL 56 21472, a t * 4

– 5 (Tex. App.

— Houst on [14th Dist.] Oct. 30, 2 018, no p et.) (mem. op.) ; Blaine
, 2 0 1 0 WL 495177 9 , a t * 8

– 9 ; Verinakis
, 9 87 S.W.2 d at 97

– 98

. T here fore, these derivative theori es do not

3 I njured par ti es may a l so use v ic arious theor ies a nd der ivat ive theor i es in an at t em pt to hol d an

em ploy er lia ble for t ort s other t han ne gl i g e nce

. T od ay ’ s case doe s not in v olve s u ch a n attempt , s o thi s op in ion ref

e r s only to th eori es seeki ng to hold an employer li able for an em ploye e ’ s negligence.9

desc ribe an in dependent basis for recover ing aga inst th e employ er

. 4 See Al f ord
, 201 8 WL 5621472, at *4

– 5 ; Blaine , 201 0 W L 495 1779 , at * 8

– 9

. U n de r certain circ umstanc es , a n injured party in an accident involving a n employee ma y have a viabl e negligence claim a gainst the employer without tying
the reco v ery to any negl igent conduc t by the employee. F or example, an emplo yer

m ight have negligence liability independent of an emplo yee/dri v er ’ s negligence if the employer kn ew or should h a ve kn own that one of the em ployer ’ s veh icles ha d
defective brakes , yet t he employer allow ed the empl o yee to d rive the ve hicle in the

course and scope of employ m ent without warn ing the emp l oye e about the
def e cti ve brakes. See F errer v. Okbamicael , 390 P.3 d 836, 8 4 5

– 4 6 (Co lo . 2017)
, sup erseded by statute as stated in
, Brown v. L ong Ro mero , 495 P.3d 955, 95 7 n. 2 (Co . 2021)

. I f the brakes failed an d ca used an accident injuring a third party, it
mi ght be d etermined that the employee did noth ing wrong but tha t the e m ployer ’ s negligence proximately caused the acci d e nt an d th e third party ’ s injuries. See id

. In suc h a s ituation
, even if no negligence of the emp loyee caus ed damage to the injured t hird party , the third party still may reco ver against the em p loyer for the damag es caused by the e mploy er ’ s independent negligence

. See i d

. Such
i ndependent theorie s are a t h ird categor y of theorie s under which an injured party

m ay seek to hold an employer l iable

. Sometim es courts or part ies may refer t o derivative theories and indep endent theories c ol lect ively a s “direct theories
, ” in

con tra s t to vicarious theories. T his opi n ion refe r s to each of the th ree cat e g ories separately: vi carious, derivative, or independent

. A n employer ’ s admiss ion that an empl oyee was act i ng in the cour se and

sc ope o f his emplo y ment when the employ ee alleg edly enga ged in negligen t conduct const i tut e s an admi ssion that under the doct ri ne of respondeat supe rior
, the

4 For this reas on, the b e tt er c ourse i s no t t o call the se t he o r ie s “ i nd e p e nde nt theories ” or

“ ind e penden t c lai ms

. ”10

e mp lo yer is vica riously liabl e for the damages p roxim ate ly cause d by the employee ’ s negligence

. See Ineo s U SA , 5 05 S.W.3d at 565

. E ven if a negl igent
driver is a n employee acting outsi d e t he co urse and scope of employment, the employer may n evertheless be liable under one of the derivative theories

. See
G r een v. R ansor, Inc., 175 S.W.3d 513, 518

– 19 (Tex

. A pp.

— Fort Worth 2005, no pet. )

. Simil ar ly, an “ e mploy er ” who hires an indepen d ent c o ntr actor may be liable
for physical harm caused by the c ontractor ’ s tortious conduct if the pla intiff proves
that the “ emp loyer ” n egligently hired the contractor. See V er i na kis
, 987 S.W.2d at
97

– 98 ; Mi reles v. A shley, 20 1 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. App.

— A maril l o 2 006, no pet.)

. But, derivative theories are dependent on the employ ee ’ s negligence, so

u nder any of the derivat ive theo ries, th e injured party must still p rove neglige n ce

on the p a rt of the employee or contra ctor. Se e B laine , 2010 WL 495 177 9 at * 9.
A

. T h i s co urt should adopt t he Admis s i on Rule

. The par ties have no t cited and re s earch has not revealed a c ase fr om the Supr eme Cour t of Texas or t his court in whi c h the court deci des whether to apply
the Admission Rule. In JBS Carriers , the Supreme Co urt o f Te xas d isposed of the

case w ithout hav ing to address pe titioners ’ a r g ument bas ed on t he Admission Rule

. Se e J BS C arrie rs, I n c. , 5 64 S .W.3d at 841, 843

. In Adams Leasing Company v. K nighton
, this court concluded that as to the third and fourth issues
, ap p e lla nts h ad failed to p reserve error in the ir motion for new trial, a s require d by the procedural

r ules t hen in eff

ect

. See 456 S.W

. 2d 574, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 19 70, no writ ). B ecause of this failure t o preserve error, the Adams L easin g

co urt s tated that “ Points of error numbers 3 and 4 are not properl y b efore thi s Court
for consideration and b oth are over ruled

. ” Afte r overru ling the is sues based on
fai lure to pres erve error, the court made a statement r e lating to t he four th issue
, wi th o ut citin g any authority. See id

. (stating
, “ Nor may a de fendant cha r ge d with

gr oss negligence in the ent rustme nt o f a vehi cle prec lude proof thereof by11

s tipulating agency on the part of the person to whom such vehicle is entrusted

. ” )

. Because the fou r th i s sue was not before th is court due to failure to preserv e error, thi s g r atuit ous statement in Adams Leasi n g was not necessa ry to th e determination
of the c ase and was an obiter dictu m

. See Air Routing Intern. v. Britannia Airways,
Ltd. , 1 50 S.W.3d 682 , 692

– 93 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (h o ld ing that statement regarding the m e rits in p rior cas e was an o biter d ict um because the cour t had found that the objection was w aived and therefore the prior
case did n ot aff

ect the appl icable leg al st a nda rd ). An ob i ter dict um is not binding

a nd has no p r ec edential value. See Seger v. Yorks h ire Ins. Co. , 503 S .W.3d 388,
399

– 400 (Tex. 2016) ; Air Routing Intern. , 1 50 S.W.3d at 692

– 93

. T hus, w hether
this court should ado pt the Admission R ule is a n iss ue of app are nt f i rst i mpre s s i on in th i s court that t he en banc majority should addre ss

. 1

. T h e De velopment o

f the A d mission Rule Maryland ’ s highest court first articu lated th e Admis sion R ule in Houlihan v.
McCall

. See 78 A.2d 6 61 , 664

– 6 5 ( Md. 1 951)

. In t ha t ca s e, p l aintiffs who w ere in j u re d in a traf

fi c accident s ued bo th the tr uck driver i nvol ved an d t he driver’s employer , seeking liabi lity against t h e employer based on respo ndeat supe rior, negligent hiring , and negligent reten tion. I d

. at 66 4

. Bef

ore tri al , the employ er adm itted an agency relat ions hip wi th the truck driver
, u nder which the e mployer was vicariously l iable for the t ruck drive r ’ s negligence

. Id

. T he tria l cour t admitte d
evide n ce of th e dr iv er ’ s dr i ving record at trial, and th e jury ul timately fou nd for the plai ntiffs. Id

. a t 664

– 65

. Maryland’s highest court rev ersed
, reason ing that b ecause the employ er admitte d the driver was its agent, “ it was q uite u nnecessar y to pu r sue the a l te rn at i ve t h eor y [of neg l i gen t hi r ing or retent io n ] in order to hol d the

cor porate defen dant [li ab le]. ” Id

. at 665 . The court concluded the trial court erred
b y admit ting the d river’s record because where agency i s admi tted, an employe e ’s
drivin g r ecor d “ ca n s erv e no pu rp ose exc e p t to inflame t he jury. ” Id

. at 666

.12

Three years after Houlihan
, the Supreme Cour t of California appli ed the

sam e rationale to a negligent

- entrustmen t theo ry in Arm enta v. Churc hill

. S ee 2 67
P. 2d 303 , 308

– 0 9 ( Cal. 1 9 5 4)

. Th ere, a ro adside worke r was killed wh en a dump

t ruck bac ke d over him. Id

. at 305 . The dece dent’s fam ily sued the truck driver for neglige nce an d his emp loyer f o r neglige n t entr us t me nt. Id

. at 3 08 . The employer
ad mitt ed t ha t the driver was acting in the c ourse of his employment and acknowledged the emplo yer ’ s vicarious lia bility for any tort liability of the driv er

. Id

. T he Arm enta c ourt a ffirme d the tri al court’s excl usio n of e vidence of the driver’s driving hi story. Id

. at 309 . The court reasoned th at neglige nt entrustment represented an alterna tive t heory und er whic h plaintif f s soug ht to im

p os e upo n th e emplo y er the s ame l iability as might be imposed upon the emp loye e

- dr iv er. Id

. Because the employer’ s admission of vi cario us liability remov ed any iss ue of the

e mployer ’ s liability for th e driver ’ s alleg e d neglige n ce , th e A rm e nt a c ourt

co nc l uded t h ere rema ined no material issue as to which evidence of the em p lo yee’s
driv ing history could be legitim ately directed. Id

. at 30 8

– 0 9

. Thus, the Armenta

c o urt concluded that the trial court p roperl y exclude d this e vidence. I d

. Th e m ost f

re qu e ntly c i ted case arti culating th e Admission R ule is McHaffie

v . Bu nch
, a case invo lvin g fact s ironically simila r to t oday ’ s case

. S ee 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo . 1995)

. McHaffi e was a passenger in a vehicle that crossed t he median of

an i n te rsta te hi g hwa y and col li ded wit h a tracto r

- t r ailer. Id

. at 82 4

. McHaff ie’s guardia n br o u gh t ne gl i gence c laims against the driver of the vehicle and the driver
of the tractor

- trailer

. I

d

. T he guardian also ass erted vicario us

- l ia bility th eor ies against th e o wner

- l e ss o r a nd th e op er ator

- le s see of the t r actor

- trailer
, s eeking to
hold ea ch liabl e fo r t h e tracto r

- trailer dr iver’s alleged negligenc e. Id

. The operator

lessee o f the tra ctor

- tr ailer admitted its vicarious l iabili ty for th e dr iver ’s al leged neglige nc e, co nc e di ng t he dri v er wa s actin g in the course and scope of his

emp l oyment a t the time o f the collision

. Id

. The guardian claimed that the operator

-13

les see of th e tractor

- trailer negligent ly hired a nd supervised its driver an d prese n ted

ev id ence th at the o perator

- lessee did not require the dri v er to ha ve adequate experi ence, te s ting, traini ng, a nd medical evalu ations befor e driving its tru cks. Id

. The jur y assessed percentag es of fault as to th e va rio us parties, inclu ding te n
perce nt col l ec tiv ely t o the driver, the owner

- lessor, and th e operato r

- lessee of the

tr actor

- tr a iler based o n the driver’s negligence an d the owner

- lessor’s a nd operator

- lessee’s vica r ious liabi lity, as well as ten perce n t to t he op erator

- lessee
b ased on neglig ent hi r in g. Id

. a t 825 . On appeal, the defendant s ar gue d that it was imprope r to all ow the guardian to pursue both respondeat

- superior a nd ne gligent

h iri ng theories against the o perator

- les see

. Id

. The McHaffie co urt agr ee d and adopted t he Admi s sion R ule as th e “ majo r ity
view

. ” Id

. at 826 . The cour t ob serv ed t hat d eriv ative theorie s such a s neglig ent

e ntrustment and negligent hiring a re forms of im put ed liability, just as res pondeat

sup erior is a form of imputed li abil ity
, because the emp loyer’s duty i s depe n de nt

on a n d derivative of the employee’s cond uct. Id

. T he court reasoned tha t to a l low
mult iple theories for attaching liability to a single party for the negligence of

an other “ serv es no rea l purpose, ” unnec e ss aril y e xp ends the “ energ y and t i m e of

courts an d l itig a nts, ” and risks the introdu ctio n of pot ential ly inflam matory, irre levant evidence into the record. Id

. The McHaffie court also explai ned that once an employer concedes i t is vica riously liable fo r a ny n egl ig ence of its emp loyee,

t he emp lo yer b ec ome s st r ictly liable to the plaintiff f or d amag es att ributable to the empl o yee’s conduct, rega rdless of the percentage of fault as between the e mployer and the employee. Id

. The M cHaffie c ourt noted that po t en tia l ex ce ption s might

e xist to the Adm issio n Ru le, suc h as (1) when the injure d party h as a viable indepe n dent theory of negligen ce against t he employe r , and ( 2) wh en the injured party seeks exe mplary da mages aga inst the e mp l oy er b as ed o n the empl o yer ’ s

c on duct that i s the bas i s of a d erivative theory

. I d

. B ut , the McHaffie court did not14

have to ad dress the existence of any such exception s to the Admission Ru le

. Id

. F ive Texas interm edi ate court s of appeals have a do pte d th e Admission Rule

. See R osell v. Cen t r

al West M

otor Stag es , 89 S.W.3 d 643 , 6 5 4

– 55 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2002, pet. deni ed); E s t a t e o f Arrington v. Fields , 578 S.W.2 d 173, 178

– 79 (Te x. App.

