### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A U G U ST 3, 200 4 S es sio n
F R ED H. WR IG HT , P h. D v. TE N N ES SE E B OA R D OF EX A M IN ER S IN PS YC HOLOGY

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 02-3172-1 Ir vin H. Kilcrease , Jr., Chancellor

No. M2003- 01654-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 28, 2004

The T e n n e s s e e B o ar d o f E xa mi n e r s in Ps y c h o lo g y r e c e iv e d a c o mp lain t f r o m th e p a ti ent of a psy cholog ist alle gi n g the psy cholog ist breac hed the e thical duty of conf identiality

by disclosing information to the patient’s sister. During the cour se of the inve stigation, the psy cholog ist revea led that he ha d d isc lo sed con fi de nti a l in fo rm a tio n a bo ut the sa me patie nt t o a no the r p sy c ho log ist romantica lly

involved with the patient. The b o ard filed char g es ag ainst the psy cholog ist alleg ing violations of the ethical r

ules g overning confide ntiality and documentation of t hera py
. Following an administrative he aring, t h e b o ard pla ced the psy cholog ist’s license on probation for two y ear s su bje c t to tw o c on dit ion s: (1 ) he c omp le te tw e nty ho ur s of c on tin uin g e du c a tio n tr a ini ng a nd(2 ) h is prac tice be supe rvised during the t wo y ear probationary period by another psy cholog ist. I n addition, the boar d assessed a $1,000.00 civil penalty ag ainst the psy cholog ist. The psy cholog ist appeale d the board’ s decision to the Chance ry Court of Davidson Countywhich af firmed the boa

rd’s de cision. The psy cholog ist appeale d to this C ourt. We aff irm.

Tenn. R. App . P .; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

Erskine P. Mabee , Chattanoog a, TN, f or Appe llant Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter , Sue A. Sheldon, Senior Counsel, Nashville, TN, for Appe lleeF o r p u rp o se s o f this a p p e a l we w ill re fer to the p a tien t b y he r in iti a ls in o rd e r to p ro te c t he r c o n fid e n tiality 1

a n d p riv a c y. -2- OP IN ION

F actual Background and Proc edural History

F re d H . Wrig ht, Ph. D. (“ Ap pe lla nt” or “Dr. Wri g ht” ) h a s b e e n a lic e ns e d p sy c ho log ist pr a c tic ing in the State of Te nn e sse e (the “ State ” ) s inc e Ma y of 19 73 , wit h a

ma jority of his profe ssional car eer spent prac ticing in Chattanoog a, Tenne ssee. Ex cept f or the pre sent ac tion, the State has neve r take n disciplinary action ag ainst Dr. Wrig ht or his license.

Dr . Wrig ht b e g a n tr e a tin g C.W. B

. in 1 97 6 fol lo wi ng he r r e le a se fr om a me nta l he a lth 1 fac ility

. When C.W .B. c ame into Dr. Wrig ht’s car e, she pr esente d mental hea lth problems relate d to depre ssion, suicidal ideation, and violent eruptions ag ainst h er h u s b an d

. During the cour se of treatment, Dr. Wright trie d to meet with C.W .B. on a wee kly basis, bu t t h ei r v i sits were not
c on sis te nt b e c aus e C.W. B . li ve d o uts ide Te nn e sse e . D r. Wri g ht treat ed C. W .B . f ro m 19 76 un til 19 9 7 , ap p r o xi m a t e l y

t w e n t y
- o n e y e ar s , w h i c h h e d e s c r i b e d a s t h e l o n g e s tt h e r ap e u t i c r e l a tio ns hip he eve r had w ith a patient.

I n N ov e mbe r 1 99 7, C.W. B . ab ru ptl y e nd e d he r re la tio ns hip wi th Dr . Wrig ht. Just p ri or to ending their relationship, C.W.B. learned that Dr . Wright re ceive d a telephone call fr om C.W .B.’ s sis te r a sking his op ini on a s to wh e the r C.W. B

. wo uld qu a lif y fo r S oc ia l Se c urity

dis abil ity be ne fi ts. C.W .B. and her sister ha d a re lationship which Dr. Wrig ht describe d as “te rrible, hostile.” D r. Wright conve y ed to C.W.B.’s sister that he f elt C.W

. B. co u l d q ualify for disability

benef its and commented on C.W.B.’s psy cholog ical and phy sical status. Dr. Wright a dmits t hat C.W.B. did not g ive him prior auth oriza tio n to re ve a l to the sis te r that he wa s C.W.B .’ s tre a tin g ps y c ho log ist or to discuss her tre atment with the s i s t er. I n fac t, Dr. Wright r ece ived telephone calls fr om C.W .B.’ s mother during the cour se of tre ating C.W .B., but he ref used to reve al any

information to the mother. Acc ording to Dr. Wright, he felt that, by speaking with C.W .B.’ s s i s t er , he could a meliorate any animositybetwee n them.

Af te r l e arn ing of

Dr . Wrig ht’ s c on ve rs a tio n w ith he r s ist e r, C.W. B . f ile d a c omp la int

a g a ins t Dr . Wrig ht with th e Te nn e sse e B oa rdof Exa min e rs in P sy c ho log y (the “ B oa rd ” ). Du ri ng the c ou rs e of the B oard’ s investigation, Dr. Wright voluntarily disclosed to the investig ator that he had previously

discussed C.W.B. with a fe llow psy cholog ist as well. Appar ently C.W .B. ha d been eng ag ed in a r omantic re lationship with another psy cholog ist, Dr. J im P ruett (“Dr. Pruett”) . Dr. Prue tt c a lle d Dr . Wrig ht anda sk e d, “ I s sh e c apa ble of kil lin g me ? ” Dr . Wr ig ht a ssu re d D r. Prue tt that he did not fee l C.W .B. w as ca pable of murder. During the cour se of the i nvestig ation, the B oard’ s investigator also ar rived at the conclusion that Dr. Wrig ht had fa iled to maintain adequate re co rds on C.W.B. during the cour se of he rT h e T e n n e sse e P sy c h o lo g y P ra c tice A c t p ro v id e s tha t “[a ]ll p ro c e e d ing s fo r d isc ip lina ry a c tio n a g a ins t a 2 l i censee o r cert i f

i ed pe rs o n unde r t hi s chap t er s hal l be co nd uct ed i n acco rdanc e wi t h t he U ni fo rm A d m i ni stra ti ve P r ocedur es Act , comp i l ed i n t i t l e 4, ch apt er 5. ” T E NN

