No. 05-658 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

 

2006 MT 181 

CITY OF BILLINGS, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

ALMA COSTA, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 05B384 

Honorable Susan P. Watters, Presiding Judge 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Josh Mirel, Office of Public Defender, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jim Wheelis, 

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Brent Brooks, Billings City Attorney; Curtis Bevolden, 

Deputy City Attorney, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: July 12, 2006 

 Decided: August 8, 2006 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk 
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Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Alma Costa appeals from the judgment entered by the Thirteenth Judicial District 

Court, Yellowstone County, affirming the Billings Municipal Court and remanding for 

imposition of sentence. We affirm. 

¶2 The issues on appeal are: 

¶3 1. In light of the District Court’s remand to the Municipal Court, does this Court have 

jurisdiction over Costa’s appeal? 

¶4 2. Did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court’s determination that an 

officer had particularized suspicion to stop the vehicle Costa was driving based on 

information of an arrest warrant for the vehicle’s registered owner and his observation that, 

like the registered owner, Costa was female? 

BACKGROUND 

¶5 Costa initially pled guilty in the Billings Municipal Court to the misdemeanor offenses 

of operating a motor vehicle without liability insurance and driving a motor vehicle while her 

license was suspended. The Municipal Court subsequently granted her motion to withdraw 

her guilty plea and appointed counsel. Costa then moved to suppress evidence, and the 

Municipal Court held a hearing at which an officer testified he stopped the vehicle Costa was 

driving upon learning, via his in-car computer, of an arrest warrant for the vehicle’s 

registered owner. At the end of the hearing, the Municipal Court orally denied Costa’s 

motion. Noting the officer had observed that the gender of the registered owner matched the 

gender of the vehicle’s occupant, the court determined the officer had particularized 
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suspicion to stop the vehicle for the purpose of learning whether Costa, the vehicle’s 

occupant, was the registered owner for whom an arrest warrant was outstanding. 

¶6 Subsequently, Costa pled nolo contendere to both misdemeanor charges, reserving the 

right to appeal from the denial of her suppression motion. The Municipal Court sentenced 

her and, upon Costa’s motion pursuant to Rule 7(b) of the Montana Uniform Municipal Court 

Rules of Appeal to District Court (U.M.C.R.App.), stayed the sentence pending appeal. 

Costa appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the Municipal Court and remanded for 

“imposition of sentence.” Costa now appeals to this Court. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶7 As did the District Court, we review a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion 

based on a finding of particularized suspicion to determine whether that finding is clearly 

erroneous and whether the trial court’s conclusions of law are correct. See State v. Schulke, 

2005 MT 77, ¶ 10, 326 Mont. 390, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d 744, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION

¶8 1. In light of the District Court’s remand to the Municipal Court, does this Court 

have jurisdiction over Costa’s appeal?

¶9 As a threshold matter, we observe the District Court’s remand to the Municipal Court 

for “imposition of sentence”—combined with Costa’s appeal to this Court—raises 

jurisdictional issues that we may address sua sponte. See State v. Reeder, 2004 MT 244, ¶ 4, 

323 Mont. 15, ¶ 4, 97 P.3d 1104, ¶ 4 (citation omitted). If the District Court’s order 

containing the remand is not a “final judgment,” this Court lacks jurisdiction. See Rule 1(d), 

M.R.App.P.; Section 46-20-104(1), MCA; Reeder, ¶ 7 (citations omitted); State v. Diesen, 
 4 

1998 MT 163, ¶¶ 3-4, 290 Mont. 55, ¶¶ 3-4, 964 P.2d 712, ¶¶ 3-4 (citations omitted). By the 

same token, without a “final judgment”—including sentencing—in the Municipal Court, 

Costa’s appeal to the District Court would have been premature and the District Court—as 

well as this Court—would lack jurisdiction over the appeal. See Rule 5(b)(2), 

U.M.C.R.App.; § 46-20-104(1), MCA; § 46-1-202(11), MCA; Diesen, ¶ 3. 

¶10 The District Court’s remand for “imposition of sentence” suggests that sentence had 

not yet been imposed and, therefore, the Municipal Court had not entered “final judgment.” 

In this regard, we note the District Court did not mention any sentence in its recitation of the 

background of the case. As stated above, however, the record—including a handwritten 

sentence on a document entitled “Billings Municipal Court Docket,” the Municipal Court 

judge’s signed certification of transcript of the proceedings which set forth the sentence, and 

the Municipal Court’s order staying the sentence “imposed by this Court on March 17, 

2005”—reflects that the Municipal Court sentenced Costa before she appealed to the District 

Court. Thus, the remand for “imposition” of sentence is both unnecessary and a nullity 

because sentence already had been imposed, and the District Court had jurisdiction over 

Costa’s appeal from a “final judgment.” 

¶11 The District Court, however, may have intended its order remanding “for imposition 

of sentence” to mean that the case was remanded for the Municipal Court to preside over 

execution of the previously imposed, and stayed, sentence. In this regard, § 46-20-706, 

MCA, provides that when a criminal appeal to this Court terminates, “the supreme court shall 

remand the cause with proper instruction together with the opinion of the court” and “all 
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orders necessary to carry the judgment into effect must be made by the court to which the 

cause is remanded.” Because nothing in Title 3, Chapter 6 or Title 46, Chapter 17, Part 4, of 

the Montana Code Annotated provides otherwise, § 46-20-706, MCA, also applies when an 

appeal from a municipal court terminates, either in a district court or in this Court. See § 46-

17-401, MCA. 

¶12 We have not previously had occasion to interpret whether § 46-20-706, MCA, 

requires a formal remand upon an appellate court’s order affirming the trial court’s judgment. 

 We do so only reluctantly here, because of the jurisdiction-related question regarding the 

finality of the District Court’s judgment. 

¶13 This Court generally uses the term “remand” to mean we are returning a case to the 

court from which the appeal has been taken with instructions to proceed in accordance with 

our disposition of the issues addressed on appeal—a disposition that ordinarily includes a 

determination that the court has, in some way, erred. In such cases, we usually state we 

reverse (at least in part) and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion or we 

provide particular instructions to be carried out. See, e.g., State v. Golie, 2006 MT 91, ¶ 31, 

332 Mont. 69, ¶ 31, 134 P.3d 95, ¶ 31; State v. Ruiz, 2004 MT 135, ¶ 19, 321 Mont. 357, ¶ 

19, 91 P.3d 565, ¶ 19. In practice, we do not remand to the district court for execution of a 

previously imposed, and affirmed, criminal sentence—even when the sentence has been 

stayed pending appeal. See, e.g., State v. Myrhe, 2005 MT 278, ¶¶ 6, 25, 329 Mont. 210, ¶¶ 

6, 25, 124 P.3d 126, ¶¶ 6, 25; State v. Grindheim, 2004 MT 311, ¶¶ 15, 58, 323 Mont. 519, ¶¶ 

15, 58, 101 P.3d 267, ¶¶ 15, 58. 
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¶14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1319 (8th ed. 2004) defines a “remand” as “[t]he act or an 

instance of sending something (such as a case, claim, or person) back for further action.” Of 

course, after this Court has entered an opinion affirming or reversing a trial court’s judgment 

and remittitur has issued, the Clerk of this Court returns the record to the court from which 

appeal has been taken. This physical return of a case—which presumably also occurs after 

an appeal from a municipal court to a district court—appears to be the meaning intended by 

the Legislature’s use of the word “remand” in § 46-20-706, MCA. Moreover, Montana 

courts have long carried out affirmed judgments without additional instruction from this 

Court; thus, it appears that an opinion or order affirming judgment—without more—is 

sufficiently “proper instruction” for a court to act, as contemplated in § 46-20-706, MCA. 

Here, absent any argument to the contrary and recognizing the matter has not been raised and 

briefed, we conclude the Legislature did not intend to require an appellate court to formally 

“remand”—as this Court uses the term—in cases involving affirmed criminal judgments. On 

that basis, we further conclude it is unnecessary for an appellate court to direct that a stay 

pending appeal be lifted, once the defendant has exhausted his or her right to appeal and the 

underlying judgment and sentence have been affirmed. 

¶15 The Municipal Court stayed Costa’s sentence pending appeal—a stay that presumably 

encompasses Costa’s appeal to this Court. Thus, the District Court’s remand was, at best, 

premature. Moreover, in light of our construction of § 46-20-706, MCA, for purposes of this 

case, we conclude formal remand was not necessary in any event. 

¶16 Having determined the District Court’s remand was of no immediate consequence—
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regardless of whether it was intended for imposition or execution of sentence—we conclude 

the remand has no effect on the “final judgment” status of the Municipal Court’s judgment 

and sentence or the District Court’s order affirming the Municipal Court. Therefore, we have 

jurisdiction over this appeal. 

¶17 2. Did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court’s determination that an 

officer had particularized suspicion to stop the vehicle Costa was driving based on 

information of an arrest warrant for the vehicle’s registered owner and his observation that, 

like the registered owner, Costa was female?

¶18 Particularized suspicion is established when a peace officer has objective data from 

which he or she can make certain inferences and a suspicion resulting from those inferences 

that the person to be stopped is, or has been, engaged in some wrongdoing. Myrhe, ¶ 11 

(citation omitted). In affirming the Municipal Court, the District Court reasoned, in part, that 

the officer had particularized suspicion based on his discovery that an arrest warrant existed 

for the female registered owner of the vehicle, and noted the officer’s observation that Costa, 

the driver, was a female. The District Court also agreed with the City of Billings’ position 

that the officer could not have determined the driver was not the registered owner until he 

stopped the vehicle. 

¶19 On appeal to this Court, Costa argues that the officer lacked particularized suspicion 

because, before stopping the vehicle based on the arrest warrant for the registered owner, he 

failed to determine whether the registered owner actually was inside. She notes the officer 

did not obtain a physical description of the registered owner and compare it with Costa’s 

appearance before initiating the stop. In this regard, she relies heavily on State v. Fisher, 

2002 MT 335, 313 Mont. 274, 60 P.3d 1004, in which we determined a district court erred in 
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denying a suppression motion. There, an officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle after he 

received an anonymous report of three or four people on foot carrying a handgun and 

followed the vehicle as it drove in a circuitous route. Fisher, ¶¶ 3-4. On appeal, we 

reasoned, in part, that nothing suggested the descriptions in the uncorroborated anonymous 

report matched the defendant or the other occupant of his car, and the officer did not observe 

any violations of traffic or vehicle registration laws before stopping the vehicle. Fisher, ¶¶ 

13-21. Fisher did not involve an officer stopping a vehicle after receiving information of an 

arrest warrant for the vehicle’s registered owner and, thus, is inapposite here. 

¶20 Costa also asserts the officer acted solely based on a “hunch.” In support, she 

advances cases from other courts, none of which concern a traffic stop based on information 

that an arrest warrant existed for the vehicle’s registered owner. 

¶21 In State v. Halvorson, 2000 MT 56, ¶¶ 13-16, 299 Mont. 1, ¶¶ 13-16, 997 P.2d 751, ¶¶ 

13-16, we addressed whether an officer has particularized suspicion to stop a vehicle when 

he or she knows the vehicle’s registered owner has a revoked or suspended license. We held 

that an officer may rationally infer the driver of a vehicle is the vehicle’s registered owner 

unless the officer is aware of any facts that would render that inference unreasonable. 

Halvorson, ¶¶ 15-16 (citation omitted). Acknowledging Halvorson, Costa points to the 

officer’s testimony in this case that, on numerous occasions, he had come across 

circumstances in which a registered owner would lend his or her vehicle to another person to 

drive. Costa contends this testimony establishes the officer was aware of facts rendering 

unreasonable his inference that she was the registered owner. While there can be no dispute 
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that vehicle owners sometimes lend their vehicles to others, that fact does not render the 

officer’s inference—that the vehicle being driven by Costa, a woman, was being driven by 

the female registered owner—unreasonable. Consequently, we hold the District Court did 

not err in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of Costa’s motion to suppress. 

¶22 Affirmed. 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

We concur: 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

/S/ JOHN WARNER 

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS