United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 22-1499

UNIVERSAL TRADING & INVESTMENT CO., INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

FOUNDATION HONESTY INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

BUREAU FOR REPRESENTING UKRAINIAN INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL

AND FOREIGN COURTS; UKRAINIAN PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE;

UKRAINE,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Chief Judge,

Howard and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

Stephen F. Reardon, with whom Law Office of Stephen F. Reardon

was on brief, for appellant.

Robert M. Shaw, with whom Ralph T. Lepore, III, and Holland 

& Knight LLP were on brief, for appellees.
November 27, 2023
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MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. This case of international 

dimensions returns to us for the second time.

In the 1990s, Cube, Ltd. ("Cube"), a Ukrainian company, 

which later was reorganized to become United Energy Systems of 

Ukraine ("UESU"), hired Universal Trading & Investment Company, 

Inc. ("UTICo") to help it recover lost assets. Through the 

intervention of Pavlo Lazarenko, the former Prime Minister of 

Ukraine, UESU had been awarded a lucrative government contract. 

But the proceeds of the contract were going missing; someone was 

diverting the assets. In connection with UTICo's work to help 

Cube and UESU recover the converted assets, UTICo discovered that 

Lazarenko was using Cube and UESU to siphon money into his personal 

offshore accounts. UTICo contacted the Ukrainian Prosecutor 

General's Office ("UPGO") and other Ukrainian agencies to report 

the fraudulent relationship. 

Based on UTICo's helpful sharing of information, UPGO 

enlisted UTICo to assist it in tracing and recovering assets that 

Lazarenko and his accomplice, Petro Kiritchenko, allegedly had 

stolen from Ukraine. UPGO agreed to provide UTICo a 12% commission 

on certain assets "returned to Ukraine, in connection with" the 

agreement. Approximately $15 million of the siphoned assets 

finally have been returned to Ukraine.1

1 Unless expressly noted otherwise, the financial figures 

in this opinion refer to U.S. dollars.
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In the instant case, UTICo has sued Ukraine, UPGO, and 

the Bureau for Representing Ukrainian Interests in International 

and Foreign Courts (the "Bureau") (collectively, the "Ukrainian 

defendants"), claiming that it has helped block and freeze assets 

all over the world and is owed a commission for its work. We 

previously affirmed the district court's exercise of jurisdiction 

over UTICo's breach-of-contract claim, finding that the Ukrainian 

defendants' transactions with UTICo were exempt from immunity 

under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the "FSIA"), 

28 U.S.C. § 1604. Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Bureau for 

Representing Ukrainian Ints. in Int'l & Foreign Cts. ("UTICo II"), 

727 F.3d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 2013).

Following our resolution of the appeal, the parties 

engaged in discovery and additional motion practice before the 

district court. In analyzing UTICo's breach-of-contract claim, 

the district court construed each asset recovery and failure to 

pay a commission as a separate claim for breach of contract. 

Universal Trading & Inv. Co., Inc. v. Bureau for Representing 

Ukrainian Ints. in Int'l & Foreign Cts. ("UTICo III"), 605 F. Supp. 

3d 273, 291 n.11 (D. Mass. 2022). It ultimately dismissed all the 

breach-of-contract claims because some were not ripe, others were 

barred by the statute of limitations, and the single remaining 

claim failed on the merits. See id. at 290-99. The district court 
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also denied UTICo's motions to amend the complaint and several of 

UTICo's discovery-related requests. See id. at 286-88.

UTICo now appeals each of those decisions, arguing that 

its breach-of-contract claims should survive summary judgment, 

that it should be allowed to amend the complaint, and that it 

should be permitted to conduct additional discovery. Finding no 

error in the district court's opinion, we affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

We assume the parties' familiarity with the factual 

context of this case and focus our recitation of the facts on those 

relevant to the instant appeal. Because the primary issue on 

appeal is the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor 

of the Ukrainian defendants on UTICo's breach-of-contract claims, 

we take the facts in the light most favorable to UTICo and draw 

all reasonable inferences therefrom in UTICo's favor. See

Pleasantdale Condos., LLC v. Wakefield, 37 F.4th 728, 730 (1st 

Cir. 2022).

1. The Contractual Arrangement

UTICo is a Massachusetts corporation that offers 

international asset recovery services. After UTICo informed UPGO 

and other Ukrainian agencies of its discovery that Lazarenko, then 

the First Deputy Prime Minister and eventually the Prime Minister 

of Ukraine, was stealing money owed to the Ukrainian government, 
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UPGO hired UTICo to assist it in recovering assets related to UESU 

and its parent company, United Energy International, Ltd. 

On May 15, 1998, UTICo and UPGO reached their first 

agreement (the "May 1998 Agreement"). That agreement stated: 

"Taking into account information and assistance that [UTICo] is 

providing[,] . . . [UPGO] has agreed that [UTICo] will be 

attributed a commission of 12 (twelve) percent on all and any above 

assets to be returned to Ukraine, in connection with the Power of 

Attorney" that was executed alongside the May 1998 Agreement. The 

May 1998 Agreement further clarified that renumeration could not 

be paid from the State budget of Ukraine; instead, it was payable 

only "from the assets to be repatriated to Ukraine from outside of 

Ukraine." 

In the months and years that followed, UPGO executed 

additional agreements relating to the May 1998 Agreement and 

granted UTICo powers of attorney to pursue various asset 

investigations across the globe. The additional powers of attorney 

contemplated work in the United States, the British Virgin Islands, 

Guernsey, the Bahamas, Panama, and other countries. But none of 

the powers of attorney contemplated work in Switzerland. 

While UTICo performed work for UPGO, UPGO twice 

confirmed the validity of the contractual arrangement. 

Specifically, on October 2, 1998, UPGO sent a letter to George 

Lambert, UTICo's President, "certify[ing] the previously agreed 
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terms in regard to the unlawful assets outside of Ukraine." And 

almost a year later, in August 1999, Nikolai Obikhod, then the 

Deputy Prosecutor General of Ukraine, wrote to Lambert, 

recognizing "the work accomplished by, and the assistance from, 

[UTICo]" in tracing assets and affirming that UTICo was entitled 

to "12% of all funds returned to Ukraine from outside of its 

borders with the assistance of UTICo." 

2. Investigation and Blocking of Assets

i. UTICo Investigation

No one disputes that UTICo was instrumental in helping 

the Ukrainian defendants investigate and freeze millions of 

dollars in assets around the world that had been expatriated from 

Ukraine. 

Some of that assistance was provided prior to the 

execution of the May 1998 Agreement. For example, in October 1997, 

UTICo shared several documents with UPGO concerning UESU and 

Somolli Enterprises Ltd. ("Somolli"), an offshore entity through 
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which UESU diverted funds.2 And during an April 1998 meeting 

between Obikhod and UTICo to negotiate the May 1998 Agreement, 

UTICo disclosed to UPGO that (1) UESU's assets were controlled by 

Bassington Ltd. ("Bassington"), an offshore entity incorporated in 

the British Virgin Islands, and (2) UTICo had additional evidence 

tracing the diversion of UESU assets. Through its work, UTICo 

dissected a four-tier subsidiary scheme and traced ownership of 

UESU and its parent company back to Bassington. 

UTICo obtained and shared evidence with the Ukrainian 

defendants after the May 1998 Agreement went into effect as well. 

