according to their respective liabilities.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). Although a court cannot dismiss an action due to misjoinder,
“[plarties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or
of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just . . .[and]
[a]ny claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 21. See also Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc. 209 F.3d 1008, 1016 (7" Cir.
2000)(stating that “{ijt is within the district court's broad discretion whether to sever
a claim under Rule 21.”); Aiello v. Kingston, 947 F.2d 834, 835 (7 Cir.
1991)(stating that “Fed.R.Civ.P, 21 allows a court to sever claims that are logically

distinct... .”).

DISCUSSION

In the instant action, the claims of the three named plaintiffs do not rise from
“the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences... .” Fed.
R. Civ. P, 20(a). The named plaintiffs each advance a claim that involves distinct
employment actions and involves a unique sets of circumstances. Plaintiffs argue
that they can join Plaintiffs’ actions merely because Plaintiffs were allegedly
discriminated against by some of the same supervisors during the same general
period. While such an approach may be convenient to Plaintiffs’ counsel, and it
requires Plaintiffs to only file one filing fee rather than three filing fees, such an
approach is not in accordance with the law. The joinder rule is intended to serve

4


an Assistant Manager from 2001 until May of 2003. (A Compl. 24). Plaintiffs
allege that in 2002 and 2003, Ahmad was not promoted to vacant Branch Manager
positions because of his religion, national origin, race, ancestry, and because Ahmad
complained about discrimination. (A Compl. 28). Plaintiffs also claim that
Ahmad’s Regional Manager harassed him starting in July of 2002. (A Compl. 25)
Plaintiffs contend that in August of 2002, Ahmad complained about the harassment
to the Assistant Director of Human Resources and that subsequently, Ahmad was
transferred repeatedly. (A Compl. 27). Plaintiffs do not allege that TCF terminated
Ahmad’s employment. Instead Plaintiffs allege that in May of 2003, Ahmad was

constructively discharged. (A Compl. 30).

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) provides:

(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons
will arise in the action. All persons (and any vessel, cargo or other property
subject to admiralty process in rem) may be joined in one action as defendants
if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all defendants will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant
need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief
demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according
to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants

3


judicial efficiency. Vasilakos v. Corometrics Medical Systems, Inc, 1993 WL
390283, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Such a purpose will not be served if we proceed in
this action on what are clearly three entirely separate employment discrimination
actions.

There are many factual differences between the claims that illustrate that
Plaintiffs’ claims are indeed entirely separate claims arising from different
occurrences. Hussain was employed in a different position than Bheri and Ahmad.
The time period of alleged discrimination for each Plaintiff does not directly
coincide. Plaintiffs allege a variety of adverse employment actions taken against
them which include being denied a promotion, being put on probation, being
transferred, and being terminated. Unlike Hussain and Bheri, Ahmad resigned from
his position and argues that he was constructively discharged.

Each individual Plaintiff has advanced claims that will require a separate
analysis of the plaintiffs work performance, qualifications, and the actions taken
against him. The court will also need to consider the qualifications of other
employees that each individual plaintiff competed with for the promotions and
consider each of the plaintiffs supervisor’s conduct and history with that particular
plaintiff. The sets of transactions and occurrences involved in each of Plaintiff's
claims are entirely distinct. Clearly, Plaintiffs have improperly sought to join three
distinct claims in one action. Therefore a severance of Bheri’s claims and Ahmad’s

claims into separate actions is warranted in this instance.


‘Minute Order Form (06/97)
“ «

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 9404 DATE 6/29/2004
CASE Hussain vs. TCF Bank
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.}

n :

DOCKET ENTRY:

e3) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due

(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) oa Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on. set for at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at

(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) a (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

CUFRCP4(n) OLocal Rule 41.1 COFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) Wt [Other docket entry] Status hearing set for 08/05/04 is stricken. Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file
second amended complaint is entered and continued to 07/28/04 at 9:00 a.m. For the reasons stated in the
attached memorandum opinion, defendant TCF Bank’s motion to sever is granted. Defendant TCF Bank’s
motion to separate the trials is terminated as moot. Enter Memorandum Opinion.

(ij) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
"a umber of notices

pe

date mailed tice

Notices mailed by judge's staff,

Notified counsel by telephone. y

Docketing to mail notices. Memorandum
Opinion distributed in open Court.

Mail AO 450 form.

JUAGS LAY LSta “SA
yes

Wd 62 NMP O02
~ Beit ceived in

central Clerk's Office

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
deputy’s
initials

Bit

w

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co

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- mailing deputy initials



CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant the motion to sever.

Sam 2 Dw Gk —

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan 7 VU"
United States District Court Judge

Dated: June 29, 2004


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ARSHAD HUSSAIN, HAROON
BHERI, and IZHAR AHMAD,

JUN 3 @ 2004

Plaintiff,
v. No. 03 C9404

TCF BANK, and TCF FINANCIAL
CORPORATION,

wee ww eres aS eS

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Defendant TCF Bank’s (“TCF”) motion to
sever Plaintiffs’ claims or alternatively, to separate the trials. For the reasons stated

below, we grant the motion to sever.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege in the first amended complaint that TCF employed
Plaintiff Arshad Hussain (“Hussain”) as a Branch Manager. (A Compl. 9). Plaintiffs
claim that Hussain opposed employment discrimination that he discovered at TCF in

September of 2002. (A Compl. 10). Plaintiffs also claim that because of Hussain’s

ie


opposition to the discrimination, and because of Hussain’s religion, national origin,
race, and ancestry, he was denied a promotion to a Regional Manager position. (A
Compl. 11). Plaintiffs also allege that Hussain was unlawfully denied a promotion to
a Senior Manager position, and put on probation. (A Compl. 14). In addition,
Plaintiffs allege that Hussain complained to the Regional Manager about
discrimination on March 3, 2003, and that on March 18, 2003, Hussain informed the
Regional Manager that he was filing a discrimination and retaliation complaint with
the Illinois Department of Human Rights. (A Compl. 15, 16). Plaintiffs further
allege that on March 19, 2003, Hussain was fired. (A Compl. 17)

Plaintiffs allege that TCF employed Plaintiff Haroon Bheri (“Bheri”) from
October of 1998 to February of 2003 and that he was an Assistant Manager From
February of 2001 to February of 2003. (A Compl. 19). Plaintiffs also allege that
between May of 2001 and Novermber of 2002, Bheri was denied a promotion to a
Branch Manager position at the Danada location on four occasions and that
“younger, non-Pakistani, non-Muslim” applicants were chosen each time for the
position. (A Compl. 20). Plaintiffs contend that Bheri was not chosen for the
positions because he complained about discrimination and because of his religion,
national origin, ancestry, race, and age. (A Compl. 21, 22). Bheri claims that he
complained about harassment at work and that he was thereafter transferred and then
terminated in February of 2003. (A Compl. 22).

Plaintiffs also allege that TCF employed Plaintiff Izhar Ahmad (“Ahmad”) as