Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part, and Majority and 

Dissenting Opinions filed August 8, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00066-CV

IGNAZIO LA CHINA, Appellant

V.

THE WOODLANDS OPERATING COMPANY, L.P. D/B/A THE 

WOODLANDS RESORT & CONFERENCE CENTER, MS TWC, 

INC., WECCR, INC. D/B/A THE WOODLANDS RESORT & 

CONFERENCE CENTER, THE WOODLANDS COMMERCIAL 

PROPERTIES COMPANY, L.P., WECCR GENERAL 

PARTNERSHIP, MS HOSPITALITY, LP, AND MND 

HOSPITALITY, INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 9th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 11-06-06810-CV
2

M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N

In this case, we consider whether the trial court properly granted summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants in a negligence suit brought by a waterpark 

patron who allegedly suffered injuries resulting from a collision on a waterslide. 

Concluding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 

some of the defendants, but the claims against newly-added parties were not the 

subject of a summary-judgment motion, we affirm in part and reverse and remand 

in part.1

BACKGROUND

Appellant Ignazio La China spent a weekend in June 2009 at The 

Woodlands Resort and Conference Center. While patronizing the facility‘s 

waterpark, he allegedly collided with another patron on a waterslide and sustained 

injuries to his nose and back. Exactly two years later, La China filed suit against 

The Woodlands Operating Company, L.P., d/b/a The Woodlands Resort &

Conference Center; MS TWC, Inc.; and WECCR, Inc. d/b/a The Woodlands 

Resort & Conference Center (collectively, the ―Original Defendants‖), asserting 

claims for negligence and gross negligence. La China alleged the Original 

Defendants did not have an employee at the top of the waterslide to regulate traffic 

and failed to reasonably and prudently protect the safety of waterpark patrons.

In answering the suit, the Original Defendants claimed a defect in parties as 

none is an owner, lessor, lessee or manager of the waterpark. The Original 

Defendants also asserted a general denial and several affirmative defenses. After 

 

1 This appeal was transferred by order of the Supreme Court of Texas to this court from the 

Beaumont Court of Appeals.
3

the parties engaged in discovery but still early in the case, the Original Defendants 

filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, asserting that La China filed suit 

against the wrong entities and that the Original Defendants owed him no legal 

duty.

2

 The Original Defendants attached as summary-judgment evidence an 

affidavit of A. Karen West, Vice President and General Counsel for The 

Woodlands Operating Company, L.P., stating that The Woodlands Operating 

Company, L.P. and WECCR, Inc. do not do business as ―The Woodlands Resort & 

Conference Center‖; and the Original Defendants are not the owners, lessors, 

lessees, or managers of, or the employers of people working at the waterpark. In 

their summary-judgment motion, the Original Defendants identified other entities 

as ―the owner of,‖ ―the lessee of,‖ ―the Manager of,‖ and ―the employer at‖ that 

location.

Before the trial court ruled on the summary-judgment motion, La China filed 

a motion for continuance, stating that he needed more time to secure discovery.3 

La China also amended his pleadings to add as additional defendants the other 

entities identified in the West affidavit: The Woodlands Commercial Properties 

Company, L.P.; WECCR General Partnership; MS Hospitality, LP; and MND 

Hospitality, Inc. (hereinafter collectively, the ―New Defendants‖). La China filed 

objections to West‘s affidavit, asserting that it was not proper summary-judgment 

evidence because it contained conclusory statements and hearsay and West did not 

establish her personal knowledge as to WECCR, Inc., MS TWC, Inc. and the New 

Defendants. Though La China also moved to strike the West affidavit, the record 

 

2 La China sued the Original Defendants in negligence and gross negligence. Both causes 

of action require the element of a legal duty owed. See Lefmark Mgmt. Co. v. Old, 946 S.W.2d 

52, 53 (Tex. 1997); see also Holman v. KRJ Mgmt., Inc., 14-03-00017-CV, 2004 WL 502934, at 

*2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 16, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.).

3

The record on appeal does not include a notice of hearing or a signed order regarding 

the continuance.
4

does not reflect that the trial court ruled on either the motion to strike or La 

China‘s objections to the summary judgment evidence. La China also filed a 

response to the summary-judgment motion and attached three supporting exhibits. 

The trial court granted summary judgment, expressly stating in the judgment that it 

was final and appealable and finally disposed of all claims and all parties. 

DISCUSSION

La China asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in 

favor of the Original Defendants because (1) the affidavit supporting the motion 

for summary judgment was insufficient; (2) La China‘s evidence created a genuine 

issue of material fact that the Original Defendants are properly named parties who 

owed La China a legal duty; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

La China‘s motion for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing. La China 

further complains that the summary judgment disposed of the claims against the 

New Defendants without any summary-judgment motion seeking dismissal of 

these claims. 

In a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden of 

establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See M.D. Anderson Hosp. & 

Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000). Likewise, with a traditional 

summary-judgment motion, the nonmovant has no burden to respond unless the 

movant conclusively establishes a claim or defense. See id. If the movant‘s 

motion and summary-judgment evidence facially establish its right to judgment as 

a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine, material fact 

issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See id. A fact is material if it affects 

the ultimate outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Henning v. OneWest 
5

Bank FSB, 05-12-00078-CV, 2013 WL 3340485, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 2, 

2013, no. pet. h.); see also Pierce v. Washington Mut. Bank, 226 S.W.3d 711, 714 

(Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, pet. denied). We consider all the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if 

reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable 

jurors could not. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). 

The evidence raises a genuine issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors 

could differ in their conclusions in light of all of the summary-judgment evidence. 

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). When, 

as in this case, the order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds 

upon which the trial court relied, we must affirm the summary judgment if any of 

the independent summary-judgment grounds is meritorious. FM Props. Operating 

Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000).

I. The Affidavit Supporting the Summary Judgment Motion is 

Sufficient.

In his first issue, La China argues the evidence in support of the motion for 

summary judgment is incompetent because the single affidavit supporting the 

motion is conclusory and based on hearsay and the affiant, Karen West, did not 

establish her personal knowledge with regard to WECCR, Inc., MS TWC, Inc., and 

the New Defendants. West‘s statements in her affidavit are not conclusory. A 

―conclusory‖ statement is defined as ―[e]xpressing a factual inference without 

stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based.‖4 See Arkoma Basin 

Exploration Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 389 n.32 (Tex. 

2008) (citing Black‘s Law Dictionary 308 (8th ed. 2004)); see also LeBlanc v. 

 

4 An objection is not required to preserve error on a challenge to conclusory statements because 

they constitute no evidence. Coastal Transp. Co., Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 

233 (Tex. 2004).
6

Lamar State Coll., 232 S.W.3d 294, 301 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.)

(―Statements are conclusory if they fail to provide underlying facts to support their 

conclusions.‖). Conclusory affidavits are not sufficient to raise fact issues because 

they are not credible or susceptible to being readily controverted. Ryland Group v. 

Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). West attested that the 

Original Defendants are not owners, lessors, lessees, or managers of the waterpark

or employers of anyone working there. We find these statements are not 

conclusory: they furnish some factual information that could have been rebutted 

and, therefore, contain enough underlying facts to support a summary judgment 

award. See Rivera v. White, 234 S.W.3d 802, 808 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, 

no pet.).

The dissent argues that the affidavit is conclusory because it recites a legal 

standard. The statement that the Original Defendants are not ―the owners, lessors, 

lessees, or managers [of the waterpark or] the employer of persons working there‖

recites facts, not legal conclusions, because, if incorrect, these facts could be 

readily controverted.5 The dissent cites Geiselman v. Cramer Financial Group, 

Inc. for the proposition that ―conclusions of ownership or lack of ownership must 

be supported by underlying facts.‖ 965 S.W.2d 532, 537 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). In that case, Cramer Financial Group sued Geiselman 

and others to collect on unsecured promissory notes payable to a failed bank. Id. at 

534. Cramer was required to prove ownership of the notes by showing, among 

other things, possession of the original notes or ―what . . . happened to the original 

notes.‖ Id. at 539. Cramer claimed, but did not present competent evidence that, 

the notes had been ―lost, stolen or inadvertently destroyed.‖ Id. at 536-37. We 

 

5

The legal standard at issue here is the existence of a duty. These facts establish that the 

Original Defendants did not owe La China a duty, as discussed below.
7

held the statement that Cramer was the owner of the notes, without proof of 

possession or what happened to the notes, was a legal conclusion. Id. at 537. The 

case does not stand for the broader proposition posited by the dissent that a 

statement of ownership (or lack of ownership), standing alone, cannot be a fact. 

