United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 20-60282 

Summary Calendar 

Maria Consuelo Rubio-de Machuca; 

Nelson Antonio Machuca-Rubio, 

Petitioners, 

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent. 

Petition for Review of an Order of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals 

No. A 209 232 363 

No. A 209 232 369 

Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Maria Rubio-de Machuca and her derivative beneficiary, Nelson 

Machuca-Rubio, are natives and citizens of El Salvador. They petition for 

review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 

*

 Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances 

set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

June 22, 2021 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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2 

dismissing their appeal of the denial by the immigration judge (“IJ”) of their 

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Rubio-de Machuca contends that she was 

persecuted and fears future persecution based on her anti-gang political opinion and her membership in a particular social group, defined as “landowners 

who refuse to cooperate with gangs.” 

This court reviews the final decision of the BIA and will consider the 

IJ’s decision only where it influenced the decision of the BIA. Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 2007). Factual findings are reviewed under 

the substantial-evidence standard; legal questions, de novo. Wang v. Holder, 

569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009). Under the substantial-evidence standard, 

this court may not reverse an immigration court’s factual findings unless 

“the evidence was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it.” Id. at 537. Among the findings of fact that this court 

reviews for substantial evidence is the conclusion that an applicant is not 

eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the CAT. Zhang 

v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 344−45 (5th Cir. 2005). 

To be eligible for asylum, Rubio-de Machuca must show that she is 

unable or unwilling to return to her country “because of persecution or a 

well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). Rubio-de Machuca has failed to 

show that the harm she suffered in El Salvador rises to the level of persecution or that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a 

protected ground. See Majd v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2006). 

Because Rubio-de Machuca has failed to demonstrate her entitlement to 

asylum, she has also failed to demonstrate her entitlement to withholding of 

removal. See id. 

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3 

Rubio-de Machuca has also failed to establish that, more likely than 

not, she would be tortured with the acquiescence of a governmental official if 

removed to El Salvador. See Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 493 (5th 

Cir. 2015); see also Morales v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(defining “torture” for purposes of the CAT). Her claim that she will be 

tortured based on generalized social conditions in El Salvador is too speculative to support relief under the CAT and is insufficient to compel reversal 

under the substantial-evidence standard. See Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d 

at 493−94. 

Finally, Rubio-de Machuca avers, for the first time on appeal, that the 

immigration court lacked jurisdiction to enter a removal order because she 

was issued a notice to appear that did not state the time and place of her 

immigration hearing. Because Rubio-de Machuca did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to that issue, that portion of the petition is dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction. See Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 690−92 (5th Cir. 

2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2718 (2020), abrogated in part on other grounds 

by Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021); Flores-Abarca v. Barr, 

937 F.3d 473, 477−78 (5th Cir. 2019). 

Accordingly, the petition for review is DISMISSED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART. 

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