IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2017-CA-00246-SCT RANKIN COUNTY

BOARD OF SUPERV

ISORS

v. LAKELAND INCOME PROPERTIES, LLC

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/25/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: DAVID ELLIS DANNY DRAKE W I LLIAM “TREY” JONES, III CRAIG SLAY COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JOSEPH ANTHONY SCLAFANI W I LLIAM “TREY” JONES, III TAYLOR B. McNEEL CRAIG SLAY ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: DAVID ELLIS DAVID W

. MOCKBEE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED. ON CROSS-APPEAL: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 05/10/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE WALLER, C.J., CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ. CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The Board of Supervisors of Rankin County has appealed the decision of the circuit

court granting Lakeland Incom e Properties’ sum m ary judgm ent m otion a nd holding that Lakeland Incom e Properties w as properly bef ore the circuit court and w as entitled to an advalorem tax exem ption under Mississippi Code S ection 61-3-21 f or the l and rented f

rom the Jackson Municipal A irport Authority

. The circuit c ourt also granted a ref und of the 2015 ad valorem taxes. Lakeland Incom e Properties f iled a cross-appeal, arguing that i t was entitled

to an a d valorem tax r e f

und under Mississippi Code Section 27-73-7 f o r the 2015 ad valorem

taxes and f

or the prior three y ears. Under a de nov o s tandard of r eview, the Court af f i rm s the trial court in holding that the ad valorem tax exem p tion sought by Lakeland Incom e Properties was a

utom atic and self

-operating under Missi s s i p p i Code Section 61-3-21, and thereby , p r operly bef

ore the c ircuit court u nder Mississippi Code S ection 11-51-77. Further, the Court af

f irm s the trial court’s holding that L akeland I ncom e Properties w a s e n titled to

a r ef und o f the 2015 taxes. The Court reverses the trial court’s holding that Lakeland Incom e Properties is n ot entitled to a ref und f or the 2 012, 2013 and 2014 tax y ears, holdi n g that Lakeland Incom e Properties is entitled to the ref und under Mississippi C o d e S e c t i on 27-73-7.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Lakeland Incom e Properties, LLC (LIP) f i led a Notice o f Appeal on Novem ber 23, 2015, alleging that LIP was aggrieved by the Novem ber 16, 2015, decision of t he Board of Supervisors (the Board) assessing ad valorem taxes t o LIP f or the property it leases f

rom the Jackson Municipal A irport Authority (the Airport). 1 LIP cited M ississippi Code Section 61-
3-21 a s p roof that it was entitled to an exem p tion f rom ad v alorem taxes. The property is a

1 On Aug u s t 2 7 , 2 0 1 4, L IP sent the B oard a Mississippi Tort Claim s Act Notice of Claim letter. The l etter sta t e d t h a t it w as providing notice of the Board’s incorrect assessm ent of ad valorem taxes on LIP’s property t hat i s r ented f rom the A irport. The Board responded to the letter via e-m ail, stating t hat t he property was proper l y a s s essed. LIP originally f

iled a com

plaint, but the circuit court advise d t h a t a N o t i ce o f Appeal was the proper procedural vehicle. The com plaint was subsequently

dism issed. 25.20-acre parcel of land at the corner of Lakeland Drive a n d A i rport Road that contains a

shopping plaza. ¶3. Both parties f

i l e d c o mp e t i n g mo t i o n s f or sum m ary judgm ent. The m otions f or

sum m ary judgm ent addr e s s e d whether Section 61-3-21 required an exem ption of the ad valorem taxes assessed to LIP. L I P argued that Section 61-3-21 entitled it to a n e x em ption, and a ref und w as required f

or the previous three y ears of taxes. The Board argued that the

exem ption did n ot apply because LIP’s r eal proper t y d i d n o t f all into the def

inition of an airport under Section 61-3-3. ¶4. Af ter the parties f

iled responses and rebuttals to the sum m ary judgm ent m o tions, the Board f iled a M otion to Dism iss, a rguing that the c ircuit court did not h ave jurisdiction over the appeal because L IP f

a iled to object under Section 25-35-93 to the Board’s assessm ent of
taxes or f ile an a pplication f

or c hange of the assessm ent. LIP respo n d ed with a Motion to Strike, statin g t h a t the Motion to Dism iss was untim ely

. L IP also argued that i t was not required t o f

ile an o b jection or an application under Section 11-51-77; t heref o re, their appeal was properly

bef ore the circuit court. ¶5. Af ter a hearing o n the com peting m otions f

or sum m ar y j u d g me n t , t h e M o t ion to Dism iss and th e Motion to Strik e , t h e trial judge r uled f rom the bench a nd then issued a corresponding written judgm e nt t o f ollow. T he t r i a l c ourt denied LIP’s Motion to Strike,
f inding that the jurisdictional i ssue cannot be waived. The trial court then denied t he m otion

to D ism iss, f

inding that the appeal was proper under Section 1 1

- 5 1 -77. The Court then granted LIP’s sum m ary judgm ent m otion and denied t h e Board’s sum m ary judgm ent m otion,