— Tyler 1979, writ ref’d n. r.e .) ; Rodge rs v. McFarland
, 4 0 2 S.W .2d
20 8, 210

– 11 (Tex

. C i v

. A pp.

— El Paso 1 966, wr it ref ’ d n.r .e.); Luvual v. He nke &
Pi l lo t , Divis ion of Kroger Co
., 3 66 S.W.2 d 831, 838 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Houston [1st Dist. ] 196 3 , wr it ref ’ d n.r.e.) ; Patterson v. East Tex. Mo tor Freig ht L i n e s , 349
S.W

. 2 d 634 , 63 6 (Tex. Civ. App

. — Beaum o nt 1961, wri t ref ’ d n.r .e.)

. The parties
have not c ited an d r es e arch has not revealed an opinion in which a Texas court has rejected the Admis sion Rule.
T h e highest courts of various other sta tes have ado pted th e Admission R u le

. See E lrod v. G&R Co nst

. , 628 S. W.2d 17 , 19 (Ar k . 1 982); Armenta , 267 P.2d at
3 09 ; Ferr er , 3 90 P. 3d at 8 41

– 47 ; Wise v. Fi berglass S

y s. , 718 P.2d 1178, 1181

– 82 (Id a ho 1986); Sedam v. 2 JR Pizza E nter s

. , 84 N.E.3d 1 17 4
, 117 7

– 79 (Ind. 2017);
Houlih an , 7 8 A.2d at 665; N e hi Bottl i ng Co . v . Jeff

ers on , 84 S o.2 d 684, 6 86 (Miss

. 195 6) ; McHaffie
, 891 S.W .2d at 8 2 4

– 26; B og danski v. Budzik
, 408 P.3d 1156
, 1161

– 64 (Wyo. 20 1 8 ). Various intermediate a ppel late courts and U nite d Sta t e s Dis trict Cour ts in other state s and the Di strict of Columbia ha ve done t he same. See
Sw ift v. Old Dom ini on Freig ht Lines
, 5 83 F. Sup p.3d 1125, 1134

– 35 ( W .D. Te nn

. J an. 31 , 20 22 ) (applying Tennessee law) ; Gr e ene v. Grams , 38 4 F. Supp. 3 d 1 00,
10 2

– 06 ( D. D.C. 2019) (apply i ng Dis tr ic t o f Co lumbia law) ; C lo oney v. Geet ing , 352 So. 2d 1 216, 12 20 (Fla. Di s t

. Ct. App. 1977) ; Ortiz v

. N.M. S t ate Pol i ce , 814
P.2d 1 17 , 12 0 (N. M. C t. A pp. 1991)

. 5

5 I n fair ne s s, the case s are not unanimous. The highe s t courts in Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky
, South C arolina , and Uta h have no t embraced the Admis sion R ule. See Mc Qu e en v. Green , 202 N.E.3d 268
, 2 77

– 8 0 (Ill

. 2022); Marquis v. St ate F arm F ire & Ca s. , 961 P.2d 1213, 1224

– 2515

At least eight U nite d Stat e s District Cou r t judges have predicted that the Supreme Court of Texas would adopt the Admission Rule if this question were before the high co ur t

. See Bancpass v. Highway Toll Adm in

. , 863 F.3d 391, 401 ( 5 t h Cir. 2017) ( holding that when there is no bin ding precedent fro m the Supre me Court of Te xas on a n issue of Texas law , a f ederal court must make a prediction of how the Supre me Cour t of Texas would res olve t he issue ) ; Graham v . L ewi s , 2023
WL 138923 , at * 2

– 3 ( N .D. Tex. Jan. 9 , 2023) ( predict ing that Supreme Court of
Te xas would adopt the Admission Rule ) ; Or donez v. Ausby
, 2023 WL 310442, at

* 2

– 5 (W.D. Tex. Ja n. 18, 2023) ; Robin son v. M elton Truck Lines
, 2 0 22 W L
1745 2 0 , at * 7 ( W .D

. Tex. J an. 18 , 20 22 ) ; Ochoa v. Mercer Transp. Co.
, 2018 WL 7505640, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Decemb er 12, 2018 ) ; F u l ler v. Wer ner Enter s

. , 2 01 8
WL 3548886 , at * 2

– 3 ( N .D. Tex. July 2 4, 20 1 8) ; S anchez v. Transp

. Inter n. Tamaulip ecos , 2 01 7 WL 3671089 , at * 2

– 3 ( S .D . T ex. J uly 2 0 , 20 1 7 ) ; San c hez v. Swift Tran sp. C

o. , 2016 WL 10587127, at * 4 ( W.D. Tex. Oct. 4 , 2016) ; Will iams v. M cCollis ter , 6 71 F. Supp .2d 884, 888

– 8 9 ( S. D. Tex

. 200 9 )

. 2

. R ationales for the A dmission Rule
D erivative the orie s provid e an altern ate mea ns of recov ery when vicariou s li a bi lity is un ava ilable aga inst an emp loyer beca use the employee w a s not act ing

w ith in the s c ope of his e mpl oyment at the t ime of h i s alleged neglig ence. See
Richard A

. Mincer, The Viability of D irect Neglig e nce Claims Again s t M oto r Car r ie rs in the Face of a n Admission of Respondeat Superi o r , 10 Wyo. L. Rev. 229, 232

– 3 3 & n.9 (201 0)

. But , if t he employer has a d mitt ed that under th e doctrine o f res pondeat

(Kan. 1998); MV Transp

. v. Allgeier
, 433 S.W.3 d 324 , 333

– 37 (Ky. 20 14) ; James v. Kelly Tr ucking Co
., 661 S.E.2d 329, 6 31

– 34 ( S.C. 2008) ; Ramon v. Ne b o Sch

. Di st ., 493 P. 3 d 613
, 61 8

– 21 ( Utah 2021 )

. T he S upreme Court o f Lou isiana r ec e ntly ruled similarly, al though its decision was based on the unique language of t h e Louis iana Civil Cod e and the Lo uisiana Code of Civil Procedure. See M artin v. Thomas
, 34 6 So.3d 238, 241

– 48 (La. 2022).16

superior t he emp loye r is subject to vi carious liabi lity for a ll dama ge s pro xim at el y caused by th e em p lo yee ’ s neglige nce , the derivative t h eor ie s become superfluous.
S ee id . Signi f

ican t ly
, t he de r ivative theo ries only ope r a te to ma ke the employ er liab le f or the damages proxim ately caused by the em ployee ’ s neglig ence , an d even if an em ployer engage s in ne glig e nt cond uct unde r these theories, an injured pa r ty

cannot reco v er damages a gains t t he em plo y er if the em plo yee ’ s n egligen c e did no t proxi mat ely cau se damage to the in jured party. See Alford
, 201 8 WL 5621 472, at
*4

– 5 ; Blaine
, 2 0 1 0 WL 49517 79 , at * 8

– 9 ; V erin a ki s , 987 S.W.2d at 97

– 98

. An

emp l oye r’s neglig ent conduct in h iri ng, train i ng, sup ervisi n g , ret ainin g , or
entrust ing is n ot a the ory wholly ind epe ndent of the plaint iff’s injuries,

unconnec ted to the em ployee’ s negli gence. Se e Alfo rd
, 20 18 WL 5621472, at * 4

– 5 ; Blaine , 20 1 0 WL 4951779 , at * 8

– 9 ; Verinak is , 987 S.W.2d a t 9 7

– 98

. Thu s, th e d erivativ e the orie s ef

fecti vely impute t he emplo yee’s liab ility f or his negligent

co nduct to the employer, in a manner simil ar to vic arious liabili t y. See M c Haff i e , 891 S.W.2d at 825

– 26

. Under ei ther resp ondeat superior or a derivative theory, t he
l iability of the empl oyer is dependent o n the neglige nce o f the empl oyee

. See id. at 82 6

. This is true r egardless of the percentage of fault as between t he employ er and

t he employee. See id. If the emp loyer admits tha t the employee ’s ne gligence is to be imp uted to the emplo yer , there is no nee d to prov e tha t the em ployer i s l ia ble
, and thus any derivative th e ories are duplicative and u nnecessar y. See id. If both
th eor i es p roceed after the employer admits its vicarious liability, a j ury would be
allowed to as sess or apportion a principal’s l iabi l it y twice. See id.
T he pur s u it of both a v ic a rious

- lia bilit y the ory an d a derivati ve theory against a n e mp l oyer after it h as conce ded respondeat

- superior liability for th e damages proxim ately caus ed by th e employee ’ s negligence is also s u perfluous to the pla intiff’s r e cover y; liabi l i ty under t he deri vative th eory will not in c rease the

p lai ntiff’s recovery

. I f an employer admi ts respo ndeat

- s uperior liability, the17

employer becomes liable for one hund red perc e nt of t he da mages attribut able t o the employe e ’s negl igence. Se e Blaine , 201 0 W L 4951779
, at * 8

– 9 ; Verina kis
, 987
S .W.2d a t 97

– 98 ; McHaf fie , 891 S.W.2 d at 826 . The fact that a plaintiff is the

“ ma ster of her c o mplaint ” and may assert mu ltip l e theor ies of a ttachin g liabilit y to

an employ e r fo r the e mployee ’s conduc t doe s not mean t hat a plaint iff shoul d be

perm itt ed t o introdu ce ev ide nce s upporting thos e multiple theories where such
evidence would s erve only to e stablish tha t which is alr eady u n dispu ted: th a t the

e mployer is liable for t h e damages at tributa ble to th e emp loyee ’s neg l igence

. See
Fer rer , 3 90 P.3d a t 8 45

. Tw o o ther re aso ns w e igh hea vily in favor of adopting the Admission Rule. First, e viden ce neces s ary to prove d erivative th eori e s is li kely to be unfa irly preju d icial t o the e m

ployee. Se e H

ouli han , 78 A .2d a t 664

– 65 ( s t atin g that “ w here

age ncy is ad mit te d, [ evidence o f a d river ’s record] can s erve n o purpose except to inflame the jury. ” ) ; Clo oney , 35 2 So.2d at 12 20 ( assert i ng that “ [s] i n c e the [ c o u n t s

a s s e r t i n g derivative theories ] impose no addi tional liabil ity b ut merely a ll ege a concurrent theory of recovery, th e desi rab ilit y of allowing these theories is

o utwei ghed by t he prejudice to the defend an ts ” )

