Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Marriage of Turano Solano, 2019 IL App (2d) 180011

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re MARRIAGE OF LISA M. TURANO SOLANO, PetitionerAppellee, and SCOTT M. SOLANO, Respondent-Appellant.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-18-0011

Filed March 8, 2019

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 17-D-1437; 

the Hon. Robert E. Douglas, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Daniel F. Konicek and Amanda J. Hamilton, of Konicek & Dillon, 

P.C., of Geneva, for appellant.

Anthony Sammarco and William J. Stogsdill, of Stogsdill Law Firm, 

P.C., of Wheaton, for appellee.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the 

court, with opinion.

Justices Zenoff and Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 In this dissolution proceeding, petitioner, Lisa M. Turano Solano, filed a petition for a 

declaratory judgment on the enforceability of a premarital agreement (Agreement) between 

her and respondent, Scott M. Solano. Following a hearing on the petition, the circuit court of 

Du Page County found the Agreement enforceable. Respondent appeals, contending that the 

trial court erred by (1) denying his request to postpone the hearing on the Agreement so that he 

could seek additional discovery, (2) conducting an unfair hearing, and (3) determining, on the 

evidence allowed at the hearing, that the Agreement was enforceable. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On December 9, 2000, the parties signed the Agreement, and on December 31, 2000, they 

were married. 

¶ 4 The Agreement stated that each party had been represented by separate counsel and was 

advised “that in the absence of [the] Agreement each party could acquire rights in the other’s 

property during marriage and upon termination of their marriage during life or as a surviving 

spouse.” It specified that each party had read the Agreement and its attachments and was 

“entering into [the] Agreement voluntarily, with full knowledge of its legal and economic 

effect.” The Agreement also stated: 

“Schedule A and the attached Exhibit set forth substantially all of [respondent’s] 

assets and liabilities as of December 1, 2000, valued as of that date. Schedule B and the 

attached Exhibit set forth substantially all of [petitioner’s] assets and liabilities as of 

December 1, 2000, valued as of that date. Both Exhibits are attached and made a part of 

this Agreement. Values shown are based on market quotes, appraisals or estimates, as 

indicated. [Respondent and petitioner] recognize that certain assets are difficult to 

value and agree that the Exhibits are adequate disclosures of the other’s assets, 

liabilities and income, and the parties expressly waive any right to disclosure of the 

property of the other party beyond the disclosure provided. The parties further agree 

that it is desirable to and they shall keep the information contained in this Agreement 

confidential.” 

¶ 5 The Agreement provided criteria for distinguishing between marital property and 

individual property. The Agreement also specified certain items of property as petitioner’s 

individual property, namely “[t]he Family Business Property, listed in Exhibit C, whether now 

owned by [petitioner] or in the future owned by [petitioner].” The Agreement provided that, if 

the parties’ marriage should terminate for a reason other than the death of a party, neither party 

would have a claim to the individual property of the other. 

¶ 6 Schedules A (respondent) and B (petitioner), referenced in the preceding quote, were 

attached to the Agreement. Each schedule stated that an exhibit was attached thereto that set 

forth “the approximate value of [the party’s] assets and liabilities” as of December 1, 2000. 

Attached to Schedules A and B were the corresponding Exhibits A and B. However, on each of 

the exhibits, in the space for “Assets,” was written, “None.” 
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¶ 7 Schedule B had a second attachment, namely the “Exhibit C” referenced in the Agreement. 

Exhibit C specified certain business interests to be classified as “Family Business Property” 

and, therefore, as petitioner’s individual property. 

¶ 8 In July 2017, petitioner filed her petition for dissolution of the marriage. She relied on the 

Agreement as settling the parties’ property classification issues. In his response to the petition, 

respondent alleged that the Agreement was unenforceable. 

¶ 9 In August 2017, petitioner filed a demand that respondent specify in a bill of particulars the 

grounds on which he was challenging the enforceability of the Agreement. 

¶ 10 In October 2017, respondent answered the demand. Respondent claimed that the 

Agreement was unenforceable because (1) “[t]he disclosure in Schedule B and Exhibit B states 

‘none’ when the Petitioner owned extensive assets and property that were not properly 

disclosed to the Respondent,” (2) respondent “was not informed of the legal effect of his 

signing the Agreement and the waiving of his rights thereunder,” and (3) the Agreement was 

“unconscionable and unfair.” 

¶ 11 On November 6, 2017, petitioner filed her petition for a declaratory judgment that the 

Agreement was enforceable. Petitioner relied on section 7 of the Illinois Uniform Premarital 

Agreement Act (Act) (750 ILCS 10/7 (West 2016)), which governs the enforceability of 

premarital agreements. The Act is the Illinois version of the Uniform Premarital Agreement 

Act (Uniform Act), which was drafted in 1983. See Unif. Premarital Agreement Act, 9B 

U.L.A. 369 (1983). The Act applies to any premarital agreement executed on or after January 

1, 1990. 750 ILCS 10/11 (West 2016). Section 7(a) of the Act provides in relevant part: 

“(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement 

is sought proves that: 

 (1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or 

 (2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before 

execution of the agreement, that party: 

 (i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or 

financial obligations of the other party; 

 (ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to 

disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the 

disclosure provided; and 

 (iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge 

of the property or financial obligations of the other party.” Id. § 7(a). 

Petitioner observed that a challenge under section 7(a) will fail, regardless of the adequacy of 

the parties’ asset disclosures, if the challenger fails to show that he “did not voluntarily and 

expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of 

the other party beyond the disclosure provided.” Id. § 7(a)(2)(ii). Petitioner noted that the 

Agreement contained a waiver of the kind contemplated in section 7(a)(2)(ii), namely that the 

parties “agree[d] that the Exhibits are adequate disclosures of the other’s assets, liabilities and 

income, and the parties expressly waive[d] any right to disclosure of the property of the other 

party beyond the disclosure provided.” 

¶ 12 In his response to the petition, respondent elaborated on his challenge to the Agreement. 

