Where the relief sought in an action to enforce an arbitration decision is nullification of
the award, the only appropriate avenue for such relief is a timely motion to vacate. Sullivan v.
Gilchrist, 87 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that failing
to challenge an arbitration decision within the applicable statute of limitations renders the award
final. Id. See also Sullivan v. Lemoncello, 36 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Thus, an unsuccessful party at arbitration may not, after failing to move to vacate the
unfavorable award, subsequently raise arguments as affirmative defenses that could have been
raised on a motion to vacate. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local
Union No. 135 v. Jefferson Trucking Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 1023, 1025-27 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating
that to hold otherwise would frustrate the purpose of according arbitration awards “finality in a
timely fashion”).

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, however, does not provide a
statute of limitations. See 29 U.SC. § 185, et. seg. Accordingly, courts have long turned to the
statute of limitations for a comparable action in the forum state. Gilchrist, 87 F.3d at 870. In
Illinois, the appropriate statute of limitations for challenging an arbitration award is the ninety-
day limit afforded by the Illinois Arbitration Act, 710 ILCS 5/12(b). Jd.

Two recent Seventh Circuit cases are directly on point in rejecting the defendants’
challenges to an arbitration award where they failed to timely file a motion to vacate. In
Lemoncello, the defendant received notice of two adverse arbitration board decisions yet refused
to comply with them. Lemoncello, 36 F.3d at 681-82. At no time, however, did the defendant
file any motions to vacate or modify the awards. Jd. Indeed, the defendant conceded that he

failed to challenge the award or the board’s authority to assess certain fines and penalties within

statute of limitations and the fact that Logwood and Stroube ~ as individual employees — filed the grievance,
therefore, has no impact on this Court’s determination of the relevant statute of limitations.


the evidence is merely colorable, is not significantly probative or merely raises “some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” summary judgment may be granted. Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S, at 261. When both parties seek summary judgment, the Court will “look to the burden
of proof that each party would bear on an issue at trial; [the Court] then require[s] that party to
go beyond the pleadings and affirmatively establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Santaella
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
US. 317 (1986)).
ANALYSIS

In its motion for summary judgment, Local 705 contends that Connor should be estopped
from attacking the JAGC decision sustaining Logwood and Stroube’s grievances, as Connor
failed to file a timely motion to vacate the JAGC decision.! According to Local 705, the relevant
statutory period for filing a motion to vacate is ninety days, pursuant to the Illinois Arbitration
Act, 710 ILCS 5/12(b). Connor concedes that it failed to move to vacate within ninety days, but
Connor argues that the relevant statute of limitations should be six months.” Alternatively,
Connor maintains that even if it is estopped from attacking the JAGC decision, this Court must
still determine whether the decision of the JAGC “draws its essence” from the collective

bargaining agreement.

! Because we hold that Connor’s failure to challenge the JAGC decision within ninety days renders its award final,
we need not reach Local 705’s arguments addressing the merits of the JAGC decision.

> Connor misreads Plumbers’ Pension Fund, Local 130, U.A. v. Domas Mechanical Contractors, Inc, 778 F.2d
1266, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985) as holding that where, as here, an individual employee files a grievance, the statute of
limitations should be six months. The Domas Court was merely distinguishing its case from DelCostello v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), where the Supreme Court held that the six month
limitations period embodied in 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act applied where individual employees
challenged awards in a § 301 duty of fair representation claim. Domas, 778 F.2d at 1268. The only significance to
the fact that an individual employee was filing suit was that the employee was seeking relief from actions of its
union and employer during arbitration. Jd. at 1270. According to Domas, the practicalities of that kind of suit
required a longer statute of limitations. /d. In the instant case, however, the practicalities do not require a longer


ninety days of receiving notice, but only contested the award after the plaintiff brought suit to
enforce the decisions. Jd. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant was barred
from challenging the plaintiff's action to enforce the board’s decisions. Jd. Similarly, in
Gilchrist, the defendants (two plumbing contractors) refused to comply with an award ordering
them to pay delinquent employee contributions. Gilchrist, 87 F.3d at 870-71. All of the parties
attended the arbitration hearing and multiple copies of the board’s decisions were sent to the
defendants. /d, When the plaintiff brought suit to enforce the award, the defendants contested
the arbitration board’s jurisdiction, the notice they received and the applicability of the collective
bargaining agreement following the purported retirement of one of the contractors. Jd. Finding
that adequate notice had been given and that the defendants’ challenges to jurisdiction and
applicability of the agreement amounted to nothing more than challenges to the arbitration
board’s authority, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendants were bound by the ninety-day
statute of limitations and that they were barred from seeking relief in the plaintiff's action to
enforce the award. Jd.

The instant case is similar to both Lemoncello and Gilchrist. As in Gilchrist, where all of
the parties were present at the arbitration proceeding, Connor and Local 705 were in attendance
and given ample opportunity to present their arguments. All of the parties, moreover, were
undeniably aware of the final JAGC decision ordering Connor to reinstate Logwood and Stroube.
Only now, after Local 705 has filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the JAGC decision, does
Connor contest the awards and ask this Court to deny relief. Specifically, Connor argues that
there was no collective bargaining agreement in effect and, alternatively, that both Logwood and
Stroube were on probation, not covered by the contract’s grievance procedures and dischargeable

without cause. Such arguments are nothing more than challenges to the JAGC’s authority under


inate Geter Form (0997)
Jy United States District Court, Northern District of Iinois

1 . "
img of Assigned Jud; i Sitting Judge if Oth
Pnporwsinc ini | Ruben Castillo ing Joe
Vv
CASE NUMBER 01 C 5327 DATE 3/5/2002
CASE Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers Filing Station and Platform Workers Union, Local 705,
TITLE vs. A.D. Connor, Inc.

of the motion being presented.]

[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

prejudice.

al) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:
qa) qo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) a Brief in support of motion due
(3) im] Answer brief to motion due__._ Reply to answer brief due
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon____sset for at
(S) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor_ at.
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__—sat_—
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on____at
(8) ao [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at
(9) im} This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(n) General Rule 21 CUFRCP41(a)(1) ) FRCP41(a)(2).
co) + [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment [14-1] is denied. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment [18-1] is granted. Judgment is
hereby entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. This case is hereby dismissed with

No notices required, advised in open court

i wired,
No notices req: number of notices

Document
Number

Notices mailed by judge’s staff. MAR 0 6 200 7]

Notified counsel! by tefephone. date docketed

v Docketing to mail notices.

v Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge

date mailed notice
courtroom

RO deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy iniiats



the collective bargaining agreement to reinstate Logwood and Stroube. See Gilchrist, 87 F.3d at
870-71. Even more importantly, at no time did Connor challenge the award through an action to
vacate. Indeed, just like the defendant in Lemoncello, Connor admits to having not filed a
motion to vacate within ninety days. See Lemoncello, 36 F.3d at 681-82. Only now, ina
subsequent action to enforce the JAGC decision, does Connor seek affirmative relief.
Accordingly, Connor is barred from contesting the authority of the JAGC to issue an award
reinstating Stroube and Logwood, and Connor’s failure to challenge the JAGC decision within
ninety days renders it final.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Connor’s motion for summary judgment is denied, (R. 14-1),

and Local 705’s motion for summary judgment is granted, (R 18-1). The Clerk of the Court is

instructed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff.

ENTERED: THA Z

Judge Ruben Castillo
United States District Court

Dated: March 5, 2002


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TRUCK DRIVERS, OEL DRIVERS
FILLING STATION AND PLATFORM
WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 705,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO

DOCK rEy

MAR 06 2002

Plaintiff,
No. 01 C 5327
ve
Judge Ruben Castillo
A.D. CONNOR, INC.

Defendant.

we SSS SS eS SY

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers Filling Station and Platform Workers Union, Local
705, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO (“Local 705”) brought this action
pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 et. seg., against
Defendant A.D. Connor, Inc. (“Connor”), seeking to enforce a decision of a Joint Area
Grievance Committee (“the JAGC”) compelling Connor to reinstate two employees represented
by Local 705. Currently before this Court are Local 705 and Connor’s motions for summary
judgment. For the reasons stated herein, we grant Local 705’s motion, (R. 18-1), and deny
Connor’s motion, (R. 14-1).

RELEVANT FACTS

Connor is engaged in the fuel hauling business. (R. 16-1, Def.’s Statement of Facts § 12-
13.) Local 705 is a union representing some of Connor’s drivers. (/d., Ex. G.) Grievant Cedric
A. Logwood was hired by Connor on December 29, 1999. (/d. 4 14.) Grievant Brian R. Stroube

was hired by Connor on October 17, 2000. (Ud. 4 15.) Both Logwood and Stroube were


a

discharged — Logwood on April 28, 2000 and Stroube on February 5, 2001. (R. 20-1, Pl.’s
Statement of Facts { 8.) Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between Connor and
Local 705, both Logwood and Stroube grieved their terminations, alleging that they were fired
without cause. (/d. | 8.) Under this agreement, unresolved grievances are to be heard by the
JAGC. (Id. 96.) Decisions of the JAGC are final and binding. (Id. J 7.) A JAGC hearing took
place on March 13, 2001, at which Logwood and Stroube presented their grievances. (/d. ¥ 9.)
Joe Malone, Connor’s advocate, was present at the hearing. (R 33-1, Def.’s Statement of Facts {
27.) Mike Bovenizer, a Local 705 representative, was present on behalf of the union and the
grievants. (R. 20-1, Pl.’s Statement of Facts { 10.) Each party’s advocate had an opportunity to
present their arguments to the JAGC. (/d. 411.) The JAGC sustained Logwood and Stroube’s
grievances and ordered Connor to reinstate both employees with backpay. (/d.) Since then,
Connor has refused to comply with the JAGC decision. id. 12). As a result, Local 705
filed a complaint in federal court seeking enforcement of the JAGC decisions. (R-1.) Currently
before this Court are Local 705 and Connor’s motions for summary judgment.
LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue for trial exists only when the “evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor.

Crim, v. Bd. of Educ. of Cairo Sch. Dist. No. 1, 147 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 1998). If, however,