. I n additi o n, there is a dan g er that a jur y wil l asses s the e mployer’s liab ility
twice or a ward duplicat ive d amages to t he pla intiff if it hears e vidence of both a
neg lig ence claim against an employee and d e rivat ive theor y against th e employer.
See Mi nc e r , s upra , 10 Wyo

. L. Rev. at 238; M cHa ff ie , 89 1 S .W.2d a t 82 6

. This is
i ncompatible with t he theory of respond e at

- superio r liabili ty, un der which t h e liabi l ity of the em

plo ye r i s f

ix ed by the employee ’ s liabil i ty , and the plaintiff’s

c om parative fault doe s not differ based on the n umber of def endants. Se e B lain e , 201 0 WL 495 17 79 , at * 8

– 9 ; Veri n akis
, 987 S.W .2d at 9 7

– 98 ; Ferr er , 390 P .3d at
845

. The A d missio n R ule prev ents th e f au lt o f one party from being asse sse d twi ce

an d thereby avo ids a “ plainly il log ical ” result. See F errer , 3 90 P.3d at 8 45 ;18

McHa ffie
, 891 S .W .2d at 827

. T o day ’ s case illus t rates this po int

. W i t hout
consi der ing an y deri v a tive theo r i es , the jury ass essed Sa li nas ’ s p ercentage of responsi bility a t 55% and A li ’ s percenta ge at 45%. When t h e d erivative t heorie s submitt ed under Que stion 1 were added to the jury ’ s consideration, but not the negli gent

- tr a ining and negligent

- super vi s ion theo r i es , the jury se t Sa li nas ’ s
pe rc en tage of responsibility at o n ly 38%, Ali ’ s percentage at 32%, and Werne r

a cting through empl oyees o th er th an Ali at 30%. Und e r thi s a ssignment o f percentages of re s ponsibility, Wer ner ’ s total res ponsibili ty inc re a sed 17%. Fin all y, in the alloc ati o n of r es ponsib ility o n which the tr i al co urt re n dered judgmen t, Salinas ’ s perce nt age of responsibil ity dropp ed to 16%, a nd Wer ne r ’s t otal

r es ponsibility increased to 84%. T hus, the jury ’ s cons i der ation o f all d er ivati v e
t heor i es e f

fectively increa sed W ern er ’ s t o ta l percentage of responsibil it y by 39%, and by pus hi ng Werner ’ s percenta ge over 50% effectiv ely made Wer n er liabl e for
10 0% o f the d am ages recove r able by the Blake P arties , rathe r than t he 45% of the
Blake Parti es ’ damages u n der the percen t ages of re spo ns ib ility set by the jury
witho ut consideri ng any derivat ive theorie s

. See T ex. C iv. Prac. & R em . C o de
Ann. §33.013 (b)

. 3. Comp a ti bil

it y w ith C ivil P r actice a nd Remedi e s Code Cha pte r 33
The Blake Pa rties arg ue tha t Chapter 33 of the Civil Practic e a nd R e m edies
Code p re c lude s applica tion of th e A dm issio n Rule

. Section 33.003 p r o vides as fol lows : ( a) The trie r of fact , as t o each caus e of action asserted, shall det er mi ne the percentage of respo nsibility, st ated in whol e numbers, for the f ollowing p ers ons w it h respect t o e a ch p erson ’ s causing or
c o nt ribut ing to cause in any way t h e harm for wh ich r e covery of da mages is sought , whet h er b y negligent act or omission, by a ny defective or unreasonably dangerous pr oduct, by ot her conduct or activ ity that v iol ates an applicab le le g al s tandard, or by any
c o mb inati on of t hese:19

(1) each c l aimant; ( 2) ea c h defe ndant; (3) e ach se ttling pers on; and (4) each responsible t hi rd party who has been desi gnated under Section 33.0 04

. (b) This section does not all ow a su bmission to th e jur y of a q uestion

re ga r di ng co nduct b y any person witho u t sufficie nt evide n ce to suppor t the sub missio n. Tex

. Civ . Prac . & Rem. Code Ann §33.003 ( We st, West l aw through 20 2 1 C .S.)

. T he Bl ake Parties a ssert that section 33.003 req uir es th at the jury d e te r mine the

per centage of r e sp onsi b ility o f a defendant/ empl o y er such a s W erner , when the

tr ial evide nce ra ises a fact issue as to wh ether the defend an t/ employer by ne gligent

act or omission c aus ed or con tribut ed to cause in any way t he harm fo r which t he pl a inti ffs seek re cove ry of da mages

. See id

. The Blake Par t ies argue tha t the
Admission Ru le co nfli cts wi th secti o n 33 .003 by prev enting the jury f ro m determining a percentage o f responsibil i ty for an e mplo yer such as We rn er based

on the empl oy er ’ s ne g l i ge n t co nduct un der on e or m o re deri vative theorie s. C ourts that have ad d resse d this issue have conc luded that in en a cti n g section 33.033, the Te xas L eg islature did not abrogate the Admissio n Rule or man date that the jury d etermin e a p er cen ta g e of resp onsi b i lity for def endant s wh o a re allege dly
l iable under theo ri e s of vicario u s or d eriv ative li ability

. See Wi lliams
, 67 1
F.S upp.2d at 88 9

– 92 ( a p p l y i n g T e x a s l a w ) ; Conkle v. Chery
, No. 03

- 08

- 00 379

- CV, 2009 WL 4832 26 at *4

– 5 (T e x . Ap p.

— Austi n 20 09, n o p e t. ) ; Rose ll , 89
S.W.3d a t 6 5 6

– 5 7 ; Loom Craft Ca rp et Mills, Inc. v. Gorre ll
, 8 23 S.W.2d 431
, 432 (Tex. App.

—

Texarkana 1992, n o wr it) ; William D . Underwo od & M icha el D.
Mo rrison, Ap

po r ti oning R espo n sibility in C ases I nvolving Cla i ms of Vicarious
De r ivati ve, or St

atutory Liability for Harm Directly Caused b y the Conduct of
Anothe r , 55 Baylor L

. Re v. 617, 634

– 36, 64 2

– 50 (2003) , b u t see Be d ford v. Mo ore ,20

166 S.W. 3 d 454 , 459

– 63 (Tex. App

. — F or t Worth 200 5
, no pet.). If und e r the
Admiss i on Ru le, an emp l oy e r is vic arious ly liable for its emp loyee ’s negligence

an d al l deriv ative theorie s agai nst the e mplo yer are barr ed, section 33 .00 3 d o e s no t mandate that the j ury dete r mine a perce ntage o f r e s p o n sibility fo r the vicariously
l i able e mployer

. See Williams
, 67 1 F.Su pp. 2d at 889

– 92 ; Conkle
, 2009 WL
483226 at *4

– 5 ; Ro se ll , 89 S.W.3d at 65 6

– 5 7 ; Loo m Craft C arpe t Mills, Inc

. , 823
S.W.2d at 432 ; Will iam D. Underwo od & M ich ael D

. Mor rison, s u pr a , 5 5 B ay l o r L. Rev

. at 634

– 36, 64 2

– 50 , bu t see Be d ford v . Mo ore , 166 S. W. 3 d 454 , 4 59

– 63

. I f an employer has a d mi tted respondeat

- s up erior liability for any ne gligence
of i ts employee, the employe r is l ia ble f or t he damages proxim ate ly ca u sed by the

e mployee ’ s ne g l i gence , rega r dless of the compa r ative fault b etwee n the employe e

an d the emplo yer

. See Williams
, 671 F.Supp.2d at 8 9 0 ; C on kl e , 2009 WL 483226
at *4 ; M cHaf f ie , 891 S.W.2d at 826 ; Willi a m D. Underwo od & Mi cha el D

. Morrison, s u

pr a , 55 Baylor L. Rev

. at 634

– 3 6

. Th e majority r u l e f rom o ther s tat es supports th e propos ition that statut es l ike Chapter 33 do not pr ec lude the adop tion or appl ication of the Admis sion Rule

. See , e.g. , Diaz v. Carcamo , 253 P. 3 d 535, 544 ( C al. 2 011) (reaffi rming Arm enta a fte r the adoption of comparative n egl ig enc e

an d stating that “ t he object ive of compar a tive fault is to achieve an equ i table
alloc ation of loss. Th at ob j ecti ve is no t ser v e d b y s u b jec ting the employ er to a

seco n d share of fa ult i n addition to that ass igned to the employee and for which the

emp loyer h as accep ted liability ” ); Fer rer , 390 P.3d at 84 7 ( sta ting that “ we join

o t her court s in concl uding tha t the [Adm i ssion R ule ] a c cor ds w i th a compar a tive negligence re g ime ”) ; Sedam
, 84 N .E.3d at 117 8

– 79 (stating that “[t]he Comparative Fault Act pr ovi des t ha t the jury must apportion fa ult to those “who
caused or contributed to ca u se the alle ged injury ”

. . . The [Admi ssion R u le ] i s

con sistent with thi s mandate because, as already sta ted, the [derivat ive clai ms] and respondeat superior claims are der ive d fro m th e same negligent act of th e21

employee ”) ; McHaffie
, 891 S. W .2d at 8 26 ( hol ding t hat the A d mission R u le

a p pl i es regardless of the comp ara ti v e fault of the e mployer versus the empl oyee) ; Swift
, 20 22 WL 1 81 0721
, a t * 5 ( holding that the A d mis sion R u le a p pl i es under
T ennessee law despite Tenne ssee ’s s ystem of comparative faul t )

. Th e en ba n c ma

jority should conclude that neither section 33. 003 nor the proportionate responsibility regi me of C ivil Prac tice a nd Re medie s Code c h apter 3 3 preclude s t his court from ado p ting or ap pl y i n g the Admiss i on Rule.
4

. A dopti n g the Admission Rul e For t he re a so ns stated above, th e en banc majority should join the ot her
Texas intermediat e court s of appeals that have adopted the Ad missi o n R ule. 6 See
Rose l l , 89 S.W.3 d at 654

– 55 ; E s tate of Ar r in gt on , 578 S.W.2d a t 178

– 7 9 ; R odg e r s , 402 S.W .2d at 210

– 1 1 ; Luv ua l
, 3 6 6 S.W .2d at 838 ; Patterson , 3 49 S.W

. 2d at 636

. B

. The en ba nc court should recognize a n exemplary

- damage ex ception to the Ad mis si on Rule

. S everal courts app lying Tex as la w and c ourts from oth er jur i s dict i ons h av e

co ncluded that t h e Admi ssio n R u l e doe s not appl y in cases in w hich the injured party p ursues a n eglig enc e claim against the driver, asserts responde at superior and
de rivat ive theorie s against the emp loyer, an d see k s exemplary damages agains t t h e

e mplo y er

. Se e Monroe v. Fr e ig ht A ll K in d s , I nc. , 20 2 0 WL 6589000, at *2

– 3 (W.D. Mo. 2 020) (ap p lying Missouri law) ; Wilson v. Image Flo rin g , 400 S.W.3d

6 T he Tex as Legis l atur e has en acted a sta tut e ad o p t i ng the A dm ission Rule as to personal

- injury actions in which the claiman t sues a defendant wh o owned, leased, or otherwise held or exercised legal contro l over a c ommercial motor vehicle or operator of a com me rcial motor

v ehicle involved in an accident. Se e Act of M ay 28, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S ., ch. 785, § 4, 2021 Te x. Sess. La w Serv. 185 5
, 1856 (codif ied at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 72.05 1 , eff. Se ptem ber 1, 2021)

. But t h e Legislature determined that this s tatu t e applie s to such civil ac tions that are filed on or after Septemb er 1, 2021, w ithou t commen ting on what r ule applies to actio ns that wer e filed be fore t hat date

. Se e 2021 Tex. Sess. La w Serv. 18 5 5, 1857

– 59 (codif ied at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Cod e § 72 .054, eff. S e ptember 1, 2021) ; Graha m , 2023 WL 1 38923 , a t * 2
, n.4. T hat statut e does n ot apply to toda y ’s c a se , and t his court sh ould ado pt the Admis sion Rule without relying on th e statute.22

