The “Grievance Resolution Procedure” established by the DuPage County Corrections Bureau
states that, after filing a grievance, if “the inmate is dissatisfied with the resolution of his/her grievance,
he/she may, within five working days of receipt of written notice of the resolution of his/her grievance,
appeal in writing to the Chief.” (Def. Ex. A at 40). In his Complaint, however, Plaintiff indicates that
he believes there to be “no formal appeal process”. (PI. Compl at III, C, 3). Asa result, Plaintiffhas not
alleged that he exercised his right to appeal. Additionally, none of the allegations in the Complaint
permit an inference that Sippos appealed or otherwise exhausted all available administrative remedies.
As such, Plaintiff's claim is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Sippos’ claim is granted, and the

case is dismissed without prejudice.

Dated: Rasuud 2007-
‘

OHM W. DARRAH
United States District Judge


eet Mii Geter Form (06/97)

C70 United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
fami ssign Sitting Jud
OX scsi John W. Darrah stn ie
CASE NUMBER 01 C7747 DATE 8/8/2002
CASE ROBERT S, SIPPOS vs. JOHN ZARUBA
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (6) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer briefto motion due___. Reply to answer brief due

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon___—_sset fora

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—ssetfor____at

(6) QO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] {set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor_ = at_
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on___—sat__—

(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to __at

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) (OC GeneralRule21 OOFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) +«<f [Other docket entry] Status hearing held. Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. Defendant’s
motion to dismiss Sippos’ claim is granted, and the case is dismissed without prejudice.

(il) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's staff,

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. Lune9 19

“

NIN

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
LG deputy’s
initiais

 “patesiiie received.in
central Clerk’s Office

railing deputy initials



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT S. SIPPOS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) No. 01 C 7747
JOHN ZARUBA, DuPAGE COUNTY >)
SHERIFF, DuPAGE COUNTY BOARD OF ) Judge John W. Darrah
COMMISSIONERS, et. al. ) aa
) qocvet
Defendants. ) 1002.

9
AUG
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Robert S. Sippos (“Sippos”), filed suit against multiple defendants, including the
DuPage County Board of Commissioners (“Commissioners”), DuPage County Sheriff John Zaruba
(“Zaruba”), and others, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently before the Court is
Defendant Zaruba’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies as Required by
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court reviews all facts alleged in the complaint and any
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Marshall-Mosby
v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 2000). Dismissal is warranted only if the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claims that would entitle it to relief. See Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

Areading of the Complaint supports the following summary of the alleged conduct of the parties.

On May 15, 2001, Sippos was taken into custody and incarcerated at the DuPage County Jail.
At that time, Sippos was being treated for an auto-immune disease known as myastenia gravis and

received 180 milligrams of the drug Mestinon per day, administered in three 60 milligram doses.


Plaintiff also received Prevacid twice each day for stomach problems, 20 milligrams of Lotensin for
blood pressure, and additional medication for gout.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff has alleged a variety of instances in which prison officials have failed
to properly administer the correct dosage of the necessary medication. During the period between
May 15, 2001 and the filing of the instant suit, Plaintiff alleges that he has filed “over thirty grievances
in regards to lack of, and/or improper administering of, medication.” Additionally, on August 9, 2001,
Plaintiff went to the DuPage County court, where Judge Dwyer entered a court order to insure that prison
officials properly administered Sippos’ medication. Since that date, Sippos alleges that prison officials
have violated the court order at least four times. In the instant suit, Plaintiff seeks compensation for:
partial loss of vision in his right eye; total loss of use of his right eye between June 12, 2001 and June
30, 2001; loss of use of his jaw from July 10, 2001 to the present; and associated punitive damages for
“indifference, negligence, and malpractice”.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), “[n]Jo action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” To exhaust
administrative remedies, a person must follow all rules governing filing and prosecution ofa claim. Pozo
v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (Pozo). In Pozo, the Seventh Circuit held that:
“Unless the prisoner completes the administrative process by following the rules the state has established
for that process, exhaustion has not occurred... A prisoner who does not properly take each step within
the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies, and thus is foreclosed by § 1977e(a) from
litigating. Failure to do what the state requires bars, and does not just postpone, suit under § 1983.”

Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023-1024.