See, e.g., Nguyen v. Citibank N.A., 14-12-00153-CV, 2013 WL 3192884, at *3

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013, no. pet. h.) (holding affiant‘s 

assertion of ownership of credit card account on behalf of bank was sufficient to 

establish such ownership and not conclusory); Cannon v. Tex. Indep. Bank, 1 

S.W.3d 218, 225 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (finding affiant‘s 

statements ―concerning execution and delivery of . . . note . . . and concerning 

[bank] being the holder and owner of the [note were] statements of fact and not 

mere expressions of opinion‖).

The dissent also cites Doherty v. Old Place, Inc. in support of the argument 

that statements of ownership always must be supported by underlying facts. 316 

S.W.3d 840, 844-45 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Ownership 

of real property was the ultimate issue in that case. The affiant summarily stated 

that he held ―fee simple title‖ to property based on three theories of adverse 

possession. Id. at 845. These statements constituted legal conclusions because 

they did not include the underlying facts that supported the conclusion that the 

affiant owned the property through adverse possession. Id.

Here, ownership of the waterpark is not the ultimate issue. The Original 

Defendants sought to prove they did not owe a duty to La China. They did so by 

showing they did not own, lease, manage, or employ anyone working at the 

waterpark. That the Original Defendants do not own the waterpark is not a legal 

conclusion regarding a contested issue in this case—it is a fact which, if 

established, negates the existence of a duty.
8

La China did not secure a ruling on his other objections to West‘s affidavit 

regarding personal knowledge and hearsay.

6

 Thus, La China waived these 

objections. See Washington DC Party Shuttle, LLC v. iGuide Tours, LLC, No. 14-

12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3226768, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

June 27, 2013, no pet. h.) (en banc) (holding objection to lack of affiant‘s personal 

knowledge is waived by failure to obtain ruling); Rizkallah v. Conner, 952 S.W.2d 

580, 585 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ) (same);7 Graves v. 

Alders, 132 S.W.3d 12, 17 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) (holding 

objections to affidavits based on hearsay were waived due to failure to obtain 

written ruling). West‘s affidavit is sufficient to conclusively establish the Old 

Defendants‘ defense as to legal duty.

In addition to concluding that West‘s affidavit is conclusory, the dissent also 

would hold that the Original Defendants‘ evidence failed to establish they did not 

―control‖ or ―occupy‖ the subject premises and thus owed no duty to La China. La 

China did not raise this issue in his appellate brief. We may not address an issue 

not asserted or briefed by La China. Robinson v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 298 

S.W.3d 321, 326 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). 

 

6

The dissent‘s other argument that the affidavit is conclusory is based on the fact that the 

affidavit does not establish West‘s personal knowledge with regard to her connections to MS 

TWC, Inc. or WECCR, Inc. or with regard to the facts that the Original Defendants are not 

owners, lessors, lessees, or managers of the waterpark or employers of anyone working there.

7 Our sister court in Beaumont has not decided whether an objection to an affiant‘s lack 

of personal knowledge is waived by the failure to obtain a ruling. However, we and the majority 

of our sister courts have answered this question in the affirmative. See iGuide Tours, 2013 WL 

3226768, at *9 (noting the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Courts of 

Appeals have held an affiant‘s lack of personal knowledge is a defect of form that is waived by 

the failure to obtain a ruling, but the Third and Eighth Courts of Appeal have held an affiant‘s 

lack of personal knowledge is a defect of substance that may be raised for the first time on 

appeal).
9

Regardless, the summary-judgment evidence was sufficient to disprove La China‘s 

allegation that the Original Defendants owed him a duty. 

Tort liability requires ―both the existence of and the violation of a duty.‖ 

Lefmark Mgmt. Co. v. Old, 946 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Tex. 1997); see also Holman v. 

