file an appropriate response to the movant’s statement, Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584
(ND. Ill. 2000).
ANALYSIS

Moline claims that Experian defamed him and violated three sections of the FCRA: 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681i(a), 1681i(b) and 1681¢e(b). Experian has moved for summary judgment on all
counts. We first address whether Experian is entitled to summary judgment on Moline’s FCRA
claims.

In order to state a claim under the FCRA, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)

inaccurate information was included in their consumer credit reports; (2) the

inaccuracy was due to the consumer reporting agency's failure to follow reasonable

procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy; (3) the consumer suffered injury;

and (4) the injury was caused by the inclusion of the inaccurate entry.
Zahran v. Transunion Corp., No. 01 C 1700, 2003 WL 1733561, at *3 (N.D. Ill. March 28, 2003).

Experian claims that it is entitled to summary judgment on Moline’s section 1681i(a) and
section 1681e(b) claims because, among other reasons, it did not report any inaccurate
information. This Court must determine whether Moline’s credit report was inaccurate, as a
matter of law, in that it stated that payments on the Ford Escort were sixty days past due. Moline
is correct that his marital settlement agreement provided that his ex-wife would be solely
responsible for the Ford Escort payments. This fact, however, does not establish that his
contractually liability to FMCC was extinguished. Indeed, under Illinois law divorce decrees do
not terminate an individual’s contractual liability to third parties. See Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,
71 Til.2d 563, 574 (1978); see also 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 548 (2003). Furthermore, Moline

signed a reversal request form two years after his divorce stating he agreed and understood that

he was not released from liability and that he remained jointly and severally liable until the



Experian is a consumer reporting agency. On or about January 6, 2003, Moline requested
and received a copy of his consumer disclosure report from Experian. (R. 16, Pl.’s Facts at { 3-
4.) The report listed the FMCC account for the Ford Escort as “Open/past due 60 days.” (dd. at
14.) The following day Moline sent a letter to Experian disputing the accuracy of the FMCC
item, stating that the divorce court awarded his ex-wife sole possession of and responsibility for
the Ford Escort. (/d. at {{] 5-7.) Upon receiving notice of Moline’s dispute, Experian sent a
consumer dispute verification form to FMCC, setting forth the nature of Moline’s dispute and
requesting verification of the account status. (/d. at {J 8-9.) On or about January 30, 2003,
Moline received from Experian a revised disclosure report stating that the FMCC account would
remain on his credit file as reported and advising him that “a divorce decree may not affect [his]
contracts with creditors.” (/d. at { 13.) In response to these events, Moline filed his Complaint
on February 25, 2003.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is only appropriate where the record shows “that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view all facts, and any legitimate inference drawn therefrom, in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986). Naturally, the non-moving party may not avoid summary judgment merely by
denying her adversary’s charges. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986). Rather, the opponent to a summary judgment motion “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact,” id. at 586, and must


account is paid in full.’ This Court finds that, despite the divorce decree, Moline was
contractually liable for the Ford Escort payments.

Experian asserts that Moline’s credit report was accurate as a matter of law because
federal regulations require creditors, such as FMCC, to report contractual obligations and require
subsequent creditors to consider these obligations when determining whether to provide credit.
See 12 C.F.R. Part 202.10(a); 12 C.F.R. Part 202.6(b)(6). We agree. By including the past-due
FMCC account on Moline’s credit report, Experian acted in accordance with federal regulations.
Thus, this Court concludes that Moline’s credit report was accurate as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we grant Experian’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Moline’s
§ 1681i(a) and § 1681e(b) claims.

Experian also seeks summary judgment on Moline’s section 1681i(c) claim. Section
1681i(c) provides that:

Whenever a statement of a dispute is filed, unless there is reasonable grounds to

believe that it is frivolous or irrelevant, the consumer reporting agency shall, in any

subsequent consumer report containing the information in question, clearly note that

it is disputed by the consumer and provide either the consumer's statement or a clear

and accurate codification or summary thereof.

15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c). Moline did not file the requisite dispute statement. (R. 12, Def.’s Facts,

Ex. G, Hughes Decl. at 20.) Experian’s “duty to include the [Moline’s] statement of dispute in

the report only arises when a statement of dispute is filed.” Mirocha v. TRW, Inc., 805 F. Supp.

‘In his deposition, Moline stated that he never signed the reversal request form. (R. 12,
Def.’s Facts, Ex. I, Moline Dep. at 20.) His testimony indicates that he asked his ex-wife to sign
for him, and more importantly, even if there is a fact issue concerning whether he signed the
document, he has provided this Court with no evidence that indicates FMCC released from his
contractual obligations.


Minmy Ora

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

aan ed Judge Ru ben Castillo Sitting Judge if Other |
(7 or Magistrate Judge igned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 1375 DATE 10/23/2003
CASE Michael Moline vs. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
TITLE

Lin the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g... plainti
of the motion being presented,}

defendant, 3rd party piaintil, and (hb) state briefly the nature

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

oO) Q Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

@) Oo Brief in support of motion due

Q) Qo Answer brief to motion due____. Reply to answer brief due

(4) Qo Ruling/Hearing onset for at.

6G Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____—_set for, at

o Oa Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set forJon set for at

(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for]on at.

(8) a {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

QFRCP4(m) = C) Local Rule 41.1. CO FRCP41(a)(1) C1 FRCP41(a)(2).

(io) =i [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendant's motion for summary
judgment is granted. This case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

(qi) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order. |

Document
Number

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required

Notices maiied by judge’s staff. oe
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663, 670 (S.D. Ind. 1992). As Experian had no legal duty to include the dispute statement, this
Court grants Experian’s motion for summary judgment on Moline’s section 1681i(c) claim.

Finally, Experian asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on the defamation claim
because Moline cannot prove that Experian acted with “malice or intent to injure.” See 15
USS.C. § 1681h(e). This Court has already determined that Experian did not violate the FCRA.
Compliance with the FCRA precludes a finding of malicious intent. Thus, this Court grants
Experian’s motion for summary judgment on Moline’s defamation count.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we grant Experian’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The

Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 58 in favor of Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (R. 10-1.)

Judge Ruben Castillo
United States District Court

Dated: October 23, 2003



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL MOLINE, )
)
Plaintiff, y
) No. 03 C 1375
v. )
) Judge Ruben Castillo
EXPERIAN INFORMATION )
SOLUTIONS, INC., ) 2
) 0
Defendant. ) ocr ChE Tey
245,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 2003

Plaintiff Michael Moline (“Moline”) sued Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
(“Experian”) for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 et seq., and for defamation. In particular, Moline claims that Experian: (1) violated 15
U.S.C. § 168 1i(a) by willfully and negligently failing to conduct a proper and reasonable
reinvestigation of allegedly inaccurate information in Moline’s credit report, failing to provide all
relevant information regarding the dispute to the furnishing entities, failing to review and
consider all relevant information submitted, and failing to delete the information from his credit
file after reinvestigation; (2) violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c) by willfully and negligently failing to
note the dispute on subsequent reports; and (3) violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) by willfully and
negligently failing to follow reasonable procedures to ensure maximum accuracy of his credit
report. (R. 1, Compl. at {{[ 20(a)-(f).) Moline also claims that Experian defamed him by
publishing credit statements both orally and in writing that reflect negatively and inaccurately on

his character.



Experian’s motion for summary judgment on all counts is presently before this Court. (R.
10-1.) After viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Moline, we conclude that there are
no genuine issues of material fact and that Experian is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we grant Experian’s motion for summary judgment.

RELEVANT FACTS

On or about October 30, 1996, Michael and Nancy Moline purchased a new 1997 Ford
Escort Wagon. (R. 16, Pl.’s Facts, Ex. M, Moline Dep. at 13.) Ford Motor Credit Corporation
(“FMCC”) financed the Ford Escort; Michael signed the financing document as the buyer and
Nancy as the co-buyer. (/d. at 15-16; see also R. 12, Def.’s Facts, Ex. K, Illinois Vehicle Retail
Installment Contract; Ex. L, Ford Credit Application Statement.) Michael and Nancy divorced
almost three years after buying the Ford Escort. Pursuant to their divorce settlement agreement,
they agreed that Nancy would be “the sole owner of the parties’ 1997 Ford Escort automobile
fand] . . . [would] be solely responsible to pay the entire balance due on the 1997 Ford Escort
automobile, together with all taxes, insurance, and outstanding expenses regarding said
automobile...” (R. 16, Pl.’s Facts at {{[ 7, 9.) On or about August 7, 2002, they signed an
extension agreement with FMCC, under which they identified themselves, respectively, as
“buyer” and “co-buyer.” (/d., Ex. J, Extension Agreement at 1.) On or about October 7, 2002,
they signed a reversal request form with FMCC that provides that they “understand and agree
that (1) neither party is released from the obligations and covenants of the contract, and (2) [they]
will continue to be liable on the contract jointly and severally with [FMCC] until such time as the

account is paid in full.” (R. 12, Def.’s Facts, Ex. P, Reversal Request.)