alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019093EN.01007501.xml

| 11.3.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 93/75 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.3.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 93/75

---

Action brought on 18 January 2019 — PE Digital v EUIPO — Spark Networks Services (ElitePartner)

(Case T-36/19)

(2019/C 93/97)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: PE Digital GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: V. von Bomhard and J. Fuhrmann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Spark Networks Services GmbH (Berlin, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: EU figurative mark ElitePartner — EU trade mark No 5 996 351

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 October 2018 in Case R 614/2017-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | alter the contested decision to the effect that the ground for invalidity under Article 59(1)(a), in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 does not preclude the contested EU trade mark; |
| --- | --- |

—

alter the contested decision to the effect that the ground for invalidity under Article 59(1)(a), in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 does not preclude the contested EU trade mark;

| — | in the alternative, annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, annul the contested decision;

| — | order the defendant and also, with regard to its intervention, the other party in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the applicant’s costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant and also, with regard to its intervention, the other party in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the applicant’s costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 59(1)(a), in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 59(1)(a), in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 94(1), first sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 94(1), first sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Young, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lombardo, J.), rendered October 2, 1980, convicting him of assault in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and unauthorized use of a vehicle, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

The People established defendant’s competence to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence *(see, People v Santos,*43 AD2d 73), as a review of the record reveals that despite defendant’s hearing impairment, he had sufficient ability to consult with his lawyers with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and he had a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him *(see,*CPL 730.10; *Dusky v United States,*362 US 402; *People v Francabandera,*33 NY2d 429). Defendant’s main defense at trial was that of justification. Penal Law § 35.15 (1) provides that a person may use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful physical force by such other person. The defendant’s state of mind is the crucial inquiry when a claim of justification is asserted *(see, People v Miller,*39 NY2d 543; *People v Powell,*112 AD2d 450; *People v Long,*104 AD2d 902). His subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of danger must be reasonable *(see, People v Miller, supra; People v Wagman,*99 AD2d 519).

The trial court erred in instructing the jury to evaluate the reasonableness of defendant’s belief in light of what an "ordinary prudent man” would have believed under the circumstances. Nevertheless, the error of law was not preserved for appellate review by timely objection at trial *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]) and we decline to exercise our discretion to grant defendant a new trial in the interest of justice since there was overwhelming evidence before the jury both to establish defendant’s guilt and to rebut his justification defense *(see, People v Hanley,*112 AD2d 1048; *People v Doctor,*98 AD2d 780).

Defendant’s remaining contentions, insofar as they were *681preserved for our review, are without merit. Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Weinstein and Eiber, JJ., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

NATHAN DUANE GOSSELIN

,

Appellant

,

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 1 5

- 00 107

- C R

Appeal from the

54th District Court

of McLennan County, Texas

(TC# 2012

- 1065

- C2 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Nathan Duane Gosselin has filed a motion to dismiss his appeal. Rule 42.2(a) permits an

appellate court to dismiss a criminal appeal on the appellant ’ s motion at any time before the

court ’ s decision. T EX .R.A PP .P. 42.2(a). Finding that Appellant has complied with the

requireme nts of Rule 42.2(a), we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.

October 21, 2015

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determine d that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-50399 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAMON GONZALEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas

(EP-96-CA-149)

November 5, 1996 Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. *

PER CURIAM:

In this appeal from the district court’s order denying his

motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Ramon Gonzalez (# 62167-

080) contends that his right against double jeopardy was violated

by his criminal conviction because a civil forfeiture preceded the

criminal judgment. A recent United States Supreme Court opinion2

has rendered this issue frivolous. U nited States v. Ursery

, 116

S.Ct. 2135, 2147-49 (1996).

Gonzalez argues for the first time in his reply brief that the

civil forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. This issue was not

raised below. And, an issue may not be raised for the first time

in a rep ly brief, even by a pro se appellant. K nighten v.

Commissioner , 702 F.2d 59, 60 & n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 464

U.S. 897 (1983).

Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. S ee Howard

v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

This Court has not yet determined whe ther a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) is required under the circumstances of this

appeal. S ee 28 U.S.C. § 2253. To the extent that a COA is

required, we construe Gonzalez’ notice of appeal as an application

for a COA and DENY the motion.

APPEAL DISMISSED
Exhibit 31.1



CERTIFICATION



I, Thomas W. Davison, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Sontra Medical Corporation;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.



4. The small business issuers other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:



(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business
issuers most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuers fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal
control over financial reporting; and



5. The small business issuers
other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of small business issuers board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):



(a) All significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and



(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting.



Date: August 16, 2004



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ Thomas W. Davison                
|Thomas W. Davison                    
|President and Chief Executive Officer
Case: 1:02-cv-04801 Document #: 123 Filed: 03/01/04 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:1160

Case: 1:02-cv-04801 Document #: 123 Filed: 03/01/04 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:1161

Case: 1:02-cv-04801 Document #: 123 Filed: 03/01/04 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:1162

Case: 1:02-cv-04801 Document #: 123 Filed: 03/01/04 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:1163

Case: 1:02-cv-04801 Document #: 123 Filed: 03/01/04 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:1164

Case: 1:02-cv-04801 Document #: 123 Filed: 03/01/04 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:1165
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 02 CR 511-4

)

ROBERT BELL, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This Court has just received from Robert Bell ("Bell") a written request for an early 

termination of his term of supervised release. Bell has supplied an impressive record of his 

accomplishments during the 14 months that he has been on supervised release to this point, but 

this Court is of course obligated to obtain input from the United States Attorney's Office before it 

rules on Bell's request.

Because the Assistant United States Attorney most recently involved in Bell's case (that 

was then Assistant United States Attorney Christina Egan, who handled Bell's Paladino-required 

resentencing) has since left the office, copies of this memorandum order are being transmitted to 

that office for reassignment as well as to Bell's defense counsel James McGurk, Esquire for as 

prompt a response as possible. This Court will act swiftly after receiving such input.

__________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: July 16, 2014
Exhibit
13.2





Credicorp
Ltd.


Certification
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


(18
U.S.C. Section 1350)





Pursuant
to the requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.
Sections 1350(a) and (b)), the undersigned hereby certifies as
follows:





1.           I
am the Chief Financial Officer of Credicorp Ltd. (the “Company”).





2.           To
my knowledge:





(A)        The
Company’s Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2009
accompanying this Certification, in the form filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(B)       
The information in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:
February 23, 2011





By:
                /s/ ALVARO CORREAName:  Alvaro
      CorreaTitle:  Chief
      Financial Officer
**Exhibit 10.78**

** **

**TERMINATION OF CONSULTING AGREEMENT**

 

This Termination of Consulting Agreement,dated as of June 30, 2002, is by and between Vari-Lite International, Inc. (the“Company”) and J. Anthony Smith (the “Consultant”).

 

W I T N E S S E T H:

 

WHEREAS, the Company (formerly known asVari-Lite Holdings, Inc.) and the Consultant entered into that certainConsulting Agreement, dated as of July 1, 1995 (the “Consulting Agreement”);and

 

WHEREAS, the Company has suffered a declinein its financial performance and management and the Board of Directors of theCompany have made recommendations for reducing expenses of the Company in orderto improve the Company’s financial performance; and

 

WHEREAS, the Compensation Committee of theBoard of Directors of the Company (the “Compensation Committee”) has determinedthat it is in the best financial interest of the Company to terminate theConsulting Agreement effective as of June 30, 2002; and

 

WHEREAS, the Consultant is a significantstockholder of the Company and agrees that it is in the best financial interestof the Company to terminate the Consulting Agreement as proposed by theCompensation Committee;

 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of theforegoing and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiencyof which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto hereby agree, effective asof the date hereof, that the Consulting Agreement is cancelled and terminatedand shall be of no further force or effect.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto haveexecuted this Agreement as of the date first above written.

 

 
|   | VARI-LITE  INTERNATIONAL, INC. |
|--------|--------------------------------|
|   |                           |
|   |                           |
|   | By:                            |   |
|   |                           | T. Clay  Powers, President |
|   |                           |
|   |                           |
|   | J. Anthony  Smith              |

 

----
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 13

- 00678

- CR

RENE ZAMORA v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 331st District Court of Travis County , Texas Trial Cause No. D

- 1

- DC

- 13

- 904017

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this caus e on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. July 2, 2015
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

EXECUTIVE TRANSPORTATION CO. 