3f

inding that the exem

ption applied under Se c t i on 61-3-21, f or t he tax y ear of 2015 but not the prior y ears. The Board appealed, and LIP f iled a cross-appeal.
S TATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ¶6. The Board raised three issues on appeal, and LIP raised two issues. The issues are consolidated and restated as f ollows: (1) Whether t he circuit court erred in deny i ng the Board’s Motion to D i sm iss based upon LIP’s f ailure to object or file an applic a t i o n before the Board prior to appealing t o the circuit court p u r suant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-77. (2) W h e t h er the circuit court e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g L I P ’ s s u mma r y judgm ent m otion, deny ing the Board’s sum m a ry judgm ent m otion and holding LIP ex em pt from ad valorem tax es under Mississippi Code Section 61-3-21. LIP raises one issue on its cross-appeal. The issue is restated as f ollows:
Whether t he circuit court erred in holding that L IP is entitled to a refund of only its 2015 ad valorem ta x e s , a s opposed t o a r efund reaching back three y ears.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7. The Court reviews a m otion to dism iss de novo. Chandler v. McKee , 202 So. 3d 1269,
127 1 ( M i s s . 2 0 1 6). A sum m a ry judgm ent m otion also is reviewed de novo. Kinney v. S. Mississippi Planning & Dev. Dist., Inc. , 202 So. 3d 1 87, 192 ( Miss. 2016). “The evidence is viewed in the light m ost f avorable to the party opposing the m otion. The m oving party has th e b urden of d em onstrating no genuine issue of m a t erial f act exists.” Id. “Sum m ary judgm ent is proper ‘ if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and adm issions

on f ile, together with the a f

f idavits, if any , s h ow that th e r e i s n o g enuine i ssue as to any

4m aterial f

act and that the m oving party is entitled to j u d g me n t a s a m atter of law.’” Id. (quoting Hosem ann v. Harris , 163 So. 3d 263, 267 (Miss. 2015)).
ANALYSIS OF THE APPEAL (1) Whether the circuit court erred in deny i ng the Board’s Motion to Dis m i s s b a s ed u pon LIP’s failure to object or file an application b e f ore the Board prior to appealing to t he circuit court p ursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-77. ¶8. The i nstant issue revolves a round t he reading of three statutes, Sections 11-51-77, 27- 35-93 and 27-35-143. Section 11-51-77 states in pertinent part: Any person aggrieved by a decision of the b oar d o f supervisors or the m unicipal authorities of a city , town or village, as to the a s sessm ent of taxes, m ay , withi n t e n d a y s af

ter the adjournm ent of the m eeting a t which such decision is ma d e , appeal to the c ircuit c o urt o f the county

. . . . The controversy shall be tried anew in the circuit court at the f irst term

. . . . Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-77 (Rev. 2012). ¶9. Section 27-35-93 states in f ull:
A p erson who is dissatisf

ied with the assessm ent m ay , at the August m eeting, present objections thereto in writing which shall b e f iled by the c lerk and docketed and p reserved with the roll. All person s w h o f a i l to file o bjections s h a l l be concluded by the assessment and precluded from questioning i t s validity af

ter its f inal approval by the board of supervisors o r by operation of law, except m inors and persons non com pos m entis. Miss. Code Ann. § 27-35-93 (Rev. 2017) (em phasis added). ¶10. Section 27-35-143 states in pertinent part: The board of supervisors of each county shall h ave p o wer, upon application of the party i nterested, or by the assessor on b ehalf of such party

. . . to change, cancel or decrease a n a s s e s s m ent in the m anner herein provided a t any tim e af ter the assessm ent roll containing s uch assessm e n t h as been f inally approved b y t h e State Tax Com m i ssion, and prior to the last Monday in August next, under the f

ollowing circum stances and no other:

5. . .

13. W hen the property has been a ssessed as subj e c t t o s t a t e taxes a n d is exem pt; or w hen the property has been assessed as subject to county an d district taxes and is exem pt f rom such taxes. Miss. Code Ann. § 27-35-143 (Rev. 2017). ¶11. The parties f

ocus their argum ents on the r ules of statutory interpretation. The Board
argues that Section 1 1 -51-77 is a s tatute of general application; theref ore, the m ore specif

ic
Sect i o n s

— Section 2 7 -35-93 and Section 27-35-143—apply o ver Section 11-51-77. LIP
argues that Section 1 1 -51-77 alone applies. LIP reasons that Section 27-35-93 and Section
27-35-143 d o not address exem ptions or apply to the instant case because t h e a i r port

exem ption at issue is autom atic or self

- operating. ¶12. The Court’s r ole “is not to decide what a statute should provide, but to d eterm ine what it does provide.” Lawson v . Honeywell Int’l, Inc. , 75 So. 3 d 1 024, 1027 (Miss. 2 011). “All words and phrases contained i n the statutes are used according to their com m on and ordinary acceptation and m eaning; but technical wo r d s a n d phrases according t o their technical

m eaning.” Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-65 (Rev. 2014). The Court exam ines the s t a t u t e a nd linguistic choices as a whole, not looking to t h e w o r d s i n isolation. Miller v. French , 530
U.S. 327, 340, 120 S. Ct. 2246, 2255, 147 L. E d

. 2 d 326 ( 2000); In r e Settoon Towing,
L.L.C. , 859 F.3d 340, 345 ( 5 t h C i r . 2017). “If the w ords of a statute a re clear and

u n a mb i guous, the C ourt applies the plain m eaning o f the statute and ref rains f rom u s i n g principles of

statutory construction.” Lawson , 75 So. 3d at 1027.

6¶13. On the other hand, if a statut e i s “ a mb i g uous or silent,” statutory interpretation is

warranted. Miss. Methodist H osp. & Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid , 21 So. 3d 600, 607 (Miss. 2009). Under the doctrine of stare decisis , the Court has stated, “[ W ]e will nevertheless continue to apply the previous [ statutory ] int e r p r e tation, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, u

pon f inding the Legislature am e nded o r reenacted t h e s t a t ute without correcting the prior interpretation.” Caves v. Y arbrough , 991 So. 2 d 142, 153 (Miss. 2008). (A) Section 27-35-143 ¶14. The Board argues that Section 27-35-143 provides t hat an application with the Board is required bef

o r e an appeal c an be taken. As stated above, Section 27-35-143 provides that “[ t]he board of supervisors

. . . shall have power, upon application of the party interested

.

