to consider it would result in a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice. . . .””’Rodriguez
y. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 917 (7* Cir. 1999).

Washington argues that it is debatable whether or not his claims are
procedurally defaulted. We do not agree. Washington also puts forth arguments
concerning his counsel’s failure to follow state court rules, such as his counsel’s
failure to present arguments, caselaw, and analysis in his brief. Such arguments only
serve to reaffirm that the state courts in this case ruled on an independent and
adequate state basis. Washington also makes some arguments regarding exhaustion
that are not pertinent. In addition, Washington argues that we should not apply the
procedural default doctrine because the conduct of his prior counsel cannot be
attributed to him. We disagree and are not convinced that procedural default should
not be applied in this action. Washington also argues that it is debatable whether or
not prejudice exists that would excuse procedural default and argues that it is
debatable as to whether the application of procedural default would result in a
miscarriage of justice. We cannot agree with either contention. Washington failed
to follow the Illinois state appellate procedures and therefore, his claims are deemed
procedurally defaulted. Washington has not provided sufficient reasons that would
indicate that any of the exceptions to the doctrine of procedural default are
applicable. Washington offers various other arguments, some of which are not
included in his habeas petition. The briefs filed by Washington in this action are

insufficient to even create a suspicion that his habeas petition should have been


appealability “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The petitioner must also show that
“reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'"" Slack v. McDonnell, 529

US. 473, 484 (2000)(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

DISCUSSION

In our prior ruling we found that the claims included in Washington’s habeas
petition were procedurally defaulted. A federal court will not address a question of
federal law presented in a habeas corpus petition brought to contest a state court
ruling if “the state decision rests on a state procedural ground that is independent of
the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Page v. Frank, 343
F.3d 901, 905 (7" Cir. 2003). In order to avoid a procedural default on a claim
presented in a habeas corpus petition the petitioner must “give the state courts one
full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round
of the State's established appellate review process." Howard v. O'Sullivan, 185 F.3d
721, 725 (7* Cir. 1999) (quoting O ’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)).
A federal court can review defaulted claims if the petitioner “shows cause for failure
to raise them at the appropriate time and actual prejudice which resulted from such

failure” or, “[a]bsent such a showing, a defaulted claim is reviewable only if refusal


granted. None of the arguments offered by Washington show that it is debatable
whether or not his constitutional rights were violated or that habeas relief should be
granted. Nor have any of the arguments presented indicate that the habeas issue
deserves “encouragement to proceed further." Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, Therefore, we

deny the motion for certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we deny Washington’s motion for a

certificate of appealability

= Der-Yeghiayan 4 VI‘

United States District Court Judge

Dated: August 18, 2004


Minute Onder Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

Nims Mogteeeludge | Samuel Der-Yeghiayan | Signed Judge

CASE NUMBER 01 949 DATE 8/18/2004
CASE Robert Washington vs. Joe McGrath
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.]

a)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

ql) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due___.

(3) im Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due___

(4) o Ruling/Hearingon____setfor at

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____esetffor___at

(6) Qo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor_ at

(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on__at

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at

(9) im} This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to)
OFRCP4(m) (Local Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)\(1) [1 FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion, the petitioner’s

motion for a certificate of appealability is denied. Enter Memorandum Opinion.

| [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
umber of nolices

Notices mailed by judge's staff. AUG 19 2004

Notified counsel by telephone. uadoues
Docketing to mail notices, Z s
Mail AO 450 fom. ; ‘sig-s'n toh yn
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom ¥ 4002 date mailed notice
MW deputy's
initials

‘Date/time Fegeived in
n lerk’s Office sailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel,
ROBERT LEE WASHINGTON,

Petitioner,
v. No. 01 C 949
JOE McGRATH, Warden, Pelican
Bay Prison, and JAMES E. RYAN,

Attorney General, State of Ilinois.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Petitioner Robert Lee Washington’s
(“Washington”) motion for a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c). For the reasons stated below we deny the motion.

BACKGROUND
On April 24, 1996, following a jury trial, Washington was convicted of
attempted first degree murder and sentenced to a term of sixty years imprisonment.

Washington appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial


District. On April 14, 1998, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Washington’s
conviction. Washington did not file a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of the State of Illinois.

On April 2, 1999, Washington filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On
April 16, 1999, the trial court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. On May
26, 1999, Washington filed a notice of appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court. On
August 15, 2000, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial of Washington’s
post-conviction petition. On September 16, 2000, Washington filed a petition for a
rehearing with the Illinois Appellate Court. On September 22, 2000, the Illinois
Appellate Court denied the petition for rehearing. On October 31, 2000, Washington
filed a petition for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.
On January 29, 2001, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois denied Washington’s
leave to appeal. Washington filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. On May 15,
2004, we denied Washington’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Washington now

seeks a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

LEGAL STANDARD
Ifa court denies a petition for writ ofhabeas and the petitioner wishes to
appeal, challenging the decisions made by the state trial courts, the petitioner must
seek a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Montgomery v. Davis, 362

F.3d 956, 957 (7" Cir. 2004), A district court should only issue a certificate of