LEGAL STANDARD

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1121
(1994). Once the movant has met its burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the
pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P
56(e). The court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. O'Connor v. DePaul University, 123 F.3d 665,
669 (7th Cir. 1997).

A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. However, the
nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts." Chicago Board of Education v. Substance, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15036, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2002). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
nonmoving party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence in which a jury could
reasonably find for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that defendants did not allow her to apply for a loan of less than $50,000

because she was an African-American. Plaintiff also argues that defendants misrepresented that

she could apply for a loan of less than $50,000 upon which she relied to her detriment.



Sentinel. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that she was refused an application because of her
race. Nor has plaintiff contradicted defendants’ factual assertions that Sentinel has not
discriminated against African-American borrowers. In the absence of any such evidence by
plaintiff, the undisputed evidence reflects that Sentinel did not racially discriminate against
African-Americans, in general, or her in particular. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to raise
genuine issues of fact as to whether Sentinel violated the Fair Housing Act or Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, and Sentinel is entitled to summary judgment on these Counts.

Finally, in Count II, plaintiff charges Sentinel with fraud under Illinois’ Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS § 505/2 (2003). Having concluded that plaintiff
has no federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count III
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

For the reasons set forth above, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as
to Counts I and II. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count If], which

plaintiff may be able to pursue in state court. Count III is dismissed without prejudice.

ENTER: November 26, 2003

Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge



As an experienced Attorney and loan officer with over 10 years experience

in the Chicago market, I may be able to help you by taking one of the following
actions:

1) Lend money directly to you to payoff[sic] the above tax bill.
2) Refinance your current mortgage and payoff[sic] the delinquent tax bill.

3) Refinance your mortgage, pay your tax bill, and payoff[sic] other bills that
have high interest rates.

4) ALSO-you may be able to borrow extra money for home improvements and
debt consolidation ...

Sincerely,
Mark R. Cahan.
(Emphasis in original).
Ina substantially similar letter from Sentinel to Dumas on or about the same time,
Sentinel's letter indicated that her unpaid balance was $700.
On or about July 18, 2002, Dumas called Sentinel in response to these letters and spoke to
Cahan and Kleanberg about a loan of $10,000 to pay off her taxes. Cahan and Kleanberg
informed Dumas of Sentinel's minimum loan amounts. Defendants contend that Kleanberg
suggested that if she was interested in taking out a loan of $20,000 or more, she should come by
Sentinel's office to complete an application. Plaintiff contends that Cahan and Kleanberg refused
to take an application from Dumas for a loan of less than $50,000. In either case, there is no
evidence that Dumas ever applied for a loan with Sentinel. After her home was sold for

delinquent taxes, Dumas filed this three count complaint.



In response, defendants argue that plaintiff is using the legal system to cure her perceived
societal wrongs. Defendants also argue that plaintiff has failed to show any evidence of racial
discrimination and that she failed to submit a completed application as required to state a claim
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to
establish that defendants made a false or misleading statement, that defendants intended that she
rely on any false or misleading statement, and alternatively, that she failed to suffer any damages
as a result of such a reliance.

In Counts J and IL, plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3605 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 by refusing her a loan
because of her race. Section 3605(a) of the Fair Housing Act provides that:

[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes

engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any

person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of

such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status,

or national origin.

42 U.S.C. §§ 3605(a) (2000).

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in lending in the Seventh Circuit, a
plaintiff must show a reason for suspecting discrimination on a prohibited basis. Latimore v.
Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 (7" Cir. 1998). This can be shown by: (1) providing
evidence that two applicants, one Caucasian and one African-American, each submitted an
application to a bank at the same time and met the bank's standard of creditworthiness, but only

the Caucasian received the loan, or (2) otherwise providing sufficient direct or circumstantial

evidence of discrimination to create a triable issue of fact. Id.



Minute Order Foren (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Hlinois

liz of Assigned Judge Robert W. Gettleman Sitting Judge if Other

or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 5255 DATE November 26, 2003
CASE Betty J. Dumas v_ Sentinel Mortgage Corp., et al
TITLE

Lin the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented. ]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) Qo Hearing

(5) a Status hearing

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__———s set for aat__.

(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for]on___—_at

(8) Qa [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] | held/continued to at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(¢m) OO General Rule21 OFRCP41(a)(1) [I FRCP4i1(a)(2).

qo) wf [Other docket enty! Memorandum opinion and order entered.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted
as to counts I and II. The Court declines to exercise supplemental
judgment over count III, which plaintiff may be able to pursue in

state court. Count III is dismissed without prejudice.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff. DEC vo 2 2003
Notified counsel by telephone. daidYockcied
Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

docking chy un
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. LYNO9 LIIYLSIO ‘sn
MYaTO
courtroom date maited notice
: leputy’s Hh - "|
os inal HW @= gag eu

OT Gaatiattl dros oot yt

dal wf [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court. "Document
No noti 4 Number
'0 notices required. number of notices, nis PENS
x

2 |



Section 1691(a)(1) of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act provides:

[I]t shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant,
with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has
the capacity to contract).

15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2000).

To establish a claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, plaintiff must have actually
submitted a completed application as defined by 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(f). Howard Oaks, Inc. v.
Maryland Nat'l Bank, 810 F.Supp 674, 678 (D. Md. 1993). Section 202(f) provides that an,

[A]pplication means an oral or written request for an extension of credit that is

made in accordance with procedures used by a creditor for the type of credit

requested. ... A completed application means an application in connection with

which a creditor has received all the information that the creditor regularly obtains

and considers in evaluating applications for the amount and type of credit

requested (including, but not limited to, credit reports, any additional information

requested from the applicant, and any approvals or reports by governmental

agencies or other persons that are necessary to guarantee, insure, or provide

security for the credit or collateral).

12 C.-F.R. § 202.2(f) (2003).

In support of its motion defendant has provided evidence that at least 34% of the loans in
which Sentinel acted as a broker were to African-American borrowers in the year in which this
dispute took place. Plaintiff, on the other hand, has presented no evidence to support her
allegation. Although plaintiff is proceeding pro se, she has been provided notice pursuant to
Local Rule 56.2 informing her that she cannot rest on her own self-serving statements. Plaintiff
has provided no evidence to suggest that Sentinel discriminated against African-American

borrowers, in general, on a prohibited basis, or that a Caucasian person with creditworthiness

similar to her’s sought to apply for and received a loan of less than $50,000 at the same time with


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
BETTY J. DUMAS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 025255
v. ) _——
) Judge Robert W. Gettleman.
SENTINEL MORTGAGE CORP., MARK R. )
CAHAN, and JEFF KLEANBERG, ) newer en
) Oe ; AY
Defendants. ) DEC o 9, 2003

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In a three count pro se complaint, plaintiff Betty J. Dumas ("Dumas") alleges that ‘
defendants Sentinel Mortgage Corporation ("Sentinel"), Mark R. Cahan ("Cahan"), and Jeff
Kleanberg ("Kleanberg"), violated the Fair Housing Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seg. (Count I), the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 (Count IJ), and the Ilinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act 815 ILCS § 505/2 (Count II) by first sending a solicitation for
a loan and then refusing to grant her a loan because of her race. Defendants have moved for
summary judgment on all three counts. For the reasons stated below, the court grants defendants’
motion as to Counts I and II and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c) over Count III.

FACTS'
Plaintiff is an African-American woman who lives in Chicago, Illinois. Cahan is the

founder and president of Sentinel, an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in

'These facts are taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statements of Material
Facts and are undisputed unless otherwise noted.



Chicago, Illinois. Kleanberg was an employee and representative of Sentinel from May 2002 to
June 2003.

Sentinel is a mortgage brokering business that does not lend money directly to consumers
but rather connects lenders with qualified borrowers. As compensation, Sentinel receives a
percentage of the total loan amount for any referral that results in a loan. Lenders with whom
Sentinel contracts require a minimum loan amount of $20,000 to $50,000 to process a loan,
depending on the particular lender. According to defendants, when a potential borrower requests
a loan for less than $20,000, it is Sentinel's practice to inform the customer that $20,000 is the
minimum loan, and if they are interested in a loan of at least $20,000 they come to Sentinel's
office to complete a loan application. There is no evidence that Sentinel has approved loans for
less than $20,000, but Sentinel admits it has approved loans for less than $50,000. In the regular
course of its business, Sentinel maintains a log of all loans in which it acted as a broker. In 2001,
18 out of 53 loans in which Sentinel acted as a broker were to African-American borrowers
(34%) and in 2002, 30 out of the 85 loans were to African-American borrowers (35%).

On or about May 17, 2002, Sentinel sent a mass mailing to all Cook County homeowners
who were delinquent on their taxes. Dumas received one such letter that stated:

FINAL NOTICE.

Dear Homeowner,

A recent review of Cook County's Property Tax Files showed your 1998
tax bill unpaid and currently outstanding. Penalties and interest are accruing at
over 18% each year until this bill is paid! Furthermore, if this tax bill is not paid

you may LOSE YOUR HOME!!!!: THIS MAY BE YOUR LAST
CHANCH[sic] TO REDEEM YOUR TAXES!!!