dismissed claims against municipal agents in such cases. See Id. at 165; Smith v. Metropolitan
School Dist. Perry Tp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 1997); Tabor y. City of Chicago, 10 F.
Supp. 2d 988, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1998). We therefore grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
claims against Officer Thomas in his official capacity.

I. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claim Against the City of Wilmington

This Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 1983 false arrest and
excessive force claims against the City of Wilmington. To state a claim against the City under
Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege: 1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a
constitutional deprivation; 2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law
or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute “custom or usage”
with the force of law; or 3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person
with “final policymaking authority.” See Monell y. Department of Social Services of the City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).

The flagship Supreme Court case that examined the pleading standard for Section 1983
municipal liability held that the liberal system of “notice pleading” through Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint include only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S. Ct. 1160
(1993). In other words, the pleading standard under Section 1983 is not more demanding than
the pleading standard in other kinds of claims for relief. Jd. at 167; Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d

589, 590 (7th Cir. 1998), Federal courts must rely on summary judgment and control of

-4.


Defendants’ motion to dismiss Madding’s common law malicious prosecution claim is
denied, Although the Local Governmental and Governmental Employee Tort Immunity Act
provides a one year statute of limitations for common law claims against a municipality and
municipal employees, the date that the statute begins to run for malicious prosecution claims is
the date that the claims against the defendant are resolved. See Watkins v. Brandt, 1996 WL
450835, at *3 (Aug. 6, 1996). In the instant case, the statute began to run on March 6, 2002, the
date that Madding’s “resisting/obstructing a police officer” charges were dismissed. (Compl.
440). Because Madding filed his complaint on October 11, 2002, less than a year after the
statutory period began to accrue, defendants’ motion to dismiss Madding’s common law claims
of malicious prosecution against the City of Wilmington and Officer Thomas in his individual
capacity is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 1983 false arrest and excessive force claims, along
with the common law malicious prosecution claim against Officer Thomas in his official capacity
is granted. However, defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 1983 false arrest and excessive
force claims, along with the malicious prosecution claim against the City of Wilmington is
denied. Likewise, defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 1983 false arrest and excessive
force claims against Officer Thomas in his individual capacity is denied. Defendants’ motion to
dismiss punitive damages claims against the City for Section 1983 violations is granted.

Additionally, defendants’ motion to dismiss the common law battery and intentional infliction of

“Te


Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996). A court will grant a motion
to dismiss only if the plaintiff cannot prevail under any set of facts that could be proven
consistent with the allegations. Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000).
In the instant motion, defendants argue that: 1) claims against Officer Thomas in his
official capacity should be dismissed with prejudice because allowing both claims against Officer
Thomas in his official capacity and claims against the municipality would effectively permit
Madding to sue the City twice for the same alleged violations; 2) the false arrest and excessive
force claims should be dismissed with prejudice because Madding has failed to state a claim
against the City pursuant to Section 1983; 3) punitive damages claims against the City for the
Section 1983 claims should be dismissed because local units of government are immune from
punitive damages liability pursuant to Section 1983; and 4) the Illinois common law claims
should be dismissed with prejudice because they were not brought within the one-year statute of
limitations of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745

ILCS § 10/8-101.

I Claims Against Officer Thomas in his Official Capacity

This Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the false arrest, excessive
force, and malicious prosecution claims against Officer Thomas in his official capacity.
Madding’s claims against both Officer Thomas in his official capacity and the City of
Wilmington are redundant because suits against municipal agents in their official capacity are, in
effect, identical to suits against the municipality. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.
Ct. 3099 (1985). To allow the plaintiff to sue both the City and its agents would allow the

plaintiff to sue the City twice for the same set of allegations. Accordingly, courts have routinely

-3-


discovery to “weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.” Leatherman, 507 U.S. at
168-169.

In the instant case, Madding alleges custom as the basis for municipal liability under
Section 1983. In his complaint, Madding contends that the Wilmington Police Department
engaged in a municipal policy, custom or practice of: 1) allowing its officers to use excessive
force against citizens; and 2) allowing its officers to arrest citizens without probable cause.
Since no heightened pleading standard exists for Section 1983 liability, Madding need not allege
other facts or additional police violations at this stage. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Section
1983 claims against the City of Wilmington is denied.

Il. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims Against Officer Thomas in his Individual Capacity

This Court denies the motion to dismiss. According to the Seventh Circuit, an official
may be individually responsible under Section 1983 if he directs the conduct causing the
constitutional deprivation or if the conduct occurs with his knowledge and consent. See Gentry
vy. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995).

Madding alleges that Officer Thomas deprived him of his constitutional rights through
the use of excessive force and false arrest. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Officer
Thomas attacked Madding and sprayed mace or pepper spray into his eyes for no reason.
(Compl. at ¥ 19). Further, the complaint alleges that Officer Thomas falsely charged Madding
with restricting/obstructing a police officer. (Compl. at {51 and 53). Because of these
allegations of constitutional violations against Officer Thomas, the excessive force and false
arrest claims against Officer Thomas in his individual capacity remain.

IV. Punitive Damages Claims Against the City Pursuant to Section 1983 Claims

5-


emotional distress claims is granted with respect to Officer Thomas in his individual capacity. If
Plaintiff chooses to proceed with the claims that still stand, he must file an amended complaint in
accordance with this opinion by October 3, 2003.

It is so ordered.

tb) CA

7 Wayne R. Andersen
United States District Judge

Dated: C4. y 03

-8-



-
Minate Order Form (8-7) .

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Ni f Assigned Judg 9 re Sitting Judge if Oth
vr Magistrate Judge Wayne R. Andersen than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 2 C 7286 DATE 9/12/2003
CASE Ronald A. Madding vs. Officer Donald Thomas, Jr. et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the parly filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

() oOo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) Q Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief duc

(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon_____set for at

(5) o Status hearing{held/continued to] [sct for/re-set for]on__—sset for__at

(6) a Pretrial conferencefheld/continued to] [set for/re-setfor]on__—ssetfor_— at.
(7) o Trial{set for/re-set for}on___at.

(8) oO (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to____at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 CFRCP4I(a)\(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

ao of [Other docket entry} Enter MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing
reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to FRCP12(b)(6) is
granted in part and denied in part. If plaintiff chooses to proceed with the claims that still stand,
he must file an amended complaint in accordance with this opinion by 10/3/2003.

al [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document

Number

ices required.
No notices reqs number of notices

SEP. 1.9.2

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

03

Notified counsel by telephone,

J | Docketing to mail notices.

mesg sy
Mail AO 450 form. Lung 19 rsa docketing dopbtyifiats

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

[8

date mailed notice
courtroom

TSA depnty's oe

initials —
Date/tisne réceived in
S central Clerk’s Office mating deputy nits



Defendants’ motion to dismiss punitive damages claims against the City for Section
1983 claims is granted. An award of punitive damages against a municipality is, in effect, a
windfall to a plaintiff at the expense of taxpayers. Therefore, considerations of history and policy
do not support punitive damage awards against municipalities for the wrongdoing of an official.
See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266, 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981); Bell v.
City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1269 (7th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, this Court grants the
defendants’ motion to dismiss punitive damages against the City of Wilmington because
damages of that sort are generally unavailable against a municipality.

Vv. Common Law Claims of Battery and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Against Officer Thomas in his Individual Capacity

Allegations of Illinois common law battery and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims against Officer Thomas in his individual capacity are barred by the Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. This statute provides a one
year statute of limitations for state law claims against a municipality or its employees. See 745
ILCS § 10/8-101. Common law claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress
begin to accrue on the date of the misconduct. See Gudino v. Town of Cicero, 2003 WL 260707,
at * 3 (Jan. 29, 2003). Since the incident occurred on September 18, 2001, and Madding did not
file his complaint until more than a year after the incident on October 11, 2002, the claims are
time-barred. Therefore, Madding’s claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional
distress are dismissed against Officer Thomas in his individual capacity.

VI. Common Law Claim of Malicious Prosecution Against the City and Officer
Thomas in his Individual Capacity

-6-


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RONALD A. MADDING,

)

)
Plaintiff, )

) No. 02 C7286
v. )

) Wayne R, Andersen
OFFICER DONALD THOMAS, JR., #106 ) District Judge
in his individual capacity and in his )

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DOCKETED
SEP 15 2003

official capacity as an employee of the
Wilmington Police Department and the
CITY OF WILMINGTON, ILLINOIS,
an Illinois municipal corporation and
body politic,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted
in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

In his complaint, plaintiff Ronald Madding asserts a total of five claims. Madding asserts
the first three claims against all three defendants: the City of Wilmington, Illinois, Officer
Thomas in his official capacity as an employee of the Wilmington Police Department, and
Officer Thomas in his individual capacity. All three defendants are charged with the following:
1) false arrest pursuant to Section 1983; 2) excessive force pursuant to Section 1983; and 3)

common law malicious prosecution under Illinois law. Plaintiff asserts the following two claims

| 3


solely against Officer Thomas in his individual capacity: 1) common law battery and 2) common
law intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Madding alleges that on September 18, 2001, at approximately 11:00 p.m., he engaged in
a dispute with a tow truck operator who was planning to tow his son’s and his wife’s vehicles
from his property at 32075 South State, Route 53, Wilmington, IL. When a police officer,
Officer Thomas, an employee of the Wilmington Police Department, arrived on the scene,
Madding alleges that the officer “struck him about the head and shoulders with his fist and/or
other instrumentalities, pushed him to the ground, and sprayed him with mace or pepper spray.”

Madding also alleges that not only did Officer Thomas wait approximately 45 minutes
before to transporting him to the station, but also that Officer Thomas answered another call
despite his complaints of injury. When Madding reached the police station, Officer Thomas
charged him with “resisting/obstructing a police officer.”

After Madding was released from the station on a bond, his wife took him to the
emergency room of Silver Cross Hospital where doctors recommended that he see an
opthomologist concerning his eyes. On March 6, 2002, the “resisting/obstructing a police
officer” charge against Madding was allegedly dismissed because Officer Thomas did not appear
in court.

DISCUSSION

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Szumny v. Am.
Gen. Fin., Inc., 246 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 2001). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is not

to decide the merits of the challenged claims but to test the sufficiency of the complaint.

-2-