2002. WL 276285, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2002). Imposing disciplinary suspensions is not per
se outrageous, even if done “recklessly, willfully and wantonly.” Am. Compl. at J 70; see Lewis
v. Cotton, 932 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (dismissing for failure to state a claim);
Herion v. Vill. of Bensenville, No. 00 C 01026, 2000 WL 1648937, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2000)
(plaintiff failed to state claim because allegations did not show conduct was extreme and
outrageous). However, defendants’ conduct must be examined in light of other factors, namely
the control defendants had over plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ particular sensitivities to emotional
stress. Honaker v, Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 489-91 (7th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs allege they are
uniquely susceptible to stress because of their medical conditions, and one could infer defendants
disliked plaintiffs given the context of the pre-disciplinary meetings. Am. Compl. at ] 25.

Even in light of these considerations, plaintiffs fail to state an actionable claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs cite Kamberos v. Infiniti of Orland Park in
support of their position, but in Kamberos the plaintiff alleged continual and daily harassment.
No. 02 C 3000, 2002 WL 31248538, at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2002) (daily psychologically
abusive tirades in front of co-workers). In their response brief, plaintiffs characterize defendants’
conduct as “bullying,” “angry,” “hostile” and abusive. Resp. at 11. But these characterizations
are not consistent with the allegations in the amended complaint. Plaintiffs merely allege
defendants met, determined that suspensions were warranted, issued suspensions and that
Batinich made one stray remark at the meeting. Am. Compl. At J 25, 68-69. They do not allege
defendants threatened to fire them, or that defendants engaged in ongoing harassment. Any
inference that defendants maliciously and systemically attempted to injure plaintiffs would be an

unreasonable reading of the complaint. Stripped of rhetoric, plaintiffs’ claims are predicated on a



for intermittent FMLA leave. Id, at { 40-42. The city re-certified Gaddy in 2003. Jd. On
November 7, 2003, Gaddy asked to leave work early because of his FMLA certified illness, Id.
Although defendants denied his request, Gaddy left work. Jd. at ¢ 42. Shortly thereafter, Haran,
Rodriguez, and Killman held a pre-disciplinary meeting about Gaddy’s conduct. Id. at {{{ 42-45.
After further consultation involving Rooney and Reyes, defendants suspended Gaddy for five
days without pay for leaving work without permission. Jd. at ] 45.
DISCUSSION

Count II

Count III alleges each individual defendant violated the ADA by failing to reasonably
accommodate plaintiffs’ requests for intermittent leave. However, as defendants correctly point
out, and plaintiffs concede, the ADA does not provide individual liability. EEOC v. AIC Security
Investigations, Inc., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-82 (7th Cir. 1995).
Count IV

Count IV alleges defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon plaintiffs by
placing them on disciplinary suspension. Defendants argue Count IV is barred by the Local
Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101, et seg., and
because plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege defendants’ conduct was objectively
outrageous. Before considering whether defendants are entitled to immunity, the court will
determine whether plaintiffs have stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that
defendants’ extreme and outrageous conduct caused plaintiffs severe emotional distress, and that

defendants knew their actions would lead to such a result. Crudup v. Barton, No. 98 C 1498,


garden-variety employment dispute. See Honaker, 256 F.3d at 489-91 (noting employment
disagreements not extreme and outrageous unless they “go well beyond the parameters of the
typical workplace dispute”), Herion, 2000 WL 1648937 at *7-8. This conduct cannot be
considered “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of
decency, or to cause distress so severe that a reasonable person could not be expected to endure
it.” Lewis, 932 F. Supp. at 1118.
Count V

Count V alleges Haran, Batinich, Rodriguez, Rooney, Killman and Reyes conspired to
intentionally inflict emotional distress upon plaintiffs by collectively imposing disciplinary
suspensions. The elements of civil conspiracy in Illinois are: 1) an agreement; 2) to participate in
an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means; 3) an overt act performed in furtherance of the
scheme; and 4) an injury caused by the overt act. Hakim v. Outsourcing Solution, Inc., No. 02. C
0425, 2002 WL 31818961, at * 7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2002). Because plaintiffs fail to state a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, their conspiracy claim must also fail.
Hanania v. Loren-Maltese, No. 98 C 5232, 2004 WL 547238, at * 19 (N.D. Ill. March 17, 2004)
(failure of underlying tort claim precludes conspiracy claim).
Punitive Damages Against the City

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages against the city.
Plaintiffs contend they are only precluded from seeking punitive damages as to Counts I - III, and
that the city is entitled'to immunity from punitive damages on their state law tort claims only if
the individual defendants are “public officials” serving in their official capacity at the time they

caused plaintiffs’ injury. This is an incorrect reading of the law. It is clear that the city is


‘Minute Order Foem (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Minois

nar oe Magiarat Judge Suzanne B. Conlon “Than Antiged See
CASE NUMBER 03 C 8631 DATE 3/31/2004
CASE DAVIS, et al. vs. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the pasty filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented}
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
2) o Brief in support of motion due__.
(3) im] Answer brief to motion due____. Reply to answer brief due.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon___setfor___—at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—_sset for at
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____setfor___—at__.
(7) i] Trial[set for/re-set for]on___at
(8) Oo (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto at
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

COFRCP4(m) Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(aX1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).

Qo [Other docket entry) Defendants’ motion to dismiss [16-1] is granted. Counts III, IV and V are
dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages against the city in Counts IV and V are

stricken. S 2. Cocke

(11) w [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. umber of novices.

Y | Notices mailed by judge's staff. APR O 220

Notified counset by telephone. date docketed)

Docketing to mail notices. 2 {

Mail AO 450 form. isias'a ca
ut at
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. 18n03 to RLS
Yaa anintos
dite mailed notice
courtroom 4 ow Raat
cB deputy’s Zhralkd Ln act hlde mw
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Date/time received in
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immune from punitive damages under federal civil rights laws. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746
F.2d 1205, 1270 (7th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the Tort Immunity Act specifically provides “a local
public entity is not liable to pay punitive or exemplary damages in any action brought directly or
indirectly against it...” 745 ILCS 10/2-102; Agnew v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, No.
97 C 5993, 1998 WL 386155, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 1998). The claims for punitive damages
against the city are therefore stricken with prejudice.
CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Counts III, IV, and V of the amended

complaint fail as a matter of law and are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive

damages against the city in Counts IV and V are stricken.

March 31, 2004 ENTER:

Sug B. Conlon

United States District Judge



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES DAVIS and WILLIAM B. GADDY, )
)
Plaintiffs, ) No. 03 C 8631
)
v. ) Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
)
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., ) Yd,
) GA,
Defendants. ) "Pp 7/5
02 wy]
Pe,
E OPINION AND ORDE O77)

James Davis and William B. Gaddy (collectively, “plaintifis”) sue their employer, the
City of Chicago (“the city”), and their supervisors James Haran, Steven Batinich, Irma
Rodriguez, Charles Killman, William Rooney, and Norma Reyes (collectively, “defendants”), in
both their individual and official capacities, for violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, ef seq. (Counts I and II), and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) (Count III), Plaintiffs also allege two state law claims: intentional infliction of
emotional distress (Count IV) and common law conspiracy to inflict emotional distress (Count
V). Essentially, plaintiffs contend they were targeted for unfair and discriminatory treatment
because they were disabled and sought to exercise their rights to intermittent FMLA leave.
Defendants’ first motion to dismiss was rendered moot by plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
Defendants now move to dismiss both of plaintiffs’ state law claims and plaintiffs’ claims under
the ADA pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In addition, defendants move to strike plaintiffs’

prayer for punitive damages in Counts IV and V.

al



BACKGROUND

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the
complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. Thompson v.
Ilinois Dep’t of Prof’! Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002). The complaint will be
dismissed only if it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of
their claims entitling them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102
(1957); Hernandez v. City of Goshen, 324 F.3d 535, 537 (7th Cir. 2003).

Davis is sixty-one years old. For the past fourteen years, Davis has met defendants’
reasonable employment expectations as a city building inspector supervisor. Am. Compl. at ¥
19. He suffers from chronic health problems. He has undergone triple-bypass surgery and
suffers from diabetes, hypertension, coronary artery disease and caudation of his left leg. Id. at J
17. In 2002, his health problems forced him to seek intermittent FMLA leave. Id. His request
was granted, and then re-certified in March 2003. Jd. at {22. On November 7, 2003, Davis
asked to leave work early in accordance with his intermittent leave arrangement. Jd. at { 24.
Defendants denied the request for accommodation and initiated disciplinary proceedings after
Davis left work without permission. Jd. at {] 24-27. Defendants suspended Davis without pay
for fifteen days on November 17, 2003. Jd. at 27. Davis filed this lawsuit on December 2,
2003. Id. at] 28. On January 16, 2004, Davis was denied a salary step increase because of the
November suspension. Jd. at ¥ 31.

Gaddy is also a building inspector supervisor. He is fifty-five years old and has been a
city employee for the last ten years. Jd. at 34. Gaddy suffers from gout, rhinitis and diabetes.

Id. at {4 35-36. He notified the city of his disability in 1992, and the city certified his eligibility