DISCUSSION

Crest argues that the City’s truck prohibition on Division street violates 625

ILCS 5/15-102 whith|states in part as follows:

(e-1) A vehicle and load more than 8 feet wide but not exceeding 8 feet 6
inches in width lis allowed access according to the following: ...(4) A
vehicle and Idad not exceeding 80,000 pounds in weight is allowed access
from a Class } of Class II highway onto any State highway orany locally
designated highway for a distance of 5 highway miles for the purpose of
loading, unloading, food, fuel, repairs, and rest.

625 ILCS 5/15-102(¢-1|)(4)(emphasis added).

I. Judicial Admission|

Crest argues that the City is bound by its admission in its original answer in

which the City agreed that Division street is a locally designated highway. Judicial

admissions are admissions made in “the pleadings, or stipulations by a party or its

counsel, that are binding upon the party making them.” Keller v. U.S., 58 F.3d 1194,

1199 n.8 (7* Cir. 1995). |However, if a party is given leave to “submit an amended

pleading, the statements made in earlier pleading are not judicial admissions.” Clark

v, Fairbanks Capital Corp, 2003 WL 21277126, *5-6 (N.D. Ill. 2003)(citing/88

LLC y. Trinity Industries) Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir.2002)).

On November 13, 2003 we granted Crest’s motion for leave to file an



the truth of those allegatio:
those allegations.”

The City argues tha}
and neither admitted nor d

confusing an ambiguous.

ns] and Defendant, therefore neither admits nor denies

because it responded that it admitted paragraph 45 in part
lenied part of paragraph 45 that the City’s response is

This is untrue. The City first expressly admits to the

accuracy of the “descriptipris of U.S. Route 30 and Division Streets.” Thus, the city

admitted that Division Str

egt was a “locally designated highway” as it is described in

paragraph 45. The remaining portion of the City’s answer to paragraph 45

indicating that the remain:

ing allegations in paragraph 45 lack specificity clearly

refers to the assertion regarding the distance between the proposed business park and

Route 30.

The City also makes arguments concerning whether or not Division Street was

a designated truck route.

Street was a truck route ji

However, we agree with Crest that whether or not Division

snot dispositive in regards to determining whether or not

Division Street is a locally designated highway.



On December 9, 2
answer and on January 2
in its original answer to
designated highway. (Al
19, 2003 when the City
gave any indication that
20, 2003. Depositions g
2003 and Crest had alre:
that Crest should have u
Division Street is a local
various arguments regar
based upon the City’s af

would necessarily mak¢

I, Amendment to Clari

003 the City filed a motion for leave to file an amended

2,|2004 we denied the motion. The City expressly admitted
the original complaint that Division Street is a locally

Ing. par. 45). It was not until five months later on November
attempted to file an amended answer without leave that it
the City contested the fact. Discovery closed on October
f City officials were already taken prior to November 19,
ady filed its motion for summary judgment. The City argues
Inderstood all along that the City contested the allegation that
ly designated highway by the fact that the City made

ding whether Division Street was a truck route. However,
(mission in its original answer it is not logical that Crest

sich an indirect conclusion.

[Long-held Position

The City also arg
clarify its position at th
attempted amendment 4

position in regards to p

lugs that in its proposed amended answer it merely sought to

e beginning of this suit. However, it is clear that the City’s

o its answer was merely an attempt to change the City’s

aragraph 45 of the complaint in order to allow the City to



amended complaint to ch

November 19, 2003 the €

the City in its proposed aj

not altered by Crest in th
leave in order to file any at

motions are filed. Fed] R

substantively alters the|sd
answer. In the instant ¢as

complaint did not alter [th

to seek leave before it file
Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Mier
2002)holding that the de
because the amended com
complaint); Fuente v. H
1987)(stating that if “a pl:
theory or scope of the cis:
the original complaint fj
to freely replead [only if]

case,”),

ion

le

lange one date in the complaint from 1999 to 1998. On

ity filed an answer to the amended complaint. However,

mended answer made alterations to paragraphs that were
e amended complaint. Generally, a party needs to seek

mended answer after discovery is completed and dispositive

. Civ. P. 15(a). However, if an amended complaint

lope of the allegations then the defendant may amend its
the amended complaint merely changed a date and the

p scope of the allegations. Therefore, the City was required
d an amended answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).See also

psoft Corp, 2002 WL 31375531, at *32 (N.D. Ill.

fendant did not need to seek leave to amend its answer
plaint changed the scope of the allegations of the

eggers & Co., Inc, 1987 WL 9019, at *1 (N.D. Ill.

aintiff files an amended complaint which changes the

e, the defendant is allowed to plead anew as though it were
id by the Plaintiff’ and that Rule 15(a) allows “defendants

he plaintiff has substantively changed the nature the



the original filing and
“undue delay, bad faith
to cure deficiencies b
opposing party” or “f
178, 182 (1962)). Thu
Since, the City made fa j
locally designated high’

summary judgment.

I. Amendment to Cl

lhe attempted amendment,” but should be denied if there is

or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure

y amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the

futility of the amendment.”)(quotingfoman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

, we denied the City’s motion for leave to amend its answer.
udicial admission in its answer that Division Street is a

way, it is precluded from arguing otherwise in its motion for

ify Ambiguous Response

The City also arg)

complaint was ambiguot
amended complaint st;
highway and Division|S'
between U.S. Route 3
Street is approximately

Ht

original answer is as f¢

and Division Streets. be

Paragraph 45 are withd

at¢

4

q

‘ut

ues that its original response to paragraph 45 of the original
us. We disagree. Paragraph 45 of the complaint and

s: “As also set forth above, U.S. Route 30 is a Class II

reet is a locally designated highway, and the distance

ind the Proposed Business Park’s entrance on Division

ine mile.” The City’s response to paragraph 45 in its

pws: “Defendant admits to the descriptions of U.S. Route 30
ifendant further answers that the reaming [sic] allegations of

sufficient specificity for Defendant to form a belief as to



‘Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Minois
‘Name of Assigned Jud; ‘ i Sitting Judge if Othe
meeiiuimet ute | Samipl Der-Yeghiayan | Sune serone
CASE NUMBER 03 C 3343 DATE 5/24/2004
CASE Crest Hill Land vs. City of Joliet
TITLE
[ln the followink bax (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) o Filed motion of [ usg listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of notion due
@) Oo Answer brief to motion |due. . Reply to answer brief due. :
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/dontinued to} [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[Held/continued to] [set for/re-set for) on set for at :
(?) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Heartng) held/continued to at
9) Oo This case is dismisse! [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) OLbcdl Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) ( FRCP41(a)(2).

go) [Other docket entry] | Status hearing set for 06/21/04 at 9:00 a.m. For the reasons stated in the

attached memorandum opinion, the Court hereby denies the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

on Count II and grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Count II. Enter Memorandum

Opinion.
al) [For further detail seq order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open cout.
No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices. Counsel fot
parties picked-up copies of the me lum
opinion from the Courtroom Deputy.
Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
MW deputy’s
initials

1YNOI L3e1sid “SA
PAE)

eSrliis Se dvd addz

Date/time received in
‘central Clerk's Office

AY 25 poy

date mailed notice

‘mailing deputy initials



CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we deny the City’s motion for summary

judgment on Court ]I and grant Crest’s motion for summary judgment on Count Il.

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan ; 6 y

United States District Court Judge .

Dated: May 24, 21

10



pursue new argument:
preliminary injunction
and the City argued th
the Illinois Motor Vehic
Division Street was ngt
such a material amendm|
answer after discovery w

judgment would have be

Howard Paper Co. v. Btd

1990)(stating that “[iJq is
amendment to the pleadij

that] [bleyond prejudig¢e

concemed with the costs|

[d]elay impairs the ‘publ

[t]he interests of justice g
[and] extreme, ‘delay itse
Bache & Co. (Lebanon

Aluminum Corp. v. Hom

“[a]n amendment should

at}

against Crest. In the City’s answer to the motion for a

the City argued that Crest would not succeed on the merits
the truck prohibition does not violate 625 ILCS 5/15-102 of

le Code, but the City made no mention of its contention that

a locally designated highway. To allow the City to make

ent to its answer that is directly opposite to the original

‘as completed and after Crest filed its motion for summary

en prejudicial to Crest and to the judicial system. See Fort

andard Havens, Inc, 901 F.2d 1373, 1379-80 (7* Cir.

wholly within a district court's discretion to deny an

ngs for delay and prejudice to the opposing party. . . [and

to the parties, a trial court can deny amendment when

that protracted litigation places on the courts [because]

ic interest in the prompt resolution of legal disputes [and]
‘0 beyond the interests of the parties to the particular suit
if may be considered prejudicial.")(quoting Tamari v.
5.A.L., 838 F.2d 904, 909 (7th Cir.1988)); Jupiter

Ins. Co, 181 F.R.D. 605, 609 (N.D. Ill. 1998)(stating that

not be denied merely due to the passage of time between



|
i
|
|
identify “those portions
and a issions on file,

|
|
demonstrate the absenc

Catrett, 477 US. 317, 3
burden may be satisfied)
pointing out “an absenc
325. Once the movant
on the allegations in thq
[Rule 56), must set fort}
trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54
summary judgment is nj
Matsushita Elec. Indus,
Rather, a genuine issue
reasonable jury could 4
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2
599 (rth Cir. 2000). Th
|

favorable to the non-mq

non-moving party. Ander,
|

F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir.

of
0
Q
23
b;
e
hai

Pp

hg
(¢
bt
q
off
ty
12
le

Vv!

20

‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
pether with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes
f a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This initial
presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by
f evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.”/d. at
s met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest
leadings, but, “by affidavits or as otherwise provided for in
pecific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
). A “genuine issue” in the context of a motion for
simply a “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
lo., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a
im a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty
248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc. 216 F.3d 596,
court must consider the record as a whole, in a light most _
ing party, and draw all reasonable inferences that favor the
son, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport Co, 212

00).



facilities, distribution|centers, and warehouses. The vehicle entrance to the proposed
business park is on a $treet named Division Street. Crest claims that it met with the
City prior to the purchase of the property and that the parties agreed that truck traffic
could proceed from ithe business park to main highways. In April of 2001 the City

Council imposed a total prohibition on truck traffic on Division Street. Crest

brought the instant

complaint alleges a dla!

Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31114. Count II of the complaint alleges js
a claim based on a viplation of 625 ILCS 5/15-102 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle

Code. On May 22, 2008 Judge Holderman, the prior judge in this case, entered a

preliminary injunction énjoining the City from enforcing its truck prohibition on

Division Street. Crest and the City have now each moved for summary judgment on

Count I.

Summary judgmer
favorable to the nonmdvi

material fact and the mpv,

Civ. P. 56(c). In seekin

gs

on seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Count I of the

im based on an alleged violation of the Surface

LEGAL STANDARD

it is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
Ing party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any
ling party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

a grant of summary judgment the moving party must


IN THE
FOR THE)

CREST HILL LAND D}
LLC.,,

v.

THE CITY OF JOLIEY,

SAMUEL DER-YEGHI

This matter is bef
LLC’s (“Crest”) motion
Defendant the City of Joli
Tl of the complaint. Foy th

summary judgment and| gt

In July of 2000

Pr

Illinois intending to de}

U)
N

»

Pi

D

1A}

pr¢

fg

IRTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

OnTH STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DIVISION

ELOPMENT,

aintiff,

No. 03 C 3343

efendant.

wee was a eae ew

0 {e)

M

VAN, District Judge
the court on Plaintiff Crest Hill Land Development

ir summary judgment on Count II of the complaint and on
pt’s (“City”) cross motion for summary judgment on Count

reasons stated below we deny the City’s motion for

ant Crest’s motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

est purchased 168 acres of property in Crest Hill,

elop a business park containing a mix of light manufacturing

1