No. 02 C 2666 Page 4

which, under the circumstances, creates a clear and present danger of a breach of the peace
or imminent threat of violence.” The apparent basis of the charge was the testimony of a
police officer that she had been told by two unnamed youths that plaintiff had “thrown” gang
signs at them inside the lobby of the police department. Plaintiffs attorney objected to the
admission of the hearsay and to the amendment, not having been previously advised of the
amended charge and not being provided with the identity of the two youths. The objections
were overruled and plaintiff was found guilty. Although the ordinance provides for fines of
at least $25 and not more than $750, no fine was levied. The hearing lasted between 15 and
20 minutes. There was no court reporter recording the proceedings.

City of Chicago y. International College of Surgeons, supra, which permits federal

courts to entertain appeals from adverse municipal ordinance decisions, by implication
determines that another of defendants’ contentions, that Younger or Colorado River
abstention doctrines counsel against a federal court entertaining claims arising out of a
municipal quasi-criminal proceeding, cannot prevail. We are mindful, however, that the
process due in such a proceeding is less than that due in a criminal] trial where liberty is at

stake. See Van Harken v. City of Chicago, supra. We are also mindful that Heck v.

Humphrey, Rooker-Feldman, Younger, and Colorado River all have at their core the notion

that federal courts should be cautious about intervening into state proceedings. Itis, thus, on
its face questionable that we entertain claims arising from an unreported municipal hearing
that concluded without a sanction and was not timely appealed. But there are too many loose
ends, as indicated, to make definitive rulings on counts H, V, VIII, IX and X at this time.

Perhaps further briefing will provide the answers. Defendants are directed to file a


No. 02 C 2666 Page 3

Cir. 1990), that a conviction bars such a claim.

Defendants also contend that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or Heck y. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994), or res judicata, bars a number of the claims, but that contention is somewhat
more problematic. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to administrative decisions,

Van Harken y. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346 (7" Cir. 1997), because its reach extends only

to the decisions of state courts, Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521 (11 Cir. 1994), and this was a
proceeding before an administrative hearing officer. Heck v. Humphrey, supra, bars any claim
that would necessarily employ the invalidity of a conviction or sentence. But does Heck v.
Humphrey apply to an administrative determination? The parties do not discuss that issue.
The federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to state agency findings that state
courts would give to them, unless Congress indicates otherwise, East Food& Liquor, Inc. v.
United States, 50 F.3d 1405 (7 Cir, 1995), but what preclusive effect would the state courts
give to this determination? The Illinois courts do not necessarily give preclusive effect to
quasi-criminal determinations, nor do the federal courts give that effect if there are serious
doubts as to the fairness, quality or extensiveness of the earlier proceedings. Mustfov v.
Superintendent of Chicago Police Department, 733 F.Supp. 283 (N.D.IIl. 1990). The parties
do not discuss either exception.

As best we can determine from the complaint, the agreed facts, and an affidavit of
plaintiffs then counsel, plaintiff was originally arrested for disorderly conduct for failure to
obey a lawful order of a police officer to disperse, this alleged conduct taking place at a police
station. When the matter came to hearing, the prosecuting attorney amended the charge to

disorderly conduct for making an “unreasonable or offensive act, utterance, gesture or display


No. 02 C 2666 Page 5

supplemental brief by February 26, 2003, with a response by March 12 and a reply by March
21.
We grant summary judgment to defendants on counts, IV, VII and XI and deny it, for

now, on counts II, V, VIII, [X and X.

SA JAMES B. MORAN
Sehrior Judge, U. S. District Court
Els , 2003.



See

Minwi2* eder Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Dlinois

(>)

Name of Assigned Judge James B. Moran Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge . than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 2666 DATE 2/5/2003
CASE Rolando Almanza vs. Town of Cicero etc. et al.
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
IN:
Memorandum Opinion and Order
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) im Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) 0 Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on at _
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at _
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) CO Local Rule 41.1 OO FRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
do) [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. But there are too many loose ends,
as indicated, to make definitive rulings on counts I, V, VIII, LX and X at this time. Perhaps further
briefing will provide the answers. Defendants’ supplemental brief by 2/26/03. Answer to supplemental
brief to be filed by 3/12/03. Reply to answer to be filed by 3/21/03. We grant summary judgment to
defendants counts, IV, VII and XI and deny it, for now, counts II, V, VIII, LX and X.
(ll) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court,
No notices required. umber of osices
Notices mailed by judge’s staff. FE 0
Notified counsel by telephone, a 10 20 03
vo | Docketing to mail notices. +
Mail AO 450 form, Qo
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice

courtroom
WAH deputy’s

initials a
an Date/time recived in
central Clerk’s Office

‘ailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
ROLANDO ALMANZA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 02 C 2666
) Arne rs
TOWN OF CICERO, a municipal corporation, ) DOGE i ED
and CICERO POLICE OFFICER LOUIS ) FEB 1 0 2003
DRAKULICH, individually, )
)
Defendants, )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff sued defendants, alleging various claims arising out of his arrest and
subsequent conviction of a Town of Cicero ordinance violation. Defendants moved to dismiss
some of the claims and, in response, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Defendants now
move for summary judgment on some of the claims.

The result in large part turns on whether an added count was timely. In count XI
plaintiff seeks administrative review of the disorderly conduct conviction. Illinois law requires
that such review must be sought within 35 days. A considerably longer period had passed
before that count was added in the amended complaint. Plaintiff points out that a federal
court has jurisdiction to review a municipal administrative action in a case otherwise properly
before the court, City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997), and
he claims, without elaboration or any reference to case law, that the amendment relates back
to the timely filed original complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c),

because it arises from the same “conduct, transaction or occurrence” as the original complaint.

SX


No, 02 C 2666 Page 2

The issue is considerably more complex than plaintiff suggests. The amendment
invokes the supplemental jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. §1367 and is governed by state law. While
federal procedural rules customarily trump state law, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965),
an extended limitations period does violence to Illinois law. The administrative proceeding
was an action by local government to vindicate local law, not a private cause of action. The
Mlinois Supreme Court has made it clear that the time limit was intended to hasten the
procedure of administrative review and avoid undue delay. Accordingly, it has held that the
commencement within 45 days is a jurisdictional requirement. Carver v. Nall. 239 Ill.Dec. 567,
714 N.E.2d 486 (iI. 1999). By that, we believe the court determined that a timely appeal is a
condition of the right to appeal and that the right expires if not timely pursued — a substantive
restriction imposed by state law. See, generally, Houben vy. Telular Corp., 309 F.3d 1028 (7"
Cir. 2002). But even if that were not so, a due regard for federal-state relations is a
countervailing interest, see City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, supra, at 174,
and, given the strong Illinois interest in a prompt appeal from an adverse determination in a
quasi-criminal proceeding, comity counsels against an indefinite extension of the right to

appeal, See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). We grant the motion for summary

judgment on count XI.

That judgment is fatal to some of the other counts. Count VII alleges a state claim for
malicious prosecution. As plaintiff concedes, that claim requires a prior termination in
plaintiff's favor, Stephens v. Taylor, 264 Ill.Dec. 934, 771 N.E.2d 638 (II. App. 3d Dist. 2002),
and he cannot make that showing. The state false imprisonment claim of count IV also falls

because of the common law doctrine, followed by Illinois, King v. Goldsmith, 897 F.2d 885 (7""