nothing to Muhammad’s complaint. The court, therefore, dismisses Muhammad’s ADEA claim
as to Bolingbrook PD.

Il. Muhammad’s Section 1983 Claims Against Her Supervisors

Defendants also argue that Muhammad’s complaint as to the individual officers should
be dismissed because it “does not contain allegations against [them] in their individual capacity.”
However, that is not the case. Although Muhammad has not made specific factual allegations
against each defendant by name, the gravamen of her complaint is clear. She claims that
defendants denied her several promotions due to her age and gender despite her “excellent
qualifications.” ' She describes her claim in great detail, identifying each of the promotions she
was denied, naming the officers who received the promotion and describing the age and
education of the promoted officers. While she has not specified each individual officer’s role in
the promotions process, she has provided enough information to place her superior officers on
notice of the claims against them. The court finds that Muhammad’s Section 1983 claim meets
the liberal notice pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and, therefore, defendants’ motion to

dismiss that claim is denied.

' Muhammad’s Title VII claims that she was discriminated against on the basis of
religion, color, national origin and race have been dismissed because those claims were not
taised in her complaint before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

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Ill. Aug. 29, 2002). However, “a court might properly entertain [a] second motion to dismiss if
convinced that it is not interposed for delay and that the disposition of the case on the merits can
be expedited by doing so.” Jd. The court finds that defendants’ renewed motion meets that
standard: the motion does not appear to have been filed to delay proceedings and adjudication of
this motion will narrow the issues before the court, allowing it to resolve this matter more
quickly. Failure to rule would result only in unnecessary delay, expense and inconvenience for
all parties. Therefore, the court will address the merits of defendants’ motion.
I. Muhammad’s ADEA Claim Against Bolingbrook PD

Bolingbrook PD argues that Muhammad’s ADEA claim must be dismissed because it is
not a proper defendant for such a claim. Although caselaw on ADEA claims against law
enforcement agencies is sparse, defendants analogize to Title VI, pointing out that, under that
statute, police departments are neither an employer, nor a proper defendant. E.g., McCraven v.
City of Chicago, 18 F.Supp. 2d 877, 881 (N.D. Ill. 1998). This is so because, as this court held
in dismissing Muhammad’s Section 1983 and Title VI claims against Bolingbrook PD,
municipal police departments have no legal existence independent from the municipality that
they serve. See Chan v. City of Chicago, 777 F. Supp. 1437, 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Collins v.
Village of Woodridge, 1995 WL 632260, *1 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Rather, the municipality is
tesponsible for the unlawful acts of its police department and, therefore, is the proper defendant
to a Title VI claim alleging discrimination by that department. McCraven 18 F.Supp.2d at 881.
The court finds that the same logic applies to Muhammad’s ADEA claim. See, e.g., EEOC v.
AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 (7 Cir. 1995) (noting that courts often apply
arguments of liability to Title VII and the ADEA interchangeably). The court concludes that the
Village of Bolingbrook, which is already a party to this action, is the proper defendant for

Muhammad’s ADEA claim and that naming Bolingbrook PD as a defendant in that claim adds

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied
in part. Plaintiffs ADEA claim against defendant Bolingbrook Police Department is dismissed.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Muhammad’s Section 1983 claim against her superior officers is

Wea
IVAN. GOTTSCHALL
nited States District Judge

denied.

DATE: July 6, 2004



Minute Qrder Form (06/275

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Jud; Sitting Judge if Oth
vor Magistrate Judge Joan B. Gottschall than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 3770 DATE 7/6/2004
CASE Muhammad vs. Village of Bolingbrook, et al.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) im Brief in support of motion due
(3) o Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due. :
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at .
(5) . i Status hearing set for 7/28/04 at 9:30 a.m.
(6) im) Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Q This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) O Local Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a\(1) OFRCP41(a)(2).

qo [Other docket entry] Defendants’ motion to strike and dismiss (28-1 and 28-2] is granted in part

and denied in part. Plaintiff's ADEA claim against defendant Bolingbrook Police department is

dismissed. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against defendants Each,

George and Johnstone is denied. Status set for July 28, 2004 at 9:30 a.m.
aid [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

X_ | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

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DOCKETED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUL 08 2004
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARIA A. MUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff,
Vv. No. 02 C 3770

VILLAGE OF BOLINGBROOK, Judge Joan B. Gottschall

BOLINGBROOK POLICE DEPARTMENT,
CHIEF KENNETH EACH, COMMANDER
KEITH GEORGE, SERGEANT MICHAEL

JOHNSTONE,

NNN eed

Defendants

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

Maria A. Muhammad ("Muhammad"), a police officer with the Bolingbrook Police
Department (“Bolingbrook PD”), has sued Bolingbrook PD, the Village of Bolingbrook (the
“Village”), and several of her superior officers alleging that she was discriminated against on the
basis of age, race, national origin, religion and gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VIL’), 42 U.S.C. § 2000¢, et seg., the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On November 4, 2002, defendants
moved to dismiss some of Muhammad’s claims. This court granted defendants’ motion in part
and denied it in part, dismissing (a) Muhammad’s Title VII claim against Bolingbrook PD
because Bolingbrook PD is not an “employer” within the meaning of that act, (b) her Section
1983 claim against Bolingbrook PD because the department has no legal existence separate from
the Village and, therefore, is not a “person” against whom a suit can be brought under that
section, and (c) her Title VI and ADEA claims against her superior officers because there is no

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individual liability under those statutes.

In their initial motion, defendants did not move to dismiss Muhammad’s ADEA claim
against Bolingbrook PD or her Section 1983 claim against her superior officers. In the “renewed
motion” before the court, defendants now seek dismissal of those claims pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, defendants’ renewed motion to
dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Muhammad’s ADEA claim against defendant
Bolingbrook PD is dismissed. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Muhammad’s Section 1983 claim
against her superior officers is denied.

AN, SI.

When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P, 12(b)(6), the court
accepts the factual allegations made in the plaintiff’s complaint as true. Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993). The court will
then consider whether any set of facts, consistent with the allegations could support plaintiff's
claim for relief. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7° Cir. 1992). A complaint
need only contain enough facts to put the defendant on notice of the claim so that an answer can
be filed. Flannery v. Recording Indus. Assoc. of America, 354 F.3d 632, 639 (7" Cir. 2004).
Dismissal should be granted only if it is “beyond doubt” that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts
to support a claim entitling plaintiff to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972).
In that inquiry, complaints prepared pro se, such as Muhammad’s, are given greater latitude. Jd.

Ordinarily, defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss would be barred by Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(g), which provides that any issues or objections that the defendant fails to raise in the initial
motion to dismiss are waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(6). The purpose of Rule 12(g) is to prevent
litigants from unnecessarily delaying proceedings at the pleading stage by interposing their

defenses piecemeal. Donnelli v. Peters Sec. Co., No. 02-C-0691, 2002 WL 2003217, *3 (N.D.

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