variously been found to have its roots in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973).

While, at first blush, the allegations raised in the plaintiff's complaint may appear to
implicate these various constitutional protections, that is not the case. It is a basic principle of
constitutional law that the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the implied
right to privacy, limit the power of only the federal and state governments; they do not regulate
purely private conduct. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2777 (1982) (citing
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 842 (1948)); Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 904
(7th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, in order to prove a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant is a state actor or, similarly, acted “under color” of state law. Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350, 95 S.Ct. 449 (1974). Thus, the plaintiff's
constitutional claim - that the forced transmission of his thoughts violated his privacy rights, as
well as his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights - turns on the question of whether his
parents may be construed as state actors for purposes of constitutional torts.

The plaintiff acknowledges that his parents are not state actors per se. He argues, instead,
that there is such a close nexus between the defendants and certain unidentified members of the
federal and state governments that we are justified in treating the defendants as if they were
cloaked in the mantle of state power. In Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of
Wheeling Township, 8 F.3d 1160, 1168 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit identified four
situations in which a private actor involves itself in government activity so as to constitute
government action, but none of these have been properly alleged here. Specifically, the plaintiff

has asserted that a “symbiotic relationship” exists between the defendants and unidentified state


I. State Claims

In the section of his complaint titled “Claims Sounding in State Law,” the plaintiff alleges
numerous violations of Illinois state tort law, including battery, invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and conspiracy. Subject matter jurisdiction over these
claims is predicated solely on the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction granted pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367. Generally, “when all the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district
court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state law claims rather than resolving them on
the merits.” Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 1998).
See also Centres, Inc. vy. Town of Brookfield, Wisc., 148 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998); Wright v.
Associated Ins. Cos., Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994). Because there are no surviving
federal claims in this case, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is
granted. This case is terminated. This is a final and appealable order.

It is so ordered.

bode CA
v Wayne R. Andersen
United States District Judge
Dated: Gauary 24, Dons



DISCUSSION

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must normally accept all factual allegations in
the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Szumny v. Am.
Gen. Fin., Inc., 246 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 2001). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is not
to decide the merits of the challenged claims but to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1996). A court will grant a
motion to dismiss only if it is impossible for the plaintiff to prevail under any set of facts that
could be proven consistent with the allegations. Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368
(7th Cir. 2000).
L Federal Claims

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated. .. .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has made the provisions
of the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961). The Fifth Amendment states that no
person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ...” U.S.
Const. amend. V. The courts have held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
applies to the workings of the federal government while the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states. Aside from these specific constitutional guarantees,
the Supreme Court has also determined that the Constitution protects an individual's right to

privacy from government (both state and federal) intrusion. This implied right to privacy has


and federal officials. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 714, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856
(1961). However, the plaintiff's complaint is bereft of any specific connection, or allegation of a
connection, between the defendants and a government official or agency. In fact, the only
reference in the entire complaint to a purported federal nexus is contained in paragraph 15 of the
amended complaint in which the plaintiff states that the “Defendants have conspired closely in a
symbiotic relationship with federal and state official to achieve and perpetuate the situation
described, and thus have acted under color of federal and state law.” (Amended Complt. at q 15.)
Such a conclusory statement, without any supporting allegations, is insufficient to allow us to
evaluate whether the plaintiff has properly alleged that the defendants acted under the color of
law. Therefore, the plaintiff's implied privacy and Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
claims must be dismissed.

In addition to these claims, the plaintiff has also alleged that the ability of others to
receive his thoughts limits his actions to the point that he has been “enslaved” in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment states that “[nJeither slavery nor
involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States. ...” U.S. Const, amend. XII.
While the case law in this circuit is clear that no direct private cause of action exists under the
Thirteenth Amendment, see Sanders v. A.J. Canfield Co., 635 F. Supp. 85, 87 (N.D. Ill. 1986),
the plaintiff seeks redress for the defendants’ alleged violations of this amendment pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3). Section 1985(3) creates a cause of action against persons who conspire to
deprive classes of persons of their federally protected rights. See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech.,
524 F.2d 818, 827-29 (7th Cir. 1975). An allegation of state action is necessary to state a claim

under Section 1985(3) if “the federal right relied upon is one requiring an element of state



Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Jud; Sitting Judge if Oth
vor Magistrate Judge Wayne R. Andersen than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 2 C 2632 DATE 1/24/2003.
CASE Kenneth J. Truitt vs. David M. Truitt et al
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
() im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due :
(4) o Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Qo Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Qo Pretrial conference(held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) 0 {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) CO Local Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) [Other docket entry] | Enter MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: The defendant’s

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted [12-1] pursuant to

FRCP 12(b)(6) is granted. This is a final and appealable order.
ai) @ {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

vo | Docketing to mail notices,

v Mail AO 450 form.

L¥8NOS LIlELSIA Sn

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom C2th kd Ae HYP bu
TSA depunya
initial

Dablinebedvaint

central Clerk's Office

mailing deputy initiale



action.” United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833,
103 S.Ct. 3352 (1983); Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 n.7 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 460 U.S.
325, 103 S.Ct. 1108 (1983); Sampson v, Village Discount Outlet, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1163, 1169
(N.D. Il. 1993). In this case, the plaintiff has alleged that, for purposes of his Section 1985(3)
claim, he was denied rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment. This amendment does not
apply to strictly private conduct, and, as we have concluded above, he has not alleged any state
action. Accordingly, all allegations arising under Section 1985(3) must be dismissed.

Even if the plaintiff's claim included an allegation of state action, or was a type of
Section 1985 claim that extended to private conspiracies, see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 91 S.Ct. 1790 (1971), his claim would fail because it lacks a required element of a Section
1985(3) cause of action: “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions.” Jd. at 102. In this case, the plaintiff has
failed to allege any type of racial or class-based animus that applies to the scenario described in
his complaint (unless, of course, individuals allegedly subjected to thought transmission
constitute a protected class - a determination we gladly leave for a higher court). Thus, there is
no basis for the plaintiff's Thirteenth Amendment claim to proceed past the motion to dismiss
phase,

Finally, to the extent that the plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint a violation of the
federal copyright laws due to the transmission and distribution of his thoughts “in a tangible
medium of expression,” that allegation is dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit.

Accordingly, the defendants” 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETED

TRUITT,

JAN 2 7 2003

KENNETH J. TRUIT, )
)
Plaintiff, )

) No. 02 C 2632
v. )

) Wayne R. Andersen

DAVID M. TRUITT and JANE C. ) District Judge
)
)
)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the Court on the motion of the defendants to dismiss the plaintiff's
complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and 12(6)(6). For the following
reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND

Kenneth Truitt, plaintiff in this case, is a resident of Chicago, Illinois. David Truitt and
his wife Jane Truitt are both the defendants in this action as well as the biological parents of the
plaintiff. It is with some regret that we are forced to pass judgment on this troubling inter-family
dispute.

From what we are able to discern from the plaintiff's complaint, he is convinced that he
was subjected to some procedure whereby his thoughts, memories, and other mental processes
were “broadcast” to the outside world. While the plaintiff is unable to identify exactly when this
procedure was performed, he is convinced it occurred during his adolescence and that the

procedure was sanctioned by his parents, the defendants. According to the plaintiff, the effects of

9



this thought-projection/mind-reading device are quite troubling. Essentially, the device
broadcasts the plaintiff's “thoughts and their visual content” which results in other people
“see[ing] and feel[ing] exactly what Plaintiff sees and feels.” (Amended Complt. at { 6.)

Apparently, the psychological effects of the procedure allegedly inflicted on the plaintiff
by the defendants have been extremely negative. For example, the plaintiff describes what he has
called the “negative feedback loop.” Because his thoughts and feelings about something are
transmitted to those around him, the argument goes, competition for his desires increases
considerably (i.e. if there is something he wants, then his mental wish to possess it is
communicated to others and the number of people aware of his desire multiplies). In his
affidavit, the plaintiff has provided an example whereby his quest for a job was thwarted because
once his personal research revealed an interesting employment prospect, the mind-reading device
“broadcast” this information to the world and, instantly, the competition for the job he wanted
increased exponentially. The device also purportedly has caused problems in his social life and
during his academic career.

On April 12, 2002, the plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the instant suit alleging this his
parents violated numerous provisions of the United States Constitution. In particular, the
plaintiff has argued that his parents have violated his right to privacy as well as the rights
protected by the Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Additionally, the plaintiff has asserted numerous state law tort violations. The defendants filed a

motion to dismiss, which is now fully briefed.