ee i ii

qualified practitioners, while the applicant lawyer submitted his
own market rate established in wholly unrelated areas of the
legal practice. Instead this litigation poses not only civil
rights issues of an unusual nature but also antitrust claims, the
retaliation claims at issue, breach of fiduciary duty claims and
breach of contract claims®--all requiring a far greater overall
breadth of skills (and a high quality of litigation skills
generally), all of whose demands were well met by Johnny’s
IceHouse’s counsel.

Nor would it do, for example, to try to split out the issues
posed by the portion of this case that has generated the present
claim for fees, coupling that proposed severance with an argument
that less expensive counsel might have done the job for less. To
begin with, the retaliation claims on which Johnny’s IceHouse
prevailed and that are now at issue were integral to and
inextricably linked with the other claims. And it would be
entirely unrealistic (and indeed uneconomic, something about
which AHAI could legitimately complain if it had been done) to
require Johnny’s IceHouse’s counsel to have compartmentalized

their handling of the litigation in that fashion.®

° Here the question is not whether all of those claims are

ultimately sustainable, but rather the level of skills and
experience required to conceptualize, develop and pursue the
claims in court and out.

& That the Schiff Hardin & Waite attorneys normally charge
lower hourly rates than Salpeter and Hiegel also does not show

13



Bk a bn

peers

that occurred in Minnesota in November 2000.
Based on its success on the Westenberg and Watts issues, Johnny’s
IceHouse now moves for an award of attorney’s fees--an interim
award in terms of this litigation as a whole, but a final award
as to the subject matter of the Order.

Prevailing Party?

This opinion must first address a cutting edge issue by

reason of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of

Health & Human Resources, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (2001). Because

Buckhannon has newly announced that the “catalyst theory” is not
a permissible basis for an award of attorney’s fees, the initial
question is whether Johnny’s IceHouse qualifies as a “prevailing
party” under Rule 54(d).

Before Buckhannon all but one of the Courts of Appeals that
had addressed the issue (including ours) had recognized the
catalyst theory, under which a plaintiff could be held a
prevailing party and hence entitled to attorney’s fees if it
achieved its desired result because the lawsuit brought about a
voluntary change in a defendant’s conduct (Buckhannon, 121 $.Ct.
at 1838 &n.3). But Buckhannon, 121 S.Ct. at 1840 found the
catalyst theory to be inconsistent with Supreme Court teaching
that a plaintiff prevails only when there is a “material

alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” (quoting


fie ib

peble te AA aki

IceHouse obtained through the Order the ultimate equitable relief
that it sought on the two issues that were literally front and
center in its Memorandum in support of its TRO motion (J. TRO
Mem. 2) (see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37).

Conclusion

Johnny’s IceHouse prevails in the substantive respects dealt
with in this opinion. Quantification of its just-established
entitlement to fees and expenses, however, will await the

submission of the LR 54.3(d) information and materials for

tf. OG. duce

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

resolution by this Court.

Date: August 2, 2001

17


representation on a contingent fee basis,‘ or where for example
counsel are acting entirely pro bono publico or on a basis
discounted from normal billing rates for one reason or another, a
court’s determination of reasonableness must follow a different
course. That normally begins by determining the number of hours
reasonably expended, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate,
after which the court will look to other considerations
(including the results obtained) that may lead to an upward or
downward adjustment of the fee (Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 433-37 (1983); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 90

F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1996)).

AHAI advances several reasons why it believes that Johnny’s
IceHouse’s requested fees and expenses (if allowed at all) should
be reduced as unreasonable: that the requested hourly rates
exceed market rates; that certain billing entries are “block
billed,” duplicative, excessive or unsubstantiated; and that the
requested fees are excessive in relation to the extent of
Johnny’s IceHouse’s success. This opinion addresses those
objections in turn.

Market Rates
In part for the reasons stated earlier, People Who Care, 90

F.3d at 1310 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

* Counsel for Johnny’s IceHouse has agreed that in the

absence of any judicial award of fees against its adversaries, no
charge will be made for their extensive legal services.

