not render a workplace objectively hostile or abusive. Harris, 510 US. at21. Indeed, a supervisor’s
frequent comments to a subordinate such as “what the hel] is going on?,” “what the hell are you
doing?,” “get your head out of your ass,” “dumb motherfucker” and “when the fuck are you going
to get the product?” did not create an actionable hostile work environment. Hardin, 167 F.3d at 345-
46. Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable jury could not conclude Lebbad’s
conduct was so severe of pervasive as to constitute an actionable hostile work environment.
Naughton’s failure to prove her sexual harassment claim dooms her Title VIE claims because she
cannot prove she was constructively discharged.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Naughton’s remaining claim must be dismissed. The court may relinquish jurisdiction over
state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). According
to the general rule, “when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the pendent claims should be
left to the state courts.” Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1252 (7th Cir. 1994).
Nevertheless, defendants argue that resolution of Naughton’s sexual harassment claim is dispositive
of her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See Jd. at 1251 (exception arises when “it
is absolutely clear how the pendent claims can be decided”). Specifically, defendants claim
Naughton’s claim is preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act.

The Ulinois Human Rights Act preempts tort claims that are “inextricably linked” to
allegations of sexual harassment. Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 111.24 511,5 16,687 N.E.2d 21, 22-23
(1997). Contrary to defendants’ position, Naughton’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim is not “inextricably linked” to her sexual harassment claim because Naughton need not rely

on any legal duty created by the Illinois Human Rights Act to state a claim. Krocka v. City of

13


Naughton’s responses to {] 70-72, 75-77, 80 and 84 of defendants’ statement of facts fail, in whole
or in part, to cite to record evidence supporting the denials. Indeed, Naughton’s responses to 7 70-
72, 75-77 and 84 are identical despite the fact that these paragraphs address at least three different
topics.

Finally, Naughton relies on evidence in her brief that is not included in either parties’
statement of facts. See, e.g., Response at 6, citing Campbell Dep. at 30-32 (“Lebbad would use
profanity and refer to women as bitches”). See also Response at 7, citing Pl. Dep. at 173, 337-8
(recounting what other people told her about Lebbad’s treatment of women). Consideration of this
evidence would effectively nullify Local Rule 56.1. Therefore, evidence submitted to the court, but
not included in the parties’ statement of material facts, will not be considered. See Bordelon v.
Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 223 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000)(“the district court is
entitled to limit its analysis of the facts on summary judgment to evidence that is properly identified
and supported in the parties’ [Local Rule 56.1] statements”).

In sum, Naughton’s factual statements will be considered to the extent they are properly
submitted and supported by admissible evidence. Defendants’ factual statements, if properly
supported, are deemed admitted to the extent that Naughton’s denials fail to comply with Local Rule
56.1.

I. Facts

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Sears is a leading national retailer

of apparel, home and automotive products and services. In 1996, Sears hired Naughton as product

promotions manager. Thereafter, Sears identified Naughton as a “high potential associate.” On July


64 (1986). In order to prove a case of discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, Naughton must
offer either direct or indirect evidence. Oest v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 615 (7th
Cir. 2001)(discrimination); Stone v. City of Indianapolis Public Utilities Division, 281 F.3d 640,
643-44 (7th Cir. 2002)(retaliation). Under either approach, Naughton must show she suffered a
materially adverse employment action. Haugerud v. Amery School District, 259 F.3d 678, 691 (7th
Cir. 2001)(discrimination); Stone, 281 F.3d at 643-44 (retaliation).
1. Adverse Employment Action

Naughton claims she suffered an adverse employment action when she was forced to resign
because of Lebbad’s discriminatory harassment.' Constructive discharge, like actual discharge, is
a materially adverse employment action. EEOC v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 276 F.3d 326,
331 (7th Cir. 2002). To establish constructive discharge, Naughton must prove that her working
conditions were so intolerable as a result of unlawful discrimination that a reasonable person would
be forced to resign. Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc. , 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 2000). “Working
conditions for constructive discharge must be even more egregious than the high standard for hostile
work environment because ‘in the ‘ordinary’ case, an employee is expected to remain employed
while seeking redress,” Id., quoting Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th
Cir. 1998). Applying this standard, Naughton’s cannot prove her constructive discharge claim if she

cannot prove her sexual harassment claim.

