However, the VA, like the hospital in Basith, was not required to restructure Rivera’s position or the
position of other employees in order to accommodate his disability. Jd. at 929; Hansen v.
Henderson, 233 F 3d $21, 523 (7th Cir. 2000) (employers are not required to manufacture a job that
will enable a disabled worker to work despite his disability). Rivera was not a qualified individual
with a disability because he could not perform the essential functions of his job. Accordingly,
summary judgment must be granted on Rivera’s disability discrimination claim.
IV. Retaliation Claims

A. Failure to Promote

Rivera claims the VA retaliated against him for filing his EEOC complaint by not promoting
him to the GS-7 position. To establish a prima facie case for failure to promote, Rivera must show:
(1) he is a member of a protect group; (2) he applied for and was qualified for the position; (3) he
was rejected for the position; and (4) those who were promoted had similar or lesser qualifications
for the position. Pafford, 148 F.3d at 669. Rivera cannot show that he was qualified for the position.
One of the qualifications required for the GS-7 position was service at the GS-6 level for at least one
year. At the time he applied, Rivera was only a GS-5. Thus, because Rivera was not qualified, his
claim fails. Jd. Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted on Rivera’s retaliation claim.

B. Removal from the Special Emphasis Program

Rivera’s final claim is that he was removed from his position as Hispanic Manager of the
Special Emphasis Program in retaliation for filing his EEOC complaint. To make out his retaliation
claim, Rivera must show: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression, i.e., reporting conduct
prohibited by Title VII; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link

between his protected conduct and the adverse employment action. Jd. at 670. The McDonnell

13


Rivera’s job title, duties, and salary did not change as a result of this assignment. Moreover,
working at the clinic did not increase Rivera’s chances of promotion. Rivera alleges that when
Phillips assigned him to the clinic, Phillips told him he would be trained to order supplies, which
Rivera believed would be a promotion. Rivera based this assumption on the fact that the previous
supply technician at the clinic, Sharon Hicks, was at a higher GS level than him. However, Hicks
was at a higher GS level because she was a computer operator, not a medical supply technician.
Moreover, Hicks’ training in ordering supplies was unrelated to the SPD. Rather, she was trained
to order supplies in 1986 when she was secretary to the Chief of Acquisition and Material
Management. No medical supply technicians in the SPD unit were trained to order supplies.
Training in ordering supplies would not have increased Rivera’s chances of promotion. Collins-
Scott eventually removed Hicks from the clinic because she received complaints from the clinic staff
regarding his work. According to Rivera, he was replaced because of his national origin.

In December 1999, Rivera requested a light duty position with the VA to accommodate his
partially disabled right knee. As part of his request, Rivera submitted notes from his physician, Scott
Rubinstein, indicating Rivera should consider a sedentary job and not lift more than ten pounds. In
order to accommodate his request, Collins-Scott prepared a letter setting forth the information the
VA needed from Rivera’s physician. Rivera refused to accept the letter from Collins-Scott, so she
had the letter placed in his locker where he later found it. On January 3, 2000, Collins-Scott and a
VA employee relations specialist met with Rivera regarding his request for a light duty position, but
Rivera would not answer any of their questions. At the meeting, Collins-Scott gave Rivera another
letter and form for his physician to complete regarding his physical limitations and prognosis.

In late January 2000, Rivera gave Collins-Scott another statement from his physician


legitimate reason for its action was pretextual, See Patel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 365, 372-73
(7th Cir. 1997) (employee failed to show pretext where employer denied her computer training
because she could not type). Thus, summary judgment must be granted on Rivera’s national origin
discrimination claim.

B. Transfer from the Clinic

Rivera next claims he was transferred from the clinic because of his national origin. Not
every action that makes an employee unhappy is actionable. For an employment decision to be
actionable, it must constitute a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing
a significant change in benefits.” Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). Rivera’s title, salary, promotion opportunities and
duties did not change as a result of his transfer from the clinic. Therefore, his transfer did not
constitute an actionable employment decision.

Alternatively, even if Rivera could establish an actionable employment decision, he fails to
rebut the VA’s legitimate reason for the decision. The VA removed Rivera from the clinic because
of complaints from clinic staff that Rivera failed to properly stock the supplies and did not come to
work on his scheduled days. Rivera claims he performed his duties and never missed work.
However, Rivera’s self-serving affidavit is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to pretext. Olsen y. Marshall & Isley Corp., No. 00-3840, 2001 WL 1117297, at *4 (7th Cir. Sept.
25, 2001) (employee’s perception of his own performance did not create genuine issue of material
fact as to pretext). In order to show pretext, Rivera must show the VA’s reason for its action was

alie, not that the VA incorrectly assessed his abilities. Jd. “And without proof ofa lie, no inference


with Rivera’s performance, Citron removed Rivera as Hispanic Manager. In addition to Rivera,
Citron replaced several of the Special Emphasis managers in an effort to make the program more
visible and effective.
DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); King v. Nat’l Human Res. Comm., Inc.,
218 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2000). Once a moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party
must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 1999). The court considers
the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. Bay v. Cassens Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000). A genuine
issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). The summary judgment standard is applied
with special scrutiny to employment discrimination cases because the outcome often depends on
determinations of credibility and intent. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, 209 F.3d 687,
692 (7th Cir. 2000).
II. National Origin Discrimination Claims

There are two accepted ways of defeating an employer’s motion for summary judgment in

a Title VII case. A plaintiff may either offer direct evidence of the employer’s impermissible


indicating that he should not lift more than ten pounds and should do sedentary work. In April 2000,
Collins-Scott repeated her request for Rivera to have his physician complete the form regarding his
physical limitations. Because Rivera never submitted the VA’s forms, Collins-Scott did not grant
his request. Although Rivera does not claim to have submitted the forms to his physician or the VA,
he claims that he complied with all of Collins-Scott’s requests.

Rivera filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
Rivera claims the VA retaliated against him for complaining to the EEOC. Specifically, he asserts
that in August 2000, Collins-Scott interfered with his opportunity to be promoted to a GS-7 level
position. However, Rivera did not receive the promotion because a prerequisite for the GS-7 level
position was at least one year of experience at the GS-6 level, which Rivera lacked (he was a GS-5).
Moreover, Collins-Scott was unaware that Rivera had applied for the GS-7 position.

In June 2000, Rivera was appointed to the position of Hispanic Manager of the VA’s Special
Emphasis program. This was a collateral position, meaning that it was in addition to, not in place
of, his normal job duties. Holding the position would not have assisted Rivera in promotion. In
December 2000, the Director of the VA Chicago, Richard Citron, removed Rivera from the position.
Rivera claims his removal was in retaliation for his EEOC complaint. A condition of Rivera’s
appointment to Hispanic Manager was performance of his regular job duties. Because Rivera was
not performing his supply duties, Collins-Scott complained to Citron. However, Rivera claims to
have never failed to perform his restocking duties. Citron believed Rivera was an ineffective Special
Programs Manager because Rivera failed to follow proper administrative procedures and possessed
poor communication skills. Rivera denies failing to follow procedures or that he had poor

communication skills. Based on complaints regarding Rivera’s work and Citron’s dissatisfaction


but did not complete training due to VA budgetary concerns. In addition to Rivera, no other VA
employees completed training. Therefore, Rivera cannot show he was denied certification training
that was given to other similarly situated employees.

Next, Rivera contends he was denied cluster training because of his national origin. Cluster
training focuses on sterilization and decontamination techniques. After Rivera was stuck with a
needle in 1995, he did not perform decontamination and sterilization work. The VA only sends two
SPD employees per year to cluster training. Because Rivera did not decontaminate and sterilize
equipment, he was of low priority for this training. However, the VA intended to eventually send
him to training. Because Rivera did not perform this type of work, he was not similarly situated to
other employees who were sent to training ahead of him. However, Rivera claims he was similarly
situated to Dolly Booth, an SPD employee who has been trained but does not perform
decontamination and sterilization work. Rivera asserts that she went through training at some point
in the past, but at the present time she does not perform this type of work. Rivera fails to produce
evidence that Booth did not perform this type of work when she was sent to training, Therefore, he
has not established she was similarly situated.

Nevertheless, even if he could establish a prima facie case, Rivera fails to produce evidence
that the VA’s legitimate reason for the employment decision was pretextual for intentional
discrimination, The VA’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not sending Rivera to cluster
training was that he did not perform the type of work that was the focus of the training. Because the
VA has offered a legitimate reason for the action, Rivera must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the VA’s reason was pretextual for intentional discrimination. Hasham, 200 F.3d at

1044-45 (pretext is a lie or phony reason). Rivera fails to offer evidence showing the VA’s


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Namest ign Sitting Judge if Other
Kors agrees |__Sueanne B. Confon | Stiga ine
CASE NUMBER 01 C 1482 DATE 10/15/2001
CASE JAMES RIVERA vs. ANTHONY PRINCIPI
TITLE

{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.]

ea)

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:
(i) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) a Brief in support of motion due
(3) o Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue____
(4) oOo Ruling/Hearing on setfor_ at.
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor___—_at.
(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—setfor at.
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) (CGeneral Rule2} OFRCP4 (a(t) O FRCP41(a)(2).
do) of [Other docket entry] _ The motion for summary judgment [18-1] is granted. Judgment is entered for

defendant Anthony Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs and against plaintiff James Rivera. ENTER

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.

orga! B Gol

a [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No noti ired.
lo notices requit umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

GT 1 7 200

Notified counsel by telephone. date docketed

Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form,

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
SB deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in -
central Clerk’s Office ailing deputy initials



City of Chicago, 259 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2001). The only issue in this case is whether Rivera
was a qualified individual with a disability.

A two-step test is applied to determine if someone is a qualified individual with a disability.
First, the court determines if the person satisfies the prerequisites for the position, e.g., educational
background and skills. If the individual does, the court must determine whether the individual can
perform the essential functions of the position held, with or without reasonable accommodation.
Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001). Rivera’s background for the position of
medical supply technician is not at issue; thus, the issue is whether Rivera had the ability to perform
the essential functions of the job.

A medical supply technician’s official duties include: collecting used medical equipment;
decontaminating, sterilizing and maintaining medical equipment; preparing trays of medical
instruments for various wards in the hospital; filling medical personnel’s requests for medical items;
wrapping instruments and medical supplies; and stocking medical supply closets. The VA contends
these duties are the essential functions of a medical supply technician and courts are hesitant to
second-guess an employer’s understanding of its jobs. Jd. at 928. Rivera claims he could have
worked forty hours per week answering telephones, wrapping instruments, folding towels, inputting
data into a computer, and entering information regarding supplies into a logbook. He also claims
that Dolly Booth, an SPD employee, did not perform any heavy lifting. The fact that some
employees did not perform a function does not make that function non-essential. See Winfrey, 259
F.3d at 616. Moreover, an essential function need not encompass a significant quantity of the
employee’s time. Basith, 241 F.3d at 929. Rivera has not offered evidence to show that the VA’s

understanding of the essential functions of a medical supply technician is incorrect. Thus, Rivera

11


of discriminatory motive can be drawn.” Jd. Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted on
Rivera’s national origin discrimination claim.

C. Denial of Overtime Hours

Rivera claims the VA denied him overtime hours because of his national origin while at the
same time providing overtime hours to non-Puerto Rican employees. However, Rivera has worked
some overtime hours, but not as often as Baron Roberson and Michael Lyda, who are both A frican-
American. When Roberson and Lyda worked overtime, they moved heavy equipment. The VA
claims that Rivera was not given this work because he could not and would not lift heavy objects.
Thus, the VA has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decisions. Rivera does not
offer any evidence challenging the VA’s reason as pretextual. Accordingly, summary judgment must
be granted on Rivera’s national origin discrimination claim. See Patel, 105 F.3d at 374 (affirming
summary judgment where employee denied overtime offered no evidence to support an inference
decision was discriminatory).
Hl. Disability Discrimination Claim

Rivera alleges the VA violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by failing to reasonably
accommodate his partial disability.' To establish a claim for failure to accommodate, Rivera must
show: (1) that he was a disabled person as defined by the statute; (2) that the VA knew about his
disability; and (3) that he was a qualified individual who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, could perform the essential functions of a medical supply technician. Winfrey v.

‘Americans with Disabilities Act standards are to be applied to determine whether the
Rehabilitation Act has been violated. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d). Thus, cases decided under both the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act are applied in determining whether there has been a violation. Silk
v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 n.7 (7th Cir. 1999).

10


employmentactions, such as “I did not promote you because of your national origin,” or the plaintiff
may use the indirect burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Dougals Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). Hasham v. Cal. State Board of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 2000);
Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir. 1998). Under the indirect approach, a plaintiff can
raise an inference of discrimination by establishing a prima facie case. If a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment decision. Ifthe employer meets this burden, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff who must produce “evidence that would, if believed by a trier of fact, show that the true
reason for the employment action was discriminatory.” Pafford, 148 F.3d at 665 (citation omitted).
Because Rivera does not present any direct evidence of discrimination, the court will apply the
indirect burden-shifting framework.

A. Failure to Train

Rivera’s first claim is that he was denied training because of his national origin. To make
out a prima facie case for failure to train, Rivera must show: (1) that he is a member of a protected
group; (2) that the VA provided training to its employees; (3) that he was eligible for training; and
(4) that he was not provided training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination, i.e., that he was denied training given to other similarly situated employees who were
not members of the protected group. Jd. at 667. It is irrelevant whether the training would have
increased Rivera’s chances of promotion. Jd.

Rivera cannot establish a prima facie case because he cannot show that he was denied
training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. There are two types of

training at issue, certification and cluster training. In 1997, Rivera received certification training,


cluster training. However, completion of certification or cluster training did not enhance a medical
supply technician’s promotion chances.

Emestine Collins-Scott was responsible for selecting the SPD employees who attended
cluster training. The VA only allowed her to send two employees per year to training, so she
generally selected one employee from the VA’s Lakeside facility and one from the Westside facility.
Because training focused on decontamination and sterilization techniques, Collins-Scott primarily
selected employees who performed that type of work. Starting in 1995, after he was stuck by a
needle, Rivera did not perform decontamination and sterilization work. Thus, Collins-Scott did not
place a priority in sending him to cluster training. However, she did intend on eventually sending
him to training. The only other employee who did not attend cluster training was Kevin Schab, a
white medical supply technician at Lakeside. However, Schab was offered training.

Rivera claims he was offered overtime work on March 15, 1998, but the offer was rescinded.
Healleges Dollie Booth, an African-American medical supply technician, worked the overtime hours
that were offered to him. However, contrary to Rivera’s claims, no one worked overtime on March
15, 1998. Rivera also claims that since March 15, 1998, he has not been offered overtime work
whereas two African-American employees, Baron Robertson and Michael Lyda, have worked
overtime on numerous occasions. When Robertson and Lyda worked overtime, they moved heavy
equipment. Due to a knee injury, Rivera could not perform heavy lifting. Thus, he was not offered
this work. In addition, Rivera did work some overtime hours, just not as often as Robertson and
Lyda.

In March 1998, the lead supply technician, Jerry Phillips, assigned Rivera to work at the

Adam Benjamin, Jr., Outpatient Clinic, a VA facility in Crown Point, Indiana (“the clinic”).


Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to retaliation claims. Id.

Rivera’s claim fails because he cannot show a causal link between the filing of his EEOC
complaint and his removal from the Special Emphasis Program. Richard Citron removed Rivera
from the position because he believed Rivera was not following proper administrative procedures
and Rivera lacked the communication skills that were essential to the job. In addition, Citron
received complaints that Rivera was not adequately performing his regular job duties, which was
required in order to act as Hispanic Manager. Based on these complaints and Citron’s dissatisfaction
with Rivera’s performance, Citron removed Rivera from the program. Rivera presents no evidence
establishing the necessary link between his EEOC complaint and his removal. Conclusory
allegations, not supported by the record, are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Haywood
y. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, Rivera fails to establish
a prima facie case.

Alternatively, even if Rivera could establish a prima facie case, he does not present sufficient
evidence to rebut the VA’s legitimate reason for his removal. Rivera attests he was an effective
manager and that he performed all of his regular job duties. He also submits the affidavit of a former
co-worker who observed him perform effectively as Hispanic Manager. Ali Aff., 6. However,
whether or not Citron’s assessment of Rivera’s job performance as Hispanic Manager or as supply
technician were accurate does not establish that his legitimate reasons for removing him were
pretextual. Thus, no inference of discriminatory motive can be drawn. Olsen, 2001 WL 1117297,

at *4. Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted on Rivera’s retaliation claim.

14


anadmission. Jupiter Aluminum Corp., 225 F.3d at 871. Moreover, the evidence relied upon must
be admissible at trial. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.34560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996).

Rivera’s Rule 56.1 responses to the VA’s statement of material facts include denials without
citations to supporting evidence, unresponsive denials, and responses asserting that Rivera “has
insufficient information to admit or deny.” In addition, Rivera fails to respond to some of the
numbered paragraphs. These responses do not comply with Rule 56.1. Accordingly, $4 10-15, 17,
19, 22, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 41-45, 47, 48, 59, 60, 64, 65, and 70-74 are treated as admissions to
the extent they fail to comply with Rule 56.1.
I. The Facts

All facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. James Rivera is of Puerto Rican descent.
Until June 2001, Rivera was employed by the VA as a medical supply technician, level GS-5, in the
Supply Processing and Distribution unit (“SPD”) at its Chicago Lakeside Medical Center
(“Lakeside”). The job duties of a medical supply technician include: collecting used medical
equipment; decontaminating, sterilizing and maintaining medical equipment; preparing trays of
medical instruments for various wards in the hospital; filling medical personnel’s requests for
medical items; wrapping instruments and medical supplies; and stocking medical supply closets.

Rivera claims the VA discriminated against him on the basis of national origin by failing to
provide him with cluster training and certification training. He believes that such training would
have increased his chances of promotion. He contends that except for a newly hired employee, he
was the only SPD employee who was not trained. Rivera did receive some certification training in
the fall of 1997, but was never given cluster training. Cluster training focuses on decontamination

and sterilization techniques. The VA expected that all SPD employees would eventually complete


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES RIVERA )
Plaintiff, No. 01 C 1482
vy. } Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
ANTHONY PRINCIPI, }
SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS ) DOCKETED
Defendant. } OCT 1 7 2001

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
James Rivera sues his former employer Department of Veterans Affairs (“the VA”) under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ef seg. and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. for national origin discrimination (Counts I - II), disability
discrimination (Count IV), and retaliation (Counts V and VI). The VA moves for summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
BACKGROUND
I. Rule 56.1 Responses
After the moving party has filed its Rule 56.1 statement of material facts, the nonmoving
party must file a response to each numbered paragraph in the Rule 56.1 statement. In cases of
disagreement, the nonmoving party must refer to specific evidence in the record supporting that
disagreement. Cent. States Pension Fund v. Bomar Nat'l, Inc., 253 F.3d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 2001);
Jupiter Aluminum Corp. v. Home Ins, Co., 225 F.3d 868, 871 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000); Local Rule 56.1.
A response that does not deny the allegations with citations to supporting evidence will be deemed

1


has not overcome the deference courts award employers. /d. at 928.

This case is analogous to Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2001). In Basith,
the plaintiff was a pharmacy technician who had injured his right leg in a car accident. The
plaintiffs physician advised him not to lift more than ten pounds and to avoid standing for more than
ten minutes at a time. The essential functions of a pharmacy technician included stocking
medications and delivering medication to patients. The plaintiff argued that other hospital
employees could have assisted him with these duties. The court rejected his argument, stating that
he was in effect asking for someone else to perform his duties. The court refused to require the
hospital to restructure the plaintiff's job or the job of other employees to accommodate the plaintiff's
disability. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability
because he could not perform the essential functions of his job. Thus, the court did not need to
decide whether the plaintiff was denied reasonable accommodation. /d. at 929-32.

Rivera’s partial disability severely limits his ability to walk or lift heavy objects. Because
of his disability, his physician advised him not to lift more than ten pounds and to take a sedentary
job. Among the essential functions of a medical supply technician are lifting and transporting heavy
supplies. This entails lifting supplies from a pallet to a supply cart, and then from the supply cart
to the shelf. Transporting supplies sometimes entails pushing a cart that weighs several hundred
pounds. In order to accommodate Rivera, he would need assistance whenever he engaged in any of
these activities if the weight exceeded ten pounds. In effect, just as the plaintiff in Basith, Rivera
implicitly wants the VA to assign someone else to assist him in performing the essential functions
of his job. Rivera also claims the VA could have accommodated him by allowing him to perform

exclusively sedentary functions like answering the telephones and entering data into computers.

12


CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment is granted.

October 15, 2001 ENTER:

B.,

zane B. Conlon
United States District Judge

15