9


w+ dt,

oi

put the matter differently, the concept of a court-ordered
consent decree must be read more broadly than AHAI would admit,
so as to embrace the Order. Buckhannon, 121 S.Ct. at 1841
pointed to enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered
consent decrees as examples of material alterations of parties’
legal relationships, but the Court did not hold that those are
the only instances in which a party may be deemed to have
prevailed. Indeed, the four-Justice dissent, id. at 1850
characterized the holding as insisting “that there be a document
filed in court,” summarizing the majority opinion in these terms
(id. at 1849):

The Court today holds that a plaintiff whose suit

prompts the precise relief she seeks does not

“prevail,” and hence cannot obtain an award of

attorney's fees, unless she also secures a court entry

memorializing her victory. The entry need not be a

judgment on the merits. Nor need there be any finding

of wrongdoing. A court-approved settlement will do.?

Johnny’s IceHouse is wholly persuasive in urging that the
Order formalizing and memorializing AHAI’s commitment legally
altered the relationship between the parties, making Johnny’s

IceHouse a prevailing party under the standard announced in

Buckhannon. That Order subjected what would otherwise have been

2 [Footnote by this Court] This Court is of course well
aware that it can be perilous to rely too heavily on a dissenting
opinion’s characterization of the majority’s holding (sometimes
advanced as a kind of rear-guard action, in an effort to limit
the scope of a holding opposed by the dissenters). In this
instance, though, the quoted language is a fair statement of the
majority opinion as it impacts on this case.

6


eo i

os

Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S.

782, 792-93 (1989)). Where a defendant voluntarily changes its
conduct, the change “lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur” for
a finding that the plaintiff has prevailed (121 $.Ct. at 1840).

So Johnny’s IceHouse could not be deemed the prevailing
party if its TRO action had simply brought about AHAI‘’s voluntary
dismissal of the proceedings against the Westenbergs and Watts.
In that respect, once this Court had called counsel’s attention
to Buckhannon and had asked the parties to address the impact (if
any) of that decision on the then-pending motion, Johnny’s
IceHouse’s Supplemental Memorandum argued that it is still a
prevailing party in terms of Buckhannon’s approach because of
this Court’s findings of fact made in its favor at the TRO
hearing and because the prohibitions against AHAI’s future
activity have been embodied in the Order, which (like all such
orders) has thus become subject to judicial enforcement and
oversight (J. Supp. Mem. 4).

In response AHAI has argued that Johnny’s IceHouse is not a
prevailing party because Buckhannon, 121 S.Ct. at 1840 limited
that phrase to parties that achieve either (1) an enforceable
judgment on the merits or (2) a court-ordered consent decree (A.
Mem. 3-4). As AHAI would have it, the Order was neither of
those.

Buckhannon cannot be fairly read so narrowly--or perhaps to



IceHouse as other than a prevailing party. In that regard AHAI
argues that because this Court made no findings on the merits of
Johnny’s IceHouse’s Title IX claim, Johnny’s IceHouse is not a
prevailing party under the holdings of such cases as Libby v.
Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 921 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1990). That
contention ignores the fact, often reiterated in the Title VII
context but equally applicable to Title IX actions, that a claim
for retaliation is a discrete claim upon which a plaintiff may
recover even if he or she does not ultimately prevail on the
merits of the substantive discrimination claim (see, e.g.,
Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 1998)). Unlike the
situation in Libby, no further proceedings in this case have the
potential to defeat Johnny’s IceHouse’s already-achieved success
on the two aspects of its retaliation claim. Accordingly it is
entitled to attorney’s fees for its efforts in that regard.

Reasonableness of Fees

In dealing with fee-shifting situations (the imposition on
one litigant of the costs of legal representation furnished to
the litigant’s opponent), the free market--the agreement reached

between lawyer and client--may or may not dictate the amount of

the “reasonable fee” that the cases require a court to determine.

For example, where as here a plaintiff's counsel has undertaken


‘Miu Order Form (06/97) ~
United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois (« s)
venoy Magistrate Jude Milton I. Shadur “than signed Sedge
CASE NUMBER 00 C 7363 DATE 8/3/2001
CASE Johnny’s Icehouse, Inc. et al. Vs. Amateur Hockey Assoc. of Ill. et al
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the
MOTION: nature of the motion being presented]
Memorandum Opinion and Order
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oa Brief in support of motion due
(3) oa Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__
(4) a Ruling/Hearingon____ssetfor__— at
(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__ssetfor___—_at
(6) a} Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor_—sat__
(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on__— at
(8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___—_aat.
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) General Rule21 OFRCP41(a\(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).
(0) «ff [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Plaintiffs’ motion for award of

submissions by parties pursuant to LR 54.3(d).

(ai)

No notices required, advised in open court.

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

so note A
No notices required. umber of notices

AUG 0 7 2001

date docketed

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

| Docketing to mail notices.

Mail A 450 form. efdeputy initials

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice

pi Aug -6 PH S07

courtroom
WAH deputy's
initials

Date/time received in

central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials

attorney’s fees and other expenses granted as to liability. Amount of award deferred pending further



ei ok haan

(Salpeter Aff. 42,5).

Because Johnny’s IceHouse’s attorneys charge virtually all
of their paying clients at the same rates and because clients who
may receive a modest 5% discount because of the volume of work
they provide constitute a very small percentage of counsel’s
overall work (Salpeter R. Aff. 97), that evidence unquestionably
suffices to establish their market rates: It represents the
amount the attorneys would have received if they had not been
representing Johnny’s IceHouse, but rather working for paying
clients (People Who Care, 90 F.3d at 1313)--in economic terms,
their opportunity cost in taking this action. Hence those rates
are considered presumptively appropriate, and the burden shifts
to AHAI to present evidence establishing “a good reason why a
lower rate is essential” (People Who Care, 90 F.3d at 1313,

quoting Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986 F.2d 1146, 1151 (7 Cir.

1993)).

On that score AHAI argues that the hourly rates requested
for the work done by Salpeter and Hiegel far exceed market rates
set in other civil rights cases, and AHAI further suggests that
they exceed market rates for comparable Chicago attorneys. To
that end AHAI points to other civil rights cases in which lead
counsel had been allowed hourly rates ranging from $300-$325 per
hour and a second-chair attorney was allowed an hourly rate of

$175 per hour (see, e.g., Krislov v. Rednour, 97 F.Supp.2d 862,

11


aay

sets forth the standard inquiry for determining “reasonable
hourly rates”:

In determining “reasonable hourly rates,” the Supreme
Court has repeatedly stressed that attorney’s fees
awarded under Section 1988 are to be based on market
rates for services rendered. The attorney’s actual
billing rate for comparable work is presumptively
appropriate to use as the market rate. If the court is
unable to determine the attorney’s true billing rate,
however (because he maintains a contingent fee or
public interest practice, for example), then the court
should look to the next best evidence--the rate charged
by lawyers in the community of reasonably comparable
skill, experience and reputation.

Johnny’s IceHouse bears the burden of proving the market rate
(id. at 1311). Once it has done so, the burden shifts to AHAI to
demonstrate why a lower rate should be awarded (id. at 1313; see

also such cases as Batt v. Micro Warehouse, Inc., 241 F.3d 891,

894 (7th Cir. 2001) and Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175

F.3d 544, 554-55 (7 Cir. 1999)).

Johnny’s IceHouse submits that it is entitled to recover
hourly rates of $495 for lead attorney Alan Salpeter
(“Salpeter”), $295 for associate Adrienne Hiegel (“Hiegel”), $185
for associate Jason Fliegel (“Fliegel”), $155 for two paralegals,
$130 for litigation support and $40 for support services. In
support of these rates Salpeter submitted an affidavit attesting
that those are the hourly rates normally charged by Mayer, Brown
& Platt for each attorney’s services, although (as stated
earlier) the firm has agreed to represent Johnny’s IceHouse in

this action on a pro bono basis unless fee-shifting is available

10


Paws

merely a private agreement to judicial oversight and enforcement
(see 121 S.Ct. at 1840 n. 7)--and it did so in response to
Johnny’s IceHouse’s concerns that a purely voluntary undertaking
on AHAI’s part would not alone provide adequate protection for
the future.

