ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Bryan H. Babb Michael P. Bishop

Kelly M. Scanlan Heather Wysong Zaiger

Bose McKinney & Evans LLP Cohen Garelick & Glazier PC

Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________

In the

Indiana Supreme Court 

_________________________________

No. 03S04-0810-CV-560

IN RE ADOPTION OF UNBORN CHILD OF B.W.

W.G., Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

D.B. AND J.B., Appellees-Respondents.

_________________________________

Appeal from the Bartholomew Superior Court, No. 03D01-0609-AD-1774 

The Honorable Chris D. Monroe, Judge

_________________________________

On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 03A04-0802-CV-107

_________________________________

June 26, 2009

Dickson, Justice.

The question presented is whether the appellant biological father's1consent to the adoption of his child was irrevocably implied when he failed to file a motion to contest in the adoption court but did take concurrent steps to establish paternity and preserve and assert his parental 

rights in another court. Upon our consideration of the asserted statutory provisions and the facts 

of this case, we find that this appellant father's actions did not irrevocably imply his consent, 

 

1

Pursuant to Indiana Administrative Rule 9(G)(4)(d), this opinion avoids reference to the names of the 

parties and affected persons. 
2

upon which the adoption decree was predicated, and thus reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. In 2006 the unmarried father, W.G., and mother, 

B.W., shared a brief relationship during which they conceived a child. After the mother expressed a desire to place the unborn child for adoption, the father registered with Indiana's Putative2

Father Registry.

3

 At some point during the pregnancy, the mother contacted an adoption 

agency, LDS Family Services, and an interested couple was found. The mother executed preand post-birth forms giving consent for the adoptive parents, D.B. and J.B., to have temporary 

custody of the child, pending the outcome of the adoption proceedings.

In late September 2006, shortly before the child's anticipated birth, the adoptive parents 

filed an adoption petition in Bartholomew County Superior Court ("the Superior Court"). The 

petition alleged, among other things, that the appellant was the child's biological father and was 

currently incarcerated in the county jail. Appellant's App'x at 8, ¶ 6. When two days later the 

child was born, the Superior Court granted the adoptive parents temporary custody, and the child 

has since remained in their custody.

On October 2, 2006, while incarcerated, the father received notice of the pending adoption. This notice complied with the dictates in Indiana Code § 31-19-4-5 describing the form 

that notice to a named father must take. The notice instructed that if the father desired to contest 

 

2 The phrase "putative father" is defined by Indiana Code § 31-9-2-100 as a person who "is alleged to be 

or claims that he may be a child's father," but who is not statutorily presumed to be the child's father by 

reason of marriage, attempted marriage, genetic testing, or having received the child into his home and 

openly held out the child as his biological child pursuant to Indiana Code §§ 31-14-7-1(1), -1(2), and for 

whom paternity of the child has not been established in a court proceeding or by executing a paternity 

affidavit. 

 

3 The Registry serves in part to preserve a father's right to oppose an adoption while simultaneously assuring the biological mother and adoptive parents that, when a putative father fails to register after a set time, 

an adoption can proceed without apprehension that it might later be upended. Many state putative father 

registry laws were direct legislative responses to the circumstances surrounding the well-publicized "Baby Jessica" and "Baby Richard" cases. See Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1031, 1036 (2002); see generally Andrew S. Rosenman, Note, Babies 

Jessica, Richard, and Emily: The Need for Legislative Reform of Adoption Laws, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 

1851 (1995). In general, to be entitled to notice of an adoption, a putative father must register with the 

State Department of Health not later than thirty days after the child's birth or the filing of a petition for the 

child's adoption. See Ind. Code § 31-19-5-12.
3

the adoption, he 

. . . must file a motion to contest the adoption of the child in accordance with IC 31-19-

10-1 in the above named court, or a Paternity action under IC 31-14 in relation to the 

child, not later than thirty (30) days after the date of service of this notice. 

If [the father], or who claims to be the father of the child:

(1) does not file:

(A) a motion to contest the adoption; or 

(B) a Paternity action under IC 31-14; 

within thirty (30) days after service of this notice; or

(2) after filing a paternity action under IC 31-14 fails to establish paternity; 

the above named court will hear and determine the petition for adoption. His consent will be irrevocably implied and he will lose his right to contest either the 

adoption or the validity of his implied consent to the adoption. He will lose his 

right to establish his paternity of the child under IC 31-14.

. . . .

This notice complies with IC 31-19-5 but does not exhaustively set forth a putative father's legal obligations under the Indiana adoption statutes. A person being 

served notice of this issue should consult the Indiana adoption statutes.

Appellant's App'x at 16-17. 

This notice informed the father that, if he sought to contest the adoption, he should file 

either a motion to contest the adoption in the Superior Court or a paternity action. The father 

never filed a motion to contest the adoption in the Superior Court, but on October 19, well within 

thirty days of receiving notice of the adoption, using a pre-printed one-page form and having 

filled in its blanks, he filed a pro se paternity action in Bartholomew County Circuit Court ("the 

Circuit Court"), in which he sought to be adjudged the child's father and to "be required to fulfill 

the obligations of a father." Id. at 27. The local court rules permitted adoption petitions to be 

filed in any court, but required that all paternity cases "shall be filed" in the Circuit Court. See

Bartholomew County LR-AR Rule 17-1(c). On October 31, also within the thirty-day limit, the 

father, pro se, filed in the same paternity action a more expansive, individualized petition entitled, "Petition to Establish Paternity and Contest Adoption of Unknown Minor Child," which 

specifically sought to "establish the paternity of the below minor child born out of wedlock," 

"contest any adoption or termination of the parent-child relationship of that same child," and 
4

"[s]et a Hearing Date to stop all adoption procedures of the unknown minor child."4 Appellant's 

Supp. App'x at 11-12. On November 6, James A. Shoaf, attorney in the Superior Court adoption 

proceeding for both the biological mother and the adoptive parents, filed in the Circuit Court paternity action his appearance for LDS Family Services and a motion that it be permitted to intervene, which motion was granted. In January of 2007 attorney James Kilburn appeared for the 

father, and in March Shoaf filed in the Circuit Court a motion to dismiss the paternity petition on 

behalf of both LDS Family Services and the biological mother, citing the pending adoption proceedings in the Superior Court. The Circuit Court denied the motion and ordered the father to 

submit to DNA testing. 

The June 21, 2007 Circuit Court hearing on the DNA test results was attended by the father, pro se, and by the mother, in person and with Shoaf as her counsel. When asked if Kilburn 

was still his attorney, the father replied, "No. As of less than 24 hours ago, he withdrew because 

he had a conflict with the Judge here or something."5 Supp. Tr. at 5. Upon motion of the State, 

which intervened for the purpose of establishing paternity, the child was also made a party to the 

action. The Circuit Court received evidence and, on June 28, entered a judgment finding that 

DNA testing resulted in a 99.99% probability of paternity and establishing paternity of the child 

in the father, adjudicating him to be the legal and biological father of the child, but without any 

reference to custody, parenting time, or support. Appellant's Supp. App'x at 50-51.

Meanwhile, on June 25 the adoptive parents moved for a final hearing on their adoption 

petition in the Superior Court, and it was scheduled for and held August 23, 2007. According to 

a certificate of service filed by Shoaf, a copy of the motion for final hearing was sent not to the 

father but only to Kilburn, the father's former attorney in the Circuit Court case. Appellant's 

App'x at 20, 23 ¶9. Similarly, a copy of the Order scheduling the date and time of the final hearing is shown to have been sent only to Kilburn, not to the father. Id. at 21, 23 ¶ 9. The adoptive 

parents and the biological mother were present at the hearing, but the father did not appear, either 

 

4 When transfer was granted, the record contained only materials from the Superior Court adoption proceeding. After hearing argument from the parties, this Court, pursuant to Evidence Rule 201, entered a 

March 18, 2009 order taking judicial notice of the materials in the Circuit Court paternity action and integrating them into the appellate record.

5 We find no withdrawal of Kilburn's appearance otherwise reflected in the Circuit Court case record. 
5

pro se or by counsel. No attorney had entered any appearance for the father in the Superior 

Court adoption proceedings until approximately one month after the final adoption decree.6 At 

the adoption hearing, counsel for the adoptive parents argued to the Superior Court that the father 

had irrevocably and impliedly consented to the adoption solely because he had not filed a motion 

to contest the adoption in that court within thirty days of receiving notice of the petition on October 2. Id. at 61-63. In support of their argument, the adoptive parents submitted various documents, including a copy of the father's paternity petition, a chronological case summary from 

the Circuit Court, and a copy of the Circuit's Court paternity judgment. Id. at 22-30, 64-65. The

Superior Court case records clearly reflected that the father had filed a pro se petition to establish 

paternity and to contest the adoption in Circuit Court. Id. at 65. 

The Superior Court entered an order finding that the father had failed to file in the Superior Court a timely motion to contest the adoption as required by Indiana Code § 31-19-10-1(b) 

and, based solely on this ground, it found the father's consent therefore irrevocably implied under 

Indiana Code § 31-19-9-12(1). The court also found adoption to be in the child's best interests, 

granted the adoption, and ordered that the father's parental rights be terminated.

7

 

Appealing the adoption judgment, the father has asserted that the trial court erroneously 

determined his consent to have been irrevocably implied, and that the adoption was therefore 

improperly granted without his consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the adoption decree, 

concluding that, "[a]lthough [the father] filed his petition to establish paternity in the paternity 

court within the required thirty days following service, he did not file a motion to contest [the] 

adoption in the proper court." In the Matter of the Adoption of the Unborn Child of B.W., 889 

 

6 On September 18, 2007, attorney Tammara Jo Sparks entered her appearance in the Superior Court for 

the putative father and filed a motion to set aside the adoption, asserting that the father had not received 

any notice of the adoption hearing. Appellant's App'x at 35-36. 

7 Also noteworthy are the father's post-decree efforts that took place in both courts. In the Circuit Court, 

the father filed a "Petition to Establish Custody and Parenting Time," Appellant's Supp. App'x at 53-54, 

which the Circuit Court stayed after finding that it lacked jurisdiction over custody issues in light of the 

Superior Court proceedings, id. at 63-64. And in the Superior Court the father filed a Motion to Set Aside 

Adoption and an Amended Motion to Set Aside Adoption informing the court that he had established paternity in the Circuit Court, that custody issues were pending, that he had not received notice of the final 

adoption hearing, and asking the Superior Court to set a hearing and to set the adoption aside. Appellant's 

App'x at 35, 36, ¶ 7. He was not successful in these efforts. 
6

N.E.2d 1236, 1240-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We granted transfer. 

Challenging the adoption decree, the father's principal argument is that his actions in 

timely moving to establish paternity and to contest the adoption in the Circuit Court were sufficient to forestall his being deemed to have impliedly consented to the adoption. Defending the 

Superior Court adoption judgment, the adoptive parents argue that Indiana Code § 31-19-10-1 

required the father to file a motion to contest the adoption in the Superior Court and that when he 

failed to do so within thirty days of receiving notice, his consent to the adoption became irrevocably implied under Indiana Code § 31-19-9-12(1). Noting that the father acted pro se when he 

petitioned to establish paternity and moved to contest the adoption in Circuit Court, the adoptive 

parents argue that they had no obligation to point out to the father what they claim was his mistake because pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys.

The adoption of a minor child generally requires, among other things, the written consent 

not only of the child's mother, but also the child's father if the child is born during their marriage 

or, if not, of the father of the child whose paternity has been established by law. But the adoption consent of a putative father may be implied under circumstances specified by statute:

A putative father's consent to adoption is irrevocably implied without further court action 

if the putative father:

(1) fails to file:

(A) a motion to contest the adoption in accordance with IC 31-19-10; and

(B) a paternity action under IC 31-14;

within thirty (30) days after service of notice under IC 31-19-4;

(2) having filed a motion to contest the adoption in accordance with IC 31-19-10, 

fails to appear at the hearing set to contest the adoption; 

(3) having filed a paternity action under IC 31-14, fails to establish paternity in 

the action; or

(4) is required to but fails to register with the putative father registry established 

by IC 31-19-5 within the period under IC 31-19-5-12. 

Ind. Code § 31-19-9-12. 

When the General Assembly overhauled Indiana's adoption statutes in 1997, it specified 

mechanisms through which putative fathers should receive notice of pending adoption proceedings and could contest those proceedings, but limited the ability later to challenge an adoption if 

the putative father failed to take certain steps. See id. §§ 31-19-1 to -29. To that end, the Gener-
7

al Assembly enacted § 31-19-4-5, which applies to the "Notice to Named Father,"8and provides 

that the notice must include the following language: 

 If __________ (putative father's name) seeks to contest the adoption of the child, he 

must file a motion to contest the adoption in accordance with IC 31-19-10-1 in the above 

named court, or a paternity action under IC 31-14 not later than thirty (30) days after the 

date of service of this notice. 

 If __________ (putative father's name):

(1) does not file:

(A) a motion to contest the adoption; or

(B) a paternity action under IC 31-14; 

within thirty (30) days after service of this notice; 

or

(2) after filing a paternity action under IC 31-14 fails to establish paternity; 

the above named court will hear and determine the petition for adoption. His consent will 

be irrevocably implied and he will lose his right to contest either the adoption or the validity of his implied consent to the adoption. He will lose his right to establish his paternity of the child under IC 31-14. 

Id. § 31-19-4-5. The statute further provides that, "This notice complies with IC 31-19-4-5 but 

does not exhaustively set forth a putative father's legal obligations under the Indiana adoption 

statutes. A person being served with this notice should consult the Indiana adoption statutes." 

Id. 

The notice that the father received on October 2, 2006, substantially tracked the language 

of § 31-19-4-5. Thus, the notice informed the father that his consent to adoption would be irrevocably implied if he failed to preserve his right to object to an adoption petition by either filing 

a motion to contest the adoption or filing a paternity action. When the father received notice of 

the adoption proceedings, within the designated time limit he attempted to do both. He commenced a paternity action, and filed to contest the adoption, but both steps were taken in the Circuit Court, which the adoptive parents contend nullified the father's attempt to contest the adoption. 

The statute authorizing the filing of a motion to contest an adoption states: "A person 

contesting an adoption must file a motion to contest the adoption with the court not later than 

thirty (30) days after service of notice of the pending adoption." Id. § 31-19-10-1(b) (emphasis 

 

8 This section applies to the appellant because he registered with the Putative Father Registry before the 

child's birth and because the mother disclosed his identity in the course of the adoption.
8

added). The phrase "with the court" is not further defined or explained in the statute. 

The adoptive parents argue that the phrase "with the court" in Indiana Code § 31-19-10-1

should be understood to refer to the court in which the adoption petition is pending; that, since 

the father failed to file his motion to contest the adoption in the Superior Court, his Circuit Court 

attempt to contest the adoption was of no moment; and that this erroneous filing warranted the 

Superior Court to find the father's consent to the adoption irrevocably implied and thereafter to 

grant the adoption. 

Seeking to reconcile the language of § 31-19-10-1, which does not designate the court in 

which a motion to contest adoption must be filed, with that of the notice statute, § 31-19-4-5, 

which requires that the putative father be notified that he "must file a motion to contest the adoption of the child . . . in the above named court, or a Paternity action," the adoptive parents point

out that this statute's mandated Notice to Named Father also states that a putative father's legal 

obligations under the Indiana adoption statutes are not exhaustively set forth in the notice and 

"[a] person being served with this notice should consult the Indiana adoption statutes." Thus, the

adoptive parents argue, these provisions can be harmonized to effectuate both, given the recognition of the named father's obligation to further consult the Indiana adoption statutes. The father 

disputes the adoptive parents' construction of Indiana Code § 31-19-10-1 and argues that "with 

the court" does not restrict him to the Superior Court. 

When different statutes are apparently inconsistent in some respects, we consider whether 

they "can be rationalized to give effect to both," and if so, "then it is our duty to do so." Wright 

v. Gettinger, 428 N.E.2d 1212, 1219 (Ind. 1981). "So long as two statutes can be read in harmony with one another, we presume that the Legislature intended for them both to have effect." 

State v. Universal Outdoor, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (Ind. 2008) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Regardless of whether the father's attempt to contest in the Circuit Court the adoption petition filed in the Superior Court was sufficient, it is agreed that he did properly and timely commence a paternity action and thereafter obtained a judgment establishing his paternity of the 
9

child. Although the parties offer persuasive competing arguments regarding the proper interpretation of §§ 31-19-4-5 and 31-19-10-1(b), both parties apparently read § 31-19-9-12(1) to trigger 

a putative father's implied consent if the putative father fails either to institute a paternity action 

or to file a motion to contest the adoption. This interpretation effectively replaces the provision's 

"and" with an "or." 

To the contrary, the plain language of § 31-19-9-12(1) authorizes a court to determine 

irrevocable implied consent only when a putative father fails in both respects, i.e., only when, 

within thirty days after receiving notice of the adoption petition, the putative father fails both to 

file a motion to contest the adoption and also to file a paternity action. But if he does either

within the thirty-day time period, this precludes a court from finding his implied irrevocable consent to the adoption under this section. In order to be deemed to have given irrevocably implied 

consent, the named father, in accordance with Indiana Code § 31-19-9-12(1), must fail to file, 

not either, but both a paternity action and a motion to contest the adoption within thirty days after service of notice. 

Applying the plain language of § 31-19-9-12(1) to require a putative father to fail in both 

respects is entirely consistent with the plain language of § 31-19-4-5, which, in addition to providing (through the statutorily mandated notice) a putative father's initial exposure to his obligations under the adoption statutes, indicates that putative fathers have a choice about how to proceed—they "must file a motion to contest the adoption of the child . . . in the above named court, 

or a Paternity action." It is thus unnecessary to impose a strained construction on either of these 

two provisions so as to read them in harmony with each other. 

In addition, the adoption statute creates a statutory proceeding unknown at common law 

and, under well-established principles, this Court must strictly construe the statute in favor of the 

rights of biological parents. Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1056 

(Ind. 1992) (citing Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (1956)). 

This interpretation finds additional support inasmuch as "[t]he adoption statutes contemplate concurrent jurisdiction by paternity and adoption courts." In re Adoption of A.N.S., 741 
10

N.E.2d 780, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Where a putative father opts under § 31-19-9-12(1) to file 

a paternity petition, the statute anticipates situations where an adoption petition is concurrently 

pending. In that circumstance, "the court in which the petition for adoption has been filed has 

exclusive jurisdiction over the child, and the paternity proceeding must be consolidated with the 

adoption proceeding." Ind. Code § 31-19-2-14(a) (emphasis added). This common-sense requirement understands that such concurrent actions are best resolved in one forum—resolution of 

paternity is a generally necessary prerequisite to completion of adoption proceedings since a legally proven biological father's consent to an adoption is required. See In re Adoption of A.N.S., 

741 N.E.2d at 784; In re M.B.H., 571 N.E.2d 1283, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Ind. Code § 31-

19-9-1(a)(2). And, moreover, if the putative father "fails to establish paternity in the action," his 

consent will be irrevocably implied without further court action. Ind. Code § 31-19-9-12(3). 

In this case, the father timely sought to establish his paternity and asserted his parental 

rights in the court designated in the local court rules. It is further noteworthy that Indiana Code § 

31-35-1-4.5 provides that a "putative father's consent to the termination of the parent-child relationship is irrevocably implied" only if the father (1) fails to file "a paternity action under IC 31-

14 . . . or in a court located in another state that is competent to obtain jurisdiction over the paternity action" within thirty days after receiving notice; or (2) having done so, "fails to establish 

paternity in the paternity proceeding within a reasonable period." Ind. Code § 31-35-1-4.5 (emphasis added). And section 31-14-10-1 provides, "Upon finding that a man is the child's biological father, the court shall . . . conduct a hearing to determine the issues of support, custody, and 

parenting time." Id. § 31-14-10-1 (emphasis added). In this case, the Superior Court, despite 

having been informed that a paternity action had been timely filed in Circuit Court, and subsequently being advised that the father had successfully established his paternity, nevertheless 

granted the adoption and terminated the father's constitutionally protected parental rights without 

the father's consent. This father timely registered with the Putative Father Registry, filed a petition to establish paternity and contested the adoption in the Circuit Court, putting all parties on 

notice that he desired to play a role in his child's life and that he sought adjudication of his parental rights. 

