**************************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of this opinion is the date the opinion was

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the

beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion

motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially

released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

This opinion is subject to revisions and editorial

changes, not of a substantive nature, and corrections

of a technical nature prior to publication in the

Connecticut Law Journal. ****************************************************************
IN RE SEQUOIA G. ET AL.*

(AC 44346)

Elgo, Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgments of the

trial court terminating her parental rights as to her minor children, S,

B and A. She claimed that the court improperly found that it was in the

best interests of the children to terminate her parental rights. Held that

there was ample evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that

termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of

the minor children as the court’s findings as to the children’s best

interests, made pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112 (k)), were factually supported and legally sound, such that this court would not substitute its

judgment for that of the trial court: it was not inappropriate for the

court to have considered, as to the emotional ties factor in § 17a-112

(k) (4), the bond between the children and their foster parents, and,

although the court did not specifically discuss the feelings and emotional

ties of the children with respect to the mother when stating its findings,

it did not follow that the court failed to consider those feelings and

ties, as reading the court’s decision as a whole revealed that the court

considered them and that it determined that the children and the mother

did not have a strong bond; moreover, when the court’s decision was

read as a whole, the court’s factual findings supported its conclusion

under § 17a-112 (k) (3) that the mother had not complied with her

obligations in connection with certain of the court’s orders, including

that it was not clearly erroneous for the court to find that she had not

fulfilled her obligations regarding visitation with the children; furthermore, as to A, the mother did not direct this court to any case law

indicating that a court has an obligation, sua sponte, to consider a less

onerous means of achieving permanency planning in the absence of a

motion specifically seeking an alternative permanency plan, and,

because the issue of whether a transfer of guardianship was appropriate

for A was never raised in the trial court, it made no findings regarding

whether such a transfer was in A’s best interest and a more appropriate

disposition for A than the one approved by the court.

Argued April 8—officially released June 8, 2021**

Procedural History

Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Litchfield at Torrington,

Juvenile Matters, where the matter was tried to the

court, Hon. Joseph W. Doherty, judge trial referee; judgments terminating the respondents’ parental rights,

from which the respondent mother appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent mother).

Benjamin A. Abrams, assistant attorney general,

with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney

general, and Evan O’Roark, assistant attorney general,

for the appellee (petitioner).

Joseph A. Geremia, Jr., for the minor children.
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The respondent mother, Michelle L.,

appeals from the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor children, Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice.1 On appeal, the

respondent claims that the court improperly found that

it was in the best interests of the children to terminate

her parental rights. We disagree with the respondent

and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts, which the court found by clear

and convincing evidence, and procedural history, are

relevant. ‘‘The family has an extensive history with [the

Department of Children and Families (department)].

. . . On July 31, 2008, neglect petitions were filed with

the Superior Court for juvenile matters with regard

to Sequoia, Tevvon and Benjamin. The children were

adjudicated neglected and a disposition of protective

supervision was entered on April 29, 2009, and expired

on June 17, 2009. On March 30, 2012, a ninety-six hour

hold was invoked with regard to Sequoia, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice. The hold was vacated on April 3, 2012.

On April 8, 2012, neglect petitions were filed with the

Superior Court for juvenile matters . . . regarding

Sequoia, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice. The children

were adjudicated neglected and a disposition of protective supervision was entered on November 14, 2012,

and expired on May 14, 2013. . . . Following a team

meeting . . . the department was concerned about

Sequoia returning to the care of either parent. She was

placed in a therapeutic foster home.

‘‘On November 21, 2016, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice

were removed from the father’s care through an [order

of temporary custody] . . . . Protective supervision of

those three children was vested in the respondent. On

January 26, 2017, and January 27, 2017, [the department]

received referrals regarding the children’s safety in [the

respondent’s] home. When [the department] responded

to those referrals, [the respondent] reportedly yelled,

screamed and used profanity. Tevvon, Benjamin and

Anice were removed from her custody pursuant to a

ninety-six hour hold on January 27, 2017. On January

30, 2017, an order of temporary custody was filed and

granted. On March 30, 2018, the court granted a motion

to modify the protective supervision to commitment

regarding Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice. All three children were committed to [the custody of the petitioner,

the Commissioner of Children and Families]. On April

23, 2018, [the petitioner] filed with the court four petitions for termination of parental rights regarding

Sequoia, Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice.’’ On September

24, 2019, prior to the start of evidence, the petitioner

moved to withdraw [her] termination of parental rights

petition as to Tevvon and, instead, filed a motion for

permanent transfer of guardianship seeking to vest

guardianship of Tevvon in his foster father, Gary R.
In its memorandum of decision, filed August 28, 2020,

the court noted that the trial took place over the course

of five days. The court stated that, despite having proper

notice, the respondent was not present for trial and did

not present any evidence or testimony to refute the

grounds alleged in the termination of parental rights

petitions. The court noted that, according to her counsel, the respondent was in Indiana. The court granted

the petitioner’s petition for a permanent transfer of

guardianship as to Tevvon and appointed Gary R., as

his permanent legal guardian.

The court found in the adjudicatory phase, by clear

and convincing evidence, that the department made

reasonable efforts at reunification; see General Statutes

§ 17a-112 (j) (1); and that the respondent had failed to

achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation

within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).2 The court

proceeded to the dispositional phase, in which it determined that it was in the best interests of Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice that the respondent’s parental rights be

terminated with respect to those three children. This

appeal followed.

On appeal, the respondent does not challenge either

the conclusions the court made during the adjudicatory

phase or the court’s decision to transfer permanent

guardianship as to Tevvon.3 Her sole claim on appeal

concerns the findings and conclusions made by the

court during the dispositional phase, with respect to

Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice. We do not agree with the

respondent.

The following legal principles and standard of review

guide our analysis. ‘‘This court will overturn a determination that termination of parental rights is in the best

interests of a child only if the court’s findings are clearly

erroneous.’’ In re Kiara Liz V., 203 Conn. App. 613,

626, 248 A.3d 813 (2021).4

‘‘In the dispositional phase

of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis

appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to

the best interest of the child. . . . The best interests

of the child include the child’s interests in sustained

growth, development, well-being, and continuity and

stability of [the child’s] environment. . . . In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the

continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is not

in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in

[§ 17a-112 (k)]. . . . The seven factors serve simply as

guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be

ordered. . . . There is no requirement that each factor

be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Footnote

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)In re Joseph
M., 158 Conn. App. 849, 868–69, 120 A.3d 1271 (2015);

see also General Statutes § 17a-112 (k).5

The court made findings pursuant to each of the seven

statutory factors in § 17a-112 (k) before determining,

by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of

the respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests

of Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice, who at the time of the

court’s decision were fifteen, twelve and nine years

old, respectively. The respondent challenges the court’s

findings as to two of these factors.

The respondent argues regarding the emotional ties

factor, § 17a-112 (k) (4), that the court did not comment

on the relationship between the children and her, but

rather focused solely on the relationship between the

foster parents and the children. She contends that the

court ignored the testimony of Anice’s foster parent,

Gary R., that she had weekly phone contact with the

respondent and had expressed that she would like to

live with the respondent or her father and, if that is not

possible, she would like to continue living with Gary

R.6 We are not persuaded.

The court found as to the emotional ties factor that

Benjamin has a positive relationship with his foster

parents and Sequoia has a positive relationship with

her foster mother, whom she approaches readily for

affection and care. The court found that Anice would

like to be adopted by Gary R. if she cannot return to

her biological parents.

It was not inappropriate for the court to have considered the bond between the children and their foster

parents. The plain language of § 17a-112 (k) (4) provides

that the trial court shall consider and make written

findings regarding ‘‘the feelings and emotional ties of

the child . . . to . . . any person who has exercised

physical care, custody or control of the child for at

least one year and with whom the child has developed

significant emotional ties . . . .’’ The court’s findings

as to the emotional ties factor indicate that the three

children had been in their placements for more than

one year at the time of its decision. In In re Nevaeh

W., 317 Conn. 723, 731–33, 120 A.3d 1177 (2015), our

Supreme Court stated that ‘‘[n]othing in [§ 17a-112 (k)

(4)], however, required the trial court to consider only

the children’s emotional ties with the respondent. . . .

To the contrary, this court has repeatedly recognized

that, in the dispositional stage, it is appropriate to consider the importance of permanency in children’s lives.

. . . Indeed . . . [i]n regard to children who have

bonded with their foster parents, [o]nce new psychological relationships form, separation from the new parents

becomes no less painful and no less damaging to a child

than separation from natural or adoptive caregiving

parents. . . . Termination of a biological parent’s

rights, by preventing further litigation with that parent,

can preserve the stability a child has acquired in a
successful foster placement and, furthermore, move the

child closer toward securing permanence by removing

barriers to adoption.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Although the court did not specifically discuss the

feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect

to the respondent when stating its findings regarding

§ 17a-112 (k) (4), it does not follow that the court failed

to consider those feelings and ties. Our Supreme Court

stated in In re Nevaeh W., that, ‘‘in considering the trial

court’s findings pursuant to § 17a-112 (k) (4), we are

mindful that an opinion must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the

parameters of its holding’’ and determined that even

though the trial court did not specifically mention the

emotional ties between the children and the respondent

in its statutory findings during the dispositional phase,

that the memorandum of decision, when read as a

whole, indicated that the court considered the children’s emotional ties to the respondent. Id., 733.

In the present case, reading the court’s decision as

a whole reveals that the court considered the feelings

and emotional ties the children had with the respondent. The court found that the respondent relocated to

Indiana and visited one time in one year. The court also

found that the respondent had difficulties ‘‘managing

the children’s behaviors during visits, as they were frequently arguing and fighting. She struggles with basic

conversation and affection with the children, and needs

to demonstrate active engagement in their lives and

show interest in their well-being. . . . [The respondent] participated in the updated court-ordered psychological evaluations with [Jessica] Biren Caverly, [a psychologist], in August, 2017. . . . It was reported that

[the respondent] consistently demonstrates emotional

coldness, detachment and flattened affect, especially

in interactions with the children. . . . It was reported

that the parents cannot appreciate the traumatic environment they created for their children and how it can

impact children long after removal from their home. It

[was] reported that neither [the respondent] nor the

father demonstrated any significant engagement or

bond with the children.’’ The court further determined

that Anice’s desire to live with the respondent or her

father is ‘‘not realistic or possible.’’ The court also found

that ‘‘Tevvon, Benjamin and Anice look to their older

sisters Azelia and Sequoia more readily as parental and

attachment figures tha[n] they do to either of their parents.’’ It is clear from these findings that the court determined that the children did not have a strong bond with

the respondent. Even if, however, such a bond were

present, ‘‘the existence of a bond between a parent

and a child, while relevant, is not dispositive of a best

interest determination.’’ In re Kiara Liz V., supra, 203

Conn. App. 626.
The respondent’s next argument concerns the court’s

findings regarding the extent to which she had fulfilled

her obligations in connection with the orders of the

court. See General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) (3). The following relevant specific steps were ordered by the court

to facilitate reunification and agreed to by the respondent: ‘‘Keep all appointments set by or with [the department]. Cooperate with [the department’s] home visits,

announced or unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)’s court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad

litem. . . . Visit the child(ren) as often as [the department] permits.’’ See In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 587,

122 A.3d 1247 (2015) (specific steps constitute order of

court). The court found, inter alia, that the respondent

had not fulfilled these court-ordered obligations.

The respondent contends that, because she has

resided out of state, ‘‘it is unlikely that the [department]

or the children’s attorney and/or guardian[s] ad litem

would conduct home visits. Regarding visitation with

the children, the [respondent] did visit with the children

when she was living in [Connecticut] and when she

is able to make trips now back to [Connecticut], she

arranges for visits with the children and, more importantly, she has weekly phone contact with the children.’’

We are not persuaded by this argument.

When reading the court’s decision as a whole, the

court’s factual findings support its conclusion that the

respondent had not complied with the court orders at

issue. The court found that, although the department

had offered supervised visitation, the respondent did

not continue visitation with Sequoia, Benjamin or Anice,

but ‘‘left her children behind’’ and moved to Indiana.

Evidence presented at trial supports this finding. A

social worker with the department testified that after

the respondent moved to Indiana in June, 2018, she had

supervised visits with some or all three of the children

in January, 2019, and June, 2019. A ‘‘Social Study in

Support of Petition for Termination of Parental Rights,’’7

dated April 16, 2018, which was admitted as a full exhibit

at trial, indicates that the respondent has not been consistent in keeping appointments with the department

and has refused to permit the department to conduct

home visits since November, 2017. In that social study,

it was noted that the respondent has visited with the

children, but struggled with appropriately parenting the

children during visits. A subsequent ‘‘Social Study in

Support of Permanency Plan,’’ dated July 1, 2019, which

was admitted as a full exhibit at trial, stated that the

respondent had visited the children twice since she

moved to Indiana in June, 2018. The court also had

before it evidence of the children’s varying degrees of

phone contact with the respondent. The July 1, 2019

social study noted that Benjamin communicates with

the respondent ‘‘a few times a month’’ on the phone,

that Anice ‘‘does not communicate often on the phone’’
with the respondent and that Sequoia talks to the

respondent weekly on the phone.

Particularly in light of the evidence that the respondent refused to allow the department to conduct home

visits since November, 2017, and that she has visited

with the children only twice in person since moving to

Indiana in June, 2018, it was not clearly erroneous for

the court to find that she had not fulfilled her obligations

in connection with the court orders regarding visitation

with the children.

Although the respondent did not file a motion for

transfer of guardianship as to Anice, she additionally

argues that the court erred in finding that it was in

Anice’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s

parental rights with respect to her because Anice, who

resides in the same household as Tevvon, ‘‘would probably be happy’’ with a permanency plan similar to that

of Tevvon, wherein guardianship would be transferred

to Gary R. She contends that Gary R. testified that he

would be willing to be a permanent resource for Anice

and that terminating her parental rights with respect

to Anice would subject her to further disruption

wherein she would be removed from the home she lives

in with Tevvon.

The respondent has not directed us to any case law

indicating that a court has an obligation, sua sponte,

to consider a ‘‘less onerous means of achieving permanency planning’’ in the absence of a motion specifically

seeking an alternative permanency plan. Rather, our

statutory scheme provides as follows: ‘‘A permanency

plan is the proposal for what the long-term, permanent

solution for the placement of the child should be. General Statutes §§ 17a-111b (c) and 46b-129 (k). Our statutory scheme provides five permanency options: (1)

reunification with a parent; (2) long-term foster care;

(3) permanent guardianship; (4) transfer of either

guardianship or permanent guardianship; or (5) termination followed by adoption. General Statutes §§ 17a111b (c) and 46b-129 (k) (2). If during the course of

the juvenile proceedings the child is placed in the care

and custody of the petitioner . . . the petitioner must

file a motion for review of a permanency plan within

nine months of that placement. General Statutes § 46b129 (k) (1) (A). When the petitioner files a motion to

review a permanency plan, the respondent parents and

qualifying relatives may file a motion in opposition to

the proposed plan. General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (1)

(A). If the permanency plan is opposed, the court must

hold an evidentiary hearing, at which [t]he commissioner shall have the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plan is in the best interests of the

child or youth. General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (1) (A).

After the hearing, the court shall approve a permanency

plan that is in the best interests of the child . . . and

takes into consideration the child’s . . . need for per-
manency. General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (2). If the trial

court approves a permanency plan of termination followed by adoption, the petitioner shall file a petition

for termination of parental rights not later than sixty

days after such approval if such petition has not previously been filed . . . . General Statutes § 46b-129 (k)

(6) (A).’’ (Footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Adelina A., 169 Conn. App. 111, 121–23,

148 A.3d 621, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 949, 169 A.3d

792 (2016).

The respondent filed a motion in opposition to the

proposed permanency plan in which she stated that it

was in the best interests of the children that they be

reunited with her, and she did not request a permanent

transfer of guardianship as to Anice. Because the issue

of whether a transfer of guardianship was appropriate

for Anice was never raised in the trial court, it made

no findings regarding whether a transfer of guardianship was in Anice’s best interests and a more appropriate disposition for Anice than the one approved by

the court. See, e.g., In re Azareon Y., 309 Conn. 626,

633–39, 72 A.3d 1074 (2013) (when respondent did not

request trial court to consider alternatives to petitioner’s permanency plan, record on appeal was inadequate

to review substantive due process claim). We cannot

review this aspect of the respondent’s best interest

claim because it was not raised in the trial court and

no exceptional circumstances exist. ‘‘It is well settled

that [o]ur case law and rules of practice generally limit

[an appellate] court’s review to issues that are distinctly

raised at trial. . . . [O]nly in [the] most exceptional

circumstances can and will this court consider a claim,

constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised

and decided in the trial court. . . . The reason for the

rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on

appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too

late for the trial court or the opposing party to address

the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which

is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown &

Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 142, 84 A.3d

840 (2014); see also In re Skylar B., 204 Conn. App.

729, 745, A.3d (2021) (only properly filed motion

provides requisite notice to all interested parties and

court of alternative disposition as well as evidence relevant for court to evaluate merits of transfer of guardianship versus termination of parental rights and adoption).

In the present case, there was ample evidence to

support the court’s conclusion that termination of the

respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests

of Sequoia, Benjamin and Anice. The respondent challenged the court’s findings only as to two of the statutory factors; both challenges we have rejected. Moreover, even if the respondent were able to demonstrate
that error existed with respect to one or both of these

factors, it would not necessarily affect our disposition

of the appeal for ‘‘a trial court’s determination of the

best interests of a child will not be overturned on the

basis of one factor if that determination is otherwise

factually supported and legally sound.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Xavier H., 201 Conn. App.

81, 102, 240 A.3d 1087, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 981, 241

A.3d 705 (2020), and cert. denied, 335 Conn. 982, 241

A.3d 705 (2020). ‘‘The balancing of interests in a case

involving termination of parental rights is a delicate

task and, when supporting evidence is not lacking, the

trial court’s ultimate determination as to a child’s best

interest is entitled to the utmost deference. . . .

Although a judge [charged with determining whether

termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest]

is guided by legal principles, the ultimate decision

[whether termination is justified] is intensely human.

It is the judge in the courtroom who looks the witnesses

in the eye, interprets their body language, listens to the

inflections in their voices and otherwise assesses the

subtleties that are not conveyed in the cold transcript.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Davonta V.,

285 Conn. 483, 497, 940 A.2d 733 (2008). We conclude

that the court’s findings as to the children’s best interests are factually supported and legally sound and we

will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial

court.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** June 8, 2021, the date that this opinion was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The court also terminated the parental rights of the father with respect

to these three children. Because the father is not participating in this appeal,

we will refer in this opinion to the respondent mother as the respondent.

2

‘‘[A] hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two

phases, adjudication and disposition. . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the

trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination

of parental rights . . . exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial

court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds

to the dispositional phase.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alison

M., 127 Conn. App. 197, 203–204, 15 A.3d 194 (2011).

3 The petitioner filed a motion to strike portions of the respondent’s appellate appendix that contained copies of documents that are dated after the

close of evidence and after the court filed its memorandum of decision. All

of the challenged documents pertain to Tevvon, and the respondent does

not challenge the court’s decision to transfer his permanent guardianship

to Gary R. Because these documents are not evidence and, moreover, are

not relevant to our resolution of the issues raised in this appeal, we do not

consider them.

4 The respondent acknowledges that reviewing courts apply a clearly erroneous standard to such claims, but invites us to apply a sufficiency of the

evidence standard to our review of the court’s best interest determination.

See In re Malachi E., 188 Conn. App. 426, 443–44 n.6, 204 A.3d 810 (2019)

(declining to adopt evidentiary sufficiency standard of review to best interest

determination as it is not used by our Supreme Court). The respondent,

however, provides no law or analysis in support of her requested standard
of review. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility

Control, 266 Conn. 108, 120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003) (appellate courts not

required to review issues improperly presented through inadequate brief).

5 General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides in relevant part that, ‘‘in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall

consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness,

nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the

parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with

the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made

reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption

and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms

of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual

or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled

their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of

the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s

person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control

of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed

significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent

has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to

make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the

foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which

the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to

reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to

incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other

custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been

prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by

the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the

unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of

the parent.’’

6 The respondent also argues that the court ignored the testimony of Gary

R. that Tevvon had weekly phone contact with the respondent. Given that

the court did not terminate the respondent’s parental rights regarding Tevvon

and that the respondent expressly stated in her brief that she was not

contesting the court’s transfer of guardianship regarding Tevvon, we do not

address this argument.

7 Pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717 (e): ‘‘(1) The court may, and in

any contested case shall, request the Commissioner of Children and Families

. . . to make an investigation and written report to it, within ninety days

from the receipt of such request. The report shall indicate the physical,

mental and emotional status of the child and shall contain such facts as

may be relevant to the court’s determination of whether the proposed termination of parental rights will be in the best interests of the child, including

the physical, mental, social and financial condition of the biological parents,

and any other factors which the commissioner . . . finds relevant to the

court’s determination of whether the proposed termination will be in the

best interests of the child. . . . (3) The report shall be admissible in evidence, subject to the right of a party to require that the person making it

appear as a witness and be subject to examination.’’