Defendants (5) to apologize to Plaintiff; and (5) to award Plaintiff $500,000 in compensatory
damages.

This court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Levin. On October 2, 2002 the
Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on the matter. The R & R
recommended that Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunctive relief as wall as mandatory
injunctive relief be denied. On October 10, 2002 Plaintiff filed objections to Magistrate Levin’s R
& R. For the reasons set forth below these objections are overruled and Plaintiffs’s request for
injunctive ruling denied with prejudice.

DISCUSSION

A federal district court is authorized to refer evidentiary hearings to a Magistrate Judge. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R.CIV. P. 72(b). Either party has ten (10) days to object in writing.
Id, The district court then conducts a de novo review of the Magistrate Judges’ R & R. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This de novo review is not the same as a de novo hearing. See United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675 (1980). Rather, the district court has the discretion to “accept, reject,
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate.” See 28
U.S.C. §636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).

The Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Order concluded the following: (1) this court
should abstain from hearing Plaintiff's case under Middlesex Ethics Comm. v Garden State Bar
Assoc., 457 U.S. 423 (182); under Rooker-Feldman set forth in Dist. Of Columbia Court of
Appeals y. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1923) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415
(1923) and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) abstention doctrines; (2) Plaintiff is not entitled

to injunctive relief under Long v. Chicago Transit Authority, 979 F. Supp. 1214, 1216 (N.D. Il.



temporary deprivation of employment does not inflict irreparable injury, and, therefore, does not
justify a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff cannot establish irreparable harm. Therefore, Magistrate

Judge Levin’s Report and Recommendation is adopted in full and Plaintiff's objections overruled.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above Plaintiffs request for a TRO and a preliminary injunction is
denied with prejudice.

So Ordered. Entered:

onald A. Guzman
United States Judge

DATED:



connection with those proceedings, such as requiring the ARDC to restore him to the practice of
law and forcing the ARDC to employ him in a professional capacity. Plaintiff also seeks certain
generalized relief, including an injunction against claimed illegal or unethical activity by the
ARDC Defendants, an injunction against their contact with other agencies, an injunction requiring
the ARDC to fund the Plaintiff's efforts and goals, and apology made to Plaintiff.

Although the ARDC Hearing Board has now decided Plaintiff's case, its recommendation
is subject to appellate review by the Review Board, Ill. S. Ct. R. 753(d) and eventually, by the
Illinois Supreme Court under Il. Sup. Ct. R. 753(d). These decisions have not been made final.
Plaintiff would not be able to obtain relief for these alleged statutory and constitutional claims
without having this court review and reverse state court decisions. See Newman v. State of Indiana,
129 F. 3d 937, 942 (7" Cir. 1997). It is undisputed that the injunctive relief which Plaintiff seeks
would have the effect of enjoining or controlling or modifying the course of these on-going
disciplinary proceedings against him, and of dictating to the Illinois Supreme Court the status of
Plaintiff's law license. This is something this Court cannot do and deprives this Court of its
jurisdiction over the claims against the ARDC, its employees and the Illinois Supreme Court.

Application of the Younger abstention doctrine produces the same result. The basic
principle of the Younger abstention doctrine is that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a federal
court should not interfere with pending state judicial proceedings. Barichello v. McDonald, 98 F.
3d 948, 954 (7" Cir. 1996). The doctrine must be applied when three requirements are met: (1) the
state judicial or judicial in nature state proceedings are on-going when the complaint is filed; (2)
the proceedings implicate an important state interest; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the

state court proceeding to raise constitutional challenges. Jd. at 955.



1997); (3) Plaintiff is not entitled to an order compelling investigations of the employees of the
ARDC under Smith v. Shook, 237 F. 3d 1322 (11" Cir. 2001); and (4) Plaintiff has failed to satisfy
the necessary factors to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Magistrate Judge also
concluded that Plaintiff had made no showing to equitable relief.

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in reaching all of his conclusions. Plaintiff
argues that the abstention doctrines relied upon by the Magistrate Judge are inapplicable to his
situation because he has followed and pursued each and every step of state procedure, raising
constitutional issues along the way but always been rebuffed. (Plaintiff's Objections pp. 2-3)
Plaintiff further argues that Illinois Rules of Professional conduct applied in his case are
unconstitutionally broad.

A. Abstention Doctrines.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine commands that federal district courts lack
jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts 406 U.S. 462, 476 (1923), The district court
does not have jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions even if those challenges allege
that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Levin v. ARDC, 74 F. 3d 763, 766 (7" Cir.
1996)(citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486 and Wright v. Tackell, 39 F. 3d 155, 157 (7" Cir. 1994). A
plaintiff “may not seck a reversal of a state court judgment simply by casting his complaint in the
form of a civil rights action.” Wrights, 39 F. 3d at 158 (quoting Ritter, 992 F. 2d at 754).

Here, Plaintiff is asking this court to review the decisions of the ARDC and the Illinois
Supreme Court regarding his pending disciplinary proceedings and his interim suspension from the
practice of law. Plaintiff asks this Court to order relief that would have the effect of altering the

course of disciplinary proceedings before the ARDC and the conduct of the Defendants in



nonmoving party will suffer if the injunction is granted balanced against the irreparable harm the
moving party will suffer and 4) the public interest. Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp., 75
F.3d 1153, 1156 (7thCir. 1996). In seeking relief directly from the Illinois Supreme Court,
Plaintiff has invoked the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority, which calls for an exercise of its
judicial power. McDunn vy. Williams,156 Ill. 2d 288, 620 N.E. 2d 385, 392 (1993). The Court’s
denial of relief on each of Plaintiffs motions must be viewed either as ancillary to the pending
disciplinary proceeding or as a final order and may be subject to review by writ of certiorari. See,
e.g., Levin v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm., 74 F. 3d 763, 766-67 (7" Cir. ), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1020 (1996). Because Plaintiff's injunctive relief request either relates to a
pending state matter, from which this Court must abstain, or it relates to a final order of the Illinois
Supreme Court, Plaintiff has not established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of
complaint.

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to raise sufficient facts to support his allegation that he will
suffer irreparable harm. Case law establishes that an attorney may challenge the constitutionality of
disciplinary proceedings within the context of those proceedings and secure a determination of
such issues from the Illinois Supreme Court. See e.g. In re Samuels, 126 Ill. 2d 509, 535 N.E. 2d.
808 (1989) and In re Doyle, 144 Ill. 2d 451, 581 N.E. 2d 669 (1991). To the extent that Plaintiff
complaints of any alleged impropriety in the conduct of his disciplinary proceedings, or any
unconstitutionality of the rules under which that proceeding has been conducted, he may raise these
issues before the ARDC Boards, the Illinois Supreme Court, and, if he so sees fit, before the
United States Supreme Court after a final decision has been rendered by the state court. Further, as

discussed in Shegog v. Bd. Of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 194 F. 3d 834, 839 (7" Cir. 1999) the



Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Ronald A. Guzman

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 5996 DATE 12/4/2002
CASE Peterson vs. United States of America, et al.
TITLE
[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) im Answer brief to motion due. _. Reply to answer brief due.
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(7) Oo Trial{set for/re-set for] on at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) OlLocal Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)\(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
(ao) «il [Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Plaintiffs request for
a TRO and preliminary injunction is denied with prejudice.
di) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. umber of noies
Notices mailed by judge’s staff,
Notified counsel by telephone, DEC 0; 2002
v | Docketing to mail notices. on
Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice
courtroom

ID deputy's
initials

O10 pacclterin

central Clerk’s Office ‘mailing deputy initials



This case clearly meets all three Younger abstention requirements. Plaintiffs admits that he
is currently the subject of on-going disciplinary proceedings with the ARDC. Second, the State of
Illinois clearly has an interest in instituting proceedings against attorneys who engage in
misconduct. Third, there is adequate opportunity afforded to Plaintiff in the state court
proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.

To the extent Plaintiff complains of any alleged impropriety in the conduct of his
disciplinary proceeding, or alleged unconstitutionality of the rules under which these proceedings
have been conducted, Plaintiff may raise these issues before the ARDC, the Illinois Supreme
Court, and if he sees fit, before any other appropriate Court after a final decision has been rendered
by the Illinois Supreme Court. Given the status of the state proceedings, it would be both
unnecessary and particularly intrusive for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's attempt
to circumvent the disciplinary proceedings against him. Therefore, it cannot be concluded as a
matter of law that the Magistrate Judge erred in invoking these abstention doctrines and Plaintiff's
objections are overruled.

B. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff further objects to Magistrate Judge Levin’s conclusion that Plaintiff has
failed to set forth sufficient facts to satisfy the factors necessary for a preliminary injunction to
issue. Once again Plaintiff complains about the conduct of the ARDC; its employees and the
Illinois Supreme Court. When determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the court
considers whether Plaintiff has established: “1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits,
and 2) no adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm if preliminary relief is denied. If the

moving party clears these hurdles, the court must then consider: 3) the irreparable harm the



administration of justice, and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 771, which prohibits conduct that tends
to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute.

On April 23, 2002 an evidentiary hearing was held in this matter before a panel of the
ARDC’s Hearing Board. On October 17, 2001, during the pendency of prehearing matters, the
Administrator of the ARDC, Mary Robinson, submitted to the Illinois Supreme Court a petition
seeking Plaintiff's interim suspension. The pretrial petition advised the Supreme Court of the
pending disciplinary matters, and of the results of a psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff. That
petition was filed pursuant to Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 774, which provides for the issuance of a rule to
show cause to an attorney who is the subject of such a petition. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 774 provides an
opportunity for the attorney to file a responsive pleading before any suspension is imposed.

On December 27, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court ordered Plaintiff suspended from the
practice of law until further order. On September 11, 2002, the Hearing Board of the ARDC
issued its report and recommendation in the matter, recommending that Plaintiff be suspended for
thirty months and until further order of the Illinois Supreme Court. Further proceedings in this
matter will be conducted in accordance with the requirement of II]. Sup. Ct. R. 753, which
provides that this disciplinary matter will eventually come before the Illinois Supreme Court for
entry of a final order.

On August 22, 2002 Plaintiff filed the instant complaint. Plaintiff seeks the following
relief: (1) a preliminary injunction against all Defendants; (2) requests this court to order the
ARDC to lift his suspension and grant him an interview; (3) requests this court to order the

ARDC to hire Plaintiff; (4) seeks an injunction against unethical activity by the ARDC



Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.; for a finding that the Controlled Substances
Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 801 is unconstitutional, for a finding that certain rules of the Illinois
Supreme Court and the Illinois ARDC are unconstitutional on their face or as applied, for a
finding that certain employees of the Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois ARDC violated the
United States Mail Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. §1341, and for a proper remedy to induce the FBI and/or
the Department of Justice to commence a proper investigation of those persons found to have
committed federal crimes. (Plaintiff's Complaint 1.) In addition Plaintiff claims his rights have
been violated under the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the American With
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ev. seq., the Age Discrimination Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq.,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Plaintiff's Complaint { 2).

Plaintiff was licensed as an attorney by the Illinois Supreme Court on November 1, 1982.
On August 22, 2001, Mary Robinson, as Administrator of the ARDC, filed a disciplinary
complaint against Plaintiff before the Hearing Board of the ARDC. The complaint charged, in
Count I, that Plaintiff had engaged in criminal conduct that reflected adversely on his honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(3) of Illinois’ Rules of
Professional Conduct by possessing cannabis. Count II of the complaint alleges that Plaintiff
threatened to present disciplinary charges over another attorney to obtain an advantage in a civil
matter, and used means in representing a client that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay or burden a third person, in violation of Rules 1.2(e) and 4.4 of Illinois’ Rules of
Professional Conduct. The complaint further alleged that Plaintiff's conduct violated Rule

8.4(a)(5) of Hlinois’ Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the



ee

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

PAUL G. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,

v.
NO. 02 CV 5996

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGIS-
TRATION & DISCIPLINARY
COMMISSION, SUPREME COURT
FBI, DEA, MARY ROBINSON,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ARDC, TRACY KEPLER &
ROSALYN KAPLAN

employees of the ARDC,

%
%& Merey

Op

we SS SS SS SS SS

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are Plaintiff's objections to Magistrate Judge Levin’s Recommendation that his
request for Preliminary injunctive relief be denied. For the reasons set forth below Plaintiff's
objections are overruled.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Paul Peterson, an attorney suspended from the practice of law by the Illinois
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (“ARDC”) filed a complaint against
Defendants, the United States Justice Department, the FBI, the DEA, the ARDC, the Illinois
Supreme Court, and employees of the ARDC, Mary Robinson, Tracy Kepler and Rosalyn

Kaplan. Plaintiffs complaint seeks a declaration as to the validity of the Religious Freedom