in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier.” 45
U.S.C, § 51; Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). The
FELA “imposes on railroads a general duty to provide a safe workplace.” Id. (quoting McGinn
y. Burlington Northern R.R.Co., 102 F.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir.1996)) (internal citations omitted).
However, the FELA does not “render a railroad an insurer of its employees.” Holbrook, 414
F.3d at 742 (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994)).

Because the statute “is meant to offer broad remedial relief to railroad workers, a
plaintiff's burden when suing under the FELA is significantly lighter than in an ordinary

negligence case.” Id. (quoting Lisek v, Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 30 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir.

1994)). Therefore, a railroad company “will be held liable where ‘employer negligence played

any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury.’” Walker v. Northeast Regional Commuter

RR. Corp., 225 F.3d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Lisek, 30 F.3d at 831). The plaintiff in

an FELA case must “proffer some evidence of the defendant’s negligence in order to survive
summary judgment.” Holbrook, 414 F.3d at 742.

In order to “establish that a railroad beached its duty to provide a safe workplace, the
plaintiff must show circumstances which a reasonable person would foresee as creating potential
for harm.” Id. (quoting McGinn, 102 F.3d at 300). “To establish foreseeability, a plaintiff must
show that the employer had actual or constructive notice of those harmful circumstances.” Id.
(quoting Williams v. Nat’! R.R. Passenger Corp., 161 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1998)).

In addition, the Locomotive Inspection Act (“LIA”) requires that railroad carriers use
locomotives only when “the locomotive. . . and its parts and appurtenances. . . 1) are in proper

condition and safe to operate without necessary danger or personal injury... , and 2) can


only Coffey’s personal belief that the light switch was in an unreasonable location. The fact that
Coffey hit his head in an effort to turn on the light switch does not create a question of liability under
the LIA or FELA.

Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Metra had either actual or
constructive notice of any alleged defect in the visor. See Holbrook, 414 F.3d at 742. In fact, Metra
had no reason to believe that the visor in cab car 8626 was faulty, because Metra never received a
complaint prior to Coffey’s incident. Metra cannot be found negligent for alleged hazardous working
conditions that were unforeseeable. See McGinn, 102 F.3d at 300. The only evidence Coffey presents
is his mere belief that the screws on the visor were loose, which caused it to shift down to the
horizontal position. However, without anything more, Coffey is unable to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to Metra’s alleged negligence. The court cannot say, based on the evidence in the
record, that Coffey has shown that Metra knew or had reason to know about “circumstances which a
reasonable person would foresee as creating a potential for harm.” Holbrook, 414 F.3d at 742.

As a result, there is no evidence to suggest that Metra played even the slightest part in
producing the injury, see Walker, 225 F.3d at 897, or that Metra had actual or constructive notice of
the alleged hazard. See Holbrook, 414 F.3d at 742.

Ill. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER: .
Ltt KA Reg —

CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, Jud;

United States District Court

DATED:

4-706


Gym/Executive Health Spa, Inc., 301 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2002). The court views the record
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 385 F.3d
1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 2004). “In the light most favorable” simply means that summary judgment

is not appropriate if the court must make “a choice of inferences.” See United States v. Diebold.

Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); see also First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co., 391 US.
253, 280 (1968); Spiegla v. Hall, 371 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2004). The choice between
reasonable inferences from facts is a jury function. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

When a party moves for summary judgment, the court must view the record and all
inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Alexander y. City of South Bend,

433 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2006); Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Communication Workers

of Am,, 220 F.3d 814, 821 (7th Cir. 2000). However, the inferences construed in the non-
moving party’s favor must be drawn from specific facts identified in the record that support that
party’s position. See Szymanski, 231 F.3d at 364. Under this standard, “{c]onclusory allegations
alone cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Thomas v. Christ Hospital and Medical
Center, 328 F.3d. 890, 892-93 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v. Nat’! Wildlife Federation, 497
USS. 871, 888-89 (1990)).
B. Coffey’s Claims

1, FELA- 42 U.S.C. § 51

The FELA provides that “every common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages

to any person suffering injury while he is employed . . . for such injury . . . resulting in whole or


withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary under this chapter.” 49 U.S.C. § 20701. There
are two ways in which a railroad company can violate the LIA. “A rail carrier may breach the
broad duty to keep all parts and appurtenances of its locomotives in proper condition and safe to
operate without unnecessary peril to life or lim, in violation of 45 U.S.C. § 23, ora rail carrier
may fail to comply with the regulations issued by the Federal Railroad Administration.”
McGinn, 102 F.3d at 299. However, “this does not mean that the LIA demands that liability
ensue in every case in which a plaintiff alleges that a carrier’s failure to install some piece of
equipment on a locomotive rendered the locomotive unsafe.” Id, With these principles in mind,
we turn to Coffey’s claims.

2. Coffey has not created a genuine issue as to Metra’s Negligence under the FELA or

LIA

As an initial matter, the court notes that “the LIA and the FELA are interrelated” Id.
Railroads will incur liability under the FELA when its employees are injured as a result of a
violation of the LIA. Id. Therefore, the court will analyze both of Coffey’s claims
simultaneously.

Count One of the Complaint alleges that Metra failed to provide Coffey with a
“reasonably safe place to work; reasonably safe methods to perform his job; reasonably safe work
equipment,” and that Metra “failed to provide a locomotive with proper standard equipment,
including a visor in the cab. . . that would remain in the locked vertical position.” Compl, § 6.
Count Two alleges that Metra’s locomotive was “not safe to operate . . . its visor was defective. .
. and did not contain sufficient lighting... .” Id., 47.

However, the facts in the record establish that Metra has complied with all federally


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

FRANK T. COFFEY,
Plaintiff,
ve
NORTHEAST ILLINOIS REGIONAL
COMMUTER RAILROAD

CORPORATION, d/b/a
METRA,

HONORABLE CHARLES R. NORGLE

)

)

)

)

)

) Case No. 04 C 3621

)

)

)

)
Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER
CHARLES R. NORGLE, District Judge
Before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment brought pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted.
1. BACKGROUND'
A. Facts
This case arises out of injuries sustained by Plaintiff Frank T. Coffey (“Coffey”) while in

the course of his employment with Defendant Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad
Corporation, d/b/a Metra (“Metra”). Coffey had been employed by Metra as an engineer since

1978. Over the twenty year period, he had been in and out of hundreds of locomotive engines

and was familiar with the Blue Island station. At 5:00 a.m on June 21, 2001, Coffey arrived at

| The court takes the undisputed facts from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements, and
notes disputed facts within the text.


mandated laws in regards to locomotives. There is no evidence to suggest that the visor on

which Coffey bumped his head was unsafe, or that the visor was in violation of any federal

regulation. Metra inspected the visor at 10:30 a.m. on the day of the accident, and found no

defects. Furthermore, Metra states that it had not received any complaints or warnings about a

faulty visor in the cab car at issue prior to Coffey’s injury.

Coffey’s argues that because the visor was in a horizontal instead of vertical position, this

establishes at least the question of negligence on Metra’s behalf. The mere fact that the visor

was in a horizontal is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Metra

had “breached its duty to provide a safe workplace.” Holbrook, 414 F.3d at 742. Coffey points

to no rule or regulation that requires Metra to keep a sun visor in a cab car in a vertical position.

Additionally, Coffey has not presented even the slightest piece of evidence to suggest that

Metra’s negligence is at fault for the location, or alleged defect in the sun visor. Therefore,

Coffey is “unable proffer some evidence of the defendant’s negligence.” Id., at 742.

Moreover, Coffey claims that the light switch in the cab car was placed in an unsafe location.

Coffey maintains that had the switch been located closer to the door, he would not have hit his head on
the sun visor. In order to establish a violation of the LIA, Coffey must show that Metra failed to keep
all parts and appurtenances in working order, or that Metra failed to comply with FRA regulations.
See McGinn, 102 F.3d at 299. Despite this, Coffey points to no federal rule or regulation which
requires Metra to place the light switch in a specific location. Moreover, the only regulations Coffey
cites merely state that “each . . . controlling locomotive shall . . . have a conveniently located light that
can be readily turned on and off by persons operating the locomotive... .” 49 C.F.R. § 229.127.

There is no evidence that suggests the light switch in cab car 8262 was placed inconveniently. It is


the Blue Island station to begin his shift. According to Coffey, he inspected a locomotive engine
which was located at the south end of a train. After his inspection, Coffey moved the train to the
Vermont Street station. At the Vermont Street station, Coffey switched from the locomotive
engine on the south end, to the cab car at the north side of the train. A cab car is a passenger car
that has a compartment with a duplicate set of operation controls that allows the engineer to
operate the train without being in the locomotive engine car. This configuration is called a
“push-pull” configuration. The process of setting up a train to enable it to operate from either the
cab car or locomotive engine is called “changing ends.”

Around 5:13 a.m., after Coffey had changed ends at the Vermont station, he moved to cab
car 8262, which was located on the second level of the car. Coffey carried his work bag which
included maps, routes, and personal items. This bag is commonly known as a “grip.” Coffey
placed his grip behind the engineer’s seat. Because the train was in the station, and it was not yet
sunrise, the cab car was still dark. The record is silent regarding artificial lighting. As Coffey
reached for the light switch, he hit his head on a sun visor that was in the horizontal position.
The visor was fastened with brackets on each end, which allowed it to fold up or down, but not
turn from side to side. According to Coffey, he believed the visor had vibrated down to the
horizontal position.

Coffey reported the injury to his supervisor, Victor A. Flores (“Flores”), and filled out a
Metra Employee Incident Injury/Iliness Report. Flores stated that Coffey told him that he tripped
over his grip, lost balance, and bumped his head. Later on June 21, Coffey completed an
Employee Incidental Injury and IlIness Report, in which he stated that in addition to his pain on

the right side of his neck, he also experienced head, jaw, and shoulder pain. Metra’s Mechanical


Department examined the visor at 10:30 a.m. on June 21, within hours of the injury reporting,
and did not find any defects. Coffey claims that his injuries did not heal, and that he was
prescribed Celebrex for his pain. Metra claims that prior to Coffey’s accident, it had not received
any complaints from engineers or personnel regarding the sun visor, or placement of the light
switch in cab car 8262.
B. Procedural History

On May 25, 2004, Coffey filed a two-count Complaint alleging violations of the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) and the Locomotive Inspection Act, (“LIA”). Then, on
February 22, 2006, Metra filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Coffey Responded on March
22, 2006, and Metra Replied on April 4, 2006. Metra’s Motion for Summary Judgment is fully
briefed and before the court.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is permissible when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

nonmoving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must identify specific facts, see Heft v.

Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 283 (7th Cir. 2003), that raise more than a mere scintilla of evidence to

show a genuine triable issue of material fact. See Szymanski v. Rite-Way Lawn Maintenance

Co., 231 F.3d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Tr.’s of North
Newton School, 278 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2002).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court can only consider evidence that

would be admissible at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Stinnett v. Iron Works