ALJ Mondi does not provide specific reasons for his credibility determination. He
merely states, without elaboration, that plaintiff is not credible because of the “lack of
supporting treatment”, “her activities even while receiving disability benefits in the past”
and because “no treating physician has opined that [she] is disabled.” (R. 22). The
ALJ failed to explain how these statements are inconsistent with plaintiff's alleged
limitations. We cannot affirm a decision if we are unable to determine whether the ALJ
“investigated ‘all avenues’ that relate to [plaintiff's] complaints of pain because [his]
decision offers no clue as to whether [he] examined that full range of medical
evidence.” Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 888. ALJ Mondi's decision, “in its present form, falls
below the mark,” thus we do not have a sufficient basis upon which to affirm his
credibility determination. fo. That said, we are not suggesting that the credibility
determination is erroneous, but only that it requires further elaboration.

Dr, Langgut’s Findings

Next, we address plaintiff's claim that the ALJ improperly relied on his own
medical opinion and erroneously rejected the findings of Dr. Langgut. Dr. Langgut
conducted a consultative mental examination of plaintiff on February 27, 2002. We
outlined the pertinent findings from his evaluation supra. After reviewing those findings,
the ALJ opined that “if adopted [they] would warrant a finding of disabled.” (R. 21-22).
The ALJ then proceeded to reject a majority of Dr. Langgut's findings, concluding that
they were not consistent with the evidence in the record. Specifically, ALU Mondi
concluded that Dr. Langgut’s findings were not persuasive because “either [plaintiff]
failed to report or the examiner overlooked [Burney’s] significant ongoing work after her

‘7-11' job ended in 1992, with earnings indicative of substantial gainful activity through

13



When she is in her apartment, she cleans it and prepares three meals per day. /d. For
entertainment, Burney may read a couple of paragraphs in a book and watch television.
Id. Burney does not use alcohol or drugs. (R. 93). She has very few friends and has
problems with daily social interactions. (R. 107).
Medical Evidence

As stated supra, the administrative record before us is voluminous, but a majority
of its contents are irrelevant to our discussion. For purposes of this opinion, we are
only concerned with evidence in the record applicable to plaintiff's May 5, 2000
application for disability benefits. Such records include, inter alia, the medical records
of plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Robert B. Wright; a consultative examination
conducted by Dr. Shital Shah; a physical RFC assessment from 2000; and a 2002
psychological evaluation from Dr. Mark B. Langgut.
A. Dr. Robert Wright

Dr. Wright began treating plaintiff in February, 1993 and continued to see her
several times a year through 2001, (R. 247-53; 308-311; 457-94; 515-517). Since the
alleged onset of her disability, Burney visited Dr. Wright for symptoms including:
migraine headaches, blurred vision, dizzy spells, hypertension, a semi-functioning left
leg and general body numbness. (R.457-465). Dr. Wright observed that Burney
suffered from chronic headaches, ranging from manageable to debilitating. (R. 308;
458). The duration of her headaches ranged from a few times a month to a period,
lasting up to two weeks, when her headaches occurred at least once a day. (R. 457).
He prescribed Tylenol and Mylanta for general pain, Midrin for migraine headaches,
and Indiral for complications caused by hypertension. /d.

4


§405(g) because it was available to Burney at the prior proceeding. True, the
certification was not actually written until approximately six weeks after the ALJ issued
his decision on June 14, 2002. However, the certification was based on information
that was part of the administrative record available to the ALJ prior to his decision.
Therefore, it cannot be considered new evidence. See Sample, 999 F.2d at 1144 (a
letter actually written after the ALJ's decision, but based on evidence in the
administrative record available to the ALJ at the time of his decision, did not meet the
newness requirement in §405(g)); See also Jens, 347 F.3d at 213 (a report written after
the ALJ’s decision, but summarizing information that had long been in existence, does
not meet the newness requirement of §405(g)).

Further, Burney did not show good cause for her failure to incorporate the
medical certification into the record in the prior proceeding. As stated above, Dr.
Wright's medical certification was based on his treatment of plaintiff from 1993 through
2001. There is no reason plaintiff could not have obtained this medical certification
prior to the ALJ’s hearing or the issuance of his decision in 2002. The certification was
not based on new medical ailments or conditions that arose or worsened after the ALJ's
hearing. Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for her failure to request the medical
certification from Dr. Wright in 2001, or anytime prior to issuance of the ALJ's decision.
See Sample, 999 F.2d at 1444 (finding no showing of good cause under circumstances
similar to the instant case). Because plaintiff has failed to establish that Dr. Wright's
medical certification qualifies as new evidence under §405(g), her request for a

sentence six remand to allow the ALJ to consider new evidence is denied.

