EEE ii EI DE_

without reaching the merits. Perez v. Wis. Dept. of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535-36 (7th
Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION

In support of her motion to dismiss, Collier refers to the answers Fowler
provided within the section of his form complaint entitled “Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies.” There, Fowler states that a grievance procedure is available
at his institution (at that time, Cook County Correctional Institution) but that he has not
filed a grievance concerning the factual allegations contained within his complaint. By
way of explanation for this failure, Fowler says only that he has filed a § 1983 suit. He
also states that he did not complain to the authorities at his institution because a
“grievance can’t solved [sic] this matter.” According to Collier, this collection of
admissions is fatal to Fowler’s ability to pursue his suit against her. We agree.

There is some question as to the accuracy ofall of Fowler’s statements regarding
his pursuit of remedies within his institution—attached to the complaint is a copy of
a grievance form involving the same situation detailed in the complaint, dated April 1,
2002.' Thus, it appears that Fowler at one point did not believe that a grievance could

not solve the matter, but the section on the form in which the inmate is permitted to

' Fowler’s statement that Collier hijacked his grievance is of no moment. It
pertains to a grievance other than the one at issue here, namely that regarding Collier’s
alleged actions on April 1, not the earlier grievance that addressed only Boykin.

-4.



exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”),
LEGAL STANDARD

The PLRA dictates that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title... by a prisoner . . . until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The
PLRA helps to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits,” by
“afford[ing] corrections officials time to address complaints internally.” Porter _v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988 (2002). The PLRA also works to
“limit judicial intervention in the management of state and federal prisons.” McCoy
v. Gilbert, 270 F.3d 503, 509-510 (7th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has recently
held that this requirement applies to every suit filed by a prisoner regarding events
occurring during his or her incarceration, whether ongoing or isolated. Porter, 534
U.S. at 524, 122 S. Ct. at 988. For these reasons Congress requires prisoners to
exhaust their administrative remedies. If a prison has an internal administrative
grievance system through which a prisoner can seek to correct a problem, “then the
prisoner must utilize that administrative system before filing a claim.” Massey v.
Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1999). Ifa prisoner plaintiff fails to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing suit, the district court must dismiss the complaint

-3-



request an appeal of the decision is left blank. In the absence of any contrary
allegation, we can only conclude that Fowler never attempted to appeal the outcome
of his grievance, apparently after concluding that to do so would be futile. In Perez,
the Seventh Circuit rejected any notion of a futility exception to the PLRA exhaustion
requirement. 182 F.3d at 537. There is no room for a court or a plaintiff to speculate
whether exhaustion would be unavailing under the specific circumstances of each case.
Id. Ifa remedy exists, a plaintiff must pursue it as far as possible before bringing suit
in federal court. Otherwise, administrative personnel are deprived of their ability to
respond to problems at their institutions. The allegations within the complaint
unequivocally indicate that Fowler has jumped the gun in filing the instant suit. As
such, we cannot consider the merits of his claims.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Collier’s motion to dismiss the complaint as to

her is granted.

Che Que Pe ea

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
APR 15 2004 United States District Court

Dated:

? Inhis response, Fowler also makes passing reference to the idea that a prisoner
who is prevented from exhausting by prison personnel can be excused from satisfying
the requirement. However, nothing in the complaint indicates that Fowler was so
prevented, and the inclusion of the April 1 grievance form directly contradicts such a
conclusion.

-5-
FOO OO ee



Minute Order Formf06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

fame of Assigned Judge Charles P. Kocoras Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 1426 DATE 4/15/2004
CASE Fowler vs. Boykin et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.}

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) i) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due__. Reply to answer brief due___.

(4) o Ruling/Hearingon set for at

(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for]on___—=s——s set for_—at_
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_setfor at
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on at

(8) Oo (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

CIFRCP4(m) Ci Local Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a\(1) I FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) «x [Other docket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: Collier’s motion (Doc 22-1) to
dismiss the complaint as to her is granted. Ail matters in controversy having been resolved, final
judgment is hereby entered in favor of all defendants and against plaintiff.

(il) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. “Document

Number

No notices required.
req number of notices,

Notices mailed by judge’s staff. APR 16 20

Notified counsel by telephone.

dave docker

| Docketing to mail notices.
Y | Mail AO 450 form

Copy to inflermagistate judge.

courtroom
SCT deputy's
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office

cualing deputy initials



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

PETER FOWLER, )
)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 03 C 1426

)

MARVIN BOYKIN, Law Library Supervisor; )
SGT. (JANE) COLLIER, Badge No. 922; )
LAWRENCE xX. O’REILLY, Assistant State’s )
Attorney; MICHAEL F, SHEAHAN, Sheriff of )
Cook County, )
)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION DOCKETED

. ; APR 1 6 2004
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on a motion by Defendant Gail Collier to
dismiss the complaint as to her. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Peter Fowler is an inmate at the Menard Correctional Center in Menard,
Illinois. At the time of the events pertinent to this case, Fowler was awaiting trial in
the Cook County Correctional Center. In his complaint, Fowler alleges that the four
defendants violated his constitutional rights by interfering with his access to the courts

and by denying him both substantive and procedural due process. Specifically, he



claimed that the prison law librarian refused to allow him access to the library while
he was preparing for a court appearance. Fowler claims that he filled out a grievance,
which he gave to Defendant Collier to file on April 1, 2002. According to the
complaint, minutes after he gave her the document, Collier searched his cell in
retaliation for his filing the grievance. During the search, Collier discovered legal
materials that she believed Fowler had stolen from the library. Fowler insisted that he
had obtained the papers lawfully, but Collier was unpersuaded.

A disciplinary hearing was held on April 5, and Fowler was found guilty of
damaging and unlawfully taking law library materials. As a result, he was sent to a
segregation unit for 20 days. In February of the following year, Fowler filed the
complaint in this case, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeking a total of
$96 million in damages.

On May 21, 2003, we considered the complaint’s viability as required by 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. The claims against Defendants Marvin Boykin, Lawrence O'Reilly,
and Michael Sheahan were dismissed, as well as one claim against Collier and any
procedural due process claim founded in the alleged refusal to allow Fowler to present
certain evidence at the disciplinary hearing. However, two due process claims

remained against Collier. She now moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to