1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

AARON PATTERSON, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) Case No. 03 C 4433 

) 

v. ) Judge Joan B. Gottschall 

) Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown 

JON BURGE et al., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 The People’s Law Office and Standish Willis (collectively, the “PLO”), prior 

counsel for plaintiff Aaron Patterson (“Patterson”), have moved for adjudication of their 

attorneys’ lien against a portion of the settlement funds derived from Patterson’s suit 

against former Chicago Police Lieutenant Jon Burge (“Burge”) and the other City of 

Chicago defendants1 (collectively the “City defendants”). Avila & Tomic LLP and 

Barry & Loewy LLP (collectively “Avila”), also former counsel for Patterson, and who 

succeeded the PLO, have also moved for attorneys’ fees under their contingency 

agreement with Patterson in the amount of $1,666,500, which corresponds to one-third of 

the settlement. For the reasons set forth below the PLO is granted $980,986 in attorneys’ 

fees in quantum meruit. Avila is granted $685,514, which is the remainder of the 

$1,666,500 portion of the settlement allocated to attorneys’ fees. The remainder of the 

settlement award currently held by the court is to be paid to Patterson. Avila’s motion to 

 

1

 Specifically, the City defendants include the City of Chicago, Richard M. Daley, Terry Hillard, Thomas 

Needham, Leroy Martin, Gayle Shines, Burge, John Byrne, James Pienta, William Marley, Raymond 

Madigan, William Pederson, Daniel McWeeny, and Joseph Danzl. 
2

strike portions of the PLO’s motion to adjudicate attorneys’ fees is denied as moot. 

Avila’s motion to conduct limited discovery of the PLO attorneys is also denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

Patterson was found guilty in the Circuit Court of Cook County of the 1986 

murders of Vincent and Rafaela Sanchez and sentenced to death. In 1992, Patterson’s 

conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. 

Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 50 (Ill. 1992). However, in 2000, the Illinois Supreme Court 

held, inter alia, that Patterson was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his 

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence that his confession was 

involuntary. Furthermore, the court held that new evidence concerning a systemic pattern 

of torturing suspects at Chicago Police Department Area 2 Headquarters (where Patterson 

gave his confession) also entitled Patterson to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his 

confession was coerced via torture. People v. Patterson, 735 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 2000). On 

January 2003, George Ryan, the then-Governor of Illinois, relying on evidence that 

Patterson’s confession was coerced by torture and that Patterson was actually innocent, 

granted Patterson a pardon, and he was released that very day. 

 On June 26, 2003, Patterson filed the instant case against numerous defendants, 

including Burge and other Chicago Police officers and officials, the City of Chicago, the 

Cook County State’s Attorneys Office, and assorted individual state’s attorneys, alleging, 

inter alia, violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and malicious 

prosecution. On March 10, 2008, Patterson and the City defendants entered into a 

settlement agreement and filed a stipulation of dismissal. As part of the settlement 

agreement, the City defendants agreed to pay Patterson the sum of $5 million. The issue 
3

presently before the court centers upon a dispute between two sets of Patterson’s 

attorneys: the PLO, which represented Patterson during the latter phases of his criminal 

case and from the initiation of this case until its withdrawal as Patterson’s counsel on 

February 9, 2006; and Avila, which represented Patterson from August 25, 2006 until 

March 20, 2008, when they, too, withdrew as his counsel. 

 At the initiation of the instant case, Patterson and the PLO entered into a retainer 

agreement (the “PLO retainer”) that stated that stated in relevant part: 

3. If there is a recovery, either through settlement or trial, the client 

agrees to pay his lawyers a contingency fee of 33 1/3% (one-third) of 

the total amount recovered, including attorneys’ fees if awarded. 

... 

5. In the event that the client obtains other lawyers to represent him in 

this matter prior to its final resolution, the replaced attorney or 

attorneys shall be entitled to a fee of the reasonable value of services 

provided based upon the number of hours spent by such attorney or 

attorneys multiplied by the hourly rate of such attorney or attorneys. 

The PLO represented Patterson until it withdrew from the case on February 9, 

2006. According to the PLO, a tentative settlement agreement had been reached with the 

City defendants in late 2005, in which the PLO offered Patterson a guaranteed net 

minimum award of $2.4 million after fees, costs, and the repayment of a loan that 

Patterson had earlier taken out. The PLO claims that it bought this offer to Patterson four 

times in January of 2006, and that each time Patterson refused the offer, stating further 

that he would not settle for any amount. The PLO claims that Patterson’s constantly 

shifting position on settlement, his conduct during depositions, his failure to heed 

counsel’s advice, his uncooperative attitude (Patterson is reported to be an emotionally 

volatile individual), and his final, repeated assertion that he would not settle for any 

amount, resulted in the PLO concluding that the attorney-client relation had irretrievably 
4

broken down, and it consequently filed a motion to withdraw, which was granted by the 

court. 

Patterson was present in court during the hearing at which the PLO moved to 

withdraw. Transcript of Record at 3, Patterson v. Burge, No. 03 C 4433 (Feb. 9, 2006). 

Patterson did not explicitly object to the withdrawal of the PLO as his counsel, stating 

that he “would like to hear them say in open court individually that each one of them 

wants to withdraw so it can be on the record.” Id. at 4. Patterson made it clear that he 

wanted his attorneys’ withdrawal on the record, and suggested that the court should 

revisit the contingency fee arrangements he had made with the PLO, a suggestion which 

the court declined at that time. 2 Id. at 5-6. Patterson then expressed the desire to proceed 

pro se while seeking new counsel, rather than have the court appoint an attorney for him, 

and he asked the court to direct the PLO to hand over to him all of the evidence as soon 

as possible. Id. at 7-9. The hearing transcript confirms that Patterson was not reluctant to 

let his attorneys withdraw, but rather that he personally wished to ensure that their 

withdrawal was on the record, and that he was concerned that the PLO might still attempt 

to collect its contingency fee after the case was resolved. 

On August 25, 2006, Patterson engaged Avila to represent him in the ongoing 

case.3

 Patterson and Avila signed a contract, which stated in relevant part: 

The Client agrees that Avila and Tomic LLC shall be entitled to 33.33% of 

any Recovery ultimately received. The 33.33% recovery that Avila and 

 

2

 At the hearing, Patterson stated: “Maybe the contract should be renegotiated, too. If they’re taking 33 1/3 

percent, and then they just decided that they want to be off the case because I refused to make a settlement, 

then maybe we should discuss how the contract should be renegotiated?” Transcript of Record at 6, 

Patterson v. Burge, 03 C 4433. 

3

 Wallace “Gator” Bradley, a self-styled “urban translator,” has also filed a motion to intervene in this case, 

seeking compensation from Avila. Bradley’s motion has not yet been ruled upon. Since his fee dispute in 

this case concerns his services to Avila in procuring and assisting with Patterson’s representation, and not 

against Patterson’s award directly, the court need not address Bradley’s claim at this time. 
5

Tomic LLC shall be entitled to receive shall be free of any and all other 

attorney’s liens or fees associated with this case. 

... 

[I]f Client decides to terminate representation with Avila & Tomic LLC 

and subsequently receives a settlement in this case after said termination 

than (sic) Avila & Tomic LLC will have a right to a portion of the 

settlement recovery not only for the Quantum Meruit amount of time in 

this case but also for a percentage of the settlement amount due to the 

value of Avila & Tomic in this case. 

 Avila continued to represent Patterson through the time at which the settlement 

agreement with the City defendants was reached and the stipulation to dismiss the case 

against the City defendants was filed. Avila subsequently withdrew as Patterson’s 

counsel on March 20, 2008.4

 

 Presently before the court are the PLO’s motion for adjudication of its attorney’s 

lien against Patterson, Avila’s cross-motion for attorney’s fees in the form of its 33 1/3% 

contingency fee, Avila’s motion to strike several portions of the PLO’s motion as 

containing hearsay, and Avila’s motion for limited discovery of the PLO. The court 

addresses each of these motions in turn. 

II. ANALYSIS

 Under Illinois law, trial judges have broad discretion in matters of attorneys’ fees 

due to the advantage of their close observation of the attorney’s work and the trial judge’s 

deeper understanding of the skill and time required in the case. Will v. Northwestern 

Univ., 881 N.E.2d 481, 505 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Mirabal v. Gen. Motors Acceptance 

Corp., 576 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1978). While the burden of proof is upon the attorney 

to establish the value of his services, the trial court “is not limited to the evidence 

presented in arriving at a reasonable fee but may also use the knowledge it has acquired 

 

4

 Patterson’s case against the Cook County defendants continues at the present. 
6

in the discharge of professional duties to value legal services rendered.” Johns v. Klecan, 

556 N.E.2d 689, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 

A. PLO’s Motion to Adjudicate Its Attorney’s Lien and Avila’s Cross-motion for 

Attorney’s Fees. 

 As an initial matter, both sides concede that the PLO may not collect the 33 1/3% 

contingency fee specified by the PLO retainer with respect to the $5 million settlement by 

the City defendants. When a client terminates an attorney working under a contingency 

fee contract, the contract ceases to exist and the contingency term, whether or not the 

client prevails, is no longer operative. Wegner v. Arnold, 713 N.E.2d 247, 250 (1991); 

Callahan, 578 N.E.2d at 988. However, a discharged attorney is entitled to be paid a 

reasonable fee on a quantum meruit basis for those services rendered prior to discharge. 

Will, 881 N.E.2d at 504; Rhoades v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 399 N.E.2d 969, 975 (Ill. 

1979). Under this theory, a trial court literally awards the attorney, as the term indicates, 

“as much as he deserves.” Wegner, 713 N.E.2d at 250 (quoting Kannewurf v. Johns, 632 

N.E.2d 711, 717 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)). Therefore, the question that initially presents itself 

is whether the PLO, which was not discharged but which rather withdrew from 

representing Patterson prior to finalization of the settlement, may receive attorneys’ fees 

on a quantum meruit basis. 

 Avila argues that it should not. According to Avila, any recovery in quantum 

meruit should properly be denied because the PLO withdrew from representing Patterson 

without good cause and “engaged in a series of unprofessional actions that sought to 

sabotage Patterson’s case.” Avila Resp. Brief 4. Avila contests the PLO’s claim that its 

motion to withdraw was based upon “irreconcilable differences that [made] it impossible 

to represent Patterson.” PLO’s Mot. for Leave to Withdraw at 1. Avila argues that there 
7

is no evidence indicating any good cause for the PLO’s withdrawal, but rather, that the 

PLO coldheartedly “fired” or “abandoned” Patterson at a time when he was desperate for 

cash and was highly motivated to settle.5 

The PLO, on the other hand, has asserted in its brief that the principal reason for 

its withdrawal from representing Patterson was Patterson’s repeated refusal to accept any 

amount of money in settlement from the City defendants. Avila retorts that there was 

never any such settlement offer from the City defendants, and that the PLO’s evidence 

thus consists entirely of falsifications and inadmissible hearsay evidence. 

However, the PLO’s argument that Patterson rejected a settlement offer of $4 

million from the City defendants is directly supported by the record and, fatally for its 

argument, Avila’s accusations of falsification are undermined by the admissions of 

Patterson, its own then-client. Although the PLO did not advance a reason in open court 

for seeking to withdraw, Patterson himself stated the reason during the motion hearing. 

During that proceeding, Patterson stated: “Maybe the contract should be renegotiated, 

too. If they’re taking 33 1/3 percent, and then they just decided that they want to be off 

the case because I refused to make a settlement, then maybe we should discuss how the 

contract should be renegotiated?” Transcript of Record at 6, Patterson v. Burge, 03 C 

4433 (Feb. 9, 2006) (emphasis added); see also Avila’s Resp. to PLO’s Mot. for 

Adjudication of Attorney’s Lien, Ex. E at 6. Patterson therefore stated in open court that 

the PLO wanted to withdraw from the case because he refused to make a settlement with 

the City defendants. Moreover, in a letter filed with the court, Patterson wrote, “The 

other issue concerns the amount allegedly offered to me to settle in January 2006 — 

 

5

 The court notes that on March 20, 2008, Avila withdrew as Patterson’s counsel citing irreconcilable 

differences with Patterson. 
8

which was $4 million. And my response to offer which included (sic), Why the rush?” 

Letter from Aaron Patterson, Patterson v. Burge, 03-C-4433, Docket no. 860 (Feb. 9, 

2006). Again, Avila’s argument to the contrary notwithstanding, its own client 

represented directly to the court, on the record, that the PLO withdrew because he refused 

to settle for $4 million. Thus, there is sufficient evidence that the PLO withdrew because 

Patterson refused to accept an offer of $4 million dollars from the City defendants.6

 An attorney who withdraws from a case with good cause may recover reasonable 

expenses on a quantum meruit basis. Kannewurf, 632 N.E.2d at 715; Reed Yates Farms, 

Inc. v. Yates, 526 N.E.2d 1115, 1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). Moreover, evidence that a 

decision by the plaintiff to refuse to allow his attorney to negotiate a possible settlement, 

at a time when her professional judgment was that a settlement was not only possible but 

in the plaintiff’s best interests, can permit the court to conclude that the plaintiff’s refusal 

forced a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Kannewurf, 632 N.E.2d 

at 715; see also Leoris & Cohen P.C. v. McNiece, 589 N.E.2d 1060, 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1992); Reed Yates Farms, 526 N.E.2d at 1121. In the instant case, there is sufficient 

evidence that the PLO withdrew because Patterson refused to settle his case against the 

City defendants for $4 million, a settlement which the PLO, which had litigated not only 

Patterson’s civil case from its inception until their withdrawal but also much of the 

preceding criminal case out of which the instant action flowed, felt, in their professional 

judgment, that it was in his best interest to accept. That refusal precipitated a complete 

 

6

 Avila has also filed a motion, addressed below, to strike portions of the PLO’s Memorandum in Support 

of its Motion for Adjudication of its Attorney’s Lien as hearsay. Avila’s motion to strike the alleged 

hearsay is a tactical move attempting to exclude any evidence that there was a settlement offer from the 

City defendants at the time the PLO withdrew from the case as a way of undermining the PLO’s claim that 

it withdrew for good cause. However, Avila’s motion notwithstanding, Patterson, in open court, and in his 

court filing of February 14, 2008, provided evidence that the City defendants made a settlement offer of $4 

million five months prior to Avila’s taking the case. 
9

breakdown of the attorney-client relationship, and the PLO therefore withdrew with good 

cause. Given these circumstances, the PLO may seek recovery of reasonable fees on a 

quantum meruit basis. 

 Next Avila asserts that even if the PLO can assert a claim based in quantum 

meruit, Avila is nevertheless entitled to its full contingency fee of 33 1/3% and that any 

recovery by the PLO must be from the remainder of the settlement funds, i.e., Patterson’s 

portion of the settlement.7

 In support of this contention, Avila cites a single case, In re 

Estate of Callahan. 578 N.E.2d 985 (Ill. 1991). However, Avila’s citation to this case is 

inapposite and its reliance upon it is misplaced. In Callahan, a discharged attorney 

sought recovery in quantum meruit for work performed on a case that was neither 

adjudicated nor settled. 578 N.E.2d at 986. The court ordered that the attorney’s claim in 

quantum meruit was to be paid from the assets of the client’s guardianship estate. Id. at 

986-87. Callahan teaches, therefore, that a discharged attorney can seek recovery in 

quantum meruit, for work performed on a client’s behalf, against the client’s estate in the 

absence of any adjudication or recovery. It does not stand for the proposition, as Avila 

would have the court believe, that a discharged attorney must seek damages in quantum 

meruit against the plaintiff’s portion of a recovery, while a successor attorney is 

permitted to recover its entire contingency fee. 

 Avila also argues that the PLO is barred from seeking any portion of Avila’s 

contingency fee because, according to Avila, the so-called “‘comparison/apportionment 

method’ of fee determination has been rejected by Illinois courts.” Avila’s Resp. to 

PLO’s Mot. for Adjudication of Attorney’s Lien 22. Avila cites principally to Loggans & 

 

7

 Unsurprisingly, Patterson also objects vehemently to this argument. An attempt before Judge Aspen in 

the autumn of 2007 to mediate attorneys’ fees between the PLO and Avila foundered. 
10

Assocs., v. Estate of Magid, 589 N.E.2d 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), in support of its 

contention that the PLO’s fees in this case should be taken from Patterson’s portion of the 

settlement. Once again, Avila’s use of the case is inapposite, if not an outright 

misrepresentation; indeed, it entirely mischaracterizes the nature of the 

“comparison/apportionment method” to support its argument. In Magid, the court 

analyzed the utility of the comparison/apportionment method, which consists of 

calculating the appropriate fees due to the discharged and successive attorneys by 

determining what percentage of the work in a given case was performed by each counsel 

and then applying that fraction to the total contingency fee paid. 589 N.E.2d at 612. The 

court finally rejected that method of calculation and upheld the method established in 

Johns v. Klecan, 556 N.E.2d 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 589 N.E.2d at 612. The method 

described in Johns consists of determining “the amount of total time spent on cases in 

performing legitimate services for the client and then multiplying that time by a 

reasonable hourly rate.” 556 N.E.2d at 684. Such an analysis, the court continued: 

[I]s ... the best method to determine the reasonable value of a discharged 

attorney’s services. That approach avoids the problems inherent in the 

comparison/apportionment approach. It is much easier for a trial court to 

undertake [this] approach than to place a value on the perhaps widely 

varying services performed by attorneys vis-à-vis the client’s ultimate 

recovery. 

Id. (internal citations omitted). Using this method of calculation, the Magid court 

determined that the discharged attorney was entitled to no fees for her work beyond those 

she had already received from another settlement in the same suit. 589 N.E.2d at 613. 

But what Johns and Magid do not stand for is the notion that Avila is entitled in this case 

to its entire one-third contingency fee and that any quantum meruit claim brought by the 
11

PLO against the contingency fee is therefore barred and must be sought instead against 

Patterson’s recovery. 

 On the contrary, Illinois law states that the proper method for determining a 

discharged (or withdrawn for good cause) attorney’s fees and successive attorneys’ fees 

is to determine one party’s fee in quantum meruit and subtract that amount from the 

contractual contingency fee, awarding the remainder to the other attorney. Wegner, 713 

N.E.2d at 253; see also Johns, 556 N.E.2d at 696; Tobias v. King, 406 N.E.2d 101, 104 

(Ill. App. Ct. 1980). In the instant case, the PLO, which represented Patterson from June, 

2003 through January, 2006, has sought recovery in quantum meruit from Avila, the 

successor counsel, which stubbornly contends that it is entitled to the entire contingency 

amount. The court rejects Avila’s contention. It will therefore proceed by evaluating the 

PLO’s claim in quantum meruit, subtracting the calculated amount from the total 

contingency fee of $1,666,500 (one third of the $5 million settlement award), and 

awarding that amount to the PLO.8

 The remainder of the one-third contingency fee will 

be awarded to Avila. 

 Before proceeding further, the court addresses the PLO’s proposal that attorneys’ 

fees in this case be capped at 38% of the $5 million settlement amount. PLO’s Mem. in 

Supp. of Mot. for Adjudication of Attorneys’ Fees at 16. The PLO proposes this as a way 

of avoiding “excessive” attorneys’ fees, and the court agrees that avoiding excessive fees 

is a necessary aim of these proceedings. However, the court has been furnished with no 

idea of how the PLO came up with a figure of 38% of the total settlement as a 

 

8

 Avila has submitted no factual data that would allow the court to determine the value of its own fees, 

insisting that it should receive the entire one-third contingency fee. Consequently, the court awards the 

remainder of one-third of the settlement award allocated to attorneys’ fees to Avila after subtracting the 

PLO’s fees determined in quantum meruit. 
12

“0reasonable” one, and the PLO offers neither logic nor law in support of increasing the 

attorneys’ joint recovery to this percentage. 

The court sees things differently. Patterson contracted with both parties for a 

contingency fee of 33% of all funds received, whether via settlement or adjudication. 

The PLO agreed in its contract with Patterson that, if it were succeeded in the case by 

other attorneys, it would seek recovery in quantum meruit. The court sees no legal or 

equitable justification for increasing the contracted-for percentage. Indeed, such a 

precedent would ultimately encourage attorneys to “jump ship,” knowing that they were 

entitled (if the case were ultimately successful for the plaintiff) to a slice of the recovery 

pie growing ever larger for the attorneys and ever smaller for the plaintiff. The court 

holds, therefore, that the total recovery by the PLO and Avila together should not exceed 

33% of the $5 million settlement. 

In making its quantum meruit determination, the trial court assesses a number of 

factors: (1) the time and labor required, and the attorney's skill and standing; (2) the 

nature of the cause; (3) the novelty and difficulty of the subject matter; (4) the attorney's 

degree of responsibility in managing the case; (5) the usual and customary charge for that 

type of work in the community; (6) and the benefits resulting to the client. See Callahan, 

578 N.E.2d at 990. The PLO argues that, employing these criteria, it should receive 

$1,432,572 of the total contingency fee of $1,666,500, leaving a mere $233,928 for Avila 

as its portion of the fees. The PLO’s fee computation is based on the sum of: (1) 1,799.8 

hours of work billed by attorney G. Flint Taylor (“Taylor”) at a rate of $525 per hour; (2) 

1201.9 hours of work billed by attorney Joey L. Mogul (“Mogul”) at a rate of $325 per 

hour; (3) 148.4 hours of work billed by attorney Michael E. Deutsch (“Deutsch”) at a rate 
13

of $525 per hour; and (4) 95.75 hours of work billed by attorney Ben H. Elson (“Elson”) 

at a rate of $200 per hour. The PLO states that some of the billed hours were on matters 

consolidated with another police torture case (Orange v. Burge, 04 C 0168) and that those 

hours are therefore divided in half. The four attorneys have each submitted affidavits 

with attached appendices containing their time sheets detailing the hours expended on the 

case. 

The court finds that, applying the criteria established above: (1) this case, with its 

sensational aspects, and considering the history of difficulties between Patterson and his 

attorneys, required extensive time and effort on the part of the PLO, which conducted 

much of the discovery. The number of hours submitted by the PLO lawyers, experienced 

civil rights litigators are, with some exceptions, not unreasonable; (2) the cause at issue is 

important, but not unique: two other lawsuits against the same City defendants are being 

litigated for the respective plaintiffs by the PLO, permitting consolidation of effort and 

hours; (3) although the case was unusual, it was not, given the final resolution of the 

criminal case and the events succeeding it, extraordinarily difficult from a legal 

standpoint; (4) the PLO, a relatively small office, had its leading attorneys investing a 

great deal of time in this high profile case; (5) the hourly rates claimed by the PLO 

lawyers are extremely high by the standards of the legal community for this type of work; 

and (6) the PLO was successful in initially negotiating a settlement for Patterson, which 

he rejected, but later accepted when it was increased by $1 million. 

The court finds the PLO’s claim for $1,432,572 to be excessive. As an initial 

matter, Avila argues, and the PLO does not contest, that the PLO, in addition to both the 

instant case and Orange v. Burge, represents the plaintiff in another contemporaneous 
14

torture victim case against the City defendants, Cannon v. Burge, (05 C 2192), which was 

filed at approximately the same time as the instant case. Any consolidated hours billed 

by the PLO attorneys should therefore be multiplied not by one-half but rather by onethird. Moreover, the hourly rates charged by the PLO attorneys are too high when 

compared to comparable lawyers doing comparable work at that time. 

The party requesting attorney’s fees bears the burden of substantiating the 

reasonableness of the hourly rates sought. See Estate of Borst v. O'Brien, 979 F.2d 511, 

515 (7th Cir. 1992). The determination of an attorney’s “reasonably hourly rate” should 

be based on the “market rate” for the services rendered. Spegon v. The Catholic Bishop 

of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 554-55 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing People Who Care v. Rockford 

Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1996)). If the court cannot 

determine the attorney’s actual billing rate because the attorney accepts cases on 

contingency fee bases and has no fee-paying clients, the court should look to the next best 

evidence of the attorney's market rate: rates similarly experienced attorneys in the 

community charge paying clients for similar work, as well as evidence of fee awards the 

attorney has received in similar cases. Spegon, 175 F.3d at 555. Specifically, an attorney 

who maintains a contingent fee practice should submit affidavits from comparable 

attorneys attesting to the rates they charge paying clients for similar work. Small v. 

Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2001). 

The PLO spends a great deal of time in its several briefs detailing the time and 

effort expended, and the small returns it realized, in defending and eventually exonerating 

Patterson from the criminal charges that precipitated this case. Although making for 

compelling reading, those details are largely irrelevant to the issue presently at bar: only 
15

the hours worked on the instant civil case are relevant to the quantum meruit calculation. 

Taylor, an experienced attorney with an extensive history of civil rights litigation, avers 

that in the 1990s he received compensation at an hourly rate of between $250 and $350 

per hour. He advances $525 per hour as a reasonable hourly rate based upon his 

experience and the other factors listed supra. The PLO has also filed affidavits from 

Steven Saltzman, an attorney in private practice serving on the Chicago Commission on 

Human Relations and the Cook County Commission on Human Rights; Clyde Murphy, 

Executive Director of the Chicago Lawyers’ Commission for Civil Rights Under the 

Law, Inc.; and Robin Potter, an attorney in private practice, all in support of Taylor and 

the other PLO lawyer’s proposed hourly billing rates.9

 Taylor provides no other 

comparative data, other than the supporting affidavits, to support his contention that the 

billing rate for senior partners of a small, public-interest law firm have increased by 

approximately 57% between the late 1990s and the interval 2003-2006. 

Nevertheless, the court finds, based upon recent cases in this district, that $400 

per hour for Taylor (and Deutsch, who is similarly situated) would have been a more 

reasonable rate for such an attorney in the interval during which the PLO represented 

Patterson. See, e.g., Thomas ex rel. Smith v. Sheahan, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, No. 04 C 3563, 

2008 WL 2266314, at *28 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2008) (awarding attorneys’ fees in civil 

rights case in range between $250 and $350 per hour); Romaine ex rel. Romaine v. City of 

Chicago, No. 05 C 2643, 2007 WL 2570347, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2007) (reasonable 

rate for an experienced civil rights attorney set at $350 per hour). Likewise, the court 

 

9

 In his affidavit, Saltzman does not provide any data concerning his own billing rates. Murphy avers that 

he is currently seeking a rate of $520 per hour for himself and $330 per hour for an associate admitted in 

1998. Murphy Aff. ¶5. Potter avers that he has received between $325 and $495 per hour and that his 

associates have billed at between $235 and $330 during the time period relevant to this case. Potter Aff. at 

6-9. 
16

finds that $300 per hour is a reasonable rate for Mogul, an attorney with nine years’ 

experience at the PLO (at the time the PLO withdrew), and $120 per hour is a reasonable 

rate for Elson, who had less than a year’s post-law school experience at the time the PLO 

withdrew from representing Patterson. The court has increased what it considers the 

reasonable rate for the PLO over these recent cases on the strength of the affidavits of the 

PLO’s fellow attorneys and considering the importance of the instant case. 

Finally, the court disallows the following billed items by Mogul as being 

unrelated to the civil case, but as rather pertaining to Patterson’s federal criminal charges: 

Date Case Item Minutes 

8/5/04 Patterson Federal Criminal case 120 

8/6/04 Patterson Federal Criminal case 420 

8/9/04 Patterson Discussion with GFT, with MED, 360 

 Tommy Brewer, meeting with 

 Tommy and Demitrus, read fed 

 crim complaint, call with Kurt on deps 

8/10/04 Discussion with Tommy, Demitrus, 360 

 Calls to Jane, Nancy, Robert, 

 Jennifer for bond court date 

 Total: 1260 minutes (21 hours) 

Therefore, given the court’s revised hourly rates, and billing all consolidated 

hours at one-third rather than one-half as the PLO suggests, the court arrives at the 

following figures for the PLO’s quantum meruit claim: 

Taylor: 1093.1 hours (work pertaining to the Patterson case alone) + 

470.6 hours (1413.3 hours consolidated with the other cases x 0.333) = 

1564 hours x $400 per hour = $625,480. 
17

Mogul: 854.9 hours (work pertaining to the Patterson case alone) + 108.6 

hours (326 hours consolidated with the other cases x 0.333) = 963.5 hours 

x $300 per hour = $289,050. 

Deutsch: 119.2 hours (work pertaining to the Patterson case alone) + 19.4 

hours (58.4 hours consolidated with the other cases x 0.333) = 984.5 hours 

x $400 per hour = $55,440. 

Elson: 83.9 hours (work pertaining to the Patterson case alone) + 7.9 

hours (23.7 hours consolidated with the other cases x 0.333) = 91.8 hours 

x $120 per hour = $11,016. 

Total: $980,986 

Subtracting this sum from the total contingency award of $1,666,500 yields a remainder 

of $685,514 as Avila’s attorneys’ fees in this case.10

Avila claims that most of the PLO’s submitted hours are fraudulent and both sides 

hurl a great deal of invective at each other, accusing each other of various forms of 

professional misconduct. However, the court has reviewed with considerable care the 

affidavits and timekeeping records submitted by the PLO attorneys and their references 

and, within the restrictions cited above, does not find them to be unreasonable. 

Furthermore, given that contingent fee cases often do not generate the same degree of 

billing specificity that hourly billing does, the PLO has met its burden of establishing its 

reasonable fees, subject to the modifications of the court. See Farfaras v. Citizens Bank 

and Trust of Chicago, 433 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Moreover, the PLO claims that it performed the lion’s share of the discovery and 

depositions taken in these related cases, with only minimal participation by Avila once it 

appeared on behalf of Patterson. Avila provides no factual evidence to the contrary, nor 

does it specifically dispute the truth of that assertion, but merely provides conclusory 

 

10 The court observes, parenthetically, that this calculation corresponds nicely with Magistrate Judge 

Brown’s observation that Avila was entering the case when it was at “the end of Act Two or the beginning 

of Act Three.” Transcript of Record at 14-15, Patterson v. Burge, 03 C 4433 (June 23, 2006) 
18

statements such as: “[Avila] worked diligently for nearly 20 months, expended enormous 

amounts of time and resources, attended numerous depositions, and fought many 

discovery battles and motions all in efforts to prosecute this case.” Avila’s Sur-Reply at 

16 (italics and underline in original). However, apart from conclusory statements of hard 

work and dedication to its client’s cause, Avila adduces no factual information to 

demonstrate, as it claims, that it performed the majority of the litigation in this case. The 

court also notes in passing that whereas Avila has litigated diligently with respect to 

recovering its claimed contingency fee, it has been somewhat less diligent with respect to 

representing its client. Specifically, in the ongoing suit against the County defendants, 

Avila responded inadequately to the County defendants’ post-discovery Requests to 

Admit, failed to respond to the County defendants’ numerous requests for clarification of 

those responses, and ignored briefing schedules set by both Magistrate Judge Brown and 

this court, failing to submit any responsive briefs whatever on behalf of their client when 

the County defendants moved to have their requests to admit be deemed as admitted. In 

the meantime, Avila filed no fewer than 18 motions, responses, sur-responses and 

associated documents (exclusive of notices of presentment) concerned with defending 

their claims for attorneys’ fees. 

