NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

LAWRENCE EMILE BOUCHER, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0763

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201301012

The Honorable Steven F. Conn, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Eric Knobloch

Counsel for Appellee

Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman

By Jill L. Evans

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. BOUCHER

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

K E S S L E R, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Lawrence Emile Boucher appeals his convictions 

and sentences for ten felonies. He argues the superior court violated his

Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying his request for alternate 

counsel without conducting a hearing. He also argues the court erred by 

refusing to include in the final jury instructions that the jury should not 

infer guilt from his absence at trial. For the following reasons, we affirm 

Boucher’s convictions and sentences.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Boucher and an eleven-year-old girl shared a bed, where 

Boucher forced her to perform sexual acts and to touch his genitals. After 

being contacted by the police, Boucher later admitted receiving oral sex 

from the girl and touching her upper thighs. 

¶3 Boucher was indicted for eleven felonies. Shortly after the 

indictment, Boucher requested and received new counsel based on a 

conflict of interest of his original appointed counsel. Over the next two 

years, Boucher requested at least twenty continuances. Two weeks before

trial, Boucher attended the final management conference telephonically. 

During the conference, Boucher’s attorney requested a continuance so that 

Boucher could find new counsel. The superior court denied the 

continuance, noting that “[Boucher is] already on his second attorney. . . . 

[I]f [he] was going to hire an attorney, he should have done . . . that before 

now.” At no time during the conference did Boucher articulate any reason 

for requesting new counsel.

¶4 Boucher failed to appear at trial. After addressing preliminary 

matters, the superior court recessed to give Boucher a chance to appear. 

Boucher did not appear. During voir dire the court addressed Boucher’s 

absence:

I am concerned that there might be some of you that would 

feel that the defendant’s absence from the courtroom is some 
STATE v. BOUCHER

Decision of the Court

3

sort of evidence that you could consider against him. It is not. 

His absence is just the same for procedural and legal purposes 

as if he were here and invoked his right to not testify, which 

he would have the right to do.

The court excused four jurors who indicated that Boucher’s absence would 

influence their decision. 

¶5 During the second day of trial, the superior court discovered 

a fax Boucher had sent directly to the court dated August 31, 2015:

Dear Sir Today at the Hearing I did not hear what my attorney 

Thomas Jones said about me wanting another attorney. I 

would like you to consider the reason I want the court to give 

me another attorney, the reason is. Is [sic] that Mr. Jones does 

not believe in me nor this case, He has me convicted already 

and we haven’t even gone to trial. And the reason I haven’t 

spoken up sooner was because he had me doing stuff to help 

my case. Going to a p[sycho]logist which I thought would 

help my case but it didn’t. . . . I would like to have [an] 

attorney that at least believes in me. 

The court acknowledged that the fax was sent before the trial. However, the 

court denied the request noting that Boucher had failed to appear at trial to 

object to his current counsel’s representation. 

¶6 In settling final jury instructions, Boucher’s attorney

requested that the superior court reiterate that Boucher’s presence could

not be held against him in considering guilt. Because the issue had already 

been dealt with in voir dire, the court denied the request. Although the 

superior court did not address Boucher’s absence directly, it instructed that

the defendant is not required to testify. The decision on 

whether to testify is left to the defendant. You must not 

conclude that the defendant is likely to be guilty because he 

does not testify. You must not discuss this fact, or let it [a]ffect 

your deliberations in any way.

¶7 During closing arguments, Boucher’s attorney addressed 

Boucher’s absence:

The final thing I would say, of course, is, as maybe the 800-

pound gorilla in the room, I have no idea why Mr. Boucher is 

not here; but that has no bearing. Whether or not Mr. Boucher 
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was seated next to me the last two days or wasn’t, has no 

bearing on what occurred back in August 9th and 10th of 

2013; so please don’t factor that in one way or the other.

¶8 The jury convicted Boucher of ten felonies and the court

sentenced him to two consecutive life sentences with an additional twentyfive years’ imprisonment. Boucher timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) 

(2016), 13-4031 (2016), and 13-4033(A)(1) (2008).1

DISCUSSION

¶9 Boucher argues the superior court (1) violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel by denying his request for alternate counsel 

without conducting a hearing; and (2) erred by refusing to instruct the jury 

regarding his absence from the trial. Boucher asks that we either remand 

the matter for an evidentiary hearing or vacate his convictions and remand 

for a new trial.

I. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

¶10 Boucher argues the superior court violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel by denying his request for alternate counsel 

without conducting a hearing pursuant to State v. Torres, 208 Ariz. 340

(2004). Under Torres, “[t]he nature of the inquiry [into a request for alternate 

counsel] depend[s] upon the nature of the defendant’s request.” Id. at 343, 

¶ 8. Only sufficiently specific, factually based allegations warrant a hearing. 

Id. Because Boucher’s complaint was not sufficiently specific, the court did 

not violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

¶11 The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants 

assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. It is well established that this 

guarantees competent counsel. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 

771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the 

right to effective assistance of counsel.”). However, the defendant is not 

“entitled to counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or 

her attorney.” State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 507, ¶ 11 (1998) (citation 

omitted). To obtain new counsel, the defendant must show a complete 

breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict between the 

defendant and appointed counsel. Torres, 208 Ariz. at 342, ¶ 6. While the

Sixth Amendment requires a court to inquire as to the basis of a defendant’s 

 

1 We cite to the current version of statutes unless changes material to 

this decision have occurred.
STATE v. BOUCHER

Decision of the Court

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request for new counsel, the nature of the inquiry is determined by the 

nature of the request. Id. at 343, ¶ 7.

¶12 In Torres, the defendant had complained in the superior court 

that “he could no longer speak with his lawyer about the case, he did not 

trust him, he felt threatened and intimidated by him, there was no 

confidentiality between them, and his counsel was no longer behaving in a 

professional manner.” Id. at 342, ¶ 2. The court denied the motion. Id.

“[G]eneralized complaints about differences in strategy may not require a 

formal hearing or an evidentiary proceeding.” Id. at 343, ¶ 8. However, “[i]f 

a defendant makes sufficiently specific, factually based allegations in 

support of his request for new counsel, the . . . court must conduct a hearing 

into his complaint.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Applying this 

standard, the court concluded that Torres “presented specific factual 

allegations that raised a colorable claim that he had an irreconcilable 

conflict with his appointed counsel.” Id. at 343, ¶ 9.

¶13 Here, Boucher telephonically attended the final management 

conference during which his attorney moved for a continuance for Boucher 

to request alternate counsel.2 The superior court denied the motion,

reasoning that Boucher should have retained alternate counsel earlier.

Because no allegations of an irreconcilable conflict between Boucher and his 

attorney were made, no Torres inquiry was necessary. Nor did Boucher’s 

fax to the superior court articulate a specific basis upon which the court 

might be required to address the appointment of alternate counsel. Instead, 

it merely alleged that Boucher’s attorney did not “believe in [him] nor this 

case.” Boucher did not state any specific facts in support of these allegations 

except that he believed that his attorney’s instructions for trial preparation 

were unhelpful. Indeed, the fax admitted his counsel was a good attorney 

and reflected that counsel had suggested Boucher go to a psychologist or 

counselor. The fact that such advice might not have been helpful for trial, 

at worst, merely shows a difference in trial strategy. Moreover, Boucher did 

not give the court a chance to further inquire with Boucher about these 

allegations because Boucher failed to appear at trial. The court considered 

and denied the motion, noting Boucher’s absence from trial. Given the 

nature of Boucher’s allegations and the fact that the court twice considered 

Boucher’s motion for new counsel, it did not violate his Sixth Amendment 

rights.

 

2 Boucher’s attorney requested a continuance so Boucher could obtain 

a new attorney. Thus, the denial of the request was in effect a denial of a 

request for alternate counsel. 
STATE v. BOUCHER

Decision of the Court

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II. Jury Instructions

¶14 Boucher argues the superior court erred by refusing “to 

advise the jury prior to deliberations to not hold his voluntary absence from 

trial against him or infer guilt based on his absence.” We review for abuse 

of discretion whether the trial court erred in refusing requested jury 

instructions. State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville, 211 Ariz. 468, 471, ¶ 8 (2005)

(citation omitted). When addressing whether jury instructions accurately 

stated the law, we review de novo. State v. Fierro, 220 Ariz. 337, 338, ¶ 4 

(App. 2011) (citation omitted). In evaluating instructions, we consider them 

in their entirety, Granville, 211 Ariz. at 471, ¶ 8 (citation omitted), and within 

the context of the trial, State v. Bruggeman, 161 Ariz. 508, 510 (App. 1989)

(citation omitted) (“Appellate courts do not evaluate jury instructions out 

of context.”). Ultimately, the inquiry is whether the “jury receive[d] the 

information it need[ed] to arrive at a legally correct decision.” Granville, 211 

Ariz. at 471, ¶ 8 (citation omitted).

¶15 The crux of Boucher’s argument rests on his contention the 

superior court implied that his failure to appear was a reflection of his 

consciousness of guilt. Based on this, he argues that the court erred by

failing to correct this implication by refusing his request to instruct the jury

not to infer guilt from his absence. However, the court’s statements and 

actions during voir dire made clear the jury should not infer guilt from his 

absence. Soon after the court stated that Boucher may not appear, it 

explicitly stated that Boucher’s absence was not evidence of guilt. The court 

then excused four jurors who indicated that Boucher’s absence would 

influence their decision. Thus, the court clearly informed the jury that it 

should not imply guilt from Boucher’s absence. We assume that juries obey 

their instructions. State v. McCurdy, 216 Ariz. 567, 574, ¶ 17 (App. 2007) 

(citation omitted).

¶16 Moreover, we view the adequacy of jury instructions in light 

of the closing arguments. Bruggeman, 161 Ariz. at 510. Here, in addition to 

the statements made by the superior court during voir dire, Boucher’s 

attorney addressed Boucher’s absence during closing arguments. 

Specifically, he stated that “[w]hether or not Mr. Boucher was seated next 

to me the last two days or wasn’t, has no bearing on what occurred . . . so 

please don’t factor that in one way or the other.” Considering the 

instructions in conjunction with the court’s statements and actions during 

voir dire and defense counsel’s closing argument, the jury received 

sufficient direction and information not to imply guilt from Boucher’s 

absence. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Boucher’s 

requested instruction.
STATE v. BOUCHER

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Boucher’s convictions

and sentences.