J-S49040-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GODFREY GILLINGS PANAM,

Appellant No. 259 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order of January 8, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0006493-2010

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN AND OLSON, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2015

Appellant, Godfrey Gillings Panam, appeals from the order entered on 

January 8, 2015 dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On September 16, 2011, a jury convicted Appellant of simple 

assault and endangering the welfare of a minor in connection with injuries 

his 18-month-old son sustained in 2010. The trial court sentenced Appellant 

to 111⁄2 to 23 months of imprisonment, with a consecutive term of four 

years’ probation. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on 

November 27, 2012. See Commonwealth v. Panam, 63 A.3d 838 (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court denied 

further review on May 30, 2013. See Commonwealth v. Panam, 68 A.3d 
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908 (Pa. 2013). Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on February 6, 2014. 

On February 11, 2014, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent 

Appellant during collateral review. Appointed counsel filed an amended 

PCRA petition on October 1, 2014. On December 17, 2014, the PCRA court 

sent Appellant notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 indicating its intent to 

deny relief without a hearing. Appellant responded on January 5, 2015. On 

January 8, 2015, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s 

PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed.1

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

Was it error for the PCRA court to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA 

petition without a hearing?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in declining to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on his PCRA petition. Citing the United States Supreme 

Court decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356 (2010), Appellant 

alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult and address 

deportation consequences resulting from his convictions at trial. Id. at 8. 

Appellant recognizes that “Padilla centered on trial counsel’s advice prior to 

the entry of a guilty plea[,]” whereas Appellant was convicted by a jury. Id.

____________________________________________

1

 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on February 6, 2015. On February 9, 

2015, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied 

on February 27, 2015. The PCRA court issued an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on April 8, 2015.
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at 9. Appellant claims that “[i]t stands to reason that if trial counsel has an 

obligation to explain immigration risks prior to a guilty plea then trial counsel 

should have the same obligation to explain immigration risks before deciding 

to take the matter to trial.” Id. at 10. Thus, Appellant urges this Court to 

“expand the protections offered by [] Padilla to ensure that a criminal 

defendant is always aware of the risks of deportation.” Id. at 9. Appellant 

posits that “[h]ad trial counsel discussed or addressed [deportation], [] 

Appellant would have pursued a negotiated plea to an offense which did not 

result in deportation.” Id. at 6. 

We begin by noting that “this Court's standard of review from the 

grant or denial of post-conviction relief is limited to examining whether the 

lower court's determination is supported by the evidence of record and 

whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Walker, 110 A.3d 

1000, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2015). Where, as here, a petitioner claims that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel, our Supreme Court has stated 

that:

A PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he 

proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his 

conviction or sentence resulted from the ineffective 

assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the 

particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence 

could have taken place. Generally, counsel's performance is 

presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will 

only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing by the 

petitioner. To obtain relief, a petitioner must demonstrate 

that counsel's performance was deficient and that the 

deficiency prejudiced the petitioner. A petitioner establishes 
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prejudice when he demonstrates that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

properly pled claim of ineffectiveness posits that: (1) the 

underlying legal issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel's 

actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) actual 

prejudice befell the petitioner from counsel's act or 

omission.

Id., citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532–533 (Pa. 

2009). 

This Court has previously summarized the decision in Padilla, as 

follows:

Jose Padilla, a Honduran native who had lived in the United 

States for more than 40 years, pled guilty to transportation 

of a large amount of marijuana, a deportable offense under 

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Padilla claimed that counsel 

not only failed to advise him of the possibility of deportation 

prior to entering the plea, but also told him that he did not 

have to worry about immigration status since he had been 

in the country so long. Padilla relied on counsel's erroneous 

advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges, and 

alleged in his post-conviction petition that he would have 

gone to trial had he not received incorrect advice from his 

attorney. 

Noting the unique nature of deportation, the Padilla Court 

decided that, [t]he weight of prevailing professional norms 

supports the view that counsel must advise her client 

regarding the risk of deportation. The Court found that, 

although civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless 

intimately related to the criminal process and concluded 

that [t]he severity of deportation— the equivalent of 

banishment or exile, —only underscores how critical it is for 

counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of 

deportation. Ultimately, the Court in Padilla remanded the 

matter for a determination as to whether Padilla could 

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's incorrect 

advice. 
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Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 339-340 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). 

Herein, Appellant did not enter a guilty plea and, thus, his reliance on 

Padilla is misplaced. Appellant chose to go to trial and a jury found him 

guilty. Hence, Padilla is not applicable. Appellant has not cited, and our 

independent review has not revealed, any case law extending Padilla to 

cases where a jury finds the defendant guilty. Moreover, while Appellant 

argues he would have pled guilty to lesser charges that would not have 

required his deportation, such a scenario is entirely speculative. Appellant 

has not alleged and proven that the Commonwealth would have agreed to 

Appellant’s hypothetical plea terms or that trial counsel could have advised 

Appellant as he contends. “The right to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 

1011, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted). “A PCRA court may decline 

to hold a hearing if the petitioner's claim is patently frivolous and is without 

a trace of support in either the record or from other evidence.” Id. Here, 

having determined that Appellant’s claim is patently frivolous, an evidentiary 

hearing was not warranted. Accordingly, Appellant’s sole appellate claim 

lacks merit.

Order affirmed. 

 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/20/2015