time were materially adverse. “Adverse employment action” can encompass a failure to
promote. Spearman y. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7" Cir. 2000); Hunt v. City of
Markham, Ill., 219 F.3d 649, 654 (7" Cir. 2000).

But this court has already told the plaintiff on at least two occasions that
unsupported allegations of retaliation do not comport with basic pleading requirements.
See Adusumilli v. Discover, 1999 WL 286289 at *5 (no actionable claim where plaintiff
failed to allege that any of the decision-makers involved in the implementation of actions
she considered adverse knew about her EEOC charge or took action due to those
complaints), Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 1998 WL 601822 at *5
(dismissing Adusumilli’s retaliation claim because her “conclusory assertions do not
satisfy” the requirement that plaintiff show a causal connection between the allegedly
adverse action and the protected activity). See also McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256,
259 (7" Cir. 1996) (dismissing retaliation claim where employee alleged no causal
connection between the retaliatory conduct and the protected activity).

Despite the court’s prior admonitions, the plaintiff has failed to state any facts to
support her claim that she was denied promotions for retaliatory reasons. The plaintiff
does not indicate what the promotions were, whether she was qualified for the new
positions she sought, or that the persons in charge of the promotion decisions were even
aware of her EEOC charge. The plaintiff's conclusory, one-sentence assertion in her

brief is insufficient to state a claim that she was denied promotions due to her EEOC

13


male co-worker stared at the plaintiff's breasts during a meeting. The plaintiff again
reported the matters to the Human Resources Department, but no action was taken.

The plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission [hereinafter, “EEOC”] on March 13, 2001.

Subsequently, the plaintiff requested a transfer to another department. Guaccio
told her that she would not be transferred unless she withdraw her EEOC charge.

When the plaintiff brought the issues to the attention of her direct supervisor,
Patel, he told her to look for another job. Patel additionally docked the plaintiff an
hour’s pay for attending a funeral over her lunch hour, even though the plaintiff had
received permission to attend the funeral and had returned to work within an hour.

The plaintiff has suffered “adverse mental health,” including depression and
unspecified “mental disability,” as a result of the perceived harassment. The plaintiff
has been under the treatment of physicians for her psychological distress.

On April 23, 2001, the plaintiff received her Notice of Right to Sue. She initiated
this lawsuit on July 13, 2001.

DISCUSSION

Even accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the complaint fails to
state a claim as a matter of law. The work conditions the plaintiff describes do not
amount to a sexually hostile work environment. Moreover, the plaintiff did not suffer

any adverse employment action that rose to the level of actionable retaliation after she

4


drastic action, including punitive sanctions and/or a regulatory injunction restricting the
plaintiff's filings.
CONCLUSION

In sum, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted as
to all claims raised in the complaint. Both the plaintiff's sex discrimination and
retaliation claims are patently without merit. Furthermore, on the court’s own motion,
attorneys’ fees and costs of suit will be awarded in favor of the defendant, in an amount
to be determined.

IT Is THEREFORE ORDERED, for the reasons set forth in this order, that the
defendant’s motion to dismiss [#12] is granted. The complaint is dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The case is terminated.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant file a bill of costs and motion for
attorneys’ fees within fourteen days of the date of this order.

ENTER:

hack, Miers,

Blanche M. Manning
United States District Court

Dated: A-f- 03-

17


526, 534-35 (7" Cir. 1993) (holding that supervisor who inappropriately teased plaintiff,
kissed her, touched her leg and upper thigh, and lurched at her did not create hostile
work environment).

Under these circumstances, it is clear that the plaintiff cannot maintain any claim
of sexual harassment. It may well be that the plaintiff genuinely believes that she has
been the victim of sexual harassment, but her perceptions are completely unreasonable,
if not irrational. Although the court has examined the plaintiff's allegations in this case
without regard to her prior cases, her accusations are completely unfounded and border
on the standard of frivolousness set forth in Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.25, 32
(1992). The plaintiff has provided no facts whatsoever to support her contention that
this case is somehow “different” from her other cases, or that her previous lawsuits were
improperly dismissed by “intentionally unfair” judges. Given the number of times the
plaintiff has been told what does and does not rise to the level of an actionable claim for
sexual harassment, her claim that she has been subjected to a hostile work environment
is dismissed with prejudice.

