retained the right to terminate him at any point. (Sedeman Dep. at 270). These facts
are cnough to place in dispute the question of whether Sedeman was “wholly free from
the control” of CRC-Evans. Therefore, a jury must decide whether Sedeman was a
loaned servant, and summary judgment on that ground is improper.

Cc. Negligent Entrustment

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants are liable for negligently entrusting vchicles
leased by Thermal Solutions to Sedeman. Plaintiffs’ rest their argument on three facts:
1) that Sedeman learned to drive on the left side of the road and was unfamiliar with
driving on the right side of the road; 2) that Sedeman did not have a valid chauffeur's
license; and 3) that at the time of the accident Sedeman had recently finished a 7-day
work week during which he had worked 94.5 hours. Thermal Solutions argues that
these facts by themselves are insufficiont to establish that it negligently entrusted
Sedeman with the minivan, The Court agrees.

A“lender may be liable for negligently entrusting an automobile to another, but
only if (1) the lender knows or should know that the one to whom he loaned it is
incompetent, inexperienced or reckless in its use, and (2) it was this incompetence,
inexperience or recklessness that was a proximate cause of the resulting accident.”
McGath v. Price, 342 Il. App. 3d 19, 28, 793 N.E.2d 801 (2003).

The fact that Sedeman was unfamiliar with the driving customs in the United
States can be dispensed with quickly. Sedeman held a valid international driver's
license at the time of the accident. Under Illinois law, a non-resident who possesses

a valid license issued to him in his home state or country may operate a motor vehicle

13



56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement, [J 32). Each day Sedeman drove three or four of the South
African workers to the job site from the hotel at which they stayed. (Pl. 56.1(b)(3)(B)
Statement, J{ 31). Furthermore, Sedeman admitted in his deposition that it was his
responsibility, even if he wanted to go somewhere else, to drive Tarkwin Enrick,
another South African worker, back to the hotel, because there was no public
transportation and Enrick had no other way to return to the hotel from the job site.
(Sedeman Dep. at 269). Although Sedeman did not bill for travel time, Thermal
Solutions reimbursed him for all gas expenses. (Def. Thermal Solutions 56,1(a)(3)
Statement, {{ 19; Pl. 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement, 4] 36).

On November 11, 2001, Sedeman had signed out for the day, and was driving
Enrick to the hotel when the accident occurred. (Def. Thermal Solutions 56.1(a)(3)
Statement, ] 22; P]. 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement, f 49). The accident occurred shortly after
Sedeman pulled out of the Citgo gate. (Pl. 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement, 49).

As a result of the accident, the Plaintiffs filed a twenty-count complaint against
Sedeman, Thermal Solutions, and CRC-Evans. With regard to the corporate
Defendants, the Plaintiffs allege that they are hable because Sedeman acted as their
agent at the time of the accident and because they negligently entrusted Sedeman with
their vehicle. Thermal Solutions moves to dismiss on two grounds: (1) that Sedeman
did not act as its agent at the time of the accident; (2) that it did not negligently

entrust Sedeman with the vehicle. CRC-Evans also moves for summary judgment on

two grounds: (1) that Sedeman was not acting as its agent at the time of the accident;



Here, Thermal Solutions clearly benefitted from Sedeman’s use of the minivan.
First, Sedeman provided transportation to three to four workers on a daily basis.
Without relying on Sedeman to provide this service, Thermal Solutions could not have
enjoyed the services of the other workers. Second, by renting a minivan and relying
on one worker to provide transportation for others, Thermal Solutions was able to save
money on rental costs and gasoline. Moreover, if Thermal Solutions directed Sedeman
to provide transportation to other workers, then the act of traveling to and from work
is of the kind Sedeman was hired to perform and occurred within the time and scope
of his employment. See, e.g., Hindle v. Dillbeck, 68 Ill. 2d 309, 370 N.E. 2d 165 (1977)
(where crew members that depended on company to provide transportation to and from
the job site, an injury during a trip to or from work was incurred in the course of
employment); Hall v. DeFalco, 178 Ill. App. 3d 408, 538 N.E. 2d 448 (1988) (employer
who supplies a means of transportation to or from work has brought travel to and from
work within the scope of employment); see also Anderson v. Falcon Drilling Co., 695
P, 2d 521, 524-25 (Ok. 1985) (when employer required employees ta carpool, they were
within the scope of employment when traveling to and from work because the travel
involved a benefit to employer).

Contrary to the Defendants’ argument, there is a dispute regarding whether
Sedeman was free to drive where he chose after work. A reasonable finder of fact could
conclude that Thermal Solutions required Sedeman to drive other employees to and
from work. Consequently, a reasonable finder of fact could find that transporting

employees to and from work was part of Sedeman’s job responsibilities and therefore

9



the accident occurred in Illinois, and the parties agree that Illinois law should apply.
Thus, the Court applies Illinois law.
Til. Analysis

A. Scope of Employment

Both Thermal Solutions and CRC-Evans argue that Sedeman was not acting as
an agent at the time of the accident. The crux of the corporate Defendants’ argument
is that Sedeman had clocked out for the day and at the time of the accident was
traveling to the hotel at which he stayed. Under Illinois law, for an employer to be
vicariously liable for an employee's torts under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the
torts must have been committed within the scope of the employment. See Pyne v.
Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 360, 543 N.E. 2d 1304 (1989); Hogun v. City of Chicago, 319
Ill. App. 531, 536, 49 N.E. 2d 861 (1943). Whether such a relationship exists is a
factual question, and summary judgment is inappropriate when scope of employment
is atissue, See, e.g., Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at 358-59; Laird v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 272
Ill. App. 3d 280, 289, 650 N.E. 2d 215 (1995); Giannoble v. P & M Heating and Air
Conditioning, Inc., 233 Il. App. 3d 1051, 1056, 599 N.E. 2d 1183 (1992); Marco vu,
County of McHenry, 218 Il. App. 3d 503, 505, 578 N.E. 2d 579 (1991). In other words,
ifreasonable people could draw different conclusions regarding whcther a person acted
within the scope of his employment, summary judgment is not proper.

Illinois docs not precisely define “scope of employment,” and instead draws from

the Restatement (Second) of Agency. Pyne, 129 Ill, 2d at 359-60; Giannoble, 233 IIL.



(2) even if Sedeman was acting as an agent at the time of the accident, he was an agent
of Therma! Solutions and not CRC-Evans.
Il. Standard of Review

Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ,P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 823, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In response, the non-moving party
cannot rest on bare pleadings alone but must designate specific material facts in the
record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324; Insolia v. Philip
Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). A material fact must be outcome
determinative under the governing law. Insolia, 216 F.3d at 598-99. The Court must
construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party as well as view all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The Court has jurisdiction over this dispute by diversity, as the parties are of
diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy is in excess of $75,000. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1832(a). A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the forum
state as well as its conflicts rules. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 96
S. Ct. 167, 46 L. Ed. 2d 3 (1975); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,

615. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941). Here, the Plaintiffs are citizens of Illinois and


Solutions’ and CRC-Evans’ characterization of the undisputed facts is inaccurate, and
both also ignore the exceptions to the general rule regarding travel to and from work.

When viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, a reasonable inference
can be drawn that Thermal Solutions required Sedeman to transport other South
African employees to and from work. At the time of the accident Sedeman was
transporting Enrick to the hotel where they stayed. Sedeman testified that cach day
he would transport three or four employces to the job site in the minivan lent to him
by Thermal Solutions. But not only did Sedeman testify that he transported other
employees to and from the job site, he also testified that, even if he desired to go
somewhere else, it was his responsibility to drive Enrick back to the hotel because
Enrick otherwise had no method of returning to the hotel after work, The inference
that Thermal Solutions required Sedeman to transport his coworkers to and from the
worksite finds further support in Thermal Solutions’ decision to rent only three
minivans. The record reflects that although Thermal Solutions supplied Sedeman
with a minivan it did not supply each of the other forcign workers with a minivan.
Thus, the workers who had no access to minivans were required to rely on Sedeman
for transportation to and from the workplace. Indeed, Sedeman stated that he had the
responsibility of transporting the other workers because he was “the best driver out of
the whole lot.” Given Sedeman’s testimony, it is reasonable to infer that Thermal
Solutions directed him to provide transportation to and from the worksite to the other
South African workers. Therefore, there is a dispute whether Sedeman was free to
drive wherever he chose after leaving work, and this dispute is material.

8



Minute Onder Foran (96/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge i : itting Judge if Other
or Maginrae Judge William J. Hibbler chart Asigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 9739 DATE 4/7/2004
CASE Sedeman v. Korczak, et. al
TITLE

[In che following box fa) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g, plaintiff, defendan, 3rd party plaimifl, and (b) state briefly the
nature of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:
Defendant Thermal Solutions’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #56)
Defendant CRC-Evans’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 58)
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (doc. #80)
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}
Q) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) Oo Answer briefto motiondue___. Reply to answer briefdue___
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon set for at
(5) ao Status hearing [held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——setfor at.
(6) o Pretrial conference [held/continued to] [set for/re-set forlon__—ssetfor__— at.
7) Oo ‘Trial [set for/re-setfor]on at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial} [Hearing] held/continuedto__— at.
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs [by/agreement/pursuant to}

OOFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule 21 OFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) @ [Other docket entry] . Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. For the attached reasons, Defendant Thermal
Solutions’ motion for summary judgment (doc. #56) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. To the extent that
Plaintiffs raise claims of negligent entrustment, summary judgment in favor of Thermal Solutions is granted. As to all
other matters, Thermal Solutions’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendant CRC-Evans’ motion for
summary judgment (doc. #58) is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ motion to strike (dac. #80) is DENIED as moot.

(11) ia [For further detail see order on the reverse side of the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court, ‘Document
‘Number

No notices required, number of pot

Notices mailed by judge’s staff. APR

Notified counsel by telephone, Bee pe due doiese,

v | Docketing to mail notices.

Copy so jndge/magistrare judge. “fs we g

dave mailed notice

courtroom
JHC deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in
ceatral Clerk's Office ‘evsiing deputy initials



characterization of the undisputed facts is inaccurate. CRC-Evans relies heavily on
testimony from Sedeman that Robinson, Thermal Solutions’ supervisor at the Citgo
site, had the authority to direct Sedeman’s work and to discharge him. CRC-Evans
cites a multitude of cases to support its contention that because Thermal Solutions had
the right to control Sedeman, he was a “loaned employee.” (Def. CRC-Evans’ Mot.
Summ. J. at 7-12) (citing American Stevedores Co. v. Industrial Commission, 408 Il.
449, 452-53, 97 N.E.2d 325 (1951); Willfong v. Dean Evans Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 1099,
679 N.E. 2d 1252 (1997); Haight, 215 Ul, App. 3d 353, 575 N.E. 2d 243; Highway Ins.
Co, v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 92 Ill. App. 2d 214, 285 N.E. 2d 309 (1968); A.J. Johnson
Paving Co, v. Industrial Commission, 82 Ill. 2d 341, 412 N.E, 2d 477 (1980); Chicago’s
Finest Worker's Co, v. Industrial Commission, 61 Ill. 2d 340, 335 N.E. 2d 434 (1975).
But each of the cases, but for Haight, examines whether a loaned employee
relationship exists under the Worker's Compensation Act, and not in the context of
employer liability for the negligence of its employees. The distinction is important
because the standard for demonstrating that an employce has been loaned differs
depending on the context. See County of Tazewell v. Industrial Commission, 193 Ill.
App. 3d 309, 315-16, 549 N.E. 2d 805 (1989) (noting the difference between the loancd
servant doctrine in the context of workers’ compensation and personal injury resulting
from an agent’s negligence).

