No. 02 C 6616 Page 4

led to his termination. His claims in this area seek to revisit the state court rulings against him.
A state court expressly dealt with the legality of the search warrant, and this court is not the
proper forum for further consideration of that issue. To the extent that any of his arguments

survive res judicata, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents us from reviewing state court

determinations, and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars any civil rights claim that
would necessarily invalidate a conviction or sentence. Under Heck, it does not matter whether
plaintiff has exhausted all remedies or whether the possibility of further state court appeals
remains; the plaintiff must show that his state court conviction has been vacated before he can
use section 1983 to seek damages resulting from that conviction. 512 U.S. at 486-87; Wiley v.
City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7" Cir. 2004). Nothing in plaintiffs complaint indicates
that any such favorable ruling has been made. The lower court rulings are final decisions for
these purposes and, should plaintiff wish to pursue his arguments, can be appealed only
through the state court system. He apparently is doing so.

We also note that a claim for a civil rights violation may be brought only against those
defendants actually responsible for the deprivation of rights. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266
F.3d 724, 740 (7" Cir. 2001). Plaintiff may not rely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, but

must instead allege personal involvement by each defendant in the wrongdoing. Id. citing

Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7" Cir. 2001). There is some indication that
plaintiff is alleging that the individual defendants were responsible for the City’s policies and

procedures pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 694 (1978). To the extent that plaintiff alleges that defendants were acting in their official
capacities, these claims are essentially against the City and the individual defendants should be

dismissed. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).



No. 02 C 6616 Page 3

ordinance requiring registration of weapons violates the federal and state constitutions.
Second, plaintiff alleges that the search and seizure, and the subsequent arrest and conviction,
violated his civil rights as protected by sections 1983 and 1985. Finally, plaintiff claims that his
arrest, conviction and termination by defendants were wrongful, resting upon numerous state
Jaw claims.

We first deal with plaintiff’s challenge to the City’s firearms ordinance. The Second
Amendment regulates only federal government restrictions and not those of the states or their
subdivisions. Sklar y. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 637 (7" Cir. 1984), citing Quilici v. Village of
Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-71 (7" Cir. 1982). For that reason alone, plaintiff’s claim
should be dismissed as he fails to point to a federal right infringed by the state actors, as is
required to state a claim pursuant to section 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
Moreover, the court in Sklar went on to find that the Chicago ordinance is valid in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Illinois Constitution because it is rationally related to the state’s
police power, as described in Article I, Section II. 727 F.2d at 637. Despite plaintiff’s citations
to numerous arguments in favor of a more expansive reading of the Second Amendment
(including United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5 Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907
(2002) (reversing the grant of motion to dismiss indictment, holding that a federal statute did
not violate the Second Amendment), plaintiff fails to direct us to any binding authority in
support of his arguments and fails to allege that defendants infringed his federally protected
rights in any way.

We next deal with plaintiff's allegations of civil rights violations arising from the search,
arrest and conviction. It is a dominoes theory: improper interrogation led to a search warrant,

which led to seizure of firearms, which led to his arrest, which led to his conviction, which



No. 02 C 6616 Page 5

For these reasons, plaintiff fails to allege that the defendants deprived him of any
federally protected rights. To the extent that he properly pleads state law tort claims, those
claims are dismissed without prejudice and we reiterate that state court is the proper forum for
any remaining disputes.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted.

Jens. Moco

4) JAMES B. MORAN
ior Judge, U. S. District Court

August 2, 2004.



X/-ate Order Form (06097)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Ns f Assigned Judy Sitti
enor Magistrate Judge James B. Moran than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 6616 DATE 8/2/2004
CASE ROBERT M. ZIEMAN, SR. vs. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DOCKET ENTRY:
QQ) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) QO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___.
(4) Q Ruling/Hearingon___setfor__at
(5) Q Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor___at.
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set forlon__—setfor___—sat__—
(72) ao Trial[set for/re-set for]on___—_—at
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) CO Local Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2),
do) «xf [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are

granted. Status hearing set for 8/24/04 is stricken.

ai) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. umber agp
Notices mailed by judge's staff. AU
Notified counsel by telephone. date docketed
v | Docketing to mail notices.
Z| Mail Ao 450 form. ified doh ints
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom SEVIS Shy nage ————
LG deputy’s
initals Dateline Yekeleed 14 <]
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy inital



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT M. ZIEMAN, SR., )
Plaintiff, }
vs. } No. 02 C 6616
CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal )
corporation, et al., )
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Robert M. Zieman filed a 24-count complaint against defendants, the City of
Chicago (City) and numerous employees, alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and state law claims. Defendants filed motions to dismiss the
complaint arguing that plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief. For the following reasons,

ae

EYED
3 2004
The facts are taken from plaintiff’s complaint. In April 1980, the City hired plaintiff

defendants’ motions are granted. BaF
i,

BACKGROUND AUG

to work in the Department of Streets and Sanitation and, in 1999, promoted him to a
supervisory position. On August 29, 2001, two City employees, defendants Ernest Cato and
Rebecca Wright, allegedly threatened to fire plaintiff if he failed to answer questions.
Defendants allegedly used information learned from this questioning to obtain a search warrant
for plaintiff's residence which led to the discovery of firearms in plaintiffs possession. Plaintiff

was then arrested and charged with violating Section 8-20-040(a) of the Chicago Municipal



y

No. 02 € 6616 Page2

Code for failure to register his firearms.’ Following the arrest, plaintiff was placed on
administrative leave and on January 2, 2002, following his conviction, he was terminated from
his job with the City.
DISCUSSION

In deciding a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court
assumes the truth of all well-pieaded allegations, making all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420 (7" Cir. 1994). The
court should dismiss a claim only if it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). While the complaint does not need to provide the correct legal theory to
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it must allege all of the elements necessary to recover.
Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7" Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986).
Where the plaintiff alleges facts establishing that a defendant is entitled to prevail on a motion
to dismiss, the court may find that the plaintiff has plead himself out of court. McCormick v.
City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7" Cir. 2000).

While plaintiff’s complaint and brief in opposition to this motion are extremely detailed,
his claims can be broken down into three general categories. First he alleges that his Second

Amendment right to bear arms was infringed by the defendants’ actions, and that the City’s

‘In the complaint and briefs, both parties refer to Section 8-20-030(a) of the Code, which is nothing
more than a definition section. We assume, for purposes of this motion, that plaintiff’s arrest and conviction
arose under Section 8-20-040(a), which states:

All firearms in the City of Chicago shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter. It shall be the duty of a person owning or possessing a firearm to cause such firearm
to be registered. No person shall within the City of Chicago, possess, harbor, have under his
control, transfer, offer for sale, sell, give, deliver, or accept any firearm unless such person is the
holder of a valid registration certificate for such firearm, No person shall, within the City of
Chicago, possess, harbor, have under his control, transfer, offer for sale, sell, give, deliver, or
accept any firearm which is unregisterable under the provisions of this chapter.