matter of law as he suffered no damages that were proximately caused by Equifax. Therefore,
Equifax’s motion for summary judgment on the §1681i(a) claim is granted.
3, FCRA 1681i(c) Claims

Quinn claims that Equifax is liable under §1681i(c) for failing to note his dispute. §1681i
(c) states:

Whenever a statement of a dispute is filed ...the consumer reporting agency shall,

in any subsequent consumer report containing the information in question, clearly

note that it is disputed by the consumer and provide either the consumer's

statement or a clear and accurate codification or summary thercof.

‘Yo succced on this point, Quinn must show that: (1) he disputed inaccurate information
contained in his credit file; (2) Equifax’s reinvestigation did nol resolve his dispute; (3) he filed a
statement of dispute with Equifax upon completion of the reinvestigation; and (4) the statement
he filed was not included in subsequent credit reports released by Equifax. See Guimond v.
Trans Union Corp. 45 F.3d 1329, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1995).

Quinn disputed the inaccurate Wal-Mart account contained in his credit report. The
reinvestigation resolved the dispute. Quinn demanded that the Wal-Mart account be deleted
from his credit file and the account was deleted within the statutorily imposed time period. As of
June 28, 2002, Quinn’s credit file contained a fraud alert. Finally, there is no evidence to suggest
that Equifax rcleased Quinn’s credit report during the period of this dispute. All of the evidence
suggests that no one besides Quinn received a copy of his credit file during the dispute. Thus,
Quinn’s claim fails as a matter of law, and summary judgment must be granted in favor of

Equifax.



B. Claims under the Act
1. FCRA §168te (b) Claims

FCRA § 1681e (b) provides that “[w]hcnever a consutner reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of
the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. §1681e (b).
Tn order to recover under this Section, a plaintiff must provide that: (1) there was inaccurate
information contained in the consumer report; (2) the inaccuracy was due to the credit reporting
company’s failure to follow reasonable procedures to ensure maximum accuracy; (3) he suffered
actual damages; and (4) those damages were caused by the inaccuracy. Philbin v. Trans Union
Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 963 (3rd Cir. 1996),

Quinn has alleged that the entire Wal-Mart account was inaccurate as to him and that it
was fraudulently opened using his social sccurity number and a different name. Viewing the
facts in Quinn’s favor, it is reasonable to infer thal the Wal-Mart account was erroneously
contained in his credit report. However, § 1681¢ (b) does not establish strict liability, nor does it
require Equifax to conduct independent “background research.” Henson v, CSC Credit Services,
29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994),

a, Reasonable Standards

Once the plaintiff sufficiently alleges “that a credit reporting agency prepared a report
containing inaccurate information,” Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151,
1156 (11th Cir, 1991), the question turns on whether Equifax maintained “reasonable standards
for assuring maximum accutacy.” Henson, 29 F.3d at 289. Reasonable procedures are “those

that a reasonably prudent person would undertake under the circumstances.” Lee v. xperian


injury, and not rely on mere conclusory statements.” Ruffin-Thompkins, 2003 U.S, Dist. LEXIS
23647, at *16 quoting Field, 2002 WL 849589, at *6, Quinn has not sufficiently explained the
circumstances of his emotional distress, mental anguish, financial and dignitary harm and thus he
can not meet the burden required for this element of the claim.

c. Causation

Because Quinn has failed {o support any of his allegations of damages, he cannot show
the causal link between the alleged inaccuracy in his report and the alleged damages. To prove
causation, Quinn must show that the reporting of inaccurate information in his credit report was a
substantial (actor that brought about damages. Philbin, 101 F.3d at 968. Quinn has not produced
evidence that the inaccurate information contained in his credit report was a significant factor in
his alleged damages. Even if damages are shown, the claimant must still raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to the causation clement. Ruffin-Thompkins, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23647, at
*16. Specifically, Quinn has not raised a material fact as to the causation element and thus his
claim fails as a matter of law regardless of whether damages had been shown, which in this case
they had not.

Tn sum, Quinn has failed to raise a genuine issue as to three of the four tests required to
survive summary judgment under a § 1681e (b) claim. Therefore, we grant summary judgment
in favor of Equifax on the §1681e(b) claim.

2, FORA 1681i (a) Claims
Quinn next claims that Equifax is liable under § 1681i (a) for failing to conduct a

reasonable rcinvestigation. § 1681i (a) states:


rely on information from the furnisher, absent prior information from the consumer that the
information might be inaccurate, Henson, 29 F.3d at 284. Quinn argues that the Henson holding
should be read narrowly and that specifically the holding limits “reliable sources” that a credit
agency can initially rely on to “court judgment dockets.” Although the Henson court ruled that
“court judgment documents” were presumptively reliable sources, the case should not be read to
specifically limit reliable documents to “court judgment documents.” Id, at 286, To limit the
case in this manner would require every credit agency to independently verify each credit line
reported to it. The costs associated with that type of investigation would be astronomical.

Courts have found that the Henson reasoning excuses credit agencics ftom independently
verifying information provided by credit grantors unless the credit agency knew or had reason to
know that the credit grantor was unreliable or reporting inaccurate information. Ruffin-
Thompkins, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23647, at *11-12 quoting Zahran v, Trans Union Corp.,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5089, No. 01 C 1700, at *3 (N.D. Il], Mar. 21, 2003) and Field y, Trans
Union L.L.C,2002 WL 849589, at *4 (N.D. Ill, May 3, 2002).

Quinn has not presented evidence that Wal-Mart is an unreliable source of information.
Prior to June 20, 2002, Equifax was not aware, nor should it have reasonably been aware, that
there was an etror regarding the Wal-Mart account contained in Quinn’s credit report, Thus, as a
matter of law, any § 1681¢ (b) claim cannot be sustained before this date. Furthermore, Equifax’s
post-June 20, 2002, procedures were also reasonable as a matter of law to ensure maximum
possible accuracy, Additionally, although this will be discussed more fully in the § 1681i (a)
reinvestigation analysis, it is clear that iquifax’s reinvestigation was reasonable as a matter of

law. Therefore, because Equifax satisfied its reinvestigation obligation under § 1681i (a), its


Information Solutions, LLC, 2002 WL 22287351, at *3 (N.D. Ul. Oct. 2, 2003), In the vast
majority of cases, reasonable procedures should be determined by a jury. Crabill v, Trans Union,
LLC. 259 F.3d. 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2001). However, there ate instances in which reasonable
procedures are reasonable as a matter of law. Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d. 662, 664;
Lee, 2002 WL 22287351, at *4,

Quinn suggests that he can overcome summary judgment based solely on a showing of
inaccuracy in his credit report. Quinn relies heavily on Parker vy. Parker, claiming “that
inaccurate reports by themselves can fairly be read as evidencing unreasonable procedures.” 124
F.Supp. 2d 1216, (M.D. Ala. 2000), However, recent decisions have questioned the Parker
Court’s reasoning that inaccurate information equals unreasonable procedures. Sce Lee y.
Experian Information Solutions 2002 WL. 22287351 (N.D. Il, Oct. 2, 2003); Ruffin-Thompkins
v. Experian Information Services, LLC, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23647 (N.D. Ill, Dec. 31, 2003).
Parker is not binding on this Court and thus we choose not to follow its reasoning. Instead, we
will follow the binding precedent found in Crabill, that allows the “reasonableness of an
agency’s procedure” to be determined on summary judgment. As this court has recently held,
“thus while the determination of whether a procedure is reasonable is a question for a jury in
most cases, if the reasonableness of the procedure is beyond question, summary judgment is
appropriate.” Ruffin-Thompkins, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23647, at *9, quoting Crabill, 259 F.3d
at 664,

To determine whether Equifax’s procedure was reasonable in this case, we must weigh
the “potential harm from inaccuracy against the burden of safeguarding against such inaccuracy.”

Philbin, 101 F.3d at 965. The Seventh Circuit in Henson ruled that credit agencies are allowed to


Quinn stated in a deposition that the only out of pocket loss he suffered as a result of
Fquifax’s alleged inaccurate reporting was the higher interest that he paid on a credit card for “a
few months.” Fleet Credit Card Service raised the interest Quinn paid on his Ileet Credit card
from 10.99% to 21.22% for purchases and balance transfers, and from 19.80% to 23.22% for
cash advances. However, Fleet Card Services raised Quinn’s interest rates before the Wal-Mart
account had even been opened.

Quinn has alleged that Equifax also reported a fraudulent OSI collection account and that
he informed Equifax of this account on May 15, 2002. However, Quinn camot recall ever secing
the OSI collection account in an Equifax credit report and all of the evidence indicates that
Equifax never reported the OSI collection account. The only evidence Quinn has offered to
support his claim that Equifax reported an OSI collection account in his credit file, is a letter
from OST Collection Services, Inc. that claims that it reported the OSI collection account to all of
three of the major credit reporting agencies. The letter is irrelevant because it neither proves nor
disproves that Equifax actually reported the OS] collection account. The lettcr merely suggests
that Equifax may have received information about an OSI collection account. Therefore, even if
the court considers May 15, 2002, as the date Equifax first learned of the dispute, Quinn’s
damages claim would still fail because there is no evidence that Equifax ever reported an OSI
collection account. Moreover, Quinn has not provided a single shred of evidence to support the
claim that he was denied credit as a result of Equifax’s alleged inaccurate credit file.

Likewise, Quinn has not provided any evidence to support his claim of emotional distress
and mental anguish. “When an injured party provides the only evidence of any emotional

distress or mental anguish, he must reasonably and sufficiently explain the circumstances of the


Minuit Grder Ferm (06497)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Wayne R. Andersen Sitting Judge If Other
or Magistrate Judge " than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 2C 5908 DATE 3/22/2004
CASE Nicholas Quinn vs. Experian Solutions et al
TITLE
Un the following box (a) indicate the party filing the mation, ¢.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3¢d party plaintiff, and (b) state brictly the nature
MoTION: ‘of the motion being presented, |
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) OQ Filed motion of [ usc listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) im) Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due,
(4) im Ruling/Hearing on set for at.
(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] {sct for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(7) Q Trial{set for/te-set for] on at
(8) QO (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to At emer
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) Ml [Otherdockctentry] Enter MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: Equifax’s motion for
summary judgment [51-1| is granted.

dl) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.)

No notices required, advised in apen court. Document |"!

‘Number:

No notices required, i

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone,
ov | Docketing to mail notices. ct

|") ait Ao 450 form. : docketing deputy iivials
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. Bo

date mailed ootive
courtroom, 1

TSA deputy’s Le Go een

i initials
) Date/time received in 7 ;
central Clerk's Office mailing deputy initials



information may cause the consumer.” Ruffin-Thompkins, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23647, at *18,
quoting Henson, 29 F.3d at 287.

As discussed above, when Equifax first learned of the dispute, Equifax reviewed the
materials Quinn sent and compiled a CDV that it forwarded to Wal-Mart. Equifax did not make
any changes to Quinn’s credit report because Wal-Mart informed Equifax that the account was
accurate as Equifax was reporting it, Equifax informed Quinn of the results of the
reinvestigation and provided him with a current copy of his credit report that same day. Equilax
admits that its reinvestigation stopped there. Equifax did not contact Quinn to request documents
nor did it communicate with Wal-Mart directly, However, Equifax was not required do cither at
this point and its standard reinvestigation procedure was statutorily sufficient because “the CDV
procedure alone is accepted by courts as an adequate method both for assuring accuracy and for
reinvestigation.” Lee, 2003 WL. 22287351, at *6 quoting Dickens v. Trans Union Corp., No. 00-
5605, 2001 WL 1006259, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2001).

Equifax was not obligated under the /lenson factors to conduct further investigation.
Quinn did not alert Equifax to the possibility that Wal-Mart was an unreliable source of
information, and there is no evidence that Equilax knew or should have known that Wal-Mart
was an unreliable source of information. There was no suggestion from Wal-Mart’s original
response that it had not conducted a thorough investigation of the Quinn account. The evidence
suggests that Wal-Mart reviewed the account, verified that the information was correct and
reported as much to Equifax. Equifax placed a fraud alert in Quinn's credit file, and Equifax

took immediate action to inform Quinn of the results of the reinvestigalion.

1]


If the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer's file

at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the consumer and the consumer notifies the

agency directly of such dispute, the agency shall rcinvestigate free of charge and record

the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file in

accordance with paragraph (5), before the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date

on which the agency receives the notice of the dispute from the consumer.

Liability under 1681i (a) does not arise until Equifax received notification from Quinn
about the alleged continucd reporting of the inaccurate information. Ruffin-Thompkins, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23647, al *18. Although not fully clear, Equifax’s duty to reinvestigate might
conceivably have arisen al two different points: On June 20, 2002, when Equifax learned of the
potential inaccuracy in Quinn’s credit report, and on July 1, 2002, when Equifax received a
second dispute from Quinn. Equifax is not liable for a failure to rcinvestigate until this time.
Furthermore, Equifax’s reinvestigation procedures after both dates were reasonable as a matter of
law.

$1681i (a) (1) (A) imposes a duty to rcinvestigate any potential inaccuracy in a
consumet’s report when the credit agency learns of the potential error. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (a) (1)
(A). Ln some citcumstances, that duty may include a duty to go beyond the original source of
information and conduct an independent investigation. Ruffin-Thompkins, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23647, at *18 quoting Henson, 29 F.3d at 287. The Court must look to two factors to
determine whether Equifax had a duty to take additional steps in its reinvestigation: (1) “Whether
the consumer has alerted the reporting agency to the possibility that the source may be unreliable

or the reporting agency itself knows or should know that the source may be unreliable”, and (2)

“the cost of verifying the accuracy of the source versus the possible harm inaccurately reported


procedures were reasonable to assure maximum possible accuracy under § 1681e (b). Lee, 2002
WL 22287351 at * 3,

After receiving a complaint from Quinn, Equifax reviewed the matcrials sent by Quinn
and sent a CDV to Wal-Mart that desctibed the dispute as “customer states not mine.” On Junc
28, 2002, Wal-Mart returned the CDV to Equifax and communicated that the information
reported by Equifax was correct. There is no evidence that Equifax knew that Wal-Mart was an
unreliable source nor is there any reason for Equifax to doubt that Wal-Mart performed a full and
complete reinvestigation regarding Quinn’s account. That same day, Equifax informed Quinn of
the results of the reinvestigation and provided him with a current copy of his credit report.
Additionally, Equifax placed a fraud alert in Quinn’s file as Quinn requested. Given the tcrse
dispute Quinn sent to Equifax, the procedure Equifax employed to assure the maximum possible
accuracy was reasonable as a matter of law.

b. Damages

Even if Equifax’s procedures were unreasonable, Quinn’s claim would still fail as a
matter of law because he has not shown that therc is a genuinc issue of material fact as to
whether he suffered any actual damages. In his complaint, Quinn claims that he: (1) was denied
credit by various entities; (2) suffered excessive or elevated interest rates and finance charges on
his credit card; (3) incurred out of pocket expenses; (4) financial and dignitary harm; and (5)
suffered mental anguish and emotional distress. However, between June 20, 2002, the date
Equifax was notified of the dispute and July 29, 2002, when the Wal-Mart account was deleted
from Quinn’s credit report, Equifax did not publish or disseminate a single credit report in

Quinn's name. Thus, it is difficult to discem how Quinn was damaged.


Quinn and his credit history and that the inaccurate information had been reported to third
parties. Quinn alleges that the defendants were in violation of multiple provisions of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act. Quinn claims damages from loss of credit opportunities, mental anguish,
financial and dignitary harm, statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. Equifax
has moved for summary judgment on all counts. For the following reasons, Equifax’s motion for

summary judgment is granted.

SION

A, Summary Judgment

Summary Judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law.”Fed. R. CIV. P. 56 (c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the
"evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 248 (1985). Initially, the moving party bears the
burden of showing that the record contains no genuine issue of material fact, Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The governing substantive law establishes which facts are
material, Anderson, 477 US. at 248.

The non-moving party must present more than a "metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts” to survive summary judgment. Matsushita Elec, Indus., Co. vy, Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 596 (1986), Additionally, "mere conclusory" allegations are not enough, Nowak v. St.

Rita High School, 142 F.3d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998).


4. Punitive Damages

Quinn’s claims under the FRCA have failed and since Quinn’s claims cannot survive
summary judgment, we must deny his claim for both statutory and punitive damages, Section
1681n (a) states that “[aJny person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed
under [the Act] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer” for actual or punitive
damages. Willful noncompliance can be shown if Quinn proved that Equifax “knowingly and
intentionally committed an act in conscious disregard for the rights of others." Ruffin-Thompkins,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23647, at *22-23, quoting, Philbin, 101 F.3d at 970. “Willful
concealment, misrepresentations, or systematic deprivation of consumers’ rights could justify an
award of statutory, or perhaps punitive damages.” Lee, 2003 WL 22287351, at *7. The
undisputed facts do not suggest that Equifax willfully concealed, misrepresented or
systematically deprived Quinn of his rights as consumer. To the contrary, Equifax reinvestigated
both of Quinn’s disputes and promptly released the findings to Quinn. Quinn has not alleged any
facts that rise to the level required for statutory and punitive damages. Hence, Quinn’s claims for
statutory and punitive damages must fail.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Equifax’s motion for summary judgment (#51-1) is

GRANTED.

TL is so ordered.

t), CR

Wayne R. Andersen

Dated: YI hak er] Lb yf United States District Judge



report prepared by Equifax. On June 20, 2002, when Quinn first informed Equifax of the Wal-
Mart dispute, the Wal-Mart account was reported as a current account with a $187.00 balance
that was being paid on time,

Equifax reviewed the dispute and prepared a Consumer Dispute Verification form (CDV)
that it forwarded to Wal-Mart on June 25, 2002. The CDV apprised Wal-Mart that Quinn was
disputing the Wal-Mart account. On June 28, 2002, Wal-Mart advised Equifax that (he
information regarding the disputed account was accurate as Equifax had reported it. That same
day, Equifax informed Quinn of the results of the Wal-Mart reinvestigation and provided him
with an updated copy of his credit report.

On July 1, 2002 Quinn contacted Equifax for a second time to dispute the Wal-Mart
account, That same day, Equifax reviewed the dispute and prepared a second CDV that it
forwarded to Wal-Mart to advise Wal-Mart that Quinn had again disputed the Wal-Mart account
opened in his name as a fraudulent account. Wal-Mart did not respond to Equifax, and on July
29, 2002, Equifax deleted the Wal-Mart account in order to comply with the FRCA §1681i thirty
day requirement. Under §1681i, once a credit reporting agency is notificd of the need to
reinvestigate an account, it has thirty days to complete the reinvestigation and fix the inaccuracy.
After deleting the Wal-Mart account in accordance with §1681i, Equifax notified Quinn that the
Wal-Mart account had been deleted and provided him with another copy of his credit report
prepared by Equifax. Quinn filed this action on September 1, 2002.

Quinn’s complaint alleges that multiple defendants including, Experian Information
Solutions, Equifax Information Services, GE Card Services, Sprint PCS, and, OST Collection

Services, Inc., had been “reporting derogatory and inaccurate statements and information” about



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
NICHOLAS QUINN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv. ) No. 02 C 5908
)

EXPERIAN SOLUTIONS, EQUIFAX ) Wayne R. Andersen
INFORMATION SERVICES LLC., GE __) District Judge
CARD SERVICES, SPRING PCS, OSI)

COLLECTION SERVICES, INC., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Nicholas Quinn (“Quinn”), brings a three count action against Equifax
Information Services LLC (“Equifax”), alleging multiple violations of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2003). Equifax has filed a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following reasons, Equifax’s
motion for summary judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

This dispute began when an allegedly fraudulent account was opened with Wal-Mart in
Quinn’s name sometime in April of 2002. On May 15, 2002, Quinn contacted Equifax on an
unrelated matter — regarding an OSI collection account he claimed was not his. ‘he OST
collection account was an account that Quinn claimed had been fraudulently opened using his
social security number, and Quinn called Equifax to make sure that it was not reporting the OSL
collection account in Quinn’s credit reports. Equifax researched the issue and on May 23, 2002,
informed Quinn that Equifax had never reported an OSI account in his credit report. On June 20,

2002, Quinn contacted Equifax to dispute the Wal-Mart account that was reported in a credit |


On July 1, 2002, Quinn sent a second dispute to Equifax and requested another
reinvestigation of the Wal-Mart account. That same day, Equifax generated a CDV that it
forwarded to Wal-Mart to advise it that Quinn was disputing the Wal-Mart account as a
fraudulent account, Wal-Mart did not get back to Equifax, and Equifax deleted the Wal-Mart
account to comply with the 30 day requirement in § 1681i (a). Equifax immediately notified
Quinn that the Wal-Mart account had been deleted from his credit file and provided him with an
updated copy of his credit report.

Quinn has argued that Equifax had a duty to take additional steps in the reinvestigation of
the Wal-Mart account, but this claim is not supported by the record. Both the original
reinvestigation and the second reinvestigation were completed and the account was deleted
expeditiously. Additionally, Equifax placed a fraud alert in Quinn's file and provided him with
multiple copies of his credit report during the reinvestigations. This was not a process that
dragged on for months, but instead was promptly reinvestigated and the account deleted within
the mandatory time required by the statute. Therefore, Equifax’s actions were rcasonable as a
matter of law. Ruffin-Thompkins, 2003 U.S, Dist. LEXIS 23647, at *18, quoting Zee, 2003 WL
22287351, at *7 m1}.

Assuming arguendo that Equifax had an obligation to go beyond the original source of the
information after Quinn disputed the Wal-Mart account for a second time on July 1, 2002,
Quinn’s claim is still defeated because he hus not suffered damages. From June 20, 2002 to July
29, 2002, no credit reports were rcleased to any other person or entity besides Quinn. Therefore,
even if Equifax was required to go beyond its initial source in its second reinvestigation, that

requirement would not have changed the outcome in this case because Quinn's claim fails as a

12