[Cite as State v. Morgan, 2012-Ohio-4937.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 97934

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

WALTER MORGAN

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-544807 

BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Sweeney, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 25, 2012 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John B. Gibbons 

2000 Standard Building 

1370 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Louis J. Brodnik 

Marc D. Bullard 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 

The Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.: 

{¶1} Appellant, Walter Morgan, asserts on appeal that a new trial is necessary 

where multiple errors in procedure occurred in the jury instructions and jury deliberations 

during his trial. He claims the trial court erred in giving a “Howard” charge when the 

jury instructions and jury forms contained contradictory statements that caused the jury’s 

inability to reach a unanimous verdict. After a thorough review of the record and law, 

we affirm appellant’s convictions. 

I. Factual and Procedural History 

{¶2} On September 25, 2010, Markita McCrimon loaned her car, a Ford Focus, to 

appellant at approximately 7:00 p.m. Between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m., Officer Kenneth 

Wohlheter of the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority (“CMHA”) observed a Ford 

Focus run a stop sign. The officer attempted to pull the car over by activating his lights 

and siren. Officer Wohlheter testified the car did not stop, but continued on for 

approximately one mile at speeds of 35 to 40 miles per hour. During the chase, Officer 

Wohlheter observed the driver of the car throw a baseball-sized object out the passenger 

window. The chase ended abruptly when the driver of the car slammed on the brakes, 

put the car in park, opened the door, and fled. 
{¶3} Officer Wohlheter testified he saw the driver clearly as the driver exited the 

vehicle and looked back at him. He testified that he got a good look at the driver and 

later identified appellant as the driver of the car. 

{¶4} Officer Wohlheter and his partner, Officer Michael Jones, gave chase but 

were unsuccessful in apprehending the driver of the car. He did, however, find an 

insurance card and a receipt in the glove box that led them to McCrimon. 

{¶5} Officer Wohlheter also testified that he had broadcast the location of the item 

the driver had thrown out the window during the case. He went back to this location 

after the search for the driver ended and met CMHA Officer Kenneth Lundy, who 

testified he retrieved a plastic baggie containing approximately 38 grams of crack cocaine 

at the location Wohlheter had broadcast. 

{¶6} Appellant was eventually tracked down and, on December 22, 2010, he was 

arraigned and charged with one count of drug trafficking, in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2) (Count 1); one count of drug possession, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) 

(Count 2); one count of tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) 

(Count 3); and one count of failure to obey the order or signal of a police officer, in 

violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) (Count 4). A jury trial commenced on December 6, 2011. 

 At the end of the state’s case, the trial court partially granted appellant’s Crim.R. 29 

motion by amending Count 4 to a lesser included offense of failure to comply, in 

violation of R.C. 2921.331(A). 
{¶7} At the end of closing arguments, without objection, the court adjourned 

without instructing the jury because it was late in the day. The jury instructions were 

given first thing in the morning on December 8, 2011, and the jury set about deliberating. 

 The jury addressed several questions to the judge. Twice the jury asked to see a police 

report, marked as Defense Exhibit B, that appellant’s attorney used in the 

cross-examination of Officer Wohlheter and in the direct examination of Officer Jones. 

The police report was prepared by Officer Jones and contained statements made by 

Officer Wohlheter. Appellant had asked that it be admitted, but the trial court denied 

that request. The trial court informed the jury that the report was not admitted and would 

not be provided. 

{¶8} The jury indicated three times that they were at an impasse and specifically 

mentioned Counts 1, 2, and 3. On December 9, 2011, after the third time, the trial court 

gave the jury a supplemental “Howard” instruction1

 without objection from appellant or 

the state. The jury later pointed out that the verdict form for Count 2, drug possession, 

may be incorrect. The court examined the forms on the record and found that the jury 

instructions were correct, but that page two of the verdict form for drug possession — the 

finding of the amount of drugs involved — incorrectly referred to a finding of guilt for 

drug trafficking when it should have referred to drug possession. The court corrected 

this page and sent the jury back to deliberate. 

 1 State v. Howard, 42 Ohio St.3d 18, 537 N.E.2d 188 (1989). 
{¶9} The jury reached a verdict later that day finding appellant not guilty of drug 

trafficking, but guilty of drug possession in an amount greater than 25 grams but less than 

100 grams of crack cocaine. The jury also found appellant guilty of tampering with 

evidence and failure to obey the order or signal of a police officer. The trial court 

referred appellant for a presentence investigation report, and sentencing was set for 

January 12, 2012. On that date, appellant was sentenced to a five-year prison term for 

drug possession, to be served concurrently to a one-year term for tampering with 

evidence, but consecutively to a six-month term for failure to comply, for an aggregate 

term of five years and six months. The trial court then properly informed appellant of 

postrelease control. 

