Docket No . 108910.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

________________________

TERRY E. READY , Special Adm ’r of the Estate of Mi chael P. Re ad y, Dec eas ed, Appe llant, v. UNITED/GOEDECK E SERVICES, INC., et al. (Un

i ted/Goed ecke Serv i ces , Inc ., Ap

pel l ee). Opinion filed October 21, 2010.

C HIEFJU ST IC E F IT ZG ER ALD de liver ed t he ju dg ment o f th e co ur t , w ith o pinion. Justice s Fre eman and Bur ke c onc ur re d in t he judgment a nd op inion. Jus t ice Kilbride sp ecially conc ur re d, wit h op inion. J ustice Garman specially concurred, with opi

nion, joi ned b y Justic e K arm eier. Jus t ice T homas t oo k no par t in the d ecisio n.

OPINI ON

T his cas e r et ur ns to thi s court f or asec ond ti

me. The i ssues b ef

ore us ar e whe ther t he ap pe llat e c o ur t fo llo we d t he inst ruc t io ns o f t his courton r em an d a nd whether i ts dec i si on on t he sole proxim

ate cause is sue was corr ect. For t he reaso ns t hat follow , w e r ever se t he appe l l ate cou rt.-2- BACK GROUND In 1999, Mi chael

Ready (Mic hael ) was killed in an acc ident at t he power pl an

t where he worke d when , duri ng a p i pe -re f i tti n g p roj ec t, a sca ffolding t rus s fe ll eig ht st o r ies an d s t ruc k h im in t he sho uld er
. His wif e, Terry Ready

(Terry), as adm

in is trat or o f h

is estate, fil

ed wrongf ul -d ea th claims in the ci

rcu i t cou rt of Co ok Co unt y against t he general contr acto r on t he project, BMW Constr ucto rs, Inc . (BMW ), and the sc af f ol di ng su bc on trac to r on the project, Uni ted/Goedecke Servi ce s, Inc . ( Unit ed) . T hos e de fendant s filed thir d- par t y cont ribu ti o n com pl ai n ts ag ain st Mic ha el’ s e mp l oye r, Mi dwest Generation EME, L.L.C. (Midw est ), and T er ry amende d her co mplaintto add Midwest as a defe ndan t. United fi le d an af fi rmati ve def ense, claiming that t he acc ident “was c aused

eit he rin who le, o r in pa rt , by and t hro ugh t he ac ti on or i na cti ons of a third party

or part ie s” f

or which Un i ted i s n ot responsi ble. Terry entered set tlemen t agr eemen

ts w ith Midw est and BMW a nd proceeded to t rial

agai nst Uni ted. Pri orto trial, Terry fi

led m ot ions in limine to excl

ude evi dence re gar ding th e c on du ct o f

Mi dw est an d B MW . Reg ardi

n g M i dw est, Terry ar gu ed t ha t he rgo o d- fait h se t t leme nt wit h t ha t co mpany p revented the j ury f rom a pporti oni ng f aul t to it. She

f urthe r arg ue d that Uni ted empl oyees J am es Tall ey , Jeff rey Tall ey , and Troy Burzawa ma de judi ci al adm is si ons i n thei r disc overy deposi

tions that Uni

ted was i n cha rge of the proje ct. Reg ardi

ng B MW , Terry

si mi la rly argued ag ain that her g oo d-fai

th sett lem ent with BMW

pr event ed th e j ury f rom apportioni

ng f aul t to BMW. S he

f urt he r arg ued t hat United ’s ex pert Ra l ph Ba rnett st at ed in his dep os itio n t hat an alt er nat ive means of lifti ng t he trusses–an ex ternal cran

e that BMW m

ay have been responsi ble, as ge ne r al c o nt r ac t o r , t o pr o vid e– wa s no t ne ce ss ar ily less dangerous than the i

nternal crane that was actually

used. In respo nse to Ter ry’s m

oti on ab out Mi dw est’s

con du ct, Uni ted argued, in p ar t , “t he iss ue o f wh et he r[ Mid we st ’s ] co nd uc t is t he so le pr ox i mate cau se o f plaintiff’s [d ece dent ’s] dea t h is st ill at issue a nd par amou nt i

n th i s c as e. ” T h e rec ord

doe s n ot co n ta i n a res ponse to Ter ry’s moti on in limine about BMW’s conduct, but in the he ar ingon Ter ry’s moti on s, Un

i ted i n di ca ted th at i ts re spo nse w ou ld be t he sa me co ncer ningbo t h se t t ling de f en da nts : “ In thi s c as e there

i s p l en ty of evi dence t ha t t he ju ry could de cide that BMW’s or Midwest[’s] con du ct w as th e s ol e p rox

i mate cau se o f Mr. Rea dy’s de at h, a nd by-3- elimi nat ingour abil

ity to bri ng i n the conduct of Mi

dwes t *** or BMW you would pr

ecl ude t he de fense fr om making t hat cas e and establ is hi ng that theory.” The t r ial c o ur t de cid ed t ha t se ct io n 2 –1 11 7 o f t he Co de o f Civ il Procedu re (735 ILCS 5/2–1117 (Wes t 2 00 2) ) do es no t pe rmit app or t ionment of

f aul t to settl i ng de f en da nts , m ak i ng ev i de nc e of t he ir conduct irre levant , bu t t he co ur t also disag re ed w ith U n ited on t he sole proxi ma te cause is sue, stating: “I think it’s cl ear that in [Uni ted job supervisor ] Jim Tall ey’s dep os itio n, he does make a dmissions that United/Goedecke was in charge of the work. Now, he also s ay s th at M i ch ae l Re ad y orMi dwest *** was as much in charge as Uni

ted was. And whi le that may aff ect one of the other

motions in li mi ne, it does not change the f act that Mr. Tall

ey has adm itted that Un it ed was in charg e o f the wo rk . And so t he ar gument of t he so le pr oximat e ca use simply wo uldn’ t b e bo rne ou t by the evi den ce.” Uni ted fi le d a mo tion to reconsider this ruli ng, arguing al

most ex clu sive ly

t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in bar ring e vidence of t he set t ling defendan ts’ conduct under

section 2–1117. The final para gr aph o f the moti on stated t hat

the trial court ’s rul

in g was i nc orre ct “ f

or a rea son unrelated t o s ect ion 2 –11 17, ” namely, “t he evidenc e [ of ne gligence by BMW and M idwes t ] is r elevant t o t he is sue of wh ether those entiti es were t he so le pr oximat e ca use of p laintiff’s injuries. ” At t he hea ring on t his motion, Un

ited stated, “[Y]our honor, we fe el that yo u s ho uld re sp ec t fu lly

r eco nsider your ru ling with r ega rd t o no t allowing t he defend ant t o int ro duc e and ar gue t o t he jury that ot her

parties, such a s BMW a

nd [Mi dwest] are the sole proxi ma te cause of plaint iff’ s [d ecedent’s] de at h in t his c as e. ” T he t r ial c o ur t r et ur ne d t o T all ey’ s depos i tion testi mony and den i ed Un i ted’s motion to recons i der. At the end of Terry ’s case and at the close of the evi dence, Un ited move d for a directed verdict, asserting that t he negl igen ce of BMW and Midwest was t he sole proxi ma te cause of the acci

dent. The trial courtdeni ed tho se motions. United then tendered a so l e p rox i mate caus e j ur y i n str uc ti on –th e s o-c al l ed l ong f orm of Il l i n oi s P atte

r n Instructions (Ci

vi l) No. 12.04. Se e I llino is Patt ern Jury Instructions,-4- Civil, No. 12.04 ( 2000) (herei naf ter IPI Ci vi l (2000) No. 12. 04) . T he trial co ur t dec lined t o u se t his ins truct ion, statin g: “A s I had ruled earl i er, I t hink ca se law pr o hibit s me fr o m a dm i tti ng ev i de nc e of BMW and Mi dwest’s negl

ige nce i n thi s ca se si

nce they have settled in good f ai th, an d so f ar as I know there *** sho uldn’t be any evi den ce i n the rec ord of Mi dwest and BMW ’sne gli gen

ce.” The jury re t ur ned a ver dict in T erry’s f avor, and the tri al court entered j udgm en t on th at v er di ct. In i

ts post trial

motion, Un

ited argued that the tria l court erred

i n exc l udi ng e vi den ce re gardi ng t he conduct of BMW

and Mi dwest as the sole proxi

ma te caus e o f the a cc i den t. Uni ted also argu ed that the tr ial cour t err ed in

refusi ng it s so le pro xi mate cause jury i

nstru ction. The t rial court denied United’s postt rial motion. Un

ited appeal

ed. The app ellate co ur t affirmed in par t and reversed i n pa rt. Ready v. United/Goedecke

Ser vice s, Inc. , 3 67 I ll. App. 3d 2 72 ( 200 6) . T he appe l l ate court hel

d that u nder sec t ion 2 –11 17 a nons et t ling defendant’s f

aul t sh oul d b e a ss es se d re l ati

ve to the fau lt o f all defendan ts, includi ng th

ose wh o hav e settled i n good f ai th. Ready , 367 Ill . App. 3d at 278. Consequentl y, the appel

la te court further

he ld that Mi dwest and BMW

should have been

in cl ude d on th e verdi ct f orm f orpurpos es of

f aul t apporti onm

en t. Ready , 367 Ill . App. 3d at 278. Because i

t rev ersed an d r emande d o n t he st at ut or y issue, t he appe l l ate court did n

ot reach the sole pro xi

mate cause i ssue. Ready , 367 Ill . App. 3d at 280. A plural ity of thi s court r eversed

th e a pp el l ate cou rt, holdi ng that se cti on 2– 11 17 did no t pe rmit ap po rt io nment o f fa ult t o s et t ling defendan ts. Ready v. United/Goedecke Service s, Inc. , 232 Ill . 2d 369 (2008) (p l ur al i ty op.) . The p l

ura l i ty opi ni on wa s m odif i ed on d en i al of re hear ing, a nd clo sed wit h t his par agr aph:

“In it s pe ti ti on f or re h ea ri ng, U n i ted argu es th at th i s c our t, in l i gh t of i ts re sol ution of the se cti on 2– 11 17 qu es t io n, sho uld address Un it ed ’s co nc er n t ha t it wa s d ep r iv ed o f a s o le pr ox i mate ca us e def ense wh en th e tr i al cou rt re f us ed i ts requ est for an i

nstruction on sol e proxim ate cause. We not e that th e iss

ue wa s raise d i

n th e a pp el l ate cou rt, but that court concl uded t ha t , be ca us e it wa s r ema nd ing fo ra n ew t r ial, it ‘need not n owaddr ess United’s co ntent ion.’ [ Ready , ] 36 7 I ll. App. 3d at 279. Becau se o ur op inion t od ay reve rse s t he-5- appe l l ate cou rt’ s j udg men t or de ring a new t rial, w e r emand t he caus e to the ap pellate cou rt for a de cisi on o n United’s cla im that t he j ury s

hould h ave b een i

nstruct ed o n s ol e proxim ate cause.” Ready , 232 Ill . 2d at 385. On rem and, the appe l l ate court, i

n a f ootnote, in

i tia l l y noted, “[T ]he supre me court ’s opini on fram ed the i ssue that

we sho uld address on remand as ‘Uni ted ’s concern

that it was depriv ed of a sol e proxim

ate c au se def

ense wh en the trial court refuse d its request f or ani ns tructi on on

sol e p rox i mate caus e.’ Ready , 232 Ill . 2d at 38 5 . A ft er re view ing t he b rie fs subm itted t o t his co ur t in t he o r igin al a pp ea l, it is a bu nd an t ly cl ear that United’s

sole proxi ma te cause defe

nse argum

ent had two componen

ts: the circui

t cour t’s excl

usi on of evi

dence re gar ding t he c o ndu ct o f t he s et t ling d efe ndant s, a nd t he cir cu it cour t’s refusal to instruct t he j ury on so le pr ox i mate cause. The re f

ore , w e add

re ss b oth of Un i ted ’s argu men ts re gar ding it s s o le proxim

ate cause def

ense.” 393 Il

l. A pp. 3d 56, 57 n.2. The appella

te court then di scussed Nolan v. W eil-McLain , 233 I ll. 2d 416 (2009), and Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago , 16 8 I ll. 2d 83 ( 199 5) , a nd de cided t hat t he tria l courtab us ed it s d isc r et io n in exclud ing evidenc e o f the set t ling defen dants’ conduct. 393 Ill . App. 3d at 5 8- 59 . Th

e a pp el l ate cou rt re man de d f or a n ew tr i al , addi

ng, “we need not addr ess United’s conten tion that the ci rcui t court erred wh enit ref

use d Un i ted’s j ury i nstructi on on s ole

proxi mate ca use .” 393 Il l . A pp . 3d at 6 0. T h i s c our t al l owe d Te rry ’s peti ti on f or l ea v e to appe al . 210 Il

l . 2d R. 3 15(a).

AN AL YSIS The fi rst iss ue be fo r e u s is simp le: Did the appe l l atecou

rt f ol l ow t he man da te of this court ? W e di rected the appell

ate court to deci de whether the jury should have been

in structed on

sole proxi

ma te cause, butwe al so referred to “Uni ted’s concer

n t ha t it wa s d ep rive d o f a so le pr o xima te caus e def en se.” Tha t def en se i nc l uded both th e j ury i ns tructi on is sue and a rel

ated evi den

tia ry i ssue, nam

el y , wh ethe r there was evi dence to support a sole pr o xima t e ca use jury inst ru ct ion. Re sol ution of bot h t hos e issue s, t hen, re quir ed t he appe l l ate cou rt to-6- det er mine wh et he rt he t r ial c o ur t er r ed by ex clu din g s uc h e vid en ce in it s ruli ng on Terry’s motions in limine . This is ex a ct ly what t he appe l l ate cou rt did. We t ur n t o t he se co nd issu e befo re us: Was t he appe l l ate cou rt ’s de cis io n o n t he so le pr ox i mate ca us e iss ue cor re ct? Li ke the appella

te court , we begin wit h Leonardi . I n Leonardi , t he plain tiff ’s decedent su f

fered i rreversi ble brai n dam age shortly

after givingbi rth and died several

yea r s la t er
. T he pla int iff filed a la ws uit agains t t he hospital where the decedent received treat men t and against several docto rs who treated her. The pl ai ntif f s ettled wit h o ne o f t he m, Dr. T ier ne y, p r io rt o t r ial. The plai ntif f then fil ed a mot ion in limine see king to bar evi

dence regardi

ng the al le ged negl ige nceof an y pe rs on ot her than the rem

ai ni ng def endan ts. The trial

court denie d t he moti on, and at t rial

all owed t he defen

dants to quest i on several witne ssesre gar ding Dr . T ierney’s c ond uct . T he j ury f oun d i n f av or of t he de f en da n ts, an d th e tr i al cou rt en tered j udgm en t on th at v erdi ct. The plai ntif f appea le d, and the appel

la te court aff

irm ed. Be fo re t his c o ur t , t he p laint iff argued that t he trial

court ’s den

ia l of his mo t ion in limine was erroneous, and as a resul t o f that rulin

g, it s dec ision t o instruct the jury on sole proxi mate cause was also err oneous. We h

el d that t he trial

court did n

ot err in deny in g th e moti on in limine (

Leonardi , 168 Ill . 2d at 95)an d f urth er d i d n ot err instr uct ing

the j ury on sol e p rox i mate cause ( Leonardi , 168 Ill . 2d at 101). We stated that “ ‘ an

an swe r whi ch den i es that an i nj ury was t he res ul t of orcaused

by t he de fen da nt ’s co nd uc t is s uffic ien t t o pe rmit t he de f en da n t i n su pp ort of h i s p osi ti on to pres en t evi denc e t hat t he i nj ury was t he resul

t o f an ot her cause.’ ” Leonardi , 168 Ill . 2d at 94, quo t ing Simpson v . Johnson , 4 5 I ll. App. 3d 7 89, 795 (1 977 ). We la ter explained , “A d efenda nt has th e ri gh t not only to rebut evidence t ending to s h ow th

at def en da n t’s ac ts a ren eg l i gen

t an d th e p rox i mate cause o f cla ime d i

n j uri es , but al so h

as th e ri gh t to en de av or to establi sh by competent evi

dence that the conduct

o f a thi rd p ers on, or so me ot her causa tive facto r, is t he sole pro xim ate cause o f plai

ntiff ’s in juri es .” L eonardi , 168 Ill . 2d at 101. Accord McDonnell v. McPar tlin , 192 Il

l . 2d 505 , 520-2 1 (200 0). Last year, we reiteratedthat a defe ndan t has a right to in

tro duce evidenc e t ha t so me o t he rpe r so n o ren t it y wa s t he so le p r o xim at e cause of the pl

ai ntif f ’si nj ury
. Nolan v. Weil-McLa in , 233 Ill . 2d 416 (2009 ). In Nolan , t he pl ain tiff fi led a negl igen ce complai

nt against-7- various compan

ie s, all egi ng that her deceden

t devel oped a s bestosrelated ca nc er aft er be ing ne glig en t ly exposed to certain products over his career. Al

l the de fen

dants exce

pt o ne settled wi

th the pla in t iff be f ore t rial. T he no nset t ling defend ant fi led a mo t ion in limine , see king t o p re sent evi dence a t tri al tha t the sol e p roxi mateca us e of t he de ce den

t’s de ath was his expo sur e t o p ro duc t s made by n on pa rty entities. The plaint iff

fil ed he r o wn mot ion in lim ine , see kin g to bar such ev i de nc e. The

tri al cou rt al l owe d the p l ai

nti f f ’s m ot ion, and ulti ma tely ent er ed jud gment on t he jur y’s verd ict in favo r o f the pla in tif f. The de fen

dant appealed, and the appel la te court aff

irm ed. We reversed an

d reman ded for a new

t rial. We he ld t ha t “o ur we llsettled rules of tort la w” pr ovid e t hat “the plai

ntif f ex cl usi ve l y be ars t he bur den o f pro of t o e st ablish the element of c aus at ion t hr oug h co mpet ent evidenc e, and t hat a de fendant has t he r ight to rebut such evi dence and to also establish

th at t he co nduc t of a not her cau sat ive f ac tori s th e s ol e p rox

i mate cause of the i

nj ury.” Nolan , 233 Ill . 2d at 444. Thu s, t he t rial co ur t er re d in pr event ing t he nons et t ling defend ant f rom presenti ng ev ide nce i n supp ort of

its sole proxim

ate cause def en se. Nolan , 233 Ill . 2d at 445. Li ke t he t rial co ur t in Nolan , the tri al court he re er re d in exclud ing evi dence that would have suppo rte d th e def en da n t’s sol e p rox i mate cause defen

se. Uni ted wa s e n ti tl ed to pres en t ev i den ce to s uppor

t a so le proxim

ate cause j ury in struction, and the questi on becom es wh eth er t hat evidenc e wo uld have ent itled Unit ed t o s uch a n instr uct ion. “Ins

truct ions convey the le gal rules applic a bl e t o t he evi dence pr es en t ed at t r ial a nd t hu s g uid e t he jur y’ s de liberat ions to ward a proper verdict.” People v. Mohr , 228 Ill . 2d 53, 65 (2008 ), ci ting People

v. Hudson , 22 2 I ll. 2d 3 92, 399 (2 006 ). The re must be so me ev ide nc e in t he r eco rd t o ju st ify an inst ru ct ion, and t he se co nd paragraph of IPI Civ

il (2000) No . 1 2. 04 s hou ld be gi ven w here the re is evi dence, al bei t sli ght and un

persuasi ve, tendi ng to show th at the so le prox i mateca us e of the ac ci de nt wasthe

con duc t of a party other than the def endan t. Leonardi , 168 Ill . 2d at 101. Reg ar ding BMW, Un

ited in dic ates that t he ev

ide nce ex cl uded by t he t r ial c o ur t wo uld have sh own that BMW

should have provided a

n external cr ane t o lift t he sc affolding and that suc h a cr ane w ou ld have elimin ated the need for Michael to work on the pro ject and, thus, wo uld have preven

ted the acciden

t. Regarding Midwe st, United-8- in dic ates t ha t t he ev id en ce ex clu de d b y t he t rial co ur t wo uld have shown tha t Mi dw es t f orce d U ni ted to ac ce pt a ddi ti ona l work ers on t he proj ec t, i

nc l udi ng the tugg er op era

torand Mic ha el, wh o ha d lit t le orno r igging exp er ience; d ecide d ho w t he signa ling wo uld be d one and wh o wo uld do it; an d fa iled t o ab ide by it s o wn sa fet y manu al. T his ev ide nc e w o uld ha

ve ten de d to s how

that t he settlin

g defendants’ conduct was the so le proximate cause of the ac cident, a nd Michael ’s dea t h, and t he trial

co ur t er re d in exclud ing it a nd r efusing t o g ive the second paragraph of

IPI Civ il (2000) No. 12.04. Having deci

ded that the tri

al courtcomm

itted an error, we must deci de whether that error was of suf fi ci ent ma gni tude to require a n

ew t r ial, tha t i s, w he the r th e error was “h arml ess.” See Nolan , 233 Ill . 2d at 445. We concl

ude that it w as, and t hat even a properly in structed j ury would not have reached a diff erent verdict because there wa s significant ev

i de nc e that U

ni ted wa s a prox im at e ca use of t he ac ci den t. The subcontract st ate d, “Cra ne and Ope ra t or t o be furnishe d by [BM W] as Uni

ted/Goedecke requires,” but the rec ord d oesnot sh ow that Unit ed e ver re que st ed o ne. In fac t , d ur ingthe in limine conferen ce Uni ted conceded that there

was“n o evi den ce e i ther way .” In a d isc o ve ry de po sit io n, Je ffr ey T alle y ( J effrey ), U nited’s constru cti on man ag er fo rt he pr o

jec t , t es t ified t ha t BM W t o ld h im in a bid meet ing

an d d ur ing a w alk ar o un d t he jo b sit e t ha t it wo uld provide an ex terna l cran e. At t r ia l, Terry called Jef frey as her fi rst witness. Whe n a sk ed o n c r o ss - ex amin ation by Uni ted’s atto rney whether the re were di scus si ons be twe en Un i ted an d B MW asto how t he scaf foldin g would be

li fted, Jef frey answered, “W

e wer e supposed to use a cr ane.” P ursua nt t o its r uli ng on Te rry’s moti on in limine , t he trial cou rt sus tai n ed an ob j ec ti on an d s tr uck t hi s testim

ony, b ut allo we d it t o st and as an o ffer o f pr o o f. Terry al so cal l ed J ef f rey ’sbrothe

r Jam es Ta l l ey, Uni te d’ s j ob su pe rvi sor on the project, as a wi

tness. On di

rect exam in ation, Jam

es testifi ed th at h e w al ke d a rou n d th e f ac tory wi th Jef frey. Jame s recal

le d walking by

an i nternal cran e or t ugger, and he stated he and Jef frey me ntioned the “possi

bi li ty we could use that [tugge r] be ing t he [ ex t er na l] cr ane wasn’ t o n si te yet.” Jam

es stated that Jeff

rey ordered hi m to check i

nto t hat po ssibili t y becau se it was t he only logical way of li ftin g the t russes. Jam

es added that the “origi

nal pla n” was to use-9- a crane, but the crane was not available, s o t hey “loo ked at alte rna t ive opt ions” f or r aisi ng the tr usses. At tria l , An thony Panega, a Mi dwest empl oyee, testif

ie d that Mi dwe st had a rul

e prohibiti

ng i ts empl oyees f rom standi

ng unde r ma terial or ma chi nery being l i f

ted by a cra ne unl ess thei r work required it

. Un it ed

att em pted to in tro duce Midwest’s saf

ety m anual co nt aining

this rule i nto evide nce. The tri al

co ur t bar re d it , a nd

Uni ted mad e t he ma nua l pa rt o f an o ffer o f pr o o f. Jam es ag r ee d t ha t it wa s his r es po nsib ilit y as Un i ted ’s saf ety re pr ese nt at iveto ensure that U ni ted’s emp lo ye es and an y other pers on s a ss i sti

n g th em com pl i ed wi th Un i ted ’s saf ety ma nual . Jame s further agr eed t hat it w as his r esp ons ibil ity, w ith r e spe ct t o t he sca ffolding work, to supply a safe working environment for United ’s emp lo yee s a nd an y o t he rpe r so ns a ss ist ing t he m. Jam es testifi ed that a Mi dw est em

pl oy ee opera ted th e tu gg er , a n d M i ch ae l di d th e si gn al i n g f rom th e tu gg er b ay , but on l y af ter a “ saf ety meeti n g” wi th James. Accor ding to James, Michael l earned o f Uni

ted ’s plan t o lift t he t ru sses , a nd t hey rea ched an und er st and ing ab out how the work wo uld bedon e. But t he i mport of Jam

es’ trial testim ony was that Uni ted i nde ed rem

ai ne d i n cha rg e o f t he sc affo ldin g w o rk, ev en if Uni ted col l ab orate d w i

th Mi dw es t em

pl oyee s on som e a sp ec ts of

how to ac co mplis h it

. Ja mes ev en st at ed t ha t he co uld hav e o rd er ed t he work done i

n a di f f eren t, saf er m an ner. The wor k w as don e pur suan t to a p la n

th at Jam es dev i se d w i

th Je f f rey. A cc ordi

ng to Ja mes , Je f f rey ch ose not on l y the materials f

or t his job, b

ut also the m

anner in w hich the y wou ld be r igged and el evated. James s t at ed t hat on the day be f ore the s caf

f old i ng work bega n, he and hi s brother walke d through the factory. They dis cussed wh ereth e s caf

f ol di n g w oul d b e b ui l t an d di f f eren t wa y s to b ui l d i t. Jam es sta ted tha t Un i ted di d n ot contro l wh

o oper ated the tugger, but agreed t hat Unit ed c ont ro lled ever ything else , includ ing“signaling and thin gs of t hat nat ur e. ” I n fact , it was James w ho d ecide d whe re t he t rus se s w o uld be t ied t o t he t ug ge rin o r de rt o lift t he m. On cross-exam

in ation, Jef frey testifi ed that United

wa s no t so lely r es po nsib le for lif

t ingthe scaffolding because it had t o use Midwest’s tugger an d th ree Mi dw es t em pl oyee s, w ho were “ i n c ontr ol of t he l i f t.” Je ffr ey, however, agreed t hat James w as r esp ons ible for r igging t he j ob an

d, f ur th er , that Uni

ted w as “in char ge o f” elevat ing t he-10- scaf f old i ng i n a saf e m an ner. The ap pe llat e c o ur t wa s in co rr ec t in s t at ing t ha t if t he jury ha d he ard the whol e story, it m

ay have rea che d a di ff

erent verdict. No r ea so na ble j ur

y wou l d h av e c on cl uded th at U n i ted wa s n ot a pr ox i mate ca us e of t he ac cident , a nd

if Uni ted was a proxim

ate cause, t he settli ng def endan ts could not have b een the sole proxim ate cause. Uni ted may h ave ex

pec t ed t o u se a n ext er nal cra ne, but t he subcontractr eq uir ed it to req ue st on e, a nd the rec ord d oesnot s how that it eve r d id. Ad dit ionally, Unit ed may have used a Mi dwest tugger ope rator and two ot her Mi

dwest empl

oyee s, i nc l udi ng Mi ch ae l , f or t his project, but the r ecord sh ow s t hat Unit ed r et ained s ignifi cant con trol ove r t he wo rk and t he sa fet y of t he pe op le do ing it. We concl ude that t he trial

cou rt ’s err

or i n r ef us i ng to i ns truct the j ury on sole proxim

ate cause was harmless

.

CONCLUSION For the reasons that we hav

e stated, the

j udg men t of th e a pp el l ate court is reversed, and t he t rial co ur t ’s judg ment on the jury ’s v erdict is aff irm ed. Appellate court judgment revers ed; circuit court judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE THO MA S took n o pa rt i n th e c ons i de rati

on or de ci si on of thi s case. JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurrin

g: I s pe cia lly

concur o nl

y b ecause the maj ority opini on cont ains a ha rm l es s- err ordis cu ss io n o f Nolan v. W eil-McLain , 233 I l l

. 2d 416 (2009 ), th at is i

n con siste n t wi th my pri or pos i ti on i n th at s mal l porti on of Nolan . I ack now ledge , ho weve r, t hat t he ha rmles s- er r o rrulin g in Nolan repr es en

ts t his court ’s h

oldi ng. Moreover, I completel y a gree wi th th e m aj ori ty ’s con cl us i on i n th e p re se

n t a pp ea l t hat the trial cour t’s erro r was harml

ess an d doe s n ot req ui re a rem an d f ora new t r ial. Thus , I specially

concur only to expl ai n m y c urrent acceptance-11- of t he ma jo rit y ana lysis o f Nolan in ligh t o f my prior separate writi

ng.

JUSTICE GARMA

N, speci ally

concurrin

g: I ag r ee wit h t he pl ur alit y t h at United pr ese nt ed insu ffi cient evi dence to warrant a jury

in struction that t he se t t ling

def endan ts were t he s ole proxi

ma te cause of the acci

dent that resulted i

n Mi ch ae l Ready’s death. I write separately , however, to express my

continue d disag re ement with the h

oldi ng of t his co ur t ’s de cision in Ready v. United/Goedecke

Services, Inc. , 23 2 I ll. 2d 369(2008 ) (ReadyI ) that se cti on 2 –11 17 of the Code of Ci

vi l Procedure (Ill . Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 11 0, pa r
. 2– 11 17 ) pr o hibit s t he jur y fro m a ppo rt ioni n g f

aul t to se t t li ng de fen dants. Contrary to t he pl urali ty’s h oldi ng i n that case, se cti on 2– 11 17 un amb igu o us ly incl ude s t hos e de fendant s by pro viding t hat “[a] ny defenda nt who se fau lt, as d et er mined by the tri er of f ac t, is 25 % or g

re ate r of th e tota l f aul t attr ib utab l e to the pl

ai ntif f , the defendants

sued by th e p la in ti

ff , and an y thi rd par t y defenda nt s who co uld ha ve be en su ed by t he pla int iff, sha ll be jo int ly and se ve r ally liable f orall ot her damag es. ” ( Empha sis add ed. ) I ll. Rev. Stat . 1987, ch. 110 , p ar . 2 –11 17. As I s t at ed in my dissent in Ready I , t he pla in la nguage of secti on 2–1117 requires tha t faul t must be al

located among al l def endants, set t ling

an d n ons ettl i ng al i ke . Th i s readi ng of t he statut e comports with an d f urth ers the l eg i sl atu re’ s “goal

of pr ot ect ingmini

mally re spo nsible to rt feaso rs fr om exc essive l i ab i l i ty.” Ready , 232 Ill . 2d at 405 (G arm an , J., disse

nti ng, j oin ed b y Ka rmeier, J.).Th e Ready I

plural ity ’s i nterpretat ion of

the statut e rew ard s set t ling defend ant s, no matt er t he de gr ee o f the ir cu lpability, and puni shes nons et t ling defend ant s. I n cas es w her e a d efenda nt may have deep pockets , a pl

ai ntif f i s en coura ged no t to s ettl

e, kn owi n g th at a ju r y, l ac kin g k no wle dg e o f an y fau lt o f t he se t t ling de fen da nt s, may ho ld t he no nse t t ling de fen da nt so lely l i ab l e f ort he injury, a bsent any co mpar at ivene gli gen

ce on the p l ai ntif f ’spart. T hus, a no nset t ling defend ant who may ha ve a less er de gr ee o f f ault t han t he se t t ling de f en da n ts ends up payi

ng m ost o f t he da mag es
. T his is no t o nly un fair to th e n

on se ttli n g def en da n t, it may also hur t t he plaint iff . I f the evi dence at t rial sho ws t hat t he only defend ant in the case has lim ited re sp on si b i l i ty fo rt he pl ain t iff’ s in

jury, t he jury, face d w ith t he n ec es si ty of as si gn i ng 100 % of t he faul t t o someone, m

ay be tem pted-12- to assi gn greater

f aul t to t he plai ntif f

. In con tra st, i f a j ur y i s a b l e to consider t he fau lt o f se t t ling de fen da nt s, a g r ea t er sha r e o f t he fau lt may b e a ss i gn ed to those de f en da n ts and the degree

of the p lai

ntiff ’s faul t reduced. In the i nstant ca se, the j ury

fou nd Unit ed t o be 65% liable for t he acc ident and Michael Ready ’s fault was asse ssed at 35% . I f the j ury had been allowed to consider the f au l t of Midwe st and B MW, t he degree of Mi

chael ’s f aul t may have been

reduced b ecause the j ury wo uld ha ve ha d the f ul l pictu re of the res pe cti ve l i ab i l i ty of al l defend an ts sue d by p laint iff. T his is n o t mer e s pe cu lat io n. Pla int iff he r se lf appa ren tl y b el i ev ed th at B M W

ha d a si gn i f i ca nt d egree of l i ab i l i ty f or the ac ciden

t. In h er res

pon se to BMW ’s

moti on f or sum mary judgm ent, plain tiff argued t hat BMW

h ad th e res ponsi b i l i ty un der i ts c on tra ct wi th Unit ed t o pr o vide an e xt er nal c ra ne t o liftt he tru sses. It was und i sp ut ed t hat no cr ane wa s p ro vide d. Pla int iff argued t ha t ha d B MW p r o vid ed t he ex t er na l cr an e, t he ac cid en t wo uld not ha ve ha ppe ne d. W ha tever th e actu al de gre e of f aul t of BMW and Midwest , t he jur y shou ld have be en able t o he ar evidenc e o n t ha t is sue. That was the onl

y way to properly

allocate the dam

ages f ort he ac ci den t. Bu t, b ec au se

of th e p l ur al i ty ’s i n ter pr eta ti on of se cti on 2–1117, the j ury

onl y he ard pa rt of th e story

of w hat happ ened on t he day of Mi chael ’sdeath

. As I st at ed in my dissent in Ready I , th e p l ura l i ty ’s rea di ng of se cti on 2–1117 upsets the bal

ance struck by

the le gis la

ture betwe e n t he goal s of

f ul l com pe ns ati on f or i njure d pl ai nti f f s a nd i m pos i ti on of l i ab i l i ty on de f en da n ts c om mensu ra te wi th the i r f aul t. That erroneous re ad ing of th e statu te h as h ad an d w i l l con ti n ue to h av e u n f ortu n ate cons eque nc es f or both pl ai ntif f s an d def endan ts.

JUSTICE KARM

EIER join

s i n thi s speci

al concurrence.