“plaintiff must address all the reasons suggested by the
defendants.”).

Mr. Lodovico’s only response to the retaliatory discharge
claim is that the Union, and specifically Mr. Zero, knew of his
intention to file a worker’s compensation claim when he was fired.
But even if they knew, Mr. Lodovico must demonstrate that his
termination was motivated by his worker’s compensation claim. The
only evidence is Mr. Lodovico’s testimony that, when Mr. Zero told
the president of the Union that he was going to fire Mr. Lodovico,
the Union president told Mr. Zero not to because Mr. Lodovico was
claiming worker’s compensation and seeing a physician. Lodovico
Dep. at 158. Even construed most favorably to Mr. Lodovico, this
falls short of showing that Mr. Zero’s decision to fire him was
motivated by his claim. Moreover, where an employer comes forward
with a valid, non-retaliatory reason for the discharge, the element
of causation is not met. Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 704
N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ill. 1998). I have already determined that Mr.
Lodovico has failed to demonstrate that the Union’s reasons for
firing him were pretextual, so he has failed to establish

causation. The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED

ENTER ORDER:

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: January (6, 2002


he could do before the accident. If he is not actually disabled,
Mr. Lodovico may proceed if he can show that his employer regarded
him as disabled, but it is not enough to show that the Union was
aware of his impairment; he must show that the Union believed that
his back injury substantially limited him in a major life activity.
Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir. 2001). The
evidence demonstrates only that Mr. Zero, the decisionmaker, was
aware that Mr. Lodovico had been injured and that he attended
physical therapy five days a week because of his automobile
accident. That is insufficient to raise an inference that Mr. Zero
considered Mr. Lodovico to be disabled.

Even if Mr. Lodovico could establish a prima facie case of age
or disability discrimination, he has failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that the Union’s reasons for firing him were
pretextual. First, he merely says that the dispute over the cases
of union baseball caps was “trivial” and “clearly suspect,” but he
comes forward with no evidence to suggest that these kinds of
trivial transgressions were usually tolerated. See Monroe v.
Children’s Home Ass’n, 128 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A person
who was sacked for trivial transgressions that an employer usually
tolerates . . . has enough to support an inference that the
employer is hiding something.”). Second, he does not even address
one of the other stated reasons~-that he had trouble getting along
with the other staff. See Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc.,

129 F.3d 391, 398 (7th Cir. 1997) (To demonstrate pretext,


sag Minus Order Form {06/97)
eb United States District Court, Northern District of Winois
Name of Asigned dude Elaine E. Bucklo Sing Sud Oe
CASE NUMBER. 00 C 8068 DATE 1/16/2002
CASE Lodovico vs. Teamsters Local Union 705
TITLE ‘

[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oOo Brief in support of motion due___.

(3) im Answer brief to motion due____._ Reply to answer briefdue____.

(4) im] Ruling/Hearing on setfor_ at

(5) im] Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____setfor ss aat__

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor__— saat.
(7) im Trial(set for/re-set for]on__—_at

(8) Qa [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to____at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule 21 CFRCP4I(a\(i) O FRCPAI(a)(2).

qo) of {Other docket entry] Defendant, Teamsters Local Union No. 705's motion for summary judgment
is granted. Accordingly, judgment is entered in favor of defendant, Teamsters Local Union No. 705 and
against plaintiff, Samuel Lodovico. Any pending motion in this case is terminated as moot. Enter
Memorandum Opinion and Order.
ab if [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court. Document
No notices required. oe Number - 7
Y | Notices mailed by judge’s staff. ‘
Notitied counsel by telephone. NAN l 72002
Docketing to mail notices. m
Y | Mail Ao 450 form ockting G50 its Cc

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
1/16/2002

ene!
a Soe
FILED davnate nice
courtroom:
MPI deputy’s aug PE Mer
initials a ~
Datd/tiine received in,
central Clerk's Otfice fie ling dopuy nats

7



DOCKETED

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS JAN? 2002

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DIVISION

SAMUEL LODOVICO,
Plaintiff,

v. No. 00 C 8068
GERALD ZERO, individually and
as Secretary-Treasurer of
Teamsters Local Union No. 705;
and TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO.
705,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Samuel Lodovico sues his former employer, Teamsters Local
Union No. 705 (“the Union”) for age and disability discrimination
under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626, and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seg., and for retaliatory discharge under Illinois law. The Union
moves for summary judgment, which I may grant only when the record
“show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). On the discrimination claims, Mr.
Lodovico’s only argument is that the Union’s reasons for
discharging him were “so clearly suspect that [he] should be found
to have met his prima facie burden.” Pretext is not a substitute
for a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework; I reach the question of pretext only if the employee can
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Paluck v. Gooding

Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1011 (7th Cir. 2000).


On his age discrimination claim, Mr. lLodovico cannot
demonstrate an essential element of his prima facie case: that
substantially younger employees were treated more favorably.
Hoffmann v. Primedia Special Interest Pubs., 217 F.3d 522, 524 (7th
Cir. 2000). This means showing that he was replaced by a
substantially younger employee, id., but Mr. Lodovico admits that
he was replaced by an older employee, Pl. Resp. to Stmt. Facts 97
10, so he cannot make out a prima facie case of age discrimination.

The Union argues that the ADA claim is outside the scope of
the EEOC charge to the extent that it claims a failure to
accommodate. Mr. Lodovico admits he was accommodated, and read
liberally, his complaint, which seeks lost wages, states a claim
for termination, which is what he claimed in the charge. To state
a claim under the ADA, Mr. Lodovico has the burden of demonstrating
that he is a qualified individual with a disability, which requires
him to show that, at the time of his discharge, he was suffering
from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one
of his major life activities. Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d
916, 923 (7th Cir. 2001). Mr. Lodovico claims that he was disabled
because he suffered a back injury after a work-related automobile
accident. But even assuming that his back injury was a physical
impairment, Mr. Lodovico does not explain how, much less come
forward with evidence to show that, his injury substantially
limited him in any major life activity. Mr. Lodovico had returned

to work, and he does not say that he was unable to do anything that

2