alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Cause No. 12-14-00296-CR 

DAVID MARK DAVIS II § IN THE TWELFTH 

Appellant § 

§ 

vs. § COURT OF APPEALS 

 § 

STATE OF TEXAS § 

Appellee § TYLER, TEXAS

APPELLANT’S NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Appellant, David Mark Davis II, files this notice of change of address with the clerk of the 

court. 

Appellant currently resides at: 

11 Glenview Court 

Lufkin, Texas 75901 

Effective June 4, 2015, Appellant's temporary physical and mailing address will be: 

905 N Loop 499 

Unit 525 

Harlingen, TX 78550 

Respectfully submitted,

David Mark Davis II 

Appellant, Pro Se 

ACCEPTED

12-14-00296-CR

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

5/28/2015 1:08:02 PM

CATHY LUSK

CLERK

 FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 5/28/2015 1:08:02 PM CATHY S. LUSK Clerk
Certificate of Service

I certify that on May 28, 2015, I sent a copy of Appellant’s Notice of Change of Address 

to all parties listed below as indicated. 

____________________ 

David Mark Davis II 

VIA Texas Official eFile System:

STATE OF TEXAS (through Counsel): 

Ed. Jones at ejones@angelinacounty.net

James Yakovsky at jyakovsky@angelinacounty.net
I

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1378

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 6, 1997

Referred to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and in addition to the Committee on House Oversight, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such

provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

AN ACT

To extend the authorization of use of official mail in the

location and recovery of missing children, and for other

purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 1378 RFH

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF USE OF OF2 FICIAL MAIL IN THE LOCATION AND RECOV3 ERY OF MISSING CHILDREN.

4 The Act entitled ‘‘An Act to amend title 3, United

5 States Code, to authorize the use of penalty and franked

6 mail in efforts relating to the location and recovery of

7 missing children’’, approved August 9, 1985 (39 U.S.C.

8 3220 note; Public Law 99–87), is amended—

9 (1) in section 3(a) by striking ‘‘June 30, 1997’’

10 and inserting ‘‘June 30, 2002’’; and

11 (2) in section 5 by striking ‘‘December 31,

12 1997’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2002’’.

Passed the Senate November 5, 1997.

Attest: GARY SISCO,

Secretary.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE  CONTAINS SUMMARY  FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM PURCHASE
POINT MEDIA  CORPORATION  FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS  AT JUNE 30, 1999 AND THE TWELVE
MONTHS  THEN  ENDED  AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY  BY  REFERENCE  TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                                          0001001065
<NAME>                                         PURCHASE POINT MEDIA CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                          1
<CASH>                                                  97
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    18,584
<PP&E>                                               4,753
<DEPRECIATION>                                       1,943
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      48,553
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              804,454
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              260,497
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                               170
<OTHER-SE>                                      (1,016,568)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        48,553
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         0
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      418,964
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  39,879
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (458,843)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (458,843)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (458,843)
<EPS-BASIC>                                         (.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         (.04)



</TABLE>
[Cite as State ex rel. New Concept Hous., Inc. v. Metz, 123 Ohio St.3d 457, 2009-Ohio-5862.] 

THE STATE EX REL. NEW CONCEPT HOUSING, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. 

METZ, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 

[Cite as State ex rel. New Concept Hous., Inc. v. Metz, 

123 Ohio St.3d 457, 2009-Ohio-5862.] 

Procedendo — Adequate remedy by way of appeal precludes writ. 

(No. 2009-0926 — Submitted November 4, 2009 — Decided 

November 10, 2009.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-080986. 

__________________ 

 Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment denying the petition of appellants, New 

Concept Housing, Inc., and George B. Stewart, for a writ of procedendo to 

compel appellee, a Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas judge, to issue a 

declaratory judgment concerning certain matters and to resolve all matters 

discussed in a prior appeal in the same case. 

{¶ 2} Appellants had an adequate remedy to raise their contentions by 

way of appeal from the common pleas court’s June 10, 2008 judgment that they 

challenge, and, in fact, they did so. See New Concept Hous., Inc. v. United Dept. 

Stores, Hamilton App. No. C-080504, 2009-Ohio-2259. “[P]rocedendo is not 

appropriate when the party seeking the writ has an adequate remedy in the 

ordinary course of law, e.g., appeal.” State ex rel. Bd. of State Teachers 

Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis, 113 Ohio St.3d 410, 2007-Ohio-2205, 865 

N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 43. 