Not at issue in this case is whether the putative father's consent should be irrevocably im-
11

plied due to his failure "to appear at the hearing set to contest the adoption" pursuant to § 31-19-

9-12(2). No such hearing was ever scheduled. Moreover, at no time before the trial court or on 

appeal have the adoptive parents asserted the putative father's failure to appear at such a hearing 

as grounds for finding his implied consent. Nor did the trial court base its implied consent decision upon the defendant's failure to appear either at such a hearing or at the final adoption hearing. This is not surprising given the fact that notice of the date of the final adoption hearing was 

sent not to the putative father but only to his former attorney in the Circuit Court matter, which 

attorney had never entered an appearance in the Superior Court adoption proceedings. If the 

facts had been otherwise, that is, where a putative father files the statutory motion to contest the 

adoption but then fails after receiving notice "to appear at the hearing set to contest the adoption," then his consent to the adoption may be irrevocably implied pursuant to Section 12(2) of 

the statute. The expeditious placement of eligible children in permanent adoptive homes should 

not be unnecessarily delayed or jeopardized. 

In sum, we hold that under Indiana Code § 31-19-9-12(1), to be deemed to have implied 

his irrevocable consent to an adoption, a putative father must fail to file both a paternity action 

and a motion to contest the adoption. The appellant-father here undisputedly timely filed his paternity action. It is therefore unnecessary to decide whether his timely attempt to contest the 

adoption, filed in the Circuit Court rather than in the Superior Court where the adoption was 

pending, satisfied the adoption implied consent statute. The paternity action sufficed to preclude 

a finding of implied irrevocable consent to the adoption. 

Conclusion

Because the trial court's decree of adoption was predicated upon its erroneous determination that the father's consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied by law, we reverse the 

judgment and remand this matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings not inconsistent 

with this opinion. 

Sullivan and Rucker, JJ., concur. Boehm, J., concurs with separate opinion. 

Shepard, C.J., dissents with separate opinion. 
Boehm, Justice, concurring.

I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to observe that these statutes, taken 

together, seem to provide multiple opportunities for confusion or even intentional obfuscation. I 

agree that the majority has worked through these seemingly inconsistent provisions in a manner 

that is consistent with the language of the statutes, and perhaps necessary to avoid forfeiture of 

important parental rights. But this is an area where all agree that the simplicity, clarity, speed, 

and finality we desire in all legal proceedings are of even higher priority in the interest of prompt 

and final resolution of the child’s status. The statutes should not permit a filing in another court 

to suspend the prompt resolution of an adoption. Dueling jurisdictions, or even the need for 

transfer and consolidation, are formulas for delay. Nor should there be any doubt what a putative 

father must do to preserve his rights. 

I hope the General Assembly will consider requiring that a putative father wishing to contest an adoption or declare paternity must file in the court in which an adoption action is pending 

or otherwise assure consolidation of these two proceedings to reduce the opportunity for delay 

and confusion, while still preserving all rights of the putative father. 
SHEPARD, Chief Justice, dissenting.

The Code section at issue in this case, Ind. Code § 31-19-9-12(1), reflects two 

straightforward ideas:

1. An objection to an adoption by someone other than a parent is a non-event, and

2. A parent who receives notice of an adoption and decides not to participate loses.

Thus, I see the section 12(1) as declaring that a putative father who acts to establish parenthood 

and actively contests an adoption is not deemed to have consented to the adoption. A putative 

father who fails to do them both is deemed to have consented.

Holding that a putative father can derail an otherwise lawful adoption by doing just one 

but not the other, as the Court does today, may help the occasional blunderer, like the inmate in 

this case. 

But it will also provide a very simple roadmap for obstructionists, a tool to use in preventing what my colleagues call the “expeditious placement of eligible children.” 

In this instance, it prevents the expeditious placement of a child who has known only 

these adoptive parents during the entire thirty-two months since his birth.

As for where a putative father must object, I find it easy enough to say that he must object in the court where the adoption is filed. It is true that the statute does not explicitly require 

that, but neither do the Rules of Trial Procedure adopted by this Court, for example. The Trial 

Rules do not say explicitly that one must file the answer to a complaint in the same court where 

the complaint was filed. Likewise, there are other statutes that provide an opportunity for objection, like the chance to object to an appraiser’s report in a condemnation, that do not compel that 

the objection be filed in the court where the condemnation is pending. I would like to think that 

in either instance we would hold that a person who filed in another court or another county didn’t 

get the job done. I would so hold here, saying that the putative father did not timely object to the 

adoption and that his consent was given by operation of law.