' To the extent that Naughton claims Lebbad’s criticism, including the negative performance review or
development plan, constitutes an adverse job action, her claim must be rejected. See Oest, 240 at 612-13 (job
related criticism, including negative performance reviews and oral or written reprimands, does notconstitute
an adverse employment action absent some tangible job consequence).

9



became upset, abruptly stopped the meeting and said, “I have a problem. You and you [Naughton
and a female representative from an outside agency] stay here” while telling the male attendees to
leave. Naughton claims she was embarrassed by Lebbad’s actions.

During a meeting on February 15, 2001, Naughton asked Lebbad if he wanted her to quit.
Lebbad responded, “No, I don’t want you to quit, I want to fire you.” Naughton left the room and
when she returned, Lebbad told her, “I didn’t mean it. I want to make this work.” He then told
Naughton to take the rest of the day off. The following business day, Lebbad apologized to
Naughton, telling her he was way out of line and should not have spoken to her that way. According
to Naughton, Lebbad did the same thing a week later.

In February 2001, Lebbad completed Naughton’s performance evaluation. Sears employees
are evaluated in two overall categories: business results and leadership skills. Employees are rated
from 1 to 5 in each overall category with 1 being “expectations not met” to 5 being “far exceeds
expectations.” In preparing Naughton’s evaluation, Lebbad took into consideration feedback he
received from Naughton’s supervisors prior to her promotion. Lebbad initially rated Naughton a“3"
or “consistently meets expectations” in business results and a “2" or “some expectations met” in
leadership skills. On March 5, 2001, Lebbad met with Naughton to discuss her performance
evaluation. Naughton disagreed with the overall “2" rating in leadership skills. Lebbad changed the
“2" toa “3.”

Sometime during the week prior to her performance review meeting with Lebbad, Naughton
met with human resources director Yvonne Sweeney to complain about Lebbad. According to
Sweeney, she received complaints about Lebbad from several employees, both male and female.

During their meeting, Naughton told Sweeney that Lebbad treats men differently than women. In



1, 2000, Sears promoted Naughton to sales promotions manager in the event marketing/sales
promotion department.

At the time of Naughton’s promotion, the event marketing/sales promotion department
consisted of four areas: (1) Naughton’s sales promotions group; (2) event marketing; (3) hometown
marketing; and (4) new store remodel, new store opening, store closing and catastrophe marketing.
The other areas were each headed by a manager: Nancy Campbell was the event marketing manager,
Don Orlando was the hometown marketing manager and John Lynskey was the new store remodel
marketing manager. Naughton and the other managers reported directly to Lebbad, who was the top
manager in the department.

Shortly after Naughton joined the event marketing/sales promotion department, Lebbad
promoted Campbell to senior event marketing manager for non-motor sports. Kevin Riley was hired
as the event marketing manager, but reported directly to Campbell. Thereafter, Touré Claiborne
(male) was hired as event marketing manager for motor sports. Claiborne reported directly to
Lebbad.

According to Naughton, Lebbad made life difficult for her. For example, Lebbad required
each manager in the event marketing/sales promotion department to have a weekly or bi-weekly
“touch base” meeting with him. Lebbad often needed to cancel these meetings with his managers.
Naughton found it difficult to reschedule her meetings with Lebbad.

Lebbad frequently used the word “idiot” to refer to Naughton and her performance. Lebbad
repeatedly threatened to prepare a development plan to improve her performance. Lebbad often
interrupted Naughton on the telephone and in meetings. Naughton claims Lebbad would make her

stop whatever she was doing to come to his office for a meeting. Once during a meeting, Lebbad



The next business day, Naughton resigned. When Naughton left, Lebbad announced that
Naughton “retired because she married rich.” After Naughton resigned, a copy of the development
plan drafted by Lebbad was placed in her personnel file.

DISCUSSION
1 Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S, 317, 322 (1986). Once a moving party has met its
burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798
(7 Cir. 1999). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Insolia v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7* Cir. 2000). The summary judgment standard is applied
with special scrutiny to employment discrimination cases because the outcome may depend on
determinations of credibility and intent. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, 209 F.3d 687,
692 (7* Cir. 2000).

Il. Summary Judgment Motion
A. Title VI Claims

Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an
employee in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment based on the employee’s sex. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination protects employees against

sexual harassment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,



‘Minute Order Form (06/97)
A

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

s
ee ae f Suzanne B.Conlon | Sting Je ter
fasdn Nuwpe 02 C 4761 DATE 2/13/2003

NAUGHTON vs. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., et al.

YY

i i

Un the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

(1) @

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
G) oO Answer brief to motion due__. Reply to answer brief due__
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on setfor______at
(5) im} Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_ssetfor___— at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor_ sat.
(0) oO Trial[set for/re-set for]on___—_at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto ss at_
(9) oa This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
COFRCP4(m) OlLocal Rule 41.1 COFRCP41(a)(1) CFRCP41(a\(2).
do [Other docket entry} | Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [9-1] is granted as to Count I

through III and denied as to Count IV. Count IV is dismissed without prejudice. ENTER
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.

Queytnne 73. Ovlew

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.}

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.

o | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

nutaber of notices

FEB oh 8200

Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
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courtroom MY UPcsse
cB deputy’s 62
initials aia
Ime rece}
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conclusion. See Pl. Facts at {J 118, 122, 128, 134 and 144; Pl. Resp. to Def. Facts at [J 14-15, 17,
20, 23, 25, 32, 35. At most, Naughton’s admissible evidence establishes that Lebbad may have
treated male employees Orlando and Lynskey better than other employees in the department. See
{14 and 118, citing Lynskey Dep. at 29 and Orlando Dep. at 63; { 15, citing Lynskey Dep. at 29
and Orlando Dep. at 57-58; §] 17 and 128, citing Pl. Dep. at 213, Campbell Dep. at 107 and
Demourelle Dep. at 41; 120, citing Pl. Dep. at 144, 202-03, 297, 313, 327-28, Campbell Dep. at 107
and Demourelle Dep. at 41; { 23, citing Lynskey Dep. at 28; { 25, citing Pl. Dep. at 162-163; J 32-
33, citing Orlando Dep. at 55-56 and PI. Dep. at 177-178; 35, citing Orlando Dep. 58; Lynskey
Dep. 27-28; { 134, citing Pl. Dep. at 162-163, Brommer Dep. at 21-22, Demourelle Dep. at 58,
Reynolds Dep. at 16 and Campbell Dep. at 96-7; and 144, citing Orlando Dep. at 55-56.

In contrast, defendants presented evidence that Lebbad interrupted male employees while
they were on the telephone, made it difficult for them to reschedule meetings, yelled at them and
criticized their performance in front of other people. Campbell Dep. at 52-54 and 106-09. Even
Orlando testified that Lebbad yelled at him, criticized his performance in front of others and made
it difficult to reschedule meetings. Orlando Dep. at 46 and 77-87. See also Lynskey Dep. at 28
(difficult for him to reschedule meetings); Reynolds Dep. at 13 (Lebbad had a “very poor
relationship” with Mike d’ Oliveira that included criticizing him in front of others). Indeed, Sweeney
received complaints about Lebbad’s behavior from both male and female employees. Based on this
record, a reasonable jury could not conclude Lebbad’s treatment of Naughton was motivated by her
gender. See Oe¢st, 240 F.3d at 615 (uncorroborated generalities are insufficient to support a

discrimination claim). See also Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 141 F.3d 751, 759 (7th

ll



2. Sexual Harassment

Tosurvive summary judgment, Naughton must present evidence showing Lebbad’s conduct:
(1) was based on sex; (2) was so severe and pervasive as to alter the terms or conditions of the
employment relationship; and (3) provides a basis for Sears’ liability. Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d
529, 532-33 (7th Cir. 1999). Sears claims summary judgment is appropriate because Naughton
cannot prove the first or second element required to establish a hostile work environment based on
her sex.

a. Harassment Based on Sex

Sears contends that Naughton cannot establish Lebbad’s conduct was based on her sex.
“Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at
‘discrimination because of sex.’” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80
(1998). “The critical issue, as Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed
to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed.” Jd. Non-sexual conduct may be actionable where the “incidents are unmatched by similar
reports of verbally and physically aggressive behavior toward male co-workers. This evidence would
permit a trier of fact to draw the inference that [the harasser] chooses to harass women but not men.”
Smith, 189 F.3d at 533.

Naughton has not presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that Lebbad subjected her to
conduct not directed at male employees. Naughton claims Lebbad called her an idiot, interrupted
her while she was on the telephone or in meetings, made it difficult for her to reschedule meetings,
yelled at her and critiqued her performance in front of others. Although Naughton claims Lebbad

did not treat males the same way, Naughton fails to provide any evidence supporting her general

10



Tesponse to Naughton’s complaint, Sweeney interviewed several employees in the event
marketing/sales promotion department. Approximately two weeks later, Sweeney informed Lebbad
of the nature of the complaint against him. During their meeting, Lebbad asked Sweeney who
complained about him. When Sweeney told him that she could not reveal that information, Lebbad
replied, “It must have been [Naughton].” Sweeney remained silent and had to leave the room
because Lebbad’s reaction was so emotional.

Thereafter, Sweeney met with Naughton. According to Naughton, Sweeney told her that
nearly everyone in the department confirmed that Lebbad treated women differently than men.
Sweeney also told Naughton that Lebbad was a problem. Sweeney informed Naughton that she was
going to set up a development plan for Lebbad.

In April 2001, Lebbad began writing a development plan for Naughton. Thereafter, Sweeney
recommended that Lebbad hold off on writing the development plan because Naughton had told her
that she wanted to pursue another opportunity within Sears. Pursuant to Sears policy, employees on
development plans cannot move into other positions. Based on Sweeney’s recommendation, Lebbad
did not present Naughton with the development plan.

On June 1, 2001, Naughton told Lebbad that she decided to stay in the event marketing/sales
promotion department. At that time, Lebbad told Naughton that he was going to place her on a
development plan. Naughton asked Lebbad to tell her what issues he had with her performance.
According to Naughton, Lebbad threw his pen across the table and yelled, “My issues with you are
you don’t delegate and you don’t take ownership.” Naughton told Lebbad that she considered his
criticisms contradictory and asked, “is there any hope in making this work?” Lebbad responded, “I

would hate to see you leave because of me.”



B. Naughton’s Submissions

Naughton’s submissions fail to comply with Local Rule 56.1. As an initial matter,
Naughton’s statement of additional facts and response to defendants’ statement of facts are peppered
with legal and factual arguments. See Pl. Facts at ff] 93-94, 97, 114, 118, 122, 125, 128, 131-134,
143-144, 148, 151-156, 158, 171, 182, 187-193, 196-197, 204 and 211; Pl. Resp. to Def. Facts at 9]
14-15, 17, 20, 23, 25, 27, 32-35, 50 and 54-55. “The purpose of the 56.1 statement is to identify for
the Court the evidence supporting a party’s factual assertion in an organized manner; it is not
intended as a forum for factual or legal argument.” Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R-D. 581, 585 (N.D.
Ill. 2000).

Moreover, Naughton fails to support numerous factual statements with admissible evidence.
See Wiskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1994)(only admissible evidence may
be considered on summary judgment). For example, Naughton improperly cites to her complaint
as evidentiary support for J{ 93, 99, 112, 119, 151-155, 188 and 211 of her statement of facts. See
Burton v. Nelson, 1998 WL 46900 at *1, n. 1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 1998)(complaint is not evidence).
Naughton also relies on her own testimony, in whole or in part, to support J 102, 106, 109, 114,
134, 138, 177 and 204 of her statement of facts and {J 25, 40, 47 and 56-57 of her response to
defendants’ statement of facts without establishing personal knowledge of the subject matter. See
Joseph P. Caulfield & Associates, Inc. v. Litho Productions, Inc., 155 F.3d 883, 888 (7th Cir.
1998)(witness lacking personal knowledge cannot raise issue of fact through deposition testimony).
Naughton further relies, in whole or in part, on testimony based on inadmissible hearsay. P]. Facts
at §f] 96 and 161; Pl. Resp. to Def. Facts at ¢ 18. Inadmissible hearsay cannot be considered on

summary judgment. Eisenstadt v, Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1997). In addition,



Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 517 (7th Cir. 2000), citing Maksimovic, 177 Ill.2d at 516, 687 N.E.2d at 23.
Defendants’ argument directly contradicts their claim, and the court’s ruling, that Lebbad’s conduct
toward Naughton was not based on her gender. Under these circumstances, the court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Naughton’s remaining state law claim.
CONCLUSION
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Naughton’s Title VII claims.

Naughton’s intentional infliction of emotion distress claim is dismissed without prejudice.

February 13, 2003 ENTER:

qf B. Conlon

United States District Judge

14



Federal Rules of Evidence. Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir. 2000). All facts
not properly supported by the record evidence must be disregarded. Brasic v. Heinemann’s Inc., 121
F.3d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1997).

In response to a motion for summary judgment, Local Rule 56.1 requires the non-moving
party to submit a response “to each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement [of material
facts], including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the
record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A). All relevant facts
denied without supporting documentation must be accepted as true provided the facts are “properly
supported by references to the record or other evidentiary material.” Jupiter Aluminum Corp. v.
Home Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2000); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir.
1993). Both parties failed to fulfill their obligations under Local Rule 56.1.

A. Defendants’ Submissions

In its statement of facts, defendants detail Sears’ treatment of Lebbad after Naughton’s
complaint. Def. Facts at {{] 58-67. Although defendants claim “Sears handling of [Naughton’s]
complaint and its subsequent treatment of her certainly is material,” they fail to explain why Sears’
subsequent treatment of Lebbad is relevant. Reply to Def. Facts at 4. In their opening brief,
defendants only mention these facts in passing to point out that Lebbad’s conduct may have been
inappropriate. Motion at 6. The court will not consider these irrelevant facts in deciding defendants’
summary judgment motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)(facts

that are irrelevant or unnecessary to summary judgment motion will not be considered).


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
WENDY NAUGHTON, )
Plaintiff, } No. 02 C 4761
v. } Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO. and }
JOHN LEBBAD, )

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Wendy Naughton (“Naughton”) sues Sears, Roebuck & Co. (“Sears”) and John Lebbad
(“Lebbad”), alleging sexual harassment (Count J), sex discrimination (Count Il) and retaliation
(Count IH) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., against Sears and common law intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV) against
Sears and Lebbad (collectively, “defendants”). Defendants move for summary judgment on all

counts,

BACKGROUND DOCKETED

L Local Rule 56.1 FEB 18 2003

Local Rule 56.1 requires litigants to follow a detailed procedure in filing and responding to
summary judgment motions. Local Rule 56.1 requires both the moving and non-moving parties to
submit a statement of material facts, including, “specific references to the affidavits, parts of the

‘record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” Local Rule 56.1(a)(3); Local Rule

56.1(b)(3)(B). Evidence submitted at summary judgment must be admissible at trial under the

a



Cir. 1998)(“Disparate treatment must be based on sex or some other illegal criteria; mere favoritism
of one employee over another is not enough”).
b. Severe or Pervasive

Even if Lebbad treated women worse than men, Naughton cannot establish that the
harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and
create an abusive working environment.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. Whether harassment is
sufficiently severe or pervasive depends on the totality of the circumstances, including “the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The work
environment cannot be described as hostile for purposes of Title VII unless a reasonable person
would find it offensive and Naughton actually perceived it as hostile. Hostetler v. Quality Dining,
Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 807 (7th Cir. 2000). These standards “are sufficiently demanding to ensure that
Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.775,
787 (1998), citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. A workplace must be “hellish” before it is actionable as
a hostile environment. Logan v. Kautex Textron North America, 259 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 2001).

Neutral verbal abuse is not actionable under Title VII. See Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1999)(“persistent cursing and use of abusive language” is not
harassment where there is nothing “inherently . .. discriminatory” about the comments). See also
Holiz v. Marcus Theatres Corp., 31 F.Supp.1139 (N.D. Ill. 1999)(“Merely yelling at female
employees and calling them names does not rise to the level of an actionable hostile work

environment”). Lebbad’s behavior may have been offensive, but “merely offensive” behavior does

12