II

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1164

To state a policy of the United States that engages the People’s Republic

of China in areas of mutual interest, promotes human rights, religious

freedom, and democracy in China, and enhances the national security

interests of the United States with respect to China, and for other

purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 11, 1997

Mr. ABRAHAM (for himself, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr.

COVERDELL, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. ASHCROFT, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. MACK,

and Mr. HELMS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To state a policy of the United States that engages the

People’s Republic of China in areas of mutual interest,

promotes human rights, religious freedom, and democracy in China, and enhances the national security interests of the United States with respect to China, and

for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the

5 ‘‘China Policy Act of 1997’’.
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1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of

2 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.

TITLE I—SANCTIONS

Sec. 101. Denial of entry into United States of certain officials of the People’s

Republic of China.

Sec. 102. Limitations on multilateral assistance for the People’s Republic of

China.

Sec. 103. Sanctions regarding China North Industries Group, China Poly

Group, and certain other entities affiliated with the People’s

Liberation Army.

Sec. 104. Consultations with allies regarding sanctions against the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 105. Termination of certain authorities.

TITLE II—HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND

DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

Sec. 201. Findings on human rights abuses in the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 202. Findings on religious freedom in the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 203. Findings on Tibet.

Sec. 204. Findings on coercive family planning practices in the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 205. Combating slave labor and ‘‘reeducation’’ centers.

Sec. 206. International broadcasting to China.

Sec. 207. National Endowment for Democracy.

Sec. 208. United States Information Agency student, cultural, and legislative

exchange programs.

Sec. 209. Annual reports on family planning activities in the People’s Republic

of China by recipients of United States funds.

Sec. 210. Sense of Congress regarding multilateral efforts to address China’s

human rights record.

Sec. 211. Sense of Congress regarding compliance by the People’s Republic of

China with the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong.

TITLE III—NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Findings on the proliferation of ballistic missiles by the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 302. Findings on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by the

People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 303. Findings on the proliferation of destabilizing advanced conventional

weapons by the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 304. Findings on the evasion of United States export control laws by the

People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 305. Findings on the inconsistent application of United States export control laws to the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong.

Sec. 306. Exports of supercomputers to the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 307. Dual-use exports to Hong Kong.

Sec. 308. Enforcement of Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act with respect to

the People’s Republic of China.
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Sec. 309. Transfers of sensitive equipment and technology by the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 310. Annual reports on activities of the People’s Liberation Army.

Sec. 311. Annual reports on intelligence activities of the People’s Republic of

China.

Sec. 312. Study of theater ballistic missile defense system for Taiwan.

Sec. 313. Sense of Congress regarding United States force levels in Asia.

Sec. 314. Sense of Congress regarding establishment of commission on security

and cooperation in Asia.

TITLE IV—TRADE

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the accession of Taiwan to the World

Trade Organization.

TITLE V—HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

WORLDWIDE

Sec. 501. Training for immigration officers regarding religions persecution.

Sec. 502. Promotion of religious freedom and human rights worldwide.

TITLE VI—OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Termination of United States assistance for East-West Center.

1 SEC. 2. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

2 The policy of the United States with respect to the

3 People’s Republic of China is as follows:

4 (1) To encourage freedom and democracy in the

5 People’s Republic of China and to deter the Govern6 ment of the People’s Republic of China from engag7 ing in activities that are contrary to the national se8 curity interests of the United States.

9 (2) To encourage the Government of the Peo10 ple’s Republic of China to make progress towards

11 improving overall human rights conditions in China

12 and Tibet, including the taking of concrete steps to

13 assure freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and

14 freedom of association in compliance with inter15 national standards on human rights.
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1 (3) To encourage the Government of the Peo2 ple’s Republic of China to channel its emerging

3 power and influence along paths that are conducive

4 to peace, stability, and development in the Asian Pa5 cific region.

6 (4) To preserve and protect the national secu7 rity interests of the United States and its allies by—

8 (A) deterring the proliferation of weapons

9 and sensitive equipment and technology by the

10 Government of the People’s Republic of China;

11 and

12 (B) sanctioning companies affiliated with

13 the People’s Liberation Army that engage in

14 the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc15 tion, the importation of illegal weapons or fire16 arms into the United States, or espionage in

17 the United States.

18 (5) To support a strong United States presence

19 in and commitment to the leadership of the Asian

20 Pacific region.

21 (6) To support integration of the People’s Re22 public of China into the community of nations.

23 (7) To limit the use of United States taxpayer

24 funds for the subsidization of the Government of the

25 People’s Republic of China through such mecha-
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1 nisms as assistance through multilateral develop2 ment banks and other United States Government

3 programs.

4 TITLE I—SANCTIONS

5 SEC. 101. DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES OF CER6 TAIN OFFICIALS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC

7 OF CHINA.

8 (a) DENIAL OF ENTRY.—Except as provided in sub9 section (b), the Secretary of State may not issue any visa

10 to, and the Attorney General may not admit to the United

11 States, any of the following officials of the Government

12 of the People’s Republic of China:

13 (1) High-ranking officials of the People’s Lib14 eration Army, as determined by the Secretary.

15 (2) High-ranking officials of the Public Security

16 Bureau, as so determined.

17 (3) High-ranking officials of the Religious Af18 fairs Bureau, as so determined.

19 (4) Other high-ranking officials determined by

20 the Secretary to be involved in the implementation

21 or enforcement of laws and directives of the People’s

22 Republic of China which restrict religious freedom.

23 (5) High-ranking officials determined by the

24 Secretary to be involved in the implementation or
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1 enforcement of laws and directives of the People’s

2 Republic of China on family planning.

3 (6) Officials determined by the Secretary to

4 have been materially involved in ordering or carrying

5 out the massacre of students in Tiananmen Square

6 in 1989.

7 (b) WAIVER.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2),

9 the President may waive the applicability of sub10 section (a) with respect to any official otherwise cov11 ered by that subsection if the President determines

12 that the waiver with respect to the official is in the

13 interests of the United States.

14 (2) NOTICE.—

15 (A) REQUIREMENT.—The President may

16 not exercise the authority provided in para17 graph (1) with respect to an official unless the

18 President submits to Congress a written notifi19 cation of the exercise of the authority before the

20 entry of the official into the United States.

21 (B) CONTENTS.—Each notice shall include

22 a justification of the exercise of the authority,

23 including—
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1 (i) a statement why the exercise of the

2 authority is in the interests of the United

3 States; and

4 (ii) a statement why such interests su5 persede the need for the United States to

6 deny entry to the official concerned in re7 sponse to the practices of the Government

8 of the People’s Republic of China which

9 limit the free exercise of religion and other

10 human rights.

11 SEC. 102. LIMITATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE

12 FOR THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

13 (a) INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION

14 AND DEVELOPMENT.—

15 (1) OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE.—

16 (A) OPPOSITION.—Except as provided in

17 subparagraph (B), the Secretary of the Treas18 ury shall instruct the United States Executive

19 Director of the International Bank for Recon20 struction and Development to vote against any

21 loan or other utilization of the funds of the

22 Bank to or for the People’s Republic of China.

23 (B) EXCEPTION.—Subparagraph (A) shall

24 not apply to any loan or other utilization of

25 funds for purposes of—
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1 (i) meeting basic human needs; or

2 (ii) environmental improvements or

3 safeguards.

4 (2) OPPOSITION TO MODIFICATION OF SINGLE

5 COUNTRY LOAN LIMIT.—The Secretary shall instruct

6 the United States Executive Director of the Inter7 national Bank for Reconstruction and Development

8 to vote against any modification of the limitation on

9 the share of the total funds of the Bank that may

10 be loaned to a single country.

11 (b) ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.—

12 (1) OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE.—Except as

13 provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary shall in14 struct the United States Director of the Asian De15 velopment Bank to vote against any loan or other

16 utilization of the funds of the Bank to or for the

17 People’s Republic of China.

18 (2) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not

19 apply to any loan or other utilization of funds for

20 purposes of—

21 (A) meeting basic human needs; or

22 (B) environmental improvements or safe23 guards.

24 (c) INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.—
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1 (1) OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE.—Except as

2 provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary shall in3 struct the United States Executive Director of the

4 International Monetary Fund to vote against any

5 loan or other utilization of the funds of the Fund to

6 or for the People’s Republic of China.

7 (2) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not

8 apply to any loan or other utilization of funds for

9 purposes of—

10 (A) meeting basic human needs; or

11 (B) environmental improvements or safe12 guards.

13 (d) BASIC HUMAN NEEDS DEFINED.—In this sec14 tion, the term ‘‘basic human needs’’ refers to human needs

15 arising from natural disasters or famine.

16 SEC. 103. SANCTIONS REGARDING CHINA NORTH INDUS17 TRIES GROUP, CHINA POLY GROUP, AND CER18 TAIN OTHER ENTITIES AFFILIATED WITH

19 THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY.

20 (a) FINDING; PURPOSE.—

21 (1) FINDING.—Congress finds that, in May

22 1996, United States authorities caught representa23 tives of the People’s Liberation Army enterprise,

24 China Poly Group, and the civilian defense indus25 trial company, China North Industries Group, at-
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1 tempting to smuggle 2,000 AK–47s into Oakland,

2 California, and offering to sell to Federal undercover

3 agents 300,000 machine guns with silencers, 66-mil4 limeter mortars, hand grenades, and ‘‘Red Para5 keet’’ surface-to-air missiles, which, as stated in the

6 criminal complaint against one of those representa7 tives, ‘‘. . . could take out a 747’’ aircraft.