{¶ 3} The trial court’s declaratory judgment was a final, appealable order 

because it affected the substantial rights of the parties, resolved the pertinent 

issues, and did not contemplate further action. Cf. id. at ¶ 45; see also Gen. Acc. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 540 N.E.2d 266, 

paragraph two of the syllabus (“A declaratory judgment action is a special 

proceeding pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 and, therefore, an order entered therein 

which affects a substantial right is a final appealable order”). 

{¶ 4} Insofar as appellants argued that the common pleas court judge had 

failed to comply with a decision of the court of appeals in a prior appeal, that 

same appellate court’s denial of their procedendo claim and affirmance of the trial 

court’s June 2008 declaratory judgment established otherwise. See State ex rel. 

Pyle v. Bessey, 112 Ohio St.3d 119, 2006-Ohio-6514, 858 N.E.2d 383, ¶ 12 (“The 

court of appeals was in the best position to determine whether Judge Bessey 

violated its mandate in Pyle I, and it concluded that he had not done so by 

affirming the judgment in Pyle II and dismissing Pyle’s writ action”). 

Judgment affirmed. 

 MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

Gonzalez, Saggio & Harlan, L.L.P., Robert R. Furnier, and Rasheed A. 

Simmonds; and Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., and John B. Nalbandian, for 

appellants. 

 Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christian J. 

Schaeffer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

______________________
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 25, 2016

No. 04-16-00169-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.J.P., A CHILD,

From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015-CI-13590

Honorable Larry Noll, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The Appellee’s motion to dismiss or abate appeal is hereby DENIED.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 25th day of August, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1306 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1306

    To prohibit the conveyance of real property at Long Beach Naval 
         Station, California, to China Ocean Shipping Company.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 22, 1997

  Mr. Inhofe introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To prohibit the conveyance of real property at Long Beach Naval 
         Station, California, to China Ocean Shipping Company.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AT LONG BEACH NAVAL 
              STATION, CALIFORNIA, TO CHINA OCEAN SHIPPING COMPANY.

    (a) Prohibition Against Direct Conveyance.--In disposing of real 
property in connection with the closure of Long Beach Naval Station, 
California, under the provisions of the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 
U.S.C. 2687 note), the Secretary of Defense may not convey any portion 
of the property (whether by sale, lease, or other method) to China 
Ocean Shipping Company, or any successor entity to the company.
    (b) Prohibition Against Indirect Conveyance.--The Secretary shall 
impose as a condition on each conveyance of real property located at 
Long Beach Naval Station the requirement that the property may not be 
subsequently conveyed (whether by sale, lease, or other method) to 
China Ocean Shipping Company, or any successor entity to the company.
    (c) Reversionary Interest.--If the Secretary determines at any time 
that real property located at Long Beach Naval Station and conveyed 
under the provisions of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 
1990 has been conveyed to China Ocean Shipping Company (or any 
successor entity to the company) in violation of subsection (b), or is 
otherwise being used by China Ocean Shipping Company (or any successor 
entity to the company) in violation of such subsection, all right, 
title, and interest in and to the property shall revert to the United 
States, and the United States shall have the right of immediate entry 
thereon.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
  CERTIFICATION
    Accompanying
    Form 10-Q
    Report
    of First Industrial, L.P.
    Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
    2002
    (Chapter 63, Title 18 U.S.C. §1350(a) and
    (b))
  Form 10-Q
  Michael
    W. Brennan
         Michael
    J. Havala
         A signed original of this written statement required by
    Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be
    retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
    Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. The information
    contained in this written statement shall not be deemed
    filed for purposes of Section 18 of the
    Securities Exchange Act of 1934, nor shall it be deemed
    incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Act
    of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, except as shall
    be expressly set forth by specific reference to such filing.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Umang Gupta, Chief Executive Officer of Keynote Systems, Inc. (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| |  |  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 14, 2006 (the
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | - |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the periods presented
therein.
| | - |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: February 14, 2006



|                                                                 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ UMANG GUPTA                                                  
|Umang Gupta Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Keynote Systems, Inc. and will be retained by it and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 19, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-60268

Summary Calendar

 

HAREGEWOIN MAMO DESTA,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

--------------------

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A75 356 010

--------------------

Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Haregewoin Mamo Desta petitions for review of an order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration

judge’s (IJ’s) decision to deny her application for asylum and

withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act

(INA) as well as the BIA’s rejection of her claim under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). Desta argues that the BIA

erred in determining that she had not established a well-founded
No. 03-60268

-2-

fear of future persecution or that it was more likely than not

that she would be tortured if she were returned to Ethiopia. 

