REVISED, September 8, 1998

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 93-4452 through 93-4611

CLAUDE CIMINO, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Cross-Appellants,

versus

RAYMARK INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants,

PITTSBURGH CORNING CORPORATION and

ASBESTOS CORPORATION LIMITED,

Defendants-Appellants,

Cross-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas

August 17, 1998

Before REYNALDO GARZA, GARWOOD and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

Before us are appeals and cross-appeals in personal injury and

wro ngful death damage suits against several manufacturers of

asbestos-containing insulation products and some of their

suppliers, the district court’s jurisdiction being based on

diversity of citizenship and the governing subs tantive law being

that of Texas. This is the same set of cases addressed in I n re1 Of the district court’s several orders with reasons and

opinions in these cases, two are published. C imino v. Raymark

Industries

, 751 F.Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990); Cimino v. Raymark

Industries , 739 F.Supp. 328 (E.D. Tex. 1990).

2 Fibreboard

, 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990), but the judgments now

before us result from a trial plan mo dified following that

decision. 1 Principally at issue on this appeal is the validity of

that modified trial plan.

The district court originally consolidated the some 3,031 such

cases then pending in the Beaumont Division of the Eastern District

of Texas for trial of certain common issues under Fed. R. Civ. P.

42(a) and also certified a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(3 ), the class generally consisting of the insulation and

construction workers, their survivors and household members, who

were plaintiffs in those pending cases. As explained in more

detail below, the trial plan ultimately implemented after

Fibreboard consisted of three pha ses, generally described as

follows. Phase I comprised a complete jury trial of the entire

individual cases of the ten class representatives and also a classwide determination of issues of product defectiveness, warning, and

punitive damages (including a multiplier as to each defendant).

Phase II, which was to address exposure on a craft and job site

basis, was dispensed with on the basis of a stipulation. In phase

III, 160 diff erent individual cases (“sample cases”), some from

each of the five different al legedly asbestos-related diseases

included in the entire group of underlying cases, were tried to two

other juries to determine only each of those individual sample case2 By the time of the phase I trial, the original 3,031 total

cases had been reduced to 2,298 by settlement, severa nce, or

dismissal.

3 Remittiturs were ordered as to 35 of th e 160 sample case

verdicts, and the averages were computed using the thus reduced

verdict figures as well as the 12 zero verdicts.

3 plaintiffs’ respective actual damages from their asbestos-related

disease. Thereafter, and following a one-day bench hearing on the

basis of which the district court determined that in each disease

category the 160 sample cases were reliably representative of the

cases involving the like disease among the remaining some 2,128

cases, 2 the court ruled that each of these re maining 2,128 cases

(the “extrapolation cases”) would be assigned by the court to one

of the five disease categories and each would be entitled to

judgment based on an amount of actual damages equal to the average

of the verdicts rendered in those of the 160 sample cases involving

the same disease category. 3 Punitive damages in each case would be

essentially based on the phase I verdict.

By the time of the phase I trial, many of the defendants had

settled and others had taken bankruptcy or otherwise been disposed

of, so only five remained, namely appellant Pitts burgh Corning

Corporation (Pittsburgh Corning), Carey Canada, Celotex,

Fibreboard, and appellant Asbestos Corporation, Limited (ACL). The

case against ACL was tried to the court under the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act, 28 USC §§ 1330(a), 1603(b). By the time the amount

of the extrapolation case judgme nts was to be calculated, all

defendants except Pittsburgh Corning and ACL had passed out of the4 After the phase I trial and before the phase III trial began,

the district court dismissed all claims for actual damages against

Carey Canada, finding there could be no evidence any plaintiff was

exposed to its product (and the four contrary phase I verdicts were set aside); although the court opined that Carey Canada would

nonetheless be liable for punitive damages, it appears that no such

judgment was rendered and the case against Carey Canada was

apparently seve red. After the phase III trials were completed,

Celotex filed for bankruptcy and was severed, and Fib reboard

settled.

5 In one of the ten cl ass representative cases, the phase I

jury returned a verdict for all defendants; the district court

subsequently granted a new trial in that case, and it has been

severed. After the phase III trial, the district court granted

Pittsburgh Corning’s motion for judgment in 17 of the 160 sample

cases. Pittsburgh Corning is the sole defendant in all but 2 of

these 157 judgments; in two of the class representative judgments

it and ACL are both cast in judgment (ACL for actual damages only).

6 Pittsburgh Corning asserts, without dispute, that the orders

for judgment in the remaining some 2,12 3 extrapolation cases (in

which judgments have not been entered) call for judgments against

Pittsburg h Corning in the approximate total amount of

$1,300,000,000 for actual damages only, excluding prejudgment

interest and punitive damages.

4 case. 4

Judgment was entered against ACL in only two of the ten class

representative cases (and in none of either the phase III sample

cases or the extrapolation cases). Judgment was actually entered

against Pittsburgh Corning in a total of 157 cases, consisting of

9 of the class representative phase I cases, 143 of the phase III

sample cases, and 5 of the extrapolation cases (1 from each of the

5 different diseases included in the class). 5 In these 157 cases,

Pittsburgh Corning has been cast in judgment for a total of

approximately $69,000,000. 6 Pittsburgh Corning and ACL each appeal

the referenced judgments entered against them, and the plaintiffs7 The 157 judgments appealed have been certified under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(b).

5 cross-appeal as to each. 7 The issues presented in the ACL appeal

and cross-appeal are few and narrow, and we address them last.

Pittsburgh Corning’s appeal presents essentially two groups of

contentions, summarized as follows: first, those challenging the

implemented Cimino trial plan as a whole, particularly its asserted

failure to properly try and determine individual causation and, in

the five extrapol ation cases, damages also, as to any plaintiffs

other than the class representatives, assertedly cont rary to our

decision in Fibreboard and Texas substantive law and in derogation

of Pittsburgh Corning’s Seventh Amendment and Due Process rights;

and second, various other issues of a more particular and

traditional sort. Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal presents issues of only

the latter variety. We now turn to consider Pittsburgh Corning’s

appeal, addressing first its attacks on the trial plan.

I.

PITTSBURGH CORNING APPEAL

A. Trial Plan Attack

1. Trial Plan

Initial Plan

The Cimino trial plan initially adopted by the district court,

which we subsequently set aside in Fibreboard

, also called for

three phases. In phase I, the jury would decide which, if any, of

each defendant’s products were de fective as marketed and

unreasonably dangerous, when each d efendant knew or should have8 In adopting that plan, the dist rict court adverted to its

earlier decision in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries , 109 F.R.D. 269

(E.D. Tex. 1985), aff’d

, 782 F. 2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986). However,

the district cour t declined to follow its J enkins format, noting

that “[t]rying these [3,000] cases in groups of ten would consume

the entire available trial time for the Court

. . . f or the next

three years.” In J enkins

, the district court had adopted and we

had sustained a class action trial plan for similar asbestos suits

which provided for a class-wide trial of essentially the same phase

I common issues, but to be followed by “consolidated mini-trials of

four to ten plaintiffs on the issues of exposur e to any products

6 known workers or their household members were at risk, whether each

defendant was guilty of gross negligence in marketing its offending

product and, as to each defendant so guilty, a punitive damages

multiplier. In phase II, the same jury would decide the percentage

of plaint iffs in the class exposed to each defendant’s products,

the percentage of claims barred by limitations and other defenses,

and would determi ne a lump sum amount of actual damages for each

disease category for all plaintiffs in the class. The jury in this

phase would also make a full determination of liability and damages

with respect to each of the eleven class representatives

individually. And the jury in phase II would also hear such

evidence as the parties desired to present from up to thirty other

illustrative plaintiffs, fifteen chosen by the defense and fifteen

by plaintiffs, as well as expert testimony regarding the total

actual damages of the class, such expert testimony to be based,

among other things, on questionnaires filled out by all class

members and other discovery, including forty-five-minute oral

depositions of class members taken by defendants. In phase III, to

be non-jury, the court would distribute the awarded damages among

the individual class members. 8previously found to be defective; any damages legally caused by

such exposure; and any comp arative fault of each plaintiff in

incurring such damages.” I d

. at 282. S ee also id

. at 284 (“.

. . the mini-trials preserve the individual issues of product exposure for each member of the class with regard to each product (if any)

found defective in the class acti on phase”), and our J enkins

opinion at 473 (“individual issues of the unnamed class members

would be resolved later in ‘mini-trials’ of seven to ten

plaintiffs.”).

7 Fibreboard

In Fibreboard , we found “no impediment to the trial of Phase

I,” id

. at 712, but held the balance of the plan invalid, stating:

“It infringes u pon the dictates of E rie that we remain

faithful to the law of Texas, and upon the separation of

powers between the judicial and legislative branches.

“ Texas has made its policy choices in defining the

duty owed by manufacturers and suppliers of products to

con sumers. These choices are reflected in the

re quirement that a plaintiff prove both causation and

damage. In Texas , it is a ‘fundamental principle of

traditional pr oducts liability law . . . that the

plaintiffs must prove that the defendant suppl ied the

product which caused the injury.’ These elements focus

upon individuals, not groups

. The same may be said, and

with even greater confidence, of wage losses, pain and

suffering, and other elements of c ompensation. These

requirements of proof define the duty of the

manufacturers.

. . . .

. . . The inescapable fact is that the individual

claims of 2,990 persons will not be presented. Rather,

the claim of a unit of 2,990 persons will be presented.

. . . .

. . . That procedure cannot focus upon such issues

as individual causation

, but ultimately must accept

general causation as sufficient, contrary to Texas law

. It is evident that these statistical estimates deal only

with general causation, for ‘population-based probability

estimates do not speak to a probability of causation in

any one case; the estimate of relative risk is a property

of the studied population, not of an individual’s case.’

This type of procedure does not a llow proof that a9 We also stated:

“Finally, it is questionable whether defendants’

right to trial by jury is being faithfully honored, but

we need not explore this issue. It is sufficient now to

conclude that Phase II cannot go forward without changing

Texas law and usurping legislative prerogatives, a step

federal courts lack authority to take.” Id. at 712.

1 0 As its “only modification” to its previous phase I , the

district court provided that “a trial on the merits of the [entire

individual cases of] the class representatives . . . will now be

submitted to the jury in Phase I.”

8 particular defendant’s asbestos ‘really’ caused a particular plaintiff’s disease ; the only ‘fact’ that can

be proved is that in most cases the defendant’s asbestos

would have been the cause.” I d

. at 711-712 (footnotes

omitted; emphasis added except in interior quotation and

in last clause). 9

Present Plan

Following this Court’ s decision in F ibreboard

, the district

court initially determined that “[t]his case will now proceed under

the procedures set out in Jenkins v. Raymark ”

—— i .e. phase I to be

followed by a series of mini-trials for all plaintiffs on their

individual causation and damage issues (see note 8, supra )

—— and set

its previously adopted phase I (which we had declined to block) for

trial. 10 The court observed that its “task appears to be

insurmountable,” but stated that it would nonetheless “take[] its

place behind the old mule and start down that long row.”

Some months later, however, the court changed its mind and

adopted the trial plan now before us (except that a stipulation was

ultimately utilized instead of phase II), observing:

“Phase One will leave unresol ved the questions of

exposure, comparative causation, and damages. These

remaining questions could easily b e resolved by the

procedure established in Jenkins if the numbers were11 Although two of the twenty-two sites were in Louisiana, the

district court, and all parties both below and on this appeal, have

proceeded on the basis that in this diversity case the controlling

substantive law is that of Texas, and we do likewise.

9 manageable. The numbers are not manageable. J enkins

envisioned groupings of ten plaintiffs submitted to a

succession of juries. If we could try one group a week,

the process would take 41⁄2 years. Additional judicial

power and t he utilization of multiple courtrooms could

shorten the time to resolve all these cases, but it would

no t decrease total court time or attorney time.

Transaction costs to the parties under the J enkins

procedure is unacceptable.”

Instead of utilizing the Jenkins procedure, the court

determined to emp loy new phases II and III: “asking the jury in

Phase Two to make findings on exposure that are specific to job

site, craft and time; and then by submitting to a jury in Phase

Three in d ividual damage cases of a statistically significant,

randomly selected sample from each of the five disease categories.”

For purposes of phase II, twenty-two different

worksites

—— principally refineries, shipyards, and chemical plants,

and also including other industrial-type fa cilities and a power

plant

—— in Beaumont, Port Arthur, Orange, and Port Neches, Texas, and

inclu ding two sites in Lake Charles, Louisiana, would be

considered. 11 The district court contemplated that the phase II

jury (the same jury as in phase I) would:

“hear evidence concerning: (a) the presence of the

Defendants’ products at the worksites; (b) the presence

of asbestos dust at the worksites; and (c) the nature of

the various crafts at the worksites and the relationship

between these crafts and the presence of asbestos dust at

these facilities. Specifically, the jury will hear

evidence concerning the working conditions of machinists,

pipefitters, insulators, carpenters, etc. and the

relationship between these workers and the Defendants’

asbestos products. The jury will make a determination as10

to which crafts at the work sites were exposed to which

Defendants’ asbestos products (if any) for a sufficient

period of time to cause injury, harm, or disease.

The Court will make a non-jury determination as to

which P laintiffs or Plaintiffs’ decedents worked for a

sufficient period of time at each worksite so as to be a

proper member of that worksite’s group and which

Plaintiffs were proper members of each of the crafts at

these worksites. . . .

The Court will submit the issue of exposure to the

jury pursuant to ten-year interva ls. So, for example,

the jury will be asked whether the produc t(s) of

Defendant X were present at Worksite Y during the 1940's,

the 50's, 60's, etc. And, for example, the jury will be

asked whether the carpenters at Worksite Y were exposed

to Defendant X’s product(s) during the 1940's, the 50's,

60's, etc.

. . . .

During Phase Two, the jury will apportion

responsibility among settling and non-settling Defendants

for the Plaintiffs’ exposure (if any).”

In Phase III, two other juries would determine for 160 sample

cases only “two damage issues,” namely “(e) whether the Plaintiffs

suffered from an asbestos-related injury or disease and, if so, (b)

what damages the Plaintiffs incurred.” The court ultimately

determined, based on information from plaintiffs, that the entire

class of 2,298 cases could be bro ken down into the 5 disease

categories, and the court then randomly selected 160 sample cases,

some from each disease category, as follows:

Disease Number of Number of

Sample Cases Cases in Class

Mesothelioma 15 32

Lung Cancer 25 186

Other Cancers 20 58

Asbestosis 50 1,050

Pleural Disease 50 9721 2 A brief description of asbestos-related diseases is contained

in Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries In

Asbestos Litigation

, 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 541 (1992). Five

conditions are described, “[m]oving from the least to the most

serious,” as follows: “(1) pleural plaque; (2) pleural thickening;

(3) asbestosis; (4) lung and certain other cancers; and (5)

mesothelioma (a rapidly-fatal form of cancer).” I d

. at 544. “The

pleurae are a double membrane surrounding the lung between the lung

and chest wall. The inner layer, adjacent to the lung tissue, is

called the visceral pleura. The outer layer, in close contact with

the inner, is called the parietal pleura.” Id ., n.10.

“Pleural plaques have been described as ‘discrete,

elevated, opaque, shiny, rounded lesions, . . . diffuse

or nodular,’ of the parietal pleura or diaphragm. They

strongly indicate asbestos exposure. Pleural thickening

includes certain types of lesion of the visceral pleura.

Unlike plaques, pleural thickening may have non-asbestos

causes. Asbestosis involves non-malignant lesions of the

lung tissue itself, varying from small areas of basal

fibrosis to a diffuse, fine fibrosis.

. . . Malignant

mesothelioma, a usually rapidly-fatal form of cancer, is

caused almost exclusively by asbestos. Lung cancer can

also be caused by asbestos, a risk greatly compounded by

smoking. Whether asbestos exposure is associated with

other types of cancer r emains a matter of considerable

debate in the medical and legal communities.

. . . The medical literature indicates that

claimants with pleural plaques unaccompanied by

asbestosis are ordinarily symptomatically unimpaired.

Some studies have associated pleural plaques with

comparatively modest breathing decrements, but many such

studies have been criticized on various grounds. It is

clear that diffuse pleural thickenin g and some of its

variants can produce significant impairments, although

thickenings are less common th an plaques. Asbestosis

‘[s]ymptoms include shortness of breath, coughing,

fatigue, and vague feelings of si ckness. When the

fibrosis worsens, short ness of breath occurs even at

rest.

. . . In severe cases, death may be caused by

respiratory or cardiac failure.’

. . . Pleural plaques are certainly markers of prior

a sbestos exposure, but the existing studies provide no

evidence that they independently cause any progression of

further asbestos-related conditions. As for asbestosis,

the evidence sugg ests that once the disease is

contracted, the symptoms tend to become progressively

11 Total 160 2,298 12m ore serious with continued occupational exposure. In

some cases, this progression occurs even after exposure

ceases.” Id . at 545-50 (footnotes omitted).

13 As noted, ACL’s case was tried to the court.

12 Individual judgment would be entered in each of the 160 sample

cases based on the phase III verdict in that particular sample

case. After phase III, the district court would assign each of the

remaining 2,298 cases to one of the 5 disease categories, and in

each case make an award of actual damages equal to the average of

the awards in the phase III cases involving the same disease.

Phase I

The phase I trial lasted approximately eight weeks. The

defendants then remaining were Carey Canada, Celotex, Fibreboard,

and Pittsburgh Corning. 1 3 The jury found in answer to the first

four questions when the defendants knew or should have known that

their “asbestos-containing insul ation products” posed a risk of

asbest os-related disease to “insulators” (question 1), to their

household members, to other “crafts working with or near insulation

products,” and to their household members. Pittsburgh Corning knew

or should have known this since 1962 (when it first en tered the

business; it left it in 1972) as to b oth insulators and other

crafts; the other three defendants since 1935 as to insulators and

since 1955 as to other crafts; all four defendants as to both sets

of household members since 1965. In answer to question 5, the jury

found that, since 1962 as to Pittsburgh Corning and since 1935 as

to the other defendants, the defendants’ listed insulation products

“were defective and unreaso nably dangerous as a result of not14 Question 6 related only to Carey Canada.

13 having an adequate warning.” The district court ultimately

disregarded the answers to questions 2, 3, and 4, which addressed

knowledge concerning other crafts and household membe rs, and

ordered judgment rendered on the basis of question 1, knowledge

concerning insulators, and question 5, failure to warn. In

question 7, 1 4 the jury found each defendant guilty of gross

negligence warranting punitive damages and assigned a p unitive

damages multiplier of $3.00 per $1.00 of actual damages to

Pittsburgh Corning, $2.00 to Celotex, and $1.50 each to Fibreboard

and Carey Canada. Questions 8 through 17 separately addressed the

individual case of each of the 10 class representatives. In each

respective question, the jury was asked to find for the particular

plaintiff or the defendants, and if for the plaintiff to find

separate dollar amounts of past and of future damages for that

plaintiff, and to “apportion causation” (in perce ntages totaling

one hundred percent) among that plaintiff, some or all of the then

current defendants, and some or all of the dismissed former

defendants. In three of the cases, the plaintiff’s causation was

not submitted (in one of these the verdict was for the defendants,

and a new trial was granted), in another three such causation was

submitted but not found, and in four cases plaintiff causation was

found (15%, 17%, 20%, and 50%). In each of the 9 cases in which

the jury found fo r the plaintiff, Pittsburgh Corning’s causation

was fixed at 20%; Fibreboard and Celotex were each assessed 15% in

8 of these cases, and in one case Celotex was assessed 30% and1 5 And, in hearings on post-trial motions below, the plaintiffs’

counsel twice expressly agreed with the district court’s assessment

that the court’s “instruction was that the jury was to assume

exposure was sufficient to be a producing cause of all these

diseases.”

