J-S45013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WALTER W. HALL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 857 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 26, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montour County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-47-CR-0000161-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JANUARY 25, 2024

Walter W. Hall appeals from the judgment of sentence of six to twelve 

months of incarceration imposed after a jury convicted him of terroristic 

threats. We affirm. 

We glean the following factual history from the trial transcript. Appellant 

and Pamela Tyler dated for several months during the winter of 2003-04. 

They stayed in touch in the ensuing years and rekindled their relationship in 

January 2021. The following month, Ms. Tyler moved into Appellant’s 

residence, where he lived with his fourteen-year-old daughter, to assist with 

Appellant’s struggling finances. While the couple had been having arguments 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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from time to time, tensions dramatically escalated on Labor Day weekend of 

2021. 

According to Ms. Tyler, the troubles began on Friday morning when 

Appellant complained about being emasculated by Ms. Tyler’s making him the 

butt of her jokes about being old and “a kept man,” and told her to get out. 

N.T. Trial, 2/10/23, at 25. She went out shopping, and Appellant bombarded 

her with phone calls and text messages. Ms. Tyler procured some items 

Appellant requested, returned to the home, and stayed in the bedroom the 

rest of the night. The next day the couple and Appellant’s daughter went to 

an auction, were Appellant berated Ms. Tyler for overpaying for an item. Ms. 

Tyler again opted to spend the evening by herself in the bedroom.

The arguing began again on Sunday morning, with Appellant

complaining that Ms. Tyler made everything about herself. He spent the early 

afternoon going back to the bedroom every few minutes to engage with her. 

Ms. Tyler stayed in bed and watched a movie until approximately 3:30 p.m.

when “the next blow-up happened” and Appellant then told her to “get the F 

out of his house.” Id. at 30. Ms. Tyler stated that she would leave and began 

packing her belongings. During the packing, Appellant resumed his circuit in 

and out of the bedroom, postulating on matters ranging from why she thought 

that he was a monster, to how much he loved her, to how stupid she was. Id. 

at 31. At one point, Appellant brought his daughter, who had been watching 

television in her own room all the while, back to the room and told her that 
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she did not have to be nice to Ms. Tyler, whom he called “that stupid bitch.” 

Id. at 32. 

Having finished gathering her belongings, Ms. Tyler began 

contemplating where she would go, as she had sold her home when she moved 

in with Appellant. Appellant then cornered her in the back of the bedroom, 

got in her face nose-to-nose, and told her that she had better not “drag his 

name through the mud” or “cause him any problems” after she left, and 

threatened to hit her. Id. at 33-34. Appellant then exited the bedroom and 

returned with one arm behind his back, again blocking her into the corner and 

inquiring whether she was going to “have the cops here” or otherwise “cause 

[him] any problems” when she left. Id. at 35. According to Ms. Tyler, after 

she informed Appellant that she would not and simply wanted to take her 

belongings and leave, he pulled out a butcher knife, held it between them, 

and told her that if she did anything, “he would hunt [her] down and take 

[her] out no matter where [she] went.” Id. 

Terrified, with no place to go, Ms. Tyler “shut down” and “crawled back 

into bed, covered up.” Id. at 36-37. Appellant later returned while she was 

in bed and threatened to have his daughter “punch [her] in the face and knock 

[her] down and kick [her] in the guts and kick [her] teeth in,” indicating that 

he would inform police that Ms. Tyler initiated it by slapping the child in the 

face. Id. at 37. Concluding that Appellant was “going to do whatever it takes 
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to hurt [her],” Ms. Tyler packed some necessary items and fled at 

approximately 1:30 A.M. on Monday, September 6, 2021. 

Ms. Tyler spent Labor Day hiding in her daughter’s basement. The 

following day, she got in touch with a domestic violence shelter and filed a 

Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) petition. On Wednesday, she obtained a 

temporary PFA order and filed a report with the police, which resulted in 

Appellant’s arrest on September 9, 2021. While in a holding cell, Appellant 

admitted to Trooper Jennifer Bowers that he had approached Ms. Tyler while 

she was packing and “told her that he would stomp her,” but denied wielding 

a butcher knife at any point. Id. at 54-55.

Appellant was charged with terroristic threats, simple assault, and 

summary harassment. He entered a guilty plea to terroristic threats but was 

granted leave to withdraw it prior to sentencing. With new counsel, Appellant 

proceeded to a jury trial on February 20, 2023. In addition to the above 

testimony provided by Ms. Tyler and Trooper Bowers, the jury heard from 

Appellant and his daughter. The latter testified that Appellant and Ms. Tyler 

communicated throughout the day in question. Id. at 96. While she could 

not understand most of what they said, she was able to hear the substance of 

the louder arguments. Likewise, she corroborated that Appellant was in and 

out of the bedroom all day but denied hearing any threats or seeing a knife. 

Id. 
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For his part, Appellant confirmed that the tensions began on Friday of 

Labor Day weekend with his bemoaning Ms. Tyler’s hurtful joking. He 

indicated that he avoided further argument and she left in her car. Appellant’s 

version of Saturday’s events at the auction omitted any indication that he had 

berated her for her failure to haggle, but included details of a prank Ms. Tyler 

pulled on his daughter, not for the first time, of pretending to unlock the car 

and making fun of the child in public when she unsuccessfully yanked the door 

handle. Id. at 67. 

Appellant claimed that he was awakened on Sunday morning by Ms. 

Tyler “slamming things around” in the bedroom and hinting that she was 

preparing to leave. Id. at 68. He told her that “it’s probably time for you to 

go anyway, so just get your stuff and leave.” Id. In Appellant’s version of 

events, Ms. Tyler immediately stopped packing and sat on the bed, and when 

he went back and forth throughout the day, it was to encourage her to 

continue packing despite her expressed disinclination to leave. Id. at 68-70. 

Any time these discussions started to become arguments, Appellant simply 

walked away. Id. at 70. Appellant maintained that he loved Ms. Tyler and 

that he recognized that she had no place to go because she had sold her house 

to help him financially, but he felt he had no choice but to ask her to leave 
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because of the way she interacted with him and his daughter after she had 

started using high-potency THC in the last month.1 Id. at 69, 75.

Appellant denied threatening Ms. Tyler verbally or with a knife. Id. at 

74. Rather, he indicated that Ms. Tyler was the one who made the threats, 

telling him that she would “destroy” him if he made her leave by telling people 

whatever she had to say to have Appellant put in jail, and that “it won’t take 

much to get them to believe [her]” even though he had done nothing. Id. at 

77-78. Appellant repeated to the jury time and time again that he held no 

malice or ill will towards Ms. Tyler that would have prompted him to threaten 

her. Instead, Appellant insisted that he “felt bad for” her. Id. at 71, 74, 75, 

78, 82. 

During closing arguments, Appellant attacked Ms. Tyler’s credibility 

largely on the basis that she “had absolutely every opportunity to leave that 

day on [Sunday,] September 5.” Id. at 103. He maintained that she did not 

do so because she was not afraid of him, and instead fabricated false 

accusations to punish Appellant for making her leave. Id. The 

Commonwealth advocated that the defense had “thr[own] everything they 

could against the wall hoping something would stick.” Id. at 106. It 

countered the defense’s reliance upon Ms. Tyler’s continued presence in the 

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1 The Commonwealth objected to Appellant’s initial reference to Ms. Tyler’s 

THC use and the comment was stricken, but later reiterations of the claim 

were not challenged.
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home after Appellant’s threats by characterizing it as “victim shaming,” 

asserting that “[a] domestic violence victim is not required to run away,” and 

noting that she explained how days of encouragement by her daughter and 

the domestic violence shelter convinced her to report the incident. Id. The 

prosecutor further ridiculed the suggestion that Ms. Tyler’s alleged THC use 

caused her to become aggressive toward Appellant, observing “in my 

experience dealing with individuals using marijuana, it does not result in them 

becoming angry, combative and argumentative.” Id. at 108. Notably, 

Appellant raised no objections to the Commonwealth’s closing remarks. 

After deliberating for several hours, the jury found Appellant guilty of 

terroristic threats but declined to find him guilty of simple assault or 

possession of a deadly weapon in connection with terroristic threats.

2

 On April 

26, 2023, Appellant was sentenced as indicated above, with provisions for 

immediate work release and automatic parole at the conclusion of his 

minimum sentence. 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the sufficiency 

and weight of the evidence. For both claims, Appellant asserted that he was 

entitled to relief based upon the discrepancies between Ms. Tyler’s testimony 

on the one hand and that of him and his daughter on the other. See PostSentence Motion, 5/5/23, at ¶¶ 5-6. Appellant further asserted that he was 

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2 At the conclusion of the trial, the court separately found Appellant guilty of 

summary harassment and imposed a fine. 
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entitled to a judgment of acquittal based upon the prosecution’s closing 

remarks about domestic violence victims, claiming that it was “speculation 

and had the jury take into consideration facts not in evidence.” Id. at ¶ 5(d). 

The trial court denied the post-sentence motion after a hearing, and 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court ordered Appellant to 

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and he promptly complied. Appellant 

presents the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict [Appellant]

of terroristic threats and establish that victim was in fear of serious 

bodily injury or was threatened?

2. Whether the verdict was against the weight of evidence 

when considering all testimony?

3. Whether the prosecutor’s statements in closing arguments 

regarding domestic violence were prejudicial to defendant?

Appellant’s brief at 4.

Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 

terroristic threats conviction. The following principles apply to consideration 

of this claim:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for a fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 
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may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered. 

Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 A.3d 100, 104 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned 

up). 

Appellant was convicted of terroristic threats pursuant to the following 

statute: “A person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person 

communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to: (1) commit any crime 

of violence with intent to terrorize another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a). We have 

explained that “the harm sought to be prevented by the statute is the 

psychological distress that follows from an invasion of another’s sense of 

personal security.” Commonwealth v. Kline, 201 A.3d 1288, 1290 

(Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up). 

The defendant need not articulate a specific crime of violence “where 

the type of crime may be inferred from the nature of the statement and the 

context and circumstances surrounding the utterance of the statement.” 

Commonwealth v. Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 1028 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(cleaned up). Further, a terroristic threats conviction does not require proof 

that the defendant actually intended to commit the violence, but rather an 

intent to terrorize a target individual. See Kline, supra at 1290. Moreover,

“neither the ability to carry out the threat nor a belief by the person threatened 
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that it will be carried out is an essential element of the crime.” Id. (cleaned 

up). 

While the statute “is not meant to penalize mere spur-of-the-moment 

threats which result from anger,” this Court has acknowledged that “being 

angry does not render a person incapable of forming the intent to terrorize.” 

Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 730 (Pa.Super. 2003) (cleaned 

up). “This Court must consider the totality of circumstances to determine 

whether the threat was a result of a heated verbal exchange or confrontation.” 

Id. (cleaned up). 

Here, Appellant contends that the totality of the circumstances is such 

that “any words construed as a threat would have been in the heat of the 

moment.” Appellant’s brief at 10. The specific circumstances upon which he 

relies are: (1) “the arguing over the course of the weekend,” (2) “the 

inconsistencies in [Ms. Tyler]’s testimony,” (3) “Appellant’s denial of intent to 

scare or threaten [her],” and (4) Ms. Tyler’s “remaining in the home despite 

having the ability to leave.” Id. Appellant asserts that his conviction is thus 

supported by insufficient evidence and should be vacated. Id. 

We are wholly unpersuaded. First, construing Ms. Tyler’s failure to flee 

at the first opportunity as evidence that she was not terrorized would be to 

view it in the light most favorable to Appellant, not the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner. Second, it was for the jury, not this Court, to resolve any 

inconsistencies in her testimony. Third, the jury was free to accept her 
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testimony that she was in essence paralyzed with fear and had to sort out 

where she could go. See N.T. Trial, 2/10/23, at 36-37. It was also free to 

reject Appellant’s self-serving denials and accept Ms. Tyler’s statements that 

Appellant made not just a single threat in the heat of an argument, but 

multiple threats of violence over the course of many hours in an escalation of 

his complaints of feeling emasculated. 

Finally, the jury heard from Ms. Tyler that Appellant both stated that “he 

would hunt [her] down and take [her] out no matter where [she] went,” and 

that he would instruct his daughter to strike her in the face, guts, and teeth, 

and from Trooper Bowers that Appellant admitted to threatening to “stomp” 

Ms. Tyler. Id. at 35, 37, 54-55. This evidence was sufficient to allow the jury 

to conclude that Appellant had threatened multiple crimes of violence, and 

that he did so not merely in the heat of the moment, but in order to terrorize 

Ms. Tyler. Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency challenge must fail.

Next, Appellant assails his conviction as being against the weight of the 

evidence. The following law applies to our consideration of that claim:

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the 

trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts 

would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of 

the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review 

applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a 
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review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). 

Accordingly, our task is to determine whether the trial court, in ruling on 

Appellant’s weight challenge, “abused its discretion by reaching a manifestly 

unreasonable judgment, misapplying the law, or basing its decision on 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 

1056 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up). 

In asserting his weight claim, Appellant merely highlights the evidence 

favorable to him, posits that the verdict was contrary to it, and, in essence, 

suggests that we weigh the evidence differently. See Appellant’s brief at 11-

12. That we will not do. See Clay, supra at 1056 (reversing this Court’s 

grant of a new trial based upon a weight challenge on the basis that the 

“Superior Court stepped into the shoes of the trial judge and revisited the 

underlying question of whether the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence, an analysis that is not appropriate under the appellate standard of 

review”). 

In rejecting Appellant’s challenge, the trial court explained that the split 

verdict plainly evinced that it carefully considered all the evidence and credited 

Ms. Tyler in some but not all respects. Appellant provides no basis for us to 

conclude that this ruling was a product of partiality, bias, ill-will, 

misapplication of the law, or a manifestly unreasonable judgment. As such, 
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we have no cause to disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying 

Appellant the requested relief.

Appellant’s final claim is that he was prejudiced by the prosecution’s 

remarks during closing arguments. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the 

prosecutor improperly commented “on facts not in evidence when he made 

the statement regarding domestic violence victims,” and “on the effects of 

marijuana on people when testimony was stricken and there was no expert 

presented by either defense or prosecution as to the effects of marijuana on 

people.” Appellant’s brief at 14. He then baldly states that the statements 

were “inflammatory and prejudicial to Appellant” and a new trial should be 

granted. Id. 

We begin by observing that our review of a claim that prosecutorial 

misconduct warrants a new trial “is focused on whether the defendant was 

deprived of a fair trial, not a perfect one. Not every inappropriate remark by 

a prosecutor constitutes reversible error.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 

230 A.3d 480, 490 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up). “Even if the prosecutor’s 

arguments are improper, they generally will not form the basis for a new trial 

unless the comments unavoidably prejudiced the jury and prevented a true 

verdict.” Id. at 490 (cleaned up). “A trial court may remove taint through 

curative instructions.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 774 

(Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc). “Courts must consider all surrounding 
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circumstances before finding that curative instructions were insufficient and 

the extreme remedy of a mistrial is required.” Id. (cleaned up). 

The effects of any improper comments “depends upon the atmosphere 

of the trial, and the proper action to be taken is within the discretion of the 

trial court.” Commonwealth v. Clancy, 192 A.3d 44, 63 (Pa. 2018) (cleaned 

up). “Our standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is limited 

to whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Hernandez, supra at 490 

(cleaned up). As our Supreme Court has explained: “If the defendant thinks 

the prosecutor has done something objectionable, he may object, the trial 

court rules, and the ruling—not the underlying conduct—is what is reviewed 

on appeal. Where . . . no objection was raised, there is no claim of 

‘prosecutorial misconduct’ as such available.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 

A.2d 666, 685 (Pa. 2009) (cleaned up). 

Here, Appellant made no objection to the prosecution’s closing remarks,

nor any request for a mistrial or other remedy. As such, the trial court did 

not have the opportunity to make a ruling as to whether the comments were 

improper and what remedy, if any, was required. Consequently, we have no 

exercise of discretion to review. In other words, Appellant’s prosecutorial 

misconduct claim was waived for purposes of this appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097, 1107–08 (Pa.Super. 2016)

(“Appellant failed to preserve this claim for appeal as he did not object to the 

prosecutor’s statement at trial and raises this argument for the first time on 
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appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).”). Therefore, Appellant’s final issue entitles 

him to no relief.3

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/25/2024

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3 The trial court in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion indicated that the 

prosecution’s remarks were supported by the evidence and made in fair 

response to the defense’s closing arguments. See Trial Court Opinion, 

7/25/23, at 5-6. As recounted hereinabove, the jury heard evidence that Ms. 

Tyler sought assistance to cope with domestic violence when she felt able to 

do so, and that Appellant blamed the conflict upon her alleged use of THC. 

See N.T. Trial, 2/10/23, at 36-39, 75. These facts in evidence were fairly 

referenced by the prosecution in response to the defense’s attacks upon Ms. 

Tyler’s credibility. Accord Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119 A.3d 1058, 1068 

(Pa.Super. 2015) (holding prosecutor’s remark that the victim was “credible 

and telling the truth” was a fair response to the defense’s contentions that the 

victim “was a juvenile delinquent, had lied about other events, and also lied 

about the sexual assaults at issue”). Therefore, we discern no basis to 

disagree with the trial court’s assessment even if Appellant had preserved the 

issue.