386, 391

– 94 (Mo. App. 201 3); W ill ia ms , 671 F. Sup p .2d at 88 8

– 8 9 (a pply ing Te x a s l aw) ; Rosell , 89 S.W.3d at 654

– 55 ; Estate of Arrington , 578 S. W.2d at 178

– 79

. T he Bla ke P a rt ies argue that, if th is c ourt ad o p ts th e Admission Rule, the court
sh ou ld recognize the e xemplary

- damage ex cep tio n and conclude that th is case falls
wit hin t hat exception because th e Blake Pa rties sought exem plary dam ages a gai nst Werner based on it s al leged gr o ss negligence. The W e rn er P arti es a s se rt that this
court should fo llow courts from other j u r isdict i o ns th at h a ve adopted the
Admission Rule but conclude d that no exemp lary

- da ma ge excepti on to that ru le

e xists. S ee Gr e ene , 384 F. Supp. 3 d a t 104 ; Ferrer , 390 P .3 d at 84 7

– 48

. If a n i njured party seek s exemplary damages a gainst th e emp l oyer , t h e in ju r ed par t y m ust pro v e by clear and con vi ncing evidence that the ha r m result ed from the employer ’ s g ro ss neglig ence , malice , o r fraud

. Se e Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 4 1 .00 3 (a ) , ( b) ( W es t, West l aw through 20 21 C

. S. ) ; Medina v. Zuniga , 593 S.W .3d 2 3 8, 247 ( T ex. 2 019 ). In a case tried to a jury, exemp lary damages may be award ed only i f the jury u nanim ous ly fin ds that the injured party
satisf ied t h is bu r de n o f proof

. See Te x

. Civ. Pra c. & Re m. Code Ann. § 41.00 3 ( d ) ( We st, West l aw through 20 21 C .S.)

. I n many cas es , p rov i ng t he driver ’s con duct
, f or which the employer has admitte d vicarious liab i l ity , wil l not by itself suffi ce to
pr ove by clear and c onvi n c in g evidence that th e injur e d p art y ’ s ha r m re sult ed from the emp lo yer ’s gross negligence , mal ic e, o r fraud

. See Te x. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 41.0 0 3(a) , (b) ; Hammerly Oaks , Inc. v. E dwards
, 958 S.W

. 2 d 387, 391 (Tex. 19 97) (sta ting t hat “t he gen e ral r ul e in Texas ” is set out in R es tat e m en t of To rts section 909, wh ic h provides that “ [p]u nitive d amag e s can pro perly be
award ed against a master or other principal because of an a ct by an ag ent if, but
onl y if, (a) the princip al autho rize d the do ing an d the ma nner of th e act, o r (b) t he

a gen t wa s unfit and the principal wa s reckless in employing him, or ( c ) the age nt

was em ploye d in a managerial c apacity an d was acting in the scope of23

employm ent, or (d) the e mployer or a manage r of the emp lo yer ra tified or

a p pr oved the a ct ”). T h us, an in j ure d pa rt y may need to rely on th e alleged conduct of the emplo y er o n which th e injur ed party bases derivative theories a s a ba sis for

pro ving tha t t he injured party ’s h a r m r esult ed from the em ploy er ’s gross negli gence , m ali c e , or fraud

. If so
, the de riva tiv e th eorie s would no t be superf lu ous, undermining a main basis for the Admis sion Rul e. If t he injured party pro v e s a n e m p lo yer ’s g ross negligence
, ma li ce , o r fraud by clear and convi ncing evid ence , th e employer should b e liable for exemplary damages
, even if the employe r admits to respond eat su perior. None theless, e ven if
derivativ e the o rie s are not s uperfluou s b ecause o f t h e injured party ’s r e q ues t f o r

e xem p l ar y da m age s , the other conce rn s discu ssed in section II. A

. 2

. abov e s till

a pply. E vidence necessary to prove d er ivative the orie s st ill i s li kely to be unfairly prejudici al to the em

pl o yee. See H

ouli han
, 78 A.2d at 664

– 65 ; Cl ooney , 352 So.2d

a t 122 0

. A dan g e r s til l ex ists that the jury w ill asses s the employer’s lia b ilit y twice

o r award duplicative damages to the pl aintiff if it hears evide nce of both a negligence claim a gainst an emp l oy ee an d a d eri vativ e theor y agains t t h e employer. Mince r , s upra , 10 Wyo. L

. Rev. at 238

. If a court rec ognizes a n

e xemplary

- damag e e x cept ion to the Admission Rule
, a dan ger exists tha t the exception may swall ow the rule

. See id . at 263. I f a n in j u red p art y onl y needs to

a llege g ross neg lig e nce , malice, or fr a u d and s eek exe m p la ry da mag e s to avoid

ap plicat ion of the Ad missio n Ru le
, man y in jured par ties may avoid the A dmission Rule by so p lea ding

. The en banc majority should co nclude th at a n exe mplary

- da mag e exc ept ion
to th e A dmissi on Ru l e exists if the in j u r ed par ty s eek s ex empl a ry damag es against
th e employer but that the ex ception do e s not a pply if the trial evidence i s legally
insuffic ient to sup port a fi ndi ng by cle a r and convi ncing evidence that t h e h a r m

re sult ed from the employer ’s gross negligence
, malice, or fraud

. See Tex. Civ.24

P rac. & Rem. Co de Ann. § 41.00 3(a) ; Robin son , 20 22 WL 1745 2 0 , at *2

– 5, * 7 (recogniz ing exe mplar y

- da m a g e exc ept ion to Admission R ul e under Texas law but

gra nting sum mary j u dgm ent a s to deri vative theories under the A dmission Rule
becau se plaintiff did not ra i se fact issue as to p l aintiff ’ s gr oss

- negl igence allegat i o n); Ocho a , 2018 WL 7505640, at * 2

– 3 ( recognizing exemplar y

- da m ag e

exc ept ion to Admission R ul e under Texas law b ut gra nt ing sum mary judgment as to deri vative theories und er the A dmission Rule becaus e trial court h ad granted

summary judg ment as to p la i ntiff ’ s gr oss

- negligence al lega tion) ; San c hez , 2016
WL 10 587 127, at *2, * 4 ( same as Ochoa ) ; Caha lan v. May Truck i n g , 201 2 WL
129 1 5496, at *4

– 6 (D. Wyo. 2012) ( holding under Wyoming law that an

e xem plary

- damage exce ption to Adm iss ion R ule di d not apply be ca u s e t h ere was

no e vi dence th at w o uld support a n award of exe m pla ry damages against th e empl oyer); Rosel l , 89 S.W.3d a t 6 54

– 55 ( re cognizing e xemplary

- damage exception to Admission Rule und er Texas law) ; E s tate of Ar r ing t on , 578 S. W.2d at 178

– 79 ( sa me as R osell ) ; M ince r, supr a , 10 W yo. L. R e v. at 2 60

– 63

. The en banc majority does n ’ t decide whe ther this court should adopt the
Admi ssio n Rule

. Rather the majority concludes that it need not address this issue
because even i f th e Admiss ion R ule were adopted
, the ru le w ould n ’ t appl y to today ’ s case because the Blake Parties pled gross ne gligence a nd sought exemplary damages. How eve r, th e tr ial evidence w as legally insufficient to support a gross

negligence findin g , and the trial court er r ed in denying Werner ’ s motio n fo r directed v erdict

. So is that all it takes to avoid the Admiss ion R ule per the majority : m erely seek exemplary dam ages? A nd even if the trial evidence is legally insufficient to support a recovery of exemplary damages, y ou still get to pursue deriva tive t h eories of ne gligence against the employer even though the employer stip ulates t o respo n d eat

- superi or liability ? Ye t tha t ’ s precisely what the ma jority
holds

. The majority takes the easy way out and doesn ’ t really decide whether the25

Admission Rule a pplies.
C

. T h is court s hould not mak e it s de c is ion s regarding the Admissi on Rule apply pro spective ly onl y. T h ough t he B la k e Par t ies have briefed various issues reg ardi ng the
A d mission Rule, they have not r equested that t his cou rt make its ruling s on th e se issues a ppl y pro spectively only. Th e en banc majority should address whe the r this

court shou ld exercise its discretion to make the decisi o ns regardin g the Admission Rule prospec t ive onl y, so that they woul d not apply to t oday ’ s case. Judic ial decisi ons generall y apply ret r oa ctively. Carrollton

- Farmer s Branc h Indep

. Sch

. Dist

. v. Edgewo od I ndep

. Sc h

. Dist

. , 826 S.W.2d 489
, 5 15 (T ex. 1992)

. O cc asionall y , a court decides to exerci se its discretion to depart from this rule by
mak i ng its decisio n apply pr ospe ctively o nly

. S e e i d

. at 515, 518. I n Carrollton

Farmer s Branch Indep e n d e n t Sch o o l D istr ict , t he S upreme C ourt of T exas dis cusse d and appl ied the Chev r on analysis to determine wh ether its judicial
deci sion would have only prosp e ctive applicat ion. See C arro llton

- Fa r

mers B r anc h
I ndep. Sch. Dist. , 826 S.W. 2d at 5 15

– 521 (applying C hevron Oil Co. v. Hu son , 404 U.S. 97, 105

– 09 (1 971 )). The Chevro n an alysis i s a three

- step process:

Firs t, the decision to be appl ie d nonretroactively mu s t establish a new princi ple of law, e ither b y o v er ruling clear past preceden t on wh ich litigants may have relied , or by d eci ding an issue of first i mpr essio n whose re solu tion was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, . . . [the court] m ust . . . weigh the m e rits and demer its in eac h

ca se by lo o king t o th e p rior history of the rule i n quest ion, its purpose

a nd effect, and wheth er retrospective operation wil l fur ther or re tard its ope r ation. Finally, [the cour t must] weig[h] the inequi ty imposed by retroacti v e application, for where a d ecision o f [the cou r t] could produce substantial inequi table results if a pplied retr oact ively , t here is ample basis in o ur cases for avoid ing the inju s tice or hardship by a holdi ng of nonretroactivity.26

I d . at 518 (quoting Che v ron Oil Co. , 4 04 U.S. at 106

– 07).
T his cou rt ’s de c isio n s regarding the Admission R ule woul d not ov errul e any past precede nt , and t hey would not d eci d e an issue whose resolution w as n ot clear l y foreshadowed

. I n the tria l court a nd on ap peal, the parties have bri efed

va rious iss ues r egardin g the Ad mission Rule

. At t r ia l, the Blake Parties su bmi tted

ev ide nce in an attem pt to prove b y c lear an d co nvinc ing evid ence that the ha r m with r espe ct to wh i ch the Blake Parties s ou ght r ecover y of e xempl a ry damages

r es ult ed f rom Werner ’ s g ro ss n eg lig ence

. Before this la wsuit was fil e d
, five Texas
interm edi ate c ourt s o f appeals ha d ad opte d the Adm ission Ru le

. See Ro sel l , 89
S.W.3 d at 6 5 4

– 55 ; Estate of A rrington , 578 S.W.2 d at 178

– 79 ; Rodg e rs , 402
S.W

. 2d at 210

– 11 ; Luvual
, 3 66 S.W.2d at 8 38 ; Patter so n , 349 S

. W

. 2d at 636

. A
f ederal dis t ri ct court in 2021 dec ided n ot to a pp ly the Admissio n Rule to ne gligent

s upe rvision cla ims a gainst the United States o f Am erica un d er the Feder al Tort
Claims Act based on the conside r ations p resent in that ca se , which ar e not pr e sent in today ’s case

. 7 See Holco mbe v. United States
, 2021 WL 67217, at * 27

– 28 (W.D.
Tex. J an. 6, 2021)

