01 C7905

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Human Rights Commission.
Therefore, the Court enters summary judgment in CEDA’s favor on Van’s national origin claim.

D. Plaintiff?s Race Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff Van has failed to provide either direct or indirect proof of discriminatory intent
on CEDA’s part on the basis of her race.

Van has not provided any facts or documents to support her claim of discriminatory
conduct on CEDA’s part on the basis of her race or color. Van’s claim regarding the alleged
harassment by Ms. Wildner for submitting memos .to her is insufficient to establish a prima-facie
case of race discrimination since she never suffered an adverse employment action by virtue of
this claimed conduct. A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Burlington
Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Negative performance evaluations have
been held not to be adverse employment actions, Qest v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 240
F, 3d 605, 613 (7" Cir. 2001). Moreover, Van admitted that she was never demoted by virtue of
the memos submitted by Wildner; she asserted no facts that she lost her job because of receiving
all of the memos and she was not transferred to another position because of receiving the
memos. Nor did Van take any time off from work because of receiving the memos. As the

affidavit of Robert L. Wharton attests, the decision to terminate Van was made by Lyle Foster in

consultations with Mr. Wharton, and not by Pat 'Wildner. Van does not demonstrate any


01 C7905

these discussions, Mr. Wharton advised Mr. Foster.in mid-July that because Van did not show
substantial improvement in her performance since,the issuance of Ms. Wildner’s evaluation, Van
should be terminated. Mr. Foster subsequently advised William Burns, Vice President of
Administrative Services, to terminate Van. On July 20, 2000, William Burns sent Van a letter
advising her that she was terminated from her employment effective July 31, 2000. On July 25,
2000, the Head Start Policy Action Council met and approved the termination of Van.
Therefore, Van has failed to show that she.satisfied CEDA’s legitimate expectations
concerning her performance as Head Start Director as delineated in Ms. Wildner’s ninety day
performance evaluation. It follows that Van cannot establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination. Thus there is no genuine issue of material fact that Van was not terminated as
Head Start Director because of her age. Accordingly, the Court grant’s CEDA’s motion for

summary judgment on Van’s claim of age discrimination.

ORDERED: The Court grants defendant CEDA’s motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff Van’s claims of national origin, race, sex and age discrimination, with prejudice.

NOV 2 1 2002
DATED:



01 C7905

Alternatively, ifa plaintiff does not have direct evidence of discrimination, she can rely

on the burden shifting formula set forth in McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). Under that analysis, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination by showing that (i) she was a member of the protected class; (ii) she performed
her job satisfactorily to the employer’s expectations; (iii) she suffered an adverse employment

action, and (iv) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside the

protected class. Plair v. E.J. Brock & Sons, Inc., 105 F. 3d 343, 347 (7" Cir. 1997).

To the extent that a plaintiff can satisfy these four elements and establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, the employer must then rebut the prima facie case by articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the contested action. Texas Dep’t of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Ifthe employer meets this burden of production,
then the presumption of discrimination dissolves and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the proffered explanation(s) is pretextial. Id. at 256. Throughout this process, the
plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of establishing that he was subject to intentional
discrimination. St, Mary’s Honor Center v, Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993).

C. Plaintiffs Claim of National Origin Discrimination

Regarding plaintiff's national origin discrimination claim, plaintiffs own deposition
testimony confirms that she has no cause of action against CEDA. In her deposition, Van
admitted that she was not making a claim of national origin discrimination against CEDA.

Moreover, a national origin claim was not part of her charge of discrimination filed with the


01 C 7905

evidence of either direct or indirect discrimination by CEDA on the basis of race. Therefore the
Court grants summary judgment in CEDA’s favot.on Van’s claim of race discrimination.

E. Plaintiff's Sex Discrimination Claim...

Plaintiff Van concedes that she has not direct evidence that she was deprived a pay
increase because of her sex. Instead, Van attempts to invoke the indirect burden shifting method
to support her sex discrimination claim by asserting that Roosevelt Burnside, CEDA’s Director
of Weatherization, received a salary increase. However, Roosevelt Burnside did not receive a
salary increase either in 1999 or 2000. Even aséiiftiing that Mr. Burnside did actually receive a
salary increase similar to the one that Van was seeking by virtue of her claim that the Early Head
Start Program was to be merged with the Head Start Program, Van still cannot establish a prima
facie case of discrimination since she admitted in her deposition that Bumside was not in a
similarly situated position: Burnside and Van were paid from two different budgets and as Van
admitted, she could not have done Burnside’s job in Weatherization. Therefore, since Burnside
never received a salary increase and since he was not in a similarly situated position as Van, Van
cannot establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Moreover, since the merger of the
Early Head Start and Head Start Programs never.took place, Van is not entitled to the 5-10%
increase in salary that she is now claiming CEDA deprived her by virtue of her sex. Therefore,
Van has no claim for sex discrimination against CEDA and the Court grants summary judgment
in favor of CEDA and against Van on Van’s sex discrimination claim.

F. Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Claim

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the ADEA, Van must either

present direct evidence of discrimination or she.may present facts which, if unexplained, would


Minute Order Form (96/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

—
Na Tf Assigned Judg y t 7 Sitting J if Oth
sie Magistrate Judge George W. Lindberg than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 7905 DATE 11/21/2002
CASE Saundra L. Van vs. Community & Economic Development
TITLE

[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented. ]

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:

ag a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___._ Reply to answer brief due

(4) QO Ruling/Hearing on set for ati

(5) im} Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-setfor]on ss set for at.

(6) Q Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—ssetfor at.
(2) iia Trial[set for/re-set for]on at

(8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to... __at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

QFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OO FRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

Copy to judge/magistrate judge. 4unog Hohe SId“s‘n ona

NOV 29-4

(10) Ml [Otherdocketentry} The court grants defendant CEDA’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff
Van's claim of national origin, race and age discrimination, with prejudice. Enter memorandum opinion
and order.

(1) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court Document
No notices required number of potices Number
Notices mailed by judge’s stalf.
Noted counsel by telephone nov 2-3-2002
lotified counsel by telephone. date,doeketed
Y | Vocketing to mail notices. ; 3
¥ | Mail AO 450 form dod JAW.

Q2

slate uiled orice

SLB deputy's Mel Wd 12 AON 20 LA
initials Sais vPeme -
Ot Ga OF whudsalou



01 C7905

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination. Boyd v. Potter, 2002 WL 113908 (N.D.
Ill. 2002). Van fails to present any direct evidence of age discrimination.

To set forth a prima facie case of age discrimination under the indirect burden shifting
method of proof, an employee must show that (i) he or she was over 40 years of age; (ii) he or
she was meeting his or her employer’s legitimate expectations, (iii) he or she suffered an adverse
action; and (iv) similarly situated substantially younger employees were treated more favorably.
Franzoni v. Hartmarx Corp., 300 F. 3d 767, 771-772 (7" Cir. 2002).

Van cannot establish that she was meeting. her employer’s, CEDA’s, legitimate
expectations. Van admitted that CEDA had problems with her performance in the past and that
there were discussions about terminating here in 1995 and 1996. The evidence also establishes
that on January 6, 2000, Robert Wharton, President and CEO of CEDA, sent Van a
memorandum which delineated his concerns about her performance. Due to the problems that
CEDA was experiencing with Van, CEDA decided to reorganize the Head Start Program
whereby that program was placed under the recently created Department of Youth and Family
Services, and Van then reported to Patricia Wildner. On January 14, 2000, Wharton placed Van
on a ninety-day probation status and instructed her that her progress would be reviewed every
thirty days. On February 7, 2000, Van met with Ms. Wildner who presented her with a written
performance appraisal in which she rated her as either “improvement needed” or
“unsatisfactory” in several respects. On April 17, 2000, Ms. Wildner submitted a three month
evaluation of Van which was subsequently reviewed by Robert Wharton and Lyle Foster,
Executive Vice President of CEDA. Based on the contents of that evaluation, Mr. Wharton and
Mr. Foster had various conversations about Van's work performance between late April 2000
through mid-July 2000, and whether CEDA should retain her as Head Start Director. Based on

6


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
)
SAUNDRA L. VAN )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 01 C 7905

-VS.~ )
)

COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC) Senior Judge George W. Lindberg
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION )
OF COOK COUNTY, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
)

DOEKETED
2

The defendant Community and Economic Development Association of foie ount ,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Inc. (““CEDA”) moves for summary judgment against the plaintiff, Saundra L. Van (“Van”). For
the reasons listed below, the court grants CEDA’s motion for summary judgment with prejudice.

Background

On October 12, 2001, Van, a former employee of CEDA, filed her complaint alleging
that (i) she was denied a pay increase because of her sex in Violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and (ii) she was harassed and terminated from her job because of her age in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In her form complaint, Van also claims
that she was discriminated against on the basis of her color and race and national origin in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Van has not filed a response to CEDA’s motion for summary judgment. CEDA properly

filed its “Notice to Pro Se Litigants Opposing Summary Judgment” pursuant to Local Rule 56.2.

3o-

Therefore, the facts asserted by CEDA are undisputed by Van.


seo

01 C7905

Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of
material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477,U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Summary judgment is
appropriate where a Title VII plaintiff cannot prove intentional discrimination either through
direct proof of discriminatory intent or through the indirect burden shifting method of proof first

elaborated in McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The “mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movifig party’s] position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury can reasonably find for the [non-moving party}”. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 252 (1986).

B. Standard of Proving Discrimination

It is well settled that to prove intentional discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national
origin or age, a plaintiff can meet this burden by introducing direct evidence from which an

inference of discrimination may be drawn. Fuka v. Tomson Consumer Electronics, 82 F. 3d

1397, 1402 (7" Cir. 1996). In a discrimination case, direct evidence is that which can be

interpreted as an acknowledgment of discriminatory intent. Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group.

Inc., 129 F. 3d 391, 396 (7" Cir. 1997). A statement is direct evidence of discrimination only if
it relates to the motivation of the decision maker responsible for the contested decision. Cheek

y. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F. 3d 200, 203 (7"" Cir. 1996).