That would be the precise analog of the healthy inmate
claiming constitutional violation because of the
inadequacy of the prison infirmary. Insofar as the
right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, "meaningful
access to the courts is the touchstone,” id., at 823
(internal quotation marks omitted), and the inmate
therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that
the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal
assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a
legal claim. He might show, for example, that a
complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to
satisfy some technical requirement which, because of
deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance
facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had
suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to
bring before the courts, but was so stymied by
inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even
to file a complaint.

In this instance it seems an understatement to say that
there is considerable doubt whether Wright's two transfers within
the Illinois prison system can entitle her to invoke the Bounds-
Lewis doctrine successfully. Petition Pt. III, which sets out
her three grounds for relief in two single-spaced typewritten
pages, surely did not require any intensive use of legal library
facilities (especially given the detailed discussion in the
Order, which dealt at great length with the arguments made on
Wright's behalf by her appellate counsel and also set forth the
court's meticulous treatment of those arguments). And perhaps
most importantly, Wright has remained in place at Lincoln
Correctional Center for somewhere between 10-1/2 and 11-1/2
months (she does not identify just when in January 2001 she was
transferred to that institution), so that any notion of an

insufficient opportunity to prepare and present her Petition

4


progeny) .

Wright's final asserted ground for federal habeas relief is
that her “use of deadly force was justified.” That contention
too was presented to and rejected by the Appellate Court as a
matter of state law--in both factual and legal terms (Order 32-
34)--and hence it too implicates no arguable federal
constitutional violation. Even apart from the presumptive
correctness of the factual determinations by both the Circuit
Court and the Appellate Court (see Section 2254(e)(1)), what has
been said regarding the cause-and-prejudice requirement as to
Wright's second ground applies with equal force here as well.

Accordingly, as stated at the outset of this opinion, “it
plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits
annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in
the district court” (Section 2254 Rule 4).* This Court therefore

dismisses the Petition summarily (id.).

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: December 21, 2001

4 Even though the Order was not really an exhibit attached

to the Petition, it is specifically referred to there--and this
Court is of course entitled to take judicial notice of the
Illinois Appellate Court's decision.

7


in various facilities. The Illinois Department of
Corrections conducted several transitions, the latest
stemming from and all male institutions to a female
institutions. In each of these transitions, as I began
researching and preparing, I was moved to another
facility with different guidelines and procedures for
access to legal library.

Logan Correctional Center
April 2000 to September 2000

Dwight Correctional Center
September 2000 to January 2001

Lincoln Correctional Center
January 2001 to Present

There is of course a recognized constitutional right of
access to the courts, though the lack of specificity in
identifying its precise constitutional source in the seminal
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) opinion and the later
opinion in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) has occasioned
some degree of judicial uncertainty as to the scope and
boundaries of that right. But Lewis, id. at 349, 351 has left no
doubt that the prisoner claiming a violation of that right must
show some actual injury stemming from the claimed deprivation:

The requirement that an inmate alleging a violation of

Bounds must show actual injury derives ultimately from

the doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle

that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks
assigned to the political branches.

* * *

Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding
right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate
cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by
establishing that his prison's law library or legal
assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.


before now appears totally insupportable.

But this Court need not decide that issue now, nor does it
have to give Wright a further opportunity to flesh out any claim
of actual injury, for her Petition is a total failure in
substantive terms in all events. This Court has reviewed the
Order in detail, and the Order together with the provisions of
Sections 2244 and 2254 plainly spell the death knell for Wright's
claims. No extensive discussion is required to demonstrate that.

Wright's proposed first ground for relief asserts the
constitutional claim that she suffered the ineffective assistance
of counsel, on the premise that her election to proceed via bench
trial rather than with an already-impaneled jury was based on
what she calls (with apparent hyperbole) “her attorney's
guarantee that she would not be found guilty of first degree
homicide.” But that issue was thoroughly explored by the
Appellate Court (Order 16-32), which concluded its discussion
with a thoughtful and accurate exposition and application of the
basic principles enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
688 (1984). As to that first claim, then, Wright fails one or
both of the tests prescribed by Section 2254 (d) (certainly its
first branch and most likely its second branch as well):

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim--


Up

“eco Minute Oxdos Foor (06/97)

LV VA United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

dm Assigned Judge
agistrate Judge

Milton I. Shadur

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CAs E NUMBER 01 C 9667 DATE 12/21/2001
v . . .
CASE USA ex rel. Yshanda Wright #K 85816 vs, Lincoln Correctional Ctr.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented ]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) 0 Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
Q) 0 Brief in support of motion due
(3) im] Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due__
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on ___ set for at .
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Q This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CUFRCP4(m) OGeneralRule21 OFRCP41(a\(1) CFRCP41(a)(2).

co) [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated in this

memorandum opinion and order, Rule 4 of the rules governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts (“Section 2254 Rules”) calls for the summary dismissal of the Petition, and this Court so

orders.
(1) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

‘Document
Number

No notices required, advised in open court,

No notices required.
£73 nunber of notices:

Y | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices. 4

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge. SURG

(22112001

date maited notice

courtroom
SN deputy’s
initials

SN

Date/time received in

central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials



(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.

Wright's second stated ground for relief is that “[a]n
affirmative defense of self defense was not fully explored,” but
the inclusion of that ground in her current federal habeas

Petition is puzzling. It does not in terms assert the

deprivation of a federal constitutional right (which is the only

potential basis for federal habeas relief under Section 2254 (a))
unless it were to be recharacterized as another aspect of the
claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. And any claim of that
nature faces the insurmountable hurdle that no such argument was
tendered to the Illinois state courts.*? That being the case,
Wright's failure even to suggest anything to indicate that she
can satisfy either prong of the cause-and-prejudice hurdles that
must be surmounted to put an issue before a federal habeas court
in the first instance amounts to a forfeiture of that argument

(c£. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) and its numerous

3 Nothing of the sort was specified or even hinted at in
the Order 1-2 statement of grounds then raised by Wright's
appellate counsel. And Order at 34-35 addresses and dispatches
Wright's self defense argument, which was advanced solely in
state law terms, as insufficient under Illinois substantive law.
That plainly does not qualify as the necessary presentation of
that argument on federal constitutional grounds.

6


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.
YSHANDA WRIGHT #K85816,

Petitioner,

pocnetes

pec 26 2001
LINCOLN CORRECTIONAL CENTER,

)
)
)
)
)
v. ) No. 01 C 9667
)
)
)
Respondent . )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Yshanda Wright (“Wright”) has just used the form provided by
this District Court's Clerk's Office for state prisoners' 28
U.S.C. §2254* claims to tender a self-prepared Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus--Person in State Custody (“Petition”), in which
she seeks to challenge her first degree murder conviction and the
consequent 20-year sentence that she is now serving. Wright has
accompanied her Petition with another self-prepared document --her
“Motion To Reconsider? and Accept Late Filing of Federal Habeus
Corpus” (“Motion”). For the reasons stated in this memorandum
opinion and order, Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases in the United States District Courts ("Section 2254 Rules”)

calls for the summary dismissal of the Petition, and this Court

» All further references to Title 28's provisions will

simply take the form “Section--.”

2 Actually, as the text of that document makes plain,
Wright's motion seeks to have this Court consider her Petition in
the first instance--there has been no prior filing and therefore
no prior ruling, hence nothing to “reconsider.”


so orders.

To begin with, Wright's Motion correctly reflects the
untimeliness of her Petition. Although Petition 2 recites a
December 10, 1999 date for the judgment of conviction, that was
actually the date on which the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District entered its 36-page unpublished order (“Order”) in
its Case No. 1-97-3047, which affirmed Wright's conviction
following her bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Petition Pt. I 93 repeats that 1999 date (this time correctly) as
the date of affirmance. Then Petition Pt. I 44 recites that the
Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on April 5,
2000--and this Court has independently verified that denial,
reported in table at 188 I11.2d 581, 729 N.E.2d 503 (2000). And
finally as to the required exhaustion of state court remedies
{see Section 2254(b) (1)), Petition Pt. II confirms that Wright
has never pursued any state court post-conviction remedy.

All of that being the case, the current filing has been
tendered well beyond the expiration of the one-year limitation
period prescribed by Section 2244(d) (1) (A), which identifies the
Section 2244(d) (1) alternative that started the one-year time
clock ticking in Wright's case. Wright seeks to have her
tardiness excused on the premise that she was denied effective
access to the courts, as reflected in her Motion 5:

I was unable to make the necessary investigation and
research in order to prepare and file due to transition