2020 IL App (1st) 172685-U

No. 1-17-2685 

May 13, 2020 

Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

DANIELLE JONES, a/k/a Victoria Jones, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 17 MC1 206050 

Honorable 

Robert D. Kuzas, 

Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Ellis and Justice Cobbs concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for theft of lost or mislaid property is affirmed over her 

claim for ineffective assistance of counsel because the record shows that a motion 

to quash arrest and suppress evidence would not have been meritorious. 

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Danielle Jones, a/k/a Victoria Jones, was found guilty

of theft of lost or mislaid property and sentenced to 30 days’ imprisonment. She appeals, arguing 

that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not file a motion to quash arrest 

and suppress evidence. We affirm.
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¶ 3 Defendant was charged with theft of lost or mislaid property (720 ILCS 5/16-2 (West 

2016)) following an incident on December 21, 2016. Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to 

exclude testimony regarding a surveillance video on the basis that the State did not provide the 

video in discovery, and therefore testimony describing its contents would be inadmissible pursuant 

to Illinois Rules of Evidence 1001 through 1004 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). The State conceded it did not 

have the video and thus could not produce it, but argued it did not need to because the only 

testimony regarding the video’s contents would be offered to describe the testifying officer’s 

course of investigation. The court denied the motion.

¶ 4 At trial, Barbara Henderson testified that on December 21, 2016, she and her daughter went 

to the Leighton Criminal Court Building around 9:15 a.m. Prior to going through security, 

Henderson placed her personal items, including her wallet, in a tray. She retrieved her items after 

going through security but did not see her wallet in the tray. Henderson asked her daughter if she 

had the wallet, and after learning that she did not, Henderson informed a Cook County Sheriff’s 

Department (CCSD) officer that the wallet was missing. The officer searched the security area but 

could not find the wallet. He directed Henderson to the officers’ room, where she filed a report. 

Later that day, Officer Kevin Joy contacted Henderson and informed her that he had located her 

wallet, which he then returned. 

¶ 5 On cross-examination, Henderson admitted that she did not see anybody take her wallet.

She placed the wallet in the tray, but an officer put the tray on the conveyor belt. After placing her 

wallet in the tray, Henderson did not see the wallet again until Joy returned it to her. Nothing was 

missing from the wallet.
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¶ 6 Deputy Susana Marquez testified that she had worked for CCSD since 2000. On December 

21, 2016, she was working at the Leighton Criminal Court Building when she was told over the 

radio to go to the sheriff’s office. Upon arrival, she learned that a complainant, later identified as

Henderson, was missing a brown wallet. Marquez spoke with Henderson and learned that she lost 

the wallet while going through security. 

¶ 7 Following the conversation, Marquez and Joy, her partner, reviewed surveillance video. 

The video showed “the female entrance where the x-ray machine is, where you could see *** the 

deputy and you could see people grabbing their items off the machine.” Based on that review, 

Marquez found a suspect, whom she identified as defendant in court, and also determined that 

defendant went to courtroom 202 after going through security. Marquez and Joy went to courtroom 

202, located defendant, and asked her to step outside. 

¶ 8 Marquez asked defendant if she had a brown wallet. After defendant said “no,” Marquez 

asked defendant to put her hands on the wall because Marquez was going to conduct a “custodial 

search.” During the search, Marquez found a brown wallet on defendant’s person. Defendant 

admitted that the wallet was not hers, but said she intended to return it to the owner after court.

¶ 9 On cross-examination, Marquez said that on the video she “observed [defendant] grab a 

bag from the conveyor belt which is where the wallet was and take it.” She did not see defendant 

take anything from the conveyor belt in person. On redirect, Marquez testified as follows: 

 “Q: With regard to the video you viewed as part of your investigation, did you see 

the defendant grab the wallet of the victim in that video? 

 A: I saw her—I remember seeing her grab a bag which was near the wallet.

 Q: To be clear, in the video the wallet is a dark, small object? 
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 A: Yes.

 Q: And that’s the object you saw the defendant grab from the video? 

 A: Correct.” 

¶ 10 Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State failed to prove she did not 

intend to return the wallet. The court denied the motion. After closing arguments, the court found 

defendant guilty. In so finding, the court explained that “[s]omeone” in the video Marquez viewed

“takes the small dark item, puts it in their bag.” The court also stated that defendant’s explanation 

for keeping the wallet did not “make any sense.” The court immediately proceeded to sentencing, 

and imposed a sentence of 30 days’ incarceration. 

¶ 11 Through counsel, defendant filed a motion to reconsider and for a new trial. At a hearing 

on the motion the court ruled that its “[p]revious order [was] to stand” after defendant failed to 

appear. Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider sentence. 

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he 

did not file a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence that Marquez recovered Henderson’s 

wallet from defendant, and that defendant stated she intended to return the wallet after court. 

According to defendant, such a motion would have succeeded because Marquez lacked probable 

cause where she “vacillated” in her testimony as to whether the surveillance video showed 

defendant taking the wallet. 

¶ 13 The United States Constitution guarantees effective assistance of counsel to all criminal 

defendants. U.S. Const., amend. VI. To prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective, “a 

defendant must show both that his counsel was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the 

defendant.” People v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122, 127 (2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
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668, 687 (1984)). To establish prejudice when an ineffective assistance claim is based on counsel’s 

failure to file a motion to suppress evidence, a defendant “must demonstrate that the unargued

suppression motion is meritorious, and that a reasonable probability exists that the trial outcome 

would have been different had the evidence been suppressed.” People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 

114040, ¶ 15. When reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this court defers to the 

trial court’s findings of fact and will not disturb them unless they are against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. People v. Stanley, 397 Ill. App. 3d 598, 612 (2009). The legal question of whether 

counsel’s conduct amounts to ineffective assistance is considered de novo. Id. 

¶ 14 The fourth amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable search and 

seizure. U.S. Const., amend. IV. “An arrest occurs when a person’s freedom of movement is 

restrained by physical force or a show of authority.” People v. Surles, 2011 IL App (1st) 100068, 

¶ 23; see also People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 473 (2009). For an arrest to constitute a reasonable 

seizure, it typically must be made pursuant to a warrant. People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 89 

(2010). A warrantless arrest is valid only if supported by probable cause. People v. Grant, 2013 

IL 112734, ¶ 11. If an officer has made a lawful warrantless arrest, he may conduct a warrantless 

custodial search of the suspect incident to that arrest. People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 63 

(citing U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). 

¶ 15 An officer has probable cause to arrest when, based on the totality of the circumstances, 

“the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious 

person to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime.” Grant, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 11. An 

officer’s “factual knowledge, based on law enforcement experience, is relevant” to this 

determination. Id. Whether probable cause exists is “governed by commonsense considerations, 
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and the calculation concerns the probability of criminal activity,” not “proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d at 472. 

¶ 16 The evidence at trial showed that Marquez and Joy reviewed surveillance video from the 

location in which Henderson lost her wallet. On the video, Marquez saw defendant “grab” a bag 

that was near the wallet on the conveyor belt. The prosecutor asked whether the wallet appeared

as a “dark, small object” in the video and whether “that’s the object you saw the defendant grab.” 

Marquez responded affirmatively. The officers located defendant in a courtroom and removed her 

to the hallway. After defendant denied possessing the wallet, Marquez told defendant to put her 

hands on the wall and performed a custodial search, which revealed Henderson’s wallet. Defendant 

admitted the wallet did not belong to her and said she intended to return it after court. 

¶ 17 We find that defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence would not have 

been meritorious. A reasonably cautious person, after viewing surveillance video of an individual 

taking an item that had been reported stolen, would have concluded that the individual committed 

a crime. Marquez therefore would have had probable cause to arrest defendant at the time Marquez 

ordered defendant to put her hands on the wall, and would have been justified in performing the 

subsequent search. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 63. 

¶ 18 Notwithstanding, defendant contends that Marquez never testified that she saw defendant 

remove the wallet from the conveyor belt, and therefore lacked probable cause to arrest. We 

disagree, as defendant’s argument is not supported by the trial record. The prosecutor specifically 

asked Marquez to clarify that the wallet was a dark, small object, and that it was this dark, small 

object Marquez saw defendant remove from the conveyor belt in the video. Marquez affirmed that 

it was. This testimony does not lend itself to the ambiguity defendant suggests. 
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¶ 19 Based on the totality of the circumstances, Marquez had probable cause to arrest defendant. 

Thus, defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence would not have been meritorious, 

and she cannot establish the prejudice required to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim. Accordingly, we affirm her conviction for theft of lost or mislaid property. 

¶ 20 Affirmed.