alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Busk *v.*Wolf & Company.

Atkinson, J.

1. There was no error in refusing to postpone the trial of the case.

2. The following contract was the basis of an action to enjoin the defendant from engaging in business in violation of its terms. “Glynn-County, Georgia. This agreement entered into on this the thirty-first day of March, 1913, by and between C. Busk, as party of the first part, and E. Wolf & Company, a firm composed of E. Wolf and S. Abady, as parties of the second part, all of said County and State, witnesseth: That whereas the parties of the second part, for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand ($1000.00) dollars, have this day purchased the business of said first party, and having paid the full amount of the *19puz'chase-pz-iee of *one*thousand ($1000.00) dollars, the party of the first paz’t agrees in consideration of this sale not to engage, either directly or indii’ectly, in the clothing, *tailorizig, or*other business of like character in the City of Brunswick, Glynn County, Georgia, for a period of three (3) years from this date. The party of the fiz'si part agrees, that if he should engage in the tailoring or clothing business in said City of Brunswick within the next three years after date, to give to the said parties of the second part all profits received in said business so conducted by him. In witness whereof we have hei-eunto set our hands and affixed our seals on this the day and year first above written.” (Signed by the parties.) *Held,*that the contract was not void as being in restraint of trade, or as being unreasonable. *McAuliffe*v. *Vaughan,*135 *Ga.*853 (70 S. E. 322, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 255, 22 Ann. Cas. 290) ; *Floding*v. *Floding,*137 *Ga.*531 (73 S. E. 729).

January 12, 1915.

Injunction. Before Judge Conyers. Glynn superior court. February 28, 1914.

*F. H. Harris, R. W. Durden,*and *Bolling Whitfield,*for plaintiff in error. 4. *H. Crovatt*and *A. D. Gale,*contra.

(a) The case is not controlled by the act of 1896 (Ga. L. 1896, p. 68), if that act (which is not embodied in the Civil Code of 1910) is valid and in force.

3. The provision that if the vendor should operate another business of the character above mentioned he should pay the profits thereof to the vendee would not *prevent*an injunction, there being evidence to show that the vendor was not financially responsible in damages, and that he declined to give any account of the profits, and that it was impracticable to show the exact amount of loss that would be sustained by the continuance in business of the vendor.

4. While the evidence was conflicting, there was no abuse of discretion in granting the interloeutoi-y injunction.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Fish, O. J., absent.*
EXHIBIT 32.1
  CERTIFICATION
  Accompanying
    Form 10-Q
    Report
 of First
    Industrial, L.P.
 Pursuant
    to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
    (Chapter 63, Title 18 U.S.C. §1350(a) and
    (b))
  Form 10-Q
  Bruce
    W. Duncan
         Scott
    A. Musil
         A signed original of this written statement required by
    Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be
    retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
    Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. The information
    contained in this written statement shall not be deemed
    filed for purposes of Section 18 of the
    Securities Exchange Act of 1934, nor shall it be deemed
    incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Act
    of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, except as shall
    be expressly set forth by specific reference to such filing.
Case: 1:02-cv-08206 Document #: 12 Filed: 08/22/13 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:66
Case: 1:02-cv-08206 Document #: 12 Filed: 08/22/13 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:67
Case: 1:02-cv-08206 Document #: 12 Filed: 08/22/13 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:68
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APP EAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

ANTONIOUS LOUIS, Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D13-4289 STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. ________________________________/ Opinion filed July 18, 2014

3.801 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, John M. Griesbaum, Judge. Antonious Louis, Perry, pro se. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

LAMBERT, J. Appellant appeals an order denying his motion to correct jail t ime credit. 1 He contends the trial court erred in awarding only fifty-two days of jail credit when he was

sentenced. We reverse and remand.

1 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801(a) permits a court to correct a sentence that fails to allow a defendant credit for all of the time he o r she spent in the county jail before sentencing.2 Appellant was first arrested on September 25, 2012. On Novembe r 14, 2012, he posted bond. Thereafter, appellant failed to appear at a manda tory court proceeding, and

a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He was rearrested o n May 29, 2013, brought to court that same day, and the trial court reinstated his bond . Based upon these facts, the trial judge, when sentencing appellant, awarded him fifty-t wo days of jail credit and, in his order denying appellant’s motion for jail credit, attach ed copies of documents supporting this chronology. Appellant argued below and argues here that he was entitled to receive two additional days of jail credit at sentencing because, although his bond was posted on November 14, 2012, he was not actually released from jail until November 15, 2012, and, although he was rearrested on May 29, 2013, and his bond was re instated that day by the trial court, he was not released from the county jail until May 30, 2013. Appellant attached to his motion a copy of a letter dated October 4, 2013 , from a court records specialist with the Brevard County Sheriff’s Office, which indi cated that, prior to sentencing, he was in custody on this case from September 25, 2 012, until November 15, 2012 (i.e., fifty-two days) and then from May 29, 2013, until M ay 30, 2013 (two days). 2 When, as in this case, a factual dispute exists, and the files and records do not conclusively show appellant is entitled to no relief, an eviden tiary hearing is generally required. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f) (incorporated in Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.8 01(e)).

2 This court entered an order directing the State to file a resp onse addressing the merits of appellant’s jail credit claim. In its response, the State asserted, among other things, that the letter from the Brevard County Sheriff’s Offic e, which appellant attached to his motion, “verifies the facts contained in the trial court ’s order.”3 REVERSED and REMANDED with directions that the trial court eith er grant the additional two days jail credit or hold an evidentiary hearing to determine appellant’s

entitlement to the same. LAWSON and WALLIS, JJ., concur.
#### Hicks *v.*Williams *et al.*

April 22, 1915.

Habeas corpus. Before Judge Edwards. Haralson superior court. November 4, 1914.

*Hewlett, Dennis & Whitman*and *Griffith & Matthews,*for plaintiff.

*G. R. Hutchens, I. N. Cheney,*and *J. 8. Edwards,*for defendants.

Evans, P. J.

A father brought a writ of habeas corpus to recover his minor child from the possession of its maternal grandparents. The respondents set up, in opposition to the writ, that the father had relinquished to them his right of possession. On the hearing the judge remanded the child to the custody of the respondents, and provided in his order that it should not be carried beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and, that when it became old enough to enter school, the judgment, upon notice to either side, might be reviewed and the question of the proper custody of the child reconsidered. *Hicks*v. *Williams,*135 *Ga.*433 (69 S. E. 547). Subsequently a petition was filed by the father for a review of the former order, and for a reconsideration of the question of the child’s custody. On the hearing the court adjudged that no sufficient reason to modify the former order was made to appear, and refused the prayer of the petition. On exception to this order, *Held,*that the court did not abuse his discretion.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Fish, O. J., absent.*
Case: 1:03-cv-05733 Document #: 34  Filed: 12/07/04 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:208

Case: 1:03-cv-05733 Document #: 34  Filed: 12/07/04 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:209

Case: 1:03-cv-05733 Document #: 34  Filed: 12/07/04 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:210
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-18-0000794 19-SEP-2019 07:59 AM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

KEVIN TRUDEAU,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 03-C-3904

Hon. Robert W. Gettleman

RECEIVER’S FIRST REPORT

Receiver Robb Evans & Associates LLC, by and through its undersigned attorney, hereby 

submits its attached Report of Activities from August 7, 2013 through September 5, 2013, as 

directed by the Court’s Order Appointing a Receiver and Implementing Ancillary Relief, dated 

August 7, 2013 [Dkt. # 742].

Dated: September 6, 2013 Respectfully submitted,

ROBB EVANS & ASSOCIATES LLC, 

RECEIVER

By: /s/ Blair Zanzig 

(One of Its Attorneys)

Blair R. Zanzig (No. 6273293)

John Hiltz (No. 6289744)

Kathy Wantuch (No. 6294034)

HILTZ WANTUCH & ZANZIG LLC

53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 205

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Telephone: 312.566.9008

Fax: 312.566.9015

 bzanzig@hwzlaw.com

 jhiltz@hwzlaw.com

 kwantuch@hwzlaw.com

Counsel for Robb Evans & Associates, Receiver

Case: 1:03-cv-03904 Document #: 747 Filed: 09/06/13 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:13192
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Blair R. Zanzig, an attorney, hereby certify that, on the 6th day of September, 2013, I 

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Receiver’s First Report to be served through the 

Court’s Electronic Case Filing System on the following:

Kimball Richard Anderson

kanderson@winston.com

Thomas Lee Kirsch, II

tkirsch@winston.com

Katherine E. Rohlf

kcroswell@winston.com

Michael Mora 

mmora@ftc.gov

Jonathan Cohen

Jcohen2@ftc.gov

Amanda B. Kostner 

akostner@ftc.gov

David O’Toole

dotoole@ftc.gov

/s/ Blair R. Zanzig

Case: 1:03-cv-03904 Document #: 747 Filed: 09/06/13 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:13193
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF FIRST INDUSTRIAL, L.P. FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH
31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           3,029
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    9,339
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,000)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                11,368
<PP&E>                                       1,806,343
<DEPRECIATION>                               (108,214)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,070,051
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           69,468
<BONDS>                                        827,398
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,158,287
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,070,051
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                63,078
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 (19,247)
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (14,397)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (14,069)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 24,165
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             24,165
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    24,165
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .45
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .45
        

</TABLE>
#### Colquitt Live Stock and Supply Company *v.*Coachman; *et vice versa.*

April 15, 1915.

Complaint. Before Judge Worrill. Miller superior court. February 28, 1914.

*Bush & Stapleton*and *W. I. Geer,*for plaintiff in error in main bill. P. D. *Rich,*contra.

Beck, J.

1. In none of the rulings of the court complained of were there involved errors of sufficient gravity to require the grant of a new trial.

2. There was sufficient evidence to authorize the verdict in favor of the ' plaintiff.

*Judgment affirmed on the main bill of exceptions; cross-bill dismissed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Fish, G. J., absent.*
#### Flora John, Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, v Supermarket General Corporation, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, plaintiff Flora John appeals, on the ground of inadequacy, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bellard, J.), entered April 9, 1985, which was in her favor, upon a jury verdict, in the principal amount of $20,000.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff Flora John incurred a herniated lumbar disc as a result of a slip and fall in defendant’s supermarket. In subsequent years she suffered additional pain and expenses when the injury was allegedly aggravated by her attempts to take such actions as lifting patients while working as a nurse. From the jury’s award to Ms. John of $6,000 in lost earnings it can reasonably be inferred that they found defendant liable for the pain and expenses of the initial injury, but did not extend liability to the subsequent "aggravations”, nor to a subsequent slip and fall at her place of employment. This determination must be upheld since it is not incorrect as a matter of law.

Because the jury limited damages to those arising directly from the original accident, their award of $14,000 for pain and suffering and $6,000 for lost earnings was reasonable *(see, Colao v Brightwater Towers,*88 AD2d 580). Although remarks *626made by opposing counsel during summation, suggesting that Flora John and her prior attorney had constructed a false case, might have been prejudicial *(see, e.g., Taormina v Goodman,*63 AD2d 1018; *Bishin v New York Cent. R. R. Co.,*20 AD2d 921), to the extent objected to, said remarks were followed by a curative instruction and the misconduct "did not prevent the careful consideration of the evidence by the jury and did not influence its verdict” *(Reilly v Wright,*55 AD2d 544, 545). Such a conclusion is particularly warranted since the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Flora John. Thompson, J. P., Brown, Weinstein and Fiber, JJ., concur.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 25, 2016

No. 04

- 16

- 00169

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.J.P., A CHILD

,

From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015

- CI

- 13590

Honorable Larry No ll, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The Appellee ’ s motion to dismiss or abate appeal is hereby DENIED.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and a ffixed the seal of the said

court on this 25th day of August, 201 6

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                                          0001033643
<NAME>                       OCWEN ASSET INVESTMENT CORP.
<MULTIPLIER>                                        1,000
<CURRENCY>                                            USD
       
<S>                                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                       3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                  MAR-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                         1
<CASH>                                             61,247
<SECURITIES>                                      316,199
<RECEIVABLES>                                           0
<ALLOWANCES>                                            0
<INVENTORY>                                             0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                        0
<PP&E>                                                  0
<DEPRECIATION>                                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    842,768
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              13,665
<BONDS>                                           585,060
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                   0
<PREFERRED>                                             0
<COMMON>                                              190
<OTHER-SE>                                        220,093
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      842,768
<SALES>                                                 0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   27,527
<CGS>                                                   0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                           0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   18,127
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      258
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  9,926
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      (784)
<INCOME-TAX>                                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  (784)
<DISCONTINUED>                                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                         0
<CHANGES>                                               0
<NET-INCOME>                                         (784)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       (0.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (0.04)
        

</TABLE>
# Official Journal C 323/18 S

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 323 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5718 September 2014 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 323

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5718 September 2014

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | |
| 2014/C 323/01 | Note to readers | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

2014/C 323/01

Note to readers

1

---

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Court of Auditors |
| 2014/C 323/02 | Annual accounts of the European Court of Auditors for the financial year 2013 | 2 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Court of Auditors

2014/C 323/02

Annual accounts of the European Court of Auditors for the financial year 2013

2

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 32.01

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
           AS ENACTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2004 of Hartford Life, Inc. (the "Company"), filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 as enacted by
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

                            /s/ Thomas M. Marra
                            ----------------------
                            Name:  Thomas M. Marra
                            Title: President and Chief Operating Officer
                            Date:  November 10, 2004

                                       49
#### Towaliga Falls Power Company *v.*Foster.

July 10, 1915.

Action for damages. Before Judge Daniel. Butts superior court. March 31, 1914.

*Cleveland & Goodrich*and *W. E. Walhins,*for plaintiff in error.

*C. L. Redman,*contra.

Hill, J.

1. The special depiurrers were met by amendment, and the petition as amended was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer.

*(a)*A number of the questions raised by the petition and demurrer are controlled by the decision in the case of *Central Georgia Power Co.*v. *Stubbs,*141 *Ga.*172 (80 S. E. 636), which was published subsequently to the trial in the court below. Only such questions will be determined now as have not been formerly ruled.

2. The act of 1912 (Acts 1912, p. 66), which fixes the venue of suits against electric companies, etc., is not unconstitutional as being in violation of art. 3, sec. 7, par. 8, of'the constitution of the State of Georgia (Civil Code, § 6437), which provides that “No law or ordin'ance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.” Service is incident and germane to the venue of suits, and in fixing venue provision must also be made for the service of suits. That the act of 1912 provides for service in cases where the venue is also fixed by the act and is comprehended in the caption does not render the act repugnant to the constitutional inhibition quoted above.

3. Nor is it in violation of art. 3, sec. 7, par. 17, of the constitution (Civil Code, § 6445), which provides that “No law, or section of the Code, shall be amended or repealed by mere reference to its title, or to the number of the section of the Code, but the amending act shall distinctly describe the law to he amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to he made.” This provision of the constitution has no application to repeals by implication *(Nolan*v. *Central Georgia Power Co.,*134 *Ga.*201 (3), 67 S. E. 656; *City of Cartersville*v. *McGinnis,*142 *Ga.*71, 82 S. E. 487), and it is only by implication that the act of 1912 (supra) amends or repeals Civil Code § 2798, in so far as that section conflicts with the act.

4. The act of 1912 (Acts 1912, p. 66) is not repugnant to the provision of the constitution of this State which declares that “Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law.” The act of 1912. is a general law operating throughout the State, and does no violence to the provisions of the constitution just quoted. *Jefferson Fire Insurance Co.*v. *Brackin,*140 *Ga.*637 (79 S. E. 467).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*