{¶10} Appellant timely filed an appeal from these convictions, raising a single 

assignment of error: “The trial court committed multiple instances of plain error by 

submitting confusing responses to jury questions and by delivering an unnecessary and 

unwarranted Howard charge and by amending the jury instructions and verdict forms 

when an error became apparent in jury deliberations.” 
II. Law and Analysis 

{¶11} Appellant relies on this court’s ability to recognize plain error, pursuant to 

Crim.R. 52(B) and App.R. 12(A), to seek a new trial. To constitute plain error, the error 

must be obvious on the record, palpable, and fundamental, so that it should have been 

apparent to the trial court without objection. See State v. Tichon, 102 Ohio App.3d 758, 

767, 658 N.E.2d 16 (9th Dist.1995). Moreover, plain error does not exist unless the 

appellant establishes that the outcome of the trial clearly would have been different but 

for the trial court’s allegedly improper actions. State v. Waddell, 75 Ohio St.3d 163, 166, 

1996-Ohio-100, 661 N.E.2d 1043. Notice of plain error is to be taken with utmost 

caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of 

justice. State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 83, 1995-Ohio-171, 656 N.E.2d 643. 

{¶12} Appellant’s single assignment of error includes several allegations of error. 

He first argues the trial court’s responses to jury questions were confusing. 

A. Admittance of Evidence 

{¶13} The jury requested to see the police report authored by Officer Jones, 

labeled as Defense Exhibit B. The trial court responded “[n]o.” The jury again 

requested to see the report and included page 11 of the jury instructions, which stated that 

the jury would be provided all evidence admitted at trial.2

 The court responded that the 

report was not admitted and would not be provided. Appellant argues the trial court 

 2 The jury also asked other questions not pertinent here, including how it 

should handle the order of the charges and whether they had to reach a consensus 

on all counts or consider them individually. 
should have supplied the jury with the report. However, the court excluded it from 

evidence without objection from appellant. Appellant now argues this was error. This 

appears to be a collateral attack on the decision of the trial court to deny appellant’s 

request to admit the police report as substantive evidence at the close of his case. 

{¶14} The introduction of evidence at trial falls within the sound discretion of the 

trial court. Evid.R. 104; State v. Heinish, 50 Ohio St.3d 231, 553 N.E.2d 1026 (1990). 

A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable manner. A reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of 

the trial court. See generally State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 

(1984). 

{¶15} Appellant was using the police report to cross-examine the state’s witnesses 

in an effort to discredit Officer Wohlheter’s identification of him. Appellant attempted to 

use the report as a prior inconsistent statement to show that Officer Wohlheter could not 

identify him. This is allowed by Evid.R. 613. However, it constitutes extrinsic evidence 

of a prior statement. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible under Evid.R. 613(B) unless a 

proper foundation for its admission is set forth. 

[A] foundation must be established through direct or cross- examination in 

which: (1) the witness is presented with the former statement; (2) the 

witness is asked whether he made the statement; (3) the witness is given an 

opportunity to admit, deny or explain the statement; and (4) the opposing 

party is given an opportunity to interrogate the witness on the inconsistent 

statement. 

 

State v. Theuring, 46 Ohio App.3d 152, 155, 546 N.E.2d 436 (1st Dist.1988). 
{¶16} Appellant was permitted to cross-examine Officer Wohlheter using the 

report and insinuated that contradictions existed between his in-court testimony and 

statements in the report. Appellant was using the report consistent with impeachment 

evidence, ostensibly under Evid.R. 613, but according to Officer Wohlheter’s testimony, 

it was not a prior inconsistent statement. The report was silent on whether Officer 

Wohlheter had seen appellant’s face. Officer Wohlheter testified he informed Officer 

Jones that he got a good look at the driver before Officer Jones wrote the report. The 

police report did not have a contradictory statement to Officer Wohlheter’s testimony. 

The report was silent on this point. 

{¶17} Further, appellant never objected to the exclusion of the police report or 

argued any justification for its admittance as substantive evidence. The police report 

may have been admissible under Evid.R. 803(8). This rule excludes out-of-court 

statements from being classified as hearsay where the statements are 

[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public 

offices or agencies, setting forth (a) the activities of the office or agency, or 

(b) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters 

there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters 

observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, unless 

offered by defendant, unless the sources of information or other 

circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 

Id. However, appellant never laid a proper foundation for admission of the report under 

this hearsay exception. He failed to establish that the police report was generated 

pursuant to any duty imposed by law. He questioned Officer Jones to establish that 
Officer Jones wrote the report, but did not question him regarding any obligation. State 

v. Wilson, 8th Dist. No. 87205, 2006-Ohio-4108, ¶ 22. 

{¶18} Therefore, the trial court could properly exclude the report from being 

admitted as substantive evidence where appellant advanced none of these theories for its 

admittance at the appropriate time. Because the report was not admitted, the court did 

not commit plain error when it did not provide it to the jury when it was requested. 

B. The Howard Charge 

{¶19} Next, appellant argues that the trial court erred by delivering a Howard

charge when the jury appeared deadlocked. Where it appears to a trial court that a jury is 

incapable of reaching a consensus, the court, in its discretion, may make a last-ditch effort 

to prod the jury into reaching a unanimous verdict so long as its instructions are balanced, 

neutral, and not coercive. Howard, 42 Ohio St.3d 18, 24, 537 N.E.2d 188. Rejecting 

other alternatives, the Ohio Supreme Court dictated the instruction to be given: 

The principal mode, provided by our Constitution and laws, for deciding 

questions of fact in criminal cases, is by jury verdict. In a large proportion 

of cases, absolute certainty cannot be attained or expected. Although the 

verdict must reflect the verdict of each individual juror and not mere 

acquiescence in the conclusion of your fellows, each question submitted to 

you should be examined with proper regard and deference to the opinions of 

others. You should consider it desirable that the case be decided. You are 

selected in the same manner, and from the same source, as any future jury 

would be. There is no reason to believe the case will ever be submitted to 

a jury more capable, impartial, or intelligent than this one. Likewise, there 

is no reason to believe that more or clearer evidence will be produced by 

either side. It is your duty to decide the case, if you can conscientiously do 

so. You should listen to one another’s arguments with a disposition to be 

persuaded. Do not hesitate to reexamine your views and change your 

position if you are convinced it is erroneous. If there is disagreement, all 

jurors should reexamine their positions, given that a unanimous verdict has 
not been reached. Jurors for acquittal should consider whether their doubt 

is reasonable, considering that it is not shared by others, equally honest, 

who have heard the same evidence, with the same desire to arrive at the 

truth, and under the same oath. Likewise, jurors for conviction should ask 

themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a 

judgment not concurred in by all other jurors. 

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶20} “Whether a jury is irreconcilably deadlocked is a ‘“necessarily discretionary 

determination’” for the trial court to make.” State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 

2004-Ohio-6548, 819 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 127, quoting State v. Brown, 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 

2003-Ohio-5059, 796 N.E.2d 506, ¶ 37, quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 

S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978), fn. 28. 

{¶21} The trial court gave the Howard instruction after the jury had three times 

indicated they were deadlocked and after a full day-and-a-half of deliberations. Other 

courts have upheld the issuance of a Howard charge after shorter periods of time where 

the jury appeared deadlocked. State v. Rhines, 2d Dist. No. 24417, 2012-Ohio-3393 

(charge issued after 11 hours of deliberations); State v. McDowell, 10th Dist. No. 

10AP-509, 2011-Ohio-6815 (charge given after jury deliberated one-and-a-half days); 

State v. Shepard, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-223, 2007-Ohio-5405, ¶ 11 (citing cases where the 

charge has been upheld after only a few hours of deliberations). Given the statements 

from the jury, that deliberations were becoming uncomfortable where it was merely 

rehashing the same arguments over and over, the trial court could properly determine that 

the jury was deadlocked. 
{¶22} The trial court did not commit error, let alone plain error, by giving a 

Howard instruction in this case where the jury indicated it was deadlocked after 

significant deliberations. 

C. Amendment of Jury Instructions and Verdict Forms 

{¶23} Finally, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by amending the jury 

instruction and verdict forms and that these errors meant the jury truly was not 

deadlocked, and thus the Howard charge was inappropriate. 

{¶24} It must first be noted that there were no errors in the jury instructions at the 

time the Howard charge was given. An error in the jury instructions was noticed by the 

state at the time the jury was initially charged, and the court modified the instructions 

accordingly. At the time the Howard charge was given, the jury instructions were 

correct. 

{¶25} There was, however, a clerical error on the second page of the verdict form 

for the amount of drugs involved in the count of drug possession. The form indicated that 

if the jury found the defendant guilty of drug trafficking, it should then indicate the 

amount of controlled substance involved. The form should have stated that if the jury 

found the defendant guilty of drug possession, it should then indicate the amount 

involved. This error had no impact on the jury’s deliberations because it related only to 

the amount involved and would only be addressed after the jury reached consensus on 

guilt for drug possession. 
{¶26} Because the jury indicated in written questions to the court that it could not 

reach a unanimous verdict on Counts 1, 2, and 3, this error likely had no impact on 

deliberations. Therefore, the trial court did not commit plain error in correcting the jury 

verdict form or in giving a Howard instruction prior to correcting the form. The error in 

the verdict form for Count 2 had little or no impact on the jury’s impasse and no impact 

on the court’s decision to give the Howard charge. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶27} The trial court did not commit plain error when it gave the jury a Howard

charge when the jury indicated it was truly deadlocked. Appellant’s argument that the 

jury was not deadlocked, but was confused by errors in the jury instructions and verdict 

forms is not persuasive. The jury instructions were correct, and a minor error in the 

verdict form did not cause the jury’s impasse. Further, the trial court’s answers to jury 

questions were proper. The evidence that appellant argues should have been provided to 

the jury was excluded as substantive evidence. Therefore, the trial court’s responses to 

the jury were correct. 

{¶28} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE 

PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, A.J., and 

JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR