present for the purchase of the rings and that Meyers and Risch each currently possessed a ring.
(Def.’s 56.1 96.)

Wagner and Gardner subsequently interviewed Meyers and Risch. (Pl.’s 56.1 7.) Risch
admitted being present at the flea market but denied ever possessing the rings. (Def.’s 56.1 97; Pl.’s
56.1 4 9.)

Initially, Meyers admitted being present at the flea market but denied ever possessing the
rings. (Def.’s 56.1 9.8; Pl.’s 56.1 49.) On May 16, 2001, Meyers admitted that he had possessed a
two-carat diamond ring and had given it to his girlfriend, Delores Henry. (Def.’s 56.1 99; Pl.’s 56.1
710.)

On May 17, 2001, Meyers provided Wagner and Gardner with a written statement. (Def.’s
56.1 § 9; Pl.’s 56.1 4 10.) In his written statement, Meyers stated that Risch gave him a two-carat
diamond ring which Meyers gave to Henry. (Pl.’s 56.1 410.) Meyers stated that Henry removed the
diamond from the stolen ring and placed it in one of her own rings. (Pl.’s 56.1 § 10.) According to
Meyers’ statement, Henry then gave the ring in which she had placed the stolen diamond to her
brother, Robert Thompson, in exchange for a car and that Robert Thompson then placed the stolen
diamond in his wife’s, Beverly Thompson’s, wedding ring. (P1.’s 56.1 § 10.) Meyers stated that he
believed Thompson wore her wedding set on her left hand. (PI.’s 56.1 § 10.)

On May 17, 2001, Meyers gave Wagner and Gardner a ring setting containing a cubic
zirconia stone, which Meyers stated was the stolen ring from which Henry had removed the
diamond. (PI.’s 56. 1 { 12.)

After speaking with Meyers on May 17, 2001, Gardner and Wagner went to the Kroger’s

bakery to question Thompson. (Def.’s 56.1 10; Pl.’s 56.1 4 13.) Neither Wagner nor Gardner had

-4-


them barred if a reasonable officer could have believed that, in light of the facts and circumstances
within the Officers’ knowledge at the time of the arrest and clearly established law, Thompson had
committed or was committing an offense. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). A reasonable but mistaken belief that probable
cause exists is sufficient for entitlement to qualified immunity. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227. In cases
involving the issue of whether probable cause existed to support an arrest, “the case should not be
permitted to go to trial if there is any reasonable basis to conclude that probable cause existed.”
McDonnell v, Cournia, 990 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Cross v. City of Des Moines, 965
F.2d 629, 632 (8th Cir. 1992)). The question of immunity is one for the court. Hunter, 502 U.S. at
228.

“Federal law asks only whether the officers had probable cause to believe that the predicate
offense, as the state has defined it, has been committed.” Williams y. Jaglowski, 269 F.3d 778, 782
(7th Cir. 2001) (citing Richardson y. Bonds, 860 F.2d 1427, 1432 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988)). A person
obstructs a police officer when he or she “knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one
known to the person to be a peace officer . . . of any authorized act within his official capacity
commits a Class A misdemeanor.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat 5/31-1(a) (2002). A person who merely
argues with the police officer about the validity of the arrest does not commit the crime of
obstruction. People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 399 (1968). Rather, obstruction requires “some physical
act which imposes an obstacle which may impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent or delay the
performance of the officer’s duties, such as going limp, forcefully resisting arrest or physically aiding
a third party avoid arrest.” Raby, 40 Ill. 2d at 399. An act of physical resistance is necessary; silence

“in the face of requests for identifying information, or even supplying false information, is not

9.


Gardner believed that Thompson was committing, or about to commit, the crime of
obstruction when she would not permit them to take the rings, said she was going to call her
husband, and began to walk away. (Pl.’s 56.1 § 29.) Wagner testified that he arrested her because
he suspected the diamond on her left hand was stolen and that she was going to conceal or destroy
it or leave the premises altogether. (P1.’s 56.1 4 29.)

Thompson agreed to calm down, remain with the Officers without handcuffs, and remove
her diamond rings and give the rings to them. (Def.’s 56.1 {J 18, 19; Pl.’s 56.1 433.) Wagner and
Gardner removed the handcuffs and seized the rings but continued to keep Thompson in custody.
(PL’s 56.1 134.) Thompson was handcuffed for a total of five to ten minutes. (Def.’s 56.1 20.)
She did not sustain any physical injuries from the handcuffs or the removal of the rings. (Def.’s 56.1
{21,)

Wagner read Thompson her Miranda rights, as a “safeguard” to protect Wagner and Gardner
in case Thompson felt like she was not free to leave. (P1.’s 56.1 135.) Wagner asked Thompson to
sign a waiver of her Miranda rights, but Thompson refused as she was too upset to understand her
rights. (Def.’s 56.1 22; Pl.’s 56.1 36.) However, Thompson indicated that she would speak with
the Officers. (Pl.’s 56.1 § 36.) Thompson again asked the Officers if she could telephone her
husband. (PI.’s 56.1 4 36.)

Wagner and Gardner walked Thompson out of the building and placed her in a squad car.
(P1.’s 56.1 437.) Thompson was in the squad car for about ten minutes. (Def.’s 56.1 § 24.)

Robert Thompson arrived and saw his wife in the squad car. (P1.’s 56.1 ]38.) He spoke with
Wagner outside of the car while Gardner kept Thompson in the car. (P1.’s 56.1 38.) Mr. Thompson

signed a property receipt, and Officers Wagner and Gardner retained the rings. (Pl.’s 56.1 39.)

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met Thompson before May 17, 2001. (Def.’s 56.1 4 10.)

Wagner and Gardner approached Thompson at the Kroger bakery and introduced themselves
as police officers. (Def.’s 56.1 11; Pl.’s 56.1 4 19.) Wagner asked to speak to Thompson privately,
and she led him and Gardner to the customer waiting area of the Kroger pharmacy. (Def.’s 56.1
13; Pl.’s 56.1 § 19.) Wagner and Gardner saw that Thompson was wearing two diamond rings, one
on each hand, (PI.’s 56.120.) Wagner told Thompson that they believed that she was in possession
of a stolen diamond and asked for her permission to take both her rings for identification. (Def.’s
56.1 4 14; Pl.’s 56.1 ] 20.) Wagner also explained that the diamond would be returned to her if it
was not stolen. (Def.’s 56.1 4] 14.) Wagner and Gardner told Thompson that she was not under arrest
and that if she admitted her guilt she would not be arrested that day. (Pl.’s 56.1 424.)

Thompson informed Wagner and Gardner that the rings she wore belonged to her and that
she had proof. (P1.’s 56.1 [25.) She held out both hands and permitted Wagner and Gardner to look
them over. (PI.’s 56.1 25.) Wagner and Gardner could not determine whether Thompson was
wearing contraband as neither officer had training or special knowledge about gems or jewelry. (Pl.’s
56.1926.)

Wagner and Gardner continued to ask Thompson to permit them to take her rings, and she
continued to refuse. (Pl.’s 56.1 27.) Wagner and Gardner testified that this caused them to be
concerned that Thompson would hide the rings. (Def.’s 56.1 § 16.)

Thompson then told the Officers that she wanted to call her husband and rose from the chair
and began to walk away from the area where they remained seated. (Pl.’s 56.1 § 28.) Wagner
blocked Thompson from leaving, and he and Gardner secured her in handcuffs. (Def.’s 56.1 § 17;

Pl.’s 56.1 9.28.)


probable cause. Carrillo, 269 F.3d at 766 (citing United States v. Faison, 195 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir.
1999)). Whether probable cause exists “turns on the information known to the officers at the
moment the arrest [was] made, not on subsequently received information.” Carrillo, 269 F.3d at 766
(citing Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 2000)). The determination of the existence
of probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances. Carrillo, 269 F.3d at 766-67 (citing
United States v. Scott, 19 F.3d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1994)). Because the issue of whether probable
cause for an arrest existed is linked to the determination of whether the arresting officers are shielded
from liability in a § 1983 action by qualified immunity, the two issues will be analyzed together
below.

Qualified immunity shields police officers “‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Sparing, 266 F.3d at 687 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609

(1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))). The defense of qualified

«e »

immunity is not available to “‘the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.
Sparing, 266 F.3d at 688 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

The plaintiff bears the burden of defeating an assertion of qualified immunity. Sparing, 166
F.3d at 688 (citations omitted). “When presented with a defense of qualified immunity, courts must
(1) determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and
(2) if so, determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”
Sparing, 266 F.3d at 688 (citations omitted). The right to be free from arrest without probable cause

is well-settled.

The Officers will be entitled to qualified immunity, and Thompson’s § 1983 action against

-8-


2. Minte-Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Minois

Name of Assigned Judge John W. Darrah Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge . than Assigned Judge
~ CASE NUMBER 01 C 4266 DATE 3/21/2002
CASE BEVERLY THOMPSON vs. DAVID E. WAGNER
Ss TITLE
Lin the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, eg., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}
(2) im) Brief in support of motion due
(3) Qo Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) im} Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(7) i) Trial{set for/re-set for] on at
(8) oO {Bench/Jury trial} [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) © General Rule21 OFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) [Other docket entry] Defendants’ Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a) motion to stay
proceedings is denied as moot. Jury trial set for 3/25/02 is vacated. Enter Memorandum Opinion And
Order. !laintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted.
adlj @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices reqnived, umber of nies
Notices maile.! hy: judge’staff. MAR 2.5 2002
Notified course! by telephone.
oj} Docketing to mail notices,
oY | Mail AO 456 form. \ \0
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom date mailed notice
LG deputy’s ud
initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office mailing deputy initials



investigate the theft of the diamond ring. Thompson was, as Meyers reported, wearing a diamond
ring on her left hand which could be easily lost or concealed. It was reasonable for Wagner and
Gardner to believe, at that time, that Thompson might be leaving the area not to call her husband but
to dispose of stolen property.

It is immaterial that it was later discovered that neither the ring produced by Meyers nor
Thompson’s rings could have been one of the stolen rings. This inquiry is focused on what Wagner
and Gardner knew at the time of the arrest. On May 17, 2001, they had reason to believe that one
of the stolen diamonds might be in the possession of Thompson. They were told this by Meyers who
had admitted to them that he had previously been in possession of the stolen ring in question and had
produced what he stated, and what the Officers also had reason to believe, was one of the stolen ring
settings. Thus, there was a reasonable basis to conclude that probable cause existed; and, therefore,
Wagner and Gardner are entitled to qualified immunity.

Because this Court has determined that the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, itneed

not reach the issue of whether Wagner and Gardner actually had probable cause.

-ll-


enough to constitute obstruction.” Williams, 269 F.3d at 782.

There was some reasonable basis for the Officers to conclude that probable cause existed,
that Thompson was in possession of stolen property and committing or was about to commit the
crime of obstruction. Berry, who had confessed to stealing the rings by deceptive practice, had told
the Officers that he had given the rings to Meyers and Risch. Meyers corroborated Berry’s story,
telling the Officers that he had possessed one of the stolen rings and had given it to his girlfriend
who gave it to Thompson’s husband.

Thompson argues that Wagner and Gardner lacked probable cause because the stolen rings
contained 1.05- and 1.08-carat diamonds and that Meyers’ written statement described a two-carat
diamond. Thompson further argues that no reasonable officer would have mistaken a two-carat for
a one-carat diamond. The fact that Meyers told the Officers that the ring was a two-carat and not a
one-carat diamond is immaterial. Neither Officer had special knowledge or training about gems or
jewelry. Furthermore, Thompson has not presented any evidence that a two-carat diamond looks
significantly different than a one-carat diamond to the untrained eye.

When the Officers spoke with Thompson, after introducing themselves as police officers, she
was wearing two diamond rings, one of which they believed might be the stolen ring. When Wagner
and Gardner told Thompson that they believed that she might be in possession of a stolen diamond
ring, Thompson objected and attempted to walk away from them to call her husband. Wagner
blocked her path and put her in handcuffs. When Thompson attempted to walk away, she committed
the physical act necessary to constitute obstruction of a peace officer.

Moreover, there was some reasonable basis for the Officers to believe that Thompson’s

walking away might impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent or delay their performance of their duty to

-10-


They then released Thompson from custody. (Pl.’s 56.1 ¢ 39.)

On May 18, 2001, Mr. Thompson faxed the diamond insurance documentation to Wagner
and Gardner, (P1.’s 56.1 4 41.) After examination, it was determined that the diamond in the
wedding set belonged to Thompson, and the rings were returned to her. (Def.’s 56.1 26; PI.’s 56.1
942.)

DISCUSSION

Thompson has moved for summary judgment. Thompson argues that summary judgment
is appropriate because the Officers lacked probable cause to arrest her and seize her jewelry, and her
arrest and the seizure of her jewelry without a warrant was unreasonable and not within one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement.

The Officers have also moved for summary judgment. They argue that summary judgment
is appropriate because there was probable cause for Thompson’s arrest for obstructing a peace officer
and that they are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions on May 17, 2001.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend.
IV. Warrantless arrests in public places are permitted under the Fourth Amendment if the arresting
officer has probable cause. Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-24 (1976)). Probable cause for an arrest exists
if the officer “reasonably believe[s], in light of the facts and circumstances within [the officer’s]
knowledge at the time of the arrest, that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.””
United States. v. Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 236
F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 2001)). Police officers may draw reasonable inferences based on their

training and experiences in determining whether suspicious circumstances rise to the level of

-7-


criminal proceeding. (P1.’s 56.1 14.)

Wagner and Gardner were members of the Kane County Sheriff’s Department (“the
Department”) and acting under color of state law at all relevant times. (Pl.’s 56.194.) Wagner had
worked for the Department for approximately eight or nine years and before that had worked as a
United States Marshal. (P].’s 56.144.) Wagner was a detective and Gardner’s supervisor. (Pl.’s 56.1
4.) Gardner was a detective and had worked for the Department for about four or five years. (PI.’s
56.194.)

On December 8, 2000, a complaint of deceptive practice was made by Diane Richardson to
the Kane County Sheriff's Office (“Sheriff's Office”). (Def.’s 56.1 § 1.) Ms. Richardson reported
that on December 2 and 3, 2000, some individuals had used bad checks to purchase two diamond
rings at her booth at the Kane County Flea Market. (Def.’s 56.1 J 1.) Officer Seidleman of the
Sheriff's Office prepared a report. (Def.’s 56.1 J 1.) This report was forwarded to Wagner for
investigation. (Def.’s 56.1 2.)

Wagner spoke with Ms. Richardson on December 15, 2000, and obtained copies of the
checks which had been written for the rings and descriptions of the rings. (Def.’s 56.193.) One
ring was a men’s ring with a 1.05 carat diamond, allegedly worth approximately $6,405. (Pl.’s 56.1
5.) The other was a women’s ring with a 1.08 carat diamond. (PI.’s 56.1 45.)

The checks had been written by Chuck Berry (“Berry”) for a total of $10,475. (Def.’s 56.1
44.) On December 21, 2000, Wagner and Gardner met with Berry at the Sheridan Correctional
Center, where he was being held on unrelated charges. (Def.’s 56.195.) After waiving his Miranda
rights, Berry confessed to writing the checks used to purchase the two diamond rings in question.

(Def.’s 56.196.) Berry also stated that Calvin Meyers (“Meyers”) and Jeremy Risch (“Risch”) were

3.


v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 150 (7th Cir. 1994). “One of the principal purposes
of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses
....” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Thus, although the moving party on a
motion for summary judgment is responsible for demonstrating to the court why there is no genuine
issue of material fact, the non-moving party must go beyond the face of the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file to demonstrate through specific
evidence that there remains a genuine issue of material fact and show that a rational jury could return
a verdict in the non-moving party’s favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-27; Anderson vy. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-56 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1994).

Disputed facts are material when they might affect the outcome of the suit. First Ind.
Bank v. Baker, 957 F.2d 506, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1992). When reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, a court must view all inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable
to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48; Popovits v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 185
F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 1999). However, a metaphysical doubt will not suffice. Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 586. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative or is no more
than a scintilla, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250.

BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1(a) & (b) statements of material
facts (referred to herein as “Pl.’s 56.1” and “Def.’s 56.1”) and exhibits are as follows.

Plaintiff, Thompson, has worked as a cake decorator at a Kroger grocery store in Ottawa,

Illinois, for approximately twenty years. (Pl.’s 56.1 § 14.) She has never been a defendant in a

2-


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

EASTERN DIVISION DORKE
) .
BEVERLY THOMPSON, ) MAR 25 2002
)
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 01 C 4266
)
v. ) The Honorable John W. Darrah
)
DAVID E. WAGNER, Star No. 634, and )
KEITH GARDNER, Star No. 182, )
)
Defendants, )
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Beverly Thompson (“Thompson”), filed a two-count amended complaint against
Defendants, David E. Wagner (“Wagner”) and Keith Gardner (“Gardner) (collectively “Officers”),
alleging violation of her civil rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
Count I alleges that Thompson’s arrest without probable cause deprived her of her rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Count II alleges that the seizure of her rings
without probable cause also deprived her of her rights under the Fourth Amendment.

Thompson and the Officers have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons that follow, Thompson’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied, and the Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there remains no genuine issue of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cincinnati Ins. Co.

. 30


CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Jo! . Darrah, Judge
United States District Court
Date: Gin lo) 200%

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