Noticeably absent from Rosenthal’s motion is any request for the court to reconsider
its ruling and find in Rosenthal’s favor. Rosenthal herself acknowledges that the
issue does not have a material impact on the ultimate ruling stating that “[w]hile this
may not affect the court’s ultimate conclusion in this case, counsel for plaintiff
respectfully submits that the language of the opinion should be amended to coincide
with other precedent and to preserve the spirit of the law and the actual
circumstances which SSR 83-20 should apply.” (Mot. 3). The fine tuning of legal
precedent for usage in future actions is not a proper basis for a motion for
reconsideration. Although, in theory, we could have addressed this issue in dicta as
part of our original ruling, since we are now at the motion for reconsideration stage,
the distinction argued by Rosenthal is no longer properly brought before us.
Currently before the court is the issue of whether there are new arguments or new
evidence or whether the court committed manifest error. As a court of law, we rule
on live disputes before us and we will not engage in a discussion of the law on issues
that are of no moment in the dispute at hand. If Rosenthal desires to refine the
precedent in regards to SSR 83-20, she must do so as part of the resolution of a live
issue that is before a court. Since Rosenthal has not provided a valid basis for her

motion for reconsideration, we deny the motion as improper.



DISCUSSION

Rosenthal challenges our ruling in regard to the ALJ’s determination of
the onset date of disability. Rosenthal argued in regards to the dispositive motions,
that the ALJ is also obligated to develop the record and determine the onset date of
disability, and that in failing to seek additional medical input on the issue of when
Rosenthal’s fibromyalgia began, he mistakenly replaced an expert's judgment with
his own. Rosenthal cited for support SSR 83-20, which states that for disabilities of
nontraumatic origin, there are other considerations that must be taken into account
such as work history and medical and other evidence concerning impairment
severity.

We need not address the arguments presented by Rosenthal in her motion for
reconsideration because she has failed to present a proper purpose for the pursuit of
the instant motion. As indicated above, motions for reconsideration are reserved for
presenting new evidence or arguments or arguing that the court committed a
manifest error of law. LB Credit Corp., 49 F.3d at 1267. Rosenthal fails to assert
such a basis for her motion. Rosenthal does not argue that the distinction she
focuses on in her motion has a material impact on this action. She even falls short of
asserting that the court was in error. For example, she states that “the language of
the Court’s opinion suggests that, before SSR 83-20 can apply, a person not only

must be found disabled, but disabled prior to the DLL.” ( Reply 2)(emphasis added).


CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we deny Rosenthal’s motion for

reconsideration.

A
Samuel wees OM ” é é 0

United States District Court Judge

Dated: January 11, 2005



‘Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge 7 iaye Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 6511 DATE 1/11/2005
CASE Rosenthal vs. Barnhart
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3cd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
Q a Brief in support of motion due
(3) QO Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief duc.
(4) i) Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) o Pretrial conferencefheld/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) Qo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) a (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 COFRCP41(a)(1) OC FRCP41(a){2).
(10) MM [Otherdocketentry] For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion, plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration is denied. Enter Memorandum Opinion.
(1) {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required,
q umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

aN 42 2005

date docketed

Wan

Ging deputy initials

Notified counsel by (etephone.

Y | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

Soba pes pan date mailed notice
courtroom pre tts git 802

deputy's
initials

MW

Date/time received in

central Clerk’s Office ailing deputy initiats



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

)

CHERIE ROSENTHAL, )
)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 03 C 6511

)

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, }
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL )
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION., )
)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Cherie Rosenthal's (“Rosenthal”)
motion for reconsideration. For the reasons stated below, we deny the motion for

reconsideration.

BACKGROUND
On July 30, 1999, Plaintiff Rosenthal applied for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under the Social Security Act. On November 8, 2000, Rosenthal appeared
at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). At the time of the
hearing, which took place twenty-seven years after her Date Last Insured (“DLI”),

1


Rosenthal was forty-six years old. On June 13, 2001, the ALJ denied Rosenthal's
application for DIB, finding she did not have a severe impairment. On July 16,
2003, the Appeals Council denied Rosenthal's request for review, making the ALJ's
decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Rosenthal sought a judicial review
of the ALJ's decision before this court and on July 27, 2004, we granted Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and denied Rosenthal’s motion for summary

judgment. Rosenthal seeks a reconsideration of that ruling.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 59(e) permits parties to file, within ten days of the entry of a judgment, a
motion to alter or amend the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) motions do
not give a party the opportunity to rehash old arguments or to present new arguments
"that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the
judgment.” Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir.1996)(citingLB Credit
Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp.,49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir.1995)), Rather, a Rule
59(e) motion "must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must
present newly discovered evidence" in order to be successful. LB Credit Corp., 49
F.3d at 1267 (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268
(7th Cir.1986)). The decision of whether to grant or deny a Rule 59(e) motion “is
entrusted to the sound judgment of the district court... ."Jn re Prince, 85 F.3d 314,

324 (7th Cir.1996).