NO. 4-03-0872 Filed: 5/1/06 

 IN THE APPELLATE COURT 

 OF ILLINOIS 

 FOURTH DISTRICT 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

SHAWN R. STANDLEY, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from 

Circuit Court of 

Macon County 

No. 03CF574 

Honorable 

Katherine M. McCarthy, 

Judge Presiding. 

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PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the 

court:

In May 2003, the State charged defendant, Shawn R. 

Standley, with two counts of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-

11(a)(3) (West 2002)). After an August 2003 trial, a jury found 

defendant guilty of home invasion. At a joint hearing in October 

2003, the trial court denied defendant's posttrial motion and 

sentenced him to 21 years' imprisonment. 

Defendant appealed, asserting (1) the State's evidence 

was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; 

(2) the 15-year sentence enhancement mandated by Public Act 91-

404 (Pub. Act 91-404, '5, eff. January 1, 2000 (1999 Ill. Laws 

5126, 5131) (codified at 720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 2002))) for 

violating section 12-11(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 

(Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3) (West 2002)) is unconstitutional; and (3) if the sentence enhancement is unconstitutional, "the judicially imposed portion of his sentence" should 
be allowed to remain. 

In September 2005, this court affirmed defendant's 

conviction and sentence. People v. Standley, 359 Ill. App. 3d 

1096, 835 N.E.2d 945 (2005). In January 2006, our supreme court 

vacated our judgment and remanded the cause to our court to 

reconsider our judgment in light of People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 

481, 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), and People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 

533, 837 N.E.2d 901 (2005), "to determine if a different analysis 

or result is required." People v. Standley, 217 Ill. 2d 622, 

622, 840 N.E.2d 1233, 1234 (2006). Accordingly, we again address 

defendant's aforementioned arguments and again affirm the trial 

court's judgment. 

 I. BACKGROUND 

At around midnight on April 28, 2003, two males armed 

with guns kicked in the back door of a home at 2757 North Church 

Street, Decatur, Illinois, and entered the home. The home 

belonged to Gary Lewis, Sharon Conaway, and their then eightyear-old son Garrett Lewis, who were all home at the time. 

During the incident, one of the men hit Gary with a gun. On May 

23, 2003, the State charged both defendant and Michael Joyner 

with two counts of home invasion. 

In August 2003, the trial court held a jury trial on 

defendant's charges. The evidence relevant to the issues on 

appeal is set forth below. 

Decatur police officer Lonnie Lewellyn testified he 
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arrived at the Church Street residence at 12:41 a.m. on August 

28, 2003, in response to a report of a home invasion. There, he 

spoke with Gary, Sharon, and Garrett. Gary and Sharon were able 

to give descriptions of the two individuals, and Gary was also 

able to provide nicknames by which he knew them. He did not 

recall Gary mentioning defendant had facial hair but did recall 

Gary recognized the hair, eyes, and voice of both suspects. 

Officer Lewellyn did note Gary and Sharon told him that both 

suspects had taken off their bandanas. 

Gary testified that around 12:15 a.m., he heard several 

loud booms coming from the kitchen area, which is attached to the 

back porch that contains an exterior door. Gary entered the 

kitchen, turned the lights on, and saw the door leading to the 

porch fly open. Two men then entered the kitchen with guns 

pointed at him. In court, Gary identified defendant as the first 

man who entered Gary's home. When defendant entered the home, he 

was wearing a bandana around his face that began right under his 

eyes and covered his mouth and nose. He was also wearing a 

hooded sweatshirt or jacket with the hood up. 

Defendant ordered Gary to the floor, and Gary laid 

stomach down on the floor. He tried to keep his head up and 

observe what was taking place. After four or five demands for 

money and drugs, defendant told Gary to stand up and moved Gary 

to a recliner in the front room. The other man brought Garrett 
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into the front room, where Sharon was already located. According 

to Gary, he was in the kitchen about 7 to 10 minutes after seeing 

defendant, and the kitchen lights were on the entire time. 

In the front room, defendant held a gun to the center 

of Gary's forehead for about 5 to 10 minutes and continued to 

demand money. During that time, defendant was directly in front 

of Gary and less than an arm's length away. The lights and 

television were on in the front room. 

At some point, defendant asked Gary for his wallet, and 

Gary indicated it was in the bedroom. While still holding the 

gun to Gary's head, defendant walked Gary to the bedroom. The 

other man brought Sharon and Garrett into the bedroom. The 

lights were also on in there. Gary opened a drawer, and defendant removed the wallet. Defendant threatened to come back and 

shoot Gary if he was lying about not having money or drugs. 

Defendant then hit Gary across the face with a gun, knocking Gary 

unconscious. The men were gone when Gary regained consciousness. 

Prior to April 28, 2003, Gary had seen defendant a few 

times through mutual friends. About three to four weeks before 

the incident, Gary had spoken a few words to defendant at the AIW 

Hall. Gary first had a notion defendant was the perpetrator when 

they entered the front room. When they reached the dresser in 

the bedroom, he got a good look at him because they were face-toface, eye-to-eye. He observed defendant had two eyebrow rings 
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over one of his eyes, but he was unsure of which eye. He also 

noted defendant's bandana slipped down several times during the 

encounter but never got below his nose. Gary testified he was 

"very certain" and "positive" that defendant was the first man to 

enter his kitchen. 

Gary acknowledged he had a prior felony for possession 

of a controlled substance and two new charges pending against 

him. He stated the State had not promised him leniency or a 

reward in exchange for his testimony. 

Sharon testified she got a good look at the two men 

shortly after they entered the house and had not yet seen her. 

One was a white male, and the other was a mixed-race male. They 

were both wearing black hooded jackets and bandanas on their 

faces. She could not recall if the kitchen light was on. When 

the white male brought Gary into the living room, she was able to 

get a closer look at the white male. The lights were on in the 

living room. She identified defendant as the white male in her 

home. Sharon was "very sure" and "had no doubt" it was defendant. Sharon noted that during the incident, she was able to see 

defendant's face from the tip of his nose to his forehead, 

including the front of his hair. Defendant had two eyebrow rings 

on the portion of the left eyebrow closest to the ear. She also 

noted the mixed-race male took off his bandana after it had 

fallen down. She further testified the lights were on in the 
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bedroom as well. The closest she was to defendant was about five 

feet away. 

According to Sharon, the entire incident lasted 20 to 

25 minutes. She too had seen defendant a couple times before the 

incident and recalled Gary talking to him at the AIW Hall two or 

three weeks before the incident. During the incident, she 

recognized his voice. When the police officer arrived, she and 

Gary told the officer the mixed-race male was known as "mixed 

Mike" and the white male was "Shawn." Later, both she and Gary 

picked defendant's picture out of a photograph lineup as the 

white male that entered their home. Additionally, Sharon acknowledged she was currently on probation. 

Decatur police officer Chad Ramey testified that on May 

1, 2003, he met with Gary and Sharon and conducted a photograph 

lineup. He first showed the lineup to Gary, who pointed to 

defendant's photograph "rather quickly." He then showed the 

lineup to Sharon, who also pointed to defendant's picture "rather 

quickly." According to Officer Ramey, Sharon was unable to see 

Gary's identification of defendant. He did not recall any of the 

people in the lineup having eyebrow rings. 

On May 21, 2003, Officer Ramey met with defendant, who 

had voluntarily showed up at the police department. He noticed 

that defendant had four holes over his left eyebrow where it had 

been pierced. He did not take a picture of defendant's eyebrow, 
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and the booking photograph was too blurry to see any holes. 

Robert Lewellen, defendant's grandfather, testified 

that defendant had been residing at his home for 1 1/2 to 2 years 

prior to April 28, 2003, but defendant was not there April 27 or 

28, 2003. According to Robert, defendant never had more than one 

eyebrow ring and sometimes did not wear it. Defendant also had a 

mustache and some chin hair. Robert identified some pictures of 

defendant, in which he had only one eyebrow ring and a mustache. 

 

Ann Lewellen, defendant's grandmother, also testified 

defendant only had one eyebrow ring and wore a mustache in April 

2003. She did not see defendant on April 27 or 28, 2003. She 

talked with her daughter Lori Blair on the afternoon of April 27, 

2003. During the conversation, Lori indicated she could not 

spend the night at Ann's home because her son and defendant would 

make a mess. Ann again talked to Lori around 5 p.m. on April 28, 

2003, and heard defendant's voice in the background. 

Jeannine McCoy, defendant's mother, also testified 

defendant had a mustache, some other facial hair, and only one 

ring in his left eyebrow. On the night of April 27, 2003, she 

talked on the phone with her sister Lori from around 9 or 10 p.m. 

to somewhere between 11:30 p.m. and 1 a.m. During the phone 

conversation, she could hear defendant's voice in the background. 

 Between 11:30 p.m. and 1 a.m., she heard defendant ask Lori if 
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she was still talking to his mom, and Jeannine told Lori to tell 

defendant "hi." 

Lori testified defendant stayed at her home the entire 

day of April 27, 2003, which was the day before her birthday. 

Defendant and her son only left for 5- to 10-minute periods to 

smoke a cigarette. That same day, she and Jeannine talked on the 

phone until past midnight, and she recalled defendant telling her 

to say "hi" to his mom around midnight. Lori also stated she saw 

defendant after midnight and as late as 1 a.m. on April 28, 2003. 

Lori's two children, Samantha Blair and Christopher Austin, also 

testified defendant was at their home between 12 and 1 a.m. on 

April 28, 2003. 

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated he 

was at Lori's home during the late-night hours of April 27 and 

the early morning hours of April 28, 2003. He only left the 

house for five-minute periods to smoke with Christopher. He had 

never been to Gary and Sharon's home and did not know them on a 

personal level. He did believe they had crossed paths before. 

He also had never met Joyner, his alleged codefendant, prior to 

his arrest for this offense. Defendant also denied ever wearing 

more than one eyebrow ring. 

After hearing all the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of home invasion. 

In September 2003, defendant filed a posttrial motion. 
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 In October 2003, the trial court held a joint hearing on defendant's motion and sentencing. Both parties agreed the 15-year 

sentence enhancement contained in section 12-11(c) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 2002)) applied to defendant's 

conviction. The court denied defendant's motion and sentenced 

him to a total of 21 years' imprisonment. Defendant then appealed. As stated, we affirmed defendant's conviction and 

sentence on appeal, and the Supreme Court of Illinois vacated our 

judgment and remanded the cause to our court. We now reconsider 

defendant's arguments as directed by our supreme court. 

 II. ANALYSIS 

 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Defendant first asserts the State's evidence was 

insufficient to prove him guilty of home invasion beyond a 

reasonable doubt since he presented four alibi witnesses and the 

State's eyewitness testimony was "suspect." 

When considering a defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the question for the reviewing court is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt does not require the exclusion of every 

possible doubt. People v. Shevock, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1037, 

782 N.E.2d 949, 954 (2003). Additionally, the jury had the 
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responsibility to (1) determine the witnesses' credibility and 

the weight given to their testimony, (2) resolve conflicts of the 

evidence, and (3) draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. 

People v. Johnson, 353 Ill. App. 3d 954, 956, 819 N.E.2d 1233, 

1235 (2004). 

An identification is insufficient to sustain a conviction if it is vague or doubtful. However, a single witness's 

identification of the accused is sufficient if the witness viewed 

the accused under circumstances permitting a positive identification. That remains true even in the presence of contradicting 

alibi testimony, provided that the witness had an adequate 

opportunity to view the accused and that the in-court identification is positive and credible. People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 

307, 537 N.E.2d 317, 319 (1989). In evaluating identification 

testimony, Illinois courts consider the factors set forth in 

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, 411, 93 

S. Ct. 375, 382 (1972), which are (1) the witness's opportunity 

to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's 

degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior 

description of the criminal; (4) the witness's level of certainty 

at the identification confrontation; and (5) the length of time 

between the crime and the identification confrontation. Slim, 

127 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 537 N.E.2d at 319. 

Here, we have more than one witness who identified 
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defendant as the perpetrator, and the Neil factors do not weigh 

in defendant's favor. Since the perpetrator was in their home 

between 20 to 25 minutes, both Gary and Sharon had a lot of 

opportunities to view him. Gary testified he was at an arm's 

length with the man for at least 10 minutes, and at one point, 

was able to look him straight in the eyes. Additionally, Gary 

had met and talked to defendant on several prior occasions, 

including only three weeks before the incident. Sharon said she 

was within five feet of defendant. While Sharon was more focused 

on the other male, Gary tried to pay close attention to defendant's actions and, as stated, was able to look him straight in 

the face. 

As to the accuracy of their initial description of the 

perpetrator, Gary recognized defendant by his voice, eyes, and 

hair and was able to provide defendant's first name to Officer 

Lewellyn. Their identification of defendant as one of the 

perpetrators remained consistent since talking to the police 

shortly after the incident. The only conflict between the 

victims' initial statements to the police and their trial testimony that related to defendant's description was as to whether 

the men's bandanas fell down and exposed their entire face. 

Further, while defendant asserted he only had one eyebrow ring, 

Officer Ramey's testimony that defendant had four holes (two per 

eyebrow ring) supports Gary's and Sharon's consistent assertion 
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that the perpetrator had two rings. 

Regarding the final two factors, both Gary and Sharon 

"rather quickly" picked defendant's photograph out of a lineup, 

which was conducted only three days after the incident. Gary and 

Sharon also did not waver or hesitate in stating defendant was 

one of the men who entered their home on April 28, 2003. 

Moreover, the failure to notice facial hair is not 

fatal to a positive and otherwise credible identification. Slim, 

 127 Ill. 2d at 310, 537 N.E.2d at 320. The case People v. 

Marshall, 74 Ill. App. 2d 483, 221 N.E.2d 133 (1966), cited by 

defendant in support of his argument that the identification 

testimony was suspect, has been criticized and not followed. See 

Slim, 127 Ill. 2d at 313, 537 N.E.2d at 322. While defendant 

presented an alibi defense and asserted he had only one eyebrow 

ring and facial hair, the jury, as the trier of fact, had the 

responsibility to resolve the conflicting testimony. See Johnson, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 956, 819 N.E.2d at 1235. 

Accordingly, we find the State's identification evidence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt. 

 B. 15-Year Sentence Enhancement 

Defendant also argues his 15-year sentence enhancement 

for home invasion while armed with a firearm is unconstitutional 

because it violates the proportionate-penalties clause of the 
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Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, '11). We 

disagree. 

Section 12-11(a)(3) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 

5/12-11(a)(3) (West 2002)) provides as follows: 

"(a) A person who is not a peace officer 

acting in the line of duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another 

when he or she knows or has reason to know 

that one or more persons is present or he or 

she knowingly enters the dwelling place of 

another and remains in such dwelling place 

until he or she knows or has reason to know 

that one or more persons is present and 

* * * 

(3) While armed with a firearm 

uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person 

or persons within such dwelling 

place whether or not injury occurs[.]" 

Section 12-11(c) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 

2002)) provides: 

"Home invasion in violation of subsection (a)(1), (a)(2)[,] or (a)(6) is a Class X 

felony. A violation of subsection (a)(3) is 
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a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be 

added to the term of imprisonment imposed by 

the court." 

Prior to Sharpe, the Supreme Court of Illinois had used 

three separate tests to determine whether a statute violated the 

proportionate-penalties clause. See People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 

503, 522, 795 N.E.2d 208, 220 (2003). The first test is whether 

the penalty is "cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate 

to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the 

community." Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522, 795 N.E.2d at 220. The 

second test is whether, when comparing similar offenses, "conduct 

that creates a less serious threat to the public health and 

safety is punished more severely." Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 522, 795 

N.E.2d at 220. The final test is whether offenses with identical 

elements are given different sentences. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 

522, 795 N.E.2d at 220. In Sharpe, the supreme court abandoned 

the second test, which was known as the cross-comparison test. 

Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 519, 839 N.E.2d at 516-17. 

 After the Sharpe decision, the Guevara court addressed 

the defendants' argument that the 15-year sentence enhancement 

for home invasion while armed with a firearm violated the 

proportionate-penalties clause under the cross-comparison test 

when compared to aggravated battery with a firearm. Guevara, 216 

Ill. 2d at 544, 837 N.E.2d at 908. Our supreme court rejected 

the defendants' argument because Sharpe prohibits a defendant 

from raising a proportionate-penalties-clause challenge under the 
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cross-comparison test. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d at 544-45, 837 

N.E.2d at 908. The court further noted the defendants had not 

challenged the 15-year enhancement under one of the other 

proportionate-penalties-clause tests, and thus their 

proportionate-penalties-clause challenge failed. Guevara, 216 

Ill. 2d at 545, 837 N.E.2d at 908. 

Here, like the defendants in Guevara, defendant argues 

the 15-year sentence enhancement for home invasion while armed 

with a firearm violates the proportionate-penalties clause under 

the cross-comparison analysis when compared to aggravated battery 

with a firearm. He also does not argue the 15-year enhancement 

violates the proportionate-penalties clause under the other two 

tests. Accordingly, defendant's proportionate-penalties-clause 

argument fails.

Since we have rejected defendant's proportionatepenalties-clause challenge to the 15-year sentence enhancement, 

we need not address defendant's last argument. 

 III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's 

judgment. 

Affirmed. 

STEIGMANN and APPLETON, JJ., concur.