INC., ACEONE TRANS CO., AF TAXI, 

INC., AG TAXI, INC., AGB TRANS, INC., 

ALMAR TAXI, INC., TS CAB, INC, BAG 

TRANS, INC., BNG CAB CO., BNA CAB 

CO., BNJ CAB, INC., BOND TAXI, INC., 

BSP TRANS, INC., DOUBLE A CAB CO., 

FAD TRANS, INC., GA CAB, INC., GD 

CAB, INC., GN TRANS, INC., GOD 

BLESS AMERICA TRANS, INC., GRACE 

TRANS, INC., IA TRANS, INC., JARNAIL 

TAXI, INC., : JAYDAN, INC. LAN TRANS, 

INC., LMB TAXI, INC. MAF TRANS, INC., 

MDS CAB, INC., MG TRANS CO., NOBLE 

CAB, INC., ODESSA TAXI, INC., RAV 

TRANS, INC., ROSEMONT TAXICAB CO, 

INC., S&S TAXI CAB, INC., SAJ TRANS, 

INC., SABA TRANS, INC., SF TAXI, INC., 

SOCIETY TAXI, INC., STEELE TAXI, 

INC., TGIF TRANS, INC., V&S TAXI, INC., 

VAL TRANS, INC., VB TRANS, INC., AND 

VSM TRANS, INC. BM ENTERPRISES, 

INC., T/A A.G. TAXI, BUCKS COUNTY 

SERVICES, INC., DEE DEE CAB 

COMPANY, GERMANTOWN CAB 

COMPANY, RONALD CAB, INC., T/A 

COMMUNITY CAB, SHAWN CAB, INC., 

T/A DELAWARE COUNTY CAB, AND 

SAWINK, INC., T/A COUNTY CAB,

Petitioners

v.

PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY 

COMMISSION,

Respondent

:

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No. 214 EAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Commonwealth Court
[214 EAL 2016] - 2

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of December, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is DENIED.
#### Juan Fernandez-Velez et al., Respondents, v Kristen Joy O’Hara et al., Appellants.

[942 NYS2d 805]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Farneti, J.), dated October 4, 2011, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Juan Fernandez-Velez did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

The defendants met their prima facie of burden of showing that the plaintiff Juan Fernandez-Velez (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and thoracolumbar regions of the injured plaintiffs spine did not constitute serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Rodriguez v Huerfano,*46 AD3d 794, 795 [2007]).

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Skelos, J.E, Dickerson, Hall, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2011 NY Slip Op 32795(U).]
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Order entered March 8, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01573-CR

No. 05-19-01574-CR

CHRISTOPHER GERARD PRUITT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F18-55426-S & F18-55425-S

ORDER

Appellant’s brief was initially due on August 12, 2020. On counsel’s 

motions, we granted four extensions of time, having considered the Texas Supreme 

Court’s ongoing direction to liberally allow extensions of time due to the COVID19 pandemic, making appellant’s brief due on March 1, 2021. To date, no brief has 

been filed, and we have had no further communication from appellant.

We ORDER the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine why 

appellant’s brief has not been filed. In this regard, the trial court shall make 
appropriate findings and recommendations and determine whether appellant 

desires to prosecute these appeals, whether appellant has abandoned the appeals, or 

whether appointed counsel has abandoned the appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b). 

If the trial court cannot obtain appellant’s presence at the hearing, the trial court 

shall conduct the hearing in appellant’s absence. See Meza v. State, 742 S.W.2d 

708 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (per curiam). If appellant is indigent, 

the trial court is ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure 

effective representation, which may include appointment of new counsel.

We ORDER the trial court to transmit a record of the proceedings, which 

shall include written findings and recommendations, to this Court within 

TWENTY DAYS of the date of this order.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to the Honorable Amber

Givens, Presiding Judge, 282nd Judicial District Court; to Valencia Bush; and to 

the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office, Appellate Division.

These appeals are ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with the 

above order. The appeals shall be reinstated twenty days from the date of this order 

or when the findings are received, whichever is earlier. 

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE