Particularly with respect to the promotion claim, Glenn does not offer any evidence that
she was as qualified or suited to the position as the employees who were promoted instead of
Glenn. Nor does Glenn dispute Best Buy’s evidence that Glenn was not as qualified or suited to
the position of Customer Service Senior as the promoted employees. Further, on the termination
charge, in addition to offering nothing to show causation, Glenn demonstrates that she broke any
causal connection that might have existed by asking to be terminated,

Race Discrimination Claim

Although it is not clear that Glenn intends her race discrimination claim to be separate
from her retaliation claim, based on the principle of giving a pro se plaintiff some latitude in
pleading her claim, I will consider the race discrimination claim for the purposes of this summary
judgment motion only. To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Glenn must show
that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she performed her job satisfactorily, (3) she suffered
an adverse employment action and (4) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside
of her classification more favorably. Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756 (7" Cir. 2001).

Again, as above, elements one and three are undisputed. Where this claim fails is in an
analysis of the second and fourth elements. With respect to the second element, as discussed
above, Glenn acknowledges in her deposition testimony that she engaged in behavior that
resulted in her being disciplined by Best Buy. Moreover, she does not refute any of Best Buy’s
evidence that she was treated no differently from others and offers nothing more than her

subjective opinion that she was treated differently from others.

reading the record in the light most favorable to Glenn, she has not established that Best Buy’s
reason for its actions is pretextual. See Walker V. Glickman, 241 F.3d 884 (7" Cir. 2001).

06123905 4


set forth more fully below, I grant defendant’s motion, finding that plaintiff has failed to establish
a prima facie case of retaliation or race discrimination.
Retaliation Claim

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Glenn must show that (1) she engaged in a
protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment decision and (3) there was a causal
link between the adverse employment decisions and the protected activity. Sweeney v. West, 149
F.3d 550 (7" Cir. 1998).

It is undisputed that Glenn engaged in protected activity in complaining to superiors at
Best Buy about racial discrimination and in filing her actions with the EEOC. The adverse
employment decisions are also undisputed. During the seven-month period in question, Glenn
applied for and did not receive a promotion, Glenn did not receive a raise, at one point her hours
were reduced, she was threatened with discharge and, finally, she was terminated.

Where Glenn’s retaliation claim fails is in showing causation. Reviewing the evidence
presented,’ and drawing all inferences in favor of Glenn as the non-movant, there is simply
nothing that Glenn offers to suggest a causal relationship between the adverse employment
actions and the protected activity. Glenn offers nothing besides her own opinion that Best Buy
was acting in a retaliatory manner. Indeed, in Glenn’s own deposition, she confirms that she was

repeatedly disciplined by Best Buy for incidents that she admits occurred.‘

3 On February 5, 2002, Best Buy filed a motion to strike plaintiff’s statement of

material facts, however, I did review Glenn’s statement in considering this motion. That motion
is denied as moot.

‘ If Glenn were able to establish a prima facie case, then Best Buy offers Glenn’s

disciplinary record as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking the employment actions
of which Glenn complains. See Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374 (7" Cir. 2000). Again

006723918) 3


Further, Glenn’s promotion claim fails on the fourth element since Glenn fails to show
that Best Buy treated similarly situated employees outside of her classification more favorably
than Glenn was treated. For one, Glenn does not provide any evidence that she was as qualified
as the other employees who were selected for the position. For another, Best Buy filled one of
the Customer Service Senior positions with an African-American woman, that is, a member of

the same protected class in which Glenn is a member.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Best Buy’s motion for summary judgment [24-1] is

GRANTED and defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff's statement of material facts [32-1] is

DENIED as moot.

ENTER:

Bd

Jamed B. Zagel M4 ) ¢
Unjted States Diktrict Judge

pate: 14 del, Zoey

0072891} 5


Minute Order Form (06/97)

nited States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

L

Name ssi; ze iting e if her

rmoafrcanges (] James B. Zage Sng Jie

Ease NUMBDR 00. 7239 DATE 2/19/2002
CASE APRIL D. GLENN vs. BEST BUY CO.
Tr

of the motion being presented.)

[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly whe naware

i

DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) QO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) ial] Brief in support of motion due
(3) QO Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due .
(4) im Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) im) Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for __at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on __ set for at.
(7) Qo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
~) Oa [Bench/Iury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to. _at
(9) QO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OCOFRCP4(m) (General Rule 21 COFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
ao «ff [Other docket entry] Motion (24-1) for summary judgment is granted. Motion (32-1) to strike
is denied. Motion (19-1) to compel is denied as moot.
di) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order-]
No notices required, advised in open court. Document
; Number
No notices required. number of notices
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
APRIL D. GLENN,
Plaintiff, ,
v. No. 00 C 7239
BEST BUY CO, Judge James B. “Dp
Defendant. hep nt .
002

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff April Glenn had been at odds with her employer Best Buy for the latter seven
months of her approximately one-year tenure with Best Buy. From December 4, 1999, until
December 21, 2000, Glenn was employed as a Customer Service Representative II. Her duties
included processing customer purchases, returns, exchanges and credit applications and
responding to customer requests for assistance. It is undisputed! ~ and well-documented by Best
Buy — that Glenn was disciplined many times during that seven-month period from June to
December. In at least six of these disciplinary actions, a written report was prepared for Glenn’s
review and signature. These disciplinary reports covered a range of behaviors, including Glenn’s
failure to follow the proper procedure for handling a customer’s check, failure to comply with the

dress code and improper handling of customers’ complaints.

' In her deposition, Glenn confirms that she behaved in the manner described in the

reports, behavior that was reasonably the subject of disciplinary action in that it diverged from
store policy. Where she does dispute the characterization by Best Buy of her behavior, her only
disagreement seems to be why ~ not whether — she behaved in the cited manner.

00¢7239:nsj


On July 26, 2000, Glenn applied to be promoted to one of two open positions of
Customer Service Senior. A number of people, including Glenn, applied for and were
interviewed for the positions. Glenn was not offered the position and, on August 13, 2000, the
decision was made to promote two other women instead.

During this same seven-month period, Glenn complained that she was the victim of race
discrimination and retaliation for her complaints of race discrimination.’ On July 12, 2000,
Glenn filed a discrimination claim with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC
(together, the “EEOC”), charging that she was subject to two disciplinary incidents in retaliation
for a June 29, 2000 complaint to the regional manager about race discrimination.

Two more EEOC claims followed. On August 15, 2000, Glenn filed another claim with
the EEOC, charging that she was retaliated against, in particular, that she was denied the July 26,
2000 promotion, for filing her July EEOC claim. On November 28, 2000, Glenn filed a third
claim with the EEOC charging that Best Buy retaliated against her. In particular, Glenn alleged
that she was threatened with discharge, her hours were reduced and she was denied a wage
increase, for filing her July and August EEOC claims.

On November 16, 2000, Glenn filed this action, alleging race discrimination and
retaliation for engaging in protected activity. Now before me is defendant Best Buy’s motion for

summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons

2 While it is not clear that Glenn took formal action with the EEOC on the race
discrimination claims as distinct from the retaliation claims, it is apparent from her deposition
that Glenn is confused about the difference between the two and that she may consider each to be
a factor in the events that took place.

0067239 2