### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 7, 200 5 S es sio n

LANCE GRI GSB Y, ET AL 

### . v. CITY OF PL AIN VIEW

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Union Coun ty No. 4463 Billy Joe Whi te, C hancellor

No. E2004-01644-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JUNE 6, 2005

East Tenne ssee Pioneer

Oil Company

owned a nd operated a Spur c onvenienc e store in Plainview, Tenne ssee. As pa

rt of a ba nkruptcy

proce eding , the Spur was sold at p u b l i c auction. Potential pu rc ha se rs we re inf

or me d pri or to the sa le that the Spu r wa s bei ng so ld w ith a n a c tiv e be e r p e rm it so long a s the purcha ser r etained Wanda Cherry Evans (“ Evans”) as mana g er. In September of 2002, L ance and L ori Grig sby

purcha sed the Spur, re tained Eva ns as manag er, a nd continued to sell bee r afte r re naming the store the A ll America n Marke t and Deli. On Fe bruary 20, 2003, the bee r boar d (the “ Boa rd”) for the City

of P lainview voted to re voke the be er pe rmit. On J uly 3, 2003, the Grig sby s and Evans ( “Plaintiffs”) f iled a complaint re q u es t i n g t he Tria l Court gr ant a writ of

certiorari and r eview the action of the beer board in revoking the beer permit. The Ci ty of Plainview (the “ City ”) f

iled a motion to dism iss claiming that the Trial Court lacked subje ct matter jurisdiction beca use the c omplaint was not fil ed wi t h i n s i x ty day s from the e ntry

of the B oard’ s order

or judgme nt and, therefor e, the complaint was time bar red. The Trial Court ag ree d and dismissed the complaint. We vacate the judg ment of the Trial Court and re mand for f urther pr ocee dings.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Chancery Court

Vacat ed; Case R em anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J
., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J J
., joined.

Michae l G. Hatmake r, Jacksboro, Tenne ssee, for the Appellants L ance Grig sby
, L ori Grig sby and Wan da Che rry Ev a ns

.

J on G. Roach, K nox ville, Tennesse e, for the Appellee Cityof Plainview.T he f act s s et fort h i n t hi s O pi ni on come al mo s t exc l us i vel y f r om t he com pl ai nt an d var i ous ex hi bi t s at t ach ed 1

the re to . F o r p u rp o se s o f t h is a p p e a l, w e w ill a ssu m e the fac ts se t f o rth in the c o m p la int a re a c c u ra te

.
-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Ev a ns wa s th e ho lde r o f a

va lid be e r p e rm it auth orizin g he r t o s e ll b e e r at th e Lutt re ll Spur convenie nce store located in Plainview, Union County , Tenne ssee. The L uttrell Spur was one 1 of seve ral businesses ow ned and ope rate d by East Tenne ssee Pioneer

Oil Company . I n J anuary of 1992, the Cityof Plainview wa s incorporated and shortly there afte r passe d Ordinanc e No. 1, whic h prohibited the s ale of beer within the Cit y ’s cor

porate limit s. Ordinanc e No. 1, howe ver, e x cepte d

“ tho se pe rs on s w ho he ld a va lid be e r pe rm it fr om the c ou nty on Janu ary

10 , 1 99 2, a nde xce pt o nly in the e sta bli sh me nts lis te d o n th os e be e r p e rm its on that date .” Th e be e r pe rm it iss ue d to Ev a ns fe ll within this exception.

Ea st T e nn e sse e Pio ne e r O il Co mpany be g a n e xpe ri e nc ing fi nan cia l dif fi c ult ie s, eventua lly

culminating in that c ompany filing f or bankruptc y protec tion in 2002. The Luttrell Spur was put up for

sale a t public auction in Septe mber of 2002. Prior to the a uction, the City ’s May or inquired about whe ther the sa le would af fec t th e v al i d i t y o f the bee r permit. The City ’s attorne y
re sp on de d v ia

la tte r d a te d Se pte mbe r 2 0, 20 02 , w hic h s ta te s in pe rt ine nt p art :

You have asked w h ether the proposed transfer of the Spur Station property would result in the transf er of the B eer Permit. The short

answe r is no.