Moreover, the Order clearly bears the mark of judicial
sanction. AHAI’s agreement to drop the disciplinary proceedings
against the Westenbergs and Watts arose out of this Court’s
finding of wrongdoing on AHAI’s part after a full-fledged factual
hearing.* And AHAI agreed to reduce its commitment to a court
order both in response to Johnny’s IceHouse’s legitimate concerns
and at this Court's request, a procedure that obviated a
conversion of the TRO into a preliminary injunction (April 26 Tr.
11). Those circumstances surrounding the entry of the Order
strongly bolster the view that Johnny’s IceHouse is plainly a
prevailing party under Buckhannon.

AHAI also strikes out on its other attempt to label Johnny’s

> AHAI argues that the Westenberg issue was dropped not

because of this Court’s April 3 findings but rather because CYA
dismissed its administrative complaint against the Westenbergs,
thereby divesting AHAI of jurisdiction over the issue. But that
is no more than a red herring: There can be no doubt that CYA
itself engaged in that dismissal in light of this Court’s
findings, which had made plain that there was no basis under
AHAI's rules or regulations for CYA’s attempted action. In that
respect the relationships between CYA and AHAI must also be kept
in mind: CYA President Stephen Morrow is also an AHAI official,
as is his wife and CYA girls’ teams manager Kathy Morrow, who
testified at the TRO hearing regarding the Westenberg issue.

7


therefore entitled to a TRO, regarding the Westenberg and Watts
issues (Apr. 3 Tr. 6). As to those two issues this Court said in
part (id. 8):

It is nothing short, I again regret to say, nothing short of
disgraceful for an organization such as AHAI, which has the
responsibility imposed on it and undertaken by it to
regulate this activity, to have its persons who are in
authority so amorphous and so totally inconsistent as to
what the operative rights and responsibilities and rules and
procedures are. As I was listening to and examining the
evidence as it was introduced, I must say the strong sense
that I gleaned was that each of those who were either making
or implementing policy for AHAI in the respects at issue
here were sort of making it up as they went along. The
plaintiffs’ March 27th post-hearing memorandum demonstrated
that, I thought, with a kind of devastating force. And the
total impact is that the purported explanations were just
rife with inconsistencies. And there is no predicate for
subjecting people who are seeking to participate in the
activity to that kind of really anarchic structure, or more
accurately lack of structure.

Accordingly my sense is that the TRO certainly should be
granted with respect to those two items.

In light of that ruling, on April 26 AHAI agreed to
discontinue both the Westenberg disciplinary proceeding and the
Watts disciplinary investigation permanently. This Court’s Order
memorialized that agreement, stating in relevant part:

The AHAI defendants will not at any time in the future
pursue, either directly or indirectly, any disciplinary
proceedings, investigations, or action of any kind against
any person or entity regarding the Westenbergs’ alleged debt
to CYA.

In addition, in light of the Court’s April 3, 2001 ruling,
the AHAI defendants will not pursue, either directly or
indirectly, any investigation, hearing, or discipline
against any person relating to an alleged roster violation,
or to the events leading up to the alleged roster violation,
involving Coach Richard Marshall and plaintiff Nikki Watts


Hours Spent and Expenses Incurred

This District Court has established a carefully structured
procedure in its LR 54.3 that serves to implement Rule 54(d) in
addressing fee awards stemming from the entry of judgment. But
LR 54.3(d) also plays a constructive role in situations such as
the present one, for parties who follow its provisions are able
to narrow the focus of any disputed aspects of the fee request
both for themselves and for the court. At this time the
litigants are engaged in the LR 54.3(d) process, and this Court’s
ruling as to the reasonableness of the lawyers’ hours and the
out-of-pocket expenses claimed by Johnny’s IceHouse will of
course be deferred until this Court is provided the necessary
grist for the judicial mill in those respects.

Results Obtained

AHAI argues finally that the lodestar figure should be
reduced because Johnny’s IceHouse’s success was limited. As
cases such as Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (quoting

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436) teach:

that a lower rate is “essential” (the term employed in Gusman and
People Who Care). For example, Salpeter adduces important
distinguishing factors that militate against such one-to-one
comparisons. And most significantly, it is market forces rather
than a judge’s subjective impressions that best valuate the
hourly rate that an attorney merits based on his or her
experience, skills and efficiency. Thus it is not for this Court
to second-guess that valuation (except, of course, in cases such
as Cooper and Beard, where an attorney is practicing outside of
his or her area of expertise).

14


ebb So ed

deb de ai de ie a,

aren

the hearing to rebut that assertion.’

As for Johnny’s IceHouse’s lack of success on the “Chill”
name issue, the Hensley approach to the concepts of “results
obtained” and “limited success” (461 U.S. at 434-37), which has
not been vitiated by Farrar (506 U.S. at 114), raises a serious
question as to whether that may call for some reduction in its
attorney fee award. In substantial part that possibility really
depends on whether it is feasible (or indeed appropriate) to
attempt to carve that time out of the time for which counsel now
make their claim (issues on which the parties have not provided
all the necessary input, but which they are expected to deal with
in the LR 54.3 submissions referred to in the preceding section).

But in all events, any such reduction (if it were to be made
at all) would have to be small, for the “Chill” name issue was
certainly secondary in terms of both the importance that Johnny’ s

IceHouse placed on it and the limited time that was devoted to it

at the hearing. What is most significant is that Johnny’s

7 Moreover, the TRO proceeding resulted in this Court’s

denunciation of AHAI’s running what this Court characterized as
TEGWAR (“The Exciting Game Without Any Rules”) as far as girls’
hockey is concerned. Later developments in the litigation have
suggested that this Court’s ruling has had a substantial
deterrent impact on AHAI’s arbitrary policymaking, as well as
fostering AHAI’s proposed implementation of rules and regulations
for girls’ hockey, changes that will benefit all of the
plaintiffs and others not involved in this action. It is surely
fair to say that Johnny’s IceHouse’s submissions “evince a public
purpose rather than merely attempt to redress a private injury”
(Maul _v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 146 (7th Cir. 1994)), further
supporting its claim for attorneys’ fees.

16



Order had in turn followed from this Court’s April 3 ruling
granting Johnny’s IceHouse a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)
on those issues. With the motion now having been fully briefed,
it is ripe for decision.
Background

Johnny’s IceHouse filed an Emergency Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order on February 13, 2001, based on a number of
AHAI's actions that had allegedly been taken in retaliation for
the filing of this lawsuit. Johnny’s IceHouse primarily sought
to restrain AHAI from pursuing (1) a disciplinary action against
Rachael Westenberg based on an alleged debt owed to the Chicago
Young Americans (“CYA”) girls’ hockey team (J. TRO Mem. 4-8) and
(2) a disciplinary investigation against Nikki Watts for an
alleged roster violation in playing for both Johnny's Chicago
Chill’s 15-and-under team and its 19-and-under team during an
exhibition tournament in Minnesota (id. 8-9). Johnny’s IceHouse
also contended that AHAI was further retaliating by pressuring
Chicago Chill President Bryan Barrish to withdraw Johnny’s
IceHouse’s permission to use the Chicago Chill name (id. 9-10).

