IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

GILBERT ARREOLA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 03 C 2854

)

MOHAMMED CHOUDRY, M.D., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

Plaintiff Gilbert Arreola contends that in April 2001, while he was incarcerated at Hill

Correctional Center, defendant Dr. Mohammed Choudry, a physician at the prison, denied Mr.

Arreola medical care for a fractured ankle because he is Jewish. Dr. Choudry is originally from

Pakistan (he is now an American citizen), and he is a practicing Muslim.

Mr. Arreola injured his ankle while playing soccer and was taken to the prison infirmary,

where he was seen by Dr. Choudry. Arreola contends that Dr. Choudry learned Mr. Arreola’s

religion from his prison identification card and, as a result, ordered Mr. Arreola to be returned to

his cell, without examining Arreola’s ankle and without ordering an x-ray. Mr. Arreola alleges

that as a result of Dr. Choudry’s refusal to treat him, he suffered physical injury, as well as pain

and suffering. Mr. Arreola has sued Dr. Choudry under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his

Eighth Amendment rights.

In the course of discovery, Mr. Arreola has identified Frank Tachau, a professor of

political science at the University of Illinois at Chicago, as an expert who will testify on Mr.
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Arreola’s behalf. Dr. Tachau’s opinions may be summarized as follows:

- The Koran, Islam’s holy book, holds that the Jews received the word of God but

misunderstood or turned away from the “straight path” of God.

- Muslims believe that the community of faithful Muslims will ultimately prevail

over non-Muslims.

- Jews were historically treated as a tolerated religious minority by Muslims.

- Following the emergence of Israel, which Dr. Tachau says constituted a

“psychological blow” to Muslims because of Israel’s control over important

Islamic holy sites, the passions of Muslims have become inflamed, and the

resulting identification of Jews as an enemy of Islam has opened the way for

Muslims to adopt vicious ethnic and religious stereotypes regarding Jews.

- Pakistan, Dr. Choudry’s country of origin, is a Muslim state that has tended to

identify with Muslim causes in a variety of ways, including activities relating to

extremist Islamic causes.

- Pakistan does not recognize the state of Israel, and Pakistani society, which has

never included a visible Jewish community, has a negative perception of Israel.

- “Because of the very nature of [Pakistan’s] origins as a Muslim state, and the

continuing active role of militant Muslim groups, attitudes that reflect anti-Jewish

prejudices are bound to be prominent in Pakistani society and to affect the

individual Pakistanis.”

See Def’s Mot. to Bar Testimony of Frank Tachau, Ph.D., Ex. B (Tachau report). Dr. Tachau’s

report also includes several references to the hostility of certain groups in Pakistan toward
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Americans and toward people of Jewish faith; the United States invasion of Iraq; and the 2002

kidnapping and murder in Pakistan of American journalist Daniel Pearl, who was Jewish.

Dr. Choudry has moved to bar Dr. Tachau’s testimony as irrelevant under Federal Rule

of Evidence 402, and as unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. For the

reasons stated below, the Court grants Dr. Choudry’s motion.

Discussion

Evidence that a party to a suit is a member of a group that adheres to tenets that are

probative of a relevant issue is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In United States

v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), the Supreme Court approved the admission of evidence that the

defendant in a robbery case, and a defense witness, were members of a prison gang whose tenets

required members to deny its existence and lie, cheat, steal, and kill to protect each other. The

defense witness, Mills, was called to discredit the testimony of Ehle, another member of the gang

who had testified as a prosecution witness and implicated the defendant in the robbery; Mills

claimed that Ehle had told him he intended to falsely implicate the defendant. Ehle was recalled

in rebuttal, testified that Mills was lying, and described the tenets of the prison gang. The

Supreme Court held that the evidence of membership in the organization, and of the

organization’s tenets, was relevant and admissible because it “made the existence of Mills’ bias

towards [the defendant] more probable,” and supported an inference that Mills’ testimony was

slanted in the defendant’s favor. Id. at 52. The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that

the testimony was unfairly prejudicial and thus inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence

403. Id. at 54.

One might think, based on Abel, that Dr. Tachau’s testimony is and should be admissible. 
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The difference between this case and Abel, however, is fairly obvious: Mr. Arreola makes no

suggestion that bias against Jews is a tenet of Islam or is somehow part of being a person of

Pakistani origin. At most, Dr. Tachau’s testimony would support a conclusion that some (or

perhaps many) Muslims, and some or many Pakistanis, dislike Jews. But absent evidence that

Dr. Choudry is one of those particular Muslims or persons of Pakistani origin, Dr. Tachau’s

testimony does not tend to make it more probable that Dr. Choudry harbors a bias against Jews.

The cases upon which Mr. Arreola relies do not support the admissibility of Dr. Tachau’s

opinions. In Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff claimed

she was terminated due to her religion, Roman Catholic. It appears from the court’s decision

that the plaintiff was permitted to introduce the fact that her employer’s general manager, who

was claimed to have been involved in the decision to terminate her, was a Baptist. But there is

no indication that any evidence was offered regarding the presumed views of Baptists toward

Catholics.

United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1986), involved a criminal charge for

threatening the life of the President. Evidence was admitted that the defendant was a religious

follower of Rev. Sun Yung Moon of the Unification Church. The evidence was offered to show

the defendant’s motive for threatening the President, who had failed to grant Rev. Moon a

pardon. Id. at 705, 708-09. But aside from the fact of the defendant’s religious affiliation, no

evidence regarding the beliefs or views of adherents of that religion was admitted. Thus the case

provides no support whatsoever for the admission of Dr. Tachau’s opinions regarding views

supposedly commonly held by Muslims and Pakistanis.

In Chapman v. Kleindienst, 507 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1974), and Reed v. Faulkner, 653 F.
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Supp. 675 (N.D. Ind. 1987), the plaintiffs’ claims involved challenges to prison regulations that

were claimed to adversely impact inmates’ religious practices (handling of pork by a member of

the Nation of Islam, and growing of dreadlocks by a Rastafarian). Evidence regarding the

particular religious practices was considered – and had to be, in order for the fact finders to

understand what the case was about. The same obviously is not true in this case. In addition, in

both Chapman and Reed, there was evidence directly linking the alleged religious practice or

belief to the particular individual involved, evidence that is lacking in this case with regard to

Dr. Choudry.

United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1999), also relied upon by Mr. Arreola,

comes somewhat closer to the mark, but still falls short. Romero involved criminal charges of

transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. The government offered

the testimony of an FBI agent with expertise in child molestation cases, to testify about the

methods and techniques used by so-called “preferential” child molesters – that is, those who

have a preference for sexual contact with children and pursue this methodically. See id. at 582-

83. The court held that this testimony was relevant to assist the jury in understanding conduct of

the defendant that was seemingly innocent on the surface but that was alleged to be part of his

pursuit of a particular victim. See id. at 584-85. In short, the basis for admissibility was nothing

like what Mr. Arreola argues here – that because the defendant is a member of a particular

group, he likely adheres to prejudices that infect some members of that group. Thus Romero

does not support admission of “profiling” evidence of the type that Mr. Arreola seeks to offer via

Dr. Tachau.

Finally, in United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994 (1st Cir. 1995), the defendant was
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charged with conspiring to hold a household employee in involuntary servitude. The defendant

was a Kuwaiti man who employed a female native of Sri Lanka as a domestic servant. The

evidence showed that the victim was forbidden to leave the house, use the telephone, or look out

the windows, and she was physically abused, denied adequate food, deprived of medical

treatment, and verbally threatened. Among the evidence the government offered at trial was

testimony about Kuwaiti customs and practices toward domestic workers. The court found this

evidence “highly probative” to show the vulnerability of the victim – who previously had

worked as a domestic servant in Kuwait – to certain verbal threats regarding what would happen

if she left the defendant’s house, to show her vulnerability to the defendant’s alleged threat to

return her to Kuwait if she did not obey his orders, and to show that defendant, via his familiarity

with Kuwaiti customs, used this to play on the victim’s vulnerabilities. Id. at 1007-08. None of

these purposes amounts to the type of “profiling” inference sought by Mr. Arreola via Dr.

Tachau’s testimony – that because Dr. Choudry is a Muslim and of Pakistani origin, he is biased

against Jews.

Perhaps more importantly, nothing in Dr. Tachau’s report suggests that hatred or

mistreatment of Jews is in any way, shape, or form a tenet or teaching of Islam. Rather, the

import of Dr. Tachau’s opinions is that many Muslims harbor such views. Though Dr. Choudry

is a Muslim, that is insufficient to provide a link between Tachau’s opinions and the issues in

this case. Rather, the inference that Arreola effectively seeks to have the jury draw by offering

Dr. Tachau’s testimony amounts to a fairly obvious logical fallacy: many Muslims hate Jews;

Dr. Choudry is a Muslim; therefore, Dr. Choudry hates Jews. The Federal Rules of Evidence

define relevance broadly, but they do not define it that broadly. In any event, the case is not a
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trial of Islam, or of persons of Pakistani origin; it is a trial regarding the alleged conduct of Dr.

Choudry. 

Even if Dr. Tachau’s testimony were somehow relevant, the unfair prejudice to Dr.

Choudry from its admission far outweighs whatever slight probative value the testimony might

be claimed to have. Allowing Dr. Tachau’s testimony would in effect encourage the jury to

draw the fallacious conclusion referenced above – that because he is a Muslim and Pakistani, he

must be anti-Semitic – and would amount to approval of the very type of invidious prejudice for

which Mr. Arreola accuses Dr. Choudry in this case.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendant’s motion to bar the testimony of

Frank Tachau [docket no. 92].

____________________________________

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY

 United States District Judge

Date: March 3, 2006