1999) (collecting cases). College of DuPage argues that because the community college district
board could not lawfully have delegated final policymaking authority to Emami and Abel,
plaintiff's Scction 1983 claim based on a theory that Emami and Abel had final policymaking
authority should be dismissed.

The court disagrees, In Kujawski v. Board of Comm’rs, 183 F.3d 734, 739 n.4 (7 Cir,
1999), the Seventh Circuit observed that a state statute is not necessarily determinative of a
delegation issue. Rather, courts “must take into account both state positive law and state custom
that has the force of law.” Id, Otherwise, a municipality could “avoid its constitutional
tesponsibilitics by delegating, in violation of state law, its responsibilities.” Id.

Here, unlike in the cases cited by College of DuPage, plaintiff has expressly alleged that
final policymaking authority was delegated to Emami and Abel. At this slage, the court cannot
say that plaintiff will be able to prove no set of facts showing (hat Emami and Abel were

delegated final policymaking authority, See Nebel v, City of Burbank, No. 01 C 6403, 2003 WL

1606087, at *5-6 (N.D. Il. Mar. 27, 2003) (rejecting argument that Section 1983 claim should be
dismissed based on failure to adequately allege final policymaking authority, where complaint
alleged that final policymaking authority had been delegated to defendants).

Nor is the court persuaded by College of DuPage’s argument that plaintiff's Section 1983
claim against it should be dismissed because the amended complaint inadequately alleges that
College of DuPage maintained a custom and practice of violating employees’ First Amendment
rights. ‘he amended complaint alleges that “[t|he actions of Emami and Abel, along with other
policymaking officials for the College of DuPage, evinces a widespread policy or custom of

disciplining and/or terminating employees who speak out on matters of public concer.” College


cither was authorized through a widespread practice constituting a custom or usage, or caused by
an employce with final policymaking authority. A municipal entity cannot be held vicariously
liable under Scction 1983 through the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell v, Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S, 658, 694 (1978). Such an entity can be sued under Section 1983 only if
the constitutional injury was authorized by express policy, authorized through a widespread
practice that is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with (he force of
law, or caused by a person with final policymaking authority.’ Sce McCormick v. City of
Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7" Cir, 2000).

There is no heightened pleading requirement in municipal hability cases brought under
Scction 1983. Seg Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff alleges in her amended complaint
that defendants Emami and Abel “possessed or were delegated final policymaking authority over
the employees in the Center for Corporate Training.” This allegation is sufficient to place College
of DuPage on notice of the claim against it.

College of DuPage argues, however, that Emami and Abel could not have possessed or
been delegated final policymaking authority under Illinois law. Tllinois’ Public Community
College Act gives the board of any community college district the power to establish policies
governing the cmployment and dismissal of community college personnel. Scc 110 ILCS 805/3-
42, Illinois couris have held that this authority cannot be delegated. See Morgan vy. Board of

Trusices of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, No. 98 C 1095, 1999 WL 160369, at *6 (N.D. Il. Mar, 9,

' Plaintiff does not claim that her alleged constitutional deprivation was authorizcd by
express policy.



of DuPage argues that these allegations are “boilerplate,” and as such, are insufficient to state a
claim

If plaintiff had based her allegation of a municipal custom on nothing more than her own
experience, the court would agrce that she would have failed to state a claim under a custom and
practice theory. See Nehel v. City of Burbank, 2003 WL 1606087, at *6 (stating that generally, “a
plaintiff's own isolated experiences arc not cnough to state a claim for nrunicipal liability under a
custom and practice theory” and collecting cases), However, here plaintiff has also alleged that
the actions of other policymakers evince a widespread custom of disciplining or terminating
employees who speak out on matlers of public concern, Although College of DuPage argues that
plaintiff's inclusion of unnamed “other policymaking officials” is disingenuous and intended to
“create an illusion of a widespread policy,” when ruling on a motion to dismiss the court must

accept the allegations in the complaint as true. See Szumny v. American Gen, Fin., Inc., 246 F.3d

1065, 1067 (7'"" Cir. 2001). Nor does this claim fail because it is alleged in conclusory fashion.
See McCormick, 230 F.3d at 325. College of DuPage’s motion to dismiss plaintiff's Section
1983 claim against it is denied.