Illinois courts have repeatedly made clear that whether an employee sent by his

general employer to another for the performance of special work becomes a loaned

11



could also conclude that Sedeman was acting within the scope of his employment at the
time of the accident, as he was transporting another employee to or from work. The
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that Sedeman was not acting
within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident is therefore DENIED.
B. Loaned Employee

CRC-Evans offers another reason why summary judgment should be granted
in its favor. According to CRC-Evans, its subsidiary, IHT, loaned Sedeman to Thermal
Solutions, An employee in the general employment of one company may, with his
consent, be loaned to another company for a special purpose, See Heinrich v. Peabody
Int'l Corp., 99 Ill. 2d 344, 351-52, 459 N.E.2d 935 (1984); Haight v. Aldridge Elec. Co.,
215 Ill. App. 3d 353, 365-66, 575 N.E. 2d 248 (1991); Mosley v. Northwestern Steel &
Wire Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 710, 718-19, 394 N.E.2d 1230 (1979). When such a transfer
occurs, the second employer, not the first, would be liable for the employee’s negligence.
Heinrich, 99 Il. 2d at 351-52; Richard v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 825,
832, 383 N.E. 2d 1242 (1978) (citing Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 Il. 300, 45 N.E.2d
665 (1942)). Whether such a transfer has occurred, however, is usually a question of
fact, but may become a question of law where the undisputed facts are susceptible to
but a single inference. Haight, 215 Il. App. 3d at 366; Richard, 66 Il. App. 3d at 832,

CRC-Evans argues that the undisputed facts establish that it loaned Sedeman
to Thermal Solutions for the special project at the Citgo refinery, and therefore it is no

longer liable for any of Sedeman’s alleged negligence. Again, CRC-Evans’

10



App. 3d at 1056; Snodgrass v. Jones, 957 F. 2d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 1992). The
Restatement (Second) of Agency sets forth three criteria to consider when determining
whether an agent’s conduct falls within the scope of employment:

Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:

(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;

(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;

(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master...

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228; see also Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at 359-60.
The general rule is that travel between work and home is not within the scope of
employment. See Snodgrass, 957 F.2d at 485; Giannoble, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 1062
(citing Urban v, Industrial Commission, 34 Ill, 2d 159, 214 N.E.2d 737 (1966)); Marco,
218 Ill. App. 3d at 506. There are, however, exceptions to this rule, most notably, when
employers cause employees to travel away from a regular workplace, when employers
provide the transportation, or when the employees’ travel “is at least partly for their
employers’ purposes rather than simply serving to convey the employees to or from a
regular jobsite.” Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at 356; Marco, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 506; Snodgrass,
957 F.2d at 485.

The Court finds that reasonable persons could differ as to whether Sedeman was
acting in the scope of his employment. Thermal Solutions and CRC-Evans both argue
that, because Sedeman had clocked out for the day and because he was driving to the
hotel at which stayed, he was not acting within the scope of his employment. Thermal
Solutions’ and CRC-Evans’ argue that it is undisputed that Sedeman was free to do his

own business with no direction from Thermal Solutions once he clocked out, and

therefore the accident was outside the scope of his employment. But Thermal

7



Solutions also paid for Sedeman’s food and lodging while he remained in the United
States. (Pl. 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement, Ff 20-21).

During the time Sedeman worked at the Citgo refinery, he was supervised by
Phil Robinson, Thermal Solutions’ Citgo jobsite project manager. (Pl. 56.1(b)(8)(B)
Statement, {[ 22). Robinson told Sedeman when to report to work, when to leave, and
gave other orders and directions regarding his work. (Pl. 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement, {J
23, 25). Robinson also had the authority to discharge Sedeman. (PI. 56.1(b)(3)(B)
Statement, {J 26-27). At the samo time Sedeman’s contract with IHT specified that
it had the absolute discretion to set and change Sedeman’s working hours, (Def, CRC-
Evans Mot. Summ. J., Ex, G). Further, Sedeman’s contract gave IHT the right to
terminate Sedeman and directed Sedeman to follow IHT’s grievance procedures should
he have a dispute regarding his employment. (Def. CRC-Evans Mot. Summ. J., Ex. G).

When Sedeman arrived at the Citgo refinery, Thermal Solutions supplied him
with a minivan to drive while he was in the United States. (ef. Thermal Solutions
56.1(a)(3) Statement, § 14). Sedeman had an international driver's license. (Def.
Thermal Solutions 56.1(a)(3) Statement, 4 15). Thermal Solutions did not, however,
supply all of the South African workers with minivans, instead renting only three vans
for general work use. (PI. 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement, {J 30, 33), According to Scedeman,
he received a one of the minivans because he was “the best driver out of the whole lot.”
(Sedeman Dep. at 55). Thermal Solutions occasionally directed Sedeman to drive
Robinson and other Thermal Solutions to and from the airport, the motel at which the
South African workers stayed, the Citgo refinery, and the Griffith, Indiana shop. (Pl.

3



in Ilhnois. 625 ILCS 5/6-102(2). Sedeman was thus competent under Illinois law to
drive in Illinois. The Plaintiffs argue, however, that because Sedeman transported his
coworkers to and from work, he was required to have a chauffeur’s license. The
Plaintiffs do not point to any statute that requires that someone driving co-workers
obtain a chauffeur’s license. See, e.g., Richards uv. Checker Taxi Co., 168 Ill. App. 3d,
154, 522 N.E.2d 650 (1988) (noting that Chicago Municipal Code, {| 28.1-3(2)(3)
requires Chauffeur’s License for taxi drivers); Leuthi v. Yellow Cab Co., 136 Ill. App.
8d 829, 483 N.E.2d 1058 (1985) (noting that Chicago Municipal Code requires persons
transporting others for hire must have a license as a public chauffeur). Moreover, the
Plaintiffs point to no evidence to suggest that the fact that Sedeman’s was not licensed
to transport coworkers was a proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiffs suggest
instead that it was Sedeman’s unfamiliarity with the custom of driving on the right
side of the road that was the proximate cause of the accident. Lastly, Plaintiffs argue
that Sedeman was “exhausted” at the time of the accident from having worked 94.5
hours. However, it does not follow that merely because Sedeman worked a long week
(albeit only 10.5 hours longer than a typical week), he was too tired to drive safely.
Sedeman did not inform anyone at Thermal Solutions that he could not drive safely.
Nor did Sedeman later testify that he had been too tired to drive. There simply is no
evidence that Sedeman was so exhausted from his work that he was unable to drive
safely. Moreover, Plaintiffs point to no case law or state regulation that supports their
speculation that someone who has worked extensive hours over the course of a week

is unfit to drive. Cf. Smith v. Solfest, 65 Il. App. 3d 779, 382 N.E.2d 881 (1978)

4



Evans also argues that it loaned Sedeman to Thermal Solutions and therefore it is not
liable for his actions. Thermal Solutions argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment on the Plaintiffs’ negligent entrustment claims because Sedeman hada valid
international driver’s license. Thermal Solutions’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. CRC-Evans’ motion for summary judgment
is DENIED.
I. Factual Background

Faizel Sedeman worked for International Heat Treatment (IHT), a subsidiary
of CRC-Evans, and was a citizen and resident of South Africa. (Def. Thermal Solutions
56.1(a)(3) Statement, Jf 5, 9; Pl. 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement, | 1). In 2001, Thermal
Solutions asked IHT to supply it with heat treatment technicians for a contract that
it had with an Illinois Citgo refinery. (PI. 56.1(6)(3)(B) Statement, 410), As a result,
THT contracted with Thermal Solutions to send six employces, all of whom, including
Sedeman, were citizens of South Africa, to Thermal Solutions to work from its Griffith,
Indiana location. (Def. Thermal Solutions 56.1(a)(3) Statement, {/] 10; Sedeman Dep.
at 37). According to the parties’ arrangement, [HT billed Thermal Solutions $19/hour
for the workers’ time, while Thermal Solutions billed Citgo $22/hour for their time.
(P1, 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement, [{ 4, 12). Sedeman, however, received his pay, based on
the number of hours that he worked at the Citgo refinery, directly from IHT. (Def.

Thermal Solutions 56.1(a)(3) Statement, J 13). Thermal Solutions paid for Sedeman’s

travel from and back to South Africa. (Pl. 56.1(b)(8)(B) Statement, J 11). Thermal



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
KEVIN M. KoRCZAK AND PHILIP J. fe ah.
a s W
SCHMIDT, as the Administrator of . ge
the Estate of Frances L. Korczak ws

and Babe Doe Korezak,
Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 01 C 9739

The Honorable William J. Hibbler
FAIZEL SEDEMAN, a/k/a FAIZEL
FEDEMAN, THERMAL SOLUTIONS, INC.,
CRC-EVANS PIPELINE INT'L, INC., AND
PIPELINE INDUCTION HEAT LTD.,

Defendants.

SS SS SS SSS eS SS SS SS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

A tragic accident involving vehicles driven by Kevin Korcezak and Faizel
Sedeman resulted in the death of Korczak’s wife, Frances Korezak, and their unborn
child, Baby Doe Korczak. After the accident, Korczak sued Sedeman as well as
Thermal Solutions and CRC-Evans Pipeline International. Korczak alleges that
Sedeman negligently caused the accident because he drove on the wrong side of the
road and further alleges that Thermal Solutions and CRC-Evans are vicariously liable
for Sedeman’s negligence under the doctrines of respondeat superior and negligent
entrustment. The corporate Defendants have moved for summary judgment, both

arguing that Sedeman was not acting as their agent at the time of the accident. CRC-

49



employee only if “he is wholly free from the control of the first employer and wholly
subject to the control of the second employer.” Richard, 66 Ill. App. 3d at 832
(emphasis added); see also Merlo, 381 Ill. at 320; County of Tazewell, 193 Ill. App. 3d
at 315-16; Mosley, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 719. It is not sufficient that an employee is
partially under the control of a third person or even takes day-to-day directions from
a third person. Richard, 66 Ill. App. 3d at 832-34. To create a loaned employee
relation, the original employer “must resign full control of the employee.” Foster v.
Englewood Hosp. Ass’n, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1060, 313 N.E. 2d 255 (1974). Further,
when a general employer has the authority to substitute another servant at any time,
when the time of the new employment is short, and when the loaned servant is a
specialist, Illinois courts have found that an employce is not a loaned employee but
instead continues his general employment. See Richard, 66 lll. App. 3d at 833 (citing
Robinson v. McDougal-Hartmann Co., 133 Ill. App. 24 _739,742-43, 272 N.E. 2d 513
(1971).

There is evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference can be drawn
that CRC-Evans did not fully relinquish control of Sedeman. Among other things, in
the contract Sedeman signed with CRC-Evans’ subsidiary, CRC-Evans gave itself
absolute discretion to set and change Sedeman’s working hours. (Def. CRC-Evans’
Mot. Summ. J., Ex. G). CRC-Evans also retained the right to terminate Sedeman and
directed him to follow its grievance procedures should he have any gricvance. (Def.

CRC-Evans’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. G). Sedeman testified that he understood that [HT

12



(passenger contributed to her injuries resulting from a car crash when she encouraged
another to drive, knowing that the driver had been awake for 23.5 hours and had
already been traveling for 5 hours),

Sedeman had a valid driver's license at the time of the accident. There is no
evidence to suggest that Thermal Solutions knew or should have known that Sedeman
was not competent to drive a vehicle merely because he was from another country or
because he had a long week at work. Consequently, to the extent that the Plaintiffs’
claims rest on a theory of negligent entrustment, summary judgment in favor of the
corporate Defendants is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

412 ( 04 V2 4. A LEED
Dated The Honor; William J, Hibbler

United States District Court

15