UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BLACKHAWK CONSULTING, LLC, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Acti on No.: 1:13-cv-13 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 7 : FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE : ASSOCIATION, : : Defendant. : MEMORANDUM OPINION G RANTING D EFENDANT ’ S M OTION TO T RANSFER V ENUE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §1404( A )
I. INTRODUCTION The Plaintiff, Blackhawk Consulting, LLC , (“Blackhawk”) has brought a complaint against the Defendant, Federal National Mortga ge Association (“Fannie Mae”) for defamation, tortious interference with existing contracts, tortious interference with prospective business opportunities, unjust enrichment, promissory es toppel, quantam meruit, statutory business conspiracy, and common law civil conspiracy. Blackhawk has moved to transfer this case to the Northern District of Texas, or to the Eastern District of Virginia in the alternative, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). Its motion will be granted.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Blackhawk is a Virginia limited liability comp any with its principal office in Herndon, Virginia. Compl. ¶ 3. Fannie Mae is a corporate ente rprise whose principal pl ace of business is in the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶ 2, 7. As of 2008, Fannie Mae has been placed under the conservatorship of the Fede ral Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”). Compl. ¶ 8.2 Fannie Mae primarily provides serv ices in the residential real estate market, including in the U.S. secondary mortgage market. Compl. ¶ 5, 17. As a part of this work, Fannie Mae acquires homes through foreclosure sales and deed s-in-lieu of foreclose sales. Compl. ¶ 18. When Fannie Mae takes title, the properties acquire real estate owned (REO) status. Compl. ¶ 18. Fannie Mae contracts with real estate brokers throughout the Unite d States to sell these REO homes. Compl. ¶ 19. Pursuant to these contract s, knows as Master Listing Agreements (MLAs), REO brokers are able to subcont ract with independent companie s to assist in sales of REO homes. Compl. ¶¶ 26-33; MLA Section 17. Blackhawk was one such subcontractor, independently consulting with Fa nnie Mae’s real estate brokers to provide REO sales field training, quality control review, and back office and administrative support. Compl. ¶ 86. Fannie Mae has never entered into a cont ractual relationship di rectly with Blackhaw k. Liszka Decl. Ex. 1. In November of 2012, Fannie Mae terminated the contracts of all known REO brokers consulting with Blackhawk. Compl. ¶¶ 99, 102. As a result, both the terminated brokers and Blackhawk were not compensated for services re ndered. Compl. ¶11. Blackhawk filed suit in this court for defamation, tortious interference with existing contract s, tortious in terference with prospective business opportunitie s, unjust enrichment, promisso ry estoppel, quantam meruit, statutory business conspiracy, and common law civil conspir acy. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), Fannie Mae has filed a Motion to Transfer Venue to the Nort hern District of Texas, or in the alternative to the Eastern District of Virginia.

