reaffirmed its local governments’ immunity from punitive damages). Plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages against defendant City of Chicago is dismissed.
YI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendant City of Chicago’s motion to partially dismiss is
granted. Specifically, plaintiff's claims against defendant City of Chicago Department of Health,
as well as her claim for punitive damages against defendant City of Chicago, are dismissed, with

prejudice.

Enter:

David H. Coar
United States District Judge

Dated: March 18, 2004

-4-


A. Defendant City of Chicago Department of Health Is Not a Suable Entity.

Defendant City of Chicago contended in its opening brief that defendant City of Chicago
Department of Health is merely an “organizational division” and “operating department” of the
City, itself, and, as such, is not a suable entity. See, e.g., Chan v. City of Chicago, 777 F. Supp.
1437, 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (dismissing Chicago Police Department from case on grounds that it
had “no separate legal existence apart from the City of Chicago, and the department [was]
therefore not a suable entity”). Plaintiff did not, in response, contend otherwise (or contend
anything at all, as she did not file a response) and, thereby, effectively conceded the point.
Plaintiff's claims against defendant City of Chicago Department of Health are therefore
dismissed, with prejudice, See Clay v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 3684, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15626, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 1996) (dismissing claims against City of Chicago Department
of Health where the plaintiff conceded that the Department of Health is merely a department of
the City).

B. Plaintiff Cannot Maintain a Claim for Punitive Damages Against Defendant
City of Chicago.

Defendant City of Chicago is a municipality and, as such, cannot be held liable for
punitive damages under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); Bielicki v. City of Chicago, No.
97 C 1471, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6880, at *13 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 1997) (“municipalities are
expressly exempted from liability for punitive damages under Title VII”); White v. City of
Chicago, No. 96 C 3329, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338, at *14 n.6 (N.D. lll. Nov. 1, 1996)
(“{mJunicipalities are immune from punitive damages imposed under the civil rights laws”); see

also Adams v. City of Chicago, 865 F. Supp. 445, 447 (N.D. Il. 1994) (noting that Illinois has

3-


Minuto Order Form (06/97)
a

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge ‘ Sitting Judge if Other
sy Magheate Jules David H. Coar Taree eed Suae
CASE NUMBER 03 C2117 DATE 3/18/2004
CASE
TITLE Bell v. City of Chicago, e¢ al.

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented,}

MOTION:
Defendant’s Motion to Partially Dismiss Complaint

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon__—ssetfor_ ss aat_

(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for]on___set for__at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor___— ss at_

(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on__—_ at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at

(9) im} This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 CUFRCP41(a\(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2)

do) =i [Other docket entry] For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order,

ay

defendant’s motion to partially dismiss the complaint (Doc. # 10) is granted. Plaintiffs claims against
defendant City of Chicago Department of Health, as well as her claim for punitive damages against

cud bon

defendant City of Chicago, are dismissed, with prejudice.

{For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. sumer of notices

Document
Number:

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
- —|
Notified counsel by telephone 2 )- (6)

Docketing to mait notices.
Mail AO 450 form docket acpusfuits
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice
courtroom,

aed/lc deputy’s
initials

-Date/time recgived.in
central Clerk's Office mailing deputy nals



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
TERRY BELL, )
)
)
Plaintiff, )
) No, 03 C2117
v. )
) HONORABLE DAVID H. COAR
CITY OF CHICAGO, CITY OF CHICAGO)
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, FRED )
WOODS, and DONALD BECKER, ) )
“
Defendants. ) ?
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER %

Defendant City of Chicago’s motion to partially dismiss plaintiff's first amended
complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(6), is now before this court. For the reasons set
forth below, the motion is granted.

1 Procedural Background

On April 25, 2003, plaintiff Terry Bell filed a four-count first amended complaint against
defendants City of Chicago and City of Chicago Department of Health. In it, she alleged claims
for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, ef seg. On June 24, 2003, defendant City of
Chicago filed a partial motion to dismiss, seeking to dismiss City of Chicago Department of
Health as a defendant and to dismiss plaintiff’s punitive damages claim against defendant City of

Chicago. The time designated by the court for plaintiff to file her response came and went

po

without any submission from plaintiff.


Thereafter, plaintiff sought and was granted Jeave to file a second amended complaint,
which she filed on August 12, 2003. In her second amended complaint, plaintiff realleged counts
I- IV of her first amended complaint (which asserted Title VII claims against defendants City of
Chicago and City of Chicago Department of Health). She also added two defendants, Fred
Woods and Donald Becker (both City of Chicago employees), against whom she asserted two
counts: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her civil rights (Count V); and (2) a
claim for slander per se under Illinois common law (Count VI).

Defendants did not move to dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint. However,
because the second amended complaint did not differ from the first amended complaint in any
respect relevant to defendant City of Chicago’s motion, the court will treat defendant’s motion as
one to partially dismiss the second amended complaint.

Il. Analysis

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a complaint need only set forth a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993). “The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test
the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits.” Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7" Cir. 1989). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the court accepts as true al! well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7" Cir.
2002). A complaint should be dismissed only if there is no set of facts in support of the claim
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. See Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 356 (7" Cir.

1997),