In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-24-00005-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 432nd District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1727043

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach

SURESH PAUDELCHHETRI, Appellant

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Suresh Paudelchhetri challenges his conviction for online solicitation 

of a minor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(c). Paudelchhetri pled guilty to that 

offense, and in connection with his plea, he signed written waivers as well as a judicial 

confession. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered a presentence 

investigation report (PSI) and then sentenced Paudelchhetri to five years’ 

confinement.

In his sole point, Paudelchhetri argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

support his guilty plea, as required under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 

1.15, because the State called no witnesses, and there was therefore no corroborating 

evidence to support his plea. Because Paudelchhetri signed a judicial confession that 

admitted to each and every act alleged in the indictment, the trial court took judicial 

notice of that confession, and the PSI provided additional evidence, we will affirm.

Discussion

Under Article 1.15, a felony conviction may not be based on a guilty plea alone. 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. Rather, even when the defendant pleads guilty, 

the State must still introduce evidence of guilt. Id. Paudelchhetri contends that “no 

evidence was brought by the State” to show that he committed every element 

contained in the indictment and that “the record fails to show in any form that [he] 

committed the offense for which he has pled guilty.”

However, under Article 1.15, the defendant may stipulate to the evidence
3 

if the defendant in such case consents in writing, in open court, to waive 

the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, and 

further consents either to an oral stipulation of the evidence and 

testimony or to the introduction of testimony by affidavits, written 

statements of witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support 

of the judgment of the court. Such waiver and consent must be 

approved by the court in writing, and be filed in the file of the papers of 

the cause.

Id. 

Here, in accordance with Article 1.15, Paudelchhetri waived in writing his right 

to a jury trial and his right “to appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of 

witnesses,” and he “consent[ed] to oral and written stipulations of evidence.” He 

further signed a “Judicial Confession,” which stated,

Upon my oath, I swear my true name is SURESH PAUDELCHHETRI 

and I am 37 years of age. I have read the indictment or information filed in this 

case[,] and I committed each and every act alleged therein, except those waived by 

the State. All facts alleged in the indictment or information are true and 

correct. I am guilty of the instant offense(s) as well as all lesser included 

offenses. Specifically, I understand what I am charged with and plead 

guilty to the charge listed on page one of this document. [Emphasis 

added.]

Any and all enhancement and habitual allegations set forth in the 

indictment or information are true and correct and I understand my 

range of punishment is as follows:

SECOND DEGREE FELONY: imprisonment for a term of not 

more than 20 years or less than 2 years in the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice; and in addition, a fine not to exceed $10,000 may be 

assessed. [Underline in original.]

Any and all deadly weapon allegations are true and correct. All 

other affirmative findings made by the Court pursuant to this plea 

agreement are true and correct. I further admit my guilt on any

unadjudicated offenses set forth in the plea recommendation set out 

above, and request the Court to take each into account in determining 
4

my sentence for the instant offense(s). I swear to the truth of all of the

foregoing and I further swear that all testimony I give in the case will be 

the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help me God.

When, as here, a defendant signs a judicial confession stating, “I have read the 

indictment or information filed in this case and I committed each and every act 

alleged therein,” the judicial confession standing alone is sufficient to support a guilty 

plea. Chindaphone v. State, 241 S.W.3d 217, 219–20 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. 

ref’d) (citing Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (op. on 

reh’g) (“It is well settled that a judicial confession, [s]tanding alone, is sufficient to 

sustain a conviction upon a guilty plea.”)).

Additionally, following the judicial confession, the parties and the trial court 

signed an agreement stating,

In open court,[1] we join and approve the waiver of jury trial pursuant to 

Art. 1.13, TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and the 

stipulations of evidence pursuant to Art. 1.15, TEXAS CODE OF

1

We have been provided with a record of the hearing at which Paudelchhetri

was sentenced, but we do not have a record of the hearing at which the trial court 

accepted Paudelchhetri’s plea because his written waivers included a waiver of the 

attendance and record of a court reporter at the plea proceeding. Nevertheless, the 

document signed by the parties and the trial court reflects that Paudelchhetri’s judicial 

confession and written waivers were accepted in open court. See Giddings v. State, 

No. 02-19-00372-CR, 2021 WL 2373462, at *2, *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 10, 

2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that “Appellant 

may not both waive the making of the record and then subsequently complain about 

insufficient proof in the record” and noting that we may rely on the clerk’s record in 

the absence of a reporter’s record of the plea proceedings). Paudelchhetri does not 

address what happened at the plea proceeding or the trial court’s taking of judicial 

notice. Rather, he argues that the State presented no evidence to support the plea at 

the subsequent punishment hearing.
5

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. . . . It is agreed that the Court may take 

judicial notice of this document and the Court takes judicial notice of 

same.

“[W]hen the trial court takes judicial notice of a judicial confession, the State is 

not required to introduce the judicial confession into evidence.” Id. at 219; cf. Giddings, 

2021 WL 2373462, at *3 (considering similar signed agreement regarding trial court’s 

taking judicial notice and parties’ approval of stipulations in open court). The trial 

court took judicial notice of the judicial confession in this case, and therefore the State 

did not have to offer it into evidence.

Additionally, as Paudelchhetri acknowledges, the trial court considered the PSI.

The PSI contains both the police version of events surrounding the charged offense 

and Paudelchhetri’s version. The police version explained that as part of a joint 

investigation with other law enforcement agencies, an investigator with the Collin 

County Sheriff’s Department had posted a phone number in an online ad, and when 

Paudelchhetri texted him at that number, the investigator posed as a 15-year-old girl. 

Under both versions of events, Paudelchhetri sent this person sexually explicit 

messages and arranged to meet the person for sex even though the person claimed to 

be fifteen years old.2 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(a) (defining “minor” for 

2

In Paudelchhetri’s version, he stated that he had gone online looking for an 

adult woman to meet for sex but that he kept messaging the investigator after being 

told “her” age because “she kept talking to [him] and [he] just forgot about it.”
6

purposes of statute to include an individual whom the defendant believes to be 

younger than 17 years of age).

In summary, the trial court took judicial notice of the judicial confession, which 

embraced every element of the charged offense, and also considered the PSI, which 

provided additional evidence relevant to the offense elements. This evidence was 

sufficient to support Paudelchhetri’s plea under Article 1.15. See Giddings, 

2021 WL 2373462, at *3–4. Accordingly, we overrule Paudelchhetri’s sole point.

Conclusion

Having overruled Paudelchhetri’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Mike Wallach

Mike Wallach

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: October 3, 2024