No. 02 € 3828 Page 4

such child.” 20 U.S.C, § 1415 (b)(1)(E),

Plaintiffs argue that, because they are claiming money damages under §§ 1983 and 1985
and state tort Jaw, they are asking for relief which is not available under the IDEA, The
Seventh Circuit has determined that the “nature of the claim and the governing law determine
the relief no matter what the plaintiff demands.” Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 992. Relief available
means “relief for the events, condition, or consequences of which the person complains, not
necessarily relief of the kind the person prefers.” Jd. The damages plaintiffs seck result from
defendants’ handling of Michael’s special education requirements, which is covered by the
IDEA.)

Plaintiffs finally argue that they should be excused from the exhaustion requirement
because the process would prove futile, presenting two arguments, First, they argue that the
administrative hearing officer could not award money damages. Again, the mere fact that
plaintiffs seek money damages does not excuse the exhaustion requirement. Charlie F.,98 F.3d
at 998. Second, plaintiffs argue that judicial economy supports their argument, as the case will
likely return to this court anyway. This contradicts a main purpose of the exhaustion
requirement, See Bills v. Homer Consolidates Sch. Dist. No. 33-C, 959 F.Supp. 507, 511
(N.D.1L 1997) (holding that one purpose of requiring exhaustion is avoiding “unnecessary

judicial review by allowing agencies to correct errors”). If plaintiffs are unsatisfied with the

‘As plaintiff argues, other jurisdictions disagree with thiy reading of the IDEA, See e.g., Witte v.
Clark Co. Sch, Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9% Cir. 1999) (holding that the IDEA does not require exbaustion
of administrative proceedings when sccking moncy damages because such remedies are not available under
the IDEA). We are, however, bound by the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the statute, We are mindful of
plaintiffs’ contention that they are seeking relief for pre-IEP violations and, with an TEP now in place, a duc
process hearing would not provide any remedy. That is, however, an argument better made to the Seventh
Circuit, Their complaint, as filed, sought a declaration that the defendants’ conduct was of a nature that
violated IDEA, and we think those allegations clearly fall within the ambit of Charlie F,



No, 02 € 3828 Page 3

DISCUSSION

The initial complaint consisted of three counts, Count I asked for a declaratory
judgment decreeing that defendants broke state laws in their handling of Michael's case,
Plaintiff now seeks to amend that claim to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. §
1985, claiming violations of Michael's civil rights. Count I was a request for injunctive relief,
ordering the defendants not to take any action to stop Michael from participating in
graduation. This court has already ruled on the injunction, graduation has passed and
plaintiffs concede that this count is moot. Count ITT alleges state law intentional infliction of
emotional distress by defendants.

Reading plaintiffs’ claim liberally, they now allege violations of § 1983 and § 1985 and
state law by the school board and its individual members, Although the complaint does not
mention the IDEA, it alleges violations of the Hlinvis state counterpart to the Act, 105 ILCS
§ 5/14-1.01 et seg. Defendant moves to dismiss the claim, arguing that the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f), prohibits plaintiffs from bringing this claim until they have exhausted all potential
administrative remedies.

Any pupil who wants relief available under the IDEA must exhaust available
administrative remedies, regardless of the specific allegations in the complaint. Charlie F. v.
Board Of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7" Cir. 1996), While plaintiffs do
not mention the IDEA by name in their complaint, they essentially allege failure in the
procedures that the school board tookin determining Michael’s eligibility for special education
services. The IDEA covers “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or

educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to



TM

No. 02 C 3828 Page 5

outcome of the full administrative proceedings, only then should they look to the courts for
relief.

We do not need to address the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allegations. While plaintiffs may
be able to state a claim, they must first go through the appropriate administrative channels,
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff's

complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

JAMES B. MORAN
r Judge, U. S. District Court

Veh. 30 , 2002.



a Minute Cat: Porm (06/97)

‘

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

(>)

Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge James B. Moran than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 3828 DATE 9/30/2002
CASE Kathy Arnold ete. et al. Vs. The Bd of Ed for Round Lake etc.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, .g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: ‘of the motion being presented.)
Memorandum Opinion and Order
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
@ oa Brief in support of motion duc
@) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(8) o Status hearing[held/continucd to] [sct for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to) [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(7) Oo Trial(sct for/re-set for] on at
(8) oO (Bench/Jury trial) [fearing] held/continued to at
(a) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant 10}
OOFRCP4(m) O Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).
eee | [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
granted and plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
(il) @f [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required, vomber of nties
Noti iled by judge’s staff.
lotices mailed by judge’s staff. OrT Nn 4
Notified counsel by telephone. ate dockoted
| Docketing to mail notices,
¥_ | Mail AO 430 form, MORE te cae G> nian
Copy to judgc/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice
courtroom

WAH deputy's
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office

‘ailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KATHY ARNOLD, as mother and best friend
of Michael Mindy, and MICHAEL MINDY,

a minor,

Plaintiffs,

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR ROUND
LAKE AREA SCHOOLS - CUSD NO, 116,

)

)

)

)

)

)

vs. ) No, 02 C 3828

)

)

)

et al,, )
)

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kathy Arnold brought this action in state court together with and on behalf
of her son, Michael Mindy, against the Board of Education for Round Lake Area Schools and
individual members of the Board, alleging that they willfully delayed in conducting a case
study analysis as required by 105 LLCS § 5/14-8.02, failed to give her adequate notice of the
hearing on her son’s Individual Education Plan (IEP), and willfully disregarded her son’s
behavioral problems, causing severe emotional distress. Defendants removed the case to
federal court and filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). Because plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C, § 1400 ef seg., defendants’
motion is granted,

BACKGROUND

The facts are taken from plaintiffs’ complaint, Plaintiff, Michael Mindy, while an



ry a
No. 02 C 3828 Page 2

eighth grade student at Magee Middle Schoolin Round Lake, Illinois, had numerous academic
and behavior problems, In October 2001, Michael’s mother, Kathy Arnold, requested that the
school district conduct a case study evaluation (CSE) of Michael to determine whether he had
a disability that would qualify him for special education or reasonable educational
accommodations. Illinois law mandates that a CSE must be conducted within 60 days; yet, not
until February 22, 2002, did defendants issue a notice of intent to convene a meeting to discuss
a possible IEP for Michael. Although Minois law requires the parent to receive 10 days’
notice, the hearing was scheduled for March 1, 2002, At the IEP meeting itself, defendants
again failed to comply with the statutory requirements as there was no regular education
teacher, special education teacher or LEA representative at the meeting. The meeting was
adjourned with the intention to reconvene with an appropriate team.

On April 15, 2002, plaintiffs’ counsel mailed a letter to defendant Paul Biscini detailing
the alleged violations, The CSE meeting was not reconvened until May 9, 2002, at which time
the parties unanimously agreed that Michael was eligible for special education due to learning
disabilities and emotional disturbances. They agreed that he should receive 100 hours of one-
on-one tutoring in the interim to ensure his successful completion of the eighth grade, and that
beginning on September 3, 2002, Michael's classroom would be a special education classroom.
Despite plaintiffs’ demands, defendants refused to allow Michael to participate in graduation
ceremonies from the eighth grade.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Circuit Court of Lake County without challenging

the Board’s actions at a due process hearing, as provided by 105 ILCS § 5/14-8.02a.