Pursuant to the numerous powers of attorney executed in connection 

with the May 1998 Agreement, UTICo gathered evidence from across 

the globe, obtaining additional information about Bassington and 

other entities involved in Lazarenko's money-laundering scheme, 

such as Bainfield Co. ("Bainfield"); Orphin S.A. ("Orphin"); 

Wilnorth, Inc. ("Wilnorth"); and GHP, Corp. ("GHP").

2 UTICo's involvement in Ukrainian recovery projects began 

in July 1993 when Cube hired UTICo to trace lost assets. At the 

time, Cube had a contract with Ukraine that required Cube to 

deliver ferrous metals to China. But Cube lost roughly half the 

value of the first delivery of the metals. The converted funds 

had passed through Indian intermediaries. UTICo traced the assets 

and was able to recover $660,000 for Cube. Cube asked UTICo to 

direct the recovered $660,000 to an account held in the name of 

Somolli. As UTICo continued to perform work for Cube and then 

UESU and learned about Lazarenko's involvement in the 

organizations, UTICo developed suspicions that Cube did not report 

the $660,000 recovery to Ukraine. Based on its suspicions, UTICo 

promptly transferred evidence about the transaction and Somolli to 

UPGO and other Ukrainian agencies. 
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UTICo performed much of its work abroad in places like 

the British Virgin Islands and Panama. But it also performed, or 

at least attempted to perform, extensive work for the Ukrainian 

defendants in the United States. Specifically, in 1999, UTICo 

learned that Lazarenko and Kiritchenko had used expatriated assets 

to purchase real estate in California and instigated proceedings 

in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

California to recover the real estate. On April 13, 1999, acting 

as amicus curiae for UTICo, UPGO sent a letter to the Northern 

District of California, which purportedly assigned UPGO's claims 

to the real estate to UTICo (the "1999 California Assignment"). 

In the letter, UPGO explained to the court that (1) Kiritchenko 

was facing prosecution in Ukraine, (2) Kiritchenko purchased the 

California properties with expatriated assets, and (3) UPGO 

supported UTICo's lawsuit to attach all Kiritchenko's realty in 

the United States, which was acquired with the laundered funds. 

UPGO also gave UTICo power of attorney to pursue the assets of 

Lazarenko, Kiritchenko, and their co-conspirators in the United 

States. 

Despite UPGO's letter, a dispute over UTICo's standing 

to sue on UPGO's behalf ensued. The district court ultimately 

concluded that UTICo did not have standing because the purported 

assignment of Ukraine's claims to UTICo was invalid and the various 

powers of attorney were not equivalent to an assignment of 
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ownership. Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Kiritchenko, No. 

C-99-3073 MMC, 2007 WL 2669841, at *20-21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 

2007). The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Universal Trading & Inv. Co.

v. Kiritchenko, 346 F. App'x 232 (9th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, 

UTICo was unable to recover the U.S. properties.

In addition to the evidence regarding activities in the 

United States, UTICo also recovered evidence of Kiritchenko's and 

Lazarenko's activities in Switzerland. None of the powers of 

attorney between UPGO and UTICo specifically contemplated UTICo 

performing work in Switzerland. But through the course of UTICo's 

investigations, it developed evidence that Kiritchenko and 

Lazarenko held assets at various Swiss banks, including Credit 

Suisse, SCS Alliance, and Banque Populaire Suisse. 

ii. Swiss Investigation

UTICo was not the only group to investigate Lazarenko 

and Kiritchenko's international money-laundering scheme. Prior to 

the execution of the May 1998 Agreement, the Swiss and Ukrainian 

governments also had been in communication, and the Swiss 

government launched its own investigation. 

Starting in January 1998, UPGO sent letters rogatory to 

the Swiss authorities, seeking assistance in investigating 

Kiritchenko and his co-conspirators. In a supplementary request 

dated February 14, 1998, UPGO indicated that Kiritchenko was 

suspected of money laundering and that Kiritchenko was the 
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beneficiary of GHP -- an entity implicated in the laundering 

scheme. In response, on March 6, 1998, Switzerland opened a 

criminal investigation to determine whether money laundering or 

other financial crimes had been committed in Geneva. 

In connection with the Swiss investigation, a Swiss 

investigating judge ordered the seizure of documents concerning 

bank accounts opened in Kiritchenko's name and started freezing 

those accounts' assets. A June 25, 1999 opinion by the Swiss 

Federal Tribunal (the "June 1999 decision") details the Swiss 

investigating judge's inquiry and the contents of UPGO's January 

and February 1998 letters rogatory. 

According to the June 1999 decision, in mid-March 1998, 

the Swiss investigating judge ordered SCS Alliance to supply all 

documents concerning GHP's bank account and other accounts opened 

in Kiritchenko's name, as well as the names of the other suspected 

individuals. On March 27 and April 1, 1998, SCS Alliance responded 

with information about bank accounts opened in Kiritchenko's name 

as well as a bank account opened in the name of a family member. 

The bank also supplied information about accounts held in the 

following entities' names: Bainfield; Wilnorth; GHP; Brancross 

Ltd. of Antigua ("Brancross"); European Federal Credit Bank Ltd. 

("European Federal"); and Zeneta Foundation of Vaduz ("Zeneta"). 

Thus, the Swiss authorities got tipped off to Lazarenko's and 
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Kiritchenko's involvement in these entities before UPGO and UTICo 

executed their May 1998 Agreement.

Around the same time, the Swiss investigating judge met 

with an investigating judge from Kiev, Ukraine. At a March 27, 

1998 meeting between the judges, the Swiss investigating judge 

provided the Ukrainian investigating judge with references to the 

offshore companies that had accounts at SCS Alliance. The Swiss 

investigating judge specifically highlighted accounts for which 

Kiritchenko appeared to be a beneficiary that Ukraine had not 

mentioned in its prior letters rogatory -- that is, Brancross, 

Wilnorth, European Federal, Zeneta, and Bainfield. 

In April 1998, UPGO continued to supplement its earlier 

letters rogatory. Those letters provided a range of additional 

information, including (1) details on a contract whose proceeds 

allegedly were paid into Bainfield's Swiss account, (2) an 

explanation of Lazarenko's suspected involvement in the 

money-laundering scheme, and (3) identification of other bank 

accounts at SCS Alliance and Credit Suisse allegedly implicated in 

the scheme. And so, the Swiss investigating judge continued to 

request information and seize accounts held in Kiritchenko's and 

Lazarenko's names, as well as accounts opened by the companies 

implicated in the laundering scheme, at Credit Suisse and SCS 

Alliance. 
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All told, before May 15, 1998 -- the date on which UTICo 

and UPGO entered their first agreement -- the Swiss investigating 

judge had received information on and ordered the seizure of the 

following accounts at SCS Alliance:

• 5317, held by Kiritchenko;

• 5383, held by Bainfield;

• 5451, held by Wilnorth;

• 5452, held by GHP;

• 5482, held by Brancross;

• 5484, held by Izabella Kiritchenko;

• 5491, held by European Federal; and

• 5522, held by Zeneta. 

And at Credit Suisse, the Swiss investigating judge had received 

information on and ordered the seizure of the following accounts:

• 875.709.72, held by Paddox Industries Ltd. 

("Paddox");

• 823.896.2, held by GHP; and

• 562.927.6, held by European Federal. 

iii. Swiss Judgments

The proceedings in Switzerland ultimately led to two 

judgments -- one against Lazarenko and the other against 

Kiritchenko.
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On June 28, 2000, the Court of Police in Geneva found 

Lazarenko guilty of money laundering and ordered him to pay nearly 

10.7 million Swiss francs to Geneva (the "June 2000 Swiss court 

judgment"). Although the judgment required Lazarenko to pay 

Geneva, Switzerland ultimately transferred most of the funds to 

Ukraine.

About two months later, on August 30, 2000, the Attorney 

General of Geneva issued a condemnation ruling against 

Kiritchenko, finding him guilty of money laundering (the "August 

2000 Swiss court judgment"). As a part of Kiritchenko's penalty, 

the Attorney General required Kiritchenko to pay a fine of 1 

million Swiss francs and ordered the transfer of certain assets 

held at Credit Suisse and SCS Alliance to Ukraine.3 Specifically, 

the August 2000 Swiss court judgment ordered the transfer of assets 

deposited in the following accounts at SCS Alliance:

• 5317, held by Kiritchenko4;

3 The condemnation ruling also transferred some assets to 

Geneva, specifically those held in account 5491 at SCS Alliance 

and those held in account 562.927 at Credit Suisse. 

4 Somewhat confusingly, the August 2000 Swiss court 

judgment states that account 5317 was "apparently not used to 

receive or channel the benefits of any illicit activity by . . .

Lazarenko or any other third party," see Appellant's App. at 2115, 

but then orders a portion of the deposits held at account 5317 to 

be transferred to Ukraine, see id. at 2118 (permitting the release 

of the seizure on account 5317 after the transfer to Ukraine of 

roughly $3.1 million held in the account). Apparently, just a 

portion of the funds in account 5317 were connected to the scheme.
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• 5383, held by Bainfield;

• 5451, held by Wilnorth;

• 5452, held by GHP;

• 5482, held by Brancross; and 

• 5522, held by Zeneta. 

And it further ordered the transfer of assets deposited in the 

following accounts at Credit Suisse:

• 875.709.72, held by Paddox;

• 823.896.22, held by GHP; and

• 21383, held by Kiritchenko. 

The fine of 1 million Swiss francs was to be paid from account 

5484, held by an entity named May at SCS Alliance. 

Nearly all the accounts listed in the August 2000 Swiss 

court judgment overlap with those identified and investigated by 

Switzerland as a part of its investigation. See supra Part 

I.A.2.ii. Only account 21383, held in the name of Kiritchenko at 

Credit Suisse, was not explicitly named in the June 1999 decision. 

Although the account was not explicitly named in the June 1999 

decision, the decision indicates that the Swiss investigating 

judge had requested information for all accounts that "had been 

opened in the name[] of . . . Kiritchenko" and "ordered the seizure 

of [those] accounts."
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iv. Transfer of Swiss Assets to Ukraine

The two Swiss proceedings ultimately resulted in the 

transfer of roughly $15 million to Ukraine.5 Those funds made 

their way to Ukraine in three tranches:

• Approximately 10.6 million Swiss francs ("tranche 

one") seized in connection with the June 2000 Swiss 

court judgment were transferred to UPGO's escrow 

account in October 2000. In March 2001, the funds 

were transferred to the Ukrainian treasury. 

• Approximately $4,058,000 ("tranche two") seized in 

connection with the August 2000 Swiss court 

judgment were transferred to UPGO's escrow account 

in October 2000. In March 2009, the funds were 

transferred to the Ukrainian treasury. 

• Approximately $1,744,980 ("tranche three") were 

transferred to the Ukrainian treasury in April 

2002. The parties disagree as to whether 

Kiritchenko voluntarily returned this money or 

5 Technically, the returned funds sum to only about 12.3 

million U.S. dollars because the 10.6 million Swiss francs returned 

in tranche one equated to roughly 6.5 million U.S. dollars at the 

time the June 2000 Swiss court judgment was issued. Throughout 

this litigation, however, the parties and the district court have 

referred to the returned funds as the $15 million in Swiss assets. 

For consistency, we will do the same.
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returned it pursuant to the August 2000 Swiss court 

judgment. 

v. Blocking of Other Assets

The Swiss assets are not the only assets to have been 

blocked. The parties agree that nearly $270 million of assets 

connected to the money-laundering scheme have been blocked in 

Switzerland and beyond. But the Ukrainian defendants represent 

that only the above-mentioned Swiss assets have been returned to 

Ukraine. 

B. Procedural History

On November 26, 2010, UTICo6 sued the Ukrainian 

defendants, alleging that the Ukrainian defendants breached their 

contractual duties under the May 1998 Agreement. UTICo also 

alleged that the Ukrainian defendants breached the 1999 California 

Assignment, were unjustly enriched, breached their fiduciary 

duties to UTICo, made misrepresentations to UTICo, and negligently 

failed to convey certain information to UTICo. It also asked the 

court to declare that: (1) UTICo is not subject to Ukrainian 

jurisdiction; (2) Ukrainian court decisions concerning UTICo would 

6 Foundation Honesty International, Inc. initially sued 

alongside UTICo. But following the Ukrainian defendants' motion 

to dismiss, the district court dismissed Foundation Honesty 

International, Inc. as a plaintiff. Universal Trading & Inv. Co.

v. Bureau for Representing Ukrainian Ints. in Int'l & Foreign Cts.

("UTICo I"), 898 F. Supp. 2d 301, 326 (D. Mass. 2012).
- 18 -

not be recognized in Massachusetts; and (3) a power of attorney 

executed on April 30, 1999, was in effect until June 5, 2010, when 

the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on a 

petition related to the California litigation, see Universal 

Trading & Inv. Co. v. Kiritchenko, 561 U.S. 1038 (2010) (mem.). 

The Ukrainian defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 

in its entirety, arguing that (1) they were immune from suit; (2) 

Massachusetts was an improper venue for the suit; and (3) UTICo 

failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. 

The district court granted in part and denied in part 

the Ukrainian defendants' motion to dismiss. UTICo I, 898 

F. Supp. 2d at 326. Specifically, the district court concluded 

that it could assert jurisdiction over UTICo's breach-of-contract 

claim relating to the May 1998 agreement under the commercial 

activity exception to the FSIA and that UTICo had adequately pled

this claim. Id. at 316-17, 319-21. The court also determined 

that venue was proper in Massachusetts. Id. at 317-18. But the 

district court dismissed the majority of UTICo's other claims 
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because it found that each claim failed to state a claim for which 

relief could be granted.7 See id. at 318-25.

The Ukrainian defendants appealed the district court's 

assertion of jurisdiction, and we affirmed. UTICo II, 727 F.3d at 

12. Like the district court, we found that the commercial activity 

exception to the FSIA permitted the court to exercise jurisdiction 

over the May 1998 Agreement breach-of-contract claim, reasoning 

that the "asset recovery services . . . described in UTICo's 

complaint [were] exactly the sort for which private citizens 

contract," id. at 20, and that the May 1998 Agreement did "not 

impinge on Ukraine's sovereignty because [it] d[id] not . . .

require [Ukraine] to reappropriate any assets into the Ukrainian 

treasury that [the] defendants decide[d] not to reappropriate," 

id. at 22.