8 (2) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is

9 to impose targeted sanctions against entities affili10 ated with the People’s Liberation Army that engage

11 in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

12 the importation of illegal weapons or firearms into

13 the United States, or espionage in the United

14 States.

15 (b) SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN PLA AFFILI16 ATES.—

17 (1) SANCTIONS.—Except as provided in para18 graph (2) and subject to paragraph (3), the Presi19 dent shall—

20 (A) prohibit the importation into the Unit21 ed States of all products that are produced,

22 grown, or manufactured by a covered entity, the

23 parent company of a covered entity, or any af24 filiate, subsidiary, or successor entity of a cov25 ered entity;
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1 (B) direct the Secretary of State and the

2 Attorney General to deny or impose restrictions

3 on the entry into the United States of any for4 eign national serving as an officer, director, or

5 employee of a covered entity or other entity de6 scribed in subparagraph (A);

7 (C) prohibit the issuance to a covered en8 tity or other entity described in subparagraph

9 (A) of licenses in connection with the export of

10 any item on the United States Munitions List;

11 (D) prohibit the export to a covered entity

12 or other entity described in subparagraph (A)

13 of any goods or technology on which export con14 trols are in effect under section 5 or 6 of the

15 Export Administration Act of 1979;

16 (E) direct the Export-Import Bank of the

17 United States not to give approval to the issu18 ance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of

19 credit, or participation in the extension of credit

20 with respect to a covered entity or other entity

21 described in subparagraph (A);

22 (F) prohibit United States nationals from

23 directly or indirectly issuing any guarantee for

24 any loan or other investment to, issuing any ex25 tension of credit to, or making any investment
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1 in a covered entity or other entity described in

2 subparagraph (A); and

3 (G) prohibit the departments and agencies

4 of the United States and United States nation5 als from entering into any contract with a cov6 ered entity or other entity described in subpara7 graph (A) for the procurement or other provi8 sion of goods or services from such entity.

9 (2) EXCEPTIONS.—

10 (A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall not

11 impose sanctions under this subsection—

12 (i) in the case of the procurement of

13 defense articles or defense services—

14 (I) under contracts or sub15 contracts that are in effect on October

16 1, 1997 (including the exercise of op17 tions for production quantities to sat18 isfy United States operational military

19 requirements);

20 (II) if the President determines

21 that the person or entity to whom the

22 sanctions would otherwise be applied

23 is a sole source supplier of essential

24 defense articles or services and no al25 ternative supplier can be identified; or
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1 (III) if the President determines

2 that such articles or services are es3 sential to the national security; or

4 (ii) in the case of—

5 (I) products or services provided

6 under contracts or binding agree7 ments (as such terms are defined by

8 the President in regulations) or joint

9 ventures entered into before October

10 1, 1997;

11 (II) spare parts;

12 (III) component parts that are

13 not finished products but are essential

14 to United States products or produc15 tion;

16 (IV) routine servicing and main17 tenance of products; or

18 (V) information and technology

19 products and services.

20 (B) IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS.—The

21 President shall not apply the restrictions de22 scribed in paragraph (1)(B) to a person de23 scribed in that paragraph if the President, after

24 consultation with the Attorney General, deter25 mines that the presence of the person in the
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1 United States is necessary for a Federal or

2 State judicial proceeding against a covered en3 tity or other entity described in paragraph

4 (1)(A).

5 (3) TERMINATION.—The sanctions under this

6 subsection shall terminate as follows:

7 (A) In the case of an entity referred to in

8 paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c), on the

9 date that is one year after the date of enact10 ment of this Act.

11 (B) In the case of an entity that becomes

12 a covered entity under paragraph (3) or (4) of

13 subsection (c) by reason of its identification in

14 a report under subsection (d), on the date that

15 is one year after the date on which the entity

16 is identified in such report.

17 (c) COVERED ENTITIES.—For purposes of subsection

18 (b), a covered entity is any of the following:

19 (1) China North Industries Group.

20 (2) China Poly Group, also known as

21 Polytechnologies Incorporated or BAOLI.

22 (3) Any affiliate of the People’s Liberation

23 Army identified in a report of the Director of

24 Central Intelligence under subsection (d)(1).
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1 (4) Any affiliate of the People’s Liberation

2 Army identified in a report of the Director of the

3 Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection

4 (d)(2).

5 (d) REPORTS ON ACTIVITIES OF PLA AFFILIATES.—

6 (1) TRANSFERS OF SENSITIVE ITEMS AND

7 TECHNOLOGIES.—Not later than 30 days after the

8 date of enactment of this Act and annually there9 after through 2002, the Director of Central Intel10 ligence shall submit to the appropriate members

11 Congress a report that identifies each entity owned

12 wholly or in part by the People’s Liberation Army

13 which, during the 2-year period ending on the date

14 of the report, transferred to any other entity a con15 trolled item for use in the following:

16 (A) Any item listed in category I or cat17 egory II of the MTCR Annex.

18 (B) Activities to develop, produce, stock19 pile, or deliver chemical or biological weapons.

20 (C) Nuclear activities in countries that do

21 not maintain full-scope International Atomic

22 Energy Agency safeguards or equivalent full23 scope safeguards.

24 (2) ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED

25 STATES.—Not later than 30 days after the date of
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1 enactment of this Act and annually thereafter

2 through 2002, the Director of the Federal Bureau of

3 Investigation shall submit to the appropriate mem4 bers Congress a report that identifies each entity

5 owned wholly or in part by the People’s Liberation

6 Army which, during the 2-year period ending on the

7 date of the report, attempted to—

8 (A) illegally import weapons or firearms

9 into the United States; or

10 (B) engage in military intelligence collec11 tion or espionage in the United States under

12 the cover of commercial business activity.

13 (3) FORM.—Each report under this subsection

14 shall be submitted in classified form.

15 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

16 (1) AFFILIATE.—The term ‘‘affiliate’’ does not

17 include any United States national engaged in a

18 business arrangement with a covered entity or other

19 entity described in subsection (b)(1)(A).

20 (2) APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.—

21 The term ‘‘appropriate members of congress’’ means

22 the following:

23 (A) The Majority leader and Minority lead24 er of the Senate.
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1 (B) The chairmen and ranking members of

2 the Committee on Foreign Relations and the

3 Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

4 (C) The Speaker and Minority leader of

5 the House of Representatives.

6 (D) The chairmen and ranking members of

7 the Committee on International Relations and

8 the Committee on National Security of the

9 House of Representatives.

10 (3) COMPONENT PART.—The term ‘‘component

11 part’’ means any article that is not usable for its in12 tended function without being embedded or inte13 grated into any other product and, if used in the

14 production of a finished product, would be substan15 tially transformed in that process.

16 (4) CONTROLLED ITEM.—The term ‘‘controlled

17 item’’ means the following:

18 (A) Any item listed in the MTCR Annex.

19 (B) Any item listed for control by the Aus20 tralia Group.

21 (C) Any item relevant to the nuclear fuel

22 cycle of nuclear explosive applications that are

23 listed for control by the Nuclear Suppliers

24 Group.
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1 (5) FINISHED PRODUCT.—The term ‘‘finished

2 product’’ means any article that is usable for its in3 tended function without being embedded in or inte4 grated into any other product, but does not include

5 an article produced by a person or entity other than

6 a covered entity or other entity described in sub7 section (b)(1)(A) that contains parts or components

8 of such an entity if the parts or components have

9 been substantially transformed during production of

10 the finished product.

11 (6) INVESTMENT.—The term ‘‘investment’’ in12 cludes any contribution or commitment of funds,

13 commodities, services, patents, processes, or tech14 niques, in the form of—

15 (A) a loan or loans;

16 (B) the purchase of a share of ownership;

17 (C) participation in royalties, earnings, or

18 profits; and

19 (D) the furnishing of commodities or serv20 ices pursuant to a lease or other contract,

21 but does not include routine maintenance of prop22 erty.

23 (7) MTCR ANNEX.—The term ‘‘MTCR Annex’’

24 has the meaning given that term in section 74(4) of

25 the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c(4)).
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1 (8) UNITED STATES NATIONAL.—

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘United

3 States national’’ means—

4 (i) any United States citizen; and

5 (ii) any corporation, partnership, or

6 other organization created under the laws

7 of the United States, any State, the Dis8 trict of Columbia, or any territory or pos9 session of the United States.

10 (B) EXCEPTION.—The term ‘‘United

11 States national’’ does not include a subsidiary

12 or affiliate of corporation, partnership, or orga13 nization that is a United States national if the

14 subsidiary or affiliate is located outside the

15 United States.

16 SEC. 104. CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES REGARDING SANC17 TIONS AGAINST THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

18 CHINA.

19 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con20 gress that the President should begin consultations with

21 the major allies and other trading partners of the United

22 States in order to encourage such allies and trading part23 ners to adopt sanctions against the People’s Republic of

24 China that are similar to the sanctions imposed on the

25 People’s Republic of China by section 102.
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1 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 45 days after the com2 pletion of the first Group of Seven summit meeting after

3 the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall sub4 mit to Congress a report on the results, if any, of consulta5 tions referred to in subsection (a).