KRJ Mgmt., Inc., 14-03-00017-CV, 2004 WL 502934, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Mar. 16, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.). Duty in the context of premises 

liability is ―commensurate with the right of control.‖ Lefmark Mgmt. Co., 946 

S.W.2d at 53-54; Nichols v. Tanglewood Manor Apartments, 14-04-00864-CV, 

2006 WL 278282, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 7, 2006, no pet.) 

(mem. op.). A party in control of a premises ―is under the same duty as the owner 

to keep the premises . . . in safe condition.‖ City of Denton v. Page, 701 S.W.2d 

831, 834 (Tex. 1986); see also Rendleman v. Clarke, 909 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism‘d). Control can be demonstrated by 

ownership, occupation, management, or possession of property. Lefmark Mgmt. 

Co., 946 S.W.2d at 54; see also Holman, 2004 WL 502934, at *2; De Leon v. 

Creely, 972 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (citing 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328 to say that control requires ―physical control 

of the property or the intention to occupy or possess the property‖). The elements 

of control can be proven by a contractual agreement assigning a right to control or 

evidence of actual control. Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex. 

2002); see also Olivares v. Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc., 14-12-00198-CV, 2013 WL 

1775998, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 25, 2013, no. pet.). 

Admittedly, the West affidavit fails to specifically deny that the Original 

Defendants ―controlled‖ or ―occupied‖ the premises where La China allegedly was 

injured. However, West attested the Original Defendants did not own, lease or 

manage the subject property, and from the terminology used in the affidavit, one
10

should easily infer a lack of control or occupation. See Gunn v. Harris Methodist 

Affiliate Hosps., 887 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied). 

The Gunn case presented a summary judgment affidavit similar to the West 

affidavit. The defendant hospital attested it did not own, maintain or operate the 

premises in which Gunn was injured. Id. at 251. The trial court granted summary 

judgment, and Gunn appealed, arguing the hospital failed to negate its duty to 

Gunn because it did not deny that it occupied the premises. Id. at 249. The court 

held that ―the [h]ospital‘s failure to use the specific term  ̳occupy‘ in its motion for 

summary judgment and supporting affidavit was not a fatal flaw.‖ Id. at 251. 

The Original Defendants‘ failure to use the specific terms ―occupy‖ or 

―control‖ did not preclude the trial court from entering summary judgment in the 

Original Defendants‘ favor. The meanings of the words ―occupy‖ and ―own‖ are 

generally understood to indicate an ability to manage and control. See Am. Fid. & 

Cas. Co. v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 334 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. 1959); State v. 

Garcia, 823 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, pet. ref‘d). Given 

that the terms ―operate,‖ as used in the Gunn case, and ―own,‖ as used here, are 

synonymous with ―manage‖ and ―control,‖ and given that the Original Defendants 

presented evidence that they did not ―own, lease, or manage‖ the subject premises, 

the Original Defendants‘ summary judgment evidence was sufficient to disprove 

La China‘s allegation that the Original Defendants owed him a duty.

We overrule La China‘s first issue.

II. La China Did Not Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to a 

Legal Duty Owed by the Original Defendants.

In his second issue, La China argues he raised a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether the Original Defendants are properly named parties who owed 
11

La China a legal duty because (1) WECCR, Inc. and The Woodlands Operating 

Company, L.P. filed an assumed name certificate identifying The Woodlands 

Resort and Conference Center, which is the subject premises, as their assumed 

name; (2) MS TWC, Inc. filed documentation with the Texas Secretary of State 

showing it is a general partner of The Woodlands Operating Company, L.P.; and 

(3) a third-party administrator for The Woodlands Operating Company, L.P. 

acknowledged it received notice of La China‘s injuries and identified a claim 

number for La China. La China tries to prove too much. At most, this evidence 

supports a reasonable inference that WECCR, Inc. and The Woodlands Operating 

Company, L.P. have a right to conduct business as The Woodlands Resort and 

Conference Center; MS TWC, Inc. was a general partner of The Woodlands 

Operating Company, L.P.; and a third-party claims adjuster for The Woodlands 

Operating Company, L.P. opened a claim for La China‘s alleged injuries. Even if 

true, these facts are not material to the issue of whether the Original Defendants 

owed La China a legal duty. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable 

to La China, reasonable and fair-minded jurors could not differ in their conclusions 

in light of the summary-judgment evidence that the Original Defendants did not 

owe a legal duty to La China for his injuries at the waterpark. See Mack Trucks, 

Inc., 206 S.W.3d at 582.

III. The Trial Court’s Denial of La China’s Motion for Continuance 

Was Not a Clear Abuse of Discretion.

La China further complains in his second issue that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying La China‘s motion for continuance requesting time to obtain 

responses to discovery requests and to conduct depositions relevant to the 

summary-judgment motion. When a party argues it has not had an adequate 

opportunity for discovery before a hearing on a traditional summary-judgment 
12

motion, such as here, the trial court may order a continuance of the hearing if it 

appears ―from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for 

reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition.‖ Tex. R. 

Civ. P. 166a(g), 251, 252; Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 

161 (Tex. 2004). When reviewing a trial court‘s order denying a motion for 

continuance, we consider whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of 

discretion on a case-by-case basis. Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161. A trial court abuses its 

discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to 

a clear and prejudicial error of law. Id. We may consider the following 

nonexclusive factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion: 

(1) the length of time the case has been on file, (2) the materiality and purpose of 

the discovery sought, and (3) whether the party seeking the continuance has 

exercised due diligence to obtain the discovery sought. Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161; 

Life Forms, Inc. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 304 S.W.3d 591, 601 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2010, pet. denied). 

It is undisputed that La China filed suit against the Original Defendants on 

the last day before the limitations period expired and sought discovery well over 

two years after the alleged incident. Neither the request for continuance nor the 

attached affidavit contain an assertion that La China exercised due diligence to 

ascertain the proper defendants to the lawsuit prior to the filing of the summaryjudgment motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 252; see also Richards v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & 

Cas. Co., 195 S.W.3d 758, 762 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, no pet.) (holding 

trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for continuance when party 

seeking continuance did not show due diligence to procure the testimony). Given 

these facts, we conclude that the trial court did not make a clear and prejudicial 

error of law in denying the request for continuance. 
13

We overrule La China‘s second issue.

IV. The Trial Court Erroneously Entered Summary Judgment in 

Favor of the New Defendants.

In his third issue, La China complains that the trial court erroneously entered 

summary judgment disposing of the claims against the New Defendants because no 

summary-judgment motion sought dismissal of these claims. Before the trial court 

granted summary judgment, La China amended his petition to add negligence and 

gross-negligence claims against the New Defendants. The Original Defendants did 

not amend their summary-judgment motion, and the New Defendants did not 

appear or assert a summary-judgment motion. It is undisputed that when the trial 

court granted summary judgment, the New Defendants had not been served with 

citation. 

The Original Defendants effectively ask this court to disregard the claims 

against the New Defendants because these defendants had not made an appearance 

and had not been served with process when the trial court rendered judgment. 

Thus, the Original Defendants argue the trial court had no jurisdiction over the 

New Defendants and no ability to render judgment against the New Defendants 

when it granted the Original Defendants‘ summary-judgment motion. Because the 

Original Defendants were the only defendants served, they argue the trial court‘s 

judgment was final and disposed of all parties. To the contrary, La China‘s claims 

were pending against the New Defendants when the trial court rendered summary 

judgment, despite the failure of La China to serve the New Defendants with 

citation, the failure of the New Defendants to make an appearance, and the trial 

court‘s inability to render judgment against the New Defendants. See In re 

Shepherd, 193 S.W.3d 181, 188–89 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. 

proceeding) (holding trial court had not lost plenary power over defendants not yet 
14

served in lawsuit after trial court dismissed plaintiff‘s claims against another 

defendant). In its judgment, the trial court disposed of the claims against the New 

Defendants when no summary-judgment motion sought such dismissal. In doing 

so, the trial court erred. See Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. 1984)

(holding trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of party that ―was 

not a party to the summary-judgment proceedings‖); see also S. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. 

v. SM Energy Co., 398 S.W.3d 350, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, 

no pet.) (holding disposition of third-party claims not addressed in summaryjudgment motion was error).

We sustain La China‘s third issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court‘s entry of summary judgment as to the Original 

Defendants. However, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 

regarding La China‘s claims against the New Defendants because those defendants 

did not seek summary judgment. The summary judgment in favor of the New 

Defendants is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Christopher, and Jamison (Frost, J., dissenting).