. C O D E A NN . § 6 3 -1 1 -2 1 6 (2 0 0 3 ).
-3- treatment. On May

2, 2002, the Tenne ssee De partment of H ealth (the “De partment” ) filed a Notice of Charg es and Me morandum for Assessment of Civil Penalties ag ainst Dr. Wrig ht. Th eD e p a r tme nt a lle g e d tha t Dr. Wri g ht’ s con du c t con sti tut e d viol a tio ns of the Te nn e sse e Psy c ho log y Pr a c tic e Ac t, codified at sectio n 6 3 -11-101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code, as we ll as specific rules g overning confide ntiality

. On Aug ust 7, 2002, the Boa rd conduct ed a he aring pursuant to the Te nnessee Uniform Admin i s t ra tive Procedur es Ac t (“UA PA”), c odified at sec tion 4-5-101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code. Dr. Wrig ht appea red be fo re t h e B oard pr

o s e . At the administrative hea ring , Dr. Wrig ht 2 fre ely admitted that, by

speaking with the sister and fe llow psy cholog ist reg arding C.W .B., he b re ached the ethica l rules g overning psy cholog ist/patient confidentiality . I n addition, Dr. Wright fre ely admitted that he failed to satisfy the re quirements in the psy cho l o gy profe ssion reg arding do c u m e n t a t i o n o f

t h e r ap y i n t h e c a s e o f

C

. W

. B

. I n f

a c t , D r
. W r i g h ta l s o s t a t e d t h a th e p r e se ntl y tr e a ts thirty -f

ive to f orty patie nts , an d he a dmi tte d tha t, ove r the pa st twe nty -o ne y e ars , h e faile d to adequately

document their the rapy

as we ll.

At the c on c lus ionof

the a dmi nis tr a tiv e he ari ng , th e B oa rdiss ue d a n ord er co ntaini ng its finding s of fac t, c onclusions of law, and policy statement. The Boa rd’s order contained, in releva nt pa rt , th e fo llo wi ng sa nc tio ns :

1. Re sp on de nt’ s li c e ns e to pr a c tic e a s a psy c ho log ist in the Sta te of Tenne ssee is he reby

place d on PROBATI ON for a period of two ( 2 ) y ear s, subject to the following terms and
c on dit ion s: (a) Supervision. Within thirty (30) day s from the date of the entry of this O rd er, Respondent must provide to a represe ntative of the B oard the name and curriculum vitae of a supervising psy cholog ist (“Supervisor” ). . . . Th e Su p e r v is o rs h a ll mo n itor Re spon de nt’ s p ra c tic e wi th r e sp e c t to documentation pra ctices a nd ethical decision
makin g . A ny

a nda ll c os ts r e la tin g to this supervision shall be the sole responsibility of the Re sp on de nt. Respondent shall submit or cause to be submitt ed reports from the Supervisor reg arding Respondent’s performanc e by J une 30th and Decembe r 31st of ea ch y ear . Fa ilureT he cha nce l l or e nt er ed an order on N ovemb er 21, 200 2, pur s uan t t o s ect i on 4

- 5- 32 2(c) o f t he T enn es s ee C od e, 3
st ayi ng t he B o ard’s d eci si o n as t o t he p rob at i o n o f D r. W ri ght ’ s l i cense, t he supervi si o n o f D r. W ri ght ’ s p ract i ce, and t he $ 1 , 0 0 0

. 0 0 c i vi l p enal t y
. F o l l o wi ng t he i ss uance o f t he chancery co urt ’ s o rder, D r. W ri ght f i l ed a m o t i o n, pursuant t o R ule 6 2 o f

t he T en ne ssee R ules o f C i vil P ro ce d ure , ask i ng t he ch an ce l l o r t o st ay en fo rce m en t o f t he B o ard ’ s sanc t i o ns. D es pi t e t h e B oar d’ s obj ec t i on , t h e ch an ce r y cou r t en t er ed an or der con t i n u i n g t h e s t ay f r om i t s pr i or rul i ng wi t h t he
co nd i t i o n t ha t D r. W right p o st a b o nd in t he a m o un t o f $ 1 ,00 0 .00 to b e fo rfeit ed i n the e ve nt o f f uture ethical violati o ns. T he chancery co urt did no t s t ay t he requir em ent t hat D r. W ri ght c o m p l et e t wenty ho urs of co nt i nui ng ed ucat i o n. A t t he tim e this c a se w a s h e a rd o n a p p e a l, D r. W rig h t ha d c o m p le te d the c o n tinu ing e d u c a tio n re q u ire m e n t.
-4- to submit or have such re ports submitt ed in a timely manner shall be consider ed a violation of this Order

.

. . . . The for eg oing r equirement for
su pe rv isi on of

Re sp on de nt’ s p ra c tic e sh a ll
rema in in effe ct for the duration of the pr ob a tio na

ry pe ri odof tw o (2 ) y e a

rs un de r this Orde r. (b) Continui ng education. W ithin the two (2) y e ar p ro batio na

ry pe ri od , Re sp on de nt s ha ll complete twe nty

(20) hour s of cont inuing education in the area s o f ethics a nd pr of e ssi on a l r isk

ma na g e me nt.
2. Re sp on de nt i s h e re by Or dered t o p a y

tw o ( 2) Ty

pe B Civ il Penalties in the amount o f Five Hundre d Dollars ($500.00) , for a tota l of

On e Th ou sa ndDo lla

rs ($ 1, 00 0. 00 ) i n c ivi l penalties, representing two ( 2) violations of the Tenne ssee Psy cholog y

Pr ac t i ce A ct or re g ulations or both in such a
manner as to i m p act directly

on the ca

re of patients or the public. . . . Dr. Wrig ht subsequently

filed, pursua nt to section 4-5-322 of the Tenne ss ee C ode, a Petition for Review a nd for Stay

of F inal Orde r in the Chance ry Court of Davidson County

. Dr. Wrig ht alleg ed 3 that the B oard violate d section 4-5- 322(h)( 3) throug h (5) of the T en n es s ee Code by

rende ring an arbitra ry and ca pricious dec ision not supported by t h e evidence, as w ell as sec tion 4-5-314 of the Tenne ssee Code by

failing to make spec ific findings of fact, failing to set forth spe cific c onclusions of law, and failing to identify an indepe ndent policy rea son for both. O n May 12, 2003, the cha ncery court issued a

Memorandum Opinion, which it later incorporated i nto a Final Orde r, af firming the decision of the B oard.

Dr. Wright, pursuant to section 4-5-323( a) of the Tenne ssee Code, a

ppeale d the dec ision of the cha ncery

court to this Court, presenting the follow issues, as we perc eive them, f or our r eview:-5-

I

. Whether the Te n n es s ee Boa rd of Examiners in Psy cholog y rende red an arbitra

ry and capricious decision, cha

rac terized by

an abuse of discre tion , b y handing down sanc tions
a g a i n s t D r
. W r i g h t t h a t w e r e c l e ar l y e xc e s s i v e g i v e n h i s u n b l e m i s h e d r e c or d a s a psy cholog ist practicing in the State of Tenne ssee; I I

. Whe the r the de c isi on re a c he d b y the Te nn e sse e B oa

rdof Exa min e rs in P sy cho log y is supported by

substantial and material evidenc e g iven that the patient did not testify at the hearing, and the admini strative panel did not adequately discuss the fac tors set forth in Tenn. Comp. R. & Re g . 1 18 0- 1- .1 0 ( 20 02 ); I I I

. Whether the Te nnessee Boa rd of Examiners in Psy cholog y failed to a dequate ly

identify independe nt policy

rea sons for it s finding s of fact and conclusions of law and the sanc tions imposed ag ainst Dr. Wrig ht; and I V. Whether the proc eeding s befor e the a dminist rative pa nel wer e unlawf ul b ec au s e a portion of the proc eeding s was held outside the pr esenc e of D r. Wright a nd was not re corde d.

For the re asons set forth here in, we af firm.
Stand ard of Review

“The scope of

revie w in the trial court of an order of an administrative ag ency is defined in [ section 4-5- 322(h) of

the Tenne ssee Code],” Metro. Gov ’t of Nashville & Davidson County v. Sh ac k le tt , 5 54 S.W. 2d60 1, 60 4 ( Te nn . 1 97 7) , w hic h p ro vid e s:

(h) The court may

aff irm the dec ision of the ag ency or re mand the
case for further proce eding s. The court may reve rse or m o d i fy t he de c isi on if

the ri g hts of the pe tit ion e r h a ve be e n p re jud ic e d b e c a us e the administrative finding s, infere nces, c onclusions or dec isions are: (1) I n v io lati o n o f

c o n s ti tu ti o n a l o r

s tatu to ry pr ov isi on s; ( 2 ) In e x c e s s o f t h e s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y o f t h e a g e n c y; (3) Ma de upon unlawf

ul proce dure; (4 ) A rb itr ary or

c apric iou s o r c ha

ra c te ri zedby

abu se of d is c r e ti o n o r c le ar ly u n w arr a n te d e xe r c is e of discretion; or (5) Unsupported by

evidenc e which is both subst an ti al and material in the light of the entire r ecor d. I n de te rm ini ng the su bs ta nti a lit y of e vid e nc e , th e c ou rt

sh a ll t ake int o acc ount whateve r i n the record f airly detra cts from its weig ht, but the court shall not substitute its judgme nt for that of the ag ency as to the weig ht of the evide nce on que stions of fact.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322( h) (2003). The statute makes clear that judicial revie w of the ag ency ’s de c isi on is n ot de novo in the chanc ery court. Sh ac k le tt , 554 S.W .2d at 604. The scope of re view in this Cou rt

is the sa me a s in the c ha nc e ry c ou rt , an d w e mus t r e vie w the c a se un de r the sa me-6-

statutory criteria. Humana of T

enn. v. Tenn. H

ealth Facilities Comm’n , 551 S.W .2d 664, 668 (Tenn. 1977); see also Mosleyv. Tenn. De p’t of Commerc e and Ins ., No. M2003-01998-COA- R3-CV, 2004 Te nn . A pp . L

EX I S 78 4, a t *1 9 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . N ov . 2 2, 20 04 ) ( c itatio n o mit te d) ; Estate of Street v. State Bd. of Equalization , 812 S.W .2d 583, 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (c itations omi tted). “O ur revie w of a

trial court’ s decision with respe ct to ag ency finding s is essentially

a dete rmination of whether the trial court corre ctly

applied the standard of revie w s et forth [i n section 4-5- 322(h) of the T e n n e s s e eCo d e].” W

ilson v. Univ. of Tenn. at Chattanooga , No. M2000-02573-COA- R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 942, at *10–11 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 28, 2001).
The Board’s Selection of S anctions Agains t Dr . Wright We beg in with Dr. Wright’s a rg ument that t h e s an ct ions imposed by the B oard a

re arbitra ry and capricious, as well as clea rly excessive, i n light of the fac ts presente d to the Boa rd. Dr. Wright points to his more than forty y ear s of profe ssional pr actice without a disciplinary infrac tion related to confide ntialityuntil C .W.B. filed the c omplaint at issu e with the B oard. D r. Wright char acte rizes his breac h of conf identiality

in reg ard to C. W

. B. ’s s i s t er as a “spur of the moment response ” that wa s “mea nt to allay some of the fea

rs and a nimosit y

of the familysituation.” At the he ari ng be fo re the B oa

rd , D r. Wri g ht r e a dil y

a dmi tte d to the tw o b re a c he s o f c on fide nti a lit y reg arding C.W .B., but on a ppeal he contends that the s an cti ons imposed by the B oard a

re not wa rr a nte d g ive n the fo llo wi ng fa c ts: (1 ) the re ha s bee n n o s ho wi ng of c on tin uo us e thi c a l vi olatio ns , (2) ther e is no his tory

of sustained c omplaints for similar violations, (3) there is no evidence that such conduct will continue in the future, and (4) since the violations occurr ed in 1997, there have been no subse quent ethica l violations of any kind.

I n re vie wi ng the B oa

rd ’s de c isi on , th is C ou rt

“ sh all no t substitut e its judg ment for that of the ag ency as to the we ight of

the evidenc e on questions of fa ct.” Te n n
. Code Ann. § 4-5-322( h)(5) (2 00 3) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . H ow e ve r, “ a g e nc y de c isi on s wi th a de qu a te e vid e nti ary su pp ort may

sti ll be arbitrary and capricious if cause d by a cle ar e rror

in judgment.” Jack

son Mobilphone Co., Inc. v. Tenn. Pub. Se rv. Comm’n , 876 S.W .2d 106, 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). In determining whe ther the B oa rd ’s de c isi on in this c a se wa s “ arb itr ary a ndc apric iou s, ” we are min df ul that:
A re viewing court should n o t applyTenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5- 322(h)( 4)' s "a

rbitrary and capricious" standar d of re view
me c ha nic a lly . In its br oa de st se ns e , the stand ardre qu ir e s th e c ou rt to determine whether

the admini strative age ncy has m ade a clea r er ror in judgment. American P aper Inst. v. Am er i can Elec . Power Serv. Cor p ., 461 U.S. 402, 413, 103 S.C t. 1921, 1 9 2 8 , 76 L .Ed.2d 22 (1 98 3) ; Citi zens to Preserv e Ov erton Park, Inc . v. Volpe , 4 01 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct . 814, 823-24, 28 L .Ed.2d 136 (1971). An a rbitrary decision is one that is not based on any course of re asoning or exercise of

judgme nt, S ta t e ex

r e l

. N i x o n v
. M c C a nle ss , 176 Tenn. 352, 354, 141 S.W .2d 885, 886 (1940), or one that disreg ards the fac ts or circ umstances of the case wit hout some basis that would lead-7- a reasonable person to re ach the same c onclusion. W agner v. City of Omaha , 2 36 Ne b. 84 3, 46 4 N .W. 2d17 5, 18 0 ( 19 91 ); Ramsey v. Departme nt of Human Servs

. , 3 0 1 A rk

. 2 8 5 , 7 8 3 S. W. 2 d 3 6 1 , 364 (1990). Id . at 110–11.

The B oard c oncluded that Dr . Wright violated sect i o n 63-11-215( b)(1) of the Te nnessee Code by eng ag ing in “ unprofe ssional, dishonorable, and unethical c onduct.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 63- 11-215(b) (1 ) (2 0 03). I n addition, the Boa rd found that Dr . Wright violated the f ollowing e thical
ru le s g ov e rn ing the ps y c ho log y pr of e ssi on : (1 ) Ge ne ra l Sta nd ard s. Th e se g e ne ra l st a nd ard s a re app lic able to the profe ssiona l an d scientific a ctivities of all licensee s or c e rt if ic a te ho lde rs
.

. . . . (w ) Do c ume ntatio n of pr of e ssi on a l andsc ie nti fi c work. 1

. L icense es o r c er t i fi ca t e h o l ders
app ro pria te ly

do c ume nt the ir pr of e ssi on a l a nd sc ie nti fi c wo rk in o rd e r t o f

a c ili ta te provi sions of service s later by the m or by oth e r p ro fe ssi on a ls, to e ns ur e a c c ou nta

bil ity a ndto meet other requirements of instit utions or the law.

. . . . (4 ) Pr iva c y

a ndc on fi den ti ality . T he se stand ard s a re po te nti a lly
app lic able to the pr of

e ssi on a l a ndsc ie nti fi c a c tiv iti e s o f a ll lic e ns e e s a ndc e rt if

ic a te ho lde rs
.

. . . . ( b ) Ma in tain ing c onfidentiality . L icense es or certificate holde rs have a primary obligation and take rea sonable precautions to respec t the confide ntialityrig hts of those with whom they work or c on s u lt , r e c o g n izing that confide ntialitymay

be e stablished by

law, ins tituti on a l ru le s or pr of

e ssi on a l or

sc ie nti fi c relationships. Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg . 1180-1-.09 ( 2002).-8-

