attempts to collect discharged debts is a contempt action in
bankruptcy court); see also Wehrheim v. Secrest, No. 00-1328, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19020, at *19 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2002) (holding
that Cox precludes suits under the FDCPA that might have been
brought as a contempt proceeding in bankruptcy court) .

I stand by my reasoning in Randolph, and hold that Ms. Cross
cannot sustain this action under the FDCPA. Any remedy for a
creditor’s collection actions during a pending bankruptcy should be
provided by the bankruptcy court. The motion for judgment on the

pleadings is GRANTED.

ENTER ORDER:

Lbue L Buhl

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: August_7__, 2003



additional remedy under the FDCPA in district court, and district
court authority is deeply divided.

The most informative Seventh Circuit opinion in this area
remains Cox v. Zale Delaware Inc., 239 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2001). In
Cox, the Seventh Circuit held that a suit for violation of section
524(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires debt reaffirmation
agreements to be filed with the bankruptcy court, may be brought
only as a contempt action, “since the debtor would be seeking to
enforce the order of discharge issued in that [bankruptcy]
proceeding.” Id. at 917. I read this as an indication of the
circuit’s preference for efficient resolution of discharge-related
claims in one forum.

Ms. Cross suggests that to deny her the opportunity to pursue
her claim in this court would contravene the principle that where
two federal statutes address the same subject, courts should give
effect to both. Peeples v. Blatt, No. 00 C 7028, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11689, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2001) (Gottschall, J.)
(holding that a bankruptcy debtor subjected to collection attempts
has a right of action under both the Bankruptcy Code and the
FDCPA). While I recognize that principle, it must be weighed
against the expressed goal of the Bankruptcy Code to provide a
comprehensive enforcement scheme in bankruptcy cases. See Bolen v.
Bass, No. 97 C 3944, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16964, at *15 (N.D. fll.

Oct. 18, 2001) (Lefkow, J.) (holding that the exclusive remedy for



Minute, Order Form (06/97)

& : United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Live of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

Elaine E. Bucklo

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 8136 DATE 8/7/2003
CASE Cross vs. Risk Management Alternatives, Inc.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented]

OFRCP4(m)

and Order.

(10) = (Other docket entry]

O Local Rule 41.1

0 FRCP41(a)(1)

ai) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(0) im) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on _____sset for____at

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on __set for at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor_ at
) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on__at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

O FRCP41(a)(2).

Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted and the
case is dismissed. Any pending motion in this case is terminated as moot. Enter Memorandum Opinion

No notices required.

Y | Notices mailed by judge's staff.

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Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
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No notices required, advised in open court

xynod LOLS! “ST
un waa

Rii:9 Wd L- SAV cO

3

number of notices

Document
Number

Maas ost

central Clerk’ £0)

AUG 08 200

dare dockered,

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8/7/2003

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2G



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JENNIFER J. CROSS,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 02 C 8136
RISK MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES, INC.,

DOCKETED

AUG 0 8 2003

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jennifer J. Cross filed a Chapter 7 petition for
bankruptcy on March 22, 2002. Ms. Cross’ creditors were notified
of this proceeding, which resulted in a discharge of Ms. Cross’
debts on July 8, 2002. On June 24, 2002, while the bankruptcy was
pending, defendant Risk Management Alternatives, Incorporated
(“RMA”), which represented one of Ms. Cross’ creditors, sent Ms.
Cross a letter, seeking to collect a discharged debt. On November
12, 2002, Ms. Cross filed this case, alleging that RMA’s letter
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15
U.S.C. § 1692 et. seq. Specifically, Ms. Cross alleged that RMA’s
attempt to collect a discharged debt was false, deceptive or
misleading, and unfair or unconscionable, in violation of §§ 1692e
and f of the FDCPA, and that in sending the letter directly to Ms.
Cross rather than to her counsel, RMA violated § 1692c(a) (2) of the
FDCPA. RMA now moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule

12(c) on the grounds that this action should have been brought in

le


the bankruptcy court as a contempt action for RMA’s violation of
the automatic stay. I grant the motion.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same
standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b) (6), and thus “should not be granted unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would
support his claim for relief.” Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d
1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1989).

The facts in this case are virtually identical to those of
Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., No. 02 C 6368, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1654
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2003) (Bucklo, J.). In Randolph, as here, the
defendant attempted to collect an unpaid debt which was discharged
in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. The plaintiff filed suit in
this court under the FDCPA. I granted the defendant creditor’s
motion to dismiss on the grounds that a remedy for actions which
violate the automatic stay must be brought in bankruptcy court.

Ms. Cross urges me to reconsider the holding in Randolph,
pointing out that Judge Kennelly has taken the opposite view. See
Hyman v. Tate & Kirlin, No. 02 C 242, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4822
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2003) (Kennelly, J.). However, as I discussed
in Randolph, while it is clear that such an aggrieved debtor such
as Ms. Cross may seek a remedy in bankruptcy court, the Seventh

Circuit has not ruled on the question of whether he or she has an