IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DEREK GRONQUIST,

Respondent, 

RICHARD KING and RICHARD JACKSON, 

individually and representing a class of similarly 

situated individuals,

Plaintiffs

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OF THE 

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Defendant, 

KING COUNTY PROSECUTOR DANIEL 

SATTERBERG, 

Petitioner, 

v.

CHASE RIVELAND and JANET BARBOUR, in 

their official capacities; the INDETERMINATE 

SENTENCING REVIEW BOARD; and KEN 

EIKENBERRY, in his official capacity as 

Attorney General of the State of Washington,

Defendants. 

NO. 97277-0 

EN BANC 

STEPHENS, C.J.⸺Courts may impose remedial sanctions in favor of a 

person who is “aggrieved by a contempt of court in the proceeding to which the 

Filed _________ : November 12, 202 _______0

FILE 

IN CLERK’S OFFICE

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER 12, 2020 

THIS OPINION WAS FILED 

FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON

NOVEMBER 12,, 2020

SUSAN L. CARLSON 

SUPREME COURT CLERK 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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contempt is related.” RCW 7.21.030(1). Among available sanctions is an order to 

pay “for any losses suffered by the party as a result of the contempt and any costs 

incurred in connection with the contempt proceeding, including reasonable 

attorney’s fees.” Id. at .030(3). This case requires us to decide whether courts have 

discretion to impose remedial sanctions under RCW 7.21.030(3) in the absence of 

ongoing, continuing contempt. We hold they do. However, because Derek

Gronquist failed to establish that he suffered any compensable losses, and because 

there is no ongoing contempt, any claim for sanctions here is moot. Accordingly,

we reverse the Court of Appeals. 

FACTS

Gronquist was convicted of violent sexual offenses in 1988. While confined, 

he participated in a sex offender treatment program until 1991. That same year, 

former participants of the program brought a class action against the Department of 

Corrections (Department) to enjoin the release of their treatment files, which 

contained extensive medical and personal information. See King v. Riveland, 125 

Wn.2d 500, 502-04, 886 P.2d 160 (1994). Gronquist was not a named class member. 

The case resulted in a permanent injunction in 1993 that prohibited the Department 

from releasing certain documents from any class member’s file. Though not a 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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named party in King, Gronquist fell within the class of persons protected by the King

injunction. 

As Gronquist approached his earned early release date, the Department 

referred him to the King County prosecutor for possible commitment as a sexually 

violent predator. Under then-current statutory law, the prosecutor sought all records 

relating to Gronquist’s treatment.

Gronquist filed a civil contempt motion against the Department and the King 

County prosecutor for releasing his treatment records. He also sought an accounting 

for all breaches of the injunction, an order transferring him to community custody, 

destruction of all improperly disclosed confidential information, at least $500 a day 

per contemnor, disqualification of a potential expert witness, and attorney fees and 

costs under RCW 7.21.030(3). Gronquist’s claims were not inconsequential: it 

appears likely the Department and the prosecutor shared some of Gronquist’s files 

in direct contravention of a valid injunction.1

 On motion by the Department, and 

1 We are sympathetic to the difficult position in which the Department and the King 

County prosecutor found themselves with respect to the 1993 injunction. Nonetheless, 

while these facts may inform whether violation of a valid court order was truly “malicious,” 

and so may be relevant to a trial court’s decision of what remedial sanctions are appropriate 

under RCW 7.21.030(2), we do not believe they are relevant to the court’s consideration 

of what compensation is appropriate to an injured party under RCW 7.21.030(3). The 

court’s decision of whether and how to compensate an injured party involves an analysis 

of the extent of the harm suffered, not the blameworthiness of the contemnor. 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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before considering Gronquist’s contempt motion on the merits, the trial court 

prospectively invalidated the 1993 King injunction as to Gronquist. Neither the 

merits of that decision nor the validity of the injunction is before us.

After transferring the remainder of Gronquist’s treatment files, the 

Department moved to dismiss Gronquist’s contempt motion as moot, arguing that, 

absent the Department’s continuing contempt of the now-invalidated injunction, the 

trial court could no longer impose coercive, remedial sanctions. The trial court 

granted the Department’s motion to dismiss in an oral ruling, but the hearing 

transcript of that proceeding, along with the trial court’s reasoning, was omitted from 

the record. The trial court’s written order incorporating its oral ruling simply states, 

“Defendant’s Motion to Deny Intervenor Gronquist’s Motion for Contempt is 

GRANTED; [] Intervenor Gronquist’s motion for contempt is denied as moot.” 

