No. 02 € 3291 Page 4

Notably, the remedies sought in counts I and II are a declaratory judgment that LPI
is not in violation of 2 U.S.C. 434(a), and an order enjoining the FEC from enforcing the fine
against them respectively. Regardless of the legal theories argued in both counts, LPI is
essentially seeking a review of the FEC’s adverse determination and resulting civil penalty.
This brings the claims within the purview of 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(C)(iii), and as a result they are
subject to the 30-day statute of limitation.'

A separate issue is raised by LPI’s request to amend its complaint to include 2 U.S.C.
§ 437h as a basis for jurisdiction, and to include the additional allegation “that Stevens is an
individual eligible to vote for the office of President.” Section 437h states:

jA]ny individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of president may

institute such actions for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to

construe the constitutionality of any provision of the Act. The district court
immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act to the

United States court of appeals for the circuit involved, which shall hear the

matter sitting en banc.

If we were to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint, we would be certifying the question
of whether the FEC has jurisdiction over the types of funds reported in LPI’s 2001 mid-year
report. The Supreme Court addressed the question of the FEC’s reach in Buckley v. Veleo, 424
U.S.1 (1975). The Buckley court found that while compelling disclosure of contributions and
expenditures does potentially infringe on First Amendment rights, it is a constitutionally
permissible restriction in light ofthe government’s interest in curbing campaign ignorance and
corruption (Id. at 68). Notably, the Court’s holding addressed only the constitutionality of

monitoring federal campaign activity (id. at 13-14).

Plaintiffs argue that the FEC required them to report local and state activity outside

‘While not a basis for the holding in this case, we note that LP{ would face an additional challenge in
overcoming FEC’s affirmative defense of waiver since LPI did not contest the allegations against it after
receiving the “reason to believe” notice and before receiving the final determination notice.


No, 02 C 3291 Page3

DISCUSSION

Before reaching the substantive issues in these motions we must determine if plaintiffs’
claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Under the Federal Election
Campaign Act a party seeking judicial review of an FEC determination must file a complaint
in the district court “prior to the expiration of the 30-day period which begins on the date the
person receives notification of the determination.” 2 U.S.C. §437g(a)(4)(C)(iii). The notice of
final determination was received by an agent of LPI on April 6, 2002. Ifthe 30-day period in
which to file includes April 6, 2002, the date of receipt, then the 30-day period in which to file
ended on a Sunday, May 5, 2002, and LPI had until Monday, May 6, 2002, to bring this action.

LPI cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) to support its contention that it had one
extya day to bring this action, making its May 7,2002, filing timely. But LPI misreads the rule.
Under Rule 6(a), “{ijn computing any period of time prescribed or allowed...by any applicable
statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins
to run shall not be included.” Applying this rule to the statute of limitations at issue, the 30-day
limit would start the day after receipt of the notice, April 7, 2002, and end on Monday, May
6, 2002. The May 7, 2002, filing is still a day late.

LPI next argues that even if it is barred from challenging the FEC’s March 25, 2002
determination, it should still be allowed to bring the broader allegations in counts I and II
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In count I, LPI alleges that the FEC improperly asserted jurisdiction
over its funds, arguing that the committee was not involved in substantial federal activity
during the time period at issue. In count II, LPI alleges that the FEC violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and exceeded its statutory authority by requiring LPI to report non-

federal activity.


No. 02 C 3291 Page 5

the permissible scope of Buckley. But the mid-year report on its face only requires the LPI,
and all party committees, to report federal contributions and disbursements. The one
exception is the reporting of shared federal/non-federal operating expenditures, but thisis then
broken up to determine what percentage of that amount constitutes federal activity. These
requirements remain in the constitutional parameters set by Buckley. If the LPI erroneously
included non-federal activity in its mid-year report, this mistake should have been brought to
the attention of the FEC after receipt of the November 5, 2001, “reason to believe” notice.
Similarly, if the LPI wanted to contest the disbursement amount attributed as federal activity,
and then used to calculate the civil penalty, this should have been done through the
administrative process. We deny plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint to include a
challenge to the application of a provision of the FECA, which has already been blessed by the
Supreme Court. See generally Cal. Medical Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 192, n. 13, 14 (1981).
Ifthe LPI is looking for prospective relief from the FEC’s reporting requirements that involve
mixed funds, then under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 it is required to bring
its claims to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 2 U.S.C. § 437h
NOTE, 116 Stat. 81, 113 (March 27, 2002).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, FEC’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary

judgment, is granted, and plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed.

JAMES 8. MORAN
ior Judge, U. S. District Court

hese S_, 2003.


At Onder Form (06/97)

(9)

/y Bo United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge Hn e
or Magistrate Judge James B. Moran “than Asipned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 3291 DATE 6/5/2003
CASE William J. Stevens etc. et al. Vs. Federal Election Commission
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.]

a)

alternative, for summary judgment, is granted, and plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment is

denied. Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed.

z [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

MOTION:
Memorandum Opinion and Order
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due.
(3) a Answer brief to motion due__. Reply to answer brief due___
(4) q Ruling/Hearingon___ssetfor___at
(5) QO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor___—_at
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_ssetfor__— ss at__
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on___at
(8) (a) [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued toa
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
CFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41{a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
(ao) «xf {Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. FEC’s motion to dismiss or, in the

No notices required, advised in open court,

No notices required. number of notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff, BUN 9.6 200
Notified counsel by telephone. de docketed
wv | Docketing to mail notices.
Y_ | Mail AO 450 form LYNOI LOMLSIa’s'y doctaingllpuy
Copy to judge/magisteate judge. URER)
courtroom 60:4 Wd S- Nr eu date maid notice
WAH deputy's
initials 43-4444
oF gag Received
central Clerk’s Office ‘nuiling deputy initials



HOT
HECKETED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUN 0 6 2003
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
WILLIAMS J. STEVENS, former Treasurer

of the Libertarian Party of Illinois, and the

)
LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF ILLINOIS, }
Plaintiffs, }

vs. } No. 02 C 3291

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, }

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, the Libertarian Party of Illinois (LPI) and its former treasurer, William J.
Stevens, bring this action against defendant, the Federal Election Commission (FEC),
contesting a civil penalty assessed against them. The FEC moves to dismiss or, alternatively,
for summary judgment, and plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment. For the following
reasons, the FEC’s motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiffs’ motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

On June 22, 2001, the FEC sent a notice to All Party Committees giving directions re
electronic filing of reports and reminding all committee treasurers that they must file a 2001
mid-year report of receipts and disbursements by July 31, 2001 (Certified Admin. Record (CAR)
tab 1), On August 20, 2001, the FEC sent a letter to Stevens informing him that LPI missed
the due date by which to file and that its failure to file a timely report could result in a civil
money penalty (CAR tab 2). LPI filed its 2001 mid-year report on September 21, 2001 (CAR
tab 3), The report states that LPI received $57,434.19 in contributions and transfers during

the first half of 2001 and lists the sum of these receipts under “Total Federal Receipts” (id. at

20



No. 02 € 3291 Page 2

AROOIO). LPI also reported that it disbursed a total of $51,321.49, $16,551.04 of which is
delineated as federal disbursements (id. at AROO1)).

On November 2, 2001, the FEC found that there was reason to believe that LPI violated
2U.S.C, § 434(a) by failing to timely file its mid-year report. It sent a mailgram to Stevens and
LPI on November 5, 2001, informing them of this finding (CAR tab 6). The letter states that
LPI’s level of financial activity for the time period at issue was $108,755 (LPI’s reported
receipts and disbursements) and categorizes the activity as not election-sensitive, It projects
that LPI will have to pay a civil penalty of $7,875, based on those estimates. The letter further
states that LPI should pay the civil penalty or challenge the finding by December 12, 2001, and
that if no response is made the FEC will assume that the allegations included in the letter are
true and make a final determination accordingly, Stevens signed for the letter on November
T, 2001 (id. at AR0063).

On March 25, 2002, the FEC made a final determination that LPI violated 2 U.S.C. §
434(a) and assessed a penalty. According to the FEC, a notice of this determination was sent
by mailgram to LPI on March 27, 2002. The notice includes much of the same information as
contained in the November 5, 2001 letter, and again sets a deadline by which to respond:

If you choose to appeal the final determination, you should submit a written

petition, within 30 days of receipt of this letter to the district court of the United

States...requesting that the final determination be modified or set aside. See 2

U.S.C. 437g(a)(4)(C) (iii). Your failure to raise an argument in a timely fashion

during the administrative process shall be deemed a waiver of the respondent’s

right to present such argument in a petition to the district court under 2 U.S.C.

437g. 11 C.F.R. 111.38,

This notice was received at the LPY address on April 6, 2002, and signed for by Julia Fox,

LPI’s assistant treasurer at the time (CAR Tab 9, ARO076). LPI brought this suit on May 7,

2002, seeking relief from the determination.