09-4698- cr (L )

Uni te d Sta

te s v . Spi ts y

n e t a l. 

### UNITED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE SE CON D C IRCU IT
SUM M AR

Y O RD ER

R U L I N G S B Y S U M M A R Y OR D E R D O N OT HA V E P R E C E D E N T I A L E F F E C T . C I T A T I ON T O A SUM M A R Y O R D ER FI LED O N O R AFTER JAN U A R Y 1, 20 07 , I S PER M I TTED A N D I S GO V ERN ED B Y T H IS C O U R T ’S L O C A L R U L E 3 2 .1 .1 A N D F E D E R A L R U L E O F A P P E L L A T E P R O C E D U R E 3 2 .1 . W H EN C I TI N G A S U M M A R Y O R D ER I N A D O C U M ENT FI LED W I TH TH I S C O U R T, A PA R TY M U S T C I T E E I T HE R T HE F E D E R A L A P P E N D I X OR A N E L E C T R ON I C D A T A B A S E ( W I T H T HE NO TATI O N “ S UM M ARY O RDER”) . A PARTY CI TI NG A S UM M ARY O RDER M US T S ERVE A CO PY O F IT O N A N Y P A R T Y N O T R E P R E S E N T E D B Y C O U N S E L . At a stated Te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of Ne w York, on the 16 day

of De cembe r, two thousand and te n. th
Present: J OSEPH M. McLAUGHL I N, RO SEM AR

Y S. POO L ER, RI CHARD C. W ESL EY, Circuit Judges

.

_____________________________________________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee ,

-v.- 09-4698-c r(L ), 09-5182- cr( CON) AL EKSANDR SPI TSYN, also known as Sasha , J OSEPH VASI L EVSKY, also known a s Osek, De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts

.

Br uce R. B ryan, Sy

rac use, NY, for Appellant Aleksa ndr Spitsy

n. J aneAnne Murr ay , Murra y L aw L L C, New Yor

k, NY and Robe rt A. Culp ( on the brief ), L aw Offic e of Rober

t A. Culp, Garrison, NY, for Ap p e l l antJ o s e p hV a s i l e v s ky. A nt o n i a M

. Ap p s an d

M i c h a e l A

. L e v y ( on the brief ), Assistant United States Attorney s, for Preet B hara

ra, United States Attorney , Southern District of Ne w York, for Appellee United States of Amer ica.2

Appea l from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York (Scheindlin, J. ). ON CO NSI DE RA TIO N W HEREOF , IT I S HEREBYOR DE RE D , AD JU DG ED , AND DE CREED that th e jud g me nt o f s a id d ist ri c t c ourt be and he reby is AF F IRM ED in part and VACATED and

RE M AN DE D in part. Aleksandr

Spits y n and Joseph Vasilevsky

appea l from convictions of ba nk fra ud, conspirac y

to commit bank fraud, a

nd transporting , and conspiringto transport, stolen che cks. Def endants a ppeal on the grounds that the evide nce is insuffic ient to sustain the convictions and the district court e rre d in imposi ngcer tain SentencingGuidelines enha nceme nts. In addition, Sp it s y na p p e a ls th e d is tric t c o urt’ s d e n ia l o f h is mo ti o nto s u

p p r e s s h is p o s t- ar

r e s t s tate me nt. We assume the pa

rties’ fa miliarity with the underly

ing f acts, proc edura l history , and issues pre sented on a pp e a l. First, whe n a par

ty challeng es a district c ourt’s rulingon a motion to suppress evidenc e, we r eview the court’s f

actua l findings f

or cle ar e rror

and the c ourt’s leg al conc lusions de novo. United States v. Iv ezaj , 568 F.3d 88, 96 ( 2d Cir. 2009). Be fore a suspec t may

be subjec ted to custodial interrog ation, she must be informed that she has the right to re main silent, that any statement she make s may be used a g ainst her, a

nd that she has a right to have counse l present. See M iranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 467-71 (1966). To establish a va lid waiver, the Gover nment has the burde n of showing , by a prepondera

nce of evidenc e, that the suspec t voluntarily waived he r rights, while fully awa re of the right being waived a nd the conse quence s of the wa iver. Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). Her e, the district cour

t did not clearly

err by findingthat Spits y

n’s waive r of Miranda ri ghts wa s unc oe rc e d a

nd kn ow ing . Sp its y

n s igne d Ru ssi an- and

En g lis h- langua g e fo rm s a c kn ow le dg inghe un de rs too d h is Miranda rights, he verba lly told the arre sting a g ents that he understood his rights, and he testified at the suppression hea ringthat he had r ead his rights on the Russian languag e for

m and “unde rstood that [he] had the right to re main silent.” Fur ther, the district court found c redible the arr estingag ent’s testimony that Spits y

n’s waive r wa s knowing and voluntary . The district cour t did not clearly

err by findingthat Spits y

n voluntarily

and kn ow ing ly

wa ive d h is Miranda ri g hts and de nyingSpi tsy

n’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss. Se c on d, we re vie w d e no vo a c ha lle ng e to t

