This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. 32,868 4 TERESA TAPIA, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Jacqueline D. Flores, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender 12 Josephine H. Ford, Assist ant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 172 {1}Defendant appeals from th e district court’s judgment in an on-record appeal 1 from metropolitan court, which convicted Defendant for driving while intoxicated 2 (DWI). The district court’s judgment affirmed the metropolitan court’s sentencing 3 order. Unpersuaded that Defendant demonstrated error, we issued a notice of 4 proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm. Defendant has responded to our 5 notice with a memorandum in opposition. We remain unpersuaded, and affirm. 6
{2} Defendant contends that the metropo litan court erred by denying her motion to 7 suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was an unconstitutional pretextual stop under 8 State v. Ochoa , 2009-NMCA-002, 146 N.M. 32, 206 P. 3d 143, based on the officer’s 9 impermissible motive to investigate her for DWI, an offense for which the officer had 10 no reasonable suspicion. [DS 20-21] Our notice proposed to hold that based on the 11 totality of the circumstances, Defendant did not establish pretext. 12
{3} In response to our notice, Defendant provides us with a detailed examination 13 of the facts, but does not challenge any particular fact described in the district court’s 14 memorandum opinion, the facts upon which our calendar notice relied. Defendant 15 continues to focus on the of ficer’s testimony that he suspected that Defendant was 16 DWI, and argues that the officer would not have stopped Defendant absent that 17 unrelated motive that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. [MIO 21-22] 18 Defendant also points out that the officer was assigned to the DWI team at the time 193 of the stop. [MIO 22] Defendant argue s the officer’s observation of the broken, 1 glaring taillight gave him the opportunity to pull over Defendant and investigate her 2 for DWI. [MIO 22-23] 3
{4} It is for the fact finder—in this case, the trial judge—to re solve any conflict in 4 the testimony of the witnesse s and to determine where th e weight and credibility lay. 5 See State v. Salas , 1999-NMCA-099, ¶ 13, 127 N.M. 686, 986 P.2d 482. As indicated 6 in our notice and as recognized in the memorandum in opposition, the metropolitan 7 court engaged in a thorough analysis of the evidence, including the officer’s 8 testimony. [MIO 16-19] The metropolitan court weighed all of the evidence, 9 considered the officer’s statements, and c oncluded that the officer did not decide to 10 pull over Defendant until after he observed the broken, glaring taillight, and that the 11 traffic stop was based primarily on that offense. [RP 121; MIO 18] As indicated in our 12 notice, the officer did not pull over Defe ndant until after he observed the broken, 13 glaring taillight despite his previous observations of other, less clear traffic offenses 14 that were more related to DWI. [RP 121] 15
{5} We agree with the metropolitan court’s belief that this Court’s opinion in 16 Ochoa , 2009-NMCA-002, ¶¶ 39-42, does not prohibit an officer from possessing 17 more than one suspicion about a defendant. As we stated in our notice, the analysis 18 under Ochoarequires the trial court to considermany objective pretext indicators and 194 weigh many factors in order to determin e whether based on the totality of the 1 circumstances, the officer who made the stop would have done so even without an 2 unrelated motive. See id. ¶¶ 40-41; State v. Gonzales , 2011-NMSC-012, ¶ 12, 150 3 N.M. 74, 257 P.3d 894. 4
{6} Our notice further indicated that where “the objective reason articulated for the 5 stop was necessary for the protection of traffic safety,” see Ochoa , 2009-NMCA-002, 6 ¶ 41, it is difficult to conclude that an officer would not have made the stop without 7 an unrelated motive. The o fficer’s stated overarching con cern in the current case was 8 that Defendant was driving unsafely and posed a threat to the driving public. By 9 suspecting that Defendant was speeding at ni ght, not using a turn signal, and driving 10 with defective equipment, the officer was observing mounting evidence that 11 Defendant posed a threat to traffic safety . We see no error in concluding that the 12 officer acted reasonably by stopping Defendant for a clear equipment violation that 13 was a safety concern for other drivers wh ere the officer suspected that Defendant 14 could pose different and greater threats to the public if left to drive farther. 15
{7} We hold that substantial evidence supports the metropolitan court’s findings 16 indicating that the officer stopped Defendant for the broken taillight based on his 17 concern for traffic safety. See State v. Salgado , 1999-NMSC-008, ¶ 25, 126 N.M. 18 691, 974 P.2d 661 (stating that s ubstantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 195 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” (internal quotation 1 marks and citation omitted)). 2
{8} For the reasons stated in our notice and this Opinion, we affirm the district 3 court’s judgment affirming the metropolitan court’s sentencing order. 4
{9} IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

6 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 7 WE CONCUR: 8

9 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 10

11 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 12