was stable. (Id.) Plaintiff insists that this is error, because
although some of Dr. Davis’ post-August 28, 2000 notes indicate
that her condition was improving, others note that Plaintiff's
depressive condition was deteriorating.

Seventh Circuit caselaw makes clear that an ALJ may not
"select and discuss only that evidence that favors his ultimate
conclusion" Herron, 19 F.3d at 333. However, the ALJ is not
required to discuss every piece of evidence in the record. Dixon
v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171,1176 (7% Cir. 2001). Rather, an ALJ
must consider the evidence in its entirety.( Godbey v. Apfel, 238
F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000); see also, Golembiewski v.
Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 917 (7% Cir. 2003) (an ALJ’s opinion
must demonstrate that he has reviewed all of the evidence to
permit appellate review, but the ALJ is not required to discuss
each item of evidence.)

After reviewing the treatment notes, the Court concludes
that the ALJ did not selectively discuss only the evidence
favoring his decision. The ALJ expressly mentions the post-
August 28, 2000 treatment notes in his decision, and concludes
that the notes indicate that Plaintiff’s depression was stable.
Specifically, the ALJ notes that although Plaintiff’s depressive
symptoms were increasing in October 2000, by January 2001,

Plaintiff was described as “stable.” (R. at 24.)

-19-



Cir. 1994). Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds
to differ, the responsibility for determining whether a claimant
is disabled falls upon the Commissioner, not the courts. Herr v.
Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7% Cir. 1990); see also Stuckey v.
Sullivan, 881 F.2d 506, 509 (7 Cir. 1989) (the ALJ has the
authority to assess medical evidence and give greater weight to
that which he finds more credible). Rather, the Court must
accept findings of fact that are supported by “substantial
evidence,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), where substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Herron, 19 F.3d at 333
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).

The Court is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner’s final decision is supported by substantial
evidence and based upon proper legal criteria. Ehrhart v. Sec’y
of Health and Human Servs., 969 F.2d 534, 538 (7% Cir. 1992).
This does not mean that the ALJ is entitled to unlimited judicial
deference, however. The ALJ must consider all relevant evidence
and may not select and discuss only that evidence that favors his
ultimate conclusion. Herron, 19 F.3d at 333. In addition to
relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must articulate his
analysis at some minimal level. See Young v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 393 (7** Cir. 1992) (ALJ must
articulate his reason for rejecting evidence “within reasonable

limits” in order for meaningful appellate review). The ALJ must

-13-


Plaintiff was depressed, she was not disabled. The ALJ properly
discussed the evidence supporting his conclusion, and cited to
supporting medical evidence. Because the ALJ did not substitute
his opinion for that of Dr. Davis, this Court rejects Plaintiff's
claim that the ALJ impermissibly reached his own medical
conclusions in Plaintiff's case.

D. The ALJ's Hypothetical To The VE Did Incorporate Plaintiff's
Difficulty In Focusing On Tasks

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE
presupposed an ability to do simple one, two, or three step jobs,
but did not incorporate Plaintiff’s difficulty in focusing on
tasks. Because the hypothetical posed to the VE was incomplete,
Plaintiff argues, it was error for the ALJ to have relied on the
VE’s opinion to find that she could perform her past work.

In his decision, the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff has
occasional auditory hallucinations and some difficulty focusing
on tasks. (R. at 25.) Because of these conditions, he limited
her to simple one, two, or three step tasks in an environment
where she would avoid contact with the general public and have
minimal contact with co-workers and supervisors. (Id.) So, the
ALJ’s decision indicates that he did, in fact, consider
Plaintiff's difficulty in focusing on tasks when formulating the
hypothetical he posed to the VE. Specifically, the ALJ limited

Plaintiff to simple one, two, or three step tasks because of her

-23-


with the law and her father died. (R. at 65.) Plaintiff
testified that it was at this point that she started putting the
wrong prices on mail. (R. at 66.) When questioned further on
the circumstances surrounding the down-sizing, Plaintiff later
testified that a few days before she left the company, she was
involved in an altercation with a co-worker, threatening her co-
worker with physical violence. (R. at 67.) Plaintiff testified
that the day after this dispute, her supervisor called her into
his office and told her that she had to leave the company. (R.
at 67-68.)

With respect to her impairments, Plaintiff testified that
she is depressed. (R. at 47.) She testified that she sometimes
likes who she is, but not most of the time. ‘(R. at 48.)
Plaintiff testified that she sometimes wishes that she could just
start all over again. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that she has
been seeing Dr. Gregory Davis once a week in a group therapy
setting, and seeing Dr. Clay every two or three months. (R. at
46.) Plaintiff testified that she thinks she is getting better,
except for the times when she gets angry. (R. at 47.) She
testified that she gets angry when her son writes her letters
from prison saying she is not doing enough for him. (R. at 50.)
Plaintiff testified that her son’s letters sometimes upset her so

much that she locks herself in her room for a couple of days



Plaintiff’s real disagreement is with the ALJ’s conclusion that
Dr. Davis’ post August 28, 2000 treatment notes indicate that her
depression was stable.

The Court acknowledges that some of the post-August 28, 2000
treatment notes indicate a worsening of Plaintiff’s condition’.
Others, however, indicate that Plaintiff’s condition was “stable”
(R. at 252,) or improving, (see, e.g., R. at 251; Treatment notes
from Dec.18, 2000, noting that Plaintiff’s depression, mood
swings, and anger were decreasing, and her activity was
increasing.) However, this is perfectly consistent with the ALJ's
findings and do not support Plaintiff’ claim that the ALJ ignored
treatment notes supporting her claims of depression.
Significantly, Plaintiff’s treatment notes from May 14, 2001 and
May 21, 2001 - the most recent treatment notes in the Record -
note that Plaintiff “appears to be experiencing [decreasing]
depression.” R. at 263, 264. Given this “trend,” the Court
cannot find that the ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s
condition was stable, or that the ALJ ignored certain treatment

notes in coming to that conclusion. Therefore, the Court

2 On October 2, 2000, for example, Dr. Davis noted that
Plaintiff’s depressive condition appeared to be worsening. (R.
at 231.) She was very quiet for much of her group meeting, and
when asked how she was doing, she responded that she was having
problems with her brother. (Id.) During another group therapy
session on April 23, 2001, Dr. Davis noted that Plaintiff was
very quiet at her group meeting and was noticeably uncomfortable
with a discussion on sexual orientation. (R. at 265.) These
notes hardly dictate the conclusion that Plaintiff’s depression
was disabling, however.

-20-


operator. The ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, the Court must deny Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment and grant the Commissioner’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.

Dated: August 9, 2004 ENTER:

QQena bys

ARLANDER KEYS
United States Magistrate Judge



which Plaintiff's symptoms occur, or indicate which
manifestations render Plaintiff unable to perform even simple,
unskilled work. R. at 25.

The ALJ noted that Dr. Davis’ opinion that Plaintiff was
disabled predated his treatment notes indicating that Plaintiff's
depression was stable. R. at 25. Moreover, the ALJ observed
that Plaintiff appeared personable and well-groomed at the
hearing. Plaintiff's ability to care for herself, as well as her
ability to assist an ailing friend with errands and cooking, and
her desire to finish her GED further informed the ALJ’s
conclusion that Plaintiff's depressive condition did not render
her disabled.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s claim, the ALJ did cite to relevant
medical evidence in support of his conclusion that Plaintiff's
depression did not render her disabled. The ALJ specifically
noted that his finding was supported by the conclusions of the
State Agency psychologist. R. at 25 (citing R. at 164 -176.)

The psychologist acknowledged Plaintiff’s history of depression,
but found that Plaintiff could nevertheless understand, remember,
carryout simple tasks, and make simple work-related decisions.
Under these circumstances the Court cannot conclude that the
ALJ improperly substituted his opinion for that of Dr. Davis. To
the contrary, the ALJ considered and weighed Dr. Davis’ opinion

against other evidence in the Record in concluding that, although

-22-


Instead, he looked to the record, the opinions of other
psychologists who had evaluated Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's
testimony and demeanor at the hearing. (Id.) Not only did
Plaintiff appear personable and well groomed at her hearing, she
also managed to adequately present herself for her evaluation
with Dr. Dizon. (Id.) The ALJ noted that, during her testimony,
Plaintiff indicated an optimistic outlook by stating that she is
finishing her GED and wants to go back to work. (Id.) ‘The ALJ
also noted that in September 2000, Plaintiff reported assisting a
friend with errands and cooking, after her friend had recently
been discharged from the hospital. (Id.) He concluded that her
ability to assist another individual indicated that Plaintiff has
the capacity to interact with others and engage in meaningful
daily activities. (Id.) ‘This, along with the evaluations of Dr.
Dizon and Dr. MacLean, convinced the ALJ that Plaintiff does not

meet the Listings and is capable of working. (Id.)

The ALJ fulfilled his obligation by identifying the evidence
which supported his conclusion and by explaining why he rejected
evidence supporting Plaintiff's claim of disability. He noted in
his opinion how the record, the opinions of other psychologists
who had evaluated Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's testimony and
demeanor at the hearing, supported his conclusion that her

impairment did not meet the “B” criteria of the Listings. (Id.)

-17-


263, and 264.) Other treatment notes from February 28, 2000,
April 10, 2000, April 24, 2000, May 15, 2000, May 22, 2000,
August 14, 2000, October 2, 2000, November 6, 2000, March 26,
2001, April 9, 2001, April 16, 2001, and April 23, 2001, showed
Plaintiff’s depressive condition worsening. (R. at 194, 190,
188, 183, 182, 240, 231, 227, 268, 261, 266, and 265.)

Dr. Davis completed the Documentation of Medical Exemption
for Plaintiff on March 20, 2000, and diagnosed her with major
depressive disorder. (R. at 177.) In the Documentation of
Medical Exemption, he noted that Plaintiff remained depressed and
that her vegetative state and mood symptoms continued. (Id.)

Dr. Davis indicated that he believed Plaintiff’s medical
condition currently prevented her from seeking employment, and
that she would be unable to return to work until her depression
was ameliorated. (R. at 178.) On August 28, 2000, Dr. Davis
wrote a letter to the Illinois Department of Public Aid, in which
he opined that Plaintiff was currently unable to maintain
employment or engage in any work-related programs. (R. at 235-
236.) He stated that Plaintiff suffered from major depressive
disorder, with psychotic features. (R. at 235.)

ec. Dr. Clay—Plaintiff’s Treating Physician
The record contains notes from Plaintiff’s treating

physician, Dr. Clay. These notes document the several occasions

-9.


and the shopping. (R. at 61-63.) Plaintiff testified that she
cooks and cleans only when she has the energy to do it. (R. at
60-61.) She testified that she occasionally tries to walk three
or four blocks. (R. at 64.) Plaintiff testified that she runs
into people she knows on these walks, but she does not stand
around talking to them because they deal drugs. (Id.) She
testified that she used to be friendly with the people she worked
with, but now that she no longer has a.job, she never sees her
old co-workers. (R. at 51.) She testified that she does not
have any female friends, except for an elderly woman who lives in
her neighborhood. (R. at 52.) Plaintiff testified that she has
some male friends who she has known since grammar school and high
school. (R. at 53.) Plaintiff testified that she has a
boyfriend who is married to another woman, and that they see each
other about every two weeks. (R. at 55.)

2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

After Plaintiff testified, the ALJ heard from Michelle

Peters, a vocational expert (“VE”). (R. at 85.) The ALJ asked
VE Peters how she would characterize Plaintiff’s past work. (R.
at 86.) VE Peters testified that she considered Plaintiff's
inspector and meter operator positions to be unskilled in nature
and light in physical demand. (Id.) She testified that she

considered the homemaker position to be low-end, semi-skilled in


until she calms down. (Id.) She also testified that when she
gets upset, she gets headaches. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that
she has memory problems, and that these problems interfere with
her ability to do housework. (R. at 55.) She testified that
other people think she is mean, and she thinks “spells” cause her
meanness. (R. at 48.) Plaintiff testified that she is currently
taking Zoloft, Trazodone, and Risperdal, but that. she
occasionally forgets to take her medications. (R. at 81, 84.)
Plaintiff testified that she sometimes hears voices calling her
name. (R. at 84.) She testified that she used to have suicidal
thoughts, but has not had any in the last year. (R. at 85.)
Plaintiff testified that she thinks she has a bad attitude and
does not want to start working until she gets better. (R. at
83.)

With respect to her daily activities, Plaintiff testified
that she spends her time sitting around watching television. (R.
at 63.) She testified that she does not like to read because she
cannot comprehend what she is reading. (R. at 60.) She
testified that her fourteen-year-old son spends all his time with
his friends, so they do not do anything together. (R. at 57.)
Plaintiff testified that she is not active in her son’s school or
any other organization. (Id.) She testified that her son cooks

for her sometimes and helps around the house by doing the laundry

-5-


The ALJ also explained why he rejected Dr. Davis’ opinion. He
noted that Dr. Davis’ opinion did not discuss the frequency with
which Plaintiff’s symptoms occur, or specifically indicate which
psychiatric manifestations prevent her from performing those
mental work-related activities required of even simple, unskilled
work. (Id.) Because the ALJ fulfilled his obligations, this

Court finds that the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Davis’ opinion.

B. The ALJ Did Not Ignore Treatment Notes Demonstrating
Plaintiff's Ongoing Symptoms Of Depression

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by focusing only
on those portions of the treatment notes indicating that
Plaintiff’s condition was stable, to the exclusion of others
demonstrating ongoing symptoms of depression. In particular, she
mentions Dr. Davis’ treatment notes from March 19, 2001, through
May 21, 2001, that were submitted to the ALJ, but never discussed
in his decision.

The ALJ does, in fact, mention Dr. Davis’ 2001 treatment
notes. Specifically, the ALJ mentioned Dr. Davis’ August 28,
2000, letter to the Illinois Department of Public Aid, in which
he opined that Plaintiff was currently unable to maintain
employment or engage in any work-related programs. (R. at 25.)
The ALJ then stated that Dr. Davis’ letter pre-dated his later
treatment notes - including the treatment notes from March, April

and May of 2001-- which indicated that Plaintiff’s depression

-18-



doing anything. (R. at 218.) Even though she diagnosed her as
suffering from major depressive disorder, Dr. Dizon observed that
Plaintiff did not appear depressed at the time of the
examination. (R. at 220.) The Global Assessment of Functioning
(“GAF”) score that Dr. Dizon assigned to Plaintiff was a 65.
(Id.)

b. Dr. Davis—Plaintiff'’s Treating Psychologist

The record also contains notes and assessments from

Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Dr. Davis. These notes
document each appointment he had with Plaintiff. In all, the
record contains treatment notes from 37 appointments, beginning

on January 10, 2000, and ending on May 21, 2001. {R. at 283.)
Dr. Davis’ treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff continued to
suffer from depression throughout her time in therapy. Many of
the notes, like the ones from appointments on January 31, 2000,
May 1, 2000, May 8, 2000, June 5, 2000, July 31, 2000, August 21,
2000, September 18, 2000, September 25, 2000, November 13, 2000,
January 29, 2001, and February 5, 2001, report that Plaintiff's
depression either continued or was stable. (R. at 231, 187, 185,
180, 241, 239, 234, 232, 236, 224, and 223.) Some of the
treatment notes, like the ones from March 27, 2000, December 18,
2000, March 12, 2001, May 14, 2001, and May 21, 2001, reported

improvement in Plaintiff's depression. (R. at 191, 225, 222,


occasional auditory hallucinations and her difficulty focusing on
tasks. Therefore, it was not error for the ALJ to have relied on
the VE’s opinion tq find that Plaintiff could perform her past
work.
E. The ALJ Sufficiently Explained Why He Discounted Plaintiff’s
Credibility

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently
explain why he discounted her credibility. Specifically,
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not explain why he found her
testimony only partially credible. For example, Plaintiff
questions why the ALJ accepted her testimony that she hears
voices, but rejected her description of her daily activities.
The ALJ is bound to consider certain factors in making a
credibility determination, and must explicitly state why he does
not believe the claimant. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 942
(7% Cir. 2002) (while an ALJ’s credibility determinations are
generally entitled to substantial deference, that is true only
when the ALJ explicitly makes such findings and explains them in
a way that affords meaningful review).

In this case, the ALJ did explain why he rejected
Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her daily activities. The ALJ
noted that Plaintiff showed up to both her hearing and her

consultative evaluation well groomed, despite the fact that she

claimed to have a problem with grooming. (R. at 25.) As such,

-24-


a
‘Minute Order Form (06/97)

We

States District Court, Northern District of Iinois

courtroom

FT/ nat deputy’s
initials

Name of Assigned Jpuige Sitting Judge if Other

or Magistrate Jdgl Arlander Keys than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBE: 03 C 3253 DATE 8/9/2004
CASE Shirley Collins vs. Jo Anne Barnhart
TITLE
[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
(60) QO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
@) QO Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for
(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for .
() o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) oO {Bench/Jury trial} [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) Cl Local Rule 41.1 OO FRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
ao %f [Other docket entry} Memorandum Opinion and Order entered. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment [#19] is denied; Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [#22] is granted.

(11) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
a | Notices mailed by judge's staff. jus 10 2004

Notified counsel by telephone, Q)

Docketing to mail notices.
ov | Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge. 1UN09 LOIWLSIO “S"f

coy te einai ints PE)

95:2 Hd 6- SN¥ AD

camalciendomaia id



simple work-related decisions. (R. at 175.) However, Dr.
MacLean opined that Plaintiff is moderately limited in her
ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed
instructions. (R. at 173-174.) He also noted that she is
moderately limited in her ability to respond appropriately to
changes in the work setting. (Id.) Dr. MacLean found no
significant limitations in any other areas of Plaintiff’s mental
functioning. (Id.) He indicated that Plaintiff could get along
with others and cope with changes in simple work situations. (R.
at 175.) A second state agency physician affirmed Dr. MacLean’s

assessments on March 21, 2000. (R. at 164.)

4. The ALJ’s Opinion
On July 23, 2001, the ALJ issued his decision, finding that
Plaintiff was not disabled and denying her claim for benefits.

(R. at 26-27.) The ALJ found that, although Plaintiff's
affective disorder is a severe impairment, the record does not
contain evidence that her condition meets or equals the Listings.
(R. at 25.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff displays
no worse than slight restrictions in her daily living activities
and social functioning, and moderate deficits in concentration,
persistence, and pace. (Id.) He also found that she has never

decompensated in work or in work-like settings. (Id.}

ell-


Plaintiff saw Dr. Clay in connection with her general medical
complaints. (R. at 179, 181, 186, 192, 195, 202, 225, 230, 233,
242, 247, 249, 251, and 256.) On March 8, 2000, an SSA
representative contacted Dr. Clay. (R. at 160.) Dr. Clay
reported that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with major depression
and an abnormal mammogram. (Id.) Dr. Clay stated that Plaintiff
could follow simple one and two-step instructions, but indicated
that she would have trouble with detailed information. (Id.)
Dr. Clay reported that Plaintiff’s condition had improved, but
her prognosis was unknown. (Id.)
d. Dr. MacLean-SSA Non-Examining Physician

Finally, the record contains Psychiatric Review Technique

(“PRT”) and Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

(“MRFCA”) forms prepared by Dr. Donald MacLean on March 21, 2000,

based on his review of the evidence in the file. (R. at 171.)

On the PRT form, Dr. MacLean indicated that Plaintiff has an
affective disorder that causes slight limitations in her daily
activities and social functioning. (Id.) He also indicated that
Plaintiff's affective disorder seldom causes any deficiencies of
concentration, persistence, or pace, and never causes any
episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like
settings. (Id.) Further, Dr. MacLean indicated that Plaintiff

could understand, remember, and carry out simple tasks and make


nature and light in physical demand. (Id.) The ALJ then asked
VE Peters whether an individual of Plaintiff’s age, education,
and vocational background, who has no exertional impairments, who
is limited to performing simple one, two, or three step tasks,
and who should avoid contact with the public and have only
limited contact with co-workers and supervisors, was capable of
performing her past work. (R. at 85-86.) VE Peters testified
that such an individual could work as an inspector and meter
operator. (R. at 86.) VE Peters further testified that these
positions require work to be done in a timely manner, and that an
individual working in these positions probably cannot be absent
more than once a month. (R. at 88-89.)

3. Medical Evidence

In addition to the testimony given by Plaintiff and VE
Peters, the ALJ considered medical records documenting
Plaintiff's impairments.

a. Dr. Dizon-SSA Examining Physician
On July 18, 2000, Dr. Elouisa Dizon performed a psychiatric

evaluation of Plaintiff for the SSA. (R. at 217.) Dr. Dizon
diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from major depressive disorder.
(R. at 220.) In her report, she noted that Plaintiff had trouble
sleeping, heard voices, and was argumentative. (R. at 217.) Dr.

Dizon also noted that Plaintiff was fatigued and uninterested in

7-



concludes that the ALJ fulfilled his obligations and rejects
Plaintiff’s claim of error.
C. The ALJ Did Not Reach His Own Medical Conclusions

Plaintiff’s third argument is that the ALJ reached his own
medical conclusions in this case. The ALJ’s responsibility is to
weigh the evidence and to make a determination on whether the
claimant is entitled to benefits. When it comes to mental
illnesses, health professionals, and not judges, are the experts.
Wilder v. Chater, 64 F.3d 335, 337 (7% Cir. 1995). An ALJ
cannot simply offer his own lay view of depression for that of a
“doctor.” Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7% Cir. 1996).
However, the Social Security Regulations make clear that the
ultimate finding of disability is reserved for the Commissioner,
and not a claimant’s treating physician. 20 C.F.R. 404.1503 and
416.903.

After weighing the evidence, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff's impairment did not meet or medically equal one of the
listed impairments. (R. at 25.) It is clear to the Court that,
in making his determination, the ALJ carefully reviewed all of
the relevant medical evidence. The ALJ noted Dr. Davis’
conclusion that Plaintiff is unable to engage in work-related
programs, but took issue with Dr. Davis’ failure to explain the
specific psychiatric symptoms causing such a disability. The ALJ

further found that Dr. Davis did not discuss the frequency with

-21-


tall and weighs approximately 217 pounds, and that she is single

and lives in an apartment with her youngest son. (R. at 39-40.)
Plaintiff testified that her oldest son is serving a sentence in
prison. (R. at 50.) Plaintiff testified that she completed the
tenth grade, but had failed to obtain a General Equivalency
Diploma (“GED”), despite three separate attempts. (R. at 76,
78.) Plaintiff testified that she still hopes to obtain a GED.
(R. at 83.)

With respect to her past work experience, Plaintiff
testified that, for approximately seven months in 1986, she was
an inspector for a company that made caps and gowns. (R. at 42.)
After leaving her job as a cap and gown inspector in 1987,
Plaintiff went to work as a meter operator. (Id.) She testified
that the job involved putting prices on mail and operating a
postage meter. (R. at 42-43.) While working as a meter
operator, Plaintiff testified that she also tried being a
homemaker for elderly people for one month in 1998. (R. at 43.)
Plaintiff testified that corporate down-sizing forced her to
leave her meter operator job. (R. at 46.) Plaintiff testified
that, prior to the down-sizing, her emotional problems had
started to interfere with her work, and that she had contemplated
leaving the company. (Id.) She explained that her emotional

problems began when her oldest son started getting into trouble

3-



build “an accurate and logical bridge” from the evidence to his
conclusion. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7TM Cir.
2000).

Finally, although Plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating his disability, “[i]t is a basic obligation of the
ALJ to develop a full and fair record.” Thompson v. Sullivan,
933 F.2d 581, 585 (7 Cir. 1991) (quoting Smith v. Sec’y of HEW,
587 F.2d 857, 860 (7 Cir. 1978)). “Failure to fulfill this
obligation is ‘good cause’ to remand for gathering additional
evidence.” Smith v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 433, 437 (7 Cir. 2000)
(finding that, if the ALJ found the evidence before him
insufficient, he should have obtained more evidence).

SOCIAL SECURITY REGULATIONS

Social Security Benefits are available only to claimants who
can establish disability under the terms of the Social Security
Act. A five-step sequential analysis is used to determine
whether an individual is eligible for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. $§
404.1520 and 416.920 (2001). The ALJ is required to evaluate, in
sequence, (1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the
claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the impairments
listed by the Commissioner in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past work;
and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work in the

national economy. See 20 C.F.R. S§ 404.1520 and 416.920; see

“14.



the degree of limitations her impairment causes.! As Plaintiff

correctly points out, a treating physician’s opinion regarding
the nature and severity of a medical condition is entitled to
controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). But,
the opinion has to be well-supported by medical findings and

cannot be inconsistent with other substantial evidence. Id. A
claimant is not entitled to disability benefits simply because a
physician finds that the claimant is "disabled" or "unable to

work." Under the Social Security Regulations, the Commissioner
is ultimately the one charged with making this determination. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(e).

In his decision, the ALJ noted that Dr. Davis did not
adequately explain the specific psychiatric symptoms which render
Plaintiff unable to sustain any kind of competitive employment.
(R. at 25.) The ALJ went on to say in his decision that Dr.
Davis did not discuss the frequency with which Plaintiff's
symptoms occur, or specifically indicate which psychiatric
manifestations prevent her from performing those mental work-
related activities required of even simple, unskilled work.

(Id.) Because he considered Dr. Davis’ opinion broad and

nonspecific, the ALJ gave his assessment little weight. (Id.)

1 Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in concluding that
Plaintiff did not have marked restriction of activities of daily living,
marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning, marked difficulties in
maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, or repeated episodes of
decompensation, each of extended duration,

-16-


OCED! Bs RY

On February 4, 2000, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI
claiming that, as of September 30, 1999, she was unable to work
because of depression and a lump in her breast. (R. at 119-121,
270-272.) The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her
claim initially on April 3, 2000, and upon reconsideration on
August 11, 2000. (R. at 94-97, 99-101.) Plaintiff requested a
hearing and her case was assigned to Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) Michael R. McGuire, who held the hearing on July 9, 2001.
(R. at 28.) The ALJ issued his decision on July 23, 2001,
finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and denying her claim for
benefits. (R. at 26-27.)

The ALJ’s decision became the final agency decision when the
Appeals Council denied review on April 4, 2003. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.1481. As a result, the ALJ’s decision stands as the final
judgment of the Commissioner, and is now the subject of the

motions before the Court.
‘AT: O: iT:
A. Evidence Presented At Plaintiff's Hearing
1. Plaintiff's Testimony
At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff, who was
represented by counsel, testified first. In response to

questions from the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that she is 5’3 %”

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the ALJ satisfied his obligations under Social Security Ruling
(“SSR”) 96-79, which requires the ALJ to give “specific reasons”
for a credibility finding. Therefore, the Court rejects
Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ improperly rejected some of
her testimony as incredible.
CONCLUSION
The Social Security Regulations and the Seventh Circuit cases
interpreting those Regulations impose many burdens upon the ALJ;
but primarily require the ALJ to carefully weigh all of the
evidence and to resist the temptation to substitute his own
judgment for that of medical professions. Plaintiff's counsel
does an excellent job of parsing through the record in an attempt
to demonstrate that the ALJ failed to satisfy his obligations to
Plaintiff. But the Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision and the
Record indicates that the ALJ carefully weighed all of the
evidence in the record, and incorporated his own impressions of
Plaintiff’s testimony and demeanor at the hearing. There is no
indication that the ALJ was unfair, or ignored evidence favorable
to Plaintiff’s claim of disability. To the contrary, the Court
finds that the ALJ’s decision was a thoughtful one, and was
consistent with his obligations under applicable law.
In conclusion, the ALJ built an accurate and logical bridge

between the record evidence and his ultimate conclusion that
Plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as an

inspector in a cap and gown factory or as a postage meter

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IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETED

AUG 1 0 2004
Shirley J. COLLINS,
Plaintifé,
No. 03 C 3253
Vv.

Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys
Jo Anne B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of
Social Security,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Shirley Collins, moves this Court for Summary
Judgment pursuant to Rule 56{a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, to reverse the final decision of Defendant, the
Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”), which
denied her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). In the alternative,
Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse the Commissioner’s denial of
her claim for benefits, or remand the case to the Commissioner
for further proceedings. The Commissioner has filed a Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment, which requests this Court to affirm
its final decision. For the reasons set forth below,. Plaintiff's

Motion is denied and the Commissioner’s Cross-motion is granted.

7



The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s primary impairment was
depression. (Id.) But, he did not agree with her treating
psychologist’s opinion that this impairment precluded Plaintiff
from maintaining employment or engaging in work-related programs.
(Id.) The ALJ gave the treating psychologist’s opinion little
weight because he believed it was overly broad and nonspecific.
(Id.) Instead, he looked to the record, the opinions of other
psychologists who had evaluated Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s
testimony and demeanor at the hearing, in making his
determination that she was capable of maintaining employment and
engaging in work-related programs. (Id.) The ALJ recognized
that Plaintiff does appear to have occasional auditory
hallucinations. (Id.) He also recognized that there is some
indication that Plaintiff has difficulty focusing on tasks.

(Id.) Therefore, the ALJ limited her to simple one, two, or
three step tasks, in an environment where she could avoid contact
with the general public and have minimal contact with co-workers
and supervisors. (Id.) Given these limitations, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff is still capable of performing her past
relevant work as an inspector in a cap and gown factory or as a
postage meter operator. (R. at 27.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the ALJ's decision, the Court may not decide
the facts, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment

for that of the ALJ. Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7

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also Young, 957 F.2d at 389. A finding of disability requires an
affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5. A negative answer
at any step (other than step 3) precludes a finding of
disability. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps
1-4, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step 5. Id.
DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision must be reversed or
remanded, because: (1) the ALJ improperly rejected the treating
psychologist Dr. Davis’ opinion that Plaintiff met the Listings
and that her overall ability to work was restricted; (2) the ALJ
erred by focusing only on those portions of the treatment notes
indicating that Plaintiff’s condition was stable, while ignoring
notes demonstrating ongoing symptoms of depression; (3) the ALJ
reached his own medical conclusions and impermissibly played
“doctor”; (4) the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE presupposed an
ability to do simple one, two, or three step jobs, but did not
include difficulty focusing on tasks; and (5) the ALJ did not
provide reasons for discounting Plaintiff's credibility. The
Court considers each argument in turn.
A. ALJ Properly Discounted Treating Psychologist’s Opinion

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting her
treating psychologist Dr. Davis’ opinion that she meets the
Listings, and that Plaintiff is unable to work. She contends
that the ALJ erred by relying upon Dr. Davis’ opinion that she

meets the “A” criteria of the Listings, but rejecting it as to

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