all factual assertions alleged by the moving party. Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Assocs., Inc.,
965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir, 1992),

Although courts often construe pleading requirements liberally for individuals
like Dauzvardis who proceed pro se, uncounseled litigants are not rclicved of the burden
of complying with procedural rules. Greer v. Bd. of Educ., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir.
2001); Members v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1998). To protect a pro se litigant
from the harsh consequences of local summary judgment rules, Local Rule 56.2 requires
that the movant serve a notice to the pro se litigant opposing summary judgment. LR
56.2. This notice outlines the requirements, procedures, and consequences of the local
summary judgment rules. Jd. Midwest Generation properly served and filed the required
notice to Dauzvardis. Thus, plaintiff was provided with specific instructions regarding
compliance with the district court’s rules.

In this case, despite the fact that proper notice of the rules were provided,
Dauzvardis failed to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A) in her
response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment when she failed to respond to
each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement. (See Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(A)
Resp.) Therefore, this Court deems all undisputed facts submitted by the moving party
as admitted because the plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A).

In addition, in the Minute Order of July 18, 2002, the Court struck Dauzvardis’
declaration in support of her Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) statement due to a technical

deficiency and allowed her to cure the deficiency. She has since done so and the matter

is now ready for the court’s consideration on the merits.



or hid evidence of discrimination from Dauzvardis, the defendants may have prevented
her from suing in time. Dauzvardis asserts that in January 2001, Mr. Mikulka, the
director of human resources, discussed the possibility of her re-employment. (P1.’s LR
56.1(b)(3) J 11.) Furthermore, Dauzvardis alleges that Mr. Mikulka and Ms. Scott were
investigating the complaint and told her not to do anything until she heard from Midwest
Generation, (Jd. $12.) Apparently, Ms. Scott called Dauzvardis in May 2001 and
informed her that the investigation revealed sexual harassment and asked her to testify at
an arbitration meeting. (/d. 413.) At this point, Ms. Scott allegedly told Dauzvardis that
this would “probably drag on over the summer” and Ms. Scott would contact her when
the company needed her to testify. (7d) After several weeks of not hearing from
Midwest Generation, she contacted an attorncy who informed her of the EEOC time
constraint and filed a complaint against Midwest Generation the next day, (7d. 7 14,
15.)

According to these allegations, Dauzvardis has raised the inference that Midwest
Generation acted affirmatively to prevent her from bringing suit within the limitations
period. If so, equitable estoppel would prevent the running of the limitations period and
Dauzvardis’ claim would not be barred by the statute of limitations. Becausc the
defendant denies these allegations, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
Midwest Gencration acted affirmatively to prevent Dauzvardis from suing in timc. Thus,

summary judgment is denied.



latest, 300 days after August 14, 2000, i.e., by June 11, 2001,! Dauzvardis filed the
complaint with the EEOC on June 14, 2001. (/d. {6.) The Seventh Circuit has stated,
“[floreclosing litigants from bringing their claim because they missed the filing deadline
by one day may seem harsh, but courts have to draw lines somewhere.” United States v.
Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (barring claim filed one day after
limitations period ran), Therefore, the claim is untimely even though it can be argued
that Dauzvardis filed the charge only four days late.

Dauzvardis could have filed a timely claim until June 26, 2001 if the claim
accrued when the resignation actually took effect, However, the statute of limitation
begins to run when the plaintiff actually discovers the injury. Cada, 920 F.2d at 450,
Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run no Jater than when Dauzvardis
claimed to be constructively discharged on August 14, 2000, Therefore, Dauzvardis’

claim was filed untimely with the EEOC.

TI, Equitable Tolling and Equitable Estoppel

When a charge of discrimination is filed untimely with the EEOC, the doctrines
of equitable tolling or cquitable estoppel can relax the statutory filing period. Chakonas
v. City of Chicago, 42 F.3d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1994). These doctrines prevent the
running of the statute of limitations even when the deadline has passed. Cada, 920 F.2d

at 450.

'The 300-day limitation period technically expired on June 10, 2001. June 10, 2001 was

a Sunday; therefore, the final day to file a timely charge with the EEOC was Monday, June 11,

2001.



TI, Untimeliness of Dauzvardis’ Discrimination Claim

Dauzvardis failed to file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. A
plaintiff alleging harassment under Title VIJ must file a timely complaint with the EEOC
before bringing a lawsuit in federal court. Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health
Scis., 167 F.3d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 1999). This provides the EEOC with the
“opportunity to settle the dispute through conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”
Cheek v. W. & 8. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994). In Illinois, a plaintiff
must file the charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged
harassment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5; Koelsch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 707 (7th
Cir, 1995), Failure to comply with the 300-day limitation period renders the charge
untimely. /d, This 300-day limitation period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit
in federal court, but is more similar to a statute of Jimitations requirement subject to
equitable doctrines such as tolling and estoppel. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455
U.S. 385, 393 (1982). The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff
discovers the injury. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir.
1990).

Here, Dauzvardis failed to file a timely complaint with the REOC. Dauzvardis
admitted in her brief in response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment that she
filed the complaint “304 days after my ‘claim’ would technically have accrued.” (P1.’s
LR 56.1(b)(3),) The alleged sexual harassment occurred in February, March, and July
2000. Ud. #7, 12.) Dauzvardis resigned on August 14, 2000. (/d. | 8.) For the

constructive discharge claim to be timely, Dauzvardis had to file the complaint, at the



Furthermore, equitable tolling would not apply because Dauzvardis waited to be
“certain that h[er] rights had been violated.” Cada, 920 F.2d at 451. Although
Dauzvardis may not have been absolutely certain that she had a potentially successful
hostile work environment suit against Midwest Generation until after Ms. Scott informed
Dauzvardis of the results of her investigation in May 2001, a reasonable person in
Dauzvardis’ position would have known of the possibility of a discrimination claim well
before the investigation. Even if Dauzvardis waited until she was certain that she had a
potentially successful sexual discrimination claim, she still could have filed the
complaint within the required 300-day limitation period in May 2001. She failed to do

so, Therefore, equitable tolling does not apply in this case.

B. Equitable Estoppel

Equitable estoppel, or fraudulent concealment, extends the statute of limitations in
limited circumstances when the defendant “takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff from
suing in time.” Cada, 920 F.2d at 450, The defendant may trigger equitable estoppel, for
example, by hiding cvidence of discrimination or promising not to plead the statute of
limitations. Jackson, 213 F.3d at 394. “In essence, equitable estoppel focuses on
whether the defendant acted affirmatively to stop or delay the plaintiff from bringing suit
within the limitations period.” Smith v. City of Chicago Heights, 951 F.2d 834, 841 (7th
Cir. 1992).

In this case, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether equitable estoppel
extends the statute of limitations period for Dauzvardis’ claim. Although nothing in the
record suggests that Midwest Generation promised not to plead the statute of limitations

8



Mite Order Fou (O09)

: United States District Court, Northern District of Hlinois
Name of Assigned Judge Ronald A. Guzman Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 8549 DATE 9/5/2002
CASE MONIQUE DAUZVARDIS vs. MIDWEST GENERATION , L.L.C.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party fiting the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, und (b) state briefly the nulure
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(I) Oo Filed mation of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

@ oO Brief in support of motion due____

(3) im] Answer bricf to motion due____.. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon set for at. wnt
(3) a Status hearing set for 9/18/02 at 9:30A.M..

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [sct for/re-set for]on__— set for at
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for]on____at

(8) 0 [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to____at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OrRcpP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1} COFRCP41(a)(2).

(10) | {Other docket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment [3-1] is denied.

a 1) | [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court

No notices required, ber ol nutes

Notices mailed by judge’s staff, SEP og 2002
Notified counsel by (elephune.

dare dockered,

date mailed notice

ov | Docketing to mail notices,

Mail AO 450 form. LENAI LOY

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
TBK deputy's
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office ailing deputy initials



Conclusion

For the foregoing rcasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied

[doc. no. 3-1].
-
SO ORDERED ENTERED: 9-5 °° 2—~

HON. RONALD A. GUZMAN
United States Judge



A. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling may extend the statute of limitations if despite all due diligence,
the plaintiff cannot obtain the information to conclude that she may have a discrimination
claim. Chakonas, 42 F.3d at 1135. It applies when the plaintiff is unable to obtain the
information to determine whether the injury was caused by wrongdoing. Cada, 920 F.2d
at 451. However, this doctrine will not postpone the statute of limitations until the
plaintiff is “certain that h{er] rights had been violated.” Jd. Instead, equitable tolling
extends the statute of limitations to when a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position
could have obtained the vital information to discover the possibility of a discrimination
claim. Jackson v. Rockford Hous. Auth. 213 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 2000).

In this case, nothing in the record indicates that the doctrine of equitable tolling
applies. A reasonable person in Dauzvardis’ position would possess the requisite
information to conclude that she may have a sexual discrimination claim against Midwest
Generation sometime prior to her resignation, In the EEOC charge of discrimination,
Dauzvardis stated, “due to the continued sexual harassment and the hostile work
environment I was subject to, I was forced to submit my resignation.” (/d.) This
allegation alone demonstrates that Dauzvardis possessed the knowledge of the possibility
of a discrimination claim against Midwest Generation, at the very latest, when she was
“forced to resign.” (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) 4 8.) Furthermore, Dauzvardis complained of
sexual harassment to the operations manager in March 2000 and again to the plant
manager in April 2000. (Def.’s Ex. B, Charge of Discrim.) A reasonable person

complaining of sexual harassment to management certainly knows of the possibility of a

discrimination claim.



judgment.

Discussion
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To overcome a motion for summary
judgment, the non-moving party must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact
exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
In addition, parties in the Norther District of Illinois must comply with Local
Rule 56.1. To comply, the moving party must serve and file a “statement of material
facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the
moving party to a judgment as a matter of law.” LR 56.1(a)(3). In response, the
opposing party must serve and file:
a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement,
including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the
affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting material relied upon, and
. .. a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional
facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the
affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon. All

material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be
deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing

party.
LR 56.1(b)(3). The Seventh Circuit has “consistently and repeatedly upheld a district
court’s discretion to require strict compliance with its local rules governing summary

judgment.” Bordelon v. Chicago. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 324, 527 (7th Cir.

2000). Therefore, failure to follow Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A) results in the admittance of

3



She officially resigned on August 14, 2000, and the resignation took effect on August 31,
2000. (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) J 9, 12.) Dauzvardis alleges that she was constructively
discharged as a result of the sexually hostile work environment at Midwest Generation,
(Def.’s Ex. B, Charge of Discrimination.)

In Dauzvardis’ response to Midwest Generation’s motion for summary judgment,
she alleges that on January 15, 2001, she met with Mr. Mikulka, Midwest Generation’s
director of human resources, and Ms. Scott, Midwest Generation’s complaint
investigator. (PI’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) § 12.) According to the plaintiff, Mr. Mikulka and
Ms. Scott stated that they intended to work on the company’s “sexual problems” and
eventually intended to re-employ Dauzvardis, (/d.) Dauzvardis also alleged that she was
told, “don’t do anything until you hear from us.” (/d.) According to Dauzvardis, Ms.
Scott called her in May 2001 to inform Dauzvardis that the investigation revealed sexual
harassment and requested that Dauzvardis testify at an arbitration meeting. (/d. 4 13.)
Dauzvardis alleges that Ms. Scott was to notify Dauzvardis when the company needed
her to testify. (/d.) After she did not hear from Midwest Generation for several wecks,
Dauzvardis contacted an attorney who advised her to file a formal complaint with the
EEOC against Midwest Generation. (/d. $4] 14, 15.)

On June 14, 2001, Dauzvardis filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”). (Def.’s LR 56.1 (a)(3) 4.6.) The
EEOC responded on August 8, 2001 by dismissing the charge as untimely, because it was
filed after the expiration of the 300-day limitation period. (Zd. | 10.) On November 7,
2001, Dauzvardis filed the complaint before this court alleging constructive discharge

due to sexual harassment. (Jd. { 11.) Midwest Generation now moves for summary

2



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
MONIQUE DAUZVARDIS, )
)
Plaintiff, ) .
y Judge Ronald A. Gufittt., .
Y. ) .
) 01 C $549
MIDWEST GENERATION, L.L.C., )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Monique Dauzvardis (““Dauzvardis”) has sued her former employer,
Midwest Generation, L.L.C, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)
for alleged constructive discharge due to a sexually hostile work environment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5. Before the Court is defendant Midwest Generation’s motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is denied,

Facts
Dauzvardis was formerly employed by Midwest Generation. (Def.’s LR 56.1
(a)(3) 4 1.) Dauzvardis began her employment with Midwest Generation on February 28,
2000. (id. ¥ 5.) Dauzvardis alleges that co-workers subjected her to sexual harassment
from the beginning of her employment at Midwest Generation in February and March
2000 and that a co-worker accosted her in July 2000. (Jd. 4] 7, 12.) Dauzvardis
complained of the alleged sexual harassment to the operations manager in March 2000

and again {o the plant manager in April 2000. (Def. Ex. B, Charge of Discrimination.)

| 5