I n t he reco rd, t he p et i t i o ner’ s nam e i s al so spell ed “ Jaso n Sett l e. ” H o wever, we wi l l ut i l i ze t he spel l i ng 1

c o n ta ine d in h is p o st-co n v ic tio n p e tit io n
. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d onBr ie fs Augus t 5, 200 8
JASON SETT LES v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty Nos. 03-00225; 03- 08307; 04-01478 Car olyn Wad e Blackett , Judge

No. W2008-00370-C CA-R3-PC - Filed April 15, 2009

Th e pe tit ion e r, Jaso n Se ttl e s, ple d guil ty in t he She lby Cou nty Cr imi na l Co ur

t to atte mpt e d f

ir st 1 degree murder, a g g ravated burg lary , ag gravated robbe ry , and two counts of aggravated assault. He
re ce i ved a total e ffe ctive sente nce of 13.5 year s in the Tennesse e De partment of Corr ection. Subsequently , he filed a pet i t i o n fo r post-convic tion relief whic h the post-conviction cour t summarily dismiss ed for failure to state a c laim upon which post-conviction re lief could be grante d. Af te r t he pe tit ion

wa s d ism iss e d, the pe tit ion e r f ile d a “ Mo tio n f

or Re c on sid e ra

tio n to Re -O pe n Po st Conviction P etition.” T he post-convic tion court denied the motion. On appeal, the pe titioner
c ha lle ng e s th e dis mis sa l of bo th h is o ri g ina l pe tit ion and his mot ion

to a men d or reop en his po stconviction petition. Upon our re view of the rec ord and the parties’ briefs, w e af firm the judg ment of the post-c onviction court. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt is Affi rm ed.
N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and D. KEL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J J ., joined.

J ason Settles, Whit eville, Tenne ssee, Pro se.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Rep o r t e r ; D a v i d H. F ind le y , A ssi sta

nt Atto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L

. G ib b o n s , D is tric t Att o r n e y G e n e r a l; an d

T r a c ye N

. Jo n e s , A s s is ta nt D is tric t Att orney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr oundT hi s p et i t i o n has t wo s t am p ed f i l e d at es: O ct o b er 12 , 20 0 7 , and O ct o b er 22 , 20 0 7

. T here i s no t hi ng i n t he 2

rec o rd t o ex p l ain w hy t he re a re two f i l i ng d ates.

T he p et i t i o ner’ s co m p l ai nt s regardi ng t he d i smi ss al of hi s o ri gi nal pe t i t i o n and hi s m o t i o n t o reop en were 3

c o n so lid a te d o n a p p e a l.
-2- In November

2002, the Shelby

County Gra nd J ury returne d an indictm en t ch ar g ing the pe tit ion e r w ithon e c ount of atte mpt e d fi rs t de gre e mur de r a nd on e c ount o f a g gra

vate d a ssa

ult , b oth of which wer e committed on J uly 17, 2002. In November 2003, the petitioner wa s indicted on two counts of ag g ravated robbe ry committed on August 16, 2002. In J anuar y 2004, the petitioner wa s indicted on ag g ravated burg lary and aggravated assault committed on Marc h 23, 2000. There afte r, on Fe bruar

y 6, 2006, the appe llant enter ed guilty pleas to attempted f irst degree murder, a g gravated burg lary , ag g ravated robber y , and two counts of ag gravated assault. The plea a gree ment provided that the petitioner’s total e ffe ctive sente nce w as 13.5 year s and that the total f ine imposed was $700.
On J anuary

31, 2007, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction re lief, alleg ing that his c onvic tio n f

or the Marc h 23, 20 00 a g gra vate d ass a

ult vio late d dou

ble je op ard

y , th at th e juv e nil e c ourt ha d n o jurisd ic tio n to tr ans fe r the c onte ste d a g gra vate d a ssa ult c onvic tio n to the She lby

County Criminal Court, that his guilty plea on that of

fense was unknowing ly

and involuntarily

enter ed beca use he w as unaw are that the conviction violated double je opardy and that the trial cour t had no jurisdiction over that crime, and that the sentenc es imposed violated statutory provisions mandating
consec utive sentenc ing. O n September 21, 2007, the post-conviction cour t e ntere d an orde r finding that the petitioner fa iled to state a c laim upo n wh i ch post -convic tion relief c ould be grante d and dismiss ed the pe tition.
On Oc tob e r 12, 20 07 , the pe tit ion e r f ile d a “ Mo tio n f

or Re c on sid e ratio n to Re -O pe n Po st 2 Convic tio n Pe tit ion ,” in whic h h e a sk e d th e po st- c onvic tio n c ourt to r e c on sid e r t

he dis mis sa l of

his orig inal petition and allow him to reopen his petition so that he could amend his issues to include ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, additional alleg ations reg ardingthe knowing and voluntary nature of his plea, a

challeng e to his competenc y to plead guilty , the def

ectivene ss of the indictment, and a violation of the plea

barg ain by

the State.
On Oc tob e r 2 2, 20 07 , th e pe tit ion e r f ile d in the po st- c onvic tio n c ourt a no tic e of a pp e a l, challeng ing the court’s dismiss al of his petition for post-conviction re lief. On De cembe r 17, 2007, the po st- c onvic tio n co ur

t ent e re d an or de r, fi nd ingthat th e pe tit ion e r f a ile d to me e t th e re qu ir e me nts for r eopening h i s post-conviction petition. On Dec ember 26, 2007, the petitioner filed a second notice of a

ppeal, c halleng ing the denial of his motion to reopen his post-convic tion petition. 3

II. Ana lys is

Initially , we note that “[r]elief under [ the P ost-Conviction Procedur e Ac t] shall be grante d when the c onviction or sen t en ce i s void or voidable be cause of the a bridg ment of any

right guara nteed by the Constitut ion of Tenne ssee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103 ( 2006). To obtain re l i ef, the petition for post-conviction re lief must be filed-3-

within one year of the date of the final action in the case
. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102(a ) (2006) ; see a lso Williams v. S tate, 44 S.W.3d 464, 468 (Tenn. 2001). The petition mustcontain “a clea r and specific statement of all g rounds upon which re lief is soug ht, including f ull disclosure of the f

actua l basis of those grounds.” Te nn.Code Ann. § 40-30- 106(d) ( 2006).
On c e a pe tit ion is t ime ly fi le d, the tr ia l c ourt

mus t de te rm ine wh e the r the pe tit ion a sse rt s a c olo ra ble c la im fo r pos t- c onvic tio n re lie f. Sup re me Court Rul e 28 § 2 (h ) d e fi ne s a

c olo ra ble c la im as “a claim that, if t ak en as t ru e, in t he light most favorable to the petitioner, would entitle the petitioner to relief

under the Post-Convi ction Procedur e Ac t.” I f the fa cts alleg ed in the petition, taken a s true, fa il to st ate a colora ble claim, then summary dismiss al is appropriate. State v. Ar nold, 14 3 S. W.3 d 7 84 , ( Te nn . 2 00 4) . Wh e the r a po st- c onvic tio n p eti ti on

wa s p ro pe rl y

dis mis se d is a question of law that this court review s de novo. State v. B urnett, 92 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tenn. 2002).

In the instan t case , the post-conviction cour t examined each of

the claims ra ised by

the pe tit ion e r. We w il l addre ss e a c h o f t he se iss ue s in

tur n. Th e pe tit ion e r’ s f

ir st c la im w a s th at hi s c onvic tio n f

or the Marc h 2 3, 20 00 a g gra vate d a ssa

ult vio lated do ub le je op ard

y . In s up po rt

of his
c la im, the pe tit ion e r s a id t hat hi s f ir st c onvic tio n f

or a g gra vate d ass a

ult wa s lat e r he ld voi d a

b in iti o beca use the c ourt discover ed that the petitioner was sevente en year s old a t the time of the off

ense. The petitioner argued that further prosec ution on the same charg e viola t edt h e constitutional protec tions ag ainst double jeopar dy

. The double jeopar dy

clause s of th e Un i t ed States and Tenne ssee Constitutions protec t an acc used from: (1) a second pr osecution followingan ac quittal; (2) a sec ond prosec ution following conviction; and (3) multipl e punishments f or the same offe nse. State v. Denton , 938 S.W .2d 373, 37 8 ( Te nn .1 99 6) . H ow e ve r, the do ub le je op ard y c la us e s d o n ot b ar re tr ia l in

c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc e s, such as whe n an “origina l conviction is deemed void be cause o f s o m e funda mental def

ect in the jurisdiction of the ca se.” Grant C. Ivey v. State, No. 01C 01-9801-CC-00052, 1999 W L228271, at *2 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. at N a shvil le , Apr . 2 0, 19 99 ). In o the r w or ds , whe n a c onvic tio n is fo un d to be void ab initio, it “thus, in effe ct, neve r existed,” and, ther efor e, ther e is no constitutional barrier to s ub se qu e nt p ro se c uti on . St ate v. Campb e ll, 64 1 S.W. 2d 89 0, 89 3 (T e nn
. 19 82 ). Re g ard le ss, thi s court ha s previously

held that raising double jeopar dy in a post-conviction action whe n a petitioner has “f ail[ed] to prese nt such a claim for deter mination in any

proce edingbefor e a c ourt of compe tent jurisdi c ti o nin

wh ic hth e c la im

c o u ld h av e b e e np r e s e nte d

w a iv e s th e c la im

f o r p o s t- c o nv iction purposes.” Sean Ea

rl J ones v. State, No. M2006-00664- CCA-R3-PC, 2007 W L1174899, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Apr. 20, 2007) , perm. to appeal denied, (Te nn. 2007); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 106(g) ( stating that generally “[a] ground for relief is waived if the pe titioner personally or through an attorney failed to prese nt it for determination in any procee ding before a court of c ompetent jurisdiction in which the ground c ould have be en pre sented” ). There fore , the petitioner is not be entitled to post-conviction re lief upon this gr ound.
As his se c on d issu e , the pe tit ion e r co nte nd e d th at th e juv e nil e c ourt did no t ha ve a uth or ity purs ua nt to Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 3 7- 1- 13 4( a )( 1) to t ra ns fe r h is c a se to c ri min a l c ourt , and that, ther efor e, the c riminal court did not have authority to c onvict or sentenc e him for the Ma rchT enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 37

- 1

- 1 3 4 (a)( 1 ) provides t hat a chi l d ’ s case s hal l be dis p o sed as i f t he 4

c h ild w e re a n a d u lt if:

( 1) T he chi l d was s i xt een ( 16 ) y ear s or mo r e of ag e a t t he t i me of

t he al l ege d conduct , or t he chi l d was l es s t han s i xt een ( 16 ) y ear s of ag e i f s uch ch i l d was cha r ged wi t h t he of

f ens e of f i r s t degr ee murder , s econd degr ee murder , r ape, agg r ava t ed r ape, r ape of a c hi l d, ag gr ava t ed r ob bery , es peci al l y ag gr ava t ed rob b ery , ki d nap p i ng, aggravat ed ki d nap p i ng or espec i al l y aggravat ed ki d nap p i ng o r a n a ttem p t t o c o m m it a n y su c h o ff e n se s. . .
.

-4- 2 3 , 2 0 0 0 a g g r av ate d

a s s a u lt

. O na p p e a l, th e St ate ar gu e s th at wh il e T e nn e s s e e Co d e A nnotated
se c tio n 3 7- 1- 13 4( a )( 1) pr ov ide s th at a juv e nil e un de r s ixte e n ye ars of age may be tr ans fe rr e d to
c ri min a l c ourt

fo r o nly c e rt a in c ri me s, “ the re is no su c h pr oh ibi tio n whe n th e de fe nd ant, a s in thi s case , is 17 y ear s of ag e.” 4
We note that if a c ourt lacks jurisdi ction to convict or se ntence a def endant, the c onviction or sentenc e is void a

nd is the ref

ore properly the subject of a post-conviction or ha

beas c orpus ac tion. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103 ( 2006); Stephenson v. Carlton , 28 S.W .3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000)

. Howeve r, our r eview of

the issu e reveals that the petitioner ha s misconstrued Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 37-1-134( a)( 1). As the State notes, the statute provides that the c ase of a minor sh a ll b e dis po se d li ke that of an a du lt i f “ [t]he c hil d w a s si xtee n ( 16 ) y e ars or mor e of a g e at th e tim e of the a lle g e d c on du c t, o r t

he c hil d w a s le ss tha

n sixte e n (1 6) ye ars of

a g e ” and c omm itt e d c e rt a in
enumer ated of

fense s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-134(a )(1) (empha sis a dded). By the petitioner’s own admission, he was seve nteen year s old at t he ti me of the aggravated assault; t here fore , he does not fall under the part o f t h e statute which re quires the of fense s to be one of c erta in offense s befor e a tr ans fe r m ay

be a uth or ize d. I d. Ins te a d, the pe tit ion e r’ s a g e at the tim e of the of fe ns e pe rm itt e d h is
case to be prope rly

transfe rre d to criminal court. The ref ore, e ven in the light most favorable to the petitioner, this gr ound is not a colorable claim for post-c onviction relief.
Th e pe tit ion e r a lso a lle g e d th at hi s p le a of guil ty to t he Ma rc h 23, 20 00 a g gra

vate d a ssa

ult was not knowing ly

or voluntarily

enter ed bec ause he was una war e that t h e co nviction violated double jeopar dy

or that the juvenile c ourt there fore lacke d jurisdiction to transfer the case to the
c ri min a l c ourt . T he po st- c onvic tio n c ourt state d that the pe tit ion e r “ fa ile d to su pp ly the Cou rt wi th a fa ctual basis for

his bare a ssertion that his guilty plea was n o t kn o wingand voluntary” and the re fo re fo un d th at is su e to b e su bje c t to dis mis sa l.
Our re view re veals that the pe titioner did supply a fa ctual basis for his claim that his plea was not knowingly

and voluntarily

enter ed; he ba sically

argued that his first two issues rende red his plea
unkn ow ingand

inv olu nta ry . A s w e have no te d, the re is no me ri t to the pe tit ion e r’ s f ir st two iss ue s. Erg o, even in the light most favorable to the petitioner, there is no basis warr antingpost-conviction relief for his complaint that his guilty plea wa s not knowingly and voluntarily

enter ed. The ref

ore, the post-conviction cour

t properly found that this issue was subject to dismissal.T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n 4 0 -3 0 -1 1 7 (a ) (2 0 0 6 ) p ro v id e s tha t a p e tit io n e r m a y fi le a m o tio n to 5

re o p e n the fi rs t p o st-co n v ic tio n p e tit io n o n ly i f:

(1) T he cl ai m i n t he m o t i o n i s b ased up o n a f i nal rul i ng of an ap p el l at e co urt
e s t a bl i s h i n g a c on s t i t u t i on a l r i g h t t h a t w a s n ot r e c og n i z e d a s e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i me of t r i al , i f r et r os pec t i v e appl i ca t i on of t h at r i g h t i s r equ i r ed

. . . ; or

-5- As the final issue in his orig inal post-conviction petition, the petitioner cla ims that he was on probation for

t h e Marc h 23, 2000 ag gravated assault whe n he wa s charg ed with his remaining offe nses. There fore , he argues that the concur rent sentenc ing imposed by the trial cour

t was illeg al as it was in direc t contrave ntion of Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-35-115(b)( 6) and Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Cr imi na l P roce dure 32 (c )( 3) (C ), wh ic h th e pe tit ion e r c onte nd s ma nd ate consec utive sentenc ing. The post-conviction cour t found that, contra

ry to the petitioner’s a ssertion, T en n es s ee C o d e A nn o t at eds ec t i o n4 0 -3 5 -1 1 5 (b ) pr o v i d es fo r di s cr et i o n ary co n s ec ut i v e s en t en ci n g; there fore , the petitioner’s se ntence s were not imposed in dir ect contravention of a statute. We agree wi th t he po st- c onvic tio n c ourt . T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 pr ov ide s: (b) The c o urt m ay

o r d e r s e nte n c e s to r

unc o n s e c uti v e ly

if th e court fi nd s b y a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that:

. . . . (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse committed wh i le on probation. . . .
There fore , the post-convi ct i o n court c orre ctly stated that, ac cordingto the statute, consec utive
se nte nc ingis d isc re tio na

ry , n ot m and ator

y . A dd iti on a lly , th e pe tit ion e r’ s c onvic tio ns do no t f a ll under a ny of the provisions for ma

ndatory consec utive sentenc ing se t f orth in Rule 32(c) (3) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure. Acc ording ly , the post-conviction court corr ectly found that the pe tit ion e r a g a in fa ile d to s tate a c la im u po n whic h p os t- c onvic tio n r e lie f c ou ld b e gra nte d. Thus , the post-conviction cour

t properly dismiss ed the pe titioner’s post-conviction petition.
After the pos t-conviction court dismiss ed the orig inal petition, the petitioner filed a “Motion for Rec onsideration to Re-Ope n Post C on v i ct i o nPetition.” W hile the motion was pending , the petitioner filed in the post-conviction cour t a notice of

appea l, challeng ing the court’s dismissal of his pe tit ion

fo r p os t- c onvic tio n r e lie f. It is we ll- se ttl e d th at, u nle ss t he mot ion

is o ne of

tho se specifie d in Rule 4 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Procedur e, “[t] he jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appea ls attache s upon t h e fi l i n g of the notice of appe al and, ther efor e, the tria l court loses jurisdiction.” State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (T enn. 1996). To that end, “[o]nce the trial cour

t loses jurisdiction, it g ener ally has no power to a mend its judgment.” I d. There fore , once the petitioner filed his notice of appea l, the pos t-conviction court lost jurisdiction to rule upon the petitioner’s motion to rec onsider or reope n the petition. Reg ardle ss, as the post-convic tion court found, the pe titioner cited no ground upon which his post-convic tion petition could be reope ned. 5(2) T he cl ai m i n t he m o t i o n i s b ased up o n new sci ent i f i c evi d ence est ab l i shi ng t hat s uch p et i t i o ner i s act ual l y i nno cent of t he o f f ense or off

enses f o r whi ch t he pet i t i on er w as c on v i ct ed; or ( 3) T he cl ai m as s er t ed i n t he mo t i on s eek s r el i ef f r om a s ent enc e t hat was e n h a n c e d b e c a u se o f a p re v io u s c o n v ic tio n a n d su c h c o n v ic tio n in the c a se in whi ch t he cl ai m i s ass ert ed was not a gui l t y plea wi t h an agreed sent ence, and t he p revi o us co nvi ct i o n has subseq uent l y be en hel d t o be i nval i d

. . . ; and ( 4) I t appear s t hatt he f act s un derl y i ng t he cl ai m, i f t r ue, woul d es t abl i s h by cl ear and c onvi nci ng ev i dence t hat t he pet i t i oner i s en t i t l ed t o hav e t he convi ct i on s et
as i de or t h e s en t en ce r edu ce d.
-6- III. Conclusi on
Ba sed upon the for eg oing, w e af firm the judgment of the post-c onviction court.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGL E, J UDGE