I do, however, recognize that some difficulties concerning Sampson’s adequacy as class
representative may arise down the road. Since Ridge Chrysler is no longer a going concern and
has no assets aside from a $500,000 litigation insurance fund, its ability to satisfy a potential
judgment is limited. If the class turns out to be as large as Plaintiffs have predicted,
approximately 65,000, then each class member will be entitled to only a mere fraction of what
Sampson has already received by way of her settlement. This relatively small amount of

recovery may ultimately call into question Sampson’s interest in pursuing this case.

For the reasons stated herein, I stand by my April 4'", 2004 decision, granting class
certification.

ENTER:

S\— 6%,

ames B. Zagel_) 4
United States Distfict Judge
L
pate: 25 Senen 28 |


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

*

i Sitting Judge if O
Na Magitrate Judge James B. Zagel than Assigned Joige
CASE NUMBER 03 C 1396 DATE 6/25/2004
CASE .. Oneta S. Sampson, et al. Vs. Western Sierra Acceptance Corp.
TITLE

[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.)

(1)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

@) a Answer brief to motion due__. Reply to answer briefdue___.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on__setfor__at

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_—ssetfor__——_at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor_ at

(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on__at

(8) Qo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs(by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) OLocalRule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) CIFRCP41(a)(2).

(10) «x [Other docket entry] The Court’s stands by it’s April 4, 2004 decision, granting class certification.

Enter memorandum opinion and order.

|] [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. number of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff. ‘UL 0 1 2004

Notified counsel by telephone.

date docket
uv | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 480 form. ‘ ; \
sn dockting ep inats
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. yynod anise 7] (
ourtroo Ag HOOL date led potice
SLB enue Lh sh Wd 62 x
initials _
i ta
DacpipibeeG ab VI sees ou un



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ONETA S. SAMPSON and LISA D.
STROUD,

Plaintiffs,
No. 03 C 1396
Vv. Judge James B. Zagel

WESTERN SIERRA ACCEPTANCE
CORP., RIDGE CHRYSLER/PLYMOUTH,
LLC doing business as MARQUETTE
CHRYSLER JEEP, CITY CHEVROLET,

INC. doing business as CITY DOCKETED
CHEVROLET-CHRYSLER-JEEP, JUL 04 2004

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification has had a somewhat interesting history. In my
order of February 26, 2004, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion because I found that the class action was
not the superior method of adjudication against the then existing Defendants, Ridge
Chrysler/Plymouth (“Ridge Chrysler”) and Western Sierra Acceptance Corp. (“Western Sierra”).
After reviewing my order, Plaintiff Oneta Sampson settled her claim with Western Sierra and
asked that I reconsider my February 26" order. Sampson argued, and I agreed, that my reasons
for denying class certification were more applicable to Western Sierra than to the remaining
Defendant, Ridge Chrysler. So, on April 4, 2004, I reversed my previous order and granted class
certification.

Ridge Chrysler now asks that I reconsider my April 4" order, taking into account the

negative impact Sampson’s settlement has had on her ability to be the lead Plaintiff in this class

AV



action’, First, Ridge Chrysler claims that Sampson mooted her claim against Ridge Chrysler
when she settled with Western Sierra. Ridge Chrysler argues that the settlement satisfied the
entirety of the damages provided for under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681n, and,
therefore, terminated Sampson’s personal stake in the litigation. United States Parole
Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). However, after reviewing the settlement
agreement in camera, | find that the settlement may not satisfy the entirety of a potential damages
award, I say may not because the settlement amount was less than the maximum recovery
allowed by the statute. For now, it is impossible to predict exactly what amount of statutory
damages (between the $100-$1,000 plus attorney’s fees) a reasonable trier of fact would award
against Ridge Chrysler. Since further damages may be awarded to Sampson, I find that this case
has not been mooted by her settlement with Western Sierra.

Second, Ridge Chrysler argues that Sampson cannot adequately represent a class of
persons who still have potential claims against Western Sierra. However, I do not think those
claims should impact this case. Sampson has an active claim against Ridge Chrysler and will
adequately represent a class as to that Defendant. Sampson’s settlement agreement with Western
Sierra does not prevent potential class members from pursuing their claims against Western
Sierra individually. Thus, given the arguments that are before me now, I find that Sampson may

adequately represent the potential class in an action against Ridge Chrysler.

' Ridge Chrysler also filed a petition for appeal of my April 4" decision with the Seventh
Circuit. On June 1, 2004, the Seventh Circuit denied Ridge Chrysler’s petition. This denial has
mooted any jurisdictional issues that were created by having both a motion for reconsideration in
this court and an appeal before the Seventh Circuit active at the same time.

2