III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other di strict or division wher e it might have been3 brought....” 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). Sec tion 1404(a) vests “discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions to transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (internal citations omitted). The burden is on the moving pa rty to establish that tr ansfer under §1404(a) is
proper. Montgomery v. STG Int’l, Inc. , 532 F.Supp.2d. 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2008). Accordingly, the defendant must make two showings to justify transfer. First, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff originally could have brought the action in the proposed transferee district. Van Dusen v. Barrack , 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964). Second, the defendant must demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh in favor of transfer to that district. Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Agric. , 944 F.Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1996). In evaluating a motion to transfer , a court may weigh several private- and publicinterest factors. Sheffer v. Novartis Pharm. Corp. , 873 F.Supp. 2d 371, 375 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Trout Unlimited , 944 F. Supp. at 16). The private-intere st considerations include: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the defendant’s preferred forum; (3) the location where the claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) ease of access to sources of proof. Sheffer , 873 F. Supp. 2d at 375; Montgomery v. STG Int’l. Inc. , 532 F.Supp.2d 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2008). “Public -interest considerations in clude: (1) the transferee’s familiarity with the governing law; (2) the relative congestion of th e courts of the transferor and potential transferee; and (3) th e local interest in deciding local controversies at home.” Onyeneho v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 466 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006); Airport Working Group of Orange County., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., et.al. , 226 F.Supp.2d 227, 229 (D.D.C. 2002) (internal citations omitted). “If the balance of private and public interests favor a tr ansfer of venue, then a4 court may order a transfer.” Sheffer , 873 F.Supp.2d at 375 (citing Montgomery , 532 F.Supp.2d at 32). B. The Court Grants the Motion to Transfer Venue to the Northern District of Texas 1. The Threshold Inquiry Fannie Mae contends that venue is more appropriate in the Northern District of Texas because the acts giving rise to the claims at i ssue, a majority of the witnesses named in the complaint, and a majority of the evidence at issue is located in Dallas, Texas. 1 Blackhawk argues that venue is appropriate in th e District of Columbia since Fa nnie Mae is headquartered there, Blackhawk itself has been affected by the tor tious conduct in the D.C. metropolitan area, and many non-party witnesses are located w ithin the court’s subpoena power. The threshold inquiry in a §1404( a) analysis is whether the action could have originally been brought in the proposed tr ansferee district. 28 U.S.C. §1404( a). Blackhawk does not dispute that the Northern District of Texas would have jurisdiction over the case and the parties, thus satisfying the threshold inquiry. Further, as re quired under 28 U.S.C. §13 91(b)(2), a “substantial part of the events or omission giving rise to the claim occurred” in Dallas. The majority of Fannie Mae’s REO activities are ba sed out of their Dallas office. Box Decl. ¶ 4. The contracts in dispute, the Master Listing Agreements (MLAs) between Fannie Mae and the REO brokers, originate and are administered from Fannie Mae’ s Dallas office. Box Decl. ¶ 6. A majority of the individuals involved in the conduct alleged in the suit, incl uding all of the named Fannie Mae

1 Fannie Mae makes two other jurisdictional argu ments. First, they argue that Blackhawk is barred from suing in the District of Co lumbia under D.C. Code § 29-105.02, since Blackhawk was not registered to do business in the District prior to bringing suit against Fannie Mae in this court. Second, Fannie Mae argues that the forum selection clause in the MLA binds Blackhawk even as a non-signatory, and thus mandates transfer of the case to the Northern District of Texas. Because the court grants Fannie Mae’s motion for a discretionary transfer of venue pursuant to §1404(a), it does not r each these issues.5 employees, are in Dallas. Box Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. The re levant emails and statements identified in Blackhawk’s complaint originated from Dalla s. Box Decl. ¶¶ 6-7. And both Blackhawk and Fannie Mae are registered to c onduct business in Dallas. Box Decl . ¶¶ 2, 9; Compl. ¶5. Because the defendant has met this test, the court next considers whether consid erations of convenience and the interest of justice we igh in favor of transfer. 2. Private Interest Factors Although “plaintiff’s choice of forum is normally to be preferred,” Starnes v. McGuire , 512 F.2d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), that deference is mitigated when, as here, the action is not brought in th e plaintiff’s home forum. Trout Unlimited , 944 F.Supp. at 17; Thayer/Patricof Education Funding v. Pryor Resources Inc. , 196 F.Supp.2d 21, 31 (D.D.C. 2002) (explaining that plaintiff’s choice of forum is “ordinarily afforded great deference, except where plaintiff is a foreigner in that forum”). Blackhawk does not even maintain a permanent office in Washington D.C., and so would hardly e xpect that its choice of forum would be given significant weight. Pl’s Opp’n to Def’s Mot. to Transfer Venue, 9, n.5 [hereinafter Pl’s Opp’n] (“Blackhawk had the right to use a broker’s offi ce in the District of Columbia to conduct meetings on an as-needed basis.”). In addition, deference to the plaintiff’s chos en forum is further mitigated here as the forum has little “factual nexus” to the case, and the “subject matte r of the lawsuit is connected” to the proposed transferee forum. Trout Unlimited , 944 F.Supp. at 17; Lagor v. Eli Lilly & Co. , No. 06-1967(JDB), 2007 WL 1748888 , at *6-7 (D.D .C. June 18, 2007). Blackhawk contends that Fannie Mae is not inconvenienced by a suit in the District given thei r significant contacts to the forum. Pl’s Opp’n 2-5. It is true that Fanni e Mae is headquartered in D.C. and maintains over 2,000,000 square footage of office space here. Id. at 2-3. And their Business Transformation6 group of the Credit Loss Management depart ment, responsible for REO training and REO property strategic planning, is situat ed in the District of Columbia. Id. at 3. Still, Fannie Mae’s mere presence in the plai ntiff’s chosen forum will be insufficient if, as here, the majority of the acts giving rise to the claims occurred outside of the District. See Sheldon v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 355 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that a defendant’s presence in the District will have “no immediate relevance” to a choice of venue if the majority of the relevant acts o ccurred outside of the District.); Fenwick v. Nat’l R. Passenger Corp. , No. 91-2617, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16544, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 1991). Most of Fannie Mae’s REO activities, including the mana gement of REO properties, are based out of Fannie Mae’s Dallas office. Box. Decl. ¶¶ 2-4. It is also undisputed that a majority of the communications identified in the complaint origin ated in Dallas, Texas. Box Decl. ¶¶ 2-7, 9, 13- 15. For instance, the October 2012 email sent by Jonathan Liszka, Vice President of REO sales, to REO brokers (Compl. ¶ 142), and the Nove mber 9, 2012 letter sent by Mr. Liszka to Blackhawk owner Jonathan Spinetto (Compl. ¶ 65) originated in Dallas, where Mr. Liszka works. Liszka Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Similar communi cations by Stephen Powell (Compl. ¶¶ 120-122), Calvin Short (Compl. ¶¶ 112-13) and Christopher Ko cks (Compl. ¶¶ 129, 148) also originated in Dallas. (Powell Decl. ¶ 4; Short Decl. ¶ 4; Kocks Decl. ¶¶ 4-5). Blackhawk argues next that the reputational damage suffered from Fannie Mae’s tortious conduct occurred wholly outside of Texas. Pl’s Opp’n. 7-9. Howeve r, Blackhawk is only able to isolate five instances where an email or letter wa s sent to D.C. Pl’s Opp’n 8. And even then, the communications were only nominally related to the venue. These co mmunications are only connected to D.C. because the CEO of Fannie Mae was copied on the e-mails and letters, and also happens to work out of the D.C. office. Pl’s Opp’n 8; Liszka Decl. Ex. 1. The remaining7 communications were disseminated to many areas of the country, of which D.C. was just one. Pl’s Opp’n 8. As a result, the Di strict of Columbia has little interest in the matter since the tortious conduct did not or iginate here and the effects of the to rtious conduct were not felt here. In addition to Dallas’s local in terest in punishing tortious co nduct occurring in its state, a majority of the witnesses also reside in Da llas, further warranting a transfer of venue. See Flagship Banks, Inc. v. Inversiones Credival, C.A. , No. 82-2540, 1982 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16220, at *6-7, *10 (D.D.C. Oct, 1, 1982) (justifying a transfer of venue because “key witnesses” resided in locations and had more contacts outside of the District of Columbia). The relevant witnesses in this case, including almost all of the Fannie Mae employees named in Blackhawk’s complaint, reside in Dallas. Compl. ¶ 65; Li szka Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Comp l. ¶¶ 120-122; Powell Decl. ¶ 4; Compl. ¶¶ 112-13; Short Decl. ¶ 4; Co mpl. ¶¶ 129, 148; Kocks Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Blackhawk additionally identifies senior o fficials in Fannie Mae’s D.C. offi ce as potential party witnesses. The court accords less weight to these individuals since neither the complaint nor Blackhawk’s Opposition clearly identifies the purpose a nd relevance of each witness’s testimony. See Clark v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. C 10-03635 SI, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136510, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2010) (granting a motion to transfer in part because plaintiff primarily offered “speculative and general predicti ons” regarding witnesse s and their anticipate d testimony). Even when Blackhawk does identify the potential testim ony of these named officials, such as Fannie Mae investigators Leslie Arlingt on and Alison Roach, it concedes that the named officials are only indirectly involved in investigating the issues raised by Blackhawk. Pl’s Opp’n 12, n.11 (“Ms. Arrington and Ms. Roach personally pa rticipated in an investigation relating indirectly to Blackhawk from their Washington D.C. offices.”) (emphasis added).8 Blackhawk further notes that many of its empl oyees who have been terminated or have quit due to the events at issu e still reside in the D.C. me tropolitan area and would provide testimony regarding Blackhawk’s obligations to RE O brokers regarding damages. Spinetto Decl. ¶¶ 3, 11, 12, 18-21, 27-29, 32-33. Although such testimony will be relevant to the case, these witnesses are not as central to the issue of liabi lity as are those specifically identified in the Complaint. And even though almost half of the terminated employees live in the D.C. area, Spinetto Decl. ¶¶ 29, 32, their test imony will likely be duplicative. Finally, a related pending reque st for declaratory judgment in the Northern District of Texas further justifies a tr ansfer of venue in the in terest of judicial economy. Federal National Mortgage Association v. Champion Homes Realty, LCC and Redline Realty, LLC , No. 3:13-cv00893-G was filed approximately one month after Bl ackhawk initiated this suit and asks for a declaration that Fannie Mae lawf ully and properly terminated the MLAs of the two defendant brokers named in the suit. 2 These defendant brokers are owne d at least in part by Spinetto, Blackhawk’s owner. Def.’s Mot. To Transfer Venue at 12; Compl. ¶ 79. Blackhawk argues that this Circuit’s first-to-file rule applies here a nd that preference should thus be given to the originally filed Complaint in this court. See WMATA v. Ragones , 617 F.2d 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (applying the first-to-file ru le and noting the Circuit’s long- standing application of the rule); Holland v. ACL Transp. Servs. , 815 F. Supp. 2d 46, 55 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that the firstto-file rule “militates against transfer” by the court w ith the first case on file). While it is true that the first-to-file rule is well-estab lished in the Circuit, this court has repeatedly held that the rule

2 Blackhawk argues that Fannie Mae lacks standing to bring suit in Texas because, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §4617(b)(A)(i), the conser vator of Fannie Mae, FHFA, has the exclusive right to sue. Pl’s Opp’n at 26. The court is satisfied that this will not bar suit in the Northern District of Texas since FHFA is aware of the suit and has approved and authorized Fannie Mae’s filing and prosecution of the claims in that action. Pollard Decl. ¶ 8.9 should not be mechanically applied, but rather that due weight should be given to equitable considerations. See Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat’l Bank , 525 F.2d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting that the firs t-to-file rule “requires a balanci ng not of empty priorities but of equitable considerations genuinely rele vant to the ends of justice.”). Regardless of whether the first-to-file rule ev en applies in this instance, Fannie Mae is correct in asserting that it ha d no choice but to bring its suit in Dallas, Texas, pursuant to the forum selection clause in sect ion 24.H of the MLAs. Blackhawk alleges that Fannie Mae filed suit in Dallas as an end-run around Plaintiff’s choi ce of forum. The court must be rigorous in determining whether one party “has launched a ‘preemptive strike’ against the other. See Stone & Webster, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co. , 2013 WL 4616430 at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2013). However, no such factors are present here. The two suits were filed closely in time and the declaratory judgment was not filed after the in itial suit had already pr ogressed significantly. Id. Because Fannie Mae has properly brought suit in th e Northern District of Texas, pursuant to its forum selection clause, and because substantiall y similar issues are present in both actions, a transfer of venue would pr omote judicial economy.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s mo tion to transfer venue to the Northern District of Texas will be gr anted. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: September 30, 2013 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge