Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is granted as to
plaintiff's federal takings claim, which is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims plaintiffasserts in her
complaint, which are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. This is a final and ealable
order.

ENTER:

STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: Ms 152093



Because the alleged taking denied her all reasonable economic use of her property, plaintiff says, her case
is exempt from Williamson’s ripeness requirements. (See Pl.’s Resp. at 3.)

Unfortunately for plaintiff, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the case

she cites for that proposition, says no such thing. In Lucas, the Supreme Court sought to identify the point
at which the regulation of land use becomes a “taking” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id, at
1014-15. Historically, the Court noted, its “regulatory takings jurisprudence . . . eschewed any set formula
for determining how far is too far, preferring to engage in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” into the
regulation’s impact on the property owner and the public interest it was said to serve. Id. at 1015 (internal
quotation marks, alterations and citations omitted). Nonetheless, the Court said, it had consistently deemed
land-use regulations that deprived property owners of all “economically beneficial . . use of [their] land”
to be compensable takings, without engaging in the usual fact-specific inquiry. Id. Ultimately, the Lucas
Court made explicit that which was implied in the Court’s earlier regulatory takings cases: a regulation that
deprives a landowner of all economically viable use of his land is a compensable taking, regardless of the
importance of the public interest underlying it. Jd. at 1019.

Lucas defines the parameters of a regulatory taking; it does not determine when regulatory takings

claims are ripe. The latter issue, as the Lucas Court made clear, is still controlled by Williamson. See

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010-13 & n.3 (discussing the ripeness of Lucas’ claim in terms of Williamson).
Because plaintiff has not pursued state remedies for compensation, as Williamson requires, her federal

taking claim is not ripe and must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

State Claims
Having disposed of plaintiff's only federal claim, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction over her state-law claims, which are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. See

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).



__ Minute Order Fofm (06/97)

IS

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

N; f Assigned Judy Sitting Judge if Oth
mor Magistrate Judge Paul E. Plunkett than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 3796 DATE 5/15/2003
CASE Donna Jean Ramey vs. City of Chicago, et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

(dl) ol

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

Bg) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due__

(4) Oo. Ruling/Hearingon___—sset for_—aatt

(5) o Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor at

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor at

(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at

(8) Oo (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___—_at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) CLoca! Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Ml [Other docket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1)

motion to dismiss is granted as to plaintiff’s federal takings claim, which is dismissed without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the
state-law claims plaintiff asserts in her complaint, which are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state
court. This is a final and appealable order.

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

ig *

No notices required.

No notices required, advised in open court.

(hei

number of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

NINN

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
deputy's
initials

TBK

MAY 1.9 2003

date docketed

docketingMeputy initials

date mailed notice

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office

citing deputy initials

v 7


OCKETED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS MAY 19 2003
EASTERN DIVISION
DONNA JEAN RAMEY, y
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 02 C 3796
) Paul E. Plunkett, Senior Judge
CITY OF CHICAGO and ARENDA )
TROUTMAN, Alderman, )
)
)
Defendants, )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In November 1999, the City erroneously amended its zoning map to reflect that plaintiff's property
had been downzoned, though no zoning change had been effected. Plaintiff contends that error violated
her rights under the Illinois and United States Constitutions and that defendants took other actions in
violation of state law. Defendants have filed motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Rule 12(6)(1)
motion is granted with respect to plaintiffs federal claim and the Court declines to exercise its supplemental

jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-law claims.

Facts
Plaintiff is the beneficial owner of property located at 403-413 East 61% Street, 6101-6109 South
Martin Luther King Drive in the 20" Ward of the City of Chicago. (Am. Compl. 45.) The building contains
eight commercial units on the ground floor and four residential units on the second floor. (Id. 6.)
When plaintiff purchased the property in 1986, it was zoned B4-3, a classification that allows both

businesses and residences. (H. §{ 6-7.) In November 1999, the City enacted an ordinance, sponsored by

%5



defendant Troutman, that changed the zoning of the area near plaintiff's property to R-3, a primarily
residential district. (Id. | 8-9.) Though the rezoning did not include plaintiff's property, the City
departments that prepare zoning maps, issue building permits and issue business licenses were erroneously
told that it did. (Id. 4] 10-11.) As aresult, existing or prospective commercial tenants of plaintiff's building
were unable to secure from the City the necessary permits and licenses to do business there. (Id. §{] 14-23,
25.) Consequently, they terminated their leases, a their negotiations to enter into them, causing plaintiff

to incur more than $100,000.00 in damages. (Id.)

The Legal Standard

In ruling on defendants’ motions, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of
the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d

363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motion); United Transp. Union v. Gateway W.

Ry. Co., 78 F.3d 1208, 1210 (7" Cir, 1996) (stating standard for Rule 12(b)(1) motion without evidentiary
submissions). No claim will be dismissed unless “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set
of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73
(1984).

Discussion

Federal Claim

In Count I of her amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that the City effected a temporary taking of
her property without just compensation in violation of her federal and state constitutional rights. The City
contends that the federal claim is not ripe. The Court agrees. A federal regulatory taking claim is ripe for
adjudication only ifthe plaintiffhas pursued available state remedies for seeking compensation. Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985); Forseth,
199 F.3d at 372 (stating that Williamson applies to temporary takings claims). Plaintiff does not allege that
she pursued state court remedies to seek compensation. Rather, she says that she was not required to do so.

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