Mr. Jenkins acknowledges that he has procedurally defaulted
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise
this argument in his state appeal. McGowan v. Miller, 109 F.3d
1168, 1172 (7th Cir. 1997). A procedurally waived claim may be
revived if the petitioner can show cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). However, Mr. Jenkins
has made no attempt to show cause, and even if he had, it would be
impossible for him to show actual prejudice given the weight of the
evidence against him at trial.

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

ENTER ER:

Oe 2 Bubb
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: March27, 2003


~

. Win Order Form (06/97)

AS United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Elaine E. Bucklo than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 6300 DATE 3/27/2003
CASE Jenkins vs. Knop
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, .g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
@) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) o ‘Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due. .
(4) o Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at ‘
(6) oO Pretrial conferencefheld/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(e) im Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) QO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) [Local Rule 41.1 OO) FRCP41(a)(1) (1 FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) ‘ml [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. Any pending motion in this case is terminated as moot and the case is terminated.

(11) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
2

No notices required.

number of notices

aS | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

R 2.8206

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

av | Mail AO 450 form. Lynog 191 ve se -_
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. PDE ut Sid's‘n aa
courtroom ESth Hd Lz YYW EU date mailed notice
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CARLOS JENKINS,

Petitioner,

No. 02 C 6300
GARY KNOP,

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Map vity &

8 em,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Carlos Jenkins was convicted in the Circuit Court
of Cook County of possession of between 1 and 15 grams of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a
church. Mr. Jenkins was sentenced to 12 years in prison. He has
applied to this court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254, seeking reversal of his conviction and a new trial.
In the alternative, he seeks a reduction of his sentence. I deny
the writ.

The facts of the case are simple. A police officer received a
tip that an individual was dealing drugs on a particular street
corner near Our Lady of Angels Church in Chicago. He later observed
Mr. Jenkins loitering on that corner, accepting money from numerous
individuals in exchange for items from a small bag which he kept in
a nearby phone booth. When Mr. Jenkins was arrested on suspicion of
drug dealing, the small bag proved to contain 24 packets of what

appeared to be cocaine. Following trial, Mr. Jenkins was convicted.

pe



His conviction was affirmed by the Illinois appellate court, and
the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The state
concedes that Mr. Jenkins has exhausted the state remedies
available to him, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1).

Mr. Jenkins bases his petition on two separate arguments.
First, he claims that his trial was constitutionally inadequate
under the 6th and 14th Amendments because all the elements of his
crime were not proven at trial via evidence, but rather via
stipulation. Second, he claims that his trial counsel was
constitutionally deficient. Neither of these claims is adequate to
support a writ of habeas corpus.

One element of Mr. Jenkins’ crime was stipulated to at trial,
but this does not render his conviction “contrary to” or a
“misapplication of” federal law, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Mr. Jenkins’ attorney stipulated that were a forensic officer to
testify, he would testify that the bag found in the phone booth
contained 5.9 grams of cocaine. However, despite Mr. Jenkins’
claims to the contrary, the other elements of the crime — Mr.
Jenkins’ constructive possession of the bag of cocaine, his intent
to deliver, and the location of the church relative to his
activities ~ were established through the testimony of witnesses.
Mr. Jenkins points to no federal authority which suggests that a
defense attorney’s choice to stipulate as to the content of a

witness’ testimony renders a trial fundamentally unfair.