to exercise “billing judgment” and request only those hours reasonably expended on this case. We
therefore exercise our discretion to reduce the number of hours proffered by plaintiffs attorneys.
See Mathur v. Board of Trustees of S. Illinois Univ., 317 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 2003) (district court
may reduce either rate or hours proffered by attorney).

Reducing the amount of time spent on “conversations with client” (except the initial
conference) by a half, the time spent preparing the motion for summary judgment by a third and the
amount of time spent on this case since defendant’s December 2002 offer to reinstate plaintiff's
disability benefits by a half,’ we come up with a total number of hours for Staver of 33.52 and for
Gainsberg of 96.46.

Multiplying the reasonable hourly rates by the reasonable number of hours yields reasonable
attorneys’ fees in the amount of $24,928.90 ($4,190.00 for Staver [33.52 hours x $125.00 per hour]

+ $20,738.90 for Gainsberg [96.46 hours x $215.00 per hour]).

find reasonable, however, a fee request for subsequent conversations with a client lasting an hour and described only
as “conversation with client.” In addition, plaintiff's attomeys spent over 60 hours working on plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, even though discovery in this case was limited, and some of their time entries, without more
detail, appear duplicative. See, for example, time entries for 11/6/02, 11/8/02, 11/12/02 and 11/13/02. Moreover,
since receiving defendant’s letter offering to reinstate plaintiff's disability benefits and pay reasonable attorneys’
fees, plaintiff's attorneys have spent over 40 hours on this matter. That is excessive.

2 Finding it reasonable to bill in increments of six minutes, we have not reduced the original time entries
for 2/21/03, 4/21/03, 5/28/03, 6/12/03 and 6/23/03. Similarly, we have reduced the 6/9/03 time entry from .15 hour
to .l hour. Time entries for 6/10/03, 6/11/03, 6/13/03, 6/18/03 and 6/23/03 indicate that both Staver and Gainsberg
were involved in the particular task. However, they did not neatly allocate the time between them for those days as
they did for the 10/28/02 entry. For the June 2003 entries, we simply cut the total time by a half as described above,
and then simply allocated 50% of that time to Staver and 50% to Gainsberg.

4



Staver takes many of his cases on a contingent fee basis and Gainsberg, who has an appellate and
bankruptcy practice, says he has been awarded fees of $200 per hour by the court in his bankruptcy
practice. But plaintiff has not provided us with evidence of other attorneys’ rates and plaintiff's
attorneys have no past ERISA case fee awards from which we could determine market rate.

Third, we note that while Staver and Gainsberg may be principals in their own Chicago law
firm, their requested hourly rate of $250 per hour is too high given their experience both as lawyers
in general and as ERISA lawyers in particular. Staver has been practicing law since May 2000.
Gainsberg has been a licensed attorney since November 1996, but spent two and a half years clerking
for a state appellate court judge. Their firm has handled only two other ERISA benefit cases; one
case settled and they were not awarded attorneys’ fees in the other. We believe that $125 per hour
is a reasonable fee for Staver, based on his experience and the services rendered, and $215 per hour
is reasonable for Gainsberg, who is more experienced than Staver.

We now turn to the matter of time expended. A parly requesting fees is required to exercise
“billing judgment” in making a claim that the number of hours submitted in a fee request is
reasonable. Spegon, 175 F.3d at 552. This means that plaintiff should make “good faith efforts to
exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley,
461 US. at 434. “Billing judgment consists of winnowing the hours actually expended down to the
hours reasonably expended.” Spegon, 175 F.3d at 552 (internal citation omitted).

Plaintiff has provided us with a time sheet indicating the actual time spent on certain tasks

associated with this case — 174 hours. We do not find this reasonable.’ Plaintiffhas made no effort

' We note first that the attomeys’ time sheet indicates numerous conversations with plaintiff, many lasting
an hour, but with no description of what was discussed. We can see the need for an initial client conference fasting a
couple of hours, and later brief conversations with the client to update him on the progress of the case. We do not

3


Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in
part. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $24,928.90 and costs in the amount of

$377.69.

ENTER:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: 4 -6- Q 3


/N itnule Order Baer (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Jud Sitting Judge if Oth
mo Magistrate Judge Paul E, Plunkett than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 5965 DATE 8/6/2003
CASE Edward Schnuckel vs. The Prudential Ins. Co. of America
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) 0 Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

3g) O Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due

(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on setfor_ at

(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—ssetfor__— at

(6) im Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set forlon___——ssetfor at.
Q) im Trial[set for/re-set for]}on__—_att

(8) Oo [BenclyJury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at

(9) ao This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) CO Local Rule 41.1 COFRCP41(a)(1) (FRCP41(a)(2).

ao [Other docket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Plaintiff's motion for
attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in part. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$24,928.90 and costs in the amount of $377.69. Status hearing set for August 13, 2003 at 9:45a.m.

(11) @ (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. number af notices

AUG 07 2003

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

J | Docketing to mail notices,
Mail AO 450 form.

und Lordisia sn
wuss

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

Qi mn Wd 9- SN EO
34900 803 gad

Date/time teceived in 7 ;
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials

dato maited notice
courtroom

BK deputy’s ORIL:
initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
EDWARD SCHNUCKEL, )
)
Plaintiff, y
)
v. ) No. 02 C 5965

) Paul E. Plunkett, Senior Judge
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE )
COMPANY OF AMERICA, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is an ERISA matter and before the Court is plaintiff's motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(1). For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion is granted
in part. The Court will award attorneys’ fees in the amount of $24,928.90 and costs in the amount

of $377.69.

Aug

Discussion . “ON
Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees of $43,512.50 and costs of $377.69. The fees request is based
on arate of $250 per hour for 174 hours of attorney time. Defendant contends that neither the hourly
fee nor the amount of time spent on the case is reasonable. Having determined that an award of
attorneys’ fees is appropriate in this case, our task is to determine what amount of attorneys’ fees is

reasonable.

“The most useful starting point for determining the amount ofa reasonable fee,” the Supreme

|



Court tells us, “is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). We begin first with the
hourly rate. A reasonable hourly rate is to be determined by the “market rate” for the services
rendered. Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). Normally, an
attorney’s actual billing rate is presumptively appropriate to use as the market rate. People Who
Care v. Rockford Board of Educ., 90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1996). But where the attorney
maintains a predominantly contingent fee or public interest practice, the court needs to look to the
next best evidence to determine market rate, e.g., evidence of rates similarly experienced attorneys
in the community charged to paying clients for similar work or evidence of fee awards the attorney
has received in similar cases. Spegon, 175 F.3d at 555. It is the party seeking the fee award who
bears the burden of proving market rate. Id. at 554.

The only market rate evidence we have are affidavits from plaintiff’s attorneys themselves.
The attorneys are Jared Staver and Neal Gainsberg, principals of Staver & Gainsberg, P.C., a two-
attorney firm in Chicago. They each seek an hourly rate of $250 and justify this rate by saying they
are “familiar with the customary and reasonable rates of a partner in a Chicago law firm. A $250.00
per hour rate is reasonable and a market rate for a principal partner of a law firm in Chicago.” (PI.’s
Exs.B47,C49.)

These statements do not support a conclusion that $250 per hour is market rate for the
services rendered. First, affidavits alone are insufficient to establish a market rate of $250 per hour.
See Spegon, 175 F.3d at 556 (“An attorney’s self-serving affidavit alone cannot satisfy the plaintiff's
burden of establishing the market rate for that attorney’s services.”). Second, the nature of Staver

& Gainsberg’s practice demands that we look at the next best evidence to determine market rate.