obligations imposed by 49 C.F.R. § 225 and 49 U.S.C. § 20703. Under Mason (a case
involving very similar facts to those before us now), references to federal obligations
in a state law wrongful discharge claim are not enough to transform the state claim into
a federal cause of action. 1997 WL 733901, *1. In Mason, the court remanded FELA
and wrongful discharge claims to state court despite that the wrongful discharge claim
expressly relied on federal law to demonstrate the public policy that defendant
allegedly sought to avoid by firing plaintiff. Jd. The court explained:

First, [defendant] argues that on the face of Mason's complaint he
specifically invokes the following sections from the federal code and
regulations: 45 U.S.C. § 441(a) (recodified in 1994 as 49 U.S.C.
§ 20109) and 49 CFR §§ 225.11, 225.25 and 225.33. I read Mason's
complaint differently. Mason does refer to these sections in his
complaint. However, he does not refer to them to claim [defendant]
violated them or to seek recovery based on their violation. Rather, Mason
has referenced the federal statute and regulations to demonstrate that
public policy prohibits the type of retaliatory actions allegedly inflicted
upon him and that Mason's actions in filing a report were mandated by
law. Mason's claims are thus grounded in state law.

Id. Sutherland’s complaint does not raise a federal question under the FRSA.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant the motion to remand.

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
s | 2 of O38 United States District Court

Dated:

-4.



otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be
removed ...”). Thus, the issue is whether Count III arises under federal law.

Sutherland contends that Count III is simply a wrongful discharge claim
pursuant to state law. Norfolk Southern argues that we have federal question
jurisdiction over Count III pursuant to both the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C.
§ 151 et seg., and the Federal Rail Safety Act (“FRSA”), 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq.

Norfolk Southern first argues that the RLA preempts Sutherland’s state law-
based wrongful discharge claim because it involves interpreting the collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Sutherland’s union and Norfolk Southern.
The complaint makes no mention of any CBA, and there is no need to interpret a CBA
to resolve Sutherland’s claim. Accordingly, the RLA does not preempt Count III.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. y. Finazzo, 512 U.S. 246, 257 (“substantive protections
provided by state law [such as the right to be free from wrongful discharge],
independent of whatever labor agreement might govern, are not pre-empted under the
RLA”); see also Mason v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 1997 WL 733901, *1 (N.D. Tl.
Nov. 17, 1997) (state law wrongful discharge claim was not preempted by the RLA
since it did not require interpreting a CBA).

Norfolk Southern also maintains that we have federal question jurisdiction over
Count III because of its reliance on FRSA provisions. As stated earlier, Sutherland
alleges that he was fired because Norfolk Southern wanted to avoid injury-reporting

-3-


Minute Order Forma (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

é Name of Assigned Judge Charles P. Kocoras Sitting Judge if Other

or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 03 C 2673 DATE 5/22/2003
CASE Sutherland vs. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
TITLE

[In the foliowing box (a) indicate the parly filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd parly plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented. ]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due _

@) oO Answer brief to motion duc___.. Reply lo answer brief due,

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on _ _ set for al

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [sct for/re-set for]on set for at
(6) o Pretrial conference{held/continued to] {set for/re-set for]on set for aat__.
(7) go Trialfset for/re-set for}on at

(8) o (Bencl/Jury trial] [Ilearing] held/continued to at.

(9) (a) This case is dismissed [with/withoul} prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

CFRCP4(n) ClLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCPAI (a1) OO FRCP4I(a)(2).

(0) =o [Other docket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: We grant the motion (Doc 4-1) to
remand this case back to the Circuit Court of Cook County. So ordered.

dl) (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court Document

Number

No notices required
ea number of notices

MAY 2 8 2803

date 2.3.8

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counset by telephone

UY | Docketing to mail notices.

av | Mail AO 450 ‘L

docketing deputy initials

Copy aa strate judge. pare

. mek
- aes th dae mailed notice
| cosiivoom eye tad sensed ote
deputy’s
initials ——
+ Shunt Clerks: yt deputy initials



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH M. SUTHERLAND,
Plaintiff,
03 C 2673

vs.

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY
COMPANY,

Ne ee

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff Joseph Sutherland’s motion to
remand this case back to the Circuit Court of Cook County. For the reasons set forth
below, we grant the motion.

BACKGROUND

The following background is based on the allegations in the complaint and does
not represent established fact. Sutherland was employed by Defendant Norfolk
Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) at its Calumet Yard of the Chicago
Terminal in Cook County. Sutherland’s responsibilities included moving groups of
railcars to different tracks within the yard. On April 21, 2000, while performing such

atask, Sutherland entered a locomotive and sat in a chair of the locomotive’s cab. The

a


chair’s back support broke, and Sutherland fell to the cab floor, sustaining injuries. On
July 3, 2000, Norfolk Southern terminated Sutherland for allegedly falsifying an injury
report. Sutherland denies this and maintains that Norfolk Southern’s real motive for
the firing was to avoid reporting his injury to the Federal Railroad Administration,
contrary to 49 C.F.R. § 225, or to the Secretary of Transportation, contrary to 49
U.S.C. § 20703.

The complaint, which was originally filed in state court, alleges three counts.
Count I is brought under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (““FELA”), 45 U.S.C.
§ 51 et seq., for negligence. Count II is also brought under FELA for violations of the
Federal Boiler Inspection Act (“FBIA”), 49 U.S.C. § 20701. Count III is an Illinois
state law wrongful discharge claim. Norfolk Southern removed the action from state
court. Sutherland now moves to have it sent back because it was improperly removed.

DISCUSSION

Although this court has original jurisdiction over Counts I and I (see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331), FELA actions generally are not removable from state to federal court. 28
USS.C. § 1445(a). Non-removable causes of action, however, become removable when
joined with another cause of action that both is removable and arises under federal law.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (“Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action

within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more