UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4289

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES BRAGG,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior

District Judge. (7:14-cr-00111-F-2)

Submitted: March 28, 2016 Decided: April 8, 2016

Before KING, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States 

Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

James Bragg appeals the district court’s judgment imposing 

a 24-month term of incarceration and a 10-year term of 

supervised release following Bragg’s guilty plea to distribution 

of a quantity of cocaine base. Bragg argues on appeal that his 

supervised release term is procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable and that his 24-month sentence of incarceration is 

substantively unreasonable. We affirm. 

We generally review a sentence for reasonableness, applying 

“a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 

106, 111-12 (4th Cir. 2015). However, because Bragg did not 

object to the term of supervised release in the district court 

or argue for a term of supervised release different than the one 

imposed by the district court, we review the procedural 

reasonableness of the supervised release term for plain error. 

See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576—8 (4th Cir. 2010).

Under the plain error standard, Bragg must show (1) an error; 

(2) that is plain; (3) that affects his substantial rights; and 

(4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Webb, 738 

F.3d 638, 640-41 (4th Cir. 2013) (alteration and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 
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Bragg asserts that his term of supervised release is 

procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to 

adequately explain its reasons for imposing the 10-year term. 

In evaluating a sentencing court’s explanation of a selected 

sentence, the district court “must make an individualized 

assessment based on the facts presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 

While the “individualized assessment need not be elaborate or 

lengthy, . . . it must provide a rationale tailored to the 

particular case at hand and adequate to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the district court explained its reasons for imposing 

the 10-year supervised release term. Specifically, the district 

court discussed Bragg’s lengthy criminal history, including nine 

drug-related convictions and eight misdemeanor infractions, as 

well as his previous failure to complete supervision without a 

violation. The district court also considered the appropriate 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors before imposing the sentence. We 

therefore conclude that there was no procedural error in the 

district court’s imposition of the 10-year term.

We next review the term of supervised release for 

substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality 

of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from 

the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Bragg challenges 
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the substantive reasonableness of the 10-year term on the ground 

that it is greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of 

sentencing. Because Bragg “simply challeng[es] the substantive 

reasonableness of his [supervised release term] due to its 

length or non-specific considerations,” our review is for abuse 

of discretion rather than plain error. See United States v. 

Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2010). 

A district court, “in determining the length of the term 

and the conditions of supervised release, shall consider the 

factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), 

(a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(c). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 10-

year term of supervised release given Bragg’s extensive criminal 

record and repeated prior violations of probation and supervised 

release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B) (identifying 

“nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant” and “adequate deterrence to 

criminal conduct” as factors for determining proper sentence). 

Thus, the above-Guidelines term of supervised release is 

substantively reasonable.

Finally, we turn to the substantive reasonableness of the 

within-Guidelines-range sentence of incarceration. We presume

that a sentence within a properly calculated Sentencing 
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Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 

F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). 

A defendant can rebut this presumption only “by showing that the 

sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors.” Id. We conclude that Bragg’s withinGuidelines-range sentence of incarceration is substantively 

reasonable and that Bragg has not made the showing necessary to 

rebut the presumption of reasonableness. See id. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED