“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life." Jd. at 484. The Court noted that because prisoners held in non-punitive
administrative segregation and protective custody were confined under similar conditions, “[the
plaintiff's] discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. at 486.

Following Sandin, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that disciplinary segregation does
not create atypical and significant hardship -- in effect, that segregation, even arbitrarily imposed,
is one of the "ordinary incidents of prison life" and not of constitutional concern. See Walker v.
O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 630 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2000); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir.
1997); Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1997)” Neither placing Aalders in
disciplinary segregation nor delaying his release can support a federal constitutional claim.

Even if Aalders had a protected interest in not being confined in segregation without due
process of law, according to the complaint he received it. Aalders received a hearing, and "[t]here
is no denial of due process if the error the inmate complains of is corrected in the administrative
appeal process.” Morisette v. Peters, 45 F.3d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 1995).

The court accordingly dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted without prejudice to any state-law claims Aalders may be able to assert in his

pending suit in the Illinois Court of Claims.

TT IS SO ORDERED.
va
David H. Coat, Judge .
DATED: & Da United States District Court

¥ The harshness of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sandin surprised judges, who were well aware that for most
prisoners disciplinary segregation is not routine and represents a radical change in their conditions of confinement.
See Leslie v. Doyle, 896 F.Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1995)(Shadur, J.). Nevertheless, lower courts must follow it.

4


of Aalders’ punishment.” Aalders was released from segregation on September 6, 2000, and
transferred to Menard Correctional Center.

Aalders alleges that while he was in segregation at Pontiac he was denied medical care for
an infection, he was not permitted to use the law library, and conditions in the segregation unit
arnounted to psychological torture. Aalders presumably includes these allegations to show his
suffering from his wrongful confinement in segregation, rather than as separate claims, since
Aalders does not name anyone from Pontiac Correctional Center as a defendant. The court
accordingly understands that this suit solely relates to Aalders’ disciplinary conviction. The court
expresses no opinion as to whether Aalders has a claim against correctional officials at Pontiac for

unconstitutional conditions of confinement there.

ANALYSIS

The court understands Aalders’ feeling of injustice, but his disciplinary conviction and
confinement in segregation did not violate his constitutional rights. Although the Eighth
Amendment forbids cruel and unusual punishment, segregation is in itself neither cruel nor
unusual. The only constitutional right potentially at issue is Aalder’s right not to be deprived of
liberty without due process of law, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

A convicted prisoner is obviously not entitled to liberty before the expiration of his sentence.
A prisoner may have “liberty interests" that may not be taken away without due process of law,
but the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a liberty interest either
in avoiding transfer to another institution, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976), or in
remaining in the general prison population, Hewert v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).

The Supreme Court in Hewitt held that mandatory language in state laws or regulations can
create a constitutionally enforceable liberty interest in avoiding segregation unless specified
conditions are met. However, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), sharply limited such liberty

interests, holding that an enforceable liberty interest can only exist in avoiding restraint that

” According to the exhibits, the loss of good-time credit ordered by the Adjustment committee was not processed,
so the length of Aalders’ incarceration is not affected. It appears from information publicly available on IDOC's
website that Aalders is serving a life sentence,


Minute Order Form (0697)

- . ‘ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

[Name of Assigned Judge or DAVID H, COAR Sitting Judge if Other
Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 4729 DATE | AUG 1 9 2002
CASE Kevin Aalders (IDOC # A-90409) v. Asst. Deputy Director Roth, et al.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢-g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the
nature of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

1) fl Fited motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

2) o Brief in support of motion due

(3) 0 Answer brief to motion due____. ‘Reply to answer brief due

(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) oO Status hearing{held/continued to) [set for/re-set for]on ___—sset for att

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for__— att

7) im Trial|set for/re-set for] on at

8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__al

9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

O FRCP4(m) 1] General Rule 21 = FRCP4i(ay(t) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).

10) a [Other docket entry] Enter memorandum opinion and order. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file in forma
pauperis [3-1] is granted. The trust fund officer at plaintiff"s current place of incarceration shall deduct $4.29 from
plaintiff's account for payment to the clerk of court and make installment payments as directed. The clerk shall send a
copy of this order to the trust fund officer at Menard Correctional Center. This action is dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, terminating case. Plaintiff's appointment of counsel [4-1] 3s denied
as moot.

(it) [For further detail see order on the reverse side of the original!

INo notices required, advised in open court.

INo notices required.

umber af notices

INoui iiled by judge’: ff.
jotices mailed by judge's stal Aus 2 8 2002

Notified counsel by telephone.

X__[Docketing to mail notices.

XK [Mail AO 450 form, Pinay pepny nen sacn locating pty ils

kcopy to judge/magistrate judge.

daw malled
Lourtroom tau malled notice

KS Kleputy’s
initials

‘Date/time received in

central Clerk's Office railing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN AALDERS,

Plaintiff,
No. 02 C 479 *Pyien

Judge David H. Cgar
nee a Re
tig

D

Aug «
G2 & any

Vv.

ASST. DEPUTY DIRECTOR ROTH, et al.

we Serene

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION A RDER

Kevin Aalders, a prisoner in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed this
pro se civil rights action against correctional officials at Joliet Correctional Center. Aalders is
granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, but, as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, he will be required to pay the fee in installments.!’

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court is required to review complaints filed by prisoners
against governmental officers or employees, and dismiss any portion of the complaint it finds
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. In determining whether the complaint states a
claim upon which relief may be granted, the court applies the standard employed in deciding a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., taking all well-pleaded allegations of the
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Zinwnerman v.
Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000).

Aalders has filed a long, rambling complaint with numerous exhibits. In addition to the
complaint with its attached exhibits filed July 2, 2002, an additional set of exhibits and a statement

entitled "Notification of Witnesses" was filed on July 30, 2002. Because Aalders is proceeding

¥ Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), Aalders is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $4.29. The trust fund
officer at Aalders’ current place of incarceration is ordered to collect, when funds exist, the partial filing fee from his
trust fund account and pay it directly to the clerk of court, Thereafter the trust fund officer at the correctional facility
where Aalders is confined is authorized to collect monthly payments from his trust fund account in an amount equal
to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the account. Monthly payments collected from plaintiff’s trust
fund account shall be forwarded to the clerk of court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the full
$150 filing fee is paid. All payments shall be sent to the Clerk, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearbom Si.,
Chicago, Il. 60604, attn: Fiscal Dept., and shall clearly identify Aalders and the case number assigned to this action.

a)


pro se, the court considers all of these materials in determining whether Aalders can state a claim

against the defendants. See Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1367 & n. 2 (7th Cir. 1997).

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

On January 13, 2000, while incarcerated at Joliet Correctional Center, Aalders was charged
with disciplinary rule violations by defendant David C, Freeman, an IDOC investigator, after
informants allegedly claimed Aalders was recruiting inmates to kill a correctional staff member and
take over a cellhouse. Aalders was immediately transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center where
a hearing was held before the Pontiac Adjustment Committee on January 21, 2000. On January
27, 2000, James M. Schomig, the warden at Pontiac, approved the Committee’s recommendation
continuing the matter for investigation.

On that date a second hearing was held, also at Pontiac, this time before Joliet’s Adjustment
Committee consisting of defendants Coutee and Dantler. Aalders contends that Coutee and
Dantler, who are both African-Americans, were prejudiced against him because he was accused
of being a white supremacist. Coutee and Dantler found Aalders guilty and recommended as
punishment loss of one year of good time credit, indeterminate confinement in segregation, one
year demotion to "C” grade and six months’ yard denial. The recommendation was approved by
defendant James Chrans, then the warden of Joliet Correctional Center, on February 4, 2000,
although Aalders remained at Pontiac.

Aalders appealed the decision to IDOC’s Administrative Review Board (ARB). After a
hearing on March 30, 2000, the ARB remanded the case to be rewritten in an order dated May 15,
2000. Eventually Aalders received a polygraph examination on July 3, 2000, On July 14, 2000,
the polygraph examiner reported that Aalders had responded truthfully, but it was not until
September 1, 2000, that IDOC Director Donald Snyder approved the ARB’s recommendation that
the disciplinary convictions be expunged. The ARB report indicated that because the revocation

of Aalder’s good-time credits had not been processed, nothing had to be done to undo that element