FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

No. 10-35022 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  3:04-cv-00331-MO

T.A., OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 5, 2010—San Francisco, California

Filed April 27, 2011

Before: Pamela Ann Rymer, Susan P. Graber, and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea;

Dissent by Judge Graber

5459
COUNSEL

Mary E. Broadhurst, Eugene, Oregon, Bryan Michael Killian,

Masai Dennis McDougall, David Bruce Salmons (argued),

Bingham McCutchen, Washington DC, for the defendantappellant. 

Richard Gunther Cohn-Lee, Andrea L. Hungerford, Nancy L.

Hungerford (argued), The Hungerford Law Firm, Oregon

City, Oregon, for the plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

T.A., a former student in the Forest Grove School District

(“Forest Grove”), appeals the district court’s determination

that he is not entitled to an award of reimbursement for his

private school tuition under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). On

remand from the Supreme Court’s opinion and our opinion,

Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir.

2008), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009), the district court held

that equitable considerations did not support any award of

private-school tuition at Mount Bachelor Academy as a result

of Forest Grove’s failure to provide T.A. with a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) under the IDEA. Because

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined T.A.’s parents enrolled him at Mount Bachelor for

non-educational reasons, we affirm.

5462 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case were published in Forest Grove Sch.

Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1081-83 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Forest

Grove I”), and we repeat them here only to the extent necessary to explain our decision today. T.A. was enrolled in the

Forest Grove School District from kindergarten until the

spring semester of his junior year in high school, when his

parents removed him from public school and enrolled him at

Mount Bachelor Academy—a private boarding school which

charged $5,200 a month for room and board. 

At Forest Grove High School, T.A.’s scholastic performance had been poor; he earned mostly C’s and D’s. When

T.A. was a freshman, his parents requested that he be evaluated for a learning disability. If T.A. had a learning disability,

he might have been eligible for special education services

under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (children with

specific learning disabilities are eligible for services under the

IDEA if “by reason thereof, [the child] needs special education and related services”). Although Forest Grove evaluated

T.A. and concluded he did not have a specific learning disability, school staff noted in an internal memo that he might

have Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).1

ADHD is a separate basis under which T.A. would have been

eligible for special education services. Id. T.A.’s parents were

informed in June 2001 he did not have a learning disability

and was therefore ineligible for special education services.

T.A. continued to earn mostly C’s and D’s throughout his

sophomore and junior years of high school. Forest Grove did

not undertake any additional action with respect to its internal

memorandum that T.A. might have ADHD.

1As we explained in Forest Grove I, “ADHD is classified as a mental

disorder. A person with ADHD often has symptoms similar to those experienced by a person with a learning disability, but ADHD is a disorder distinct from learning disabilities. . . . The evaluation of T.A. for a learning

disability therefore did not encompass an evaluation for ADHD.” Forest

Grove I, 523 F.3d at 1081 n. 1. 

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A. 5463
In fall 2002—during T.A.’s junior year of high school—he

began to use marijuana at least three or four times a day.

Sometimes, T.A. was so highly dosed with marijuana he

could not speak or get out of bed. T.A.’s parents found drug

paraphernalia in his room. His parents also discovered he had

made $1200 worth of “1-900” pornographic phone calls, and

they removed the family computer from their home after they

discovered T.A. had visited Internet pornography sites. On

February 11, 2003, T.A. ran away from home, but was

returned to his parents by the police several days later. In

response to T.A.’s escalating behavioral problems, T.A.’s parents took him to Dr. Michael Fulop, a psychiatrist, who conducted several tests and evaluations of T.A. in late January

and February 2003. After T.A. ran away from home—but

without seeking intervention by, or services from, the school

district—T.A.’s parents removed T.A. from school and

enrolled him in a three-week program for troubled youth at

Freer Wilderness Therapy Expeditions in March 2003.2 At a

family therapy session held at Freer, T.A. informed his parents he had used cocaine.

Dr. Fulop completed his report on T.A on March 15, 2003,

while T.A. was enrolled at Freer. Dr. Fulop diagnosed T.A.

with ADHD, as well as depression and marijuana addiction.

On March 23, 2003—upon T.A.’s return from Freer—his parents immediately removed him from public school and

enrolled him at Mount Bachelor Academy. Subsequently, on

April 18, 2003, T.A.’s parents filed an IDEA complaint

against Forest Grove, which claimed Forest Grove had not

provided T.A. with a FAPE under the IDEA. As required by

the IDEA, T.A.’s parents requested an administrative due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). The assigned hearing

officer continued the matter to allow Forest Grove to evaluate

T.A. for ADHD.

2Freer Wilderness Therapy Expedition is not a school; instead, it is a

residential treatment program for troubled teens. Freer is licensed as a

Mental Health and Drug and Alcohol treatment program by the state of

Oregon. 

5464 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A.
On July 7, 2003, a team of Forest Grove’s medical and educational specialists confirmed Dr. Fulop’s diagnosis that T.A.

had ADHD. On August 26, 2003, a similar team determined

T.A. was not eligible for services or accommodations under

the IDEA, because his ADHD did not have a severe adverse

effect on his academic performance. 

On January 26, 2004, the hearing officer assigned to T.A.’s

case held that T.A. was disabled, that the diagnosis had a

severe adverse effect on his academic performance, and that

Forest Grove had thus failed to provide T.A. with a FAPE.

Thus, the hearing officer held T.A.’s parents were entitled to

reimbursement for the full cost of T.A.’s Mount Bachelor

tuition.3 Forest Grove appealed the hearing officer’s decision

in federal district court. The district court reversed the hearing

officer’s grant of reimbursement to T.A.’s parents. The district court held T.A. was statutorily ineligible for reimbursement of private school expenses under 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(10)(C) because he had never previously received

special education. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 640 F.

Supp.2d 1320, 1335 (D. Or. 2005). Section 1412(a)(10)(C)

provides for private school reimbursement only for children

with disabilities who are denied a FAPE in public school and

“who previously received special education and related services.” Further, the district court held that “[e]ven assuming

that tuition reimbursement may be ordered in an extreme case

for a student not receiving special education services,” T.A.’s

case was not sufficiently “extreme” to require such reimbursement. Id. at 1334 (emphasis added). 

3T.A.’s parents also contended they were entitled to reimbursement for

the cost of Dr. Fulop’s evaluation, and for the cost of the Freer expedition.

The hearing officer denied reimbursement for Freer because it was not an

appropriate placement for a child with a disability. The hearing officer further denied reimbursement for Dr. Fulop’s evaluation because T.A. first

presented that claim to the hearing officer in his opening brief. Neither of

these claims are the subject of this appeal. 

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A. 5465
We reversed. We held that under “general principles of

equity,” students who had not previously been diagnosed with

disabilities—and thus, did not previously receive special education services—are nevertheless entitled to private school

reimbursement under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C), which provides that the court “shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate” in actions brought under the IDEA.

Forest Grove I, 523 F.3d at 1088. Moreover, we found “nothing in § 1415(i)(2)(C), Supreme Court precedent, or our own

precedent [to suggest] that tuition reimbursement is available

only in extreme cases for parents who place their child in private school before receiving special education and related services in public school.” Id. (emphasis in the original). We

thus remanded this case to the district court to consider “all

relevant factors in determining whether to grant reimbursement and the amount of the reimbursement.” Id. at 1088-89.

In part, we held: 

We are mindful that the Hearing Officer found that

T.A.’s parents sent him to Mount Bachelor Academy

not only because of his disabilities, but also for reasons unrelated to his disabilities (i.e., substance

abuse and behavioral problems), and the district

court would be acting within its discretion to consider that factor as well.

Id. at 1089. The Supreme Court affirmed. Forest Grove Sch.

Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009). 

On remand, the district court reconsidered the case in light

of the factors under the “general principles of equity” we set

out in Forest Grove I, 523 F.3d at 1088, and denied T.A. and

his parents tuition reimbursement. The district court held that

the “decisive factor in this case is that T.A.’s parents appear

to have enrolled T.A. in [Mount Bachelor] not because of any

disability recognized by the IDEA but because of his drug

abuse and behavioral problems.” The district court held the

“timing of the change in schools is instructive,” noting that

5466 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A.
T.A.’s enrollment at Mount Bachelor followed his descent

into increasingly severe drug addiction, his decision to run

away from home, his calls to 1-900 sex lines, and his use of

Internet pornography sites, none of which events were attributable to any IDEA-defined disabilities. Moreover, the district

court noted that T.A.’s father said nothing on the Mount

Bachelor application about T.A.’s ADHD or schoolwork in

response to a question which asked “what specific events precipitated enrollment in the program?” Instead, T.A.’s father

listed “inappropriate behavior, depression, opposition, drug

use, runaway.” 

