and duplicative. Theobald responds that he spent 187.5 hours and
Lavezzi spent 64 hours responding to the motion. Based upon
Theobald’s level of experience with these types of cases and a
review of the Plaintiff’s filings, the Court concludes that
Theobald’s hours are excessive and Lavezzi’s hours are duplicative
and excessive. Accordingly, the Court reduces Theobald’s time by
37.5 hours and reduces Lavezzi’s time by 32 hours.

The trial was originally set for May 2004, but was rescheduled
for August 30, 2004. Defendants object to Plaintiff's request for
393.75 hours of Theobald’s time and 66 hours of Lavezzi’s time for
trial preparation. Due to the change in trial date, Theobald
submitted trial preparation time from February through March 2004
and again from July through August 2004. Defendants contend this
is excessive and duplicative. However, adequate trial preparation
is important and the Plaintiff had the burden of proof on her
claims. Plaintiff was successful on four of the five claims
asserted at trial. Further, Defendants expended roughly the same
amount of time preparing for trial as did Plaintiff. See Quinones
v. City of Evanston, No. 91 C 3291, 1995 WL 656690 at *5 (N.D. Til.
Nov. 6, 1995) (finding reasonable fees when both sides spent roughly
the same time on the case). The Court concludes that the trial
preparation time was reasonable.

Defendants also object to time spent in connection with the

EEOC proceedings, but cite no authority to support their


3. Resulting Attorney’s Fees

In her motion, Plaintiff seeks 1,369.50 hours of Theobald’s
time at $350 per hour ($479,325.00); 193 hours of Lavezzi’s time at
$75 per hour ($14,475.00), and 1 hour of Lavezzi’s time at $65 per
hour ($65.00). The Court has concluded that Theobald reasonably
expended 1,289 hours at the reasonable hourly rate of $325, fora
total of $418,925.00. Lavezzi reasonably expended 158.5 hours at
the reasonable hourly rate of $75 ($11,887.50), and .5 hours at the
$65 rate ($32.50), for a total of $11,920.00. Thus, Plaintiff is
entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of $430,845.00.

B. Costs

Defendants only make one objection to the taxable and
nontaxable costs submitted by Plaintiff -- the legal research
costs, totaling $1,551.93 -- on the grounds that the descriptions
are not well documented and unnecessarily vague. The disputed time
descriptions merely read, “computer research during [particular
month]” and there is no additional documentation for the above-
claimed costs. District courts have discretion in determining to
what extent prevailing parties may be awarded costs. See Weeks v.
Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 945 (7th Cir. 1997).
Without more specific time entries or documentation, the Court
cannot discern whether these research charges were necessary,
related to the winning claims, or even related to this litigation.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to the research costs. See


billing resulted in a lower fee than Defendants’ tenth-hour billing
for the identical task.

Defendants also argue that the time spent preparing and
reviewing certain documents was excessive. Defendants object to
approximately 45 hours spent preparing the complaint, which is
substantively identical to Plaintiff’s EEOC discrimination charges.
Theobald responds that he spent 32.25 hours investigating
Defendants’ written statements, researching, and preparing the
complaint. Given the particular facts here and the similarity of
the complaint and EEOC charges, the Court finds that the time spent
on the complaint was excessive, and accordingly reduces Theobald’s
time by 10 hours.

Defendants contend that Theobald’s 72 hours responding to
their Rule 12(b) (6) motion was excessive. Theobald responds that
he spent 69.5 hours in responding to the motion, and that it took
Defendants 50 hours to draft the motion to dismiss and reply.
After reviewing the Plaintiff’s response brief to the motion to
dismiss, a fifteen-page document with a lengthy recitation of
facts, the Court concludes the time spent was clearly excessive,
especially in light of Theobald’s experience in employment
discrimination cases. The Court reduces Theobald’s time by 29.5
hours to a more reasonable (but generous) 40 hours of work.

Defendants argue that the amount of time expended by Theobald

and Lavezzi on Defendants’ summary judgment motion was excessive


contentions that such time was not part of case or duplicative.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s argument that the EEOC
proceedings were related to the federal case and were reasonable.

Defendants object to 27 hours of time spent on clerical tasks.
Plaintiff seeks 1 hour of Lavezzi’s time at a lower $65 per hour
rate (normally $75 per hour) for filing motions with the court
clerk. Delivery of a motion to the clerk, while necessary, is a
task that is “easily delegable to non-professional assistance.”
Spegon v. The Catholic Bishop of Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 553 (7th Cir.
1999). As such, Lavezzi’s time is reduced by .5 hour at the $65
hourly rate.

Defendants also object to the 26 hours spent preparing the fee
statement, with 13.5 hours of Theobald’s time and 12.5 hours of
Lavezzi’s time. In considering the reasonableness of such requests
the “relevant inquiry is whether the hours claimed to have been
expended . . . bear a rational relation to the number of hours
spent litigating the merits of the case.” Id. at 554, The Court
concludes that 26 hours is excessive for such task and does not
bear a reasonable relation to the number of hours spent litigating.
Accordingly, the Court reduces Theobald’s hours by 3.5 hours, and
reduces Lavezzi’s hours by 2.5 hours.

For the foregoing reasons, Theobald’s claimed time is reduced
by 80.5 hours and Lavezzi’s claimed time is reduced by 35 hours.

The balance of the time sought is reasonable.


Bennett v. Smith, No. 96 C 2422, 2002 WL 169323 at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 1, 2002). Plaintiff's total costs are therefore reduced by
$1,551.93, and Plaintiff is entitled to $5,921.75 in costs.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees is granted, but reduced. Plaintiff is awarded a

total of $436,766.75 in attorney’s fees and costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

Bp . United States District Court
Dated: Gel ds ACIS
4



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT D
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS APR 1 5 20
EASTERN DIVISION 05

JUDGE HARRY
US. DISTRICT Gon MENWEBER

JENNIFER FARFARAS, ‘OURT JUDGE

Plaintiff,
Case No. 01 C 8720
Vv.
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
CITIZENS BANK & TRUST CO. OF
CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff won a lawsuit against Defendants on sexual
harassment, assault, battery, and IIED claims. Before the Court is
Plaintiff's motion for $501,338.68 in attorney’s fees and costs,
and Defendants’ objections. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's
motion is granted, but reduced to $436,766.75.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Title VII, a court has the discretion to award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees as part of costs, 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000), and a prevailing plaintiff should generally
recover attorney’s fees. See Dunning v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 62
F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 1995). A reasonable fee award is assessed
by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation times a reasonable hourly rate” — the “lodestar” figure.
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989). “The Court must

excluded from this calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably


2. Hourly Rate

Mr. Theobald asserts that his hourly rate is $350, and that he
has charged this rate since 2001. Defendants contend that
Theobald’s hourly rate is too high. It is undisputed that Theobald
charged Plaintiff $325 an hour from the date she retained him on
January 3, 2001 to the present date. An “attorney's actual billing
rate for comparable work is ‘presumptively appropriate’ to use as
the market rate.” People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 90
F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1996). Similarly, in Mohr, Theobald
represented a plaintiff in a race discrimination case and sought
$350 per hour in fees, but charged the plaintiff $275 per hour.
See Mohr, 194 F.Supp.2d at 786. The court held that Theobald was
entitled to $275 per hour -- the amount he actually charged his
client.

Here, the Court finds that the $325 hourly rate that Theobald
charged Plaintiff -- and the rate she actually paid -- is the best
evidence of the appropriate market rate. See Stark III. v. PPM
America, Inc., 354 F.3d 666, 675 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he best
evidence of market value of legal services is what people will pay
for it.”).  Theobald’s supporting affidavits are insufficient to
rebut such presumption. Thus, Theobald’s compensation is set at
$325 per hour. The Court also concludes that Lavezzi’s standard

hourly rate of $75 per hour is reasonable.


expended’ on the litigation . . . [because] they are excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” See Stark III v. PPM Am.,
Inc., No 01 C 1494, 2003 WL 21223268, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 23
2003). The Court first determines the amount of hours reasonable
expended, and then examines whether the requested hourly rate is
reasonable. See id.
II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks $493,865 in attorney’s fees for the services
of her counsel, Mr. Edward Theobald (“Theobald”), and Theobald’s
clerk/paralegal, Mr. David Lavezzi (“Lavezzi”), and $7,473.68 in
taxable and nontaxable costs. Defendants object and assert that a
reasonable award would be $63,412.50 in attorney’s fees and
$5,921.75 in costs. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ objections
are untimely. The Court, however, granted Defendants’ motion to
extend the relevant deadlines, and set a new briefing schedule in
its February 23, 2005 Minute Order. Accordingly, the Court
declines to find waiver. See Mohr v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of
Trustees, 194 F.Supp.2d 786, 787-88 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding no
waiver). The Court now addresses the merits of Plaintiff's motion.

A. Attorney’s Fees

Defendants object to the number of hours expended as

excessive, duplicative, or unnecessary, and Theobald’s hourly rate

as unreasonably high.

N


1. Number of Hours

Defendants raise numerous objections to Plaintiff’s request
for 1,563.50 billable hours. Except for the following objections
that the Court will discuss, Defendants’ remaining arguments are so
without merit that they do not require a detailed discussion.
Defendants object to 421.5 hours because the descriptions are
“block billed” and do not state a time for each distinct legal
task. Examples of such entries are “additional work on discovery
disclosure” and “review our documents, prepare answers to
defendant’s interrogatories.” Similarly, Defendants object to many
time entries as vague and ambiguous, such as “prepare for trial”
and “prepare for Mr. Meyer’s deposition.” The Court has reviewed
Plaintiff’s submissions and concludes that the billing statement is
sufficiently detailed and unambiguous and includes the dates of
work, description of work, total hours expended, and total cost for
task. The Court further notes that Defendants utilized similar
time entries in this matter.

Defendants object to Plaintiff’s use of quarter-hour billing
increments, but do not identify how much time should be reduced for
such practices. Plaintiff responds that it used quarter-hour
billing minimally and cites to cases suggesting that quarter-hour
billing is acceptable. There is no evidence that the use of such
practices resulted in higher fees for particular tasks in this

case. In fact, on at least one occasion, Plaintiff’s quarter-hour