focus of his sentencing decision was the heinous nature of the crime, Benford’s refusal to accept
responsibility for the crime, and Benford’s prior criminal record. Thus, we concluded that the trial
judge most likely would have handed down the same sentence even if he had not considered the
improper impact statements. In light of this finding, as well as the strict standard imposed by the
Seventh Circuit for granting habeas relief in such cases, we do not believe “that reasonable jurists
would find [our] assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at
484.

Benford also challenged the fact that three of the improperly admitted victim impact
statements made reference to her alleged participation in another, unrelated murder. Although we
recognized in our opinion that this claim presented a “more complex issue,” we conclude again that
it is unlikely that a reasonable jurist would find our conclusion to be debatable or wrong.

In People v. Hope, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the admission of impact statements
written by victims of an unrelated crime constituted a violation of fundamental fairness. 702 N.E.2d
1282, 1289 (Ili. 1998). However, we observed that to succeed on such a claim, the petitioner must
demonstrate that the judge gave “explicit attention” to and “found[ed]” the sentence “at least in part”
on the inaccurate information. Jd. (quoting Tucker v. United States, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)).
During Benford’s sentencing, the trial judge acknowledged that he had read all of the victim impact
statements and he made reference to her officially documented criminal history, but he did not
mention explicitly the other murder alluded to in the statements. Instead, he focused on the nature of
the crime itself, stating that the conduct of the murder informed him as to Benford’s character more
than any other piece of evidence. There is no indication that the trial judge gave explicit attention to
the statements conceming the second murder or that the sentence ultimately imposed was in any way

founded upon those allegations. A due process claim does not lie under circumstances such as those


violated by the error. We must therefore determine whether, under the first Slack method evaluation,
Benford has demonstrated “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessments of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

Benford argues that she is entitled to a COA because our conclusion that she was not entitled
to a new sentencing hearing was based on a “subjective” assessment of the record as applied to the
law. We disagree. In our opinion, we recognized that although there is some authority for the
proposition that the improper admission of victim impact statements can amount to a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); People v. Richardson, 715 N.E.2d 1104, 1106-07 (Ill. 2001), the bulk of case law
suggested that such errors entitle a petitioner to a new sentencing hearing only in rare, particularly
egregious cases. First, Benford was unable to cite to a single case in which the United States
Supreme Court or a court in the Seventh Circuit actually granted a habeas petition because the trial
court had violated state laws regarding the submission of victim impact statements. Second, we
observed that the Seventh Circuit has set forth a stringent standard for evaluating claims of
evidentiary error in state court.

In Howard v. O'Sullivan, for example, the Seventh Circuit stated that, “[t}o be of
constitutional import, an erroneous evidentiary ruling must be so prejudicial that it compromises the
petitioner’s due process right to a fundamentally fair trial.” 185 F.3d 721, 723-24 (7th Cir. 1999);
see also Searcy v. Greer, 768 F.2d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Unless the claimed error amounted to a
fundamental defect so great that it inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice, the
conviction should stand.”) (quoting Cramer v. Fahner, 683 F.2d 1376, 1385 (7th Cir. 1982)). The
error committed by the trial court in Benford’s case did not approach a “complete miscarriage of

justice.” The trial judge did consider the impact statements in his deliberations; however, the true


presented by Benford. See Lechner v. Frank, 341 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding no due
process clause violation where the trial judge did not reference the inaccurate information in
announcing the petitioner’s sentence); see also U.S. ex rel. Welch, 738 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1984)
(finding a due process violation only where the trial judge explicitly recognized inaccurate evidence
as “significant factor” in his sentencing decision). In light of this precedent, the fact that Benford
cannot establish a due process violation is not a matter that would be subject to debate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Benford’s motion for issuance of a certificate of appealability is

denied. She may now request a certificate of appealability from the Court of Appeals pursuant to

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b). It is so order:

MARVIN E. ASPEN
United States District Judge

Dated: az


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Minsie Order Foran (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Jud yi Sitting Judge if Other
vor Magistrate Judge Marvin Aspen than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 2643 DATE 8/25/2004
CASE Willette Benford vs. Lynn Cahill-Maschino
TITLE

of the motion being presented.)

{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintitY, defendant, 3rd party plaintifY, and (b) state briefly the nauure

MOTION:

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(2) a Brief in support of motion due

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OFRCP4(m) (©) Local Rule 41.1 OO FRCP4i(a)(1)  FRCP41(a)(2).

Court of Appeals pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b).

ao [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order: Benford’s motion (25-1) for issuance
of a certificate of appealability is denied. She may now request a certificate of appealability from the

Docketing to mail notices.

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a1) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.}
No notices required, advised in open court. Document
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
WILLETTE BENFORD, ) Peg LT ep
Petitioner, } 15 ? 2004
y. } No. 03 CV 2643
LYNN CAHILL-MASCHING, }
Respondent, ‘

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge:

On October 11, 1995, after a jury trial, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois entered a
conviction against Willette Benford for first-degree murder and sentenced her to fifty years
imprisonment. Following the denial of her appeal and post-conviction petition, Benford petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus, which we denied on June 30, 2004.’ Presently before us is Benford’s
motion for a certificate of appealability (“COA”), which, for the reasons set forth below, we now
deny.

ACOA is required to take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order in a
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 or 2255. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). “A certificate of appealability
may issue... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84
(2000), elucidated two methods by which a district court is to evaluate a request for a COA. First,
when the district court rejects a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, “[t}he petitioner must

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessments of the constitutional

'Since the filing of this action, Alyssa B. Williams has replaced Lynn Cahill-Masching as the

Warden of the Dwight Correctional Center. Williams is the proper respondent in this action. G


claims debatable or wrong.” Jd. at 484. Alternatively, “when the district court reject[s] a
petitioner’s claims on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional
claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional tight and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
tuling.” Id. at 484 (emphasis added).

In this case, Benford requests leave to appeal only one of the claims that she raised in her
habeas petition: her assertion that her due process rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to
comply with the Illinois Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, 725 Il. Comp. Stat. 120/1-9
(1994). The Act allows the prosecution to submit a single victim impact statement during the
sentencing phase of a criminal trial. 725 Il]. Comp. Stat. 120/6(a). In murder cases, only the victim’s
immediate family members (parent, children, or siblings) are allowed to present such statements to
the court. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 120/5(a). At Benford’s trial, the court allowed the prosecution to
submit twelve impact statements, including statements from ten parties who were not immediate
family members. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court recognized that the trial court had indeed
failed to comply with the law, but ruled that it could not grant Benford a new sentencing hearing on
that basis because of a provision of the Act, which reads: “Nothing in this Act shall create a basis for
vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.” 725 Il]. Comp. Stat.
120/9.

In her habeas petition, Benford argued that the state’s violation of Illinois law was so
egregious that it amounted to a denial of her federal due process rights. After reviewing the United
States Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit’s pronouncements on the subject, we found that, although

the trial court certainly had erred by admitting the statements, Benford’s due process rights were not