On appeal, T.A. contends the district court abused its discretion when it held T.A. and his parents were not entitled to

reimbursement.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s equitable determination to grant or deny reimbursement for private

school tuition under the IDEA. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v.

T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2008). We reverse a district court’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard

only if the district court’s decision was “[1] illogical, [2]

implausible, or [3] without support in inferences that may be

drawn from the facts in the record.” United States v. Hinkson,

585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 

III. DISCUSSION

[1] We first reject T.A.’s contention that, as a matter of

law, his parents’ subjective reasons for private school enrollment cannot be a valid equitable consideration. In Forest

Grove I, we specifically held:

We are mindful that the Hearing Officer found that

T.A.’s parents sent him to Mount Bachelor Academy

not only because of his disabilities, but also for reaFOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A. 5467
sons unrelated to his disabilities (i.e., substance

abuse and behavioral problems), and the district

court would be acting within its discretion to consider that factor as well.

523 F.3d at 1089. That holding is the law of the case, and no

exception to the doctrine applies here.

[2] We disagree with the dissent that this sentence is a

“finding of fact” which required the district court to hold that

T.A.’s enrollment was precipitated in part by his disabilities.

Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, see Dissent at 5475 n. 1,

the hearing officer never made an explicit finding of fact as

to the reasons T.A.’s parents enrolled him at Mount Bachelor.4

And as an appellate court, we are not in the business of making findings of fact. The passage cited above simply stated

that the district court had discretion to consider the reasons for

T.A.’s enrollment at Mount Bachelor as an equitable factor on

remand. The section in which this sentence was included

instructed the district court, under general principals of equity,

to consider “all relevant factors in determining whether to

grant the reimbursement and the amount of the reimbursement.”5 Forest Grove I, 523 F.3d at 1088-89.

4On the contrary: although the hearing officer generally discussed both

T.A.’s behavioral and academic difficulties and the dual services Mount

Bachelor provided, it held “it was T.A.’s escalating drug abuse, depression

and out of control behavior that caused his parents to remove him . . . from

[Forest Grove High School.]” (emphasis added). As the hearing officer

made no explicit factual finding as to the reasons for enrollment at Mount

Bachelor—and the closest it came to doing so suggested enrollment was

precipitated exclusively by drug abuse, depression, and behavioral

problems—Forest Grove should not be penalized for its failure to appeal

this nonexistent factual finding. 

5We also find unpersuasive the dissent’s contention that the district

court was required explicitly to state that it was rejecting the Hearing Officer’s factual findings. See Dissent at 5474. Nothing in Ojai Unified Sch.

Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1993) requires a district court

to recite some liturgical phrases effectively to reject the Hearing Officer’s

factual finding, and here (as discussed infra), the district court’s analysis

was sufficient to support its factual findings. 

5468 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A.
Moreover, even were we to read this passage as “factfinding” on appellate review—fact-finding which required the

district court to accept that T.A. was sent to Mount Bachelor

for both reasons related and unrelated to his disability—the

district court was not required to award reimbursement to

T.A. simply because T.A.’s enrollment in private school was

motivated in part by his disabilities. Section 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii)

—the statute under which we instructed the district court to

consider possible reimbursement under “general principles of

equity,” Forest Grove I, 523 F.3d at 1088—provides that “the

court . . . basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). The “preponderance of

the evidence” standard necessarily requires the district court

to weigh the equitable factors. Even if the district court were

bound by a factual determination that T.A.’s enrollment was

motivated by reasons both related and unrelated to his disabilities, the court could have held the non-disability reasons so

outweighed the disability reasons as to make reimbursement

inequitable, and hence inappropriate under § 1415(i)(2)

(C)(iii). 

Indeed, our remand order instructed the district court to

“consider all relevant factors in determining whether to grant

reimbursement.” Forest Grove I, 523 F.3d at 1088 (emphasis

added). Affirming our decision, the Supreme Court similarly

instructed the district court to consider all equitable factors

“in determining whether reimbursement for some or all of the

cost of the child’s private education is warranted.” Forest

Grove, 129 S.Ct. at 2496 (emphasis added). If indeed the

“factual” finding that T.A. enrolled at Mount Bachelor for

reasons related to his disability was the law of the case—and

if any disability-related motivation for enrollment at Mount

Bachelor requires at least some reimbursement—these

remand orders would not have instructed the district court to

determine whether reimbursement was required. Instead, the

remand orders would simply have instructed the district court

to determine the amount of reimbursement to which T.A. was

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A. 5469
entitled. We, and later the Court, remanded for determination

of liability for reimbursement, not solely for damages. 

[3] In any event, we hold that there was sufficient evidence

in the record to support the district court’s factual determination that T.A.’s parents enrolled him at Mount Bachelor solely

because of his drug abuse and behavioral problems. Our standard of review bears reiteration: to find the district court made

a “clearly erroneous finding of fact,” this court must find that

the district court’s determination was “[1] illogical, [2]

implausible, or [3] without support in inferences that may be

drawn from the facts in the record.” Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1263.

Here, there were ample facts in the record to support the district court’s conclusion that T.A. enrolled at Mount Bachelor

solely for non-academic purposes. As the district court noted,

T.A.’s parents decided to enroll him at Mount Bachelor

directly after T.A.’s behavioral and drug problems escalated.

Indeed, although T.A.’s parents had sought IDEA academic

services through Forest Grove in 2001, they did not seek a reevaluation of T.A. in 2003 until nearly a month after they had

already enrolled him at Mount Bachelor.6 Moreover, T.A.’s

father’s answer to the one question on the Mount Bachelor

application which asked which “specific events precipitated”

enrollment mentioned only T.A.’s behavioral and drug problems, not his academic difficulties. Thus, the district court’s

determination that T.A.’s parents enrolled him at Mount

Bachelor because of his drug abuse and behavioral problems

was not illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. Id.

[4] The dissent would reverse the district court because

“the only support for the district court’s conclusion concerning the parents’ reasons is one response to one question . . .

out of an 18-page application.” Dissent at 5477. But as an ini6Such an evaluation, of course, was required if the parents were to be

reimbursed the Mount Bachelor tuition as a result of the school district’s

failure to provide a FAPE. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415. 

5470 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A.
tial matter, the district court did not “view” the response in

isolation. On the contrary, the district court explicitly held

that it considered T.A.’s Mount Bachelor application in conjunction with the timing of T.A.’s enrollment at Mount Bachelor, related to the events which showed his escalating drug

and behavioral problems in the months leading up to his

enrollment. Moreover, the district court’s focus on the “specific events” question was not “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in

the record.” Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1263. The “specific events”

question was the sole question on the Mount Bachelor application which asked what precipitated T.A.’s enrollment at

Mount Bachelor. Therefore, the district court quite reasonably

concluded that the “specific events” question was particularly

useful in determining T.A.’s parents’ motivation in enrolling

him at Mount Bachelor. 

[5] We also find no clear factual error in the district court’s

determination that “T.A.’s father said nothing on the [Mount

Bachelor Academy] application about . . . T.A.’s trouble with

his school work.” The district court’s determination that

T.A.’s father did not mention his school work on the Mount

Bachelor application came in the context of the district court’s

discussion of the application question: “What specific events

precipitated enrollment to this program?” Moreover, the topic

sentence of the paragraph in which the district court’s factual

determination is included rejects T.A.’s counsel’s assertion at

oral argument that “inappropriate and oppositional behavior

and drug use could be symptoms of T.A.’s ADHD and that by

listing them on his application, T.A.’s father was enrolling

T.A. in MBA as a result of his ADHD.” “Inappropriate

behavior,” “opposition,” and “drug use” were three of the

“specific events” listed by T.A.’s father in response to the

question about what “precipitated” T.A.’s enrollment at

Mount Bachelor. Thus, read in context, the district court’s

determination that T.A.’s father said nothing about T.A.’s

trouble with school work was in reference to his father’s

answer to the “specific events” question. We thus cannot conFOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A. 5471
clude that the district court’s factual determination was illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be

drawn from the facts in the record. Id.

It is true that T.A.’s father referenced T.A.’s academic difficulties and ADHD in response to two questions on the

lengthy Mount Bachelor application: 1) “List any academic or

learning differences . . . include . . . ADD, ADHD, etc . . .”;

and 2) “If at any time the student had been diagnosed as having attentional or emotional problems: What was the diagnosis?” It is also true that T.A.’s father mentioned several

academic objectives he hoped T.A. would achieve at Mount

Bachelor. But the fact that T.A.’s father listed “ADHD” in

response to questions which specifically asked him to list that

condition does not compel the conclusion that T.A. was

enrolled at Mount Bachelor because of his ADHD. Nor does

the fact that T.A.’s father hoped T.A. would achieve some

academic gains at Mount Bachelor Academy—which is, after

all, a school—compel the conclusion that T.A. was enrolled

for academic reasons. This is particularly true in light of the

fact that T.A. was enrolled at Mount Bachelor after several

months of escalating drug abuse and behavioral problems—

and directly after he attempted to run away from home—and

not during the two-year period when ADHD and poor scholastic performance alone, and not drugs and pornography,

were the problem. 

[6] The dissent contends our decision today “punishes”

parents who seek to address “all of their child’s needs.” Dissent at 5479. Hardly. Our decision today merely affirms the

district court’s fact-specific weighing of the equities in this

case under our deferential abuse of discretion standard. Thus,

contrary to what the dissent contends, our decision does not

establish a rule of law which requires parents who “seek to

address all of their child’s needs” to “answer each and every

question with the response: ‘Disability.’ ” Id. Instead—in

light of the timing of T.A.’s enrollment at Mount Bachelor,

and a review of his Mount Bachelor application—we con5472 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A.
clude that in this case the district court’s determination that

T.A. enrolled at Mount Bachelor due to his behavior and drug

problems was not illogical, implausible, or without support in

inferences which may be drawn from facts in the record.7

Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262. The dissent apparently reads the

record in this case differently than did the district court. Our

role, however, is solely to determine whether the district court

abused its discretion, not to evaluate the record de novo.

8

AFFIRMED.

GRABER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

Until the most recent iteration of this case, it has been completely undisputed that T.A.’s parents sent him to Mount

Bachelor Academy for two kinds of reasons: reasons related

7Moreover, contrary to the dissent’s contention, the district court did not

deny reimbursement “only because of its view that the parents’ reason for

enrollment was the ‘decisive factor.’ ” Dissent at 5479. The district court

also held: 

T.A.’s parents do not appear to have expended significant effort

to secure T.A.’s place at [Mount Bachelor]. In fact, T.A. was

enrolled at [Mount Bachelor] ten days after Dr. Fulop recommended the school. T.A.’s parents do not appear to have done

significant research into schools dealing with children with

ADHD and depression to determine the best placement for T.A

. . . . This factor weighs against requiring the District to reimburse T.A. for the cost of [Mount Bachelor], particularly in light

of the evidence that T.A.’s parents enrolled him at [Mount Bachelor] for reasons other than his ADHD and depression. 

Emphasis added. 

8To paraphrase Judge Farris’s comment in Li v. Ahscroft, 378 F.3d 959,

964 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2004): Our dissenting colleague differs from us on what

is the appropriate appellate function. She would retry. We are content to

review. 

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A. 5473
to his disability and reasons unrelated to his disability. We

need look no further than our original opinion. “[T]he Hearing

Officer found that T.A.’s parents sent him to Mount Bachelor

Academy not only because of his disabilities, but also for reasons unrelated to his disabilities . . . .” Forest Grove Sch. Dist.

v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis

added), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009). “The district court

adopted all of the Hearing Officer’s factual findings, and the

[Forest Grove] School District has not appealed any of those

findings.” Id. at 1087 n.10; see also 129 S. Ct. at 2489 (“The

District Court accepted the hearing officer’s findings of fact

. . . .”). 

On remand, the district court found otherwise. The district

court found that T.A.’s parents enrolled him at “MBA [Mount

Bachelor Academy] not because of any disability recognized

by the IDEA [Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act]

but because of his drug abuse and behavioral problems.”

(Emphasis added.) Under any standard of review, I am at a

loss as to why the district court did not clearly err. If it is

established that both X and Y caused an event, then a finding

that only X, but not Y, caused the event is clearly erroneous.

In so ruling, the district court erred in four ways.

First, its decision contravenes the doctrine of the law of the

case. Because the School District did not appeal the tworeasons factual finding in the original appeal, the district court

lacked authority to reconsider that finding. See United States

v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 856 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The law of the

case doctrine precludes a court from reconsidering an issue

that it has already resolved.”).

Second, the district court’s decision contravenes our case

law establishing that the court must provide a sufficient explanation when it rejects an agency’s factual finding. See Ojai

Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir.

1993) (“The court, in recognition of the expertise of the

administrative agency, must consider the findings carefully

5474 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A.
and endeavor to respond to the hearing officer’s resolution of

each material issue. After such consideration, the court is free

to accept or reject the findings in part or in whole. . . . [But]

courts are not permitted simply to ignore the administrative

findings.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, the district court never stated that it was rejecting the

Hearing Officer’s factual finding—although it was—and,

therefore, never undertook an appropriate analysis. Instead,

the court simply ignored the administrative finding, which it

may not do. Id.

In addition to those independent and sufficient reasons to

reverse, the district court’s decision lacks support in the

record, its third reversible error. Overwhelming evidence,

including testimony, doctor’s records, and other documents,

demonstrate that T.A.’s parents enrolled T.A. at Mount Bachelor Academy both for reasons unrelated to his disabilities

and for reasons related to his disabilities. It came as no surprise that the Hearing Officer found that both reasons motivated T.A.’s parents. Indeed, the School District did not

dispute that factual finding before the Hearing Officer, before

the district court, before this court, or before the Supreme

Court. Even after we reiterated in our opinion the Hearing

Officer’s factual finding,1 the School District did not dispute

that finding in its petition for rehearing or in its petition for

certiorari.

One of the many documents supporting the Hearing Officer’s factual finding was the Mount Bachelor Academy application. When T.A.’s parents enrolled him at Mount Bachelor

Academy, his father completed an 18-page application regard1

I am puzzled by the majority’s assertion that I claim that we, the appellate court, made a finding of fact in our original opinion. Op. at 5468. We

did not. But we did state the undisputed fact that “the Hearing Officer

found” that the parents’ reasons were dual: related to T.A.’s disability and

unrelated to T.A.’s disability. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1089 (emphasis

added). 

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A. 5475
ing T.A. and his needs. The father’s responses make it crystal

clear that T.A.’s parents enrolled T.A. both for reasons unrelated to his disabilities and for reasons related to his disabilities. Concerning T.A.’s disabilities, his father stated on the

application that his son’s “learning difficulties” included “verbal processing [and] ADHD”; he stated that T.A. had been

diagnosed with “ADHD” and “verbal processing difficulty”;

and he stated that his “specific objectives” for T.A. included

“improved verbal processing skills” and “study habits.”

2

In reaching its conclusion that T.A.’s disabilities played no

role in the parents’ decision, the district court impermissibly

relied on only one answer, taken out of context. In response

to the one question that queried which “specific events precipitated enrollment to this program,” T.A.’s father listed only

reasons unrelated to T.A.’s disabilities; he did not state

“ADHD” or “school difficulties.” But viewing that response

in isolation makes no sense. As noted above, T.A.’s father

repeatedly expressed his desire, on the very same application

form, that the private school address T.A.’s ADHD and

school difficulties, including in his responses to the surrounding questions. And, also as noted above, numerous documents

and other evidence supported the Hearing Officer’s factual

finding.

Were the district court’s myopic focus on one response out

of dozens not already apparent from its factual finding concerning the parents’ reasons for enrollment, the court’s next

factual finding would remove all doubt. The district court

found that “T.A.’s father said nothing on the MBA application about the one ADHD symptom for which the School Dis2Those responses are not surprising. Months before enrollment at Mount

Bachelor Academy, T.A.’s parents had hired a doctor to evaluate T.A.’s

needs. As the Hearing Officer found, that doctor recommended that T.A.’s

parents send T.A. to Mount Bachelor Academy so that “he could work on

drug issues and school related issues and address both his ADHD and his

depression.” Hearing Officer’s Decision at 23 (emphases added). No one

has ever challenged that factual determination. 

5476 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A.
trict could be liable, T.A.’s trouble with his school work.”

Again, the record belies that finding. For example, T.A.’s

father stated on the application that T.A.’s “learning difficulties” included “has a hard time with math,” “tests poorly due

to speed,” “low working memory,” and “math disability”; and

his “specific objectives” for T.A. included “improved verbal

processing skills” and “study habits.” The district court

clearly erred.

The majority does not defend the district court’s finding on

its own terms. See op. at 5471-72. Rather, the majority

explains that the district court did not actually mean what it

plainly said—that “T.A.’s father said nothing on the MBA

application about the one ADHD symptom for which the District could be liable, T.A.’s trouble with his school work.”

(Emphasis added.) According to the majority, the district

court really meant that, “in response to one question on the

MBA application, T.A.’s father said nothing about the one

ADHD symptom for which the District could be liable, T.A.’s

trouble with his school work.” I cannot accept the majority’s

blatant revision of the district court’s opinion or its refusal to

address what the court in fact wrote.

In the final analysis, the only support for the district court’s

conclusion concerning the parents’ reasons is one response to

one question regarding the specific events that precipitated

enrollment, out of an 18-page application. The district court’s

reliance on the triggering event alone is a fourth reversible

error, this time another error of law.

A child may have a range of special needs stemming from

several sources, which might include lack of adequate parenting; inability to speak English; bullying class-mates; drug

abuse; anger; laziness; and physical disabilities. The events

that finally trigger a decision to send one’s child to private

school may or may not relate to the child’s disabilities. But

the fact that a particular event precipitates enrollment does not

negate the fact that the parents’ decision also is meant to

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A. 5477
address the child’s disability-related needs. This is particularly true when all of the evidence confirms that, although the

triggering events may not have related to disability, the parents undeniably chose a placement in order to meet the child’s

disability-related special needs.

This case presents an excellent example. For years, T.A.’s

parents sought special services under the IDEA for T.A. and,

for years, the School District refused to provide the required

services. T.A.’s disabilities and special needs went unmet, and

he performed poorly at school. Like many teenagers, while in

high school, T.A. began using marijuana, started getting into

trouble, and became defiant toward his parents. At wit’s end,

T.A.’s parents hired a doctor to evaluate all of T.A.’s needs.

T.A. then ran away from home for a few days. After that episode, the doctor concluded his evaluation and recommended

that T.A.’s parents send T.A. to Mount Bachelor Academy so

that “he could work on drug issues and school related issues

and address both his ADHD and his depression.” Hearing

Officer’s Decision at 23 (emphases added). One cannot fault

the parents for following their doctor’s considered recommendation.

It comes as no surprise, then, that T.A.’s father peppered

the Mount Bachelor Academy application with his desire to

treat T.A.’s disability and disability-related needs. It also

comes as no surprise that T.A.’s father listed as the triggering

events the facts that T.A. had run away from home and

abused drugs. It was those non-disability-related events that

ultimately triggered the decision to seek private placement,

but the parents expressly sought to meet their son’s disabilityrelated special needs as well—special needs that the School

District repeatedly had refused to provide. It is clear that

T.A.’s parents’ intentions were to meet all of T.A.’s needs:

not just his disability-related needs, but also not just his nondisability-related needs.

When the parents of a child face a recalcitrant school district that refuses even to acknowledge that it must provide ser5478 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A.
vices under the IDEA, and the child also has non-disabilityrelated special needs, what should the parents do? One lesson

to be learned from today’s majority decision is that it is much

safer if the parents seek treatment only for the child’s

disability-related needs. That conclusion runs entirely contrary to the spirit of the IDEA and to common sense. See C.B.

v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09-56588, 2011 WL

1108254 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2011). Alternatively, if the parents

prudently seek to address all of their child’s needs, they

would be wise to answer each and every question with the

response: “Disability.” Nothing in law or equity requires such

a formalistic approach. T.A.’s parents are to be commended,

not punished, for seeking to treat all of T.A.’s special needs.

They also should be commended, not punished, for responding honestly and accurately to the questions on the application

form, rather than concerning themselves with what might look

best to a reviewing court in later years.

Everyone agrees that the School District denied T.A. a free

appropriate public education; everyone agrees that T.A.’s

placement at Mount Bachelor Academy was proper; and

everyone agrees, as the district court found, that many equitable factors support reimbursement. Indeed, the district court

denied complete reimbursement only because of its view that

the parents’ reasons for enrollment was the “decisive factor.”

Because the district court’s analysis of that factor is clearly

incorrect, no equitable factors support the complete denial of

reimbursement. T.A.’s parents are entitled to reimbursement.3

The majority’s sanctioning of the contrary result under the

guise of deferential review is deeply disappointing.

3To be clear, the fact that the parents chose Mount Bachelor Academy

in part for reasons unrelated to T.A.’s disability, combined with the

school’s high cost, could support a reduction in reimbursement. But no

factor supports the complete denial of reimbursement altogether. 

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T.A. 5479