alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
EUROTECH, LTD. BALANCE SHEET AS OF MARCH 31, 1997 AND STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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#### LOCKWOOD v. WALDORF.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.

December 2, 1895.)

Costs—Right to—Action to Recover Chattels.

Code Civ. Proc. § 3228, subd. 2, providing that plaintiff obtaining judgment in an action to recover chattels is entitled to costs, but, if the value of the chattels recovered is fixed at less than $50, plaintiff cannot recover costs exceeding the amount of value, does not entitle plaintiff to any costs where the value of the chattels is not fixed.

Appeal from order of Monroe county judge.

Action by Orval A. Lockwood against George A. Waldorf to recover possession of certain chattels. From an order vacating so much of the judgment in favor of plaintiff as awarded to plaintiff the sum of $124.64, costs, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before BROWN, P. J. and DYKMAN and PRATT, JJ.

Dill & Cox and T. N. Little, for appellant.

George H. Smith, for respondent.

PRATT, J.

This is an appeal from the county judge of Orange county, who disallows $124.64, costs awarded to plaintiff against defendant. The county judge must be right. There was nothing de*200termined by the appellate court, except a judgment for the return of property the value of which was not fixed. The appellant relies on section 3228 of the Code as to when plaintiff is entitled to costs. Subdivision 2 of that section says:

> “In an action to recover chattels, but if the value of the chattels, or all of the chattels, recovered by plaintiff, as fixed, is less than $50, the amount of his costs cannot exceed the amount of value.”

I find no means of assisting plaintiff under the law. In the justice’s court the plaintiff recovered judgment for $100, or the return of the property. He appealed from this judgment, and got the same result, without damages or value of property. The other sections of the Code referred to by plaintiff are inapplicable to this case. The plaintiff is unfortunate, but there are no legal means of helping him out.

Judgment affirmed. All concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1179 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

  1st Session
                                S. 1179

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To amend the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 to reauthorize the 
                   National Flood Insurance Program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Flood Insurance 
Reauthorization Act of 1997''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM.

    Section 1319 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 
4026) is amended by striking ``September 30, 1997'' and inserting 
``September 30, 2002''.

            Passed the Senate October 1, 1997.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
105th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1179

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To amend the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 to reauthorize the 
                   National Flood Insurance Program.
```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv. ) No. 01 CR 1115
) Court of Appeals Nos.
ALFREDO LONGORIA and ) 03-1454 & 03-2615
LEONEL DURAN, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM

On June 20, 2005 our Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the
convictions of Alfredo Longoria (“Longoria”) and Leonel Duran
(“Duran”) but (2) issued a limited remand order as to their

sentences, as prescribed by United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d

471, 483-84 (78 Cir. 2005). This Court has requested and has
received input from counsel for the government and for Longoria
and Duran as to their respective views on whether the same
sentences should have been imposed if the Sentencing Guidelines
had been viewed as advisory rather than as mandatory (the pre-
Booker understanding).

From those submissions and this Court’s own review of the
original sentencing proceedings, the presentence investigation
reports and other sentencing materials, this Court has determined
that the answer to that question is uncertain on the existing
record--that a further sentencing hearing, including
(1) potential evidentiary submissions, (2) a new allocution by

each defendant in terms of the different legal environment that


now exists and (3) arguments by counsel unfettered by the
mandatory view of the Guidelines that originally prevailed, is
necessary for an informed decision. In this Court’s view, the
fact that the original sentences--imposed under the then-
erroneous understanding of the role of the Guidelines--prevented
the appropriate presentation of such additional input for this
Court’s consideration at the original sentencing created the
plain error referred to in Paladino. Accordingly this Court
requests the Court of Appeals to vacate the original sentences
and to remand both defendants’ cases to this District Court for

resentencing.

Co Mon. DL stor

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: July 21, 2005
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 10, 2015

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. AURELIO GARCIA SANCHEZ

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Macon County

No. 2012CR13 David Earl Durham, Judge

No. M2014-01997-CCA-R3-CD – Filed December 4, 2015

_____________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., concurring.

First, I concur in Judge Holloway’s separate opinion, and with the results reached

in the lead opinion. Second, I write to remind both the State and the defense bar that 

under binding precedent from our supreme court that “[s]imply stated, polygraph 

evidence is inadmissible.” State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 409 (Tenn. 2012). The 

results of polygraph examinations are inherently unreliable, they are thus not probative, 

and they lack relevance. A defendant’s willingness or refusal to take a polygraph test is 

not admissible. Id. The trial court should have sua sponte ruled that all evidence of the 

polygraph examination in this case must be excluded. I know of no exception to the rule 

of inadmissibility of such evidence. Whether the threat or use of a polygraph 

examination might someday be argued by a defendant as evidence of an involuntary 

statement or as evidence of coercion, and thus be an exception to the rule of

inadmissibility, is not raised in this case. 

All this being said, I fail to see in this case how the erroneous admission of 

evidence of the polygraph examination during the suppression hearing affected the issue 

before the trial court – whether the statements made by Defendant should have been 

suppressed. Accordingly, I too believe that the judgments must be affirmed.

____________________________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, PRESIDING JUDGE
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4276

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHEASER ANTONIO GRANT,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. (8:06-cr-00515-HMH-1)

Submitted: September 28, 2017 Decided: October 2, 2017

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lora Blanchard, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville, South Carolina, for 

Appellant. Beth Drake, Acting United States Attorney, A. Lance Crick, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Cheaser Antonio Grant appeals from the judgment revoking his supervised release 

and imposing a 48-month sentence. Grant challenges his sentence, contending that it is 

plainly unreasonable, because the district court did not sufficiently explain its reasoning. 

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation 

of supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We 

will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not ‘plainly 

unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)). 

“When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first 

determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 

546 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court 

adequately explains the sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 

Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Thompson, 595 F.3d at 546-47.

Grant claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district 

court failed to explain adequately its reasons for imposing a 48-month sentence, which 

was below the statutory maximum but exceeded the applicable Sentencing Guidelines’ 

advisory policy statement range. Having reviewed the record, we find that the district 

court’s explanation of this sentence, considering its commentary during the proceeding, 

was sufficient under the circumstances. See Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (discussing

standard). We therefore conclude that Grant’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
3

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment order. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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### IN THE UNITED STATE S C OURT OF AP P EALS F ORT HE F IFT H CIRCUI T

N o. 10- 40384

M I G U E L H E R N A N D E Z, as G uardi an of D avi d P. H er nandez, an i n capa cit ated i n divi du al ; I N E Z B A L T A Z A R H E R N A N D E Z , as G u ardi an of Ar m a nd o H e r na nd e z , J r . , a n i nc a p a c i t a t e di nd iv i d ua l ; M I CH ELLE C R AY T O N ; A L IC IAM A T A ; D E A N N T O R R E S , as G u ardi an of C h ri st oper N o r r is , a n in c a p a c ita te din d iv id u a l, P l ai n t i f fs- A pp el l ees

v. A D E LA ID E H O R N , C om m i ssion er of the D ep a rtm en t of A gin g a n dD i sa b i l i ty S ervi ces; B A R R YW A L L E R , A ssi st an tC om m i ssi on er Provi der S ervi ces; D EN I SE G ER ED I N E, St at e Sc ho o l s ; IVABE N SO N , Supe r i nt e nde nto f t he C o r p u s C h r is ti S ta te S c h o o l, D efen d a n ts - A p p ell a n ts

Appe alf

r o m t he U ni t e d St at e s D i s t r i c tCour tf o rt he S ou th ern D i stri ct of

T ex a s, C orp u s C h ri sti

ON P ET I T I ON F OR R EHE AR I NG B ef ore SM ITH , W IE N E R , an d O W E N , C i rcui tJu dg es. P E R C U R IA M: U nite d S ta te s C ou rt of Ap pe a ls Fifth C irc uit 

## F I L E D M arch 2 9, 20 11 Lyl e W . Cayce C lerkN o. 10- 40384

4 5 7U .S . 3 0 7 , 3 1 5 -16( 1 9 8 2 ). 1 2 I T I S O RD ER ED t hat t he ap pe l l ant s ’ M o t i o n f o r Pane lRehe ar i ng regardi n g t h ei r c on t en t i ont h at i n ad equ ate s t af f i n g i s not act i on able u n der Y ou ngberg v. R om eo , i s GRANT ED

. 1 IT IS F U R T H E R O R D E R E D t h a t p a n e l re h e a r in gis D E N IE D a s to a ll
o th e ris s u e s o n w h ic h a p p e lla n ts r e q u e s t r e c o n s id e r a tio n b e c a u s e , a s w e h e ldin
o uro r i gi nalpa ne lo pi ni o n, t ho s e i s s ue s ha veb e e n waive d. W e ha ve revi ew ed the on e i ssue on w h ic h w e gran treheari n g, an d n ow ho l d thatitdo e s no ta f fe c to uro r i gi nalho l di ng. Appe l l ant s ’b r i e f m ak e s t he
nar r o w c l ai m t hat “i nad e qua t e s t af f i ng” i s a n a c t i o n whi c h i s pr o pe r l y br o ugh t aga i n stt h e State rat h er th an aga i n st ap pel l an t s. E ven assum i n g t h i s i s t rue, i t i s n o basi s on w h i ch w e shou l d reverse t h e di st ri ct court’ s den i alof app el l an t s’ M ot i on t o D i sm i ss/ S u m m ary Ju dg m en t
. A pp ell e e s a sser t ed, an d the di st ri ct court basedi t s den i alof t h at m ot i on on, n u m erous al l egeddep art u res f rom pr o fe s s i o nals t and ar ds , m any o f w hi c h dono ti nvo lves t af f i ng s ho r t ag e s . W e do
no tde c i de ho w a ppe l l ant s m ay pr o c e e d o n r e m and o r w he t he rt he y m aym ak e
an y broad er “bu dg et ary constr ai n t s” argu m en t s t h an t h e na rrow one m ad e on appealc onc er ni ng t he i ss ue o f i nadequat e s t af

f i ng. Af t e rr e v i e wi n gth e o n l yi s s u e o n wh i c h we g r a n tp a n e lr e h e a r i n g , we confirm our ori gi n alaf f i rm ati on of

t h e di st ri ctcour t ’s den i alof app el l an t s’ M oti on to D i sm i ss/ S u m m a ryJu d gm en t.
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 151 (Tuesday, August 10, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 43717]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-16987]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 11491]


Foreign Affairs Policy Board Charter Renewal

ACTION: Notice of renewal of the charter of the Foreign Affairs Policy 
Board.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Department 
of State hereby provides notice of the renewal of the charter of the 
Foreign Affairs Policy Board (``the Board''). The Foreign Affairs 
Policy Board provides the Secretary of State with advice, feedback, and 
perspectives from a diverse array of experts to advance the 
Department's mission and help root American foreign policy in the needs 
and aspirations of the American people. The Board's activities are 
advisory only.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Designated Federal Officer Jennifer R. 
Littlejohn in the Office of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State, 
at email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a0ecc9d4d4ccc5cacfc8ceeaf2e0d3d4c1d4c58ec7cfd6"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4d01243939212827222523071f0d3e392c3928632a223b">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Board is established under the general 
authority of the Secretary of State and the Department of State as set 
forth in Title 22 of the United States Code, in particular Section 2656 
of that Title and consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
    Authority: 5 U.S.C. Appendix, 41 CFR 102-3.65.

Salman Ahmed,
Director, Office of Policy Planning, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2021-16987 Filed 8-9-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-10-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
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Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 9, 2019

No. 04-19-00399-CR

Kurt Wayne LOPER,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 6, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 566384

Honorable Wayne A. Christian, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant’s counsel has noted there are items missing from the clerk’s record. 

Specifically, appellant’s counsel states, “a review of the docket sheet does indicate that the 

defense counsel e-filed two documents on May 23, 2019,” which include a Motion for Speedy 

Trial with a memorandum of law attached. We ORDER the trial court clerk to file a 

supplemental clerk’s record containing the two documents e-filed two on May 23, 2019, within 

10 days of this order. 

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 9th day of October, 2019.

___________________________________

Luz Estrada,

Chief Deputy Clerk
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christopher Martinez, Appellant.

[945 NYS2d 239]—

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Caesar D. Cirigliano, J), rendered March 10, 2011, as amended March 31, 2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of attempted robbery in the third degree, and sentencing him to a term of 1 to 3 years, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was *678not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury’s assessment of the matters cited by defendant that allegedly affected the victim’s credibility. We also note that the fact that the jury convicted defendant and the codefendant of different degrees of attempted robbery does not warrant a different conclusion regarding the weight of the evidence *(see People v Rayam,*94 NY2d 557 [2000]).

The victim identified defendant as one of the two men who robbed him, even though defendant wore a mask and did not speak during the robbery. Defendant and the victim lived in the same building and the victim saw defendant almost daily. The victim was able to identify defendant by a distinctive body movement, which the victim had seen defendant make many times. A distinctive gait or body movement may be a valid means of identification *(see People v Bale,*10 NY2d 895 [1961]). Furthermore, the trial court granted defendant permission to demonstrate his gait or body movements, and the jury had an opportunity to make its own judgment regarding their distinctiveness.

In addition, there was ample evidence that the other robber was the jointly tried codefendant. The codefendant is defendant’s brother, who also lived in the building. This evidence tended to connect defendant with the crime circumstantially and thus corroborate the victim’s identification *(see e.g. People v Hinton,*252 AD2d 428 [1998], *lv denied*92 NY2d 1033 [1998]; *People v Hurd,*160 AD2d 199, 200 [1990], *lv denied*76 NY2d 789 [1990]). Furthermore, the victim testified that in the course of defending himself, he struck the codefendant in the head. When the codefendant was arrested later that day, he had a “fresh cut” on his head.

The court properly exercised its discretion in declining to deliver an adverse inference charge relating to the loss of the original handwritten version of a police report. There was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the People or prejudice to defendant *(see People v Martinez,*71 NY2d 937, 940 [1988]; *see also*CPL 240.75).

Defendant’s remaining claim is unpreserved *(see People v Buckley,*75 NY2d 843 [1990]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find no basis for reversal. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Catterson, Richter and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.