In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3538

Edison K. Spearman,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Ford Motor Company,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 C 452--David H. Coar, Judge.

Argued April 5, 2000--Decided November 3, 2000

 Before Manion, Kanne, and Evans, Circuit Judges.

 Manion, Circuit Judge. Edison Spearman sued his

current employer, Ford Motor Company, alleging

that Ford violated Title VII by subjecting him to

a hostile environment of sexual harassment,

retaliating against him for opposing sexual

harassment, and for discriminating against him on

the basis of his sex. Ford moved for summary

judgment, which the district court granted.

Spearman appeals, and we affirm. 

I. 

 Edison Spearman is a black man and a

homosexual/1 who has been working for Ford since

1990. In October 1995, Spearman worked as a

"blanker operator" at Ford’s Chicago Heights

Stamping Plant, where he operated press machines

that "blank" or "stamp" sheet metal into

dimensional form. In the summer of 1997, Spearman

was promoted to the position of "blanker utility"

worker, and assigned to relieve two blanker

operators (Gregory Curtis and Steve Neeley) for

their work breaks, lunch breaks and other

rotations. 
 Spearman filed his first of several complaints

of harassment on December 8, 1995, in which he

reported that since his assignment as a blanker

operator in October 1995, Curtis constantly took

personal items (pens, newspapers, and gloves)

from him without his permission. When Spearman

told Curtis to stop, Curtis (a black man) called

Spearman a "nigger" and a "selfish bitch." Curtis

would also hound Spearman for lunch money, and

then call him a "cheap ass bitch" if his requests

were occasionally denied. Following a glovesnatching incident, Spearman had two meetings

with his union representative and Curtis to

resolve the matter.

 Spearman reported no further incidents of

harassment until May 16, 1997, when he filed a

written complaint concerning an altercation with

Curtis over the timing of lunch breaks. Curtis

confronted Spearman, called him a "little bitch,"

told him that he hated his "gay ass," and

threatened to go to Spearman’s residence in

Indiana and "f---- [his] gay faggot ass up." To

defuse the situation, a foreman assigned Spearman

and Curtis to different press areas for the

balance of the shift. The following week, labor

relations investigated the matter and held two

meetings with Spearman, Curtis and a union

representative.

 Curtis and Neeley testified that they and their

co-workers at Ford suspected that Spearman was a

homosexual. According to Curtis, he thought that

Spearman was homosexual when they first met and

Spearman supposedly took "a full look" at Curtis

like a man would look at a woman. Curtis also

opined that other blanker operators at Ford were

uncomfortable with Spearman because they observed

that he "looked [them] over" like a man would

"take a full look" at a woman, that he got too

close to his male co-workers when he talked to

them, and even "rubbed up especially close" to

some of them. Curtis also testified that one coworker started "squirming" when others teased him

that Spearman had a "crush" on him. And Curtis

also claimed that his brother-in-law and a coworker told him that they saw Spearman at gay

nightclubs. 

 According to Spearman, Curtis continually

harassed him after the May 1997 incident by

reporting to work late and returning from his

breaks late in order to disrupt Spearman’s relief

schedule as a utility worker, and thus deprive

him of his breaks and lunches. Curtis’s negative

behavior toward Spearman continued until he was

moved to another press machine (and away from
Spearman) in October 1997.

 Spearman submitted another written complaint

concerning a June 21, 1997 argument with Neeley

over the timing of a break. As a blanker utility

worker, Spearman told Neeley to take a break, but

Neeley refused, leaned into Spearman’s face, and

taunted him by telling Spearman to hit him. In

his complaint, Spearman wrote: "[T]here’s a

constant problem with Steve, when it comes to

breaks; since I’ve become utility, he rebels and

insist [sic] on debating me about how and when I

relieve." Labor relations responded by conducting

a meeting with all of the parties involved in the

matter.

 In June 1997, Spearman discovered graffiti on

the bulletin board that stated: "Aids kills

faggots dead . . . RuPaul, RuSpearman."/2

Spearman waited five months to report the

incident, and when he did, labor relations

representatives promptly painted over it the

following day. 

 On October 21, 1997, Spearman delivered another

complaint to Ford that involved an altercation

with George Pearson (who was temporarily assigned

to work with Spearman) about the timing of a

break. While Pearson was leaving his work

station, he said to Spearman, "You f----ing jackoff, pussy-ass," and saluted Spearman with his

middle finger. Spearman reported the incident to

his foreman, Anthony Perez, who assured Spearman

that he would discuss the matter with Pearson and

"discipline him." Shortly after Spearman filed

his complaint about the incident, a labor

relations representative investigated the matter

and conducted a meeting with Spearman and his

union representative. 

 In November 1997, Spearman discovered more

graffiti outside a portable toilet that stated:

"Ed Sperman [sic] is a fag and has AIDS" and

"Edison Sperman [sic] is gay." Labor relations

representatives painted over the graffiti

immediately after Spearman’s report. 

 Ford received another letter from Spearman

around November 24, 1997, in which he complained

that he was being harassed by Perez, who used the

following instructional hypothetical at a

department meeting about sexual harassment:

Say for instance, Greg and Ed are in the back

bringing in a coil, and Ed touches Greg in a way

that made him feel uncomfortable, that can be a
charge of sexual harassment.

Spearman believed that Perez’s hypothetical was

about himself (Ed) and Greg Curtis, and thus it

was "totally inappropriate" and harmful to

Spearman because he and Curtis had been involved

in several altercations in the past. Perez

testified that he was not referring to Spearman

in the example, but to Ed Rolff, one of

Spearman’s co-workers. 

 In the same letter, Spearman also complained

that Perez had offered to give him a hug on two

separate occasions. On the first occasion,

Spearman admits that Perez greeted him with a hug

because he showed up for work during a staff

shortage in the summer of 1997. But Spearman

stated that he "felt very awkward" about Perez’s

second offer of a hug that occurred when Spearman

was confused about overtime duties and consulted

Perez for advice. Perez testified that Spearman

appeared to be distraught because the press

machine was not working, and that Perez offered

to give him a hug to lift his spirits.

 During the afternoon of November 24, 1997, Perez

instructed Spearman to perform housekeeping

duties and wash the windows of the press machines

for about an hour before the end of his shift.

Spearman believed that his assignment was

punitive and that Perez was retaliating against

him for his November 17, 1997 harassment

complaint about Perez’s instructional

hypothetical and offers to hug Spearman. He left

work that day, went on medical leave in December

1997, and did not return to work until May 4,

1998. Perez testified that he assigned similar

housekeeping tasks to other utility workers and

operators to keep them busy when they were not

operating the press machines. 

 During his medical leave, Spearman received

treatment for depression. When he returned to

work after a five-month absence, he discovered

that his tool box was destroyed and that his

tools had been stolen. 

 Spearman then sued Ford, alleging that it

violated Title VII by subjecting him to a hostile

environment of sexual harassment; by retaliating

against him because he filed complaints opposing

sexual harassment; and by discriminating against

him because of his sex by failing to investigate

his sexual harassment complaints as promptly as

similar complaints from female employees. Ford

moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted Ford’s motion, concluding that while

Spearman established a reasonable inference that

he was harassed because of his sex, his sexual

harassment claim failed because he did not show

that the harassment was severe enough to cause a

change in his employment conditions. The district

court also denied Spearman’s retaliation claim by

concluding that he failed to establish a prima

facie case by showing that he suffered an adverse

employment action. The court did not address

Spearman’s sex discrimination claim. Spearman

appeals.

II.

 "We review the district court’s entry of summary

judgment de novo," Miller v. American Family Mut.

Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000),

viewing all of the facts, and drawing all

reasonable inferences from those facts, in favor

of the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is

proper if the record shows that "there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d

788, 798 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)).

 Title VII prohibits an employer from harassing

an employee "because of [the employee’s] sex."/3

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523

U.S. 75, 78 (1998); 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a)(1).

Same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under

Title VII "to the extent that it occurs ’because

of’ the plaintiff’s sex." Shepherd v. Slater

Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1007 (7th Cir. 1999).

We have stated that "[t]he phrase in Title VII

prohibiting discrimination based on sex" means

that "it is unlawful to discriminate against

women because they are women and against men

because they are men." Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,

Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). In

other words, Congress intended the term "sex" to

mean "biological male or biological female," and

not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation. See

id. at 1087. Therefore, harassment based solely

upon a person’s sexual preference or orientation

(and not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful

employment practice under Title VII. Id. at 1085;

see also Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health

Care Center, Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir.

2000).

A. Hostile Environment Claim

 Spearman first argues on appeal that he was

sexually harassed at Ford in violation of Title

VII. He claims that the vulgar and sexually
explicit insults and graffiti of his harassers

were motivated by "sex-stereotypes" because his

co-workers perceived him to be too feminine to

fit the male image at Ford. His contention relies

primarily on Curtis’s testimony that there is a

"masculine" environment at the Ford plant,

implying that he questioned Spearman’s

masculinity. Spearman also contends that Curtis

engaged in sex stereotypes when he called

Spearman a "bitch," which, according to another

utility worker at Ford (David Gibson), meant that

Curtis called Spearman a "woman." Moreover,

Spearman asserts that the graffiti associating

him with a drag queen (RuPaul) proves that his

co-workers perceived him to be too feminine to

work at Ford. And he claims that sex stereotypes

motivated Perez to harass him with the windowwashing assignment, which is a function

"traditionally reserved for women" (a view that

could also be labeled sex stereotyping).

 While sexually explicit language may constitute

evidence of sexual harassment, it is not "always

actionable, regardless of the harasser’s sex,

sexual orientation, or motivations." See Oncale,

523 U.S. at 79. The plaintiff must still show

that he was harassed because of his sex. Id.

Similarly, while sex stereotyping may constitute

evidence of sex discrimination, "[r]emarks at

work that are based on sex-stereotypes do not

inevitably prove that gender played a part in a

particular employment decision. The plaintiff

must show that the employer actually relied on

[the plaintiff’s] gender in making its decision."

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251

(1989). Therefore, according to Oncale and Price

Waterhouse, we must consider any sexually

explicit language or stereotypical statements

within the context of all of the evidence of

harassment in the case, and then determine

whether the evidence as a whole creates a

reasonable inference that the plaintiff was

discriminated against because of his sex. 

 Here, the record clearly demonstrates that

Spearman’s problems resulted from his

altercations with co-workers over work issues,

and because of his apparent homosexuality. But he

was not harassed because of his sex (i.e. not

because he is a man). His harassers used sexually

explicit, vulgar insults to express their anger

at him over work-related conflicts. However,

these conflicts did not arise because he is a

man. Curtis directed insults at Spearman to

irritate or provoke him during three specific

arguments about lunch money, small personal

items, and the timing of lunch breaks. And

Pearson directed a barrage of derogatory remarks
at Spearman after he unsuccessfully protested

Spearman’s order to take a break. It is clear

that Curtis and Pearson lodged sexually explicit

insults at Spearman to express their acrimony

over work-related disputes, and not to harass him

because he is a man; and such conduct does not

constitute sexual harassment. See Johnson v.

Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997)

(sexually explicit remarks among male co-workers

were "simply expressions of animosity or juvenile

provocation," and were not directed at the

plaintiff because of his sex). 

 The record also shows that Spearman’s co-workers

maligned him because of his apparent

homosexuality, and not because of his sex. The

testimonies of Curtis and Neeley clearly

demonstrate that Spearman’s harassers were

motivated by their suspicion of Spearman’s sexual

orientation and his perceived desire for some

sort of physical intimacy with them. And even

Spearman’s understanding of Perez’s instructional

hypothetical indicates that Perez teased him

about his homosexuality. Moreover, Spearman’s coworkers directed stereotypical statements at him

to express their hostility to his perceived

homosexuality, and not to harass him because he

is a man. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.

Curtis called him a "bitch" which, according to

Gibson, means a "woman," or a "faggot." And the

graffiti that specifically stated that Spearman

is "gay," a "fag," and compared him to a drag

queen confirms that some of his co-workers were

hostile to his sexual orientation, and not to his

sex. 

 Title VII is not a "general civility code" for

the workplace, see Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; it

does not prohibit harassment in general or of

one’s homosexuality in particular. Likewise,

sexually explicit insults that arise solely from

altercations over work-related issues, while

certainly unpleasant, do not violate Title VII.

Because Spearman was not harassed because of his

sex, his hostile environment claim fails. Oncale,

523 U.S. at 78. 

B. Retaliation Claim

 Spearman’s next argument on appeal is that Perez

assigned him the window-washing task to retaliate

against him for his written complaint about

Perez’s harassment, in violation of Title VII. 

 Title VII "protects persons not just from

certain forms of job discrimination [and
harassment], but from retaliation for complaining

about the types of discrimination it

prohibits."/4 Miller, 203 F.3d at 1007; 42

U.S.C. sec. 2000e-3(a). To prevail on a claim of

retaliation, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he

complained about conduct that is prohibited by

Title VII; (2) he suffered an adverse employment

action; and (3) the adverse employment action was

caused by his opposition to the unlawful

employment practice. Miller, 203 F.3d at 1007. An

"adverse employment action" alters the "terms or

conditions" of one’s employment. Silk, 194 F.3d

at 804. It "constitutes a significant change in

employment status, such as hiring, firing,

failing to promote, reassignment with

significantly different responsibilities, or a

decision causing a significant change in benefits

as well as the ’denial of a raise or promotion.’"

Id. at 804 n.16 (quoting Burlington Industries,

Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). 

 Here, Perez assigned Spearman to wash the

windows of his two press machines for about an

hour. Spearman argues that the assignment was

"degrading and punitive" and thus diminished his

job responsibilities as a utility worker. But he

also testified that he performed housekeeping

duties as a utility worker before, including

sweeping around the press machines and removing

trash from the plant floor. Thus, the additional

task of washing the windows of the press machines

certainly did not "significantly" alter (if at

all) the terms and conditions of his employment.

Perez testified that the cleaning assignments

were to keep Spearman busy with necessary cleanup chores rather than having him "standing there

doing nothing" for an hour or so before his

relief duties were to begin. The assignment was

nothing more than "a mere inconvenience or an

alteration of job responsibilities," Crady v.

Liberty Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Indiana, 993

F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993), and thus

Spearman’s retaliation claim fails./5

C. Sex Discrimination Claim

 Spearman’s last claim on appeal is that Ford

discriminated against him on the basis of his sex

by failing to investigate his alleged sexual

harassment complaints as promptly as it

investigated sexual harassment complaints from

female employees. To raise a prima facie case of

sex discrimination, Spearman must show that: (1)

he belongs to a protected class (in this case,

males); (2) he performed his job satisfactorily;

(3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) Ford treated similarly situated female

employees more favorably. See Greenslade v.
Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853, 863 (7th

Cir. 1997). 

 Spearman’s discrimination claim does not meet

the fourth test of the prima facie case. We have

already established that none of his complaints

involved sexual harassment, and there is no

evidence in the record that demonstrates that

Ford perceived Spearman’s complaints to be about

sexual harassment at the time he filed them.

Therefore, Spearman does not show that he was

similarly situated to female employees who filed

sexual harassment complaints. Furthermore, the

record demonstrates that Ford sought to resolve

Spearman’s complaints with investigations,

meetings, and by promptly painting over graffiti.

Spearman provides no evidence that Ford responded

more vigorously to sexual harassment complaints

from female employees. Because Spearman’s

complaints were not about sexual harassment, and

he provides no comparative evidence to support

his disparate treatment claim, it fails./6 Cheek

v. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F.3d 200, 204 (7th Cir.

1996). 

III.

 Although the district court determined that

there was evidence that Spearman was sexually

harassed, but granted summary judgment for Ford

by concluding that the harassment was not severe

or pervasive enough to cause a change in

Spearman’s employment conditions, we conclude

that Spearman’s sexual harassment (hostile

environment) claim fails because he was not

harassed because of his sex; his retaliation

claim fails because he did not suffer an adverse

employment action; and his disparate treatment

claim fails because he has not shown that he was

similarly situated to female Ford employees who

filed sexual harassment complaints, or that Ford

treated female employees more favorably. We AFFIRM.

/1 Spearman testified at his deposition that he is a

homosexual, but he claims that he never made that

known to anyone at Ford. 

/2 RuPaul is the name of a black, male drag queen

and entertainer.

/3 This provision of Title VII provides that: "[i]t

shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

employer . . . to discharge any individual, or

otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because

of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,

or national origin." 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e2(a)(1).

/4 The retaliation provision of Title VII provides

that: "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment

practice for an employer . . . to discriminate

against any individual . . . because he has

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

practice by [Title VII]." 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e3(a). 

/5 The retaliation claim also fails because

Spearman’s numerous complaints of co-worker abuse

did not involve an unlawful employment practice

under Title VII, and there is no evidence in the

record that he even had a subjective belief that

he was being sexually harassed. See Hamner, 224

F.3d at 707.

/6 It is also questionable whether Spearman ever

suffered an adverse employment action, but

because we conclude that his sex discrimination

claim fails because there is no evidence that he

meets the fourth test of a prima facie case, we

decline to address this issue.