he su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e and

“ a ff ir m if the e vid e nc e , whe n v ie we d in its tot a lity

and in t he light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he g ov e rnme nt, wo uld pe rm it a ny ratio na l jury

to f ind the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be yon d a

re a so na ble doubt.” United States v. Ge ibel , 369 F.3d 682, 689 ( 2d Cir. 2004). After an exhaustive revie w of the re cord, w e find that a rational jury

could find De fenda

nts guilty of the four

charg ed offe nses, for substantially the same r easons the district c ourt noted in its opinion denying De fe nd ants ’ p os t- ve rd ic t mo tio ns fo r j ud g me nts of a c qu itt a l or

fo r n e w tri a ls. Third, we r eview c riminal sentence s “for abuse of discretion, a sta

ndard that incorporates de novo re view of que stions of law . . . and c lear -er ror r eview of

questions of fac t.” United Sta te s v . B on illa , 618 F.3d 102, 108 ( 2d Cir. 2010). Her e, the Gove rnment pre sented testimony3

that Def endants re ceive d 31 stolen chec ks and 3 F BI -g ener ated c hecks f rom L eonid Volov, totaling less than $15,000, a nd cashe d the che cks at a New Jersey

chec k-ca shing f

acility . The Gover nment also submitted documentary evidenc e that De fenda

nts cashed 545 a dditional checks at the Ne w J erse y

fac ility , althoug h the che cks we re not fr om Volov. The Gove rnment argued that the district court c ould infer that the 545 c hecks w erestolen, like the Volov che cks, but the district court stated that while “ in my hear t of hea rts Ibelieve that some perc entag e [of the 545 non-Volov che cks] were stolen,” “I have no ba sis” to “par se one by one.” T he district cour

t instead found that the 545 c hecks to ove r 50 payees w ere either stolen or part of a n insurance fra ud scheme and ca lculated the D efe ndants’ Guidelines of fense levels ac cording ly

under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) (1) ( specify ing of fense level incr ease s for greater losses to victims) and U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) (2) ( specify ing of fense level incr ease s for higher numbe rs of victims). Def endants a nd the Gover

nment all agree that the district court e rre d. As the Gove rnment stated: [T] he existi ngevidentiar y rec ord does not support a f inding that any of the non-V olov Checks wer e the pr oduct of insura nce f raud or , mo re ov e r, that V a sil e vs ky and Spi tsy n k ne w o r c on sc iou sly avoided f inding out that any

of the non-V olov Checks wer e the product of insura

nce f raud. We agree . Be cause the district court re lied on insufficient e vidence to include all 545 non-Volov chec ks as “r eleva

nt conduct” unde r U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b), the district cour t clearly err ed. E.g. , United States v. Phillips , 431 F.3d 86, 89- 90 (2d Cir. 2005). The ref ore, w e vac ate the De fe nd ants ’ s e nte nc e s and re ma nd the c a se to t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

fo r n e w s e nte nc ingpr oc e e din g s. Vasilevsky

reque sts that we “dire ct that re sentenc ing on r emand be conducte d on the exis ting se ntencingrec ord, with no opportunity for e ither par

ty to reope n or add to that re cord.” As Vasilevsky

notes, numerous c ircuit courts have held that the r ecor d on a sente ncingrema nd ordinarily should not be reope ned with re spect to issues on which the G overnme nt had the burdens of

production and pe rsuasion. E.g. , Un ite d S tates v . No ble , 367 F.3d 681, 682 ( 7th Cir. 20 04 ); United States v. Hudson , 1 29 F .3 d 9 94 , 9 95 (8 th C ir . 1 99 7) ; Un ite d S tates v . Le onzo , 50 F .3 d 1 08 6, 10 88 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 5) ; United States v. Dic kler , 64 F.3d 818, 832 ( 3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Park

er , 30 F.3d 542, 553- 54 (4th Cir. 1994). Bu t se eUn ite d S tates v . M att he ws , 278 F.3d 880, 885- 86 (9th Cir. 2002). Howe ver, c ircuit courts a lso have a llowed the Gover nment to submitadditional evidenc e on re mand if the Gove rnment “te nder[s] a persuasive rea son why

fairne ss so require s.” E.g. , United States v. J ohnson , 587 F.3d 203, 213 ( 3d Cir. 2009) (quotingDickle r , 64 F.3d at 832). Her e, bec ause the district court has not yet ruled on whether the Gover

nment may

submit additi onal evidenc e, we decline to r ule on Vasilevsky ’s reque st. W e allow the district c ourt, in the first instance , to determine whether to reope n the sentenc ing r ecor d. We have c onsidered D efe ndants’ re maining a rguments and find them to be without merit.4

F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED in part. Def endants’ se ntence s are VA CA TED and the c a se is RE M AN DE D to the district court for new se nte nc ingpr oc e e din g s.

FOR THECOURT: Catherine O ’Ha g an Wolfe, Clerk