After two full days of evidentiary hearings on Johnny’s
IceHouse’s motion, supplemented by extensive pre- and post-
hearing briefing, on April 3 this Court found that Johnny’s
IceHouse had not met its burden on the Chicago Chill name issue

but that it had more than amply sustained its burden, and was


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHNNY'S ICEHOUSE, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 00 C 7363

AMATEUR HOCKEY ASSOCIATION OF
ILLINOIS, et al.,

DOCKETED

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AUG 0? ono,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Johnny’s IceHouse, Inc. and its fellow plaintiffs
(collectively “Johnny’s IceHouse,” treated after this sentence as
a singular noun) have moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 54 (da)
for an award of attorney’s fees and other expenses in the
aggregate amount of $133,592.56 against Amateur Hockey
Association of Illinois, Inc. and its individual codefendants
(collectively “AHAI,” also treated as a singular noun).! That
award is sought on the strength of this Court’s May 4, 2001 order
(“Order”) that memorialized AHAI’s agreement to dismiss the two
previously pending disciplinary actions against individual
plaintiffs: in one instance Rachael Westenberg and her parents,

and in the other instance Nikki Watts. AHAI’s agreement and the

+ For purposes of this opinion, Johnny’s IceHouse’s earlier

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order is cited “J. TRO Mem.--.” As for the
briefs filed on the current motion, Johnny’s IceHouse’s opening
memorandum is cited “J. Mem.--” and its supplemental memorandum
is cited “J. Supp. Mem.--,” with AHAI’s intervening memorandum
cited “A. Mem.--.” This opinion employs the same “J.” and “A.”
designations in referring to the parties’ exhibits.


870 (N.D. T1l. 2000)). AHAI also submits the affidavit of its
lead counsel Ronald Safer (“Safer”) attesting that Schiff, Hardin
& Waite’s standard hourly billing rates for lead counsel on this

matter are $350 for Max Brittain, Jr., $325 for Ralph Morris and

$350 for Safer (Safer Aff. 93). Associate Jennifer Cerven’s
standard hourly billing rate is $230 (id.). Finally, AHAI points

out that while Salpeter is an experienced litigator, he does not
have extensive case experience arising out of civil rights
litigation under Title IX or otherwise (A. Ex. Cc).

There is however an inherent logical fallacy in the approach
urged by AHAI, which would pigeonhole this action in generic
terms as a “civil rights action” and then proceed to draw
invidious comparisons between the Mayer Brown lawyers’ hourly
rates and the rates charged by lawyers who handle more
conventional litigation that comes under the civil rights rubric
and who charge less for their time. This is not at all a
situation comparable to that in Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914,
920-21 (7 Cir.), where prisoners’ rights litigation under
Section 1983 was in a well-marked-out area of law such that
comparisons of that type could have legitimate force. Nor is
this case at all akin to that in Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942
(10 Cir. 1994), where this Court wrote for a Tenth Circuit
panel addressing a claim for fees ina specialized area of school

law with an established market for the rates regularly charged by

12



i cl

wei ite a

Indeed, “the most critical factor” in determining the
reasonableness of a fee award “is the degree of success
obtained.”

Connolly v. National Sch. Bus Serv. Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7%

Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) sets
out a three-part test for evaluating “degree of success’:

Under this test, we look at the difference between the

judgment recovered and the recovery sought, the

significance of the legal issues on which the plaintiff
prevailed and, finally, the public purpose served by

the litigation. The standard is whether the fees are

reasonable in relation to the difficulty, stakes, and

outcome of the case.

AHAI argues that Johnny’s IceHouse’s success was limited
because it did not obtain a broad injunction against retaliation
and it did not succeed on the “Chill” name issue (A. Mem. 6).
AHAI further points out that the Order barring AHAI from pursuing
the Westenberg and Watts issues affected only the Westenbergs and
Watts, assertedly providing no benefit to the rest of the
plaintiffs (id.).

That latter contention does not call for a limited-success
reduction. There is certainly nothing inappropriate about the
pursuit of claims that relate to some but not all of a lawyer's
litigation clients. In any event, the Johnny’s IceHouse motion
for a TRO explained that the pursuit of those disciplinary

proceedings could result in the suspension of the Chicago Chill

teams (J. TRO Mem. 12), and there was no evidence submitted at

15