. . t o change, cancel o r decrease a n assessm ent in the m anner herein p rovided

. . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 27-35-143. It then provides: “W hen the property has been assessed a s subject

to state [ or county and district t axes] and i s exem p t

. . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 27-35-143 (13). The plain language o f Section 27-35-143 neither provides w hat a taxp a y er m ust do to
preserve the right to appeal nor requires a taxpay er to f ile an application. It m e rely details the power of the board of supervisors “upon a pplication.” Miss. C ode Ann. § 27-35-143. Theref ore, the only statutes at issue that address a n appeal and the procedure pre-appeal are Sections 11-51-77 and 27-35-93. (B) Section 27-35-93 and Section 11-51-77 ¶15. To understand Sections 27-35-93 and 1 1-51-77, the Court m ust look to our caselaw reaching b ack to 1876 and the corresponding stat u t e s , t h e r ights to appeal an airport

7exem

ption i nterestingly being partly determ ined by caselaw handed d own approxim ately

t w e n t y - s e v e n y ears bef

ore Kitty Hawk and while O rville and W i lbur W right w ere m ere children. In 1876, the Court state d t hat t he board of supervisors’ decision regarding an “exem ption under s tatutory or c onstitutional p rovisions” i s not f inal. Horne v. Green , 52 Miss. 452, 457 (1876). “The action of the board of supervisors i n m atters of assessm ent is only conclusive as to m ere i rregularities a nd m atters of f act resting wholly in pais [ , outside of court]; such, f

or instance, as excessive valuation, m isdescriptions, listing of property to the wrong person, and the like.” Id. at 456-57 (em phasis in original). ¶16. At the tim e of Horne , Sections 16 8 4 o f the Code of 1 871 c ontained the precursor language to Section 2 7 -35-93. Section 1 6 8 4 provided “any person dissatisf ied with any

assessm ent, m ay f

ile his objections t h e r e t o , i n writing, on or bef ore the f irst Monday of August, which shall be f

iled by said clerk, and preserved with said rolls.” Miss. Code § 1684 (1871). Further, S ection 1685 provided that “the b oard of supervisors of each county , shall hold a m eeting at the cou r t h o u s e . . . to hear objections

. . .[ a nd] said rolls, af ter being

exam ined and corrected as af oresaid, shall be final and conclusive , as to the ass e s s m ents contained therein.” Miss. Code §1685 (1871) (em phasis added). At the tim e of Horne , there

was no statute allowing f or a ppeal of an assessm ent to the c irc u i t court, as is provided f or today in Section 11-51-77. ¶17. Moving t o the Code of 1880, Section 5 04 addressed appeals a n d c o n s t i t u t e s the
precursor statute to S ection 11-51-77. 2 The Code o f 1880 a lso continued to c o n t a in the

2 It stated i n pertinent part: “Any person agg r i e v e d b y a ny d ecision of t he board of supervisors as to the assessm ent of taxes m ay , within f ive day s af

ter t he adjournm ent of the 8language pertinent i n Horne

. Section 1684 becam e Section 499, 3 and Section 1685 becam e

Section 503

. 4 The Legislature also added t he f ollowing language to Section 499: “[ A]ny
person f a iling to f

ile objections, as herein provided f or, s hall b e concluded by said

a s sessm ent, and precluded f rom questioning its validity , af ter the approval of s u c h

assessm ent r oll by the board of supervisors.” The additional language added to S ection 499

serves t o clarif

y the law already present in t he code that, af t er the r o l l s a r e c o r r e cted f or objection, they

are f inal and conclusive. See Miss. Code §1685 (1871). ¶18. Although the num

bers o f the r elative statutes have changed since 1871 and 1880, the

text of the statutes at issue has rem ained m aterially the s a m e. Theref o re, the additional
l a n g u a g e a d d ed to S ection 4 99 d oes not af f ect the analy sis of the Horne Court. Further, neither does the addition of Section 504 af

f ect the analy sis of

the Horne Court. ¶19. The Court now turns t o o ur caselaw over the last century , and when exam i ned closely , it f ollows the r

ule f i rst penned in Horne

. In 1888, the Court cited Horne in City of Meridian

v. P hilips , 4 So. 119 (Miss. 1888). The Philips C ourt upheld Horne in holding that “where property is exempt by law f r o m taxation, it cannot be s ubjected thereto b y any a ction of the

m eeting at which such decision is m ade, appeal to t he circuit court of the county

. . . .” Miss. Code § 504 (1880).

3 Section 499 stated: “any person di s s a t i s f ied w ith any assessm ent m ay f ile his objections thereto in writing, on or bef ore the f irst Monday of A ugust

. . . . ” M i s s . Code § 499 (1880).

4 “The b oard of supervisors of each county , shall hold a m eeting at the c ourt-house, on the f irst Monday of August to hear objections to the assessm ent, a n d t o e x a mi n e the sam e.” Miss. Code § 503 (1880). Further, it stated “ s aid rolls, af ter b eing e xam ined and corrected as af

oresaid, shall be f

inal and c onclusive, as to the a ssessm ents contained therein.” Id. 9board of supervisors, or the o f f icers charged with the assessm ent and collection of taxes

. . . .” Id. at 120 (em

phasis added). ¶20. I n 1932, the Court c reated an e xception, holding that an objection is ne e d e d i f t h e property is “ not s uch a p r o p e r t y as is absolutely exem pt f rom t axation, b ut is subject to taxation or not, according as th e f a c t s ma y be.” N. Am . Old Rom an Catholic Diocese v. Havens , 144 S o. 473, 4 74 (Miss. 1932). The exem ption statute in Havens asked the Court
to c onsider whether the property w a s o w n e d b y a r eligious organization and being used exclusively f

or religious or charitable purposes. Id. Theref ore, Havens lim i ted the ability of

a t axpay er to appeal without objection only to cases in which t he exem ption is autom atic or self -operating. ¶21. In 1946, the C ourt o nce again exam ined Horne

. Stern v. Parker , 2 7 So. 2d 402, 403 (Miss. 1946). The S

tern Court stated: And f or three quarters of a century , say as f a r back as Horne v. G r e e n , 52 Miss. 452, it has been the settled rule, under statutes of which Sections 9789 and 9790, Code 1942, are the present representatives, that the f i nal j udgm ent of the taxing a

uthorities is conclusive, in the absence o f objections thereto presented bef

o re the said a

uthor i t i es in t he statutory m anner and at the tim e and pl a c e d e s i g n a ted b y the statute, as to all issues resting in pais, as for instance “listing the property to the wrong p erson and the like,” which would include, o f course, the assessment of an interest t herein to the wrong person . Stern , 27 So. 2d at 403 ( em phasis added). Notably , Stern d oes not address a n e x em ption, and it reiterates that an objection is required f or issues with the assessm ent, such as listing the wrong person. S im ilarly , sixteen y ears bef ore Stern, t he Court held that a n objection in writing was required f

or objecting to an assessm ent in Adam s C ounty v. Bank of Com m erce

1 0in Liquidation , 128 So. 110 (Miss. 1930). However, Adam s County also f ailed t o deal with

exem ptions. ¶22. In 1 962, the Court again r evisited the e f f ect of self -operating or autom a t ic exem ptions in G ray v . Steelm an , 137 S o . 2 d 7 9 7 (Miss. 1 962). The Court held that a tax sale f or the surf ace land did not include any m ineral rights because “upon the creation of such m ineral interest the exem

ption autom atically applies.” Id. at 799. G r a y is in line with Horne , H a vens , Stern and Adam s County

. Under Gray , once the interest was created , t h e

exem ption applied, m eaning the exem ption is autom atic or self

-operating. Gray , 137 So. 2d

at 799. T h e exem

ption was not a f

actual question as i n Havens , and the issue in Gray was

w h e t h e r an exem

ption applied, as opposed to t he assessm ent issue in Stern or Adam s County

. ¶23. In 1988, the Court a gain weighed in on whether an objection to the assessm ent was needed to appeal a n exem ption. Morco Indus., Inc. v. City o f Long Beach , 5 30 So. 2d 141 (Miss. 1988 )

. I n M

o r co Industries , the taxpay er sought a ref und o f ad valorem taxes collected f

or a school district under an exem ption. T he taxpay er sought a r ef und f or the y ears of 1981 through 1983, b ut the taxpay er paid the t axes each y ear without objection or protest. Id. at 142. In August 1985, the taxpay er m ade a n a pplication f

or a ref u nd. Id. at 142. Aside
f rom the y ear in which the application was f i led, the Court held, “[ W ] e are of the opinion that
Morco was entitled to e xem ption f rom all taxes, ad valorem and otherwise, f or a period of

ten (10) y ears f

r om the date of com

pletion of the project and that t he l o w e r court erred in

1 1ruling to the contrary .” Id. at 144. Theref ore, as in Gray , f

r om the creation of the interest, the

exem ption applied. ¶24. In 2 014, the Court of Appeals considered whether it could consider a tax assessm ent that never was object e d to under Section 27-35-93. Darden e x rel. Darden v. Bd. of Sup e r v i s ors, Wilkinson Cty. , 169 So. 3d 913 (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2 014). The Darden Court concluded that i t c ould not, because the statute had not been f o llowed. Id. at 915. Darden considered a tax assessm ent that w as never objected to, but not a tax exem ption; theref

ore, it is in line with A dam s County

. I n f act, m any cases 5 that h ave com e b ef ore the Court have noted the im

portance of the objection (or application or petition) bef ore the b oard (or city or

c o mmission) bef

ore an appeal is taken. However, like Darden and Adam s County , t h o s e cases did not address a claim ed exem ption. ¶25. Based on precedent dating back to 1876 and the f act that t he statutes at issue have not

m aterially changed, the Court af f irm s the trial court’s judgm ent. Under Section 27-35-93,

a taxpay er who claim s entitlem e nt to an exem ption that is autom atic or self -operating need

n o t f i l e an objection, petition, or application with the board bef ore a ppealing to the circui t
court under Section 11-51-77. In essence, the doctrine of stare decisis carries t he day

. See
United S ervs. Auto. Ass’n v. Stewart , 919 So. 2d 24, 30 (Miss. 2005) (“Our application of

5 See Pascagoula-Gautier Sch. Dist. v. Bd. o f Supervisors of Jackson C ty. , 212 So. 3d 742, 747 ( M i s s . 2016); Riverboat Corp. of Mississippi v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Supervisors , 198 S o. 3 d 2 89 (Miss. 2016); Mississippi State Tax Com m ’ n v. ANR Pipeline Co. , 806 So. 2d 1081 (Miss. 2001); Ditto v. Hinds Cty., Miss. , 665 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1995); Lenoir v . Madison Cty. , 641 So. 2d 1124 (Miss. 1994); City o f Jackson v. DeSoto, Inc. , 350 So. 2d 686 (Miss. 1 9 77); Jennings v. Bd. of S u p e r v i sors of Coahom a Cty. , 31 So. 107 (Miss. 1902). 1 2stare decisis i s n e cessary , i n t e r a l ia, s o that trial courts can m ake correct d ecisions and

lawy ers can properly advise their clients.”). T h e Court determ ined the Legislature’s intent in 1876 regarding the precursor statute to Section 27-35-93, a n d within the passing 142 y ears, the statutory language a t issue in 1876 has not m aterially changed. F urther, the cases related

to the issue bef

ore the Court—whether they be on t he requirem ent of objections f or alleged
f aulty assessm ents or on the e f f ect of an exem

p tion—have suppor ted the Horne Court’s analy sis. This analy sis allows the appeal, shall we say , to take f light. (2) Whether the circuit c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g L I P ’ s s u mmary judgm ent m otion, deny ing the Board’s sum m a ry judgm ent m otion and holding LIP ex em pt from ad valorem tax e s under Mississippi Code Section 61-3-21. ¶26. The instant issue turns on a de novo a naly sis of the f ollowing two-part consideration,

as stated above. T he taxpay er n eed not f i le an objection, petition, o r application with the board bef ore appealing to the circuit court under Section 11-51-77, if t wo conditions exist: (1) the taxpay er claim s entitlem ent to an exem p tion and (2) that exem

ption is autom atic or self -operating. ¶27. There is n o d i s p ute here that the taxpay er claim s entitlem ent to an exem p tion. The

exem ption at issue is Mississippi Code Section 6-3-21(3). It states: (3) All contracts, l eases a nd other arrangem ents entered into pursuant to this section are deem ed to serve a public and governm ental purpose as a m atter of public necessity ; theref

ore, all s uch contracts, leases, and other arrangem ents an d all structures, i m

provem ents and other f acilities erected, installed, constructed or located in connection therewith on an airport or a i r navigation f acility owned or controlled by an authority , o r any portion of f acility thereof or space therein, shall be f ree and exem

pt f rom all state, county a nd m unicipal ad valorem t axes on real p roperty a nd personal p roperty f or so long as m ay otherwise be lawf

ul, a nd the charges, rentals a nd f ees received b y an a

uthority

1 3in connection w ith such contracts, leases and other arrangem ents shall be

deem ed to be in lieu of

said taxes. Miss. C ode Ann. § 6 1-3-21 (Rev. 2013). The contracts, l eases and other arrangem ents ref erred to are def

ined by subsection one. It states: (1) In connection with the operation o f an a i rport o r a i r n avigation f acility owned or controlled by an authority , the au t h o r i t y m ay enter into contracts, leases a nd other arrangem ents f or term s n ot to exceed f

if ty (50) y ears with any persons: (a) granting the privilege of using or im proving the airport or air navigation f

acility or any portion or f a c ility thereof or s p ace therein for commercial purposes ; (b) conf errin g t h e privilege of supply i ng goods, c o mmo d ities, things, services or f acilities at the airport or air navigatio n f acility ; and (c) m aking available services to be f urnished by

the authority or its agents at the airport or air navigation f acility

. M i s s . C ode Ann. § 61-3-21 (em phasis added). Further, S ection 6 1-3-3 is m aterial to th e analy sis, as it d ef

ines the term “ airport” a s used in Section 61-3-21. I t states in pertinent part: The f ollowing wo r d s o r t e r m s, whenever used or ref e rred to i n this c hapter, shall have the f

ollowing respective m eanings unless d i ff erent m eanings clearly appear f r om the context: (a) “Airport” m eans any area of land or water which is used, or intended f

o r use, f or the landing and taking of f of airc r a f

t , a n d any appurtenant a r eas w hich are u sed, or i ntended f or use, f or airport buildings or other airport f acilities or rights

- o f

- w ay , or f

or other appro p r i a te purposes, including buffer areas and areas for airport c o m p a tible development, together with all buildings and f a cilities located thereon. Miss. Code Ann. § 61-3-3 (Supp. 2017) (em phasis added). ¶28. The trial court f

ound that the airport exem ption applied to LIP’s p roperty

. LIP argues that the t rial court’s holding was correct. Quoting the statuary l anguage, L IP reasons that the leased property is in an area of airport-com pat i b l e d e v elopm ent, is a b uf f er area to the Airport and is being used b y LIP f or com m ercial purposes. O n the o ther hand, the Board

1 4argues that LIP’s l ease does not qualif y f or the exem

ption because the com m ercial purpose is not in connection with the operation of the airport. F urther, the Board argues that LIP has

not m et i ts s um m a ry judgm ent burden by providing evidence of the com m erc i a l purpose being in connection with operation of the airport. The Mississippi Airports Association f iled

an a m icus brief a rguing that the s t a t u t o r y schem e under Section 61-3-1 provides broad authority to airport authorities to lease properties f or com m ercial developm ent. ¶29. For tax s tatutes, the “presum ption is in f

avor of taxing p ower, and b u rden is on the claim ant to prove or establish c learly h is right to exem ption

. . . .” Kerr-McGee Chem . Corp.
v. Buelow , 670 So. 2d 12, 16 (Miss. 1995). The Court recently has stated: [ S]ince exem

ptions f rom taxation are not f

avored, [ the] general rule is that a grant of exem

ption f rom taxation is never presum ed; on the c o ntrary , in all cas e s having doubt as to legislative intention, or as to inclusion o f particular property within [ the] term s of [ the exem ption] statute, [ the] presum ption is in f avor of [ the] taxing power, and [ the] burden is on [ the] claim ant t o prove or establish clearly

his right to exem

ption . . . . Castigliola v. Miss. Dep’t of Revenue , 162 S o. 3 d 795, 799–800 (Miss. 2015) (quoting Miss.
State Tax Com m ’n v. Med. Dev i ces, Inc. , 624 So. 2d 9 87, 990–91 (Miss. 1993)). And, under the s um m ary judgm ent standard, “[ t]he evidence is viewed in t he light m ost f avorable

t o t h e party opposing the m otion. The m oving party has the burden of dem onstrating no genuine issue of

m aterial f

act exists.” Kinney , 202 So. 3d at 192. ¶30. The f

irs t q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e l e a s e b e t w een LIP and the Airport was f or

com m ercial purposes in c onnection with the operation o f the airport when an airport includes “buf f er areas and areas f

or airport com

patible developm ent

. . . .” M iss. Code Ann. §§ 61-3-

1 53, 61-3-21(3). 6 Second, the question is whether the exem ption created by Section 61-3-21(3) is autom atic. (A) Whether the lease w as for com m ercial purp o s e s in

connection w ith the operation of the airport under S ection 61-3-3. ¶31. In 2 012, an a ttorney g eneral opinion was issued interpreting “ com m ercial purposes” under S ection 61-3-21. Akins , Opinion No. 2012-00024, 2012 W L 1071307 (Miss. A.G. Feb. 21, 2012). Considering the plain language and th e o r d i n ary use o f the words, the attorney general opinion stated: The term “com m ercial” i s def ined in B lacks Law D ictionary , Fif t h Edition, as “relat e s t o o r i s connected with trade and traf f ic or c o m m erce in general; is occupied with business and com me r ce.” The term “com m erce” m eans “the exchange o f goods, productions, or property of any kind; t he buy ing, selling, and exchanging of

articles.” Blacks Law Dictionary , Fif th Edition. Id. at *4. It then concluded: “W e inte r p r e t t h e phrase ‘com m e rcial purpose,’ as
contem plated in MCA Sections 61-3-21 and 61-5-11, to m ean f or the purpose of

engaging in business or f

or the purpose of

buy i ng or selling goods, products or property .” Id. ¶32. The C ourt a grees with the 2012 attorney g eneral o pinion. U nder t he ordinary m eaning and use of “com m ercial purposes,” it includes the sale or exchange of goods. See Miss. Code

6 The Board places g r eat weight on a 2002 attorney general opinion. In 2002, the attorney general issued an opinion on the instant issue concluding that the property was not exem pt. However, the applicable statutes have since been am e nded. Mitchell , Opinion No. 2002-0164, 2002 W L 10 5 7 9 2 6 , a t *1 (Miss. A.G. Apr. 19, 2002). First, in 2004, the def inition of airport was am ended adding, “or f o r other appropriate p urposes, including buf f e r a reas and areas f

or airport com

patible developm ent

. . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 61-3-3 (2004). Second, t h e e x e m p t ion statute, Section 61-3-21, did not c ontain any language regarding com m ercial purposes. T he changes in the statute m aterially af f e c t the application of the statute; theref

ore, the attorney

general opinion is inapplicable to the instant case. 1 6Ann. § 1-3-65 (2014) (All words and phrases c ontained in the statutes are used according to

their com m on and ordinary acceptation a nd m eaning). Further, i n support of i ts s u mmary judgm ent m otion, LIP presented an af f idavit stating the term s of the lease and stating that the property has been used s o l e l y f o r “com m ercial purposes” s ince t he inception of the lease. The lease itself also was bef ore the trial court, and it provided that the land w ill be utilized
f or “the developm ent and operation of a shopping center and related im provem ents.” ¶33. Theref

ore, considering the evidence bef ore t he trial court, it is clear that the shopping plaza f e l l within the general understanding o f “com m ercial p urposes,” as stated by Section
61-3-21. See M iss. Code Ann. § 61-3-21. In f a ct, the l ease could n ot have b een extended

to LIP if t he proposed developm ent did not serve any of the purposes d etailed in Section 61- 3-21(1). See id. S pecif

ically , here, the l ease s erved a com m ercial purpose, as detailed in Section 61-3-21(1). ¶34. The question n o w becom es whether the shopping m a ll, when leased to LIP f rom the Airport, c o nstitutes “other a ppropriate purposes, including b uf f er areas and areas f

or airport

com patible deve l o p me n t

. ” Miss. Code Ann. § 61-3-21. The use o f t he w ord “including” illustrates that other appropriate purposes c an be considered either buf f er areas or areas f

or airport-com

p atible developm ent. ¶35. The p lain m eaning of “com patible” in the Merri a m -W ebster Dictionary is “capable of existing together in harm ony ” Compatible , Merriam -W ebster Dictionary (2018). Black’s
Law Dictionary does not def ine “com patible.” Understanding what is com p atible with the Airport or exis t s i n harm ony with the Airport requires the Court to consider the specif ic

1 7concerns and issues f aced by the Airport. Miss. Code Ann. § 61-3-3. Based on the m aterials bef ore the trial court 7 and in the record on appeal, i t is apparent that the noise o f t he airport is a concern f

o r developm e nt. According to the Airport Association’s brief , “[ t]he FAA has long e ncouraged m easures by state and local go v e r n m ents to establish and m aintain

com patible l and uses around airports.” Land leased f or a c om m ercial purpose—such as the buy ing or selling goods, products, or property

— serves the purpose of e nsuring d evelopm ent, despite a ny noise issues. Theref ore, land leased by

the Airport f

or com m e rcial p urposes is

a com patible developm ent f

or an airport. 8 ¶36. Further, Black’s Law Dictionary does not d ef ine “buf f er area,” but it d ef

ines a buf f er zone as “[ a]n area of

land separating two d if

f erent z o nes or areas to help each blend m ore easily w ith the other, such as a strip of land between i ndustrial and residential areas.” Buffer

zone , Black’s Law Dictionary ( 10th ed. 2 0 1 4 ) ( e m p hasis added). The record on appeal, including the z o n i n g ma p s, shows that the property at issue f alls in the a rea im m ediately adjacent to the land used f or l a n d i n g a n d t aking of

f o f aircraf

t. Thus, along with being an

7 T h e lease ag reem en t b etw een L I P an d th e A irp o rt m en tio n s th e n o ise in h eren t in th e o p eratio n o f air c r a f

t

. F u r th er, th e 2 0 0 0 M a ster P lan U p d ate f o r t h e J ack so n In tern atio n al A i r p o rt w as p resen ted to th e trial co u rt, an d i t contains a s e ction dedicated to “Noise Exposure.” Noise exposure also is m entioned throughout the report at dif f erent intervals.

8 T h is c o n clu sio n m atch es th e p e rsu asiv e au th o rity o n p o in t

. I n 2005, under the am ended s tatutes, the attorney general considered w hether real estate owned by the Golden Triangle Regional Airport Authority and leased to a private com p any was exem

pt. Andrews , Opinion No. 2005-0462, 2005 W L 3298167, a t *1 (Miss. A.G. Sept. 23, 2005). The attorney general answered in the af f i rm ative stating: “the [ st a t u t o r y ] l anguage clearly exem pts any structures, im

provem ents and personal property erected or installed on a leasehold executed pursuant to this authority f rom all state, county or m u nic ipal real o r personal property ad valorem taxes.” Id. 1 8airport-com p atible developm ent, the propert y a t i s s u e also f alls within the buf

f er area or zone, as def

ined by Black’s Law Dictionary

. ¶37. The Board argues that certain actions by the Board, specif ically in 2008, a s shown by the Board’s m inutes, illustrate that LIP’s property is not a buf f er ar e a o r a n airportcom patible developm ent because it was deem ed to be surplus l and. However, t he actions of the Board were s pecif

ically

— as noted in the m inutes on January 22, 2008—to “preserve the ad valorem tax e xem

ption available to leases of a i r p o r t p r o p erties” and to m ake the leases
“m ore b a nkable so that it would be m ore econom ically f easible f or Cham blee to continue to im p rove the properties.” The N o v e mb e r 20, 2008, resolution also did not c h ange the undisputed f

act that LIP continued to rent t he land at issue f rom t he Airport. Theref

ore, this
argum ent is m oot. ¶38. T h e r e c o r d contains i nf orm ation that ( 1) the leased prem ises h a d a c o mme r c i a l
purpose, and (2) with the noise concern, land l eased f o r a com m ercial purpose is com patible with the Airport. Thus, the instant issue does not present a disputed i ssue of m aterial f

act. LIP’s shopping plaza constitutes an airpor t

- c o m patible developm ent as Section 61-3-21
contem plates, and it is entitled to the ad valorem tax exem p tion. (B) Whether the ex em ption is autom atic. ¶39. Material to the d e novo sum m ary -judgm ent a naly sis is the f i nal q uestion of whether the instant exem

p tion is autom atic or self

- serving. The au t o ma t i c versus f a c tually driven

exem ption was f

irst penned by the Havens Court. Havens , 144 So. at 473. In Havens , the question was not only whether the property w as owned by t he religious organization, but also

1 9whether it was being used exclusively f or religious purpo s e s . I

d . a t 474. In Havens, the Board n eeded to inquire not only into w ho bought the property b u t a lso into the specif ic
every day use of the property

by the owners. See id. The inquiry was a f act-driven one that would change on a case-by -case basis. On t he other hand, in Gray , the Court held t hat at “the creation o f such m ineral interest the exem ption autom atically a

pplies.” Gray , 137 So. 2d at 799. ¶40. Here, when the Airport leases land f or a com m ercial purpose and the rents exchange h a n d s , the exem

ption applies. In other words, at the tim e of the lease, the purpose of the property is known because the Airport cannot enter into a lease like the one at issue unless it has a com m ercial purpose. 9 Section 61-3-21 states i n pertinent part: “[ T]he authority m ay
enter into

. . . l eases . . . (a) granting the privilege of using or im proving t h e a i r p o r t or air navigation f

acility or any portion or f

acility thereof or space therein f or com m ercial purposes

. . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 61-3-21. And the pay m ent of rents is t he exem ption that applies in lieu o f taxes, a s in Gray , where “[ t]he m ineral docum entary stam p tax [ was] a substitute
f or the ad valorem

taxes . . . .” Gray , 137 So. 2d at 799. ¶41. The Court holds that the instant case i s on point with Gray and distinguishable f rom Havens

. T he trial court was presented with enough evidence t o determ ine, as the trial court did, that the exem

ption was autom atic and did not require an objection. Thus, because the trial court was presented with e vidence of the com m ercial purpose of the l ease and because the creation of the lease f

or a c om m ercial purpose autom atically triggers the exem ption, the

9 S ectio n 6 1 -3 -2 1 lists o th er p o ssib le p u rp o ses. S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 6 1 -3 -2 1 (1 ). H o w ev er, f

o r th e in stan t case, co m m ercial is th e o n ly p u rp o se at issu e. 2 0Court af

f irm s the trial court’s grant of L IP’s m otion f or sum m a ry judgm ent and denial of the Board’s m otion f

or sum m ary judgm ent. A NALYSIS OF THE CROSS

- APPEAL
Whether the circuit court erred i n h o l d ing that LIP is entitled only to a refund of i ts 2015 ad valorem t a x es, as opposed to a refund reaching back three y ears. ¶42. W h en it granted LIP’s sum m ary judgm ent m otion, the t rial court f ound that LIP was entitled to a ref

und of its 2015 taxes, but the t ax ref u nd did not r each back to the three y ears prior to N ovem

ber 2015 because the additional y ears were not properly bef ore the court on appeal under Section 1 1-51-77. On appeal, LIP argues that i t i s e n t i t l e d to a tax ref und

r e a c h ing b ack three y ears (2012-2015), totaling $152,605.98. The B oard a rgues tha t a n objection was required f

or each y ear f

or which LIP s eeks a r ef

und. T he Board p oints to City of Jackson v. Sly , 343 So. 2d 473, 476 (Miss. 1977), t o argue that an objection is required
f or each y ear in which a ref und is claim ed. ¶43. A s um m a ry j u d g me nt m otion is reviewed de novo. Kinney , 202 So. 3d at 192. The Court has stated:
It is the settled law of this state that, in the absence o f a statute p roviding otherwise, taxes or li c e n s e f ees voluntarily paid without p rotest cannot be recovered, although assessed and collected without legal authority

. Morco Indus., Inc. , 5 30 So. 2d at 145 (quoting City of Grenada v. Andrews , 58 So. 2d 382,
383 (1952)). As s tated above, the Morco Industries C ourt held that “Morco w as entitled to

exem ption f rom a ll taxes, ad valorem and otherwise, f o r a p eriod of ten (10) y ears f rom the date o f c om

pletion of the project.” Morco Indus., I nc . , 530 So. 2d at 1 44. The Morco

2 1Industries Court then considered whether t he taxpay e r w as e ntitled t o a r e f u n d f or those
y ears. 10 Id. It listed specif ic ty pes of t axes f

or which the Legislature had provided a specif ic ref und statute, but the t ax at issue in M orco Industries , m

unicipal s e p a r ate school-district taxes, was not included. Id. Unlike Morco Industries , LIP p oints to S e c t i o n 27-73-7 to dem onstrate that it is entitled to a ref und. Section 27-73-7 states in pertinent part: The tax collector is authorized and e m powered to ref

und any individual, f

irm or c orporation any ad valorem , p rivilege or excise tax which has been paid or collected through error o r othe r w i s e when such person, individual, f irm or corporation has paid any s uch tax in excess of the sum properly due whether paid under protest or not. T axes erroneously p aid w i t h i n the m eaning of this section shall include, but not be lim ited to, double pay m ent, or overpay

m ent, or pay m ent on s tate, U nited States, v acant and exem pt land, a nd the purchase paid f or the redem

ption of lands erroneously

sold f or taxes. Miss. Code Ann. § 27-73-7 (Rev. 2017). ¶44. Notably , Section 27-73-7 contains no r e q u i r e me n t t h a t a n o b j e c t i o n be m ade. Specif ically , i t provides that the error in pay m ent could h av e b e e n “ u n d er protest or not.” Miss. Code A nn. § 27-73-7. I n the sections a bove, the Court h as addressed whether the taxes

were paid “in error,” and the o nly issue r em aining is whether Section 27-73-7 e n t i t les LIP to a ref und of the taxes f

rom previous y ears, bef

ore 2015. ¶45. “If th e w o r d s o f a s t atute are clear and unam biguous, t he Court applies the plain

m eaning of the statute and ref rains f rom using p rinciples of s tatutory construction.” Lawson , 75 So. 3d at 1027. Section 27-73-7 plainly states that an individual m ay receive a ref und f or “any ad valorem

. . . tax which h a s been paid or collected through error . . . whether paid

10 T h e statu te o f

lim itatio n s w as n o t a stated issu e i n M o r co In d u stries , as it is h ere, an d is ad d ressed in

fra

. 2 2under protest or not.” Miss. Code Ann. § 27-73-7. Section 27-73-7 goes o n to s tate plainly

that “ [ t]axes erroneously p aid within the m eaning of this section shall include . .

. pay m ent

on . . . exem

pt land . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 27-73-7. T h u s , t h e a i r p o r t t a x e x e m p t i o n u n d e r Section 61-3-21 is included under Section 27-73-7. ¶46. The Board argues that Sly r equires that an objection be m ade f or each y ear in which

a ref und is sought. However, the instant case is m aterially distinguishable f rom Sly f or two

reasons. First, the Sly Court did not c onsider Section 27-73-7. S econd, unlike h ere, the Sly
Court concluded that an application was required f o r t h e t a x pay er to be e ntitled to the

exem ption at issue under Section 27-31-101. Sly , 343 So. 2d at 475-76. The exem ption at issue here, unlike the exem ption at issue in Sly , is a

u tom atic. See Sly , 343 So. 2d at 475-76. ¶47. LIP a lso states that the ref und potential of Section 27-73-7 i s lim ited by the statute of lim itations enum erated in Section 15-1-49. S ee Miss. Code Ann. § 27-73-7; M iss. C ode Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2012). The C ourt agrees . U n d e r Sections 27-73-7 and 1 5-1-49, LIP is entitled to a tax ref

u nd f or the taxes collected in error f or the y e ars 2012 through 2015. The
Court reverses t h e t r i a l court and rem ands f or f urther proceedings consistent with this opinion on this issue.
CONCLUSION ¶48. The C ourt a f

f irm s the trial court in h olding that the ad valorem tax exem ption sought by LIP was autom atic and self

- operating under S ection 61-3-21, a n d thereby , properly bef ore the circuit court under Section11-51-77. Further, the Court a f f irm s the trial court’s holding that L IP was entitled to a ref und of the 2015 taxes, but under Section 27-73-7, reverses the

2 3trial court’s h o l d i n g t h a t LIP is not entitled to a ref und f or 2012, 2013 and 2014 taxes and

rem ands f

or f urther proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶49. ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRM E D . O N C R O SS-APPEAL: REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WAL L E R , C.J., RANDOLPH A ND KITCHENS, P.JJ., KING, COLEMAN, MAX W ELL, BEAM AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.

2 4