Filed 4/11/23 P. v. Raya CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SALVADOR ARIE RAYA,

Defendant and Appellant.

F083571

(Super. Ct. No. SF020428A)

MODIFICATION OF OPINION 

AND DENIAL OF REHEARING 

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion herein filed on March 17, 2023, be modified as 

follows:

1. On page 3, the paragraph beginning with “When Nakabayashi finally ...,” 

is deleted and replaced with:

When Nakabayashi finally engaged with the driver, who he 

identified as defendant during the hearing, he asked defendant to provide 

his license, registration, and insurance. Defendant responded to this request 

stating he did not have his actual license with him but had a copy. 

Defendant further explained that he did not have the vehicle registration 

with his name on it yet, as he had just purchased the vehicle. Defendant 

then turned to his passenger seat and produced two documents which 

appear to be related to the vehicle’s registration under someone else’s 

name. Nakabayashi testified he noticed defendant making an exaggerated 

movement toward the front passenger seat while retrieving the documents. 

In the body camera footage, we also see defendant show Nakabayashi an 

image on his cell phone that he states is a picture of his driver’s license. 

Nakabayashi then asks defendant to read the license number out loud so he 

can write it down. Defendant never provided any proof of insurance.
2.

2. On pages 3 and 4, the paragraph beginning with “After obtaining this 

information ...,” is deleted and replaced with:

After obtaining this information, Nakabayashi returned to his vehicle 

and conducted a records check on his computer. During this search, 

Nakabayashi discovered defendant had prior arrests for operating a “chop 

shop” and a firearm related charge. Nakabayashi also was able to obtain a 

Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) for the vehicle during the records 

check. Nakabayashi then decided to check the VIN on the actual vehicle 

because based on his training and experience he was aware that “chop 

shop” operators often “switch or swap VINs.” Additional facts that 

appeared to influence Nakabayashi to conduct the search for the VIN were 

that the vehicle defendant was driving appeared to be spray painted and was 

a Honda from the 1990’s which, again based on his experience, he knew to 

be the most commonly stolen vehicle in Kern County.

3. On page 4, the paragraph beginning with “Nakabayashi then started ...,” is 

deleted and replaced with the following:

Nakabayashi then started to search the vehicle by opening the driver 

side door and searching in that area. In his testimony, Nakabayashi 

testified he was able to locate matching VINs on the dashboard, the driver 

side door, and under the hood. While Nakabayashi was looking under the 

hood for another VIN, defendant started questioning him about what he was 

looking for and made a comment about being previously arrested for a 

“chop shop.” Nakabayashi told defendant that was why he was looking for 

another VIN, and to verify it had not been swapped. After closing the hood 

of the vehicle, Nakabayashi moved to the passenger side door and opened 

it. Nakabayashi found two firearms on the front passenger seat under a bag 

and the papers defendant had gone through to produce the registration 

documents. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of the patrol 

vehicle.

4. On page 10, in the paragraph beginning with “Again, the existence ...,” the 

fourth sentence is deleted and replaced with the following:

When Nakabayashi finally approached defendant and asked him to provide 

his license, registration, and insurance, defendant produced a photocopy of 

his license on a cell phone, registration documents in another person’s 

name, and no proof of insurance.

5. On pages 10 and 11, the paragraph beginning with “Nakabayashi then 

turned ...,” is deleted and replaced with the following:

Nakabayashi then moved to the passenger side door, which he had 

earlier testified was another location where a VIN could be found. 

Eventually, Nakabayashi turned his attention to the passenger seat in the 
3.

vehicle where defendant had turned to retrieve the vehicle registration 

documents. While looking through the materials on this seat, the video of 

Nakabayashi’s body camera reveals a seat covered in a mess of papers and 

other materials. We believe the progression of these events, as they 

unfolded, provided the level of probable cause necessary to justify 

Nakabayashi’s continuing search for a matching VIN and other documents 

related to ownership of the vehicle. This search continued to the passenger 

seat, where defendant had previously retrieved the registration documents 

from, and resulted in the discovery of the two firearms under all the papers 

and other materials piled on that passenger seat. The search conducted by 

Nakabayashi was supported by probable cause and did not violate 

defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

6. On page 11, after the heading under section I.D. titled The Availability of 

the Good Faith Exception, the two paragraphs shall be deleted in their entirety and 

replaced with the following:

Because it is unnecessary to the overall result in this case, we decline 

to address the argument raised by the People that Nakabayashi may have 

been acting in good faith when searching the interior of the vehicle, in 

reliance on the standards set out in People v. Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th 353, 

and In re Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60. We do note, however, that the 

decision in Lopez did not overturn the authority to conduct searches for 

registration documents or other proof of ownership when appropriate. 

(People v. Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th, at p. 360, 381 [overturning only the 

validity of a traffic-stop identification-search, previously discussed in In re 

Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60.)

This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.

The petition for rehearing filed by appellant on April 4, 2023, is denied. The 

petition for rehearing filed by respondent on March 28, 2023, is denied.

FRANSON, A.P.J.

WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, J.

SNAUFFER, J.
Filed 3/17/23 P. v. Raya CA5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SALVADOR ARIE RAYA,

Defendant and Appellant.

F083571

(Super. Ct. No. SF020428A)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Colette M. 

Humphrey, Judge.

Matthew A. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and 

R. Todd Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
2.

Defendant Salvador Arie Raya challenges the trial court’s decision to deny his 

motion to suppress evidence following a traffic stop. Our review of the transcript of the 

hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, and all the evidence submitted during that 

hearing, leads us to conclude the trial court’s denial of the motion is supported by the 

record and constitutional standards expressed in the law. 

PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On June 20, 2021, an information was filed charging defendant with unlawfully 

carrying a loaded firearm on his person, or in a vehicle, in a public place or on a public 

street, without being the registered owner of the firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 25850, 

subd. (c)(6), a felony; count 1), and unlawfully concealing in a vehicle under his control a 

firearm (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1), a misdemeanor; count 2). 

On September 2, 2021, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained 

during a traffic enforcement stop. The motion was denied on October 19, 2021. 

Following the ruling on the motion to suppress, defendant entered a plea of no contest to 

counts 1 and 2 as alleged in the information. 

On November 17, 2021, defendant was placed on probation for a period of 

two years with the condition that he serve 180 days for count 1 in the custody of the Kern 

County Sheriff. On count 2, probation was denied, but defendant received an additional 

sentence of 180 days, which was to be served concurrently with the sentence for count 1. 

Defendant filed his notice of appeal challenging the denial of his motion to 

suppress on November 18, 2021. 

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Deputy Bryan Nakabayashi testified that on May 7, 2021, he was patrolling the 

500 block of “F” Street in Wasco when he noticed a vehicle missing a front license plate 

and decided to execute a traffic stop. However, before talking to the driver, Nakabayashi 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise specified. 
3.

checked the back license plate number on the vehicle and discovered it had been reported 

stolen. Nakabayashi’s body camera footage, which was admitted into evidence as 

Exhibit 1, reveals he told another deputy who was also at the scene that when he first saw 

defendant’s vehicle, he suspected it was spray painted, which was common for stolen 

vehicles. Nakabayashi stated this was the reason he checked the license plate number 

before approaching defendant. 

When Nakabayashi finally engaged with the driver, who he identified as defendant 

during the hearing, he asked defendant to provide his license, registration, and insurance. 

Defendant responded to this request stating he did not have his actual license with him 

but had a copy. Defendant further explained that he did not have the vehicle registration 

with his name on it yet, as he had just purchased the vehicle. Defendant then turned to 

his passenger seat where there were some papers and produced the photocopy of his 

license and a registration for the vehicle with someone else’s name on it. Nakabayashi 

testified he noticed defendant making an exaggerated movement toward the front 

passenger seat while retrieving the documents. Defendant never provided any proof of 

insurance. 

After obtaining this information, Nakabayashi returned to his vehicle and 

conducted a records check on his computer. During this search, Nakabayashi discovered 

defendant had prior arrests for operating a “chop shop” and a firearm related charge. 

Based on this information, Nakabayashi decided to check the Vehicle Identification 

Number (VIN) on the vehicle. Nakabayashi explained that based on his training and 

experience he was aware that “chop shop” operators often “switch or swap VINs.” An 

additional fact that appeared to influence Nakabayashi to conduct the search for the VIN 

was that the vehicle defendant was driving was a Honda from the 1990’s which, again 

based on his experience, he knew to be the most commonly stolen vehicle in Kern 

County. 
4.

Before starting the search, Nakabayashi’s body camera video shows him putting 

on gloves as he tells another deputy that he is going to pat down defendant before 

searching for the VIN because defendant has a prior arrest for an unlawful firearm. 

