To convict on accountability, the prosecution must only prove the defendant had a

specific intent to promote a crime, not necessarily a specific crime. Once the

defendant's specific intent to aid a crime is proven, he is accountable for any crime

that happens as a consequence of the intended crime.

Specific intent, or even the reasonable foreseeability of a killing, is simply not required.

Because we cannot review Illinois courts' interpretation of Illinois law, Lovett's claim that
he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt -- because Illinois courts improperly defined
the elements of the offense -- necessarily fails. Taking Illinois law as we find it, and taking the
account of the evidence at trial as given in the opinion of the Illinois Court of Appeals, a
reasonable trier of fact could have found that Lovett had joined with others for the purpose of
committing a battery and that one of his confederates -- whether known to him by name or not --
intentionally shot and killed the victim. Under the I!linois accountability statute, as interpreted
by Illinois courts, that was sufficient to find him guilty of murder.

In reviewing Lovett's conviction, the Illinois Appellate Court applied the correct
constitutional standard: “whether any rational trier of fact could have found [Lovett] guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt." Pet. Exh. A at 8; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979). The Illinois Appellate Court's application of that standard to the facts of this case was
not unreasonable. This ends this court's review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and the petition is

dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Ronald A. Guzman.
United States District Court

DATED: _<9/ Mi a7


In affirming the conviction of the defendant ... the Illinois court's [sic] of review have
erroneously held that the State need only prove the defendant had a specific intent to promote a
crime, not necessarily a specific crime, and once [this] is proven, he is accountable for any crime
that happens as a consequence of the intended crime. As a result of the decisions rendered by the
Illinois courts of review, the doctrine of "accountability" has been stretched across acceptable
legal boundaries. ...

The gravament [sic] of accountability ... is to attach legal responsibility, and
culpability, to the “natural and probable' consequences of acts perpetrated by another
person. The petitioner was convicted of First Degree Murder without any proof that
the natural and probable consequence of hitting the victim with his hands would end
up with the victim being killed by a gunshot inflicted by some unknown person.

Pet. at 4. Lovett argues there was no evidence that he intended that a shooting take place or was
aware that anyone was armed. The actual perpetrator was, and remains, unknown.

Interpreting Illinois statutes is the province of the Illinois courts, not federal courts on
habeas review. "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court
determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to
deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). “State courts are the ultimate expositors of state
law." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 690-91 (1975). It is for state courts to determine the
elements to be proven to establish criminal liability, and their interpretation is binding on federal
courts. See Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 416-20 (7th Cir. 1987).

Unfortunately for Lovett, the Illinois courts have interpreted 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) to impose
liability for murder in precisely this case, where a defendant joins with others to commit a battery
and one of the others kills the victim. Intent to kill, or even knowledge that killing is a
possibility, is unnecessary. The Illinois Supreme Court expressly rejected Lovett's argument:
"Defendants argue that the common-design rule should be abolished because it creates a
misdemeanor murder rule.' We agree that the rule does impose liability for murder even though
a misdemeanor was originally intended." People v. Terry, 99 Ill.2d 508, 515, 460 N.E.2d 746,
749 (1984). Citing Terry, the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. O'Reilly, 250 Ill.App.3d 622,

625, 621 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1st Dist. 1993), following Terry, stated the rule as follows:

3


‘Mintiie Order Form (06/97)

C L United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
N: yf d Judge tin e if
‘pGlosimestees | Ronald A. Guzman | Stine ie fone
/) CASE NUMBER 01 C 2317 DATE 5/17/2001
CASE USA ex rel RICHARD LOVETT vs. JAMES SCHOMIG, Warden
TITLE

Lin the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (6) state briefly the
nature of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

(3) QO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due___.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon____setfor___—_at

(5) i] Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___set for ___at

(6) gq Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/te-set for] on ___setfor. se at_—
(7) Qa Trial[set for/re-set for]on___at

(8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule2i OFRCP41(a)(1) OFRCP4i (a)(2).

a0) so [Other docket entry] |. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Petitioner Richard
Lovett’s Petition for Habeas Corpus challenging his conviction for murder is denied.

(11) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
4 number of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff. MAY 24 2001

Notified counsel by telephone. date docketed

J | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. cand
Copy tojudgelmagistatejudge. =i. F0) FER BOCKETING
courtroom = QU HAY 18 PH 4 33 dats ited note
TBK deputy’s
initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office mailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
United States ex rel. )
)
RICHARD LOVETT (B-52399) )
)
Petitioner, ) No. 2001 C 2317
)
v. )
) Judge Ronald A. Guzman
JAMES SCHOMIG, Warden, )
o
Respondent. ) 4 Gin
Gp Ugo y
2. QD
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER %,
o

Petitioner Richard Lovett, represented by counsel, filed this petition for habeas corpus
challenging his conviction for murder in the Circuit Court of Cook County on June 17, 1996,
following a bench trial. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction May 7, 1999,
People v. Lovett, No. 1-96-3714, Pet. Exh. A, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to
appeal on April 5, 2000.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
requires the court to conduct an initial review of habeas corpus petitions. The court may
summarily dismiss a petition without examining the state court record or ordering a response if it
plainly appears from the face of the petition and its exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1993), That is the case here.

Petitioner accepts the statement of facts set forth in the opinion of the Illinois Appellate
Court. Pet. at4. According to the opinion, Lovett, a member of the Vice Lords street gang,
was driving with two other gang members, Mitchell and Newsome, to meet other gang members
near Simeon High School in Chicago. They decided to go to 79th Street to look for members of

the Black Disciples and Gangster Disciples gangs, with whom the Vice Lords were at “war.”


Spotting a rival gang member, they stopped, left the car and chased him; when they couldn't
catch him, they started to return to the car.

On the way to the car, they saw a group chasing the victim down an alley between May and
Aberdeen streets, and they got in the car and drove down Aberdeen. They saw the group ina
gangway where the group had stopped the victim. Lovett asked the victim why he was being
chased, and the victim responded that it was because he was a "brick." The group began
punching the victim, and Lovett joined in. While they were punching him, someone shot the
victim, and Lovett fled with the others to 79th and Racine, where he saw Mitchell, who had
driven his car there. Lovett and Newsome got in the back seat, and Mitchell continued driving
while they discussed “taking care of business on 78th Street, and about trapping the brick in the
gangway."!/

Lovett raises a single claim for habeas review. He presents it as a claim that he was not
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but it appears from his supporting argument that his
teal dispute is with the broad scope of Illinois' accountability statute as interpreted by the Illinois
courts. Lovett does not claim that any particular fact was not proven; rather, he believes that the
proven facts should not subject him to criminal liability.

Lovett was found accountable for the shooting under 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c), which provides
that “[a] person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when ... (c) Either before or
during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such
commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning
or commission of the offense." Lovett argues that while the statute requires proof of specific
intent to aid or abet the crime charged, the Illinois courts have mistakenly made the net of

accountability much broader:

¥ Neither the opinion nor the petition explains what was meant by "brick."

2