IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

DEUTCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 

COMPANY, as Trustee for Saxon Asset 

Securities Trust 2007-2 Mortgage Loan Asset 

Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2,

No. 51425-7-II

Appellant,

v.

GEORGE PETER BECK; DELBERT 

ARMSTRONG; PUGET SOUND LEASING 

CO., INC.; STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA, INTERNAL 

REVENUE SERVICE; AND PERSONS OR 

PARTIES UNKNOWN CLAIMING ANY 

RIGHT, TITLE, LIEN, OR INTEREST IN 

THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE 

COMPLAINT HEREIN,

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Respondent.

LEE, J. — Deutsche Bank National Trust Company appeals the superior court’s order 

granting George P. Beck’s cross-motion for summary judgment and dismissing Deutsche Bank’s 

foreclosure action. Deutsche Bank argues that the superior court erred because Deutsche Bank

never clearly and unequivocally accelerated Beck’s home mortgage loan, and therefore, the statute 

of limitations did not bar Deutsche Bank’s foreclosure on the loan. We reverse the superior court’s 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

July 11, 2019
No. 51425-7-II

2

order granting Beck’s cross-motion for summary judgment and remand to the superior court for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

FACTS

On February 14, 2007, Beck executed a promissory note to Saxon Mortgage, Inc. for 

$433,000 payable in monthly installments. The note was set to mature on March 1, 2037. The 

note was secured by a deed of trust. The note was assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust 

Company as Trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-2 Mortgage Loan Asset Backed 

Certificates, Series 2007-2. 

In July 2008, Beck stopped making monthly payments. In October, 2008, Beck was sent 

a notice of default stating the amount of default was $17,170.23. The notice of default also stated,

If the default(s) described above is (are) not cured within thirty days of the mailing 

of this notice, the lender hereby gives notice that the entire principal balance owing 

on the note secured by the Deed of Trust described in paragraph 1 above, and all 

accrued and unpaid interest, as well as costs of foreclosure, shall immediately 

become due and payable. 

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 108. On June 5, 2013, Beck was sent another notice of default that stated 

the amount owing was $159,048.55 in principal and interest with additional costs for a total default 

of $217,858.78. 

On July 6, 2016, Deutsche Bank filed a foreclosure complaint against Beck. Deutsche 

Bank also filed a motion for summary judgment. Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment 

was supported by affidavits and exhibits establishing the above facts. 
No. 51425-7-II

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Beck filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Beck did not dispute the underlying 

facts of the case, but he argued that the October 2008 notice of default accelerated the loan and 

triggered the statute of limitations. Therefore, the statute of limitations for foreclosure expired. 

Beck also argued that Deutsche Bank did not have authority to pursue the foreclosure 

because the note was assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee for Saxon 

Asset Securities Trust 2007-2 Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2; therefore, 

the Deed of Trust was originally improperly assigned to a non-existent entity. Beck included the 

assignment of the Deed of Trust from Saxon Mortgage, Inc. to Deutsche Bank National Trust 

Company, as Trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-2 on October 27, 2008. Beck also 

included a second assignment of the Deed of Trust from Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 

as Trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-2 to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as 

Trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-2 Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 

2007-2 on October 4, 2011. 

The superior court granted Beck’s cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissed 

Deutsche Bank’s foreclosure action, and awarded Beck his attorney fees and costs. Deutsche Bank 

appeals.

ANALYSIS

Deutsche Bank argues that the superior court erred by granting Beck’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment. We agree. 

We review summary judgment orders de novo. Washington Federal v. Azure Chelan, LLC, 

195 Wn. App. 644, 652, 382 P.3d 20 (2016). Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine 
No. 51425-7-II

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issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 

56(c). “‘A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends.’” Washington 

Federal, 195 Wn. App. at 652 (quoting Dong Wan Kim v. O’Sullivan, 133 Wn. App. 557, 559, 137 

P.3d 61 (2006), review denied, 159 Wn.2d 1018 (2007)). We review facts and inferences in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. 

Here, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the issues raised by Beck’s crossmotion on summary judgment. The parties agree on the language contained in the October 2008 

notice of default. Therefore, the issue is only legal: whether the language of the October 2008 

notice of default accelerated the loan and triggered the statute of limitations. 

RCW 4.16.040 provides a six year statute of limitations for actions on promissory notes 

and deeds of trust. Merceri v. Bank of New York Mellon, 4 Wn. App. 2d 755, 759, 434 P.3d 84, 

review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1008 (2018). When the note is paid in installments, the six year statute 

of limitations runs against each individual installment when it is due. Id. at 759-60. However, 

when a note is accelerated, “the entire remaining balance becomes due and the statute of limitations 

is triggered for all installments that had not previously become due.” 4518 S. 256th, LLC v. Karen 

L. Gibbon, P.S., 195 Wn. App. 423, 434-35, 382 P.3d 1 (2016), review denied, 187 Wn.2d 1003 

(2017). “‘[A]cceleration must be made in a clear and unequivocal manner which effectively 

apprises the maker that the holder has exercised his right to accelerate the payment date.’” 

