Critically, Apprend?’s “holding is inapplicable in situations in which the sentence
established is not ‘more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense imposed by the jury’s
verdict.” United States v, Huerta, 239 ¥.3d 865, 876 (7" Cir. 2001) (quoting Apprendi, 120 S.
CU. at 2361 13) (emphasis added), See also United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 877 (7
Cir. 2001); United States v, Brough, 243 F.3d 1078, 1079-80 (7" Cir. 2001). Indeed, Apprendi is
“irrelevant” where “a deug dealer is sentenced to less than 20 years’ imprisonment — the limit
under 2$ U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) for even small-scale dealing in Schedule I and [J controlled
substances.” Talhott, 226 F.3d at 869 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Robinson,
250 1'.3d 527, 529 (7" Cir. 2001) (“when a defendant’s sentence does not exceed 20 years
imprisonment ~ the maximum under § 841(b) for possessing/distributing the smallest amount of
cocaine — Apprendi? is irrelevant’) (citations omitted), United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820, 826
(7° Cir, 2000) (“the Apprendi rule applics only to drug quantities that permit a sentence in excess
of the default statutory maximum of twenty years”),

Contrary to petitioner’s argument, the indictment specified that Williams was charged
with possession with intent to distribute a substance containing cocaine, a Schedule TI controlled
substance (Count Lf), and a related conspiracy (Count 1), and the jury was instructed that, to find
Williams guilly, it must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that cocaine was involved.? In fact,
the parties stipulated at trial to the amount and type of controlled substance involved: 3,971

arams of 80% pure cocaine. ‘The jury found Williams guilty on Counts J and UI. ‘The lowest

5 ‘The clements instruction stated, in pertinent part, “To sustain the charge of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, the government must prove the following propositions: First, the
defendant knowingly possessed cocaine; Second, the defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to
distribute it, and, Third, the defendant knew the substance was a controlled substance.” It also contained
the phrase that petitioner cites as the basis for her third ground for relief (ie,, that it did “not matter
whether the defendant knew that the substance was cocaine”).

4.


the type and quantity of the drug at issue; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the
jury to make findings on those “elements” under a reasonable doubt standard (and, instead,
making those findings itself under a preponderance standard).

In her petition, Williams also obtusely suggests that Apprendi altered the Seventh
Cireuit’s formulation of drug-related offenscs to require a jury finding of actual knowledge on
the part of defendants concerning the types of drugs involved therein. Based upon that
suggestion, as well as her generic contention that drug-related offenses require a showing of
“specific intent,” she asserts that: (3) the court erred by instructing the jury that it did “not matter
whether the defendant knew that the substance was cocaine.”

B. rounds I - LI Fail Because of Apprendi’s Irrelevance to Petitioner's Casc.

The Seventh Circuit's construction of Apprendi is clear (and, in some respects, more
narrow than that rendered by other federal courts of appeals). “All Apprendi holds is that most
circumstances increasing a statutory maximum sentence must be treated as elements of the
offense — and if the defendant has demanded a jury trial, this means that they must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury’s satisfaction.” Talbott v. lndiana, 226 1',3d 866, 869 (7"
Cir. 2000), What this means in the conlext of drug-related offenses is that “a post-Apprendi
indictment should specify, and the trier of fact must be instructed to determine, not only the
elements of the offense, which appear in § 841(a), but also the events listed in § 841(b) on which
the prosecutor relies to establish the maximum sentence.” United States v. Bjorkman, 270 F.3d
482, 491 (7" Cir. 2001)2

* The Seventh Circuil does not consider drug type or quantity to be real “elements” of the

offenses proscribed by section 841 (a). Bjorkman, 270 F.3d at 491-92. See also United States v. Brough,
243 F.3d 1078 (7" Cir. 2001),

-3-


maximum sentence for an offense involving any detectible amount of cocaine (or other Schedule
Il controlled substance) is 20 years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(I)(C). Because petitioner reecived
a sentence below the default statutory maximum, Apprendi is irrelevant to her case and wholly
unavailing as a means of attacking her sentence and securing her release. See, e.g., Huerta, 239
£..3d at 876; Robinson, 250 F.3d at $29; Williams, 238 F.3d al 876-77; Talbott, 226 F.3d at 869.
Given that all three of petitioner's purported grounds [or relief are dependent upon the
applicability of Apprendi, they cannot even get off the ground and must be rejected."

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Williams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

) yu (by
David H. Coar
United States District Judge

Enter:

Dated: January 29, 2004

4 Petitioner's third argument relates to the statement in the elements instruction that it did “not
matter whether the defendant knew that the substance was cocaine.” In her petition, Williams indicates
that her argument is premised on Apprendi (notwithstanding that Apprendi does not even speak to this
issue). In her reply, she seeks (o disentangle her argument from Apprendi by contending that section 841
offenses have always required proof of “specific intent.” Regardless, it is clear from the balance of
petitioner's submissions to the court that her meandering argument is premised on Apprendi and its
progeny and, therefore. fails for the reasons set forth herein, In any event, petitioner has not identified
any other ground upon which this court could find error in the instruction and, on that basis, grant her
petition. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v, Osmani, 20 F.3d 266 (7" Cir. 1994),
establishes that the elements instruction utilized in this case is perfectly acceptable, Further, the Seventh
Circuit expressly declined to revisit Osmani in ruling on Williams’ direct appeal. Walls, 225 F.3d al 867-
68,

5.



rc Form (O07)

United States District Court, Northern District of Tlinois

Name of Assigned Judge David H. Coar Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER OL 7759 DATE 1/29/2004
CASE .
TITLE Sharce §. Williams, Petitioner, v. United States of America, Respondent

[In the following box (a) indicute the party filing the motion, ¢.g,, plaintitt, defendant, 3rd party plaintifl, and (h) state brielly the nature

MOTION: al the motion being presented.

Williams’ Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

DOCKET ENTRY:

(ap) Oo Viled motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
{2) im Brief in support of motion due ____
(3) oC Answer brief to motion due, ___. Reply to answer briefdue____.
(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon set for al,
{5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__— set for__ at
(7) oO ‘Trial[set for/re-set forlon _ ss at__
(8) ml [Bench/Jury tria!] [Hearing] held/continued to __at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) Ol Local Rule di.) CUFRCP41(a)(1) GO FROP41(a)(2).
qo) {Other docket entry] — Williams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied in its entirety. This case
is terminated,

ql) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court Document

Number

No notices required, number of nolicus

Notices maited by judye’s staf. Fee Q 2 2004

Notified counsel by telephone. dale dures

v Dacketing lo mail notices,

Mail AO 480 form, i Ro cKeting Uput y initials

Copy to judgefmagistrate judge

y ate mpiled potion
courtroom tee

deputy's |
initials

Date/time received in *
central Clerk's Office mailiny, depus



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
SHAREE 8S. WILLIAMS, )
)
Petitioner, )
) No. 0107759
v. )
) HONORABLE DAVID H, COAR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) a
) t
Respondent. ) onset qos
va
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER FEB g2

Petitioner Sharee 8. Williams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 is before this court. [or the following reasons, (his court denies the petition in its
entirety.
1. Background

On November 13, 1998, following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to
distribute a Schedule I! narcotic, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count f) and possession with
intent to distribute and distributing a Schedule II narcotic, in violation of 21 U.S.C, § 841(a)(L)
(Count IL), She was also convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon (Count V), in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(2)(1). On March 18, 1999, this court sentenced Williams to 97 months’
imprisonment, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) and the applicable sections of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines,

On August 15, 2000, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions on Counts | and II] and
reversed and temanded for a new trial on Count V. United States v. Wails, et al., 225 F.3d 858
(7" Cir, 2000). Williams did not file a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

On remand, the parties agreed that reversal of the conviction on and dismissal of Count V

\


would not affect the sentence, Accordingly, on November 1, 2000, an amended judgment was
entered imposing a 97-month sentence (and deleting reference to the conviction on Count V).
The judgment was docketed and made final on November 6, 2000, and petitioner filed no appeal
from that judgment.

On October 9, 2001, petitioner timcly filed a Section 2255 motion to vacate her sentence.
IL. Habeas Corpus Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, federal prisoners can challenge the imposition or length of their
detention if their conviction or sentence has been founded on an error that is “jurisdictional,
constitutional, or is a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.” Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 1339, 1341 (7" Cir. 1992) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). [f the court concludes that any such errors infected the judgment or sentence,
it “shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shal] discharge the prisoner or resentence him or
grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” 28 U.S.C, § 2255.
Iu. = Analysis

A. Petitioner Asserts Three Grounds for Relief.'

In support of her request for release from imprisonment, Williams asserts three arguments
— all of which are premised upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 8. Ct, 2348 (2000). Petitioner claims that Apprendi established
drug type and quantity as “material elements” of drug-related offenses under 21 ULS.C, § 841(a).

On that basis, she contends that: (1) the indictment was faulty by virtue of its failure to specify

‘The grounds were nol so enumerated by petilioner, and their contours are unclear, but the court
has taken care to identify and address any potent ial yrounds/arguments in her submissions,

-2-