Instead, Roberts argues that her discharge took place on the heels of her statutorily protected
activity, and thus a causal nexus under the direct method has been established.? On March 16, 2000,
Roberts complained to Bryan, Weber, and Davenport that she believed her race played a part in the
negative feelings demonstrated by the teachers to that point. At the outset of this meeting, Bryan and
Weber had been prepared to recommend that the Board elect not to renew Roberts’ contract for the
upcoming school year. But as a result of the meeting, Weber and Bryan agreed to withdraw this
recommendation, and in fact Roberts was given another chance to rectify the problems between
herself and the staff at Madison. Rather than retaliate against Roberts, the District instead provided
hera second-year’s contract. It was not until the problems persisted throughout Roberts’ second year
that the District elected to decline to renew Roberts’ contract for the 2001-2002 school year. Indeed,
more than a year passed between Roberts’ statutorily protected activity and the Board’s decision to
terminate her employment. The Court concludes that Roberts has failed to submit any evidence,
direct or circumstantial, to demonstrate that there was a causal nexus between her March 16, 2000
complaints and her March 2001 termination and her retaliation claim fails.

C. Due Process Claim

Roberts’ final claim is that the District deprived her of due process when it discharged her

without notice of the charges against her or a fair and prompt hearing. In its motion for summary

judgment, the Defendant mistakes Roberts’ due process claim as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equal protection

3 Roberts’ argument is confusing. At the conclusion of the single paragraph in her brief,
Roberts states that “Jones made his first complaint of race discrimination in 1995 . . . [and the]
proximity of time establishes the causal nexus.” Of course, Roberts (and not Jones) is the
Plaintiff in this case and Roberts was not hired until 1999. The Court construes Roberts’
argument liberally to suggest that the proximity between her complaints at the March 16, 2000
meeting and the Board’s March 2001 decision to terminate her employment demonstrates a
causal nexus.

19



facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. And neither "the
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, nor
the existence of “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus., Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), is sufficient to
defeat such a motion. Further a plaintiff cannot manufacture a conflict by submitting an affidavit
that contradicts an earlier deposition. Piscione v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 171 F.3d 527, 532 (7th
Cir.1999). Nor can a plaintiff defeat a motion for summary judgment in the context of employment
discrimination with conjecture or speculation regarding the employer’s motives. Abioye v.
Sundstrand Corp., 164 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 1998).
A. Discrimination Claims

Roberts alleges that the District discriminated against her in violation of Title VII because
of her race and gender when it transferred her to another administrative position and when it later
failed to renew her contract, effectively terminating her. A plaintiff may defeat a summary judgment
motion in an employment discrimination case by using either the direct method or the indirect
method. Cerutti v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2003). In order to proceed under the
direct method, Roberts must have put forth evidence — either direct or circumstantial — sufficient
to raise an inference that the employer's decision to take an adverse job action against her was
motivated by an impermissible purpose. Cerutti, 349 F.3d at 1060; Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003); Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 753-54 (7th Cir. 2003).
Here, Roberts submits no evidence and makes no argument sufficient to proceed under the direct
method, and so must proceed under the more familiar burden-shifting approach set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

13


Shortly after the October meeting with the counselors, problems began to surface at Madison.
First, Madison teacher Carol Vermaat' complained to Russ Bryan that Roberts had yelled at her in
a hallway and social worker Jennifer Madson complained that Roberts had confronted her in the
presence of other Madison faculty. (Bryan Dep. at 22-24). Bryan felt these complaints were unusual
because never before had he received a complaint from a teacher about an administrator (Def.
56.1(a) Statement ] 40). Shortly after Vermaat and Madson complained to Bryan about Roberts,
Bryan received an anonymous letter complaining about Roberts. (Def. 56.1(a) Statement ]42). The
anonymous author complained that Roberts: 1) was not knowledgeable about the staff or school
procedures;? 2) was not available to the staff; 3) blamed others when problems arose; 4) was in

“control mode”; 5) did not accept input from staff; and 6) yelled at employees. (Def. 56.1(a)

' Several of the teachers and employees of the District relevant to this litigation have
changed their names since the time of Roberts’ tenure as principal. In all cases, the Court refers
to the employees by their current name.

? Roberts admits that she did not know everyone’s name at the beginning of the school
year, but testified that she did know them by the middle of the year. (Robert’s Dep. at 149). The
Defendant denies Roberts’ 56.1(b) Statement 23, claiming that 1) it represents a self-serving
opinion; and 2) it is not material. But Defendant has an entire section of its statement of facts
devoted to an attempt to prove that Roberts did not know the names of all faculty and staff at
Madison, and thus if Roberts’ statement is not material, neither are Defendant’s. Second,
testimony given by parties in depositions is almost always self-serving. Much of Bryan’s
testimony, offered by Defendant, is also self-serving. Nothing in the Federal or Local Rules
prevents a party from relying on self-serving testimony. See Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366
F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (self-serving affidavit acceptable method for providing evidence on
summary judgment provided it is based on personal knowledge). Roberts’ testimony is based on
personal knowledge — she knew whether she knew the names of Madison personnel. Because
Defendant’s denial is improper the Court deems Plaintiff's 56.1(b)(3)(B) Statement ] 23 to have
been admitted. Further, the fact that Defendant's have presented testimony of other witnesses
who stated that Roberts did not know every staff member's name is of no import because on
summary judgment the Court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Contrary to Defendant's representation, this is a contested fact and the Court must
accept as true Plaintiff's contention that she knew everyone’s names.

4


claim. Roberts moves to strike the District’s motion for summary judgment on Count III of her
complaint. In response to Roberts’ motion to strike, the District points out the grounds for its
summary judgment motion as to Count III of Roberts’ complaint. Because the undisputed facts show
that Roberts cannot state a due process claim, the District’s motion for summary judgment as to
Count III is also granted.

In order to assert a violation of the due process clause in the context of an employment
decision, a plaintiff must show that she had a property interest and that the deprivation of continued
employment occurred without due process of law. Burrell v. City of Mattoon, 378 F.3d 642, 647
(7th Cir. 2004). “‘A protected property interest in employment can arise from a state statute,
regulation, municipal ordinance, or an express or implied contract--those ‘rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Crull v.
Sunderman, 384 F.3d 453, 460 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922,
943 (7th Cir.1996)) (internal quotation omitted).

Here there is no state statute, regulation, or school code that provides Roberts with any
expectation that her job as principal should continue beyond the length of any contract. Further,
Roberts points to no evidence to suggest that any conduct on the part of the District created a
legitimate claim of entitlement to an extension of her contract beyond the 2000-2001 school year.
Indeed, quite to the contrary, every message that Roberts received from the District during the 2000-
2001 school year informed her that she was not performing her job to the District’s satisfaction and
that it was unlikely that it would renew her contract. Because Roberts can not demonstrate a
legitimate claim to continued employment, her due process claim fails.

Il. Conclusion

20


District applied its expectations in discriminatory terms, she cannot establish that its reasons for
firing her were pretextual. See Mateu-Anderegg, 304 F.3d at 626; Coco, 128 F.3d at 1179. Roberts
points only to deposition testimony of one school board member, Osie Davenport, to suggest that
other principals were treated more favorably and thus the District applied its expectations in a
discriminatory manner. But Davenport’s testimony is so vague and devoid of detail that it fails to
describe the situations these principals found themselves in. In other words, Davenport’s testimony
does not point to another principal who, faced with overwhelming negative reactions from the staff
he led, was given special services or support by the District to improve his relationships with staff.
In the end, the question for the Court is not whether the District was mistaken about the reasons why
the faculty at Madison consistently complained about Roberts for two years, but whether the District
honestly believed that the faculty had legitimate complaints about Roberts that were sufficiently
significant to prevent Roberts from doing her job. Little v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007,
1012 (7th Cir. 2004).

Roberts submitted no evidence that the District did not honestly believe the teachers’
complaints about her leadership. Roberts speculates that because she was the first female, African
American principal in the District, because the District had only a small African American
population, and because no formal grievances were filed against her that the District’s reasons for
terminating her must be pretextual. But neither the fact that Roberts was the first African American
principal in the District, nor the racial composition of the school sheds any light on the honesty of
the Defendant’s motives. And the mere fact that no faculty filed formal grievances against her does
not undermine the Defendant’s decision to terminate her because of the volume of informal

complaints lodged against her. Roberts must do more than offer her speculation regarding the

17



Roberts’ performance at a 3. (Def. 56.1(a) Statement ¥ 119). But in “Accountability 7,” where
Roberts was assessed based upon her ability to “[d]evelop and maintain open lines of communication
with students, staff and other district personnel,” Bryan gave Roberts a score of 1 and wrote that:
Although [Roberts] was involved in a number of activities designed to develop and maintain
an open line of communication with staff, I expressed concern throughout the year about the
need to improve working relationships through effective communication. This concern was
noted in memos dated January 19, 2000 and March 10, 2000. This accountability must be
a focus for the 2000-2001 school year and significant improvement in [Roberts’] relationship
with the staff must occur. The information collected and summarized by Mr. Tom
Cavenagh, [sic] further indicates a similar need. It is my hope that the relationship and
communication issues can be resolved before the start of the 2000-2001 school year.
(Roberts Dep. at Ex. C).
Near the end of the 1999-2000 school year, the Board acted on Roberts’ suggestion from the
March 2000 meeting and hired Thomas Cavenagh, the director of the Dispute Resolution Center at
North Central College in Naperville, to play a neutral, mediative role, to assess the situation at
Madison, to recommend a program to resolve the conflicts, and to work with Roberts and the staff
to improve the climate at Madison. (Def. 56.1(a) Statement J] 120-122). Cavenagh met with Bryan
and Roberts to discuss his approach and the mediative process. (Cavenagh Dep. at 14-15).
Cavenagh then spent the next three weeks at the school meeting with Bryan, Roberts, and each and
every paid staff member (including janitorial staff, kitchen staff, secretarial staff, administrative staff,
faculty, and parent representatives) at Madison. (Cavenagh Dep. at 15-16), Cavenagh observed at
the outset that there was significant tension at Madison and that a significant number of personnel,
from all areas of the school, had difficulties working with Roberts. (Cavenagh Dep. at 17-20). In
particular, Cavenagh observed that “virtually all” faculty believed that Roberts was not responsive

to their needs and that when they asked about her nonresponsiveness she blamed someone other than


At your mid-year conference on January 18, I reviewed my concerns over the current issues
of low staff morale and the low level of trust that has developed between you and the staff
at Madison. Ihave discussed the need for you to focus your attention on using interpersonal
skills, which are necessary to establish positive working relationships with staff. I believe
that the trust and morale issues are a direct result of not establishing a collaborative
relationship with staff. Your attention to this matter will hopefully lead to a new level of
trust, respect, and staff confidence in your leadership style.

At this point in the year the issues are continuing to increase in magnitude rather than
improve. I believe that many staff are withdrawing into their classrooms as a method of
coping with their perceived inability to share information about the atmosphere in the
building. I have encouraged staff members to meet with you to share their concerns. If this
dialog occurs, I believe it can be helpful in creating a collaborative relationship with staff.
As discussed, I will continue to closely monitor progress in the areas of staff morale, trust,
respect and positive working relationships. If significant progress toward improvement in
these areas has not been made by March 1, 2000, I will not be able to recommend you for
continued employment as principal at Madison Junior High School.

Iappreciate your shared concern over the issues that have developed over the first half of this
year. I truly believe you are committed to working to resolve the problems. It is my sincere

hope that you will be able to establish the necessary staff relationships to lead Madison in
a positive direction.

Roberts responded to Bryan’s memorandum a few weeks later, expressing her concern that
Bryan’s memorandum focused only on the negative areas of her performance and excluded any
discussion of areas in which Bryan praised her job performance. (Roberts Aff., Ex. B). Roberts
repeated to Bryan her feeling that certain staff loyal to Pentecost launched a “smear campaign”
against her and pleaded for support from the District to help quell the unrest. (Roberts Aff., Ex. B).
At some point during her tenure as principal, Roberts also asked the Board to provide a statement
to the staff in support of her leadership, but they did not. (Roberts Dep. at 208). Neither the Board
nor Bryan ever convened a meeting to announce their support for Roberts as principal, though Bryan

continued to meet with Roberts on a weekly basis through March 2000. (Def. Ex. J. at 80, 145).



Statement § 43). Bryan showed Roberts the letter and explained that he did not “know where it was
coming from” but that Roberts “need{ed] to be aware that somebody has these feelings.” (Bryan
Dep. at 35).

Because of the letter and the complaints that Bryan received, he began to visit Madison in
November 1999 to observe the atmosphere at Madison. (Def. Ex. J at 142). Bryan also met with
the school social worker and guidance counselors, who reported that there was a low level of trust
between Roberts and the staff. (Bryan Dep. at 41). At the same time, Roberts expressed to Bryan
that she believed that the counselors loyal to Pentecost continued the campaign against her by
keeping “issues” that they had with her alive. (Bryan Dep. at 38-39). And although Bryan talked
with Roberts about the staff members’ concerns and the ways in which she could improve the
climate at Madison and her relationships with staff, he never investigated Roberts’ suspicion that
staff members rebelled against her purposefully and in support of Pentecost’s unspoken “claim” to
the principal’s position. (Bryan Dep. at 38-41; Def, 56.1(a) Statement J 52). Throughout December,
Madison’s union representatives (Vermaat and Jacqueline Plourde who represented the 66 certified
personnel at Madison) continued to bring concerns to Bryan similar to those voiced in the
anonymous letter. (Def. Ex. J at 142). Bryan met with Roberts four times in December 1999 to
discuss ways in which she could improve her relationships with her staff. (Def. 56.1(a) Statement
4152). Later in December, Bryan expressed concem to the school board about Roberts’ performance,
noting her interaction with the staff. (Def. 56.1(a) Statement ] 53).

On January 18, 2000, Bryan met with Roberts for her mid-year review. (Def. 56.1(a)
Statement § 56). The day after the review, Bryan sent Roberts a written memorandum discussing

her performance. (Def. Ex. J. at 145), That memorandum reads, in full:


Defendant’s motives. Abioye, 164 F.3d at 368. Roberts’ discrimination claims fail because she
cannot show that she was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations and because she cannot
show that her employer’s proffered reason for terminating her was pretextual.
B. Retaliation Claim

Roberts’ second claim is that the district retaliated against her because she complained during
the March 16, 2000 meeting with Bryan, Weber, and Davenport that she was being subjected to
differential treatment because of her race and gender. As with discrimination claims, a plaintiff
pursuing a retaliation claim can proceed under the direct or indirect method. Under the direct
method, Roberts must demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the two. Stone v. City
of Indianapolis, 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit has adopted a burden-
shifting method, similar to that set forth in McDonnell-Douglas, for plaintiffs who choose to proceed
under the indirect method. Under this method, Roberts must first establish that: (1) she engaged in
a statutorily protected activity; (2) she was meeting her employer's legitimate expectations; (3) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated
employees who did not engage in statutorily protected activity. Sitar v. Indiana Dept. of Transp.,
344 F.3d 720, 728. (7th Cir. 2003). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case under the
indirect method, the defendant has the opportunity to come forward with a legitimate reason for its
action, and if it does, the burden then returns to plaintiff to show this reason to be pretextual. Jd.
Roberts cannot prevail under the indirect method because, as noted in the discussion of her
discrimination claims, she cannot establish that she was meeting her employer’s legitimate

expectations or that the District’s reasons for its actions were pretextual.

18


criticisms that had been directed at her by the staff had been done because she was African
American. (Davenport Dep. at 51). Roberts also suggested the District support some team-building
training and look into hiring a conflict resolution consultant. (Roberts Dep. at 180-81). Roberts
requested that Bryan and Weber reconsider the decision not to renew her contract and give her an
additional year to resolve the problems at Madison. (Roberts Dep. at 125). Davenport recognized
that the Board had put Roberts in a difficult position because of the faculty who were loyal to
Pentecost. (Davenport Dep. at 39-40, 102-103). At the end of the meeting, Weber and Bryan agreed
to withdraw the recommendation to dismiss Roberts at the end of the current school year. (Def. Ex.
J. at 143).

Shortly after the Board met, Bryan asked Roberts to draft a plan for the 2000-2001 school
year that would address the areas of improvement he noted in his March 10 memorandum. (Def. Ex.
J. at 143). Roberts drafted a plan identifying specific tasks for herself, Bryan, and the District to
improve her leadership skills, the relationships between principal and staff, and staff morale.
(Roberts Dep. at Exs. D & E). And again, Roberts requested that Bryan provide a written and verbal
statement of support to help quell the tensions at Madison. (Roberts Dep, Exs. D & E). In addition
to Roberts’ plan, Bryan prepared a summary report of the problems at Madison for the Board on
April 3, 2000, in which he noted that Roberts’ problems “centered around ineffective leadership
strategies for establishing relationships” and “ineffective communication.” (Bryan Dep. at 27).

On June 6, 2000, Bryan submitted his final review of Roberts’ 1999-2000 performance.
(Def. 56.1(a) Statement § 115). The review contained 11 “accountability” areas in which Bryan
assessed Roberts’ performance on a scale of 1-6 with 6 being the highest rating. (Def. 56.1(a)

Statement 4 116; Roberts Dep. at Ex. C). In every area but “Accountability 7,” Bryan assessed



United States District Court, Northern District of Dlinois

Name of Assigned Jud; iti i ltt Or
-_ Magistrate Judge William J. Hibbler ines dsclioed Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 6733 DATE 11/1/2004
CASE ROBERTS vs. NAPERVILLE COMM. UNIT SCHOOL. DIST.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
Deft. Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #34)
Plaintiff's Motions to Strike (docs. #40,42)
Deft. Motions to Strike (docs. #44, 48)
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) Qo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above,]
(2) Do Brief in support of motion due
(3) ia} Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due. .
(4) ia} Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) im Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(6) i} Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for) on set for at .
(a) Q Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) a [Bench/Jury trial) [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) (Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) =f [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendant’s Motion for Summary

ay)

Judgment (doc. #34) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (doc. #40) is DENIED. Plaintiff's and Defendant’s Motions to Strike Exhibits and Statements
of Facts (doc. #42, 44, 48) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth in the Memorandum

Opinion and Order. All pending dates and motions are terminated as moot.

uo [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.)

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. srumber of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counse! by tetepbone.
: “ct duno
Docketing to mail notices, 19, “eo:
ing to mail notices gusta sn

NOV 0 2 2004

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge. BY 3S

id J. AGN h007

sac deputy’s Vo US HY
initials

Date/time received in
centrat Clerk’s Office



mailing before it was proofed. (Roberts Dep. at 88-90). Bryan later informed her that he was
disappointed that she had not taken responsibility for the newsletter. (Roberts Dep. at 88-90).

The teachers remained upset, and a week later, Bryan wrote Roberts a memorandum
expressing his concern about her loss of respect with the staff members at Madison because of the
newsletter incident. (Def. Ex. J. at 112). Bryan explained that Roberts had “demonstrated to [her]
staff a pattern of errors due to lack of attention to details [and] . . . a pattern of not accepting
responsibility for errors when brought to your attention.” (Def. Ex. J. at 112). Bryan informed
Roberts that her explanation of the error “further eroded the staff’s confidence, trust and respect in
you as their principal.” (Def. Ex. J. at 113), As a result of her handling of the incident, Bryan
advised Roberts that he would distribute a survey to all Madison staff to assess their opinion of
Roberts as principal. (Def. Ex. J. at 113).

Bryan modeled the survey after one created by Cavenagh earlier in the spring. (Cavenagh
Dep. at 76, Exs. 11-12). In Cavenagh’s survey, the faculty members are asked generally whether
they agree or disagree about qualities that are important for a principal to be effective. (Cavenagh
Dep. at Ex. 12). In Bryan’s survey, the faculty members are asked to evaluate Roberts’ effectiveness
or skill in the general categories listed in the survey created by Cavenagh. (Cavenagh Dep. at Ex.
11). Roberts did believe that any of the questions in the survey were biased towards African
Americans or females. (Roberts. Dep. at 197). The results showed that the faculty at Madison had
an extremely unfavorable opinion of Roberts. (Def. Ex. J. at 116-126). Out of 33 questions, only
three times did the staff give Roberts an average rating that was neutral or slightly favorable. (Def.
Ex. J. at 116). Thus in 30 questions, the staff gave Roberts an average rating that was unfavorable.

(Def. Ex. J. at 116). In fact, for 10 of the 33 questions, two-thirds or more of the staff gave Roberts

11



herself. (Cavenagh Dep. at 23-24). Cavenagh also noticed faculty complaints about Roberts’
professionalism. (Cavenagh Dep. at 23). Cavenagh believed that the tension at Madison made it
difficult for the staff to excel at their jobs. (Cavenagh Dep. at 41). At the same time, Cavenagh
acknowledged that the transition to a new principal, particularly since Pentecost had also applied for
the position, made for a difficult situation at Madison. (Cavenagh Dep. at 40).

Around June 5, 2000, Cavenagh prepared a memorandum that identified five issues that
needed to be resolved at Madison and also identified a variety of strategies to address those issues.
(Cavenagh Dep. at 61; Def. Ex. J. at 107-110). Among other things, Cavenagh expressed his opinion
that the District had an “ongoing” need to evaluate the administration at Madison and that the
Associate Superintendent (Bryan) should design and implement a formal evaluation process that
allowed staff to contribute feedback in the evaluation of Roberts and Madison’s assistant principals.
(Def. Ex. J. at 110).

Early the following school year, Roberts’ problems boiled over. In November 2000, Madison
prepared a school newsletter for public distribution. (Bryan Dep. at 53; Roberts Dep. at 85-86). But
Roberts’ secretary included in the newsletter the Social Security numbers of every staff member at
Madison. (Bryan Dep. at 53-54; Roberts Dep. at 85-86). The newsletter’s were delivered to the post
office for mailing prior to Roberts proofing them, but Roberts retrieved before the post office mailed
them. (Roberts Dep. at 85-87). Needless to say, the faculty were upset that their personal
information nearly made it into the public domain, and Roberts and Bryan convened an impromptu
school meeting to explain the error. At a school meeting, Roberts attempted to explain how the

mistake occurred, informing them that a secretary had composed the newsletter and distributed it for

10


But Roberts’ problems continued to grow. Bryan was frequently called to the school to deal
with complaints regarding Roberts. (Bryan Dep. at 72). Vermaat and Plourde, Madison’s union
Tepresentatives, both continued to complain to Bryan about Roberts. (Bryan Dep. at 72). Patrice
Olinger, a teacher at Madison, wrote letters to the school board complaining about Roberts, but
failed to mention any specific events that formed the basis of her complaints. (Olinger Dep. at 55-
56, 59-60).

On March 10, 2000, Bryan composed a memorandum to Roberts regarding her employment
recommendation for the 2000-2001 school year. (Def. Ex. J. at 79). Bryan informed Roberts that,
although she had made an effort to improve her relationships with schoo] personnel, he did not “feel
satisfactory progress ha[d] been made in order for me to recommend reemployment as the principal
at Madison Junior High School for the 2000-2001 school year.” (Def. Ex. J. at 79). Bryan informed
Roberts that: 1) she had not developed effective leadership strategies and that staff members were
uncomfortable approaching her to discuss problems; 2) staff morale was low; and 3) staff members
did not respect her as a leader. (Def. Ex. J. at 79). Bryan further stated his belief that the issues he
had identified could not be improved to the level necessary to lead the staff in the future and that he
would recommend to the board that she be dismissed as principal of Madison. (Def. Ex. J. at 79).
Atthis point, Bryan had met with Roberts or Madison staff members 35 times in an effort to improve
the climate at Madison. (Def. Ex. J. at 143).

On March 16, 2000, Roberts met with school board member Osie Davenport, Bryan, and
Superintendent Donald Weber. (Def. 56.1(a) Statement f 100). At the meeting, Bryan discussed
the concerns about Roberts and her relationship with the staff at Madison. (Def. 56.1(a) Statement

4] 102, 107). Roberts expressed her concern to Davenport, Bryan, and Weber that many of the



It seems likely that the Defendant handled Roberts’ tenure as school principal poorly. The
conflict resolution specialist it hired recognized the District put Roberts into a difficult position
because of the feelings of the assistant principal who had also applied for Roberts’ principal position.
Even the District’s own school board member recognized that Roberts had been placed in a difficult
position. And yet the District did little to defuse the tense situation. Instead, the District appears to
have allowed childishness and pettiness prevail over the students’ well-being, which is unfortunate.
But as unfortunate as the District’s poor business decisions may have been, they do not amount to
discrimination and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Wo Lc his, fl

Dated

United States District Court

21


example, Roberts consistently points to the fact that no grievances were filed against her to dispute
Defendant's proffered facts regarding complaints about Roberts’ performance. But grievances are
but one of many ways faculty may have complained about Roberts. Paragraphs 51, 55, 61, 86, 87,
98, and 99 of Roberts’ 56.1(b)(3)(A) Statement are also stricken (and the corresponding paragraphs
of Defendant's 56.1(a) Statement are therefore admitted), Except as otherwise noted here, the
Plaintiff's and Defendant’s motions to strike are denied.

Prior to the start of the 1999-2000 school year, the District interviewed several candidates
to assume the vacant principal position at Madison Junior High School. (Bryan Dep. at 6-7). The
District put together an interview committee consisting of parents, teachers, and administrators
(including the outgoing principal, Jerry Virgo, and the Assistant Superintendent for Human
Resources, Dr. Michael Kiser). (Bryan Dep, at 6-7). Dr. Kiser and Russ Bryan, the Associate
Superintendent responsible for supervising Madison, eventually recommended to the School Board
that it hire Roberts for the position at Madison. (Def. 56.1(a) Statement { 26). The Board accepted
the recommendation and the District hired Roberts, an African American female, as the principal of
Madison Junior High School for the 1999-2000 school year. (Def. 56.1(a) Statement §f 1, 7, 28).

In October 1999, Roberts held a meeting with Madison’s school counselors to discuss the
school’s approach to dealing with at-risk students. (Roberts Dep. at 69-74). According to Roberts,
the counselors disagreed with her suggested plan and shortly thereafter “started a campaign” against
her. (Roberts Dep. at 71-74). Roberts suspected that Sally Pentecost, the assistant principal and also
an applicant for the principal position filled by Roberts, was upset that she was not hired as principal
and encouraged the counselors loyal to her to sow the seeds of dissension within the school.

(Roberts Dep. at 68; Davenport Dep. at 33; Olinger Dep. at 17-18).



Under the burden-shifting test, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an
adverse employment action; (3) she was meeting the employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) that
the employer treated similarly situated employees who are not in the protected class more favorably.
Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 885-86 (7th Cir. 2001). Once a plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to come forward witha legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Jd. at 886, If the employer meet this burden, the burden
returns to the plaintiff who must show the employer's proffered reasons to be pretextual. Id.

Roberts’ race and gender discrimination claims fail because she cannot prove that she was
meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations. Shortly into her first year as principal at Madison,
the associate superintendent received an anonymous letter from a member of the staff complaining
about Roberts. In response, Bryan came to the school to observe the interaction between Roberts
and her staff and he noticed the tension at the school. At the end of her first semester as principal,
Bryan explained that the tension was increasing, not decreasing and warned her that if the climate
at Madison did not improve he would not be able to recommend her for continued employment.
Throughout Roberts’ employment at Madison, the District received complaints from faculty and staff
about Roberts’ performance. The district hired a conflict resolution specialist who also observed that
“virtually all” of the faculty at Madison believed Roberts was not responsive to their needs and that
the climate at the school made it difficult for the teachers to do their jobs. Despite these troubles,
the District did give Roberts a chance to improve the climate at Madison and renewed her
employment for a second year. But during her second year, Roberts lost the respect of the staff when

a school newsletter included the staff’s social security numbers. A survey of the staff shortly after

14


Roberts to maintain student performance, but also expected Roberts to effectively lead the faculty
and staff at Madison and to create a climate where the faculty and staff excelled. The undisputed
facts demonstrate that Roberts failed to meet this expectation.

Furthermore, even if Roberts could demonstrate that she was meeting her employer’s
legitimate expectations, she could not show that its reason for discharging her was pretextual.
Oftentimes, consideration of legitimate expectations is tied together with an analysis of whether the
employer’s reasons for its actions were pretextual, and in some ways that is the case here. See,
e.g.,Mateu-Anderegg v. School Dist. of Whitefish Bay, 304 F.3d 618, 626 (7th Cir. 2002). Roberts
argues among other things that she was not given sufficient support by the District, and thus her
performance was unfairly assessed. It is evident from the record that the District handled Roberts’
tenure as the principal at Madison poorly. The District knew that two assistant principals at Madison
coveted the vacant principal’s position, but selected Roberts to fill that position. At the outset of
her employment, Roberts complained to the District that some of the teachers appeared to launch a
vendetta against her. Roberts repeated this complaint several times throughout her tenure at
Madison. But the District never responded. When Bryan came to visit Madison, he focused on
Roberts’ conduct and never once appeared concerned with the possibility that the complaints from
the faculty and staff might be a product of childishness rather than of Roberts’ inability to function
as a principal. In short, the District tumed a blind eye to the possibility that the assistant principals
might have chaffed feelings at being passed over in favor of an outsider, Roberts, and it did little or
nothing to defuse the hostile situation faced by Roberts.

But the fact that the District made poor business decisions does not by itself demonstrate that

its reasons for its actions were pretextual. Unless Roberts submitted evidence to show that the

16


Defendants’ facts are riddled with statements of fact that rely upon matters outside the
personal knowledge of the deponent or that simply are not relevant. For example, Defendant
attempts to show that Roberts did not know the names of her staff members by citing to the
deposition testimony of Patrice Olinger and Jacqueline Plourde. (Def. 56.1(a) Statement ff] 64-65).
Olinger testified that “People talked about her not knowing their name.” Plourde testified that
Roberts did not know Marie Higgins’ name because Higgins “told us” and that she “believe[d]” that
Ellen Rathunde also told her that Roberts did not know her name. None of these statements is based
on the witness’ personal knowledge. In another statement, Defendant points to facts suggesting that
Kathryn Houk, a teacher at Madison, felt that Roberts was not a good principal. (Def. 56.1(a)
Statement {ff 78, 81, 85). But Houk was not a decisionmaker, nor does Defendant point to any
evidence that Houk communicated her concern to Bryan, the primary decisionmaker for the
Defendant. Defendant does not suggest that Houk, because of her teaching experience, is an expert
competent to testify on the characteristics of a good principal. Houk’s opinion is simply a naked
opinion, lacking any relevance to the issues at hand. To the extent that Defendant's statement of
facts relies upon irrelevant testimony or upon testimony that is not based on the personal knowledge
of the witness, those statements will be disregarded.

Plaintiff's statement of facts, on the other hand, frequently fails to point the Court to the
specific part of the record where the disputed fact can be found. For example, Paragraphs 55, 68,
70, 80, 87, 91, 98, 102, and 122 of Roberts’ 56.1(b)(3)(b) Statement and Paragraphs 133, 136, 138,
and 161 of her 56.1(b)(3)(a) Statement fail to direct the Court to any specific portion of the record
to support the statement. These paragraphs therefore are stricken. Roberts also repeatedly denies

facts from the Defendant, but points to evidence that in no way refutes the contested fact. For


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
PREDONNA ROBERTS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Nos. 02C 6733
v. )
)
) The Honorable William J. Hibbler
NAPERVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT )
ScHOOL DistRICT 233, )
Defendant. } NOCKETED
Nov 0 2 2004

(@) INI NI
Predonna Roberts believed that the Naperville Community Unit School District unfairly fired
her from her position as the principal of Madison Junior High School. Roberts sued the District,
alleging that it fired her because of her race and gender in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, in
retaliation for her opposition to racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and without
giving her due process in violation of 42 USC. § 1983. The District moves for summary judgment.
IL. Factual Background
Both parties move to strike portions of the other’s statement of facts. And both parties
throughout their statements of fact frequently fail to direct the court to the appropriate portion of the
record or to the deposition testimony of a witness with personal knowledge of the subject matter or
the parties cite to material that simply is not relevant, all of which are improper. See Greer v. Board
of Educ. of City of Chicago, Ill., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7 th Cir.2001); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113
F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir.1997); Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir.1994); Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir.1986).
1



a negative rating. (Def. Ex. J. at 116). Furthermore, approximately one-third of the staff added

written negative comments about Roberts at the conclusion of the survey. (Def. Ex. J. at 117-126).

After the survey was completed, Bryan wrote to Weber and explained that the tension at
Madison was higher than a year ago. (Def. Ex. J. at 114), Bryan also explained that the level of staff
confidence in Roberts’ ability was low. (Def. Ex. J. at 114). Shortly thereafter, Bryan discussed the
results of the survey with Roberts and informed her that he believed she would be unable to reverse
the staff's opinion of her. (Roberts Dep. at 137). Bryan recommended that the Board terminate
Roberts. (Davenport Dep. at 46-47). The Board, however, rejected that recommendation and Bryan
then recommended that the District transfer Roberts to an administrative position at the central
office. (Bryan Dep. at 68-69). Sally Pentecost was appointed interim principal. (Bryan Dep. at 69-
70). On January 1, 2001, Roberts was transferred to the position of Administrator of Special
Projects, placing her in charge of the District’s grants. (Davenport Dep. at 44-45, Roberts Dep. at
Ex. I). In March 2001, the Board voted not to rehire Roberts for the 2001-2002 school year. (Def.
56.1(a) Statement { 176).

I. Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). All facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The

party opposing summary judgment, however, must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific

12


this incident revealed that they overwhelmingly felt unfavorably towards Roberts and on nearly every
question rated Roberts unfavorably. In other words, Roberts failed to meet the District’s expectation
that she effectively lead and communicate with her staff.

Roberts offers little to rebut Defendant’s evidence that she failed to develop effective
leadership skills or to demonstrate that she was meeting the District’s performance expectations.
Instead, Roberts first quibbles with the evidence submitted by the Defendant. It is true that much
of what Defendant points to—deposition testimony of Houk, Olinger, and Plourde, for
example—contains statements outside the scope of these witnesses personal knowledge. It is also
true that Defendant often refers to facts that are contested — such as whether Roberts knew all of
the staff members’ names. But the Court has ignored this evidence. The record, however, is replete
with facts to demonstrate that the climate at Madison was tense and that the teachers at Madison
overwhelmingly disapproved of Roberts’ as a principal. Roberts offers no evidence to place these
facts in dispute and cannot defeat Defendant’s summary judgment motion with a self-serving
conclusion that, despite the numerous complaints about her leadership that are in the record, she did
meet the District’s expectations. Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 980 (7th Cir.
2004),

Roberts next points to evidence that students at Madison continued to excel, which, she
argues, shows that she was meeting the District’s legitimate expectations. But the students’ level
of performance speaks to but one of many expectations the District may have had for her. Legitimate
performance expectations are "bona fide expectations, for it is no business of a court in a
discrimination case to decide whether an employer demands 'too much' of [its] workers. Coco v.

Elmwood Care, Inc., 128 F.3d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1997). Here the District not only expected

15