I t is c l ea r from state law that bee r permits m ay be issued to per sons who ar e not the owne rs of the r eal e s t at e.

... I t is myunderstanding that th e be e r p e rm it i s issu e d to an ind ivi du a l. B a se d on tha t, it is my opinion that so long as the individual entity to whom the permit was issued continues to hold the permit and operate under that permit that ther e is n o tr a n s f

e r d e s p it e th e c h a n g e in o w n e r s h ip

... . T h u s , the chang e in owner ship would have no e ffe ct on the permit it self....

I n light of the fore g oing le g al opinion of the City ’s attorne y , a publi c announc ement was made prior to the start of the bi dding at the auc tion that the Spur would be sold with an active be e r l ic e nc e , p ro vid e d th a t th e pu rc ha se r re ta ine d Eva ns a s ma na g e r. Re ly ing on thi s a nn ou nc e me nt, L ance and L ori Grig sby

purcha sed the L

uttrell Spur for $220,500. Ac cording to the Grig sby s, the sale price would have been sig nificantly less without a valid beer

permit, perha

ps to the point of “no sale.” After

purcha sing the Spur, the Grig sby s entere d into a contra ct wi t h Evans to manag e the store, which ha d been r ename d the All Americ an Mar ket a n d Deli (the “ Deli”) . Be cause the Grig sby s retaine d E v an s as mana g er, the y utiliz ed the be er pe rmit previously issued to Evans and

so ld b e e r at th e De li f

or c on su mpt ion of

f p re mis e s.-3- Evans re ceive d notification in Dec ember of 2002 that she ne eded t o complete a

rene wal application for the bee r permit, which she did timely . On Fe bruary 20, 200 3
, t h e B oard voted to r evoke Evans’ beer permit. On J uly 3, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a complaint re questing the Trial Court gr ant a writ of certiorari and r eview the propriety of the B oard’ s revoc ati o n o f E v an s’ bee r permit. Plaintiffs claimed that the a ct i o n s o f the B oard “ at its Febr uary 20, 2003 meeting wer e arbitra ry , capricious, without cause, illeg al, improper, and in d i re ct co ntrave ntion of the repr esentations previously made by [t he City ].”

The City filed a motion to dismis s claiming the Trial C ourt lacke d subject matter jurisdiction over the c laims set forth in the complaint. The City claimed in this motion t hat pursuant to T e nn . Co de An n. § 2 7- 9- 10 2, Pla int if fs ha d s ixty

(6 0) da y s fr om F e br

ua ry 20
, 20 03 in wh ic h to fi le a p e t i t i o n f

o r w r i t o f c e r t i o r ar i

. T h e C i t y a v e rr e d t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n t w a s t i m e b arr e d be c a us e Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until J uly 3, 2003. The Trial Court a g ree d and issued an or der g ra nti ng the City ’s mot ion to d ism iss . A c c or din g to the Tria l Co urt:

[The Boa rd] a cted to r evoke the “g randf ather ed” be er pe rmit issued in t h e n ame of Wanda Cherry Evans on F ebrua

ry 20, 2003. The Court f u rt h er finds that the ac tion of the Boa rd ... on F ebrua

ry 20, 2 0 0 3
, at wh i ch t h e P l ai n t i ffs we re p re s en t an d h ad ac t u al k n o wl ed ge of the a ction, serve d as the “ trig g er” to commence the running of the six ty (60) day period within which a

Pe t i t i o n fo r Certiora

ri must be filed. B eca

use the Plaintiffs di d not file a Petition or Com plaint for Wri t of Certiorari within si x ty (60) day s of the F ebrua

ry 20, 2003 action of the Boa

rd ... [ this Court] has no subject m atter jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs then filed a motion asking the Trial Court to re consider its orde r g ranting the City ’s motion to dis miss. Plaintiffs arg ued that acc ording to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 9-102, the six ty day time limit in which to file a pe tition for writ of ce rtiorari does not beg in to run until “entry of the orde r or judg ment.” Plaintiffs then arg ued that beca use the B oard ne ver a ctually enter ed an

or de r o r j ud g me nt, the sixty da y tim e lim it n e ve r b e g a n to ru n. Th e Tria l Co urt de nie d Pl a int if fs ’

m o t i o n t o re co n s i d ers t at i n g:

I t doe s appea

r that the Citymade a

rec ord of this proce eding by way of a co urt r e po rt e r a ndfi le d th a t r e c or d a s th e min ute s. ... In my opinion, that’s all the city has to do to rec ord their judg ment ....
Plaintiffs appea l the di smissal of their c omplaint and arg ue that the Trial Court erre d when it conclude d that the complaint was not filed i n a ti mely manner , thus depriving the Trial Court of subject matter

jurisdiction.-4- Discussion

Ou r s ta nd ardof

re vie w a s to the g ranti ng of a mot ion to d ism iss is s e t ou t in Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co. , 945 S.W .2d 714 (Tenn. 1997) . I n Ste in , our Supreme Court e x plained:

I n considering a motion t o dismiss , courts should construe the complaint l i b er all y

in favor of

the plaintiff, taking all alleg ations of fac t a s true, and deny the motion unless it a ppear s that the pl ai n t iff can pr ove no set of f

acts in support of he r cla im that would entitle her to relief. Cook v. Spinnake r's of Rivergate, I

nc ., 878 S.W .2d 934, 938 (Tenn. 1994) . I n considering this appeal fr om the trial court' s g rant of the de fe nd a nt' s mot ion to dis mis s, we take a ll a lle g a tio ns of fa c t in the pl ain ti f

f' s c o mp la in t a s tr

u e , a n d r e v ie w th e lo w e r c o u r ts ' le g al

c on c lus ion s de novo wi th n o p re su mpt io n of c or re c tne ss. Te nn . R. App. P. 13(d); Owens v. Tr uckstops of Ame rica
, 915 S.W .2d 420, 424 (Tenn. 1996) ; Coo k

, s up ra

.

Stein v. Dav idson Hotel Co. , 945 S.W .2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997)

.

The parties ag ree that the prope r proc edure to appea l the revoc ation of Evans’ beer p er m it is vi a a sta tutory

writ of ce rtiorari. See T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 5 7

- 5

- 1 0 8

. T h e p ar ti e s further

a g re e that th e app lic able tim e lim it f or Pla int if fs to f ile a pe tit ion fo r w ri t of

c e rt ior ari is s e t f

orth i n Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27- 9-101 and 102. The se statutes provide:

27-9-101. Right of Review. – Any one who may be ag g rieve d byany final orde r or judg ment of any board or

commission functi o n i n g under the laws of this state may have the order

or jud g me nt r e viewed by

the c ou rt s, wh e re no t othe rw ise sp e c if ic a lly provided, in the manne r provided by this chapter.

27-9-102. F ilin g and c o ntents of p etition. – Suc h p art y sh a ll, wi thi n s ixty

(6 0) da y s f

ro m the entry of

the or de r o r j ud g me nt, fi le a pe tit ion of

c e rt ior ari in th e c ha nc e ry c ou rt of a ny c ou nty in which any

one (1) or m ore of the petit ioners, or any one (1) or more of the mate rial def

endants re side, or have the ir principal of fice
, stating br iefly

the issues involved in the cause, the substanc e of the order or j udg ment complained of, the respects in which the pe titioner claims the orde r or judg ment is errone ous, an d p ray ing f or an
acc ordant re view. (e mphasis added)

As emphasized, the applica ble six ty day period beg ins to run when the final judgment or orde r is enter ed. I n Car te r v . B d. of Z on ing Ap pe als
, 214 Tenn. 42, 377 S.W .2d 914 (1964), our-5-

S u p re m e C o u rt wa s d i s cu s s i n g t h e a b o v e s t at u t e a n d n o t ed t h e d i s t i n ct i o n b et we en re n d er i n g a judgme nt and entering a

judgme nt. Accor ding to the Carter Cou rt :

[T] he ti me for filing the petition for ce rtiorari runs from the e ntr y of the orde r or judg ment and not from the rendition of the jud g me nt.

The distinction betwee n the “r endition” of a judgme nt and the “entry ” of a

judgme nt or order

was c lear l y pointed out by the Court in J ackson v. Jarratt, 1 6 5 T en n

. 76, 52 S.W .2d 137, in which the Court stated:

“‘Rende red’ means e x presse d o r announce d in a

c on c lus ive ma nn e r and wi th de c isi ve e ff e c t, c e rt a inl y so when a t the same time notation of it is made on a judgme n t d o cket, or

other more or less permanent memorandum rec ord kept by the J udg e for

the purpose. ' The re ndition of judgme nt, and the entry of judgme nt, are differ en t and distinct, eac h from the other. The former

is the ac t o f the court, while the latter is the ac t of the cle rk of the co u rt

. * * * To

re nd e r jud g me nt is to re turn o r g ive jud g me nt; a ndit can not be said, in our opi nion, that the phra se, in any of its forms, includes the idea of making a writ ten entry or re cord of

a judg ment.’” P. 79 of 165 Te nn., p. 138 of 52 S.W.2d.

* * *

The distinct i o n betwee n “re ndition” of judg ment and “e ntry ” of judgment in the J ackson c ase se ems to be universa lly rec og nized. The “ e n try ” o f

ju d g me n t i s th e mi n is te r ia l a c t b y w h ic h e n during evidenc e of the judicial act of rendition of judg ment is affor ded....

Carter , 377 S.W .2d at 916 (e mphasis in origina l).

The purpose of the pr ovision requiring that a petition for writ of certiorari be f iled within six ty

day s of entry

of a f inal judgme nt is “to p romote the timely resolution of disputes by establishing f

iling dea dlines that wi l l k ee p cases moving throug h the sy stem.” Hickm an v. Bd. of Paroles , 78 S.W .3d 285, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The six ty day time limit is jurisdictional and the “[f]ailure to file a w rit within thi s period pre clude s re v i ew o f s uch dec isions bythe courts.” J oh ns on v . M

e tro po lit an Go v ’t for Nas hv ill e Da v ids on Cou nty , 54 S.W .3d 772, 774 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).Br annon and s i m i l ar cases d o no t ho l d t hat t he ap p roval and f i l i ng of t he m i nut es cannot co nst i t ut e t he ent ry 2

o f a j u d g m e n t.

-6-

B r a n n o n v

. Co u n ty o

f Shelby
, 900 S.W .2d 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) involved a

re qu e st b y

Sta nd ard Con str

uc tio n Compa ny

fo r a sp e c ia l us e pe rm it w hic h w ou ld a llo w i t to op e rate a sand a nd g rave l excavating business. Severa l a djoining property owner s opposed the g ranting of the s p e c ia l u s e p e r mi t. N e v e r th e le s s , th e Sh e lb y Co u n ty B o ar d o f Co mm is s io n e r s ap p r oved the reque st on Dec ember

7, 1992. Id . at 3 1. Ac c or din g to the She lby Cou nty Cha rt e r, the sp e c ia l us e permit did not become e ffe ctive until it was s i gn ed b ythe may or, an e vent which ha ppened on Dec ember

14, 1992. There afte r, on January 25, 1993, the B oard of

Commi s sioners appr oved the minutes from its Dece mber 7 meeting and the minutes we re the n filed as a matter of public r ecor d. th Id. at 33 an d n

. 5

. The a djoining prope rty owner s then filed a pe tition for writ of ce rtiorari on Fe bruary 23, 1993. The pe tition was filed more than s i x t y day s after

the spec ial use permit was signe d by the may or, but less than s ix ty day s from whe n the minutes from the De cembe r 7 meeting th

wer e appr oved and f

iled. Id

. at 33. This Court concluded that the trigg ering event whic h started the six ty day time p er i o d in that case was whe n the spec ial use permit was signe d by the may or on Dec ember 14 and became eff ective, not w hen the minutes w ere approve d and filed the following th J anuary

. Acc ording ly , the petition was not filed timely and the tria l court l acked subject matter 2 jurisdiction. Id. at 33, 34.

Ad v an c e d Sale s, In c . v. W

ils on Cou nty , No. 01-A- 01-9805-CH-00245, 1999 T enn. App. LEXI S 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 1999), no appl. perm appeal filed , involved a re quest by Advanc ed Sales, I nc., for permission to use a particular p ar ce l o f property for mac hine

ma nu fa c turing a ndre pa ir . T he re qu e st w a s d e nie d b y the Wils on Cou nty

B oa rdof Z on ing Ap pe a ls and one of

the primary

issues befor e this Court on appea l was whe n the six ty day period in which to file a pe tition for writ of ce rtiorari beg an to run. We stated:

Th e pe tit ion e r a lle g e s th a t th e B oa rd ' s " or de r o r j ud g ment " was not ente red until J anua ry24, 1997 when the B oard me t and approve d the minutes of t h e December 20 meeting . We fail to find wher e that appe ars in the rec ord. What does appea r is the application dated De cembe r 3
, 1996 ref lecting a hea

ring date of

Dec ember

20. Various notices to the public and to affe cted landow ners a ppear in the

re c or d a nn ou nc ing a he ari ng da te of De c e mbe r 2 0. Th e pe tit ion its e lf has a section on which to show the action of the Boa rd. That se ction ref lects that the pe tition was presente d to the Boa rd on Dec ember

20, 1996, and the entry , "Re lief Denied," is circled on the form. It is true that the place on t h e fo rm s howing how the member s voted is left bla nk , b ut the re is n o d isp ute that th e B oa rdvo te d u na nim ou sly

to d e n y t h e p e t i t i o n

. T h e f

o r mi s s i g n e d b y t h e B o ar d s e c r e t ar y.

We think the Boa

rd' s order or judg ment was e ntere d on Dec ember

20, 1996. The a

pplicant r el i es on the ca se of Carter v.T he C i t y ci t es c ase s such as K ie lb a sa v . W ilso n C o u n ty B d . o f Z o n in g A p p e a ls
, N o. M 1999- 01155- CO A- R3- 3

C V , 2 0 0 0 T e n n . A p p . L E X IS 2 7 7 (T e n n . C t. A p p . M a y 5 , 2 0 0 0 ), no app l

. per m

. app eal f i l ed
, for t he propo s i t i on t hat
t he si xt y da y s st art s t o run f rom t he d at e o f

t he act i o n co m p l ai ned of, no t when t he judgm ent i s ent ered

. I n K i elb a sa , t h is C our t s t at ed onl y t hat t he pet i t i oner s wer e r equi r ed t o f i l e a pet i t i on wi t hi n s i xt y day s of “ t he B oard’ s deci s i on. ” Id

. , at

* * 4, 5. H owever , i n t hat cas e t he pet i t i oner s es s ent i al l y ac kn owl edged t hei r pet i t i on was f i l ed t oo l at e, but t hey cl ai med tha t t h e sta tute o f l im itatio n s w a s to lled d u e to fra u d u le n t c o n c e a lm e n t a n d la c k o f n o tice

. W e d isa g re e w ith the C ity’ s inte rp re ta tio n o f K i elb a sa becau s e t he ex act d at e upo n whi ch t he j udgment was “e nt er ed” was neve r an i s s ue i n t hat ca s e.

-7- Bo ar d o f Zo nin g A

pp e als of C ity of N

as hv ill e , 214 Tenn. 42, 377 S.W .2d 914 (Tenn. 1964) for the proposition that the Board' s order or judgme nt in this case was only "r ender ed" on Dec ember 20, 1996 and not "e ntered" until the B oard a pproved the minutes in J anuary of 1997. The Carter

case , howe v er, stands for an e ntirely differ ent p ro p o s i tion. I n that case the petition for ce rtiorari alleg ed that the Board made an ora l ruling on F ebrua ry 11, 1963, but the appellant filed a pe tition t o rehe ar a nd t he orde r of the B oard w as not enter ed until April 24, 1963. The petition f or certiorari was filed on April 25, 1963.

The Supreme Court held that if the fa cts alleg ed in the petition

wer e true , the petition was t i m el yfiled. The Carter case does not de a l w ith the e ff

e c t of a B oa rd ' s a c tio n in app ro vin g its min ute s at a later me eting . I t deals only with a fac t q u est ion as to when the Boa rd' s order was actua lly enter ed. I n this case we think the rec ord befo re t h e Board c onclusively shows that the B oard' s action wa s enter ed on the r ecor d on Dec ember 20, 1996.

A d v a n c e d S a le s , Inc.
, 1 9 9 9 Tenn. App. L EXI S 333, at ** 3 - 5. See also Gore v. De pt. of Correction , 132 S.W .3d 369, 378-79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)(Indicating that the re quirement of T enn. C ode Ann. § 27- 9-102 that a f inal judgme nt be enter ed wa s met when the a ppeal of an inmate’ s sentenc e to thirty

day s punitive seg reg ation for attempted esca pe was denied by

the war den with a note stating “no due pr ocess violation noted.”)

.

The case law beg inning with the S upreme Court’s decision in Carter certainly shows that something more than simplya vote taking place is require d befor e a judg ment or orde r will be considere d as having been enter ed pursuant to T enn. Code Ann. § 27-9- 102. I n Brannon the B oard’ s judgme nt was ente red w hen the spe cial use permit was signe d by the may or, and in Advanc ed Sales the B oard’ s judgme nt was ente red w hen the petition wa s marke d “Relief D enied” and sig ned by the B oa rdSe c re tary

. I t is thi s “ so me thi ng mor e ” wh ic h e le vate s a jud g me nt fr om on e wh ic h h a s si mpl y been rende red, to one that also has bee n enter ed. I t is thi s “something more” which is the “e nduring 3 evidenc e of the judicial act of rendition of judg ment ....” Carter , 377 S.W .2d at 916.

I n the pre sent case , all we able to g lean from the sparse rec ord is that the B oard vote d to revoke Evans’ be er pe rmit on Fe b ruary 20, 2003. Whil e this certainly would qualify

as the-8-

“re ndition” of the Boa

rd’s judgme nt, it falls short of qualify ing as the “entry ” of that judgme nt. T he

re c or d c on ta ins no pr oo f e sta bli sh ing wh e the r anythi ng e lse ha pp e ne d on F e br

ua ry 20 wh ic h w ou ld th b e s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o p e r l y c h ar a c t e r i z e t h e B o ar d ’ s j u d g m e n ta s h a v i n g b e e n e n t e r e d o n t h a td a y. There is no “something mor e” in a ddition to t he vote of the B oard a nd, there fore , no “enduring evidenc e” of

the Board’ s rendition of j udg ment. See Carter , 377 S.W .2d at 916. Acc ording ly , we
vac a te th e ju d g me n t o f th e T r ia l Co u r t w h ic h h e ld th a t th e B o ar d ’ s ju d g me n t w a s e n te red on Fe bruary 20, 2003, and that Plaintiffs’ complaint w as time barre d. I n so doing, w e note that Plaintiffs’ prese nce at the meeting when the Boa rd revoke d the bee r permit is immaterial to whethe r the B oard’ s judgme nt was ente red f or purpose s of Tenn. Code A nn. § 27-9-102.

Whe n r uli ng on Pla int if

fs ’ m oti on to re c on sid e r, the Tria l Co urt st a te d th a t “ the City made a rec ord of this proce eding by way of a c ourt reporter a nd filed the re cord a s the minutes.” The T r i a l C o u r t t h e n a d d e d t h a t t h i s w a s “ a l l t h e c i t y h a s t o d o t o r e c o r d t h e i r j u d g m e n t

. ” U n f

o r t u n a t e l y, there is absolutely

no proof in the r ecor d sh o wi n g t h at a recor d was made of the proc eeding s and subsequently

filed. The very first mention in the record before us of the e x istence of a court reporte r wh o tr a ns c ri be d a nd fi led the m inu te s is wh e n th e Tria l Co urt ma de the abo ve state me nts immediately

prior to denying Plaintiffs’ motion t o re co n s i d er. The re cord doe s not contain the minutes or any

other proof

establishing the prese nce of a transcript or that one was filed. Whil e we
are c on fi de nt s uc h p ro of

wa s p re se nte d to the Tria l Co urt, f or so me un kn ow n r e a so n th a t pr oo f d id not make its way

into the rec ord on appe al. Having the proc eeding s transcribed and f iled as the Boa rd’s minutes would constitute entry of the Boa rd’s judgme nt, a ssuming no other event a lrea dy had occ urre d sufficie nt to establish entry of the judg ment. Neve rtheless, be cause of the lack of proof in the rec ord in this appeal of the g ranting of a motion to dismiss
, we are unable to hold that the Trial Cou rt didno t e rr

wh e n it c on c lud e d th a t th e re c or din g a ndfi lin g of the min ute s w a s su fficie nt t o constitute entry

of the B oard’ s judgme nt.

P er h ap s m o re i m p o rt an ti s t h e f ac tt h at t h e re co rd co n t ai n s n o p ro o f s h o wi n g when the min ute s we re fi le d. With ou t this criti c a l fa c t, an d e ve n th ou g h th e fi lin g of the min ute s w ou ld be su ff ic ie nt t o trig g e r the sixty

da y pe ri od in thi s c a se , w e c a nn ot d e te rm ine wh e the r P la int if fs ’ complaint was filed timely beca use we have no w ay

of knowing when the six ty day period started to r un . We lik e wi se do no t kn ow wh e the r a nythi ng oc c ur re d a ft e r the vo te to re vo ke Ev a ns ’ p e rm it but before the minutes were filed, if and whe n they wer e, which c ould properly be conside red a s the entry of the B oard’ s judgme nt as was the c ase in Brannon and Advanc ed Sales . I n short, the proof as it curr ently exis ts in the record before us in this appeal of the g ranting of a motion to dismis s does not establish that Plainti ffs c an prove no set of fa cts in support of their c laim that would entitle them to relief. Ste in , 9 45 S.W. 2da t 71 6. Th is i s e sp e c ia lly so g ive n th a t th e on ly

iss ue in d isp ute a t th is time is whether this a ction was timely filed. Acc ording ly
, we va cate the judg ment of the Trial Court and re mand this case t o t he Tria l Court to determine whe n and if the B oard’ s judgme nt ever was enter ed by

the filing of the minutes or some other a ct of the B oard othe r than just the B oard’ s vote, and if so, whe ther Plaintiffs’ c omplaint was filed within six ty day s from that date

.-9- Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is vaca ted, and this cause is rema nded to the Tria l Cou rt fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s a s n e c e ssa ry c on sis te nt w ith thi s O pin ion a ndfo r co lle c tio n of the c os ts below. Costs on appea l are assessed a g ainst the Appellee , Cityof Plainview.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE