IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

KEVIN TRUDEAU, 

 Defendant, 

THE LAW OFFICES OF MARC J. LANE, 

PC, 

Respondent. 

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Case No. 03-C-3904 

Hon. Robert W. Gettleman 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL MARC LANE TO DISCLOSE 

INFORMATION REGARDING TRUDEAU’S ASSET PROTECTION PLAN 

 

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I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Federal Rules 37, 45 and 69, and Paragraph XVI of the Stipulated Final 

Order (Sept. 3, 2004) (DE56), the FTC moves to compel Marc Lane and his firm (collectively, 

“Lane”) to disclose information regarding Trudeau’s “asset protection” plan. As the Court has 

noted, Lane is “a self-professed specialist in protecting his ‘client’s assets from creditors and 

lawsuits while, at the same time, allowing them to retain control over the assets and the income 

they produce.’” Mem. (Mar. 6, 2013) (DE578) at 2-3 (quoting Lane’s website). In light of 

Lane’s asset protection specialty and his close business relationship with Trudeau, the FTC 

served Lane with a subpoena seeking documents and testimony regarding “the protection of 

existing or potential Assets from known or reasonably foreseeable creditors including, without 

limitation, the FTC.” PXA:1 at 8 (spec. 1); id. at 3 (spec. B). In response, Lane withheld all 

responsive documents and indicated he will not testify at his deposition regarding Trudeau’s 

asset protection plan.1 Significantly, however, Lane has substantial information regarding 

Trudeau’s assets – in fact, Lane produced a privilege log listing documents 

responsive to the FTC’s request seeking documents related to protecting assets “from known or 

reasonably foreseeable creditors.” See PXA:2. 

For two reasons, Lane’s privilege assertion is meritless. First, planning how to protect 

assets from “known or reasonably foreseeable creditors” is not “predominantly” legal advice. 

Second, even assuming that Lane’s asset protection planning for Trudeau was privileged, the 

crime-fraud exception vitiates any privilege here. Indeed, prima facie evidence shows that 

Trudeau used Lane’s asset protection plan (including the business entities Lane created) to avoid 

complying with the Court’s June 2010 order to pay, thereby violating 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), which 

criminalizes “[d]isobedience or resistance” of a court’s lawful order. Likewise, prima facie 

evidence shows that Trudeau has used the entities Lane created to convey assets fraudulently in 

 

1 See Lane Motion To Quash (Feb. 26, 2013) (DE569) at 10 (seeking to quash the FTC’s 

request pursuant to FRCP 30(b)(6) for deposition testimony concerning asset protection). Lane’s 

motion to quash primarily addressed other issues, and the privilege objection was left 

unresolved. 

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derogation of the FTC’s rights as a judgment creditor. Thus, there is abundant evidence that the 

crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applies to Lane’s asset protection planning. 

Accordingly, the FTC asks the Court to compel Lane to produce the documents at issue and 

testify regarding Trudeau’s asset protection plan. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. The FTC’s Asset Protection Discovery 

The FTC’s asset protection discovery requests seek only documents reflecting advice 

“related to the protection of existing or potential Assets from known or reasonably foreseeable 

creditors including, without limitation, the FTC.”2 PXA:1 at 8 (spec. 1) (emphasis added). The 

request seeking testimony from Lane’s firm contains identical language. See id. at 3 (spec. B). 

After the Court indicated that Lane must log responsive documents, Lane produced a 

privilege log with entries. Lane describes most of the documents very vaguely (see, 

e.g., PXA:2 at 12 (“ ”), although some plainly concern asset 

protection (see, e.g., id.

”) (emphasis added), and all of which Lane logged as responsive to the 

FTC’s request for documents related to asset protection.3 See PXA:1 at 8 (spec. 1). 

 2

 Not all strategies that might “protect assets” are necessarily unethical or illegal. See 

e.g., L. Davis et al., A Distinction Without a Difference? An Examination of the Legal and 

Ethical Difference Between Asset Protection and Fraudulent Transfers Under Virginia Law, 47 

U. RICH. L. REV. 381 (2012). The line between legitimate and illegitimate planning is often 

drawn at the point where the client (in this case, Trudeau) has known or reasonably foreseeable 

creditors. See, e.g., G. Rothschild & D. Rubin, Asset-Protection Planning: Ethical? Legal? 

Obligatory? 142 TRUSTS & ESTATES 42 (Sept. 2003) (“On one side is the legal and ethical assetprotection planning that serves merely to protect against the possibility of creditors in the future. 

On the other side is planning that serves to defraud existing or probable future creditors.”). The 

FTC located one ethics opinion that addressed directly the “propriety of asset protection 

planning.” Specifically, the San Diego County Bar Association found it unethical for an attorney 

“to advise, prepare, and assist in the implementation of an asset protection plan,” which the client 

sought “to protect personal assets from existing and identifiable creditors.” Ethics Op. 1993-1 

(Emphasis added). 

3 Lane has also objected on privilege grounds to the 30(b)(6) deposition topic concerning 

asset protection. See Lane Motion To Quash (Feb. 26, 2013) (DE569) at 10. On February 19, 

prior to Lane’s motion to quash the FTC’s subpoena seeking asset protection documents and 

discovery, the parties conducted a meet and confer regarding Lane’s objection to disclosing asset 

protection information. 

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B. Lane’s Role Facilitating Trudeau’s Financial Affairs 

The fact that Lane logged documents as responsive to the FTC’s request for 

asset protection materials is unsurprising given Lane’s ubiquitous presence as Trudeau’s de facto 

financial manager. Significantly, Lane formed most (if not all) of the multi-tiered portfolio of 

entities designed to protect Trudeau’s wealth from techniques that judgment creditors routinely 

employ.4 Following the Court’s original 2008 order to pay, Lane created a “first tier” of three 

domestic entities that Trudeau uses to operate the Global Information Network: GIN USA, KT 

Radio Network (“KTRN”), and Website Solutions USA (“WSU”).5 PXA:4-6. Lane is also 

involved with (and apparently created)6 a “second tier” of offshore entities that own the first tier: 

Global Information Network FDN (“GIN FDN”), which owns GIN USA; APC Trading 

(“APC”), which owns KTRN; and NBT Trust, which owns WSU.7 PXA:7 (FRAP 26.1 

disclosure of GIN USA, KTRN, and WSU, filed last week).8 

 4

 In essence, “[a]sset protection planning is about creating a plausible story to tell a judge 

or a jury, which has as its end result that assets are protected.” J. Adkisson & C. Riser, Asset 

Protection at 5 (2004). 

5 See also FTC v. GIN USA, No. 5:12MC35, 2012 WL 5463829 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 

2012) at 5 (“The record evidence suggests that movants [GIN USA, KTRN, and WSU] are not 

business pursuits created totally independent from Trudeau, but may have been created to evade 

the contempt sanction and conceal Trudeau’s assets.”). 

6 aid Lane at least so far this year. PXA:11 (m

. Lane also d note pursuant to whic

note on 

ned as which, in turn, is the . See id. 

7 From an asset protection standpoint, Lane has employed an effective “separation 

methodology.” See Adkisson & Riser, Asset Protection at 88-89. In essence, Trudeau runs the 

“Global Information Network” through a set of domestic entities, none of which holds all of the 

various component parts necessary to operate the business, and all of which quickly move funds 

offshore. See id. at 89 (“Separation methodology involves removing valuable assets from a 

liability-attracting operating business entity and using leases, rents, and licenses to continually 

bleed the business of assets. Thus, the operating business never accumulates significant value 

that could be exposed to creditors. The assets important to overall business success are spread 

across the component entities, so the value and profits in each entity is minimized but, when 

taken as a whole, in practical terms, the client is more wealthy and profitable than ever.”). 

8 These six “first tier” and “second tier” entities are not the only entities involved. For 

instance, APC’s Swiss subsidiary, Website Solutions Switzerland GmBH (“WSS”) “employs” 

Trudeau. See FTC Contempt Reply (Oct. 15, 2012) (DE517) at 3 n.3. 

