Filed 07/22/20 by Clerk of Supreme Court 

IN THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA 

2020 ND 162 

In the Interest of Edward Skorick 

Tessa M. Vaagen, Assistant State’s Attorney, Petitioner and Appellee 

 v. 

Edward Skorick, Respondent and Appellant 

No. 20190349 

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable James S. Hill, Judge. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice. 

Tessa M. Vaagen, Assistant State’s Attorney, Bismarck, ND, petitioner and 

appellee. 

Tyler J. Morrow, Grand Forks, ND, for respondent and appellant. 
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Interest of Skorick 

No. 20190349 

VandeWalle, Justice. 

[¶1] Edward Skorick appealed from a district court order civilly committing 

him as a sexually dangerous individual. Skorick argues the court erroneously 

considered experts’ reports in making its decision. We reverse and remand for 

further proceedings.

I 

[¶2] In September 2018, the State petitioned to have Skorick civilly 

committed as a sexually dangerous individual. Two experts, Dr. Richard Travis 

and Dr. Stacey Benson, submitted reports and each opined that Skorick met 

the criteria of a sexually dangerous individual and recommended that Skorick 

be committed as a sexually dangerous individual.

[¶3] Dr. Travis testified at the September 2019 hearing about his report 

relating to his opinion that Skorick is a sexually dangerous individual. After 

Dr. Travis’ testimony on direct examination, Skorick’s attorney moved to strike 

Dr. Travis’ report, claiming the State did not offer his report into evidence at 

the hearing. The State argued it was not required to admit the report as an 

exhibit because the report was filed in the Odyssey system in 2018. The district 

court denied the motion and stated Dr. Travis’ report would stand as part of 

the record. 

[¶4] In October 2019, the district court issued an order finding Skorick 

engaged in sexually predatory conduct, he has a congenital or acquired 

condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or 

other mental disorder or dysfunction, and his conditions make him likely to 

engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct that pose a danger to 

others. The court also found Skorick continues to have serious difficulty 

controlling his behavior. The court ordered Skorick civilly committed as a 

sexually dangerous individual. 
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II 

[¶5] Skorick argues the district court erred by considering Dr. Benson’s and 

Dr. Travis’ reports in finding Skorick was a sexually dangerous individual. 

[¶6] A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit or 

exclude evidence. State v. Muhammad, 2019 ND 159, ¶ 6, 931 N.W.2d 181. A 

court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, unconscionably, or 

unreasonably, it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or when its decision is 

not based on a rational mental process leading to a reasoned decision. Larson 

v. Larson, 2016 ND 76, ¶ 32, 878 N.W.2d 54. 

[¶7] Civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals is governed by 

N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. “At the commitment proceeding, any testimony and 

reports of an expert who conducted an examination are admissible, including 

risk assessment evaluations.” N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13. “The effect of this 

language is to allow the admission of expert reports which would otherwise be 

excluded from admission as hearsay pursuant to N.D.R.Ev. 807.” Matter of 

Gomez, 2018 ND 16, ¶ 15, 906 N.W.2d 87. 

[¶8] Civil commitment proceedings are civil in nature, and the North Dakota 

Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Gomez, 2018 ND 16, ¶ 10, 906 N.W.2d 87. 

Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 61, no error in admitting or excluding evidence is grounds 

for vacating a judgment or order. All errors and defects that do not affect a 

party’s substantial rights are harmless errors and must be disregarded. 

N.D.R.Civ.P. 61. If evidence was erroneously admitted, we will consider the 

entire record and decide in light of all the evidence whether the error was so 

prejudicial the defendant’s rights were affected and a different result would 

have occurred absent the error. State v. Azure, 2017 ND 195, ¶ 22, 899 N.W.2d 

294. 

[¶9] Here, it appears the district court relied on Dr. Benson’s and Dr. Travis’ 

reports in making its decision. The district court’s memorandum decision and 

order stated that although Dr. Benson did not testify at the hearing, the court 

“received and reviewed her report.” The court’s order also states, “The [report] 

of each psychologist was reviewed extensively by the court in preparation for 
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the hearing and again following the hearing. The findings that follow are based 

upon a weighing of the testimony and credibility of each psychologist in light 

of their respective evaluative findings.” 

[¶10] The State concedes the district court may have erroneously considered 

Dr. Benson’s report. The State did not offer the report into evidence at the 

commitment hearing; however, it argues any error in considering the report 

was harmless. But the court’s order specifically mentioned Dr. Benson’s report 

seven times in its findings of fact. To the extent the court relied on Dr. Benson’s 

report in making its decision, we cannot conclude its reliance on the report was 

harmless. We conclude the court abused its discretion in considering Dr. 

Benson’s report. 

[¶11] With regard to Dr. Travis’ report, the State did not offer it into evidence, 

and the district court’s order is silent on whether it was part of the hearing 

record. The court denied Skorick’s motion to strike Dr. Travis’ report at the 

commitment hearing and stated “[t]he report stands as part of the record.” It 

is unclear whether the court meant the report was part of the complete record 

before the court or the hearing record. Because we are uncertain whether Dr. 

Travis’ report was admitted at the hearing, we reverse and remand for a 

determination of whether the report was part of the hearing record. If not, the 

court must make findings on whether Skorick is a sexually dangerous 

individual on the basis of Dr. Travis’ testimony at the hearing. 

III 

[¶12] The order is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

[¶13] Gerald W. VandeWalle 

Jerod E. Tufte 

Daniel J. Crothers 

Jon J. Jensen, C.J. 

 
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McEvers, Justice, dissenting. 

[¶14] I respectfully dissent. I agree the district abused its discretion in 

considering Dr. Benson’s report because it was never offered into evidence. 

Majority, at ¶ 10. Even assuming the court abused its discretion in considering 

Dr. Travis’ report, I would affirm because the error is harmless. 

[¶15] The appellant has the burden to establish not only the trial court erred, 

but also the error was highly prejudicial. Howes v. Kelly Services, Inc., 2002 

ND 208, ¶ 3, 654 N.W.2d 422. Even when the district court abuses its 

discretion in admitting evidence it is not reversible error unless “all the 

competent evidence is insufficient to support the judgment or unless it 

affirmatively appears that the incompetent evidence induced the court to make 

an essential finding which would not otherwise have been made.” Interest of 

J.S.L., 2009 ND 43, ¶ 25, 763 N.W.2d 783 (relying on N.D.R.Civ.P. 61 setting 

forth rule on harmless error) (citations omitted). “Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 61, no 

error in admitting or excluding evidence is ground for granting a new trial or 

otherwise disturbing a judgment or order.” Solwey v. Solwey, 2018 ND 82, ¶ 

23, 908 N.W.2d 690. I am not convinced the court was induced by either of the 

reports in making its findings. 

[¶16] In order to determine whether the district court’s error was harmless, 

we must consider what findings are required and look at the findings made 

and evidence on which they were based. This was an involuntary commitment 

hearing under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3, which authorizes commitment if the 

person is found to be a “sexually dangerous individual.” See Matter of Barrera, 

2008 ND 25, ¶ 5, 744 N.W.2d 744. 

A “sexually dangerous individual” is defined by a three-part test: 

(1)the individual has engaged in sexually predatory conduct; 

(2)the individual has a congenital or acquired condition that is 

manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other 

mental disorder or dysfunction; and 
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(3)the disorder makes the individual likely to engage in further 

acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to 

the physical or mental health or safety of others. 

Id. (relying on Matter of Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 22, 730 N.W.2d 570 and 

N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8)). This Court has construed the definition of a sexually 

dangerous individual to mean “proof of a nexus between the requisite disorder 

and dangerousness encompasses proof that the disorder involves serious 

difficulty in controlling behavior.” Matter of G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶ 18, 711 

N.W.2d 587 (discussing the due process requirements of Kansas v. Crane, 534 

U.S. 407 (2002)). 

[¶17] The district court found Dr. Travis testified extensively and persuasively 

at the hearing regarding the contents of his report. The court indicated its 

findings of fact were based upon a weighing of the testimony and the credibility 

of each psychologist in light of their respective evaluative findings. 

[¶18] In its finding on the first statutory element, the district court referred to 

Dr. Travis’ testimony regarding Skorick’s history of predatory conduct stating, 

“Dr. Travis testified that Mr. Skorick has a documented history of acting out 

sexually as an adolescent and has a clear history of sexually predatory 

conduct.” The court then goes on to observe neither Dr. Travis nor Dr. Benson 

dispute Skorick’s convictions satisfy the element for “sexually predatory 

conduct.” It is hard to imagine how considering Dr. Benson’s report, which was 

consistent with Dr. Travis’ testimony, could be prejudicial to Skorick. 

[¶19] In its finding on the second statutory element, the district court again 

considered the reports of Dr. Travis and Dr. Benson, which provided similar, 

but not identical diagnoses. The court stated: “While the diagnoses are not 

identical, there are some similarities and Dr. Travis testified persuasively 

regarding his reasoning for his determination.” The further found: 

Dr. Travis testified that these diagnoses are evidenced by his 

extensive criminal history that included numerous offenses of 

sexual acts against prepubescent and pubescent female victims. . . 

. . Dr. Travis expressed that he is particularly concerned because 

Mr. Skorick continues to commit sexual acts despite the 
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consequences that follow for his actions and he even continues to 

commit sexual acts while in the NDDOCR. 

[¶20] Again, I fail to see the prejudice to Skorick by the district court 

considering the reports, when ultimately it was Dr. Travis’ testimony the court 

found persuasive in making its finding on the second element. 

[¶21] In regard to the third statutory element, the district court again 

considered Dr. Travis’ and Dr. Benson’s reports which came to similar results. 

The court noted that Dr. Travis explained through his testimony Skorick is 

“well above average risk to reoffend,” and his mental health disorders and his 

pattern of sexually predatory conduct show that Skorick cannot control his 

behavior in the community and he will likely reoffend. The court also noted, 

Dr. Travis testified to the fact that Skorick takes no ownership for his past 

behavior and shows no remorse for his victims which shows Skorick’s antisocial 

personality disorder continues to be a problem and will continue to aggravate 

his other disorders. Because Dr. Travis’ testimony was adequate to meet this 

element, Skorick has failed to show he was prejudiced. In addition, in regard 

to the three statutory prongs, Skorick’s attorney conceded there was testimony 

in support, stating, “I will wholly admit without going forward on any cross 

that the State has provided testimony as to those three things.” 

[¶22] In regard to Skorick’s difficulty controlling his behavior, and the nexus 

between his disorder and his dangerousness, the district court again 

considered the testimony and the reports of Dr. Travis and Dr. Benson. The 

court stated Dr. Travis testified Skorick has serious difficulty controlling his 

behavior, noting more than fifty major violations and a score of minor 

violations while in custody. The court noted Dr. Travis testified Skorick was 

sexually aggressive towards another inmate and Skorick masturbating in front 

of another inmate was a display of Skorick’s repressed sexual aggression he 

could no longer control. The court noted, “Dr. Travis specifically testified that 

Mr. Skorick would have continued difficulty controlling his behavior due to his 

combined sexual disorders and personality disorder, combined with his 

continued behavior while in the NDDOCR, the raised fist at one of the 

NDDOCR staff members, and Mr. Skorick’s lack of treatment.” 
7 

[¶23] Because the testimony of Dr. Travis supports the district court’s findings 

Skorick meets all three elements of a sexually dangerous individual, and there 

is a nexus he has serious difficulty controlling his behavior, I would affirm. 

[¶24] Lisa Fair McEvers