testimony of two doctors who discussed the extent and seriousness
of his injuries. This medical testimony about the seriousness of
his injuries also indicated that the third Briggs scenario
(injuries of no monetary value) did not apply. Further, Mr.
Bedenfield presented evidence from the lockup keeper showing that
he had “obvious pain or injury” upon his arrival at the police
station after the incident. Here, “there is no denying that [Mr.
Bedenfield] suffered physical injuries during the incident.”
Stachniak v. Hayes, 989 F.2d 914, 923-24 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming
trial court’s refusal to give nominal damages instruction in
excessive force case). And as the jury found that the single use
of force during the incident was excessive, there is no denying
that Mr. Bedenfield suffered physical injuries as the result of
excessive force. Because the award of nominal damages was against
the manifest weight of the evidence, a new trial on the issue of

damages is appropriate.'

+ “Partial trials are proper if ‘it clearly appears that the

issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others
that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.’” McClain v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 139 F.3d 1124, 1128 (7th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S.
494, 500 (1931)). If the question of damages “is so interwoven
with that of liability that the former cannot be submitted to the
jury independently of the latter without confusion and
uncertainty,” then a retrial on damages alone is tantamount to a
denial of a fair trial. Id. (citing Gasoline Prods., 494 U.S. at
500). I see no difficulty here with submitting the issue of
damages to a new jury without the issue of liability. Cf. id. at
1128 (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court ordered new
trial on damages alone in a wrongful death case).

4


injuries have no monetary value or are insufficient to justify

with reasonable certainty a more substantial measure of

damages.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). None of these
situations apply here.

First, the undisputed testimony of Mr. Bedenfield, Officer
Shultz, and Officer Giesbush all show that throughout the
encounter, there was only one instance of force used on Mr.
Bedenfield, which occurred during the second pat down after Mr.
Bedenfield exited the police car. There was no force used during
the first pat down search, nor was there force used as Mr.
Bedenfield entered and exited the police car. The only force used
on Mr. Bedenfield occurred during the second pat down, when
Officers Shultz and Geisbush handcuffed him. As there was only one
instance of force during the encounter, the jury could not have
found that the officers used both justifiable and excessive force.
The extent of force used while handcuffing Mr. Bedenfield was
contested, but by finding in his favor, the jury thought it
excessive. Therefore, any injury resulting from the officers’ use
of force was not the result of justifiable force. Thus, the first
Briggs situation does not apply.

Nor do the second two Briggs situations apply. The second
Briggs situation (lack of credible evidence of injury) occurs where
nearly all evidence of damages consists of the plaintiff’s

testimony. Id. Here, however, Mr. Bedenfield produced the



Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages is

GRANTED.
ENTER ORDER:
Lhe 0 Buhle
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: July /7_, 2003



Mine’: Orter Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Elaine E. Bucklo Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge . than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 7013 DATE 7/17/2003
CASE Bedenfield vs. Shultz, eta 1.
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) Qa Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due__
(4) ob Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) im Status hearing[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) ob Pretrial conference{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(@) a) Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CFRCP4(m) OC Local Rule 41.1 C}FRCP41(a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) =o [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order granting plaintiff's motion for anew

trial on the issue of damages. Pretrial order will be due by 8/22/03; and response to any motions in limine

by 9/5/03. Pretrial conference set for 9/26/03 at 4:00 p.m. Two-day jury trial set for 10/6/03 at 9:30 a.m.

Defendants’ bill of costs is denied as untimely.
(1) @ (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
2

No notices required. umber of wotioes

oS | Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

JUL, 18 2003

Fite docketed

Docketing to mail notices,

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

72003
courtroom Hh SG Hg date mailed notice
MPI deputy’s 0
initials
Date/time ed in
centrat Clerk's Office mailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

&
i)

JUL

KENDELL BEDENFIELD,

_

Plaintiff, 8 2003

No. 01 C 7013

ve

ROBERT SHULTZ and JAMES GEISBUSH,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kendell Bedenfield sued Chicago Police Officers
Robert Shultz and James Geisbush under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding
an incident alleging the excessive use of force. The incident
occurred outside a currency exchange, where Mr. Bedenfield was
stopped by Officers Shultz and Geisbush, who were responding to a
robbery alarm at the exchange. As Mr. Bedenfield was leaving the
currency exchange, the officers stopped him and conducted a pat
down search. Following the pat down, the officers learned that the
alarm was false and there had been no robbery. Mr. Bedenfield then
entered the squad car and was asked for some information. During
this conversation inside the car, there was a comment made about
whether Mr. Bedenfield had a weapon. The officers told Mr.
Bedenfield to exit the car, where they attempted to perform a
second pat down search. During this search, there was a dispute
between Mr. Bedenfield and the officers, and Mr. Bedenfield was

forcefully handcuffed and arrested. Mr. Bedenfield claimed that he

lo



was severely injured during this encounter with the police.
Following a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Mr.
Bedenfield, awarding him one dollar in nominal damages. Mr.
Bedenfield now moves pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 for a new trial
on the issue of damages. I grant the motion.

When a verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence, I may grant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. Cefalu v.
Village of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 2000). While I
am well aware of the high bar for granting a motion for a new
trial, especially based on weight of the evidence, see Latino v.
Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314-15 (7th Cir. 1995), I find that there was
no reasonable basis for the jury’s award of nominal damages and
that a new trial on that issue is warranted. See Cefalu, 211 F.3d
at 424 (‘As long as there is a reasonable basis in the record to
support it, we will not overturn a jury’s verdict.”).

The Seventh Circuit has noted that excessive force and nominal
damages “make strange bedfellows.” Briggs v. Marshall, 93 F.3d
355, 360 (7th Cir. 1996). There are, however, three situations in
which nominal damages may be awarded to remedy the constitutional
violation of excessive force.

First, during an altercation between a police officer and an

arrestee/detainee, the officer might use both justifiable and

excessive force, but any injury might have resulted from the
justifiable force, thereby supporting the denial of
compensatory damages. Next, nominal damages may be
appropriate where a jury reasonably concludes that evidence
concerning the plaintiffs’ injuries was not credible....

Finally, nominal damages may be appropriate where the victim's

2