alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-3009

___________________________

Sylvester Barbee

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Cheri Ellis, US Department of Agriculture Inspector, Egg Processor, Cummins

Unit; Aundrea Weekly, Safety and Sanitation Officer, Cummins Unit; Troy

Moore, Dr., Physician of CMS, Cummins Unit; Marie Austin, Health Service

Administrator of CMS, Cummins Unit; Jason Boyd, Poultry/Swine Company

Inspector of Egg Process Room, Cummins Unit; John Doe, Hen House Sanitation

Inspector 2012, Cummins Unit; Angelika Smarjesse, Food Preparation and Service

Manager, Cummins Unit (originally named as Angelika Smarjessi)

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

____________

 Submitted: July 25, 2017

 Filed: July 28, 2017

[Unpublished]

____________

Before GRUENDER, BOWMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.
Sylvester Barbee appeals from the order of the District Court granting 1

summary judgment to defendants Cheri Ellis and Audrea Weekly in Barbee’s 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from conditions of his confinement while he was held

at the Cummins Unit. We agree with the district court that even assuming Barbee 2

wasincarcerated under conditions that amounted to a substantial risk of harm, he has

shown no jury issue whether these defendants were deliberately indifferent to that

risk. See Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2017) (noting that an official

is deliberately indifferent if she fails to respond reasonably to a known substantial

risk); see also Cullor v. Baldwin, 830 F.3d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 2016) (reviewing an

order granting summary judgment de novo). We affirm the judgment.

______________________________

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable

Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of

Arkansas.

Barbee has waived his remaining claims by failing to brief them. See Dick v. 2

Dickinson State Univ., 826 F.3d 1054, 1058 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016). 

-2-
Exhibit 4.6.1


 


 


Additional Agreement No. 1


to the LOAN AGREEMENT No. 1 


dated 22 April 2021 


 


30 June 2021


 


Arras Minerals Corp., company established
in accordance with the the laws of the Province of British Columbia, Canada, entity No. BC1287773, located at: Suite 1610, 777
Dunsmuir Street, Vancouver, Canada, V7Y 1K4, represented by CFO Mr. Christopher Richards, acting on basis of the Articles,
hereinafter referred to as the “Creditor”, on one part, and Ekidos Minerals LLP, a limited liability
partnership established in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan, BIN 191040035309, located at: Republic of
Kazakhstan, Almaty, 050000, Panfilov Street 158, Office 1, Almaty, represented by Director, Mrs. Irma Nuss, acting on the basis of
the Charter, hereinafter referred to as the “Debtor”, on the other part, hereinafter collectively referred to as
the “Parties” and individually as “Party”, have concluded this Additional Agreement No. 1 to the Loan
Agreement No. 1 dated 22 April 2021 (hereinafter – the “Agreement”) as follows:


 


1. Clause 3.1 of Section 3 of the Agreement to revised
as follows:


 


“The Debtor shall repay the Loan in full on or before 30 November
2021 to the bank account of the Creditor as specified in this Agreement”


 


2. In all other matters that are not regulated by
the terms of this Additional Agreement No. 1, the Parties are guided by the provisions of the Agreement.


 


3. This Additional Agreement No. 1
enters into force on the date of its signing.


 


SIGNATURES AND REQUISITES OF THE PARTIES:


 


On behalf of the Creditor


Arras Minerals Corp.


 


/s/ Christopher Richards       


Christopher Richards


CFO


 


On behalf of the Debtor


Ekidos Minerals LLP


 


 


/s/ Irma Nuss        


Irma Nuss


Director
#### Karen E. Kusiak, Appellant, v Emmett M. Foster, Respondent.

— Amended order unanimously modified, on the law, and, as modified, affirmed, without costs, in accordance with the following memorandum: Respondent sought a modification of a support order under the Uniform Support of Dependents Law (Domestic Relations Law art 3-A) by petition dated November 19, 1984, alleging that he had been employed for six weeks from August 6, 1984 through September 16, 1984, had been unemployed for two weeks, and had resumed *983employment with a different employer, receiving his first paycheck on October 5, 1984. He requested a determination that he should pay $20 per week for the six weeks he was employed during the summer and asked the court to fix an appropriate amount thereafter. The parties stipulated to a temporary order of $20 per week on January 28, 1985, after the matter had been referred to the Support Collection Unit for a financial investigation. On March 11, 1985, Family Court ordered permanent support of $25 per week effective immediately and fixed support for the six-week summer period at $20 per week, but failed to make an order for the period from October 5, 1984 until January 28, 1985, after defendant was reemployed and before the temporary order. The financial investigation included respondent’s pay stubs from October 5th through the rest of 1984. The Support Collection Unit recommendations did not address any dates other than the six-week summer employment specifically requested by respondent. Petitioner on reargument sought an order covering the period from October 5th to January 28th and the court refused on the ground that this order reflected the recommendation of the Support Collection Unit. We cannot consider the portion of the record relating to the reargument motion, since the court’s decision was not embodied in an order and entered *(see,*CPLR 5512 [a]). Respondent’s modification petition stated that he was unemployed for two weeks, until September 16, 1984, when he returned to work for John Wojtowicz, and respondent requested that the court determine support based on his present employment. Because he was employed, it was an abuse of discretion to fail to include the period of employment from October 5, 1984 to January 28, 1985 without indicating the reason for such exclusion. The order is therefore modified to provide additional support, from October 5, 1984 to January 28, 1985, at the rate of $25 per week, payable in a lump sum or at the rate of $5 per week. (Appeal from amended order of Chautauqua County Family Court, Hartley, J. — modify support.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Denman, O’Donnell, Pine and Schnepp, JJ.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk September 4, 2012

t0827 

# Order

September 4, 2012

145214

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 145214

COA: 307787

Mackinac CC: 2010

- 003313

- FC

SHANE MICHAEL CALVEY, Chippewa CC: 10

- 000431

- FC

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 17, 2012 order

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) Respondent, )

) v. ) ) SHERIFF JABANG, ) ) Appellant. )

) No. 77969-9-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: MAR 

# 11 2019

PER CURIAM -

SheriffJabang challenges legal financial obligations imposed following his jury convictions for second degree identity theft and possession ofa controlled substance. Jabang contends,and the State concedes, that the $200 criminal filing fee and $100 DNA collection fee should be stricken from his judgment and sentence due to his indigence, previous DNA collection, statutory amendments,and State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732,746-50,426 P.3d 714 (2018). We accept the State's concessions and remand for the trial court to strike the filing and DNA collection feesfrom the judgmentand sentence.

FOR THE COURT: 

### 4r 

# 5kuilf\tcl,
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       7,102,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  2,308,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,983,000
<PP&E>                                         812,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                 148,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,684,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,118,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        49,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   9,453,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,684,000
<SALES>                                      1,143,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,143,000
<CGS>                                          979,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,566,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,219,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (4,219,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                  63,000
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (4,156,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.89)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.89)





</TABLE>
#### Lawrence J. Wyetzner et al., Appellants, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Adler, J.), dated May 31, 1984, which granted the motion of the defendant City of New York for a change of venue from Kings County to Richmond County.

*597Order affirmed, with costs.

Although the city’s motion was made approximately one year after commencement of this suit, Special Term did not abuse its discretion in granting a change of venue from Kings to Richmond County where the cause of action arose and the Trial Calendar is less congested *(see,*CPLR 504 [3]). Mollen, P. J., Gibbons, Brown, Niehoff and Eiber, JJ., concur.
## NUMBER 13

- 1 7

- 00 429

- CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRIST I

- EDINBURG

ENRIQUE ANGEL RAMOS, App ellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 206th District Court

of Hidalgo County, Texas.



## ORDER ABATING APPEAL

Before J ustice s Rodriguez , Contreras, and Benavides

Order Per Curiam

Appellant’s counsel, the Honorable Alegra Hill with the L aw Offices of Brandy

Wingate Voss, PLLC , has filed a motion requesting to withdraw as c ounsel. According

to her motion to wit hdraw, good cause exists for her to withdraw because s he has

accepted a position with the Offi ce of the Governor of Texas starting October 1, 2018,2

and will no longer be practicing appellate law or available to represent private parties.

Adequate reason for the discharge of counsel and appointment of new counsel

rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Carroll v. State

, 176 S.W.3d 249, 255

(Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd). In those circumstances where the

app ointment of substitute counsel may be necessary, an appellate court, when faced with

a motion to withdraw, should abate the proceeding to the trial court for determination of

this issue. Accordingly, we ABATE the appeal and REMAND the cause to the trial c ourt

for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Upon remand, the trial court shall determine whether appellant ’s court

- appointed

at torney should remain as appellant 's counse l; and, if not, whether appellant is entitled to

new appointed counsel. I f the trial court determines that there is no reason to discharge

appellant ’s current appointed attorney and appoint substitute counsel, the court shall

enter an order to that effect. If the trial court determines that new counsel should be

appointed, the name, address, telephone number, email address, and state bar number

of the newly appointed counsel shall be included in the order appointing counsel. The

trial court shall further cause its order to be included in a supplemental clerk's record to

be fil ed with the Clerk of this Court on or before the expiration of ten days from the date

of this order.

It is so ordered.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish.

T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 28th

d ay of September , 201 8

.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DERRECK SUNDERLAND,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 09-15400

D.C. No. 1:06-cv-00999-LJO

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 29, 2010** 

Before: ALARCÓN, LEAVY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges. 

California state prisoner Derreck Sunderland appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have

FILED

JUL 09 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 We grant Sunderland’s request for a certificate of appealability as to 1

whether the Board of Prison Terms’ (“Board”) 2003 decision denying him parole

violated his due process rights because it breached his plea agreement, and as to

whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant an evidentiary

hearing regarding this issue.

2 09-15400

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm. 1

Sunderland contends that he was deprived of the benefits of his plea bargain

as a result of the Board’s 2003 decision finding him unsuitable for parole. The

state court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971). 

 The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant an

evidentiary hearing because Sunderland did not set forth a colorable claim for

relief. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). 

We decline to grant a certificate of appealability as to whether Sunderland’s

no contest plea was not knowing and voluntary, and whether the government

breached his plea agreement by filing a statement pursuant to Cal. Penal Code

§ 1203.01, referencing a prior offense. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). 

We grant Sunderland’s request for judicial notice, filed on June 15, 2009.

AFFIRMED.
Filed: July 23, 2002 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-6212 (CR-98-282, CA-00-1192-1) United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus Eric Pearson Lee, Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER The court amends its opinion filed April 30, 2002, as follows: On page 2, lines 2 and 3 of text: The prepositional phrase is corrected to read “under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2001).” For the Court
/s/ Patricia S. Connor ClerkUNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-6212
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus ERIC PEARSON LEE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge. (CR-98-282, CA-00-1192-1) Submitted: April 18, 2002 Decided: April 30, 2002 Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Eric Pearson Lee, Appellant Pro Se. Angela Hewlett Miller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: Eric Pearson Lee seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2001) and denying reconsideration of that order. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Lee , Nos. CR-98-282; CA-00-1192-1 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 27, 2001; Feb. 6, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
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**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND**

**CHIEFFINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO**

**18U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Each of the undersignedhereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in his capacity as anofficer of Force Protection, Inc. (the “Company”), that, to his knowledge,the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30,2008, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78m or 78o(d)) and that theinformation contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. This writtenstatement is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as anexhibit to such Form 10-Q. A signed original of this statement has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 
|                           |   |                                       |
|--------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------|
| Date:  September 30, 2008 |   | /s/ MICHAEL MOODY                          |
|                           |   | **Michael  Moody**                         |
|                           |   | **President  and Chief Executive Officer** |
|                           |   |                                       |
| Date:  September 30, 2008 |   | /s/ FRANCIS E. SCHEUERELL, JR.             |
|                           |   | **Francis  E. Scheuerell, Jr.**       |
|                           |   | **Interim  Chief Financial Officer**       |

 

 

This exhibit shall not bedeemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934 or otherwise subject to the liabilities of that Section, nor shall itbe deemed incorporated by reference in any filings under the Securities Act of1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, whether made before or after thedate hereof and irrespective of any general incorporation language in anyfilings.

 

----
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT UNDER SECTION 302 OF**

**THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Umang Gupta, certify that: 

 

1. I havereviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Keynote Systems, Inc.; 

 

2. Basedon my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report; 

 

3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this quarterly report; 

 

4. The registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis quarterly report is being prepared; 

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors: 

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting. 

 

Date: August 13, 2004