Caroselli has filed a two count complaint against Allstate, alleging a violation of The
Americans with Disabilities Act (the ““ADA”) and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Allstate has moved for summary judgment on both counts.

DISCUSSION

IL Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering such a motion, the court accepts as true the
evidence set forth by the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
party opposing the motion. Associated Milk Producers, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, 27 F.3d
268, 270 (7th Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating an absence of
evidence to support the position of the nonmoving party. Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42
F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). In making its determination, the court does not make credibility
determinations or weigh evidence, but only determines “whether there is any material dispute of
fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. American Hoescht Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.
1994). A genuine dispute about a material fact exists only if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

i. Caroselli Is Not Disabled Within the Meaning of the ADA

The ADA prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual

with a disability because of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual with a



Caroselli does not dispute that in August 2000, Allstate informed her that because of the
growth in its business and the corresponding increase in the demands on the Glenbrook Channel
group that Caroselli as the Channel Manager would need to work a full Monday through Friday
workweek. However, Caroselli responded that she was not able to work a full workweek and
that she needed to maintain a Tuesday through Thursday work schedule. However, a part-time
schedule is not a reasonable accommodation for a full-time job. DeVito, 270 F.3d at 533.

The undisputed evidence shows that Allstate determined that, as a result of the increase in
the volume of work and client demands, a Channel Manager is required to work a full-time
schedule. Caroselli does not dispute that all of the Channel Managers reporting to Caroselli’s
supervisor work a full-time schedule. Caroselli’s insistence that she is unable to work a full
workweek Monday through Friday demonstrates that she is not able to perform an essential job
function of a Channel Manager, and Allstate is not required to accommodate a part-time schedule
for a full-time job. Thus, Caroselli cannot establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination. Finally, because Caroselli is not able to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, her harassment claim based on her alleged disability and her reasonable
accommodation claim necessarily fail.

IV. The Illinois Human Rights Act Preempts Caroselli’s State Tort Claim

Count II of Caroselli’s complaint alleges the state law tort action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Allstate argues that Count Il is preempted by the Illinois Human Rights
Act (“IHRA”), 775 ILCS 5/1-101, et seq., because it is “inextricably linked” to a claim for a civil

tights violations under the IHRA.



resulting from the impairment. Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 n. 3 (7th
Cir. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(G)(2)). Caroselli claims that she is substantially limited in
one or more major life activities, including working, sleeping, standing and certain household
chores, and that she is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner and duration in which
she can work because she can only work three days a week.

Although Caroselli’s fibromyalgia may restrict certain of her life activities, merely having
some limitations does not make her disabled under the ADA. An inability to perform a particular
job for a particular employer does not establish a substantial limitation on the ability to work.
Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 514 (7th Cir, 1998). Rather, the impairment must
substantially limit employment generally. Jd.

In Toyota Motor Mfg. Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), the Supreme
Court held that, when evaluating whether a plaintiff is restricted in performing the major life
activity of performing manual tasks, the central inquiry is whether the individual is unable to
perform the variety of tasks central to most people’s daily lives, and not whether the individual is
unable to perform the tasks associated with a specific job, 535 U.S. at 200-01. The Court noted
that household chores, bathing and brushing one’s teeth are among the functions of daily life that
are of central importance to an individual. /d. at 201. In Williams, the Court ultimately
concluded that although the plaintiffs condition caused her to avoid sweeping, quit dancing,
occasionally seek help dressing and reduced the amount of time she was able to play with her
children, garden and drive long distances, she was not substantially limited in the activities

central to most people’s daily lives. Jd. at 202.



disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position...” /d. at § 12111(8). Further, a
“disability” means “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual.” Jd. at § 12102(2)(A). Caroselli argues that she suffers
from a physical impairment, fibromyalgia, which substantially limits one or more major life
activities and that she has a record of such impairment. Allstate concedes that Caroselli has a
physical impairment but disputes that she is substantially limited in her major life activities or
that she has a record of such a disability.

To invoke the protection of the ADA, Caroselli must show that: (1) she has a disability as
defined by the ADA; (2) she was performing her job satisfactorily; (3) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside her protected class were treated
more favorably. Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2001); Moore v. J.B.
Hunt Transp., Inc., 22) F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir.2000). The ADA defines “disability” in three
ways: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individual’s
major life activities; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

To demonstrate that she is substantially limited in a major life activity, Caroselli must
establish that she is unable to perform specific major life activities that an average person can
perform or that she is significantly restricted in her ability to perform such major life activities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). The analysis for determining whether an individual’s impairment
substantially limits a major life activity has three facets: (1) the nature and severity of the

impairment; (2) the duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long-term impact



substantially limited in any major life activities, including, among others, working and caring for
herself and her family, and she is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Because
Caroselli is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, she does not have a record of such a
disability. Thus, Caroselli cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

QI.  Caroselli Is Not Qualified for the Channel Manager Position

Even if Caroselli suffered from a qualifying disability, she nevertheless cannot prevail on
her ADA claim because the undisputed facts demonstrate that she has declined to perform the
essential functions of the Channel Manager position with or without a reasonable
accommodation. Caroselli argues that she is qualified for the Channel Manager position because
she performed its functions for two years. However, Caroselli was a Senior Marketing Manager
for two years and not a Channel Manager. In July 2000, Allstate reorganized and the Senior
Marketing Manager was assigned to a distribution channel and became a Channel Manager.
Caroselli overlooks the undisputed evidence that after the reorganization her job duties and
responsibilities changed and that there was a increase in demand for marketing support which
required a Channel Manager to be available Monday through Friday.

An employer is not required to modify, reduce or reallocate the essential functions of a
job to accommodate an employee. Emerson v. Northern States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 514
(7th Cir. 2001). A full-time schedule can be an essential job function. DeVito v. Chicago Park
District, 270 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2001). A district court will not otherwise second guess an
employer’s judgment in describing the essential functions of a job. DePaoli v. Abbott

Laboratories, 140 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 1998).



Minute: Qrder Form (06/97) v cTM
YW United States District Court, Northern District of Hlinois
Name of Assigned Judge Wayne R. Andersen Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 1C 6834 DATE 2/20/2004
CASE Corinne Cesario Caroselli vs. Allstate Insurance Company
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing (he motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im Brief in support of motion due

eB) a Answer brief to motion due____. Reply to answer brief due,

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon___—_ssetfor___—_att

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___——ssetfor_—at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] {set for/re-set for}on____——ssetfor__—s at
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on saat

(8) oO (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

CFRCP4(m) Local Rule 41.1 CUFRCP41(a)(1) [1 FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Wi [Otherdocket entry] Enter MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: Allstate’s motion for
summary judgment is granted, terminating the case. All pending motions are deemed moot by this
Memorandum, Opinion and Order. This is a final and appealable order.

(11) a [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. FFB 2 3 2004
V_ | Docketing to mail notices.

¥_ | Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice
courtroom

TS, deputy’s
initials —- .
Date/time received in.» ‘!.'*
central Clerk’s Office rraling deputy initials



CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Allstate’s motion for summary judgment is granted,
terminating the case. All pending motions are deemed moot by this Memorandum Opinion and
Order. This is a final and appealable order.
It is so ordered,

e- CAL

Wayne R. Andersen

United States District Judge
Dated: Dhrusey G0, 2004

11



The IHRA preempts state tort claims that are “inextricably linked” to a civil rights
violation within the meaning of that statute. Krocka v, City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th
Cir. 2000). Thus, if a state common law claim is in essence one that seeks redress for a “civil
rights violation” as defined by the IHRA, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. Jd.
A “civil rights violation” occurs when an employee is terminated on the basis of “unlawful
discrimination.” 775 ILCS 5/2-102. “Unlawful discrimination,” in turn, includes
“discrimination against a person because of his or her ... handicap.” 775 ILCS 5/1-103. The test
to determine whether a claim is subject to IHRA preemption was clarified by Maksimovic v.
Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). The pivotal question is “whether the tort claim is
inextricably linked to a civil rights violation such that there is no independent basis for the
action.” Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d at 23.

In this case, we find that Caroselli’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is
“inextricably linked” to her employment discrimination claim. The factual allegations set forth
in the discrimination claim are re-alleged and incorporated by reference as the facts and alleged
conduct of Allstate which support Caroselli’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, Without considering Allstate’s alleged discriminatory conduct, Caroselli has not stated
an independent basis for imposing liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus,
we conclude that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is inextricably linked to

Caroselli’s discrimination claim, and the claim is preempted by the IHRA.

10



This Court does not discount that the evidence shows that fibromyalgia has affected
Caroselli’s life and that she has had to make some adjustments to cope with her condition.
However, this falls short of establishing that she is significantly restricted in performing major
life activities. The record shows that Caroselli is able to perform the functions of daily life that
are central to most people’s lives. She can get herself and her daughter ready in the mornings
and can perform the normal morning tasks without assistance. Caroselli also is able to perform
various household tasks to care for herself and her family, and she can perform these tasks with
minimal assistance. She also is able to attend exercise classes. The adverse effects of her
fibromyalgia are not of the nature or level of severity that impose significant restrictions on
Caroselli’s ability to care for herself and her family as compared to an average individual in the
general population.

In addition, Caroselli has not produced any evidence to show that her impairment
substantially limits her ability to work. Indeed, Caroselli does not dispute that she is able to work
three days a week, and she admits that she has not investigated whether any jobs are available
outside of Allstate that she could perform working three days a week. Just because Caroselli
may be precluded from performing the job of Channel Manager at Allstate does not mean that
Caroselli cannot perform many other jobs either within Allstate or for another employer. “It is
not enough for the plaintiff to show that her impairment prevented her from performing one
narrow job for one employer.” Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.
1998).

Based on the undisputed facts and viewing the record most favorably to Caroselli, it is the

conclusion of this Court that, although she suffers from fibromyalgia, Caroselli is not



products. As a result, Allstate reorganized, and the Senior Marketing Manager was assigned to a
distribution channel and became a Channel Manager. After the reorganization, Caroselli’s job
duties changed and her responsibilities increased dramatically. As a result of the increase in
demand for marketing support, Allstate determined that a Channel Manager must be available
Monday through Friday.

In August 2000, Caroselli’s supervisor advised Caroselli that because of the growth
in business and the corresponding increase in demands for the Glenbrook Channel group she
would have to work a full time schedule. Caroselli, however, responded that because of her
fibromyalgia she could only work three days a week and only Tuesday through Thursday.
As an alternative, Caroselli suggested that Allstate hire a “qualified assistant” to help her
with projects. However, Caroselli’s supervisor did not think this alternative solution would
work because it still would mean that Caroselli, as the person ultimately responsible for the
production and delivery of the marketing materials and support, would not be available for
two days of the week.

From the middle of September 2000 through the middle of October, Caroselli was out
of the office on medical leave. When she returned, Caroselli learned that she would be
reporting to Maribeth Barrett. In November 2000, Maribeth Barrett was hired to take over
Caroselli’s position as Channel Manager for the Glenbrook Channel. Caroselli, however,
retained her job title and benefits as Senior Marketing Manager, and a majority of her duties
and responsibilities remained the same. In February 2001, Caroselli began another medical

leave of absence. On July 21, 2003, Allstate discharged Caroselli.


her hair and makeup, without any assistance. She also helps her daughter get ready for
school and walks her daughter to the bus stop each morning.

Caroselli regularly performs household chores such as making beds, rinsing and
stacking dishes in the dishwasher, straightening up around the house, taking newspapers to
the trash, sorting and organizing the family’s mail, cooking and doing the laundry.
However, Caroselli does need help making the beds and carrying the laundry, and she also
cannot lift certain Caphalon pots when she is cooking. During certain limited periods of
time, Caroselli experienced greater difficulty in performing some of these tasks. Although it
may have taken her longer to accomplish these routine tasks, Caroselli still was able to
perform most of these tasks without assistance.

Caroselli also remains able to go for walks and has been able to travel since her
diagnosis. Her condition also has not limited her ability to read, either at work or at home,
or watch television. She also participates in various exercises programs, including Pilates, in
which she has progressed to an advanced level. She also receives massage therapy for her
condition. Since her diagnosis, Caroselli has experienced some difficulty with sleeping.
However, on average, she receives six hours of sleep per night and by taking a nap during
the day, she is able to obtain an average of eight hours sleep in a twenty four hour period.

From 1992 through 2000, Caroselli worked a reduced schedule at Allstate. Caroselli
was Senior Marketing Manager for a specific distribution channel at Allstate, the Glenbrook
Channel, and was responsible for performing marketing support functions for sales teams in
the Glenbrook Channel. In July 2000, Allstate experienced a significant increase in the

demand for its financial products and hired additional sales people to sell its financial



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION ne
FES % 8 2004
CORINNE CESARIO CAROSELLI, )
Plaintiff, }
v. No. 01 C 6834 FEB 2 3 2004

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, ) Wayne R. Andersen
) District Judge
Defendant. )

)
)

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on the defendant Allstate Insurance Company’s motion
for summary judgement. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment is
granted.

BACKGROUND

The following undisputed facts are taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56 statements
of facts. Plaintiff Corinne Cesario Caroselli began her employment with Allstate in October
1983. In September 1991, Caroselli was diagnosed with fibromyalgia. The symptoms of
fibromyalgia consist of, among other things, muscle spasms, pain due to muscle spasms,
swelling of tissue, headaches, and stomach problems.

In 1992 after her diagnosis, Caroselli reduced her work schedule to three days a
week—Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. Although Caroselli has fibromyalgia, she is able
to wake up, get out of bed and perform all of the normal morning activities, including using

the bathroom, brushing her teeth, bathing, taking her medication, dressing herself and fixing

(>