In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 15-1291V

(Filed: December 27, 2018)1

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

*

SUSAN COTTINGHAM, on behalf of *

her minor child, K.C., *

Petitioner, *

*

v. *

*

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND *

HUMAN SERVICES, *

*

Respondent. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

Andrew Donald Downing, Van Cott & Talamante, PLLC, 3030 N. Third Street, Suite 

790, Phoenix, AZ 85012, for Petitioner. 

Chad A. Readler, C. Salvatore D’Alessio, Catharine E. Reeves, Ann D. Martin, and Voris 

E. Johnson, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Torts Branch, P.O. Box 146, 

Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044, for Respondent.

___________________________________________________________

OPINION

___________________________________________________________

WILLIAMS, Senior Judge.

This is the third opinion by this Court on the issue of whether Petitioner, who voluntarily 

dismissed her Vaccine Act petition, had a reasonable basis for her claim and is entitled to her 

attorneys’ fees and costs. For the reasons stated below, the Court sustains the Special Master’s 

decision denying fees and costs. 

Background

On October 30, 2015, Susan Cottingham filed a petition for compensation under the 

Vaccine Act on behalf of her minor daughter, K.C. The petition sought compensation for three 

 

1 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 18 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims, the 

Court issued its Opinion under seal to provide the parties an opportunity to submit redactions. The 

parties did not propose any redactions. Accordingly, the Court publishes this Opinion.

National Childhood Vaccine 

Injury Act; 42 U.S.C. § 300aa15(e); Attorneys’ Fees and Costs;

Reasonable Basis for Claim; 

Voluntary Dismissal; Impending 

Statute of Limitations.
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injuries allegedly resulting from K.C.’s receipt of a human-papillomavirus (“HPV”) vaccine on 

July 5, 2012, when she was 14 years old - - chronic headaches, two instances of fainting, and 

menstrual problems. 

Petitioner first contacted counsel on May 15, 2015. Over the next five months, counsel for 

Petitioner obtained medical records from K.C.’s pediatrician, orthopedist, physical therapist, 

urgent care provider, and gynecologist. Pet’r’s Exs. 3-7. On October 28, 2015, counsel obtained 

a sworn statement from K.C. describing that approximately four months after she received the 

vaccine, she began experiencing “regular weekly headaches,” low grade fevers, dizziness, near 

black-outs, and menstrual problems. Based on his review of the medical records collected as of 

mid-October 2015, Petitioner’s counsel was of the opinion that the onset of K.C.’s vaccine-caused 

injury occurred on November 1, 2012, and that the applicable statute of limitations would expire 

on November 1, 2015. Counsel filed the petition on October 30, 2015, two days prior to the 

expiration of the statute of limitations. At the time of filing, counsel did not yet have Petitioner’s 

records from Children’s of Alabama, or additional records from the University of Alabama 

Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology.

By March 15, 2016, Petitioner’s counsel had filed all relevant medical records. On March 

28, 2016, the Special Master conducted a status conference, and Respondent’s counsel “noted that 

reasonable basis for bringing the case may not be present for petitioner.” Order (Mar. 28, 2016). 

“Acknowledg[ing] the reasonable basis issue,” Petitioner’s counsel requested an opportunity to 

review the case with a medical expert and file a supporting expert report. Id. Petitioner was 

ordered to file a status report within 30 days. Id. 

Between April and October 2016, Petitioner’s counsel contacted two potential experts, and 

the Special Master granted Petitioner several extensions of time to submit an expert report. 

Ultimately, Petitioner was unable to submit any expert opinion supporting her claim. On October 

7, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss her petition, and the Special Master issued a decision 

denying compensation on October 13, 2016. 

On October 26, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion seeking attorneys’ fees and costs in the 

amount of $11,468.77 and on March 30, 2017, the Special Master denied this fee request, finding 

that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable basis for her claim. In reaching this conclusion, the 

Special Master considered the “reasonable basis” issue under two alternative standards - - an 

evidence-based standard and a “totality of the circumstances” standard. Cottingham on behalf of 

K.C. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1291, 2017 WL 1476242, at *10-11 (Fed. Cl. 

Spec. Mstr. Mar. 30, 2017). The Special Master reasoned: “[a]ctions of an attorney are not 

evidence. Even an attorney’s decision to file a petition shortly before the (perceived) expiration 

of the statute of limitation is not evidence that affects the merit of the ‘claim for which the petition 

was brought.’” Id. at *9. The Special Master found that the medical records included “no evidence 

to support the petition’s vaguely asserted claims that the HPV vaccination caused K.C.’s 

headaches, fainting, or menstrual problems” and that Petitioner did not present an opinion from a 

retained expert supporting the contention that a vaccination harmed K.C. Id. at *11. 

Recognizing that “[s]ome non-binding precedent indicates that the actions of an attorney 

should be considered in examining whether there is a reasonable basis for the claim,” the Special 

Master separately addressed the totality of the circumstances standard and found that Petitioner 

also failed to establish a reasonable basis under this legal construct. Id. at *11-15. Petitioner 
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sought reconsideration, and the Special Master denied that motion. Cottingham on behalf of K.C. 

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1291, 2017 WL 2209904 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 

20, 2017).

On April 27, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion for review. In a September 18, 2017 decision,2

this Court stated that the Special Master erred in failing to consider the impending statute of 

limitations as a factor weighing in favor of a reasonable basis finding. Cottingham v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 134 Fed. Cl. 567, 578 (2017). This Court stated: 

[w]here an impending statute of limitations forced counsel to choose between 

preventing a Vaccine Act claimant from pursuing a potentially viable claim, or 

filing a complaint without a complete set of medical records and expert analysis, 

counsel acted prudently in preserving his client’s rights. 

Id. This Court vacated the Special Master’s decision denying attorneys’ fees and costs, and 

remanded the case to the Special Master to “apply a totality of the circumstances standard and 

reassess whether Petitioner’s claim had a reasonable basis at the time the petition was filed and at 

intervals when additional evidence became available to Petitioner’s counsel thereafter.” Id.

On November 7, 2017, while the case was pending before the Special Master on remand, 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued Simmons v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 875 F.3d 632 (Fed. Cir. 2017) and held that an imminent running of the statute of 

limitations was not a proper factor to be considered in assessing whether a Vaccine Act claim has 

a reasonable basis. The Federal Circuit reasoned: 

The Vaccine Act provides that there must be a “reasonable basis for the claim for 

which the petition was brought” before the special master may exercise her 

discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1) (emphasis 

added). Whether there is a looming statute of limitations deadline, however, has 

no bearing on whether there is a reasonable factual basis “for the claim” raised in 

the petition. That is an objective inquiry unrelated to counsel’s conduct. Although 

an impending statute of limitations deadline may relate to whether “the petition was 

brought in good faith” by counsel, the deadline does not provide a reasonable basis 

for the merits of the petitioner’s claim. 

Id. at 636. 

Despite the Federal Circuit’s decision in Simmons, the Special Master awarded fees in this 

case, stating that Simmons did not affect his analysis because this Court’s October 12, 2017 

Opinion “remain[ed] binding.” Cottingham on behalf of K.C. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 

No. 15-1291V, 2017 WL 6816709, at *6 n.3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing Strickland 

v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335, 1338, n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

On January 10, 2018, Respondent filed a motion for review arguing that in light of 

Simmons, this Court should vacate both its October 12, 2017 Opinion and the Special Master’s 

remand decision, and reinstate the Special Master’s original decision denying attorneys’ fees and 

 

2 The public version of this decision was filed on October 12, 2017. 
4

costs. In a May 31, 2018 decision,3this Court found the Federal Circuit’s rationale in Simmons

governs this case and that this Court’s earlier remand decision contained language that did not 

comport with the Federal Circuit’s subsequent holding in Simmons. Cottingham v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 139 Fed. Cl. 88, 92 (2018). This Court also found that the Special Master 

on remand had misinterpreted this Court’s findings on the probative value of Petitioner’s affidavit 

and Petitioner’s medical records. This Court remanded this matter to the Special Master to reassess 

whether there was a reasonable basis for Petitioner’s claim in accordance with Simmons, based on 

the evidence alone, without considering the impending statute of limitations. Id. at 94.

On June 20, 2018, the Special Master issued a third decision on the fee petition, finding 

that there was no reasonable basis for Petitioner’s claim. Cottingham on behalf of K.C. v. Sec’y 

of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1291V, 2018 WL 3432638, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 

20, 2018). The Special Master found that Petitioner did not provide any evidence that K.C.’s 

injuries - - headaches, fainting, and menstrual problems - - were caused by her vaccination. The 

Special Master noted that Petitioner provided no medical record containing a treating doctor’s 

opinion that K.C.’s injuries were associated with the vaccine and no expert opinion supporting this 

theory, despite consulting two experts. Id. at *5. The Special Master concluded that this lack of 

evidence meant that there was no reasonable basis for the petition and found that Petitioner was 

not eligible for a fee award. Id.

Discussion

Petitioner argues that the Special Master committed two errors in his decision denying 

attorneys’ fees and costs: 1) that the Special Master misinterpreted Simmons by imposing an 

evidence-based test in place of a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, and 2) that the Special 

Master improperly elevated Petitioner’s burden of proof for establishing reasonable basis. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Special Master misinterpreted Simmons. The 

Court in Simmons was presented with a narrow issue - - whether an imminent statute of limitations 

deadline could be considered in assessing whether the petitioner’s claim had a reasonable basis. 

The Court clearly and firmly stated that such deadline could not be considered:

Whether there is a looming statute of limitations deadline, however, has no bearing 

on whether there is a reasonable factual basis “for the claim” raised in the petition. 

That is an objective inquiry unrelated to counsel’s conduct.

Simmons, 875 F.3d at 636.

In assessing reasonable basis, the Court of Appeals did not prohibit consideration of the 

evidence supporting the claim. On the contrary, the Simmons Court affirmed the Court of Federal 

Claims’ rationale for finding that there was no reasonable basis for the petitioner’s claim, and 

quoted the trial court’s reference to the lack of evidence:

[i]n particular, the Claims Court noted that “[c]ounsel failed to produce any 

evidence, at the time the petition was filed or in the five months before the special 

master dismissed the case for failure to prosecute, to support the claim that 

petitioner suffered from GBS caused by his flu vaccine.” Further, the Claims Court 

 

3 The public version of this decision was filed on September 20, 2018.
5

held that “[t]he fact that the statute of limitations was about to expire did not excuse 

counsel’s obligation to show he had some basis for the claim beyond his 

conversation with the petitioner.”

Id. at 634 (quoting Simmons v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 128 Fed. Cl. 579, 583-84 (2016)) 

(internal citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, under Simmons, a special master may 

consider the evidence a petitioner provided, such as medical records and affidavits, in determining 

whether a reasonable basis for the claim exists. As the Court of Federal Claims has recognized, 

this type of inquiry is consistent with the Vaccine Act’s requirement that a petition must be filed 

with evidence of an injury. See Carter v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 132 Fed. Cl. 372, 380 

(2017) (stating that Section 11 of the Vaccine Act “expressly requires a petition to be filed with 

evidence of injury”).

Petitioner also argues that the Special Master contradicted this Court’s finding in its 

original remand decision in concluding that Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to 

support a reasonable basis for her claim. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, this Court did not 

reassess the sufficiency of Petitioner’s proffered evidence or find that Petitioner had in fact 

provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that her claim had a reasonable basis. 

Finally, Petitioner argues that the Special Master imposed too high a burden of proof to 

establish reasonable basis “by expanding it into a causation analysis.” Pet’r’s Mot. 7. The Special 

Master, however, did not require Petitioner to satisfy the Althen factors or otherwise demonstrate 

causation in fact. Rather, in concluding that Petitioner’s claim lacked a reasonable basis, the 

Special Master focused on the lack of evidence in Petitioner’s medical records and the treating 

physicians’ diagnoses, along with the absence of any expert opinion or supporting medical 

literature. See generally, Bekiaris v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-750V, 2018 WL 

4908000, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 25, 2018) (“[T]he quantum of evidence of causation to show 

reasonable basis is markedly less than that needed to prove entitlement.”).

Conclusion

Petitioner’s motion for review is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall not disclose this decision publicly for 14 days.

s/Mary Ellen Coster Williams 

MARY ELLEN COSTER WILLIAMS

Senior Judge