alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   Exhibit 10.65
                               KEE JOINT VENTURE /
                     FIST LIGHT FILMS/AMERICAN ARTIST FILMS/
                                I.J. KAPPLIN CO.
                             LEASE AMENDMENT-RENEWAL


This agreement, entered into this 5th day of December, 1997 by and between Kee
Joint Venture known as Landlord, and First Light Films/American Artist Films
hereinafter known as Tenant and I.J. Kapplin co. hereafter called "Agent".

                                   WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a lease dated August 15, 1996 covering
premises commonly known as 1245 Fowler Street Atlanta, GA, and

WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant desire to amend said lease in certain respects,

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of TEN DOLLARS, each paid to the
other, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and
Tenant hereby agree that said lease is hereby amended as follows:

1. The monthly rental shall increase to $3400.00 commencing January 1, 1998.

2. The term of said lease is extended to December 31, 1998.

3. The tenant name is changed from First Light Films to American Artists Film
Corporation.

All other terms, conditions and covenants of said lease shall remain unchanged.


IN WITNESS whereof the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals
this 5th day of January, 1998.


FAX SIGNATURES ARE ACCEPTABLE AND BINDING TO ALL PARTIES.

LANDLORD                                            TENANT

Kee Joint Venture                    American Artists Film Corporation

By:   /s/                            By: /s/  J. Eric Van Atta, Vice President 
   --------------------------            --------------------------------------

                                     By:                       
                                         --------------------------------------

I.J. Kapplin Co.

/s/ Lynn Carden                                        
--------------------------------------
Lynn Carden
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                        DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                             JUN-30-1996
<CASH>                                     2,221,368
<SECURITIES>                                   2,364
<RECEIVABLES>                                269,939
<ALLOWANCES>                                  22,455
<INVENTORY>                                   14,596
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           2,567,631
<PP&E>                                     3,720,752
<DEPRECIATION>                               477,111
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             8,470,631
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        832,357
<BONDS>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<COMMON>                                      32,879
<OTHER-SE>                                 6,372,059
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               8,470,631
<SALES>                                      246,053
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           4,530,277
<CGS>                                        150,583
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                150,583
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           3,798,922
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              17,985
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            51,124
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (102,036)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (102,036)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                               (102,036)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.03)



</TABLE>
# Official Journal C 213/2016

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 213 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5914 June 2016 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 213

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5914 June 2016

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Council |
| 2016/C 213/1 | Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the role of the youth sector in an integrated and cross-sectoral approach to preventing and combating violent radicalisation of young people | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Council

2016/C 213/1

Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the role of the youth sector in an integrated and cross-sectoral approach to preventing and combating violent radicalisation of young people

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
**Exhibit 15.1**

The Board of Directors and Shareholders 

Gulf Island Fabrication, Inc. 

We are aware of the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-46155) pertaining to the Long-TermIncentive Plan, the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-88466) pertaining to the 2002 Long-Term Incentive Plan, and the Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-144673) of Gulf Island Fabrication, Inc., of our report datedOctober 23, 2009, relating to the unaudited condensed consolidated interim financial statements of Gulf Island Fabrication, Inc. that are included in its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2009. 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

October 23, 2009
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SEC FORM
10-K AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001001540
<NAME> LEXINGTON GLOBAL ASSET MANAGERS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> US DOLLAR

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                       9,878,653
<SECURITIES>                                 1,061,227
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,807,707
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            13,098,048
<PP&E>                                       3,419,470
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,487,894
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              18,038,255
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,848,923
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        54,879
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,718,414
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                18,038,255
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            19,137,169
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                628,861
<INCOME-TAX>                                   355,211
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            273,650
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   273,650
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .06


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 120 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 120

   Recognizing the 1 year anniversary of the April 2, 2010, fire and 
       explosion at the Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, Washington.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 31, 2011

  Mrs. Murray (for herself and Ms. Cantwell) submitted the following 
             resolution; which was considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   Recognizing the 1 year anniversary of the April 2, 2010, fire and 
       explosion at the Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, Washington.

Whereas the State of Washington, the community of Anacortes, the Tesoro Refining 
        and Marketing Company, and the United Steelworkers experienced a tragedy 
        on April 2, 2010, when a fire occurred at the Tesoro refinery in 
        Anacortes, Washington;
Whereas 7 workers died as a result of the tragedy: Daniel J. Aldridge, Matthew 
        C. Bowen, Donna Van Dreumel, Matt Gumbel, Darrin J. Hoines, Lew Janz, 
        and Kathryn Powell;
Whereas the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
        continues to investigate and review the April 2, 2010, refinery fire, 
        and procedures and processes to prevent future tragedies from occurring;
Whereas the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries issued a 
        Citation and Notice of Assessment covering 44 violations of State 
        workplace safety and health regulations at the Anacortes work site 
        (which are being appealed); and
Whereas the fire and explosion at the Tesoro refinery is a reminder of the 
        dangerous nature of refinery operations around the Nation: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate--
            (1) expresses sincere condolences to the families, loved 
        ones, United Steelworkers, fellow workers, and the Anacortes 
        community concerning the tragedy at the Tesoro refinery in 
        Anacortes, Washington;
            (2) honors Daniel J. Aldridge, Matthew C. Bowen, Donna Van 
        Dreumel, Matt Gumbel, Darrin J. Hoines, Lew Janz, and Kathryn 
        Powell; and
            (3) expresses support for the efficient and safe operation 
        of our Nation's oil refineries.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2019182EN.01000502.xml

| 27.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 182/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/5

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 21 January 2019 — CV v Iccrea Banca SpA Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo

(Case C-37/19)

(2019/C 182/07)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: CV

Respondent: Iccrea Banca SpA Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo

Question referred

Must Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/88/EC (1) and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, taken separately where applicable, be interpreted as precluding provisions of national legislation or national practices pursuant to which, once the employment relationship has ended, the right to payment of an allowance for paid leave accrued but not taken (and for a legal arrangement, such as ‘abolished public holidays’, which is comparable in nature and function to paid annual leave) does not apply in a context where the worker was unable to take the leave before the employment relationship ended because of an unlawful act (a dismissal established as unlawful by a national court by means of a final ruling ordering the retroactive restoration of the employment relationship) attributable to the employer, for the period between that unlawful act by the employer and the subsequent reinstatement only?

---

(1)  Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).

---
#### Marge Tugendhaft, Respondent, v Country Estates Associates et al., Appellants.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dunkin, J.), dated August 22, 1983, as, upon their motion to excuse their default and to require plaintiff to accept their answer, directed plaintiff to accept defendants’ answer only on the issue of damages, and limited any trial of the action to that issue.

Order reversed, insofar as appealed from, as a matter of discretion, without costs or disbursements, and motion granted in its entirety, on condition that defendants personally pay plaintiff $250. Defendant’s time to pay the $250 is extended until 30 days after service upon them of a copy of the order to be made hereon, with notice of entry; in the event that condition is not complied with, then order affirmed, insofar as appealed from, with costs.

We note at the outset that Special Term’s order is appealable by defendants since it did not grant them the complete relief requested *(see, Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ.,*60 NY2d 539, 544-545; *Lincoln v Austic,*60 AD2d 487, 490, *lv denied*44 NY2d 644).

Inasmuch as defendants have demonstrated a meritorious defense, their answer was served within a relatively short time after the expiration of a stipulation extending the time to answer (slightly more than three months), plaintiff has shown no prejudice as a result of this delay, and defendants, by moving to have their default excused and requiring plaintiff to accept their answer, have shown an intent to defend the action, Special Term erred by not granting defendants’ motion in its entirety and permitting them to challenge the merits of the case *(see, Junior v City of New York,*85 AD2d 683). Moreover, to date, plaintiff has not entered a default judgment against defendants.

We exercise our discretion to excuse the default pursuant to CPLR 2005 based upon the foregoing reasons, but have imposed an appropriate sanction *(see, Heffney v Brookdale Hosp. Center,*102 AD2d 842; *Stolpiec v Weiner,*100 AD2d 931). Public policy favors the resolution of cases on their merits. Lazer, J. P., Gibbons, O’Connor and Brown, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Daniel BERNARDINO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-10460.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 7, 2011.

*74William C. Brown, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Nancy E. Larson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.

Roderick Christopher White, Law Offices of Roderick C. White, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Daniel Bernardino appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 554(a), which imposes criminal penalties for “fraudulently or knowingly” facilitating the exportation of items one “know[s] ... to be intended for exportation contrary to any law or regulation of the United States.” Bernardino was convicted of Count Five of the superseding indictment, which alleged that he facilitated the export of assorted firearms and ammunition without obtaining the license required by 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2). We AFFIRM.

Bernardino requested a jury instruction that would have required both knowledge that the weapons and ammunition were items for which 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2) requires an export license, and an intention to export the weapons without the license. Bernardino contends that denying this instruction was error, and that the evidence at trial was insufficient because it did not establish knowledge of the licensing requirement and the specific intent to disregard it.

All of Bernardino’s arguments are premised on the mistaken view that he was charged and convicted under a different provision, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c), which imposes penalties for “willfully” violating 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)’s licensing requirement. References to 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) appear prominently in the heading and final clause of Count Five of the superseding indictment, and the district court’s judgment names 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) as the statute of conviction. But Bernardino omits all discussion of § 554(a) from his briefing, beyond a single reference in a passing description of a different count.

In any event, § 554(a) does not require the mental states described in Bernardi-no’s requested instruction. “Unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.” *Bryan v. United States,*524 U.S. 184, 193, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 1946, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998). In this case, culpability required that Bernardino know that he was dealing with weapons and ammunition that were intended for export, and that their exportation would be illegal. *Cf. Babb v. United States,*252 F.2d 702, 707 (5th Cir.1958).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Adriana GUERRERO-HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 09-72942.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 21, 2011.

Nicole Hope Nelson, Nelson Smith, LLP, Portland, OR, for Petitioner.

Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Gladys Marta Steffens Guzman, Esquire, Ernesto Horacio Molina, Jr., Esquire, Senior Litigation Counsel, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Adriana Guerrero-Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an Immigration and Customs Enforcement decision reinstating her prior removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law and due process claims. *Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t Homeland Security,*539 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.2008). We deny the petition for review.

Contrary to Guerrero-Hernandez’s contention, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) applies to her expedited removal order. *See Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales,*486 F.3d 484, 496 n. 14 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (“Any mode of departure — voluntary or involuntary — while subject to an order of removal constitutes a removal for reinstatement purposes.”).

The reinstatement of Guerrero-Hernandez’s removal order did not violate her due process rights. *See id.*at 497 (“Reinstatement of a prior removal order — regardless *202of the process afforded in the underlying order — does not offend due process because reinstatement of a prior order does not change the alien’s rights or remedies.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### In re TERMINAL RY. OF BUFFALO. Appeal of TOWN OF WEST SENECA.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

November 13, 1907.)

Appeal from Special Term, Erie County.

Petition by the Terminal Railway of Buffalo, under Railroad Daw, Laws 1897, pp. 794, 796, c. 754, §§ 60, 62, for the establishment of highway crossings in the town of West Seneca. From a determination of the board of railroad commissioners, the town of West Seneca appeals. Affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

Determination of the board of- railroad commissioners affirmed, without costs, on opinion of McLennan, P. J., in Matter of Petition of the Terminal Railway of Buffalo, etc., as to its Highway Crossings in the Town of Cheektowaga (decided at this term of court) 106 N. Y. Supp. 655.

KRUSE, J., dissents.
#### Noel Cruz, Respondent, v Felix Rivera, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[942 NYS2d 91]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alison Y. Tuitt, J.), entered July 14, 2011, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, in this action for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, denied defendant Felix Rivera’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against him, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant the motion to the extent of dismissing plaintiffs 90/180-day claim, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Defendant established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant submitted the affirmed report from an orthopedist who, based upon an examination of plaintiff, found full range of motion in the relevant parts of the body and concluded that all sprains/strains had resolved. Defendant also submitted plaintiffs bill of particulars and deposition testimony wherein he stated that he only missed about one week of work as a result of the accident.

Plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to the existence of serious injuries to his cervical and lumbar spine. Plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the affirmation of his treating physician, who reviewed MRI reports finding disc herniations and bulges and, upon examination, found that plaintiff suffered persisting muscle spasms and limitations in multiple ranges of motion. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the physician’s attribution of a quantified percentage of loss of range of motion was sufficient to raise triable issues of fact *(see Perl v Meher,*18 NY3d 208, 217 [2011]; *Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345, 350 [2002]). The unaffirmed MRI reports, which were referred to and not disputed by defendant’s medical expert, and were relied upon by plaintiff’s physician, were properly considered in opposition to the motion since they were not the sole basis for the findings of plaintiffs physician *(see Rubencamp v Arrow Exterminating Co., Inc.,*79 AD3d 509 [2010]).

Dismissal of plaintiffs 90/180-day claim is warranted in light of the allegation in his bill of particulars that he was confined to bed for only a week, and his deposition testimony that he missed about a week of work after the accident *(see Hospedales v “John Doe”,*79 AD3d 536 [2010]; *McClelland v Estevez,*77 AD3d 403 [2010]).

We have considered the remaining contentions, including de*577fendant’s claim that there was an unexplained gap in treatment, and find them unavailing. Concur — Tom, J.E, Catterson, Richter, Abdus-Salaam and Román, JJ.