. Th e H o lco mbe d ecision issued af ter th e parties f

ully briefed this

7 Hol com b e v. U

nite d States is not on p oint. S ee 2021 WL 67 217, a t *28 (W.D. T ex. J an . 6, 2021)

. The court in that c ase d oes n ot s t at e that the re is an excepti on to t he Admi ssion Ru le f or neg l ige nt

- superv ision claims

. See id

. On th e contrar y, the Holc o mbe cou r t cite s a c a se appl ying the Admis sion Rule to a negli gent

- s upervisio n c l aim u nd er Tex as l aw and indicat es that the Adm is sion Ru le generally a pplies to ne gli gent

- su perv isio n cl aim s

. See i d

. at *2 7 (c iti ng Williams
, 6 7 1 F

. Supp .2 d at 888

– 8 9 ). T he Holcombe co urt de cided not to apply the A dm ission Rule to the neg lige nt

- supervision clai m s in that ca se ba sed on “ t he un ique po sture of claims brought un der the [ Fed eral Tort Clai ms Ac t] and practi cal consid erat i ons

. ” S e e id . at *2 7

. The Holc ombe court stressed that cl aim s ag ainst the U nited Sta te s of America under the Fe d er al Tort Clai m s Ac t a re all bas ed on responde at

- su peri or liability , which is dif fer ent from the context i n wh ich t he Admission Rule norma lly a pplies. See id

. at *2 7

– 28. The Hol combe case involved cla ims brought against the Uni te d States of America st em mi ng from the ma s s sh o ot ing in Sut herland Spring s, Te xas , an d alleging that the sho ote r sh ould not have been abl e to pur chase the firearms h e us e d in th e shootin g, b ut that neg lige nt fai lures by the U nit ed States to collect, handl e, and report required i nfor ma tion about t h e sh o ot er allowed him to do so. S ee id

. at * 1

.27

a ppeal. See id

. Ot her tha n that case
, r e se arch ha s n ot re vealed any de cisio n applyin g Texas law in whic h the cou rt declined to apply the Admis s i on Rule. This

court ’s de cisions regard ing th e Ad m is s ion Rul e would not “establi sh a ne w principle of law” as necess ary for t his court to ex ercise its discretion to l imit the applica t ion of the de c isions under the first step of the Chevron analysis. See
G allow ay v. Atrium M edical Center , 558 S .W.3d 316 , 32 2

– 2 3 (Tex . App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet

. )

. I n addition, r e trospective applic ati on of this

court ’s de cis io ns r egar ding the Admission Ru l e w ould furthe r the operation of th is
rule
, and applying t he se decisions r etroactively w ould not produce sub s ta nti al
in equitable results

. See i d

. U n der t he applicable leg al standa rd, it would not be

a ppropriate f

or this court to exercise its discre ti o n to make the decisio ns reg arding
the Admission Rule apply pros pect ive ly onl y

. See id

. T he en banc maj ority suggests in vari ous parts of its op inion that the
Admission Ru le may not be applied to this c ase because this court had no t yet adopted th is rule w hen t h e trial c ourt deni ed t he W erner P arties di rected

- verdict

m otion based on the Admission Rule. See ant e at 33
, 35
, 3 7 ( Hassan, J., e n banc majority )

. Th ese suggestion s contradict binding precedent under which j udic ial
decisions ba sed on the common law g eneral ly apply ret r oa c tively. S e e C a rrollton

Farmer s Branc h Indep

. Sch

. Dist

. , 826 S.W.2d at 5 15 ; Gallow ay , 558 S.W.3d at 32 2

– 2 3

. Notw ithstand ing t he en ba nc majority ’ s intimations to the c ontrary, e ven if
the law is un settled or the is sue is one of firs t impres sio n , an appella te cou rt may h old that a trial cou rt erred or abuse its d iscretion if th e trial court ’ s legal decision
i s incorr ec t under the ap pella te court ’ s in terpretation o f the law , even though no precedent bound the trial co urt to follow this i nterp r etation when the trial court

r uled

. See I

n re Sil ver , 540 S.W.3d 530
, 538 (Tex. 2018) ; G allow ay , 558 S.W.3d at 32 2

– 2 3

.28

D

. T he en banc majorit y s hould ho ld that as to the derivat ive theories the t ria l co urt reversibly err ed in d en ying Wer ner ’ s motion for dir e cted
ve rdi ct bas e d on the Ad m ission Ru le

. T h e Blake Part i e s asserted negligenc e cla ims aga inst Ali

. T h ey asserted t hat
at the ti me of Ali ’ s n egl ig ence , Wer ner employed Ali
, and Ali was act ing in t he

co ur se and scope o f h is e mpl oyment with Werner , so that Werner is vicari ously
liable for Ali ’ s ne g li gence under t h e doctrine of respon d eat supe ri or. The B lak e Pa rties also asserted v arious Q u esti on 1 & 2 Theories against Werner. The Blake
Parti es a lleg e d that the W erne r Pa rt i es ’ c ond uct consti tuted gross negli gence t h at

was a proximate ca use of th e o cc u r rence in ques t ion r esulting in damages to the
B lake P arti es. The Bl ake P arties so ught actual da mag es ag ainst Ali and W erner, as well as exemplar y da mages against We rner. T he cl a ims aga in st Ali
, the Q uesti on 1 & 2 The orie s , an d the Blake P a rties ’

r equ es ts for ex emplary d amages were tried in a n un bifurca t ed jury trial. At trial
We rne r stipulat ed that Ali was acting in the course a nd sc ope of his empl oyment

w ith Werner when A li e n gaged in the alleged ly negl i gent c onduct , thus ad mitting
that u n der the do ctr in e of r espondeat superior, Wern er is v i ca r iously li a b le f o r any negligen t a cts o r omissions by Ali

. S ee In eos US A, LLC , 505 S.W .3d at 565

. At t he

c lose of t he evidence at t ri a l
, Werner mo ved for a directed verd ic t as to al l Q uesti on 1 & 2 T he orie s aga ins t Werner on the gr o unds th at Werner adm itte d Ali

was a ctin g i n the cour se and s cop e of his em ploymen t a t Wer ner an d there wa s no evidence at tria l th at Werner was grossly neg li g en t. The tri al court denied W erner ’s
moti on. Unde r the Admissi on Rule
, Wer ner ’s a dmission tha t Al i was acting in the

cou rse and sc o pe o f h is employment wit h We rner when A li engage d i n the
all eg edly negl igen t conduct bars t he B lake Part ie s from pursuin g the d er ivative

t heorie s against Wer ner u nless t he exempl ary

- damage e xce ption app l ie s

. See
Cahalan
, 2 012 WL 12915496, at *4

– 6 ; W illia ms , 6 71 F

. S u pp.2d at 888

– 8 9 ; Ro se ll
,29

89 S.W.3 d at 65 4

– 55 ; E s tat e of Arringt on , 5 78 S.W.2d at 178

– 79 ; Rodgers
, 402
S.W .2d at 2 10

– 11 ; Luvua l
, 3 66 S.W.2d at 838 ; Patt erson , 349 S.W

. 2 d at 636

. A s me ntione d a b ov e , this cou rt sho u ld det ermine that the exemplar y

- d amag e exception to th e A d mission Ru le doe s not a ppl y if the t rial evidence is legally
insu fficient to supp o rt a finding that cle ar and co n vi ncing e vidence p roves the
ha r m wi th resp ect to wh ich the injur e d party see ks recov e ry of exem plary damages
result ed from t he employ er ’s g r oss negligence , mal ic e, or fr aud

. The B lake Parties
did n ot seek exe mplary damages b a sed on any alleged mal ice or f r au d by We rner. Instead
, they sough t exemp l ary dama ges based on W er ner ’ s a ll eged gro s s negligen ce. Over Werner ’ s ob jec tion t hat the re was n o ev idence to sup po rt the

s u bm issio n, th e trial court a sked the jury in Question 13 w h eth er the jury

unan imously f

ou n d by clea r and convinci ng evid ence that th e ha rm to the Blakes

r e su lted f rom Werner ’ s gro ss ne g ligence. Beca use th e j ury did not unan imo us l y

an swer any of th e l iabili ty ques t ions, the jury foll owed the trial court ’ s instruct i on and di d not an s wer this q u e s ti on. On appea l, the Werner Part ies arg ue that t he d eriv at ive t h eori e s have n o valid i t y based on the Adm ission Rule

. Th e B lake Part ies assert t hat ev en if th e
court a dop ts th e A dmission Rule , the exemp lary

- dama ge exception ap plies beca us e th ey sou gh t exemp lary damages base d o n We rner ’ s al le ged gross ne g lige nce

. T he
W er ner Parties assert t h at (1) no evidenc e s uppo rted a reco v ery b y the Blake
Part i es of exemplary dam ages ; ( 2) th e Blake Par ties ’ tri al strategy of inundating the j ury with prejudicial arguments and evidence related to d erivative t heories agai nst Werner res te d largely on the leg a l question of whether they had a vi a ble

gross

- negligence c laim against Werner ; ( 3 ) t he Bl ak e Parties did not possess a valid gro ss

- negligenc e claim ; (4) the trial court er red in allowing the Blake Parties

to use th eir g r oss

- negligenc e allegation to evade t he Admission Rule ; ( 5 ) there wa s

no evidence of the requir ed elements of gross ne gli gence i n today ’ s case ; and ( 6 )30

the Wer ner Parties ’ reque st for a directed verdict based on the Admission Ru le should have been granted

. T he We rner Pa rt ies ha ve suf ficie ntl y br iefed a c hallenge
to th e trial c o u rt ’ s denial of thei r motion for directe d v er di c t as to al l Question 1 &
2 Theorie s a gainst We rner on th e gr ou nds th at Werner admi tt ed Ali was actin g in
th e cour se and s cope of hi s em ployment at We r n er and ther e wa s no e vi dence at trial that Wer ner was g ro ssly negligen t. Se e Pe rr y v. Cohe n , 272 S. W.3 d 5 85, 5 88 ( Tex. 2008) (hol d ing cou rt of app eals erred by c o ncluding appellant f ai led to

a ssign er ror as to sp ecial

- exceptions or d er because, under liberal co nstru ctio n o f

ap p ella nt ’ s brief, ap pellant c ha llenged th e order by pr esen t i ng argum en t ch allengi ng ba sis o f t his order , th ough appella nt did not expressly c h allenge the
ord er)

. Thus, this court should decide whe th e r t he t ri al evide nce was legal ly

s uffi cie nt to pro ve by cl e ar and convi nci n g evidence that the ha r m wit h respect to

w hich t he Blake P art ies s ou ght r e c overy of exe mpla ry da mages result ed f rom Werner ’ s g ross n egl igence

. See Tex. Civ . Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 4 1.0 0 3 (a )

. T his l egal suff

ici ency revi ew is c onducted und e r the “c lear and c o nvincing ”
evi dence standard

. See U

- Hau l I nte rn

. , v . Wa ldr ip , 380 S .W.3d 118, 1 37 (Tex. 2012). “ ‘ Clear a nd convincing ’ mea ns th e measure or de gree of pro of that will produ ce i n t h e mind of the trier of fa ct a firm be lief or c onvicti o n as to the trut h of the allegations sought t o be establis h e d

. ” T ex. Civ. Prac . & Re m. Co d e Ann § 41 .00 1(2 ) (Wes t, West l aw throu gh 20 21 C .S.) ; Wa l dr ip , 3 80 S .W.3d at 137

. The
B l ake Par t ies ha d the burde n to prove b y cle ar a nd convincin g eviden c e th at the
ha r m with respect to which the Bl ake Parties s o u ght r ec overy of exem pl ary d ama g e s result ed f

rom Werne r ’s g ross neglig ence

. See Tex. Civ. Pra c. & Re m. Code Ann. § 41.00 3(a)

. “ ‘ G r o ss neg lig e nc e ’ means “ an ac t or omissio n: (A ) wh ich
when vie wed ob

j ecti v ely from the standpoint of the actor at t he time of i t s

occ ur rence inv olve s an extre m e degree of r isk , cons idering the prob ability and magnitud e o f the p otential har m to others; and ( B ) of w hic h t h e actor has ac tual,31

subjec tive awar ene ss of the risk i nvol ved, but neve r theless proceeds with
consci ous indiffer e n ce t o the right s, s af ety , or w e lfare of oth ers

. ” Tex . Civ. Prac . &
R em. Code Ann § 41 .00 1 ( 11 ) ; see Wa ldr ip , 38 0 S.W.3d at 137

. Th u s , gross ne gl igence c o nsis ts of bot h objective a nd subjective el ements.
S ee Wa ldr ip , 380 S. W.3d at 137

. Unde r t he obj ective component
, “ extreme risk ” is

not a remote possi bili ty or even a high probabi lit y o f minor harm, b ut r ather th e lik elih ood of the B la kes ’ s e ri ous injury. S e e id

. The subjective prong, in turn,

requ i res th at Wer ner kne w ab out the risk, but th at the We rner ’ s acts or o missions
demonstrate d i ndifference to the consequences of i t s acts. Se e i d

. An act or

om issi on that is on ly t hou ghtless, ca reless
, o r no t inordin a tely risky cannot be grossly negligent. S e e Me di na , 593 S .W.3 d at 24 9

. I n deter mining w hether the trial evide nce was legal ly s uffi cie nt to pro ve by
clear and convi nci n g evidence that t he ha r m wit h resp ect to w hich t he Blake
P art ies s ought re c overy of exe mplary da mages result ed f rom Werner ’ s g ros s

n egl igence , this court sh ould look at all the t rial evidence in the light mos t favorable to the Blake Part ies to determine whe t her a reasona bl e trier of fact c ould
have formed a firm belief or con v ic tion that this proposit ion was true. See
Southwestern B e ll Telephon e Co. v. Gar za , 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 ( Tex. 2004). To give appropriate deference to the factfinder ’ s conclusions and t h e role of a c ou rt conducting a l egal suf

ficiency review, lookin g at t h e evidence in the light most
favorable to the Blake Parti e s means that this court mu st as sume that all dis puted
facts have been resolved in favor of the Blake Parties if a reasonable fa c tfinder
could d o so. See id

. A c orollary to this re quirement is that a c ourt should disregard
all evidence that a reasonable fa c tfinder could have disb eli eved or found to have
been incredible. See id

. This does not mean that a court must disregard all evi d ence that doe s not support t his proposition

. See id

. Disregardi ng und i sp uted facts that do not support th is proposition could s k ew the analysis of whet her ther e is clear and32

co nvincing evidence. See id

. If, after conducting its legal sufficiency review of the
trial evi de nce, this court d etermines that no reasonable fa ctfind e r could form a fi rm belief or conviction that the ha r m wi t h respect to w hich t he Bla ke P a rt ies sought

re c ove ry of exe mplary da mages result ed f rom Werner ’ s g ross n egl igence , then th is

co u rt must concl ud e that the eviden ce is legally insufficient. See id

. D uri ng closin g argumen t, counsel f or the Blake Parties poin te d to the
follow ing as ev idenc e of gross negl ige n c e: ( 1) section 2

. 6. 2 o f the Texas
Com mer cial Moto r Vehicle Drive rs Handbo o k s t ates that on ic y roa ds a

commer cial dr iver m ust r educ e th e spe ed “ t o a c rawl ” a nd then stop driving as soon as the driver ca n s a f ely do s o , yet witn es ses from Werner testifi ed t h at section
2.6.2 . is a guide line not a r ule or st andard , thus in dicating t hat Wer ner thinks
W erner and its dr ivers d o no t have to f ollo w sec tion 2

. 6.2 . and tha t Wern er and its
drivers do n ot foll ow this se ct ion; (2) despit e a n a cci dent prior to the a c cid e n t in

q uestion wi th facts sim ilar to t he a ccident in q uestion, We rner cont i nue d to use a bus in ess mo del in whi ch it p uts it s least

- e xper ience d driv e rs in the mo st challenging circumstances , pairing th em wit h trainers on “ Ju st i n Tim e ” ru ns in

w hich the re i s a dditi onal pres sure to be o n

- tim e an d i n which t he least

- exp er i ence d
dri v er o fte n must be un sup ervise d b ecau se the trai ne r must be in the t r uck

- t r act or ’ s

s l ee per berth; (3) one of Werner ’ s sa fety director s testified that he w as ha ppy w ith
what A l i di d a n d t hat in less th an one

- hal f of on e pe rce nt of ser ious crashes
in volving a W er n er truck coul d Werner or its dr iver ha ve d on e someth i ng t hat

r easona b ly would h av e prevented the cras h
, thus showing that in 19 9 ou t of every 20 0 se ri ous cras hes Werner sa ys “ W e di d nothing wron g ” ; (4) Wern er ’ s head of

sa fety t estified that W erner d id not h ing wrong and t hat Wer ne r has n ot lear ned an y

s afety less ons f

rom th e a c cident in q uestio n; (5) another one of Werner ’ s s afety
di rectors testifi ed t ha t W erner has m ad e no ch ang e s i n its truck

- dr iving school s as

a re sul t of the a ccident in q ue stion ; an d (6 ) a l a wyer for W e rner t es ti fied that33

We rner m ade perfe ct d ecisi ons. A f ter consider ing the t rial evidence un de r the appliable st a nd ard of review, this c our t sho uld c onclude that th e trial ev ide n ce was legally in sufficient t o pro ve b y c lear and co nvincing ev i d ence that th e ha r m with

respec t to whi ch the Blake P arti es so ught r e c ov er y of exempl a ry damages r esult ed
f rom Werner ’s g ro ss n egligence

. 8 See Me dina
, 59 3 S.W .3 d at 247

– 50 ; Re ede r v. Wood C nty

. En ergy , 395 S.W.3d 789, 797 (Tex . 2 012); Wa ldr ip , 380 S

. W. 3d at 137

– 41; Garza , 164 S.W.3d at 627; Robin son , 20 22 WL 174520
, at * 2

– 4; R uelas
v. We stern Truck & T

rai le r Mai ntenance , 2019 WL 4060891, a t * 7

– 9 (W. D . Te x. 2019) ; Ca halan
, 20 12 WL 12915496, at *4

– 6

. Therefor e, th e ex emplary

- dam ag e exception does n ot app ly, and this court should hold th at th e trial court e rred in
d e nyi n g Werner ’ s motion for d irected verdict a s t o all d erivati ve t heorie s again st
Wern er on th e gr ounds th at We rne r ad mit ted Ali was a cting in the cour se and

s cope of h is e mplo yment at Werner and th ere wa s no evidenc e a t t rial tha t Werner

was gros sly negli g en t

. 9 See Medina , 593 S.W .3 d at 247

– 50 ; Rob in son , 20 22 WL
174520 , at * 2

–

4; Ru e las
, 20 19 WL 40 608 91, at *7

– 9 ; Nat ’ l Se c urity Fire & Cas.
Co . v. Hu rst , 523 S.W.3d 840, 8 45

– 4 6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. de n ied ) ( h old ing that trial court err ed in d enying appellant ’s mo tio n for

8 Th e Blak e Part ie s did not seek exemplary dama ges base d o n any a ll eged fraud o r malice by Werne r. I n any e vent , th e tria l evidence was le gal ly ins u ffici e nt to prove b y clear and co nvincin g evi de n ce t h a t the ha r m w i t h resp ect to which th e Blake Parti e s sought r ecover y of ex emplary damages result ed from W erner ’ s fra ud o r mal ice.

9 The en banc majority co n cludes that the trial evidence is lega lly sufficient to suppo rt (1) a finding of a neglig ence d uty, breach o f duty, and ca usa tion based on some of the Blake Parties ’ derivative theor ies and (2) a fin ding that We rner ’ s neg ligent training and supervision pr o xim ately ca used the a ccident in q uesti on. See ante a t 38

– 6 5 ( Hassan, J., e n banc majority )

. But Werner ’ s motion for dir ec ted ve rdict based o n the Adm is sion Rule d id no t ch al len ge the suff ic iency of the trial evidence to support the ess ential e leme nts of any of these negligence theori es, and the exi st ence of legally sufficie nt eviden ce as to any of these el ements woul d not pr eclu de jud gmen t as a matter of la w in favor of Wer ner a s to the d erivative t heor i es based on t h e gr ound tha t W e rne r ad mit t ed Ali was a cting in the cour se and s cope of h is emplo ym ent at Werner and th ere wa s no evidenc e a t t ria l that Werner was gros sly negli g en t

. See Cahala n , 20 12 WL 129 15 496, at *4

– 6

.34

dir e cted verdict and submitt ing a claim to the jur y de spite a ppellan t ’ s argument

t hat the clai m was precluded a s a matter of law by t he d efense of estoppel );
Cahal a n , 20 12 WL 12915496, at *4

– 6

. T he B l ake Parties contend that v ar ious ind epende n t theories ag ain st We r ne r

wer e submit te d t o the jury a nd w e r e a bas is of the jury ’ s ver dict, including theories
b a s ed on Wern er ’ s alle ged ne gligen ce in (1) havi ng n o syste m to i nf o rm Werner
dri ve rs of ad vers e wea ther and road conditions, ( 2) selecting the “ d ange rous ro ute ”
fol l ow ed by t he tractor

- trailer Ali drove on t h e Acci d ent Da te ; ( 3) failing to notify
Ali of a w inter s to rm w arn ing update, a nd ( 4) prohi biting Ali fro m us ing his
citiz en ’ s band radio an d hi s outs id e tem perat ure gauge

. T h e B lake Par t i es cite no

case s ho ldin g t hat a ny o f th ese t heorie s const itutes a n in de p e n dent t he or y

. To the

exte nt th a t o ne or more of the Q uesti on 1 & 2 Theor ies w as an independent t h eory, the t rial court did n ot err i n denyi ng Werner ’ s motion for d irected verdict because
the A d mission Rule does not a ppl y to inde pen den t the ories

. 10 See Ferrer , 390 P .3 d

a t 845

– 46 ; Min c e r, su

pra , 10 Wyo. L. Rev. a t 26 0.
The en banc majority states that alle g ing a defendant engaged in gross neglig ence “ en title [s] Texas plaintif fs to seek exe mplary d a mages, a theory that

was presen ted to the jury .” Ante at 35 ( Hassan, J., e n banc majority )

. Though a plaintiff a lle ging gross negligence may seek exemplary damages, that pursuit must

com e to an end and the gross

- negligence issue must not be presented to a jury if there is leg ally insuf

f icient evidence of gross neglig ence at trial and the defendan t

move s for a direct ed verdi ct on that ground , as happened in today’s case. See

10 T o adjudicat e t oday ’ s a ppeal , this court need not and should not determine if any of the Blake Parties ’ theor ies a re inde pendent t heori e s

. My dissenti ng c o l lea gue, Chief Justice Chri stopher, concludes tha t t his c o urt should n o t adopt the A dmission Ru le and indicates that adoptin g t his rul e would c ause problems in he al th care liability c ases in which a plaintiff assert s a vicarious liabilit y theory and a n i n d e pen de nt theory agains t a h ospital. In such a sce nar io
, t h e Admissio n R ule wo u ld p rovide no impedi ment to the plaintiff purs uin g both a vicar i o us liability theory and an in depe ndent theory. See F errer , 390 P.3 d at 8 4 5

– 4 6

.35

R ichard v. Wia tt , No. 14

- 22

- 00 236

- CV, 202 3 WL 3071161, at *2

– 6 (Tex. Ap p.

— Houston [14th Dist .] Apr. 25, 2023, no p e t. h.) (holding that trial court prope rly granted directed verd ict as to plaintif f’s gros s

- negligence theory )

. A directed verdict eliminates a gross

- neglige nc e theory and prevents th at theory from being
submitted to the jury. See id

. at *1

– 2. A trial cour t has a duty to grant a motion for
dire cted verdict as to a theor y of recovery sup por ted b y legally insufficient
evidence. See Rounsaville v. Bullard , 276 S. W. 2d 791, 794 ( Tex. 1955); Cherqui v. Westheimer S treet F

estival Corp. , 116 S .W.3d 337, 343 (Tex. A p p.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no p et.)

. The trial evidence was l egally insufficie nt to pr ove by clear and convincing evidence that the harm with respect to which the Blake Parties sought recovery of exemplary dama ges resulted from We rner’s gross negligenc e

. See Medina , 593 S.W.3d at 247

– 50 ; Ro binson , 2022 WL 174520, at
*2

– 4; Ruelas , 20 19 WL 40 60891, at *7

– 9. T he trial court had a duty to grant
Werner ’ s motion for directed v erdict based on the Adm ission Rule

. See
Rounsaville , 276 S .W.2 d at 794; Cherqui
, 116 S.W.3d at 3 43

. The en banc majority a sserts that the B la k e Par ties ’ gr o ss

- ne gligence claim was viable when the
trial court denied Werner ’ s motion for directed verdict , but a gross

- neglig ence claim as to which a trial court is du t y

- bo und to grant a directed verdic t is not viable. 11 See a nt e at 3 5 ( Hassan, J., e n banc majority ) ; Rounsaville
, 276 S.W. 2d at 794; R ichard , 2022 WL 3071161, at *2

– 6; Cherqui
, 116 S.W.3d at 343

. The en banc majority also asserts that Werner has f ailed to contend on appeal that the Bla ke P art ies ’ gr o ss

- ne gligence theory was no t via ble when the trial

11 Of course, the same result would be true if a plaintiff asserted a gross

- negligence clai m and the tria l court gran ted a defendant’s mo tion for summary judgment holding there was no evidence to suppo rt a gross

- negligence claim. If the trial court holds by either summary judgme nt or direct ed verdict that there is insufficient evidence to su ppor t a gross

- negl i gence claim , then the Admission Rule preclude s submission of any derivative theory of negl igenc e to the jury if the employer has stipulate d that the employee was acting in the course an d scope of his employment.36

cou rt denied Werne r ’ s moti on for directed verdict

. Ant e at 35 ( Hassan, J., e n banc majority )

. In d oing s o, t he en banc majorit y mis characterizes the Wer ner Parties ’ appellate conten ti ons

. The Wer n er Parties contend on appea l tha t (1) “ [ the Blake
Par ties ’ ] str ate gy for inundating the jury with prejudicia l a rgume nts and evid ence related t o Werner rested largel y on the legal questi on of whether they had a vi able gross negligence claim ag ainst Werner ”; (2) “ [ t he Blake Parties] d i d no t posses s a legally valid gr o ss ne gligence claim, and the tri al court erred in allow ing them to push that clai m to evade the Admissi on Rule ” ; (3) “ [t ] here is simply no evidence of the required elements of g ross negligenc e here ” ; (4) “[the Wer ner Parti e s ’] request for a directed v erd ict bas ed on the “ Admission Ru le” should have bee n
g rante d

— it was the only po ssible hope for salvaging th e trial. Without it, the damage to the r ecord and the unfairness of the tr ial proces s could not possibly be
undone ” ; ( 5 ) “ [t ] o the extent it exists, the gross

- negligence exception to the
Admission Rul e d oes n ot apply ” ; and (6) “ [t] he baseless direct neglig ence claims

were u nquestionably harmful and justify a new trial. ”
The en ba nc majority states that Werner moved for a direc ted verdict based

upon “ the alleged absence of evidence capable of supporting ‘ the submission in this case of a direct liability cla im against Werner because here the fact that Mr. Ali was in the course and scope of his employment as a driver for Werner is not disputed. ’ ” A nt e at 3 3 ( Hassan , J., e n banc majority ) (quoting part of Werner ’ s directed

- ver dict motion )

. The en banc majority t hen suggests that Wer ner is materially missta ting the law by failing to mention the exempla ry

- damage exception to the Admiss ion Ru le. See id

. The en banc m ajority indicates that
W erner ’ s motion for directed verdict re lied upon the A dmiss ion Rule but did n o t

a ddr ess t he exemplary

- damage exception. A qu ot e from Werner ’ s motion for
d irected verdict show s that this is not the ca se . In this motion Werner asserted : W e also move fo r directed verdict on the grounds that the re ’ s no37

evidence to support the submissio n in this case of a direct liability claim against Werner because here the fa ct that Mr. Ali was in the course and scope of his e mploy m ent as a d river for Werner is not disp uted. He wa s. He was our d river. He was dr ivi ng ou r truck that day and there ’ s no e vidence that Werner itself was grossly negligent. And I will make a separate motion for directed verdict about that in a minute o r two depending how quick ly I talk, but we d on ’ t believ e there ’ s any evidence to suppo rt the s ubmission of a direct liability

c laim against Werner in this case, so we move for directed verdict.

After goin g back on the record following an off

- the

- record disc uss ion,

c ounsel for Wern e r summariz ed the moti on that he had made be fore the dis cussi on as follows : “ I had moved for a directe d verdict on the claims against Werner for
direct liabil ity because i n this case Mr. Ali ’ s employment, he was in the cour se an d scope at the time of this accident. T hat ’ s not d isputed. And there ’ s no evidenc e t hat
W erner was independently grossly negligent in this cas e, so we move for directed
verdict on those c laims. ” The trial court then d e nied We rner ’ s motion f or directed
verd i ct. Werner ha s no t igno re d or overlo oked the exempla ry

- damage excep tio n to the Admission Rule.
T he en banc majority does not add r es s whether the trial ev ide n ce was legally

s ufficient t o pro ve b y c lear and co nvincing evid ence that the h a r m wit h respect to whi ch t he Blake P ar t i es so ught recove r y of exempl a ry damages r es ult e d f rom W erner ’s g ro ss negligence

. I nstead, the en banc majori t y states that even i f the majority chose to adopt the Ad missio n Rule, the ma jo rity would conclud e that the
B lake P arties ’ allegat ion of gross neg ligence s u ffices t o trigger the exempl ary

damage exc epti o n to the Admission R ule , e v en if the trial eviden ce wa s le gally insufficient to support a gro ss

- negligenc e fi nding. 12 See ante at 35 ( Hassan, J., e n

12 The en banc m a

jority c ites C ri s to v. C.R

. Eng land, In c. in s upport of th is propos ition

. S ee ante
a t 33 ( Hassan, J., e n banc majority ) ; 2 021 W L 801340, at *4 (W.D. Te x. Jan. 7 , 20 21)

. T h e Cristo case d oes not su pport thi s prop osition

. See Cristo , 2021 WL 8013 40, at *4

. I n st ead, the C ris to cou rt s im p ly states that o ther cour t s h ave con cluded that they sh oul d di smis s as a m atter38

banc majority )

. Allowing a plead i ng of gross negl i gence to trigger an exception to
the A dm ission R ule even though no legally suff ici ent e vidence of gross negl igen ce has been admitted at tria l effectively nullifies the Admission Rule in this c ontex t. If
th e Admis sion Ru le bars derivative claims in a case in w hich the plaint iffs do not
al lege g ross negli gence, the result should be the sa me i f the plaintiffs allege gr os s negligence but the evide nce at trial is legally insufficient to support this alle gation

. See Rob in son , 20 22 WL 174520 , at *2

– 5, * 7 ; Ochoa
, 2018 WL 7505640, at * 2

– 3 ; San c hez , 2016 WL 105 87127, at *2, * 4 ; Cahalan
, 2012 WL 1 2 9 1549 6, a t *4

– 6

. The en ba nc m ajority cla ims that its version of the exempl ary

- damage

excep tion maintains the un ifo rmity of this court ’ s juris pruden ce in l ight of this

co ur t ’ s opinion in t he Adams Leasing c ase

. See ante at 35 ( Hassan , J., e n banc majority ) ; Adams Leas ing , 45 6 S .W. 2 d at 576 ( stating
, “ Nor m ay a de fendant
char ged with gross neglige nce in the entrustment of a ve hicle p reclude proof thereof by s tipulating agency on the p art of the per so n to w h om such veh icle is

e ntrusted

. ” )

. As di scus sed ab ove, this gratuitous st atement i n t he Ad ams Leasing opini on was not necess ary to the determinati on of the c ase and was an obit er dictu m ; therefore, this s tatement does not form a part o f this court ’ s j ur is pr u denc e. See A ir Rou ting Intern. , 1 50 S.W.3 d at 692

– 93

. In a ny event, this stat ement does

not confli c t with the adoption of the Admissio n Ru l e wit h a n exempl ary

- damage

ex ception that do es not appl y if the t r ia l evid ence i s le gal l y ins ufficient to sup port a

of law d eriva tive theories of ne gligence i f t he empl oye r do es not dis pute tha t its empl oyee was
ac ting in the course and sc ope of e mplo yment and if no viab le gr oss

- negli gen c e claims rem a in. Se e id

. Th e Cr i sto cou rt gran ted summary jud gm ent as to b oth the request f or ex empla ry damage s and as to the p l ain tiff ’ s deriva tive theories of ne gligence

. See id

. at * 2

– 6. T he availab ility of s umm ary judgment i f the summ ary

- j udg ment e vid e n c e does not rais e a fact is s ue on g ros s negli genc e and th e e mp loyer has a dmi t ted that its empl o yee w as acting in the course

an d sc ope of employ ment do es not me an that an emp loyer m ay n ot obtain a directed verdi ct if t he trial ev i de nce does n o t ra is e a fact i ss u e on gr oss neg lige nce and the e mploye r has ad mi t t ed that it s emp l oyee was acti ng in the cours e a nd sc op e o f empl oyment

. The Cris to court did not st at e or imply that an employer may n ot ob ta in a d i recte d ver dict o n a plai nti ff ’ s re ques t s for

e xem pl ary da mages an d derivative t heori es of ne gligen ce

. I d

.39

gro ss

- negligenc e finding

. See Adams Leasing , 456 S.W

. 2 d at 5 76

. T he Adams Leasing cour t correct ly stated that a stipulat ion by an employer that i t s driver was acting as its agent d o es no t re n d er inadm is sibl e evidence oth erwise a dmissib le a s
p art of the plai nt iff ’ s at t em pt to pro ve the e mployer ’ s al leged gro ss ne g li gence

. See
Adams Leasi ng , 456 S .W

. 2d at 576

. If an employer do es not want evidence
rel evant only to its alleged gr os s negl igence or to a d eriv ative theory t o be
admiss i ble at t ri al
, then the e m ployer m ay admi t that its empl oyee was a ct i ng i n the

co u r s e and sc ope of em ployment a nd file a m otion for summary judgment asserting there is no evid ence of gross negligence and s e ek i ng summa ry judgm en t

as to any deriva tive theori e s u nder th e Admission Rul e

. See Robin son , 20 22 WL
17452 0 , at *2

– 5, * 7 ; San c hez
, 20 1 6 WL 10587127, at *2, * 4 ; C ahalan
, 2 01 2 WL
129 15496, at *4

– 6

. Ho wever, so long as a plainti f f ’ s exemplary

- da m age re ques t and a derivat ive the or y ar e before the c ourt, then t he emplo yer ’ s admission t hat th e

em ploye e was acting as its age n t o r in the cou r s e and s c ope of empl oyment doe s
not ren de r ina d mi ssible otherwise adm issibl e evidence as part of the plaintiff ’ s
at tem pt t o pro ve the employer ’ s a lleg ed gross negli gence or a d erivat ive theory

. The en banc m ajority a lso appears to conclude that a directed ver dict may only be based on t he legal insufficiency of the trial evide nce to support an essen tial
element of the chall enged liability theory and that a directed v erdict may n o t be
based on a legal rul e that bars r ecover y under the challenged liab ility th e ory base d
on the trial ev i d enc e

. This con clusion is erro neous. See Hu rst , 523 S.W.3d at 8 45

– 4 6 ( holding that trial court e rr ed in denying appellant ’s mo tio n for dir e cted

ver d ict and submitt ing a clai m to t he jur y despite a ppellan t ’ s argument t ha t the
cla i m was p recluded a s a matter o f law by the defense of estoppel ) ; Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slov acek, L.L.P. , 97 S.W. 3d 179
, 1 89

– 90 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet. ) ( holding that the trial court di d not err in grant in g directed verdict as to ce rta in br each

- of

- fid u c iary

- duty clai ms based on the rule40

against dividing or fracturing a negli gence clai m against an attorney
, without any
de termination that the trial evidenc e was legally insuffi cient to su pport an essent ial
elem ent of the breach

- of

- fid u c iar y

- dut y clai ms at issue).
T h e tria l court based its judgment in p art on the j ury ’s finding i n r esponse to Qu estion 1 , under which the Blake Parties argued various derivat ive theor ies, and the jur y ’ s f

indi n g i n response to Quest ion 2 b ased on the deriva ti ve theor ies of negli gen t sup er vis i o n th e o ry and n eglige nt training

. If the trial court had g ra nt ed
W ern er ’ s motion fo r direct ed ver dict as to the d er ivative t heor ies
, the tria l court would not have subm itted th e d erivati ve t heories in Q uestion s 1 and Q ue st ion 2 to

t he jury. The tr ial c ourt e r red in not granting Wern e r ’ s motio n for dire cted ver dict

as to these derivative the or ies

. In ren deri ng judgment , t he tr ial court rel i e d on t he jury ’ s det e rminat ion o f p er c e n tages of re sp on sibility in Questi on 5
, b ased o n t he ju ry ’ s consi dera t i on of W erner ’ s n egligence as fou n d by the jury in respons e t o Qu estion s 1 and 2. After consider i ng th e Blake P arties ’ many derivative theories the jury assessed W erner ’ s r esponsi bilit y a t 70%
, Ali ’ s re sponsibility at 14 % , a nd
Salina s ’ s resp onsibility at 16% in Q uestion 5

. I n Question 7, considering only the

resp onsib ility of A li and Sa linas, the jury asse ssed Ali ’ s responsibility at 45% a nd
Salinas ’ s res p onsibility at 55%. If the trial c o urt had grant ed the motion for
di rect ed verdic t, the B lake Parties would not have been able to argue a t length during clo sing a rguments abou t Werner ’s alleged neglige nce b ased on derivative
theor ies , and the jury would no t have answered Questions 1
, 2, 5, a nd 6

. Thes e

ar guments and questions concentra t ed the jur y ’s attention on th e derivative
the ories and pro babl y inflamed the jury against Wer n er , as shown by the jury ’s
fin ding in Q uestion 5 (on which the trial court rende r ed judgment) th at Werner ’s negl igence un der the deri vative th eories c au sed or co n tr ibute d t o the Blake Part ies ’ injuries f ive times as mu ch as Ali ’s negligence did and more t h an four times as
much as Salin as ’s negl i gence did

. See S hick v. Ill. Dep ’t of Hu m an Servs ., 3 07 F.3d41

6 05, 6 11

– 14 ( 7 th Cir

. 2002)

. A reasonab le probab ili ty exists th at th e trial court ’ s

error affected the jur y ’s damage findi n gs in response to Questio ns 8 t h ro ugh 12.
See Mi nce r , s upra , 1 0 Wyo

. L. Rev. at 238; S hick , 3 07 F.3d at 611

– 14 ; M cHaff ie , 891 S.W.2d at 82 6

. Th u s , the tr ial co u r t ’ s erro r i n den ying We rner ’ s di r ec ted

v erdict moti on as to th e d eri vative t heor ies probably caus ed the rend i ti on of an improp e r judgme n t

. See Tex. R. App

. P. 44 .1(a ); Kroger Co. v. Guin n , No. 0 5

- 04

- 01464

- CV
, 2005 W L 19 508 87, at *5 (Tex. A pp

. — Dal l a s Aug. 16, 2 005, n o p et.) (mem. op.). T h e t r ial cour t reversibly e rred in den y in g Werner ’ s motion f or di re cted verdic t as to the d eri vative t h eories a n d i n failing to rende r judgment th at the Blake Parties take n oth i ng as to a ll of the ir d er iva tiv e t heor ies , in c luding th e

ne gligent

- trai ning and neg ligen t

- superv i s ion the ories

. 13 The trial court ’s erro r affects all of the matter in controv ersy and does not affe ct a part that is severable without unfairness to the part ie s ; t herefore , this court may not order a new trial only as to the part a ffected b y t he er ror. See Tex. R. App

. P. 44 .1( b ) ; Ginn v.
Pierce , 595 S.W.3d 762, 76 8

– 69 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). T his court should sust ain the We rner P a rti e s ’ Ad mis s i on Rule arguments d is cusse d ab ove , rev erse the trial court ’s judgment
, re nder judg ment th a t t he Blak e P arties t ake noth ing as to all of their der ivative th eor i es of neg ligence
, and reman d
the ca se to the t ria l court fo r a ne w tr ial , as required b y the interests of justice. 14

13 T he en banc majority asserts that this dissenting opinion “ insist s [this co u rt] must overt urn the jury’s verdict based on the trial court’s implicitl y er ro neous adm iss i on o f evidence that t e nded to p rove the Blakes’ allegations concernin g gross negligence a nd neg ligent superv ision

. ” Ante at 3 7 ( Hassan, J., e n banc majority )

. By think ing t hat this dis sent has erroneo usly concluded that the tri al court a buse d its di s c retion in admitti ng e vi den ce t he en ban c majority mi s under s tand s th is opinion . At no poi nt does th is diss enting opinion e xpli citly or implicit ly ad dress whet her the trial

cour t erred in mak ing any eviden tiary ruling. This dissent ’s c onclu sion that the tri a l court reversibl y er r e d i n deny ing Wern er ’ s motio n for di rected ve rdict does not imply that th e trial

co urt erred in admitti ng any evidence
, and th e conclusion is reached after c o nsideration of all the evidence admitted at tr ial und er the sta nda r d of review appli cabl e to motion s f o r di rected ver dict

.
14 As expla ined in this opinion
, I conclude that this court should rev erse the trial court’s judgment based on the Admission Rule

. If the Supreme Court of Texas were to determine that th e trial42

Se e Tex. R. App . P. 4 3 .3 ; Ginn , 595 S.W.3d a t 76 8

– 6 9 ; K roge r Co. , 2005 W L
19 5 0 887 , at *5

. Instead, the en banc majority affirms the tria l court ’ s judgment
, issuing an opinion in which the en ban c majority erroneousl y concludes that even i f this co urt

were t o adopt the Admission Rule
, the exempl ary

- damage exc eptio n to th is ru le
would a pply because the Blake Parties pleaded gross negligence
, even tho ugh the
tria l evide nce was legally insufficient to support a gross

- neg ligence fin ding

. As Chief Justice Christop her points out in her dissenting opinion
, the en ban c maj ority also applies a n egligence

- duty analys is that conflicts w ith the Sup reme Court of
T e xas ’ s requirement that co urts imposing a negligence dut y on employers mu st
spec ific ally state the negligence d uty in question and may not be apply a ge neral

ne gli gence duty

. See ante at 3 8

– 5 3 ( Hassan, J ., en banc majority ); ante at 5

– 6 (Chris topher, C.J., e n banc dissentin g opinion ) ; P a gayon v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
, 536 S.W.3d 4 99 , 506 (Tex. 2017)

. III

. C ONCL USI ON

T h e en banc majority s hould adopt t he Admis sio n R ul e a nd con c lude that a n

e xempla ry

- damage exce ptio n to t he A d mission Ru le exists if t he injured party
seek s exempla ry damag e s aga inst the employer ba sed o n t he emplo yer ’ s a l l e g ed

gross neg li gence , m ali c e, or f raud
, but that the e x ception doe s n ot app ly if th e t ri a l

ev idence is lega lly in suff icient to suppo rt a f

indin g that cle ar and convi n c i ng evidence p roves th e ha r m w it h resp e ct to which the injured party see ks recov ery of

e x e m pl ary damage s result ed f ro m the e mployer ’ s gross neg ligence
, mali c e , or f rau d

. U n de r t h e ap plicable legal stand ard, it is not appr opria t e f or this c o u rt to exercise i ts dis cre t ion to make its dec is io ns regarding the A dmission Ru le apply

court’s judgment should not b e reverse d b a sed on the Admissio n Rule
, then I conclude that reversal and r emand f

or a new trial would be wa rranted for the reasons stated in Part II.A of Chief Ju stice Christopher’s en banc dissenting opinion . T here fore I join Part II .A

.43

prospect ive l y on l y

. T he trial court revers ibly e rr ed in d en y ing Werner ’ s motion for d irect e d

v erdic t a s to de ri vative theor ies an d in failing t o render ju dgmen t that the Blake
Parties take n o t hing as to all of t he d erivative th eor ies
, including t h e neglig ent

tr ainin g a nd negl ige n t

- sup ervi sion theo ries . T his court should sust ain the We rne r P a rtie s ’ Ad mis s i on R ule arguments , rev erse t he trial cou rt ’s judgment
, render judg ment th a t t he Blake Parties take noth in g as to all of their derivative theor i es of

neg ligence
, and r emand the ca se to the t ria l cou rt fo r a ne w tr ial. 15 Because the en
banc majority i n stead affirms the tria l court ’ s jud gmen t , I respectfully dissent.

/s/ Randy Wilso n Just ice En banc court consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise, Jewell, Bourliot, Zimmerer, Spa in, Hassan, Po issan t, and Wilson. Justice Hassan authored the En B a nc M ajor ity Opinion , in which J ustices Bourliot, Zimmerer, Spain, and Poissant j oin ed. Chie f Justice C hristoph er authored an En Banc Dissenting Opini on , in whic h Justice s Wise, Jewell, and Wilson joined as to P art I and P art II.A for the reasons stated i n p age 6 a nd foo tnote 14 of Justice Wilson ’ s En Ban c Dissenting Opinion

. J us t i ce Wils on authored a n En Ban c Dissenting Opinion , in which Justice s Wise an d J ewe ll joined

.

15 When a pa rty re ceives fa vo r able jury findings on two or more theor ies of recovery that yield different damage amounts , that party may elect the theory of recovery up on which the party wishe s to recover. See Birchfield v. Texarka na Mem

. Hosp. , 747 S.W.2d 361, 36 7 (T ex

. 1987 )

. By elec ting to recover based on o ne theor y , t he prevailing party does not waive any alternati ve theories of recovery and m a y seek recovery under one of these alterna tive theories in a motion for rehearing if the appellate court reverses the judg me nt. Se e B oy ce Ir on Wo rks v. S w

. Bell Tel

. Co. , 747 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. 1988)

. After a party seek s recovery under an alternative theor y of recovery in a motion for rehearing
, any opposing party may respond and assert a ll object ions

or argu me nts th a t th e opposing party ha s to ren ditio n of judgment based on the alter native th eory. See B eal Ban k

, S.S.B. v. Schleider
, 124 S.W.3d 640, 650, n. 4 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Thus far in this ca se , no party has addressed whet he r t h e B la ke Parties p roperly c o uld mak e a Boy ce I ron W or ks ele ction to rec over ba sed on the jury ’ s fin ding in response to Question 6 or in response to Question 7. See E nergy Mai ntenance Servi ces Gr oup I v. Sa ndt
, 401 S .W.3d 204, 2 18, n.9 (Tex. A pp.

— Ho ust o n [ 14 th Dist.] 20 12, pet. d enie d)

. Becaus e th is is sue is n ot be fore th e court to day
, I do not take any position on it

. See i d

.