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# United States Court of Appeals Forthe Seventh Cir c uit

No. 17-2816

U NI T E D S TAT E S OF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

L AUR AN C E H. F RE E D, Defendant-Appellant.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the No rthern Di stri ct o f Il l i no i s, Ea stern Di v i s i o n. N o . 1 3 CR0 0 9 5 1 — Robe rt M. Dow, Jr. , Jud g e.

A RGU E D F E B R

UAR Y 7, 2019

— D E C I D E D A PRI L 22, 2019

Befor e B AU E R

, H AMI L TON

, and B RE N NAN

, Circuit Judges

. B AU E R , Cir cuit Judge. It appear s that Laur ance Fr eed di d
ev er ythi ng he c ould to keep hi s r eal estate bus iness ali v e. Unfor tunately for Fr eed, much of that w as i llegal. Fr eed l i ed to pr ospecti v e lender s about the av a il abi li ty of c ollater al and to
ensur e those lender s r emain e d in the dar k about numer ous defaults, he l ie d to the Ci ty of Chi cago. The gov er nment also2 No. 17-2816
pr ov e d that Fr eed enter ed into loan a gr eements wi th no intenti on of abi ding by thei r ter m s. W e affi rm Fr eed’s conv i cti ons f o r b ank fraud (18 U.S .C. § 1344); m ai l fr aud (18 U.S

. C. § 1341); wi r e fr aud (18 U.S .C

. § 1343); and making false statements to a fi nanci al insti tuti on (18 U.S .C. § 1014) .

I. BACKGROUND Laur ance Fr eed w a s the pr esi dent a nd chi ef executi v e offi cer of Joseph Fr eed and As s o c i ates (“JFA”), a r eal estate d e v e lopment company
. Fr eed also cr eated and manage d
sev er a l r eal estate v entur es including Uptown Goldblatts V ent u r e, LLC (“UGV”). UGV w as r esponsi ble for dev elopi ng
a bui lding in the Uptown nei ghbor hood a nd secur ed tax incr ement financing (“TIF”) fr om the Ci ty of Chi c ago to fund the pr oj ect in 2 002. T

ax incr ement financing i s a mechani sm for fundin g pr oj ects appr ov ed by the Chi cago Ci ty Counsel. After i denti fying a r egi on in n e ed, the ci ty assesses the pr oper ty taxes collected in that ar ea a nd fr eezes the deter m ined amount in place

. T

a x e s c ollected in subsequent y ear s that exceed that amount ar e funneled into the TIF pr ogr am. The c i ty i ssued tw o TIF notes that enti t l ed UGV to the payment of TIF funds: a
r ed e v e lopment note for $4.3 m i lli on and pr oj ect note for $2.4 mi lli on. UGV w as requi r ed to fi l e an a nnual r e qu i s it i on for m wi th the ci ty that cer ti fi ed, among other things, i t w as not in default on any loans and i t had n ot ent e r e d i n t o any tr ansacti ons that w ould har m i ts abi li ty to meet i ts f in anci al obli gati ons. If an y e v e n t of default occur r ed, the ci ty w ould be di schar ged of i ts obli g a t io n t o p r ov i de UGV wi th TIF payments.No. 17-2816 3
Fr eed obtai n ed a loan fr om Cole T aylor Bank in 2002 that

w a s secur ed in par t by the $ 2.4 mi lli on pr oj ect note. Thi s agr eement pr ov i ded that attachment of any secur i ty inter est or li en to the collater al used t o secur e the loan w ould c onsti tute
an ev ent of default. In 2006, tw o other Fr ee d enti ti es enter ed into a loan agr eement wi th a b ank co n s or ti um for a $105 mi lli on line of
cr edi t. The p ar ti es r efer r ed to thi s as “the b i g line of cr edi t,” as shall w e. T

o s ecur e thi s loan they pledged as c ollater a l pr oper ti es known as the Ev anston P l aza and the Str eets of W oodfi eld, and Fr eed per s onally guar anteed $50 m i l li on of the l oan. UGV subsequently enter ed into an agr eement to become a bor r ow er under the bi g l ine of cr edi t and p ledged the $2.4 m i l li on pr oj ect note as collater a l. UGV repr esented that i t owned the note fr ee of any encumbr ances despi te the fact that the TIF not e w as alr eady pledged to Cole T aylor

. In August 2 008, a r epr esentati v e fr om Cole T

aylor sent an emai l to Fr eed r emin ding hi m the pr oj ect note w as collater al in thei r sti ll-outstanding 2002 loan. Fr eed for w ar ded thi s emai l to JFA’s lawy er who infor med hi m that the pr oj ect note w as double-pledged—once to Cole T aylor and once for access to the bi g line of cr edi t. Thi s consti tuted an
ev ent of default underthe Cole T aylor loan agr eement. By f all of 2008, Fr eed ha d w it hdr a wn m i lli ons of dollar s fr om the S tr eets of W

oodfi eld to meet the ongoi ng f in anci al obli gati ons of hi s v ar i ous pr oper ti es and p r oj ects. Opposed to thi s tacti c and ci ti ng concer ns that thes e wi thdr aw als w ould leav e them un a b l e to meet pr oper ty tax obli gati ons, the chi ef financi al offi cer of JFA r esi gned. JFA f ai led t o m ake i ts payment on the bi g l ine of c r e d it in Nov ember 2008, a n ev ent of default on thi s loan. Appr oxi mately $900,000 in taxes w er e due4 No. 17-2816

o n t h e Ev anston Plaza pr oper ty in Nov ember whi ch went unpai d as well. Fr eed sought a $10 mi lli on l oan modi fi ca t i o n fr om a b ank
consor tium to addr ess these i ssues. Fr eed g a v e p r esentati ons to the bank consor ti um on December 15, 2008, and Januar y 20, 2009. Dur ing these pr esentati ons Fr eed pr esented sli des that contained thr ee potenti al l y fr a udulent statements. Th e fi r st indi cated that the S tr eets of W oodfi eld could ser v e as c ollater al for the loan modi fi cati on, but fai l ed to explain that a p p r oxi

mately $3.6 mi lli on had been w ithdr awn fr om the pr oper ty

. S econd, a s li de indi cated the Ev anston Plaza p r oper ty could
ser v e as collater al for the l oan modi fi cati on, but fai led to aler t the consor ti um of the $900,000 in unpai d taxes. Finally , a sli de indi cated the p r oj ect note w as av a il ab le to ser v e as c ollater al and w or th $2.4 mi lli on. In tr uth, the pr oj ect note w a s w or thless to the consor tium since i t w as a lr eady ser ving a s collater al for tw o di ffer ent loans. Fur ther m or e, the p ayments alr eady m ade by the ci ty had decr eased the v alue of the pr oj ect note to $2.1 mi lli on. Bank of Amer i ca w as wi lling to pr ov i de the loan m odi fi cati on and Fr eed s i g n e d t he agr eement on Apr i l 2, 2009. The agr eement p r ohibi ted wi thdr a w al of funds fr om the S tr eets of W oodfi eld unless the money that r emained w i th the enti ty w as suffi ci ent to cov er pr oper ty tax paym e nt s an d secur i ty d eposi ts for all tenants. When Fr eed si gned the a gr eement the S tr eets of W oodfi eld had only $19,000 i ni ts r eser v es, a tax obli gati on of

ar ound $4 mi lli on p er y ear , and sev er al tenants wi th secur i ty deposi ts. The next day , when funds wer e di str ibuted to the S tr ee t s of W

oodfi eld, Fr eed i mmedi ately wi thdr ew $273,000No. 17-2816 5
and in the following w eeks made sev en wi t h dr aw als totali ng
ar ound $1.3 mi lli on. S hor tly ther eafter

, Cole T aylor sought t o amend the UGV loan and di scov er ed the pr oj ect note had been double pledged. Cole T a ylor dr afted an amendment that stated F r e ed w ould obtai n a r e l e a s e of the pr oj ect note fr om Bank of Amer i ca b y October 2009. One of Fr eed’s associ ates a t a meeti n g wi th Cole T aylor r epr esented that UGV w as alr eady in talks wi th Bank of Ame r ica to obtai n a r elease. But Fr eed n ev er di scussed the

r elease wi th Bank of Amer i ca and they fai led to ev en d i s cov er the double pledge unti l 2010. The final par t of Fr eed’s scheme w as the annual r equi si ti on for ms he pr ov i ded the ci ty pur suant to the TIF note agr eement, whi ch r equi r ed hi m to cer ti fy UGV w a s not in default on any loans. F r e ed clai med none of hi s enti ti es w er e in default in si gned affi dav i ts he pr ov i ded the c i ty in D e c ember of 2008, 2009, and 2010, in or der to conti nue r ecei v ing TIF payments. A jur y c onv i cted Fr eed on thr ee bank fr aud counts, one mai l fr aud count, and four false-statement counts. On a ppeal, Fr eed makes tw o pr inci pal ar guments. Fr eed asser ts tw o j ur y instr ucti ons w er e incor r ect and ther e w a s insuffi ci ent ev i dence for sev er al of hi s conv i cti ons. W e di s a gr ee and affi r m. II. ANAL

YSIS A. Jury Instructions Befor e w e r e a ch t he mer i ts of Fr eed’s appeal, w e m ust deter mine whether w ai v er i s appr opr i ate because Fr eed fai led to obj ect to the assai led instr ucti ons at the j ur y in s t r ucti on confer ence. W

ai v er i s often the r esult when a par ty fai ls to6 No. 17-2816 obj ect, but r ecently w e hav e acknowledged the har shness of thi s r ule ma y b e inappr opr i a te i f i t appear s counsel mer ely “negli gently bypassed a v ali d ar gument r ather than [making]

a knowin g intenti onal deci si on.” United States v
. Pust, 798 F .3d 597, 602 (7th Ci r
. 2 015) (quoting United States v
. Natale, 719 F .3d 719, 729–30 (7th Ci r
. 2013)). “The touchstone of w ai v er i s a knowing and intenti onal deci si on.” United States v
. A l-Aw adi, 8 7 3 F .3d 592, 597 (7th Ci r
. 2017). When i t appear s a r eflexi v e “no obj ecti on” r esponse w as gi v en dur ing a r ote colloquy wi th the di s tr i ct cour t, w e may examine the r ecor d to deter mine whether the obj ecti on w as for fei ted rather than w ai v ed. Natale, 719 F .3d at 730 –31. The necessi ty of r ev i ew may also ar i se absent an obj ecti on i f the j ur y instr ucti on “in accur ately state[d] t he l a w by mini m i zing or omi tti ng elements r equi r ed for
conv i cti on.” Id. at 731. The r ecor d demonstr ates th a t t h e j ur y instr ucti on confer

ence w as anythi ng but an exer ci se in the r eflexi v e. The fai lur e to obj ect w as not par t of a ser i e s o f call-and-r esponse “no obj ecti ons,” but occur r ed betw een in -depth di scuss io ns of other instr u cti ons. If thi s i s n ot w ai v er , appellant has for fei ted these ar guments and w e must r ev i ew for plain er r or
. Because t h e defendant could not meet h i s b ur den, ev en under p l a i n
er r or r ev i ew

, w e need not deci de the w a i v er i ssue. Thi s cou r t w i ll find plain er r or i f the defendant can establi sh ( 1 ) a n er r or or defect, ( 2) the er r or i s clear or obv i ous and no t subj ect to r easonable di spute, (3) the er r or affected substanti al

r i ghts, a nd (4) the er r or ser i ously a ffects the fai rness, integr i ty , or publi c r eputati on of j udi ci al pr oceedings. United Stat e s v
. Navarro , 817 F .3d 494, 4 9 9 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 15). If the defendantNo. 17-2816 7

meets thi s hi gh bar

, thi s Cour t, in i ts di scr et io n, may r emedy the er r or
. United States v
. Ajayi, 8 0 8 F

. 3 d 1113, 1122 (7th Ci r
. 2015); Puckett v

. United States , 556 U.S . 129, 135 (2009)). P a tter n instr ucti ons ar e p r esumed to accur ately state the law

. United States v
. M arr

, 7 60 F

. 3d 733, 744 (7th Ci r
. 2014). Fr eed assai ls S ev enth Ci r cui t P atter n Jur y Instr u cti on § 5.06, whi ch cov er s the cr i minal li abi li ty of pr inci pals codi f ie d a t 18 U.S .C. § § 2 ( a) and (b). See P atter n Cr i minal Jur y Instr ucti ons of t h e S ev enth Ci r cui t § 5 .06, at 64 ( 2 012). The instr ucti on th e di str i ct co ur t gav e mi r r or ed § 5 .06(a): “Any per son who knowingly ai ds; counsels; commands; induces; or pr ocur es the commi s si on of an offense may be found gui l ty of that offense i f he knowingly par ti ci p ated i n the cr i minal acti v i ty and tr i ed to make i t succeed.” 1
A per son i s li ab le for ai din g and abetti ng a cr i me i f he takes

an affi r mati v e act in fur ther ance of that offense wi th the intent of faci l i tati ng commi ssi o n of the offense. Rosemond v
. United States , 572 U.S

. 65, 7 1 (2014) (ci tin g Central Bank of Denver , N.A.
v
. First Interstate Bank of Denver , N.A. , 511 U.S

. 164, 1 81 (1994)). Addi ti onally

, i t i s axi omati c t h a t one cannot ai d and abet a
cr i me unless a cr i me w as actually commi tted. See United States
v. Motley , 940 F .2d 1079 (7th Ci r . 1991). Fr eed latches onto thi s
r equi r ement and asser ts the d i s tr i ct cour t’s ai ding and abetti ng instr ucti on w a s defi ci ent because i t di d n ot r equi r e the j ur y to find a cr i me w a s actually commi tted. But the di str i ct cour t instr ucted the j ur y that the defendant must hav e “knowingly

1 Secti o n 2 (a ), sta tes tha t “ [w]ho ev er co mmi ts a n o ffense a ga i nst the U ni ted S ta tes o r a i ds, ab ets, co u nsel s, co mmands, induces o r pro cures its co mmi ssi o n, i s puni shab l e a s apri nci pa l .” 1 8 U .S .C. § 2 (a ).8 No. 17-2816
par ti ci pated in the criminal activity ” to be found gui lty of ai ding and abetti ng. T

ranscr i pt at 2162 ( e mphasi s a dded). The

r equi r eme n t that the d efendant knowingly p ar ti c i pated in “cr i minal acti v i ty” logi cally r equi r es u n d er lyi ng cr i minal act iv ity

. Ther efor e, ev en though the di s tr i ct cour t d i d not expli ci tly explai n an under l yi n g cr i me w a s r equi r ed to suppor t
an ai d in g and abetti ng conv i cti on, i t w a s suffic ie ntly i mpli ed by the i nstr ucti on. The “wi llfully causing” patter n instr ucti on cor r esponds to 18 U.S

. C. § 2 (b), whi ch states, “Whoev er w illfully causes a n act to be done wh i ch i f di r ectly per for med by hi m or another

w ould be a n offense agai nst the Uni ted S tates, i s puni shable as
a pr in ci pal.” The di str i ct c our t in s t r ucted: “If the defendant knowingly causes the acts of another then t h e defendant i s
r esponsi ble for those acts as though he p er sonally commi tted them.” 2 The d i ffer e n c e b etw een the use of wi llfully in the statute and knowin gly in the j ur y instr ucti ons i s obv i ously pr oblemati c. How ev er

, w e fin d no indi cati on in the r ecor d that the j ur y
r eli ed u pon the ai d ing and abetti ng or the wi llfully causing instr ucti on. The gov er nment di d not adv ance a theor y at tr i al that Fr eed w as assi sting in thi s scheme or wi l lfull y c a using other people to per for m cr i minal acts in fu r t h er a nce of hi s scheme. Rather

, the g o ve rnm e nt r e p e atedly a sser ted Fr eed w as in char ge of the whole oper ati on. They asser ted he w as th e

2 The di stri ct co urt si mpl y a do pted the pa ttern i n s tructi o ns whi ch i ncl ude the inco rrect mens rea
. S ecti o n 5.0 6 (b ) sta t es tha t “ [i ]f a defenda n t kno wi ngl y ca u ses the a cts o f a no ther, then the defenda nt i s respo nsib le fo r tho se a cts
a s tho ugh he perso na l l y co mmi t ted them.”No. 17-2816 9
indi v i dual who gav e the pr esentati on to t h e b a n k s wi th the false infor m ati on being pr oj ected on the s li d es behind hi m
. The gov er nment a s s er ted Fr eed si gned the d ocuments containing falsehoods that w er e submi tted to the ci ty . And they asser ted t h at Fr eed hi mself nev er intended to abi d e by the pr omis e s that he made when he si gned the loan modi fi cati on wi th Cole T aylor and the a mended loan agr eement wi th Bank of Amer

i ca. If the gov er nment had a r gued other wi se the outcome of this ca s e m i ght be di ffer ent, b ut Fr eed’s r ole in the scheme makes i t h i ghly unli kely that the instr ucti ons had any effect on the j ur y
. Addi ti onally

, the d i str i ct cour t labor i ously descr ibed each element of each cr i me and stated after each that t h e gov er nment must pr ov e ev er y element, including the cor r ect mens rea, bey ond a r easonable d o u bt or a v er d i c t of not gui lty must be

r ender ed. Thi s fu r t h er mi ti gates the l i keli hood that the j ur y beli ev ed they could conv i ct Fr eed for a mens rea other than the
one descr ibed by the di str i ct c our t in det a i ling the r equi rements of each substantiv e offense. See United States v
. V alencia , 907 F .2d 6 71, 681 (7th Ci r
. 1990); United States v
. Brown , 739 F .2d 1136, 1143 (7th Ci r
. 1984) (defendant ar gued that the di s t ri ct
cour t ’ s defini ti on of knowingly negated the speci fi c intent to defr aud, but the cour t held that includin g the intent to defr aud in the elements of the sub s tanti v e offense w as suffi ci ent). W e
assume j ur i es follow the in str ucti ons they ar e g iv en and nothi ng in the r ecor d indi c a t e s thi s pr esumpti on should be di scar d ed. United States v. Keskes , 7 03 F

. 3d 1078, 1 086 (7th Ci r
. 2013). W e find no plain er ror
.10 No. 17-2816
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Fr eed also ar gue s the gov er nment p r oduced insuffi ci ent
ev i dence to pr ov e Counts 6, 7 , 10, 11, 14, a n d 16. W

e conduct thi s r ev i ew d e novo and constr ue the ev i dence in the li ght most fav or able to the gov er nment. United States v
. W eimert, 819 F .3d 351, 354 (7th Ci r
. 2016). A v er di ct wi l l be ov er tur ned on appeal only i f “the r ecor d i s dev oi d of ev i dence fr om whi ch a r ati onal tr i er o f fact could find gui lt bey ond a r easonable doubt.” United States v. Memar

, 906 F .3d 652, 656 (7th Ci r . 2018). i. Counts 6 and 7 Counts 6 and 7 char ged Fr eed wi th bank fr aud in v i olati on of 18 U.S .C. § 1344 for l y in g in UGV’s annual submi s si ons to the ci ty

. Fr eed ar gues ther e w a s no ev i dence that he li ed to the ci ty in or d er to defr aud the b anks. A bank fr aud conv i cti on
r equi r es the g o v e r nment pr ov e (1) ther e w as a s cheme to defr aud a financi al in sti tuti on; (2) the defendant knowingly executed or a ttempted to execute the scheme; (3) the defendant acted wi th the in t e n t to defr aud; ( 4 ) the scheme inv olv ed a mater i ally false or fr audulent p r e t ense, r epr esentati on, or pr omi se; and (5) at the t i m e o f the char ged offense the enti ty
w a s a “financi al insti tuti on” w i thin the meaning of 18 U.S

. C. § 2 0. Shaw v
. United States , 137 S

. C t

. 4 6 2 , 465 (2016); see also P a tter n Cr i minal Jur y Instr ucti ons of t h e S e v enth Ci r cui t & Comment, at 447–48 (2012). The gov er nment pr oduced per suas iv e ev i dence demonstr a tin g Fr eed knew the affi dav i ts he submi tted to the ci ty w er e false. At the ti me the documents w er e submi tted for 2009 and 2010, UGV had m i ssed s ev er a l p ayments on th e bi g line of
cr edi t a nd h ad b een sent multi ple noti ces of default. TheNo. 17-2816 11
gov er nment a lso p r esented ev i dence that Fr eed knew the pr oj ect note w a s double p l e d g ed, an ev ent of default for the Cole T a ylor loan, whi ch UGV’s in -house counsel confi r med. Thus, the falsehood of the affi d av i ts submi tted to the ci ty w as fi r mly establi s hed. How ev er

, the r ub of Fr eed’s appeal li es in h o w h i s falsehoods affected the banks. Fr e e d a r g u es that hi s li es actually benefi tted the b anks because they allow ed UGV to acqui r e capi tal to pay them. But what Fr eed leav es out i s that wi th the ci ty unaw a r e of the defaults, he w as able to keep them hi dden fr om the banks and maintain hi s li e r egar ding the av ai l abi li ty of the TIF notes as collater al. Fr eed admi ts t h at i f he had di sclosed the defaults “the Ci ty w ould hav e declar ed a default under the Uptown Goldblatts r edev elopment agr eement and

r efused to make any futur e payments on the notes. Indeed, thi s i s exactly what happened when the Ci ty l ater became aw ar e of the defaults.” But ther e i s no fr aud exempti on for schemes that benefi t one’s c r edi tor s and Fr eed’s admi ssi on shows the tr uth

w ould hav e destr oy ed hi s scheme. Thus, by suppr essin g the li kelihood that the bank consor ti um w ould di scov er the defaults and ensur ing the ci ty di d not al e r t them, Fr eed w as able to li e ab out the av ai labi li ty and v alue of the T IF notes as collate r a l

. Because a r easonable j ur or could find that Fr eed’s li es to the ci ty pr ev ented t h e b anks fr om di scov er ing hi s scheme, w e a ffi r m the d i str i ct cour t’s deni al of Fr eed’s moti on for acqui ttal on these counts.12 No. 17-2816
ii. Counts 10, 11 Fr eed also asser ts that the pr oof of Counts 10 and 11 lacks suffi ci ent ev i dence demonstr at in g F r e e d kn o w in g ly m a de false statements to a banking insti tuti on under 18 U.S .C. § 1014. S ecti on 1014 makes i t a cr i me to “knowi n gly make[] any false statement

... for the pur pose of in fluencin g in any w ay the acti on of

... any insti tuti on t h e a ccounts of whi ch ar e insur ed b y the Feder al Deposi t Insur a nce Cor por a ti on.” Fr eed w as
conv i cted of Counts 10 and 11 for pr esenting false infor m ati on to a bank consor ti um o n D e ce mber 15, 2008, a nd Januar y 20, 2009, r especti v ely

. Both counts ar e based on a sli de descr ibing the pr oposed “Lin e of Collater a l” whi ch in cluded r epr esentati ons that UGV own e d one hundr ed per cent of the TIF n otes, the cost to s ell th e m w a s $ 0 , and the pr oceeds of that sale

w ould b e $ 7,698,000. Fr eed asser ts hi s s ta t e m ents w er e techni cally tr u e. How ev er , Fr eed’s r epr esentati ons a t these meeti ngs w ould not natur ally b e under s tood as s i mply stati ng facts about unav ai lable collater al, infor mati on that w ould hav e been useless to the banks. The p r esentati on clear ly in di cated the p r oj ect note w as av a i lable to ser v e as collater a l for the loan modi fi cati on, a r e p r e s e nt a t i o n th a t th e g o ver nment pr ov ed w as false. See W

illiams v
. United States , 458 U.S

. 279, 296 (1982) (Mar shall, J

. , d i ssenting) (noti ng that “the Cour ts of Appeals hav e h eld that the fai lur e to di sclose mater i al infor m ati on needed to av oi d decepti on in c onnecti on wi th loan tr ansacti on
cov er ed by § 1014 consti tutes a ‘false statement or repor t,’ and thus v i olates the statute.”). The n otes wer e a lr eady d o uble pledged and thus unav ai lable to ser v e as c ollater al. A r easonable j ur or could find these r epr esentati ons wer e false.No. 17-2816 13
iii. Counts 14 and 16 Counts 14 and 16 in v olv e Fr eed’s fr audulent v i olati on of tw o l o an a gr eements. The s tatutor y language of § 1014 i s capa c io u s ; i t i s c ast in br oad di sj uncti v e ter ms because “Congr ess h oped to pr otect feder ally insur ed insti tu ti ons fr om losses st e m m ing fr om false statements or mi sr epr esentati ons that m i slead the in sti tut io n s into making financi al c ommi tments, adv ances, or loans.” W illiams , 458 U

. S

. a t 294 (Mar

shall, J., di ssenting); se e also United States v
. Krilich , 159 F .3d 1020, 1028 (7th Ci r
. 1998). Fr eed expounds a r estr i cti v e r eading of the s tatute and asser ts that agr eeing to the cov enants wi thin the loan agr eements w a s a nonacti onable p r omi se of futur e conduct. The gov er nment’s theor y at tr i al w as not that F r eed
ev entually br oke a pr omi se after agr eeing to i t, but r ather that Fr eed made a false statement of pr esent in t ent. Put another

w ay , Fr eed made a f alse statement to the bank because he had
no intenti on of abi ding by cer tai n pr ov i si ons of the loan agr eement when he si gned i t. Whether a pr omi se made w i th a pr esent intent not to keep i t r esults in c r i minal li abi li ty pur s u a nt to § 1014 i s appar ently
one of fi r st i mpr essi on in thi s ci r cui t. Fr eed pr inci pally r eli es on W illiams , to establi sh that pr o m i s es of f utur e in tent cannot be consi der ed false state m ents under § 1014. 458 U.S

. at 285. How ev er

, W illiams cannot be r ead to m ean t h a t pr omi s es ar e categor i cally bey on d t h e reach of § 1014. In W illiams , the S upr eme Cour t mer ely held that checks cannot be consi der ed factual asser ti ons that can be categor i zed a s tr ue or false. Id. a t 284. W illiams di d not hold, as Fr eed asser ts, that a false pr omi se14 No. 17-2816

cannot be a false statement suffi ci ent to establi sh cr i minal li abi l i ty under § 1014. W e fin d a case fr om our si ster ci r cui t, United States v
. Shah , 44 F .3d 2 85 ( 5 th Ci r
. 1995), mor e instr u c t i v e. In Shah , the d efendant challenged hi s conv i c ti on under 18 U.S .C. § 1001, whi ch pr ohibi ts m a ki ng a false statement to a gov er nment agency w i th the in tent to decei v e or mis l e a d

. Id

. a t 289. Shah

v i olated an agr eement r elated to gov er n ment so li ci tati on b y di sclosin g hi s bi d to a competi tor befor e the contr a c t w as
aw ar ded. Id. The c our t held that “to establi sh a v i olati on
... the go v e r n m e n t must find

... that the statement [ i mpli ed by the ter m], ‘I w i ll not di sclose pr i ce infor m ati on befor e the contr act
aw ar d’ w as f alse when made .” Id. at 290–91. S hah contended, as Fr eed does, that the statement w as nei ther tr ue nor false when made, but w as mer ely a p r edi cti on of futur e per for mance. Id. at 290. The cour t r ej ected thi s a r gument as w e do today

. “S ince
a pr omi se necessar i ly car r i es wi th i t the i mpli ed asser ti on of an intenti on to per for m i t follows tha t a p r omi se made wi thout such an intenti on i s f r a u dulent and a cti onable in decei t.” Restatement (Second) of T orts § 530(1) cmt. c .; S e e also Elmore v
. United States , 267 F

. 2d 595, 603 (4th Ci r
. 1 959) (holding that a statute making i t a cr i me to knowin gly make a false statement t o influence the acti on of the Commodi ty Cr edi t Cor por ati on should include “not only false st a t ements of exi sting f act b ut also f alse and fr audulent pr omi ses whi ch the maker does not intend to per for m.”). 3

3 Thi s Co u rt i m pl i edl y hel d a s much rega rdi ng 1 8 U .S .C. § 1 0 0 1 i n United States v
. Elliott, 7 7 1 F .2 d 10 4 6 , 10 4 9

– 5 0 (7 t h Ci r. 19 8 5). In Elliott, a n (co nti nued...)No. 17-2816 15
Wi th tha t, w e mov e to the c ase at hand. In par ti cular , w e
m u s t deter min e whether the gov er nment put for th s uffi ci ent
ev i dence to establi sh that Fr eed had a pr e s e n t intent n ot to abi de by the pr ov i si ons in the contr acts when each w er e made. W e conclude i t di d

. Count 14 inv olv ed a cov enant in the amended loan agr eement be tw een UGV and Cole T aylor

. The agr eement Fr eed
s igned declar ed that “[t]he B or r ow er a nd Co-Bor r ow e r cov enant and agr ee to pr ov i de to [ Cole T aylor ] a rele a s e a nd ter minati on of the [pledge of the TIF note to Bank of Amer i ca] by no later than October 31, 2009.” The r ecor d indi cates that in
a meeti ng befor e the loan amendment w a s a ppr ov ed, F r e e d agr eed to obtai n a r elease fr om B ank of Amer i ca by August 20. Addi ti onally

, one of Fr eed’s associ ates dur ing a me e t ing j ust befor e the amended l oan agr eement w as si g n e d stated that they wer e alr eady in talks wi th Bank of Amer i ca to obtai n the

r elease. B ut Fr eed fai led to ev en n oti fy Bank of Amer i ca of the double pledge dur ing the r elev ant ti me per i od. In fact, Bank of Amer i c a di d n ot lear n of the double pledge unti l 2010. Based
on F r e ed’s fai lur e to aler t Bank of Amer i ca to the d ouble pledg e d u r ing the r elev ant ti m e per i od, and hi s r epeated pr omi se a nd f ai l ur e to r emedy the si tuati on, a reasonable jur or

3 (...co nti nued)

a mb i ti o u s rea l esta te a gent wa s co nv i cted o f kno wi ng l y m a k i ng a fa l se sta tement to a n a gency i n v i ol a ti o n o f 1 8 U

. S .C. § 1 0 0 1

. Id

. a t 1 0 4 9

. The Co urt n o ted tha t El l i ott’s cl a i m tha t he intended to i nhab i t a resi dence w a s fa lse when he si gned the l o a n a greement b eca use hi s l o ana ppl ica t i o ndi d
no t i ncl ude i nfo rma ti o n ab o ut o ther pro perti es he o wned, he nev er put the uti l iti es in hi s o wn na me, a nd he entered i n to a co ntra ct to rent the pro perty l ess than si x ty da ys a fter the purcha se. Id

. a t 1 0 4 9

.16 No. 17-2816
could infer that Fr eed n ev er intended to obtai n the r el e ase when he pr omi sed to do so. Fi nally , Count 16 inv olv ed the followin g p r ov i si on in a constr ucti on l oan agr eement betw een B a nk of Amer i ca and the S tr eets of W

oodfi eld: Bor r ow er s may make D i str ibuti ons pr ov i ded

... cash and cash equi v alents r emain ing after such

a d i s t r ib u ti on shall be not less than an amount equal to the aggr egate of (A) the total a mount of [ tenant secur i ty deposi ts], (B) an amount su f fici ent to pr ov i de for the r eal estate taxe s o n the Pr emi ses to be pai d in the c u r r e nt y ear ..., and (C) a r easonable w or ki ng capi tal r eser v e. The gov er nment pr ov i d ed ev i de n ce that when the agr eement w as si gned the S tr eets of W oodfi eld only had $19,000 in i ts cash r eser v es, despi te the fact that the y ear ly p r oper ty taxes
w er e ar ound $4 mi lli on. Fur ther mor e, the day after s i gnin g the agr eem e n t, Fr eed w i thdr ew $273,000 and hi s w i thdr aw als in A pr i l alone totaled $1.3 mi lli on. The l ack of capi tal in t he S tr eets of W

oodfi eld r eser v es, along w i th Fr eed’s i m medi ate and continuous wi thdr aw al of s ubstanti al funds, c ould c a use
a r easonable j ur or to infer that Fr eed di d not intend to abi d e b y thi s ter m when he si gned the agr eement. Thus, the g o ve rnm ent pr ov i d ed ample ev i dence that Fr eed d i d not intend to keep thi s pr omi se when he made i t.

III. CONCLUSION For the for egoi ng r easons, the j u dgment of the di str i ct cour t i s AFFIRMED.