alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Case: 1:02-cr-00573 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 06/11/02 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:1
Case: 1:02-cr-00573 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 06/11/02 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:2
Case: 1:02-cr-00573 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 06/11/02 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:3
Case: 1:02-cr-00573 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 06/11/02 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:4
Case: 1:02-cr-00573 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 06/11/02 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:5
Case: 1:02-cr-00573 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 06/11/02 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:6
Case: 1:03-cv-09416 Document #: 5 Filed: 12/29/03 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:32

Case: 1:03-cv-09416 Document #: 5 Filed: 12/29/03 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:33
#### Katherine Iaunow, Appellant, v Lloyd H. Hearns, Respondent.

(Appeal No. 2.)

—Appeal unanimously dismissed, without costs, as academic. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Donovan, J.—automobile negligence.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Denman, Pine and Schnepp, JJ.
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 153 (Thursday, August 12, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 44366]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-17152]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION


Temporary Suspension of In-Person Hearings

AGENCY: Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (the 
``Commission'') is temporarily suspending in-person hearings, 
settlement judge conferences, and mediations in the manner described 
below until December 31, 2021.

DATES: Applicable: August 6, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sarah Stewart, Deputy General Counsel, 
Office of the General Counsel, Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission, at (202) 434-9935.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On July 30, 2021, Commission Chief 
Administrative Law Judge Glynn F. Voisin issued an order, which is 
posted on the Commission's website (www.fmshrc.gov). The contents of 
the order were also published in the Federal Register. 86 FR 42,827 
(Aug. 5, 2021). Under the terms of that order, the Commission was going 
to resume the pre-pandemic norm of in-person hearings as of September 
1, 2021.
    On August 6, 2021, Chief Judge Voisin issued an order supplementing 
the July 30 order. The contents of the August 6 order are set forth in 
this notice.
    In view of recently updated guidance from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (``CDC'') highlighting the risks presented by 
the novel coronavirus COVID-19 and especially its rapidly spreading 
delta variant, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 
Office of the Chief Administrative Law Judge (OCALJ) is, effective 
immediately, strongly discouraging the scheduling of in-person 
hearings, settlement judge conferences and mediations until December 
31, 2021. At the discretion of the presiding Administrative Law Judge 
and in coordination with the parties, such proceedings may be held by 
videoconference or by telephone.
    In the event a Judge determines in-person proceedings are necessary 
for all or part of a hearing, settlement conference or mediation, he or 
she will seek authorization of Chief Judge Voisin prior to scheduling 
any such proceeding. Such authorization should only be sought where 
absolutely necessary and is unlikely to be granted absent an 
extraordinarily compelling need and strict protocols ensuring the 
safety of all in attendance. No party, representative or witness shall 
be compelled to attend an in-person hearing or conference during the 
pendency of this order.
    The presiding administrative law judge may be contacted with 
questions regarding this notice.
    Authority: 30 U.S.C. 823; 29 CFR part 2700.

    Dated: August 6, 2021.
Sarah L. Stewart,
Deputy General Counsel, Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission.
[FR Doc. 2021-17152 Filed 8-11-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6735-01-P
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Amy M. Abrams, Also Known as Amy S. Abrams, Deceased.

—Order unanimously reversed, on the law and facts and in the exercise of discretion, without costs, motion granted, decree vacated and matter remitted to Oneida County Surrogate’s Court for further proceedings, in accordance with the following memorandum: Amy Marion Abrams executed a last will and testament on June 8, 1983. She died on September 7, 1984 leaving two surviving children, petitioner Donald Abrams and respondent Elaine Appier. The will bequeathed to petitioner $1,000 in trust, payable at the rate of $200 per year for five years, and appointed Elaine Appier’s husband, William Appier, as trustee of the trust. The remainder of the estate was be*991queathed jointly to William and Elaine Appier, and William Appier was appointed executor to serve without bond.

After refusing to sign a consent to probate, petitioner was served with a citation and appeared personally before the Surrogate on the return date. He was granted a one-week adjournment in order to retain counsel. Petitioner made repeated attempts to hire a lawyer for the purpose of objecting to the will but was unable to do so. He failed to appear on the adjourned date, October 16, 1984, and a decree of probate was immediately entered. On the following day, petitioner succeeded in retaining a lawyer, who immediately communicated with the Surrogate’s Court Clerk and learned of the entry of the decree.

Petitioner expeditiously moved to vacate the decree and for permission to file objections to the probate of the will. The Surrogate reserved decision on the motion but permitted petitioner to examine the attesting witnesses under oath *(see,*SCPA 1404). Thereafter the Surrogate denied petitioner’s motion. We reverse.

The parties agree that petitioner’s motion is procedurally governed by CPLR 5015 (a) (1) *(see,*SCPA 102, 209). To be relieved of his default, petitioner was required to show reasonable excuse for the delay and that his claim has merit *(Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Andersen & Co.,*60 NY2d 693). Petitioner provided ample explanation for the brief delay we see here and his showing of merit upon examination of the attesting witnesses was sufficient under the circumstances to satisfy the second prong of the test *(see, Sortino v Fisher,*20 AD2d 25, 32).

Petitioner is authorized to file objections to probate of the will within 20 days of entry of the order hereon *(see,*SCPA 1410). (Appeal from order of Oneida County Surrogate’s Court, Ringrose, S.—vacate default decree.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Denman, Pine and Schnepp, JJ.
##### 



Exhibit 32 CERTIFICATION Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of CVF
Technologies Corporation (the Company), does hereby certify, to such
officers knowledge, that: The Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended September 30,
2004 (the Form 10-QSB) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Dated: November 15, 2004
    
    /s/ Jeffrey I. Dreben

Jeffrey I. Dreben,
Chief Executive OfficerDated: November 15, 2004
    
    /s/ Robert L. Miller

Robert L. Miller,
Chief Financial Officer
 This certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Form 10-QSB
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be
incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company unless such
incorporation is expressly referenced therein.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

January 9, 2019

No. 04

- 18

- 00934

- CR

Omar Benitez ARIAS

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 216th Judi cial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 6599 Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The court reporter responsible for filing the portion of the reporter’s record relating to pre

- tria l hearings in this appeal filed a notification of late record informing the court that the reporter’s record has not been filed because appellant has failed to file a designation of record. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 34.6(b)(1).

We, therefore, ORDER appellant to file written proof to this court on or before January 22, 2019 that he has filed a designation of record with the court reporter. See

T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 34.6(b)(c). If appellant fails to respond within th e time provided, appellant’s brief will be due within thirty days from the date of this order, and the court will only consider those issues or points raised in appellant’s brief that do not require a reporter’s record for a decision. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 3 7.3(c).

___________________________ ______ Irene Rios , JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 9th day of January, 2019

.

______________________________ _____ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
#### Aristone Realty Capital, LLC, Respondent, v 9 E. 16th Street LLC et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[941 NYS2d 840]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles E. Ramos, J.), entered December 6, 2011, which denied the motion of defendants 9 E. 16th Street LLC, Regal Real Estate, LLC, doing business as Regal Investments Inc., Maurice Laboz and William Punch for, inter alia, summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claim for specific performance, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

In this action arising out of a failed real estate transaction, purchaser and seller met with their counsel and allegedly agreed upon the terms and conditions of the sale. Thereafter, the attorneys exchanged e-mail communications, culminating in seller’s counsel’s transmittal of an “execution version” of the contract that allegedly contained the previously agreed upon terms and provided the purchaser with wiring instructions for payment of the deposit. Unlike an earlier e-mail that transmitted a “proposed contract” subject to his client’s “review and modification,” the latter e-mail was not so qualified. In response to the offer e-mail, purchaser’s counsel exchanged a signature page executed by his client and purchaser tendered payment of the deposit. Under these circumstances, triable issues of fact exist as to the viability of plaintiffs claim for specific performance, despite the lack of a fully executed contract *(see Newmark & Co. Real Estate Inc. v 2615 E. 17 St. Realty LLC,*80 AD3d 476 [2011]; *cf. Naldi v Grunberg,*80 AD3d 1, 6 [2010], *lv denied*16 NY3d 711 [2011]).

Further, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether seller’s attorney, who copied his client on the relevant e-mail communications without any protest, had apparent authority to act on seller’s behalf *(see Korin Group v Emar Bldg. Corp.,*291 AD2d 270 [2002]). Plaintiffs demand for, and acceptance of, a return of the deposit, in response to, inter alia, concerns about the integrity of the escrowed deposit, while allegedly reserving its *520right to enforce the contract and pursuing a countersigned contract, did not evidence, as a matter of law, an intent to cancel any contract formed. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Catterson, DeGrasse, Manzanet-Daniels and Román, JJ.
##### 



Exhibit 32.02
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ENACTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Lizabeth H. ZlatkusName:
    Lizabeth H. ZlatkusTitle:
    Executive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:
    November 3, 2005
 50
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Thomas Ostraticky, Appellant.

—Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dubin, J.), rendered December 12, 1983, convicting him of reckless endangerment in the first degree, after a jury trial, and imposing sentence.

Judgment modified, on the law, by reducing the conviction to one of reckless endangerment in the second degree and by vacating the sentence imposed. As so modified, judgment affirmed and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for resentence.

In order to prove defendant’s guilt of reckless endangerment in the first degree under Penal Law § 120.25, the prosecution was required to demonstrate: (1) that the defendant’s reckless conduct was of an extreme nature, committed under circumstances "evincing a depraved indifference to human life”, (2) that the risk created by that conduct was one of the "death” of another person rather than of some other form of serious physical injury *(see,*Penal Law § 10.00 [10]), and (3) that the risk was "grave”, rather than merely "substantial” *(cf.*Penal Law § 120.20).

However, there was no testimony to support a finding that the officer, the person at whom defendant’s conduct was directed, was in imminent danger of death. The officer testified that the police car’s right front bumper and the left front bumper of defendant’s car collided. This occurred twice. Neither of the vehicles was disabled; both were capable of moving under their own power. Defendant left the scene in his car and subsequently the police car pursued him, but without success. Later on the officer operating the police vehicle complained of pain in his back and was taken to the hospital *760where it was determined that he had suffered a sprain. He was released after approximately one hour. Thereafter the officer took three days’ sick leave.

Nonetheless, facts proven by the prosecution do support a conviction of reckless endangerment in the second degree under Penal Law § 120.00. Accordingly, the conviction is reduced to reckless endangerment in the second degree (CPL 470.20 [4]). Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A1 5 D0 34 8 . MARK J . KERLI N v . CARTER BROW N et a l

.

Pri s o n i n m at e M ark Kerl i n at t em p t ed t o fi l e a p ro s e ci v il act i o n ag ai n s t W al k er

C o u n t y S u p eri o r Co urt Cl erk Cart er Bro wn , t h e Ci t y o f LaFay et t e, an d W al k er

Co u n t y , cl ai m i n g an i nt en t i o n al t o rt fo r t he d en i al of h i s co n s ti t u t i o n a l ri g h t s

. On

Feb ru ary 2 7

, 2 0 1 5

, t h e t ri al co u rt d i s m i s sed h i s p et i t i o n p u rs u an t to OCGA § 9 -1 5 -2
(d ). On Ap ri l 2

, 2 0 1 5

, Kerl i n fi l ed t h i s ap p l i cat io n fo r d i scret i o nary ap p eal

, s eek i n g

rev i ew o f t h e Feb ru ary

2 7 , 2 01 5 o rd er. 1 W e l ack ju ri s di ct i o n

. An ap p l icat i o n fo r di s cret i o n ary ap p eal m u s t b e fi l ed wi t h i n 3 0 d a y s o f t h e

en t ry o f t h e o rd er o r j u d gm en t t o b e ap peal ed

. See OCGA § 5 -6 -3 5 (d ). A p art y ’ s

fai l u re t o m e e t th i s s t at u t o ry dead l in e d ep ri v es u s o f ju ri s d i ct i o n to co n s i d er t h e

ap p li cat io n

. Hi l l v. S ta t e , 2 0 4 Ga. Ap p

. 5 82

, 5 8 3 (4 2 0 SE2 d 3 93 ) (1 99 2 ). Becau s e

Kerl i n fi l ed t h is ap p l i cat i o n 3 4 d ay s aft er en t ry of t h e o rd er h e wi s h es t o ap peal

, i t i s

u n t i m el y . Th e ap p l i cat i on i s t herefo re DISM ISSED fo r l ack o f ju ri s d i ct i o n

.

1 Becau s e h e was in carcerat ed w hen h e i n i ti at ed th i s act i o n , K erl in ’ s ap p eal i s

co n tro l l ed b y t h e Pri so n Li t i gat i o n Refo rm Act o f 1 9 9 6

, O CG A § 4 2 -1 2 -1 et s eq

. Un d er O CGA § 4 2 -1 2 -8

, “ [a] p p eal s o f al l a c t i o n s fi l ed b y p ri s o n ers s h al l b e as
p ro v id ed i n Co d e Sect i o n 5 -6 -3 5 ,” t h e d i s cret io n ary ap p eal s s t at u t e. April 28, 2015C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e
, A t la n t a
,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r t i f y t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a tr u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t

h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 04/28/2015
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

PAPA JOHN’S INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Delaware corporation, and PAPA JOHN'S
FOOD SERVICE, INC., a Kentucky
corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs. No. 04 C 3131

ANTOIN §, REZKO, an individual resident of
Illinois, et al.,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Defendants. )

ME A IM _ OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants Antoin Rezko and certain companies of which he is principal move to stay

discovery because Rezko has been indicted on charges related to this action. Plaintiff objects,

pointing out that the corporate defendants have no privilege against self-incrimination, Rezko

can always make an election to testify or not testify, and any delay greatly prejudices plaintiff.

We grant the stay, but we do so with a direction that all records of the corporate

defendants and all records in the possession of defendant Rezko that may reasonably be
deemed discoverable in this action be preserved.

We see no reason to dwell at length on the applicable law. It is well set forth in Cruz

y. County of DuPage, 1997 WL 370194 (N.D. ILL). The ruling on the stay is a discretionary

call, Here the two actions, in substantial respects, involve the same subject matter. Rezko has

been indicted. His companies have not been indicted and, in any event, have no privilege. But,

we are led to believe, they are out of business and any information from them would largely

require the assistance of Rezko. Because they are out of business there is little likelihood that


” No.04 C3131 Page 2

a delay will have any adverse effects on the public interest at stake. There is prejudice to
plaintiffs — if they are cntitled to recover, that recovery will be delayed and may be reduced
because the assets of defendants may have gone elsewhere. But delay in a civil action is not
uncommon and certainly is less prejudicial than forcing Rezko to testify or abandon any

meaningful defense by not testifying.

S3 JAMES B. MORAN
cnior Judge, U. S. District Court

Mash, 2007.
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#### In the Matter of the Claim of the Estate of Gaetano Mesi, Appellant, v Ro-Siu Construction, Inc., et al., Respondents. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

—Casey, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed February 27, 1985.

Decedent was employed as a laborer at a construction site located near the waterfront. While waiting for a load of concrete to be delivered, decedent decided to go swimming, *877apparently due to the heat. Decedent developed cramps and drowned. The Workers’ Compensation Board found that when decedent drowned, he was engaged in an activity which he had been instructed not to do, and that swimming was not part of or incidental to his employment. There is proof in the record that wash-up facilities were available to decedent and his co-workers, and that they had been instructed several times not to swim. Since the Board’s resolution of the factual issue of whether a particular activity is within the course of employment will be disturbed only if it is unsupported by substantial evidence *(Matter of Commissioner of Taxation & Fin. v Fisher,*89 AD2d 664, 665), the Board’s decision herein must be affirmed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.