Even construing all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in the light most favorable to
MoGowan, it is unreasonable to expect that Johnson anticipated “being haled into court” in Illinois as
aresult of her conduct. See World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. First, while McGowan alleges
that Johnson is “formerly of Illinois” (McGowan Compl, 1), her status as a prior resident does not bear
on her current disposition as a resident of Alabama. Second, McGowan never alleges that Johnson even
entered Illinois during the time surrounding the incident. McGowan states that she was a “passenger in
a motor vehicle driven by ... Johnson ... traveling from their respective residences back to school in
Alabama.” (McGowan Compl. §4). Yet, she also alleges that, at the time of the incident, Johnson was
a resident of the State of Alabama. (McGowan Compl. {1). Thus, based on the pleadings, it appears that
Johnson did not set foot in Illinois during the events leading up to the incident in question.

Apart from failing to show that Johnson did anything in Illinois, McGowan has failed to show
that the injury arose out of any of Johnson’s supposed connections with Illinois. There are no allegations
0 inferences that indicate that McGowan’s injuries have anything to do with Johnson’s prior residency
in Illinois or that, prior to the accident, Johnson drove through Illinois with McGowan as a passenger.
| The claim arises entirely out of Johnson’s operation of the vehicle leading up to the accident, which took
place entirely in Indiana.

Therefore, Johnson has not “purposely availed [herself] of the privilege of conducting activities”
in INinois. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. It would not be “fair, just, [or] reasonable” to require Johnson to
defend this action in Illinois. See Rollins v. Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d 244, 275 (1990). Accordingly,
Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.

, Enterprise’s Motion to Transfer Venue

Enterprise argues that this case should be transferred to the Northern District of Alabama

because such a transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses as well as the interests


i

¥

This determination depends on whether the plaintiff asserts general or specific jurisdiction against the
defendant, RAR, 107 F.3d at 1277. “General jurisdiction ... is for suits neither arising out of nor related
to the defendant’s contacts, and it is permitted only where the defendant has ‘continuous and systematic
general business contacts’ with the forum state. RAR, 107 F.3d at 1277. Specific jurisdiction “refers to
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit ‘arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the

i
forum.” RAR, 107 F.3d at 1277, quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 486 U.S.

408 (1984).

In the instant case, McGowan does not allege that Johnson had “continuous and systematic”

contact with Illinois. The only instance in which McGowan states that Johnson has had contact with
|
Illinois is that she is “formerly of Illinois”. (McGowan Compl. 1). As a result of her failure to raise

issues of general jurisdiction in the Complaint, McGowan waived any general jurisdiction arguments.

RAR, 107 F.3d at 1277.

The next question is whether McGowan has met her burden of establishing that Illinois has

specific jurisdiction over Johnson. Defendants need not be physically present in the jurisdiction to have

|
“minimum contacts” with the state. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-253 (1958) (Hanson).

|The critical inquiry is whether Johnson purposely availed herself of the rights and privileges of
|

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. In other words, Johnson’s activities must be of the quality and nature such that
|
" she would reasonably anticipate being haled into Illinois court. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.

conducting activities in Illinois, such that she invoked the benefits and protections of Illinois law.

, Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Finally, due process requires that Johnson’s relationship with

IMinois not be “random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474

(1985).


of justice.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought.” A transfer is proper if: (1) venue is proper in both the transferee and transferor
courts; (2) it is for the convenience of the parties or witnesses; and (3) it is in the interest of justice. Law
Bulletin Publishing, Co. v. LRP Publications, Inc., 992 F.Supp. 10104, 1017 (N.D.IIl, 1998).
Venue is appropriate in a judicial district in which “(1)... any defendant resides, if all defendants
reside in the same state, (2) ... a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
pccurred, or a substantial part of the property that is subject of the action is situated, or (3) ... any
defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b) (2). In the instant case, McGowan filed her suit in the Northern District of Illinois. None of
the defendants reside in Illinois, and none of the events or omissions that give rise to the claim occurred
jin Illinois. Therefore, venue is improper in this Court.

Because venue is not proper in this Court, the transferor court, Enterprise’s Motion to Transfer

Venue is denied. Furthermore, because venue is not proper in this Court, the case is dismissed. See 28

U.S.C. § 1406(a).

For the reasons stated above, Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss is granted. Enterprise’s Motion to

(Act

soul W. DARRAH
United States District Judge

, Transfer Venue is denied, and the case is dismissed for improper yenue.

-
Dated: / Ane 257 FO 2.



Minute ger Form (

United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

| f Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Oth

aange Magistrate Judie John W. Darrah than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 01 C6906 DATE 6/25/2002
CASE AMBER MCGOWAN vs. KELLIE JOHNSON
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

M TION: of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

(¢3) : im) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

Bg) (a Answer brief to motion due____. Reply to answer brief due.

@ oO Ruling/Hearingon____ssetfor___—_aat

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____——s set for_ at

6 'O Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__———ssetfor_——att_—
gq ‘Oo Trial[sct for/re-set for] ont.

3) 'O [BenclyJury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at

Qo oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule 21 CFRCP41(a)(1) OFRCP41(a)(2).

(0) [Other docket entry] Status hearing held. Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order.
Johnson’s motion to dismiss is granted. Enterprise’s motion to transfer venue is denied, and the case is dismissed
for improper venue.

11) | For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.
i 8)
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. sonberotvtes
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
AMBER McGOWAN, )
i )
Plaintiff, )
) No. 01 C 6906
Vv. )
: y Judge John W. Darrah
KELLIE JOHNSON and )
ENTERPRISE LEASING, INC. ) DOCKETEp
)
Defendants. ) JUN 26 2002

i ’ MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Amber McGowan (“McGowan”), filed suit against Defendants, Kellie Johnson
(“Johnson”) and Enterprise Leasing, Inc. (“Enterprise”), for a variety of tortuous acts leading to an
automobile accident and injuries resulting therefrom. Currently before the Court is Johnson’s Motion
fo Dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction and Enterprise’s Motion to Transfer Venue.

i
The plaintiff bears the burden of providing facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.

jStee! Warehouse of Wisc., Inc. v. Leach, 154 F.3d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1998) (Leach). All disputed facts
bearing on jurisdiction are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. (LFG, LLC v. Zapata
Corp., 78 F.Supp.2d 731, 734 (N.D.Ill. 1999) (LFG).
A reading of the Complaint supports the following allegations of events and conduct of the
' parties.
On September 7, 1999, McGowan was a passenger in a vehicle owned by Enterprise and
operated by Johnson. At this time, McGowan was a resident of Illinois, and Johnson was a resident of
f Alabama. Enterprise is an Alabama Corporation, and Johnson rented the vehicle from Enterprise-South

_ Central, located in Huntsville, Alabama. At approximately 4:36 p.m. on September 7, 1999, while

driving southbound on I-65 in Greenwood, Indiana, Johnson lost control of the vehicle, causing it to flip


over several times and land in the northbound lanes of I-65. McGowan alleges that she was injured as
a proximate result of the accident.
Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss

Johnson argues that the suit against her should be dismissed because this Court lacks in

personam jurisdiction.
i

A federal district court in Illinois has personal jurisdiction over a party involved in a diversity

action only if Illinois courts would have personal jurisdiction. Klump v. Duffus, 71 F.3d 1368, 1371 (7th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1004 (1996); Leach, 154 F.3d at 714. A determination of whether an
[llinois court would have jurisdiction requires an examination of three sources of law: “(1) state statutory
law, (2) state constitutional law, and (3) federal constitutional law.” RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel Ltd., 107
F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir, 1997) (RAR).
Under Illinois law, a court can have personal jurisdiction over a non-resident via the state’s long-
ao statute. 735 ILCS 5/2-209. The statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over claims that arise
‘out of a number of enumerated acts, 735 ILCS 5/2-209(a). The statute also provides that an Illinois
‘court may exercise jurisdiction on any basis permitted by the state or federal constitution. 735 ILCS 5/2-
209(c). Therefore, the statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the Illinois courts to the
fullest constitutional limit, and the statutory analysis collapses into a two-prong analysis: one based on
| the Illinois Constitution and one based on the federal Constitution. RAR, 107 F.3d. at 1276.
: The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause permits an Illinois court to exercise jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant only if the defendant has had “certain minimum contacts with [the state]
" such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.’” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945),quoting Milliken v, Meyer,

311 US. 457, 463 (1940); Neuman & Assoc. v. Florabelle Flowers, 15 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 1994).