Filed 2/25/22 In re King B. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re King B., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

_____________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Cedric B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B312472

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00964AB)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner. 

Affirmed. 

Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,

Assistant County Counsel and William D. Thetford, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

_________________________

Cedric B. (father) appeals from an April 23, 2021 order of 

the juvenile court that adjudicated two of father’s children

juvenile court dependents, granted the children’s mother full 

physical and joint legal custody, and permitted father to have 

only monitored visits with the children. Father contends the 

juvenile court erred in requiring his visits to be monitored

because there was no substantial evidence that unsupervised 

visits would be detrimental to the children. We find no error, and 

thus we will affirm the order in full.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

King B. (born in May 2014) and Ka.B (born in August 2015) 

are the children of father and S.H. (mother). Prior to these 

proceedings, father and mother did not live together, but had an 

informal shared custody arrangement. 

Father has four other children with different mothers: 

Ka’M.B (date of birth and mother unknown); Ki.B. (born in 2008), 

whose mother is Chanelle C.; and twins Mar.B. and Mas.B. (born 

in February 2014), whose mother is T.T. The present appeal 

concerns only King and Ka.

Father had several contacts with the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) prior to this 

proceeding. In May 2009, father and Chanelle C. entered into a 

voluntary family maintenance plan following extensive incidents 

of domestic violence, including during Chanelle’s pregnancy with 

Ki. In October 2016, father was arrested for driving under the 

influence with two of his children and his niece in the car. And in

February 2018, T.T. reported that father had pushed her onto the 

bed and put his hand over her neck during an argument. The 
3

incident ended only when one of the couple’s young children came 

into the room and began yelling at father.

A. Present Investigation

The family came to DCFS’s attention on February 27, 

2021,1 when father was detained by law enforcement after a 

domestic violence incident with his girlfriend, T.S. 

Law enforcement reported that father had punched T.S. in the 

face and then strangled her for approximately a minute. T.S.’s 

children pushed their way into the room and hit father until he 

let go of T.S. Father was arrested, and King and Ka.B. were 

taken into protective custody. Because father refused to provide 

any information about their mother, the children were placed in 

foster care for several days. They were released to mother on 

March 4.

A children’s social worker (CSW) interviewed father, who 

insisted that he had not been the aggressor in the domestic 

violence incident. He denied hitting or strangling T.S., and said 

T.S. had “set it all up.”

Five-year-old Ka. said she had witnessed the incident 

between father and T.S. Ka. said father was “fighting” with T.S., 

and T.S. had grabbed a knife from the kitchen. Ka. said she had 

been scared by the fighting. Six-year-old King said he heard the 

fighting but did not see it. When King walked out of his bedroom, 

father told him to leave the house. King was frightened and 

walked alone to a near-by store. 

T.T., the mother of father’s six-year-old twins, said she 

previously had had a restraining order against father. Although 

1 All subsequent dates are in 2021 unless otherwise 

indicated.
4

the restraining order no longer was in place, T.T. did not allow 

the children to see father alone.

B. Petition; Detention

DCFS filed a juvenile dependency petition on March 2. It 

alleged that the children were juvenile court dependents 

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300, 

subdivisions (a) and (b), because father and T.S. had a history of 

engaging in violent altercations in the children’s presence, and 

father recently had struck T.S. in the face and choked her. The

domestic violence between father and T.S. was alleged to create 

an endangering home environment for the children. 

On March 8, 2021, the juvenile court ordered the children 

detained from father and placed with mother under DCFS 

supervision. Father was granted monitored visits with the 

children after his release from custody.

C. Jurisdiction and Disposition 

In April 2021, mother asked DCFS not to interview the 

children. She explained that King was having nightmares and 

difficulty sleeping, and she did not want Ka. to have to relive the 

incident.

DCFS reported that mother was providing a stable and 

loving home environment for the children, and both children 

appeared to be doing well in her care. Father had not contacted 

mother or DCFS to arrange visits with the children. DCFS 

recommended that the court terminate its jurisdiction with a 

family law order giving mother sole physical and joint legal 

custody of the children, with father to have monitored visits.

