Shortly thereafter, pursuant to the remand order, the Board reconsidered all of the
televant evidence in King's record, including the CFD's July 20, 2001 letter, and again
found that he was not entitled to receive disability benefits pursuant to 40 ILCS 5/6-101.
The Board informed King of its decision in a February 19, 2002 letter. Jn light of that
decision, the parties returned to state court to continue litigating King’s State Case. At
some point in the litigation, the State Case was transferred to Judge Quinn.’ On
November 21, 2002, Judge Quinn issued an order (1) denying King’s request for a writ
of mandamus against both the City and the Board, (2) reversing the Board’s decision to
terminate King’s benefits, and (3) retroactively reinstating his disability benefits. This
decision was not appealed, and thus became a final judgment

On April 11, 2002, after receiving the EEOC right to sue letter, but before a final
judgment had been rendered in state court, King filed the instant suit alleging a violation
of the ADA.

Legal Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), We must evaluate the admissible

evidence supporting the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

' Unfortunately, neither side provided us with a copy of the docket from the State Case.
Therefore, we cannot make conclusive findings as to some of the procedural steps in that
litigation. However, it is undisputed that the case was remanded to the Board on August 23,
2001 for reconsideration of its decision to terminate King’s Benefits. It is also undisputed that at
some point, the case returned to the Circuit Court of Cook County and Judge Quinn issued a
dispositive final judgment in the case on November 21, 2002.



the state and federal actions. Both claims revolve around the termination of King’s

Benefits and the City's refusal to reinstate him as a PIC within the CFD. Morever, it
appears that the July 20, 2001 letter became a basis for both claims because it was
considered in the State Case.

However, even if the July 20, 2001 letter was not a basis for the State Case, both
actions still have a single core of operative facts. Res judicata applies to cases where
the core of operative facts can be divided into different phases. Davis, 53 F.3d at 803.
“Although there may be different phases to an employment action, the overlap of the
facts behind the entire sequence calls for common treatment.” /d. It would be silly to
break this sequence of events into little packages, and litigate it twice; once over the
interim measures and again over the final decision. fd. “Different phases of the same
basic dispute are not separate claims.” /d. Therefore, even if the July 20, 2001 letter
was not part of the State Case, the CFD’s May 17, 2001 decision not to immediately
reinstate King was an interim measure. The July 20, 2001 decision was the final
decision. Those two incidents are different phases of a single employment action and
are not separate claims.

Next, from his brief, it appears that King is under the misapprehension that his
ADA claim could not have been brought with his state court mandamus action. There is
no question that he could have joined additional causes of action to his state court
claims. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., et al. v. City of Chicago, 636 F. Supp. 374,
379 (N.D. Ill. 1986)(citing Skilling v. Skilling, 432 N.E.2d 881, 886 (1st Dist. 1982)(Circuit

courts have “the general power to determine all matters of controversy arising . . . by



Where the plaintiff has filed a federal suit after a dispositive state court judgment, we
must afford that prior judgment “the same effect that courts of Illinois would give it, had
this suit been filed there.” Davis v. City of Chicago, 53 F.3d 801, 802 (7th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, the doctrine of res judicata does apply to Title VII claims; there is no special
immunity. Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assoc., 999 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1993).

For the doctrine of res judicata to apply in this case, the City must prove three
elements: “(1) an identity of the parties or their privies; (2) an identity of the cause of
action; and (3) a final judgment on the merits.” Brzostowski, 49 F.3d at 338. “Once
these three requirements have been satisfied, a later suit should be barred.” /d. The
doctrine of res judicata “serves a vital purpose, inducing people to combine claims and
theories that are efficiently litigated jointly, and preventing the waste of judicial resources
that sequential suits create.” Davis, 53 F.3d at 802.

Neither side disputes the presence of the first and third elements of the doctrine
of res judicata. There is an identity of the parties. King and the City were parties in the
State Case and are both parties in this federa! case. There is also a final judgment on
the merits of King's State Case. On November 21, 2002, Judge Quinn issued an Order
(1) denying King’s request for a writ of mandamus against both the City and the Board;
(2) reversing the Board's decision to terminate King’s benefits; and (3) retroactively
reinstating his disability benefits. That decision was not appealed and became a final

judgment on the merits.


Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). While the City bears the initial
burden of demonsirating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, this burden
may be discharged by showing the district court that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

The City moves for summary judgment in this case on the grounds that (1) King’s
claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) King cannot establish a violation of the
ADA; and (3) King cannot establish that he was denied reasonable accommodations
even if he were found to be an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. We find
the City’s res judicata argument dispositive of this case and therefore will not address its
remaining two grounds for summary judgment. The City’s successful res judicata
argument also moots its motion to strike plaintiff's response to its 56.1 statement of
undisputed facts. Both parties agree on the facts material to the City’s res judicata
argument. The facts that are the subject of City’s motion to strike are relevant to the two
latter arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment. Because we need not
address those arguments, we deny the City's motion to strike as moot.

1. Res Judicata

Under the doctrine of res judicata, claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acts as a bar to a subsequent suit between
the parties. Brzostowski v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 49 F.3d 337, 338 (7" Cir.
1995); River Park, inc. v. The City of Highland Park, 184 II]. 2d 290, 302 (1!!.1998). This
bar applies to matters actually decided in the prior suit and all issues that could have

been decided during that suit. Brzostowski, 49 F.3d at 338; River Park, 184 Ill.2d at 302.



City had refused to reinstate him and consequently he had been without salary and
benefits since May 17, 2001. Furthermore, King was allowed to incorporate the CFD's
July 20, 2001 decision into his State Case. After that decision was brought to Judge
Madden’s attention, he remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration. King also
cited the letter and decision in his state court summary judgment brief and Judge Quinn
incorporated those facts into his November 21, 2002 opinion.

King’s federal claim is based on the same core of operative facts. King alleges
that the City discriminated against him in violation of the ADA by (1) refusing to make
reasonable accommadations for his known disabilities, (2) refusing to rehire him after
the Board terminated his benefits on May 17, 2001, and (3) ultimately terminating his
employment on July 20, 2001, The relief King seeks is twofold, he requests his salary
and benefits from May 17, 2001, the time he claims the City should have rehired him
and made accommodations for his disability, and reinstatement as a PIC with the CFD.
King's state and federal actions are clearly based on the same core of operative facts
and thus constitute an identity of action under the doctrine of res judicata.

King makes three unpersuasive arguments against this conclusion. First, King
argues that his state and federal claims are based on separate and distinct facts. He
argues that his state claim is based on the Board’s May 16, 2001? decision to terminate
his Benefits effective May 17, 2001, while his federal claim is based on the City’s July
20, 2001 decision not to reinstate him as a PIC with the CFD. As we stated above, this

argument must fail. There is a single core of operative facts that are common to both

* King’s complaint misstates the date of the Board’s decision as May 17, 2001. However, that
minor inconsistency is not relevant to our discussion,



Minute Order Form {06°97}

id

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Michael T, Mason

Sitting Judge If Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 2608 DATE 2/2/2004
CASE William King vs. City of Chicago
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintifY, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state bricfly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented. |

DOCKET ENTRY:

qa a Filed motion of { use fisting in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) Q Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due

(4) o Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(3) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on. set for at

(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on _ set for at

g” a Trial[set for/re-sct for] on at

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continucd to at 7

(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) Local Rule 41.1 CERCP41(a\(1) [1 FRCP41(a)(2).

(io) =f [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order,
defendant City of Chicago’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I [43-1] is granted and its motion
to strike plaintiff’s 56.1 response [53-1] is denied as moot. Judgment is entercd in favor of defendant, City
of Chicago, and against plaintiff, William King. Case dismissed, Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order.