6 SEC. 105. TERMINATION OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES.

7 (a) TERMINATION DATE.—Sections 101 and 102

8 shall cease to apply at the end of the five-year period be9 ginning on the date of enactment of this Act.

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON REVIEW.—It is the

11 sense of Congress that Congress should review the desir12 ability of terminating the sanctions in this title before the

13 date on which the sanctions would otherwise terminate

14 under this title upon the occurrence of any of the following

15 events:

16 (1) The admission of the People’s Republic of

17 China into the World Trade Organization on com18 mercially viable terms.

19 (2) A determination by the President that the

20 Government of the People’s Republic of China is im21 plementing fully all applicable international agree22 ments relating to the proliferation of arms.

23 (3) A determination by the President that the

24 Government of the People’s Republic of China is ac-
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1 tively and effectively combatting all forms of reli2 gious persecution in China.

3 (4) A determination by the President that the

4 Government of the People’s Republic of China is re5 evaluating in a meaningful manner its actions re6 garding the massacre of students in Tiananmen

7 Square in 1989.

8 (5) The publication by the Government of the

9 People’s Republic of China of a report on the na10 tional security strategy of that government which in11 cludes a comprehensive description and discussion of

12 the elements of that strategy similar to the descrip13 tion and discussion of the national security strategy

14 of the United States in the annual report required

15 by section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947

16 (50 U.S.C. 404a).

17 (6) A determination by the President that the

18 Government of the People’s Republic of China has

19 taken meaningful actions toward improving overall

20 human rights conditions in China and Tibet, includ21 ing the release of political prisoners, improving pris22 on conditions, providing prisoners with adequate

23 medical care, and full compliance with any inter24 national human rights accords to which that govern25 ment is a signatory.
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1 TITLE II—HUMAN RIGHTS, RELI2 GIOUS FREEDOM, AND DE3 MOCRACY IN CHINA

4 SEC. 201. FINDINGS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE

5 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

6 Congress makes the following findings regarding

7 human rights abuses in the People’s Republic of China:

8 (1) Congress concurs in the following conclu9 sions of the Department of State regarding human

10 rights in the People’s Republic of China in 1996:

11 (A) The People’s Republic of China is ‘‘an

12 authoritarian state’’ in which ‘‘citizens lack the

13 freedom to peacefully express opposition to the

14 party-led political system and the right to

15 change their national leaders or form of govern16 ment’’.

17 (B) The Government of the People’s Re18 public of China has ‘‘continued to commit wide19 spread and well documented human rights

20 abuses, in violation of internationally accepted

21 norms, stemming from the authorities’ intoler22 ance of dissent, fear of unrest, and the absence

23 or inadequacy of laws protecting basic free24 doms’’.
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1 (C) ‘‘Abuses include torture and mistreat2 ment of prisoners, forced confessions, and arbi3 trary and incommunicado detention’’.

4 (D) ‘‘Prison conditions remained harsh

5 [and] [t]he Government continued severe re6 strictions on freedom of speech, the press, as7 sembly, association, religion, privacy, and work8 er rights’’.

9 (E) ‘‘Although the Government denies that

10 it holds political prisoners, the number of per11 sons detained or serving sentences for

12 ‘counterrevolutionary crimes’ or ‘crimes against

13 the state’ and for peaceful political or religious

14 activities are believed to number in the thou15 sands’’.

16 (F) ‘‘Non-approved religious groups, in17 cluding Protestant and Catholic

18 groups . . experienced intensified repression’’.

19 (G) ‘‘Serious human rights abuses persist

20 in minority areas, including Tibet, Xinjiang,

21 and Inner Mongolia [, and] [c]ontrols on reli22 gion and other fundamental freedoms in these

23 areas have also intensified’’.

24 (H) ‘‘Overall in 1996, the authorities

25 stepped up efforts to cut off expressions of pro-
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1 test or criticism. All public dissent against the

2 party and government was effectively silenced

3 by intimidation, exile, the imposition of prison

4 terms, administrative detention, or house ar5 rest. No dissidents were known to be active at

6 year’s end.’’.

7 (2) People’s Republic of China authorities con8 tinue to hold Wei Jingsheng in prison for his

9 prodemocracy beliefs, and he is suffering in prison

10 from a lack of medical attention and beatings by fel11 low prisoners.

12 (3) On October 30, 1996, a People’s Republic

13 of China court sentenced Wang Dan to 11 years in

14 prison primarily for articles published outside the

15 People’s Republic of China, and People’s Republic of

16 China authorities are not providing him with ade17 quate medical care.

18 (4) In addition to Wei Jingsheng and Wang

19 Dan, hundreds, if not thousands, of other political,

20 religious, and labor dissidents are imprisoned in

21 China for peacefully expressing their beliefs and ex22 ercising their internationally recognized rights of

23 free association and expression.

24 (5) Labor activist Liu Nianchun, severely ill in

25 a labor camp, has not only been denied medical
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1 treatment but has been tortured with electric batons

2 and has had his 3 year reeducation-through-labor

3 sentence in prison arbitrarily extended by 216 days.

4 (6) Li Hai was charged with prying into and

5 gathering state secrets and subsequently sentenced

6 to a 9-year term in prison on December 18, 1996,

7 for going door-to-door to collect the names, ages,

8 family situations, alleged crimes, lengths of prison

9 sentences, locations of imprisonment, and treatment

10 while imprisoned of people sentenced to prison for

11 their activities during the 1989 Tiananmen Square

12 protests.

13 (7) Gao Yu, serving a 6-year term in prison on

14 charges of ‘‘leaking state secrets’’ despite the fact

15 that the information in question was already com16 mon knowledge, has been denied medical parole and

17 adequate medical care despite life threatening illness

18 and was vilified by People’s Republic of China au19 thorities after she was awarded the UNESCO

20 Guillemo Cano World Press Freedom Prize.

21 (8) People’s Republic of China companies still

22 export prison labor products to the United States.

23 Since 1991, the United States Customs Service has

24 issued 27 detention orders banning the importation

25 of goods suspected to be products of prison labor in
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1 China, including hand tools, artificial flowers,

2 Christmas tree lights, and diesel engines.

3 (9) The People’s Republic of China has not

4 fully complied with the 1992 Memorandum of Un5 derstanding on Prison Labor, and People’s Republic

6 of China authorities often wait several years before

7 granting requests by United States Customs Service

8 officials to inspect prison facilities in China. In

9 1996, such authorities granted just one of eight out10 standing requests by such officials to inspect prison

11 facilities in China.

12 (10) Under current law, People’s Republic of

13 China authorities may administratively sentence

14 China citizens to 3 years of labor reform without

15 trial.

16 (11) The People’s Republic of China restricts

17 the access of its citizens to the Internet and blocks

18 web sites operated by foreign news organizations and

19 human rights organizations.

20 (12) The Government of the People’s Republic

21 of China prohibits independent labor unions, and

22 workers who attempt to form unions without state

23 approval are given severe prison sentences as shown

24 in the treatment of Zhang Jingsheng, a labor leader

25 in Hunan province who was arrested following the
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1 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre and sentenced to

2 13 years in prison for organizing workers.

3 SEC. 202. FINDINGS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE PEO4 PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

5 Congress makes the following findings regarding reli6 gious freedom in the People’s Republic of China:

7 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of

8 China restricts the ability of religious adherents, in9 cluding Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, and others,

10 to practice outside of state-approved religious orga11 nizations, and detains worshipers and clergy who

12 participate in religious services conducted outside

13 state-approved religious organizations, as well as

14 those who refuse to register with the authorities as

15 required.

16 (2) Bishop Zeng Jingmu, 76 years old, detained

17 for the third time in 7 months and in poor health

18 from pneumonia, is serving a reeducation through

19 labor term for organizing religious assemblies and

20 masses not sanctioned by the official Chinese Catho21 lic Church.

22 (3) On January 31, 1994, Premier Li Peng

23 signed decrees number 144 and 145 which restrict

24 worship, religious education, distribution of Bibles
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1 and others religious literature, and contact with for2 eign coreligionists.

3 (4) The Government of the People’s Republic of

4 China has created official religious organizations

5 that control all religious worship, activity, and asso6 ciation in China and Tibet and supplant the inde7 pendent authority of the Roman Catholic Church,

8 independent Protestant churches, and independent

9 Buddhist, Taoist, and Islamic associations.

10 (5) In July 1995, Ye Xiaowen, a rigid com11 munist hostile to religion, was appointed to head the

12 Bureau of Religious Affairs, a government agency of

13 the People’s Republic of China that is controlled by

14 the United Front Work Department of the Chinese

15 Communist Party. The Bureau of Religious Affairs

16 has administrative control over all religious worship

17 and activity in China and Tibet through a system of

18 granting or denying rights through an official reg19 istration system. Those who fail to or are not al20 lowed to register are subject to punitive measures.

21 (6) Unofficial Christian and Catholic commu22 nities were targeted by the Government of the Peo23 ple’s Republic of China during 1996. A renewed

24 campaign aimed at forcing all churches to register

25 or face dissolution resulted in beating and harass-
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1 ment of congregants, closure of churches, and nu2 merous arrests, fines, and sentences. In Shanghai,

3 for example, more than 300 house churches or meet4 ing points were closed down by the security authori5 ties in April alone.

6 SEC. 203. FINDINGS ON TIBET.

7 Congress makes the following findings regarding

8 Tibet:

9 (1) The Department of State China Country

10 Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 states:

11 ‘‘Chinese government authorities continued to com12 mit widespread human rights abuses in Tibet, in13 cluding instances of death in detention, torture, ar14 bitrary arrest, detention without public trial, long

15 detention of Tibetan nationalists for peacefully ex16 pressing their religious and political views, and in17 tensified controls on religion and on freedom of

18 speech and the press, particularly for ethnic Tibet19 ans.’’.

20 (2) The report also cites three instances in

21 which Tibetan Buddhist monks died in prison in the

22 People’s Republic of China in 1996.

23 (3) Many victims of the brutality committed by

24 the People’s Armed Police and the Public Security
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1 Bureau of the People’s Republic of China have been

2 young Tibetan Buddhist nuns and monks.

3 (4) Between June 1994 and May 1995, three

4 Tibetan nuns—15-year-old Sherab Ngawang, 24-

5 year-old Gyaltsen Kelsang, and 20-year-old

6 Phuntsok Yangkyi—died as a result of torture in

7 prison in Tibet.

8 (5) On March 11, 1997, the Senate adopted a

9 resolution calling for the release by the Government

10 of the People’s Republic of China of Tibetan

11 ethnomusicologist and Fulbright Scholar Ngawang

12 Choephel, who was sentenced to 18 years in prison

13 in the People’s Republic of China in December

14 1996, and of other Tibetans who are prisoners in

15 the People’s Republic of China for reasons of con16 science.

17 (6) In May 1995, authorities of the Government

18 of the People’s Republic of China detained Gedhun

19 Choekyi Nyima, then 6 years old, and his parents,

20 just days after the boy was recognized by the Dalai

21 Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama, and authorities of

22 that government continue to hold him and his fam23 ily.

24 (7) In May 1997, the Government of the Peo25 ple’s Republic of China announced the sentencing of
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1 Chadrel Rinpoche, the head of the search committee

2 for the 11th Panchen Lama, to 6 years in prison.

3 (8) In April 1996, authorities of the Govern4 ment of the People’s Republic of China banned the

5 display of photographs of the Dalai Lama, even in

6 private homes, and the decision led to demonstra7 tions in Ganden monastery during which 90 monks

8 were arrested and 1 monk was shot to death by se9 curity forces of that government.

10 SEC. 204. FINDINGS ON COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING

11 PRACTICES IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

12 CHINA.

13 Congress makes the following findings regarding fam14 ily planning practices in the People’s Republic of China:

15 (1) For more than 15 years there have been

16 frequent and credible reports of forced abortion and

17 forced sterilization in connection with the coercive

18 population control practices of the People’s Republic

19 of China.

20 (2) Forced abortion was rightly denounced as a

21 crime against humanity by the Nuremberg War

22 Crimes Tribunal.

23 (3) Although it is the stated position of the po24 litburo of the Chinese Communist Party that forced

25 abortion and forced sterilization have no role in the
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1 population control program of the Government of

2 the People’s Republic of China, the policy of that

3 government seems to encourage both forced abortion

4 and forced sterilization through a combination of

5 strictly enforced birth quotas and impunity for local

6 population control officials who engage in coercion.

7 Officials acknowledge that there have been instances

8 of forced abortions and sterilization, yet there is no

9 evidence that the perpetrators of such acts have

10 been punished.

11 (4) The People’s Republic of China population

12 control officials, in cooperation with employers and

13 works unit officials, monitor women’s menstrual cy14 cles and subject women who conceive without gov15 ernment authorization to extreme psychological pres16 sure, to harsh economic sanctions (including

17 unpayable fines and loss of employment), and to

18 physical force.

19 (5) Official sanctions for giving birth to unau20 thorized children include fines in amounts several

21 times larger than the per capita annual incomes of

22 residents of the People’s Republic of China. In

23 Fujian, for example, the average fine is estimated to

24 be twice a family’s gross annual income. Families
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1 who cannot pay the fine have had their homes and

2 personal property confiscated and destroyed.

3 (6) Especially harsh punishments have been in4 flicted on those whose resistance to such policies is

5 motivated by religion. For example, according to a

6 1995 Amnesty International report, the Catholic in7 habitants of two villages in Hebei Province were sub8 jected to population control under the slogan ‘‘better

9 to have more graves than one more child’’. Enforce10 ment measures included torture, sexual abuse, and

11 the detention of resisters’ relatives as hostages.

12 (7) Forced abortions in the People’s Republic of

13 China often take place in the very late stages of

14 pregnancy, or even during the process of birth itself.

15 SEC. 205. COMBATING SLAVE LABOR AND ‘‘REEDUCATION’’

16 CENTERS.

17 (a) AUTHORIZATIONS FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR AD18 DITIONAL MONITORING OF EXPORTATION OF SLAVE

19 LABOR PRODUCTS.—There are authorized to be appro20 priated $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1998 and $2,000,000

21 for fiscal year 1999 for monitoring by the United States

22 Customs Service and the Department of State of the ex23 port by the People’s Republic of China to the United

24 States of products which may be made with slave labor

25 in violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19
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1 U.S.C. 1307) or section 1761 of title 18, United States

2 Code.

3 (b) REPORTS ON EXPORTATION OF PRODUCTS MADE

4 WITH SLAVE LABOR.—

5 (1) REPORTS.—

6 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year

7 after the date of enactment of this Act and an8 nually thereafter, the Commissioner of Customs

9 and the Secretary of State shall each submit to

10 the Members of Congress referred to in sub11 paragraph (B) a report on the manufacturing

12 and exportation of products made with slave

13 labor in the People’s Republic of China during

14 the one-year period ending on the date of the

15 report. Each report shall be submitted in un16 classified form, but may include a classified

17 annex.

18 (B) MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.—Reports

19 under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to

20 the following Members of Congress:

21 (i) The Majority leader and Minority

22 leader of the Senate.

23 (ii) The chairman and ranking mem24 ber of the Committee on Foreign Relations

25 of the Senate.
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1 (iii) The Speaker and Minority leader

2 of the House of Representatives.

3 (iv) The chairman and ranking mem4 ber of the Committee on International Re5 lations of the House of Representatives.

6 (2) CONTENTS OF REPORTS.—Each report

7 under paragraph (1) shall include information con8 cerning the following:

9 (A) The extent of the use of slave labor in

10 manufacturing products for exportation by the

11 People’s Republic of China, as well as the vol12 ume of exports of such slave labor products by

13 that country.

14 (B) The progress of the United States

15 Government—

16 (i) in identifying products made with

17 slave labor in the People’s Republic of

18 China that are destined for the United

19 States market in violation of section 307 of

20 the Tariff Act of 1930 or section 1761 of

21 title 18, United States Code; and

22 (ii) in stemming the importation of

23 such products.

24 (c) RENEGOTIATION OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDER25 STANDING ON PRISON LABOR WITH THE PEOPLE’S RE-
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1 PUBLIC OF CHINA.—It is the sense of Congress that, since

2 the People’s Republic of China has substantially frus3 trated the purposes of the 1992 Memorandum of Under4 standing with the United States on Prison Labor, the

5 President should immediately commence negotiations to

6 replace the memorandum of understanding with one pro7 viding for effective monitoring of forced labor in the Peo8 ple’s Republic of China, without restrictions on which pris9 on labor camps international monitors may visit.

10 SEC. 206. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING TO CHINA.

11 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addi12 tion to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be appro13 priated for ‘‘International Broadcasting Activities’’ for fis14 cal year 1998, there is authorized to be appropriated for

15 ‘‘International Broadcasting Activities’’ for that fiscal

16 year $5,000,000, which shall be available only for broad17 casting by Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America to

18 the People’s Republic of China.

19 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con20 gress that United States international broadcasting

21 through Radio Free Asia and Voice of America should be

22 increased to provide continuous 24-hour broadcasting in

23 Chinese and Tibetan dialects which include Mandarin Chi24 nese, Tibetan, and at least one other dialect.
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1 SEC. 207. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY.

2 In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized

3 to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for grants to the

4 National Endowment for Democracy, there is authorized

5 to be appropriated for that fiscal year $2,000,000 for

6 grants to the Endowment which shall be available only for

7 purposes of programs relating to the People’s Republic of

8 China.

9 SEC. 208. UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY STU10 DENT, CULTURAL, AND LEGISLATIVE EX11 CHANGE PROGRAMS.

12 In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized

13 to be appropriated to the United States Information Agen14 cy for fiscal year 1998, there is authorized to be appro15 priated for the Agency for that fiscal year $2,000,000,

16 which shall be available only for the purposes of student,

17 cultural, and legislative exchange activities in or with the

18 People’s Republic of China.

19 SEC. 209. ANNUAL REPORTS ON FAMILY PLANNING ACTIVI20 TIES IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

21 BY RECIPIENTS OF UNITED STATES FUNDS.

22 (a) ANNUAL REPORTS.—

23 (1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than January

24 15 each year, the Secretary of State shall submit to

25 Congress a report that describes the family planning

26 activities in the People’s Republic of China during
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1 the preceding year of each covered family planning

2 organization that carried out such activities in the

3 People’s Republic of China during that year.

4 (2) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.—Each report

5 under paragraph (1) shall include the filing submit6 ted to the Secretary for purposes of such report by

7 each covered family planning organization whose ac8 tivities are covered by such report.

9 (b) COVERED FAMILY PLANNING ORGANIZATION DE10 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘covered family plan11 ning organization’’ means any for-profit or non-profit en12 tity that receives United States funds to conduct family

13 planning activities abroad.

14 SEC. 210. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING MULTILAT15 ERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHINA’S HUMAN

16 RIGHTS RECORD.

17 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find18 ings:

19 (1) On April 15, 1997, members of the United

20 Nations Human Rights Commission voted 27–17 to

21 block a resolution, sponsored by Denmark, critical of

22 the human rights record of the Government of the

23 People’s Republic of China.

24 (2) The United States Government failed to

25 vigorously lobby other nations to support the resolu-
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1 tion in a timely and effective manner, and France,

2 Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Australia, and

3 Japan did not cosponsor the resolution.

4 (3) In response to support for the resolution by

5 Denmark and the Netherlands, the Government of

6 the People’s Republic of China has adopted punitive

7 measures against Denmark and Netherlands busi8 nesses—including the denial of contracts to Nether9 lands companies and undue delays in authorizing ex10 pansion plans by the Denmark shipping line

11 Maersk—thereby linking human rights and trade.

12 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con13 gress that—

14 (1) the United States Government should great15 ly increase efforts in the United Nations Human

16 Rights Commission and other international fora to

17 draw attention to and condemn the gross violations

18 of international standards on human rights by the

19 Government of the People’s Republic of China;

20 (2) the President should vigorously lobby other

21 countries for passage of future Commission resolu22 tions on the human rights record of the Government

23 of the People’s Republic of China; and
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1 (3) such lobbying should begin not later than 6

2 months before the commencement of the next annual

3 meeting of the Commission.

4 SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING COMPLIANCE

5 BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH

6 THE JOINT DECLARATION ON HONG KONG.

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find8 ings:

9 (1) The People’s Republic of China resumed

10 sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997.

11 (2) In the Joint Declaration, a legally binding

12 document in all its parts and the highest form of

13 commitment between sovereign states, the People’s

14 Republic of China pledged that after its resumption

15 of sovereignty over Hong Kong ‘‘[t]he current social

16 and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain un17 changed, and so will the life-style. Rights and free18 doms, including those of the person, of speech, of

19 the press, of association, of travel, of movement, of

20 correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of

21 academic research and religious belief will be en22 sured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administra23 tive Region’’.

24 (3) The People’s Republic of China further

25 pledged in the Joint Declaration that the policies of
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1 the ‘‘. . . Joint Declaration will be stipulated in a

2 Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative

3 Region of the People’s Republic of China, by the

4 National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic

5 of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50

6 years’’.

7 (4) The Basic Law prescribes the systems to be

8 practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative

9 Region after the resumption of sovereignty over

10 Hong Kong by the People’s Republic of China.

11 (5) According to Article 2 of the Basic Law:

12 ‘‘The National People’s Congress authorizes the

13 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to exer14 cise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive,

15 legislative and independent judicial power, including

16 that of final adjudication’’.

17 (6) According to Article 5 of the Basic Law:

18 ‘‘The socialist system and policies (of the People’s

19 Republic of China) shall not be practiced in the

20 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the

21 previous capitalist system and way of life shall re22 main unchanged for 50 years’’.

23 (7) According to Article 27 of the Basic Law:

24 ‘‘Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech,

25 of the press and publication; freedom of association,
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1 of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and

2 the right and freedom to form and join trade unions,

3 and to strike’’.

4 (8) According to Article 32 of the Basic Law:

5 ‘‘Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of reli6 gious belief and freedom to preach and to conduct

7 and participate in religious activities in public’’.

8 (9) According to Article 34 of the Basic Law:

9 ‘‘Hong Kong residents shall have freedom to engage

10 in academic research, literary and artistic creation,

11 and other cultural activities’’.

12 (10) According to Article 39 of the Basic Law:

13 ‘‘The provisions of the International Covenant on

14 Civil and Political Rights, the International Cov15 enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and

16 international labour conventions as applied to Hong

17 Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented

18 through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Admin19 istrative Region’’.

20 (11) President Jiang Zemin of the People’s Re21 public of China, in his statement of July 1, 1997,

22 at the ceremony in Hong Kong marking the estab23 lishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative

24 Region, said that ‘‘. . . Hong Kong will enjoy a high

25 degree of autonomy as provided for by the Basic
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1 Law, which includes the executive, legislative and

2 independent judicial power, including that of final

3 adjudication’’.

4 (12) President Jiang further said that the

5 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has the

6 ‘‘ultimate aim of electing the Chief Executive and

7 the Legislative Council by universal suffrage’’.

8 (13) President Jiang further said that ‘‘[n]o

9 central department or locality (of the People’s Re10 public of China) may or will be allowed to interfere

11 in the affairs which, under the Basic Law, should be

12 administered by the Hong Kong Special Administra13 tive Region on its own’’.

14 (14) President Jiang further said that ‘‘the pro15 visions of the International Covenant on Civil and

16 Political Rights, the International Covenant on Eco17 nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international

18 covenants as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in

19 force to be implemented through the laws of Hong

20 Kong’s regional legislation’’.

21 (15) President Jiang further said that adher22 ence to these principles ‘‘serves Hong Kong, serves

23 the (People’s Republic of China) and serves the en24 tire nation as well. Therefore there is no reason

25 whatsoever to change them. Here I want to reaffirm
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1 that ‘one country, two systems, Hong Kong admin2 istering Hong Kong’ and ‘a high degree of auton3 omy’ will remain unchanged for 50 years’’.

4 (16) President Jiang, in another statement of

5 July 1, 1997, at a rally in Beijing marking the es6 tablishment of the Hong Kong Special Administra7 tive Region, said that the People’s Republic of China

8 ‘‘will unswervingly carry out the principles of ‘one

9 country, two systems’, ‘Hong Kong people admin10 istering Hong Kong’ and ‘high degree of autonomy’,

11 and make sure that the previous socio-economic sys12 tem and way of life of Hong Kong remain un13 changed and that laws previously in force will re14 main basically unchanged. We will firmly support

15 the Hong Kong SAR in its exercise of the functions

16 and powers bestowed on it by the Basic Law and the

17 Hong Kong SAR Government in its administration

18 in accordance with law.’’.

19 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con20 gress that—

21 (1) the statements of President Jiang Zemin of

22 the People’s Republic of China constitute a welcome

23 reaffirmation of the obligations of the People’s Re24 public of China under the Joint Declaration to en25 sure that Hong Kong remains autonomous, the
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1 human rights of the people of Hong Kong remain

2 protected, and the government of the Hong Kong

3 Special Administrative Region is elected democrat4 ically; and

5 (2) the fulfillment by the People’s Republic of

6 China of the obligations under the terms of the

7 Joint Declaration and the Basic Law constitutes a

8 crucial test of Beijing’s ability to play a responsible

9 global role.

10 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

11 (1) BASIC LAW.—The term ‘‘Basic Law’’ means

12 the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Adminis13 trative Region of the People’s Republic of China, as

14 adopted on April 4, 1990, by the Seventh National

15 People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China.

16 (2) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term ‘‘Joint

17 Declaration’’ means the Joint Declaration of the

18 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

19 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the

20 People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong

21 Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.
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1 TITLE III—NATIONAL SECURITY

2 MATTERS

3 SEC. 301. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC

4 MISSILES BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

5 CHINA.

6 Congress makes the following findings regarding the

7 proliferation of ballistic missiles by the People’s Republic

8 of China:

9 (1) In December 1992, the Government of the

10 People’s Republic of China violated the Arms Export

11 Control Act and the Export Administration Act of

12 1979 with the transfer by the Ministry of Aerospace

13 Industry of approximately 24 M–11 missiles to

14 Sargodha Air Force Base in Pakistan.

15 (2) From September 1994 to June 1996, the

16 Government of the People’s Republic of China again

17 violated the Arms Export Control Act and the Ex18 port Administration Act of 1979 with the transfer

19 by the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of as many as

20 30 M–11 ballistic missiles to Sargodha Air Force

21 Base.

22 (3) In June 1995, the Government of the Peo23 ple’s Republic of China violated the Arms Export

24 Control Act and the Export Administration Act of

25 1979 with the transfer by the Chinese Aerospace
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1 Corporation to Iran of possibly hundreds of missile

2 guidance systems and computerized machine tools

3 for the production of ballistic missiles.

4 (4) In August 1996, the Government of the

5 People’s Republic of China violated the Arms Export

6 Control Act and the Export Administration Act of

7 1979 with the transfer to Pakistan of factory plans

8 and equipment capable of constructing a ballistic

9 missile factory.

10 (5) In August 1996, the Government of the

11 People’s Republic of China violated the Arms Export

12 Control Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979,

13 and the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of

14 1992 with the transfer by the China Precision Engi15 neering Institute to Iran’s Defense Industries of gy16 roscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment for the

17 construction and test of ballistic missile guidance

18 systems.

