Although the statute governing the ability of community mental health boards to make contracts
imposed no limitation on the duration of those contracts, the court found that the rule of
Millikin applied, saying that “it is contrary to the effective administration of a political
subdivision to allow elected officials to tie the hands of their successors with respect to decisions
regarding the welfare of the subdivision.” Jd. at 482-83, 741 N.E.2d at 1071. The court rejected
the plaintiff's argument that Millikin should not apply because the members of the board had
staggered employment terms, holding that the board’s authority was limited by the term of the
township supervisor who had appointed the board’s members. Jd. at 486, 741 N.E.2d at 1073.

Trombetta argues that the rule of Millikin does not apply to elected boards like the School
Board. The Court disagrees. Trombetta cites no Illinois case drawing this distinction, and the
county board in Millikin was an elected board. Trombetta also argues that the rule of Millikin
does not apply to school boards because the legislature has authorized school boards to employ
superintendents and principals for up to five years. See 105 ILCS 5/10-23.8 & 10-23.8a. But the
legislature’s creation of this exception to the general rule applicable in Illinois does not, in the
Court’s view, generally exempt school boards from Millikin; rather the existence of this narrow
exception to the general rule created by Millikin suggests a legislative intent to preclude other
exceptions. Cf State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 250, 562 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1990) (expression
of certain exceptions in a statute is construed as excluding all others).

Trombetta also notes that in Grassini, the court relied in part on the fact that there was a
statute (part of the Illinois Municipal Code) that permitted municipalities to make employment
contracts for certain specified positions for a term exceeding one year, but not for a term greater
than that of the mayor or president of the municipality. Grassini, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 620, 665
N.E.2d at 864 (quoting 65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(b)). But the applicability of Millikin — which essentially

4



year contract, even though the board members themselves served for one-year terms. The
Illinois Supreme Court held that the contract was void. It reasoned that allowing the county
board to enter into an employment contract that extended beyond its own term would deprive the
county’s succeeding boards of the ability to exercise authority over the county’s employees and
was therefore contrary to effective administration. Jd. at 532-33, 32 N.E. at 494.

The rule of Millikin has since been applied by the Illinois courts to contracts adopted by
both elected and appointed governmental boards. In Deyo v. Commissioner of Highways of
Sheridan, 256 Ill. App. 3, 1930 WL 2992 (1930), Millikin was applied to limit the powers of
highway commissioners to incur on a town’s behalf debts extending beyond their term in office.
1930 WL 2992, at *3. In Grassini y. DuPage Township, 279 Ill. App. 3d 614, 665 N.E.2d 860
(1996), the court considered a township administrator’s four year employment contract that had
been approved by the township board of trustees entered into an employment contract with the
plaintiff to serve as the township administrator for a four-year period. When a new board of
trustees was appointed, it voted to terminate the plaintiff's contract, and the plaintiff filed suit.
The court determined that the employment contract was outside the authority of the township
board and was therefore void ab initio because “a township board may not contract persons for
terms greater than the period for which the board making the decisions has left to serve.”
Grassini, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 620, 665 N.E.2d at 864.

In Cannizzo v. Berwyn Township 708 Community Mental Health Board, 318 Ill. App. 3d
478, 741 N.E.2d 1067 (2000), the court determined that the rule established in Millikin and
Grassini extended to all governmental boards. The court concluded that a contract between the
Berwyn Mental Health Board and its executive director that extended beyond the term of the
township supervisor who appointed the Board’s members was ultra vires and void ab initio.

3



sets up a common law rule — does not depend on the existence of a statute; indeed in Grassini the
court relied on Millikin’s common law rule, citing the Municipal Code provision as reflecting
that the legislature agreed with Millikin and had enacted a statute specifying how the principle of
that case would apply to municipalities. Trombetta cites no Illinois decision, however,
indicating that the applicability of Millikin turns on whether the legislature has specifically
adopted it in a statute concerning the particular type of governmental board.

Finally, Trombetta argues that school boards are not subject to this rule, relying on
Libertyville Education Association v. Board of Education District No. 70, 56 Ill. App. 3d 503,
371 N.E.2d 676 (1977). The Court disagrees. The Libertyville case dealt not with an
employment contract for a particular employee, but rather with a collective bargaining
agreement between a teacher’s union and a local board of education. In upholding the school
board’s right to enter into a five-year collective bargaining agreement, the court largely relied on
post-Millikin developments establishing the principle of tenure for teachers, as well as on the fact
that the collective bargaining agreement at issue “did not purport to limit the [School] Board’s
authority to hire or discharge teachers.” Jd. at 505-06, 371 N.E.2d at 678-79. Thus, contrary to
Trombetta’s argument, this decision does not stand for a rule that school boards are exempt from
the Millikin doctrine.

In sum, the Court concludes that the general rule against beyond-term employment
contracts applies in this case. It is undisputed that Trombetta’s four-year contract extended
beyond the terms of the then-current members of the Board. For this reason, the School Board
acted ultra vires when it awarded Trombetta a four year contract, and the contract was void.
Count 4 is dismissed for failure to state a claim.

In Count 5, Trombetta asserts a claim of tortious interference with contract. To support a

5



Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Jud Sitting Judge if Oth
ov Magistrate Judge Matthew F. Kennelly than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 5895 DATE 3/13/03

CASE Trombetta vs. Board of Education
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}

DOCKET ENTRY:

a) oO Filed motion of { use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) a) Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Qa Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to, at
(9) im This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) CO Local Rule 41.1 OO FRCP41(a)(1) [FRCP41(a)(2).
qo) =o {Other docket entry] For the reasons set forth on the attached order, the Court dismisses Counts
4 and 5 of plaintiffs amended complaint for failure to state a claim.

al) @ (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

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claim of tortious interference with contract, Illinois law requires that a plaintiff establish: 1) a
valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and another, 2) the defendant’s awareness of
this contractual relation, 3) the defendant’s intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of
the contract, 4) a subsequent breach, caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct, and 5)
damage. See, e.g., HPI Health Care Services, Ine. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 145,
154, 545 N.E.2d 672, 676 (1989). Trombetta cannot sustain such a claim because his four-year
contract was not valid.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Counts 4 and 5 of plaintiff's amended

complaint for failure to state a claim.

WAM LWA,

MATTHEW F. KENNEL!
Date: March 13, 2003 United States District Judge


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GENEROSO TROMBETTA,
Plaintiff,

vs. No. 02 C 5895
BOARD OF EDUCATION, PROVISO
TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DIST. NO. 209;
THERESA L. KELLY; EMANUEL “CHRIS”
WELCH; DANIEL J. ADAMS; MICHAEL J.
CARLSON; RONALD SERPICO; and
GREGORY T. JACKSON,

Defendants.

pockered
2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER WAR 4 7

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

In April 2000, plaintiff Generoso Trombetta was hired by Proviso Township High School
District No. 209 as the Building Manager of Proviso East High School. In April 2001, Michael
Manzo, the School Board’s President and Trombetta’s cousin, ran against Ronald Serpico in the
municipal election for Mayor of Melrose Park, with Trombetta acting as his campaign manager.
Serpico won. In the same election, candidates affiliated with Manzo and Serpico ran for four
open positions on the seven-member School Board. The elections resulted in an apparent 4-3
majority on the Board for those affiliated with Manzo.

In June 2001, the School Board entered into a four year employment agreement with
Trombetta. Trombetta alleges, however, that Serpico and his supporters on the School Board
decided to retaliate against him and others who had supported Manzo in the mayoral election.

He alleges that in order to gain control of the School Board, Serpico pressured one of the Board



members aligned with Manzo to switch political allegiances by threatening to fire the member’s
father from his job with the Village of Melrose Park. After this Board member switched sides in
November 2001, Trombetta says, the Board had a majority of Serpico sympathizers. In April
2002, Trombetta was terminated at the direction of the School Board, an action that Trombetta
says that the Board took to retaliate against him for his support of Manzo.

Trombetta has filed a five-count amended complaint alleging federal claims for violation
of his rights of free speech and due process of law, as well as two state law claims. In Count 4,
Trombetta alleges that the termination breached his contract with the School Board, which he
says entitled him to employment through July 1, 2005. He alleges in Count 5 that the individual
defendants tortiously interfered with his contract with the Board. Defendants have moved to
dismiss both of these claims. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants defendants’ motion.

Discussion

The defendants have moved to dismiss Counts 4 and 5 for failure to state a claim. Ona
motion to dismiss, the Court reads the complaint liberally, granting the motion only “if it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which entitles
him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).

Defendants argue that Trombetta’s multi-year contract with the School Board is void as a
matter of Illinois law. If they are correct, Trombetta’s breach of contract claim fails, as does his
claim of tortious interference with contract.

Under Illinois law, the general rule is that a governmental board whose members serve
limited terms may not enter into a contract for a term beyond that for which the board sits. This
rule dates back at least as far as Millikin v. Edgar County, 142 Ill. 528, 32 N.E. 493 (1892). In
Millikin, an elected county board of supervisors employed a keeper of a poor house for a three-

2