This court will uphold the factual findings that an alien is

not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal if those

findings are supported by substantial evidence. Chun v. INS, 40

F.3d 76, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1994). The substantial evidence

standard requires that the decision be based on the evidence

presented and that the decision be substantially reasonable. 

Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS, 78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996). The

BIA’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, and the

record does not compel a contrary conclusion as to either Desta’s

INA claims or her CAT claim. See id. Accordingly, Desta’s

petition for review is DENIED.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 6392

MAURO GOROSTIETA HERNANDEZ , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. B. J. MEEKS, Warden; STEPHEN HOEY; L. SANCHEZ, HIT; N. ROSARIO, RN; L. CROSS, HSA; CHRISTOPHER DAVIS, NP; FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Charleston

. Mary G. Lewis , District Judge. ( 2:18

- cv
- 00661

- MGL )

Submitted : August 2 2 , 2019 Decided: August 26, 2019

Before KING and RICHARDSON , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON , Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Mauro Gorostieta Hernandez, Appellant Pro Se. Marshall Prince, II, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Mauro Gorostieta Hernandez appeals the district court ’ s order granting Defendants’
motio n for summary judgment in Hernandez’s civil action

. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012) . The magistrate judge recommended th at Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted and
advi sed Hernandez that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation. The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge ’ s recommendation is
necessary t o preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 845

- 46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Hernandez
ha s waived appellate review by failing to file timely objections after receiving proper
notice. Accordingly , we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 20-0504

CRAZY CARLS, INC., d/b/a AUTO RESOURCE,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

SANDRA JORGENSEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

FILE

MAR 0 9 2021

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of Supreme Court

State of Montana

ORDER

Appellee Crazy Carls, Inc., d/b/a Auto Resource, has filed a Motion to Dismiss on

the ground Appellant Sandra Jorgensen, a self-represented litigant, did not file her opening

brief in a timely manner. Jorgensen has responded.

Crazy Carls, Inc. notes that Jorgensen's opening brief was due on Monday,

February 1, 2021, following receipt of the last transcript on December 31, 2020. M. R.

App. P. 13(1): Crazy Carls, Inc., points out that Jorgensen did not move this Court for an

extension of time, and that, as of February 10, 2021, Jorgensen had not filed her brief.

M. R. App. P. 13(3).

After the motion to dismiss was filed, Jorgenson filed, on February 22, 2021, a

document titled "Informal Appeal Brief" which references proceedings in the "Lower

Courr and appears to be arguments in support of an appeal. We deem the document to be

her appellate brief. On the same day, Jorgensen also filed a document titled "Affidavit of

Truth in Verification in Opposition," which, despite its denomination, is not notarized. See

§ 1-5-602(13), MCA. Jorgensen states that her brief was timely "filer on January 29,

2021, but that "the mails apparently are so messed up that it was not received by the court,

nor the other side (or so they report)."

However, the Clerk of the Supreme Court did not receive any document from

Jorgenson for filing by January 29, 2021, as Jorgenson claims, or by the due date of her

03/09/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0504
brief. This was Jorgenson's responsibility, and the problem does not appear to lie with the

United States Postal Service. At the least, Jorgenson should have moved for an extension

of time for filing of her brief, prior to the expiration of the time granted under the Rules of

Appellate Procedure.

While "[i]t is reasonable to expect all litigants, including those acting pro se, to

adhere to the procedural rules," First Bank (NA.)-Billings v. Heidema, 219 Mont. 373, 376,

711 P.2d 1384, 1386 (1986), this Court gives some latitude to self-represented litigants as

long as it does not prejudice the other party. Heidema, 219 Mont. at 376, 711 P.2d at 1386.

We caution Jorgensen that she should not misrepresent any fact or action to this Court, and

must comply with the Appellate Rules. However, we conclude that dismissal of the appeal

would be an overly harsh sanction at this juncture. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED without prejudice.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court is directed to provide a copy of this Order to counsel

of record and to Sandra Jorgensen personally.

DATED this — ay of March, 2021.

2

/#5"

Chief Justice

Justices
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dyego Foddrell, Appellant.

[942 NYS2d 803]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated September 29, 2009 *(People v Foddrell,*65 AD3d 1375 [2009]), affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, rendered August 24, 2004.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]). Mastro, A.P.J., Rivera, Angiolillo and Dickerson, JJ., concur.