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Honorable Bobby Joe Mann Opinion No. JIG829 

Palo Pinto County Attorney 

P. 0. BOX 1450 Re: Whether a taxing unit 

Mineral Wells, Texas 76067 may grant a homestead exemption to persons 65 years of 

age or older while denying 

the exemption to disabled 

persons (RQ-1247) 

Dear Mr. Mann: 

Article VIII, section l-b, of the Texas Constitution 

and section 11.13 of the Tax Code contain the provisions 

either requiring or authorizing the various types of 

political subdivisions to grant or offer the various types 

of residence homestead exemptions from ad valorem 

taxation. Article VIII, section l-b(b), of the Texas 

Constitution and section 11.13(d) of the Tax Code 

authorize taxing units to grant to two specified classes 

of persons a so-called 8'optiona111 residential homestead 

exemption in an amount not less. than $3,000. YOU ask 

whether the governing body of a taxing unit may offer such 

an exemption either to the class of persons who are 65 

years of age or older or to the class of persons who are 

disabled without offering the exemption to both. We 

conclude that the governing body of a taxing unit may 

offer the residence homestead exemption to one of the 

specified classes without offering it to both. 

Article VIII, section l-b(b), of the Texas Constitution contains the following relevant language: 

(b) From and after January 1, 1973, the 

governing body of any county, city, town, 

school district, or other political 

subidvision of the State may exempt by its 

own action not less than Three Thousand 

Dollars ($3,000) of the market value of 

residence homesteads of persons, married or 

unmarried, including those living alone, who 

are under a disability for purposes of 

payment of disability insurance benefits 

under Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and 

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Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 2 WI-8291 

Disability Insurance or its.successor or of 

married or unmarried persons sixty-five (65) 

years of age or older, including those living alone, from all ad valorem taxes thereafter levied by the political subdivision. 

As an alternative, upon receipt of 

petition signed by twenty percent (20%) oaf 

the voters who voted in the last preceding 

election held by the political subdivision, 

the governing body of the subdivision shall 

call an election to determine by majority 

vote whether an amount not less than Three 

Thousand Dollars ($3,000) as provided in the 

petition, of the market value of residence 

homesteads of disabled persons z of persons 

sixty-five (65) years of age or over shall 

be exempt from ad valorem taxes thereafter 

levied by the political subdivision. &I 

eliaible disabled werson who is sixty-five 

(65) years of acre or older mav not receive 

both exemwtions from the same wolitical 

subdivision in the same vear but mav choose 

either if the subdivision has adowted both. 

(Emphasis added.) 

'Section 11.13 of the Tax Code contains the following 

relevant language: 

. . . . 

(d) In 

provided by 

.a - 

addition to the exemptions 

Subsections (b) and (c) of this 

section ise@ing forth the so-called "mandatory" residence homestead exemptions that 

must be granted by school districts], an 

individual who is disabled gr is 65 or older 

is entitled to an exemption from taxation by 

a taxing unit of a portion (the amount of 

which is fixed as provided by Subsection (e) 

of this section) of the appraised value of 

his residence homestead if the exemption is 

adopted either: 

(1) by the governing body of the 

taxing unit: or 

(2) by a favorable vote of a majority 

of the qualified voters of the taxing 

unit at an election called by the governing body of the taxing unit, and the 

governing body shall call the election on 

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Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 3 (JM-829) 

the petition of at least 20 percent of 

the number of qualified voters who voted 

in the preceding election of the taxing 

unit. 

(e) The amount of an exemption.adopted.as 

~rsov:d;~oby Subsection (d) of this section 

of the appraised value 

resid&ce homestead unless 

of the 

a larger amount 

is specified by: 

(1) the governing body authorizing the 

exemption if the exemption is authorized 

as provided by Subdivision (1) of Subsection (d) of this section: or 

(2) the petition for the election if 

the exemption is authorized as provided 

by Subdivision (2) of Subsection (d) of 

this section. 

(f) Once authorized, an exemption adopted 

as provided by Subsection Cd) of this 

section may be repealed or decreased or 

increased in amount by the governing body of 

the taxing unit or by the procedure 

authorized by Subdivision (2) of Subsection 

(d) of this section. In the case of a 

decrease, the amount of the exemption may 

not be reduced to less than $3,000 of the 

market value. 

In construing a statute, we are required to give 

effect to the evident intent of the legislature when it 

enacted the provision. Minton v. Frank, 545 S.W.2d 442, 

445 (Tex. 1976); Calvert v. Texas Piwe Line Co., 517 

S.W.Zd 777, 780 (Tex. 1974). A close reading of section 

11.13 of the Tax Code, however, does not reveal whether 

the legislature intended that governing bodies be allowed 

to grant residence homestead exemptions to only one of the 

specified classes and not to the other. The extant 

legislative history of the section fails to disclose any 

evidence of legislative intent. But language in the 

authorizing constitutional provision does. 

The relevant sentence of article VIII, section l-b(b) 

declares: "An eligible disabled person who is sixty-five 

(65) years of age or older may not receive both exemptions 

from the same political subdivision in the same year but 

may choose either if the subdivision has adowted both." 

(Emphasis added.) The controlling principle in giving 

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Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 4 (JM-829) 

effect to a constitutional amendment is to give effect to 

the intention of the framers of the amendment and of the 

people who adopted it. Gr co avuu Indewendent School 

District, 539 S.W.2d 861; 8:5-z, (Gex. 1976), awweal 

dism'd, 429 U.S.,973 (1977); Farrar v. Board of Trustees 

of Emwlovees Retirement Svstem of Texas, 243 S.W.2d 688, 

692 (Tex. 1951). Language in a constitutional amendment 

must be presumed to have been carefully selected, and the 

words used are to be interpreted as the people generally 

understood them. Leander Indewendent School District v. 

Cedar Part Water Suwwlv Corw 

1972). We may not construe the 

479 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex. 

constitution in a way that 

thwarts the will of the people by reading into the 

constitution language that is not included therein, or by 

construing the constitution differently from its plain 

meaning. Cramer v. Shewherd, 167 S.W.2d 147, 154 (Tex. 

1943). 

It is clear that the legislature intended, when it 

proposed the amendment, and the people intended, when they 

adopted the amendment, that political subdivisions be 

empowered to offer the "optional** residence homestead 

exemption to one of the specified classes of persons 

without offering it to both. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the governing body of a taxing unit may offer the 

residence homestead exemptions to one of the specified 

classes of persons, i.e. either persons who are 65 years 

of age or older or persons who are disabled, without 

offering the residence homestead exemption to both. 

SUMMARY 

Pursuant to article VIII, section l-b(b) 

of the Texas Constitution and section 

11.13(d) of the Tax Code, the governing body 

of a taxing unit may offer the so-called 

"optional11 residence homestead exemption to 

one of the specified classes of persons, 

i.e. either persons who are 65 years of age 

or older or persons who are disabled, without offering the residence homestead 

exemption to both. 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

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Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 5 (JM-829) 

MARY KELLER 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLBY 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Jim Moellinger 

Assistant Attorney General 

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