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______________________________________________________________________________ 2018 IL App (2d) 170036 No. 2-17-0036 Opinion filed February 5, 2018

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

CAROL E E. AASEN, et al

. , ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. P laintiffs -Appe ll ants , ) )

v. ) No s. 15- TX -164 ) 15- TX -165 ) 15- TX -167 DAVID J. RICKERT, Treasure r and ) ex officio Collector of Kane County, ) Honorable ) M. Katherine Moran, Defendant -Appell ee

. ) Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Zenoff and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION
¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Carole A a sen and approximately 665 other tax objectors (O bjectors)
, appeal
the judgment of the trial court denying their motion for summary judgment and dis missing their
tax objection complaints against defendant, David J. Rickert, treasurer and ex officio collector of
Kane County (Collector)

. The Objectors argue that the Kane County c lerk lacked the authority

to use the Illinois Departme nt of Revenue’s amended apportionment s for tax year 2012 to collect

taxes in tax year 2014. We affirm.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 A. Stipulated Facts2018 IL App (2d) 170036

¶ 4 The parties stipulated to the relevant facts in these three cases, consolidated in the trial

court, as follows. The Objectors each own real property in a part of Kane County within a taxing
district that lies in at least one other county. S pecifically, the Objectors own property located in
the following taxing districts lying in the following counties:

Distric t Counties
Elgin School Dist rict U46 Kane, Du Page, and Cook
Elgin College Dist rict 509 Kane, Cook, and De Kalb
Elgin City Kane and Cook
Gail Borden Library Kane and Cook
¶ 5 The drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution
, recognizing the need for the fair

a

pportionment of the burden of taxation of property in taxing districts that overlap more than one
county, provided as follows :
“The General Assembly may provide by law for fair apportionment of the burden
of taxation of property situated in taxing districts that lie in more than one county.” Ill.

Const. 1970, art. IX, § 7.
¶ 6 Accordingly, s ection 18-155 of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/18 -155
(West 2014))
, entitled “Apportionment of taxes for districts in two or more counties,” provides

for the f air apportionment of that burden. To accomplish this goal, section 18 -155 authorizes the
Department of Revenue (D OR ) to apportion the amounts to be raised by taxation on property in a
district that overlaps multiple counties, so that each county bear s th e burden as though all parts
of the district had been assessed at the same proportion of actual value. It also authorizes the

D OR to certify to each county clerk the percentage constituting that county’s burden, which the
clerk will apply to the property o f the taxing district that lies in that county. 35 ILCS 200/18

-

155 (c) (West 2014).

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-2018 IL App (2d) 170036

¶ 7 Section 18-155 of the Code provides in relevant part:

“ The burden of taxation of property in taxing districts that lie in more than one
county shall be fairly apportioned as provided in Article IX, Section 7, of the Constitution

of 1970.

*** When the Department has received a written request for equalization for
overlapping tax districts as provided in this Section, the Department shall promptly notify
the county clerk an d county treasurer of each county affected by that request that tax bills
with respect to property in the parts of the county which are affected by the request may
not be prepared or mailed until the Department certifies the apportionment among

c ounties of the taxing districts’ levies, except as provided in subsection (c) of this

Section. To apportion, the Department shall:
(a) On or before December 31 of that year cause an assessment ratio study to be
made in each township in which each of the named overl apping taxing districts lies, using
equalized assessed values as certified by the county clerk, and an analysis of property
transfers prior to January 1 of that year. The property transfers shall be in an amount
deemed reasonable and proper by the Departme nt. The Department may conduct
hearings, at which the evidence shall be limited to the written presentation of assessment
ratio study data.
( b) Request from the County Clerk in each County in which the overlapping
taxing districts lie, certification of th e portion of the assessed value of the prior year for
each overlapping taxing district ’ s portion of each township. Beginning with the 1999
taxable year, for those counties that classify property by county ordinance pursuant to
subsection (b) of Section 4 o f Article IX of the Illinois Constitution, the certification shall

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be listed by property class as provided in the classification ordinance. The clerk shall
return the certification within 30 days of receipt of the request.
(c) Use the township assessment ratio studies to apportion the amount to be raised
by taxation upon property within the district so that each county in which the district lies
bears that burden of taxation as though all parts of the overlapping taxing district had

been assessed at the sa me proportion of actual value. The Department shall certify to
each County Clerk, by March 15 , the percent of burden. Except as provided below, the
County Clerk shall apply the percentage to the extension as provided in Section 18

- 45 to

determine the amoun t of tax to be raised in the county.
If the Department of Revenue does not certify the percent of burden in the time
prescribed, the county clerk shall use the most recent prior certification to determine the

amount of tax to be raised in the county.

If the use of a prior certified percentage results in over or under extension for the
overlapping taxing district in the county using same, the county clerk shall make
appropriate adjustments in the subsequent year . Any adjustments necessitated by the
procedu re authorized by this Section shall be made by increasing or decreasing the tax
extension by fund for each taxing district where a prior certified percentage was used. No
tax rate limit shall render any part of a tax levy illegally excessive which has been
apportioned as herein provided. The percentages certified by the Department shall remain

until changed by reason of another assessment ratio study made under this Section .”
(Emphases added.) 35 ILCS 200/18-155 (West 2014).
¶ 8 I n this case, for the tax year 2012, the D OR did not certify the apportionments for the

districts at issue to the county clerks by March 15, 2013. Accordingly, the Kane County c lerk

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used the most recent prior certif ication to determine the Objectors’ property taxe s for tax year

2012.
¶ 9 On May 15, 2013, the D OR certified the apportionment s for tax year 2012 to the county

clerks. The D OR ’s apportionment percentage for Kane County w as lower than in the

certification used for t he tax bills issued for tax year 2012. O n March 14, 2014
, the D OR

certified the apportionments f or tax year 2013. O n March 26, 2014, when the Kane County c lerk
extended the tax burden for tax year 2013
, he reduced the amount of tax extended to adjust for

the over -extension in tax year 2012. The parties do not dispute that the Kane County c lerk had
the authority pursuant to section 18-155(c) of the Code to make this adjustment.
¶ 10 On May 21, 2014, the D OR certified a “Corrected” apportionment of the district s’ tax

burdens for tax year 2012 , and on December 12 , 2014, the D OR certified “Amended ”
apportionments of the district s’ tax burden s . For tax year 2014 , t he Kane County c lerk applied
the amended apportionment s to the extension for tax year 2012. On February 9 , 2015, the Kane
County c lerk informed the O bjectors via letter that :
“[F] or the past two years the tax rates for the taxing districts [at issue] were
disproportiona tely low due to an issue with the percent of burden that Kane County
property owners pay to the [ taxing districts at issue].

*** The percentages the Department of Revenue assigned to Kane County were
too low and were too high in DuPage and Cook Counties based upon numbers they
received from this office in 2011 and 2012 and did not reflect an accounting change due

to a software issue.

The software issue has been resolved, but the affected parcels will have to pay an
increased rate for the 2014 tax year to make up the difference. As a result, the tax rate for

the affected districts will increase.”

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Th us, in 2015, when the Kane County c lerk extended t he tax burden in the O bjectors ’ districts
for tax year 2014, the extension included a “Manual Adjustment” that reflected the a mended
apportionments for tax year 2012.
¶ 11 The apportionments for tax year 2012 were:

District Originally ext ended by

c lerk May 2013 using prior certified percentage Certified by D OR May 2013 & adjusted by clerk March 2014 Amended by DOR Dec. 2014, with “Manual Adjustment” included in 2015
Elgin U46 34.28% 31.54% 33.63%
Elgin 509 61.62% 60.53% 61.86%
Elgin City 79.61% 78.47% 79.60%

Borden 68.21% 66.40% 68.09%

¶ 12 B. Proceedings
¶ 13 On October 1, 2015, the Ob jectors filed tax objection complain t s against the Col lector
, pursuant to section 23

- 5 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/23

- 5 (West 2014)), alleging that the K ane

Count y c lerk’s application of the amended apportionments for tax year 201 2 to the collection of

taxes for tax year 2014 was void and illegal pursuant to, inter alia , section 18-155 of the Code.
¶ 14 The O bjectors moved for summary judgment. On January 10, 2017, a fter hearing the
parties’ arguments, the trial court denied the O bjectors’ motion for summary judgment and

dismissed their complaint s, stating, in part:
“[T]he language of Section 18

- 155, the objective in ensuring correct, appropriate
adjustments are made, and the burden of taxation of property in taxing districts th at lie in
more than one county― that lie in more than one county is fairly apportioned as provided
by the statute, this Court finds that the action taken by the County Clerk is not contrary to

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[t he] statute and the county clerk is authorized under Section 18

- 155 to adjust the tax
objector’s [ sic ] 2014 taxes to account for the apportionment for 2012.”
¶ 15 The Objectors filed their notice of appeal on January 12, 2017.
¶ 16 After the parties filed their appe llate briefs, this court, on its own motion, ordered the
parties to prepare supplemental briefs addressing: “ (1) what the legislative intent and legislative
history of section 18

- 155 of the Code provides relating to the county c lerk’s authority and/or

obli gation to exten d taxes after receiving a cert i fication , and (2) how the legislative history and
legislative intent support their respective interpretations of Section 18-155.”
¶ 17 I I. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 The Objectors argue that the trial court erred by den ying their mot ion for summary
judgment and by dismiss ing their tax objection complaints, because the Kane County c lerk

lacked the authority to use the DOR’s amended apportionments for tax year 2012 in connection
with the extension for tax year 2014.
¶ 19 Summary judgment motions are governed by section 2

- 1005 of the Code of Civil
Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2

- 1005 (West 2014)). Pursuant to that section
, summary judgment
should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

735 ILCS 5/2

- 1005(c) (West 2014). Whether summary judgment was appr opriate in this case

turns on the trial court’ s interpretation of section 18-155 of the Code.
¶ 20 We review de novo an order granting or denying summary judgment. See Millennium

Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan , 241 Ill. 2d 281, 309 (2010). De novo revi ew is also
appropriate to the extent that this case turns on construction of the Code and thus presents a
question of law. See Better Government Ass’ n v. Zaruba , 2014 IL App (2d) 140071, ¶ 20.

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¶ 21 The Objectors a rgue that the Kane C ounty c lerk lacked the au thority to use the DOR’s
2014 certified amended apportionments for tax year 2012. The Objectors contend that section

18-155 (c) of the Code allows a county clerk to adjust an app ortionment only in “ the subsequent

year ,” meaning the following tax year, whic h in this case was 2013. The C ollector argues that
this interpretation is contrary to the plain language and purpose of the statute. The C ollector
contends that “the subsequent year” mean s the year after the D OR certifies the apportionment.
¶ 22 The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.

Board of Education of Springfield School District 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois , 2017 IL
120343, ¶ 24. The best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the languag e of the statu t e itself
, given i t s plain and ordinary meaning. Id . We must avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that

would create absurd results or render part of the statute a nullity. See Nelson v. Artley
, 2015 IL
118058, ¶¶ 25, 27. “Additionally , in construing statutes relating to the levying and collection of
taxes, this court has sought to give them a reasonable and commonsense meaning, so as to avoid
making it difficult or impossible for taxes to be levied and collected.” In re Application fo r
Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989
, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 169 (1995).
¶ 23 The O bjectors’ interpretation
, that “the subsequent year” means the following tax year
, is
counter to these principles and reads into the relevant language the w ords “tax year.” This
interpretation ignores the purpose of the statute, which , again, provides:

“ The burden of taxation of property in taxing districts that lie in more than one county
shall be fairly apportioned as provided in Article IX, Section 7, of the Constitution of
1970.” 35 ILCS 200/18-155 (West 2014).
¶ 24 Under section 18 -155 , t he D OR conducts an assessment ratio study in each township in
which an overlapping district lies, by using equalized assessed values of taxable property and an
analysis of p roperty transfers. 35 ILCS 200/18

- 155(a) (West 2014). The DOR then uses the se

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studies to apportion the amount of proper ty tax to be raised within the district , “ so that each
county in which the district lies bears that burden of taxation as though all pa rts of the
overlapping taxing district had been assessed at the same proportion of actual value.” 35 ILCS

200/18-155 (c) (West 2014). The D OR then certif ies to each county clerk the percent age
constituting that county’s burden. Id

. ¶ 25 A county clerk’s dut y is to fix the amount of taxes that will be extended. In re
Application for Judgment & Sale
, 167 Ill. 2d at 174. A county clerk’s duties in the extension of
taxes are purely ministerial; thus, a clerk has no power to determine whether taxes have been

le gally assessed. Id

. ¶ 26 H ere, once the D OR certified the amended apportionments , the Kane County c lerk had a
duty to extend the taxes to determine the amount to be raised

. See id

. If it were otherwise, the

D OR ’s mandate w ould be thwarted

. In determining the legislature’s intent
, we consider the
necessity and purpose for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the goals sought to be

achieved. Progressive Universal Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. , 215 Ill. 2d
121, 134 (2005).
¶ 27 Alt hough the O bjectors urge this court to limit “ the subsequent year” to mean subsequent

tax year, we will not read this limitation into the statute
, particularly where it conflicts with the
legislature’s express intent , namely
, that “ [t] he burden of taxation of property in taxing districts
that lie in more than one county shall be fairly apportioned.” 35 ILCS 200/18

- 155 (West 2014) ;

see Brunton v. Kruger , 2015 IL 117663 ¶ 24 (in interpreting a statute
, a court must not read into

it exceptions
, limitations , o r conditions that conflict with the express intent of the legislature ).

Th e O bjectors’ interpretation would defeat the state d purpose of section 18 -155 by prohibiting a
county clerk from apply ing a fair apportionment, as determined by the DOR , to property in
taxing districts that lie in more than one county . See Brucker v. Mercola , 227 Ill. 2d 502, 514

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(2007) ( e ach word, clause
, and sentence in a challenged statute is to be given some reasonable
meaning and not rendered superfluous).
¶ 28 Further, the O bject ors’ interpretation would produce an unjust result in this case by
nullifying the Kane County c lerk’s appropriate extension based upon the correct apportionments
as certified by the DOR. See Progressive Universal Insurance Co.
, 215 Ill. 2d at 134 (when

in terpre ti ng a statute , a court must presume that the legislature did not intend to produce absurd,

inconvenient, or unjust results )

. A s stated in the Kane County c lerk’s February 2015 letter,

“[t] he percentages the Department of Revenue assigned to Kane Co unty were too low and were
too high in DuPage and Cook Counties. ” If we adopt the Objectors’ interpretation as to the

amended apportionment s, the statute’s purpose would not be implemented and it would be

rendered a nullity. See In re Detention of Lieber man , 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (2002) ( when
interpreting a statute , courts may consider the nature and object of the statute and the
consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other).
¶ 29 The Objectors support their interpretation of “the subsequent year” in section 18 -155 by
citing section 18

- 157 of the Code. 35 ILCS 200/18

- 157 (West 2014). Section 18

- 157 provides
in relevant part:
“If a court, in any tax objection based on the apportionment of an overlapping t axing

district under Section 18- 155, enters a final judgment that there was an over extension or
under extension of taxes for an overlapping taxing district based on the apportionment

under Section 18

- 155 for the year for which the objection was filed, the county clerks of
each county in which there was an under extension shall proportionately increase the levy
of that taxing district by an amount specified in the court order in that county in the
subsequent year or in any subsequent year following the final judgment of the court. ”
(E mphasis added.) Id.

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¶ 30 The Objectors contend that section 18

- 157 and section 18

- 155 use the phrase “the
subsequent year” to refer to the year immediately following the tax year for which an
apportionment is at issue. However, words in a statute must be read in context , rather than in

isolation. Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray
, 191 Ill. 2d 214, 229 (2000). The Objectors’
interpretation of the phrase in section 18

- 157 entirely ignores the context in which it appears

. The legislature wa s addressing the action t hat county clerks must take when a court enters a
specific final judgment. W hen read in context, that phrase, as well as the phrase “ or in any
subsequent year ,” relates to the “final j udgment of the court ” (35 ILCS 200/18-157 (West 2014) ).

Thus, the Objec tors’ interpretation of the phrase in section 18

- 157 does not support thei r
interpretation of the phrase in section 18 -155. Under section 18

- 155, the phrase relates to the

DOR ’s certification of an apportionment , which it may do in any subsequent year
, re quiring the
ministerial application by the clerk of a tax rate consistent with that apportionment.
¶ 31 Further, the Objectors fail to cite authority limiting the DOR to one apportionment , and
we have found no indication that the legislature intended to limit when the DOR may amend an
apportionment. Although section 18-155 (c) provides that “[t] he Department shall certify to each
County Clerk, by March 15 , the percent of burden,” that section also provides that
, if the DOR

“ does not certify the percent of burden in the time prescribed, the county clerk shall use the most
recent prior certification” and that “[t] he percentages certified by the Department shall remain
until changed by reason of another assessment ratio study made under this Section. ” 35 ILCS

200/18- 155(c) (West 2014). The statute further provides : “If the use of a prior certified
percentage results in over or under extension for the overlapping taxing district in the county
using same, the county clerk shall make appropriate adjustments in the subsequent year .” Id

. Reading the statute as a whole, we determine that “ the subsequent year” means the year after the

DOR certifies the apportionment

. Under the O bjectors’ interpretation, if the DOR had certified a

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-2018 IL App (2d) 170036

lower percentage in this case, the Ka ne County c lerk would not be authorized to make an
adjustment in the O bjectors’ favor. Because the O bjectors’ interpretation is illogical
, and for the

reasons stated above
, we reject the O bjectors’ interpretation.
¶ 32 In addition, t he Objectors argue that th eir interpretation is supported by the recent

addition of section 18 -15 6 to the Code. The Objectors contend that section 18

- 156, applicable

for tax year 2015 and thereafter (35 ILCS 200/18 -156(e) (West 2016) ), authorizes the DOR to

revise an apportionment if a county’s share of an overlapping taxing district’s tax levy “is
subsequently determined to exceed 105% of what that county’s share should have been.” 35

ILCS 200/18 -156 (a) (West 2016). Therefore, t he Object or s argue , here th e DOR had no such
authority to revise the apportionment, because section 18-156 was not yet effective.
¶ 33 T he argument fail s because t he Objectors fail to r ecognize that section 18

- 155 provides

that “ [t] he percentages certified by the Department shall remain until changed by reaso n of
another assessment ratio study made under this Section.” 35 ILCS 200/18

- 155(c) (West 2014).

Further, section 18

- 155 does not limit the DOR’s authority to revise an apportionment

. Accordingly, we reject the Objectors’ argument regarding section 18-156.
¶ 34 The Objectors also argue that the Kane County c lerk’s manual adjustment was erroneous
because “taxes must have some degree of finality, stability, and security to the taxpayer.” Hamer

v. Kirk , 57 Ill. App. 3d 335, 341 (1978). We recognize the importance of these goals. However,
the purpose of section 18

- 155 is to fairly apportion the burden of taxation of property in taxing
districts that lie in more than one county. Section 18

- 155 provides a mechanism to achieve this

purpose by allowing county cl erks to make adjustments when the use of prior certifi cations

results in over or under extension s . The legislature does not appear to have sought finality in
achieving this purpose , and though citing Hamer for the general proposition
, the Objectors do
not cite authority directly on point.

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-2018 IL App (2d) 170036

¶ 35 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the Objectors’ motion for summ ary judgment

and dismissed the O bjectors’ tax objection complaints

. ¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s order.
¶ 38 Affirmed

.

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