alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
16
<PAGE>

                        HOMESIDE LENDING, INC.
   EXHIBIT 12.1(a) - COMPUTATION OF THE RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                    (Dollar Amounts in thousands)

The following table sets forth the ratio of earnings to fixed charges of
HomeSide Lending, Inc. for the three months ended August 31, 1997, the three
months ended August 31, 1996, and for the six months ended August 31, 1997
and the period from March 16, 1996 to August 31, 1996.  The ratio of earnings 
to fixed charges is computed by dividing net fixed charges (interest expense
on all debt plus the interest portion of rent expense) into earnings before 
income taxes and fixed charges.


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                      For the Three    For the Three     For the Six    For the Period from   
                                      Months Ended     Months Ended     Months Ended     March 16, 1996 
                                     August 31, 1997  August 31, 1997  August 31, 1996  August 31, 1996
                                     ---------------  ---------------  ---------------  ---------------  
<S>                                  <C>              <C>              <C>              <C>     
Earnings before income taxes         $     36,898     $     23,125     $   70,171       $    36,603
                                     ---------------  ---------------  ---------------  ---------------
Interest expense                           19,811           17,684         37,873            30,276
Interest portion of rental expense            325              411            647               670
                                     ---------------  ---------------  ---------------  ---------------
Fixed charges                              20,136           18,095         38,520            30,946
                                     ---------------  ---------------  ---------------  ---------------            
Earnings before fixed charges              57,034           41,220        108,691            67,549
                                     ---------------  ---------------  ---------------  --------------- 
Fixed charges:
--------------
Interest Expense                           19,811           17,684         37,873            30,276     
Interest portion of rental expense            325              411            647               670 
                                     ---------------  ---------------  ---------------  ---------------                         
Fixed charges                              20,136           18,095         38,520            30,946
                                     ---------------  ---------------  ---------------  ---------------
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges   $       2.83     $       2.28     $     2.82       $      2.18
                                     ===============  ===============  ===============  ===============
</TABLE>
----

|   | (1) | the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated: May 9, 2011 |                           |
|--------------------|--------------------------------|
|               |                           |
|               |                           |
|               | /s/ Glenn R. James             |
|               | Name: Glenn R. James           |
|               | Title: Chief Executive Officer |

----
<PAGE>   1
Exhibit 3.45
                          AMENDED AND RESTATED BY-LAWS

             AMERICAN PROFESSIONAL HOLDING, INC., A UTAH CORPORATION

                         Adopted as of November 1, 1996

                             ARTICLE I SHAREHOLDERS

         Section 1. Annual Meeting. The annual meeting of the shareholders shall
be held in the month of June in each year or at such other time as shall be
fixed by the Board of Directors, for the purpose of electing directors and for
the transaction of such other business as may come before the meeting.

         Section 2. Notice of Meeting. Written notice stating the place, day and
hour of the meeting and, in case of a special meeting, the purpose or purposes
for which the meeting is called, shall, unless otherwise prescribed by statute,
be delivered not less than ten (10) nor more than sixty (60) days before the
date of the meeting, either personally or by mail, or at the direction of the
president, or the secretary, or the officer or other persons calling the
meeting.

                          ARTICLE II BOARD OF DIRECTORS

         Section 1. Number, Tenure and Qualifications. The number of directors
of the corporation shall be not less than one (1) nor more than four (4) as
established by the Board of Directors from time to time. Each director shall
hold office until the next annual meeting of shareholders and until his
successor shall have been elected and qualified. Directors need not be residents
of the state of incorporation of the corporation or shareholders of the
corporation.

         Section 2. Regular and Special Meetings. The Board of Directors may
call regular and special meetings.

                              ARTICLE III OFFICERS

         Section 1. Number. The officers of the corporation shall be a
president, vice president, a secretary and a treasurer, all of whom shall be
elected or appointed by the Board of Directors. Such other officers and
assistant officers as may be deemed necessary may be elected or appointed by the
Board of Directors. Any two or more offices may be held by the same person.

         Section 2. Election and Term of Office. The officers of the corporation
shall be elected annually by the Board of Directors. Each officer shall hold
office until his successor shall have been elected and shall have qualified or
until his death or until he shall resign or shall have been removed in the
manner hereinafter provided.

                             ARTICLE IV FISCAL YEAR

         The fiscal year of the corporation shall begin on the 1st day of
January and end on the 31st day of December in each year.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 2.3

Eastern Division

Katherine Albrecht, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.:

1:03−cv−06472

Hon. Morton

Denlow

Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority, et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Wednesday, February 16, 2005:

 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier :Settlement conference held and

continued to 3/2/2005 at 10:00 AM.(mmm, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:03-cv-06472 Document #: 56 Filed: 02/16/05 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:392
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 24, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-51064

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROY LESTER MITCHELL, JR., 

also known as Roy Lester Mitchell,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. W-02-CR-42-1

--------------------

Before DeMOSS, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Roy Lester Mitchell, Jr., appeals the sentence he received

following his guilty-plea conviction for being a felon in

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

The sentence imposed will be upheld unless it was imposed in

violation of the law or as a result of an incorrect application

of the guidelines; in reviewing the sentence, the district

court’s fact findings are reviewed for clear error and its legal
No. 02-51064

-2-

conclusions are reviewed de novo. United States v. Armstead, 114

F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1997).

Mitchell argues that the district court erred in assessing a

four-point sentencing increase, pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(5), because there was no proof that the gun was

possessed in connection with any drug-trafficking crime,

particularly because no crack cocaine was found in his home at

the time the search warrant was executed. He urges that the

record shows that he had the gun to protect his family following

an armed robbery of his home. 

Contrary to Mitchell’s assertions, the record establishes

that he was dealing drugs out of his home, as evidenced by the

fact that several controlled purchases of crack cocaine were made

there, that drug paraphernalia and proceeds were found there, and

that Mitchell, despite specifically denying that he dealt in

crack cocaine, admitted to possessing drug money and to buying

and selling drugs at the street values reflected in the ledgers

he kept. That no crack cocaine was actually found at the time of

the search is irrelevant. See Armstead, 114 F.3d at 511. 

Because the gun was kept at Mitchell’s residence and could have

been used to facilitate his drug trafficking, the four-point

enhancement was appropriate. See id. at 507, 512.

Mitchell next asserts that the district court improperly

denied his request for a § 5K2.12 downward departure based on the

fact that he possessed the gun under duress. He does not contend
No. 02-51064

-3-

that the district court’s denial was based on a mistaken belief

that it lacked the authority to grant the departure. 

Consequently, this issue is not reviewable by this court. See

United States v. Yanez-Huerta, 207 F.3d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 2000). 

Mitchell has not demonstrated any error in the sentence he

received. The district court’s judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**1324 KA 11-02185**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JIBRIL A. BURT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (ROBERT L. KEMP OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

FRANK A. SEDITA, III, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (DONNA A. MILLING OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Sheila A. DiTullio, J.), rendered September 29, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of burglary in the second degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is unenforceable and that he should have been afforded youthful offender treatment. We reject those contentions. Defendant waived his right to appeal both orally and in writing, and the record demonstrates that County Court “ ‘engage[d] the defendant in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice’ ” ( People v Glasper , 46 AD3d 1401, 1401, lv denied 10 NY3d 863; see People v Korber , 89 AD3d 1543, 1543, lv denied 19 NY3d 864). Further, “the record as a whole, including the written waiver of the right to appeal, establishes ‘that the defendant understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ ” ( People v Jones , 96 AD3d 1637, 1637, lv denied 19 NY3d 1103). Defendant’s valid waiver of the right to appeal encompasses his contention that he should have been afforded youthful offender treatment ( see People v Rush , 94 AD3d 1449, 1449-1450, lv denied 19 NY3d 967). Finally, there is no merit to defendant’s contention that the court failed to rule on his request for such treatment inasmuch as the court’s comments at sentencing establish that the request was denied.

Entered: December 28, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
ex10-1.htm


    EXHIBIT
10.1

    


    THIRD
AMENDMENT TO THE

    CYBERONICS,
INC. AMENDED AND RESTATED 1997 STOCK PLAN

    


    WHEREAS, there is reserved to the Board
of Directors ("Board") of Cyberonics, Inc. in Section 15 of the Cyberonics, Inc.
Amended and Restated 1997 Stock Plan (the "Plan") the right to amend the Plan,
subject to certain restrictions set forth therein; and

    


    WHEREAS, the Board deems it advisable
to amend the Plan in the manner hereafter set forth;

     

    NOW, THEREFORE, Section 2(m) of the
Plan is hereby amended effective as of August 19, 2008, to read as
follows:

     

    (m) "Fair Market Value" means, as of
any date, the value of Common Stock determined as follows:

     

    (i) If the Common Stock is listed on
any established stock exchange or a national market system, its Fair Market
Value shall be the closing sales price for such stock (or the closing bid, if no
sales were reported) as quoted on such exchange or system on the day of
determination, or if such Common Stock was not traded on the day of
determination, the closing sales price for such stock for the last market
trading day prior to the day of determination, as reported in The Wall Street Journal or
such other source as the Administrator selects;

     

    (ii) If the Common Stock is regularly
quoted by a recognized securities dealer but selling prices are not reported,
the Fair Market Value of a Share of Common Stock shall be the mean between the
high bid and low asked prices for the Common Stock on the day of determination,
or if such Common Stock was not traded on the day of determination, the mean
between the high bid and low asked prices for the Common Stock on the last
market trading day prior to the day of determination as reported in The Wall Street Journal or
such other source as the Administrator deems reliable; or

    


    (iii) In the absence of an established
market for the Common Stock, the Fair Market Value shall be determined in good
faith by the Administrator.

    


    Except as amended and modified hereby,
the Plan shall continue in full force and effect and the Plan and this amendment
shall be read, taken and construed as one and the same
instrument.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Manor, Appellant.

— Casey, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Clyne, J.), rendered September 29, 1983, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of arson in the third degree.

The indictment of this 18-year-old defendant stemmed from the burning of J. B. Scott’s Lounge in the City of Albany during the commission of a burglary by defendant and two accomplices on July 22, 1982. In addition to the charge of arson in the third degree, the indictment also charged defendant with the crimes of reckless endangerment in the first degree and burglary in the third degree. However, only the arson charge was submitted to the jury. Following defendant’s conviction of that charge, he was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 5 to 15 years.

On this appeal, defendant argues that the trial court excessively interfered with the examination of witnesses and with the conduct of the trial so as to deprive him of a fair trial. To substantiate this argument, defendant points out the court’s interruption of the District Attorney’s examination of the witness William Clark to inquire as to whether an accelerant was used to start the fire and the point of origin of the fire. Additionally, defendant charges that the court interrupted the District Attorney to question the witness Theresa Robinson about her participation in a party where she allegedly overheard statements by defendant admitting to the crime. We believe these and other similar inquiries by the trial court are not prejudicial, but, rather, attempt to explain and clarify discrepancies that arose from the testimony as it was given *(see, People v Hazen,*94 AD2d 905, 906). As to the court’s persistent questioning of defendant’s witness David Pidgeon, this was made necessary by the equivocal manner in which that witness evaded and eluded answering the court’s question as to whether a particular document contained his signature. We find no basis to criticize the conduct of the trial court in regard to its inquiries in this case.

In regard to the sentencing, the crime created the potential of grave danger to human life even though the actual damage was to the nightclub only. Defendant’s prior involvement with the law began with arrests dating back to 1981. Although this conviction is his first felony, he has had prior probation and short periods of incarceration. This history, plus the seriousness of defendant’s conviction, supports the imposition of the maximum sentence that was imposed, and the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

*922Judgment affirmed. Kane, J. P., Main, Casey, Mikoll and Yesawich, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-1913

_____________________________

CORDAROLL DESHE DIXON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

John L. Miller, Judge.

July 12, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, B.L. THOMAS, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kevin P. Steiger, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### Edgar A. Prue, Respondent, v City of Syracuse et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

—Respondent’s motion granted and appeal unanimously dismissed, without costs, as moot. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Hayes, J.—wage garnishment.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Green, O’Donnell and Pine, JJ. [124 Misc 2d 1036.]
#### MORZIERES, Respondent, v. VANNI et al., Appellants.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department.

July 27, 1896.)

Action by Marguerite Morzieres against John Vanni and John Renoux to recover damages for injury to household property.

Ullo, Ruebsamen, Cochran & Baldwin, for appellants.

Kantrowitz & Es-berg, for respondent.

DALY, P. J.

The defendants were co-partners engaged in the business of trucking and moving goods for hire, and were common carriers. They were moving household furniture for the plaintiff, including china ware in a barrel. Defendant Renoux was carrying the barrel when the hoops gave way, and the barrel drop*1146ped, breaking the china. Defendant Vanni, after looking through the barrel, agreed that they would be responsible for it, and would pay §30. Upon this testimony the justice was justified m giving judgment for the plaintiff:. The injury occurred while the goods were in the hands of defendants, who could easily show that it was unavoidable, or the result of defective packing, for which they were not responsible, if such were the case. The giving way of the hoops was not necessarily the result of defective packing, but may have been the result of negligent handling, and yet defendants do not explain it. _ On the contrary, one of them admits responsibility for the injury, and the amount of it. This admission dispensed with further proof by plaintiff. It should be observed that defendant Vanni, who is said to have made the admission, was not called to deny it The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Radiologix, Inc. (the
"COMPANY") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2002, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "REPORT"),
I, Mark L. Wagar, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



/s/  Mark L. Wagar
--------------------------------------
Mark L. Wagar
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

Dated: August 14, 2002
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 1408** 

FORREST SATTERFIELD , Plaintiff

– Appellant , and
JOAN MOORE , Plaintiff ,
v. JOHNNIE NEWTON; TONYA NEWTON; NANCY CHAPMAN, EEOC; AVA MORROW, EEOC; REUBEN DANIELS, JR., EEOC; PAT MCCORY, Governor , Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina , at Asheville
. Martin K. Reidinger , District Judge. ( 1:14

- cv - 00016

- MR

- DLH )

Submitted : July 24, 2014 Decided: July 28, 2014

Before FLOYD and THACKER , Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Forrest Satterfield, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Forrest Satterfield seeks to appeal the district
court ’ s order dismissing his action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for failure to state a claim . We dismi ss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court ’ s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil cas e is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). The district court ’ s order was entered on the docket

on January 24, 2014 . The notice of appeal was filed on April 24, 2014 . Because Satterfield failed to file a timely notic e of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately3 presented in the materials before th is court and argument would
not a id the decisional process.

DISMISSED