19 (6) It has been reported that the Central Intel20 ligence Agency discovered a shipment by the Peo21 ple’s Republic of China to the Syrian Scientific

22 Studies and Research Center, a Syria Government

23 agency that oversees missile development, of guid24 ance equipment for M–11 ballistic missiles. This al25 leged shipment would be a violation of the Missile
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1 Technology Control Regime. This alleged shipment

2 would have taken place after the limited sanctions

3 imposed by the United States on the People’s Re4 public of China for shipments of M–11 missiles and

5 components to Pakistan had been lifted following the

6 assurances of the Government of the People’s Re7 public of China that it would comply with the Missile

8 Technology Control Regime.

9 (7) After each of these violations, the President

10 either failed to take appropriate actions to deter fu11 ture violations of such Acts and the Regime, took

12 the least onerous action against the Government of

13 the People’s Republic of China that was possible

14 under such Acts and the Regime, or rescinded pre15 vious actions thereby diluting or eliminating the de16 terrent effect of sanctions under such Acts and the

17 Regime with respect to the Government of the Peo18 ple’s Republic of China.

19 (8) This inaction forces Congress to take af20 firmative action in the bilateral relations between the

21 United States and the People’s Republic of China in

22 order to respond sufficiently to these violations of

23 United States law.
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1 SEC. 302. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS

2 OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY THE PEOPLE’S

3 REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

4 Congress makes the following findings regarding the

5 proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by the Peo6 ple’s Republic of China:

7 (1) In January 1996, the Government of the

8 People’s Republic of China violated the Arms Export

9 Control Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention

10 Act of 1994, and the Export-Import Bank Act of

11 1945 with the transfer by the China Nuclear Energy

12 Industry Corporation to the Abdul Qadeer Khan Re13 search Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, of as many

14 as 5,000 ring-magnets for the extraction of enriched

15 uranium for the potential use in nuclear weapons.

16 (2) In September 1996, the Government of the

17 People’s Republic of China violated the Arms Export

18 Control Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979,

19 and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of

20 1994 with the transfer by the China Nuclear Energy

21 Industry Corporation to a nuclear reactor facility in

22 Khushab, Pakistan, of an industrial furnace and

23 special diagnostic equipment capable of converting

24 plutonium and uranium to weapons grade material.

25 (3) In March 1996, the Government of the Peo26 ple’s Republic of China violated the Arms Export
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1 Control Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979,

2 the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992,

3 and Executive Order 12938 with the transfer by the

4 Jiangsu Corporation to Iran organizations affiliated

5 with the Iranian Defense Industries Organization

6 and the Revolutionary Guards of virtually complete

7 chemical weapons production facilities.

8 (4) After each of these violations, the President

9 either failed to take any action to deter future viola10 tions of such Acts or took such trifling action as to

11 have no meaning or effect on the future proliferation

12 of weapons of mass destruction by the People’s Re13 public of China.

14 (5) This inaction forces Congress to take af15 firmative action in the bilateral relations between the

16 People’s Republic of China and the United States in

17 order to respond sufficiently to these violations of

18 United States law.

19 SEC. 303. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF DESTA20 BILIZING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAP21 ONS BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

22 Congress makes the following findings regarding the

23 proliferation of destabilizing advanced conventional weap24 ons by the People’s Republic of China:
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1 (1) In January 1996, the Government of the

2 People’s Republic of China violated the Iran-Iraq

3 Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 with the trans4 fer by the Chinese Precision Machinery Import-Ex5 port Corporation to the Iran military of 60 C–802

6 advanced anti-ship missiles and 20 Houdong fast-at7 tack patrol craft, 15 of which were equipped with C–

8 802 missiles.

9 (2) In test firings of this missile from land10 based batteries and from naval vessels, and test

11 firings of a similar missile from fighter aircraft, the

12 Iran Government claimed direct hits on the intended

13 targets. This operational ability restores an anti-sur14 face warfare capability lost by the Iran military dur15 ing the Iran-Iraq War.

16 (3) The Commander of the United States Fifth

17 Fleet commented that these missiles represented a

18 new dimension to the threat faced by the United

19 States Navy, stating ‘‘[i]t used to be we just had to

20 worry about land-based cruise missiles. Now [the

21 Iranians] have the potential to have that throughout

22 the [Persian] Gulf mounted on ships.’’.

23 (4) It was reported in numerous press sources

24 that the Department of Defense found these trans25 fers destabilizing, and pressed for the imposition of
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1 sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Prolifera2 tion Act of 1992 but that the Department of State

3 did not wish to impose such sanctions for fear of

4 damaging bilateral relations between the People’s

5 Republic of China and the United States.

6 (5) The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act

7 of 1992 does not differentiate between transfers of

8 destabilizing weapons that will and will not damage

9 bilateral relations. Any determination of whether to

10 impose sanctions on the People’s Republic of China

11 for this transfer should have been made strictly on

12 the basis whether this transfer was or was not desta13 bilizing.

14 (6) In light of these reports, it is likely that

15 sanctions would have been imposed if the Clinton

16 Administration had been more concerned with the

17 stability of the region and the security of United

18 States troops than with the maintenance of cordial

19 relations between the People’s Republic of China and

20 the United States.

21 (7) This inaction forces Congress to take af22 firmative action in the bilateral relations between the

23 People’s Republic of China and the United States in

24 order to respond sufficiently to this violation of

25 United States law.
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1 SEC. 304. FINDINGS ON THE EVASION OF UNITED STATES

2 EXPORT CONTROL LAWS BY THE PEOPLE’S

3 REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

4 Congress makes the following findings regarding the

5 evasion of United States export control laws by the Peo6 ple’s Republic of China:

7 (1) On November 14, 1994, the President is8 sued Executive Order 12938, relating to the emer9 gency regarding weapons of mass destruction, de10 claring that the proliferation of weapons of mass de11 struction and the means of delivering them con12 stitute ‘‘an unusual and extraordinary threat to the

13 national security, foreign policy, and economy of the

14 United States’’ and that he had therefore decided to

15 ‘‘declare a national emergency to deal with that

16 threat’’.

17 (2) The President reaffirmed Executive Order

18 12938 on November 15, 1995, and again on Novem19 ber 11, 1996.

20 (3) The Director of Central Intelligence stated

21 in the report entitled ‘‘The Acquisition of Tech22 nology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction

23 and Advanced Conventional Munitions’’ that, from

24 July to December 1996, ‘‘China was the most sig25 nificant supplier of W[eapons of] M[ass]
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1 D[estruction]-related goods and technology to for2 eign countries.’’.

3 (4) United States supercomputers are the com4 puter of choice for the nuclear weapons agencies of

5 the People’s Republic of China as highlighted by the

6 comments of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, an

7 agency known to work on nuclear weapons develop8 ment, that its United States-built supercomputer

9 provides the Academy with ‘‘computational power

10 previously unknown’’ and is available to ‘‘all the

11 major scientific and technological institutes across

12 China’’.

13 (5) The People’s Republic of China has consist14 ently provided technical and scientific assistance for

15 the development of nuclear weapons to both Iran

16 and Pakistan, and it is illogical to believe that such

17 assistance would not also include computational as18 sistance if needed.

19 (6) According to the Under Secretary of Com20 merce for Export Administration, 47 United States

21 high-performance supercomputers were exported to

22 the People’s Republic of China between January

23 1996 and March 1997. Press reports indicate Unit24 ed States intelligence sources consider the actual

25 number of such supercomputers exported to the Peo-
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1 ple’s Republic of China during that period to have

2 been in the hundreds.

3 (7) Current United States export regulations

4 require an export license for shipments of super5 computers to the People’s Republic of China only if

6 the end-use will be militarily related. However, the

7 determination of that end-use is left to the exporter,

8 thereby providing an incentive for inadequate inves9 tigations of the end-use of supercomputers exported

10 to the People’s Republic of China.

11 (8) The Department of Commerce has initiated

12 investigations of United States supercomputer man13 ufacturers who, as last as June 1996, allegedly sold

14 supercomputers to the Chinese Academy of Sciences,

15 which also administers research in nuclear weapons

16 and missiles, in violation of existing United States

17 export control regulations relating to supercomput18 ers.

19 (9) On 14 July 1997, the ‘‘China Daily’’, the

20 newspaper of the Government of the People’s Repub21 lic of China, stated that ‘‘China will open up its de22 fense sector to foreign investors’’ by ‘‘strengthening

23 international military-related electronic technology

24 exchanges’’ and that ‘‘China’s defense-related elec-
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1 tronics should no longer be hidden from foreign in2 vestors’’.

3 (10) It was exactly this concern of diversion to

4 military end-use and to third nation proliferators

5 that prompted the President, on June 16, 1997, to

6 tighten export controls for supercomputers so as to

7 address the concern of ‘‘[t]he potential diversion to

8 military use of technology acquired’’ through experi9 ence developed in operating supercomputers and cus10 tomizing software and the concern that ‘‘the Peo11 ple’s Republic of China may transfer advanced-weap12 ons related technology to other countries, as in the

13 case of ballistic missile transfers’’.

14 (11) Throughout this period, the President has

15 consistently acted in a manner so as to loosen con16 trols on the export of supercomputers from the Unit17 ed States and thereby make it easier for the Govern18 ment of the People’s Republic of China to divert

19 United States supercomputers to military end-uses

20 and to assist in the proliferation of weapons of mass

21 destruction.

22 (12) This inaction forces Congress to take af23 firmative action in the bilateral relations between the

24 People’s Republic of China and the United States in
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1 order to respond sufficiently to these violations of

2 United States law.

3 SEC. 305. FINDINGS ON THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION

4 OF UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL LAWS

5 TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND

6 HONG KONG.

7 Congress makes the following findings regarding the

8 inconsistent application of United States export control

9 laws to the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong:

10 (1) While Hong Kong was sovereign territory of

11 the United Kingdom, United States control of Unit12 ed States exports to Hong Kong of items listed on

13 the United States Munitions List and the Commerce

14 Control List was considerably more lax than United

15 States control of exports of such items to the Peo16 ple’s Republic of China.

17 (2) On June 19, 1997, at a time when Hong

18 Kong was still territory of the United Kingdom, the

19 Department of Commerce discovered that a super20 computer exported to a Hong Kong based company

21 without the need of an export license because it was

22 being exported to Hong Kong was reexported to a

23 defense research institute in Changsha, People’s Re24 public of China.
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1 (3) A Federal grand jury is currently inves2 tigating the 1995 diversion by the Government of

3 the People’s Republic of China to military aviation

4 production of aircraft machining equipment that was

5 originally exported from the United States for civil6 ian end-use.

7 (4) The People’s Republic of China is the only

8 country which does not allow United States officials

9 to investigate the final end-use of exported tech10 nology and recently refused United States requests

11 to examine the location of the supercomputer di12 verted from Hong Kong.

13 (5) The continuation of this inconsistent export

14 control regime without specific assurances and ver15 ification measures to prevent unauthorized reexport

16 from Hong Kong, or diversion to military end-use,

17 provides the Government of the People’s Republic of

18 China with the means to circumvent United States

19 export controls and gain access to critical technology

20 necessary both for defense modernization and the

21 proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of

22 mass destruction.

23 (6) This inaction forces Congress to take af24 firmative action in the bilateral relations between the

25 People’s Republic of China and the United States in
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1 order to respond sufficiently to these violations of

2 United States law.

3 SEC. 306. EXPORTS OF SUPERCOMPUTERS TO THE PEO4 PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

5 (a) PRIOR APPROVAL OF EXPORTS AND REEX6 PORTS.—The President shall require that no covered com7 puter may be exported or reexported to the People’s Re8 public of China without the prior written approval of each

9 of the designated officials.

10 (b) EXPORT OR REEXPORT WITHOUT UNANIMOUS

11 APPROVAL.—If any one of the designated officials does

12 not approve of the export or reexport of a covered com13 puter to the People’s Republic of China, the computer may

14 be exported or reexported to the People’s Republic of

15 China only pursuant to a license issued by the Secretary

16 of Commerce under the export administration regulations

17 of the Department of Commerce, and without regard to

18 the licensing exceptions otherwise authorized under sec19 tion 740.7 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, as in

20 effect on June 10, 1997.

21 (c) DEADLINE FOR RESPONSE TO APPLICATION.—

22 Each designated official shall approve or disapprove in

23 writing of the export or reexport of a covered computer

24 to the People’s Republic of China not later than 10 days
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1 after receipt by the United States of the application for

2 the export or reexport of the computer.

3 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

4 (1) COVERED COMPUTERS.—The term ‘‘covered

5 computers’’ means the digital computers listed as

6 ‘‘eligible computers’’ in section 740.7(d)(2) of title

7 15, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on

8 June 10, 1997.

9 (2) DESIGNATED OFFICIALS.—The term ‘‘des10 ignated officials’’ means the following:

11 (1) The Secretary of Commerce.

12 (2) The Secretary of Defense.

13 (3) The Secretary of Energy.

14 (4) The Secretary of State.

15 (5) The Director of the Arms Control and Dis16 armament Agency.

17 SEC. 307. DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO HONG KONG.

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi19 sion of law, the provisions of this section shall apply with

20 respect to exports of covered items to Hong Kong.

21 (b) PRE-LICENSE VERIFICATIONS.—The Secretary of

22 State and the Secretary of Commerce shall not approve

23 an export license application for the export of a covered

24 item to Hong Kong if United States officials are denied

25 an opportunity to conduct a pre-license verification with
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1 respect to the end-use of such covered item and the recipi2 ent of such item.

3 (c) POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION.—If United

4 States officials are denied the ability to a conduct post5 shipment verification of the location, recipient, and end

6 use of a covered item that has been exported to Hong

7 Kong from the United States pursuant to an export li8 cense granted by the Secretary of State and the Secretary

9 of Commerce, thereafter any application to export a cov10 ered item to Hong Kong shall be treated in the same man11 ner as a request to export such item to the People’s Re12 public of China.

13 (d) DIVERSION OF COVERED ITEMS.—If the Presi14 dent, or any other official of the United States, obtains

15 credible evidence that a covered item exported from the

16 United States to Hong Kong on or after July 1, 1997,

17 has been diverted—

18 (1) to the People’s Republic of China;

19 (2) to an end use not authorized under the ex20 port control laws or regulations of the United

21 States, or

22 (3) to a recipient, other than the recipient spec23 ified in the export license application,

24 any application to export a covered item to Hong Kong

25 that is pending or filed after the date on which such evi-
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1 dence is obtained shall be treated in the same manner as

2 a request to export such item to the People’s Republic of

3 China.

4 (e) COVERED ITEM DEFINED.—In this section, the

5 term ‘‘covered item’’ means the following:

6 (1) Any item on the United States Munitions

7 List.

8 (2) Any item on the Commerce Control List of

9 the Department of Commerce.

10 SEC. 308. ENFORCEMENT OF IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PRO11 LIFERATION ACT WITH RESPECT TO THE

12 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

13 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy

14 of the United States that—

15 (1) the delivery of 60 C–802 cruise missiles by

16 the China National Precision Machinery Import Ex17 port Corporation to Iran poses a new, direct threat

18 to deployed United States forces in the Middle East

19 and materially contributed to the efforts of Iran to

20 acquire destabilizing numbers and types of advanced

21 conventional weapons; and

22 (2) the delivery is a violation of the Iran-Iraq

23 Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C.

24 1701 note).

25 (b) IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS.—
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1 (1) REQUIREMENT.—The President shall im2 pose on the People’s Republic of China the manda3 tory sanctions set forth in paragraphs (3), (4), and

4 (5) of section 1605(b) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non5 Proliferation Act of 1992.

6 (2) NONAVAILABILITY OF WAIVER.—For pur7 poses of this section, the President shall not have

8 the authority contained in section 1606 of the Iran9 Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 to waive

10 the sanctions required under paragraph (1).

11 SEC. 309. TRANSFERS OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT AND

12 TECHNOLOGY BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC

13 OF CHINA.

14 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find15 ings:

16 (1) Credible allegations exist that the People’s

17 Republic of China has transferred equipment and

18 technology as follows:

19 (A) Gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test

20 equipment for missiles to Iran.

21 (B) Chemical weapons equipment and

22 technology to Iran.

23 (C) Missile guidance systems and comput24 erized machine tools to Iran.
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1 (D) Industrial furnace equipment and high

2 technology diagnostic equipment to a nuclear

3 facility in Pakistan.

4 (E) Blueprints and equipment to manufac5 ture M–11 missiles to Pakistan.

6 (F) M–11 missiles and components to

7 Pakistan.

8 (2) The Department of State has failed to de9 termine whether most such transfers violate provi10 sions of relevant United States laws and Executive

11 orders relating to the proliferation of sensitive equip12 ment and technology, including the Arms Export

13 Control Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention

14 Act of 1994, the Export Administration Act of

15 1979, and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945,

16 and Executive Order 12938.

17 (3) Where the Department of State has made

18 such determinations, it has imposed the least oner19 ous form of sanction, which significantly weakens

20 the intended deterrent effect of the sanctions pro21 vided for in such laws.

22 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con23 gress that—

24 (1) the transfers of equipment and technology

25 by the People’s Republic of China described in sub-
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1 section (a)(1) pose a threat to the national security

2 interests of the United States;

3 (2) the failure of the Clinton Administration to

4 initiate a formal process to determine whether to im5 pose sanctions for such transfers under the provi6 sions of law referred to in subsection (a)(2) contrib7 utes to the threat posed to the national security in8 terests of the United States by the proliferation of

9 such equipment and technology; and

10 (3) the President should immediately initiate

11 the procedures necessary to determine whether sanc12 tions should be imposed under such provisions of law

13 for such transfers.

14 (c) REPORT.—

15 (1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 60 days

16 after the date of enactment of this Act, the Presi17 dent shall submit to Congress a report setting

18 forth—

19 (A) the date, if any, of the commencement

20 and of the conclusion of each formal process

21 conducted by the Department of State to deter22 mine whether to impose sanctions under the

23 provisions of law referred to in subsection

24 (a)(2) for each transfer described in subsection

25 (a)(1);
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1 (B) the facts providing the basis for each

2 determination not to impose sanctions under

3 such provisions of law on the Government of

4 the People’s Republic of China, or entities with5 in or having a relationship with that govern6 ment, for each transfer, and the legal analysis

7 supporting such determination; and

8 (C) a schedule for initiating a formal proc9 ess described in paragraph (1) for each transfer

10 not yet addressed by such formal process and

11 an explanation for the failure to commence such

12 formal process with respect to such transfer be13 fore the date of the report.

14 (2) FORM.—The report shall be submitted in

15 unclassified form, but may include a classified

16 annex.

17 SEC. 310. ANNUAL REPORTS ON ACTIVITIES OF THE PEO18 PLE’S LIBERATION ARMY.

19 (a) ENTITIES OWNED BY PLA.—Not later than Jan20 uary 31 each year, the Secretary of State shall publish

21 in the Federal Register a list of each corporation or other

22 business entity that was owned in whole or in part by the

23 People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of

24 China as of December 31 of the preceding year.

25 (b) REPORT ON PRC MILITARY MODERNIZATION.—
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1 (1) REQUIREMENT.—

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March

3 31 each year, the Secretary of Defense, in con4 sultation with the Secretary of State, shall sub5 mit to Congress a report on the military mod6 ernization activities of the People’s Liberation

7 Army.

8 (B) SUBMITTAL.—The Secretary of De9 fense shall submit each report to the following:

10 (i) The Majority leader and Minority

11 leader of the Senate.

12 (ii) The chairmen and ranking mem13 bers of the Committee on Foreign Rela14 tions and the Committee on Armed Serv15 ices of the Senate.

16 (iii) The Speaker and Minority leader

17 of the House of Representatives.

18 (iv) The chairmen and ranking mem19 bers of the Committee on International Re20 lations and the Committee on National Se21 curity of the House of Representatives.

22 (C) FORM.—The report shall be submitted

23 in unclassified form, but may include a classi24 fied annex.

25 (2) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—
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1 (A) CONTENTS.—Each report under para2 graph (1) shall include the following:

3 (i) A description of developments

4 within the People’s Liberation Army, in5 cluding the implications of the develop6 ments for United States policy toward the

7 People’s Republic of China.

8 (ii) A description of the scope and

9 pace of modernization by the People’s Lib10 eration Army.

11 (iii) To the maximum extent prac12 ticable, an analysis of the intent of such

13 modernization programs.

14 (B) RELATIONSHIP TO ANNUAL HUMAN

15 RIGHTS REPORT.—The report shall complement

16 and not replace applicable sections of the an17 nual report on human rights in China by the

18 Department of State.

19 (c) PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS.—In

20 publishing a list under subsection (a) and preparing a re21 port under subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense shall

22 take appropriate actions to ensure the protection of

23 sources and methods of gathering intelligence.
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1 SEC. 311. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

2 OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

3 (a) REPORTS.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 31

5 each year, the Director of Central Intelligence and

6 the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

7 jointly and in consultation with the heads of other

8 appropriate Federal agencies (including the Depart9 ments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and State),

10 shall submit to the Members of Congress referred to

11 in paragraph (2) a report on the intelligence activi12 ties of the People’s Republic of China directed

13 against or affecting the interests of the United

14 States.

15 (2) SUBMITTAL.—Each report under paragraph

16 (1) shall be submitted to the following:

17 (A) The Majority leader and Minority lead18 er of the Senate.

19 (B) The chairman and ranking member of

20 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the

21 Senate.

22 (C) The Speaker and Minority leader of

23 the House of Representatives.

24 (D) The chairman and ranking member of

25 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

26 of the House of Representatives.
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1 (3) FORM.—Each report shall be submitted in

2 unclassified form, but may include a classified

3 annex.

4 (b) CONTENTS OF REPORTS.—Each report under

5 subsection (a) shall include information concerning the fol6 lowing:

7 (1) Political and military espionage.

8 (2) Intelligence activities designed to gain polit9 ical influence, including activities undertaken or co10 ordinated by the United Front Work Department of

11 the Chinese Communist Party.

12 (3) Efforts to gain direct or indirect influence

13 through commercial or noncommercial

14 intermediaries subject to control by the People’s Re15 public of China, including enterprises controlled by

16 the People’s Liberation Army.

17 (4) Disinformation and press manipulation by

18 the People’s Republic of China with respect to the

19 United States, including activities undertaken or co20 ordinated by the United Front Work Department of

21 the Chinese Communist Party.

22 SEC. 312. STUDY OF THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

23 SYSTEM FOR TAIWAN.

24 (a) STUDY.—The Secretary of Defense shall carry

25 out, with appropriate representatives of the Government
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1 of Taiwan, a study of the architecture requirements for

2 the establishment and operation of a theater ballistic mis3 sile defense system for Taiwan, including the Penghu Is4 lands, Kinmen, and Matsu. The study shall include the

5 following:

6 (1) An assessment of missile threats to Taiwan.

7 (2) Identification of the requirements of Taiwan

8 for deployment of an effective theater ballistic mis9 sile defense system.

10 (3) Identification of existing theater ballistic

11 missile defense systems or existing technology for

12 such systems, that the United States could sell to

13 Taiwan to assist in meeting the requirements identi14 fied under paragraph (2).

15 (4) Systems or technologies the United States

16 is developing that could address the missile threats

17 to Taiwan’s security.

18 (5) Identification of potential joint cooperative

19 efforts by the United States and Taiwan to develop

20 theater ballistic missile defense systems.

21 (b) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—

22 (1) SUBMITTAL.—Not later than July 1, 1998,

23 the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Com24 mittee on Armed Services and the Committee on Ap25 propriations of the Senate and the Committee on
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1 National Security and the Committee on Appropria2 tions of the House of Representatives a report on

3 the study conducted under subsection (a).

4 (2) FORM.—The report shall be submitted in

5 unclassified form, but may include a classified

6 annex.

7 SEC. 313. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED

8 STATES FORCE LEVELS IN ASIA.

9 It is the sense of Congress that—

10 (1) the current force levels in the Pacific Com11 mand Theater of Operations are necessary to the

12 fulfillment of the military mission of that command

13 and are vital to continued peace and stability in the

14 region covered by that command;

15 (2) any reductions in such force levels should

16 only be done in close consultation with Congress and

17 with a clear understanding of their impact upon the

18 capacity of the United States to fulfill its current

19 treaty obligations with other states in the region as

20 well as to the continued ability of the United States

21 to deter potential aggression in the region; and

22 (3) the annual report on the national security

23 strategy of the United States required by section

24 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

25 404a) should include specific information on the
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1 adequacy of the capabilities of the United States

2 Armed Forces to support the implementation of the

3 national security strategy of the United States as it

4 relates to the People’s Republic of China.

5 SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ESTABLISH6 MENT OF COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

7 COOPERATION IN ASIA.

8 It is the sense of Congress that the President and

9 the Secretary of State should initiate negotiations with the

10 Government of the People’s Republic of China and the

11 governments of other countries in Asia to establish a com12 mission on matters relating to security and cooperation

13 in Asia that would be modeled after the Commission on

14 Security and Cooperation in Europe.

15 TITLE IV—TRADE

16 SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE ACCES17 SION OF TAIWAN TO THE WORLD TRADE OR18 GANIZATION.

19 It is the sense of Congress that Taiwan should be

20 admitted to the World Trade Organization as a separate

21 customs territory when Taiwan meets the established cri22 teria of the Organization for membership on that basis.
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1 TITLE V—HUMAN RIGHTS AND

2 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

3 WORLDWIDE

4 SEC. 501. TRAINING FOR IMMIGRATION OFFICERS REGARD5 ING RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION.

6 Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act

7 (8 U.S.C. 1225) is amended by adding at the end the fol8 lowing:

9 ‘‘(e) TRAINING ON RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION.—The

10 Attorney General shall establish and operate a program

11 to provide to immigration officers performing functions

12 under subsection (b), or section 207 or 208, training on

13 religious persecution, including training on—

14 ‘‘(1) the fundamental components of the right

15 to freedom of religion;

16 ‘‘(2) the variation in beliefs of religious groups;

17 and

18 ‘‘(3) the governmental and nongovernmental

19 methods used in violation of the right to freedom of

20 religion.’’.

21 SEC. 502. PROMOTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND

22 HUMAN RIGHTS WORLDWIDE.

23 (a) REPORTS ON RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION.—

24 (1) REPORTS.—Not later than March 30, 1998,

25 and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall
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1 submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of

2 the Senate and the Committee on International Re3 lations of the House of Representatives a report on

4 religious persecution worldwide.

5 (2) CONTENTS.—Each report shall include a

6 list of the government officials of any country world7 wide who have been materially involved in the com8 mission of acts of persecution that are motivated by

9 a person’s religion.

10 (b) PRISONER INFORMATION REGISTRY.—

11 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State

12 shall establish and maintain a registry to be known

13 as the Prisoner Information Registry.

14 (2) CONTENTS.—The registry shall be a reposi15 tory of information on matters relating to the penal

16 systems of the various countries and of individuals

17 in such systems, including—

18 (A) the charges brought against the indi19 viduals in such systems;

20 (B) the judicial or administrative processes

21 to which such individuals were subject;

22 (C) the length of imprisonment of such in23 dividuals in such systems;

24 (D) the use (if any) of forced labor in such

25 systems;
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1 (E) the incidences (if any) of torture in

2 such systems;

3 (F) the physical and health conditions in

4 such systems; and

5 (G) such other matters as the Secretary

6 considers appropriate.

7 (3) ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.—The Sec8 retary may make funds available to non-govern9 mental organizations currently engaged in monitor10 ing penal systems worldwide or individuals in such

11 systems in order to assist in the establishment and

12 maintenance of the registry.

13 TITLE VI—OTHER MATTERS

14 SEC. 601. TERMINATION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

15 FOR EAST-WEST CENTER.

16 (a) REPEAL OF AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.—

17 The Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Be18 tween East and West Act of 1960 (chapter VII of Public

19 Law 86–472; 22 U.S.C. 2054 et seq.) is repealed.

20 (b) PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CENTER.—

21 Notwithstanding any other law, no funds appropriated or

22 otherwise made available to the Director of the United

23 States Information Agency for any fiscal year after fiscal

24 year 1997 may be used for any purposes (including grants

25 and payments and expenses of operation) relating to the
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1 Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between

2 East and West.

Æ