This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 ROBERT A. REHM, Trustee of the 2 Robert A. Rehm Revocable Trust 3 Dated June 4, 2007, 4 Plaintiff-Appellee, 5

v. NO. 32,200 6 PARRA FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 7 a New Mexico Partnership, and SECURITY 8 ESCROW CORPORATION, a New Mexico 9 Corporation, 10 Defendants-Appellants. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Clay Campbell, District Judge 13 Segal & Whittaker, LLP 14 Jeannette Martinez Whittaker 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellee 17 The Allison Law Firm, P.C. 18 Michael Allison 19 Albuquerque, NM 20 for Appellants 212 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 VANZI, Judge. 2
{1} Appellant Parra Family Li mited Partnership (Parra) appeals from the district 3 court’s order entering judgment terminating Parra’s rights to property that was the 4 subject of a real estate contract with R obert A. Rehm, as Trustee of the Robert A. 5 Rehm Revocable Trust (Rehm). We affirm. 6 BACKGROUND 7
{2} In 2002, Rehm and Parra entered into a standard real estate contract (Contract). 8 Parra agreed to pay Rehm $450,000 as the purchase price for certain commercial real 9 property (the property) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. After several defaults by Parra 10 on its obligations, the parties amended the Contract. Among other things, the 11 November 2010 amendment required Parra to pay $23,000 in increased principal 12 because of its uncured default, as well as all delinquent property taxes associated with 13 the property. All other terms of the original Contract remained in force. 14
{3} By 2011, Parra was again in default as it had not paid the real estate taxes for 15 2009 and the first half of 2010 as required by the Contract and the amendment. Thus, 16 in accordance with the terms of the C ontract, Rehm mailed written notice to Parra 173 requiring payment of all delinque nt taxes, penalties, and in terest, plus costs. When 1 Parra failed to make the payment, Rehm f iled a complaint for declaratory judgment 2 and injunction on June 30, 2011, seeking a re lease of the specialwarranty deed from 3 escrow. The summons was served on Parra on July 20, 2011, and on August 19, 2011, 4 Parra’s counsel filed an entry of appearance. No answer was filed in response to the 5 complaint. 6
{4} Instead, on September 13, 2011, the parties filed a stipulation for settlement 7 and/or judgment (Stipulation). Parra agreed inthe Stipulation that (1) it was in default 8 on the Contract and the subsequent ame ndment, (2) Rehm had provided valid notice 9 to Parra but Parra had faile d to cure the default, and (3) Rehm was entitled to the 10 release of the special warranty deed. Ho wever, because Parra wanted to continue 11 making the payments due and owing on th e Contract, it agreed to make certain 12 payments as specified in the Stipulation, including resuming regular monthly 13 installments in the amount of $4,015 due on the 5th day of each month. The 14 Stipulation—signed by both parties and thei r attorneys—also provided that if Parra 15 did not make the payments as specified , upon the filing of an affidavit by Rehm’s 16 attorney, and “without further hearing or notice to Parra herein, [Rehm] shall be 17 entitled to immediate entry of [j]udgmentagainst Parra as prayed for in the 18 [c]omplaint.” The parties agreed that th e matter would remain open in the district 19 court until all the payments were met or default occurred. 204 {5} Eight days following entry of the stipulation, Parra filed a petition seeking 1 Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection, pursuant to which he was protected from creditors 2 for a short period of time until the stay was lifted in January 2012. Shortly thereafter, 3 in March 2012, Parra submitted a deficien t and tardy payment of $2,900 for that 4 month. This followed a pattern of late payments Parra had made by the 20 thof each 5 month, and not the 5th as required by the original Contract, its 2010 amendment, and 6 the 2011 stipulation. Finally, based on the belated and in complete March 2012 7 payment, which was also made by personal check instead of the required cashier 8 check or money order and was therefore re turned to Parra, Rehm exercised its right 9 to terminate the Contract in accordance with the stipulation. 10
{6} Citing the Stipulation, on March 26, 2012, Rehm’s attorn ey filed an affidavit 11 of default in the pending district court cas e. Parra filed a motion to deny entry of 12 proposed judgment and for ancillary relie f on April 5, 2012, arguing that Rehm’s 13 motion was procedurally defective and subs tantively improper. Without a hearing, 14 the district court entered judgment, termin ating Parra’s rights to the property on April 15 10, 2012. This appeal followed. 16

DISCUSSION 171 We note also that Parra’s brief inchief does not fully comply with Rule 21 12-213(A)(3) and (4) NMRA. Rule 12-213(A )(3) requires that the brief in chief 22 include a summary of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review, and Rule 23 12-213(A)(4) requires a statement of the applicable standard of review. Counsel is 24 reminded that the Appellate Rules promote the Court’s efficient and timely resolution 25 of issues on appeal and that failure to comply with them may have serious 26 consequences for the parties. See Rule 12-312(D) NMRA. 27 5 {7} On appeal, Parra contends that its rightto due process was violated, the rules 1 of civil procedure were not followed, the district court effectively granted summary 2 judgment despite disputed material facts, and the forfeiture was inequitable. Before 3 we turn to any of Parra’s arguments, we are compelled to first address the fact that 4 Parra’s brief in chief—like his docketing statement in this case—completely failed to 5 inform this Court that the Stipulation ag reed to by the parties and their attorneys 6 entitled Rehm to a judgment against Parra if Rehm’s attorney filed an affidavit 7 asserting that Parra was in default. 1 That procedure, which is material to the 8 consideration of the issues raised on appeal, provides: 9 [Rehm] is willing to enter into such an agreement provided Parra 10 stipulates and agrees to pay for [ Rehm’s] attorney[] fees and costs 11 incurred in the enforcement of the Contract and make the payments as 12 specified in this Stipulation for Se ttlement and/or Judgment, (hereinafter 13 referred to as “Stipulati on”), and agrees that s hould any of the payments 14 not be made on the date specified and in the amount and in the manner 15 required by this Stipulation, that[Rehm] will have the right to 16 immediately enter a [j]udgment terminating Parra’s rights in the 17 [p]roperty and authorizing [Rehm] to retain all sums paid by Parra as 18 liquidated damages for Parra’s use of the property. The entitlement to 19 this [j]udgment shall be by affidavit of [Rehm’s] attorney that Parra did 20 not make the payments as specified herein and, upon filing of such an 216 affidavit, and without further hearing or notice to Parra herein, [Rehm ] 1 shall be entitled to immediate entry of [ j ] udgment against Parra as 2 prayed for in the [ c ] omplaint. 3 (Emphasis added.) There is no dispute that Parra and its attorney voluntarily and 4 knowingly agreed to the immediate-entry- of judgment provision in the Stipulation. 5 Thus, notwithstanding Parra’s attempt to get around the clear terms of the above 6 provision by failing to raise its existence, wemust consider Parra’s arguments in light 7 of the parties’ agreement allowing for suchjudgment against Parra in the event of a 8 default. 9
{8} With regard to Parra’s contention thatour rules of civil procedure were not 10 followed because Rehm did not file a moti on for relief pursuant to Rule 1-007 NMRA, 11 thereby providing Parra with an opportunityto respond, Parra does not make any 12 argument that the Stipulation, which waives its right to notice and hearing, should not 13 apply here. In any event, Parra filed a motion to deny entry of proposed judgment, 14 which was presumably considered by the district court before it entered the default 15 judgment. See Stinson v. Berry , 1997-NMCA-076, ¶ 8, 123 N.M. 482, 943 P.2d 129 16 (“Where there has been no formal expression concerning a motion, a ruling can be 17 implied by entry of final judgment or by en try of an order inconsistent with the 18 granting of the relief sought.”). Similarly, to the extent Parra contends that the lack 19 of notice and opportunity to be heard violates due process, this Court recently relied 20 on a United States Supreme Court case fo r the proposition that “a party properly 217 waived procedural due process protections by signing a contract which provided that 1 a judgment could be entered without notice or a hearing because it was a sophisticated 2 party represented by counsel, and it wa s not a contract of adhesion.” Chavez v. State 3 Workers’ Comp. Admin. , 2012-NMCA-060, ¶ 27, 280 P.3d 927 (citing D. H. 4 Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. , 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972)). Again, Parra makes no 5 argument that the Stipulation did not waive its due process rights. 6
{9} Finally, to the extent Parra argues that th e district court failed to consider that 7 Parra was disputing the facts alleged by Rehm, that the forfeiture was inequitable, and 8 that principles of equitabl e estoppel apply, in our view the threshold issue we must 9 consider is whether the district court was correct in upholding the immediate-entry-of10 judgment procedure in the Stipulation. Parra admits that it tendered a check in the 11 deficient amount of $2,900 on March 20, 2012. Thus, it was in default. Rehm was 12 therefore entitled to an immediate entry of judgment against Parra upon the filing of 13 an affidavit by Rehm’s attorney asserting th at Parra was in default. In neither its 14 motion before the district court nor in its brief in chief on appeal has Parra offered any 15 argument challenging the validity of the Sti pulation. In particular, because its 16 existence was never raised, Parra has not offered any argument establishing why it 17 was error for the district court to hold the parties to the Stipulation’s default provision 182 In its reply brief, Parra ultimately concedes that the Stipulation provides that 14 a forfeiture could occur if Parra “failed to abide by the payment schedule contained 15 in the Stipulation.” Parra argues, however , that notwithstanding this clear provision, 16 the district court “was bound to consider all of the surrounding facts and 17 circumstances” set forth in its motion to deny entry of judgment. We disagree, and 18 Parra provides no support for its argument. This Court will not consider propositions 19 that are unsupported by citation to authority. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & 20 Revenue Dep’t , 1998-NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969. 21 8 allowing for immediate entry of judgment. 2Consequently, we conclude that the 1 district court properly entered judgment in this case. 2 CONCLUSION 3
{10} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 4
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

__________________________________ 6 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 7 WE CONCUR: 8

_________________________________ 9 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 10

_________________________________ 11 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 12