(Id. 4.16.) The unnamed judge in the second courtroom ordered Zurita confined to the Cook
County jail. (Pl. Response to the Individual Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss the Amended Compl., 9.)

Because Zurita could not make bail on the domestic battery charge, he went to the Cook
County Jail at 26" Street and California Avenue. There, Zurita underwent the intake procedures
by the Cook County officers. Zurita was strip-searched, photographed and issued prison
clothing. Throughout the intake procedures and subsequent confinement, Zurita repeatedly
informed the Cook County officers that he was not Landeros. (Am. Compl. {| 17.)

On or about Monday, October 16, 2000, Zurita appeared before a judge regarding the
domestic battery charge. Again, Zurita attempted to explain that he was not Landeros but the
Assistant Public Defender (whom Zurita does not identify as the same counsel from October 12)
ignored him. The Assistant Public Defender recommended to Zurita that he accept a plea bargain
in which he would receive either a 60-day sentence or a “reinstatement” of a domestic abuse
counseling program to which Landeros had been previously assigned. (Id. {| 19.) Thereafter,
Zurita pled guilty and accepted the reinstatement. (Id.)

On his release, Zurita learned that his employer terminated him from his security guard
position due to his detention. On November 2, 2000, as required by the guilty plea on behalf of
Landeros, Zurita met with Tom Donners (“Donners”), a domestic violence counselor. At that
meeting, Zurita explained to Donners that he was not Landeros. Donners decided to review
Landeros’ computerized file. According to the file, Landeros was listed as 5’7” tall, 130 lbs., and
born in 1966 whereas Zurita was 6’2” tall, 245 Ibs., and born in 1955. Donners immediately

realized that Landeros and Zurita were different people. On Donners’ initiative, the judge was



ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the court grants defendants’ motions to dismiss [#13] [#30].

This case is dismissed with prejudice. Case is terminated.

ENTER:_ edu Kp fern —
GAOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW
Dated: September 15, 2003 United States District Judge



detaining the plaintiff affer the plaintiff appeared before a judge who ordered the detention. The
Griffin defendants relied on Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 700 (7° Cir. 1987), to support
their contention that they were not liable for the two days of alleged mistaken detention after the
plaintiff appeared before a judge because they were acting pursuant to the judge’s order. The
Seventh Circuit stated in Patton that “jailing a person for a period of time over his vigorous
protest that he is the wrong person, without investigating him or bringing him before a
magistrate, raises serious constitutional questions.” 822 F.2d at 700 (emphasis added). The
defendants argued that Patton’s language is disjunctive: jailers may either conduct a minimal
investigation to verify the detainee’s identity, or may bring the detainee before a magistrate or
judge~and if they do the latter, they may escape any liability for failing to do the former. Griffin,
1999 WL 417342, at *2.

The court rejected this argument by reading Patton alongside Johnson v. City of Chicago,
711 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ill. 1989). In Johnson, the plaintiff was held for only twenty-four hours
before he was taken before a judge, but the judge did not discover the mistaken identity and the
custodian continued to hold the detainee for six days after the first appearance, without
investigating the plaintiff's claims of mistaken identity. Jd. at 1467. As the Griffin court
interpreted Johnson, the district court “denied a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff
had adequately alleged a failure to investigate and a prolonged detention, including for a period
after the plaintiff had been brought before a judge.” Griffin, 1999 WL 417342, at *3, The
Griffin court reasoned that “Patton and Johnson can only be reconciled by reading the statement
{from Patton] ‘investigation . . . or bringing . . . before a magistrate’ as a statement which means

that the custodian has a continuing duty to investigate if the proceedings before a judge do not


informed of the misidentification. On February 27, 2001, Zurita was “cleared of all charges”
entered against him as Landeros. (/d. { 22.)

On or about May 28, 2002, Zurita filed the instant lawsuit. On or about October 9, 2002,
Zurita filed an amended complaint, which defendants have moved to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected,”
another to a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim against defendants under
section 1983, Zurita must allege facts sufficient to show that (1) he was deprived of a
constitutional right and that (2) the defendants caused this deprivation. Zurita is not specific
about which of his constitutional right defendants allegedly violated. However, even if Zurita
properly alleges a deprivation of his constitutional rights, he does not allege facts sufficient to
show that the defendants caused this deprivation.

Zurita argues that Sheahan and the Cook County officers were the “moving force” behind
the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights because of Sheahan’s failure to implement a
meaningful policy and practice to verify the identity of those detained within the Cook County
Jail. Defendants argue that they cannot be held liable for the alleged deprivation because
defendants held Zurita in the Cook County jail pursuant to a court order.

Zurita relies heavily on Griffin v. Sheahan, No. 98-C-2398, 1999 WL 417342 (N.D. Ill.
June 16, 1999), to support his contention that the judge’s order to hold Zurita does not
“immunize” defendants from liability. The issue in Griffin was whether the defendants, the Cook

County Sheriff and the Director of the Cook County Jail, could be held liable for wrongfully



Jd.(emphasis in original)(quoting Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 300 (9" Cir. 1959).

Sheahan and Cook County officers detained Zurita pursuant to a court order. Defendants
were acting pursuant to state law by accepting custody of Zurita and not releasing him until a
court order was issued. 730 ILCS 125/4 states, “The warden of the jail shall receive and confine
in such a jail, until discharged by due course of law, all persons committed to such jail by any
competent authority.” The language of this statute is mandatory. Thus, the Sheriff is a “mere
custodian,” and, as such, he is “not required to evaluate the sufficiency of court orders under the
threat of civil rights actions.” Johnson, 711 F. Supp. at 1474.

Zurita’s appeals to Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 326 (7" Cir. 1999), and Armstrong
v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 578-79 (7" Cir. 1989), do not help him. In Luck, the plaintiff was
detained for eight days on the basis of a warrantless arrest without being brought before a judge
or magistrate for a probable cause hearing. Luck, 168 F.3d at 325. In Armstrong, the plaintiff
was arrested on a valid warrant, but was then detained for fifty-seven days without appearing
before a judge. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 567-68. Zurita appeared before a judge-twice-on the
very day that he was arrested. Neither time did Zurita protest that he was not Sergio Landeros,
and he even pled guilty to trespassing charges under that name. A judge then ordered the
defendants in this case to hold Zurita in the County Jail until he posted bond. The defendants did
so, releasing Zurita four days later. These facts are not sufficient to state a claim against

defendants for the deprivation of Zurita’s constitutional rights.


Minuto Orde Form (0697)

\0. ‘ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name ssigned Ju Sitting J if Other
or Magistrate Judge Joan H. Lefkow than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C3771 DATE 9/15/2003
CASE Zurita vs. City of Chicago, et al.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon_____sset for___—_at

(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor_— at

(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_setfor__—at__.

(7) mi) Trial[set for/re-set for]on__—sat__—.

(8) a [Bencl/Jury trial} [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) i) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
QFRcP4(m) O Local Rule 41.1 CUFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) =o [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendants’ motions to dismiss

[13-1] and [30-1] are granted. Case dismissed with prejudice. Case is terminated.

(1) ff (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
4

No notices required. .
number of notices

J | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. SEP.1,%.200;

Dockcting to mail notices.
JS | Mail AO 450 form, sn dockesibeAeputy rials

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

se pe 9nsroos
‘ 2 8 WH L | ass 8) date mailed notice
courtroom
MP tie ox yy eg Gs wo
initials i iO eb.
Date/thntdtebeived in 7
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials



specifically address and resolve the issue of mistaken identity.” Jd. Thus, the Griffin court held
that the defendants could be held liable for wrongfully detaining the plaintiff despite the fact that
defendants were acting pursuant to a court order.

This court disagrees with the Griffin court’s reading of Johnson. In Johnson, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff filed suit against both the City of Chicago, whose police officers
executed the arrest, and the Cook County Sheriff, who detained the plaintiff in the Cook County
jail pursuant to a court order. 711 F. Supp. at 1466-67. The analysis on which the Griffin court
relied applied only to the plaintiff's claims against the City. The Johnson court held that the
plaintiff's appearance before the judge was not a sufficient intervening cause to absolve the City
from liability for the entire period of detention. /d. at 1473. Thus, the court held that “the chain
of causation between the City’s mistaken identification of [the plaintiff] and his subsequent
detention remained intact” despite the judge’s order. Jd. However, the court granted the Sheriff's
motion to dismiss. The court stated that the defendant

was merely following a valid court order to detain [the plaintiff]... Although the

mistake as to [the plaintiffs] identity might have been easily discovered by the

sheriff’s agents, it is clear that [the sheriff] cannot be held liable. ... A mere

custodian is not required to evaluate the sufficiency of court orders under the

threat of civil rights actions.

Id, at 1474 (citing Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1239 (7" Cir. 1986)). This
outcome is supported by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Arensman v. Brown, 430 F.2d 190,
194 (7" Cir. 1970). There the court stated,
The failure of a jailor or keeper to release a prisoner held on a warrant or
commitment cannot be the basis for a civil rights action regardless of
allegations or malice, motive or intent. His act is required by law ... so

long as he acted under authority of the writ or warrant, he was performing
a duty which the law at that time required him to perform.


south side of Chicago. Subsequently, the officers transported them to the 10" District Police
Station (the “Station’”).

While at the Station, Zurita and his friend gave the police their full names, addresses and
social security numbers. The police also fingerprinted and photographed them. After he and his
friend had been held at the Station for seven hours, the police charged them with criminal
trespass. The police released Zurita’s friend but transferred Zurita to a holding cell. There, the
police informed Zurita that they believed his name was an alias and that his real name was
“Sergio Landeros” (“Landeros”). The police further informed Zurita that Landeros had an
outstanding arrest warrant stemming from a charge for domestic battery in 1999 and that the
police would continue to detain Zurita on that basis. Zurita protested repeatedly that the officers
had the wrong man but the police responded, “That’s your name now,” or other words to that
effect. (Am. Compl. { 12.) Thereafter, Zurita remained in the holding cell and repeatedly yelled
out that he was not Landeros but the police ignored him.

After remaining in the holding cell for approximately one hour, another police officer
“processed” Zurita by questioning him about, among other things, his age, date of birth, height
and weight. (Id. 14.) Again, Zurita explained that he was not Landeros but he was ignored.
On Thursday, October 12, the police brought Zurita to state criminal court. At the appearance for
the criminal trespass charge, Zurita attempted to explain to the Assistant Public Defender that he
was not Landeros. The Assistant Public Defender, however, advised Zurita that his best strategy
was to plead guilty to the criminal trespass charge before he “worried about the issue of his
misidentification.” (Jd. § 15.) Zurita pled guilty to the criminal trespass charge and then was

transferred to another courtroom, where the court “executed” the warrant for Landeros’ arrest.



arrested sufficiently enough to identity him[.]” (/d. § 29.) With respect to both Counts, Zurita
alleges that Sheahan is liable for his failure to train, discipline and punish the Cook County
officers for their actions. Before this court are defendants’ separate motions to dismiss Zurita’s
amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Jurisdiction is
properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1334(a). For the reasons set forth below,
the court grants both motions.
STANDARDS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease
Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7" Cir. 1997). Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Sanville v. McCaughtry,
266 F.3d 724, 732 (7" Cir. 2001). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all
well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, and it draws all reasonable inferences from those
facts in the plaintiff's favor. Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 486 (7" Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, the
court is not required to “ignore any facts set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff's
claim [nor does it] assign any weight to unsupported conclusions of law.” LeBlang Motors,
Lid. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 148 F.3d 680, 690 (7" Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).

ALLEGATIONS FROM THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
During the evening of Wednesday, October 11, 2000, two Chicago police officers

stopped and detained Zurita and a friend for trespassing on unidentified property located on the


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETED
SEP 1 7 2003
)
RUDOLPH ZURITA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 02 C 3771
) Judge Joan H. Lefkow
CITY OF CHICAGO et al. )
)
Defendants. )
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Rudolph Zurita (“Zurtia”) has filed a two-count amended complaint for false
imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Michael Sheahan (“Sheahan”), the
Sheriff of Cook County, in his official capacity, and the Sheriff of Cook County police officers
Leibas, Muhammad and Ryan (collectively, the “Cook County officers”), in their individual
capacities.' Under Count I, Zurita alleges that the Cook County officers unlawfully detained him
for four days in the Cook County jail without probable cause and failed to investigate and verify
his identity after he repeatedly told them that he “was not the person named in the arrest
warrant.” (Am. Compl. {] 24.) Further, Zurita alleges that the “information on the face of the
warrant” demonstrated this misidentification. (/d.) Alternatively, Zurita alleges under Count II
that the Cook County officers unlawfully detained him based on an invalid arrest warrant because

“{t neither truly named the individual to be arrested nor did it describe the individual to be

"Zurita also filed his lawsuit against the City of Chicago and certain City of Chicago police officers. On or
about March 24, 2003, this court dismissed Zurita’s lawsuit against these defendants with prejudice pursuant to an

agreed order of dismissal. oa