FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

G AND G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS,

LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ZIHAO LIU, DBA Wave Hookah; 

WAVE HOOKAH, INC., DBA Wave 

Hookah, an unknown business 

entity,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-56047

D.C. No.

2:19-cv-07896-

WDK-JC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

William D. Keller, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 10, 2022

Pasadena, California

Filed August 22, 2022

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Sandra S. Ikuta, 

Circuit Judges, and George B. Daniels,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

* The Honorable George B. Daniels, United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2 G AND G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS V. LIU

SUMMARY**

Communications Law

The panel affirmed, on an alternative ground, the district 

court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendant in an 

action alleging that transmission of a pirated television 

program via Internet streaming, as opposed to via satellite or 

cable systems, violated the Cable Communications Policy 

Act, 47 U.S.C. § 553, and the Communications Act, 

47 U.S.C. § 605.

 The district court ruled that §§ 553 and 605 do not apply 

when a pirated program is transmitted via Internet streaming. 

The panel, however, concluded that the plaintiff, a 

middleman distributor of entertainment display rights, failed 

to meet its burden on summary judgment to provide 

evidence sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of 

material fact regarding the method of transmission of the 

program at issue. Accordingly, the panel declined to reach 

the merits and affirmed on that alternative ground.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
 G AND G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS V. LIU 3 

COUNSEL

Thomas P. Riley (argued), Law Offices of Thomas P. Riley 

P.C., South Pasadena, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Trevor B. McCann (argued) and Ryan P. Harley, Collins & 

Collins LLP, Walnut Creek, California, for DefendantsAppellees.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

Television “signal piracy,” that is, displaying television 

programs without the right to do so, has long been regulated 

by the Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 553 

(“§ 553”) and the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 

(“§ 605”). Those statutes clearly apply when the pirated 

program is transmitted via traditional satellite or cable 

systems. See, e.g., Int’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, 75 F.3d 

123 (2d Cir. 1996); Cablevision of Michigan, Inc. v. Sports 

Palace, Inc., 27 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 1994). G & G Closed 

Circuit Events, LLC (“G & G”), a middleman distributor of 

entertainment display rights, asks us to resolve a blockbuster 

question of first impression for the courts of appeals: 

Whether §§ 553 and 605 apply when the pirated program is 

transmitted via Internet streaming. The district court said 

“no,” holding that the “[I]nternet defense” is dispositive. 

But on appeal, G & G’s case never makes it past the opening 

credits. Because G & G failed to meet its burden on 

summary judgment to provide evidence sufficient to 

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 

method of transmission of the program at issue, we decline 
4 G AND G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS V. LIU

to reach the merits and affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment on that alternative ground.

BACKGROUND

G & G buys commercial distribution rights from 

entertainment producers and then sublicenses the rights to 

display televised sports and entertainment programs at 

commercial establishments such as bars, clubs, and 

restaurants. Here, G & G purchased exclusive commercial 

distribution rights to a televised boxing match (the “fight”) 

and charged businesses between $2,800 and $14,000 for a 

sublicense. Wave Hookah (“Wave”), a hookah lounge in 

Van Nuys, California, displayed the fight to its customers on 

a September evening in 2018. Rather than sublicensing the 

fight from G & G, a Wave employee purchased it from 

digital media provider Flipps Media, Inc., for $84.99, and 

displayed the fight to guests on a laptop “via the [I]nternet.” 

G & G sued Wave under §§ 553 and 605, alleging violations 

of those statutes’ prohibitions on signal piracy. The district 

court granted summary judgment in favor of Wave, finding 

that §§ 553 and 605 did not regulate streaming over the 

Internet.

We do not reach this interesting and complicated 

question because the familiar summary judgment standard 

counsels upholding summary judgment on alternate 

grounds. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 

Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). We review de 

novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, 

considering the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tschida v. Motl, 924 F.3d 1297, 1302–03 (9th 

Cir. 2019). Where, as here, the party moving for summary 

judgment (Wave) has borne its initial burden to show that 

the nonmoving party (G & G) “does not have enough 

evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden 
G AND G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS V. LIU 5

of persuasion at trial,” the nonmoving party then has the 

burden “to produce evidence to support its claim.” Nissan 

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102–03. Because 

G & G failed to produce evidence to support its claim after 

Wave carried its initial burden, summary judgment for Wave 

was appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322–23 (1986).

ANALYSIS

I. THE SIGNAL PIRACY STATUTES

To explain why G & G failed to meet its burden on 

summary judgment, it is helpful to briefly lay out the signal 

piracy statutes at issue. To begin, § 553 concerns “cable 

systems.” See 47 U.S.C. § 553(a). To be liable under § 553, 

Wave must have intercepted or received a “communications 

service offered over a cable system” without authorization. 

Id. § 553(a)(1). A “cable system” is defined for purposes of 

§ 553 as “a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission 

paths and associated signal generation, reception, and 

control equipment that is designed to provide cable service 

which includes video programming and which is provided to 

multiple subscribers within a community” with certain 

exceptions. Id. § 522(7).

Section 605, by contrast, prohibits the unauthorized 

interception, receipt, and use of “radio communications,” 

including “satellite television signal piracy.” DirecTV, Inc. 

v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 

47 U.S.C. § 605(a). To establish liability under § 605 here, 

Wave’s display of the fight must have been a “radio 

communication” as it is defined under § 605 or otherwise 

involved a satellite television signal, see DirecTV, Inc., 

545 F.3d at 844 (“[T]he ‘communications’ protected by 

§ 605(a) include satellite television signals.”). “Radio 
6 G AND G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS V. LIU

communication” for purposes of § 605 means “the 

transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and 

sounds of all kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities, 

apparatus, and services (among other things, the receipt, 

forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to 

such transmission.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(40).

Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have 

acknowledged that transmissions over the Internet involve 

myriad technologies that may include both cable and satellite 

components. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand 

X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005) (explaining that 

Internet cable modem service “transmits data between the 

Internet and users’ computers via the network of television 

cable lines owned by cable companies,” and that Internet 

service may be provided by other “terrestrial- and satellitebased wireless networks”); Brand X Internet Servs. v. 

F.C.C., 345 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[C]able

modem service uses the network of coaxial cable employed 

to transmit television signals.”), rev’d on other grounds,

545 U.S. 967 (2005). The “potentially intricate issues of 

overlap and distinction” between §§ 553 and 605 have not 

been clearly resolved in the Ninth Circuit. Kingvision PayPer-View v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 349 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1999). Neither statute expressly references Internet 

streaming. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 553, 605.

II. THE PARTIES’ EVIDENCE AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In its summary judgment motion, Wave posited that 

because the lounge displayed the fight “via the [I]nternet” 

rather than via traditional satellite or cable transmissions, 

there could be no dispute that Wave’s conduct fell outside 

the ambit of §§ 553 and 605. Wave supported its motion 

with declarations from the lounge owner and an employee 

that Wave purchased the fight from an Internet streaming 
G AND G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS V. LIU 7

service and displayed the program by streaming it over the 

Internet.

G & G said, “not so fast,” arguing that the signal piracy 

statutes did extend to programs transmitted over the Internet, 

and that Wave’s discovery responses were inadequate 

because they failed to provide sufficient information for 

G & G to prosecute its claims under this theory. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(d). G & G supplied a declaration from counsel 

identifying gaps in Wave’s discovery responses, which 

ostensibly prevented G & G from supporting its claims. For 

example, G & G noted that Wave had declined to respond to 

interrogatories regarding satellite or cable services 

employed by Wave, among other discovery deficiencies.

The district court agreed with G & G and deferred 

consideration of the summary judgment motion pursuant to 

its authority to do so when the nonmovant has shown that it 

cannot present facts “essential to justify its position.” Id. 

The court reopened discovery for sixty days “in order for the 

parties to determine the method of transmission” of the fight 

and granted an additional ten days for supplemental briefing.

At the end of the sixty-day extension, however, G & G

had taken no steps to participate in additional discovery or 

to compel any further response from Wave. Instead, G & G

elected not to supplement its briefing and asked the court to 

consider Wave’s summary judgment motion fully briefed 

and ready for consideration. The district court obliged. This 

time, the district court agreed with Wave and granted 

summary judgment on the grounds that the “[I]nternet 

defense” was “dispositive” and §§ 553 and 605 did not 

extend to “unauthorized broadcasts over the [I]nternet.”
8 G AND G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS V. LIU

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE

The district court granted summary judgment, holding 

that the “Internet defense” absolved Wave of liability. We 

agree that summary judgment was appropriate, albeit for the 

alternative, independent reason that G & G failed to bear its 

burden of production. Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1067 

(9th Cir. 2013) (a court of appeals may affirm the district 

court on any grounds the record supports). Although the 

district court afforded G & G ample opportunity to pursue 

additional discovery to demonstrate how §§ 553 and 605 

might encompass the Internet transmission at issue here, 

G & G sat on its hands. For example, G & G produced no 

evidence that would address whether the fight was relayed 

by way of a “facility, consisting of a set of closed 

transmission paths” or “provided to multiple subscribers 

within a community,” such that the fight could have been 

transmitted by way of a “cable system” within the meaning 

of § 553. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(7) (defining “cable system”). 

Similarly, G & G produced no witnesses or documents to 

explain whether Wave’s display of the program involved a 

“transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, 

and sounds of all kinds” or otherwise involved a satellite 

transmission as would be required to establish liability under 

§ 605. Id. § 605(a). And, remarkably, G & G undertook no 

discovery about the nature of the transmission to or from 

Flipps Media, Inc., the entity from which Wave purchased 

the fight. For instance, G & G never offered evidence 

addressing whether Flipps itself obtained the fight from a 

satellite or cable provider, nor did G & G investigate the 

technology that Flipps used to transmit programming to its 

customers.

Thus, G & G ended discovery on a cliffhanger, offering 

at best conclusory statements about the fight’s method of 
G AND G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS V. LIU 9

transmission and the underlying technology. This posture 

made it impossible for the district court to undertake the 

basic exercise of comparing the facts of the case to the 

statutory language to assess whether §§ 553 or 605 regulate 

Wave’s conduct.

CONCLUSION

We note that on their face, §§ 553 and 605 do not provide 

for an “Internet defense” that automatically absolves an 

entity of liability, as the district court held. Rather, these 

statutes regulate specific methods of transmission. We 

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 

Wave because G & G failed to meet its burden of production 

to establish that Wave’s method of transmitting the fight 

comes within the ambit of §§ 553 or 605. The district court 

afforded G & G generous time to undertake additional 

discovery to provide the evidence necessary to ascertain the 

technical nature of the transmission at issue. Instead of 

taking that opportunity, G & G simply stopped the show and 

asked the district court to rule on the sparse record. 

Summary judgment for Wave was appropriate.1

AFFIRMED.

1 Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of G & G’s federal 

claims, we decline to reinstate G & G’s pendent state-law claims. See 

28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3).