(i) if [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in epen court, Document
s ‘Number
No notices required. ninber of novices,
av | Notices meiled by judge's staff. iqan § a jae
Notified counsel by telephone. «date dockeled
Docketing to tal notices.
| Mail AO 450 form. =n [,
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. de ° y
pews
dace mailed notice
courtroom : ty
KE deputy’s ~ KE
initials
Pepin: received in, + -
Jattal CIRC Uffice rniling deputy initia



process; he will have a good cause for doing so”). Moreover, King could have requested
that the state court postpone or stay the first suit until he had his right to sue letter. See
Brzostowski, 49 F.3d at 339. However, King could not pursue his State Case to a final
judgment and then bring a subsequent federal action premised on the same facts.
Because there is an identity of King’s state and federal actions, the City has
established that all three elements of res judicata are present in this case and thus
Count | of King’s federal claim is barred.
Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, the City's motion for summary judgment as to Count | is
granted and its motion to strike King's response to its 56.1 statement is denied as moot.

It is so ordered.

Enter: .

Mohr G PPM Badegor

MICHAEL T. MASON

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: February 2, 2004



reason of statute or the constitution.”), affd, 826 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1987). State Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over ADA claims. Bagnola v. City of
Chicago, 1997 WL 106126 at *3 (NLD. Ill. Feb. 12, 1997). Therefore, King’s ADA claim
could have been raised in his state court mandamus action. American Nat'l Bank, 636
F. Supp. at 379. In fact, that was the only time to do so. /d. “To hold otherwise would
result in a piecemeal litigation by first requiring review of an administrative body's
decision and then entertaining another action to test the constitutionality of such
decision.” Id.

King's last argument is closely associated with the previous argument. King
argues that the filing requirements for his Administrative Review Action in state court
precluded him from raising his ADA claim in that action. Specifically, King argues that
he was required to file his ADA claim by June 27, 2001, while he did not receive his
EEOC right to sue letter authorizing him to pursue his ADA claim until February 4, 2002.
The Seventh Circuit has explicitly rejected this argument in two pervious opinions. See
Herrmann, 999 F.2d 223; Brzostowski, 49 F.3d 337.

King received his EEOC right to sue letter on February 4, 2002, nine months
before the November 21, 2002 final decision in his State Case. If King wanted to assert
an ADA claim, he was required to amend his State Case to include that claim before a
final judgment on the merits. King could have asked the EEOC to expedite the
administrative process in order to receive his right to sue letter at an earlier date.
Herrmann, 999 F.2d at 225 (‘If a plaintiff faces a looming deadline for suing on his other

claims he can ask the EEOC or its state counterpart to accelerate the administrative

10



A. Identity of the Causes of Action

The sole dispute between the parties revolves around the question of whether
there is an identity of the causes of action. A claim has “identity” with a previously
litigated matter for the purposes of res judicata, “if it emerges from the same ‘core of
operative facts’ as that earlier action.” Brzostowski, 49 F.3d at 339. To determine
whether res judicata applies, the court employs the “same transaction” test. William
Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 99 F.3d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1996). “Under this ‘same
transaction’ test, once ‘a transaction has caused injury, all claims arising from that
transaction must be brought in one suit or be lost.” /d. “Transaction” is defined as “a
single core of operative facts which give rise to a remedy.” /d. The “same transaction”
test focuses on “whether the multiple claims turned on the same fact.” fd. “Under this
approach, ‘two claims are one for the purposes of res judicata if they are based on the
same, or nearly the same, factual allegations.” /d.

The City argues, and we agree, that there is an identity of the state and federal
actions sufficient to satisfy the second element of res judicata. Both actions are based
on a single core of operative facts: the Board’s decision to terminate King's Benefits
effective May 17, 2001, and the City’s decision not to reinstate King upon the Board's
decision that he was no longer disabled. The fact that the City did not issue an official
letter notifying King of its decision until July 20, 2001 does not bar the application of res
judicata. in Count Il of his State Case, King requested mandamus relief ordering the

City to reinstate him to a PIC position with the CFD with the same rank and grade as

required by § 6-153 of the Pension Code. in support of Count Il, King stated that the



examination and functional capacity evatuation. On June 18, 2001, Stewart and Dr.
Hugh Russell, the CFD Medical Director, determined that plaintiff was unfit for
reinstatement to duties as a paramedic in charge ("PIC") with the CFD,

On June 26, 2001, King filed a two-count complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Case Number 01 CH 10462 (‘State Case”), which was assigned to Judge
Madden. Count! was an Administrative Review Action against the Board and Count II
was a mandamus action against the City and the Board pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/14-101
et. seg. In Count ll, King petitioned the court to issue a writ of mandamus (1) ordering
the City to reinstate him to active duty as a PIC with the CFD, or (2) ordering the Board
to return him to its disability pension rolls because of his claimed disability.

Atter King filed his State Case, Stewart notified King in a letter dated July 20,
2001, that based on the results of his medical evaluation, his request for reinstatement
to a PIC position with the CFD could not be granted. In fight of the City’s decision not to
reinstate King to a PIC position, on August 23, 2001, Judge Madden remanded the case
to the Board for reconsideration of its decision to terminate King’s Benefits.

While the Board was reconsidering its decision to terminate King's Benefits
pursuant to the state court remand order, King filed a charge with the EEOC on January
24, 2002, In that charge, King claimed that he had been discriminated against on the
basis of his disability, in violation of the ADA. King listed July 20, 2001 as the earliest
date of discrimination, but stated that he had been denied Benefits since May, 2001. On
February 4, 2002, the EEOC issued King a right to sue letter based on his January 24,

2001 charge.


because the Board was exempt from the claims alleged in Count Il. The only remaining
claim in this case is Count |, in which King alleges that the City discriminated against him
in violation of the ADA. We now address the City’s motion for summary judgment on
Count !. The City argues that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because (1)
King’s claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) King cannot establish a violation
of the ADA; and (3) King cannot establish that he was denied reasonable
accommodations even if he were found to be an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability. In this opinion, we will also address the City’s motion to strike the plaintiff's
response to its 56.1 statement of undisputed material facts. For the following reasons,
we grant the City’s motion for summary judgment and deny its motion to strike as moot.
Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements and
are uncontested. The City hired King as a fire paramedic in 1980, and he worked in that
capacity until 1996. During his employment, King suffered injuries that exacerbated a
previous back condition. Specifically, King has three disc hernias. On May 31, 1995,
King injured his back on a call and the Board provided him with Benefits beginning on
July 24, 1996. He received these Benefits from 1996 until 2001. On May 16, 2001, the
Board issued a decision rescinding King’s Benefits on the ground that he was no longer
disabled within the meaning of 40 ILCS 5/6-153. On May 17, 2001, the rescission of
King's Benefits became effective and he sent a letter to Charles Stewart (“Stewart”), the
Director of Personal for the CFD, requesting reemployment with the CFD. On June 5

and 11, 2001, King underwent fitness-for-duty testing which included a medical

nD



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS DASKETEN
EASTERN DIVISION “ee
FEB 93 7004
William King, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 02 C 2608
ve )
) Mag. Judge Michael T. Mason
City of Chicago, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Michael T, Mason, United States Magistrate Judge:

On April 11, 2002, plaintiff William King (“King”) filed a two-count complaint
against defendant City of Chicago (“City”) alleging that the City violated the American
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C, §12101 et. seg. King alleged that the
City violated the ADA in Count | by denying him reemployment with the Chicago Fire
Department (“CFD”) and not providing reasonable accommodations for his injuries, and
in Count {I because the Retirement Board of the Fireman’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of
Chicago (“Board”) refused to reinstate King’s suspended duty disability benefits
(‘Benefits’). On September 18, 2002, we dismissed Count Il against the City because it
was not the proper party. The Board, not the City, retained exclusive jurisdiction over
awarding duty disability benefits and thus King could not obtain the relief he was seeking
in Count !I from the City.

On November 26, 2002, King filed a two-count First Amended Complaint
substituting the Board for the City as the named defendant in Count I) and leaving

Count | unchanged. On November 3, 2003, we dismissed Count II for a second time

L