17


“although her earnings from work approach the level deemed indicative of substantial
gainful employment.” (R. 23). At step 2, the ALJ makes two conflicting findings.
Initially, in the section of his decision entitled “Evaluation of the Evidence”, he finds that
Burney has a “mental impairment that is severe within the meaning of the Regulations.”
He then proceeds to a step 3 determination that the mental impairment does not “meet
or medically equal any impairment” in the Listings. (R. 21). Within that section of his
decision, ALJ Mondi does not address any possible physical impairments. However,
two pages later, in the section entitled “Findings”, he opines that Burney has “physical
and mental impairments that are ‘severe’,” but do not meet or medically equal any
impairment in the Listings. (R. 23) (emphasis added). This inconsistency will be
addressed infra.

At step 4, the ALu finds that despite her impairments, the exact nature of which
is unclear, Burney can perform unskilled, medium exertional level work “subject to
limitations that are ‘slight’ in understanding, remembering and carrying out short,
simple, as well as detailed instructions; and ‘moderate’ in the ability to make judgments
on simple work-related decisions and to respond appropriately with the public,
supervisors, and co-workers.” (R. 23). Accordingly, the ALJ concludes that with an
RFC to perform unskilled, medium exertional level work with some slight and moderate
limitations, Burney can perform her past relevant work as a receptionist and thus is not
disabled under the Act. Because the ALJ found that Burney can perform her past
relevant work, he never reached step 5 of the analysis.

Burney raises a number of issues on appeal. Specifically, she argues that (1)

the ALJ erred as a matter of law by substituting his medical opinion for that of Dr.

9


Dr. Langgut also evaluated Burney’s ability to handle responsibility. (R. 22). He
found “although she may need some assistance as a function of her episodic mood
variability,” she is capable of managing her finances. Id. He also found that she
“demonstrated adequate judgment, responsibility, and arithmetic reasoning skills, as
well as an ability to understand the effects of her actions on herself and others.” /d.
Finally, Dr. Langgut diagnosed Burney with Bipolar Disorder, |I° and R/O Schizoid®
personality features. (R. 522).

C. Other Medical Evidence

In addition to Dr. Wright's treatment notes and the results of Dr. Langgut’s
examination, the record also contains the results of a physical consultative examination
and a physical RFC assessment. Based on a July 13, 2000 consultative examination,
Dr. Shah opined that plaintiff's “orientation, memory, appearance, behavior and ability
to relate during the exam was entirely within normal limits.” (R. 454). Physically, Dr.
Shah found that plaintiff had a “full range of motion” in all joints. fd. The doctor further
noted that plaintiff's gait was normal, and she was able to bear her own weight and
ambulate without the aid of any device. /d. As for plaintiffs complaints of seizures, Dr.
Shah found that, clinically, there were no neurological findings. /d.

In November, 2000, at the behest of the SSA, Dr. Robert Patsy affirmed the

findings of an August 7, 2000 physical RFC assessment. Dr. Patsy concurred with the

5 Bipolar II is a mood disorder characterized by both manic and depressive episodes.
DORLAND’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 209 (27th ed. 1988).

6 A schizoid personality is characterized by traits of shyness, sensitivity, social
withdrawal, and introversion. fd. at 1492.


Additionally, Dr. Wright observed Burney’s social behavior. (R. 460). He noted
that she repeatedly failed to make eye contact with him during their appointments.
Burney told Dr. Wright that she often had trouble “finding words.” (R. 478). Dr. Wright
also documented Burney’s rambling speech, which did not follow any logical pattern (R.
460), and her frequent circuitous speech patterns. (R. 460).

B. Dr, Mark Langgut

Dr. Langgut, a clinical psychologist, conducted two consultative psychological
evaluations of Burney in 1996 and 2002. (R. 312-317; 518-523). At each exam, Dr.
Langgut performed detailed psychological evaluations, including memory tests, abstract
reasoning tests and an IQ test. /d. He also made general observations about her
social behavior. /d. in the most recent examination, he opined that Burney has areas
of intact intellectual ability and may be able “to learn new tasks, synthesize novel
information into existing cognitive schema, and use insight and judgment to good
advantage.” (R. 512-22). When testing her judgment and insight, Dr. Langgut
determined that “she has intact judgment and she is well able to make appropriate
decisions and understand the effect of her actions on herself and others.” (R. 521).

Dr. Langgut further observed that “her thought processes were characterized by
rapid speech, poor coherence, and moderately increasing suggestibility.” /d. Burney
“shifted topics in an overly flexible manner” and had “moderately obsessive ideas and a
mild degree of ruminative ideation.” /d. Additionally, he opined that “her

consciousness was clear to somewhat confused, as well as overly abstract.” /d.

4Ruminative ideation is the constant dwelling on certain topics or ideas. DORLAND'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1476 (27th ed. 1988).


CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court remands this case to the ALJ for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion. On remand, the ALJ should: (1) better
articulate his step 2 findings, (2) consider the effect, if any, of Dr. Wright's treatment
notes on his determination regarding plaintiff's physical impairments, and (3) elaborate
on the basis for his credibility determinations and his decision to disregard the findings
of Dr. Langgut. Accordingly, we grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and deny
defendant's motion for summary judgment. It is so ordered.

ENTER: ‘

eke P Pete:

MICHAEL T. MASON

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: August 7, 2004

18


is “unreliable because of serious mistakes or omissions, the reviewing court must
reverse unless satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have come to a different
conclusion, in which event a remand would be pointless.” Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d
305, 309 (7th Cir. 1996).
LEGAL ANALYSIS

A person is disabled under the Act if “he or she has an inability to engage in any
substantial gainful! activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less that twelve months.” 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(1)(A). In determining whether the claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider
the following five step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. §416.1920(a)-(f): “(1) whether the
claimant is currently employed, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, (3)
whether the claimant's impairment is one that the Commissioner considers conclusively
disabling, (4) if the claimant does not have a conclusively disabling impairment, whether
she can perform her past relevant work, and (5) whether the claimant is capable of
performing any work in the national economy.” Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176. If at any step
in the inquiry the ALJ determines that the claimant is not disabled, the analysis ends.
Goodson v. Barnhart, 217 F.Supp.2d 892, 900 (N.D.IIl. 2002). The claimant has the
burden of establishing a disability at steps 1 through 4. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 886.
However, if the claimant reaches step 5, “the burden shifts to the ALJ to establish that
the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy.” /d.

Steps 1 through 3 of the ALu’s analysis are not contested by the parties. At step
1, ALJ Mondi finds that plaintiff is not currently engaged in gainful employment,

8


le Order Form (06/97)

Sap

ited States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Aspigged Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
or aie Judge Michael T. Mason than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 2148 DATE 8/9/2004
CASE Burey vs. Barnhart
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g-, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Q Brief in support of motion due

(3) q Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due :

(4) QO Ruling/Hearing on set for _ at

(5) Qa Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :

(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) oO {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

COFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) | [Other docketentry] For reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment [17-1] is granted, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [20-
1] is denied, judgment is entered for plaintiff and this case is remanded to the Commissioner for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order.

(1) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
3

No notices required.

umber of notices

VY _| Notices mailed by judge’s staff AUG 1 0 2004

dfOdockered

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices,
Y_ | Mail AO 450 form.

dboferity dent inicats

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

8/9)

courtroom date mailed notice
KF deputy’s
initials

6~ SAY Ha0z
Date/iimné feckived in
contrat clack Office

KF

mating depaty initials



Dr. Wright’s Treatment Notes

Related to the ALJ’s failure to sufficiently articulate his step 2 findings is plaintiff's
argument that the ALJ ignored a pertinent line of evidence, namely medical records
from plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Wright. In her application for benefits, plaintiff
alleged the physical impairment of migraine headaches, which is supported by Dr.
Wright's treatment notes. As stated above, it is unclear whether the ALJ considered
plaintiff's migraines a severe impairment. What is clear, is that the ALJ failed to
adequately address plaintiff's claims regarding her migraine headaches within his
decision. In his cursory opinion, which barely reaches the sixth page, the ALJ does not
include a single reference to the content of Dr. Wright's treatment notes or findings.

The ALJ has the duty to “weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts, make
independent findings of fact and determine the case accordingly.” Brown v. Barnhart,
298 F.Supp.2d 773, 778 (7" Cir. 2004). In Social Security cases, “treating source
opinions must be given special consideration.” /d. at 788 (citing Dominguese v.
Massanari, 172 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1100 (E.D. Wis. 2001). Additionally, if “well supported
evidence by medically acceptable clinical and faboratory diagnostic techniques and ‘not
inconsistent’ with other substantial evidence, the adjudicator must afford such opinions
controlling weight.” /d., (citing SSR 96-8p); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). If the ALJ
chooses not to afford the treating physician's opinion controlling weight, she may not
simply reject it. /d. Instead, she is required to “evaluate the opinion’s weight by looking
at the length, nature and extent of the plaintiff's and physician's treatment relationship;
the degree to which the opinion is supported by the evidence; the opinion’s consistency

with the record as a whole; whether the doctor is a specialist and ‘other factors.” /d.

11


Langgut; (2) he failed to consider a relevant line of evidence, namely the medical
records from Dr. Wright; (3) he erred in finding Burney's complaints of pain not credible;
and (4) her case should be remanded back to the ALJ to allow him to consider new
evidence. Further, our independent review of the ALJ’s opinion raises an additional
basis for appeal, namely the ambiguity of the ALJ’s step 2 findings.
Step 2 Ambiguity

We begin by addressing the ambiguity in the ALJ’s articulation of his step two
findings. As we stated supra, the ALJ’s decision contains two internally inconsistent
step 2 findings. In the “Evaluation of the Evidence” section, ALJ Mondi found that
Burney has a “mental impairment that is severe within the meaning of the Regulations,”
but makes no mention of the presence or absence of any physical impairments, or the
level of their severity. (R. 21). Two pages later, in the “Findings” section of his
decision, the ALJ states that Burney has both “physical and mental impairments that
are ‘severe” under the Act. (R. 23) (emphasis added). From the ALJ’s decision, we
cannot determine his precise step 2 finding. We do not know whether the ALJ
determined that plaintiff has both mental and physical impairments, which he
considered severe, or, if he only considered plaintiff's mental impairments severe under
the Act. Further, if the ALJ did find that plaintiff had severe physical impairments, we
cannot decipher their identity based on his decision. The ambiguity of the ALJ’s step
two findings necessitate a remand for a more meaningful articulation of which, if any, of
plaintiff's impairments the ALJ found to be severe under the Act. See Marco v. Apfel,
97 C 6824, 1999 WL 311695, *5 (N.D.IIl. May 13, 1999) (remanding a case to the ALJ
because his step 3 findings were inconsistent).

10


original DDS physician that plaintiff could perform medium level exertional work.
Specifically, he found that she could lift up to 50 pounds occasionally, and 25 pounds
frequently. (R. 496). She could stand and/or walk for a total of about 6 hours in an 8-
hour work day, and could sit for a total of about 6 hours in an 8-hour work day. /d.
Burney’s ability to push and/or pull was unlimited. /d. Dr. Patsy also found that plaintiff
did not have any postural, manipulative, visual, or communicative limitations, but she
should avoid concentrated exposure to hazards because of her alleged seizures. (R.
497-99).
STANDARD OF REVIEW

We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and
free from legal error. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7" Cir.
2002). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence and is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7" Cir. 1995)(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). We must consider the entire administrative record, but we will
not “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute our
own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7"
Cir. 2003)(quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000)). We will conduct
a “critical review of the evidence” and will not let the Commissioner's decision stand “if it
lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of the issues.” /d. (quoting Steele,
290 F. 3d at 940.). The ALJ “must build'an accurate and logical bridge from evidence
to [his] conclusion,” however he need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record.
Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1177 (7 Cir. 2001). When the decision of the ALJ

1



previous work experience as an assistant manager of a convenience store and a
receptionist. (82-85). Burney was an assistant manager at a 7-11 store from 1986-
1992. According to Burney, her employment at 7-11 ended because the store closed
and she “fell on [her] head.” (R. 94). The administrative record does not contain
conclusive evidence regarding her employment from 1992-1996. However, from 1997-
1998, Burney worked as a receptionist for Sullivan Personnel Services and Centurion
Services. (R. 377). From 1999-2000, after the alleged onset date of her disability,
Burney worked part-time for Centurion Services. Id.

Burney testified that she suffers from migraines that cause blurred vision and
slurred speech. (R. 86). She stated that at the time of the hearing she had been
having “more and more migraine attacks . . . every couple of weeks, . . . for like three or
four days” at a time. (R. 96-97). Additionally, she reported having dizzy spells, hip
problems, and back problems. (R. 86). She has trouble walking and occasionally uses
a cane in the summer time. (R. 101). She uses the cane at home and when she goes
to the park to heip her with balance. /d. She can walk up to six blocks to the grocery
store, but after three blocks her “leg gives completely out.” (R. 89). She stated that she
has great difficulty walking to the grocery store and has fallen while walking there in the
past. Id.

Save infrequent house guests, Burney has lived alone in an apartment on the
third floor of a building without an elevator for the past 23 years. (R. 91, 103). She

testified that there are lots of days when she does not leave her apartment. (R. 103).

3ALJ Mondi noted that Burney was not using her cane at the hearing. (R. 20).

3


1998 and at least approaching that level in years 1999-2000,” and they were
“inconsistent with [plaintiff] never receiving treatment for a mental impairment.” (R. 22).
The ALJ further concluded that “with treatment, [Burney’s] limitations may be further
reduced.” /d.

The ALJ’s findings must be based on testimony and medical evidence in the
record. Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7" Cir. 1996). Medical evidence may be
discounted if it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other evidence in the
record. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 871. ALJ Mondi acknowledged that Dr. Langgut
diagnosed plaintiff as having bipolar disorder with functional limitations that if adopted
would warrant a finding of disabled. However, he disregarded those medical findings
concluding that “the record is persuasive that claimant has only slight limitations. . . .”
(R. 22). The ALJ failed to cite any specific evidence in the record to support this
statement. He merely provided the record cites “B1-B10F”, which correspond to the
exhibit numbers given to plaintiffs medical records. He did not actually cite to a specific
document or set of documents that supported his conclusion. The ALJ did not cite a
conflicting medical report or examination finding, just the record as a whole. Such a
blanket citation, without elaboration, is not sufficient to build an accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to the ALJ’s conclusion.

The ALJ also discredited Dr. Langgut findings on the grounds that he did not
mention Burney's significant ongoing work since 1992, apparently concluding that Dr.
Langgut’s findings were inconsistent with her work record after 1992. Unfortunately, the
ALJ did not cite any medical evidence to support such a conclusion and did not seek

the testimony of a medical expert to determine whether plaintiff's work history after

14


assume that ALJ Mondi impermissibly substituted his own judgment for that of the
physicians. See Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1077 (7" Cir. 1991). Such actions
require a remand.
New Evidence

Finally, Burney seeks a remand pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to
allow the ALJ to consider “new evidence” plaintiff believes merits a finding that she is
disabled under the Act. Specifically, plaintiff seeks a remand to allow the ALJ to
consider Dr. Wright's July 26, 2002 medical certification in which he states that “Ms.
Irene Burney remains unable to work due to headaches, problems with concentration,
imbalance and falls along with visual disturbances. She has difficulty with verbal
communication that makes all forms of work not feasible.” (R. 534).

In order to obtain a sentence six remand to allow the Commissioner to consider
“new evidence,” plaintiff must show that the evidence is in fact new, is material to her
claim, and there is good cause for her failure to incorporate the evidence into the record
at the prior proceeding. See 42 U.S.C. 405(g);Sample v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1138, 1144
(7 Cir. 1993). Evidence is ‘new’ if it was either not in existence or not available to the
claimant at the prior proceeding. Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 214 (7" Cir. 2003).
Evidence is “material” if there is a “reasonable probability that the Commissioner would
have reached a different conclusion had the evidence been considered.” /d. (quoting
Perkins v. Chatter, 107 F.3d 1290, 1296 (7" Cir. 1997)).

Dr. Wright's July 26, 2002 medical certification fails to meet at least two of the
three §405(g) “new evidence” requirements and thus cannot and does not merit a

sentence six remand. First, the medical certification is not “new” evidence under

16


PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Burney filed an application for DIB and SSI benefits on May 5, 2000, alleging a
disability onset date of January 1, 1999.’ (R. 368-70). Her application was denied
initially and after a timely request for reconsideration. (R. 359-66). Thereafter, Burney
requested, and was granted, a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 367). On November 7,
2001, Burney testified at a hearing conducted by ALJ John L. Mondi. (R. 79-110). ALJ
Mondi issued a written decision on June 14, 2002 denying Burney DIB and SSI
benefits. (R. 19-24). The Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review and ALJ
Mondi’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.? See Zurawski v.
Halter, 245 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); Reg. §416.1481.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's Testimony

At the time of the hearing, Burney was forty-five years old. (R. 82). She stood

5'11 and weighed 230 pounds. (R. 88). Burney has a high school education and

‘Plaintiff also filed a previous application for benefits alleging a disability onset date in
1992. Based on that application, plaintiff was found disabled on November 19, 1997 and
awarded benefits retroactive to 1992. Sometime thereafter, her benefits were terminated
because the Commissioner found that she was engaged in substantial gainful employment from
1994-1998. (R. 373-77). Documents regarding the termination of her benefits are not part of
the administrative record before us. However, based on Burney’s subsequent May 5, 2000
application for DIB benefits, it appears that she received more DIB benefits than she was
entitled to pursuant to the Commissioner's 1997 disability determination. Specifically, in her
May 5, 2000 application, plaintiff stated that she was “willing to have $200 deducted from [any
possible] social security benefit [to apply] toward repayment of the overpayment.” (R. 369).