First, he claimed that he “did not retain counsel to review [the Agreement] and that the counsel 

listed therein did not inform him of the legal ramifications of the terms and conditions of [the 
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Agreement].” Second, respondent asserted that petitioner failed to make an adequate 

disclosure of her assets prior to the parties’ execution of the Agreement. According to 

respondent, the parties agreed not to disclose any assets on Exhibits A and B because they 

intended that only petitioner’s family business interests set forth in Exhibit C would be deemed 

individual property. Respondent asserted that petitioner’s representation of “None” in the 

space for assets on Exhibit B was “false and misleading.” He claimed that he “relied upon the 

Petitioner’s inaccurate disclosure as both parties were not excluding assets from the other or 

from the marriage, [except for] the family bakery business ownership provided in Exhibit C, 

and the Petitioner’s reliance at this time on the failed disclosure appears to rise to the level of 

concealment.” Respondent asserted that he “did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an 

adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the Petitioner, especially in 

consideration of the vast property that it is believed the Petitioner holds an interest in 

concerning her family’s business enterprises.” 

¶ 13 In an attached affidavit, to support his assertions as to the parties’ mutual understanding in 

executing the Agreement, respondent averred in part: 

“4. Approximately 30 days prior to the marriage ceremony, Lisa presented to me 

[the Agreement] for execution. Lisa and I discussed [the Agreement] on several 

occasions prior to the execution of [the Agreement] on December 9, 2000. I did not 

draft [the Agreement] or the Exhibits provided therein, said documents were drafted by 

Lisa’s attorney and provided to me. 

 5. The discussions concerning the [A]greement were focused on [the Agreement] 

being in place to provide that Lisa would maintain her ownership interest in the family 

bakery businesses and I would not receive stock or other ownership interest in the 

family bakery business due to our marriage. 

 6. Lisa and I further discussed our income at that time and Lisa informed me that 

she was a salaried employee with the family bakery business and that as part of our 

marriage, any money that she earned or received from the family bakery business was 

going to be used and shared by the parties, akin to marital income. In furtherance of her 

statements, throughout the marriage, Lisa’s income and monies received from the 

family bakery businesses, in any form provided, [were] used by Lisa and I for our 

family and in the acquisition of marital property. 

 7. Prior to the execution of the Premarital Agreement, and prior to the execution of 

Exhibit[s] A and B, Lisa and I discussed that neither of us were providing a detailed 

disclosure of personal property to the other as both of us agreed that all of our personal 

property was going to be shared and combined together and used by both [of] us as a 

married unit. Accordingly, both Lisa and I provided on Exhibits A and B the word 

‘None’ regarding the disclosure of assets and the values of same as we both intended 

for Exhibits A and B to reflect that nothing or no personal property was being excluded 

from the other party as our individual property was to be combined together when 

married. The only assets that were to be excluded, as provided above, was that I would 

not receive an ownership or stock interest in the family bakery business. 

 8. At no time did Lisa provide to me, prior to the execution of the Premarital 

Agreement, any detailed disclosure of her income, assets, debts or liabilities. I did not 

have knowledge or the ability to obtain knowledge regarding Lisa’s property. She did 

not provide to me any disclosure of her specific ownership interest in the family bakery 
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business, nor did she provide to me any value of her ownership interest in the family 

bakery business. She did not provide to me any values of any bank accounts, financial 

assets, personal property or other property that she had an interest in. At the time of the 

execution of the Premarital Agreement I was not provided, nor was I aware of, the 

value of Lisa’s property, personal assets, debts, obligations or the value or interest she 

had or may have had in the family bakery business.” 

¶ 14 On November 9, 2017, the trial court granted respondent 28 days (until December 7, 2017) 

to respond to the petition. Over respondent’s objection, the court set the petition for a hearing 

on December 13, 2017. 

¶ 15 On November 16, 2017, respondent moved to continue the hearing on the petition. 

Respondent claimed that he needed additional time to conduct discovery on the following 

issues: 

“the circumstances under which the Premarital Agreement was negotiated and 

executed; the assets which the Petitioner had at the time of the execution of the 

Premarital Agreement; her earnings at that time and throughout the marriage; her 

interest in the substantial family business related to the Turano Baking Company 

business, of which she is an employee and corporate attorney; what holdings the 

Petitioner had at the time of the marriage, and now, in said family related businesses 

and how she acquired them, be it by gift or as part of her employment income, and 

other matters related to the negotiations for an execution of the Premarital Agreement 

and the lack of disclosures of information concerning the Petitioner’s assets and 

income.”

Respondent asserted that discovery was still in its “initial stages.” He claimed that, although he 

had submitted his financial-disclosure statement and answered petitioner’s requests for 

discovery, petitioner had failed to submit her own financial disclosure or answer discovery 

requests. 

¶ 16 In her response to the motion to continue, petitioner argued, inter alia, that additional 

discovery was unnecessary because the parties’ mutual waiver of further disclosure was of 

itself dispositive of respondent’s assertion that he had not received an adequate disclosure from 

petitioner. 

¶ 17 At the hearing on the motion to continue, respondent alleged that, when he signed the 

Agreement, petitioner had not disclosed her interest in her family’s “sizable estate” and that 

respondent was not otherwise aware of that interest. Respondent claimed that discovery was 

necessary regarding the extent of petitioner’s interest in the estate. The court disagreed and 

denied the motion to continue: 

“[R]eally, what we are talking about here is what’s in the four corners of a 

premarital agreement. And you know, the only thing I can see that we would even have 

testimony on would be the parties and perhaps their attorneys at the time. That would 

be it. 

 * * *

I don’t see that this needs discovery. It’s a pretty simple matter. We are going to 

keep the 12/13 hearing. And you go with what you have got because the parties are—to 

me, it seems like a relatively simple issue. So, despite the amount of money that’s 

involved in it, the issue involved is relatively straightforward. So, motion is denied.” 
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¶ 18 In moving for reconsideration, respondent disagreed with the trial court’s view that the 

enforceability of the Agreement was a matter restricted to the four corners of the document. 

Respondent identified several issues involving extrinsic facts. 

¶ 19 At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, the court agreed with respondent that the issues 

raised went beyond the text of the Agreement, but the court continued to believe that further 

discovery was unnecessary. Respondent’s enforceability challenge could be resolved by the 

Agreement and the testimony “of the parties and perhaps their attorneys.” The court “[could 

not] see what collateral people other than that would have knowledge as to whether [the 

Agreement] was unconscionable.” The court assured respondent that, if the issues as 

developed at the hearing necessitated additional discovery, it would continue the hearing for 

that purpose. 

¶ 20 At the December 13, 2017, hearing on the petition, the trial court allowed respondent to 

present his case first, since he had the burden of proof under section 7 of the Act. Respondent 

asked to open his case by calling petitioner as an adverse witness. The trial court denied the 

request: 

“[Y]ou have to overcome the issue, first, of whether [respondent] voluntarily waived 

the rights before I am going to get into what [petitioner] told him or didn’t tell him 

because if he voluntarily waived his rights, you don’t have to get into that, Mr. Laraia 

[(respondent’s counsel)]. 

 So if you want to put your client on with regard to that issue, that is what the Court 

needs to hear first before I go any further than that.” 

¶ 21 Respondent’s counsel then called respondent, who testified that he and petitioner became 

engaged in December 1999. The trial court sustained petitioner’s objection to counsel’s 

attempts to question respondent about whether petitioner, who was an attorney, represented 

them in their purchase of a home in 1999 and whether respondent made financial disclosures to 

petitioner in connection with the purchase. The trial court remarked to counsel: 

“[W]hat I told you [to] get out of him before I go into any other issues is whether or not 

it’s voluntary because if I decide that it’s a voluntary waiver, none of this is relevant to 

anything. 

 So if you get to the issue of whether or not or what the voluntariness of the 

[Agreement] was, I would appreciate that.” 

¶ 22 Respondent testified that, in July or August 2000, the parties discussed entering into a 

premarital agreement. Later, in September or October 2000, petitioner presented the 

Agreement to him. They talked about the terms of the Agreement, and petitioner told him that 

the Agreement was “strictly for bakery ownership.” Petitioner told respondent to read the 

Agreement and consult with an attorney before signing it. 

¶ 23 The day after receiving the Agreement, respondent delivered it to his cousin, Vincent E. 

Solano, who practiced criminal law. They discussed the Agreement a week later over the 

phone. However, during their discussion, which lasted about two minutes, Vincent did not 

provide respondent any advice about the Agreement. When respondent’s counsel asked 

respondent for the substance of what was discussed, petitioner objected, and the trial court 

sustained the objection. Respondent made an offer of proof as to his conversation with 

Vincent. 
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¶ 24 When the offer of proof was concluded, respondent acknowledged that he did not disclose 

any of his assets on the Agreement’s Schedule A. When counsel asked about petitioner’s 

disclosure of assets to respondent, petitioner objected on the ground that the question went 

“well beyond the issue of whether or not it was a voluntary agreement.” The trial court 

sustained the objection. When counsel asked to make an offer of proof, the trial court 

responded: 

“At this point in time, *** the Court has heard enough from [respondent].

And I will tell you exactly how I am going to rule and why I am going to rule. I will 

give you your [Rule] 304 language, if you wish. 

 [Respondent] has testified that [petitioner] gave him the [Agreement and] told him 

to read it and to get an attorney. 

 He the next day, and this is in September, the next day he got it to [Vincent], he 

conferred with [Vincent], although he never hired [Vincent], that is between him and 

[Vincent]. This is family. 

He didn’t ask any follow up questions to [Vincent]. And then he signed the 

[Agreement] with everything that is in it. 

 So the Court finds that he had adequate time, which is what the case law usually 

looks at: Was this presented to him the day before, or was it presented prior. It was 

presented [in] September prior to the December date that it was agreed to. He had three 

months. 

 He was advised to get an attorney and to read it. He did get an attorney or gave it to 

an attorney, he conferred with the attorney, and he signed it and initialed every page. 

 The Court finds that there is a voluntary waiver as set forth in Paragraph No. 2 and 

will grant the declaratory judgment.” 

¶ 25 The court then allowed respondent’s counsel to make a lengthy offer of proof as to 

petitioner’s disclosure of assets to respondent prior to the execution of the Agreement. When 

the offer of proof was concluded, counsel concluded his direct examination of respondent. 

¶ 26 On cross-examination, respondent testified that petitioner did not threaten bodily harm to 

respondent if he did not sign the Agreement. Respondent understood that Exhibits A and B to 

Schedules A and B were for the parties to list property that they wanted to keep separate from 

each other. Respondent did not list any property on Exhibit A because the parties “were joining 

everything together.” 

¶ 27 Following his redirect examination of respondent, respondent’s counsel stated that he had 

“nothing further.” Petitioner called no witnesses of her own. 

¶ 28 The trial court then made its oral ruling that the Agreement was enforceable: 

“For the reasons previously recited by the Court, but I will reiterate them, by 

[respondent’s] testimony [petitioner] presented him [the Agreement] in September or 

October of [2000]. At the time that she presented it, she informed him to get an attorney 

and to read the document. He testified that he got the document to [Vincent] the next 

day. He testified to a phone call he had with [Vincent] wherein he did not ask any 

questions, and he proceeded to sign the document. 

 There is nothing here that indicates that this was not voluntary on his part. He 

testified on cross-examination that he was not under duress and was not forced or 

coerced into signing. 
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 For these reasons, the Court finds as a matter of law that [the Agreement] was not 

unconscionable, and the declaratory judgment is granted.” 

¶ 29 In its written order, the trial court found, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) 

(eff. Mar. 8, 2016), that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of the 

declaratory judgment. 

¶ 30 Respondent filed this timely appeal. 

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 32 Respondent raises three contentions on appeal. First, he claims that the trial court erred by 

refusing to postpone the hearing on the Agreement so that he could seek additional discovery. 

Second, he claims that the trial court conducted an unfair hearing. Third, he claims that, even 

on the limited record that the trial court did permit, the court erred in holding that the 

Agreement was enforceable. We reject all three claims of error. 

¶ 33 A. Discovery 

¶ 34 We begin with the argument on discovery. The trial court has inherent authority to conduct 

the course of litigation. See J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182, 196 (2007). Thus, the court, in 

addressing a pretrial motion, can initially limit its focus to a dispositive issue and allow only 

the discovery that is necessary for development of that issue until it is decided. See Yuretich v. 

Sole, 259 Ill. App. 3d 311, 314 (1994) (“Motions for summary judgment can only be granted 

after discovery is taken, and may entail additional expense, but the trial court has the power to 

limit initial discovery to an issue which may be dispositive.”). 

¶ 35 The issue that the trial court found dispositive, and elected to address first, was the 

voluntariness issue. In his pleadings below, respondent appeared to make two separate 

assertions of involuntariness. First, he claimed that his execution of the Agreement as a whole 

was involuntary because he did not retain counsel to review the Agreement and advise him of 

its meaning and effect. His second assertion was specific to the Agreement’s waiver provision, 

which stated that the parties “agree that [Exhibits A and B] are adequate disclosures of the 

other’s assets, liabilities and income, and the parties expressly waive any right to disclosure of 

the property of the other party beyond the disclosure provided.” Respondent claimed that his 

assent to the waiver provision was involuntary because, when the parties executed the 

Agreement, petitioner had not disclosed her assets. 

¶ 36 Respondent’s two assertions of involuntariness corresponded to sections 7(a)(1) and 

7(a)(2)(ii) of the Act. Section 7(a) of the Act was adopted verbatim from section 6(a) of the 

Uniform Act (Unif. Premarital Agreement Act, 9B U.L.A. 369, 376 (1983)), with identical 

paragraph designations. 

¶ 37 We quote again section 7(a) of the Act: 

“(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom 

enforcement is sought proves that: 

 (1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or 

 (2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before 

execution of the agreement, that party: 

 (i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or 

financial obligations of the other party; 
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 (ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to 

disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the 

disclosure provided; and 

 (iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge 

of the property or financial obligations of the other party.” 750 ILCS 10/7(a) 

(West 2016). 

¶ 38 Sections 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2) provide what may be termed, respectively, the 

“involuntariness” and “unconscionability” tracks for proving a premarital agreement 

unenforceable. If the challenging party establishes that his or her execution of the premarital 

agreement as a whole was involuntary, then the agreement would be unenforceable by 

operation of subsection (a)(1). Alternatively, the challenging party could proceed under the 

“unconscionability” track but would have to prove not only that the agreement “was 

unconscionable when it was executed” but also that all of the circumstances listed in 

subsections (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(ii), and (a)(2)(iii) were present “before execution of the 

agreement,” including that he or she “did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any 

right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the 

disclosure provided.” Id. § 7(a)(2). 

¶ 39 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(1) (eff. July 1, 2014) states that “a party may obtain by 

discovery full disclosure regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the 

pending action.” Although the scope of permissible discovery is broad, it is not unlimited. The

Y-Not Project, Ltd. v. Fox Waterway Agency, 2016 IL App (2d) 150502, ¶ 43. To protect 

against abuse, discovery is limited to disclosure of relevant evidence or that which will lead to 

such evidence. In re Estate of Blickenstaff, 2012 IL App (4th) 120480, ¶ 48. The trial court’s 

refusal to postpone the hearing on the declaratory-judgment petition denied respondent 

additional discovery on the issues raised by the parties. A ruling denying or limiting discovery 

does not constitute reversible error unless the complaining party demonstrates prejudice. 

Citizens Against Regional Landfill v. Pollution Control Board, 255 Ill. App. 3d 903, 909 

(1994). Normally, a discovery ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Adler v. 

Greenfield, 2013 IL App (1st) 121066, ¶ 40. Here, however, since the trial court’s ruling 

depended on its interpretation of section 7(a)(2)(ii), our review is de novo. Gunn v. Sobucki, 

216 Ill. 2d 602, 609 (2005). 

¶ 40 The trial court had the authority to initially limit its consideration to the dispositive issues 

of whether respondent “execute[d] the [A]greement voluntarily” (750 ILCS 10/7(a)(1) (West 

2016)) and whether he “voluntarily and expressly waive[d], in writing,” further disclosure of 

petitioner’s assets (id. § 7(a)(2)(ii)). See Yuretich, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 314. The court had the 

corresponding power to limit discovery to those dispositive issues. See id. 

¶ 41 Our review of what discovery was permitted below is determined not only by what the trial 

court appropriately deemed dispositive issues but also by the scope of respondent’s appellate 

challenge to the court’s rulings on those issues. As noted, respondent’s voluntariness 

arguments below could be construed as applying to both sections 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2)(ii). On 

appeal, however, his argument is focused on subsection (a)(2)(ii). He argues not that his 

execution of the Agreement as a whole was involuntary (subsection (a)(1)) but that his 

execution of the waiver provision specifically was involuntary (subsection (a)(2)(ii)). 

Moreover, he argues that his waiver was involuntary because, when he signed it, (1) he did not 

understand its significance and (2) petitioner had not made a fair and reasonable disclosure of 
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her assets. As we explain below, the trial court was correct in finding that respondent 

voluntarily waived his right to further disclosure. Infra ¶¶ 44-64. To demonstrate reversible 

error from the denial of discovery, respondent must show that he was entitled to discovery on 

the specific question of whether his waiver was voluntary. 

¶ 42 Notably, respondent’s claim of error with respect to discovery is even narrower than his 

substantive challenge to the trial court’s rulings on voluntariness. Respondent does not claim, 

for instance, that the trial court erroneously denied him discovery on whether he understood 

the waiver. Respondent accurately comments that, in the pleadings below, “issues were raised 

concerning several components of proof within section 7(a),” and he asserts that “[d]iscovery 

should have been allowed toward information relevant to that.” Indeed, respondent asked the 

trial court for a continuance in order to conduct discovery on the following issues: 

“the circumstances under which the Premarital Agreement was negotiated and 

executed; the assets which the Petitioner had at the time of the execution of the 

Premarital Agreement; her earnings at that time and throughout the marriage; her 

interest in the substantial family business related to the Turano Baking Company 

business, of which she is an employee and corporate attorney; what holdings the 

Petitioner had at the time of the marriage, and now, in said family related businesses 

and how she acquired them, be it by gift or as part of her employment income, and 

other matters related to the negotiations for an execution of the Premarital Agreement 

and the lack of disclosures of information concerning the Petitioner’s assets and 

income.”

However, in this appeal, the only claim that respondent develops with respect to the denial of 

discovery is that he was wrongfully barred from seeking information on petitioner’s financial 

situation as it existed when he waived his right to further disclosure. He begins his argument as 

follows: 

“[U]nder the express terms of the statute within subheading (a)(2), there are two time 

frames to look at: first, the time when the [A]greement was entered—whether it was 

unconscionable at the time it was entered—and second, during the time before the 

[A]greement was entered—whether it was subject to any of three identified conditions 

before its execution. *** 

 Of paramount importance then is discovery of what was actually disclosed to 

[respondent] by [petitioner] before execution of the [A]greement; what disclosure was 

actually, voluntarily, knowingly waived by [respondent] before execution of the 

[A]greement, beyond the disclosure already made by [petitioner]; and what constituted 

reasonable knowledge of [petitioner’s] true financial circumstances before execution 

of the [A]greement. Significant, also, then, would be [petitioner’s] actual financial 

circumstances, her disclosure of her financial circumstances to [respondent] before the 

[A]greement, and [respondent’s] actual knowledge before entering the [A]greement.” 

(Emphases in original.) 

¶ 43 He continues in his reply brief: 

“[Respondent’s] argument below, and now on appeal, is relatively straightforward: by 

precepts of statutory construction, reading the language of section 7(a)(2) under its 

plain, ordinary, and accepted meaning, there had to be a reasonable and fair disclosure 

of [petitioner’s] assets before entry of [the Agreement] for there to have been an 

express and voluntary waiver at the time of entry of [the Agreement] by [respondent] to 
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further disclosure of her assets. Discovery should have been permitted toward this 

inquiry. Instead, it was not.” (Emphasis added.) 

¶ 44 Respondent interprets section 7(a)(2)(ii) to mean that, unless a party has made a fair and 

reasonable disclosure of his or her assets, the other party cannot be deemed to have voluntarily 

waived the right to disclosure beyond the disclosure made. Respondent argues that, since the 

adequacy of a disclosure must be judged by what was not disclosed, he was entitled to 

discovery on the assets that petitioner held when he agreed to the waiver provision. 

¶ 45 Since the range of permissible discovery is determined by relevancy and relevancy is 

determined in turn by the governing law, we must examine the governing standards in section 

7 of the Act. As noted, subsection (a)(2) has a series of conditions joined by two conjunctions. 

In order to prevail under subsection (a)(2), the party challenging the enforcement of a 

premarital agreement must prove not only that the agreement “was unconscionable when it 

was executed” but also that, “before execution of the agreement,” the challenging party 

“(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial 

obligations of the other party; 

 (ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the 

property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and 

 (iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the 

property or financial obligations of the other party.” 750 ILCS 10/7(a)(2)(i), (ii), (iii) 

(West 2016). 

¶ 46 The Agreement’s waiver provision faithfully tracked the language of subsection (a)(2)(ii). 

The effect of the waiver becomes, then, a matter of statutory interpretation, the goal of which is 

to ascertain the legislature’s intent. Bank of New York Mellon v. Laskowski, 2018 IL 121995, 

¶ 12. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language itself when given 

its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Issues of statutory interpretation are issues of law and so 

reviewed de novo. Cohen v. Chicago Park District, 2017 IL 121800, ¶ 17. 

¶ 47 We have found no Illinois decision that expressly analyzes the issue of statutory 

interpretation raised here. We granted petitioner’s motion to cite In re Marriage of Woodrum, 

2018 IL App (3d) 170369. In Woodrum, the respondent challenged the parties’ premarital 

agreement on the ground that she did not receive a fair and reasonable disclosure of the 

petitioner’s assets. The appellate court noted that, “[u]nder the [Act], the only way that [the 

petitioner] could have been relieved of his statutory obligation of providing a fair and 

reasonable disclosure was by [the respondent] ‘voluntarily and expressly waiv[ing], in writing, 

any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of [the respondent] beyond the 

disclosure provided.’ ” Id. ¶ 59 (quoting 750 ILCS 10/7(a)(2)(ii) (West 2016)). As the 

respondent did not sign any purported waiver of disclosure, the Woodrum court held the 

petitioner to his obligation of providing the respondent with a fair and reasonable disclosure. 

Id. ¶¶ 61-77. 

¶ 48 As there was no purported waiver in Woodrum, the court was not presented with the 

question of what effect such a waiver would have. The Woodrum court did suggest that a 

waiver would have “relieved [the petitioner] of his statutory obligation” of disclosure, but the

court provided no supporting reasons. Id. ¶ 59. Thus, Woodrum provides no analytical 

guidance on the issue at hand. 
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¶ 49 According to respondent, the phrase “beyond the disclosure provided” in subsection 

(a)(2)(ii) indicates that the extent of the existing disclosure, as bearing upon its fairness and 

reasonableness, is relevant to whether the challenging party voluntarily waived his or her right 

to further disclosure. See 750 ILCS 10/7(a)(2)(ii) (West 2016). We disagree. “If the [statutory] 

language is clear and unambiguous, we may not depart from the plain language and meaning of 

the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not 

express, nor by rendering any word or phrase superfluous or meaningless.” Cuevas v. Berrios, 

2017 IL App (1st) 151318, ¶ 33. Subsections (a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(iii) provide for challenges 

based on the unreasonableness of the other party’s disclosure of assets and on the challenging 

party’s lack of knowledge of the other party’s assets. By contrast, nothing in the text of 

subsection (a)(2)(ii) suggests that there must be a certain degree of disclosure, or knowledge of 

the party’s undisclosed assets, before a party can waive the right to further disclosure. If 

respondent is correct that a waiver can be overcome by showing that the other party failed to 

make a fair and reasonable disclosure of assets prior to the waiver or that the challenging party 

lacked knowledge of the other party’s assets, then subsection (a)(2)(ii) is essentially indistinct 

from the other subsections, and waivers have no independent force. The proper reading of the 

three subsections is that the legislature intended in subsection (a)(2)(ii) to provide for waivers 

that entirely forestall challenges otherwise available under the other two subsections. 

¶ 50 Respondent, however, suggests that subsection (a)(2)(ii) at a minimum presupposes some

level of disclosure before a waiver can be voluntary. But respondent suggests no criteria for 

judging the minimum adequacy of a disclosure apart from the criteria in subsections (a)(2)(i) 

and (a)(2)(iii). We cannot accept a reading that effectively conflates the three subsections. In 

our view, a waiver under subsection (a)(2)(ii) can be voluntary even where the other party has 

disclosed no assets at all. 

¶ 51 We also note that the Agreement’s waiver provision contains language that is stronger and 

more explicit than the statutory terminology. The parties not only waived the right to 

disclosure beyond what was given but also expressly conceded that “the Exhibits are adequate 

disclosures of the other’s assets, liabilities and income.” 

¶ 52 Respondent cites several foreign authorities to support his interpretation of section 

7(a)(2)(ii) of the Act. As the purpose of a uniform act is to promote consistency among 

jurisdictions, judicial opinions from other jurisdictions interpreting uniform acts are given 

greater deference than usual. Mikrut v. First Bank of Oak Park, 359 Ill. App. 3d 37, 56 (2005). 

But none of the authorities cited by respondent persuades us of his position. 

¶ 53 Respondent cites the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 

533 (Conn. 2007), to support the proposition that, “without sufficient disclosure and 

knowledge of a party’s assets, there cannot be intelligent waiver of the legal rights being 

waived by the other party.” But Friezo is inapposite because, when that case was decided, the 

Connecticut version of section 6 of the Uniform Act did not allow a party to waive the right to 

disclosure of the other party’s financial information. See id. at 545-47 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. 

§ 46b-36g(a) (1995)); Amberlynn Curry, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Its 

Variations Throughout the States, 23 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law 355, 364 (2010) (“Under 

section 46b-36g a party cannot waive the right to disclosure of the other party’s financial 

information.”). Friezo has no bearing on how to judge the voluntariness of a waiver under 

section 7(a)(2)(ii) of the Act. 
- 13 - 

¶ 54 Respondent also cites the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Miller, 7 P.3d 1223 

(Kan. 2000). Respondent derives the following principles from Davis: (1) “[t]o be considered 

‘fair and reasonable,’ pursuant to the [Act], the financial disclosure should go to a general 

knowledge of the nature and extent of the other party’s involved property”; (2) “[t]he 

disclosure before execution of the agreement must approximate assets in general terms, or at 

least divulge the general nature of assets, without an attempt to hide or conceal assets”; and 

(3) “the language ***, ‘beyond the disclosures provided herein,’ is a waiver of any future 

disclosures, not a waiver of disclosures made in the past.” 

¶ 55 When Davis was decided, the Kansas version of section 6 of the Uniform Act was 

substantively unchanged from its source. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-807 (1988). In particular, 

the waiver provision in the Kansas act, section 23-807(a)(2)(B), was taken verbatim from 

section 6 of the Uniform Act. See id. § 23-807(a)(2)(B) (“such party did not voluntarily and 

expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of 

the other party beyond the disclosure provided”). 

¶ 56 Respondent’s points (1) and (2) are drawn from Davis’s discussion of what manner of 

disclosure is considered fair and reasonable. But these points are irrelevant to whether a party’s 

waiver dispenses with the other party’s obligation to provide a fair and reasonable disclosure in 

the first place. 

¶ 57 Respondent’s point (3) is more apt. He derives it from Davis’s discussion of the trial 

court’s holding that the wife “waived her right to any disclosure of [the husband’s] property in 

the settlement agreement,” pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(B) of the Kansas act. Davis, 7 P.3d at 

1233. In discussing the wife’s challenge to that holding, the supreme court quoted two 

paragraphs from the premarital agreement. Paragraph 2 read: 

“ ‘2. Financial information disclosure. “Husband” has made complete disclosure to 

“Wife” of his financial situation through personal and business records and through 

statements made at a conference of attorneys and accountants in which a transcribed 

record was taken on December 1, 1994.’ ” Id. at 1234. 

Paragraph 3 read: 

“ ‘3. Waiver of additional financial information. The parties hereto each voluntarily 

and expressly waive any right to disclosure of the property, financial position or 

obligations of the other beyond the disclosures provided herein and by the attachments 

hereto.’ (Emphasis added.)” Id. at 1233. 

¶ 58 The wife argued that, “although paragraph 3 controls the waiver of release of any 

additional financial information, paragraph 2 controls the disclosure of previous or attached 

financial information.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. The court agreed with the wife, 

“interpret[ing] the contract to be a waiver of any future disclosures and not to apply to a waiver 

of any and all disclosures made in the past.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 1234. 

¶ 59 Respondent submits that, though Davis was relying on the language in the parties’ 

agreement, the court was also indirectly interpreting subsection (a)(2)(B), in that the waiver 

language in the parties’ agreement tracked the waiver language in the subsection. Thus, 

respondent claims, Davis supports construing a subsection (a)(2)(ii) waiver not as a concession 

to the adequacy of disclosures made prior to the execution of a premarital agreement but 

strictly as a waiver of a right to subsequent disclosures. 
- 14 - 

¶ 60 To the extent that the Davis court was construing subsection (a)(2)(B) of the Kansas statute 

as respondent claims it was, we disagree with that interpretation as extended to the Act’s 

identically worded subsection (a)(2)(ii). There is no support in subsection (a)(2) for dividing 

the right to “a fair and reasonable disclosure” into disclosures already made and disclosures yet 

to be made. Likewise, a waiver tracking the language of subsection (a)(2)(ii) has unrestricted 

temporal scope. There is no intelligible way to construe a waiver of information “beyond the 

disclosure provided” other than as a concession to the adequacy of what, if anything, was 

already disclosed. In any case, the Agreement’s waiver indeed contained an express 

acknowledgement of the adequacy of existing disclosures. 

¶ 61 In his reply brief, respondent cites In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000), to 

support his view of a voluntary waiver under subsection (a)(2)(ii). In Bonds, the California 

Supreme Court construed a portion of California’s verbatim adoption of section 6(a) of the 

Uniform Act. Respondent applies Bonds as follows: 

“From a fair reading of the statute, [respondent] has contended a voluntary and 

express waiver ‘before’ execution of the express agreement should be measured 

against the actual disclosure made and any disclosures withheld before entry of the 

agreement. See, 750 ILCS 10/7(a)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). [Citation.] Elements of lack of 

fair and reasonable disclosure, lack of express and knowing waiver, and lack of 

imputed knowledge together presuppose conveying an element of knowing waiver. 

See, In re Marriage of Bonds, *** 5 P.3d at 830-31. To be consistent with the purpose 

of discovery in Illinois, then, discovery should have been allowed to inquire into fair 

and reasonable disclosures before execution of the agreement, and to test whether a 

voluntary and express waiver had been given within the express elements of the statute. 

As a matter of statutory construction, this is a fair and reasonable reading of the 

statute.” 

¶ 62 Respondent misapplies Bonds. The issue in that case was not what makes a waiver 

voluntary under section 6(a)(2)(ii) of the Uniform Act, but what makes the execution of a 

premarital agreement as a whole voluntary under section 6(a)(1) of the Uniform Act, as 

adopted in California. See Cal. Fam. Code § 1615(a)(1) (West 1994) (“(a) A premarital 

agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves *** the 

following: (1) That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily[.]”). The Bonds court held 

that “a number of factors are relevant to the issue of voluntariness” under subsection (a)(1), 

including 

“the coercion that may arise from the proximity of execution of the agreement to the 

wedding, or from surprise in the presentation of the agreement; the presence or absence 

of independent counsel or of an opportunity to consult independent counsel; inequality 

of bargaining power—in some cases indicated by the relative age and sophistication of 

the parties; whether there was full disclosure of assets; and the parties’ understanding 

of the rights being waived under the agreement or at least their awareness of the intent 

of the agreement.” (Emphasis added.) Bonds, 5 P.3d at 824-25. 

¶ 63 We need not determine whether “full disclosure of assets” is, as the Bonds court held, 

integral to the voluntariness of a premarital agreement as a whole under section 6(a)(1) of the 
- 15 - 

Uniform Act and, by extension, section 7(a)(1) of the Act.1 Respondent does not raise any 

issue under section 7(a)(1). His focus is on whether a party must fairly and reasonably disclose 

assets before the other party can be said to have voluntarily agreed to a waiver of further 

disclosure pursuant to section 7(a)(2)(ii) of the Act. For the reasons we have provided, we 

reject respondent’s interpretation of section 7(a)(2)(ii).

¶ 64 To summarize, the trial court was correct to identify voluntariness as a dispositive issue in 

the declaratory-judgment proceedings. Respondent has shown no error in the trial court’s 

refusal to continue the declaratory-judgment hearing for respondent to seek discovery 

pertaining to the voluntariness issue. Respondent’s only claim of error on discovery is that he 

should have been allowed to seek information on whether petitioner made a fair and reasonable 

disclosure of assets, which respondent claims was pertinent to whether his waiver of further 

disclosure was voluntary under section 7(a)(2)(ii) of the Act. Respondent fails to show 

prejudice from the denial of discovery, because voluntariness under section 7(a)(2)(ii) does not 

depend on whether the other party made any kind of asset disclosure. 

¶ 65 B. Conduct of the Declaratory-Judgment Hearing 

¶ 66 Respondent makes several claims of error regarding the trial court’s conduct of the hearing 

on petitioner’s petition for a declaratory judgment. 

¶ 67 First, respondent contends that “[t]his matter should have gone to a full, fair hearing, with 

full discovery.” He elaborates: 

“Here, the trial court got it backwards, relying on a waiver clause in the 

[A]greement to in fact exclude or limit the testimony it would hear. It should have 

heard the full testimony, including [petitioner’s] disclosures and financials, to then 

determine if the written waiver was valid and effective. 

 The court also got it backwards by relying on one point of contention for the entire 

hearing and restricting its entire inquiry to this one point, as opposed to allowing the 

case to develop fully under the evidence. The court forced the litigation on just this one 

point on declaratory judgment, a single point not of [respondent’s] choosing, when the 

court also ruled [respondent] had the burden of proof.”

Respondent claims that “Illinois decisions routinely demonstrate that full evidentiary 

hearings—along with complete discovery—resolve the issues related to enforcement of a 

premarital agreement.” Respondent cites several decisions, appending to each citation a 

parenthetical description noting that a “full hearing,” or a hearing on multiple issues, was held 

in the case. Respondent cites nothing in these cases, however, to suggest that the trial court, in 

considering the validity of a premarital agreement, cannot limit its initial review to dispositive 

issues but rather must address and decide all issues contemporaneously. 

¶ 68 Respondent also claims that the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to call petitioner 

as an adverse witness to examine her on disclosures she made prior to his execution of the 

Agreement. Normally, an evidentiary ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but to the 

extent that the ruling is based on statutory construction, it is reviewed de novo. Gunn, 216 Ill. 

 

1We note that some jurisdictions depart from Bonds in taking a narrower view of voluntariness 

under section 6(a)(1) of the Uniform Act. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 512 

(Iowa 2008) (holding that the execution of a premarital agreement need not be both knowing and

voluntary, but only voluntary, i.e., free from duress or undue influence). 
- 16 - 

2d at 609. The trial court correctly viewed the voluntariness inquiry under section 7(a)(2)(ii) of 

the Act as distinct from whether, and to what extent, petitioner disclosed her assets to 

respondent prior to his waiver of further disclosure. Consequently, the trial court did not err in 

barring respondent from calling petitioner to testify as to disclosures. 

¶ 69 Respondent’s next contention has the following three paragraphs devoted to it:

“During [respondent’s] own direct examination, after the court sustained an 

objection to whether [petitioner] had represented [respondent] in the purchase of their 

home before they got married [citation], and after it sustained an objection to whether 

[respondent] had given [petitioner] his financial information as part of that closing 

[citation], the court declared, ‘if I decide that it’s a voluntary waiver, none of this is 

relevant to anything’ [citation]. This statement from the court gives pause. The court is 

telling the litigant the case is being provisionally tried, and if the court decides one way, 

other evidence may either be relevant later, or not. 

 Each time [respondent] attempted to discuss what [petitioner] disclosed to him 

about her financials in advance of contracting outside what was stated in the schedule 

and exhibit, counsel for [petitioner] objected. Each time, the court sustained those 

objections. [Citation.] 

 [Respondent] then proceeded with an offer of proof, despite hearing that the court 

had already ‘heard enough,’ telling [respondent] ‘exactly how I am going to rule and 

why I’m going to rule.’ [Citation.]” (Emphasis in original.) 

¶ 70 The foregoing is just a series of representations from the record along with respondent’s 

commentary. Any claim of error is at best insinuated, and there is no citation to authority. A 

reviewing court is entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined with pertinent authority 

cited and a cohesive legal argument presented. Walters v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 

103488, ¶ 5. Points not so developed are forfeited. Id. ¶ 6; see Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 

25, 2018) (“[a]rgument *** shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons 

therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on,” and “[p]oints not 

argued are forfeited”). Respondent’s point does not amount to argument and, therefore, is 

forfeited. 

¶ 71 Finally, respondent cites authority that a civil litigant is entitled to a fair hearing. See In re 

Marriage of Houston, 150 Ill. App. 3d 608, 611-12 (1986). He then recaps his challenges to the 

trial court’s discovery and evidentiary rulings that were premised on the trial court’s belief that 

petitioner’s disclosures to respondent were not relevant to whether respondent’s waiver of 

further disclosure was voluntary under section 7(a)(2)(ii) of the Act. He also complains that the 

trial court “told [him] it already had its mind made up, telling him during presentation of the 

evidence how it was going to rule.” Respondent, however, fails to demonstrate prejudice from 

what he perceives as the trial court’s “pre-judgment” of his case. The trial court did effectively 

cut off counsel’s direct examination of respondent, but respondent does not complain about 

any barred testimony other than testimony about petitioner’s disclosures (which, we have held, 

were irrelevant to the dispositive issue before the court). Following his redirect examination of 

respondent, counsel rested without presenting additional evidence. 
- 17 - 

¶ 72 C. The Declaratory Judgment 

¶ 73 Respondent contends that, even upon the limited record presented at the hearing, the trial 

court’s judgment declaring the Agreement enforceable was erroneous. The standard of review 

applicable to a declaratory judgment depends on the nature of the question presented. In re 

Marriage of Kranzler, 2018 IL App (1st) 171169, ¶ 39. Questions of fact are reviewed under 

the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, but questions of law, like the interpretation of a 

premarital agreement, are reviewed de novo. Id. 

¶ 74 The trial court found that respondent’s assent to the Agreement, including its waiver 

provision, was voluntary because he had ample time to review the Agreement, had consulted 

with an attorney, and was not coerced by petitioner into signing it. 

¶ 75 Respondent asserts that his testimony at the hearing established that petitioner did not 

make a fair and reasonable disclosure, or any “real disclosure” at all, of her assets prior to his 

waiving the right to further disclosure. He claims that petitioner’s designation of “None” on 

Exhibit B, where she was to list her assets, “was itself misleading, leading [respondent] to 

believe after a discussion with [petitioner] that it referred to the bakery stock, and that 

everything outside of the bakery stock would become part of the marriage once they were 

married.” Here respondent cites not evidence admitted at the hearing but testimony he gave 

during an offer of proof. Respondent obviously cannot properly rely on excluded evidence to 

support an evidentiary challenge. Based on our interpretation of section 7(a)(2)(ii), the trial 

court was correct in holding that petitioner’s asset disclosure, or lack thereof, was irrelevant to 

the dispositive issue of whether respondent’s waiver of further disclosure was voluntary. 

¶ 76 Respondent also refers to his testimony that he did not discuss the Agreement’s waiver 

provision with petitioner or anyone else, including Vincent, and that he did not understand the 

meaning of the provision. Here again respondent cites testimony he gave during an offer of 

proof rather than evidence admitted at the hearing. Moreover, respondent develops no claim of 

error specific to the exclusion of his testimony about his understanding of the waiver provision. 

¶ 77 Respondent also asserts that the basis of the trial court’s ruling on voluntariness “sound[s] 

*** of the common-law measurements for finding a premarital agreement valid and 

enforceable as entered voluntarily without coercion or duress, being the determination instead 

for agreements before the 1990 enactment of [the Act].” Respondent cites no authority for why 

those “common-law measurements” should not be applied to the Act. “Voluntary” is not 

defined in the Act or the Uniform Act, and “if a term has a settled legal meaning, the courts will 

normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate the established meaning” (People v. 

Smith, 236 Ill. 2d 162, 167 (2010)). This appeal does not require us to ascertain exactly what 

“voluntary” means in section 7(a)(2)(ii). For us it is enough that compelling reasons exist for 

holding that the voluntariness of a waiver of further disclosure under section 7(a)(2)(ii) is not 

determined by whether the other party has made any level of disclosure. 

¶ 78 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 79 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County. 

¶ 80 Affirmed.