N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential. 

# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

__________________________
DAVID C. CORSON,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.
ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee.

__________________________

2010-7059

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Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in Case No. 08-2573, Judge Alan G. Lance, Sr.

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Decided: October 6, 2010

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D AVID C. C ORSON , of Chloe, West Virginia, pro se.

W ILLIAM P. R AYEL , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee.
With him on the brief were T ONY W EST , Assistant Attorney General, J EANNE E. D AVIDSON , Director, and A LAN J.CORSON v. DVA 2

L O R E , Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were

D AVID J. B ARRANS , Deputy Assistant General Counsel,
and Y. K EN L EE , Staff Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC.

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Before L OURIE , B RYSON , and D YK

, Circuit Judges

.
P ER C URIAM

.

David Corson (“Corson”) appeals from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“the Veterans Court”) affirm ing a June 19, 2008, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“the Board”) in which the Board dismissed Corson’s motion to revise an earlier, October 9, 2001, Board decision on grounds of clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”). Corson v. Shinseki , No. 08- 2573 (Vet. App. Jan. 5, 2010). We affirm

.

B ACKGROUND

Corson served on active duty in the United States Navy from October 1957 to December 1961. In April 1983, the Board denied Corson’s claims of entitlement to (1) service connection for a psychiatric disability and chronic brain syndrome, (2) an increased disability rating for postoperative residuals ofangiofibroma of the nasopharynx, and (3) a total di sability rating based upon individual unemployability. Corson did not appeal theBoard’s decision, but he subsequently requested its revision based on multiple allega tions of CUE. In October 2001, the Board concluded that there was no CUE in its earlier, 1983 decision. Corson then requested revision ofthe Board’s 2001 decision, again based on multiple allegations of CUE. In June 2008, the Board held Corson’sCORSON v. DVA 3

allegations of CUE to be an improper second collateralattack on the Board’s 1983 decision, and thus to be precluded by 38 C.F.R. § 20.1409(c) , which provides that once the Board renders a final decision on CUE, a claimant is prohibited from challenging that CUE determination on the same basis. Accordingly, the Board dismissed Corson’s claims with prejudice.

On January 5, 2010, the Veterans Court affirmed. The court agreed that Corson’s CUE allegations directed at the Board’s 2001 decision were improper attempts to relitigate theories of error in the Board’s 1983 decision, and thus the Board properly dismissed Corson’s claims based on principles of res judicata as reflected in§ 20.1409(c). The Veterans Court issued its final judgment on January 29, 2010, and Corson appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c).

D ISCUSSION

This court’s jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Court is limited by statute. 38 U.S.C. § 7292. We “have exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof [by the Veterans Court] . . . , and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.” Id. § 7292(c). We must hold unlawful and set aside any regulation or any interpretation thereof relied upon by
the Veterans Court that we fi nd to be “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contra ry to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limit ations, or in violation of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of procedure required by law.” Id. at § 7292(d)(1). We, however, “mayCORSON v. DVA 4

not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or re gulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2).

In this case, the Veterans Court ruled that Corson’schallenge to the Board’s October 2001 decision was precluded by 38 C.F.R. § 20.1409( c), which provides that“[o]nce there is a final decision on a [CUE] motion . . . relating to a prior Board decision on an issue, that prior Board decision on that issue is no longer subject to revision on the grounds of clear and unmistakable error.” Rather, “[s]ubsequen t motions relating to that prior Board decision on that issue shall be dismissed with prejudice.” Id. This court has upheld the validity of§ 20.1409(c), agreeing that the rule “promotes the interests of judicial economy and finality of decision.” Disabled
Am. Veterans v. Gober , 234 F.3d 682, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Corson challenges the Board’s application of § 20.1409(c), arguing that the Board incorrectly appliedthe regulation when it “reached a broad general determination rather than addressing . . . each separate reasonably raised issue of CUE” as required by 38 U.S.C.§ 7104(d)(1). We disagree. To the extent that the decisions of the Board and the Veterans Court interpreted § 20.1409(c) in applying the regulation, we see no error in their interpretation. On its face, § 20.1409(c) does notrequire each issue of CUE previously presented be addressed separately, but rather it requires that such claims must be dismissed with prejudice. That is what the Board did. Furthermore, Corson fails to explain how any alleged failure to set forth reasons and bases under § 7104(d)(1) could have “manifestly changed the outcome” of the Board’s decision as required for a determination of
CUE. Cook v. Principi , 318 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ( en banc ).CORSON v. DVA 5

Corson also alleges various constitutional violations, including violations of his due process rights under theFifth Amendment, and numerous statutory and regulatory violations. He further alleges that the VeteransAdministration conspired to violate his rights in retaliation for his filing a discrimination action against the
Administration. It is unclear how any of Corson’s allegations relate to the decision of the Veterans Court from which he appeals. To the extent that Corson is arguingthat the application of § 20.1409(c) violated his due process rights by denying him ve terans benefits, such anargument challenges the Board’s application of the regulation to the facts of this case, i.e. , it challenges the Board’s determination that Corson’s allegations of CUE amounted to no more than an attempt to relitigate hisprior CUE allegations directed at the 1983 Board decision. We lack jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

We have considered Corson’s other arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the
decision of the Veterans Court.

AFFIRMED

C OSTS

No costs.