Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DANIELLE L. GREGORY GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

J.T. WHITEHEAD

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

EDWARD T. BRONAUGH, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1210-CR-832

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Reuben B. Hill, Judge

Cause No. 49F18-1109-FD-62862

June 12, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
2

Case Summary

Edward Bronaugh (“Bronaugh”) was convicted after a bench trial of Battery, as a 

Class D felony;1 Residential Entry, as a Class D felony;2 Resisting Law Enforcement, as a 

Class A misdemeanor;3 Disorderly Conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor;4 Public Intoxication, 

as a Class B misdemeanor; 5and Public Nudity, as a Class C misdemeanor.6 He now appeals, 

raising for our review the single issue of whether his convictions were supported by 

sufficient evidence because he was involuntarily intoxicated. 

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On the morning of September 2, 2011, Bronaugh smoked adulterated marijuana. 

Later that day, he entered the Bethesda Temple Apostolic Church. There, he conversed with 

Barry Fields (“Fields”), who noticed that Bronaugh’s thoughts were “all over the place.” (Tr. 

at 10, 45.) Bronaugh hugged Fields and kissed his neck, making Fields uneasy. Fields told 

Bronaugh he should leave, at which point Bronaugh turned and began walking in the 

direction of the daycare wing of the church. Another man directed Bronaugh outside, where 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.

2

I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5.

3

I.C. § 35-44-3-3 (2011). The relevant statutory provision was recodified as Indiana Code section 35-

44.1-3-1, effective July 1, 2012. We refer to the statutory provision in effect at the time of the alleged 

offense.

4

I.C. § 35-45-1-3.

5

I.C. § 7.1-5-1-3 (2011). The relevant statutory provision was modified, effective July 1, 2012. We refer 

to the version of the statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense.

6

I.C. § 35-45-4-1.5.
3

he began running around the church parking lot.

Bronaugh then ran across the street and undressed on a street corner before returning 

to the church parking lot where he again began running around. He then ran to a house 

across the street, where he broke through a screened porch door at the back of the house, and 

then broke a glass window pane of the house’s back door. Upon hearing the glass break, 

Bianca Harris (“Harris”), who was inside the house, grabbed her infant son and ran out the 

side door. In her driveway, Harris met Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer 

Charles Rhodes (“Officer Rhodes”), who was responding to reports of a disturbance.

Eventually, Bronaugh exited the house through the front door and stepped onto 

Harris’s lawn, at which point Officer Rhodes ordered him to get down on the ground. 

Bronaugh initially complied, but got up again. Officer Rhodes approached Bronaugh and 

ordered him to put his hands behind his back. Bronaugh yelled back at Officer Rhodes, and 

refused to comply with the officer’s orders. Officer Rhodes warned Bronaugh that he would 

be tased if he refused to comply. Bronaugh again refused to comply with the officer’s orders, 

and started to get to his feet, at which point Officer Rhodes tased him. Bronaugh stood up 

with the taser prongs still in his side, and Officer Rhodes tased him again. 

After a third tase, Bronaugh got up on one knee, made a fist with his right hand, and 

charged at Officer Rhodes. Officer Rhodes was unable to distance himself from Bronaugh, 

who swung at Officer Rhodes’s face, but missed. Bronaugh swung again, landing a painful 

blow to Officer Rhodes’s bicep. Officer Rhodes handcuffed Bronaugh after a long scuffle.

While handcuffed, Bronaugh continued to struggle, and ate some of the grass of the 
4

lawn down to the dirt, while babbling nonsensically. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police 

Officer Eric Hotseller (“Officer Hotseller”), who had responded to Officer Rhodes’s call for 

assistance, asked what Bronaugh was on, and Bronaugh responded that he was “on wet and 

crack cocaine.” (Tr. at 33, 38.) Officer Rhodes testified at trial that “wet” is adulterated 

marijuana, and that “[t]hey have used embalming fluid in the past where they will dip it in 

embalming fluid to get a high and it . . . [allegedly gives] individuals . . . superhuman 

strength which can cause them to fight through . . . [and] they don’t feel pain[.]” (Tr. at 33.) 

On September 7, 2011, the State charged Bronaugh with Battery, as a Class D felony; 

Residential Entry, as a Class D felony; Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Class A 

misdemeanor; Disorderly Conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor; Public Intoxication, as a Class 

B misdemeanor; and Public Nudity, as a Class C misdemeanor. After a bench trial, the trial 

court found him guilty as charged.

On September 24, 2011, the trial court entered judgments of conviction, and sentenced 

Bronaugh to 730 days imprisonment, with 185 days suspended to probation, and sixty-seven 

days of credit time.

Bronaugh now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Bronaugh contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. More 

specifically, he argues that he “was not aware the marijuana he [had] smoked was laced with 

embalming fluid and [that it] would cause him to ‘go crazy[.]’” (Appellant’s Br. at 5.) Thus, 

he asserts that he was so involuntarily intoxicated as to be unable to form the requisite intent 
5

for the offenses of which he was convicted.

When reviewing a defendant’s conviction for sufficiency of the evidence after a bench 

trial:

[t]his court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. 

Cox v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Only the evidence 

most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences that 

can be drawn therefrom will be considered. Id. If a reasonable trier of fact 

could have found the defendant guilty based on the probative evidence and 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, then a conviction will be affirmed. Id.

at 1028-29.

Sargent v. State, 875 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

Criminal intent can be established by circumstantial evidence and inferred from the 

defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct reasonably 

points. Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing C.L.Y. v. State, 

816 N.E.2d 894, 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). To sustain convictions of Battery, 

as a Class D felony, Residential Entry, as a Class D felony, Resisting Law Enforcement, as a 

Class A misdemeanor, and Public Nudity, as a Class C misdemeanor, the requisite intent is 

“knowingly or intentionally[.]” I.C. § 35-42-2-1; I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5; I.C. 35-44-3-3 (2011); 

I.C. § 35-45-4-1.5. The intent required to sustain a conviction of Disorderly Conduct, as a 

Class B misdemeanor, is “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally[.]” I.C. § 35-45-1-3. There 

is no intent element associated with Public Intoxication, as a Class B misdemeanor. I.C. § 

7.1-5-1-3 (2011); see also Street v. State, 911 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. 

denied.

Voluntary intoxication may not be used as a defense to dispute the existence of a 
6

mental state that is an element of a crime. I.C. § 35-41-2-5; see also Sanchez v. State, 749 

N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind. 2001). However, “[i]nvoluntary intoxication is a defense to the crime 

charged if, as a result of the intoxication, the defendant was unable to appreciate the 

wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense.” Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 734 

(Ind. 2000). “An involuntary intoxication defense disputes the existence of intent.” Id. “If 

successful, this defense would negate culpability for any offenses [the defendant] 

committed.” Id.

The law governing the defense of involuntary intoxication provides:

It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct did so 

while he was intoxicated, only if the intoxication resulted from the 

introduction of a substance into his body:

(1) without his consent; or 

(2) when he did not know that the substance might cause intoxication.

I.C. § 35-41-3-5. The defendant has the burden of proving the defense. Melendez v. State, 

511 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (Ind. 1987).

Here, Bronaugh admitted at trial that he voluntarily smoked marijuana on the morning 

of September 2, 2011, and that he engaged in each of the acts alleged by the State. (Tr. at 43-

49.) Officer Rhodes testified that Bronaugh struck him, and that Bronaugh struggled while 

he attempted to place him under arrest. Officers Rhodes and Hotseller testified that 

Bronaugh stated that he had consumed “wet and crack cocaine[,]” which both officers 

described at trial as marijuana adulterated with formaldehyde, adding a secondary effect to 

the marijuana.

By concluding that Bronaugh committed all six offenses as charged, the trial court 
7

implicitly found that he satisfied the intent requirement for each offense. (App. at 18-21; Tr. 

at 54-55.) The trial court was entitled to so find based on the evidence presented at trial, and 

the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. To the extent Bronaugh argues that 

he was unaware that the marijuana was adulterated, that argument is a request that we 

reassess witness credibility and reweigh evidence, which we cannot do. See Sargent, 875 

N.E.2d at 767.

Conclusion

The State presented sufficient evidence from which the trial court could conclude that 

Bronaugh possessed the requisite intent for each of the charged offenses.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., and BARNES, J., concur.