tf
No. 02 C 742 Page 4

of the circumstances, judging the use of force from the perspective of a reasonable officer at
the scene, rather than trying to determine what should have happened. Graham y. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Jones by Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178, 183 (7 Cir. 1995).

Again, plaintiff's burden is high, but a reasonable jury could find that Officer Graziano
used excessive force when arresting Taylor. If the jury believes Taylor’s story, he was
unarmed, did not struggle, yet he was wrestled against the car by Graziano, who twisted his
arm behind his back and caused his head to hit the rear window of the car. A jury may
determine that this was excessive, given the circumstances.

Also, plaintiff alleges that Officer Manfredi watched the struggle, should have realized
that Graziano was using excessive force, yet falled to say or do anything to stop him. Ifa jury
believes plaintiff's version of events, they may determine that Manfredi had both the
motivation and the opportunity to intervene, yet failed to do so, which is enough to find him
liable for Taylor’s injuries as well. See Yang y. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7* Cir. 1994);
Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 276-77 (7 Cir. 1986).

‘ON (e)
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Manfredi’s summary judgment motion is granted

as to Count I and denied as to Count II; defendant Graziano’s motion is denied.

Arenas. Moro

JAMES B. MORAN

Senior Judge, U. S. District Court
Qe. IS, 2003.



»

No. 02 C 742 Page3

Chicago, 913 F.2d 469, 473 (7 Cir. 1990). This determination is made at the time of the arrest.
Qian, 168 F.3d at 953. If at that time a reasonably prudent person could believe that the
suspect had committed or was committing an offense, the officer had probable cause. Id.
While the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, in a § 1983 case involving a false arrest
claim, the concepts merge and the sole question is whether there was probable cause for the
arrest. Boyce v. Fernandes, 77 F.3d 946, 948 (7" Cir. 1996).

Obviously, plaintiff bears a heavy burden in proving a false arrest. However, a
reasonable jury could believe plaintiff’s story and find that probable cause did not exist.
Essentially, Taylor claims that he was simply standing near a friend’s house, followed by
Graziano when he began to head towards home, and was subsequently arrested. While
Graziano had received a call reporting “suspicious behavior,” there is no evidence that he had
information about any specific criminal activity. If the jury believes Taylor, it may reasonably
determine that the arrest lacked probable cause.

Manfredi’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted. He heard the
report over the police radio and noticed that Taylor matched Graziano’s description. A
reasonable officer in his position could act on this information, believing there to be probable
cause. Moreover, Manfredi played only a minor role in actually arresting Taylor, watching
him until the arrival of Graziano. This does not amount to a violation of Taylor’s § 1983
rights.

Excessive Use of Force
The right to make an arrest inherently carries with it the right to use a reasonable

amount of force. Saucier y. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 208 (2001). The court must look at the totality


Minute Ordeacorm (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

OFRCP4(m) (Ci Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).

denied.

(11) & [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

seriaaetis | James. Moran | Sunita
CASE NUMBER 02 C 742 idol DATE 12/15/2003
CASE CATHY RIDLEY vs, RONALD GRAZIANO, JOHN MANFREDI
TITLE F L |
{ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing fhe motion, ©. plaintiff, defendant, 3d party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.] 1 | i
MEMORANDUM sie AND ORDER
DOCKET ENTRY: ‘
(iy o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) iat} Brief in support of motion due____.
(3) oa Answer briefto motion due__. Reply to answer briefdue__.
(4) o Ruting/Hearing on setfor___—at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for) on setfor_ sat
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_esetfor__—sat_
(a) oO Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at
(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__—_at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

ao) of (Other docket entry] / Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. Defendant Manfredi’s summary
judgment motion is granted as to Count I and denied as to Count II; defendant Graziano’s motion is

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. number of notices

Document
Number! 4

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone. DEC, 6.2003
of | Docketing to mail notices. j

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

9 LolwLsia sn
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3



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CATHY RIDLEY, as next of kin and guardian )
on behalf of KENNETH I. TAYLOR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 02 C 742
)
RONALD GRAZIANO, JOHN MANFREDI, +)
and other unidentified police officers, ) a
) <
Defendants. ) & S
FY
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ¥

Plaintiff Cathy Ridley brought this action on behalf of Kenneth L. Taylor,
alleging false arrest and excessive use of force by defendants, Bartlett, Dlinois, police officers.
Defendants filed motions seeking summary judgment as to all counts. For the following
reasons, defendant John Manfredi’s motion is granted in part and denied in part and
defendant Ronald Graziano’s motion is denied.

BACKGROUND
In the early evening of June 17, 2000, Kenneth Taylor was standing with a group of
friends in front of a house in Bartlett. Defendant Graziano had been called to the scene
because of a report of “suspicious behavior” in the area. When he approached Taylor and his
friends, Taylor, along with at least two others, left and began heading towards his house.
Plaintiff alleges that Taylor simply turned away and began walking, while defendant Graziano
claims that Taylor ran from the scene. Graziano began to follow Taylor in his squad car and

put out a call on his radio describing the individuals who had left the scene. Defendant

37



No. 02 C 742 Page2

Manfredi heard the call, saw Taylor and noticed that he matched the description given by
Graziano. He radioed back to Graziano and followed Taylor, in his car, until Graziano
arrived. Upon arriving at the scene, Graziano began to question Taylor, eventually placing
him under arrest. Plaintiff alleges that Graziano initiated a struggle with Taylor, using
excessive force, first twisting his arm behind his back then causing Taylor to hit his face
against the squad car, knocking out his teeth. Defendants maintain that Taylor was acting
suspiciously, refusing to remove his hand from his pocket, and that any injuries were the result
of his struggle to resist arrest. All charges against Taylor were dropped.
DISCUSSION

Our function in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is merely to determine if
there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson y. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986). Only if the evidence on file shows that no such issue exists and that the

moving party {s entitled to judgment as a matter of law will we grant the motion. Celotex

Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Bennett v. Roberts, 295 F.3d 687, 694 (7" Cir.
2002). In ruling on this motion it is not our job to determine whether the plaintiff's story or
the defendants’ story is more likely to be true. Instead, we decide only whether a reasonable
jury could believe the story as told by the plaintiff and, if so, whether he would be entitled to
recovery.
False Arrest

In order to prevail on a claim for false arrest, plaintiff must prove that defendants
arrested Taylor in the absence of probable cause. Qian y. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7 Cir.

1999). The existence of such probable cause {is an absolute bar to recovery. Smith y. City of