w

The more onerous requirements of Rule 23(b) (3), however, are
not met here. In order to satisfy this rule, plaintiffs must show
that common questions predominate in the suit and that a class
action is superior to other methods of adjudication. Rule 23(b) (3)
certification was denied in Hill v. Amoco Oil because individual
questions respecting not only damages, but also liability, would
have to be resolved in each of hundreds or thousands of individual
cases. Id. at *28. “Where, as here, individual questions bearing on
liability predominate over common questions, certification of a
Rule 23(b) (3) class is inappropriate.” Id. at *26-27. I agree with
Judge Gottschall’s analysis in that case. If an African-American
was required to prepay at a Speedway station, she would be a member
of the class, but if all other customers (including Caucasians)
were also required to prepay at that station or at that hour, she
would not have demonstrated that Speedway discriminated against
her. Id. at *26.

Finally, the plaintiffs ask for a class consisting of all
African-American persons who have purchased gasoline at the
defendant’s stations in Cook, Lake, DuPage, McHenry, Will, and Kane
Counties in Illinois as well as Lake County in Indiana. They
further ask for a subclass consisting of those persons who were
required to prepay. The proposed class is overly broad; persons who
were not required to prepay suffered no injury alleged in the

complaint. The class is certified as to African-Americans required


of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members
{the alleged discriminatory conduct) and his claims are based on
the same legal theory. Id. at *18-19. Finally, there is no reason
to doubt the adequacy of representation. Representation is adequate
where the plaintiff's attorney has the qualifications and
experience necessary to conduct the litigation and if the named
plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the proposed
class. Id. at *20. The defendant argues, first, that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys are obviously inadequate because of a failure
to submit evidence as to other members of the class. This is a
perplexing argument; plaintiffs do submit a good deal of such
evidence. Next, it argues that there is no viable class
representative because plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden
of showing that Perry Whiteside may serve in that capacity. As I
stated in my earlier order, there is every indication that he may.

Plaintiffs seek certification under both Rule 23(b)(2) and
23(b) (3). They meet the requirements for certification under
23(b) (2). Such certification is appropriate where the defendant
acted on grounds generally applicable to the class and where
declaratory or injunctive relief is necessary. Cases involving
racial discrimination against a large group of individuals are
textbook examples of the type of action appropriately resolved

under 23(b) (2). Id. at *22-23.



to prepay for gasoline at the defendant’s stations in the named

counties.
ENTER ORDER:
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: July 14 , 2004



&

” Mioute Onde onn (06097)
United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge Elaine E. Bucklo Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Asalgned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 2032 DATE 7119/2004
CASE Blanchard, et al. Vs. Speedway Superamerica, LLC
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.
DOCKET ENTRY:
ql) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) o Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due. :
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) is} Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(7) Qa Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
OFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 CIFRCP41(a)(1) COFRCP41(a)(2).
ao [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order granting plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification. The class is certified as to African-Americans required to prepay for gasoline at the
defendant’s stations in Cook, Lake, DuPage, McHenry, Will, and Kane Counties in Ilinois as well as
Lake County in Indiana.
(il) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
Ff | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form. AUNOD LIVISIO “S'N
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. Yua1
common OPC He GI TNE NON.
MPs fos potas Babar ka te a
initials cut an
central Clerk's Office



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DOCKETED
JUL-2 0 2004

LENORE BLANCHARD, LANITA GRAY,
KENNETH JOHNSON, CHRISTOPHER
LAWSON, DEBRA MCCARROLL, BRUCE
POLK, ISABELLA SMITH, KERRY
STEWART, and PERRY WHITESIDE,

Plaintiffs,
v. No. 02 C 2032

SPEEDWAY SUPERAMERICA, LLC,

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs are African-American customers of defendant
Speedway Superamerica, LLC (“Speedway”), a gas station chain, who
were allegedly obliged to pay for gasoline before filling their
tanks (“pre-payment”) while white customers were allowed to fill
their tanks and pay afterwards. The plaintiffs seek relief on
behalf of themselves and a class of African-American customers
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (Count I) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (Count
II). Speedway successfully moved to dismiss the § 2000a claims of
all plaintiffs other than Perry Whiteside for failure to comply
with state notice requirements and to dismiss plaintiff Debra
McCarroll’s claim under Count I under the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs now move for class certification. I Grant the motion, but

as to a narrower class than that requested by the plaintiffs.

|


I note, first, that nearly identical classes were certified in
nearly identical cases against different defendants twice in the
last three years. Hill v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 97-C7501, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3082, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2001) (certifying class of
African-Americans allegedly obliged to pre-pay for gasoline at
Chicago-area Amoco stations); Hill v. Shel] Oil Co., No. 98-C5766,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13396 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2002) (certifying
class of African-Americans allegedly obliged to pre-pay for
gasoline at Chicago-area Shell stations). In order to gain class
certification, plaintiffs must satisfy the four requirements of
Rule 23(a) (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate
representation) as well as the requirements of at least one
subcategory of Rule 23(b). Like the plaintiffs in the previous
litigation on the subject, plaintiffs here easily meet the
standards of Rule 23(a). The plaintiffs have identified 72
individuals who claim to have been mistreated in a similar fashion
by the defendant; this is more than enough to render joinder
impracticable. Hill v. Amoco Oil Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3082,
at *15-16. The commonality and typicality requirements, usually
analyzed together, are similarly met. There is a question of law or
fact common to the resolution of all class members’ claims (whether
the defendant engaged in a pattern of discrimination against
African-Americans by requiring prepayment). Id. at *17. The named

plaintiff’s claim arises from the same event or practice or course