2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
5

At the April 23 jurisdiction/disposition hearing, father’s 

counsel asked the court to dismiss both counts of the petition, 

urging that father no longer was in a relationship with T.S., and 

thus that there was no risk of future domestic violence between 

them. Father’s counsel also requested that mother and father be 

granted joint physical custody of the children or, in the 

alternative, father be granted nine hours per week of 

unmonitored visitation.

The children’s counsel asked the court to sustain the 

allegations of the petition, urging that the violence between 

father and T.S. had been significant and both children had been 

traumatized. County counsel agreed, noting that the children 

were very young, the level of violence between father and T.S.

had been significant, and father had not addressed any of the 

case issues since being released from jail a month earlier. 

County counsel further asked that father be ordered to 

participate in counseling and a 26-week domestic violence 

program.

The court sustained both counts of the petition, noting that 

the domestic violence had been recent, recurring, and 

traumatizing for the children. The court further found that 

mother was nonoffending and the children were safe in her care. 

The court therefore declared the children juvenile court 

dependents and ordered them removed from father. It then 

entered an exit order that granted mother sole physical and joint 

legal custody of both children, granted father nine hours per 

week of monitored visitation, ordered father to complete domestic 

violence and individual counseling, and terminated juvenile court 

jurisdiction. Father timely appealed.
6

DISCUSSION

Father contends the juvenile court erred by denying him 

unmonitored visitation. For the reasons that follow, father’s 

contention lacks merit.

I.

Legal Standards

A. Section 362.4

The order at issue (sometimes referred to as an “exit order”) 

was entered pursuant to section 362.4, which provides that when 

a juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction, it may enter orders 

“determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.” 

(§ 362.4, subd. (a); In re Roger S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 25, 30.) 

Such an order may be transferred to a family court file, and it 

remains in effect until modified or terminated by the superior 

court. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 203; § 362.4.) 

Father asserts without analysis that the juvenile court’s 

exit order necessarily was predicated on a finding that 

unmonitored visitation would be “detrimental” to the children, 

which finding father contends was not supported by substantial 

evidence. But nothing in section 362.4 requires a juvenile court 

to order unmonitored visitation in the absence of a finding of 

detriment. Indeed, while section 362.4 directs courts to make 

custody and visitation orders upon terminating dependency 

jurisdiction, it does not set out any standards governing the 

terms of such orders. (See § 362.4.)3 

3 None of the cases father cites suggests that the juvenile 

court was required to make a “detriment” finding in the context 

of an exit order entered pursuant to section 362.4. Significantly, 

each of the cited cases arose under sections of the Welfare and 

Institutions Code that expressly require a finding of detriment. 
7

In the absence of a statutory directive, appellate courts 

have held that when making exit orders under section 362.4, 

“ ‘the [juvenile] court’s focus and primary consideration must 

always be the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re T.S. (2020) 

52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513, italics added, quoting In re Nicholas H. 

For example, In re A.J. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 154, 158–159

reviewed an order entered pursuant to section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(4)(C), which provides that if a child is placed into 

permanent guardianship, the juvenile court “shall also make an 

order for visitation with the parents . . . unless the court finds by 

a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be 

detrimentalto the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” 

(Italics added.) Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 

36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763 and In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 

960, 962 considered orders entered pursuant to section 366.21, 

which provides that at a status review hearing, a dependent child 

shall be returned to the parent’s physical custody unless the 

court finds “that the return of the child to his or her parent or 

legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the 

safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the 

child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1), italics added.) Finally, several 

other cases considered orders entered pursuant to section 362.1, 

which provides that while a dependency proceeding remains 

open, a parent shall be denied visitation only if such “shall 

jeopardize the safety of the child.” (Italics added; see In re C.C. 

(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491; In re Dylan T. (1998) 

65 Cal.App.4th 765, 770; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 

573, 580.) Because none of these cases concerns the statute at 

issue in this case, none supports father’s contention that the 

juvenile court was required to make a finding of detriment in 

order to require that father’s visitation be monitored. (See In re 

C.C., at p. 1492 [juvenile court order must be “tethered to the 

statutory directive”].)
8

(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268; accord, In re John W. (1996) 

41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973 [“in making exit orders, the juvenile 

court must look at the best interests of the child”]; In re 

Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 712 [upon terminating its 

jurisdiction, juvenile court shall make custody and visitation 

determinations “based on the best interests of the child without 

any preferences or presumptions”].) We will presume the 

juvenile court applied that standard in the present case. (See 

People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361 [“In the absence of 

evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and 

applies the correct statutory and case law.’ ”].)

B. Standard of Review

Father contends there is a split of authority concerning the 

standard of appellate review applicable in this appeal. According 

to father, some cases have applied an abuse of discretion 

standard, while others have applied the substantial evidence test. 

Father urges us to apply the latter standard, contending that it 

relies on “reasonable, credible solid evidence,” rather than on a 

juvenile court’s “subjective, albeit well-intended” exercise of 

discretion. 

In so contending, father misapprehends the relevant

standards of review. A discretionary determination by a trial 

court—here, the juvenile court’s custody and visitation order—is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 

26 Cal.4th 249, 255; K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, 979.) 

That review, however, has several components. As our Supreme 

Court has explained: “ ‘[T]he trial court’s findings of fact are 

reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are 

reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is 
9

reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ” (Gaines v. Fidelity 

National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1100.)

Our Supreme Court recently described the interplay of 

these standards in the context of a discretionary determination

under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The high court 

explained that while the factual components of the juvenile 

court’s findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, the 

juvenile court’s ultimate determination—that is, its “delicate 

balancing of these determinations as part of assessing the likely 

course of a future situation that’s inherently uncertain”—is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (In re Caden C. (2021) 

11 Cal.5th 614, 640.) Although “the practical difference between 

the standards is not likely to be very pronounced, . . . [a]t its core, 

[this] hybrid standard . . . simply embodies the principle that 

‘[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a reviewing court to 

substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child’s best 

interests for the trial court’s determination in that regard, 

reached pursuant to the statutory scheme’s comprehensive and 

controlling provisions.’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)

Applying this standard to the juvenile court’s 

determination in the present case, we will review the juvenile 

court’s decision to grant father monitored visitation for an abuse 

of discretion. To the extent that determination requires factual 

findings, we will review such findings for substantial evidence.

II.

The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by 

Denying Father Unmonitored Visitation

Father contends the trial court erred by denying him 

unmonitored visitation with the children. As we discuss, 

substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion 
10

that unmonitored visitation was not in the children’s best 

interests, and thus the court did not abuse its discretion by 

ordering monitored visitation.

We begin by noting that father’s opening brief significantly 

misstates the substantial evidence standard of review. As our 

Supreme Court recently explained: “In reviewing factual 

determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should 

‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or 

resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ (In re Dakota H. (2005) 

132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) The [juvenile court’s] determinations 

should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even 

though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the 

trial court might have reached a different result had it believed 

other evidence.’ (Ibid.; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 

2020) Appeal, § 365.)” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 640, italics added.)

Father’s contention that “the substantial evidence standard 

amounts to a contention that” the “ ‘undisputed facts lead to only 

one conclusion’ ” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1529

(I.W.), disapproved of on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. 

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, fn. 4) takes the quoted language 

significantly out of context. I.W. concerned a parent’s challenge 

to an order terminating parental rights. The parent contended, 

among other things, that the juvenile court erred in terminating 

parental rights because substantial evidence supported her 

contention that the child was not likely to be adopted. (Id. at 

p. 1525.) In rejecting this contention, the Court of Appeal 

explained that because the mother was challenging a juvenile 

court’s factual finding, that finding must be affirmed if supported 

by substantial evidence, and thus could be reversed only if “the 
11

evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of 

law”—that is, “where undisputed facts lead to only one 

conclusion.” (Id. at pp. 1528, 1529.)

As applied in the present case, the standard articulated in 

I.W. permits reversal of the exit order only if the juvenile court’s 

findings are not supported by substantial evidence—or, stated 

differently, if the undisputed facts compel the conclusion that 

requiring monitored visits between father and the children is not 

in the children’s best interests. No such undisputed evidence 

appears here. As discussed above, the evidence before the court 

demonstrated that father engaged in an act of extreme violence 

against his girlfriend in the presence of his two young children. 

That violence traumatized both children, causing King to have 

nightmares and difficulty sleeping, and led to father’s arrest and 

the children’s placement in foster care. Father showed no 

remorse for his conduct, insisting that he had not been the 

aggressor in the domestic violence incident. Further, he failed to

address any of the case issues by participating in counseling or 

domestic violence classes upon his release from jail. 

The incident of domestic violence between father and T.S., 

moreover, was not an isolated event. Father had a history of 

domestic violence with his romantic partners: In 2009, father

engaged in domestic violence against Chanelle C., the mother of 

Ki.B.; and in 2018, he was involved in another incident of 

domestic violence with T.T, the mother of father’s twins. The 

incident with T.T., moreover, was strikingly like the one reported 

by T.S.: According to T.T., father had pushed her onto the bed 

and put his hands around her neck. That incident, like the 

incident at issue here, ended only when children present in the 

home intervened. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court
12

was well within its discretion in concluding that it was in the 

children’s best interests that visits with father remain monitored. 

Father contends that the trial court erred in finding that 

unmonitored visitation would be detrimental to the children 

because father was no longer romantically involved with T.S. and 

had no intention of resuming a relationship with her. As an 

initial matter, the only evidence that father and T.S. no longer 

were involved was father’s own representation to DCFS—a 

representation the juvenile court was not required to accept. 

Moreover, even if father and T.S. had separated,their separation 

did not require the court to conclude that the children no longer 

would be exposed to domestic violence. As we have described, 

father had a history of domestic violence with many of his 

romantic partners; the juvenile court therefore could reasonably 

have concluded that a similar incident of domestic violence, 

either with T.S. or a future partner, was likely to occur in the 

future. (See In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 576, 

overruled on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 

9 Cal.5th at p. 1003, fn. 4 [“ ‘[P]ast violent behavior in a 

relationship is “the best predictor of future violence.” Studies 

demonstrate that once violence occurs in a relationship, the use 

of force will reoccur in 63% of these relationships. . . . Even if a 

batterer moves on to another relationship, he will continue to use 

physical force as a means of controlling his new partner.’ ”].)

Father next contends that the incident of domestic violence 

did not place the children at risk of harm because he never 

intentionally hurt them. It is well established, however, that 

“ ‘[d]omestic violence in the same household where children are 

living . . . is a failure to protect [the children] from the 

substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering 
13

serious physical harm or illness from it.’ ” (In re E.B., supra, 

184 Cal.App.4th at p. 576; In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 

183, 194 [same].) Children can be “ ‘put in a position of physical 

danger from [domestic partner] violence’ because, ‘for example, 

they could wander into the room where it was occurring and be 

accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, foot or 

leg. . . .’ ” (In re E.B., at p. 576.) Domestic violence between 

parents also can create psychological distress for children, as 

occurred in the present case. 

Father also contends that the monitored visitation order 

was unjustified because the children were not afraid of him and 

wished to continue spending time with him. That the children 

did not express fear of father is not determinative: The decisive

issue, as we have said, is the children’s best interests, as 

measured by their physical and psychological well-being. The 

juvenile court properly concluded that it was reasonably likely 

that father would engage in future domestic violence in the 

children’s presence, endangering both their physical and 

psychological health.

Father contends, finally, that the visitation order was 

erroneous because “robust visitation” is essential to maintaining 

a bond between parent and child. The cases father cites for this 

proposition, however, addressed the frequency of visitation 

between parents and children—not whether such visits should be 

monitored or unmonitored.
14

DISPOSITION

The April 23, 2021 order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

*

*

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.