UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LAWRENCE E. JAFFE PENSION PLAN, )

On Behalf of Itself and All Others Similarly )

Situated, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) No. 02 C 5893

)

HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., ) Judge Nan R. Nolan

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs have filed this securities fraud class action alleging that Defendants Household

International, Inc., Household Finance Corporation, and certain individuals (collectively,

“Household”) engaged in predatory lending practices between July 30, 1999 and October 11, 2002

(the “Class Period”). Currently before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of

Documents by Defendants’ Experts Pursuant to Plaintiffs’ Subpoenas. For the reasons set forth

below, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs seek to compel three of Defendants’ experts – Robert E. Litan, Carl A. LaSusa, and

John L. Bley – to produce documents pursuant to subpoenas issued on or about February 5, 2008.

The experts have all timely objected to the subpoenas on numerous grounds. (See Exs. 4-6 of Pl.’s

Mot.)

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the parties placed a joint call to chambers on

or about February 26, 2008 to discuss this issue, as well as a continuing dispute regarding

Defendants’ identification of 23 witnesses as non-retained “experts” pursuant to Judge Guzman’s

ruling in Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., No. 01 C 736, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85678 (N.D. Ill.

Nov. 16, 2006). At the time, the court was completely unaware of the subpoena dispute and had
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not received any motion, documentation, or other information about it. As usual, the parties

bickered extensively and tossed out numerous facts and arguments, and the court instructed

Plaintiffs to file an appropriate motion.

After receiving the motion, the court issued an Order addressing the Sunstar matter and

setting a short briefing schedule on the subpoena dispute. (Minute Order of 2/26/08, Doc. 1187.)

The court did not understand, however, that Mr. LaSusa was represented by separate counsel who

did not yet have an appearance on file in the case and who had never been contacted by Plaintiffs’

counsel for a meet and confer. The court appreciates that Mr. LaSusa’s counsel has prepared a

response to this motion despite receiving late notice of the court’s February 26, 2008 Order.

DISCUSSION

A. The Litan and Bley Subpoenas

The Litan and Bley subpoenas were not issued by this court and cannot properly be

enforced here. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 clearly states that “[i]f an objection [to a

subpoena] is made . . . the serving party may move the issuing court for an order compelling

production or inspection.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(2)(B)(i). The Litan subpoena was issued by the

district court for the Western District of Missouri, and the Bley subpoena was issued by the district

court for the Western District of Washington. (See Exs. 2 and 3 to Def. Resp.) Curiously, Plaintiffs

misleadingly omit these significant facts from the body of their motion. Contrary to Plaintiffs’

assertion, attachment of the experts’ objections with case captions from the other jurisdictions as

exhibits to the motion is not adequate notice to this court. Nor are the statements made by

Defendants’ counsel to the court’s law clerk during the contentious February 26, 2008 telephone

call.

 Plaintiffs argue that the subpoenas are properly before this court because the individuals

“are not uninterested, independent third parties” but, rather, are “paid experts.” (Pl. Reply, at 4.)

It is clear, however, that “a subpoena duces tecum issued pursuant to Rule 45 is an appropriate
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discovery mechanism against nonparties such as a party’s expert witness.” Expeditors Int’l of

Washington, Inc. v. Vastera, Inc., No. 04 C 321, 2004 WL 406999, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2004).

Plaintiffs have not cited a single case suggesting that this court can enforce Rule 45 subpoenas

issued by other jurisdictions merely because they are addressed to expert witnesses. To the extent

this is not the issuing court for the Litan and Bley subpoenas, and in light of the misleading nature

of Plaintiffs’ motion, the court will not address those two subpoenas here. See Steadfast Ins. Co.

v. Auto Marketing Network, Inc., No. 97 C 5696, 2001 WL 881354, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2001)

(“[T]his court lacks the power to enforce or modify subpoenas obtained from other district courts.”);

Lieberman v. American Dietetic Ass’n, No. 94 C 5353, 1995 WL 250414, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25,

1995) (“Nothing . . . authorizes this court to either enforce or modify subpoenas obtained from the

California district court.”) (emphasis in original).

B. The LaSusa Subpoena

The LaSusa subpoena did issue from this court, but it suffers from other defects. First, as

mentioned earlier, Plaintiffs never conducted a meet and confer session with Mr. LaSusa’s counsel

prior to bringing this motion, as required by Local Rule 37.2 and this court’s Standing Order on

Discovery Motions.

In addition, on March 30, 2007, the parties entered into a detailed Stipulation Regarding

Expert Discovery designed to “limit the scope of discoverable information relating to . . . experts’

opinions.” (Stipulation, Ex. 7 to Pl. Mot., ¶ 1.) Pursuant to the Stipulation, the parties agreed that

testifying experts would provide five categories of information: (1) expert reports; (2) a list of all

case-related materials relied upon by each expert, with corresponding Bates stamp numbers and

deposition pages, as well as copies of all other documents or information the expert relied upon;

(3) the compensation the expert received for the study and testimony; (4) the expert’s qualifications,

including a list of all publications authored within the preceding 10 years; and (5) a list of cases in

which the expert testified as an expert at trial, hearing, or deposition within the preceding four years.
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(Id. ¶ 2.) This largely mirrors the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). The parties also agreed that

if the expert had in his possession, custody or control reports submitted in the cases identified in

subpart 5, he would produce them along with the expert report in this case, unless subject to a

protective or confidentiality order. (Id. ¶ 3.) Finally, the parties agreed that the content of

communications between counsel and experts, and notes or other preliminary work created by, for,

or at the direction of the experts, need not be produced. (Id. ¶ 4.)

Plaintiffs now argue that the Stipulation does not serve as a limit on their ability to seek

additional documents from Defendants’ experts. (Pl. Mot. at 4.) Defendants disagree, arguing that

the Stipulation “clearly and unambiguously defines the bounds of the permissible scope of material

an expert is required to produce.” (Def. Resp., at 5.) “As with other contracts, courts interpret

stipulations according to the objective intentions of the parties.” United States v. Johnson, 396 F.3d

902, 905 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus, the court “do[es] not look beyond the four corners of the agreement

unless the stipulation is reasonably subject to more than one interpretation.” Id. Whether an

agreement is clear or ambiguous is a question of law. Kaplan v. Shure Bros., Inc., 266 F.3d 598,

604-05 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Frydman v. Horn Eye Ctr., Ltd., 286 Ill. App. 3d 853, 858, 676 N.E.2d

1355, 1359 (1st Dist. 1997)). “Courts will not find ambiguity in contractual language where none

exists, . . . and contract language will only be found ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible

to different constructions, not merely when the parties disagree as to its proper construction or

application.” Id. at 605 (citing In re Estate of Powless, 315 Ill. App. 3d 859, 864, 734 N.E.2d 111,

116 (5th Dist. 2000) and Allied Asphalt Paving Co. v. Village of Hillside, 314 Ill. App. 3d 138, 144,

731 N.E.2d 425, 429 (1st Dist. 2000)).

As noted, Paragraph 1 of the Stipulation states that the purpose of the agreement is “to limit

the scope of discoverable information relating to such experts’ opinions as follows.” The parties’

dispute focuses on the meaning of the phrase “as follows.” Plaintiffs insist that the phrase means

that expert discovery is limited as stated in the Stipulation, but otherwise not limited at all.
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Defendants counter that the phrase means that discovery is limited as stated in the Stipulation,

such that no other discovery is permissible.

Applying the above legal principles, and viewing the Stipulation as a whole, the court finds

no ambiguity in the agreement. Giving the phrase “as follows” its ordinary meaning, the Stipulation

sets forth the entire universe of discoverable information relating to the parties’ experts. Interim

Health Care of Northern Illinois, Inc. v. Interim Health Care, Inc., 225 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2000)

(“In Illinois, clear and unambiguous terms in a contract are given their ordinary and natural

meaning.”) (internal quotations omitted). The Stipulation details in the five paragraphs after the “as

follows” language both the experts’ required disclosures as well as information that need not be

disclosed. It is also states that the Stipulation does not prevent deposition questions relating to the

substance of the experts’ opinions, his compensation, his hours of preparation, or the frequency

and duration of meetings with counsel regarding the report. To the extent that paragraph 2 of the

Stipulation essentially parallels the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B), Plaintiffs’ proposed

interpretation to allow additional discovery would render the remainder of the Stipulation largely

meaningless. Illinois, however, “requires that contracts be interpreted as a whole, in a way that

gives effect to all terms, in the light of their ordinary and natural meanings.” LaSalle Nat’l Trust,

N.A. v. ECM Motor Co., 76 F.3d 140, 144 (7th Cir. 1996).

The Stipulation clearly sets forth the parties’ rights and responsibilities with respect to expert

disclosures and covers the scope of discoverable information in that regard. See Woods v.

Southwest Airlines, Co., 523 F. Supp. 2d 812, 821 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“Illinois contract law presumes

that a written agreement communicates the intent of the parties without a need to resort to extrinsic

evidence of the same.”) Thus, Plaintiffs’ subpoena for additional expert disclosures from Mr.

LaSusa is improper, and his objections are sustained. Plaintiffs of course remain free to pursue

areas of inquiry contemplated by the subpoena during Mr. LaSusa’s deposition.

CONCLUSION
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For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents by

Defendants’ Experts Pursuant to Plaintiffs’ Subpoenas [Doc. 1184] is denied.

ENTER:

Dated: March 10, 2008 ___________________________________

NAN R. NOLAN

United States Magistrate Judge