Unbeknownst to Otrompke at the time, Carroll and the law firm in which he was a partner had
previously defended members of the Chicago Police Department who had been accused of civil
rights violations. According to Otrompke, the inquiry panel rclied heavily on the facts
underlying his July 4, 2000 arrest in recommending denial of his application for admission to the
AJinois bar. The pancl’s later written opinion also discusses, however, several other legal
problems which Otrompke expericnced prior to his 23rd birthday. These include an arrest for
scaling the wall of a elevated train station and another arrest for attempting to leave a restaurant
without paying for a meal. The board also examined records regarding relationship counseling
that Otrompke underwent during law school, as well as his rather tumultuous work history.

The inquiry panel met for a second time in May 2002. The panel declined to recommend
certification of Otrompke and issued a six-page opinion discussing the basis for its decision, It is
unclear from the complaint whether the full Committee voted to uphold the inquiry panel’s
decision. Otrompke, however, appears to allege that he has yet to be allowed to go before a
hearing panel to present evidence on his behalf. Under Tllinois law, such complaints should be
directed to the Illinois Supreme Court. Otrompke, however, did not follow that course, instead
filing suit in this Court on October 10, 2003. On October 22, 2003, the Board of Admissions and
the Committee on Character and litness mailed Otrompke a letter requesting that he sign a
standard waiver of liability form before he would be allowed a hearing. The substance of this
waiver essentially provided that as an inducement to the Board of Admissions to conduct an
investigation into Otrompke’s application, he would release the Board and its members from any

liability arising out of the investigation. Pl’s Reply to D’s Resp. to Motion for Taylor Relief p. 7.


proceedings in which the plaintifis could present their claims. In short, Otrompke has provided
the Court with no authority for enjoining ongoing state proceedings based on the type of delay
that has occurred here.

In sum, the Younger factors favor abstention in this case. The question remaining is
whether we should dismiss this action or mercly stay it pending resolution of the Illinois
procecdings. See Green y. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 2002). A stay may be
appropriate when a plaintiff is foreclosed from bringing his damages claims in the state
procecding. /d., citing Majors v. Englebrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 1998); Simpson v.
Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 138-39 (7th Cir. 1995). Neither side has yct commented on this issue, and
the Court is unwilling to decide it without further comment from the partics.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that it should abstain in this case pursuant
to Younger v. Harris. The parties are ordorcd to submit simultancous briefs on or before April
23, 2004 on the issue of whether a stay or dismissal of Otrompke’s complaint is appropriate.
This case is sct for status and ruling on April 29, 2004 at 9:30 a.m. Otrompke’s rencwed rule 11

motion and motion to show cause and for injunctive relief [Docket # 25] are denicd.

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge

Date: April 14, 2004



Otrompke does not contend that he would be unable to bring his constitutional claims

before the Illinois Supreme Court as part of the appeal process provided by Illinois law. The fact
that he has made no effort to do so does not assist Otrompke in his claim that stale procedures are
inadequate. As the United States Supreme Court has emphasized, “when a litigant has not
attempted to present his federal claims in related state court proceedings, a federal court should
assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy in the absence of unambiguous
authorily to the contrary.” Pennzoil v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987), There is no serious
question that the Illinois Supreme Court is capable of resolving such constitutional claims. See
Hale, 335 F.3d at 683,

The primary point of contention between the parties appears to concern whether the
requisite oxtraordinary circumstances are present such that the Court should enjoin the state court
proceedings and decide Otrompke’s constitutional claims, despite the fact that the Younger
factors point toward abstention. Otrompke bears the burden of demonsirating the cxistence of
such circumstances. Green, 281 F.3d at 667, citing Ramsden v. AgriBank, FCB, 214 F.3d 865,
871 (7th Cir. 2000). In order to make such a showing, Otrompke must demonstrate:

“(1) the ‘state proceedings is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,”

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S, 592, 611 (1975), (2) there is ‘an extraordinarily

pressing need for immediate equitable relief,’ Kugler v. Helfunt, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25

(1975); or (3) the ‘challenged provision is flagrantly and patently violative of express

constitutional prohibitions,’ Moore v. [Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979)].”

Pincham v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, 872 F.2d 1341, 1349 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Jacobson v. Village af Northbrook Municipal Corp., 824 F.2d 567, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1987).

Though Otrompke alleges thal defendants’ conduct violated his constitutional rights, he docs not

contend that their conduct was flagrantly and patently violative of the Constitution. Thus the


Discussion

Otrompke claims that he has been improperly deprived of his right to engage in the
practice of law in Illinois. He contends that defendants’ decision to deny him admission to the
Illinois bar was based on the fact that he was arrested while engaging in constitutionally
protected political activity and that the board’s decision was effectuated without adequate duc
process. Otrompke also claims that inquiry panel member Carroll is biased against him and that
Carroll’s decision to deny Otrompke’s application was made in bad faith as a result of this bias.
Before we may address the merits of Otrompke’s constitutional claims, we must determine
whether the Younger abstention doctrine precludes the Court {rom exercising jurisdiction over
these claims. We conclude that it docs.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), requires federal courts to abstain from ongoing
state proceedings thal arc (1) judicial in nature, (2) implicate important state interes(s, and (3)
offer an adequate opportunity for review of constitutional claims, (4) so long as no extraordinary
circumstances exist which would make abstention inappropriale. Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d
661, 666 (7th Cir. 2002), citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,
457 U.S, 423, 432, 436-37 (1982). It has long becn held that the bar admission process amounts
to a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Younger. See Hale v, Committee on Character
and Fitness of the State of Iilinois, 335 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2003), Moreover, there is no question
that the state proceedings are still “ongoing.” See Edward v. Til. Bd. Of Admissions, 261 F.3d
723, 727, 28 (7th Cir. 2001). Further, it is undisputed that state bar admission proceedings
implicate the important state interest of regulating persons who are authorized to practice Jaw in

the state. See Storment v. O'Malley, 938 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir. 1991).


consider his July 4, 2000 arrest, Younger itsclf seems to dispose of this argument. Younger held
that where a statute or conduct has the incidental cffect of inhibiting first amendment rights, it
can still be upheld if the effect is minor in relation to the need to control the conduct and lack of
alternative means for doing so. 401 U.S. at 51. Becausc this appears to be cxactly whal has
happened in Mr. Otrompke’s situation, he has failed to meet his heavy burden of demonstrating
that the board's decision to deny his admission to the Illinois bar was made in bad faith or was
the result of bias.

Next Otrompke appears to argue that the Court should exercise jurisdiction over his
claims duc to timeliness concerns. Oirompke does not allege, however, that there is an
“extraordinarily pressing need for immediate equitable relicf.” Instead, however, hc merely
contends that the Court should not abstain duc to the delay of over three years that he has already
suffered, thus making federal intervention the only way for him to receive a timely decision.
However, because of the important state interest implicated here, as well as the fact that the
Illinois Supreme Court is capable of resolving his fedcral claims, Otrompke’s concems regarding
delay are best Icft to the state court as well.

None of the cases Otrompke cites supports refusal to abstain or its converse, enjoining the
Illinois bar admission proccedings. Black vy. Cook County Officers Electoral Beard, 750 F.Supp.
901 (N.D. IL 1990), and Misurelli v. Racine, 346 F.Supp. 43 (E.D. Wis. 1972), do not even
involve Younger abstention. Nor does United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218 (7th
Cir, 1976), which was a representative habeas corpus case. Further, Bickham v. Lashof, 620 F.2d
1238 (7th Cir. 1980), and Lynk vy, Laporte Superior Court No, 2,789 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1986),

are distinguishable as in those cases, unlike this one, there were no pending state court


Mine Ord Fos (6299)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Jud; 7 Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate sudge Matthew F. Kennelly than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 7198 DATE 4/14/2004
CASE Otrompke vs. Chairman of the Committee
TITLE

[In the following bax (a) indicate the party filing the motion, .g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (bh) stale briefly the nature
of the motion being presented]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

ab) a Filed motion of { usc listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due
(4) ia Ruling/Hearing on __ sct for al
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference{held/continued to| [sct for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) m Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) oO |Bench‘Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to _____at
(9) a) This case is dismissed |with/without} prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CIFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OO FRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).
ao [Other docket entry] For the reasons set forth on the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order,
the Court concludes that it should abstain in this case pursuant to Younger v. Harris. The parties are
ordered to submit simultancous bricfs on or before 4/23/04 on the issue of whether a stay or dismissal of
Otrompke’s complaint is appropriate. This case is set for status and ruling on 4/29/04 at 9:30 a.m.
Otrompke’s renewed rule 11 motion and motion to show causc and for injunctive relief (25-1,2,3) are
denied.
dl (Hor further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in upen court. Document
Number
No notices required. umber of notices
Notices mailed by judge's stat?
Notitied counsel by teleph APR,2.0 2004
Y | Docketing to mail notices. .
Mail AQ) 450 form,
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. we yee vari

date mailed notive
courtroorn

ORG deputy's
initials

Date/ime received in 7
ventral Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials

©



Court need only address the factors of bad faith and extraordinarily pressing need.

Otrompke contends that he has presented “enough bad Jaith to fill a warehouse.” Pl’s.
Resp. p. 8. He argues that defendant Carroll is biased against Otrompke’s admission to the bar
because the firm at which Carroll is a partner has in the past represented members of the Chicago
Police Department in claims brought against them for alleged civil rights violations. As a result,
Otrompke contends that Carroll’s decision to deny Otrompke’s bar admission application was
made in bad faith and was motivated by his desire to “coax additional work from Illinois police
departments, to discourage his political adversaries and to line his own pockets.”

These allegations, however, fall short of meeting the high threshold required to overcome
abstention. In order to estabtish that he is entitled to the bad faith exception to Younger, a
plaintiff must allege specific facts to support inferences of bad faith and bias. Pincham, 872 F.2d
at 1349-50. He must present more than mere allegations and conclusions. /d, Otrompke’s claim
can only be characterized as speculative. His contention, made on information and belief, that
defendants intended to “discourage [him] from continuing to pursue his attorney’s liccnse, to
crush [his] spirit of dissent, and to erode his will to live” falls far short of the standard required to
show bad faith, Further, the mere fact that Carroll in the past has represented police officers in
cases involving claims that they violated individuals’ civil rights is insufficient to suggest that
Carroll’s decision regarding Otrompke’s application was the result of bias or was made in bad
faith. Under this line of reasoning, any judge who may have, before appointment to the bench,
sued or defended police officers would be considered biased and obligated to recuse himself in

any matter involving police misconduct. Otrompke cites no support for such a rule.

With regard to Otrompke’s contention that the board should not have been allowed to



Commitiec on Character and Fitness to assess the moral character of each potential candidate for
admission to the Illinois Bar. Ili, Sup. Ct. R. 701, 702. Every applicant to the Tlinois bar must
file a character and fitness registration application, which the Board then forwards to the
Character and Fitness Committee. Tl. Bar Admis. R. 3.2c; Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 704 (a), (b), A
Committee member evaluates the application, and if he or she is unable to recommend
certification, the Committee Chairman assigns the application to a three-member inquiry panel
for further cxamination, Ill. Bar Admis. R. 5.2a. The way the panel review is conducted is
dctermined by the panel chairperson, including the decision of whether to require the applicant to
appear personally before one or more of its members. Ill, Bar Admis. R. 5.2(b),(c).

The decision of the majority of the panel members is then reported to the full Committee
for determination of whether the panel’s recommendation should be affirmed or whether the
matter should be referred to a hearing panel. Je. If the full Committee votes to withhold
certification or recommends referral to a hearing pancl, the Committee chairperson appoints a
hearing panel consisting of the remaining members of the full Committee who were nol on the
inquiry panel. Ll Bar Admis. R, 5.3a. At the conclusion of the hearing, a member prepares the
findings and conclusions of the Learing Panel, in the event that the panel votes not to
recommend certification of the applicant. Jd, An applicant may appcal an adverse decision by
the hearing panel to the Illinois Supreme Court, though the court generally will not overturn the
panel's decision absent a showing that it was arbitrary. Jn re Latimer, 11 Til. 2d 327, 330, 143
N.E.2d 20, 22 (1957).

‘The Character and Fitness Committce’s hearing in Otrompke’s case was held before an

inquiry panel consisting of defendants James Carroll, Arleen Anderson, and Eileen Letts.


Procedure. lor the reasons stated below, the Court abstains from exercising jurisdiction over
Otrompke’s claims but defers pending further briefing determination of whether we should
dismiss the case or instead should stay it.

Background

The following facts are taken from the allegations in Otrompke’s complaint.

Otrompke graduated from DePaul University College of Law and passed the Illinois bar
examination and its component parts, including the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam.
Despite the fact that Otrompke completed these requirements nearly three years ago, he has not
received a law license. Nor has he been given a hearing before the Committee at which he is
allowed to call witnesses on his behalf, despite having requested one in February 2001.

On July 4, 2000, three weeks before Otrompke was set to take the bar examination, he
was arrested by Chicago police officers afler intervening when he observed an officer arresting
an individual who had just left a political meeting that Otrompke had also attended. Otrompke
asked for the officer’s badge number and threatened to file an administrative complaint against
him, Otrompke was arrested for disorderly conduct, but the charges were later dropped.
Otrompke claims that he was arrested for political purposes, as the mecting he had attended just
prior to his arrest conccrned an organization (hat advocates political dissent,

After Otrompke received a passing score on the bar exam, defendant Arlecn Anderson, a
member of the Committee on Character and Fitness, scheduled a hearing to inquire as to his
fitness to reecive an attomey’s license. At this point we depart from the complaint to bricfly
review the process for admission to the Illinois bar.

‘The Illinois Supreme Court created the Board of Admissions to the Bar and the


FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION APR 2 0 2004

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURL
DOCKETED

JOHN JOSEPH OTROMPKE,
Plaintiff,

VS. Case No. 03 C 7198
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE

ON CHARACTER AND FITNESS FOR TIIE
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,
ARLEEN ANDERSON, JAMES CARROLL,
EILEEN LETTS, AND ILLINOIS BOARD OF
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,

Defendants,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

John Joseph Otrompke has sued the Chairman of the Commitiee on Character and Fitness
for the First Judicial District of Illinois, Arleen Anderson, James Carroll, Eilecn Letts, who were
members of an inquiry panel of that Committee, and the Minois Board of Admissions to the Bar,
claiming that defendants’ failure to approve his admission to the Tlinois bar and their delay in
granting him a hearing constitute violations of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. He also asserts state law claims of invasion of
privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. In addition to
requesting an immediate hearing before the Committee, Otrompkc also requests that the Court
permanently enjoin the defendants from requiring bar applicants to sign liability waivers as a
condition of receiving a hearing before thc Committee. Defendants have moved to dismiss

Otrompke’s complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

o)