For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is

denied. It is so ordered.

ENTER:

Met LPT ada
MICHAEL T.CMASON
United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: October 31, 2002



A motion for reconsideration is an “improper vehicle to introduce evidence
previously available or to tender new legal theories." Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar, Ltd.,
804 F.2d 398, 404 (7" Cir 1986); see also Quaker, 123 F.R.D. at 288 (reconsideration
of final rulings will not be granted to allow the losing party to rehash oral arguments or to
present new legal arguments or facts which the party could have presented during the
pendency of the underlying motion). Any evidence that the City, and not the Fund,
administer healthcare benefits was available to the plaintiff during the briefing on the
motion ta dismiss, yet he did not advance that argument. Therefore, it cannot now, ona
motion for reconsideration, be brought up for the first time.

Further, even if we were to consider plaintiff's argument, we would still dismiss
Count II because the new argument advanced by the plaintiff does not change the fact
that it is the Fund, not the City, that controls plaintiff's receipt of benefits. Specifically,
the City has a contract with plaintiff's union to provide healthcare benefits to any union
member who is receiving disability benefits from the Fund. When the Fund determined
that the plaintiff was not disabled, the City — pursuant to contract - ceased paying for
the plaintiff's healthcare. This result stemmed solely from the Fund's decision to stop
providing plaintiff with disability benefits and thus it is still the actions of the Fund, not
the City, which gave rise to the cause of action in Count Il. The City did not make any
sort of independent determination about plaintiff's entitlement to benefits, and thus, is

not the proper party.



’
Nhinate Order Forru (06°97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Michael ‘T, Mason Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 2608 DATE 10/31/2002
CASE King vs. City of Chicago
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd purly plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented,]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) o Answer briefto motion due____. Reply to answer briefdue____.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon__ set for at

(5) im Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-sct for]on | setfor at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [sect for/re-set for]on_—s set for at_
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on at

(8) im [Rench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to aat

(9) Oo ‘This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs|by/agrecment/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) Clocal Rule 41,1 COFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) +4 [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached Mcmorandum Opinion and Order,
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration [19-1] is denied. Status hearing set for 11/26/02 at 9:00 a.m. Enter
Memorandum Opinion and Order.

al) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court

notices required.
No notices required. umber of potices

ii pang

a | Notices mailed by judge’s staff. fev,
ti "

Notitied counsel by telephone.

dat dockere
Docketing to mail notices, G
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Copy 10 judge/magistrate judge.
vaea1/2002
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT he eye
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS DOCKETED
EASTERN DIVISION
NOV 01 2002

William N. King,

)
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 02 C 2608

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Mason
City of Chicago, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Michael T. Mason, United States Magistrate Judge:

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of our
September 18, 2002 order dismissing Count II of the plaintiff's complaint, For the
reasons set forth below, the plaintiff's motion is denied,

“Motions for reconsideration serve a narrow function and must be supported by a
showing of extraordinary circumstances justifying relief from judgment.” John Doe v. Bd.
of Education of Oak Park River Forest High School Dist., No. 94 C 6449, 1996 WL
197690 (N.D.IIl. April 22, 1996). District court rulings are not to be viewed “as mere first
drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure." Quaker Alloy
Casting Co. v. Gulfco Industries, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D.IIl. 1988). Instead,
motions for reconsideration are designed to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence. Publishers Resource, Inc. v. Walker-Davis
Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7" Gir. 1985).

Plaintiff William King, a fire paramedic for the City of Chicago (‘City’), brought a

complaint against the City alleging that it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of

a)


1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 ef. seq. In Count Il of the complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that the City violated the ADA when the Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of
Chicago ('Fund”) refused to reinstate King's suspended duty disability benefits. In our
September 18, 2002 opinion, we agreed with the City that it was not the proper party for
Count II since the Fund has exclusive jurisdiction over duty disability benefits.
Specifically, we held that the City did not have the power to reinstate the plaintiff's duty
disability benefits because the Fund is an independent statutory entity and is nota
department of the City of Chicago. Therefore, we granted defendant's motion to
dismiss Count II of the complaint.

The plaintiff, in asking the Court to reconsider its September 18, 2002 opinion,
argues for the first time that there were actually two separate parts to Count Il. The first
section dealt with the plaintiff's loss of duty disability benefits, which are administered by
the Fund. The second section dealt with his loss of healthcare benefits, which are
administered by the City. However, neither the complaint nor plaintiff's response to
defendant's motion to dismiss indicates the distinction the plaintiff is now trying to
advance. The only mention of healthcare benefits in Count II is in the statement, “King,
a 21 year veteran, has been without pay, disability benefits or healthcare since May 17,
2001.” (Cplt., para. 55). Although the City specifically stated that it was not a proper
party to Count Il because it did not administer the Fund, which had denied plaintiff
benefits after it determined he was fit to return to work, plaintiff never argued in his

response brief that the City was a proper party because it administered his healthcare

benefits.