NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JOEL L. BOYCE; DELYNN E. BOYCE, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

No. 14-56610 

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00601-MMMJEM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 8, 2017**

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. 

Joel L. and Delynne E. Boyce appeal pro se from the district court’s 

summary judgment for the United States in its action to reduce to judgment federal 

income tax assessments from tax years 1998 to 2008. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the existence of subject matter 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 21 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 14-56610 

jurisdiction and summary judgment. Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 541 

(9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that it had subject matter 

jurisdiction over the action. See 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (district courts have such 

jurisdiction to render judgments and decrees necessary or appropriate for the 

enforcement of the internal revenue laws).

The district court properly granted summary judgment for the government to 

reduce assessments to judgment because the government submitted Form 4340 for 

years 1998 to 2008, and the Boyces failed to raise a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to the insufficiency of the notices of deficiencies and assessments for those 

tax years. See Palmer v. IRS, 116 F.3d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997) (Internal 

Revenue Service assessments for unpaid taxes entitled to presumption of 

correctness unless taxpayer submits competent evidence that the assessments were 

“arbitrary, excessive, or without foundation”); see also Hughes, 953 F.2d at 535 

(absent contrary evidence, official certificates, such as a Form 4340, constituted 

proof of fact that assessments were actually and properly made).

The district court properly granted summary judgment for the government to 

foreclose on the tax lien, and properly ordered the sale of the Boyces’ property,
3 14-56610 

because the Boyces failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

there was a nominee relationship or fraudulent conveyance. See 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7403(a), (c) (authorizing district court to decree a sale of property subject to 

federal tax lien according to its findings regarding the interests of all parties); see 

also Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(a)(1) (a transfer made by a debtor is voidable if it is 

made with an “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 

debtor”); Fourth Inv. LP v. United States, 720 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013)

(finding nominee relationship where taxpayer continued to exercise substantial 

control over the property in question).

We reject as without merit the Boyces’ contentions concerning the 

government’s authority to bring this action and alleged judicial bias.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Boyces’ request for judicial notice, set forth in their opening brief, is 

denied. 

AFFIRMED.