Back in the district court, the parties engaged in

limited discovery relating to the timeliness of UTICo's 

breach-of-contract claim. Both parties filed motions for summary 

judgment on the statute-of-limitations question. Following a 

7 In addition to the breach-of-contract claim relating to 

the May 1998 Agreement, the district court permitted UTICo's 

request for a declaration of the duration of the April 30, 1999 

power of attorney to proceed. UTICo I, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 326. 

But the district court's allowance of UTICo's request for 

declaratory relief was limited: the district court allowed it to 

proceed only insofar as the duration of the April 30, 1999 power 

of attorney might be implicated in resolution of the 

breach-of-contract claim. Id.
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February 18, 2015 hearing on the cross-motions for summary 

judgment, the district court denied UTICo's motion. 

On May 16, 2018, the district court held a second hearing 

on the Ukrainian defendants' motion for summary judgment. The 

district court ultimately denied the Ukrainian defendants' motion. 

But during the hearing, it also narrowed the scope of the claims 

before it. It determined that UTICo's claims for breach of 

contract became ripe only when the relevant assets were actually 

repatriated to Ukraine. And because only the roughly $15 million 

in assets connected to the June 2000 Swiss court judgment and the 

August 2000 Swiss court judgment (the "Swiss assets") had been 

repatriated to Ukraine, the district court limited UTICo's 

breach-of-contract claim in the case to the Swiss assets. 

In the time between the two hearings, UTICo had moved to 

amend its complaint. The district court also addressed this motion 

at the May 16, 2018 hearing. It denied the motion, reasoning that 

to the extent UTICo was attempting to add allegations that the 

Ukrainian defendants breached the duty of good faith and fair 

dealing, UTICo had failed to meaningfully explain these theories 

of recovery. It also emphasized UTICo's delay in seeking to amend 

the complaint and how UTICo did not even attach a proposed amended 

complaint to its motion. See UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 285.

After additional discovery, on February 8, 2019, the 

Ukrainian defendants moved for summary judgment a second time, 
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arguing that the remaining breach-of-contract claims were barred 

by the statute of limitations and that, in any event, the claims 

failed on the merits. In response, UTICo moved under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 56(d) to conduct additional discovery, arguing 

that it lacked sufficient discovery to defend against the Ukrainian 

defendants' motion. While the Ukrainian defendants' motion for 

summary judgment and UTICo's Rule 56(d) motion remained pending, 

the parties also prepared for trial, filing proposed findings of 

fact, proposed conclusions of law, and trial memoranda. UTICo 

then belatedly moved to amend the complaint and cross-moved for 

partial summary judgment. 

In a detailed decision issued on June 1, 2022, the 

district court granted the Ukrainian defendants' second motion for 

summary judgment, finding that UTICo's breach-of-contract claims 

connected to the two tranches of Swiss assets repatriated to 

Ukraine in 2001 and 2002 -- that is, tranches 1 and 3 -- were 

barred by the statute of limitations and that the remaining claim 

failed on the merits. UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 280, 293, 

299. The court also denied UTICo's other motions, reasoning that 

the Rule 56(d) motion simply sought to relitigate discovery 

disputes to no avail and that the motion to amend was both late 

and futile. Id. at 286-88.

On June 1, 2022, the district court entered judgment in 

favor of the Ukrainian defendants. This timely appeal followed. 
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II. Discussion

On appeal, UTICo challenges each of the district court's 

rulings in the June 1, 2022 decision. UTICo also seeks review of 

the district court's determination that UTICo's breach-of-contract 

claim was ripe only as it related to the $15 million of Swiss 

assets that have been transferred to the Ukrainian treasury. 

Finally, UTICo argues that the district court abused its discretion 

by denying UTICo's three motions to amend. We address each 

argument in turn, beginning with UTICo's contention that the 

district court erred in limiting its breach-of-contract claim to 

those relating to the $15 million of Swiss assets.

A. Non-Repatriated Assets

UTICo first takes issue with the district court's 

discarding of the portion of UTICo's breach-of-contract claim 

premised upon the $260 million of blocked assets that are 

unconnected to the two Swiss court judgments. But its grievances 

can be disposed of quickly because they stem primarily from a 

misunderstanding of what exactly occurred at the May 16, 2018 

hearing.

UTICo misinterprets the nature of the district court's 

May 16, 2018 order and June 1, 2022 decision. UTICo asserts that,

during the May 16, 2018 hearing, the district court did not dismiss 

the claims premised upon the $260 million of blocked assets not 

encompassed in the Swiss assets, but rather it bifurcated the trial 
- 23 -

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b). Under the bifurcated 

trial, says UTICo, the parties would first try the case as it 

related to the $15 million in Swiss assets and then separately 

address the breach-of-contract claim relating to the remaining 

$260 million in blocked assets. UTICo further contends that the 

district court then forgot about the bifurcation, thereby denying 

UTICo an opportunity to conduct discovery on the $260 million worth 

of assets and improperly expanding the scope of the Ukrainian 

defendants' second summary judgment motion to include all assets.

But the district court did no such thing. At the May 

16, 2018 hearing, the district court made no mention of Rule 42(b). 

Rather, it noted that UTICo's breach-of-contract claim was not 

ripe insofar as it was based on non-repatriated assets and 

therefore dismissed the claims relating to the blocked -- but not 

yet repatriated -- $260 million. See Appellant Addendum at 45 

("At this point only the Swiss assets are litigable."). In doing 

so, the district court made clear that it was not deciding the 

merits of UTICo's breach-of-contract claims as to those assets.8 

8 The Ukrainian defendants also appeared to understand 

that UTICo was not foreclosed from bringing an action in the future 

based on the blocked, but not yet repatriated, assets should those 

assets someday be repatriated. See Transcript of Motion Hearing 

at 29-30, Dist. Ct. Docket Item 168 (counsel for the Ukrainian 

defendants acknowledging the court's "point" concerning future 

repatriation and recognizing that "[d]own the line[,] who knows 

what happens [regarding an action] if assets are repatriated in 

the future?").
- 24 -

See Transcript of Motion Hearing at 39-40, Dist. Ct. Docket Item 

168 (noting that the court was not granting "judgment on the 

merits" on the non-Swiss assets). In other words, it left open 

the possibility for UTICo to bring a new lawsuit if those assets 

are someday repatriated. 

On appeal, UTICo does not otherwise dispute the district 

court's ruling that its breach-of-contract claims relating to the 

non-repatriated assets are not ripe. In fact, its 

statute-of-limitations arguments are premised on repatriation 

being defined as the point at which a breach-of-contract claim 

ripens. 

Instead, UTICo attempts to circumvent the ripeness issue 

by asserting a different theory as to the non-repatriated assets: 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

But that theory is notably absent from UTICo's initial complaint,

and, for reasons explained infra, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying UTICo's subsequent requests to amend the 

complaint to add a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing based on the Ukrainian defendants' alleged 

failure to repatriate assets.

UTICo's arguments that the district court improperly 

dismissed and denied UTICo discovery on its breach-of-contract 

claim relating to the $260 million non-repatriated assets thus are 

without merit. Indeed, its underlying assumption that the district 
- 25 -

court granted summary judgment on the merits of this claim is 

incorrect. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of 

the portion of UTICo's breach-of-contract claim relating to the 

non-repatriated assets as unripe.

B. Swiss Assets

UTICo next challenges the district court's determination 

that the Ukrainian defendants were entitled to summary judgment on 

the portion of UTICo's breach-of-contract claim related to the 

Swiss assets that have been transferred to the Ukrainian treasury. 

It argues that the district court erred in finding that the statute 

of limitations barred UTICo's claims connected to tranches one and 

three and that equitable tolling was not warranted. UTICo also 

argues that it has raised a genuine issue as to whether it assisted 

the Ukrainian defendants in recovering the three tranches.9 

9 UTICo additionally contends that the district court 

erred in dividing the assets at issue in this litigation for 

purposes of determining accrual into the "Swiss assets" and other 

non-repatriated assets. In pressing this contention, UTICo argues 

that the contract does not contemplate divisibility but instead 

contemplates that the "worldwide assets," with respect to which 

UTICo's services were contracted, are to be treated as a "whole." 

The upshot of this contention, it seems, is that any claim to a 

commission owed on the Swiss assets, so defined, is also unripe 

insofar as the whole package of assets contemplated by the parties'

contract has not been repatriated. And accordingly, there is no 

basis for the district court to have passed on the statute of 

limitations and merits questions with respect to any claims based 

on the Swiss assets. However, aside from asserting that there is 

no basis on the face of the contract for concluding that the 

contract is divisible, UTICo fails to develop any argument that 

the district court erred in its application of Massachusetts law 

when it concluded that the contract was divisible for 
- 26 -

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Potvin v. Speedway LLC, 891 F.3d 410, 413-14 (1st Cir. 

2018); see Barraford v. T & N Ltd., 778 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir. 

2015) (review of grant of summary judgment on 

statute-of-limitations grounds is de novo). "We will affirm the 

entry of summary judgment if -- and only if -- the facts," as

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, "show beyond 

any legitimate question the movant's entitlement to judgment as a 

matter of law." Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 

F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although we 

must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 

the nonmovant, we are not obligated "to draw unreasonable

inferences or credit bald assertions, empty conclusions, [or] rank 

conjecture." Cabán Hernández, 486 F.3d at 8 (emphasis omitted).

1. Statute of Limitations

The parties agree that the relevant statute of 

limitations is six years and that UTICo's cause of action began to 

accrue when the assets were returned to Ukraine. On appeal, the 

parties also agree that assets are not "returned" until they are 

statute-of-limitations purposes. We therefore fail to see any 

error in the district court's ruling.
- 27 -

transferred into the Ukrainian treasury; mere transfer to UPGO's 

escrow account is not enough.10

UTICo commenced this action on November 26, 2010. Thus, 

unless tolling is warranted, any cause of action that accrued 

before November 26, 2004, is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Tranches one and three were transferred to the Ukrainian treasury 

in March 2001 and April 2002, respectively, and therefore, unless 

tolling is appropriate, any claims relating to these tranches are 

time-barred. The district court concluded tolling was not 

warranted because the return of funds to Ukraine was not inherently 

unknowable, the Ukrainian defendants did not have an affirmative 

duty to disclose to UTICo the return of funds to the Ukrainian 

treasury, and the Ukrainian defendants did not intentionally 

10 Before the district court, the Ukrainian defendants 

argued that the assets were "returned" once transferred to UPGO's 

escrow account. See UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 291. The 

district court concluded that no reasonable factfinder could agree 

with the Ukrainian defendants' interpretation of the contract and 

that assets were not "returned" until they were transferred to the 

Ukrainian treasury. Id. at 292-93. On appeal, the Ukrainian 

defendants have not argued that the district court erred in 

concluding that the assets needed to be transferred to the 

Ukrainian treasury for them to qualify as "returned."

Nevertheless, on appeal, UTICo rehashes its argument 

that assets are not "returned" until they reach the Ukrainian 

treasury, and, at various points, chastises the district court for 

finding that a cause of action accrues when assets are merely 

blocked. These arguments are puzzling, to say the least, as the 

district court found that a cause of action does not accrue until 

the funds reach the Ukrainian treasury, see id., and the Ukrainian 

defendants do not dispute this point on appeal.
- 28 -

deceive or conceal the fact that tranches one and three had been 

returned. See UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 293-95.

On appeal, UTICo makes much of the fact that it presented 

evidence showing that it typically takes five to seven years to 

recover expatriated assets once they are blocked. It accuses the 

district court of overlooking UTICo's expert affidavits to that 

effect in determining that the statute of limitations had run on 

tranches one and three. 

UTICo's arguments about the precise impact these 

affidavits should have on the statute of limitations are not the 

model of clarity. To the extent that UTICo is arguing that the 

statute of limitations should automatically be tolled by five to 

seven years, its argument misses the mark. As the district court 

aptly noted, that the typical asset recovery period is 

five-to-seven years "does not change the fact that tranche [one]

and tranche [three] were actually adjudicated and returned to the 

Ukrainian [t]reasury by 2003," and thus, the actions premised on 

tranches one and three accrued more than six years before the 

commencement of this litigation. UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 

293.

UTICo next argues that it should be permitted to seek 

recourse under the discovery rule. The discovery rule permits 

tolling of the statute of limitations "until a prospective 

plaintiff learns or should have learned that [it] has been injured 
- 29 -

. . . in three circumstances: where a misrepresentation concerns 

a fact that was 'inherently unknowable' to the injured party, where 

a wrongdoer breached some duty of disclosure, or where a wrongdoer 

concealed the existence of a cause of action through some 

affirmative act done with the intent to deceive." Patsos v. First 

Albany Corp., 741 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Mass. 2001).

UTICo claims that the statute of limitations should have 

been tolled for two separate reasons: (1) the fact of repatriation 

was "inherently unknowable" and (2) the Ukrainian defendants 

fraudulently concealed the transfer of tranches one and three to 

the Ukrainian treasury. To the extent that UTICo again falls back 

on its expert affidavits to argue that a reasonable person would 

not have asked about the recovery of funds until five to seven 

years after assets were blocked, we are unconvinced. A reasonable 

juror could not sign onto that line of logic in light of the 

evidence that several news organizations had reported on 

interactions between Swiss authorities and UPGO. Moreover, as the 

district court noted, UTICo was in regular communication with UPGO 

and could have asked UPGO whether Ukraine had fully repatriated 

the assets from the accounts implicated in the June 2000 Swiss 

court judgment and August 2000 Swiss court judgment. See UTICo 

III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 294. Although UTICo contests the accuracy 

of the news articles and suggests they referred to the transfer of 

funds to UPGO's escrow account rather than the Ukrainian treasury, 
- 30 -

those stories, at a minimum, put UTICo on notice that it should 

have been asking the Ukrainian defendants about the repatriation 

of the specific Swiss accounts implicated in tranches one and three 

if it truly thought it had a claim to a commission on those returned 

funds.

UTICo asserts it did just that, but that UPGO denied any 

recovery of Swiss assets. Therefore, UTICo argues, a reasonable 

juror could find that UPGO concealed the repatriation of tranches 

one and three. To demonstrate a genuine issue of fact as to 

whether the Ukrainian defendants concealed the transfer of 

tranches one and three to the Ukrainian treasury, UTICo relies on 

Lambert's affidavit and his 2019 deposition.

The Lambert affidavit and 2019 deposition suggest that 

UTICo asked representatives of UPGO whether any assets had been 

returned to the Ukrainian treasury. For example, Lambert attests 

that at meetings in 2003 with representatives of UPGO, he inquired 

about the recovery of frozen assets, including those from 

Switzerland, and that UPGO representatives denied that any assets 

had been repatriated. During his 2019 Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on 

behalf of UTICo, Lambert similarly stated that at the 2003 and 

2004 meetings, UTICo "raised the question about the recovery of 

the various accounts. [UTICo] went through various jurisdictions. 

And it was never disclosed to [UTICo] that any assets had been 

actually repatriated, in terms that the Ukrainian treasury 
- 31 -

obtained those funds." Relying on this evidence, UTICo contends 

that the district court erred in concluding that "there is no 

cognizable fraudulent concealment to be found in the record" and 

thereby granting summary judgment for the Ukrainian defendants on 

statute-of-limitations grounds.

Under Massachusetts law, the rule governing equitable 

tolling of a statute of limitations because of fraudulent 

concealment is codified at Massachusetts General Laws ch. 260 § 12. 

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that, in the 

absence of a fiduciary relationship, the statute of limitations 

may be tolled because of fraudulent concealment only "if the 

wrongdoer . . . concealed the existence of a cause of action 

through some affirmative act done with intent to deceive." Epstein

v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 460 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Puritan Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cashman, 596 N.E.2d 1004, 1010 (Mass. 

1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see

Abdallah v. Bain Capital LLC, 752 F.3d 114, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2014). 

In challenging the district court's ruling that there was no 

factual basis in the record from which a reasonable factfinder 

could "conclude that Ukraine intentionally concealed any cause of 

action," UTICo has failed to develop any argument or cite any case 

law in support of the proposition that Lambert's statements in his 

affidavit and 2019 deposition in and of themselves suffice to 

permit a reasonable juror to find that the Ukrainian 
- 32 -

defendants -- through the representations of the UPGO's 

representatives -- acted with an intent to deceive UTICo. See

United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues 

adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort 

at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.").

Whether Lambert's attestations create a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether the repatriation of tranche three was 

unknowable or concealed by the Ukrainian defendants is a closer 

question. But we need not wade any further and decide whether 

UTICo has created a genuine issue of fact as to the timeliness of 

this claim because, as we next explain, the breach-of-contract 

claim relating to tranche three fails on the merits.

2. Recovery of Tranches Two and Three

We turn now to the district court's ruling that the 

Ukrainian defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the 

merits of UTICo's breach-of-contract claim relating to tranche 

two. The district court concluded that UTICo has not demonstrated 

a genuine issue of fact as to whether it was helpful in the recovery 

of the accounts listed in the August 2000 Swiss court judgment 

which comprise tranche two. UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 298-99. 

Tranche three, like tranche two, implicates the August 2000 Swiss 

court judgment. Thus, we find that the district court's analysis 

on the merits of the breach-of-contract claim relating to tranche 

two applies equally to the claim relating to tranche three.
- 33 -

As the district court explained, a reasonable juror 

certainly could find that UTICo assisted the Ukrainian defendants 

in locating and blocking assets. See id. at 296-98. But the 

question before us is not merely whether UTICo assisted the 

Ukrainian defendants in a broad sense. To defeat the Ukrainian 

defendants' motion for summary judgment, UTICo had to show that a 

reasonable juror could infer that the $4.058 million returned to 

Ukraine in tranche two and the $1.744 million in tranche three 

were returned to Ukraine "in connection with" the powers of 

attorney executed by UPGO. Like the district court, for purposes 

of considering the Ukrainian defendants' motion for summary 

judgment, we will adopt UTICo's definition of "in connection with"

and ask whether UTICo was "helpful" in recovering the assets. See

UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 295-96. The precise question before 

us therefore is whether a reasonable juror could infer that UTICo's 

work under the powers of attorney was helpful in recovering the 

assets returned pursuant to the August 2000 Swiss court judgment. 

We agree with the district court that a reasonable juror could 

not.

UTICo argues that summary judgment should not have been 

granted to the Ukrainian defendants on the merits because it has 

raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether it was helpful in 

recovering tranches two and three. The Ukrainian defendants 

respond that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to 
- 34 -

UTICo's helpfulness in the recovery of tranches two and three 

because the record establishes that the Swiss authorities 

recovered these assets without meaningful help from UTICo.

Before diving deeper into UTICo's arguments on appeal, 

we find it useful to pause and lay out the summary judgment 

standard in more detail. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

56(a), a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The party 

seeking summary judgment "bears the initial burden of showing that 

no genuine issue of material fact exists." Feliciano-Muñoz v. 

Rebarber-Ocasio, 970 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2020). If the moving 

party meets this burden, the nonmovant must then put forth specific 

facts to establish the existence of a genuine dispute of material 

fact. See Pleasantdale Condos., LLC, 37 F.4th at 733. And "[o]n 

issues where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of proof," 

id. (citation omitted), "conclusory allegations, improbable 

inferences, and unsupported speculation" will not suffice, Balser

v. Int'l Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers 

(IUE) Loc. 201, 661 F.3d 109, 118 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation 

omitted). Instead, the nonmovant must come forth with "definite, 

competent evidence to rebut the motion for summary judgment." 

Pleasantdale Condos., LLC, 37 F.4th at 733 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).
- 35 -

As an initial matter, UTICo's argument on appeal largely 

boils down to: (1) we recovered hundreds of documents; (2) we sent 

these to UPGO at some point; (3) UPGO shared the documents with 

the Swiss authorities; and (4) therefore, we must have been helpful 

to Ukraine in its efforts to recover the Swiss assets mentioned in 

the August 2000 Swiss court judgment. But UTICo does little to 

connect the dots and explain how it knows that the documents made 

their way to Switzerland and why the documents would have been 

critical to the Swiss authorities succeeding in their prosecution 

of Kiritchenko.

UTICo's effusiveness and lack of developed argumentation 

before us and the district court may well mean its argument that 

it assisted in the recovery of tranches two and three is waived. 

See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17 ("It is not enough merely to mention 

a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to 

do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put 

flesh on its bones."); Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 

635 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Judges are not expected to be mindreaders. 

Consequently, a litigant has an obligation to spell out its 

arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold its peace." 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district 

court should not be expected "to ferret out . . . evanescent 

needle[s] from . . . outsized paper haystack[s]." Rivera-Gomez, 

843 F.2d at 635. Nonetheless, the district court patiently waded 
- 36 -

through UTICo's submissions, paying particular attention to the 

Lambert affidavit and the exhibits referenced in it. After its 

careful review, it concluded the Ukrainian defendants were 

entitled to summary judgment. 

This court also has reviewed UTICo's submissions and has 

reached the same conclusion: UTICo has failed to show that a 

reasonable juror could conclude that UTICo's work in connection 

with the May 1998 Agreement and related powers of attorney helped 

Ukraine recover the Swiss assets in tranches two and three.

A quick recap of the Swiss authorities' knowledge at the 

time UTICo and Ukraine entered the May 1998 agreement demonstrates 

why UTICo's arguments on appeal lack merit. As previously 

mentioned, by the time May 15, 1998, rolled around, the Swiss 

authorities already knew the names of several companies associated 

with Kiritchenko, had identified accounts related to the companies 

at Credit Suisse and SCS Alliance, and had some awareness of the 

connection between those accounts and Kiritchenko's 

money-laundering scheme. The names of those companies and accounts 

later would reappear in the August 2000 Swiss court judgment. In 

addition, in the months leading up to the May 1998 Agreement, the 

Swiss investigating judge exchanged information with Ukraine and 

requested information regarding Kiritchenko and his companies' 
- 37 -

accounts from banks within its jurisdiction.11 What is more, the 

information obtained by Switzerland was apparently not 

insubstantial as it was enough to result in the seizure and 

compulsory administration of the bulk of the accounts that later 

were named in the August 2000 Swiss court judgment.

UTICo is correct that it would be an additional two years 

before Kiritchenko would plead guilty to the Swiss charges. But 

its suggestion that UTICo was the one to tip the scales and secure 

Kiritchenko's plea with the evidence it gathered and the threat of 

its California litigation amounts to little more than conjecture 

that cannot defeat summary judgment. See Pleasantdale Condos., 

LLC, 37 F.4th at 733 ("Evidence that is conjectural or problematic 

will not suffice to forestall summary judgment." (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted)); Cabán Hernández, 486 F.3d at

8 (emphasizing that on summary judgment we do not have "to draw 

unreasonable inferences or credit bald assertions, empty 

conclusions, [or] rank conjecture").

There are a few problems with UTICo's suggestion that it 

provided evidence that helped Ukraine recover the assets and caused 

11 We note that this information exchange was not a one-way 

street. The Swiss investigating judge also shared information 

with the Ukrainian authorities. For example, at a March 27, 1998 

meeting, the Swiss investigating judge alerted a Ukrainian 

investigating judge to the names of several accounts and entities 

for which Kiritchenko was the beneficiary but that Ukraine had 

failed to mention in its requests to Switzerland.
- 38 -

Kiritchenko to plead to the Swiss charges. First, although UTICo 

establishes that it sent hundreds of pages of documents to UPGO, 

it is unclear exactly what they sent to UPGO and when. Although 

the powers of attorney are dated, the hundreds of pages of 

documents lack dates, and Lambert's affidavit does not fill that 

gap.

Similarly, UTICo has not put forth evidence establishing 

that these documents were crucial to the Swiss authorities in 

securing the August 2000 Swiss court judgment or Kiritchenko's 

plea. Although it asserts that its expert declarations explain 

the importance of certain documents -- in particular, the recovery 

of Kiritchenko's passport -- to proving up a money-laundering 

charge, we have reviewed its expert declaration and found nothing 

to that effect. Indeed, UTICo's experts say little about the 

specific types of evidence needed to secure the return of 

expatriated assets after a money-laundering conviction. Instead, 

UTICo's experts opine about the length of the typical asset 

recovery cycle, the documents related to asset recovery that UTICo 

believes the Ukrainian government possesses, the veracity of 

documents relating to the California litigation, and the 

interpretation and translation of UTICo's agreements with UPGO. 

None of these things bear on the importance of the documents UTICo 

sent to UPGO to send to the Swiss.
- 39 -

This once again forces UTICo to rely on Lambert's 

statements to fill the gap. But neither his affidavit nor his 

2019 deposition testimony rises to the occasion. As the district 

court noted, UTICo's argument that it assisted in the recovery of 

the Swiss assets suffers from issues of "vagueness" and is often 

"conclusory." UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 296, 298. Lambert's 

affidavit and 2019 deposition suffer from these same defects. 

Although Lambert's affidavit and deposition testimony recount the 

entities about which UTICo gathered evidence and the evidence 

recovered, they fail to include specific details from which one 

might infer how that evidence landed in Switzerland's hands, how 

it was crucial to obtaining the August 2000 Swiss court judgment, 

and why Switzerland could not obtain this information during its 

own investigation.12

Finally, UTICo's suggestion that its evidence and 

parallel litigation in California caused Kiritchenko to plea and 

provide the information to get Swiss recovery over the finish line 

overlooks the additional evidence obtained by Switzerland during 

12 At times, UTICo's reply brief suggests that without 

UTICo, the Swiss authorities would not have known of the companies 

and accounts implicated in the money-laundering scheme. But this 

assertion is at odds with the non-speculative evidence 

establishing that the Swiss authorities knew of the relevant 

accounts and companies before the May 1998 Agreement's execution. 

What is more, such a contention cannot be taken seriously where 

Lambert, in his 2019 deposition testimony, acknowledged that the 

Swiss authorities knew of the existence of these companies. 
- 40 -

its investigation. In particular, the Swiss investigating judge 

deposed Kiritchenko and Lazarenko. In his deposition, Lazarenko 

offered the Swiss authorities details on the money-laundering 

scheme and the entities implicated in it. And, in June 2000, two 

months before the August 2000 Swiss court judgment against 

Kiritchenko, Lazarenko pled guilty to the offenses against him, 

including the factual details underlying his offenses. 

UTICo's strongest support for its assertion that UPGO 

forwarded helpful documents from UTICo to Switzerland are two 

December 12, 1998 letters from UPGO to the Swiss investigating 

judge. The two letters indicate that UPGO sent several volumes of 

documents to Switzerland that included, among other things, the 

following: (1) "[d]ocumentation on transfers of funds from the 

accounts of [United Energy International Ltd.] . . . to the 

accounts of various firms in Swiss banks"; (2) "[c]opies of the 

documents on the owners and principals of [Bainfield, Paddox, and 

Bassington]"; and (3) information concerning Somolli. Even so, it 

remains unclear what information UTICo transmitted to Ukraine, 

whether those mailings both pre-date the December 12, 1998 letters 

and post-date the May 1998 agreement, and why the transmitted 

information was crucial to the success of the Swiss investigation. 

Without those details, we are left only to speculate on the 

usefulness of the information and whether it was forwarded to 

Switzerland. And speculation and surmise cannot carry the day at 
- 41 -

the summary-judgment stage. See Gomez v. Stop & Shop Supermarket 

Co., 670 F.3d 395, 398 (1st Cir. 2012) ("Assumptions are not a 

substitute for evidence," we will not "pile[] inference upon 

inference" at the summary-judgment stage in a manner that "elevates 

assumption over proof."); Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 

(1st Cir. 1997) ("[E]stablishing a genuine issue of material fact 

requires more than effusive rhetoric and optimistic surmise."). 

Nor can "'[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence' in favor 

of the nonmoving party . . . defeat summary judgment." 

Barreto-Rosa v. Varona-Mendez, 470 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2006)

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 

(1986)).

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the 

Ukrainian defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the 

portion of UTICo's breach-of-contract claim related to the Swiss 

assets that have been transferred to the Ukrainian treasury.

C. Motions to Amend

Finally, UTICo takes issue with the district court's 

denial of UTICo's three motions to amend. 

"We review a district court's denial of a motion to amend 

for abuse of discretion." Mulder v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 

865 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2017). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

15(a) instructs that leave to amend be "freely give[n] when justice 

so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "But this does not mean 
- 42 -

. . . that a trial court must mindlessly grant every request for 

leave to amend." Nikitine v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 715 F.3d 388, 

390 (1st Cir. 2013) (omission in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Indeed, "a district court may deny leave 

to amend when the request is characterized by undue delay, bad 

faith, futility, [or] the absence of due diligence on the movant's 

part." Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). And where "the record evinces an 

arguably adequate basis for the [district] court's decision," we 

will affirm the denial of a motion to amend. Hatch v. Dep't for 

Child., Youth & Their Fams., 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2001).

