The Court hopes that this detailed opinion satisfactorily answers all of Mr. Delatorre’s

questions about the jurisdiction of this Court, and thus ends further uncontrolled outbursts by him
in Court. Nevertheless, this Court has repeatedly warned Mr. Delatorre—and will continue to
caution him-—that his continued failure to obey this Court’s orders could result in him being
barred from the courtroom during jury selection or trial to avoid potential prejudice to his six co-
Defendants and to himself.' The Seventh Circuit has recently warned against allowing
courtroom behavior and atmosphere to “spiral[] out of control” such that co-defendants in the
case become irretrievably prejudiced. See United States v. Mannie, 509 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir.
2007).

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at
every stage of his trial and this Court “must indulge every reasonable presumption against the
loss of constitutional rights.” Mlinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970), However, “a
defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he
will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting
himsclf in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot
be carried on with him in the courtroom.” /d, at 343; see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S, 32, 44 (1991) (“The court may bar from the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a
trial.”). ‘I'he right to be present can be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct

himself with the decorum and respect necessary for the proper, nonprejudicial administration of

' Further, this Court will not allow outbursts from any of the Defendants on the alleged
ground of providing assistance to their attorneys. The Seventh Circuit “clearly disfavors any
form of hybrid representation,” because “it allows a defendant to address the jury, in his capacity
as counsel, without being cross-examined, in his capacity as a defendant.” United States v.
Kosmel, 272 F.3d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 2001).


criminal law; Mr. Delatorre’s interpretation of Article | of the Constitution, to the extent it would
divest federal courts of the authority granted by Article III, is erroneous. This Court agrees with
and is obligated to follow the extensive line of United States Supreme Court precedent—and that
of every federal court in this nation—asserting jurisdiction over criminal defendants and actions
occurring not just in the District of Columbia and certain federal (erritories, but in every state in
this country.

Furthermore, the government’s decision not to provide written answers to Mr, Delatorre’s
requests for proof does not constitute a default or agreement with Mr, Delatorre’s arguments
because the issue of subject matter jurisdiction—which in this case lies squarely with this Court
for the reasons explained above—may not be waived. See, e.g., Leguizamo-Medina v. Gonzales,
493 I'.3d 772, 774 (7th Cir, 2007). The government is not required to submit a “proof of claim”
to Mr. Delatorre or the other Defendants before trial; rather, the government has the burden of
proof at trial to prove the Defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Around the time he began submitting his pro se filings, Mr. Delatorre also began
speaking out of turn, interrupting the attorneys as well as this Court during status and motion
hearings, and ignoring direct orders and requests from this Court. During numerous court
hearings, Mr. Delatorre orally reiterated many of the arguments this Court has just addressed,
accused his attorneys of failing to represent him, demanded this Court answer his questions
before he answered ours, and accused the government and this Court of illegally detaining him.
This Court has given Mr. Delatorre enormous leeway, allowing him to voice his thoughts and
opinions, but he continues to refusc to acknowledge and honor this Court’s requests that he

exercise self-control during court proceedings.


the judicial proceedings. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. The rule in Allen is codified in Rule 43 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a defendant waives his right to be
present “when the court warns the defendant that it will remove the defendant from the
courtroom for disruptive behavior, but the defendant persists in conduct that justifies removal
from the courtroom.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(1)(C). “If the defendant waives the right to be
present, the trial may proceed to completion, including the verdict’s return and sentencing, during
the defendant’s absence,” Fed. R, Crim, P, 43(c)(2).

For the reasons stated above, all of Mr. Delatorre’s pending pro se motions are denicd.
This Court will assert its subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Delatorre and his co-Defendants as
required by the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, and proceed with this trial as scheduled. This Court respectfully requests that Mr.
Delatorre allow his two competent court-appointed attorneys to represent him without any further

courtroom speeches not expressly authorized by this Court.

ENTERED:

Judge Ruben Castillo
United States District Court

Dated: January 30, 2008


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
Vv. No. 03 CR 90
FERNANDO DELATORRE, also known as
“Fern,” Fern-dog,” and “Fernwood,”
BOLIVAR BENABE, also known as “Jap,”
JUAN JUAREZ, also known as “Ghost,”
JULIAN SALAZAR, also known as “Mando,”
“Comrade,” “Conrad,” Cuz,” and “Cuzzo,”
HAROLD CROWDER, also known as “H-Man,”
CHRISTIAN GUZMAN, also known as
“Mousey,” and STEVEN SUSINKA,

Judge Ruben Castillo

wee ee SS Ee HY

se

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Despite being represented by counsel, beginning on October 16, 2007, Defendant
Fernando Delatorre (“Mr. Delatorre”) bas filed numerous pro se motions, affidavits, petitions,
notices, letters, and other filings with this Court. (See R. 470, 471, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498,
499, 522, 578, $79, 581, 582, 584, 586, 607, 608, 612, 613, 614, 615, 640, 641.) This Court has
received and reviewed alt of Mr. Delatorre’s pro se filings. This opinion addresses the reasons
behind our earlier denials of Mr. Delatorre’s motions, and our denial of his currently pending
pleadings.

Mr. Delatorre essentially argues that the government and this Court do not have
jurisdiction over him because: (1) the United States Criminal Code was never properly enacted
and is thus void; (2) he is a “sovereign” “flesh and blood man,” not the “fictional,” capitalized

entity, “FERNANDO DELATORRE” charged in the Indictment; and (3) United States district


courts do not have jurisdiction to enforce federal criminal law outside of the District of

Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and federal enclaves and territories. Mr. Delatorre also
argues that the government’s failure to respond to his demands for proof that his arguments are
wrong constitutes a default; Ze., an admission that Mr. Delatorre’s arguments are correct, and
that as a result the charges against him must be dismissed. The Court has no doubt about the
sincerity with which Mr. Delatorre has asserted these theories—both in writing and in repeated
oral presentations to the Court.

Similar arguments have been made by other defendants in the past, and they have always
been rejected as erroneous as a matter of law. This Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Delatorre and
his co-Defendants pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which states: “The district courts of the United
States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against
the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231. ‘The 1948 amendment to that statute passed
both houses of Congress and was signed into law by President Truman on June 25, 1948, such
that the jurisdictional statutes relied on in this case were properly enacted and are binding. See
United States v. Troy Lawrence, No. 02 CR 200, slip. op. at 5-6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2006). This
Court must follow the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which has also repeatedly held that
there is no merit to the argument that ‘Title 1 8—the federal criminal code—is unconstitutional
because of supposed irregularities in its enactment. See, e.¢., United States v. Collins, Nos.
05-4708, 06-2746, 06-3741, 2007 WL 4355361, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 14, 2007); United States v.
States, No. 06-2345, 2007 WL 2768906, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 2007) (per curiam); see also
United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 977-78 (7th Cir. 2003) (the Seventh Circuit has

“repeatedly held” that “district judges always have subject-matter jurisdiction based on any


indictment purporting to charge a violation of federal criminal law”).

Furthermore, Mr, Delatorre is an actual, bona fide Defendant in this case. This Court’s
jurisdiction over Mr. Delatorre remains valid whether his name is written in all capital letters or a
mix of capital and lower case letters, or whether he identifies himself as: a “real flesh and blood
man, io his private capacity,” a “sovercign secured party creditor;” a debtor; the “authorized
representative of the corporate fiction-entity/debtor identified as Fernando Delatorre,” or “third
party intervenor on behalf of Defendant/Debtor Fernando Delatorre.” Mr. Delatorre’s Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”), copyright, and trademark filings do not change this fact. The
Defendants charged in this case are not fictional creations, but individual citizens of the United
States subject to its valid and enforceable laws, Mr. Delatorre is not a “sovereign” outside the
jurisdiction of this Court, but an individual—‘*natural or unnatural”—subject to the criminal laws
of this country “whether |he| requested, obtained or exercised any privilege from the federal
government.” United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 812 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument that an individual can
be a sovereign citizen of a state who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States);
United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993) (same). Accordingly, Mr.
Delatorre’s two experienced court-appointed attomeys are properly representing him-—under any
of the aforementioned names—as the one and only Fernando Delatorre indicted in this case.

Moreover, the laws of the federal government apply to United States citizens throughout
the nation, not just in the District of Columbia or federal enclaves. Sloan, 939 F.2d at 500-01,
his Court has an obligation under Article [ll of the United States Constitution to assert its

subject-matter jurisdiction over defendants charged in an indictment with violating a federal