NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:
PETER SZANTO,

Debtor

___________________________________ PETER SZANTO ,

Appellant,

v.

U NITED S TATES TRUSTEE ,

Appellee. No. 2 1

- 60035

BAP No. 20

- 1106

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Taylor, Lafferty III, and Brand, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Submitted January 4, 2024 * *

Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ , Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JAN 4 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Peter Szanto appeals pro se from the B ankruptcy A ppellant P anel’s (BAP)
order affirming the B ankruptcy C ourt ’ s order denying Szanto discharge in his
chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
We review decisions of the BAP de novo and apply the standard of review applied
by the BAP to the B ankruptcy C ourt ’ s decision. In re Boyajian , 564 F.3d 1088, 1090
(9th Cir. 2009)

. The BAP reviewed the B ankruptcy C ourt decision in this case using
the following standards: (1) the B ankruptcy C ourt’s determinations of the historical

facts we re reviewed for clear error; (2) the selection of the applicable legal rules

under 11 U.S.C. § 727 were reviewed de novo; and (3) the application of the facts
to those rules requiring the exercise of judgments about values animating the rules

was reviewed de novo. We affirm.

The B ankruptcy C ourt did not abuse its discretion by denying Szanto
discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) . The B ankruptcy C ourt identified four grounds
for denial of discharge; in each case, its factual determinations survive clear error
review and its legal determinations survive de novo review.

The B ankruptcy C ourt correctly determined that denial of discharge was
proper under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(B), which provides that a debtor shall not be
granted a discharge if, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or trustee
,
he transfers or conceals estate assets. The record shows transfers and concealment
by Szanto with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.3

The B ankruptcy C ourt correctly determined that denial of discharge was
proper under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)( 4 )( A ) , which provides that a debtor shall not be
granted a discharge if the debtor knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or

account , provided that “the relevant false oath relate[s] to a material fact.” In re Retz , 606 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) . The record shows that Szanto , under penalty
of perjury, repeatedly provided false accounts of his finances
, with staggering

omissions totaling over a million dollars.

The B ankruptcy C ourt correctly determined that denial of discharge was
proper under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(D) , which provides that a debtor shall not be
granted a discharge if he knowingly and fraudulently withholds from an officer of
the estate recorded information relating to his property or financial affairs. The

record shows that Szanto knowingly and fraudulently withheld accounting and
financial statements from the chapter 7 trustee.
Finally, t he B ankruptcy C ourt correctly determined that denial of discharge
was proper under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(A) , which provides that a debtor shall not
be granted a discharge if he refused to obey a lawful order of the B ankruptcy C ourt.
“[I]t is totally within the discretion of the [ B ] ankruptcy [ C ] ourt to find a particular

violation of the [ C ] ourt ’ s order so serious as to require denial of discharge.” In re

Devers , 759 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1985). The record shows that Szanto repeatedly
refused to obey the orders of the B ankruptcy C ourt

.4

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v.
Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.