We quickly dispose of UTICo's appeal of the denials of 

the first and second motions to amend. In its first motion to 

amend, UTICo sought leave to add an unfair and deceptive trade 

practices claim under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 93A. The 

district court denied this motion without prejudice to UTICo 

refiling the motion after this court resolved the Ukrainian 

defendants' interlocutory appeal. Certainly, we see no abuse in 

the district court's decision to defer consideration of the motion 

to amend until our resolution of an appeal that may have dispensed 

of the case in full. UTICo remained free to refile its motion to 

amend after we affirmed the district court's exercise of 

jurisdiction over the breach-of-contract claims and mandate issued 

on September 4, 2013. 
- 43 -

For some reason, UTICo never refiled its first motion to 

amend. Instead, UTICo waited over a year to file its second motion 

to amend. That motion made no mention of an unfair and deceptive 

trade practices claim. The precise amendments that UTICo sought 

to make were less than clear. At a minimum, it appears UTICo 

sought to add additional factual allegations it believed related 

to the tolling of the statute of limitations. During the May 16, 

2018 hearing, UTICo also suggested that it sought to amend the 

complaint to add a claim that the Ukrainian defendants breached 

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but the motion 

itself makes no mention of a good faith and fair dealing claim. 

At the conclusion of that hearing, the district court denied 

UTICo's second motion to amend because it was not "well-founded" 

and because the amendments that UTICo sought to make did not relate 

to the remaining breach-of-contract claims.13 

13 The district court also emphasized that UTICo had failed 

to include a proposed amended complaint with its motion to amend. 

See UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 285. On appeal, UTICo makes 

much of the fact that the Local Rules for the District of 

Massachusetts do not require a party to attach a copy of its 

proposed pleading to a motion to amend. UTICo is correct that 

neither Local Rule 15.1 nor Rule 15 require a proposed pleading, 

but the point still stands that a party must set forth some basis 

on which the district court can distill how and why a party seeks 

to amend a complaint -- whether that be done in the motion to amend 

or in a proposed complaint attached to the motion. UTICo failed 

to do so, particularly with respect to its claim that the Ukrainian 

defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing.
- 44 -

Again, we see no abuse of discretion in the district 

court's denial of the second motion to amend. The proposed 

amendments included in UTICo's motion did not relate to the Swiss 

assets -- the only claim remaining after the May 16, 2018 hearing. 

Nor did the proposed amendments relate to the reasoning on which 

the district court predicated its decision to limit the 

breach-of-contract claim to the repatriated Swiss assets. 

Instead, the proposed amendments merely identified funds which had 

yet to be repatriated and attempted to buttress UTICo's already 

dismissed claims that related to the California litigation.

Finally, we turn to the denial of UTICo's third motion 

to amend. UTICo moved to amend the complaint a third time late in 

this litigation. It sought to add several claims to the complaint, 

including claims for fraudulent concealment, breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and misrepresentation. 

The district court denied the motion to amend both because of undue 

delay and because UTICo's proposed amendments would have been 

futile. See UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 286-87.

The district court acted within its discretion in 

denying the third motion to amend based on undue delay. By the 

time UTICo filed its third motion to amend, discovery had closed, 

the deadline for summary judgment motions had passed, and the 

Ukrainian defendants' second motion for summary judgment was 

pending before the court. In addition, over a year had passed 
- 45 -

since the district court denied UTICo's second motion to amend 

for, among other reasons, its failure to meaningfully articulate 

a claim based on a theory of breach of the implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing. We have upheld the denial of motions 

to amend for undue delay based on even shorter time frames at 

earlier stages of the litigation. See, e.g., Calderón-Serra v.

Wilmington Tr. Co., 715 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2013) (affirming 

denial of motion to amend "filed . . . nearly a year after the 

commencement of the action and many months after the . . . motions 

to dismiss had been taken under advisement"); Villanueva v. United 

States, 662 F.3d 124, 127 (1st Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming 

denial based on undue delay when plaintiff was aware of facts 

underlying proposed claim before filing suit yet waited four months 

to request to amend); Kay v. N.H. Dem. Party, 821 F.2d 31, 34 (1st 

Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (affirming a finding of undue delay when 

plaintiff moved to amend three months after granting of motion to 

dismiss relevant claims).

UTICo contends that its delay in filing the third motion 

to amend should not be held against it where the district court 

took nearly three years to rule on the motion and previously took 

over three years to rule on the second motion to amend. But 

UTICo's frustration about the pace of this litigation misses the 

point. For various reasons, the pace of this case's proceedings 

may have been slow. Nevertheless, UTICo still had ample time to 
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seek leave to amend for a third time to try and remedy the flaws 

in its second motion to amend.

It also is unclear why UTICo could not have requested 

leave to make the amendments set forth in its third motion to amend 

at an earlier stage of the litigation. Although UTICo asserts in 

a conclusory manner that its proposed amendments were "based on 

new evidence and facts showing UTICo's assistance in the recovery 

by [the d]efendants of the assets in Switzerland and elsewhere," 

it does not explain why it had to wait until four months after the 

close of discovery to add these allegations and why it could not 

discover those facts earlier. Nor does it make any effort to 

explain what the "new evidence and facts" are and why they are 

critical. What is more, it does not appear that the proposed 

amendments actually further elucidate UTICo's assistance in 

recovery of the $15 million of Swiss assets. Indeed, at oral 

argument, UTICo conceded that its proposed amendments to the 

complaint did not affect the claims remaining at that point, that 

is, the breach-of-contract claims relating to the $15 million in 

Swiss assets, but rather focused on pleading additional claims. 

Given the delay in moving to amend for the third time and the lack 

of explanation for why UTICo failed to propose these amendments 

earlier, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
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discretion in denying the third motion to amend.14 See

Calderón-Serra, 715 F.3d at 20 ("Appreciable delay alone, in the 

absence of good reason for it, is enough to justify denying a 

motion for leave to amend.").

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district 

court's dismissal of UTICo's breach-of-contract claim insofar as 

it relates to blocked but not yet repatriated assets, its grant of 

summary judgment to the Ukrainian defendants on UTICo's 

breach-of-contract claim related to the Swiss assets, and its 

denial of UTICo's three motions to amend.

14 Because the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying the third motion to amend for undue delay, we need not 

pass judgment on whether the proposed amendments would have been 

futile. It does appear that many of UTICo's proposed amendments, 

such as its claims related to the California assignment and 

fraudulent concealment claim, are futile. But we pause to make 

clear that we decline to address the futility of UTICo's claim for 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 

today. The district court concluded that although our decision in 

UTICo II approved of the exercise of jurisdiction over UTICo's 

breach-of-contract claims, its reasoning foreclosed the exercise 

of jurisdiction over a claim for breach of the implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing that rested on the theory that Ukraine 

has failed to repatriate assets. UTICo III, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 

286-87. That may well be the case, but we find it best to leave 

this question of foreign sovereign immunity for another day.