alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Silverleaf Resorts, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Harry
J. White, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company. Dated:  May 12, 2004
    /s/ HARRY J. WHITE, JR.Harry J. White, Jr.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-22-00100-CR

Ex Parte Eric Rosales

On Appeal from the

445th District Court of Cameron County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2021-DCR-2031

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

August 11, 2022
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</TABLE>
**Exhibit99.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Reportof Sontra Medical Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Sean F. Moran,Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge: 

 

(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. 

 

/s/ Sean F. Moran

Sean F. Moran 

Chief Financial Officer

May 15, 2003 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by §906 has been provided to the Company and will be obtained by the Company andfurnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Steven L. Muellner, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Meade Instruments Corp.;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



Date:
October 20, 2008

|    |  |                                                                               |  | 
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|By: |  | /s/STEVEN L. MUELLNERSteven L. Muellner President and Chief Executive Officer |  | 

---



QuickLinks
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eric McMullen, Appellant.

[942 NYS2d 836]

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E. Fahey, J.), rendered November 13, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of robbery in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [3]). The record of the plea colloquy establishes that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to appeal *(see People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; *People v Eatmon,*66 AD3d 1453, 1453 [2009]). That valid waiver of the right to appeal encompasses defendant’s contention that *1435imposition of the maximum period of postrelease supervision rendered the sentence unduly harsh and severe *(see People v Hidalgo,*91 NY2d 733, 737 [1998]; *People v Wilson,*53 AD3d 928, 929 [2008], *lv denied*11 NY3d 858 [2008]). Defendant’s further contention that County Court erred in failing to apprehend the extent of its discretion in imposing a period of post-release supervision survives the waiver of the right to appeal *(see People v Montgomery,*63 AD3d 1635, 1636 [2009], *lv denied*13 NY3d 798 [2009]; *People v Burgess,*23 AD3d 1095 [2005], *lv denied*6 NY3d 810 [2006]). We conclude, however, that “[t]he court’s statement at the plea proceeding with respect to the imposition of a five-year period of postrelease supervision does not, without more, indicate that the court erroneously believed that it lacked discretion to impose a shorter period” *(People v Porter,*9 AD3d 887 [2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 710 [2004]). Present — Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Lindley, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1052 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1052

 To amend the Andean Trade Preference Act to prohibit the provision of 
duty-free treatment for live plants and fresh cut flowers described in 
   chapter 6 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 22, 1997

  Mrs. Boxer introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Andean Trade Preference Act to prohibit the provision of 
duty-free treatment for live plants and fresh cut flowers described in 
   chapter 6 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON PROVISION OF DUTY-FREE TREATMENT FOR LIVE 
              PLANTS AND FRESH CUT FLOWERS UNDER THE ANDEAN TRADE 
              PREFERENCES ACT.

    (a) In General.--Section 204 of the Andean Trade Preference Act (19 
U.S.C. 3203) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) in paragraph (7), by striking ``or'' at the 
                end;
                    (B) in paragraph (8), by striking the period at the 
                end and inserting ``; or''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(9) live plants and fresh cut flowers described in 
        chapter 6 of the HTS.''; and
            (2) in subsection (e)(5)--
                    (A) by striking subparagraph (A); and
                    (B) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) through (D) 
                as subparagraphs (A) through (C), respectively.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the date that is 15 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 31.2CERTIFICATIONI, Robert L. Miller, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-QSB of CVF Technologies Corporation;  2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement ofa material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)for the registrant and have: a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;  b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fiscalfourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of whichare reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarizeand report financial information; and  b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: August 15, 2005           /s/ Robert L. Miller   Robert L. Miller,   Chief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Alcide, Appellant.

[942 NYS2d 875] —

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Reichbach, J), rendered December 12, 2006, convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a *898weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court’s procedure for handling certain jury notes violated the procedure set forth by the Court of Appeals in *People v O’Rama*(78 NY2d 270, 277-278 [1991]) is unpreserved for appellate review *(see People v Ramirez,*15 NY3d 824, 825-826 [2010]; *People v Bryant,*82 AD3d 1114 [2011]), and we decline to reach the contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Since the jury merely requested read-backs of certain trial testimony, the alleged error did not constitute a mode of proceedings error which would obviate the preservation requirement *(see People v Starling,*85 NY2d 509 [1995]; *People v Bryant,*82 AD3d at 1114).

The defendant’s contention regarding the Supreme Court’s participation in reading back certain trial testimony is also unpreserved for appellate review, and we also decline to review that contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Rivera, J.E, Chambers, Austin and Roman, JJ., concur.
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<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1998

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<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  269,784
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    1,885,985
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               3,669,015
<PP&E>                                         3,391,913
<DEPRECIATION>                                 774,910
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 7,228,950
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          196,357
<BONDS>                                        0
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<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       6,010
<OTHER-SE>                                     4,926,583
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   7,228,950
<SALES>                                        222,194
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               222,194
<CGS>                                          64,464
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  589,327
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (21,689)
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<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.06)
        

</TABLE>
*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-50399

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAMON GONZALEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas

(EP-96-CA-149)

 

November 5, 1996

Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:

In this appeal from the district court’s order denying his

motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Ramon Gonzalez (# 62167-

080) contends that his right against double jeopardy was violated

by his criminal conviction because a civil forfeiture preceded the

criminal judgment. A recent United States Supreme Court opinion
2

has rendered this issue frivolous. United States v. Ursery, 116

S.Ct. 2135, 2147-49 (1996).

Gonzalez argues for the first time in his reply brief that the

civil forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. This issue was not

raised below. And, an issue may not be raised for the first time

in a reply brief, even by a pro se appellant. Knighten v.

Commissioner, 702 F.2d 59, 60 & n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464

U.S. 897 (1983).

Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See Howard

v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

This Court has not yet determined whether a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) is required under the circumstances of this

appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. To the extent that a COA is

required, we construe Gonzalez’ notice of appeal as an application

for a COA and DENY the motion.

APPEAL DISMISSED
#### Leaf *v.*Stubbs. Wallace & Sutker *v.*Stubbs. Weitz *v.*Stubbs. Wood *v.*Stubbs. Rauzin *v.*Stubbs.

June 25, 1915.

The description of the next preceding case applies here.

Evans, P. J.

These cases are controlled by the opinion this day rendered in the case of *Eliopolo*v. *Siubbs.*

*Judgments affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
Presidential Documents

43901 

Federal Register 

Vol. 86, No. 151 

Tuesday, August 10, 2021 

Title 3— 

The President 

Notice of August 6, 2021 

Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Export Control Regulations 

On August 17, 2001, the President issued Executive Order 13222 pursuant 

to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 

seq.). In that order, the President declared a national emergency with respect 

to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 

policy, and economy of the United States related to the expiration of the 

Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended. Because the implementation 

of certain sanctions authorities, including sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of 

such Export Administration Act of 1979, consistent with section 1766(b) 

of Public Law 115–232, the Export Control Reform Act (50 U.S.C. 4601 

note), is to be carried out under the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act, the national emergency declared on August 17, 2001, must 

continue in effect beyond August 17, 2021. Therefore, in accordance with 

section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am 

continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 

13222, as amended by Executive Order 13637 of March 8, 2013. 

This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to 

the Congress. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

August 6, 2021. [FR Doc. 2021–17195 

Filed 8–9–21; 11:15 am] 

Billing code 3295–F1–P 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with FR_MEMO1BIDEN.EPS</GPH>
#### Jeffers *v.*The State.

August 14, 1915.

Indictment ior rape. Before Judge Bartlett. Douglas superior court. May 28, 1915.

*J. H. McLarty*and *J. S. James,*for plaintiff in error.

*Clifford Walker, attorney-general, J. B. Hutcheson, solicitor-general,*and *Mark Bolding,*contra.

Fish, C. J.

1. On the trial of one charged with rape the court instructed the jury: “In determining the issues of this case you will consider all the facts and circumstances of the case; the time and place where the offense is charged to have been perpetrated; the time that the complaint was made and the manner in which it was made; . . ' also the failure of the party claiming to have been injured to make complaint; the reason for not complaining or the reason for making complaint; the circumstances under which the complaint was made. Weigh and consider all the circumstances in determining and reaching a finding in this case. If the injured party failed to make complaint at the first opportunity, you will consider whether there was or was not sufficient or reasonable cause or excuse for not complaining at first, or as soon as she was likely to have made complaint. If there was no reasonable excuse for making complaint, that would be a circumstance you would consider in reaching the truth of this transaction, that is, as to whether it was reasonable or unreasonable and whether it should have been made earlier under the circumstances of the ease. But, should you find that the injured party was a child of tender years, that also, would be a circumstance that you would consider with the other testimony in the case in reaching your conclusion in the matter.” *Held,*that the judge in so instructing the jury expressed or intimated his opinion as to what had been proved, viz., that the female alleged to have been raped made complaint that the accused had committed the offense upon her. Accordingly, under the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code (1910), § 4863, the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.

2. The facts set out in the motion for a new trial do not require a discussion of the question whether there was evidence corroborating that of the female alleged to have been raped, or whether an omission to give a charge on the subject of corroboration was error. The judgment being reversed on another ground, no opinion is expressed on the sufficiency of the evidence.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

NOTE.

Chief Justice Eish was prevented by sickness from taking part in the judgments of the cases where his absence has been noted in this volume.