alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT31.2**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO****SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF2002**

I, R. Scott Ervin,acting as the Interim Chief Financial Officer, certify that:

1. I have reviewedthis quarterly report of Force Protection, Inc.;

2. Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer asof, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The smallbusiness issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the smallbusiness issuer and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to thesmall business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the smallbusiness issuer’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in thisreport our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in thesmall business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the small business issuer’s most recent fiscal quarter (the smallbusiness issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, thesmall business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The smallbusiness issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, tothe small business issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of the smallbusiness issuer’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small businessissuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in the smallbusiness issuer’s internal control over financial reporting.

Date:  May 15,2006
|        | /s/ R. Scott  Ervin             |   |
|--------|---------------------------------|--------|
|   | R. Scott Ervin                  |   |
|   | Interim Chief Financial Officer |   |

 

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

OP 20-0139

MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

MONTANA HIGHWAY PATROL,

Petitioner,

v.

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARK

COUNTY, HONORABLE BRENDA R. GILBERT,

Presiding Judge,

Respondent.

F LED

MAR 1 7 2020

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of Supreme Court

State of Montana

ORDER

Petitioner Montana Department of Justice, Montana Highway Patrol (MHP) seeks

a writ of supervisory control directing the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, to

reverse its Order denying MEM' s motion for summary judgment in its Cause No. DV 19-

40. In that Order, the District Court determined that questions of fact precluded summary

judgment.

Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy that is sometimes justified when

urgency or emergency factors exist making the normal appeal process inadequate, when

the case involves purely legal questions, and when the other court is proceeding under a

mistake of law and is causing a gross injustice, constitutional issues of state-wide

importance are involved, or, in a criminal case, the other court has granted or denied a

motion to substitute a judge. M. R. App. P. 14(3). Whether supervisory control is

appropriate is a case-by-case decision. Stokes v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court,

2011 MT 182, ¶ 5, 361 Mont. 279, 259 P.3d 754 (citations omitted). Consistent with Rule

14(3), it is the Court's practice to refrain from exercising supervisory control when the

petitioner has an adequate remedy of appeal. E.g., Buckles v. Seventh Jud. Dist. Ct., No.

OP 16-0517, 386 Mont. 393, 386 P.3d 545 (table) (Oct. 18, 2016); Lichte v. Mont.

03/17/2020

Case Number: OP 20-0139
Eighteenth Judicial Dist. Court, No. OP 16-0482, 385 Mont. 540, 382 P.3d 868 (table)

(Aug. 24, 2016).

Here, MHP asserts that the District Court is operating under an error of law and that

the issue is purely one of law, the District Court's conclusion notwithstanding. However,

although MEIP recites Rule 14(3), it offers no argument as to why the normal appeal

process would be inadequate in this case. It has therefore not met the criteria for this Court

to assume supervisory control.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for writ of supervisory control is DENIED and

DISMISSED.

The Clerk is directed to provide immediate notice of this Order to counsel for

Petitioner, all counsel of record in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, Cause

No. DV 19-40, and the H4Trable Brenda R. Gilbert, presiding Judge.

DATED this 3 day of March, 2020.

Chief Justice

AJL

2

ee

Justices
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-536
In Re: CARLOS TAYLOR, Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CA-97-1577-21BD) Submitted: April 16, 1998 Decided: May 1, 1998 Before WILKINS and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Carlos Taylor, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Carlos Taylor petitions the court for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the district court to enter default judgment in hisfavor in his suit against the South Carolina Department of Corrections. The grant of a writ is a drastic remedy to be exercised only in extraordinary situations. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court , 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Taylor’s case does not present such a situation. Court are extremely reluctant to grant a writ of mandamus. See In re Ford Motor Co. , 751 F.2d 274, 275 (8th Cir. 1984). The party seeking such relief carries the heavy burden of showing he has no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires and that his right to such relief is clear and indisputable. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Diaflon, Inc. , 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (citations omitted). Taylor has not made such a showing. Accordingly, although we grant Taylor leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny his petition for a writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Silverleaf Resorts, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Robert E. Mead, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.


Dated:  November 19, 2002                      /s/ ROBERT E. MEAD
                                               ------------------
                                               Robert E. Mead
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-11-0000388

30-JAN-2014

08:05 AM
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22
- 6399

DUSTIN JAMAL WARREN , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. WARDEN BARNEY OWENS , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. Louise W. Flanagan , District Judge. ( 5:20

- hc

- 02206

- FL )

Submitted : September 28 , 2023 Decided: October 2, 2023

Before NIEMEYER , THACKER , and RUSHING , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Dustin Jamal Warren, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-6399 Doc: 11 Filed: 10/02/2023 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: Dustin Jamal Warren seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substanti al showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists c ould find the district court’s assessment of th e constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v.
Davis , 580 U.S. 100, 115

- 17 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the p etition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 140

- 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000))

. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Warren has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED USCA4 Appeal: 22-6399 Doc: 11 Filed: 10/02/2023 Pg: 2 of 2
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42925

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROBERT DAVID HOLMES,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 586

Filed: August 7, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Jason D. Scott, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified seven-year sentence with one-year 

determinate term for felony possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before MELANSON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and GRATTON, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Robert David Holmes pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance, Idaho 

Code § 37-2732(c). The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with one year 

determinate, to be served consecutively with his sentence in a separate case. Holmes appeals, 

contending that his sentence is excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 
2

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Holmes’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### Inter Metal Fabricators, Inc., Appellant, v HRH Construction LLC et al., Respondents. (And Other Actions.)

[942 NYS2d 334]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered December 10, 2010, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants HRH Construction LLC’s and Vigilant Insurance Company’s motions for summary judgment dismissing the second and third causes of action for foreclosure of mechanic’s liens and HRH’s motion for summary judgment as to liability on its counterclaim for willful exaggeration of the liens, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Defendants demonstrated conclusively that the amount of the lien was willfully exaggerated *(see*Lien Law § 39; *Northe Group, Inc. v Spread NYC, LLC,*88 AD3d 557 [2011]; *Strongback Corp. v N.E.D. Cambridge Ave. Dev. Corp.,*25 AD3d 392, 393 [2006]). The evidence includes documents, created by plaintiff and submitted to its surety, that tend to show that plaintiff knowingly marked up its costs and expenses, as well as the testimony of plaintiff’s vice president and chief operating officer admitting to the overcharges and stating that he was “entitled to mark it up to whatever number I want,” and, “You know what? People do a lot of things.”

We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P, Catterson, DeGrasse, Manzanet-Daniels and Román, JJ.
EXHIBIT 10.3



AMENDMENT NO. 4 TO

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT



This Amendment No. 1 (the Amendment) to that certain Employment Agreement (the Agreement) dated as of August 1,
1997 between Notify Technology Corporation (the Company) and Gerald Rice (the Employee) is made as of February 23, 2000.



In consideration of good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Company and Employee agree as
follows:



1.    Section 3(a)
of the Agreement shall be amended so that it reads in its entirety as follows:



Base Compensation.    The Company shall pay the Employee as compensation for services a base salary at an annualized rate of $170,000. Such salary shall be reviewed at least annually and shall be
increased from time to time subject to accomplishment of such performance and contribution goals and objectives as may be established from time to time by the Board. Such salary shall be paid periodically in accordance with normal Company payroll.
The annual compensation specified in this Section 3(a), together with any increases in such compensation that the Board may grant from time to time, is referred to in this Agreement as Base Compensation.



This Amendment has been executed effective as of the first
date set forth above.



|NOTIFY TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION        |  |  |  | EMPLOYEE             
|------------------------------------ |  |  |  | ---------------------
|                                    
|/s/    PAUL
DEPOND                   |  |  |  | /s/    GERALD W.
RICE
|Paul DePond, Chief Executive Officer |  |  |  | Gerald W. Rice
#### Hendricks & Christian *v.*Lott *et al.*

*July*3, 1915.

Complaint. Before Judge Thomas. Colquitt superior court. July 27, 1914.

*James Humphreys*and *Hendriclcs &*Hendricks, for plaintiffs.

*Shipp &*Kline, for defendants.

Lumpkin, J.

1. Suit was brought on a promissory note, seeking to recover principal, interest, and attorney’s fees. The answer of- the defendants denied the substantial paragraphs of the petition, including the allegation of service of notice ten days before the filing of the suit, in order to claim attorney’s fees. It further pleaded want of consideration for the note sued upon, and that the defendants had paid the full amount due to the plaintiffs, and “by accident” had paid $15 in excess of such amount, for which they prayed judgment. *Meld,*that the answer did not admit a prima facie case in the plaintiffs, or amount to an assumption of the burden of proof by the defendants, and give to them the right to claim the opening and conclusion of argument. *Culver*v. *Wood,*138 *Ga.*60 (2), 62 (74 S. E. 790).

*(a)*As the defendants did not by their pleadings admit a prima facie case in the plaintiffs, although, after the jury was stricken and before evidence was introduced, they stated orally that they admitted a prima facie case, that they signed the note, that it belonged to the plaintiffs, and that notice had been served upon them of the intention to sue for attorney’s fees in addition to the note, this did not operate as a proper assumption of the burden of proof on the whole case, so as to place it upon the defendants, with the rights incident to the assumption thereof.

(b) Accordingly, it was not error under such facts, and where both parties introduced evidence, to fail to charge that the burden of proof in the case was upon the defendants; nor was there error in charging that “the material issues in this case you will determine in favor of that party with whom jmu find the preponderance of the evidence lies.”

2. The defendants not having recovered the $15 claimed to have been paid by them by mistake, it will not require a reversal, at the instance of the plaintiffs, that the presiding judge in his charge referred to such contention, whether or not the evidence was sufficient to show a mistake in making the payment.

3. There was no merit in any of the other grounds of the motion for a new trial, and there was no error in overruling them.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
Exhibit
      23.1





CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





Our
      report on our audits of the consolidated financial statements of Manhattan
      Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 2007 and 2006 and
      for
      the years then ended and on the consolidated statements of operations, changes
      in stockholders' equity (deficiency) and cash flows for the period from August
      6, 2001 (date of inception) to December 31, 2007, included in this Annual Report
      on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007, is dated March 28, 2008.
      We
      consent to the incorporation by reference of our report in the following
      registration statements previously filed by the Company with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933: the registration
      statements on Forms S-3 with SEC File Nos. 333-131814 and the registration
      statements on Forms S-8 with SEC file Nos. 333-15807, 333-112888, 333-112889
      and
      333-48531.





/s/  J.H.
      Cohn
      LLP





Roseland,
      New Jersey


March
      28,
      2008
# Official Journal C 191A/2019

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 191A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 626 June 2019 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 191A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 626 June 2019

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | V   Announcements |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) |
| 2019/C 191 A/01 | Notice of open competition — EPSO/AD/374/19 — Administrators (AD 7) in the following fields 1. Competition Law; 2. Financial Law; 3. Economic and Monetary Union Law; 4. Financial rules applicable to the EU budget; 5. Protection of euro coins against counterfeiting | 1 |

Contents

page

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO)

2019/C 191 A/01

Notice of open competition — EPSO/AD/374/19 — Administrators (AD 7) in the following fields 1. Competition Law; 2. Financial Law; 3. Economic and Monetary Union Law; 4. Financial rules applicable to the EU budget; 5. Protection of euro coins against counterfeiting

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
#### Refugio AGUIRRE-GOMEZ; et al., Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-72023.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 20, 2011.

Andres Z. Bustamante, Law Offices of Andres Z. Bustamante, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioners.

Geoffrey Forney, Trial, Oil, Jem C. Sponzo, Esquire, Daniel Eric Goldman, Esquire, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Refugio Aguirre-Gomez, Miriam Aguirre, and their minor child, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying their motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. *183§ 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, *Singh v. Gonzales,*491 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.2007), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed 14 years after the September 8, 1995, deportation order, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling, *see Singh,*491 F.3d at 1096-97.

We need not consider petitioners’ remaining contentions in light of our disposition.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1211 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

  1st Session
                                S. 1211

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To provide permanent authority for the administration of au pair 
                               programs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT AUTHORITY FOR AU PAIR PROGRAMS.

    Section 1(b) of the Act entitled ``An Act to extend au pair 
programs'', approved December 23, 1995 (Public Law 104-72; 109 Stat. 
776) is amended by striking ``, through fiscal year 1997''.

            Passed the Senate September 25, 1997.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
105th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1211

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

   To provide permanent authority for the administration of au pair 
                               programs.
```