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DIEGO MURCIA v. WALT GEYER ET AL.

(AC 35906)

Gruendel, Sheldon and Flynn, Js.

Argued April 14—officially released June 24, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Housing Session at Bridgeport, Rodriguez, J.)

Walt Geyer and RaShanda Johnson-Geyer, self-represented, the appellants (defendants).

Kent M. Miller, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SHELDON, J. The defendants, Walt Geyer and RaShanda Johnson-Geyer, appeal from the trial court’s judgment, in this summary process action, in favor of the

plaintiff, Diego Murcia, on his claim of nonpayment of

rent arising from a lease agreement between the plaintiff landlord and themselves. We conclude that the

record before us is inadequate to review the defendants’

claim on appeal, and thus we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history. The plaintiff, in his summary process complaint dated June 25, 2013, alleged that he and

the defendants had entered into an oral agreement to

rent the premises of ‘‘604 Center St Ext. Apt 1, Bridgeport, CT 06604’’ for a term of one year. The plaintiff

alleged that the defendants had agreed to pay, on the

first day of each month, the amount of $950 to him, but

they had not paid the rent due on June 1, 2013, as agreed

upon in the lease. On June 20, 2013, the plaintiff served

upon the defendants a notice instructing them to quit

possession of the premises on or before June 24, 2013.

The defendants, however, remained in possession of

the premises beyond June 24, 2013. As a result, the

plaintiff commenced this summary process action.

Thereafter, on June 26, 2013, the defendants filed

their answer to the plaintiff’s summary process complaint, in which they raised five special defenses: (1)

rent was offered to the plaintiff on June 19, 2013, which

was before the date on which they received the notice

to quit; (2) no rent was due under Connecticut law

because there were ‘‘housing, zoning, building and fire

code violations’’ and the ‘‘residence was found to be

totally illegal on the basis of having no history of

required permits’’; (3) the defendants notified the plaintiff and Bridgeport’s building department of these

alleged violations; (4) the eviction was brought in retaliation for the defendants’ notification of public officials

or agencies complaining about the condition of their

apartment; and (5) the defendants had not received a

ninety day letter before the notice to quit was served

upon them.

The matter was tried before the court, Rodriguez,

J., on July 15, 2013. The plaintiff and both defendants

testified and presented evidence at trial. The defendants

testified as to the plaintiff’s failure to correct several

housing code violations, including removing litter, garbage, rubbish and overgrowth from the front, left and

back yards; repairing or replacing the front porch and

stairs; repairing open and exposed electrical wiring on

the rear porch and stairs; repairing a defective outlet

in the bathroom; repairing the living room windows to

make them weather tight; and the conducting of an

inspection by a licensed electrical contractor to verify
that the first floor electrical supply is separate from all

other apartments and in proper operating condition.

The court continued the case in order to provide the

plaintiff with the opportunity to correct these alleged

violations. On July 31, 2013, the plaintiff presented evidence to the court that he had corrected all of the

previously described violations. The court later, and

without filing an accompanying memorandum of decision, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for

immediate possession of the premises. Thereafter, on

August 2, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to open

the judgment, which was denied by the court on August

5, 2013, also without filing an accompanying memorandum of decision. This appeal followed.

The defendants’ only claim on appeal is that the court

abused its discretion by rendering judgment in favor of

the plaintiff based on the evidence before it. Specifically, they claim that the evidence clearly demonstrated

that the plaintiff’s basis fortheir eviction was retaliatory

in nature arising from their reporting of several housing

code violations to the Building Department of the City

of Bridgeport. To the contrary, the plaintiff argues that

the evidence supported the court’s rendering judgment

for possession of the premises in his favor due to nonpayment of rent.

We must consider first whether we have an adequate

record forreview of the defendants’ claim. We conclude

that we do not. The court’s rendering judgment in favor

of the plaintiff in this summary process action constitutes an appealable final judgment, and, ‘‘therefore, pursuant to Practice Book § 64-1 (a), the court was required

to state, either orally or in writing, a decision that

encompassed its conclusion as to each claim of law

raised by the parties and the factual basis therefor. . . .

If an oral decision is rendered, a signed transcript of

the oral decision should be created and filed for use in

any appeal. If the court fails to file an oral or written

decision, the appellant, who has the duty to provide an

adequate record for appellate review; see Practice Book

§ 61-10; must file a notice to that effect with the appellate clerk in accordance with Practice Book § 64-1 (b).’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gordon v. Gordon,

148 Conn. App. 59, 66–67, 84 A.3d 923 (2014).

In the present case, the court did not file a written

memorandum of decision explaining its ruling, nor did

it prepare and sign a transcript of an oral ruling. The

defendants did not file a notice pursuant to Practice

Book § 64-1 with the appellate clerk’s office, nor did

they file a motion asking the court to articulate the

factual and legal basis for its ruling. See Practice Book

§ 66-5.

Although the record before us includes the trial transcript, we cannot readily identify any portion of it that

encompasses the court’s factual findings with respect to

the defendants’ claim of retaliatory eviction. Cognizant
that we must make every reasonable presumption in

favor of the correctness of the court’s decision, we are

constrained to conclude, on the basis of our review of

the limited record provided to us, that the court acted

reasonably and did not abuse its discretion in rendering

judgment in favor of the plaintiff.1

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Pursuant to Practice Book § 61-10, which was amended October 18,

2012, to take effect January 1, 2013, ‘‘this court will not decline to review

a claim on appeal solely on the basis of a party’s failure to seek an articulation.

See Practice Book § 61-10 (b). As stated in the commentary to the rule,

however, the new subsection (b) that was created by the amendment was

not intended to preclude this court from declining to review an issue where

the record is inadequate for reasons other than solely the failure to seek

an articulation, such as, for example, the failure to procure the trial court’s

decision pursuant to [Practice Book §] 64-1 (b) . . . . Practice Book § 61-

10, commentary.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Gordon v. Gordon, supra, 148 Conn. App. 68 n.10.

The new subsection also in no way alters the responsibility of an appellant

to ensure that the appellate record is perfected for proper presentation of

all claims raised. See Macricostas v. Kovacs, 67 Conn. App. 130, 133, 787

A.2d 64 (2001) (‘‘The duty to provide this court with a record adequate for

review rests with the appellant. . . . It is incumbent upon the appellant to

take the necessary steps to sustain its burden of providing an adequate

record for appellate review. Practice Book § [60-5] . . . . It is not the

function of this court to find facts. . . . Our role is . . . to review claims

based on a complete factual record developed by a trial court. . . . Without

the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court . . .

any decision made by us respecting [the defendant’s claims] would be

entirely speculative. . . . Where the transcript does not reveal the basis of

the court’s factual conclusion, we will not review the appellant’s claims.’’

[Internal quotation marks omitted.]).

In the present case, we do not decline to review the defendants’ claim,

rather we review the claim on the record provided. Nor is our resolution

founded solely upon the defendants’ failure to seek an articulation, but upon

their failure to procure a memorandum of decision.