Nakabayashi then approached the vehicle, told defendant to get out of the vehicle, and 

patted him down. Defendant started to become agitated, asking many questions about 

why he was being searched. Defendant was then told to sit on the sidewalk while the 

search for the VIN was conducted. Defendant was not handcuffed at this point. 

Nakabayashi then started to search the vehicle by opening the driver side door and 

searching in that area. While Nakabayashi was looking under the hood for another VIN, 

defendant started questioning him about what he was looking for and made a comment 

about being previously arrested for a “chop shop.” Nakabayashi told defendant that was 

why he was looking for another VIN, and to verify it had not been swapped. After 

closing the hood of the vehicle, Nakabayashi moved to the passenger side door and 

opened it. Nakabayashi found two firearms on the front passenger seat under a bag and 

the papers defendant had gone through to produce the photocopy of his license and the 

registration. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of the patrol vehicle. 

During the hearing when asked why he searched the interior of the vehicle when 

he said his purpose was to look for a VIN, Nakabayashi explained:

“There are vehicle VIN numbers on the dash, on the dashboard. 

There are sometimes underneath the hood, near the firewall of the vehicle. 

There’s also vehicle VIN stickers that are located on the insides of the 

doors. As well as VIN stickers in various places on parts of the vehicle like 

the inside of the trunk.” 

Nakabayashi further explained that when he moved to the front passenger side of the

vehicle, he was still looking for the vehicle’s VIN and defendant’s license, current 

insurance, and registration documents, and that was why he lifted the papers and a bag on 

the front passenger seat, exposing the firearms. 
5.

Next to testify was Tammy Olinger, who works in the administrative offices of the 

Kern County Sheriff’s Department. Olinger testified she is responsible for maintaining 

dispatch records which are created for deputies when they call in to conduct a search for 

information. Olinger is specifically responsible for pulling audio and logs when needed. 

Olinger explained the logs are created when officers call in to the dispatch staff who then 

create the logs by typing in the information they receive. Olinger then authenticated the 

log generated for May 7, 2021, when Nakabayashi called in to dispatch during the traffic 

stop involving defendant. This log was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 2. The log 

specifically showed that after Nakabayashi made an inquiry, the vehicle defendant was 

driving when stopped showed up as a recovered stolen vehicle, and that the license plate 

on the vehicle was considered stolen. 

DISCUSSION

I. The Search of the Vehicle Was Appropriate

A. The Standard of Review

Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. (People v. Williams (1999) 

20 Cal.4th 119, 130 (Williams).) When the search lacks a warrant, the moving party’s 

initial burden is to simply establish the absence of a warrant. (Ibid.) “The burden then 

shifts to the prosecution to justify the warrantless search.” (People v. Marquez (2019) 31 

Cal.App.5th 402, 409, citing Williams, supra, at p. 127.) “The prosecution must prove by 

a preponderance of the evidence that the search falls within an exception to the 

Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” (Marquez, at p. 409.) 

A traffic stop is considered lawful when the facts and circumstances surrounding 

the stop cause the officer to have a reasonable suspicion the driver violated the Vehicle 

Code. (People v. Nice (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937–938.) Furthermore, an

investigatory detention by police is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and 

therefore legal, “when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, 

considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective 
6.

manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. 

Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) The detention should “be temporary and last no longer 

than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 

U.S. 491, 500.) If, however, when challenging the search, a defendant has a specific 

argument other than just the lack of a warrant as to why the search was unreasonable, that 

argument must be made in the motion to suppress to give the People an opportunity to 

address that specific point in the trial court and not wait for the appeal. (Williams, supra, 

20 Cal.4th at p. 130.) 

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “ ‘ “we defer to the superior 

court’s express and implied factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, 

[but] we exercise our independent judgment in determining the legality of a search on the 

facts so found.” ’ ” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979.) “ ‘On appeal we 

consider the correctness of the trial court’s ruling itself, not the correctness of the trial 

court’s reasons or reaching its decision.’ ” (People v. Jimenez (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 

1337, 1360.) 

Of relevance to this case, we note the decision in People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 

353 (Lopez), in which our Supreme Court considered the issue of a warrantless search of 

a person solely to obtain evidence of his or her identity, in light of Arizona v. Gant (2009) 

556 U.S. 332. In Gant, the United States Supreme Court was specifically dealing with 

the search of a vehicle incident to an arrest that had already occurred. The Gant court 

explored the permissible scope of a warrantless automobile search and eventually held:

“[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if 

the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the 

time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 

evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a 

search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a 

warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.” 

(Arizona v. Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 351.) 
7.

Following the decision in Gant, our own Supreme Court reevaluated its own 

language in the prior case of In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, where the court stated 

a limited warrantless search was permitted in “the context of a valid traffic stop during 

which a driver fails to produce the required automobile registration, driver’s license, or 

identification documentation upon an officer’s proper demand.” (Id. at p. 68.) While 

evaluating the holding in Gant and considering the facts before the court, the Lopez court 

concluded “the Fourth Amendment does not contain an exception to the warrant 

requirement for searches to locate a driver’s identification following a traffic stop.” 

(Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 381, emphasis added.) The holding in Lopez has yet to be 

extended to searches for automobile registration, insurance, or a VIN, which go to the 

question of who owns the vehicle. (See LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise On The 

Fourth Amendment (6th ed. Oct. 2022 update) § 7.4(d).) 

At the beginning of the hearing held on October 15, 2021, on defendant’s motion 

to suppress, the parties agreed that the search at issue was conducted without a warrant. 

At this point, therefore, the burden shifted to the People to prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the search conducted by Nakabayashi came within an exception to the 

Fourth Amendment requirement for a warrant. 

B. Defendant Forfeited the Right to Argue the Search Constituted a 

Prolonged Detention

In his opening brief, defendant argues the constitutionality of the search conducted 

by Nakabayashi was in doubt because it was unjustifiably prolonged. This was the first 

time defendant raised this specific argument in this matter. The People now contend 

defendant has forfeited the opportunity to raise this specific argument on appeal. We 

note, defendant did not address the issue of forfeiture in his reply brief to this court. 

At the trial court level, defendant submitted moving papers for his motion to 

suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, citing the case of Williams, supra, 

20 Cal.4th 119, for the proposition that:
8.

“Although a defendant must—at some point in the hearing on the 

motion—put forth the specific grounds on which the motion is based, the 

Court concluded that he is not required to put these reasons forward in the 

initial moving papers. A defendant is obligated to specify ‘the precise 

grounds for suppression’ and ‘the inadequacy of any justifications for the 

search or seizure’ only after the prosecution offers a justification for the 

warrantless act.” 

However, when quoting this language, defendant failed to acknowledge additional 

language in Williams that went on to state:

“Of course, if defendants have a specific argument other than the 

lack of a warrant as to why a warrantless search or seizure was 

unreasonable, they must specify that argument as part of their motion to 

suppress and give the prosecution an opportunity to offer evidence on the 

point.” (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 130.) 

For instance, the Williams court noted a defendant could not wait for an appeal to raise 

the failure to comply with the knock and announce requirements of section 840 for the 

first time. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 130.) Therefore, while the prosecution 

retains the burden of proving that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable under 

the circumstances, if a defendant sees “a critical gap in the prosecution’s proof or a flaw 

in its legal analysis,” an objection must be made on that basis, or the defendant will risk 

forfeiting the issue on appeal. (Ibid.) 

At no point during the hearing on the motion to suppress in the trial court did 

defense counsel raise the argument that the search of defendant’s vehicle was 

unjustifiably prolonged. Defendant has waived that specific issue here. 

C. Probable Cause Existed For the Search

Again, in this case Nakabayashi decided to conduct a traffic stop when he noticed 

the vehicle defendant was driving was missing a front license plate. The body camera 

video entered as evidence in this matter also showed Nakabayashi had a concern the 

vehicle was stolen because it appeared to be spray painted and had a back license plate 

that was listed as being stolen. When taking the matter under submission, the trial court 

stated:
9.

“My initial reaction is to consider the totality of the circumstances. 

No front license plate, which clearly gave you⸻the deputy authority to stop 

the car. A stolen license plate on the back end of the Court⸻car. The 

defendant not producing registration, not producing a driver’s license, 

which is another violation. Seems to me that the officer should be allowed 

to search the car. Because I think we have enough crimes involved there 

they could find evidence, but, in an abundance of caution, I’m going to take 

it under submission because I want to read this case2in more detail.” 

Without providing any further statement, the trial court denied the motion to suppress on

October 19, 2021. 

“Probable cause is a more demanding standard than mere reasonable suspicion.” 

(People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 862.) Probable cause requires 

“ ‘particularized suspicion.’ ” (Texas v. Brown (1983) 460 U.S. 730, 742.) “Probable 

cause to search exists when, based upon the totality of the circumstances ..., ‘there is a 

fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 

place.’ ” (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1098, quoting Illinois v. Gates

(1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238; accord, Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696 

[“the known facts and circumstances” must be “sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable 

prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found”].) 

Again, the trial court stated its belief Nakabayashi had the authority to stop 

defendant because of the lack of a front license plate. This is a violation of the Vehicle 

Code and a valid reason for the stop. (Veh. Code, §§ 5200, 5202.) The court then cited 

the stolen license plate in the back of the vehicle and defendant’s inability to provide a 

valid license and registration as valid reasons for justifying a search of the vehicle under 

the “totality of the circumstances” standard. While substantial evidence supports each of 

these conclusions, it is our responsibility to consider the validity of the court’s ruling 

justifying the search undertaken by Nakabayashi. (See People v. Jimenez, supra, 242 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1360.) 

2 The “case” referenced by the trial court is Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th 353.
10.

Again, the existence of probable cause is determined on the totality of the 

circumstances. (People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1098.) The totality of the 

circumstances presented to Nakabayashi was the lack of a front license plate on a vehicle 

that appeared to be spray painted, a fact he understood through experience might suggest 

the vehicle was stolen. A quick check of the back license plate revealed the rear license 

plate to the vehicle was reported stolen. When Nakabayashi finally approached 

defendant and asked him to provide his license, registration, and insurance, defendant 

produced a photocopy of his license, a registration document in another person’s name, 

and no proof of insurance. Nakabayashi returned to his vehicle and ran a computer 

check, from which he learned defendant had prior convictions for operating a “chop 

shop” and firearms related charges. At this point, Nakabayashi decided to conduct a 

search to confirm the vehicle’s VIN and to pat down defendant due to the prior weapons 

charges on his record. 

When Nakabayashi returned to the vehicle and asked defendant to get out so he 

could do a quick pat down search, defendant appeared agitated and started questioning 

why Nakabayashi needed to do this. After completing the pat down search, defendant 

was instructed to sit on the sidewalk, but was not handcuffed. Nakabayashi testified he 

started his search for additional information about who owned the vehicle and to verify 

the VIN, because he was aware through training and experience that those who operated 

“chop shops” would “switch or swap” out VIN numbers on stolen vehicles. When 

Nakabayashi was looking under the hood of the vehicle for another VIN, defendant 

started verbally challenging him again about what he was looking for. Unprovoked, 

defendant then acknowledged his prior for operating a “chop shop” and Nakabayashi 

responded noting that was why he was trying to confirm the accuracy of the VIN. 

Nakabayashi then turned his attention to the passenger seat in the vehicle where 

defendant had turned to retrieve the photocopy of his license and the vehicle registration 

document. While looking through the materials on this seat, the video of Nakabayashi’s 
11.

body camera reveals a seat covered in a mess of papers and other materials. We believe 

the progression of these events, as they unfolded, provided the level of probable cause 

necessary to justify Nakabayashi’s search, which ended at the passenger seat and resulted 

in the discovery of the two firearms under all the papers and other materials piled on that 

passenger seat. The search conducted by Nakabayashi was supported by probable cause 

and did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

D. The Availability of the Good Faith Exception

Although unnecessary to the overall result in this case, we find it necessary to 

address the argument raised by the People that Nakabayashi may have been acting in 

good faith when searching the interior of the vehicle while still looking for verification of 

defendant’s identity. This argument points to the fact that the California Supreme Court 

overruled its holding in the earlier case of Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, stating, “the 

Fourth Amendment does not contain an exception to the warrant requirement for searches 

to locate a driver’s identification following a traffic stop.” (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 

p. 381.) 

We believe such an argument was unreasonable at the time it was made as In re

Arturo D. had been overruled on the issue of searches for identity over 18 months before 

the search occurred in this case.3 We would expect a law enforcement officer who 

regularly conducts vehicle stops that could lead to a search would receive regular training 

on changes in the law that potentially impact the validity of those searches. The 

18-month period here exceeds what we would consider a reasonable period of time for 

such training to occur justifying the use of the good faith exception expressed in Davis v. 

United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 231 [holding the exclusionary rule does not apply 

3 Lopez was decided on November 25, 2019, while the search at issue in this case 

occurred on May 7, 2021. 
12.

“when the police conduct a search in compliance with binding precedent that is later 

overruled”]. 

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence is affirmed. The 

judgment is also affirmed.