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Significantly, in addition to forming and coordinating among the various asset protection 

vehicles Trudeau controls, Lane serves as Trudeau’s business advisor, tax preparer, and financial 

planner. PXA:9 at 99:15-17 (“Q: And what types of services have you provided for Mr. 

Trudeau or his affiliated companies? Lane: Business, tax, and financial planning.”). Among 

other things, Lane prepared the dubious tax returns Trudeau offered in opposition to the pending 

contempt motion.9 See Opp. (Sept. 25, 2012) (DE509), Exs. D, F-H. Lane also testified in the 

underlying contempt trial regarding Trudeau’s financial affairs, see PXA:9 at 100-107, and 

prepared a balance sheet that the Court concluded was “not worth the paper it is written on,” 

Mem. Op. (Aug. 7, 2008) (DE157) at 9. Finally, Trudeau has paid Lane to perform 

, including Lane received for 

 PXA:12-13. 

C. Payments Lane Received After this Court’s June 2010 Order To Pay 

The Trudeau paid Lane for these are not 

the only monies he paid Lane after the Court ordered that Trudeau pay to redress the more than 

800,000 consumers he injured.10 Specifically, after the Court entered the Order to pay in June 

2010, Lane received more than for 

 See PXA:14. Lane knew about the Court’s 

Order when he received these payments, see PXA:1 at 42 (

”), yet Trudeau continued 

to pay Lane, and Lane continued to take Trudeau’s money. 

 9 More than $6 million in federal and state tax liens have been filed against Trudeau, 

PXA:10, which suggests that Trudeau has no qualms about filing returns that understate his 

his most recent “sworn” financial disclosure, Trudeau lists his current tax liability as 

 PXA:11 at 8. 

10 d . PXA:12. puted that Trudeau 

owns See Opp. (DE509) at 5 n.2. paid Lane the other PXA:11. 

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III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Pursuant to Rules 37(a)(1), 45(c)(2)(B)(i), and 69(a)(2), the Court has the authority to 

compel Lane to provide discovery concerning Trudeau’s asset protection plan. Although Lane 

asserts an across-the-board privilege claim, the attorney-client privilege is narrowly construed 

“because it is in derogation of the search for truth.” United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 

(7th Cir. 1991). Lane has the burden to prove each element of the privilege, including that the 

communications involve “legal advice,” and that Lane provided the advice in his capacity as a 

“legal adviser.” United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir.1983) (citing 8 Wigmore § 

2292). For advice to qualify as sufficiently “legal” to support the privilege, its legal aspects 

“must be the predominant element,” rather than its business aspects. See, e.g., Harmony Gold 

U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 116 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“[T]he legal advice given to 

the client, or sought by the client, must be the predominant element in the communication[.]”) 

(citation omitted) (emphasis added). Furthermore, “[t]he claim of privilege cannot be a blanket 

claim; it must be made and sustained on a question-by-question or document-by-document 

basis.” White, 950 F.2d at 430 (citation omitted). Finally, even if Lane could establish that the 

documents contain predominantly legal advice he provided as a legal adviser, the “privilege is 

forfeited if the attorney is assisting his client to commit a crime or a fraud.”11 United States v. 

Al-Shahin, 474 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). 

IV. ARGUMENT

Lane’s privilege argument fails for two reasons. First, Lane cannot establish that his 

asset protection planning constitutes predominantly legal advice. Second, there is far more than 

the required prima facie showing that Lane’s asset protection plan enabled Trudeau to both 1) 

evade the Court’s order to pay in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), and 2) convey assets 

 11 “To establish the crime-fraud exception, and thus defeat the privilege, the government 

must present prima facie evidence that gives color to the charge by showing some foundation in 

fact. Such evidence then allows the district court to require the defendant to come forward with 

an explanation for the evidence offered against the privilege. The district court then exercises its 

discretion in accepting or rejecting the proffered explanation.” United States v. Boender, 649 

F.3d 650, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations, alterations, and quotations omitted). 

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fraudulently. Accordingly, even if the information is arguably privileged, the crime-fraud 

exception applies.12 

A. Lane’s Asset Protection Planning Is Not Predominantly Legal Advice. 

As Lane’s website explains, his asset protection services involve placing assets beyond 

the reach of creditors, while enabling clients “to retain control over the assets and the income 

they produce.”13 PXA:3 (Lane’s website). This is exactly what Lane did for Trudeau when Lane 

created various entities (including several offshore) and installed Trudeau’s wife as their nominal 

owner. This asset protection assistance is not “legal work.” Rather, Lane’s work creating a web 

of business entities and asset transfers concerns business matters and, therefore, is not privileged. 

See, e.g., Energy Capital Corp. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 481, 485 (Fed. Cl. 2000) (“An 

attorney’s work in drafting by-laws, promissory notes, security agreements, incorporation 

documents, partnership documents and tax information concerns business–not legal–matters and 

therefore is not privileged.”) (quotation omitted); Boca Investerings P’Ship v. United States, 31 

F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining that there is no privilege “[w]hen a lawyer acts 

merely to implement a business decision”). 

 12

there is no need to address the work product doctrine separately because, with 

respect to the issues this motion raises, there is no difference between the privilege and work 

product claims. As with the attorney-client privilege, the attorney-work product doctrine does 

not apply unless Lane establishes that the documents at issue contain exclusively legal work 

product. See, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding no 

work product protection applied to documents reflecting thoughts of an attorney working as a tax 

preparer); Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 667 F.2d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that work 

product protections apply “[o]nly where the document is primarily concerned with legal 

assistance”) (emphasis added). And, even if the documents at issue do contain exclusively legal 

work product (which is extremely doubtful), the crime-fraud exception would vitiate any work 

product protection. See, e.g., Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 213 F.R.D. 528, 535 

(N.D. Ill. 2003) (“The crime-fraud exception provides that communications normally protected 

by the attorney-client privilege or by the work product doctrine are not protected if they relate to 

communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

13 One leading source on asset protection “concepts and strategies” uses similar language, 

explaining that “[t]he most difficult issues in asset protection involve control, or more precisely, 

how to have effective absolute control over an asset without having to legally own it and thus 

expose it to creditors.” Adkisson & Riser, Asset Protection at 245. 

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Furthermore, even if one views Lane’s asset protection planning as “mixed” business and 

legal advice, no privilege applies because legal considerations do not “predominate.” See, e.g., 

Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 116 (“[T]he legal advice given to the client, or sought by the 

client, must be the predominant element in the communication[.]”) (citation omitted) (emphasis 

added); N. Shore Gas Co. v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 164 F.R.D. 59, 61 (N.D. Ill. 1995) 

(“[T]he confidential communications must be primarily legal in nature[.]”) (citations omitted) 

(emphasis added).14 On Trudeau’s behalf, Lane created entities and coordinated transfers 

between them. Even if this work is “quasi-legal,” it is not predominantly legal and therefore, the 

privilege does not apply.15 Especially given that the privilege “obscure[s] the search for the 

truth” and therefore must “be confined to [its] narrowest possible limits to minimize the impact 

on the discovery process,” N. Shore, 164 F.R.D. at 61, this type of asset protection planning is 

not sufficiently “legal” to warrant protection. 

B. The Crime-Fraud Exception Vitiates Any Privilege. 

1. Lane’s Asset Protection Planning Facilitates Trudeau’s Ability To 

Evade the Court’s Order To Pay in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), “criminal contempt is a crime, like all other crimes.” In 

re Troutt, 460 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968)). 

The elements of criminal contempt under Section 401(3) are “(1) a lawful and reasonably 

specific order that (2) the defendant has violated (3) willfully.” Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 

 14 See also Lindley v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 267 F.R.D. 382, 392 (N.D. Okla. 

2010) (“Where, however, the legal and business purposes of the communication are inextricably 

intertwined, the entire communication is privileged only if the legal purpose outweighs the 

business purpose.”) (citations omitted); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 

587 F. Supp.2d 548, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[I]n order to merit protection, the ‘predominant 

purpose’ of the communication must be to render or solicit legal advice[.]”) (citations omitted); 

Neuder v. Battelle Pac. N.W. Nat’l Lab., 194 F.R.D. 289, 293 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Where business 

and legal advice are intertwined, the legal advice must predominate for the communication to be 

protected.”) (citations omitted). 

15 Notably, writing with respect to tax materials, the Seventh Circuit has found “dual 

purpose” documents are not privileged. See Frederick, 182 F.3d at 501-02 (“a dual-purpose 

document—a document prepared for use in preparing tax returns and for use in litigation—is not 

privileged”). 

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480 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also United States v. NYNEX Corp., 

8 F.3d 52, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same). 

Initially, it is beyond dispute that Trudeau has violated (and continues to violate) this 

Court’s lawful Order to pay.16 Furthermore, there is overwhelming evidence that Trudeau has 

knowingly used Lane’s asset protection planning to evade the Court’s Order. See e.g., FTC 

Mem. (Apr. 1, 2013) (DE603) at 2-3 (summarizing evidence that Trudeau controls entities that 

Lane formed, and which have assets that Trudeau could use to comply). At very minimum, there 

is sufficient proof to conclude that it has “some foundation in fact,” which is the evidentiary 

threshold necessary to establish a prima facie case that the crime-fraud exception applies. See 

Boender, 649 F.3d at 655; see also Al-Shahin, 474 F.3d at 946-47 (“In order for the crime/fraud 

exception ‘[t]o drive the privilege away, there must be ‘something to give colour to the charge;’ 

there must be ‘prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in fact.’”) (quoting Clark v. 

United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)) (Seventh’s Circuit’s alterations); id. at 947 (noting that the 

relevant question “is not whether the evidence supports a verdict but whether it calls for 

inquiry”). Because there is prima facie evidence that Lane helped Trudeau violate 18 U.S.C. § 

401(3), the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applies. Cf. United States v. 

Rogan, No. 1:08-cr-00415-2 (N.D. Ill.) (attorney Frederick Cuppy sentenced to prison following 

indictment on various charges arising from Cuppy’s efforts to help judgment debtor (Peter 

Rogan) protect assets through an offshore trust Cuppy created post-judgment). 

2. Lane’s Asset Protection Planning Has Enabled Trudeau To Effect 

Fraudulent Conveyances. 

Attorneys may not advise their clients regarding how to effect a fraudulent conveyance,17

and such advice, if given, is not privileged. See, e.g., Tindall v. H & S Homes, LLC, 757 F. 

 16 See generally Order (Dec. 6, 2012) (DE535) (holding that there is “no question” that 

the FTC has “establish[ed] a prima facie showing of [civil] contempt.”). The FTC’s prima facie 

showing included establishing that Trudeau substantially violated an unambiguous command. 

See FTC v. Trudeau, 739 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2009) (elements of civil contempt). 

17 See, e.g., The Fla. Bar v. Rood, 622 So.2d 974, 978 (Fla. 1993) (affirming discipline 

against attorney who helped fraudulently convey a property) (per curiam); In re Conduct of 

Hockett, 734 P.2d 877, 883 (Or. 1987) (“Assisting clients to cheat creditors is ‘dishonesty’ under 

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Supp. 2d 1339, 1361-63 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (holding that the crime-fraud exception applied to postjudgment communications related to the creation of new entities as part of “a plan to assist 

Defendants in transferring assets . . . for the purpose of avoiding the payment of the outstanding 

judgment”) (quotation omitted); Cendant Corp. v. Shelton, 246 F.R.D. 401, 406 (D. Conn. 2007) 

(allowing deposition of debtor’s attorneys as to the formation and operation of certain entities 

based on evidence that debtor’s “primary purpose in forming and operating each of these entities 

was to use them as a vehicle for shielding his assets from creditors who were making claims 

against him while maintaining his control over those assets”). 