II. Retaliation

The complaint likewise fails to state a cognizable retaliation claim. Defense
counsel is mistaken in her assertion that the plaintiff raised the issue of retaliation for the
first time in her brief opposing dismissal. The pro se complaint plainly advances a

theory of recovery based on retaliation. The plaintiff alleges both that she was promised

9


or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Jd. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785 (1998). The complained-of conduct
must be “hostile or deeply repugnant” rather than merely “unpleasant.” Baskerville v.
Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7" Cir. 1995) (rejecting plaintiff's claim of hostile
work environment even though plaintiff alleged that her supervisor called her “pretty
girl,” made grunting noises when she wore a skirt, suggested she “run around naked,”
called her his “Anita Hill,” and pantomimed masturbation in her presence).

Moreover, “isolated and innocuous” incidents will not rise to the level required to
establish hostile work environment, whatever the plaintiff's subjective perceptions. See
Doe vy. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 444 (7" Cir. 1994), “[S}imple teasing,
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to
discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 788 (internal citations omitted), In order to prevail on a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim, a plaintiff must show that his or her work environment was both
subjectively and objectively hostile. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993). An objectively hostile environment is one that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive. Jd. at 21, 23. In determining whether a plaintiff has met this
standard, courts must consider all the circumstances, including “the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it was physically threatening or humiliating

6


filed an EEOC charge. In fact, the plaintiff has filed at least five other lawsuits against
schools and other employers making substantially similar allegations.' In each case, the
courts have rejected the plaintiff’s claims and explained to her what is and is not
actionable. Because in pursuing this lawsuit the plaintiff continues to ignore court
rulings and well established case law, the defendant will be awarded its costs and
attorneys’ fees incurred in defending this suit.
I. Sexually Hostile Work Environment

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful “for an employer to
... discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). An employer violates Title
VII when “discrimination based on sex . . . create[s] a hostile or abusive work
environment.” Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).

However, “not all workplace conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’
affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title VII.”

Id. at 67. Rather, “[flor sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe

1 The court’s docket reflects the following cases filed by the plaintiff in this district,
besides the instant case: Adusumilli v. Chicago Police Dept., Case No. 95 C 7680; Adusumilli v.
Loyola University, Case No. 97 C 8188; Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology, Case No.
97 C 8507; Adusumilli v. Novus Services, Case No. 98 C 6129; and Adusumilli v. Discover
Financial Services., Case No. 00 C 5522. Four of the five are employment discrimination
cases; the other is a Title IX civil rights action against a school alleging sexual harassment.

5


staring and touching offensive, her subjective perceptions are insufficient to state an
actionable claim. Only a single incident-when a co-worker allegedly touched his penis
against the plaintiff-could be deemed serious, and only then if the plaintiff's perception
was correct and he hadn’t simply unintentionally brushed against her. That episode,
while offensive and inexcusable if intentional, was not sufficient, either by itself or in
conjunction with the other events described by the plaintiff, to create a sexually hostile
work environment. No reasonable person could find that the incidents about which the
plaintiff complains have been so objectively extreme or humiliating as to rise to the level
of a Title VII violation.

“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment--an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile
or abusive--is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; McKenzie v. Illinois
Dept. of Transportation, 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7° Cir. 1996). Whatever the plaintiff's
subjective perceptions may be, the minor incidents complained of here do not suffice to
state a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. In numerous other cases,
including Baskerville and the plaintiff's own previous suits, the courts have held that
conduct much more severe than the conduct the plaintiff currently alleges does not
constitute actionable sexual harassment. See, e.g., McKenzie, 92 F.3d at 479-80 (holding
that three sexually suggestive comments over a three-month period did not create a

hostile work environment); Saxton v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 10 F.3d

8


Minute Order Pormn (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge | ~~ BLANCHE M. MANNING Sitting Judge if Other

or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C5404 DATE eo f-0 oh
CASE Indira Adusumilli vs. Swedish Covenant Hospital
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented, ]
MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

qd) im) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) o Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____—_—set for at .
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at |
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at :
(9) QO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to] |
OFRCP4(m) OO General Rule21 OC FRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2). |
(10) a {Other docket entry] For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion and |
Order, the defendant’s motion to dismiss [#12] is granted. The complaint is dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The case is terminated. The defendant is directed to file a bill of
costs and motion for attorney’s fees within fourteen days of the date of this order.
di) [See attached Memorandum Opinion and Order.]
No notices required, advised in open court. Document
, - Number
No notices required. umber of notices
Notices mailed by judge’s staff,
Notified counsel by telephone. FEB Lo 4 200
VY | Docketing to mail notices.
JY | Mail AO 450 form.

courtroom ray
mim doputy’s aR) i
initials :
Date eB Gpived in
gs id \ Senitat Cletk’s Office ing dpa inl
ay-Gaus

gt Ga


plaintiff's EEOC charge constituted statutorily protected activity, the court finds that the
plaintiff did not suffer adverse employment actions.
According to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,

An adverse action occurs when an employee is fired or demoted, suffers a
decrease in benefits or pay, or is given a significantly lesser job. Not every
unwelcome employment action qualifies as an adverse action. Negative
reviews, a change in job title, an increased distance to travel to work, or a
lateral transfer do not, by themselves, qualify.

Hill y. American General Finance, Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7" Cir. 2000).

In fact, it is not enough to state an adverse employment action-the plaintiff must
show that she was subjected to “materially” adverse job action. See, e.g., Ribando v.
United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 510-11 (7" Cir. 1999):

Although we have defined the term broadly, the adverse job action must be
“materially” adverse, meaning more than “a mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities.” Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.
of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7" Cir. 1993). We have explained, a materially
adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a
demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished
title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular
situation. Jd.; see Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118
S.Ct. 2257, 2268-69, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1988) (“A tangible employment
action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.””)

“{N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” Id.,

citing Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7" Cir. 1996).

11


a transfer only if she agreed to drop her EEOC charge, and that she was unjustly
punished for attending a funeral over her lunch hour when she refused to do so.

Counsel also misstates the law with respect to exhaustion. It is true that a Title
VII plaintiff may generally raise only claims that were brought before the EEOC or
claims that are “like or reasonably related to” allegations in the EEOC charge. See, e.g.,
Cheek v. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F.3d 200, 202 (7" Cir. 1996). However, in this circuit
there is an exception for retaliation claims in order to avoid multiple EEOC filings in
cases where the filing of an EEOC charge is the catalyst for retaliation. Heuer v.
Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d 1021, 1023 (7" Cir. 2000); McKenzie v. Illinois Dept. of Transp.,
92 F.3d 473, 482-83 (7" Cir. 1996).

Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails because she has not articulated
any materially adverse consequences for pursuing her EEOC charge. Under Title VU, it
is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees . . . because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a). To state a claim for retaliation, the plaintiff must allege that: (1) she
engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse job action; and
(3) a causal link exists between the protected expression and the adverse action. Dey v.

Colt Construction & Development Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1457 (7" Cir. 1994). Although the

10


or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s
work performance.” /d. at 23.

In this case, the plaintiff fails to state a colorable claim for sexual harassment
because the alleged conduct has not been severe, debilitating, or pervasive enough to
create a hostile work environment. To the contrary, the plaintiff complains of conduct
remarkably similar to perceived offenses that the courts have repeatedly discounted in
her prior lawsuits. See, e.g., Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, No. 95 CV 7680, 1997 WL
769457, *9 (N.D. Ill.1997) (Plunkett, J.) (granting employer’s motion for summary
judgment and holding that allegations that co-workers ogled the plaintiff and touched her
arm, fingers, and buttocks did not give rise to a Title VII claim), aff'd Adusumilli v. City
of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 361-62 (7" Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 988 (1999);
Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology, No. 97 CV 8507, 1998 WL 601822, *4
(Leinenweber, J.) (granting motion to dismiss Title [X claim of sexual harassment
because the plaintiff's allegations that various professors and students ogled her and
touched her hand, shoulder, back, leg, and breast failed to state a claim). In each of these
cases, the plaintiff has alleged some form of ogling and inappropriate touching; in each
case, her claims have been rejected.

As with all of her prior cases, it is clear that the instances of conduct the plaintiff
alleges in the instant complaint constitute harmless and isolated incidents that do not rise

to the level of creating a hostile work environment. Even if the plaintiff has found the

7


plaintiff contends that male coworkers and supervisors have subjected her to a “sexually
hostile” work environment ever since she began working there.

More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that a male technician, Tudor Iacob,
“inappropriately poked [plaintiff's] fingers” when he was showing her a pneumatic tube.
A male director, Ramesh Patel, inappropriately touched her hands on several occasions
while showing her how to use a computer program and when taking binders the plaintiff
handed him. Patel additionally looked at the plaintiffs groin once and stared at her face
on multiple occasions, making her feel uncomfortable. A male co-worker, Jun Magsino,
touched the plaintiff's fingers and hands while showing her how to prepare a gel.
Another co-worker, Merdin Kyaw, ogled the plaintiff's breasts. Supervisor Zoon Park
intentionally brushed his hips against the plaintiff's when they were standing together in
the pharmacy. Park also touched the plaintiff's hand “inappropriately” when the plaintiff
was giving him a binder. He once approached the plaintiff, stood very close to her, and
stared.

The plaintiff reported the above incidents to the hospital’s President and CEO,
Mark Newton, as well as Anthony Guaccio, the Vice President of Human Resources.

Following the plaintiff's complaint, male technician Sandeep Mehta touched his
penis to the plaintiff's hips and told her that she looked beautiful. Another co-worker,
Michael Vo, rubbed his arm against hers. A mailroom employee intentionally touched

the plaintiff's fingers on three occasions when she was giving boxes to him. Another

3


charge, particularly given her past history of making similarly unsubstantiated claims
though advised of the necessary elements of such a claim. The plaintiff's retaliation
claims cannot survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Because the plaintiff has failed
to show either materially adverse employment action or causality, her retaliation claims
are dismissed with prejudice.

IH. Costs of Suit

The plaintiff continues to file lawsuits making the same or substantially similar
frivolous claims. The district and appellate courts in this circuit have repeatedly
explained the law to the plaintiff concerning what constitutes sexual harassment and
retaliation, A judge of this district court found at least one complaint, in Adusumilli v.
Discover Financial Services, No. 98 C 6129, 1999 WL 286289, *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19,
1999) (Gottschall, J.), to be “baseless” and sanctionable. The judge in that case even
circulated her opinion to the other judges of the district so that they would be on notice
of the plaintiff's frivolous litigation. In fact, the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished
order, granted the defendant-appellee’s motion for sanctions in connection with the
appeal of that case. See Mandate entered August 20, 1999, in Appeal No. 99-2269. But
warnings and even sanctions have not deterred the plaintiff from relitigating essentially
the same lawsuit over and over, against different employers.

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure holds even unrepresented parties

to a specified standard for filing claims in federal court. Specifically, the rule states that

14


multiple lawsuits in which she alleged similar conduct, the plaintiff has pursued the
instant lawsuit, which levels even less serious accusations of sexual harassment than the
previous suits--and she did so even after being repeatedly cautioned by this court that
complaints of ogling and touching would not suffice to state a claim for hostile work
environment sexual harassment. It thus appears to the court that the plaintiff has not
taken prior court rulings and warnings seriously.

The defendant has not moved for sanctions. Nevertheless, a prevailing defendant
is entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees if the plaintiff either brought suit in subjective bad
faith or the action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not
brought in subjective bad faith.” Vitug v. Multistate Tax Com’n, 883 F.Supp. 215, 218-
19 (N.D. Il. 1995), citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.0.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421
(1978); Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 894 F.2d 250, 253 (7" Cir.1990). The court
makes such a finding here. Because the plaintiff has put this court and yet another
defendant to the time and expense of addressing a complaint containing claims nearly
identical to those that have been repeatedly rejected in her previous suits, the defendant
will be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs of suit in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The defendant is directed to
submit a bill of costs and motion for attorneys’ fees within fourteen days of the date of

this order. If the plaintiff persists in litigating frivolous claims, the court may take more

16


It is well established that pro se complaints are to be liberally construed. Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), reh’g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also
McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7" Cir. 2000). They can be
dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Haines, 404 U.S. at 521; Zimmerman y. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7" Cir. 2000).

When considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the court takes the allegations in the complaint as true,
viewing all facts--as well as any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom--in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Autry v. Northwest Premium Services, Inc., 144 F.3d
1037, 1039 (7" Cir. 1998). Dismissal should be denied whenever it appears that a basis
for federal jurisdiction in fact exists or may exist and can be stated by the plaintiff.
Jones v. Edgar, 3 F. Supp.2d 979, 980 (C.D. Ill. 1998). Nevertheless, in order to
withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts sufficiently setting forth the
essential elements of the cause of action. Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 893 (1992).

FACTS

The plaintiff alleges the following facts, which will be accepted as true for

purposes of this motion: The plaintiff has been employed as an administrative secretary

in the pharmacy department at Swedish Covenant Hospital since June 8, 2000. The

2


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOPVETED
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,"

EASTERN DIVISION FEB 04 2002
INDIRA ADUSUMILLI, )
Plaintiff,
Vv. } 01 CV 5404
SWEDISH COVENANT HOSPITAL, }
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The plaintiff, Indira Adusumilli, has brought this pro se civil action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The plaintiff claims that the defendant, Swedish Covenant Hospital,
has discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, in violation of Title VII. More
specifically, the plaintiff alleges that although she has repeatedly complained to her
employer about a sexually hostile work environment and pervasive sexual harassment,
the defendant has failed to transfer her to a different department or to take any other
corrective action. The plaintiff additionally maintains that the defendant has retaliated
against her for challenging her mistreatment. This matter is before the court for
consideration of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a

claim. For the reasons stated in this order, the motion will be granted.

lly


In her complaint, the plaintiff complains of two “adverse” employment actions:
her supervisor purportedly refused to transfer her to a different department unless she
dropped her EEOC charge and she was docked an hour’s pay for attending a funeral on
her lunch hour. But neither adverse job action was “material.” The denial of a transfer
cannot be characterized as adverse employment action at all; to the contrary, the denial
maintained the status quo. Furthermore, being docked an hour’s pay for attending a
funeral over a lunch hour, while perhaps unfair under the circumstances described by the
plaintiff, simply does not rise to the level of a “materially adverse change in the terms
and conditions of employment.”

In response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff additionally claims that she
received unfair performance evaluations, was passed over for [unspecified] “promotions
and other positions” for which she applied, and was denied sick time to care for her ill
child. As noted above, negative performance evaluations cannot be deemed materially
adverse job consequences. Furthermore, the hospital’s sick leave policy cannot
reasonably be characterized as retaliatory even if every other past employer allowed the
plaintiff to use sick time when her child was ill.

The only claim that gives the court pause is the plaintiff's assertion, raised for the
first time in her brief opposing dismissal, that she has been denied promotions as a result
of her EEOC charge. The court is troubled that defense counsel omitted reference to that

allegation in the reply brief, addressing only whether performance evaluations and sick

12


“[b]y presenting to the court . . . a pleading, . . . an unrepresented person is certifying that
to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,--. . . (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. . . .” (emphasis added). Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b).

“Frivolous, vexatious, and repeated filings by pro se litigants interfere with the
orderly administration of justice by diverting scarce judicial resources from cases having
merit and filed by litigants willing to follow court orders.” U.S. ex rel. Verdone v.
Circuit Court for Taylor County, 73 F.3d 669, 671 (7" Cir. 1995). In addition to
sanctions, courts may also award attorneys’ fees and court costs against pro se litigants
who file frivolous or vexatious suits. Courts may even restrict a litigant’s access to the
courts. See, e.g., Lysiak v. C.LR., 816 F.2d 311, 313 (7" Cir. 1987) (holding that “{a]
court faced with a litigant engaged in a pattern of frivolous litigation has the authority to
implement a remedy that may include restrictions on that litigant’s access to the court”
and enjoining pro se litigant from filing additional pleadings until previous monetary
sanctions were paid); Verdone, 73 F.3d at 674 (ordering serial litigant to seek leave to
file future pleadings).

Ms. Adusumilli’s pattern of filing and pressing suits that have no legal basis is

both disturbing and unduly costly to defendants and the courts alike. After losing

15