The court therefore denies Avila’s motion for an award of its one-third 

contingency fee in its entirety and adjudicates the PLO’s attorney’s lien thus: the PLO is 

granted $980,986 in attorneys’ fees in quantum meruit. Avila is granted $685,514, which 

is the remainder of the $1,666,500 (one-third) portion of the $5,000,000 settlement 

allocated to attorneys’ fees. The remainder of the settlement award is to be paid to 

Patterson. 
19

B. Avila’s Motion to Strike Certain Portions of the PLO’s Motion to Adjudicate as 

Hearsay 

Avila has also moved to strike from the PLO’s motion certain statements that the 

PLO includes in its motion and its Exhibit C, arguing that they are hearsay. Specifically, 

the alleged hearsay statements were made by Mara Georges (“Georges”) and appeared in 

a Chicago Tribune article, which the PLO quotes and appends as Exhibit C to its motion, 

to the effect that a settlement offer was made by the City defendants before the PLO 

withdrew as Patterson’s attorney. Avila has also moved to strike the portions of the 

PLO’s motion which quotes Magistrate Judge Michael Mason of this district to the effect 

that the City was willing to make a settlement offer of $16.5 million to the four torture 

plaintiffs, including Patterson. 

This motion to strike is part of Avila’s vain and disingenuous attempt to prove 

that there was no settlement offer whatever made by the City defendants prior to Avila’s 

appearance as Patterson’s attorney. However, even assuming, arguendo, that the 

statements are hearsay, and would therefore be inadmissible as testimony at a hearing, 

Patterson’s own words, as quoted from the record, supra, and as reflected in the exhibits 

to Avila’s own response brief, fatally undermine Avila’s argument. Patterson clearly and 

unequivocally indicates that there was indeed a $4 million settlement offer from the city 

defendants and that the PLO withdrew because Patterson would not settle for any amount 

at that time. The court did not, nor did it need to, consider any of the alleged hearsay 

statements in its analysis above, and Avila’s motion is therefore denied as moot. 

C. Avila’s Motion to Conduct Limited Discovery of the PLO 
20

Finally, Avila seeks to conduct discovery of the PLO lawyers as part of its effort 

to prove that the PLO’s billing records are fraudulent. Avila argues that it has a “right to 

a hearing” on the matter of fees, citing both Wegner and Magid. 713 N.E.2d at 247; 589 

N.E.2d at 615. However, Avila adduces no facts or evidence, other than its unilateral 

assertion, that the PLO’s billing is fraudulent. 

Once again, Avila’s reliance on Wegner and Magid to support its contention that 

it has a right to an in-court hearing, and therefore to conduct additional limited discovery, 

is misplaced. Neither case suggests that an attorney disputing a prior attorney’s quantum 

meruit claim has “a right to a motion hearing” and Avila adduces no case law or Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure to suggest that it has. Nor can the court find any precedent that 

holds that a hearing and discovery must be conducted in an attorneys’ fee dispute based 

on quantum meruit. On the contrary, such an in-court hearing is generally within the 

court’s discretion, and is usually held when there are issues not sufficiently or adequately 

addressed by the contesting parties’ briefs. Both parties have briefed this matter 

exhaustively. Moreover, Avila has had access to the affidavits of the PLO attorneys 

seeking fees and their attached exhibits detailing their billing hours. These affidavits and 

exhibits, signed by the respective parties, are representations to the court under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). It is unclear what more Avila could hope to gain through 

taking depositions of the PLO attorneys listed in its motion. Given the apparent futility 

of Avila’s motion, and the fact that the court has decided herein the issue of both parties’ 

recovery of attorneys’ fees in this case, Avila’s motion to conduct limited discovery of 

the PLO attorneys is denied. 
21

III. Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, the PLO is granted $980,986 in attorneys’ fees in 

quantum meruit. Avila is granted $685,514, which is the remainder of the $1,666,500 

portion of the $5,000,000 settlement allocated to attorneys’ fees. The remainder of the 

settlement amount is to be paid to Patterson. Avila’s motion to strike portions of the 

PLO’s motion to adjudicate attorneys’ fees is denied as moot. Avila’s motion to conduct 

limited discovery of the PLO attorneys is denied. 

ENTER: 

 

 _/s/___ 

 JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL 

 United States District Judge 

DATED: August 4, 2008