Merceri, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 761 (quoting Glassmaker v. Richard, 23 Wn. App. 35, 38, 593 P.2d 

179 (1979)). 
No. 51425-7-II

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Deutsche Bank argues that the language in the October 2008 notice of default did not 

accelerate Beck’s debt because the language was conditional and referenced actions that could be 

taken in the future—not actions that were currently being taken. We agree. 

The language in the October 2008 notice of default stated,

If the default(s) described above is (are) not cured within thirty days of the mailing 

of this notice, the lender hereby gives notice that the entire principal balance owing 

on the note secured by the Deed of Trust described in paragraph 1 above, and all 

accrued and unpaid interest, as well as costs of foreclosure, shall immediately 

become due and payable. 

CP at 108. This language does not clearly and unequivocally express that Deutsche Bank elected 

to accelerate the debt in 2008. 

First, the language in the October 2008 notice of default is conditional. At the time the 

notice was sent, the loan was not accelerated because it explicitly provided that Beck had 30 days 

to cure the default before the loan could be accelerated. However, Beck argues that, because he 

did not cure the default, the language in the notice acted to automatically accelerate the loan once 

the condition was satisfied. But acceleration is not self-executing. Merceri, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 760. 

Therefore, to actually exercise the option to accelerate the debt, Deutsche Bank would have had to 

take some clear, unequivocal action to accelerate the loan once the condition for acceleration 

identified in the notice was met. 

Second, the language in the October 2008 notice of default was a warning of an intended 

future action—it was not a statement of an action that was taken. For example, in Merceri, the 

court held that a notice of default stating that the loan “will be accelerated” if the default was not 

cured was not a declaration that the entire balance was due or that the loan was accelerated. Id. at 
No. 51425-7-II

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761. Similarly, here, the October 2008 notice of default’s statement of default did not include an 

accelerated balance due; it only identified 4 delinquent payments totaling $16,015.96 and late 

charges totaling $18.50.1 And no language in the October 2008 notice of default specifically 

informed Beck that the full principle amount of the loan plus all accrued interest is immediately 

due and payable. Id. 

The conditional, future warning language of the October 2008 notice of default did not 

clearly and unequivocally express that Deutsche Bank was exercising the option to accelerate the 

loan. Accordingly, the superior court erred by granting Beck’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment.2

 

1 Attached to the same notice of default was a “Notice Required by the Fair Debt Collection 

Practice Act” which included the following paragraph:

As of the date of this letter, you owe $455,806.95. Because of interest, late charges, 

and other charges that may vary from day to day, or may apply only upon payoff, 

the amount due on the day you pay may be greater. Hence if you pay the amount 

shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after we receive your check, in 

which event we will inform you before depositing the check for collection.

CP at 111. However, this statement could not be a clear and unequivocal acceleration of the loan 

because it was attached to the same notice in which acceleration of the loan was made conditional 

on the failure to cure the default within 30 days. Instead, this statement is more reasonably 

construed simply as a statement of the full amount of the debt as of October 17, 2008 (the date the 

letter was sent) and not a statement of the amount that was currently owed or that was attempted 

to be collected. Accordingly, a statement of the full amount of the debt owed attached to a notice 

of default which makes acceleration conditional on failure to cure within 30 days, would not be a 

clear and unequivocal action accelerating the debt. 

2 Because we reverse the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Beck, we also 

reverse the superior court’s award of attorney fees and costs to Beck. Further, we decline to 

address which payments, if any, are barred by the statute of limitations or Beck’s argument that 

Deutsche Bank lacks authority to foreclose. These issues may be properly addressed by the 

superior court on remand.
No. 51425-7-II

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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Deutsche Bank requests attorney fees on appeal under RAP 18.1 and the terms of the note. 

We grant attorney fees under RAP 18.1(a) “[i]f applicable law grants to a party the right to recover 

reasonable attorney fees or expenses.” Both the note and the deed of trust provide Deutsche Bank 

the right to recover reasonable attorney fees for actions brought to enforce the note. Because this 

is a foreclosure action to enforce the note and this appeal protected Deutsche Bank’s interests in 

the foreclosure and note enforcement action, Deutsche Bank is entitled to recover attorney fees on 

appeal under the terms of the note and the deed of trust.

We reverse the superior court’s order granting summary judgment and remand to the 

superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

Lee, J.

We concur:

Maxa, C.J.

Cruser, J.