? 42 U.S.C. §405(g) requires the Commissioner, as part of her answer to plaintiff's
federal complaint, to provide the Court with a transcript of the applicable administrative record,
including the evidence upon which the ALJ based the findings and decisions plaintiff takes
issue with in her complaint. In accordance with §405(g), the Commissioner provided us with a
538-page administrative record. A majority of the voluminous record is irrelevant to the issues
presently before this Court.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

EASTERN DIVISION
{RENE BURNEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 03 C 2148

v. )

) Mag. Judge Michael T. Mason
JO ANNE BARNHART, )
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Michael T. Mason, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff, Irene Burney (“Burney” or “plaintiff’), has brought a motion for summary
judgment seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (“Commissioner’ or “defendant’), who denied Burney’s claim for Disability
Insurance Benefits (‘DIB’) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits under
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381a (2000). Defendant Barnhart filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment asking that we uphold the decision of the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”). We have jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the following reasons, we grant plaintiff's motion and deny
defendant's motion, remanding this case to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

A(0


(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)). The ALJ is required to “give good reasons" for the
weight afforded to a treating physician, regardless of her final decision. /d. (quoting
Wates v. Barnhart, 274 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2003); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2).

ALJ Mondi’s decision does not sufficiently address plaintiff's complaints of
debilitating migraine headaches, or Dr. Wright's treatment notes regarding plaintiff's
ailments. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim is remanded to the ALJ for further elaboration on
plaintiff's alleged physical impairments and the effect, if any, of Dr. Wright's treatment
notes on the ALJ's conclusions regarding the extent of plaintiff's limitations and
disabilities.

Credibility

The ALJ similarly failed to sufficiently articulate the basis for his finding that
plaintiff's allegations regarding her limitations and disabilities are not credible.
Generally, the court must defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination because the ALJ,
not the reviewing court, personally observed the plaintiff at the hearing. Powers v.
Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000). However, an ALJ’s credibility findings cannot
be affirmed unless he provides “specific reasons for [his] finding on credibility,
supported by the evidence in the case record.” The ALJ's reasons must be “sufficiently
specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the
adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.” S.S.R.
96-7p (1996). “It is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a single, conclusory
statement that ‘the individual's allegations have been considered’ or that ‘the allegations
are (or are not) credible.” Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887 (quoting S.S.R. 96-7p (1996)).

12


1992 was truly inconsistent with a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and schizoid personality
features. It is not permissible for an ALJ to deny a claimant benefits solely because the
ALJ believes that the claimant's ability to do certain things precludes him from being
disabled. Rohan, 98 F.3d at 970. Moreover, ALJs “must not succumb to the temptation
to play doctor and make their own independent medical findings.” Id. Often, “common
sense can mislead” and “lay intuitions about medical phenomena are wrong.” Schmidt
v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117, 118 (7 Cir. 1990). This is especially true in cases involving
mental illness. Wilder v Chater, 64 F.3d 335, 337 (7" Cir 1995). In those cases, health
professionals, particularly psychiatrists, are the experts, not lawyers or judges. /d.

The foregoing analysis also applies to the ALJ’s statement that plaintiff's failure
to seek or receive mental treatment can serve as a basis to discredit the findings of Dr.
Langgut. This is not a situation where Burney has inexcusably refused medical
treatment that would eliminate her disability entirely. 20 C.F.R. § 416.930(b);
DeFranceso v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1040, 1043 (7" Cir. 1989) (in such a situation the
claimant will not be found totally disabled). Instead, in the instant case, there is no
evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s statement that Burney’s limitations may be
reduced with treatment, much less eliminated entirely.

As stated above, the ALJ is required to build an accurate and logical bridge from
the evidence to his conclusion. Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1177. The ALJ failed to elaborate
on his reasoning for discrediting Dr. Langgut’s findings. He neither supports his
decision by relying on other medical findings in the record, nor did he cite inconsistent
medicai evidence that would allow him to discount Dr. Langgut'’s findings. In the
absence of sufficient explanation or contradicting medical evidence, this Court must

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