an exception to the Younger doctrine applies. Specifically, Snell asserts that because § 22(A)(2)
imposes a per se prohibition against solicitation of paticnts by doctors licensed under the Medical
Practice Act, it is “flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional, and as such abstention under Younger
is inappropriate. PI.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 2. Snell argues that such
a clearly unconstitutional infringement of his First Amendment rights, and the continuing
infringement of those rights which are unaddressed by the singular act of solicitation at issue in the
pending matter before the DPR, constitute “extraordinary circumstances” justifying the court to
refrain from abstaining under Younger. Id. at 3.

When a party claims that extraordinary circumstances exist preventing abstention under
Younger, that party must demonstrate the existence of those extraordinary circumstances. Green y.
Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Ramsden v. AgriBank, FCB, 214 F.3d 865, 871
(7th Cir, 2000), In this case, Snell does not demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances which
would justify the court from refraining in its application of the Younger doctrine.

Snell’s assertion that § 22(A)(24)'s per se prohibition on solicitation is an unconstitutional
infringement of his First Amendment rights and that the continuing infringement of those rights,
which are unaddressed by the singular act of solicitation at issue in the pending matter before the
DPR, is not cnough to show that extraordinary circumstances exist. See Arkebauer v. Kiley, 985
F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the extraordinary circumstances exception to Younger
provides a “very narrow gate for federal intervention.”); see also Pincham v. Il. Judicial Inquiry Bd.,
872 F.2d 1341, 1350 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a single state judicial disciplinary proceeding
having a ‘chilling effect’ on an Appellate Court judge’s free speech rights is not enough to establish

extraordinary circumstances under the Younger doctrine). Furthermore, the possible



court proceeding are: (1) if the state prosecution is conducted in bad [aith, (2) if there is an
extraordinarily pressing need for immediate equitable relief, or (3) ifthe challenged statute provision
is “flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional. Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook Mun, Corp., 824
F.2d 567, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations and quotation marks omitted),

The Younger abstention doctrine applies to both criminal and civil actions. See Ramsden
v. Agribank, FCB, 214 F.3d 865, 871 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the courts have extended
Younger to include state civil proceedings as well as state criminal proceedings). The Younger
abstention doctrine assumes that a plaintill’s federal constitutional claims can be faitly vindicated
in the state court proceedings without federal intrusion. See Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v.
McCarty, 270 F.3d 536, 537 (7th Cir. 2001). ‘The underlying rationale behind both the rule and its
exceptions derives from the principles of equity, comity, and federalism. See Younger, 401 U.S. at
53; see also Ramsden, 214 F.3d at 871. These principles are “evident in the earliest Younger
abstention cases, which all concerned atiempts to enjoin criminal prosecutions under allegedly
unconstitutional statutes.” Barichello, 98 F.3d at 954.
B. The Application of the Younger Doctrine to this Case

The Director takes the position that under Younger, the court should abstain from hearing
this case because the DPR administrative proceeding against Snell is currently pending. ‘The
Director asserts that all of the Younger requirements are satisfied in this case. Specifically, the
Director asserts that the DPR proceeding is: (1) judicial in nature, (2) implicates important state
interests, and (3) offers an adequate opportunity for review of constitutional claims.

In his response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Snell does not dispute the Director’s

asscrtion that the general Younger requirements are satisfied in this case, Instead, Snell argues that


unconstitutionality of § 22(A)(24) does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith cfforts
to enforce it. Pincham, 872 F.2d at 1350. In his response, Snell cites numerous cases, including
United States Supreme Court cases, holding that certain statutes banning the solicitation of
professional patronage are unconstitutional violations of commercially protected specch. Pl.’s Mem.
of Law in Opp'’n to Def.’s Mol. to Dismiss, at 3-10. Although these cases indicate a current trend
toward the abolition of statutes prohibiting the solicitation of professional patronage, they do not
support Snell’s position that § 22(A)(24) is flagrantly and patently unconstitutional. See Pincham,
872 F.2d at 1350.

By referring to these cases in his brief, Snell vigorously argues the merits of his case. But
he fails to provide the court with a reason as to why he is unable to obtain relief in the Illinois State
courts. Snell argues that the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in Desnick v. Dep’tof Prof"!
Regulation, 171 LI.2d 510 (Il. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of § 22(A)(24) of the Medical
Practices Act) somehow makes his appeal through the Illinois State courts unavailing. Snell’s
reference to Desnick does not persuade the court that there is no adequate opportunity for State
review in this case. Snell will have a fair opportunity to distinguish, limit, or overrule Desnick in
light of the receni case law on this issue. This opportunity is cnough to justify the application of the
Younger abstention doctrine in this case. See Barichello, 98 F.3d 948, 954 (stating that abstention
is proper if the slate couri procedures will afford an adequate remedy in the absence of
“unambiguous authority to the contrary.”) (citations omitted), Because the Illinois courts can grant

Snell all of the relief he requests, dismissal, rather than a stay, is proper in this case. See Green, 281

T'.3d 667.



Mime Order Farm (06/97)

Qs Ag Ante States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Nu f igned Jud; 5) Sitting Judge if Other

me at Agnes Sua Charles Norgle ig, Jef Other

CASE NUMBER 02 € 8172 DATE 6/4/2003
CASE SNELL vs. PUCINSKI
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented,}

MOTION:
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) C] Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
Q) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) C) Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due____.
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing onset for at_
(5) 0 Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [sct for/re-set for] on setfor at
(7) im] Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [[learing] held/continued to ______at
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 CPRCP41(a)(1) C1 FRCPAI(a)(2).

(0) MH [Otherdocketentry] Before the court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint [4-1]
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated on the attached

order, Defendant’s motion [4-1] is granted. Pag

qi) [For further detail see order attached Lo the original minute order.)
‘No notices required, advised in open court. i Document
No notices required. ver ofr U Number
Notices mailed by judge’s staff. JUN 08 0
Notified counsel by telephone. dasa 20
| Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AQ 450 form. 4409 LOI ddocketing Aa inaials |
Copy w judge/magistrate judge yang aASh Isp
5
scaurrcom Se Hd on , date raid notice
deputy’s Ar ey
initials OL gy
sida He ved in
central Clerk’ Oftice malting deputy nits



Ill. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

Liked

CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, SR., Judge
United States District Court



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DISTRICT
JOSEPII SNELL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 02 C 8172
)
AURELIA PUCINSKI, in her official ) Ilonorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr. Dp. ..
capacily as Director of the Illinois, ) uy 1 atm
Department of Professional Regulation, ) Ny 0,
) <lay
Defendants. J

OPINION AND ORDER
CIJARLES R. NORGLE, District Judge.

Before the court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint brought pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, Defendant’s
motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Joseph Snell, is a licensed chiropractor who practices in Savoy, Illinois, Snell is
currently a respondent in a pending Llinois Department of Professional Regulation (“DPR”)
administrative disciplinary proceeding. Sec Dep't of Prof"! Regulation v. Snell, 199909505-1. In
that proceeding, the DPR seeks to discipline Snell for purchasing automobile reports and then using
them to solicit injured persons in need of his chiropractic services.

Snell brings this action against Defendant, Aurelia Pucinski in her official capacity as
Director of the DPR (“Director”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of

§ 22(A)(24) of the Illinois Medical Practice Act, 225 ILCS 60/22(A)(24), which regulates medical

a


doctors and chiropractors. Section 22(A)(24) prohibits medical professionals from participating in
conduct which constitutes solicitation of professional patronage. 225 ILCS 60/22(A)(24).
Essentially, Snell’s Complaint alleges that § 22(A)(24) violates the free speech and cqual protection
clauses of both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions. Additionally, Snell’s Complaint
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Director to prevent enforcement of § 22(A)(24).

The Director has now filed this Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requesting that the court refrain from cxercising its jurisdiction in this case,
The Director bases her motion on the abstention doctrine as set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971). The court will now address the Director’s motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Younger Abstention Doctrine

Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts are requircd to refrain (rom enjoining
ongoing state judicial and administrative procecdings when important state interests are involved.
Barichello v. McDonald, 98 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 1996). Specifically, Younger and its progeny
require a federal district court “to abstain from enjoining ongoing state proceedings that are (1) [sic]
judicial in nature, (2) implicate important state interests, and (3) offer an adequate opportunity for
review of constitutional claims, (4) so long as no extraordinary circumstances--like bias or
harassment--exist which auger against abstention.” Majors v. Englebrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 711 (7th

Cir. 1998) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Asg’n, 457 U.S. 423, 429

(1982); sce ‘rust & Investment Advisers v, Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir, 1994); sce also

Butler v. City of Chicago, No, 02 C 7553, 2003 WL 21148480, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2003).

Several additional extraordinary circumstances justifying a federal courl’s intervention in a state