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 741-42.

Gronquist appealed the trial court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed, 

holding Gronquist’s motion was not moot because a compensatory order for losses 

and attorney fees could still be awarded. Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 49392-6-

II, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019) (unpublished), 

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2049392-6-II%20Order%20Amending%20Opinion.pdf. The Department and the prosecutor petitioned this court for 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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review, arguing that Gronquist’s contempt motion, and any attendant relief sought, 

became moot once the trial court could no longer impose coercive sanctions. We 

granted the petition. Gronquist v. King County Prosecutor, 193 Wn.2d 1037 (2019).

ANALYSIS

Whether a claim is moot is a question of law, which we review de novo. De 

novo review also applies to questions of statutory interpretation. Applying de novo 

review, and interpreting the distinct remedy provisions in RCW 7.21.030, we hold 

that continuing or ongoing contempt is not a prerequisite to a trial court’s ability to 

fashion a remedy for a party’s losses under .030(3). Gronquist’s civil contempt 

motion is nonetheless moot because he failed to allege any compensable losses.

1. When a Cause of Action Is Dismissed as Moot, the Proper Standard of

Review Is De Novo

As an initial matter, it is important to note that the trial court did not make any 

determination as to whether contempt was warranted; rather, it simply denied 

Gronquist’s motion for contempt as moot. CP at 741-42. Whether a legal claim or 

issue is moot raises a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. See Barr 

v. Snohomish County Sheriff, 193 Wn.2d 330, 335, 440 P.3d 131 (2019) (citing Cost

Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wn.2d 635, 641, 310 P.3d 804 (2013)). 

A case becomes moot when a court can no longer provide effective relief. SEIU 

Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 168 Wn.2d 593, 602, 229 P.3d 774 (2010) (citing 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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In re Recall Charges Against Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 Dirs. Butler-Wall, 162 Wn.2d 

501, 505, 173 P.3d 265 (2007)); City of Sequim v. Malkasian, 157 Wn.2d 251, 259, 

138 P.3d 943 (2006) (“‘The central question of all mootness problems is whether 

changes in the circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have 

forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.’” (quoting 13A CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 3533.3, at 261 (2d ed. 1984))).

Because mootness was the basis for the trial court’s decision, the correct 

standard of review is de novo.2

 Applying this standard, we address whether a finding 

of continuing contempt is required for the trial court to exercise its discretionary 

authority to order a contemnor to compensate a moving party for any losses, costs, 

and attorney fees.

2 The Department appears to concede this fact, as it has effectively abandoned its 

former argument for abuse of discretion review. Compare Br. of Resp’t Dep’t of Corr. at 

4-5 (Wash. Ct. App. No. 49392-6-II (2018)) (arguing for abuse of discretion review), with

Dep’t of Corr.’ Suppl. Br. at 4-20 (failing to challenge the Court of Appeals’ determination

that the proper standard of review is de novo). This concession is well taken; in moving to

dismiss, the Department exclusively argued that Gronquist’s motion for contempt was

moot. CP at 599-604, 715-21. Because the sole question before us is the legal question of

whether the statute affords a contempt remedy at all in the absence of ongoing contempt,

there is no basis for abuse of discretion review.
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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2. Continuing Contempt is Not a Prerequisite To Granting Compensatory

Relief under RCW 7.21.030(3)

Intentional disobedience of any lawful court order is contempt of court. RCW 

7.21.010(1)(b). In addition to their inherent contempt powers, courts are statutorily 

authorized to impose both punitive and remedial sanctions. Remedial sanctions are 

civil sanctions imposed “for the purpose of coercing performance when the contempt 

consists of the omission or refusal to perform an act that is yet in the person’s power 

to perform.” RCW 7.21.010(3) (emphasis added); In re Pers. Restraint of King, 110 

Wn.2d 793, 799-800, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988). Washington’s civil contempt statute 

outlines the court’s authority to impose remedial sanctions designed to coerce a 

contemnor into purging continuing contempt. RCW 7.21.030(2). Specifically, 

before imposing coercive sanctions under .030(2), the court must first find that “the 

[contemnor] has failed or refused to perform an act that is yet within the person’s 

power to perform.” Id. 

This prerequisite is limited to subsection (2). In contrast, subsection (3) of the 

civil contempt statute provides that “[t]he court may, in addition to the remedial 

sanctions set forth in subsection (2) of this section, order a person found in contempt 

of court to pay a party for any losses suffered by the party as a result of the contempt 

and any costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceeding, including 

reasonable attorney’s fees.” RCW 7.21.030(3) (emphasis added). Subsection (3), 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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by its plain terms, does not predicate the court’s authority to order compensatory 

relief on a finding of continuing contempt, nor does it state that an order must serve 

a coercive purpose.

We apply ordinary rules of statutory construction to decide whether a court’s 

authority to issue a compensatory order under subsection (3) against a contemnor is 

subject to subsection (2)’s restrictions on imposing remedial sanctions. We review 

questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Spokane County v. Dep’t of Fish & 

Wildlife, 192 Wn.2d 453, 457-58, 430 P.3d 655 (2018) (citing State v. Velasquez, 

176 Wn.2d 333, 336, 292 P.3d 92 (2013)). Our starting point in interpreting a statute 

is the statute’s plain language and ordinary meaning. Id. “When possible, we derive 

legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature, 

considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which 

the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” 

State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). “‘Statutes must be 

interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion 

rendered meaningless or superfluous.’” Spokane County, 192 Wn.2d at 458 (quoting 

Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996)). 

Further, “‘a reading that results in absurd results must be avoided because it will not 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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be presumed that the legislature intended absurd results.’” Id. (quoting State v. 

Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 733, 63 P.3d 792 (2003)).

The Department and the prosecutor argue that a finding of contempt under 

subsection (3) cannot be premised on past contempt. But, as the Department 

correctly acknowledges, the award of “losses” under RCW 7.21.030(3) is 

conditioned only upon a party being “found in contempt of court.” RCW 

7.21.010(1)—not RCW 7.21.030(2)—defines “contempt of court,” and the 

legislature expressly intended for that definition to apply throughout the entirety of 

chapter 7.21 RCW. See RCW 7.21.010. In contrast to RCW 7.21.010(1)’s broad 

contempt of court definition, the legislature inserted language into subsection (2) 

limiting that provision’s reach to continuing contempt, nothing more. See RCW 

7.21.030(2). The absence of similar limiting language in subsection (3) indicates 

the legislature intended the broader definition provided in RCW 7.21.010(1) to 

apply.

The Department argues subsection (2)’s narrower definition of contempt 

extends to subsection (3) through the operation of subsection (3)’s “in addition to” 

language, which states that “[t]he court may, in addition to the remedial sanctions 

set forth in subsection (2) of this section, order a person found in contempt of court 

to pay a party . . . .” RCW 7.21.030(3) (emphasis added). But this is an unnatural 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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reading. Despite the Department’s assertion that this “in addition to” language 

means the court may issue an order under subsection (3) only if it additionally 

imposes remedial sanctions under subsection (2), the phrase “in addition to” 

reasonably means the court can do more. Compare WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 24, 1606 (2002) (defining the prepositional phrase “in 

addition to” to mean “over and above”; “besides”); with OXFORD LEARNER’S

DICTIONARY, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/

addition #addition_idmg_1 (defining “in addition to” as an idiom “used when you 

want to mention another person or thing after something else”) 

[https://perma.cc/2PGZ-KJPU].

We acknowledge there may be multiple, reasonable meanings of this phrase. 

But when the language of a provision, the context of the statute in which the 

provision is found, and the statutory scheme as a whole are not conclusive as to 

legislative intent, we look to legislative history and other aids. Evans, 177 Wn.2d at 

192-93. “The court has frequently looked to final bill reports as part of an inquiry

into legislative history.” State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 594, 601, 925 P.2d 978 (1996)

(plurality opinion). Here, the final legislative report on Substitute House Bill 1983, 

which enacted chapter 7.21 RCW, states that “[t]he court may indemnify any person 

injured by a person’s contemptuous conduct.” FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 51st
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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Leg., at 139-40 (Wash. 1989). Though not dispositive, this report, like subsection 

(3), speaks broadly of the court’s authority to compensate or indemnify an injured 

person without any limiting language regarding the coercive effect of the order or 

continuing nature of the contemptuous conduct.

Adopting the Department’s contrary reading of subsection (3) would lead to 

untenable results, disallowing any remedy when an act of contempt is discontinued 

at the eleventh hour. Under this reading, any losses and costs a party suffered as a 

result of contemptuous conduct that is purged just before a finding of contempt is 

entered would be unrecoverable under this statute. This proposed result stands in 

stark contrast with subsection (3)’s broad language authorizing compensatory orders 

for any losses. Worse, under the Department’s proposed interpretation, even after a 

finding of contempt and the imposition of remedial sanctions under subsection (2), 

courts would still be powerless to order a contemnor to compensate a party for losses 

and costs incurred prior to the finding of contempt.

Such a stingy interpretation would undermine the very purpose of the 

statute—to encourage compliance with court orders—and would reward 

contumacious behavior by affording a class of contemnors safe harbor to violate 

court orders. Because subsection (3) does not require a finding of continuing 

contempt, the most reasonable interpretation of the legislature’s use of the phrases 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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“any losses” and “any costs” is that it encompasses those losses and costs incurred 

prior to a finding of contempt, including those incurred after a contemnor purges the 

contempt and thus renders coercive sanctions unavailable.

Contrary to the Department’s argument, this interpretation does not 

improperly blend the concepts of punitive and coercive contempt sanctions. It is 

true that we have repeatedly affirmed that civil contempt sanctions are coercive and 

criminal contempt sanctions are punitive. See In re King, 110 Wn.2d at 800 (stating 

that “[a] civil contempt sanction is coercive and remedial, and is typically for the 

benefit of another party; a criminal sanction is punitive and is imposed for the 

purpose of vindicating the authority of the court”). From this general statement, the 

Department asserts that a compensatory order that reaches any losses and costs 

incurred before a finding of contempt is, inherently, not coercive. But the 

Department errs by assuming that any contempt action that is not coercive must be 

punitive. As we have previously reasoned, “In determining whether a particular 

contempt sanction is civil or criminal, we look to the substance of the proceeding 

and the character of the relief that the proceeding will afford.” Id. at 799 (emphasis 

added). Though not necessarily coercive in nature, subsection (3) compensatory 

orders fulfill another recognized civil contempt function: compensation to the 

injured party. See id. at 800.
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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A key purpose underlying the past-punitive/continuing-coercive distinction in 

contempt actions is to ensure that courts afford criminal defendants proper due 

process protection when imposing criminal sanctions. Id. at 800 (citing State v. 

Boatman, 104 Wn.2d 44, 46-47, 700 P.2d 1152 (1985); State v. Browet, Inc., 103 

Wn.2d 215, 219, 691 P.2d 571 (1984)). However, such criminal due process 

concerns are not implicated by a compensatory award—a fact reflected in the 

legislature’s placement of this compensatory order authority within the civil 

contempt statute—and its omission from the criminal contempt statute. And though 

the Department argues that a compensatory order to pay losses incurred from a 

party’s contempt must be coercive if it is to be a permissible civil contempt action, 

both the title of the civil contempt statute (“Remedial sanctions—Payments for 

losses”) and the broad text of subsection (3) distinguish this compensatory order for 

payment of losses from other coercive, remedial sanctions. As shown, compensatory 

orders authorized under subsection (3) provide plaintiffs with relief that is distinct 

in both purpose and form from remedial sanctions authorized under subsection (2). 

It stands to reason that the legislature would craft distinct statutory requirements for 

awarding these distinct forms of relief.

The plain text of subsection (3)’s authorization is broad, allowing courts to 

order a contemnor to pay for any losses and costs, conditioned only on a finding of 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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contempt, not continuing contempt. Contrary to the Department and prosecutor’s 

assertions, interpreting subsection (3) to permit appropriate compensatory orders 

does not require inserting language into the statute; we rely on a straightforward 

application of the statute as written. See State v. Glas, 147 Wn.2d 410, 417, 54 P.3d 

147 (2002). Accordingly, we hold that a civil contempt motion is not moot simply 

because coercive, remedial sanctions are no longer available under subsection (2). 

A court may order compensatory relief under subsection (3) for specific losses 

suffered as a result of the contempt. The remaining question is whether Gronquist 

has shown entitlement to compensatory relief in this case.

3. Gronquist’s Contempt Motion Is Moot Because He Failed To Allege Any

Compensable Losses

In his contempt motion, Gronquist sought a number of remedies, including a 

request for an award of cost and attorney fees under RCW 7.21.030(3).3 Such an 

award is purely discretionary. RCW 7.21.030(3) (stating the court “may” order such 

an award). A party raising a claim for costs and attorney fees under subsection (3) 

must first allege some underlying contemptuous conduct and establish a violation of 

Washington’s civil contempt statute.

3 Following the trial court’s prospective invalidation of the injunction as to 

Gronquist and the Department’s lawful transfer of Gronquist’s remaining treatment files, 

his remaining remedies were effectively extinguished. 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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As explained, the superior court had discretion under RCW 7.21.030(3) to 

enter an order in favor of Gronquist for any compensable losses, even in the absence 

of continuing contempt. However, Gronquist did not allege any compensable losses 

suffered as a result of contempt; he sought only costs and fees incurred in bringing 

the contempt motion. Unlike the recovery of a party’s losses, an award of costs and 

attorney fees is intended to facilitate litigation on the merits: it does not provide a 

remedy for the alleged contempt itself.

Absent any actual compensable losses, further litigation to resolve whether 

the Department and the prosecutor were once in contempt becomes a purely 

academic question⸺the answer to which cannot afford Gronquist any “effective 

relief” from the alleged contempt. See Malkasian, 157 Wn.2d at 259 (requiring the 

availability of effective relief on a petitioner’s claim to bar dismissal of an action for 

mootness). Gronquist’s contempt motion is therefore moot, and permitting further 

litigation to determine only whether he is potentially entitled to a discretionary award 

of costs and fees is unnecessary.

CONCLUSION

Applying de novo review, we hold that a civil contempt motion is not 

necessarily moot when coercive sanctions are no longer available under RCW 

7.21.030(2). The court has discretion to enter a compensatory order for losses and 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 97277-0 

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costs under RCW 7.21.030(3). Nonetheless, Gronquist’s motion is moot because he 

suffered no compensable losses due to contempt, and his claim for attorney fees and 

costs in bringing a contempt motion cannot provide effective relief from the 

Department’s alleged contempt. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and 

reinstate the trial court’s dismissal of Gronquist’s contempt motion as moot. 

Johnson, J.

Madsen, J.

Owens, J.

Chun, J.P.T.

Stephens, C. J.

Owens, J.

Chun, J.P.T.
1 

No. 97277-0

GONZÁLEZ,J. (concurring)— I concur with much in the majority opinion, 

and I concur in result. I write separately to emphasize that RCW 7.21.030 does not 

create a stand-alone cause of action for damages. A judge must find contempt 

before making a compensatory award for that contempt. RCW 7.21.030(2), (3). 

The decision of whether to hold a party in contempt rests in the sound discretion of 

the judge given the circumstances of the case. See In re Pers. Restraint of King, 

110 Wn.2d 793, 798, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988) (citing Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wn.2d 

626, 630, 585 P.2d 130 (1978)). 

I also write to emphasize that whether to grant or dissolve an injunction also 

lies within the sound discretion of the judge. Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., Council 

28 v. State, 99 Wn.2d 878, 887, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983) (citing Alderwood Assocs. v. 

Wash. Envtl. Council, 96 Wn.2d 230, 233, 635 P.2d 108 (1981)). In this case, and 

before considering Gronquist’s contempt motion for an alleged violation of the 

injunction, the trial court prospectively invalidated the injunction as it applied to 

Gronquist and gave Gronquist an opportunity to challenge that decision. For 

various reasons, no challenge was perfected, and the merits of the decision to 

vacate the injunction are not before us. 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 97277-0 (González, J., concurring)

2 

After a suitable opportunity to challenge the decision to vacate the 

injunction, the trial court dismissed the contempt motion as moot and did not 

award any compensation or attorney fees. Unfortunately, the parties elected not to 

designate the transcript of that hearing on review, despite the fact the trial judge 

incorporated the oral ruling as part of the summary judgment order. CP at 741-42. 

Given that, it may well be the court dismissed the case merely on mootness 

grounds, in which case de novo review is appropriate. But if the court merely 

dismissed this case on mootness grounds, there would have been little cause to 

incorporate the oral ruling. 

Regardless, in this case, the only damages alleged were attorney fees. 

Attorney fees might well be within the sound discretion of the court had they been 

accrued to enforce an injunction. But given that the 1993 injunction had been 

vacated as to Gronquist at the time the contempt motion was heard, and given that 

Gronquist articulated no compensable losses for the prior violations of the 

injunction other than attorney fees, I agree with the majority that the trial judge did 

not err in dismissing this case on summary judgment. 
Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 97277-0 (González, J., concurring)

3

 ____________________________ 

Wiggins, J.P.T.

Montoya-Lewis, J.

Yu, J.

González, J.