This Court ex tends substantial defe renc e to the sele ction of an a ppropriate sanction by

an ag ency char g ed with the re g ulation of profe ssional conduct. Se e Mc Cle lla n v . B d. of R e ge nts of S tate Un iv ., 92 1 S. W.2 d 6 84 , 6 93 (T e nn
. 19 96 ) (s ta tin g that “ [t]he app ro pria te re me dy is p e c uli arl y

wi thi n the dis c re tio n o f the [ag e nc y ]”) . T he le g isl a tur e ve ste d th e B oa rdwi th the po we r t o: (1 ) D e ny a n a pp lic a tio n f

or a lic e ns e or

c e rt if ic a te to any

app lic a nt; (2) Permanently

or tempora

rily withhold iss u an ce of

a license or certificate; (3 ) S us pe nd , li mit

or re stric t a pr e vio us ly

iss ue d li c e ns e or

c e rt if ic a te for suc h time and in such a ma nner a s the board may determine; (4) R ep ri mand or take such ac tion in relation to disciplini ng an applicant or

licensee or certified person a s the board in its discre tion may deem pr oper; or (5) Permanently

revoke a license or ce rtificate

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-11-215(a ) (2003) . The scope of our r eview of the sanc tions selected by the B oa rdin this c a se c a n b e state d a s f oll ow s: The g ener al rule that the courts will not ordinarily revie w the
e xer c ise of dis c re tio n e ntr us te d to a dmi nis tr a tiv e bo die s a pp lie s w ith respe ct to various dis cre tionary acts of administrative bodies, such a s in c on ne c tio n w ithlic e ns e s, pe rm its , o r c e rt if ic a te s. J udicial re view of the imposit ion of sanctions, including the assessment o f p enalties, by an administrative a g ency exercising discretionary

power , extends, a nd is limited to, the determination of whether there has bee n an abuse of discretion, and whether the ag ency has made an allowa

ble judg ment in its choic e of reme dy

. The c ourt ma y no t in te rf e re wi th the sa nc tio n or pe na lty , or s e t it a sid e , u nle ss there has bee n an abuse of discre tion, it i s unwarran t ed i n l aw or wi tho ut ju st if

ic a tio n in fa c t, o r the pe na lty is s o c le arl y disproportionate to the off ense or completely inequitable in t he lig ht of t h e s u rrounding circ umstances a s to constitute an abuse of discretion, or be shocking to the sense of fairne ss. Since it is t he responsibilityof the a g ency and not of the court to impos e a sanction
or asse ss a penalty , the court should not substitut e anothe r one f or that imposed by

the ag ency

which is within the all owable limits of the statute.
73 A C .J.S. Public Administrati ve Law and Proce dure § 4 17 (2 00 4) ; see also W oodard v. U.S. , 725 F.2d 1072, 1077 ( 6th Cir. 1984).

At the close of

the admini strative hearing , the Board eng ag ed in a lengthy discussion of the
app ro pria te pe na lty

fo r D r. Wri g ht’ s c on du c t, p art ic ula rl y re g ard ing the fo rm of su pe rv isi on to-9-

impose upon Dr. Wrig ht. I t is true, as Dr. Wrig ht points out , that during their deliber ations one of the B oard me mbers noted the isolated nature of the alleg ed violations. However , the B oard me mbers also expressed concerns over the se riousness of the e thical bre ache s and the a ppare nt inabilityon Dr. Wrig ht’s part to r ecog nize a ppropriate profe ssional bounda ries with his patients. Some board members did not fee l the breache s of confidentiality wer e “spur of t he moment incidenc es,” and they questioned Dr. Wrig ht’s ap p ro ach to the confidentiality and docume ntation rules g overning the profe ssion. Rega

rding d o cu m en tation of thera py sessions, Dr. Wright a cknowledg ed that the purpose be hind the documentation rule is to a llow another psy cholog ist to pi ck up a patient’s thera py wh e re he le ft

of f i n th e e ve nt h e c ou ld n o lo ng e r c on ti nu e the ra py . H ow e ve r, Dr . Wrig ht f re e ly admitted at the hea

ring to only

taking four pa g es of notes over the twenty -one y ear period he treated C.W .B. In additio n , Dr

. W ri g ht admitted that he inadequately documented the prog ression of thera py for his other patients as well, stating that felt he kne w them well enoug h. One boa rd member expressed conc erns that these statements by Dr. Wri gh t ev i d ence d a re curring pr oblem indicating that perha ps Dr. Wrig ht did not understand the nee d for pr oper doc umentati o n of thera py . After revie wing the re cord, w e cannot say that the Boa

rd’s c hoice of

sanctions was a

rbitrary and ca pricious or outside the rang e of a cce ptable sanc tions under section 63-11-215( a) of the Tennessee Code f or conduct of

this nature. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the c hance ry court’s r uling in that re g ard.

The Board’s Assessm ent of a Monetary P enalty
Next, Dr

. W ri gh t arg ues that the B oard’ s decision re g arding the monetary penalties is not
s u p p o rt ed b y

s u b s t an t i al an d m at er i al ev i d e n c e
. T h e ge n er al ru l es go v er n i n g t h e p s y ch o l o gy pr of e ssi on pr ov ide , inre le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
I n assessing the civil penalties pursuant to these rule s the Boa rd may
c on sid e r the fo llo wi ng fa c tor s: (i ) Whe the r the a mou nt i mpo se d w ill be a su bs ta nti a l e c on omi c deter rent to the violator; (i i) Th e c ir c ums ta nc e s le a din g to the vio la tio n; (iii) The seve rity

of t h e violation and the risk of ha rm to the public; (iv) The e con o m ic bene fits gained by the violator as a

result of non-complianc e; and (v) The intere st of the public.

Te nn . Co mp. R. & Re g . 1 18 0- 1- .1 0( 3) (d ) ( 20 02 ). I n s up po rt of his po sit ion , D r. Wri g ht p oin ts t o the abse nce of

any testimonyby

C.W .B. at the hearing r eg arding harm c aused to he r per sonally by his actions, discussion by some of the Boa

rd m ember s during their deliberations about t he lack of such proof

, an d t he discussion by

the B oard me mbers during deliberations concerning w here the money paid by Dr. Wrig ht would eventually end up.

Th e B oa rd , p ur su a nt t o s e c tio n 6 3- 1- 13 4 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e , “ ma y a sse ss a c ivi l pe na lty
a g a ins t [a lic e ns e e ] in a n a mou nt n ot t o e xce e d o ne tho us a nddo lla rs ($ 1, 00 0) for eac h s e pa rate-10-

violation of a statute, rule or orde r pertaining to suc h board, commission or ag ency .” Tenn. Code An n. § 6 3- 1- 13 4( a ) ( 20 03 ). Th is p e na lty sh a ll b e a sse sse d inaccor dan c e wi th the sc he du le established by

the B oard. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-134( b) (2003). The sche dule provides that the Boa rd may impose a “Ty

pe B ” civil pena lty

“whe never

the B oard f

inds t h e p er s o n require d to be lic e ns e d .

. . is g uil ty

of a vio la tio n o f the Psy c ho log y Ac t or ru le s p ro mul g a te d p ur su a nt the re to i n s u ch a m an n eras t o i m p ac td i re ct l y o n t h e c ar e o f p at i en t s o r t h e p u b l i c. ” T en n
. C o m p
. R

. & R eg. 1180-1-.10( 3)(b) (2002). “‘Ty pe B’ civil pe nalties may be assessed in the amount of not less than
o n e h u n d re d d o l l ar s ($ 1 0 0 ) n o r m o re t h an fi v e h u n d re d d o l l ar s ($ 5 0 0 ). ” T en n
. C o m p
. R

. & R eg. 1180-1-.10( 3)(c ) (2002)

. I n determining whe ther ther e existed substantial and mate ria l e v id e n c eto support the B oard’ s de c isi on , w e are min df

ul that: [A] revie wing court should not apply T en n
. C ode Ann. § 4

- 5

- 3 2 2 ( h ) ( 5 ) ' s " s u b s t a n t i a l a n d m a t e r i a l e v i d e n c e " t e s t m e c h an i c a l l y. I nstead, the c ourt should review th e re cord c are fully to determine whether the administr at i v e ag ency ' s decision is supported by "suc h rele vant evidenc e as a

rational mind might acc ept to support a rational
con clu si on ." Clay County Mano r v. State De p't of Health & Environment , 8 4 9 S

. W

. 2 d 7 5 5 , 7 5 9 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 3 ); Southern Ry. v

. State Bd. of Equalizati on , 682 S

. W

. 2 d 196, 199 (Tenn. 1984) . The court ne ed n o t rewe igh the evidenc e, Humana of Tennessee v. Te n n e s s e e H

e a lt h F a c il it ie s Com m 'n , 551 S.W .2d 664, 667 (Tenn. 1 9 7 7 ) , a n d t h e a g e n c y' s d e c i s i o n n e e d n o tb e s u p p o r t e d b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Street v. S t ate Bd. of Equalization , 812 S.W .2d 583, 585 (Tenn.A pp. 1 9 9 0 ). The evidence will be suffic i en t i f i t furnishes a r easona bly sound fac tual basis for the d ec i sion being revie wed. W ay n e C o u n t

y v
. T e n n e s s e e S o l i d

W as te Disposal Cont rol Bd. , 756 S.W .2d 274, 279 (Tenn.A pp. 1988).

J a c k s o n M o b il p h o n e Co

. , I

n c
. v
. Te n n
. P u b

. S e r

v
. Co m m 'n , 876 S.W .2d 106, 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

At the outset, we note that the Boa rd, during its deliberations, orig inally considere d assessing a $2,000.00 pena lty ag ainst Dr. Wright. The applicable rule at issue in this case mere ly states that t he boar d “ may consider the following fac tors.” See T e n n
. Co mp
. R. & Re g
. 1 1 8 0

- 1

- . 1 0 ( 3 ) (d)3 (2 00 2) (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e re c or d of the he ari ng be fo re the B oa rddo e s r e ve a l th a t, d uring the ir deliberations, some Boar d Members e x presse d a re luctance to assess a c ivil penalt y . Howeve r, during this discussion t he B oard me mbers also we nt throug h every fac tor listed in the applicable r ule. Despite their initi al reluc tance , the Board members reache d a consensus in assessing two Ty pe B civil penalties ag ainst Dr. W rig ht in the amount of $500.00 eac h. Reg arding the l ack of testimony by C.W .B., w e note that the a pplicabl e ru l e d o es not list harm to a patient as a fa ctor for consideration. See T en n
. C omp. R. & Reg . 1180-1-.10( 3)(d) 3 (2002). Eve n if such harm were a-11-

fac tor to be consider ed whe n assessing a civil pe nalty , we f ind that Dr. Wright pr esente d sufficie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt

a fi ne wh e n h e te sti fi e d a s f oll ow s: Q. You would ag ree with me that brea ching confide ntialityfor one of y our patients that send t hem i nto a ra g e for two y ear s wo uldqu a lif

y a s h arm ; w ou ld y ou no t? A. Ye s. Th a t w a s a

mis take in j ud g me nt o n my pa rt

.

. . . . Q. I n t h i s l etter — . . . In this first parag raph y ou appea r to be discussing the brea ch of c onfidentiality with the sister. And the last sentenc e of t h i s para g raph say s: “I still don’t know what is so infuriating about that or what harm wa s done.” A. An d I st ill do n’ t kn ow . I f any bo dy kn ow s, ple a se te ll m e be c aus e I c a n’ t im a g ine — I

ha ve ha d a lmo st f

ive y e ars to think about this — and I still can’ t imagine any harm that wa s done other

than I admit, c erta inly , to the patient but not, vis-avis the wider world.

. . . . Q. And y ou’re looking f orwa rd to the fee dback, but y ou believe that these off

enses that we ’re about today are benig n, and y ou sti ll b e lie ve that? A. Vis-a- vis the wider world. I t certainly was not benig n to the patie nt f or wh ic h I de e ply re g re t.

Ba sed upon our r eview of the administrative rec ord, we a ffirm the c hance ry court’s de termination that there exis ted substantial and material evidenc e to support the B oard’ s assessment of a monetary penalty ag ainst Dr. Wrig ht.

P olicy Reasons for the Board’s Dec ision

In h i s t h i r d i s s u e , D r
. W r i g h tc o n t e n d s t h a tt h e B o ar d , i n i t s h a s t e t o d e p ar tf o r t h e d a y, me rel y mad e a pe rf

un c tor y re c itatio n o f a

bo ile rp la te po lic y

jus tif ic a tio n f or its de c isi on wh e n it stated:

Dr

. Whe la n: Ab ste nti on s, wh ic h I a ssu me the re ’s no t. Th e C ha ir wi l l v o te for the motion meaning that the motion
car ries. S o they are the penalties. Then the final point is the policy or the justification f or taking this action,
a nd I wi ll sta te the po lic y of the B oa rd . We take thi s action in orde r to promote the pr otection of the citizens of Tenn essee . And I believe now we a

re conclude d with our business in this case.-12-

Dr . Wr ig ht a

rg ue s th a t th is d e mon st rate s th e B oa rd ’s failu re to c on sid e r the se ri ou sn e ss o f the ir fi nd ing s a ndc on sti tut e s a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e that th e a c tio ns o f th eB oa rdare arb itr ary

a ndc apric iou s.

Se c tio n 4 -5 -3 14 (c ) o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e re qu ires an agency re nd e ri ng a

fi na l or de r t o include a policy

justification in the order f or the a ction taken. Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-5-314( c) ( 2003). “‘Policy rea sons’ are not findings of fac t, but statements of the rea sons f or the ac tion taken by

the Boa rd as a result of the f

acts a s found.” Sla tto n v. Te nn . S tat e Bd . o f A rc hit e c tur

al & En g’ g E

x am ’r s , No. 88-48-II , 1988 Tenn. App. L EXI S 452, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 20, 1988). “The purpose of section 4-5- 314(c) is to enable the trier of fac t to determine the ba sis for which the a dminist rative ag ency rea ched its dec ision, th er eb y safe g uarding ag ainst arbitra ry or untena

ble conc lusions.” Southwest Motor Freight, Inc. v. D ep’t of C o mm er ce & Ins ., No. 01A01-9403- CH-00119, 1994 Tenn. App. LEX I S 7 4 2 , at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 16, 1994). “ The for eg oing is not a me re technica lity but is an absolute nece ssity without whic h judicial revie w would be impossibl e.” Levy v. Stat e Bd. of Examine rs for Speec h Pathology & Audiology , 553 S.W .2d 909, 911 (Tenn. 1977) ; see also CF Indus. v. Tenn. P ub. Serv. Comm’ n , 599 S.W .2d 536, 541 (Tenn. 1980)

. I n this case we are not dealing with the absenc e of a policy j u s t i fication for an a g ency ’s decision but whethe r the policy justification g iven i s adequate under the statute. I n the final orde r, the B oa rdpr ov ide d th e fo llo wi ng po lic y jus tif ic a tio n: “ Th e Te nn e sse e B oa rdof Ex a min e rs in Psy cholog y

makes this decision and ta kes this a ction in or der to e nforc e the statutory laws and r

ules g overning the profe ssional prac tice of Psy cholog y in the State of Tenne ssee a nd in order to pr otect the he a lth , s a fe ty

a ndwe lf are of the c iti zen s of the State of Te nn e sse e .” Th e app lic able statut e on ly require s that the administrative ag ency include its policy

rea sons in the order, and we f ind nothing in the stat u t e re q u i ri n g a policy statement to take a

particula r form. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5- 31 4( c ) ( 20 03 ). I n f

a c t, this Cou rt

ha s st a te d th a t:

I t is no t impr op e r f

or e ith e r pa

rt y or c ou ns e l f

or e ith e r p art y

to sug g est or eve n urg e upon an a dminist rative a g ency t h e merits of a particula r policy or re asons why

a particular decision should be made

. I f the sug g estion is a cce pted, it be comes a part of the decision of the B o ar d

. I f co rr ec t , i t i s n o t re n d er ed i n co rr ec t b y i t s o ri g i n
. If incorre ct and not acc epted, its offe r does not invalidate the decision if oth e rw ise c or

re c t.
Slatton , 1988 Tenn. App. L EXI S 452, at *6–7.

Our re view of the administrative rec ord reve als the policy statement made by

the B oard w as more than a

perf unctory boilerplate state ment as s u g g ested by Dr. Wrig ht. The re cord c ontains
se ve ra l in sta nc e s w he re the B oa rdme mbe rs dis c us se d th e ne e d to se nda c le ar m e ssa g e to p ra ct i t i o n er s an d t h e p u b l i c t h atm a i n t a i n i n g co n fi d en t i al i t y i s i m p o rt an ti n t h e p s y ch o l o gy profe ssion. I n discussing the need for supervision, the Boa rd also mentioned the ne ed to protec t the-13-

public from future violations by Dr

. W ri gh t

. We affirm the chanc ellor’s finding that the B oard’ s policy justification complied with section 4-5-314( c) of the Tenne ssee Code.

Ex P ar teCo m m unic at ion s
In h i s fi n al i s s u e, Dr

. W ri gh tco n t en d s t h e a d m i n i s tra t i v e r ec o rd re v ea l s t h at , d u ri n g a brea k in the Boa

rd’s de liberations, the administrative law judge had an ex parte c on ve rs a tio n w ith
on e of the B oa rdme mbe rs . D r. Wri g ht c on te nd s th is ex parte comm u n i ca t i o n v i o l at ed t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1 ) s ec t i o n 4 -5 -3 0 4 (a ) o f t h e T en n es s ee C o d e p ro h i b i t i n g ex parte c ommun ic a tio ns in c on te ste d c a se hearings; (2) the admini strative law judg e’s own instruc tion to the Boar d prior to deliber ating ; (3)
se c tio n 8-4 4- 10 4( a ) of the Te nn e sse e Cod e re qu ir ing the me e tin g of a g ov e rn me nt bod y to be fu lly
rec orded; a nd (4) se ction 4-5-319( c) of the Tenne ssee Code requiring a rec ord to be made of all oral proce eding s befor e an a dminist rative a g ency . Acc ording ly , Dr. Wright urg es this Court to declare the B oard’ s final orde r void and of no e ffe ct pursuant to se ction 8-44-105 of the Tenne ssee Code.

The UA PA require s an ag ency conducting a conte sted ca se hearing to maintain a n officia l
rec ord of the e ntire proc eeding s conducte d befor e the a dminist rative body , which s h al l consist of “matter s place d on the re cord a fter an ex parte communication.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5-319(b) (11) (2 00 3) . T he UA PA a lso e xpre ssl y state s th a t:
Unless re quired for

the disposition of ex p a rte ma tte rs sp e c if ic a lly authorized by

sta tute, an administrative judg e, hea ring office r or ag ency member se rving in a conteste d case proce eding m ay not communicate , direc tly

or indirec tly , reg arding any issue in the proce eding , while the proc eeding is pending , with any person without notice and opportunityfor a ll parties to participate in the communication.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-304( a) ( 2003). “The hear ing sha ll be open to public observation pursuant to the provisions of title 8, chapter 44, unless otherwise pr ovided by state or f eder al law.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5- 312(d) (2003). Once a petition for judicial r eview of the ag ency ’s dec ision is fil ed, the age ncy “shall t ransmit to the re viewing court the origina l or a c ertified c opy of the entire rec ord of the proc eeding s under r eview.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5-322(d) (2003) ( emphasis adde d).

T h e administrative r ecor d does not support Dr. Wrig ht’s conclusion that an ex pa rte communication occurre d during the Board’ s deliberations. During the cour se of the de liberations the following exchang e occ urre d:

D r
. W h e l a n : I thi nk we ’r e — whi le m a y b e n o ti n a g re e me nt, th ere’ s u nd e rs ta nd ing . A ndit’ s y ou r m oti on to chang e or dr op i t . Someone else c an make a motion if they like. We do need to g o b ac k an d v isit one other part of it, a nd I

might ask f

or some cla

rification-14- here . The orig inal proposal — motion was for a re prima nd , a ndI be lie ve that a re prima ndis j us t something that’s written as oppose d to probation, wh i c h i s w h e r e w e ’ r e t ak i n g s o m e a c t i o n
. Am I
c or re c t on that? So thi s wo uld be a pr ob a tio n, no t a reprimand. The Court: What y ou’re say ing is probationary , the things — that

we ne ed to put him under g uidance and counse ling
a ndsu pervisio n. Th a t is pr ob a tio na ry a s o pp os e d to
a re primand. Dr . Fre e ma n: Wel l, w e c ou ld i ssu e a re prima nd a nd pu t his lic e ns e on probation. Dr. Whelan: Can y ou wait — Ms. King: Are we a lmost t hroug h? Dr. Whelan: Yeah, I mean, just for — the J udg e is g oing to g ive us

some information — T h e C o u r t : O k a y. W h a tw a s yo u r q u e s t i o n ? I’ ms o rr y. Dr. Whelan: Oh, I

thought y ou wer e about to s ay s o m et hing. A board me mber ne eds to take a brief br eak. Th e Cou rt : Y

ou need to clarify that on your reprimand versus the other

. There ’s also may

be a point of que stion on y our fines and pe nalties — I

don’t know whe ther it matters to y ou, but the money may g o into y our — I think the money g oes i n t o y our budg et. It doesn’t g o into the g ener al fund. Dr. Whelan: Okay

. On that point, let’s take a brief brea k for boa rd members to — board members, let’s take a maxi mum of te n mi nu te s so we c a n c ome ba c k a ndtry to f ini sh this up. (B rea k in proce eding s.) Dr. Whelan: Th e ju d

g e in fo r m e d u s th a t, in fa c t, we need to be probation rather than reprimand

. Correc t me if I ’m
wr on g
. W e ’ r e t a l k i n g ab o u t a p r o b a t i o n h e r e , n o t a re prima nd . So on e of

the thi ng s a

bo ut the motio n is that it needs to be a

bout probation to do these other things. . . .

As a g e ne ra l matte r, “ [t]he pa

rty c la imi ng bia s a s a

re su lt o f e x part e c ommun ic a tio ns mus t prove both the e x istence and content of the alleg ed communication, and the rec ord may neg ate a ny cl ai m that the communication cr eate d undue bias in the de cisionmaker.” 73 C.J .S. Pu bli c Administrati ve Law and Procedure § 127 (2004). Our revie w of the rec ord does not lead us to draw the same infe renc e urg ed upon this Court by Dr

. W ri g ht. See A rk. Appraiser Licensing & Certification Bd. v. Fletc her , 933 S.W. 2d 78 9, 79 2 (A rk . 199 6) . To the c on tr ary , th e re c or d r e ve a ls-15-

t h att h e B o ar d m em b er s m er el y t o o k u p t h e s am e t o p i c m en t i o n ed b y t h e a d m i n i s tra t i v e l aw j u d ge prior to the bre ak in their de liberations. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the c hance ry court’s f inding that there wer e no ex parte communications during the administrative proc eeding befor e the B oard.
Conclusion

For

the re asons containe d here in, we af firm the dec isions of the chancer ycourt a nd the Tenne ssee B oard of

Ex aminers in Psy cholog y in all respec ts. Costs of t his appea l are to be assesse d
a g a ins t th e Ap pe lla nt, Dr . Fre d H . Wrig ht, a ndhis su rety , for wh ic h e xec uti on ma y iss ue if
nece ssary
.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE