NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appelle e,

v. JOEL L. BOYCE; DELYNN E. BOYCE,

Defendants

- Appellants. No. 14

- 56610

D.C. No. 2:13

- cv
- 00601

- MMM

JEM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 8, 2017 **

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Joel L. and Delynne E. Boyce appeal pro se from the district court ’ s summary judgment for the United States in its action to reduce to judgment federal

income tax assessments from tax years 1998 to 2008

. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the existence of subject matter

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. S ee Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 56610

jurisdiction and summary judgment

. Hughes v. United States , 953 F.2d 531, 541
(9th Cir. 1992) . W e affirm.

T he district court properly concluded that it had subject matter
jurisdiction over the action. See 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (district courts have such
jurisdiction to render judgments and decrees necessary or appropriate for the

enforcemen t of the internal revenue laws ).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the government to
reduce assessments to jud gment because the government submitted Form 4340 for
years 1998 to 2008 , an d the Boyces failed to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact as to the in sufficiency of the notice s of deficiencies and assessments for those

tax years. See Palmer v. IRS , 116 F .3d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997) (Internal
Revenue Service assessments for unpaid taxes entitled to presumption of
correctness unless taxpayer submits competent evidence that the assessments were

“a rbitrary, excessive, or without foundation”); see also Hughes , 953 F.2d at 535
(absent contrary evidence, official certificates, such as a Form 4340, constituted
proof of fact that assessments were actually and properly made)

.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the government to

foreclose on the tax lien, and properly order ed the sale of the Boyces ’ property ,3 14

- 56610

because the Boyces failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
there was a nominee relationship or fraudulent conveyance

. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 7403(a) , (c) ( authorizing district court to decree a sale of property subject to
federal tax lien according to its findings regarding the interests of all parties ); see

also Cal

. Civ. Code § 3439

. 04 (a)(1) (a transfer made by a debtor is voidable if it is

made with an “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the

debtor ” ) ; Fourth Inv

. LP v

. United States , 720 F

. 3d 1058 , 1069 ( 9th Cir

. 2013 )
(finding nominee relationship where taxpayer continued to exercise substantial
control over the property in question)

. We reject as without merit the Boyces ’ contentions concerning the
government’ s authority to bring this action and alleged judicial bias.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3 d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Boyces’ request for judicial notice, set forth in their opening brief, is

denied.

AFFIRMED.