COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LESLIE CHARLES QUINN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2393-96-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 NOVEMBER 4, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FLUVANNA COUNTY 

John R. Cullen, Judge 

 Shanon S. Echols for appellant. 

 (Richard Cullen, Attorney General; Daniel J. 

Munroe, Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Leslie Charles Quinn (appellant) appeals his convictions 

of two counts of grand larceny. He contends the trial court 

erred when it denied his motion to suppress two incriminating 

statements he made at different times to investigators from 

separate jurisdictions. For the reasons that follow, we reverse 

and remand. 

 I. 

 FACTS 

 In the early morning hours of March 18, 1996, a magistrate 

issued a warrant to search appellant's home in order to seize 

evidence related to numerous burglaries appellant was suspected 

of having committed. Investigator Jack Elliott and other 

officers of the Goochland County Sheriff's Office executed the 

warrant. The officers seized numerous items they believed were 

stolen property and arrested appellant. Following his arrest, 
 -2- 

appellant asked to meet with an attorney before communicating 

further with any of the officers. 

 On March 19, Keith Waldrop was appointed to represent 

appellant on one charge of breaking and entering a trailer in 

Goochland County. 

 The record indicates that appellant remained in custody 

continuously from the date of his arrest through his sentencing 

on September 27. Prior to April 9, Investigator Elliott 

approached appellant "once or twice" and asked if he was "ready 

to make a statement." Appellant responded by telling the 

investigator that he "wanted [his] attorney present before [he] 

made any kind of a statement." The record does not indicate that 

appellant ever met with Mr. Waldrop during this time. 

 In the morning of April 9, Investigator Elliott visited 

appellant in his jail cell and told appellant that he would "like 

to ask him a few questions." The investigator moved appellant 

from his cell to a vacant office for the meeting. Investigator 

Elliott began the meeting by advising appellant of his Miranda

rights. The investigator then asked appellant if he "had a 

lawyer appointed to him yet." Appellant told the investigator 

that Mr. Waldrop had been appointed to represent him. 

Investigator Elliott explained to appellant that Mr. Waldrop had 

been appointed to represent him on a single charge of breaking 

and entering in Goochland County and not with regard to other 

charges or "possible charges" in Goochland or other counties. 
 -3- 

The investigator told appellant that he did not intend to speak 

with appellant about the charge for which Mr. Waldrop had been 

appointed and that if appellant desired the assistance of counsel 

prior to being interrogated, he needed to "re-invoke" his Miranda

right to counsel. Investigator Elliott later testified exactly 

what he told appellant: 

 [I] explained to him that my understanding of 

the law is that whenever he invoked his 

Miranda warning the night he was arrested, 

that no one was allowed to question him at 

that point about that particular charge or 

any other charge that he might be involved 

in. Once he went to court, he was appointed 

a lawyer by the Court for that particular 

charge. He was not charged with another 

crime. Therefore, my understanding of the 

law was that his charge then became lawyer 

charge specific and if he wanted to invoke 

his Miranda warning on any other conversation 

we had, he had to re-invoke. 

Following the investigator's explanation of appellant's right to 

legal assistance, appellant did not ask to consult with Mr. 

Waldrop or any other attorney. 

 Appellant agreed to make a statement. Investigator Elliott 

then questioned appellant about the items seized during the 

search of his home. During this exchange, appellant disclosed 

his involvement in burglaries and larcenies in both Goochland and 

Fluvanna counties. Investigator Elliott asked appellant if he 

would make a "formal statement" on tape. Appellant consented, 

and, during his taped statement, admitted to stealing the 

property at issue in this case which had been located in Fluvanna 

County. 
 -4- 

 The Goochland County Sheriff's Office informed the 

authorities in Fluvanna County of appellant's statement. On 

April 22, a Fluvanna County grand jury charged appellant with two 

counts of grand larceny. On April 23, the trial court ordered 

appellant moved from the James River Correctional Center to the 

trial court for a hearing scheduled at 2:00 p.m. on April 25. At 

1:20 p.m. on April 25, Investigator Albert Bryant of the Fluvanna 

County Sheriff's Office approached appellant in a holding cell 

near the trial court. After appellant was warned of and waived 

his Miranda rights, he again confessed to taking the property at 

issue in this case. 

 Appellant filed a motion to suppress numerous items of 

evidence, including the statements he made to Investigator 

Elliott on April 9 and to Investigator Bryant on April 25. 

