the prosecutor’s closing argument did not render Williams’ trial fundamentally unfair was
reasonable and must be honored. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 871 (“[W]hen the constitutional question
is a matter of degree, rather than of concrete entitlements, a ‘reasonable’ decision by the state
court must be honored.”). Accordingly, under this standard of review, the comments made by
the prosecutor during closing arguments did not deprive petitioner of a fair trial. Therefore,

habeas corpus relief on this claim is denied.

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Finally, Williams contends that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to inquire of
prospective jurors about possible prejudice against gang membership and failing to object to
remarks made by the prosecuting attorney.

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated using the two-pronged test outlined
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Barrow, 398 F.3d 597at 603. Under the first
prong, it must be shown that the performance of counsel fell outside the “range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases” as determined under an objective standard of
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong presumption of competence
and any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id, at 689.
The second prong of the test requires that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” /d. at 694.

The Illinois Appellate Court specifically applied the Strickland test. Williams, 692
N.E.2d at 732. In considering whether Williams’ counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire of

14


corroborating witnesses as well as recantation by the state’s witnesses establishes his actual
innocence. Second, Williams claims that the ruling of the trial and appellate court as to the
credibility of the recantation testimony violates Williams’ constitutional rights. Third, Williams
asserts that his right to be tried by a fair impartial jury was denied due to the failure of the trial
court to inquire during voir dire about the possible prejudice of prospective jurors toward gang
membership. Fourth, Williams claims that remarks made by the prosecuting attorney during
closing arguments denied Williams a fair trial and denied him due process of law. Finally,
Williams contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to inquire of prospective jurors
about possible prejudice against gang membership and failing to object to remarks made by the

prosecuting attorney.

DISCUSSION

Williams’ petition for writ of habeas corpus is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as amended

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (‘AEDPA”).

I. Procedural Default

Before the Court addresses the merits of the claims raised, it must first determine whether
Williams exhausted his available state remedies. Spreitzer v. Schomig, 219 F.3d 639, 644 (7th
Cir. 2000). Claims must first be fully and fairly presented to the state courts. Rodriguez v.
Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 916 (7th Cir. 1999). To fulfill this requirement, “state prisoners must give
the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one
complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 845 (1999). To satisfy “one complete round” of appellate review in Illinois, petitioner

5


courts questioned the courts’ application of state case law and provided numerous policy
arguments for adopting a new standard in Illinois but failed to point to any Supreme Court
precedent in support of that position. (Resp’t’s Ex. G at 32-37; Resp’t’s Ex. K at 16-18.)

As the Supreme Court noted in Herrera v. Collins, “[t]he Constitution itself . . . makes no
mention of new trials.” 506 U.S. at 408. The courts’ ability to grant new trials was originally
founded in common law and was slowly replaced by state statutes. Id. at 409-10. There is not a
single standard used by the states to determine when to grant a new trial. /d. at 410. Moreover,
the state post-conviction relief process is not required by any constitutional provision or federal
law. Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996). “Federal habeas corpus relief is
available only to persons being held in state custody in violation of the Constitution or federal
law; it is not a remedy for errors of state law.” Jd. Therefore, Williams has failed to
demonstrate that the courts’ adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, relief on this ground must be

denied.

Cc. A Fair and Impartial Jury

Third, Williams’ asserts that his right to be tried by a fair, impartial jury was denied due
to the failure of the trial court to inquire during voir dire about the possible prejudice of
prospective jurors toward gang membership. Federal law does not require a trial court to inquire
sua sponte about the possible prejudice of prospective jurors toward gang membership. Gardner
y. Barnett, 199 F.3d 915, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citations omitted). In the words of
the Seventh Circuit: “The conduct of voir dire is left to the trial court’s sound discretion. The

10


[BJecause Williams's conviction rests squarely upon the credibility of the eyewitnesses
and, at a minimum, substantial doubt exists as to which version of the witnesses”
testimony is true, the circuit court should have granted a new trial so that a jury could
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses... . Indeed, Williams’s constitutional right to a
fair and impartial jury requires that a jury make this factual determination.
(Resp’t’s Ex. G at 16 (emphasis in original)). Similarly, in the motion for leave to appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court, the argument was presented as:
An essential feature of our justice system’s guarantee of a fair and impartial jury is that
juries - not judges - decide whether witnesses are credible .... Accordingly, in cases
like this - where the only evidence linking a defendant to a crime is the testimony of
witnesses who have recanted that testimony in a post-conviction proceeding and there is
substantial doubt as to which version of the witnesses’ testimony is true - the defendant’s
constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury requires that a new trial be granted.
(Resp’t’s Ex. K at 18). It is clear from the similar language that the issue stated in the habeas
petition is the same as the one presented to the state courts. Although the constitutional violation
was presented differently in this petition, it is essentially the same argument. See, ¢.g., Jnre
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a “fair trial in a fair tribunal.”).
Moreover, a more lenient standard of drafting is appropriate when considering a pro se petition.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Therefore, the question as to whether having a
judge rather than a jury determine the credibility of recanting witnesses violated Williams’

constitutional rights was properly presented to the state courts, and the Court will decide this

issue on its merits.

Il. Merits of the Petition
To state a basis for federal habeas corpus relief under AEDPA, Williams must show that

the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable


must present his claims on either direct appeal or post-conviction review at each stage of the
appellate process, including the Illinois Supreme Court. Jd. at 847-48; see White v. Godinez, 192
F.3d 607, 608 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying the rule in the context of post-conviction proceedings).
Issues that are not carried through an entire round of appellate review are procedurally defaulted
and cannot be reviewed in a federal habeas proceeding. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848.

Procedural default may be excused, however, if the petitioner can show one of two
exceptions. First, an issue wil! not be barred if the petitioner demonstrates good cause for the
default and actual prejudice resulting from the application of the doctrine. Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Second, the petitioner can obtain review of the merits of
an otherwise defaulted claim by demonstrating that the failure to consider the claim will result in
a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2003). A
fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs when a constitutional violation results in the continued
incarceration of a party who is actually innocent. Thomas v. McCaughiry, 201 F.3d 995, 999
(7th Cir. 2000).

Respondent asserts that Williams’ claim that the “Trial and Appellate Courts erred on
credibility” is procedurally defaulted. Williams states in the “Supporting Facts” section of his
petition that:

{t]he ruling of the Trial and Appellate Court as to the credibility of the recantation

testimony of the only witnesses against petitioner violates his right to due process and

equal protection of the laws. The petitioner has a constitutional right to have [the]
credibility of the witness presented testimony determined by jury in this case when no
other evidence linked petition[er] to [the] crime at trial and where there is substantial
doubt as to which version of the witnesses testimony is truthful and when said testimony
establishes petitioner’s actua] innocence.

(Habeas Pet. at 5.) In his appeal of the denial of his post-conviction petition, Williams presented

the following argument:


underlying state criminal proceeding.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). “This rule
is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not
imprisoned in violation of the Constitution -- not to correct errors of fact.” Id.

There are exceptions to this general rule, however, where the “discovered evidence is so
compelling that it would be a violation of the ‘fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process
Clause’ not to afford a defendant a new trial” such as “any showing that the prosecution
knowingly proffered false testimony or failed to disclose exculpatory evidence.” Coogan, 958
F.2d at 801.

Williams’ contention that the courts erred by failing to grant him a new trial based on this
new evidence fails to point to any independent constitutional violation. Williams does not
demonstrate that the courts’ decisions are contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Freestanding claims of innocence of this sort
are not actionable for habeas corpus relief. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405. Therefore, Petitioner’s

habeas claim based on newly discovered evidence is denied.

B. Courts’ Rulings on the Credibility of Recantation Testimony

The second claim presented is that the rulings of the trial and appellate courts as to the
credibility of the recantation testimony violate Williams’ constitutional rights. Again, to form
the grounds for federal habeas corpus relief, the courts’ rulings must have “resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

There is no precedent to support the contention that the right to a jury trial should extend
to proceedings to determine whether to grant a new trial. Petitioner’s arguments to the state

9


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. )
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) 03 € 1437

)

EDWIN R. BOWEN, Warden ) Judge Ronald A. Guzman
Centralia Correctional Center, )
)
Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Michael Williams (“Williams”) is in the custody of Respondent Warden of the
Centralia Correctional Center, Centralia, Illinois. In 1996, Williams was convicted in state court
of first degree murder and was sentenced to forty years in prison. Williams seeks a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, For the reasons stated below, this Court denies

Williams’ petition.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In habeas corpus actions, the Court presumes that the factual determinations of the state
court are correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Todd v. Schomig, 283 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2002). Williams has
not presented clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption. Therefore, the Court
adopts the facts as set forth by the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Williams, 692 N.E.2d

723, 725-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).

During the night of August 27, 1994, and the early morning of August 28, Turonica


[Defendant] didn’t do it on LaSalle Street, and he didn’t do it in the suburbs. He

did it in Russell Square Park . . . at a party that had a lot of gang members present,

and he did it at a time of night when the gang members are taking over the street.

And there are nice people in that neighborhood. ... But those people are under

their beds at 1:25 in the morning. They’re watching for the bullets to come

through the windows because you don’t even have to go out on the street to get

shot . . . and there’s nine hundred murders in this city every year, and about seven

hundred of them are just like this, and the witnesses aren’t a heck of a lot better

than the guys who pull the triggers.

Williams, 692 N.E.2d at 731.

Under Supreme Court precedent, it is not enough that the prosecutor’s remarks were
“undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant question is whether the prosecutors”
comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quotations omitted). To aid in
determining whether the remarks constituted a fundamental unfairness, Darden sets forth five
factors: “(1) whether the prosecutor misstated the evidence, (2) whether the remarks implicate
specific rights of the accused, (3) whether the defense invited the response, (4) the trial court’s
instructions, (5) the weight of the evidence against the defendant, and (6) the defendant’s
opportunity to rebut.” Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 793 (7th Cir. 2000). “These factors . .
_ are not to be applied in a rigid manner, but should be used as a guide to determine whether
there was fundamental unfairness that infected the bottom line . . . .” Hough y. Anderson, 272
F.3d 878, 903 (7th Cir. 2001).

The Illinois Appellate Court evaluated the impact of the prosecutor’s arguments using the
Illinois common law standard that “the complained-of argument must have resulted ina
substantial prejudice to the defendant, such that, absent those comments, the result would have

been different.” Williams, 692 N.E.2d at 731. The appellate court held that although it

12


litigants do not have a right to have a particular question asked. Although the Constitution does
require inquiries into certain biases (such as race), bias against street gangs is not among them.”
Id. (citations omitted).

Williams has failed to establish that the trial court’s failure to inquire during voir dire
about the possible prejudice of prospective jurors toward gang membership was either contrary
to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court. Therefore, habeas corpus relief on these grounds is denied.

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Fourth, Williams asserts that remarks made by the prosecuting attorney during closing
arguments denied Williams a fair trial and due process of law. The relevant portions of the
State’s closing argument are as follows:

This is a case about good and evil.

This is evil. This is Raymond Malone after he encountered Michael Williams and
[Hodby], after they brutally in cold blood executed him... .
That’s the value they placed on human life... .

You know from what happened out there on August 28 that we are dealing with
evil, wicked, vicious people, and [Scott Tyler] would . . . have been remiss if he
didn’t make sure that his loved ones were safe before he took that act of courage
and came forward and identified the killers in this case.

What your duty in this case is to [sic] decide--to send a message to the likes of
Michael Williams and to say we are governed by the rule of law. We do believe
in a society where things are decided in courtrooms and not on the street.

11


application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);
see also Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds,
521 US. 320 (1997).

“A state court decision is ‘contrary to’ Supreme Court precedent ‘if the state court arrives
at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law’ or ‘if the
state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court

os

precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [that reached by the Supreme Court].’” Dixon v.
Snyder, 266 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362, 405
(2000)). An “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law occurs when

the state court applies the correct legal rule in an objectively unreasonable manner. Williams,

529 U.S. at 409-10.

A. New Evidence

Williams’ first claim is that the post-trial recantation of the State’s four witnesses and the
affidavits of two additional people who say that the circumstances were such that it would have
been impossible for the state’s witnesses to have identified Williams as the shooter tend to
establish his actual innocence of the crime. “As a general rule, newly discovered evidence that
bears only on the question of guilt or innocence is not reviewable by a federal court on a motion
for habeas corpus relief.” Coogan v. McCaughtry, 958 F.2d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 1992). “[C]laims
of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground

for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the

8


trial court denied the post-conviction petition.

Williams appealed the denial of post-conviction relief to the Mlinois Appellate Court.
(Resp’t’s Ex. G at 2.) In that appeal, Williams raised three issues regarding whether: (1) he was
deprived of due process and entitled to a new trial because the recantation testimony established
his actual innocence, (2) he had a constitutional right to have the credibility of the witnesses’
recanted testimony determined by a jury in this case, and (3) the trial judge wrongly dismissed
his post-conviction claims regarding insufficient voir dire, prosecutorial misconduct and the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The appellate court affirmed the denial of post-
conviction relief. (Resp’t’s Ex. J at 16.) The appellate court noted:

... the recanting witnesses contradicted their own affidavits. In its ruling on [the] post

conviction hearing, the court noted specific inconsistencies in the witnesses’ hearing

testimony and their submitted affidavits. The court also found it significant that the
witnesses could not recall much of their trial testimony. The court’s ruling was based on
the lack of credibility of the testimony given at the hearing itself compared to the
affidavits submitted and the earlier trial testimony.

(Resp’t’s Ex. J at 12-13.)

Williams then filed a petition for leave to appeal with the Illinois Supreme Court raising
three issues as to whether: (1) the appellate court’s decision affirming the trial courts judgment
not to grant a new trial was contrary to Illinois law; (2) Williams’ constitutional right to a fair
and impartial jury was violated when the judge, rather than a jury, determined the credibility of
the recanting testimony; and (3) the appellate court properly relied upon the principle of res
judicata to reject Williams’ remaining post-conviction issues. (Resp’t’s Ex. K at 3-4.) The
Supreme Court of Illinois denied Williams’ petition. (Resp’t’s Ex. L.)

On February, 2003, Williams filed the instant habeas corpus petition. In his petition,

Williams presents five claims. First, Williams contends that newly discovered evidence of


prospective jurors about possible prejudice against gang membership, the court held that
“tendering supplemental voir dire questions is a matter within the protected realm of trial
strategy.” Jd. The court noted that because most of the State’s witnesses were gang members, it
was plausible that the defense counsel chose not to tender supplemental questions for strategic
reasons. /d. In deciding the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense
counsel’s failure to object to remarks made by the prosecuting attorney during closing
arguments, the court held the claim was “unpersuasive for reasons previously stated.” /d.
Previously, the court held that the prosecutor’s statements were harmless and did not refer to
evidence not presented in trial. /d. at 467-68.

Only “{a] clear error in applying Strickland’s standard would support a writ of habeas
corpus.” Holman y. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 1997). In this case, the appellate court
reasonably held that Williams failed to overcome the presumption that the decision not to submit
supplemental voir dire questions was part of a sound trial strategy, thereby failing the first prong
of the test. See id. at 701. Likewise, after holding that the comments made by the prosecuting
attorney during closing arguments were harmless, the court was reasonable to dispose of the
claim of ineffectiveness based on the defense counsel’s failure to object to those remarks for
failing to meet the second prong of the Strickland standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 at 697 (“If
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”). To show prejudice from
ineffective assistance of counsel, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Jd. at 694. The court had already examined the statements to determine if “the

15


at |.) First, Williams claimed he was entitled to a new trial based on the newly discovered
evidence presented at the post-trial hearing. Second, he claimed he was denied his constitutional
right to a fair and impartial jury because the trial judge did not, sua sponte, question the venire
regarding prejudice against gang membership. Third, Williams contended that the prosecutor’s
closing argument improperly appealed to the emotions of the jury and referred to evidence not
presented at trial. Finally, Williams claimed that his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to request that potential jurors be questioned about prejudice toward gang
members and for failing to object to improper remarks in the prosecutor’s closing argument.

The appellate court affirmed the conviction, disagreeing with Williams on all points. Williams,
692 N.E.2d at 728-32. Williams then filed a petition for leave to appeal with the Hlinois
Supreme Court raising essentially the same issues. (Resp’t’s Ex. E at 3-4.) The Illinois Supreme
Court denied Williams’ petition. (Resp’t’s Ex. F.)

In November 1998, Williams filed a post-conviction petition in the trial court. His
petition raised four issues. (Resp’t’s Ex. G at 1-2.) First, he argued that he was denied due
process and was entitled to a new trial because four of the prosecution’s witnesses recanted their
trial testimony and two additional witnesses were found to corroborate the recantations, thus
establishing Williams’ actual innocence. Second, Williams claimed that the trial judge’s failure
to question potential jurors about bias against gang membership denied Williams his
constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Third, Williams asserted that the prosecutor’s
closing argument was improper and inflammatory and therefore deprived Williams of due
process. Fourth, Williams claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that
potential jurors be questioned about prejudice toward gang members and for failing to object to
improper remarks in the prosecutor’s closing argument. Following an evidentiary hearing, the

3


Williams held a party at her home in Chicago. The guests included members of neighborhood
gangs, including the Titanic Black P-Stones (“TBPS”) and its rival gangs, the Conservative Vice
Lords (“CVL”) and the Renegade Vice Lords. At some point during the party, there was a
incident in which a member of TBPS and a member of CVL bumped into each other and words
were exchanged. Two or more CVL members then left the party, stating something to the effect
that they’ll “be back.” Soon after, two to four people dressed in black arrived outside the party
and began firing guns. The victim, an alleged TBPS member, was fatally shot. Williams and
another defendant were indicted for the murder, and the matter proceeded to simultaneous jury trials.

At trial, four eyewitnesses to the shooting incident testified for the State. Among the
eyewitnesses was Scott Tyler. During initial conversations with police, Tyler did not name
Williams as one of the shooters. However, Tyler later identified Williams in a police lineup as
one of the gunmen. At trial, Tyler testified that he saw four shooters and again identified
Williams as one of the gunmen. Tyler also testified that his initial reservations were caused by
his concern for relatives that lived in the area, given the number of CVL members in the
neighborhood.

In January 1996, a jury found Williams guilty of first degree murder. Williams then filed
a motion for a new trial arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt and that newly discovered evidence warranted a new trial. In May 1996, the trial court
conducted a hearing and heard argument on Williams’ post-trial motions. Williams presented
new evidence in the form of testimony from five witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
trial court denied Williams’ motion for a new trial and sentenced him to forty years of
imprisonment.

Williams appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court and raised four issues. (Resp’t’s Ex. A

2


disapproved of the prosecutor’s arguments, which depicted Petitioner as evil and urged the jury
to send a message, the statements, when viewed in the context of the entire closing arguments,
were harmless. /d. at 731-32. Furthermore, the court held that there was no support for
Williams’ claim that the State remarked that Williams engaged in acts to intimidate its witness,
Scott Tyler. Id.

In determining whether federal habeas corpus relief is appropriate, the first question is
whether the law applied by the appellate court is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. As
previously noted, a state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the court
“arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law.”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. In this case, the standard used by the appellate court is substantially
similar to the Supreme Court standard expressed in Darden. See United States ex rel.
Washington v. Page, 981 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (stating Illinois’ “substantial
prejudice” standard is substantially similar to the Darden standard).

The question, then, is whether the application was unreasonable. Barrow v. Uchtman,
398 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2005). The determination of reasonableness is quite deferential and
a state decision may stand so long as it is objectively reasonable, regardless of whether the
reviewing court determines it to be substantively incorrect. Id. In this case, the appellate court
examined the impact of the prosecutor’s statements in the context of the entire closing argument
and looked to whether the prosecutor included evidence not presented at trial. Williams, 692
N.E.2d at 731-32.

The court’s analysis of the objected-to comments in comparison to the full context of the
prosecutor’s statements was thoughtful. The court determined that the prosecutor had not
misstated the evidence or discussed any evidence not presented at trial. The court’s holding that

13


complained-of argument . . . resulted in a substantial prejudice to the defendant, such that, absent
those comments, the result would have been different” and held that the statements were
harmless. Williams, 692 N.E.2d at 732. Therefore, because the statements themselves did not
result in a substantial prejudice to Williams, the failure to object to those statements does not
undermine confidence in the outcome, See Howard, 225 F.3d at 794. Based on the record
before the Court, the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was not clearly

erroneous. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted on this basis.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, the Court denies Williams’ petition for writ of habeas corpus.

This case is hereby terminated.

SO ORDERED enteren: ///2 9/d5

“DP
L- 7 c
HON. RONALD A. GUZMSN
United States Judge

16