14 Fibreboard none; in the only 4 of these cases in which Carey

Canada’s causation was submitted, it was found to be 15%. In each

of these 9 cases, the causation of each of some 10 former

defendants was submitted, separately for each, and it was found in

each case in amounts ranging from as little as a total of 10% for

all of them to as much as 50% for all. The jury’s phase I actual

damage findings totaled some $3.5 million.

Phase III

Following completion of the phase I trial (and a continuance),

the district court proceeded directly into phase III, without any

phase II trial. It was not until approximately seven weeks into

the phase III trials that the stipulation

—— which ultimately replaced

phase II

—— was entered into. It was clear from the beginning of, and

throughout, the phase III trials that the two juries were not to,

and did not, determi ne whether exposure to any of defendants’

products was a cause of the sampl e plaintiffs’ complained-of

condition. In phase III the court instructed the jury that they

were to assume exposure was sufficient to be a producing cause of

all the disease categories. As plaintiffs admit in their brief

here, in the phase III trial “the juries were told to assume that

the claimants had sufficient exposure.” 15 Indeed, for the most part

evidence of exposure and its likely or possible results was not1 6 The district court announced on more than one occasion at the

beginning of the phase III trials, “[w]e are not going to try 160

cases of individual exposure.” Plaintiffs’ counsel informed the

district court post-trial

—— and defense counsel concurred

—— ”[w]e were

not allowed to litigate exposure during Phase 3. When we tried the

individua l cases, we were not allowed to litigate exposure,” and

“we were prohibited in Phase 3 from proving exposure either to

Pittsburgh Corning’s products or exactly when the dec ades of

exposure were or how much they were.” As the district court noted

in one of its post-trial orders, “the parties did not litigate

during the ‘Phase Three’ trials the duration and extent of exposure to asbestos by each of the 160 individual plaintiffs,” and

“[e ]vidence quantifying how much exposure was not allowed in

individual cases unless the issue of smoking was raised,” and “the

‘Phase Three’ trials did not involve litigation of individual

exposure, periods and duration.” Evidence of exposure was limited

to lung cancer and certain other cancer cases where smoking was raised, essentially consisted of showing the number of years of

asbestos exposure, and was not product or defendant specific. At

the beginning of the phase III trials, the court instructed the

juries they would:

“not hear evidence concerning which product the y might

have been exposed to or how much exposure they might have

had. Or which product they used more than others.

For most of these cases, you may assume that there

has been sufficient exposure to asbestos-containing

insulation products for that exposure to be a producing

cause of an asbestos-related injury or disease.

Now, therefore, it will not be necessary for you to

hear any evidence about the quanti ty or amount of

exposure in most of these cases. There is a category

that I wish to address separately with you.

It is n o t scientifically disputed that in lung

cancer cases, there are two causes of lung cancer, of the

types of lung cancer that we have that are the subject of

claims in this case. And those two causes are exposure

to asbestos fibers and smoking.

Therefore, I have ruled that it is appropriate for

you to hear evidence on the lung cancer category of cases that relates to quantification of exposure.

. . . .

You may assume that there was a sufficient exposure for

15 allowed. 16 Simply stated, whether there was exposure to Pittsburghthat exposure to be a producing cause o f an asbestosrelated injury or disease on the damage question.

N ow, you may very well have, as I told you

-- I

guess it was Tuesday

-- a dispute about a diagnosis in

some cases. And I am going to permit in those cases you

to hear evidence about amounts of exposure compared, for

example, to amounts of smoking, so you can decide one way

or the other.

And y ou will hear evidence -- it is not disputed

s cientifically -- that for lung cancer cases, probably

laryngeal cancer cases and maybe some other cases that

fall in that category of, quote, “other cancers ,” that

there’s a synergistic effect between smoking and asbestos

exposure.”

16 Corning’s

—— or any other defendant’s

—— asbestos, and, if so, whether

that exposure was a cause of any of the 160 sample plaintiffs’

illness, disease, or damages, was neither litigated nor determined

in any of the phase III trials. Nor were any matters concerning

any individual sample plaintiff’s past connection with any

particular worksi te or craft either litigated or determined in

phase III (although some miscellaneous information in this regard

was not infrequently incidentally reflected in general background

or work history testimony).

Following the phase III jury verdicts (including 12 zero

verdicts) in the 160 sample cases, the district court ordered

remittiturs in 35 of these cases (“34 of the pulmonary and pleural

cases and in one mesothelioma case”), and calculated the average

actual damage award, after remittitur (and considering the zero

verdicts), in eac h disease category to be the following:

mesothelioma, $1,224,333; lung cancer, $545,200; other cancer,

$917,785; asbestosis, $543, 783; pleural disease, $558,900. These17 It appears undisputed that exposure sufficient to cause

asbestosis is also sufficient to cause mesothelioma, lung cancer,

and pleural plaques.

1 8 The crafts were divided into four general groupings:

“Production Crafts” (some thirteen in all, including e.g. pumper,

gauger, and tube cleaner and various railyard crafts, including

brakeman and engineer); “Maintenance Crafts” (eighteen, including

boilermaker/steamfitter, insulator, machinist, brick mason, heavy

equipment operator, and welder); “Shipyard” (thirteen, including

rigger, ship fitter, laborer, electrician, carpenter, insulator,

machinist, and pipefitter); and “GSU Powerhouses” (one of the

twenty-two sites) (eleven, including operator, electrician,

pipefitter, heavy equipment operator, and insulator). Of the

plaintiffs involved in this suit, only a very small minority were

17 were the figures to be applied to the extrapolation cases.

Phase II stipulation

We now turn to the written stipulation

—— entered into after some

seven weeks of the phase III trials had taken place

—— which replaced

phase II. It was executed by all the plaintiffs and by Pittsburgh

Corning, Fibreboard, and Celotex, who constituted all the thenremaining defendants (except ACL, whose case was non-jury), and was

approved “so ordered” by the district court.

Att ached to the stipulation as an exhibit was a special

verdict form that would consist of separate interrogatories, each

with a part (a) and a part (b), one each for each of the twenty-two

worksites at issue. For example, question 1(a) would ask “For

Worksite No. 1, do you find that the following crafts had

sufficient exposure to asbestos during the specified time periods

to be a producing cause of the disease of asbestosis.” 17 The jury

would answer yes or no separately as to each of over fifty listed

crafts for each of four specified decades, namely 1942-52, 1952-62,

1962-72, and 1972-82. 18 Question 1(b) would state, “For the craftsinsulators.

1 9 Thus, for example, the verdict form would allow the jury to

find in its a nswer to question 1(a) that at worksite No. 1 the

production “c raft” of “operator” had “sufficient exposure to

asbestos to be a producing cause of the disease of asbestosis

during” each of the 1962-72 and 1972-82 decades, but not during

either the 1942-52 or the 1952-62 decades. Again for example, the

jury, assumin g it had made the answers to question 1(a)

hypothesized in the preceding sentence, would be able in answer to

question 1(b) to apportion “causation” with respect to the

production “craft” of “operator” at worksite No. 1 during the

decade 19 62-72, say twenty percent to Pittsburgh Corning, twenty

percent to Fibreboard, fifteen percen t to Celotex, and specific

percentages (presumably including zero) sever ally to each of the

former defendants who had settl ed, all such percentages to total

o ne hundred percent for that particular decade; “causation”

percentages with respect to the production “craft” of “operator” at

worksite No. 1 would similarly be assigned to each current

defendant and former d efendant for the decade 1972-82, but such

percentages could be different from those stated for them

r espectively for the 1962-1972 decade (or the percentages c ould

remain the same as between the decades), and, again, the

percentages would total one hundred percent.

18 and the time periods which were answered ‘yes’ in question 1(a),

c ausation is apportioned as follows.” This question would be

answered by stating separately for each listed craft a percentage

applicable to each of the current defendants and each of the former

defendants who had settled as to each of the same four decades (as

to each decade the percentages were to total one hundred percent). 19

This process would be repeated, with questions 2(a) and 2(b), 3(a)

and 3(b), and so forth, separat ely as to each of the remaining

worksites.

The stipulation provides in part that:

“(3) It is stipulated that some individuals working

in the listed crafts

. . . at the 22 Phase Two worksites

during each decade from 1942 to 1982 were exposed to

asbestos during the course of their employment. The

exposure of some members of each of the crafts . . . at

the 22 worksites was of sufficient length and intensity2 0 As Pittsburgh Corning did not produce or sell asbestoscontaining insulation products before 1962, special provisions were

made concerning it. “If an individual did not have exposure to

asbestos after July 1, 1962, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation will be

assessed no percentage responsibility.” And, “[i]f the C imino

tri al management plan is affirmed on appeal and . . . [the cited

perce n tage provisions] become operative, the percentage to be

applied to Pittsburgh Corning Corporation shall be reduced

according to the following formula.” This formula provided that in

each individual plaintiff’s case, Pittsburgh Corning’s causation

share would be the same fraction of ten percent as the number of

the Pittsburgh Corning decades (1962-72; 1972-82) during which that

19 to cause pulmonary asbestosis of varying degrees.

Asbestos-containing products of predecessors to the

Celotex Corporation and Fibreboard Corporation were

present dur ing each decade in the specified worksites.

An asbestos-containing product of Pittsburgh Corning

Corporation was present during the decades 1962-1982 at

the specified worksites.

The defendants do not stipulate that any members of

the various crafts at the various worksites had the same

exposure to any products or that any such individuals had

the same susceptibility to asbestos-related diseases in

the various crafts and worksites.” (Emphasis added).

The stipulation further provides that, although “[i]f the

Court were to proceed with ‘Phase Two’

. . . [i]t is stipulated for

purpose of appellate review that the [phase II] jury’s verdicts

would ass ign different [causation] percentages to each” of the

defendants Pittsburgh Corning, Fibreboard, and Celotex, and “would

assign different percentages with respect to each Phas e Two

w orksite

. . . craft

. . . and decade combinations” submitted

,

nevertheless “[defendants] stipulat e it shall be deemed that the

Phase Two jury” assigned in all instances the following comparative

causation shares, viz : Pittsburgh Corning, ten percent;

Fibreboard, ten percent ; Celotex, ten percent; and Manville

Personal Injury Settlement Trust, thirteen percent. 20 The courtindividual was exposed to asbestos was of the total number of the

inquired-about decades (1942-52; 1952-62; 1962-72; 1972-82) during

which that individual was exposed to asbestos. Thus, if an

individual had been exposed to asbestos in each of the decades

1962-72 and 1 972-82, but not in any other of the four decades,

Pittsburgh Corning’s causation share would be 10% (2/2 x 10); if

the individual had been exposed to asbestos in each of the three

decades 1952-62 , 1962-72, and 1972-82, but not in the 1942-52

decade, Pittsburgh Corning’s share would be 6 2/3% (2/3 x 10); if

the individual was exposed in all four decades, Pittsbu rgh

Corning’s share would be 5% (2/4 x 10); if the individual was

exposed in each of the decades 1942-52, 1952-62, and 1962-72, but

not in the 1972-82 decade, Pittsburgh Corning’s share would be 3

1/3% (1/3 x 10). The district court subsequently ruled that these

decades were 1/1/1942 through 12/31/1951, 1/1/1952 through

12/31/1961, 1/1/1962 through 12/31/1971, and 1/1/1972 through

12/31/1982, and that exposure at any time during the decade

sufficed, that is, for example, exposure from December 1, 1961,

through January 31, 1972, but not thereafter, was exposure in each

of the three decades ending 12/31/82. For these purposes, exposure

to asbestos was not limited to exposure at one of the twenty-two

worksites; thus one extrapolation plaintiff was judged to have been

exposed during all four decades, although it is evident that the

court found none of his exposure prior to 1964 was at any of those

twenty-two sites.

20 would use these stated percentages to fashion judgments in the 160

phase III sample cases and in the extrapolation cases.

Before setting out these percentages, however, the stipulation

had made clear that defendants were not thereby agreeing that the

trial p lan

—— e ither the originally planned phase II or the

contemplated extr apolation procedure

— — was a permissible way to

adjudicate their liability and damages. Thus, it stated:

“This stipulation relates to the percentage findings

to be supplied through the Court’s special verdict form

which the Court intends to apply to individuals pursuant

to the Cimino trial management plan, to which these

defendants object

. I f the review ing courts reject

determination of individual legal causation issues by

resort to general Phase Two worksite/craft findings , or

r eject the use of Rule 23 class trials for asbes tos

injury cases, the Phase Two share percentage findings

specified below are void .” (Emphasis added).2 1 And to submit offers of proof to the district court

concerning.

22 T he stipulation also says that “[i]t is understood b y the

Court, and it is agreed by the parties, that Defendants do intend

to challenge all aspect s of the C imino trial management plan

including all aspects of the Phase Two trial which would culminate

in use of the special verdict form.” Finally, paragraph 15 of the

stipulation states:

“The District Court is o f the view, and the parties

stipulate, that no appellate rights are prejudiced or

waived by entering into this stipulation, and that no

reviewing court should construe this stipulation as being

21 Defendants’ reservations of their objections in this resp ect are

also reflected in later passages of the stipulation. In paragraph

5 it is stated that “Defendants continue to object to these

extrapolation procedures,” and paragraph 8 states:

“Defendants reserve all rights to object to all past and

future aspects of the Cimino trial plan and to assign as

error all prior, present, and future rulings of the

Court, except only that Defendants shall not assert that

the evidence is or would be insufficient to support a 10%

finding (as compared, e.g., to a 5% finding, etc.) with

respect to any particular Phase Two jobsite and craft

combination.”

And, the stipulation recites that defendants specifically reserved,

and would be afforded, the right to contend on ap peal 2 1 the

following (among other things):

“that it is impermissible to determine medical or other

causal responsibility on a jobsite or craft-wide basis;

that it is impermissible to establish a single period of

time sufficient to cause asbestos related disease, injury

or harm except in connection with evidence presented in

regard to an individu al and as applied to that

individual; that it is impermissible to use decades of

exposure to asb estos, worksite or employment status to

assess individual exposure or medical causation issues;

and that it would be impermissible under governing law to

assign a single percentage of ‘causation’ or ‘responsibility’ to a particular craft or job

classification.” 22an agreement by the parties to any part of the Cimino

trial management plan, or to the trials that have

occurred as of the date of this s tipulation, or to

further implementation of Cimino procedures by the

Court.”

22 Paragraph 12 of the stipulation confirms its limited nature,

viz :

“(12) Without limitation, Defendants do not

stipulate that : entry of any judgment based on actual or

stipulated Phase Two fi ndings is legally or factually

sound; any Defendant in fact has legal responsibility to

any individual plaintiff; any individual plaintiff was in

fact exposed to injurious quantities of asbestos from the

products of any Defendant; the products of any of the

Defendan ts were in fact legal causes of injury to any

indiv idual plaintiff; or t hat any issue framed by the

Cimino pleadings can be adjudicated on a jobsite or

craft-wide basis. Defendants have not stipulated or

agreed that evidence to b e received under the Cimino

trial management plan is or could be sufficient to

establish in these cases that any class member plaintiff

suffers from an asbestos-related disease (except as previously stipulated on the record in particular cases),

o r that the asbestos-containing product or products of

any defendant caused or contributed to any such disease,

nor that a finding of responsibility or causation in any

percentag e with respect to a defendant and any class

member is or could be sustained by evid ence limited to

asbestos-related disease among, or exposure to asbestos

of, members of specified crafts at specified worksites

over ten-year periods of time in the absence of evidence

sufficient to show that each plaintiff class member to

whom a defendant is held liable in any percent himself or

hers elf has an asbestos-related disease and that such

class member was exposed to the defendant’s a sbestos

product or products in quantities and for times

suf ficient to cause such disease. Further, defendants

have not stipulated to the sufficiency of any evidence

which would permit any finding by the Court or jury that

any class member plaintiff has been damaged in any sum or

amount by reference or resort to damages suffered by any

other plaintiff, or groups of plaintiffs, in the absence

of evidence specifically showing damage suffered by such

plaintiff class member himself or herself individually.”

(Emphasis added).

Finally, the stipulation reflects that the court, by its23

approval thereof, had ruled, and “would have adhered to such ruling

throughout the trial” and “will adhere to this ruling in reviewing

offers of proof” mentioned in the stipulation, that, with presently

immaterial exceptions,

“.

. . it would not submit to the jury for a verdict (or

receive individual evidence for individual adjudication)

as to each plaintiff class member except where it has

done so in procee dings to date, several issues,

including: whether he or she was exposed to an asbestoscontaining product; whether that exposure was sufficient

to cause injury; the identity of those who manufactured

the products to which such each plaintiff was exposed;

and the individual damages suffered by such person as a

result of exposure.”

After the stipulation, the phase III trials continued for

approximately five more weeks, conducted in all material respects

on the same basis and in the same manner as they had be en during

the some seven weeks before the stipulation was entered into.

Extrapolation

The final phase was that of extrapolation. About a month

after completion of the phase III trials, a one-day non-jury

hearing was held in which the district court heard evidence

concerning the degree to which the 160 sample cases were

rep resentative, in their respective disease categories, of the

cases in the same disea se category among the 2,128 extrapolation

cases. Essentially the only evidence at this hearing was the

testimony of three expert witnesses called by the plaintiffs,

namely Dr. John Dement, Director, Office of Occupation Health and

Technical Services, National Institute of Environmental Health

Sciences; Professor Ronald Frankewitz of the University of Houston,

a Ph.D. in Evaluation, Measurement, and Statistics; and University2 3 Professor Frankewitz had no information as to any of the

verdicts in any of the phase III sample cases, “made no attempt .

. . to correlate or to identify any results or factors . . . that

24 of Texas Law School Professor of Trial Practice Patrick Hazel, an

experienced personal injury trial lawyer.

The district court’s opinion dealing with extrapolation does

not refer, either generically or specifically, to any evidence

other than Professor Frankewitz’s testimony. He stated that he was

furnished by someone in the off ices of plaintiffs’ counsel

computerized written data reflecting, as to each of the 160 sample

cases and each of the 2,128 extrapolation cases, whether the case

was a sample case or an extrapolation case, which of the 5 disease

categories the case involved, and an answer to each of 12 specific

variables pertaining to the particular plaintiff or plaint iff’s

decedent alleged injury to whom formed the basis of the suit. The

12 variable were gender, race, whether living, whether ever smoked,

whether was a wage earner (when not specified), age, first year of

exposure, last year of exposure, total years of exposure, latency,

pack years smoked, trade and predominant craf t. Professor

Frankewitz testified that the sample cases in each of the five

disease categories were representative of the extrapolation cases

in the same disease category “in terms of the variables that I’ve

analyzed,” so that, for example, if one were to randomly select

another 50 asbestosis cases from the 2,128 extrapolation cases, 99

out of 100 times (98 out of 100 in two minor respects) those 50

cases would have “the same mix of variables” as the 50 asbestosis

cases wh ich were a part of the 160 sample phase III cases. 2 3 Dr.would predict or estimate what jury awards might be,” and stated

t hat “none of what I have done

. . . related to magni tude of

verdicts.”

2 4 Similarly, when asked “what criteria were used to determined

who was a wage earner,” Dr. Frankewitz replied “Again, this was

information that was encoded and afforded to me.” When asked

whether the wage earner variable “is equivalent in some fashion to

whether or not a wage-lost claim was asserted,” he responded “I

don’t know what we’re talking about there. I have no knowledge of

that terminology. I’m operating on the basis of merely a

categorical variable, sir, whether a person wa s classified as a

wage earner or not.”

25 Frankewitz did not select the variables, nor did he determine what

those variables were in any of the cases; rather he was simply

furnished that information by plaintiffs’ counsel’s office.

Similarly, he made no independent judgment as to which disease

category any case fit in, but simply was furnished that conclusion

by the office of plaintiffs’ attorneys. And Dr. Frankewitz was

even not sure jus t what some of the variables meant. When asked

what the variable “total years of exposure” meant, he repled “As

far as I’m concerned, I believe it’s . . . I’d be guessing. I

would say it’s the number of years that an individual was exposed

to asbestos in a particular setting, particular situation” (earlier

in his testimony he had indicated that it was “a function of” first

and last years of exposure). He did not calculate “total years of

exposure” and when asked who did, said “My belief would be it would

be a clerk under the superv ision or direction of one of the

plaintiffs’ attorneys.” 24 The district court concluded “that the

distribution of variables between the samples and their respective2 5 Defendants unsuccessfully objected to Professor Frankewitz’s

t estimony on the basis that his testimony as to the presence and

distribution of the different variables depended entirely on what

he was told by employees of plaintiffs’ attorneys. In an effort to

respond to this, and to a similar unsuccessful objection to Dr.

Dement’s testimony, plaintiffs, well after the extrapolation

hearing and the orders initially entered on the basis thereof,

m oved to place of record the answers of all class mem bers to

Fibreboard and Master interrogatories, which they asserted were the

ultimate source of the “variables” and disease data furnished

Fr ankewitz and Dement. The district court denied the motion,

stating that these answers “were neither offered nor admitted into

evidence at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 requires a formal offer of

answers to interrogatories at trial. J ones v. Diamond

, 519 F.2d

1090, 1098 and n.13 (5th Cir. 1975); 4A Moore’s Federal Practice §

33.29(1.-2).” The plaintiffs’ interrogatory answers are not in the

record before us. Apparently for the same reason (and also in

reference to prejudgment interest), plaintiffs also filed (well

after the extrapolation hearing) a motion and supplemental motion

to take judicial notice o f the years of last exposure of each

plaintiff (relying on their referenced interrogatory answers). The

district court likewise denied those motions.

Dr. Dement concluded that f rom an epidemiological point of

view the distribution of certain important “risk factors” in each

disease category in the 160 phase III sample cases was very comparable to or representative of the distribution of those same

factors in the like disease category cases among the extrapolation

cases. The “factors” were age, race, sex, whether or not the

individual ever smoked (at least in some disease categories), the

year of first exposure (year of last exposure was not considered),

and the length of time from first exposure to the initial diagnosis

(latency period). A final factor was to characterize the

individual’s “predominant work site” (site of longest employment)

as having been in one of six different generic types, namely

“refinery, chemical plant, shipyards, construction and trades,

household exposure, and a group sort of catch-all other.” This

factor also asked as to each of these six generic types of work

sites whether the individual had or had not ever worked at such a

site. Concerning the some 2,128 extrapolation cases, Dr. Dement

was furnished by personnel in the office of plaintiffs’ counsel the

answer as to each individual to each of the above “factors” as well

as the appropriate disease category for that individual. Dr.

Dement did not make any review of any of those 2,128 cases and

relied entirely on the referenced answers furnished by the office

of plaintiffs’ counsel. He did state that whether or not an

individual was exposed t o asbestos at a work site was n ot a

criteria in determining the individual’s “predominant work site”

and “we have no exposure information, to my knowledge, or very

little at most of these work sites.” However, in general

26 subclasses is comparable.” 25refineries, chemical plan ts, and shipyards were a source of

asbestos exposure. Dr. Dement acknowledged that since 1970 there

was likely some decrease in industrial asbestos exposure, but that

in some instances “there was some deteriora tion in plant

operational maintenance conditions that would cause increases.” He

also stated that “it [the 2,128 cases] is of a very m ixed work

history population. Many of these individuals worked in many, many

different places.” Dr. Dement likewise acknowledged that his

“analysis was strictly the risk factors for the disease not in the

level of any disability,” and that the risk factors simply related

to “increased risk and you cannot predict on any individual basis

whether or not

. . . he’s going to develop lung cancer or

asbestosis or not.”

Professo r Hazel testified that in personal injury cases

generally (he had never had an asbestos case) the main factors

important to evaluation for settlement purposes were the potential

for liability for actual or punitive damages, the extent of the

plaintiff’s injury, the venue or forum (the parti cular jury

selected if settled at that stage), the quality of the opposite

party’s legal representation, the defendant’s ability to pay, and

“the host of other factors I would call the plaintiff’s

characteristics

. . . what is the appearance this plaintiff is

likely to make? What kind of presentation in front of the jury is

this plaintiff likely to make?” Professor Hazel looked at the

verdicts in the 160 sample phase III cases and also at some of the

evidence in some of those cases; he did not do any review of any of

the extrapolation cases. He received information from some of the

plaintiffs’ lawyers regarding what they thought were “pluses” and

“minuses” in their sample phase III cases, and stated that smoking

was a reported negative, as was age in some instances and “whether

the jury won’t like him or her”; while no one had had “ten years”

in prison, there were instances counsel “said here’s something we

know but the other side doesn’t know.” Most of the things

plaintiffs’ counsel reported “as the positives and the negatives”

would fit into Hazel’s classification of “plaintiff’s

characteristics.” Reviewing memos from defense counsel concerning

possible settlement of these cases, Hazel noted (over defense

objections) that they mentioned disease classifications, smoking

(in lung cancer cases only), whether or not over age 60 (or 65),

and what Hazel assumed was job impairment; other than smoking they

did not “appear to consider

. . . the individual characteristics of

any Plaintiff.” In reviewing the verdicts rendered in the phase

III cases, Hazel “was struck” by the difference in verdicts as

between the two different juries that tried those cases. Hazel

recognized that attorneys generally value pleural cases with “the

lowest evaluation” of all asbestos-related disease classifications,

and notic ed this pattern had n ot been followed in the phase III

verdicts, but had no explanation for that. Indeed, the average

phase III pleural verdict exceeded both the average asbestosis and

the average lung cancer verdict by more than $10,000 (after

27remittitur and including zero verdicts). Hazel had no information

on the range of injury involved in the phase III pleural cases; nor

had he ever before seen or studied a situation where one particular

jury repeatedly returned separate verdicts in a long series of

cases.

2 6 At approximately the con clusion of the phase I trial, and

well before phrase III began, a motions panel of this Court issued

an order denying a petition for writ of mandamus filed by

Fibre board challenging the trial plan. The order was without

opinion (it merely recited “It is ordered that the petition for

writ of mandamus is denied”). It is settled that the motions panel

order is no t binding on us. S ee, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak

Co

., 104 F.3d 702, 704 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied

, 118 S.Ct. 336

(1997); Browning v. Navarro

, 887 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1989),

28 2. Analysis

As noted, Pittsburgh Corning attacks the Cimino trial plan, as

it did at all times below, principally on the basis that it fails

to properly try and determine individual causation, and in the

extrapolation cases also fails to properly try and determine

individual damages, as to any plaintiffs other than the ten class

representatives whose individual cases were fully tried in phase I.

Pittsburgh Corning asserts in this connection, among other things,

that these aspects of the trial plan are contrary to Fibreboard

,

impose liability and damages where they would not be imposed under

Texas substantive law, and invade its Seventh Amendment and due

process rights. Although we do not separately address the due

process contention as such, we conclude that the Cimino trial plan

is invalid in these respects, necessitating reversal o f all the

phase III sample case judgments as well as the five extrapolation

case judgments before us. 26reh’g denied , 894 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1990); Northshore Development

Co

. v. Lee

, 835 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1988) (“a motions panel

decision is not binding precedent”).

29 We begin by stati ng some very basic propositions. These

perso nal injury tort actions for monetary damages are “a

prototypical example of an action at law, to which the Seventh

Amendment applies.” Wooddell v. Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers

,

112 S.C t. 494, 498 (1991). The Seventh Amendment applies

notwithstanding that these are diversity cases. S imler v. Conner

,

83 S.Ct. 609 (1963). S ee also Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,

Inc

., 116 S.Ct. 2211 (1996). But because these are diversity

cases, the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, and Erie R. Co.

v. Tompkins

, 58 S.Ct. 817 , 822-23 (1938), with its seeming

constitutional underpinning, mandate that the substantive law

applied be that of the relevant state, here Texas. Substantive law

includes not only the factual elements which must be found to

impose liability and fix damages, but also the burdens of going

forward with evidence and of persuasion thereon. P almer v.

Hoffman

, 63 S.Ct. 477, 482 (1943); Cities Service Oil Co. v.

Dunlap , 60 S.Ct. 201 (1939).

None of the foregoing is or can be altered by the utilization

of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). As to the

Seventh Amendment, the Court in Ross v. Bernhard

, 90 S.Ct. 733

(1970), held that in a stockh olders’ derivative action seeking

monetary relief

—— now provided for in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1

—— although

the right of the stockholders to sue on behalf of the corporation

was an equitable matter determinabl e by the court, the monetary2 7 Indeed, the instant case is clearly a fortiori of Ross . In

Ross

, the Court was dealing with an action

—— a stock holders’

derivative suit

—— which was historic ally equitable and which was

fairly described as a “true” class action. Here we are dealing

with tort personal injury damage suits, historically the

q uintessential legal action for Seventh Amendment purposes, and

with a Rule 23(b)(3) class action which, at least in the personal

injury damage suit context, has no equitable antecedents and is not

30 claims of the corporation against the defendants were legal claims

to which the Seventh Amendment applied. The Court observed that

“The Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue

to be tried rather than the character of the overall action,” id

.

at 738, and “nothing turns now upon the form of the action or the

procedural devices by which the parties happen to come before the

court.” I d

. at 739. It also noted that it was “inclined to agree

with the description” of derivative suits “as one kind of ‘true’

class action,” and that “it now seems settled in the lower federal

courts that class action plaintiffs may obtain a jury trial on any

legal iss u es they present.” I d

. A leading text gives the

following commentary on Ross :

“The lang uage just quoted, that nothing turns on

‘the procedural devices by which th e parties happen to

come before the court,’ makes the Ross case controlling

not only for derivative act ions but also for the other

procedural devices that the Civil Rules borrowed from

equity. In all of these it will be for the judge to

decide whether the device may be used, but once he or she

does so there will be a right to jury trial on any of the

underlying issues that are legal in nature. Indeed, the

Ross decision itself relied in pa rt on lower court

decisions reaching this result with regard to class

actions under Rule 23. The Court said that ‘it now seems

settled in the lower federal courts tha t class action

plaintiffs may obtain a jury trial on any legal issues

they present,’ and indicated its agreement with the view

that derivative suits are one kin d of ‘true’ class

action.” 9 Wright & Miller, F ederal Pr actice and

Procedure , § 2307 at 79 (footnotes omitted). 27a “true” but rather a “spurious” class action.

We also observe that the passing reference in Ross ’s footnote

10 to “the practical abilities and limitations of juries” has been

explained by the Cour t as referring to one of the criteria to be

used in assessing, under the “public righ ts” doctrine, “whether

Congress has permissibly entrusted the resolution of certain

dis putes to an administrative agency or specialized court of

equity, and whether jury trials would impair the functioning of the

legislative scheme.” Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg , 109 S.Ct.

2782, 2790 n.4 (1989). S ee also Wright, Law of Federal Courts (5th

ed.), § 92 at 658-59.

2 8 Further, Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a) provides that: “The right of

trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the

Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be

preserved to the pa rties inviolate.” The original advisory

committee notes reflect that: “This rule provides for the

preservation of the constitutional right of trial by jury as

directed in the enabling act

. . . .” S ee also Fed. R. Civ. P.

42(b) (“.

. . always preserving inv iolate the right of trial by

jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States”).

2 9 As do also Erie and the Rules of Decision Act in diversity

cases.

31 And, this Court has long held that the applicability of the Seventh

Amendment is not altered simply because the case is Rule 23(b)(3)

c lass action. S tate of Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc

., 573

F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1978). 28

Similarly, use of Rule 23(b)(3) or 42(a) does not alter the

required elements which must be found to impose liability and fix

damages (or the burden of proof ther eon) or the identity of the

substantive law

—— here that of Texas

—— which determines such elements.

We squarely so held in Fibreboard

. And the rules enabling act, 28

U.S.C. § 2072 likewise mandates that c onclusion. 2 9 As we said in

Blue Bird Body Co .:

“This Circuit has also explained that the meaning of

liability for antitrust purposes does not change simply

because a trial is bifurcated under Fed. R. C iv. P.30 See also id . at 327:

“The holding in Shumate [ Shumate & Co. v. Ntl.

Ass’n

, 509 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 197 5)] affirming the

district c ourt’s denial of a class certification is a

recognition by this court that the fact that a case is

proceeding as a class action does not in any way alter

the substan tive proof required to prove up a claim for

relief. The holding is also a recognition that ‘impact’

is a question unique to each particular plaintiff . . .

.”

Similarly, the en banc Fourth Circuit stated in the anti-trust

class action case of Windham v. American Brands, Inc

., 565 F.2d 59,

66 (4th Cir. 1977)

—— which we cited with approval in Blue Bird Body

Co ., n.20

—— as follows:

“While a case may present a common question of violation,

the issues of injury and damage remain the critical

issues i n such a case and are always strictly

individualized.

. . . .

Generalized or class-wide proof of damages in a private

anti-trust action would, in addition, contravene the

mandate of the Rules Enabling Act that the Rules of Civil

Procedure ‘shall n o t abridge, enlarge or modify any

32 42(b). In R esponse of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response,

Inc

., 537 F.2d 1307 (5t h Cir. 1976), this court stated

that there was ‘no basis in law or logic to give

liability different meanings depending upon the trial

procedure used.’ I d

. at 1321. The Leasco opinion

explained tha t bifurcation in no way diminishes the

req uirement that a plaintiff show some evidence that a

violation caused him injury before a defendant is found

liable.

. . . .

Just as the meaning of liability does not vary because a trial is bifurcated, the requisite proof also

in no way hinges upon whether or not the action is

brought on behalf of a class unde r Rule 23 . It is

axiomatic that a procedural rule cannot ‘abridge,

enlarge, or m odify any substantive right.’ [citing 28

U.S.C. § 2072] Consequently, t his court has no power to

define differently the substantive right of individual

plaintiffs as compared to class plaintiffs .” I d

. at 317-

318 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). 30substantive right.’” (Footnotes omitted).

3 1 As previously observed, after Fibreboard the district court

at first determined to follow t he J enkins multiple mini-trials

format (see note 8, supra ), but some months later changed its mind

and devised the present plan; the quoted language comes from the

latter opinion-order. It may also be noted that in its final

published opinion in this matter, Cimino

, 751 F.Supp. 649, the

district court does not again advert to the idea that Texas would

apply some sort of collective liability theory.

33 Nor is deviation from these settled principles authorized

b ecause these are asbestos cases whose vast numbers swamp the

courts. F ibreboard clearly so holds. So, also, in J ackson v.

Johns-Manville Sales Corp

., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985), c ert.

denied

, 106 S.Ct. 3339 (1986), a diversity asbestos case arising in

Mississippi, we declined to adopt a federal common law rule for

asbestos cases (or to certify to the United States Supreme Court

whether to do so), stating:

“. . . [U]nder our federal system Congress is generally

the body responsible for balancing competing interests

and setting national policy. There is no doubt that a

desperate need ex ists for federal legislation in the

field of asbestos litigation. Congress’ silence on the

matter, however, hardly authorizes the federal judiciary

to assume for itself the responsibility for formulating

what essentially are legislative solutions. Displacement

of state law is primarily a decision fo r Congress, and

Congress has yet to act. . . .” Id . at 1327.

When, after Fibreboard

, the district court adopted the present

tria l plan, it initially justified doing so on the basis of its

conclusion that “the Texas Supreme Court, if faced with the facts

of this case, would apply a collective liability theory, such as

the Court’s plan, to an asbestos consolidated action.” 31 The court

based this conclusion on a passage in Gaulding v. Celotex Corp

.,

772 S.W.2d 66, 71 (Tex. 1989), stating “We are not to be construed32 Thus, we held in Fibreboard :

“Texas has made its policy choices in defining the duty

owed by manufacturers and supplie rs of products to

consumers. These choices are reflected in t he

requirement that a plaintiff prove both causatio n and

damage

. In Texas, it is a ‘fundamental principle of

traditional products liability law . . . that the

plaintiffs must prove that the defendan t supplied the

product which caused the injury.’ [citing Gaulding ]

These elements focus upon individuals, not groups . The

same may be said, and with even g reater confidence, of

wage losses, pain and sufferi ng, and other elements of

compensation.” Id . at 711 (footnotes omitted; emphasis

added).

See also id

. at 711-712, invalidating procedure because it “cannot

focus upon such issues as individual causation, but ultimately must

accept general causation as sufficient, contrary to Texas law” and

“it does not allow pro of that a particular defendant’s asbestos

‘really’ caused a particular plaintiff’s disease; the only ‘fact’

that can be proved is that in most cases the defendant’s asbestos

would have been the cause.” I d

. at 712 (footnote omitted; original

emphasis).

34 as approving or disapproving alternative liability, concert of

action, enterprise liability, or market share liability in an

appropriate case.” We are compelled to reject the district court’s

conclusion for each of several indepe ndently sufficient reasons.

To begin with, it is contrary to Fibreboard

, which plainly holds

that under Texas substantive law causation of plaintiff’s injury by

defendant’s p r oduct and plaintiff’s resultant damages must be

determined as to “individuals, not groups.” 3 2 F ibreboard ’s

determination of Texas law is precedent which b inds this panel.

See, e.g., F.D.I.C v. Abraham

, 137 F.3d 264, 268-69 (5th Cir.

1998); Broussard v. Southern Paci fic Transportation Company , 665

F.2d 1387, 1389 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). Gaulding furnishes no

basis to depart form Fibreboard because it was quoted and relied on35

therein. Fibreboard at 711, n.4. No Texas appellate decision or

statute subsequent to Fibreboard casts doubt on the correctness of

i ts reading of Texas law. In the second place, even were we not

bound by Fibreboard we would reach the same conclusion it did,

namely that under Texas personal injury p roducts liability law

causation and damages are determine d respecting plaintiffs as

“individuals, not groups.” We know of no Texas appellate decision

which in that or a similar context has even approved of in dicta,

much less adopted, the theories of “alternative liability, concert

of action, enterprise liability, or market share liability” which

Gaulding states it was not “approving or disapproving.” I d

. at 71.

“We have long followed the principle that we will not create

‘innovative theories of recovery or defense’ under local law, but

will rather merely apply it ‘as it currently exists.’” J ohnson v.

Sawyer

, 47 F.3d 716, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citations

omitted). Consistent with that principle, we have on more than one

occasion expressly refused t o hold that Louisiana would apply a

market share liability theory to asbestos personal injury claims,

where no Louisiana appellate decision had either done so or

declined to do so. T hompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp

., 714

F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1983) (refusing to hold that Louisiana

would adopt either “enterprise” or “market share” liability; noting

“[b]oth theories represent radical departures from traditional

theories of tort liability” and “[s]uch departures are for the

Louisiana courts, not for us”); B ateman v. Johns-Manville Sales

Corp

., 781 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir. 1986) (market share3 3 I n Thompson

, B ateman, and Jefferson

, we also declined to

certify the issue to the Louisiana Supreme Court. R hynes does not

mention certification.

3 4 We also note that in Gaulding the Te xas Supreme Court

observ ed concerning the “concert of action” theory that “[m]ost

jurisdictions that have con sidered this theory have rejected its

application to latent disease product liability cases which involve

numerous manufacturers,” id

. at 69, and concerning the “enterprise

liability” theory that it “has been rejected by virtually all other

jurisdictions [apart from the Easte rn District of New York] that

have considered this concept.” I d

. at 70. The R estatement Third,

Torts: Products Liability expressly declines to take a position on

market share liability. I d

. § 15, comment c

. The reporter’s notes

to this section state that “[a] substantial number of courts have

rejected the market-share approach.”

3 5 For example, there was no finding on any defendant’s market

share. Moreover, joint and several liability were imposed, which

Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability § 15, comment c indicates would be improper if such approach were used (“. . . if

a court does adopt some form of proportional liability, the

liability of each defendant is properly limited to the individual

defendant’s share of the market. The rules of joint and several

liability are incompatible with a market-share approach to

causation”). As to “concert of action,” there was no finding of

any concert. As to “enterprise liability,” there was no finding

that “the risks inherent in asbestos

. . . products w ere jointly

controlled by the defendants.” G aulding at 70. “Alternative

liability” is plainly ina pplicable here as it applies only where

“acts of negligence are s imultaneously committed by two or more

tortfeasors and only one act results in injury

. . . [w]hen a plaintiff fails to join all possible defendants, alternative does

36 liability). S ee also Jefferson v. Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc

., 106

F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997) (declining to adopt market share

l iability in Louisiana diversity suit for lead paint poisoning);

Rhynes v. Branick Mfg. Co

., 629 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1980) (declining

to adopt “product line” liability theory in Texas diversity case). 33

We apply Texas law as it currently exits, which is correctly stated

i n Fibreboard

. 34 Finally, it is clear that this case was neither

tried nor determined on any of “the collective liability theories”

mentioned in Gaulding

. See id . at 71. 35not apply.” I d

. at 69 (emphasis added). S ee also In Re Benedectin

Litigation

, 857 F.2d 290, 312 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied

, 488

U.S. 1006 (1989) (applicable “only when two or more defendants have

been at fault, and one and only one caused the injury”);

Restatement Second, Torts § 433 B comment h

, which states that

cases applying the doctrine “all have been cases in which all of

the actors involved have been joined as defendants. All of these

cases have involved conduct simultaneous in time, or substantially

so,

. . . .” Here these factors are not met: the wrongful conduct

of the defendants was not simultaneous or substantially so (e.g.,

Fibreboard produced and sold asbestos products to which many

plaintiffs were allegedly exposed decades before Pittsburgh Corning

entered the business); the conduct of several pa rties, not only

one, allegedly caused the complained of injuries; and it is not

shown that all manufacturers of asbestos products to which all

plaintiffs were exposed were joined.

3 6 Nor wa s there any summary judgment, or judgment under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 50, rendered on that issue.

37 Thus, the question becomes: did the implemented trial plan

include a litigated determination, consistent with the Seventh

Amendment, of the Texas-law mandated issues of whether, as to each

individual plaintiff, Pittsburgh Corning’s product was a cause of

his complained-of condition and, if so, the damages that plaintiff

suffered as a result.

We turn first to the phase III plaintiffs. In these cases,

the trial plan was adequately individualized and preserved Seventh

Amendment rights with respect to each individual’s actual damages

from an asbestos-related disease. However, it was not designed or

intended to, and did not, provide any trial or any determination of

whether a Pittsburgh Corning product was a cause of that disease. 36

It was strictly a damages trial as to those individual plaintiffs.

The stipulati on

— — not entered into until midway through phase

III

—— established merely that “some” individuals working in each of

the listed crafts, “during” each of the four decades 1942-1982 and37 Incidental general background and work history testimony as

to many of these one hundred sixty plaintiffs reflects claimed

extensive asbestos expo sure at many locations other than the

twenty-two worksites, both within the general southeast Texas area,

elsewhere in the state, and at numerous locations in other states

(none of which were claimed to contain Pittsburgh Corning

asbestos), as well as lengthy exposure prior to 1962, and even prior to 1942. For example, one phase III plaintiff’s exposure

apparently commenced before 1933; another was first exposed in

Oregon in 1942, later moved to Texas doing construction work “at

different locations around Texas,” and began experiencing weakness

38 at each of the twenty-two worksites, “were exposed to asbestos”

with “sufficient length and intensity to cause pulmonary asbestosis

of varying deg rees” and that “an asbestos-containing product of

Pittsburgh Corning Corporation was present during the decades 1962-

1982 at the specified worksites.” It was e xpressly not stipulated

“that any members of the various crafts at the various worksites

had the same exposure to any products,” or “that any such

individuals had the same susceptibility to asbestos-related

diseases in the various crafts and worksites,” or that “any

individual plaintiff was in fact exposed to injurious quantities of

asbestos from the products of any defendant.” Phase III did not

litigate or determine whether or to what extent any of the one

hun d red sixty individual plaintiffs was exposed to Pittsburgh

Corning’s

—— or any other defendant’s

— — asbestos, or was exposed to

asbestos at any of the twenty-two worksites, or whether any such

exposure was in fact a cause of that plaintiff’s illness or

disease. Nor did phase III litigate or determine either any

individual plaintiff’s past connection with any particular worksite

or craft, or whether or to what extent such individual was exposed

to asbestos o therwise than at any of the specified worksites. 3 7and shortness of breath sometime between 1965 and 1975; and another

“since about 1957" had “worked primarily as a plumber and pipe

fitter in the Waco area” during which he applied and removed

asbestos products. Another’s working career commenced in 1961 at

an ammunition plant in Tyler, Texas, where he remained (except for

some two years running a small store) until 1977 or 1978 and was

exposed to asbestos there; thereafter and until 1989 he worked in

construction at various jobs around Texas, including at Mount

Pleasant and in paper mills, an d in at least eight other states,

and was exposed to asbestos; in “the early ‘80's” he began to feel

wea ker; in 1986 he was diagnosed with asbestosis; and in 1989 he

returned to work at the Tyler ammunition plant where he remained

employed at trial.

38 The stipulation reserved it the right to do so and reflects

t hat the district court would adhere to its trial plan

notwithstanding any such tenders.

39 Indeed, for the most part exposure evidence was not allowed and the

jury was instructed to assume sufficient exposure. Nor did phase

III either litigate or determine whether or to what extent asbestos

exposure, either generally or to the product of any particular

defendant, was uniform or similar for members of any given craft at

any one or more of the specified worksites.

We note that at least two of the twenty-two sites actually

each involved two plants, and another involved “the facilities” of

a company “including” its powerhouse. Further, Pittsburgh Corning

tendered evidence 38 that a typical refinery covers several square

miles and indicating that at refineries, shipyards, and other

installations asbestos exposure levels were not uniform at the site

or throughout a craft or within a decade or between decades, and

that most individuals employed at the twenty-two worksites did not

have sufficient exposure to cause asbestosis. Also so tendered was

evidence indicating that exposure to asbestos below some level

would not produce asbestosis and even above that level risks remain3 9 Also, that lun g cancer, in addition to being caused by

smoking and asbestos exposure, can be caused by exposure to

radiation, chromium, arsenic, and polynuclear aromatic

hydrocarbons, and that exposure to such known causes of lung cancer

“ are very frequent in both shipyards and the petrochemica l

industry”; that because of the long latency of asbestos-related

lung cancer

—— generally 25 to 30 years, sometimes as short as 10 to

15 years

—— ”if an individual were ex posed to asbestos only a few

years prior to the diagnosis of lung cancer, that asbestos would

not be able to be incriminated” (and “exposures occurring 15 years prior to diagnosis of lung cancer are not going to be as important

as exposures 30 or 35 years prior to diagnosis of lung cancer in

terms of being causally related”).

40 very low until a multiple of five or ten or twenty times the

threshold level is reached; 39 that not all those exposed to asbestos

in substantial quantities and for protracted periods of time

develop asbestosis; that asbestosis develops in “a relatively small

percentag e of patients with significant asbestos exposure”; and,

that although there is a dose respo nse relationship

— — the more

exposure the more risk, the less, the less risk

—— resp ecting

asbestosis, nevertheless the effect of the same exposure is not the

same as between different individuals and “two similarly exposed

asbestos workers with exactly the same asbestos historical exposure

can go on to have in one case asbestosis and the other case no lung

problems.” Moreover, we have held, in a Texas law diversity case,

that “the appropriate test for a [plaintiff’s] minimum showing of

producing cause in asbestos cases” is that stated in Lohrmann v.

Pittsburgh Corning Corp

., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986), namely the

“‘frequency-regularity-proximity’ test” under which “a motion for

summary judgment cannot be defeated merely by alleging work at a

shipyard in which defendants’ asbestos products had somewhere been

present. Rather, there must be proof of frequent and regular work4 0 Slaughter also observ ed that this test had been adopted by

all but three circuit courts and by some eight states. I d

. at 171

n.3.

41 in an area of the shipyard in proximity to some specific item of

defendants’ asbestos containi ng product.” S laughter v. Southern

T alc. Co

. , 949 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added)

. 40

It is important to note that this is merely a m inimum showing;

Slaughter makes clear that making such a showing merely gets a

plaintiff to the jury, it does not entitled h im to judgment as a

matter of law. See id . at 173. Further, it is obvious that for

these purposes a shipyard is not considered as a single,

undifferentiated, and uniform mass.

We have noted that the district court, in the order in which

it initially adopted the present plan, stated that for purposes of

the then-contemplated phase II trial it would “make a non-jury

det e rmination as to which Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ decedents

worked for a sufficient period of time at each worksite so as to be

a proper member of that worksite’s group and which Plaintiffs were

proper members of each of the crafts at these worksites.

. . .” As

previously observed, after phase I the case proceeded directly into

phase III without any phase II, and the stipulation was not entered

into until phase III was half complete. It is not clear that the

district court ever determined that any (or, if so, which) of the

tried one hundred sixty phase III plaintiffs, or that any (or if

so, which) of the unsevered extrapolation plaintiffs, actually did

work at the worksites “for a sufficient period of time” to be

“proper members of each of the crafts at these worksites.” And, if42

such determinations were made, it is not clear what criteria were

employed and what source or s ources of information were utilized

either in selecting or in applying the criteria. In any event, it

is clear not only that any such determination was made non-jury,

but further that it was made without either any evidentiary (or

other) hearing or any summary judgment procedure (or Fed. R. Civ.

P. 50 motion). Accordingly, no such determination can serve to

justify or sustain the trial plan as implemented.

With one exception, noted below, we are aware of no appellate

decision approving su ch a group, rather than individual,

determination of cause in a damage suit for personal injuries to

individuals at widely different times and places. For example, in

a personal injury suit by individuals living in the neighborhood of

a landfill allegedly contaminated by defendant, the Sixth Circuit

remarked:

“Thus, the court, as is appropriate in this type of

mass tort class action litigation, divided its causation

analysis into two parts. It was first established that

Velsicol was responsible for the contamination and that

the particular contaminants were capable of producing

injuries of the types allegedly suffered b y the

plaintiffs. Up to this point in the proceeding, the five

representative plaintiffs were acting primarily in their

representative capacity to the class as a whole. This

enabled the court the determine a kind of generic

causation

—— whether the combinatio n of the chemical

contaminants and the plaintiffs’ exposure to them had the

capacity to cause the harm alleged. This still left the

matter of individ ual proximate cause to be determined.

Although such generic and individual causation may appear

to be inextricably intertwined, the procedural device of

the class action permitted the court initially to assess

the defendant’s potential liability for its conduct

without regard to the individual components of each

plaintiff’s injuries. However, from this point forward,

it became the responsibility of each individual plaintiff

to show that his or her specific injuries or damages were41 This was a bench trial case, no jury apparently having been

demanded, in which a Rule 23(b)(3) class was certified, and a trial

held in which defendant’s culpability for cont aminating the

landfill and area water supply with chemicals generically capable

of causing the injuries sued for was determined along with punitive

damages and the entire claims of the five cla ss representatives.

Deferred for later “ind ividual hearings” were “the issues of

causation and injury of” each of the other class members. Id . at

1194.

4 2 Cf. Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc

., 97 F.3d 1227 , 1229,

1234 (9th Cir. 19 96) (in certifying Rule 23(b)(3) class in

prescription drug products liability suit, district court

“specifically excluded the individual issues of proximate

causation, compensatory damages”; class certification reversed

43 proximately caused by inges tion or otherwise using the

contaminated water.” S terling v. Velsicol Chemical Co

., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988). 41

See also In Re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation

, 818 F.2d

145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied , 108 S.Ct. 695 (1988) (in appeal

from settlement in Rule 23(b)(3) class action for agent orange

exposure, in which general liability issues, including the military

contractor defense, were to be tried class-wide and ind ividual

issues, such as each individual’s damages caused by exposure, “were

to be left to individual trials,” id

. at 150, 164, the court holds

certification proper o nly because of “the centrality of th e

military contractor defense” and that certification “would have

been error” in an action by civilians for exposure during civilian

affairs, noting “[t]he relevant question

. . . is not whether Agent

Orange has the capacity to cause harm, the generic causation issue,

but whether it did cause harm and to whom. That determination is

highly individualistic, and depends upon the character istics of

individual plaintiffs (e.g., state of health, lifestyle) and the

nature of their exposure to Agent Orange

. . .,” id

. at 165-166). 42because sufficient reasons not given, but rule 23(c)(4)(A)

exclusion of individual issues essentially approved ); M alcolm v.

National Gypsum Co

., 995 F.2d 346, 350-353 (2d Cir. 1993)

(disapproving consolidation for trial of forty-eight asbestos cases

because too many different individual exposures, crafts, worksites,

and diseases involved); Jenkins , 109 F.R.D. at 284 (observing, in

justifying class trial of common issues and i ndividual trials of

individual issues of exposure-causation and damages, “[t]he

experience of this Court

. . . has been that the verdicts that have

been rendered in favor of defendants have been rendered on the

basis of a plaintiff’s failure to prove exposure or t o prove the

existence of an asbestos-related injury. The defendants have not

been successful on the state of the art defense).”

4 3 Except for certain damages claims first authorized by the

1991 amendments thereto.

44 The district court also justified its trial plan by reliance

on Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co ., 494 F.2d 211, 258-63

(5th Cir. 1974), where, in a Title VII Rule 23(b)(2) class action,

we stated that back pay could be awarded on a class -wide basis,

using average rates of pay and approximations, and did not require

an individual plaintiff by individual plaintiff approach. However,

Pettway is inapplicable here, for each of several reasons. In the

first place, Title VII actions are entirely equitable actions 43 and

back pay awards therein are strictly equitable remedies, as we

recognized in Pettway (“the award of back pay” is “one element of

the equitable remedy,” id . at 1125), and as we have held in other

decisions both before and after Pettway

. J ohnson v. Georgia

Highway Express, Inc

., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) (no

entitlement to a jury in Title VII action seeking back pay as that

is “an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy, to be

determined through the exercise of the court’s discretion, and not

by a jury”); Wilson v. Belmont Homes

, 970 F.2d 53, 54-56 (5th Cir.4 4 Also, Pettway involved matters such as back pay among a class

of employees, matters which by their nature are far more objectively measurable and far mo re reflected by measurable

variables common to the group than are such inherently subjective,

imprecise, and wholly individualized matters as physical pain,

mental suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life which are

significant damages elements in this kind of case.

45 1992). S ee also Johnson v. Chapel Hill ISD

, 853 F.2d 375, 383 (5th

Cir. 1988) (front pay). Thus, in P ettway there was no Seventh

Amendment right to jury trial. J ohnson ; Wilson

. Here, by

con trast, we have personal injury damage suits, the protypical

Seventh Amendment case. In the second place, P ettway involved only

federal law, and hence this Court was not constrained by the Rules

of Decision Act and Erie

, as it i s here. Relatedly, P ettway

involved what Johnson had characterized as an “equitable remedy, to

be dete rmined through the exercise of the court’s discretion,”

w hile here the elements of liability and recoverable damages are

fixed by state substantive law. 44

Nor do we consider that In Re Chevron U.S.A., Inc ., 109 F.3d

1016 (5th Cir. 1997), justifies the instant trial plan. That

action involved claims by approximately 3,000 neighboring property

owners for person al injury and property damage allegedly caused

contamination from Ch evron’s former crude oil storage waste pit.

Apparently no form of class action was involved, although some

cases were consolidated. The district court directed that thirty

individual plai ntiffs be chosen, fifteen by the plaintiffs and

fifteen by the defendants, and that t here be “a unitary trial on

the issues of ‘general liability or causation’ on behalf of the

remaining plaintiffs, as well as the individual causation and46

damage issues of the [thirty] selected plaintiffs.” Id . at 1017.

Apparently, the individual causation and damage issues of the

remaining un selected plaintiffs would be determined subsequently in

individual trials (if the unitary trial established “liability on

the part of Chevron for the pollutants that, allegedly, give rise

to all of the plaintiffs’ claims,” id

. at 101 9). Chevron sought

mandamus, contending “that the goal of the ‘unitary’ trial was to

determine its liability, or lack thereof, in a single trial and to

establish bellwether verdicts to which the remaining claims could

be matched for settlement purposes.” I d

. at 1017. We stated that

the thirty selected plaintiffs were not shown or chosen so as to be

representative of the other plaintiffs, and observed that “ [a]

bellwether trial designed to achi eve its value ascertainment

function for settlement purposes or to answer troubling causation

or liability issues common to the universe of cla imants has as a

core element representativeness

. . . .” I d

. at 1019 (emphasis

added). We granted mandamus prohibiting “utilization of the

results obtained from the trial of the thirty (30) selected cases

for any purpose affecting issues or claims of, or defenses to, the

remaining untried cases.” While the majority opinion (one judge

specially concurred) contains language generally looking with favor

on the use of bellwether verdicts when shown to be statistically

representative, this language is plainly dicta , certainly insofar

as it might suggest that representative bellwether verdicts could

properly be used to determine individual causation and damages for

other plaintiffs. C f. Sterling , 855 F.2d at 1200 (difference4 5 We also specifically stated that we expressed no opinion on

whether the mix of claims there was such as to potentially

authorize either bellwether trials based on appropriate sampling or

a stand-alone, common issue trial. Id . at 1021.

4 6 See, e.g., Cosden Oil v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft

, 736

F.2d 1064, 1070 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984) (“This panel, however, is not

bound by dicta of a previous panel”); C uracao Drydock Co. v. M/V

Akritas , 710 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1984).

47 between generic and individual causation). To begin with, no such

question was before this Court, as the trial plan contemplated that

individual causation and damages issues would not be controlled by

the thirty individual bellwether verdicts, which would be used to

encourage settlement. Moreover, what we did

— — our holding

— — was to

prevent any preclusive use of the unitary tri al results (whether

for general causation or individual causation or otherw ise) in

cases other than those of the thi rty selected plaintiffs. 4 5 And,

we concluded that if the district court carried out a nother,

different trial plan, that would present “matters for another panel

to consider in the event those decisions are subject to appellate

review.” I d

. at 1021. Finally, the majority opinion in I n Re

Chevron U.S.A. does not even cite Fibreboard , or the Seventh

Amendment (or discuss the right to jury trial), and does not refer

to the Texas substantive law elements of liability and damages in

the matter before it. Clearly, I n Re Chevron U.S.A. does n o t

control the result here, and this panel is not bound by its dicta. 46

In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos

, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996), a

divided panel of the Ninth Circuit in a rule 23(b)(3) class action

permitted recoverable tort damages to be determined in a lump sum

for the entire class. H ilao was a suit under the Alien Tort Claims48

Act, and the Court essentially applied substantive princi ples of

federal or international “com mon law.” S ee id

. at 776-778. The

majority distinguished Fibr eboard on the basis that there “the

pro posed procedure worked a change in the parties’ substantive

rights under Texas law that was barred by the Erie doctrine.” I d

.

at 785 (footnote omitted). By the same token, H ilao is

distinguishable here; it did not operate under the constraints of

the Rules of Decision Act or Erie ; the present case, by contrast,

does operate under those constraints. If H ilao is not thus

distinguishable it is simply contrary to Fibreboard

, which binds us

and which in our opinion is in any event correct. Further, Hilao

did not address

—— and there was apparently n ot presented to it any

conten tion concerning

— — the Seventh Amendment. Finally, we find

ourselves in agreement with the thrust of the dissenting opinion

there. I d

. at 788 (“Even in the context of a class action,

individual causation and individual damages must still be proved

individually”).

In sum, as Fibreboard held, under Texas law causation must be

determined as to “individuals, not groups.” And, the Seventh

Amendment gives the right to a jury trial to make that

determination. There was no such trial determination made, and no

jury determined, that exposure to Pittsburgh Corning’s products was

a cause of the asbestos disease of any of the one hundred sixty

phase III plaintiffs. Nor does the stipulation determine or

establish that. Accordingly, the judgments in all the one hundred

f orty-three phase III cases before us must be reversed and4 7 Nor was there any summary judgment or Rule 50 judgment in

that respect. In some few of the cases, an asbestos-related

disease may have been admitted.

49 remanded.

We turn now to the extrapolation cases. As to the matter of

individual cau sation, it is obvious that the conclusion we have

reached in respect to the phase III cases applies a fortiori to the

extrapolation cases. In the extrapolation cases there was no trial

and no jury determination that any individual plaintiff suffered an

asbestos-related disease. 47 Indeed, in the extrapolation cases

there was no trial at all

—— by jur y or otherwise

— — and there was no

evidenc e presented. So, our holding as to the phase III cases

necessarily requires reve rsal of the judgments in the five

extrapolation cases before us.

As to the matter of ac tual damages, the extrapolation cases

are likewise fatally defective. Unlike the phase III cases, in the

extrapol ation cases there was neither any sort of trial

determination, let alone a jury determination, nor even any

evidence, of damages. The district court considered that these

deficiencies were adequately compensa t ed for by awarding each

extrapolation case plaintiff who alleged an asbestos-related

disease an amount of actual damages equ al to the average of the

awards made in the phase III cases for plaintiffs claiming the same

category of disease. This plainly contravenes F ibreboard ’s holding

that under the substantive law of Texas recoverable damages are the

“wage losses, pain and suffe ring, and other elements of

compensation” suffered by each of the several particular plaintiffs4 8 As previously observed, see notes 23, 24, and 25, supra, and

accompanying text, comparability or representativeness were

measured and fo und o nly in terms of certain specified variables,

and these did not include, for ex ample, matters which anyone

claimed were representativ e of physical pain, mental suffering,

loss of enjoyment of life, wage loss (past or future), or medical

expenses. Similarly, Professor Frankewitz “made no attempt . . .

to correlate or to identify any results or factors

. . . that would

predict or estimate what jury awards might be” and stated that none of what he did “related to magnitude of verdicts.”

We also note that the testimony at the extrapolation hearing,

particularly that of Dr. Dement and Professor Frankewitz, was

fatally flawed because their information as to the distribution of

the variables among the extrapolation plaintiffs (and to a large

extent among the phase III plaintiffs) was simply based on what

they had been furnished b y clerks or paralegals in the office of

plaintiffs’ counsel, who did all the assignment of variables (and

in some cases their interpretation) to particular plaintiffs, and

was not supported by independent evidence.

50 as “individuals, not groups.” We also observe in this connection

that none of the experts at the extrapolation hearing puported to

say that the damages suffer ed by the phase III plaintiffs in a

given disease cate gory (whether as disclosed by the phase III

evidence or as found by the jury) were to any extent representative

of the damages suffered by the extrapolation plaintiffs in the same

disease category. 48 The procedure also violates Pittsburgh

Corning’s Seventh Amendment right to have the amount of the legally

recoverable damages fixed and determined by a jury. The only

juries that spoke to actual damages, the phase I and III juries,

received evidence only of the damages to the particular plaintiffs

before them, were called on to determine only

, and only determined,

each of those some one hundred seventy particular plaintiffs’

actual damages individually and severally (not on any kind of a

group basis), and were not called on to determine , and did n ot

detrmine or purport to determine, the damages of any other4 9 And we note that the phase III verdicts within each disease

category varied quite significantly. There were mesothelioma

verdicts of $200,000 and of over $2 million, lung cancer verdicts

of $150,000 and of over $1 million, asbestosis verdicts of less

than $100,000 and of over $1 million, pleural verdicts of $150,000

and of over $1 million. There were also twelve zero verdicts.

And, Professor Hazel “was struck” by the differences in verdicts as

between the two different juries that tried the phase III cases. The phase III juries did not make average awards, they made a

series of very different individual awards. The averages were

created by others after the fact. And, if we look to averages, we

note that the average phase III verdict in pleural cases was higher

than that in both lung cancer and asbestosis cases, contrary to the

almost universal view that pleural disease is less serious and less

disabling than either lung cancer or asbestosis (and that of all

asbestos personal injury cases pleural cases have the least

settlement value). Professor Hazel was unable to suggest any

explanation for this discrepancy.

50 There the Seventh Circuit stated:

“.

. . the judge must not divide issues between separate

trials in such a way that the same issue is reexamined by

different juries.

. . . The right to a jury trial in

federal civil cases, conferred by the Seventh Amendment,

is a right to have juriable issues determined by the

first jury impaneled to hear them (provided there are no

errors warranti ng a new trial), and not reexamined by

another finder of fact. This would be obvious if the

second finder o f fact were a judge. . . . But it is

equally true if it is another jury.” Id . at 1303.

Similarly, where legal and equita ble claims share one or more

overlapping common factual issues, the legal issues must first be

tried to the jury to protect Seventh Amendment rights that could be

51 plaintiffs or group of plaintiffs. 49 We have held that “inherent

in the Sevent h Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury is the

general right of a litigant to have only one jury pass on a common

issue of fct.” B lue Bird Body Co

., 573 F.2d at 318. This requires

that if separate trial ar e ordered, the separately tried issues

must be “distinct and separable from the othe rs.” I d

. S ee also

Matter of Rhone Poulenc

, 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied

, 116

S.Ct. 184 (1995). 50 By the same token, where the issues to beinfringed by prior bench trial determination of the common issues.

Roscello v. Southwest Airlines

, 726 F.2d 217, 221 (5th Cir. 1984).

5 1 Nor are we aware o f any legally valid ground on which the

personal injury damages suffered by one person may be determined,

without any evidence, solely on the basis of the average of awards

made to other persons in similar cases.

52 separately tried are separable and distinct, the Seventh Amendment

rights of the parties are preserved as to both sets of issues.

Blue Bird Body Co

., 573 F.2d at 318. As the cited cases

demonstrate, these principles are fully applicable in class actions

for damages. It necessarily follows from these principles that the

jury’s phase III findings of the actual damages of each of the

individual phase III plaintiffs cannot control the determination

of, or afford any basis for denial of Pittsburgh-Corning’s Seventh

Amendment rights to have a jury determine, the distinct and

separable issues of the actual damages of each of the extrapolation

plaintiffs. 51

We conclude that the extrapolation case judgments, as well as

the phase III judgments, are fatally flawed, are contrary to the

dictates of Fibreboard

, and contravene Pittsburgh-Corning’s Seventh

Amendment rights. We do not act in ignorance or disregard of the

asbestos crises. In A mchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor

, 117 S.Ct.

2231, 2237-38 (1997), the Su preme Court called attention to the

report of the Judicial Confer ence’s Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos

Litigation, stating that “Real re form, the report concluded,

required federal legislation creating a national asbestos-dispute

resolutio n scheme.” I d

. at 2238. The Court also observed, “The

argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims5 2 Cf. Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg

, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 2790 n.4,

2795-97 (1989) (indicating that under the “public rights” doctrine

Congress can, even in some cases not involving th e federal

government, sometimes limit what might otherwise be Seventh

Amendment rights, when it acts for a valid legislative purpose

under Article I and has created a seemingly private right so

closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a

matter appropriate for agency or specialized court resolution, and

has assigned its adjudication to such an agency or specialized

court, and jury trials would impair the functioning of the scheme).

53 processing regime would provide the most secure, fair , and

e f ficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure.

Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution.” Id . at 2252

(footnote omitted). Nevertheless, the Court refused to stretch the

law to fill the gap resulting from congressional inaction. As we

said in Fibreboard

, federal courts must remain faithful to Erie and

must maintain “th e separation of powers between the judicial and

legislativ e branches.” I d

. at 711. 52 “The Judicial Branch can

offer the trial of lawsuits. It has no power or competence to do

more.” Id . at 712.

We accordingly reverse the judgments before us in all the one

hundred forty-three phase II I cases and in all the five

extrapolation cases, and those one hundre d forty-eight cases are

remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

B. Other Pittsburgh Corning Contentions;

Plaintiffs’ Cross-Appeal as to Pittsburgh Corning

We turn now to Pittsburgh Corning’s remaining claims of error

and to plaintiffs’ cross-appeal as to Pittsburgh Corning. I n

light of our above holding, we pretermit any consideration of any

remaining claims of Pittsburgh corning, and of any claims of error

raised by plaintiffs in their cross-appeal as to Pittsburgh53 Strictly speaking, this holding was directed to cases filed

before September 2, 1987, but the court stated that it was

“consistent with the current prejudgment interest statute which is

applicable to actions commenced on or after Se ptember 2, 1987.”

Id . at 769.

54 Corning, which relate solely to some or all of the phase III cases

or some or all of the extrapolation cases or solely to both. Any

other c laims of Pittsburgh Corning, and plaintiffs on their

referenced cross-appeal, we consider solely insofar as they pertain

to the nine judgments in the phase I class representative cases.

We first consider Pittsburgh Corning’s contentions; to the extent

they sufficiently relate to the same subject matter, we consider

plaintiffs’ cross-appeal contentions along with the related

Pittsburgh Corning contention.

1. Prejudgment Interest

The district court held that prejudgm ent interest on past

actual damages accrued at the expiration of six months after the

plaintiff’s last exposure. Pittsburgh Corning contends, i nter

alia

, that such accrual date is too early; plaintiffs in their

cross-appeal contend it is too late. In O wens-Illinois, Inc. v.

Estate of Burt

, 897 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. 1995), the Texas Supreme Court

held that in asbestos personal injury actions prejudgment interest

commences to accrue six months after the date the defendant

received notice of the claim or the dat e the lawsuit was filed,

whichever is earlier. 5 3 The awards of prejudgment interest are

hence vacated and remanded for recalculation.

2. Miscellaneous Asserted Trial Errors

Pittsburgh Corning complains that the district court55

erroneously excluded evidence it tendered o f studies by Dr.

Selikoff concerning the incidence of cancer among refinery workers.

However, this claim as briefed to us relates only to the phase III

cases; and, in the motion for new trial hearing Pittsburgh Corning

stated “we didn’t really use the refinery worker studies as such in

the Phase I trial. We tried to use it in Phase 3, but in Phase 1

we used many studies other than the fivefold insulator study of Dr.

Selikoff” and that prejudice was reflected as to phase III by the

fact that “the [phase III] verdicts are multiples [of] what the

compensatory results were in Phase I. I think it’s a striking

contrast.” Pittsburgh Corning also complains about being limited

as to its presentation of smoking evidence and of the jury

instructions in that regard. Again, as briefed in this Court, this

claim appears focused largely on phase III; and, at the motion for

new trial hearing, Pittsbur gh Corning observed that smoking

evidence was allowed in the phase I trial and that of the ten phase

I cases there was a defense verdict in one case and contributory

negligence findings in four o ther cases, and in essence conceded

that this claim was viable only as to phase III. We conclude that

the refinery study and smoking conten tions present no reversible

error respecting the phase I cases.

Pittsburgh Corning complains that plaintiffs’ counsel engaged

in repeated improper appeals to bias, passion, and prejudice, as a

result of which the phase I jury awards (and those in phase III,

which we do not address) were excessive. While Pittsburgh Corning,

understandably perhaps, rather exaggerates in this connection, it5 4 As to Pittsburgh Corn ing’s complaint that one of its

witnesses was served with a subpoena in the courtroom just after

testifying, the service occurred during a break, outside the

presence of the jury and the judge. When the proceedings resumed,

the district court reprimanded plaintiffs’ couns el. Pittsburgh

Corning mentions adverse audience reaction on a couple of

occasions, but the district court properly handled those matters.

Neither of these occurrences, or the use of the demonstrative box

alluded to by Pittsburgh Corning, presents any reversible error,

whether considered alone or in the aggregate with the other claims

in this connection.

56 is nevertheless regrettably true that plaintiffs’ counsel stepped

well out of line on several o ccasions. However, as to virtually

all of these instances in which Pittsburgh Corning made objection,

the objection was promptly and properly sustained and, on request,

an approp riate instruction was given. Some of what is raised on

appeal in this connection was not objected to below. Considering

the phase I evidence and verdicts, the length of the phase I trial,

and the trial court’s rulings, we are not persuaded that reversible

error has been demonstrated or that manifest injustice would result

by allowing the verdict to stand. See Johnson v. Ford Motor Co

.,

988 F.2d 573, 582 (5th Cir. 1993); Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,

Inc ., 886 F.2d 758, 765 (5th Cir. 1989); Wilson v. Johns-Manville

Sales Corp

., 810 F.2d 1358, 1362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

, 484 U.S.

828 (1987). 54

Pittsburgh Corning asserts error in the trial court’s refusal

to furnish the prospective jurors a list of all the over two

thousand class members so the jurors could be questioned about

whether they knew any of them. The district court determined that

this was impractical and unnecessary. The prospective jurors had

the ten individual class representatives identified to them. Each5 5 Another separate question asked “have you read, heard about

or seen any reports about court cases or lawsuits about asbestos,”

with a “yes” answer calling for an explanation.

5 6 The district court also asked the prospective jurors whether,

should they later learn that someone they knew was a member of the

class, they could set that aside in their deliberations.

57 prospective juror had already filled out a 53-part questionnaire,

and the completed questionnaires were available to counsel. Among

other things, this question naire asked whether the prospective

juror knew anyone suffering from an asbestos-related disease and,

in a separate question, whether the prospective juror “knew of

anyone who has or had a lawsuit concerning alleged asbestos-related

injuries.” If the latter question were answered “yes,” the person

or persons so known were to be named and an explanati on given. 5 5

The district judge’s questioning of the prospective jurors resulted

in several being excused because of their relationship with persons

who suffered from asbestos-related disease. 56 The parties were then

afforded an opportunity to voir dire the prospective jurors,

including asking individuals about their answers to the above

identified questions on the questionnaire. And, Pittsburgh Corning

did ask certain jurors about their referenced answers. No

complaint is made that voir dire by counsel was unduly restricted

in this respect. A district judge generally has broad discretion

in determining how best to conduct voir dire

, United States v.

G reer , 968 F.2d 433, 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1992), c ert. denied

, 113

S.Ct. 1390 (1993), but that discretio n is abused if the scope of

voir dire is inadequate to discover bias or deprives a party of an

opportunity to make reasonably intelligent us e of his peremptory58

challenges. I d

. at 435, 443 . Considering together the

questionnaire, the court’s questions to the panel, and the

individual voir dire allowed the parties, we conclude that no abuse

of discretion has been shown, althoug h the better practice would

have been to furnish the prospective jurors the class list.

3. Recusal

We reject, as we earlier did in denying Pittsburgh Corning’s

petition for mandamus raising the identical contentions, Pittsburgh

Corning’s claims that the district judge who initially primarily

presided over these cases should have recused himself earlier, as

well as that the successor district judge did not properly rule on

their motions raising that matter. After again thoroughly

consid ering the matter, we find these contentions to be without

merit.

4. Exemplary Damages

Pittsburgh Corning raises several challenges to the award of

exemplary damages. It complains of the admission of evidence

concerning its Tyler asbestos plant. Although none of the class

had worked there and the asbestos exposure there was far greater

than at the twenty-two sites at issue, the evidence was relevant to

the exemplary damages issue as having some tendency to show

Pittsburgh Corning was aware of, and consciou sly indifferent to,

the risks posed by the asbestos it manufactured. A limiting

instruction was given in this connection. No abuse of discretion

in the admission of this evidence has been established. See King

v. Anthony world Industries , 906 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1990),5 7 We note that neither Pittsburgh Corning nor plaintiffs sought

to submit evidence of Pittsburgh Corning’s financial resources or

insurance coverage or evidence of other asbestos damage awards of

any kind which Pittsburgh Corning had paid or as to which final

judgm ents were outstanding against it. S ee Owens-Corning

Fibreglass v. Malone , __ S.W.2d __, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 877, 1998

WL 288690 (Tex. 1998).

59 cert. denied , 500 U.S. 942 (1991).

Further complaint is made by Pittsburgh Corning as to the

district court’s instructions concerning exemplary damages and what

was necessary to find in order to impose them. To the extent that

these contentions are predicated on proper objections made at

trial, we conclude that the instructions, when taken and considered

as a whole, were adequate, though not perfect, and that any

deficiency did not prejudice Pittsburgh Corning’s substantial

rights. S ee Russell v. Plano Bank & Trust

, 130 F.3d 715, 719 (5th

C ir. 1997). Some challenges to the instructions that Pittsburgh

Corning now raises are not supported by proper objection below, and

as to these we conclude that reversal under the plain error

doctrine is not appropriate here. Id . at 719, 721. The use of a

multiplier to determine punitive damages is likewise challenged by

Pit tsburgh Corning. However, our decisions in J enkins and

Fibreboard mandate rejection of that challenge. It is also

contended that the multiplier of three that the jury assigned to

Pittsburgh Corning is excessive, both generally and as a matter of

due process. We reject this contention. S ee Edwards v. Armstrong

World Industr ies , 911 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1990). 5 7 In

another variation of its excessiveness argument, Pittsburgh Corning

calls a ttention to the fact that the district court, after5 8 Plaintiffs do not challeng e this ruling in their crossappeal.

60 initially con cluding that the multiplier applied to all actual

damages, granted a remittitur by its rul ing that the multiplier

applied only to the share of actual damages for which Pittsburgh

Corning was liable. This, says Pittsburgh Corning, was an eighty

percent reduction (much larger, it says, in the phase III and

extrapolation cases), and under Wells v. Dallas ISD

, 793 F.2d 679,

683-84 (5th Cir. 1986), mandates a new trial. We disagree. The

district court initially observ ed that as to punitive damages,

“[t]he jury verdict is well supported by the evidence and does not

offend the Texas proportionality rule.” Although it then concluded

that the multiplier should apply to the entire amount of actual

damages found, it reserved “for another day” whether “for equitable

considerations or by way of remittitur” it should limit the

multiplier to the share of actual damages for which Pittsburgh

Corning would be liable. It ultimately so limited the multiplier. 5 8

In doing so, however, the court expressly stated “This Court does

not find the amount of the multipliers to be excessive as to

suggest that passion rather than reason motivated the jury.” The

Court went on, in the same opinion, to state:

“Taking into account equitable considerations, and

in the nature of a remittitur, the Court has decided to

apply the multipliers set for a defenda nt to that

defendant’s allocated sha re of actual damages. This

ruling also most clos ely comports with the holding in

Edwards v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc

., 911 F.2d at

1154.”

Plaintiffs contend “there was not an actual remittitur.” Given the61

district court’s having expressly found that the multiplier verdict

was well supported by the evidence, was proportional, and was the

product of reason, not passion, it appears to us that the court was

in part interpreting the jury’s verdi ct

—— which, after all, was a

multiplie r, not a stated sum

— — in accordance with its most likely

intent and in part was attempting to conformthe judgment to the

assumptions implicit in our Edwards decision. In that Texas law

diversity suit for asbestos personal injury damages, we “review[ed]

the proportionality of the punitive damage award against Celotex in

comparison with its allocated share of actual damages” and, so

d oing, did “not find it so excessive as to suggest that pa ssion

rather than reason motivated the jury.” I d

. at 1154. Based on the

foregoing, it is clear to us that the doctrine of Wells v. Dallas

ISD is not applicable here. We reject Pittsburgh Corning’s

challenges to the punitive damage award.

Plaintiffs present two c hallenges to the punitive damages

award. First, they contend that the multiplier should be applied

not only to the actual damages awarded by the jury, but also to the

prejudgment interest which was subsequently awarded by the court.

They contend in this connection that Texas law regards prejudgment

interest as a component of actual damages, citing, among other

cases, Benavides v. Isles Construction Co

., 726 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex.

1987); Paramore v. Nehring

, 792 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. App.

—— Austin 1990,

no writ); El Paso County Water Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Gr ijalua , 783

S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex. App.

—— El Paso 1990), writ denied

, 795 S.W.2d

705 (Tex. 1990); and Wood v. Armco

, 814 F.2d 211, 215 (5th Cir.5 9 And, the Texas legislature likewise has in effect overruled

the Paramore approach. S ee Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.50(e) (Acts

1995, 74th Leg. ch. 414 § 5).

62 1987). These cases do not address the issue now before us. Many

of them, such as Benavides, El Paso County Water Imp. Dist. No. 1

,

and Wood are essentially pleading cases, stating in general terms

that “common law” prejudgment interest is an element of actual

damages that has to be specifically pleaded for. P aramore held

that prejudgment interest was a part of “the actual damages” which

the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com.

Code § 17.50(b)(1), required the trial court to double when

rendering judgment. However, P aramore recognizes that three other

Texas Courts of Appeals had held otherwise, and in each of those

three cases the Texas Supreme Court had refused application for

writ of error “no reversible error.” See Paramore , 792 S.W.2d at

211-212. Since P aramore

, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals declined

to follow its approach and has continued to hold “that prejudgment

interest should not be included as actual damages before trebling”

under the DTPA. R oberts v. Grande

, 868 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Te x

.

App.

—— Houston [14th] 1994; no writ). 59 Moreover, in a case such as

this there are no mandatory punitive damages, and whether to award

them, and how much to award, is a question for the jury (subject to

review for excessiveness). Here, the most reasonable view of the

verdict

—— one apparently shared by the trial court

—— is that it does

not reflect on intention to have the multipliers it selected apply

to anything other than “actual damages” or “compensatory damages”

as defined in the court’s charge and as fixed by the phase I jury63

for the class representatives (and to be fixed by the phase III

j uries for the other class members). There was no mention of

prejudgment interest in the charge, and the definition and elements

of “actual damages” (or “compensatory damages”) as given in the

charge included only the conventional elements (and not prejudgment

interest or anything similar thereto) and purported to be complete.

The jury was told that class members would “have to prove, first of

all, whether they are entitled to compensatory, or actual damages,

and if so, the amount,” a nd “if you award punitive damages, what

you are asked to do is make an award for each one dollar of actual

damages which may subsequently be determined for a particular

plaintiff

. . . an amount that would be a fraction of one dollar or

a multiple of one dollar for each dollar of actual damages . . .

for each one dollar of actual or compensatory damages.” The phase

I jury proceeded to fix the “compensatory damages” for each of the

class representatives, as well as the multiplier for each

defendant. The most reasonable interpretation of the verdict is

that the jury intended the multiplier to apply only to the actual

or compensatory damages as found by them, not to something else.

We reject plaintiffs’ claim that the multiplier should be applied

to prejudgment interest.

Plaintiffs’ final contention in their cross-a p peal as to

Pittsburgh Corning is that we should hold it “jointly and severally

liable for the exemplary damages assessed against it and Celotex.”

We reject this contention. Plaintiffs base their argument on H ofer

v. Lavender

, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984), in which the Texas Supreme64

Court held that the wrongdoer’s estate could be liable for punitive

damages, relying in part on the notion that such damages were not

simply to punish the guilty party, but also to “reimburse for

losses too remote to be considered as elements of strict

compensat ion” or “to compensate for inconvenience and attorney’s

fees.” I d

. at 474. Plaintiffs also rely on C elotex Corp. v. Tate

,

797 S.W.2d 197, 208-209 (Tex. App.

—— Corpus Christi 1990; no writ),

where the court, in rejecting a due process challenge to a punitive

damage award based on the contention that the defendant was being

subjected to successive multiple punishments for the same conduct,

relied on the above language from Hofer in stating that punitive

damages had a compensatory component as to each plaintiff, that the

jury was instructed in the quoted Hofer language, and that it could

not be determined what portion of the exem plary damages award

related to the Hofer nonpunitive components. These authorities do

not address the question of joint and several liability for

punitive damages.

We believe plaintiffs seek to assign to Hofer and Celotex a

weight which they will not bear. We reviewed those two decisions,

and a host of other Texas authorities, in E state of Moore v.

C.I.R. , 53 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 1995), where we stated:

“.

. . [T]he Texas Supreme Court has emphasized at least

since 1847 that exemp lary damages are awarded not to

compensate the plaintiff for any injury received but to

punish the d efendant and to deter others. [citations

omitted] This Court too has repea tedly stated that

exemplary damages are not compensatory under Texas law.

Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc

. , 782 F.2d 468, 474

(5th Cir. 1986) (‘The purpose of punitive damages is not

to compensate the victim but to create a de terrence to

the defendant, and to protect the public intere st.’);65

[citations omitted].

. . . .

We also note that the year after the Texas Supreme

Court released its opinion in Hofer

, the court determined

that prejudgment interest is not available on exemplary

damages precisely because of their non-compensatory

nature. The court stated: ‘Punitive damages are

intended to punish the defendant and to set an example to

others. . . . They are assessed over and above the

amount of damages necessary to indemnify the plaintiff.

The plaintiff can thus be made whole even if prejudgment

interest is not awarded on punitive damages.’ C avnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc

. , 696 S.W.2d 549, 555-5 6

(Tex. 1985) (citation omitted).

Texas courts have also rejected arguments that

punitive damages should be reduced in proportion to the

percentage of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.

Reduction of punitive damages is not appropriate because

‘[t]he purpose of awarding exemplary damages is not to

compensate the plaintiff, but to punish and set an

example to others.’ E lbar, Inc. v. Claussen

, 774 S.W.2d

45, 53 (Tex. App.

—— Dallas 1989, writ dismissed as moot);

[citations omitted].

. . . .

There is no requirement that exemplary damages bear

any relation to the plaintiff’s inconvenience, attorney’s

fees, or losses too remote to be considered as elements

of actual damages.” Id . at 715-716.

In Estate of Moore

, we concluded by stating that “[t]he

overwhelming weight of Texas authority holds that exemplary damages

are not awarded to compensate the plaintiff for any injury” and

that the “fundamental truth” is that “exemplary damages in Texas

are awarded on account of and in proportion to the defendant’s

wrongful conduct.” Id . at 716. See also Ellis County State Bank

v. Keever , 888 S.W.2d 790, 796, 798 (Tex. 1994), which reiterates

the holding of Cavnar v. Quality Control Board

, 696 S.W.2d 549,

555-56 (Tex. 1985), that prejudgment interest is not recoverable on6 0 See also Tex. Civ. Proc. & Remedies Code § 41.006 (applicable

to actions filed after September 2, 1987), which provides that a punitive damages award “must be specific as to a defendant” and

“each defendant is lia ble only for the amount of the award made

against that defendant.”

61 See also St. Louis & S.W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Thompson , 113

S.W. 144, 147 (Tex. 1908).

66 punitive damages becaus e “‘[p]unitive damages are intended to

punish the defendant and to set an example to others. They are

assessed over and abo ve the amount of damages necessary to

indem nify the plaintiff,’” and which goes on to state that

“[p]uniti ve damages, being inherently penal in character, should

not be enlarged by the imposition of prejudgment interest.” 60

Whatever may be the case where defendants, each with malice,

act jointly to commit a single wrong, and the jury assesses a

single punitive damages award in one specified dollar amount

“jointly against said defendants, ” see Waggoner v. Wyatt , 94

S.W.1076 , 1078 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906; writ refused), 6 1 that is not

the situation here. Here the theory of liability against

defendants as submitted to the jury was not one of joint action (or

civil conspiracy), but strictly of individual action, often taken

at widely different times ( e.g., Fibreboard and Celotex during the

period after 1942, Pittsburgh Corning only after 1962). Further,

the jury instructions concerning punitive damages mention ed only

punishment for wrongdoing and setting an example to deter others,

and did not include any Hofer -type element such as compensation for

losses too remote to be covered by actual damages, or for62 Thus, the phase I charge stated:

“Exemplary damages or punitive damages means an

amount that you may, in your discretion, award as an

example to others and as a penalty or by way of

punishment, in ad dition to any amount that you find as

actual damages.

To say it another way, there are several purposes

behind an exemplary damage award, include [sic] punishing

the wrongdoer, setting an example so that others may be

deterred from similar conduct in the future.

Simply put, this issue is that of just punishment,

not fair compensation. The focus in this regard is on

the Defendants’ conduct, not on the product.”

67 inconvenience or attorney’s fees. 6 2 Finally, punitive damages

liability and the multiplier were each fixed by the jury separately

from each other and separately for each defendant. The multiplier

ultimately assessed by the jury was d ifferent for each defendant

(except Carey Canada and Fibreboard were each separately assessed

a $1.50 multiplier). Obviously, what the jury contemplated was

separate, several punitive damages awards as to each defendant. We

know of nothing in Texas law which prevents this.

Finally, reliance on a Hofer -type quasi-compensatory approach

to impose joint and s everal liability for the separate punitive

damages awards would render suspect the entire multiplier concept

in this kind of phased trial. As previously noted, the multiplier

concept was approved in Jenkins on the basis that punitive damages

were “not to compensate the victim,” id

., 782 F.2d at 474, and that

having them vary with actual damages (by a multiplier for each

defendant severally based on the wrongfulness of its conduct) would

p reserve the necessary individual consideration because in the

subsequent individual cases each individual’s actual damages would68

be found. However, the Hofer quasi-compensatory factors were not

submitted as part of actual (or punitive) damages and they do not

necessarily vary with variations in the amount of actual damages.

It is plain then that the trial here, and the trial plan, so

far as concerned punitive damages and the multiplier, was

formulated, approved, and conducted on the assumption that such

damages were entirely punitive and to serve as an example and were

several as to each defendant and related only to the wrongfulness

of its conduct. We accordingly reject plaintiffs’ contention that

Pittsburgh Corning should have been held liable for Celotex’s

punitive damages.

5. Effect of Celotex Bankruptcy

As previously noted, Celotex filed chapter 11 (and was

severed) after all the phase III verdicts were returned (and before

Fibreboard settled). The district court held Pittsburgh Corning

liable for all of Celotex’s fifteen percent causation share (in the

phase I cases; ten percent in the phase III and extrapolation

cases) of actual (not exemplary) damages. Pittsburgh Corning

contends that Celotex’s share should not all be allocated to it but

should instead be ratably redistributed among the settling

defendants (including Fibreboard), Pittsburgh Corning, and any

contributory negligent p laintiff, in the proportion which their

assigned causation percentages bear to each other. Were we to

fashion what we believe would be the most appropriate rule, we

would tend to agree with Pittsburgh Corning. But precedent bars

the way.69

Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co

. , 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1 984),

w hich the parties agree and agreed below controls this issue,

provides for joint and several liability as to nonsettled shares,

with the particular view of protecting the plaintif f against an

insolvent, nonsettling defendant. Id . at 429. Celotex was not a

settling defendant. Had Celotex taken bankruptcy before trial, its

comparative causa tion share would not have been submitted to the

jury, and Pittsburgh Corning could not reduce its liability by

virtue of any claimed partial causation by Celotex. That much is

clear from Duncan

, and is not really disputed by Pittsburgh

Corning. See also Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp ., 761 F.2d

1129, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1985). Likewise, had Celotex taken

bankruptcy after the judgment becam e final, Pittsburgh Corning

would remain liable for Celotex’s fifteen p ercent share. That,

too, is clear from Duncan

. So why should it make any difference

that Celotex’s bankruptcy came after the verdict but before final

judgment? The answer to that question is that Celotex’s share of

ca usation, along with Fibreboard’s and Pittsburgh Corning’s and

that of the previously settling defendants and, in some instances,

that of a negligent plaintiff, was determined by the jury, in

percentages that totaled one hundred percent (as the instructions

requi red). Logically, it should be assumed that proportionate

allocation of Celotex’s percentage share of causation among the

others would produce the same result as if Celotex’s share had

never been submitted at a ll (as it would not have been if it had

taken bankruptcy prior to trial). For example, if at trial70

Pittsburgh Corning was assessed 20% causation and Celotex 15% and

others a total of 65%, then if Celotex’s 15% is reallocated,

Pittsbu rgh Corning’s causation share amounts to some 23.53%

(20/85), not 35% (20% + 15%). That

— — 20/85ths

—— is w hat the jury

actually found was Pittsb urgh Corning’s proportion of causation

among those whose causation now has legal relevance. However, that

sort of approach was rejected, at least for post-judgment

insolvency, in Duncan , where the Court said:

“An alternative would be to reallocate the insolvent

tortfeasor’s share of liability among all parties whose

actions or produc ts were a cause of the injuries,

inclu ding the negligent plaintiff. This suggestion is

a ttractive and was endorsed by a distinguished Special

Committee of the Tort and Compe nsation Section of the

State Bar. As a judicial rule, however, reallocating the

insolvent’s share would create problems of post-trial

jurisdiction and final ity of judgments.” I d

. at 429,

n.9.

The last sentence of this passage suggests that the Duncan court

may have only been speaking to the situation where a nonsettling

bankrupt becomes insolvent after the judgment is final. As for

pretrial insolvency, there would be no need to thus “reallocate,”

as the causative fault of a nonsettling defendant would simply not

have been submitted to the jury. Arguably, then, Duncan does not

necessarily

preclude acceptance of Pittsburgh Corning’s argument.

On the other hand, Duncan can also perhaps reasonably be read

as generall y rejecting this sort of proportionate reallocation.

That, in substance, is how we read it in Whatley v. Armstrong World

Industries, Inc

., 861 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1988). In that Texas law

asbestos case, the plaintiff settled before trial with twelve

defendants and proceeded to trial against Raymark alone. The jury6 3 Pittsburgh Corning contends, not without some force, that its

approach is supported by Bowers v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co

., 832

F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1987). In that Texas law case, Bowers, injured

in a tire explosion, sued Firestone, General Motors (GM), and Budd

Company (Bu dd). The jury assessed comparative causation 25% to

Bowers, 50% to Fi restone, 121⁄2% to GM, and 121⁄2% to Budd, but a lso

fou nd that Bowers was n ot at fault. The trial court, because of

the latter finding, disregarded the 25% causation finding as to

Bowers, and proportionally reallocated the causative shares of the

defendants to be 66 2/3% (50/75) for Firestone, 16 2/3% (121⁄2/75)

for GM, and 16 2/3% (121⁄2/75) for Budd. N o complaint was made on appeal to these rulings . Firestone and GM settled with Bowers in

lieu of app ealing. Budd appealed, claiming that the evidence

71 found Raymark and 10 of the settling defendants guilty of causative

fault, assigning to Raymark and to 9 of the settling defendants

each a 9.09% causation share and to the tenth settling defendant a

9.1% share, for a total of 100%. Plaintiff’s damages were thus

reduced by 90.01% for purposes of its judgment against Raymark in

the trial court. Plaintiff appealed, urging there was no evidence

to support a find ing of causative fault as to several of the ten

settling defendants. We agreed as to 2 of them (who each had 9.09%

shares), and hence reform ed the judgment by assigning to Raymark

the entirety of those two settling defendants’ shares, making

Raymark liable for 27.27% (3 x 9.09%) of plaintiff’s total damages.

Id

. at 842-44. Although we did not expressly address a

proportional reallocation

—— under which Raymark’s share would become

not 27.27% but rather 11.11% (9.09/81.82)

—— our judgment necessarily

rejected it. The dissent expressly contended that Raymark was

entitled to a new trial on allocation, but the majority rejected

that approach, holding that automatic reallocation of the entirety

of the share of each nonliable settling defendant to Raymark was

required as a matter of law by Duncan

. 63showed Bowers was negligent as a matter of law, that the weight of

the evidence against Bowers entitled Budd to a new trial on that

issue, and that the form of the contributory negligence special

issues was im proper. B owers v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co

., 800

F.2d 474, 476-78 (5th Cir. 1986). Bowers cross-appealed because

the judgment awarded him nothing for prejudgment interest. We held

Bowers was entitled to prejudgment interest and remanded. Id . at

478-79. On remand, the district court held that Bowers was

entitled to prejudgment interest on only the actual damages for

which Budd was liable (16 2/3% of the total). Bowers again

appealed, claiming not that Budd’s 16 2/3% share of the actual

damages as fixed in the judgment was in error, but rather only that

Bowers was enti tled to recover from Budd prejudgment interest on

100% (not, say, 371⁄2%) of the actual damages. Bowers , 832 F.2d at

66-67. We rejected this contention, holding that Firestone and GM

had settled all their liability and that that included prejudgment

interest. We did not address, and there was not before us, any

issue as to the propriety of the 66 2/3%, 16 2/3%, and 16 2/3%

allocation. No claim was made that Bowers was entitled to recover

more than 16 2/3% of his actual damages from Budd

— — or that Budd

should not have been assessed more than 121⁄2% of the actual damages;

the only issue was whether Bowers was entitled to recover from Budd

prejudgment interest on 100% (not any lesser per centage) of his

actual damages rather than merely on the same percentage thereof as

Budd was liable for. Moreover, the trial court’s action there can

be viewed not so much as a reallocation as an interpretation of the

verdict such that the verdict itself did not find any causative

fault on the part of Bowers. We conclude that B owers is not

controlling.

72 We conclude, albeit reluctantly, that W hatley , and its

interpretation of Duncan

, compel rejection of Pittsburgh Corning’s

reallocation arguments respecting Celotex.

To the extent that Pittsburgh Corning complains that its

subrogation rights agains t Celotex are prejudiced, we disagree.

Pittsburgh Corning’s discharge of the judgment will entitle it to

be subrogated to plaintiffs’ righ ts as against Celotex. S ee

Gideon , 761 F.2d at 1140-41.

We reject Pittsburgh Corning’s complaints as to the effect on6 4 Pittsburgh Corning also argues that Fibreboard, because it

settled after Celotex filed for chapter 11, actually settled more

than its causative share as found by the ju ry. We reject this

contention. A settling defendant cannot settle more than its jurydetermined share. International Proteins Corporation v. RalstonPurina , 744 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1988).

6 5 These are the case in which the plaintiffs are the Estate of

Norman Atchison, Sammy Atchison, and Clarence Atchison, and the

case in which the plaintiffs are Lowell Nations and Ann Mae

73 its liability share of the Celotex chapter 11. 64

C. Conclusion on Pittsburgh Corning’s Appeal and

Plaintiffs’ Related Cross-Appeal

In sum, we reverse the judgm ents in all the 143 phase III

cases and in all the 5 extrapolation cases before us and those

cases are remanded fo r further proceedings not inconsistent

herewith. As to the judgments against Pittsburgh Corning in the

nine class representative cases before us, we reject all of the

contentions raised on cross-appeal by plaintiffs and, with the

single exception of the date on w hich prejudgment interest

commences to accrue, we likewise reject all of Pittsburgh Corning’s

contentions on appeal. The nine class representative cases before

us as against Pittsburgh Corning are remanded for the sole purpose

of recalculating prejudgment interest based on the accru al date

specified in this opinion, and in all other respects said nine

judgments against Pittsburgh Corning are affirmed.

II.

ACL APPEAL

A. Introduction

ACL appeals the two judgments rendered against it in two of

the nine class representative cases. 65 Plaintiffs cross appeal asNations.

6 6 The district court he ld that Texas substantive law applied

to the claims against ACL. No party challenges that ruling on

appeal.

74 to ACL.

As previously noted, the cases against ACL were bench tried by

virtue of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

ACL is a Canadian corporation, a majority of whose shares are

owned by the government of Quebec, Canada. ACL mined chrysotile

asbestos in Canada. During the years 1951-1961, ACL sold and

shipped the raw asbestos, minimally processed by it, to Fibreboard

in the United States. The product was considered raw asbestos when

received. Fibreboard refined the raw asbestos, blended it with

asbestos, including amosite asbestos, obtained from other

suppliers, and incorporated it into many asbestos-containing

finis hed products manufactured and sold by Fibreboard, including

insulation pr oducts

— — the only products at issue in this case

—— and

other products such as shingles and linoleum. 66 There was evidence,

which the district court credited, that during th ose years 1951-

1961 ACL supplied at least fifty percent of the asbestos used by

Fibreboard. In 1962, Fibreboard ceased its purchases from ACL.

ACL was never involved in the design, manufacture, sale, or

distribution of the insulation products at issue here ( or,

apparently, any other asbestos-containing finished products).

The district court ruled that “ACL’s liability to the

plaintiffs arises through the plaintiff’s exp osure to Fibreboard

products which contained asbestos supplied by ACL.” But it went on6 7 No complaint is made by any party on appeal as to this

limitations ruling; nor does any party complain on this appeal of

the district court’s dismissal of the conspiracy claims against ACL

or its ruling that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act prevented

any claim for exemplary damages against ACL.

75 to hold that ACL was not liable to any phase III or extrapolation

plaintiff because “ACL was not a party to the Phase II

stipulation,” so nothing in the stipulation could be used against

ACL, and “[t]he Court has heard no independent evidence of exposure

to Fibreboard products from which the Court could make findings to

form a basis of liability”

—— presumably to any particular phase III

plaintiff or to any extrapolation plaintiff

— — ”against ACL for i t s

fibre cont ribution to the Fibreboard insulation products.” The

court d id find, however, that “[t]here was sufficient evidence

presented in Phase I to s u pport a finding that the Phase I

plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos supp lied by ACL through

exposure to Fibreboard products. ” Nevertheless, the court held

that, except for the plaintiffs in the Nations and Atchison cases

(see note 65, supra )

, limitations barred recovery against ACL by

any other phase I or class representative plaintiff. 67

With resp ect to the two cases in which ACL was held liable,

the following appears to be the district court’s material findings

and conclusions. In its initial findings and conclusions, the

district court stated:

“The evidence also shows that ACL knew or should have

known as early as 1935 that asbestos workers and

household members of asbest os workers were at risk of

getting an asbestos-relat ed injury or disease from the

application, use, or removal of Defendants’ asbestoscontaining insulation prod ucts. . . . ACL sold its

product to intermediaries. These intermediaries68 The court also found:

“With the exception of Fibreboard’s products, it is not

possible for the Court to determine from the record how

much of ACL’s raw asbestos found its way into the

Defendants’ products to which the class representatives

were exposed. The Court is also persuaded from the

evidence that, with the exception of Fibreboard’s

products, the Plaintiffs will not be able to prove the

amount of ACL fibers contained in th e Defendants’

products to which the remaining Plaintiffs were exposed.”

No party has challenged this finding on appeal.

69 The court stated:

“.

. . the Court found that ACL knew or should have known

as early as 1935 that asbestos workers and household

membe rs of asbestos workers were at risk of getting an

asbestos-related injury or disease from the application,

use or removal of asbestos containing insulation

products. The Court found that from 1951 until 1961,

Fibrebo ard Corporation purchased over 50% of its raw

asbestos from ACL. The Court also found that ACL had

76 incorporated the asbestos into finished products and sold

the products to the worksites where the Plaintiffs allege

they were exposed to asbestos.

. . . The issue is

whether ACL’s reliance on its intermediaries to pass on

warnings concerning the dangers of asbestos to users of

asbesto s products was reasonable. S ee Alm v. Aluminum

Co. of America , 717 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. 1986) . . . .

In other words, were ACL’s intermediaries capable of

passing on a warning and, if not, did ACL know about that

incapacity? The specific question this Court must answer

is the following: Did ACL have actual knowledge that the

raw asbestos it supplied to its intermediaries was being

made into insulation products and sold by such companies

without an adequate warning? The evidence in the record

establishes that ACL did have such knowledge.

It is apparent that ACL’s liability is derivative of

the intermediaries to which it sold its raw asbestos.

. . . .

The evidence does show that, from 1951 until 1961,

Fibreboard Corporation purchased over 50% of its raw

asbestos from ACL.” 68

The district court later reiterated these findings. 69 The districtact ual knowledge that the raw asbestos it supplied to

Fibreboard Corporation was being made into insulation

products and sold b y Fibreboard without an adequate

warning.”

77 court determined that ACL’s liability to a particular class

representativ e plaintiff would be a fraction of one-half the

F ibreboard causative share of that plaintiff’s actual damages as

found by the jury; the fraction would have as its n umerator the

number of years after 1951 that that plaintiff was exposed to

Fibreboard’s asbestos-containing insulation products and as its

denominator the total number of that plaintiff’s working years on

which the jury based on its actual damages award to that plaintiff.

ACL’s liability would be joint and several with the liability of

other defendants. The court further ruled that “Fibreboard’s

liability for actual damages [to such a phase I plaintiff] will be

reduced by the amount” of ACL’s liability to that plaintiff.

B. ACL Claims of Error

On appeal, ACL challenges the judgments against it on

essentially two bases. First, it contends, in a variety of

arguments, that as a mere bulk supplier of a raw mater ial later

incorporated into various finished products by another

(Fibreboard), not all of which products are unreasonably dangerous

or defective, it owed no duty to the plaintiffs who were harmed by

exposure to that raw material through exposure to one particular

type of finished product (insulation products). Second, it

contends that any liability it may have is in any event derivative

of that of Fibreboard, so Fibreboard’s settlement discharged it.78

1. Mere Supplier

The district court seems to have based its liability

determination against ACL on ACL’s failure to warn the users of

Fibreboard insulation products, given that ACL knew such insulation

products were otherwise dangerous and that Fibreboard was not

giving a warning, or an adequate waiving.

The district court did not find that ACL’s raw asbestos was

defective or unreasonably dangerous when sold to Fibreboard, or

that Fib reboard was not a sophisticated and knowledgeable

manufacturer of asbestos containing finished products; nor did the

court find that all or substantially all of the diverse finished

products manufactured by Fibreboard and containing ACL-supplied raw

asbestos were defective or unreas onably dangerous. The only

products at issue here were insulation products, and the district

court imposed liability on Fibreboard and the oth er manufacturer

defendants because their insulation products were, as the phase I

jury found, “defective and unreasonably dangerous as a re sult of

not having an adequate warning.” We have held that not all

asbestos-containing finished products are defective or unreasonably

dangerous. See, e.g., Gideon , 761 F.2d at 1143 (“We have refused

to hold asbestos products inherently dangerous”), and 1145 (“As to

Raymark, we are unable to find

. . . that the danger created by the

use of its products [asbestos packings] outweighed their utility.

. . all asbestos-containing products cannot be lumped together in

determining their dangerousness”). S ee also, e.g., Corrosion Proof

Fittings v. EPA

, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991). If asbestos-7 0 See also id

. comment j , explaining that a product seller is

not liable for failure to warn of risks “that should be obvious to,

or generally known by, foreseeable product users” because “[w]hen

a risk is obvious or generally known, the prospective addressee of

a warning will or should already know of its existence. Warning of

an obvious or generally known risk in most instances would not

provide an effective additional measure of safety.” It is obvious

here that no warning ACL failed to give Fibreboard would have

provided any “effec tive additional measure of safety” for

plaintiffs.

7 1 See also Aluminum Co. of American v. Al m , 785 S.W.2d 137

(Tex. 1990) (appeal following remand to court of appeals).

79 containing finished products are not all unreasonably dangerous or

defective, then it necessarily follows that ordinary raw asbestos

sold to a sophisticated and knowledgeable manufacturer of such

products is not of itself defective or unreasonably dangerous. Nor

did the district court find that ACL failed to adequately warn

Fibreboard or that Fibreboard was not fully k nowledgeable of the

relevant risks posed by its asbestos-containing insulation

products. Indeed, the evidence virtually compels the conclusion

that Fibreboard was so aware. That being the case, any failure to

warn Fibreboard would be clearly immaterial. S ee, e.g.,

Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability (1997) § 2, comment

i (“Notwithstanding the defective condition of the product in the

absence of special warnings, if a particular user or consumer would

have decided to use or consume even if warned, the lack of warnings

is not a legal cause of the plaintiff’s harm”). 70

In imposing liability on ACL, the district court relied on Alm

v. Aluminum Co. of America

, 717 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. 1986). 71 That case

was a suit by James Alm for personal injuries suffered when the cap

o n a bottle of 7-Up he had purchased exploded off the bottle and80

struck him in the eye. The cap was put on the bottle by JFW

Enterprises, Inc. (JFW) utilizing a capping machine purchased by it

from Alcoa, the machine’s manufacturer. The retailer from whom Alm

purchased the bottle had in turn purchased it from JFW. A lm at

589-90. “Alcoa supplied a capping machine to JFW. Alcoa knew that

through use its capping machine would go out of adjustment, thereby

causing misapplie d caps. And Alcoa knew of the risk of personal

injury from bottle cap blow off.

. . .” I d

. at 591. Alm sued

Alcoa, JFW, and the retailer, but the latter two settled. The jury

returned a general finding of neg ligence and proximate cause

against Alcoa and JFW each. One allegation of negligence as

against Alcoa “was that Alcoa’s warning to JFW was inadequate.”

Id

. at 593. Alcoa appealed the judgment on the verdict against it,

and the court of appeals held for Alcoa, reasoning that the jury’s

finding that JFW was negligent was an implied finding that Alcoa

had adequately warned JFW. I d

. at 592. On Alm’s appeal to the

Texas Supreme Court, that court disagreed because “the jury could

have determined that JFW was negligent without believing that Alcoa

adequately warned JFW of the hazards as sociated with bottle cap

blow off. There were, after all, other allegations of negligence

against JFW.” I d

. The Supreme Court went on to review the

evidence concerning whether Alcoa adequately warned JFW and stated

“This evidence cl early constitutes some evidence, certainly more

than a scintilla, that Alcoa inadequately warned JFW.” I d

. at 594.

The Supreme Court also called attention to evidence that JFW “was

not familiar with the hazards associated with misapplied caps.”81

Id

. It remanded the case to the court of appeals “for it to

consider Alcoa’s factual insufficiency points regarding the

adequacy of its warning of the hazard of cap blow off to JFW.” I d

.

at 595.

While Alm contains some broad dicta concerning when one in a

position analogous to Alcoa’s might be obligated to warn consumers

despite warning a party such as JFW, its clear holding is that an

adequate warning to JFW would have protected Alcoa. Obviously

Alcoa did not

—— indeed could not have

—— war ned Alm, or other

consumer s, and there is nothing to suggest the contrary (nor,

plainly, did JFW warn anyone). If failure to warn Alm (or

consumers generally) could alone have supported Alcoa’s liability,

there would have been no occasion to remand for a determination

concerning the adequacy of Alcoa’s warning to JFW. Moreover, it is

clear that there was sufficient evidence that JFW was not otherwise

knowledgeable of the relevant hazards.

Alm is thus distinguishable from the case at bar, in which a

supplier of raw material to a sophisticated and knowledgeable

m anufacturer of diverse finished products which incorporate that

material is held liable for failure t o warn users of one type of

such finished products of the dangers posed by the raw material’s

presence in the product. The general rule in this connection is

stated in Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability (1997) in

the comments to its section 5. Comment a to section 5 states in

relevant part:

“Product components include raw materials, bulk products,

and other constituent products sold for integration into82

other products. Some components, such as raw materials,

valves, or switches, have no functional capabilities

unless integrated into other products. Other components,

such as a truck chassis or a multi-functional machine,

function on their own but still may be utilized in a variety of ways by assemblers of other products.

As a general rule, component sellers should not be

liable when the component itself is not defective as

defined in this Chapter. . . .

The refusal t o impose liability on sellers of

nondefective components is expressed in various ways,

such as the ‘raw material supplier defense’ or the ‘bulk

sales/sophisticated purchaser rule.’ However expressed,

these formulations recognize that component sellers who

do not participat e in the integration of the component

i nto the design of the product should not be liable

merely be cause the integration of the component causes

the product to become dangerously defective. This

Section subjects component sellers to liability when the

components themselves are defective or when component

providers substantially participate in the integration of

components into the design of the other products.”

Illustration 4 to section 5 gives an example which closely

parallels ACL’s situation:

“4. ABC Foam Co. [here ACL] manufactures bulk foam

with many different uses. XYZ Co. [here Fibreboard]

purchases bulk foam from ABC, then processes the foam and

incorporates the processed foam in the manufacture of

disposable dishware. A BC becomes aware that XYZ is using

processed foam in the dishware. ABC and XYZ are both

aware that there is a potential danger tha t processed

foam may cause allergic skin reactions for so me users.

ABC is aware that XYZ is not warning consumers of this

potential problem. A BC has no duty to warn XYZ or

ultimate consumers of the dangers attendant to use of the

processed foam for disposable dishware. The foam sold by

ABC is not defective in itself as defined in this

Chapter. A supplier of a component has no duty to warn

a knowledgeable buyer of r i sks attendant to special

application of its products when integrated into

another’s product. A BC did not participate in the design

of th e disposable dishware manufactured by XYZ, and i s

thus not subj ect to liability under Subsection (b).”

(Emphasis added).

Comment c to section 5 focuses specifically on raw materials83

and includes the following:

“ c. Raw Materials . Product components include raw

materials. See Comment a

. Thus, when raw materials are

contaminated or otherwise defective within the meaning of

§ 2(a), the seller of the raw materials is subject to

liability for harm caused by such defects. Regarding the

s eller’s exposure to liability for defective design, a

basic raw material such as sand, gravel , or kerosene

cannot be defectively designed

. Inappropriate decisions

regarding the use of such materials are not attributable

to the supplier of the raw materials but rather to the

fabricator that puts them to improper use. The

manufacturer of the integrated product has a significant

comparative advantage regarding selection of materials to

be used. Accordingly, r a w-materials sellers are not

subject to liability for harm caused by defective design

of the end-product

. The same considerations apply to

failure-to-warn claims against sellers of raw materials.

To impose a duty to warn would require the seller to

develop expertise regarding a multitude of different endproducts and to inve stigate the actual use of raw

materials by manufacturers over whom the supplier has no

control. Courts uniformly refuse to impose such an

onerous duty to warn .” (Emphasis added).

Illustration 5 to section 5 is also parallel to ACL’s case here,

viz :

“5. LMN Sand Co. [here ACL] sells sand in bulk.

ABC Construction Co. [here Fibreboard] purchases sand to

use in mixing cement. LMN is aware that the improper

mixture of its sand with other ingredient s can cause

cement to crack. ABC utilizes LMN’s sand to form a

cement supporting column in a building. As a result of

improper mixture the cement column cracks and gives way

during a mild earthquake and causes injury to the

building’s occupants. LMN is not liable to the injured

occupants. The sand sold by LMN is not itself defective

under §§ 1-4. LMN has no duty to warn ABC about

improperly mixing sand for use in cement. LMN did not

participate in ABC’s design of the cement and is not

subject to liability for h arm caused by the sand as

integrated into the cement.”

We observe that ACL’s asbestos is clearly not defective for

these purposes. Under section 2 of the R estatement Third

, a

product is defective if it contains a manufacturing defect or a7 2 Comment c

, directed at raw materials, references this caveat,

stating: “For a consideration of whether special circumstances may

give rise to a duty on the part of raw-material sellers to warn of

risks attending integration of raw materials with other components,

see Comment b .”

84 design defect or because of inadequate warnings or instru ctions.

A manufacturing defect exists “when the product departs from its

intended design.” I d

. § 2(a). There is no evidence or finding

that this was the case with ACL’s raw asbestos, or that it was any

different from any other chrysotile asbestos. Comment c to section

5, above quoted, makes it clear that neither design defect (“a

basic raw material

. . . cannot be defectively designed”) nor

failure to warn or instruct (“Courts uniformly refuse to impose

such an onerous duty to warn”) apply to ACL and its raw asbestos.

Comment b

, directed at product components, contains a caveat,

stating:

“Courts have not yet confronted the question of whether,

in combination

, factors such as the component purchaser’s

lack of expertise and ignorance of the risks of

integrating the component into the purchaser’s product,

and the component supplier’s know ledge of both the

relevant risks and the purchaser’s ignorance thereof,

give rise to a duty on the part of the component supplier

to warn of risks attending integration of the component

into the purchaser’s product.” (Emphasis added). 72

The hypotheti cal situation given in the above quotation from

Comment b is in some respects arguably parallel to A lm, if Alcoa

there were considered the component supplier and JFW the component

purchaser, as Alcoa was knowledgeable of the risks and JFW was not,

and Alcoa knew or should have known JFW was not but failed to warn

JFW. Here, however, there not only is no finding that ACL failed

to warn Fibreboar d, but it is also clear that Fibreboard was n ot7 3 See, e.g., McKisson v. Sales Aff iliates, Inc

. , 416 S.W.2d

787, 788-89 (Tex. 1967); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears , 911 S.W.2d

379, 381-83 & nn.2 & 3 (Tex. 1995) (also citing tentative draft of

Restatement Third, Torts ); Firestone Steel Products Co. v. Barajas

, 927 S.W.2d 608, 613, 616 (Tex. 1996).

85 ignorant of the risks and did not lack expertise (and there is no

contrary finding). Moreover, A lm is also distinguishable (and the

c ase against Alcoa there stronger than that against nondefective

component suppliers) because Alcoa’s capping machin e and system

were defective and were so for the only purpose for which they were

intended or usable, namely putting caps on bottles. By contrast,

here ACL’s raw asbestos was not itself defective, and it could be

and was incorporated by Fibreboard into some of its n ondefective

finished products (as well bei n g incorporated into Fibreboard

insulation products).

We believ e that the Texas Supreme Court would follow the

Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability § 5 in this respect.

Cf. Klem v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours Co

., 19 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1994)

(Louisiana la w). The Texas Supreme Court has long looked to the

Restatement of Torts as an influential guide in products liability

law, 73 and has recently heavily relied on the refinem ents in such

law reflected in Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability

.

See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company v. Martinez

,

___ S.W.2d

___, 41

Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1047, 1998 WL 352929 (Tex. 1998).

Applying section 5 of the Restatement of Torts, T hird:

Products Liability

, as we believe the Texas Supreme Court would, we

hold that no basis has been demonstrated to hold ACL liable. Its

raw asbestos, as sold to Fibreboard, was not adulterated or other86

than normal chrysotile asbestos, and it was not itself defective in

the sense of section 2 of the Restatement Torts, Third ; Fibreboard

was a sophisti cated, expert, and knowledgeable manufacturer who

pro duced diverse finished products into which it incorporated,

after refining it, the raw asbestos purchased from ACL (and from

other suppliers); not all of such finished products are shown to be

defective; there is no basis for finding, and no finding, that

Fibreboard either did not know exactly what it was getting from ACL

or that it was unaware of the asbestos-related risks presented by

its finished insulation products; ACL had no role in the design,

manufacture, sale, or distributio n of the insulation products at

issue here (or, apparently, any other Fibreboard-finished

products); ACL and Fibreboard were not affiliated; and, there is no

practical way ACL could have warned plaintiffs of the risks posed

by Fibreboard insulation products. These factors dictate a finding

of no liability on the part of ACL to plaintiffs.

Accordingl y, the judgment against ACL in the Atchison and

Nations cases is reversed and judgment is here rendered that the

plaintiffs in those cases take nothing from ACL.

2. Fibreboard Settlement

Because of our above ho lding, ACL’s alternative contention

that any liability it might have was discharged by the Fibreboard

settlement becomes moot, and we pretermit consideration of it.

C. Cross-Appeal

The contentions raised in plaintiffs’ cross-appeal as to ACL

are all rendered moot by our above holding that ACL is in any event7 4 We accept all the Fed. R. App. R. 28(j) letters previously

submitted. We GRANT the following motions: Pittsburgh Corning’s

motion to file three volumes of supplemental transcri pt excerpts

related to claims of alleged trial bias , passion, and prejudice;

motion of ACL to file corrected brief; and Pittsburgh Corning’s

motion to withdraw its motion to certify questions to the Supreme

Court of Texas. All other pending, undisposed of motions are

DENIED.

87 not liable, and we accordingly pretermit consideration of them.

III.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, on Pittsburgh Corning’s appeal we reverse the

judgments in all the 143 phase III cases and in all 5 extrapolation

cases that are before us and such cases are r emanded for further

proceedings not inconsistent herewith. As to Pittsburgh Corning’s

appeal of the judgments against it in the nine phase I cases before

us, we reject all of its contentions on appeal except that relating

to the date on which prejudgment interest commences to accrue; as

to these same nine cases, we reject plaintiffs’ cross-appeal

against Pittsburgh Corning; and these nine cases, so far as they

concern Pittsburgh Corning, are r emanded solely to amend the

judgments therein against Pittsburgh Corning so as to reflect

prejudgment interest calculated from the appropriate accrual date

as provided herein. With respect to ACL’s appeal of the judgments

a gainst it in the Nations and Atchison cases (two of the class

representative phase I cases), we reverse the judgments against ACL

and render judgment in its favor; and we reject plaintiffs’ crossappeal as to ACL. 7488

REVERSED and REMANDED in part; VACATED and REMANDED in part;

REVERSED and RENDERED in part.

ENDRECORD89

REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

I write separately to concur in the excellent opinion in this case, but also to add some of

my own comments and thoughts about these consolidated cases, which have burdened our judicial

system for so many years. In particular, I wish to express my concerns raised by Pittsburgh

Corning’s attack on Judge Parker’s ingenious but, unfortunately, legally deficient trial plan. This

case is a striking example of the crisis presented by the state of asbestos litigation in our judicial

system; therefore, I am also writing separately to further urge upon Congress the wisdom and

necessity of a legislative solution.

Texas law simply provides no way around Pittsburgh Corning’s right to a jury trial as to

causation or the requirement that causation and damages be determined as to individuals and not

groups. See In re Fibreboard Corp. , 893 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that policy

choices of State of Texas in defining “the duty owed by manufacturers and suppliers of products

to consumers . . . are reflected in the requirement that a plaintiff prove both causation and

damage. . . . These elements focus upon individuals, not groups.”). If Judge Parker had

conducted phase II according to his plan, however, rather than replacing phase II with the phase

II stipulation, the only issue before us today would be the propriety of the phase III damages

determinations. Of course, the majority opinion correctly explains that these damages

determinations were fatally deficient under Texas law and the Seventh Amendment as to the more

than 2,000 “extrapolation” cases; however, these “extrapolated” damages determinations are

valuable in and of themselves as indications of an appropriate settlement range for each of the five

disease categories involved.

It is clear that the enigma of asbestos litigation is not readily susceptible to resolution

under the standards and practices representative of traditional tort litigation. See Jenkins v.

Raymark Industries , 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Courts, including those in our own

circuit, have been ill-equipped to handle this ‘avalanche of litigation.’ . . . Our numerous opinions

in asbestos-related cases have repeatedly recognized the dilemma confronting our trial courts, and90

expressed concern about the mounting backlog of cases and inevitable, lengthy trial delays.”); see

also Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative

Alternative? , 13 C ARDOZO L. R EV . 1819, 1841 (1992) (arguing that “Appellate opinions arguably

applying a ‘there is law and there is asbestos law’ doctrine can be found.”). In 1991

, the Judicial

Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation (the “Ad Hoc Committee”), whose

members were appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, issued a report noting that:

What has been a frustrating problem is becoming a disaster of major proportions to both

the victims and the producers of asbestos products, which the courts are ill-equipped to

meet effectively.

* * *

The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be briefly summarized: dockets

in both federal and state courts continue to grow; long delays are routine; trials are too

long; the same issues are litigated over and over; transaction costs exceed the victims’

recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process;

and future claimants may lose altogether.

R EPORT OF T HE J UDICIAL C ONFERENCE A D H OC C OMMITTEE ON A SBESTOS L ITIGATION 2-

3 (Mar. 1991) [hereinafter A D H OC C OMMITTEE R EPORT ]. The history of this case, up to and

including our resolution of this appeal (which is dictated by binding authority) is a perfect

illustration of the incompatibility of asbestos litigation and traditional tort litigation procedures.

This case also illustrates the need for a legislative response to the asbestos litigation crisis.

As the majority opinion in this case notes, there is a dire need for legislative intervention in the

arena of the asbestos litigation crisis. In its report, the Ad Hoc Committee argued that effective

reform of the asbestos litigation crisis requires federal legislation creating a national asbestos

dispute-resolution scheme. A D H OC C OMMITTEE R EPORT 3, 27-35. The Judicial Conference of

the Untied States adopted the Ad Hoc Committee’s recommendations, and urged Congress to

“consider a national legislative scheme to come to grips with the impending disaster relating to

resolution of asbestos personnel injury disputes, with the objectives of achieving timely,

appropriate compensation of present and future asbestos victims and of maximizing the prospects

for the economic survival and viability of defendants.” R EPORT OF THE P ROCEEDINGS OF THE91

J UDICIAL C ONFERENCE OF THE U NITED S TATES 33 (Mar. 12, 1991). More recently, the Supreme

Court discussed the Ad Hoc Committee’s report and the Judicial Conference’s recommendations

to Congress, noting that “[t]o this date [June 25, 1997], no congressional response has emerged.”

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor , 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2237-38 (1997).

As the majority opinion convincingly establishes, the trial plan which the district court

implemented below was legally deficient. As to the 160 phase III “sample” plaintiffs, who tried

their cases to a jury regarding damages, the trial plan was inconsistent with the requirement of

Texas law that determinations of causation be made as to “individuals, not groups.” See

Fibreboard , 893 F.2d at 711. The stipulation that replaced phase II established only that “some”

individuals working in each of the listed crafts during each of the relevant time periods at each of

the 22 work sites were “exposed to asbestos [with] sufficient length and intensity to cause

pulmonary asbestosis of varying degrees,” and that a Pittsburgh Corning asbestos product was

present at those sites during two of the relevant time periods. As such, the stipulation was not

sufficiently individualized, as it would have been if Pittsburgh Corning had stipulated that “all” of

the plaintiffs were so exposed.

As to the “extrapolation” plaintiffs, the same rationale applies with respect to the issue of

causation. Additionally, however, the extrapolation cases were deficient with regard to the

determination of actual damages. In contrast to the “sample” phase III cases, no jury ever

considered the “extrapolation” cases, and neither the court nor a jury made any individualized

determinations of actual damages, as required by Texas law. See Fibreboard , 893 F.2d at 711. It

is for these reasons that we are reversing the judgments in the phase III “sample” cases and the

“extrapolation” cases.

It appears, however, that Judge Parker’s phase II plan would have been sufficient if he had

implemented the plan rather than disposing of it with the phase II stipulation. Under the plan,

phase II would have addressed exposure on a craft and work site basis during the relevant time

periods. A jury would have made exposure findings regarding specific work sites, crafts, and time75 If the defendants’ contested causation as to any particular

plaintiff (for example, if a part icular plaintiff could have

sustained his or her injury, in whole or in part, as a result of

excessive smoking), they could file a motion opposing judgment as

to that plaintiff with supporting affidavits discus sing the

specific evidence that should pre clude judgment as to that

plaintiff. Although this process could, potentially, still result

in the necessity of several plaintiff-specific determinations, it

would at least dispose of the causation issue as to many of the

plaintiffs. Alternatively, and perhaps preferably, if the

(continued...)

92 periods. The jury would have heard evidence regarding the presence of the defendants’ asbestos

products and asbestos dust at each work site. The jury would also have heard evidence about the

nature of the different crafts at each work site and the relationship of those crafts to asbestos.

Additionally, the jury would have heard evidence regarding working conditions at each work site

and the relationship of those conditions to the defendants’ products.

The presentation of such evidence would clearly be sufficient for a reasonable jury to

conclude that the presence of the defendants’ products caused injuries to individuals working in

certain crafts at certain work sites during certain time periods, and how long of a time period

would be sufficient to support such causation. The jury would have also heard evidence regarding

the presence of the defendants’ products at the relevant work sites during the relevant time

periods. Based on that evidence, the jury would have apportioned responsibility among the

settling and non-settling defendants. The court would then make a determination of which

plaintiffs worked for sufficient periods of time at each work site and which plaintiffs were

members of each craft at those work sites.

The evidence, if presented as the plan anticipated, would satisfy the plaintiffs’ burden of

proof, and would support a reasonable jury’s determination of causation specific to craft, work

site, and relevant time period. Such evidence would also support a determination of the length of

time on the job required to support causation. As such, the court’s task of simply plugging each

plaintiff into a craft, work site, and time period would be a sufficiently individualized

determination of causation for the district court to grant judgment as to the causation issue. 75(...continued)

defendants contend that a plaintiff’s injury was the result of

something other than the defendants’ products, they could address

that contention during the damages phase, at which time (as the

majority opinion in this case makes clear) a jury must determine

each plaintiffs’ damages on an individualized basis.

93 The question of damages, however, is another story. The inescapable reality is that Texas

law requires that determinations of damages be made as to individuals, not as to groups, and this

Court is powerless to alter that reality. As stated, the Ad Hoc Committee’s report concluded that

the only real solution to the problems posed by the asbestos litigation crisis lies with Congress,

but the Ad Hoc Committee continued that “[a]t the same time, or failing congressional action, the

federal judiciary must itself act now to achieve the best performance possible from the system

under current law.” A D H OC C OMMITTEE R EPORT 4. Judge Parker made a valiant and admirable

effort to take such action. Unfortunately, however, this Court is without the power to sanction or

condone his approach.

Although resolution of these cases, under the current state of law, would require an

inordinate number of damages trials, the parties involved should not lightly cast aside the figures

that Judge Parker arrived at in phase III as representative of actual damages in each category of

disease. In arriving at these figures, Judge Parker tried 160 individual “sample” cases from each

of the five disease categories represented by the pool of plaintiffs. The two juries that tried those

160 cases determined only whether each particular “sample” plaintiff suffered from an asbestosrelated disease or injury and, if so, the amount of damages incurred. Following the trials, Judge

Parker held a one day hearing after which he determined that the “sample” cases within each

disease category were reliably representative of the more than 2,000 remaining

“extrapolation” cases. Judge Parker then assigned each “extrapolation” case to a disease category

and awarded actual damages equal to the average of the awards in the “sample” cases involving

the same disease.

In sum, the judiciary’s utter inability to adequately address the seemingly insurmountable7 6 The members of the Ad Hoc Co mmittee were Judge Thomas M.

Reavley (Chairman), Judge David D. Dowd, Jr., Judge Thomas F. Hogan

(who filed a Separate Dissenting Statement), Judge John F. Nangle,

Judge Robert M. Parker (the same Judge Parker who tried the cases

before us on this appeal, except that he is now a Fifth Circuit

Judge) and Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr.

94 problems posed by asbestos litigation further underscores the need for legislative action.

Nevertheless, although the procedure outlined above does not satisfy the demands of Texas law

requiring individual determinations of damages, the parties should take notice of these figures as

representative of an appropriate settlement range within each disease category. Such notice is

particularly advisable for Pittsburgh Corning, against whom the phase I jury awarded a three to

one punitive damages multiplier (i.e., $3.00 of punitive damages for every $1.00 of actual

damages).

I tend to agree with Judge Thomas F. Hogan’s Separate Dissenting Statement to the Ad

Hoc Committee’s report. 76 Judge Thomas acknowledged the “national crisis involving asbestos

litigation,” but expressed concern with the Ad Hoc Committee’s recommendation that, if

Congress chose not to accept the Committee’s recommendation of a national legislative scheme

to deal with asbestos claims, Congress should consider legislation to expressly authorize the

consolidation and collective trial of asbestos cases in order to expedite disposition of cases in

federal courts with heavy asbestos personal injury caseloads. A D H OC C OMMITTEE R EPORT 41-43

(Separate Dissenting Statement of Judge Thomas F. Hogan). Judge Hogan stated:

My concern is the underlying premise of the report regarding the use of class action

“collective” trials (trials by aggregation of claims) of asbestos cases. It is a novel and

radical procedure that has never been accepted by an appellate court. It has been

challenged as being constitutionally suspect in denying defendants their due process and

jury trial rights as to individualized claimants, as well as conflicting with the court’s

obligations to apply state law. . . .

This recommendation, aside from the constitutional question, as a practical matter

may well prove impossible to execute. See generally , the reference to the Cimino trial

( passim ) [referring, ironically, to the present case]. Trial by aggregation of claims and

then the extrapolation of the damages by the court has been recognized by the Committee

itself as being “the most radical solution . . . .” See Report at 21. As mentioned, it has

never been approved by any appellate court.95

Id. at 41.

Our decision in this case shows that Judge Hogan’s prophecy rang true. Judge Hogan did

agree that “a national solution is the only answer.” Id. at 42. He continued, however, that

“[s]ince the aggregation or collective trial method is highly questionable, a logical and viable

solution would be the passage by Congress of an administrative claims procedure similar to the

Black Lung legislation.” Id. Judge Hogan concluded:

There already exists a model to follow in the Black Lung program. If there is to be any

Conference action, it is hoped the Conference would suggest that Congress consider such

an approach.

Id. at 43.

I agree with Judge Hogan’s comments. Obviously, the type of consolidation attempted in

this case is unworkable in practice. Fibreboard and the majority opinion in this case make that

much abundantly clear. As I have discussed, it is also apparent that the federal judiciary has not

been able to formulate an appropriate response to the asbestos litigation crisis. In fact, this case

suggests that we may

be without the power to do so.

As such, there must be some alternative solution. The power to devise such a solution lies

solely in the halls of Congress. Although I do not express any opinion on the strengths and

weaknesses of the Federal Black Lung Program as implemented, the underlying concept of setting

up an administrative claims procedure to handle a massive amount of claims for disabling

employment-related impairments makes sense in the context of dealing with claims for asbestosrelated injuries. Congress promulgated the Black Lung Program to rectify the historical lack of

adequate state compensatory schemes for miners suffering from pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C. §

901 (1998). Similarly, asbestos-related injuries have presented the courts with an unmanageable

situation, which has resulted in an inadequate method of compensation for such injuries, both

from the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ point of view. As such, I join Judge Hogan in urging

Congress to formulate an administrative claim procedure for dealing with claims for asbestosrelated injuries modeled on the Black Lung legislation.96

In conclusion, I agree with the rationale and the result which the majority opinion has

reached. Our hands are tied by the United States Constitution. We must respect Texas law and

the Seventh Amendment. As the Ad Hoc Committee noted:

The picture is not a pretty one. Decisions concerning thousands of deaths, millions of

injuries, and billions of dollars are entangled in a litigation system whose strengths have

increasingly been overshadowed by its weaknesses.

A D H OC C OMMITTEE R EPORT 2 (quoting statements of the Institute for Civil Justice of the Rand

Corporation). This statement still holds true; however, the picture is much worse today. I

implore Congress to heed the plight of the judiciary and the thousands of individuals and

corporations involved. Congress alone has the power to devise a system to even attempt to

alleviate these most pressing of concerns. Congress utilized this power in response to the plight

of the coal miners. Simply stated, it is Congress’ duty and responsibility to do the same in

response to the asbestos litigation crisis.