Under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (“FDCPA”), transfers are fraudulent 

as to the United States if made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.” 28 

U.S.C. § 3304(b)(1)(A). In prior briefs, the FTC has presented overwhelming evidence that 

Trudeau has used (and continues to use) companies (GIN USA, KTRN, and WSU) to convey 

assets to his wife, Nataliya Babenko, who serves as their nominee owner while Trudeau retains 

control.18 As relevant to this motion, however, it is undisputed that Lane created these entities, 

see PXA:4-6, and it is beyond serious debate that Trudeau has made transfers to and through 

these entities “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor” (such as the FTC).19 At 

 

DR 1–102(A)(4). We conclude that the accused’s act of assisting his clients in ‘fraudulent’ 

transfers, was done with the intent to cheat creditors of their lawful debts. Such conduct is 

‘conduct involving dishonesty,’ a violation of DR 1–102(A)(4).”); Allen v. State Bar, 570 P.2d 

1226, 1229 (Cal. 1977) (“Participating in a scheme to defraud creditors is a crime and properly 

subjects an attorney to disciplinary action.”) (internal citation omitted); Townsend v. State Bar, 197 P.2d 326, 328-29 (Cal. 1948) (suspending attorney who transferred client’s property after 

learning of decision adverse to client because transfers were for the purpose of preventing 

recovery on the judgment); Conn. Informal Op. 91-23 (Dec. 5, 1991) (“[A] lawyer may not 

counsel or assist a client to engage in a fraudulent transfer that the lawyer knows is either 

intended to deceive creditors or that has no substantial purpose other than to delay creditors.”). 

18 See e.g., Contempt Mem. (Apr. 1, 2013) (DE603) at 2-3 (summarizing evidence that 

Trudeau controls GIN USA, KTRN, and WSU). 

19 Additionally, Trudeau used Lane’s asset protection plan to violate 28 U.S.C. § 3401(a), 

pursuant to which a transfer made after the debtor incurs an obligation is fraudulent as to the 

United States if either (1) the debtor does not receive reasonably equivalent value, and is 

insolvent or becomes insolvent as a result of the transfer, or (2) the transfer was made to an 

insider, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that 

the debtor was insolvent. 

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very minimum, there is prima facie evidence that Lane assisted fraudulent transfers, thereby 

triggering the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Lane’s asset protection planning is not privileged, but even assuming otherwise, the 

privilege yields here to the substantial the evidence that Lane’s asset protection plan enabled 

Trudeau to violate 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), the law prohibiting fraudulent transfers, or both. 

Accordingly, the FTC asks the Court to compel Lane to produce the documents at issue and 

testify regarding Trudeau’s asset protection plan. 

Dated: April 15, 2013 

David O’Toole (dotoole@ftc.gov) 

Federal Trade Commission 

55 West Monroe Street, Suite 1825 

Chicago, Illinois 60603-5001 

Phone: (312) 960-5601 

Fax: (312) 960-5600 

Respectfully Submitted, 

/s/ Jonathan Cohen 

Michael Mora (mmora@ftc.gov) 

Jonathan Cohen (jcohen2@ftc.gov) 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. M-8102B 

Washington, DC 20580 

Phone: 202-326-3373; -2551 

Fax: 202-326-2558

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Jonathan Cohen, hereby certify that on April 15, 2013, I caused to be 

served true copies of the foregoing by electronic means, by filing such documents through the 

Court’s Electronic Case Filing System, which will send notification of such filing to: 

Kimball Richard Anderson 

kanderson@winston.com

Thomas Lee Kirsch, II 

tkirsch@winston.com 

Katherine E. Croswell 

kcroswell@winston.com

Daniel J. Donnellon 

ddonnellon@ficlaw.com 

Kenjiro D. LeCroix 

klecroix@ficlaw.com

 

/s/ Jonathan Cohen 

Jonathan Cohen (jcohen2@ftc.gov) 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

Federal Trade Commission 

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