Appellant argued that these statements had been obtained in 

violation of his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Following a 

hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion. The trial 

court concluded that appellant never made a "specific request" 

for counsel before making his statement to Investigator Elliott. 

 The trial court stated that "at best there was an equivocal 

statement or ambiguous statement or some discussion about Mr. 

Waldrop being appointed in another matter." 

 Appellant was subsequently tried and both of his statements 

were admitted into evidence. The trial court convicted appellant 
 -5- 

of two counts of grand larceny. 
 -6- 

 II. 

WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER MIRANDA

 Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied 

his motion to suppress the statements he made to Investigator 

Elliott in Goochland County on April 9 and to Investigator Bryant 

in Fluvanna County on April 25. He argues that these statements 

should have been suppressed because the Commonwealth failed to 

prove that he waived his Miranda right to counsel. Referencing 

the so-called "Edwards rule," appellant asserts that the 

Commonwealth did not prove that he waived his right to counsel 

prior to making his statements because both statements were 

obtained during interrogation that was initiated by the 

investigators after he had previously invoked his Miranda right 

to counsel. We agree. 

 A. 

MIRANDA AND THE "EDWARDS RULE" 

 In order to insure that the Fifth Amendment right against 

compulsory self-incrimination is protected during the custodial 

interrogation of criminal suspects, the United States Supreme 

Court established a series of "procedural safeguards" that law 

enforcement authorities must adhere to when interviewing suspects 

in their custody. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457, 

114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (citing Michigan v. 

Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2363-64, 41 L.Ed.2d 

182 (1974)); see also Mier v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 827, 831, 
 -7- 

407 S.E.2d 342, 344-45 (1991). Compliance with these procedures 

is a "prerequisite[] to the admissibility of any statement made 

by a defendant" during custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 

U.S. at 476, 86 S. Ct. at 1629; see also Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 

3 Va. App. 249, 252, 349 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1986). 

 Included among the safeguards established in Miranda is the 

right of a suspect to have counsel present at any custodial 

interrogation and to terminate the interrogation by invoking this 

right. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S. Ct. 

1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 475, 

86 S. Ct. at 1625, 1628; see also Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 

Va. 454, 462, 352 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1987); Foster v. Commonwealth, 

8 Va. App. 167, 173, 380 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1990). In order for a 

defendant's statement to be admissible at trial, the Commonwealth 

must prove that the defendant was informed of his Miranda right 

to counsel, i.e., that he has the right to consult with a lawyer, 

to have the lawyer present during interrogation and that, if the 

defendant is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent 

him. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471, 473, 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1626, 

1627, 1628; Green v. Commonwealth 223 Va. 706, 710, 292 S.E.2d 

605, 607 (1982). If the interrogation continues without the 

presence of an attorney, the defendant's statement is 

inadmissible unless the Commonwealth proves by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently waived his right to retained or appointed counsel. 
 -8- 

See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S. Ct. at 1884; Miranda, 384 

U.S. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628. See also Colorado v. Connelly, 

479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S. Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); 

Mills v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 459, 468, 418 S.E.2d 718, 

722-23 (1992). 

 In order to "prevent police from badgering a defendant into 

waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights" and to "protect 

the suspect's 'desire to deal with the police only through 

counsel,'" the United States Supreme Court established the 

"Edwards rule" as a "second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda

right to counsel." See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458, 114 S. Ct. at 

2355; McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176, 178, 111 S. Ct. 

2204, 2208, 2209, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 

U.S. 344, 350, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1180, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990). 

Pursuant to Edwards and its progeny, once the defendant invokes 

his Miranda right to counsel, all police-initiated interrogation 

regarding any criminal investigation must cease unless the 

defendant's counsel is present at the time of questioning. See

Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S. Ct. 486, 491, 

112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683, 

108 S. Ct. 2093, 2099, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988); Edwards, 451 U.S. 

at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885; see also Jackson v. Commonwealth, 

14 Va. App. 414, 416, 417 S.E.2d 5, 6-7 (1992). If the police 

initiate interrogation of a defendant after he has invoked his 

Miranda right to counsel and before his counsel is present, "a 
 -9- 

valid waiver of this right cannot be established . . . even if he 

has been advised of his rights." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 

S. Ct. at 1884-85; see Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 252, 

397 S.E.2d 385, 395 (1990); Hines v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 

218, 221, 450 S.E.2d 403, 404 (1994). However, the Edwards rule 

only applies to periods of continuous custody, and, if the 

defendant is released from custody following the invocation of 

his Miranda right to counsel, the Edwards rule does not bar 

subsequent police-initiated interrogation. See Tipton v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 832, 834, 447 S.E.2d 539, 540 (1994).1

 Whether the Edwards rule renders a statement inadmissible is 

determined by a three-part inquiry. Cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 

U.S. 91, 95, 105 S. Ct. 490, 492-93, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). 

First, the trial court "must determine whether the accused 

 

 1See also United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945-46 (5th 

Cir. 1994); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257 

(9th Cir. 1992); Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 

(11th Cir. 1988); United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 

F.2d 117, 125 (7th Cir. 1987); McFadden v. Garraghty, 820 F.2d 

654, 661 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Geittmann, 733 F.2d 

1419, 1429 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 

1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to 

definitively address the issue of whether a break in custody 

terminates the "Edwards effect" of a defendant's request for 

counsel on subsequent police-initiated interrogation, dicta in 

two of its cases suggest that continuous custody is a requirement 

for application of the Edwards rule. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 

177, 111 S. Ct. at 2208 (stating that a suspect's statements 

during post-invocation, police-initiated interrogation are 

presumed involuntary "assuming there has been no break in 

custody"); Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (stating 

that a suspect's initial request for counsel does not disappear 

when the police approach him "still in custody" about a separate 

criminal investigation). 
 -10- 

actually invoked his right to counsel" and whether the defendant 

remained in continuous custody from the time he or she invoked 

this right to the time of the statement. Id.; see Tipton, 18 Va. 

App. at 834, 447 S.E.2d at 540. Second, if the accused has 

invoked his or her right to counsel and has remained in 

continuous custody, the statement is inadmissible unless the 

trial court finds that the statement was made at a meeting with 

the police that was initiated by the defendant or attended by his 

lawyer. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 96, 105 S. Ct. at 493 (stating 

that statement is admissible if made at a defendant-initiated 

meeting); Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153, 111 S. Ct. at 491 (stating 

that police "may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel 

present"). Third, if the first two parts of the inquiry are met, 

the trial court may admit the statement if it determines that the 

defendant thereafter "knowingly and intelligently waived the 

right he had invoked." Smith, 469 U.S. at 96, 105 S. Ct. at 493. 

 On appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, the burden is on the appellant to show that the trial 

court's decision constituted reversible error. See Stanley v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 873, 874, 433 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1993). 

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom. See Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 

1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). We review the trial 

court's findings of historical fact only for "clear error," but 
 -11- 

we review de novo the trial court's application of defined legal 

standards to the particular facts of a case, such as 

determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause. See

Shears v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 398, 477 S.E.2d 309, 311 

(1996); see also Ornelas v. United States, U.S. , , 116 

S. Ct. 1657, 1662, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Whether a defendant 

"invoked" his Miranda right to counsel during custodial 

interrogation and whether he "waived" this right are determined 

by applying judicially declared standards. See Davis, 512 U.S. 

at 458-59, 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (standard for invocation); Moran v. 

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1140-41, 89 L.Ed.2d 

410 (1986) (standard for waiver). 

 B. 

THE APRIL 9 STATEMENT 

 We hold that the trial court erred when it declined to 

suppress the statement made by appellant to Investigator Elliott 

on April 9. The Edwards rule clearly applied to appellant's 

incriminating statement made on April 9. Appellant previously 

had invoked his right to counsel, remained in continuous custody 

from the time of his request until the time of his statement, and 

his statement was made at a meeting initiated by Investigator 

Elliott at which appellant's counsel was not present. See Hines, 

19 Va. App. at 221-22, 450 S.E.2d at 404-05. 

 The record established that appellant invoked his right to 

counsel prior to April 9. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct. 
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at 2355 (stating that the invocation must be sufficiently clear 

so that "a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would 

understand the statement to be a request for an attorney"). 

Appellant testified that he "asked for an attorney" when he was 

arrested on March 18, and Investigator Elliott testified that 

appellant "invok[ed] his Miranda warnings the night he was 

arrested." Although the trial court concluded that appellant 

never made a "specific request" for counsel, the trial court's 

reasoning indicated that it did not consider in its analysis 

appellant's request for counsel on the night of his arrest. 

 The record also established that appellant remained in 

continuous custody from the time of his arrest until the time he 

made his statement. Appellant was arrested on March 18 and was 

visited in his jail cell on April 9 by Investigator Elliott. In 

addition, a series of custodial transportation orders and court 

orders in the record indicate that appellant was incarcerated at 

the James River Correctional Facility from April 23 through 

September 27, the day his sentence was imposed. No other 

evidence in the record sheds light on appellant's custodial 

status during this time. Based on this evidence, we may infer 

that no break occurred in appellant's custodial status following 

his arrest. 

 In addition, the meeting with appellant on April 9 was 

initiated by Investigator Elliott while appellant was still in 

custody. In the morning of April 9, Investigator Elliott 
 -13- 

approached appellant in his jail cell and told appellant that he 

wanted to ask him a few questions. He then moved appellant to 

the vacant office where appellant eventually made his statement. 

 Nothing in the record indicates that appellant desired to speak 

with Investigator Elliott prior to the investigator's visit. 

Appellant's counsel was not present at any time during the 

meeting. Although appellant was given and waived his Miranda

rights prior to making his statement, the fact that he had 

earlier invoked his right to counsel precluded the Commonwealth 

from proving a valid waiver of his rights at a meeting initiated 

by the authorities at which his counsel was not present. See

Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153, 111 S. Ct. at 491, Edwards, 451 U.S. at 

484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1084-85. In addition, the fact that the 

investigator asked appellant about crimes that had not been 

previously discussed is of no moment because appellant's initial 

request for counsel is deemed non-offense-specific. See

Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683, 108 S. Ct. at 2099. 

 Because the Edwards rule applied to the statement made by 

appellant on April 9, the Commonwealth did not establish that 

appellant waived his Miranda right to counsel prior to making the 

statement. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S. Ct. at 1629. For 

these reasons, the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the 

statement. 

 C. 

THE APRIL 25 STATEMENT 
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 The admissibility of the April 25 statement raises an issue 

of first impression in Virginia. We must determine whether the 

Edwards rule bars admission of a statement made during an 

interrogation initiated by an officer from a jurisdiction 

different than the one in which the defendant initially requested 

counsel. The uncertainty stems from the as yet unaddressed 

effect of Roberson on Simmons v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 111, 300 

S.E.2d 918 (1983). 

 In Simmons, the defendant, an Army sergeant, was detained by 

military authorities when, after an unauthorized absence from his 

post, he informed them of a possible warrant for his arrest in 

Fairfax County. Simmons, 225 Va. at 114, 115-16, 300 S.E.2d at 

919, 920. Later in the day, a staff sergeant who was attempting 

to verify that Simmons was both "AWOL" and wanted by authorities 

in Fairfax, warned Simmons of his Miranda rights and asked 

Simmons if he wanted an attorney. See id. at 116, 300 S.E.2d at 

920. Simmons replied that he wanted an attorney. See id. 

Simmons remained in custody until a Fairfax investigator arrived 

to question him about a murder in Fairfax County. See id. at 

116-17, 300 S.E.2d at 920. The Fairfax investigator, who did not 

know of Simmons' earlier request for counsel, informed Simmons of 

his Miranda rights. Simmons then signed a written waiver form, 

see id. at 117, 300 S.E.2d at 920-21, and confessed to the 

Fairfax murder. See id. at 117, 300 S.E.2d at 921. Following 

another period of unbroken custody and another informed waiver of 
 -15- 

his Miranda rights, Simmons confessed again to the murder. See

id. at 117-18, 300 S.E.2d at 921. 

 The trial court denied Simmons' motion to suppress his 

confessions. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, 

holding that the Edwards rule did not apply to Simmons' 

confessions. See id. at 121, 300 S.E.2d at 923. The Court noted 

that Simmons' initial request for counsel was made to a military 

sergeant during the sergeant's investigation of Simmons' "status 

with reference to the military law." See id. The Court reasoned 

that because Simmons' confessions occurred during interrogation 

by a different law enforcement officer who did not actually know 

of Simmons' initial request for counsel and who questioned 

Simmons about a different crime, Edwards did not bar the 

admission of his confessions. See id.

 In Roberson, the United States Supreme Court addressed the 

issue raised in Simmons and reached a different conclusion. 

Roberson was arrested on April 16 for burglary and, after being 

informed of his Miranda rights, requested the assistance of 

counsel. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 678, 108 S. Ct. at 2096. 

Roberson remained in custody until April 19, when he was 

approached by "a different officer . . . about a different 

burglary." See id. The officer, who was ignorant of Roberson's 

earlier request for counsel, gave Roberson his Miranda warnings. 

See id. Roberson subsequently confessed to the burglary. See

id.
 -16- 

 The trial court granted Roberson's motion to suppress and 

the United State Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at 678-79, 108 

S. Ct. at 2096-97. In its opinion, the Court rejected both 

theories relied upon by the Virginia Supreme Court in Simmons to 

limit the reach of the Edwards rule. First, the Court held that 

the Edwards rule is not offense specific and that a defendant's 

request for counsel during an interrogation about one crime bars 

subsequent police-initiated interrogation about other suspected 

criminal activity. See id. at 682-84, 108 S. Ct. at 2098-99. 

 Second, the Court held that an officer who initiates the 

reinterrogation of a defendant without knowing of the defendant's 

prior request for counsel is not relieved of complying with the 

Edwards rule. See id. at 687, 108 S. Ct. at 2101. The Court 

indicated that law enforcement authorities have a duty to inform 

each other of prior invocations of the Miranda right to counsel 

by suspects in their custody and that the Edwards rule requires 

officers to ascertain prior to interrogation whether a suspect 

has previously requested counsel. The Court stated: 

 [C]ustodial interrogation must be conducted 

pursuant to established procedures, and those 

procedures in turn must enable an officer who 

proposes to initiate an interrogation to 

determine whether the suspect has previously 

requested counsel . . . . Whether a 

contemplated reinterrogation concerns the 

same or a different offence, or whether the 

same or different law enforcement authorities

are involved in the second investigation, the 

same need to determine whether the suspect 

has requested counsel exists. The police 

department's failure to honor that request 

cannot be justified by the lack of diligence 

of a particular officer. 
 -17- 

Id. at 487-88, 108 S. Ct. at 2101 (emphasis added). Based on the 

use of the word "authorities" in this passage rather than 

"officers" and the fact that the Court stated it was addressing a 

conflict in state and federal cases that dealt with successive 

interrogations by officers from separate jurisdictions, see id.

at 680 n.3, 108 S. Ct. at 2097 n.3, we conclude that the Court 

clearly did not intend this aspect of the Roberson holding to be 

limited by jurisdictional lines. 

 Based on our reading of these two cases, we hold that 

Roberson renders Simmons no longer controlling. In Roberson, the 

United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the reasoning 

relied upon by the Virginia Supreme Court in Simmons. Contrary 

to the holding of Simmons and pursuant to Edwards and its 

progeny, under Roberson if a defendant requests counsel during 

custodial interrogation and remains in continuous custody, any 

subsequent waiver of his Miranda right to counsel obtained during 

reinterrogation initiated by the authorities and held outside the 

presence of his counsel is presumed to be involuntary. See

McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177-78, 111 S. Ct. at 2208. The fact that 

the subsequent interrogation (1) was initiated by authorities 

from another jurisdiction who did not actually know of the 

defendant's prior request for counsel or (2) concerned a separate 

criminal investigation does not preclude the application of the 

Edwards rule. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687-88, 108 S. Ct. at 
 -18- 

2101.2

 We hold that the trial court erred when it denied 

appellant's motion to suppress the statement made to Investigator 

Bryant on April 25. Like the circumstances surrounding the April 

9 statement, the record indicates that appellant invoked his 

Miranda right to counsel on March 18 and remained in continuous 

custody until he was approached by Investigator Bryant in a 

holding cell on April 25. Investigator Bryant advised appellant 

of his Miranda rights, and appellant waived his rights and made 

the incriminating statement. Appellant's counsel was not present 

during the interrogation. Because there was no break in 

appellant's custodial status prior to this interrogation and 

because it was initiated by Investigator Bryant and held outside 

the presence of appellant's counsel, the Edwards rule mandates 

suppression of the statement. Even though Investigator Bryant 

 

 2We need not address the effect of Roberson on McFadden v. 

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 103, 300 S.E.2d 924 (1983), a sister case 

of Simmons, because McFadden is factually distinguishable. In 

McFadden, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Edwards did not 

preclude the admissibility of McFadden's confessions even though 

they were made at post-invocation interrogations initiated by 

investigators from different jurisdictions investigating 

different crimes. See McFadden, 225 Va. at 110, 300 S.E.2d at 

927-28. Although not mentioned by the Virginia Supreme Court in 

its reasoning, the facts of McFadden indicate that McFadden was 

twice released from custody after he requested counsel and before 

the interrogation that led to his confessions. See id. at 106, 

300 S.E.2d at 925. As the Fourth Circuit reasoned when it 

affirmed the denial of McFadden's petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, these breaks in McFadden's custody mooted the "Edwards

effect" of his initial request for counsel on later 

police-initiated interrogation. See McFadden v. Garraghty, supra

note 1, 820 F.2d at 661 (citing Skinner, supra note 1). 
 -19- 

was from a jurisdiction different from the officers who knew of 

appellant's request for counsel, he knew of appellant's prior 

contacts with the Goochland authorities. Pursuant to Roberson, 

the investigator was required to exercise diligence prior to 

interrogating appellant to determine whether appellant had 

previously requested counsel. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687-88, 

108 S. Ct. at 2101. This failure to honor appellant's request to 

deal with the police only through counsel cannot be justified by 

the lack of adequate procedures in place to inform officers 

subsequently coming into contact with appellant of appellant's 

prior request for counsel. See id. at 688, 108 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 -20- 

 III. 

 HARMLESS ERROR 

 Next we must determine whether the admission of appellant's 

statements in violation of the Edwards rule constituted 

reversible error. See United States v. Cannon, 981 F.2d 785, 

789-90 n.3 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that Edwards violation can be 

harmless); cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-10, 111 

S. Ct. 1246, 1263-65, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (holding that 

constitutional "trial errors," such as the admission of an 

involuntary confession, can be harmless). 

 A federal constitutional error is harmless, and thus 

excusable, only if it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827-28, 

17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296, 111 

S. Ct. at 1257 (applying Chapman test to erroneously admitted 

confession); Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005, 

407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991). The admission of evidence obtained 

in violation of the federal constitution is reversible error if 

"there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained 

of might have contributed to the conviction." Fahy v. 

Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S. Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 

171 (1963); see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828 

(stating that the Chapman test "do[es] no more than adhere to the 

meaning of [Fahy]"). 
 -21- 

 We review the record in this case with an awareness of the 

impact that a confession can have in a criminal trial. 

 A confession is like no other evidence. 

Indeed, "the defendant's own confession is 

probably the most probative and damaging 

evidence that can be admitted against him. 

. . . [T]he admissions of a defendant come 

from the actor himself, the most 

knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of 

information about his past conduct. 

Certainly, confessions have profound impact 

on the jury, so much so that we may 

justifiably doubt its ability to put them out 

of mind even if told to do so." While some 

statements by a defendant may concern 

isolated aspects of the crime or may be 

incriminating only when linked to other 

evidence, a full confession in which the 

defendant discloses the motive for and means 

of the crime may tempt the [trier of fact] to 

rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its 

decision. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296, 111 S. Ct. at 1257-58 (citations 

omitted). 

 The court conducting a harmless-error inquiry 

must appreciate the indelible impact a full 

confession may have on the trier of fact, as 

distinguished, for instance, from the impact 

of an isolated statement that incriminates 

the defendant only when connected with other 

evidence. 

Id. at 313, 111 S. Ct. at 1266 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 

 Based on our review of the record, we hold that the 

erroneous admission of appellant's statements was not harmless. 

Appellant's statements contained a comprehensive admission of 

guilt that described in detail both his motive for taking the 

stolen property and the means by which he committed the crimes. 
 -22- 

They also provided the only direct evidence in the record of 

appellant's knowledge that the tools and equipment loaded onto 

the truck by his son belonged to "another" and of his intent to 

"permanently deprive" Messrs. Worley and Truslow of possession of 

these items. See Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 251, 

356 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1987) (defining larceny as "the wrongful 

taking of the goods of another without the owner's consent and 

with the intention to permanently deprive the owner of possession 

of the goods"). After balancing appellant's confessions, which 

were both comprehensive and extremely probative, against the 

comparatively weaker lawfully admitted evidence of his guilt, we 

find a reasonable possibility that appellant's confessions 

contributed to the trial court's verdict. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the convictions of two 

counts of grand larceny and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded.