IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

AUGUSTUS H. EVANS, JR., §

§ No. 257, 2014

Defendant-Below, §

Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware in and

v. § for Sussex County

§

STATE OF DELAWARE, §

§

Plaintiff-Below, § Cr. ID No. 0609011528A

Appellee. §

Submitted: June 9, 2014

Decided: August 19, 2014

Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 

O R D E R

This 19th day of August 2014, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Augustus H. Evans, Jr., filed this appeal from the 

Superior Court’s order dated April 23, 2014 denying his third motion for 

postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”). 

After Evans filed his opening brief on appeal, the appellee, State of 

Delaware, filed a motion to affirm the Superior Court judgment under 

Supreme Court Rule 25 (“Rule 25”).

1

 

1

The Court has not considered Evans’ request to respond to the motion to affirm. Under 

Rule 25(a), a response to a motion to affirm is not permitted unless it is requested by the 

Court. Also, the Court has not considered Evans’ second “permissive writing” 
2

(2) In July 2007, a Superior Court jury convicted Evans of several 

criminal offenses related to his September 2006 confrontations with a rival 

drug dealer in Seaford and a police officer in Laurel. On direct appeal, we 

affirmed Evans’ convictions and sentence.

2

 We also affirmed the denial of 

Evans’ first and second motions for postconviction relief.3

(3) The following excerpt from our decision on direct appeal

provides a context for the claims raised by Evans in this appeal. 

The evidence presented at trial fairly 

established that within a ten to twelve hour period, 

i.e. from Saturday evening, September 16, 2006 

through Sunday morning, September 17, 2006, 

Evans was involved in two gun incidents. The first 

incident occurred Saturday night in Seaford, 

Delaware, when Evans fired three shots at a rival 

drug dealer, William Witherspoon, hitting 

Witherspoon once in the left thigh. The second 

incident occurred Sunday morning in Laurel, 

Delaware, when Evans pointed a gun at Officer 

Charles Campbell of the Laurel Police 

Department.

Evans was arrested on September 17, 2006, 

for the Laurel incident. Two days later, while in 

custody pursuant to the Laurel arrest, Evans was 

interviewed by Seaford Police Lieutenant Richard 

 

submission under Rule 15(a)(vi), because it was, in effect an impermissible response to a 

motion to affirm. 

2

Evans v. State, 2009 WL 367728 (Del. Feb. 13, 2009).

3

State v. Evans, 2009 WL 2219275 (Del. Super. Ct. July 6, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Evans 

v. State, 2009 WL 3656085 (Del. Nov. 4, 2009); State v. Evans, 2013 WL 1090979 (Del. 

Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Evans v. State, 2013 WL 5614265 (Del. Oct. 

10, 2013).
3

Jamison about the Seaford incident. During that 

videotaped interview, which was played for the 

jury at trial, Evans essentially admitted to shooting 

Witherspoon.4

(4) Evans’ opening brief repeats, verbatim, the claims raised in his 

third postconviction motion. Fairly summarized, Evans’ claims entitled 

“Entitlement to Voluntariness Instruction,” “Self-Incrimination,” and 

“Pretrial Detentioners” concern the self-incriminating statements he made to 

Lieutenant Jamison.5 Evans’ claim entitled “Veracity Challenge/Franks 

Evidentiary Hearing” concerns the denial of his pretrial request for an 

evidentiary hearing challenging his arrest on the Laurel charges. Finally, in 

a claim entitled “Judicial Bias/Abuse of Discretion,” Evans alleges that the 

judge who presided over his jury trial and denied his postconviction motions

was biased against him. 

(5) “It is well-settled that the Superior Court must address the 

procedural requirements of Rule 61 before considering the merits of a 

 

4

Evans v. State, 2009 WL 367728, at *1 (Del. Feb. 13, 2009) (footnotes omitted).

5

The claim entitled “Entitlement to Voluntariness Instruction” argues that the Superior 

Court committed plain error when it failed to give a jury instruction that Evans had 

requested on the voluntariness of the statements he made to Lieutenant Jamison. The 

claim entitled “Self-Incrimination” argues that the Superior Court’s former adjudication 

of a Miranda claim, which was based on Evans’ interview with Lieutenant Jamison, was 

incomplete. The claim entitled “Pretrial Detentioners” argues that Evans was illegally 

interviewed by Lieutenant Jamison.
4

postconviction motion.”6 Likewise, when reviewing an appeal from the 

denial of postconviction relief under Rule 61, this Court will address any 

applicable procedural bars and any exceptions to those bars.

7

 

(6) In this case, the Superior Court concluded, and we agree, that 

Evans’ third postconviction motion was untimely under Rule 61(i)(1)8and 

repetitive under Rule 61(i)(2).

9

 We also agree that Evans’ postconviction 

motion raised formerly adjudicated claims under Rule 61(i)(4).

10

 

(7) Evans’ claims entitled “Pretrial Detentioners” and “Veracity 

Challenge/Franks Evidentiary Hearing” were considered on their merits on 

direct appeal and in the Superior Court’s denial of Evans’ first 

postconviction motion. Thereafter, on appeal from the denial of Evans’ first 

postconviction motion, we barred the claims as formerly adjudicated.11 In 

this appeal from the denial of Evans’ third postconviction motion, Evans has 

 

6

Raymond v. State, 2013 WL 56144, at *1 (Del. Jan. 3, 2013) (citing Younger v. State, 

580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990)).

7

Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 

8

See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring a motion filed more than one year after 

the judgment of conviction is final).

9

See id. at (i)(2) (barring any ground for relief not asserted in a prior postconviction 

proceeding as required by R. 61 (b)(2)).

10 See id. at (i)(4) (barring formerly adjudicated claim). 

11 See Evans v. State, 2009 WL 3656085, at *1 (Del. Nov. 4, 2009) (barring claim of 

improper detention and challenge to veracity of probable cause affidavit as formerly 

adjudicated on direct appeal).
5

not demonstrated that either claim warrants further consideration under the 

narrow “in the interest of justice” exception found under Rule 61(i)(4).12

(8) Evans’ claims entitled “Entitlement to Voluntariness 

Instruction” and “Self-Incrimination” could have been raised on direct 

appeal and were not. Those claims, therefore, are defaulted under Rule 

61(i)(3) unless Evans can demonstrate that an exception to the procedural 

bar should apply.

13

 On appeal, Evans has not demonstrated that either claim 

warrants review because of a constitutional violation so substantial that it 

constitutes a “miscarriage of justice” undermining the “fundamental legality 

. . . or fairness” of Evans’ conviction under Rule 61(i)(5)14 or a newly 

recognized retroactively applicable right under Rule 61(i)(1).15 Delaware 

law does not require the court to give a voluntariness instruction after the 

court has found a defendant’s statement was voluntary.16 The “law of the 

 

12 See id. at (i)(4) (providing that a formerly adjudicated claim may be reconsidered in the 

interest of justice). See Lindsey v. State, 2014 WL 98645, at *3 (Del. Jan. 9, 2014) 

(quoting Weedon v. State, 750 A.2d 521, 527-28 (Del. 2000)).

13 See id. at (i)(3) (barring any ground for relief not asserted in the proceedings leading to 

the judgment of conviction). 

14 See id. at (i)(5) (providing that the procedural bars of (i)(1), (2) and (3) shall not apply 

“to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional 

violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the 

proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction”). 

15 See id. at (i)(1) (providing that a motion may be considered when it asserts a newly 

recognized retroactively applicable right).

16 See Harris v. State, 1993 WL 61667 (Del. Feb. 3, 1993) (citing Flamer v. State, 490 

A.2d 104, 116 n.7 (Del. 1983)).
6

case doctrine” bars Evans from relitigating the legality of his arrests and, by 

extension, his claim that his statements were rendered involuntary due to an 

illegal arrest.17 As we have also explained, we held Evans’ claim that he 

was improperly detained as procedurally barred in a prior decision.18 It 

remains barred, notwithstanding the different spins he attempts to put on the 

same basic argument.19 

(9) We therefore agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion that 

Evans’ “effort to revisit his [claims] by repackaging same under a claim of 

judicial bias and/or incompetence must fail.” Based on our foregoing 

analysis of the other claims on appeal, we similarly conclude that Evans’ 

derivative claim of “Judicial Bias/Abuse of Discretion” is not supported by 

the record and is without merit.

(10) Lastly, we note the obvious: This is Evans’ third Rule 61 

petition. We have now concluded for a third time that the Superior Court 

has properly found that Evans’ claims do not present grounds for relief from 

his judgment of convictions by the court. Each time we have invested 

 

17 See, e.g., Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 579 (Del. 1998) (“The prior decisions by 

this Court on any adjudicated issue involving Brittingham’s claims became the law of the 

case in all subsequent stages of his continuing criminal proceedings.”).

18 See supra note 11.

19 “Neither the Superior Court nor this Court is obligated to reconsider a previously 

rejected claim simply because the issue has been refined or restated.” Desmond v. State, 

2014 WL 3809683, at *2 (Del. Aug. 1, 2014) (citing Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 

(Del. 1990)).
7

considerable time to detail our reasons. In the future, if Evans files 

additional petitions, we do not intend to continue to invest scarce judicial 

resources in addressing Evans’ repetitive claims. We also encourage Evans 

to be mindful of subsection (j) of Rule 61.20

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the State’s motion to 

affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice

 

20 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(j) (“If a motion is denied, the state may move for an 

order requiring the movant to reimburse the state for costs and expenses paid for the 

movant from public funds.”).