Finally, College of DuPage contends that it is entitled to immunity with respect to
plaintiff s state law claims, under IIlinois’ Local Governmental and Governmental Employces
Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101, et seq. Plaimtifi’s amended complaint alleges that
Emami’s and Abel’s actions “were done with deliberate oppression and were done wilfully or
with such gross negligence as to indicate wanton disregard for Plaintiff's rights.” Under the Tort

Immunity Act, “allegations of wilful and wanton conduct by a public cmployce are sufficient to

state a cause of action against the municipality-cmployer.” Glover v. City of Chicago, 436 N.E.2d



Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge If Other
or Magistrate Judge George W. Lindberg than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 4358 DATE 12/5/2003
CASE Carpanzano vs. College of Dupage
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, und (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented]

DOCKET ENTRY:

on) im] Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oa Brief in support of motion due
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due___—_--s Reply to answer brief due. .
(4) QO Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [sct for/re-set for] on set for .__at
(6) im] Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/purauant to]
OFRCP4(m) OC Local Rule 41.1 C)FRCP41(a)(1) [1 FRCP41(a)(2).
qo) =x [Other dockct entry] Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. Enter memorandum opinion and
order.
qi) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court. Document
‘ J Namber
No natices requires umber of nstives
Nolices rnailed by judge's staff. ,
Notified counsel by telephone, q EC 08 2003
VY | Docketing to mail natives. a) =
Mail AO 450 f ein st e ’
fail A form. 4unod Lawisia sn heen
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. atts) onal a)
courtroom 02+ Wd g- 330 bu date mailed notice
SLA deputy’s
initial
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central Clerk's Office mang dep nis



623, 630 (ILL. App. Ct. 1* Dist, 1982), College of DuPage’s motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law
claims against it is denied.

ORDERED: College of DuPage’s motion to dismiss [20-1] is denied.

ENTER:

rge W Lindberg
i éS. District Judge

DEC 05 2003

DATED:



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EYER
EASTERN DIVISION pacKet to
pes 0 8 2003
CHRISTINA CARPANZANO,
Plaintiff,

03 C 4358
Vv.
Judge George W. Lindberg
COLLEGE OF DUPAGE, an Tllinois municipal
entity, MARY LOU EMAML, and JOYCE ABEL,
individually and in their official capacitics

as employees of College of DuPage,

Defendants.

eee we SS ES YS SS eS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant College of DuPage has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiff's claims against it. For the reasons stated bclow, the motion to
dismiss is denied.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded [acts and

must draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in plaintiff's favor. MCM Partners

Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 972 (7"" Cir. 1995). According to the

allegations in the amended complaint, defendant College of DuPage is a public community
college. Defendants Mary Lon Emami (“mami”) and Joyce Abel (“Abel”) were cmployccs of
the College of DuPage. The College of DuPage hired plaintiff in May 2000 as a program manager
for its Center for Corporate Training, in the Business and Professionals Institute.

One of plaintiff's responsibilities in her program manager position was to sell training
classes to corporations, Ten dollars was automatically deducted from the gross sale price of each

training class sold by plaintiff and others, and placed into the “Tcam Fund.” The money

DBS



contributed to the Team Fund was taken out of profits that otherwise would have gone lo the
College of DuPage. The Team Fund was used to pay for personal items for the clerical staff,
including plants, books, gift certificates, and lunches.

On June 28, 2002, plaintiff wrote a memorandum to defendants Emami and Abcl, stating
that she had “professional and ethical problems with the arrangement and usage of this fund,” and
that she would no longer contribute to it. According to plaintiff, immediately after she relayed her
intention not to contribute to the Team Fund, she began receiving warnings and written.
disciplinary lettcrs regarding her job performance from Emami and Abel. On January 31, 2003,
plaintiff was suspended. [he suspension continued until plaintiff was terminated on March 6,
2003.

Plainti(f filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges
that defendants retaliated against her for exercising her lirst Amendment rights under the United
States Constitution, and alleges supplemental state law claims of retaliatory discharge and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

When ruling on a motion to dismiss under l’ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
court must consider “whether relief’ is possible under any set of facts consistent with the

allegations of the plaintiff's complaint.” Pokuta v. ‘lrans World Airlines, Inc., 19] F.3d 834, 839

(7" Cir, 1999), That is, if it is possible to hypothesize a set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff
to relief, consistent with the allegations in the complaint, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
inappropriate, Graehling v. Village of Lombard, 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7" Cir. 1995).

College of DuPage first argues that plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against it should be

dismissed because the amended complaint fails to adequatcly allege that the deprivation of rights