alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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Exhibit 31.01
 HARTFORD LIFE, INC.
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ENACTED BY SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Hartford Life, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the
periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    [Paragraph omitted in accordance with SEC transition instructions
contained in SEC Release 34-47986];c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andd)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting;
and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):
 a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize
and report financial information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.
  By:
    
    /s/ Thomas M. MarraThomas M. MarraPresident and Chief Operating Officer
 61
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Merrill Lynch Preferred
Capital Trust II (the "Trust") and Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding II, L.P. for
the period ended April 1, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Haig J. Nargesian, Regular
Trustee of the Trust, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
    of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.





                              MERRILL LYNCH PREFERRED CAPITAL TRUST II


                              By:  /s/ HAIG J. NARGESIAN
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                              Name:    Haig J. Nargesian *
                              Title:   Regular Trustee









Dated: May 12, 2005
_____________________

* Haig J. Nargesian functions as the equivalent of the Chief Executive Officer
  and Chief  Financial  Officer of the Trust for  purposes  of Section  906
  of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
#### Michael S. Regal & another *vs.*Perla C. Lyon, administratrix.

Suffolk.

March 22, 1912.

May 27, 1912.

Present: Rugg, C. J., Morton, Braley, Sheldon, & DeCourcy, JJ.

*Practice, Civil,*Appeal.

Under R. L. c. 173, § 96, as amended by St. 1906, c. 342, § 2, no appeal lies from a ruling of a judge of the Superior Court sustaining an answer in abatement and ordering judgment for the defendant, where no judgment has been entered.

Contract against the administratrix of the estate of a constable for $110 alleged to have been deposited by the plaintiffs with the defendant’s intestate in lieu of a bond to dissolve an attachment upon goods and effects of the plaintiffs. Writ dated April 4, 1910.

*231In the Superior Court the defendant filed an answer in abatement. The case was heard upon the matters alleged in this answer by *Jenney,*J., who made an order as follows: “Sustained after hearing and judgment ordered for the defendant.”

The judge filed a memorandum of findings, which is referred to in the opinion as constituting no part of the record. The memorandum concluded as follows:

“On the foregoing facts, I rule that this action cannot be maintained, and sustain the answer in abatement and order judgment for the defendant.

“I am somewhat in doubt as to whether the matters set forth in said answer are properly matters in abatement, but inasmuch as the parties have been fully heard and have introduced such evidence as they desired as to all matters involved in the action, I have made the order as indicated.”

The plaintiffs filed the following statement:

“Now come the plaintiffs in the above entitled cause and appeal from said court to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, for deciding the issues raised by the defendant’s answer in abatement for the defendant.”

The case, was submitted on briefs.

*S. Sigilman,*for the plaintiffs.

*W. H. Thorpe,*for the defendant.

Braley, J.

The memorandum of his findings of fact and reasons for decision filed by the presiding judge who heard the case without a jury cannot be considered as constituting a part of the record on which the plaintiffs’ appeal is founded. If dissatisfied with the ruling sustaining the defendant’s answer in abatement they should have excepted. No judgment having been entered there is no question of law apparent upon the record for this court to decide and the appeal must be dismissed. R. L. c. 173, § 96. St. 1906, c. 342, § 2. *Cotter*v. *Nathan & Hurst Co.*211 Mass. 31. *Chapman*v. *Briggs Iron Co.*6 Gray, 330. *Hutchinson*v. *Tucker,*121 Mass. 402. *Standish*v. *Old Colony Railroad,*129 Mass. 158. *Ingalls*v. *Hobbs,*156 Mass. 348. *New York Life Ins. Co.*v. *Macomber,*169 Mass. 580. *Boyd, petitioner,*199 Mass. 262. *Abbott*v. *Walker,*204 Mass. 71.

*So ordered.*
#### Ibrahim NAOFAL, a.k.a. Ibrahim Noufal, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MURASEY, Respondent.

No. 08-71852.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 19, 2011.

Marc Jason Wigul, Law Offices of Marc J. Wigul, Encino, CA, for Petitioner.

Jesse Lloyd Busen, Nehal Kamani, Emily Anne Radford, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

*147MEMORANDUM **

Ibrahim Naofal, a native and citizen of Syria, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence factual findings, *Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey,*542 F.3d 788, 742 (9th Cir.2008), and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Naofal failed to demonstrate the beating he endured was on account of a protected ground, including his religion. *See INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (to reverse the agency’s finding “we must find that the evidence not only *supports*that conclusion, but *compels*it”) (emphasis in original); *see also Parussimova v. Mukasey,*555 F.3d 734, 740-41 (9th Cir.2009) (“[t]he Real ID Act requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”). Accordingly, Nao-fal’s withholding of removal claim fails. *See Ochoa v. Gonzales,*406 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.2005).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NO. 07-10-00433-CV 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL A 

JANUARY 27, 2011 

CARMEX AUTO SALES, APPELLANT 

v. 

EUSEBIO RODRIGUEZ AND ESTELA CANEZ, APPELLEE 

 FROM THE 84TH DISTRICT COURT OF HUTCHINSON COUNTY; 

NO. 38,083; HONORABLE WILLIAM D. SMITH, JUDGE 

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

ON MOTION TO DISMISS 

Appellant, Chriscella Mariscal d/b/a Carmex Auto Sales, has filed a motion to 

dismiss this appeal because he no longer desires to pursue it. No decision of this Court 

having been delivered to date, we grant the motion. Accordingly, the appeal is 

dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). All costs related to this appeal are assessed 

against appellant. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(d). If dismissal will prevent appellees from 

seeking relief to which they would otherwise be entitled, the Court directs appellees to 

file a timely motion for rehearing. No motion for rehearing from appellant will be 

entertained. 

 Mackey K. Hancock 

 Justice
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1424 

CA 15-00517 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, PERADOTTO, AND CARNI, JJ. 

 

BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, FORMERLY KNOWN AS 

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP, 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KENNETH MAESTRI, ALSO KNOWN AS KENNETH V. MAESTRI, 

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

FRENKEL LAMBERT WEISS WEISMAN & GORDON, LLP, BAY SHORE (MICHELLE

MACCAGNANO OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County

(Deborah H. Karalunas, J.), entered January 3, 2014. The order denied

the motion of plaintiff to vacate an order dismissing the complaint. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted,

the order dated December 13, 2012 is vacated and the complaint is

reinstated. 

Memorandum: In this mortgage foreclosure action, plaintiff

appeals from an order that denied its motion seeking to vacate an

order dated December 13, 2012, in which Supreme Court sua sponte

dismissed the complaint as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c). We

agree with plaintiff that the court erred in denying the motion. The

court erred in dismissing the complaint sua sponte inasmuch as “[u]se

of the [sua sponte] power of dismissal must be restricted to the most

extraordinary circumstances, and no such extraordinary circumstances

are present in this case” (Midfirst Bank v Bellinger, 117 AD3d 1520,

1522 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v

Alexander, 124 AD3d 838, 839). Indeed, a plaintiff has not abandoned

a foreclosure action where, as here, the plaintiff has taken the

preliminary step toward obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure

and sale by moving for an order of reference within one year of the

defendant’s default (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 124 AD3d at 839; Klein v

St. Cyprian Props., Inc., 100 AD3d 711, 712).

Entered: December 31, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
I

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1211

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 26, 1997

Referred to the Committee on International Relations

AN ACT

To provide permanent authority for the administration of

au pair programs.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT AUTHORITY FOR AU PAIR PRO4 GRAMS.

5 Section 1(b) of the Act entitled ‘‘An Act to extend

6 au pair programs’’, approved December 23, 1995 (Public

7 Law 104–72; 109 Stat. 776) is amended by striking ‘‘,

8 through fiscal year 1997’’.

Passed the Senate September 25, 1997.

Attest: GARY SISCO,

Secretary.
Brandt v. Pallito, 638-10-15 Wncv (Teachout, J., Oct. 27, 2017)

[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the 

accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]

STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION

Washington Unit Docket No. 638-10-15 Wncv

JEFFREY-MICHAEL BRANDT

Plaintiff

v.

ANDREW PALLITO, Commissioner, Vermont

Department of Corrections, and 

DAVID TURNER, Facilities Executive

Defendants

ENTRY

Motion to Reconsider

Mr. Brandt seeks reconsideration of the court’s September 1, 2017 summary judgment 

decision. He objects that the court erred in accepting that the State’s compelling governmental 

interest in preventing sexual violence in its prisons is served by its policy of prohibiting the 

introduction into those facilities of explicit photographs of pierced genitalia and nipples. He 

argues that Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 863 (2015), requires more of the State than what the 

summary judgment record included when the court decided this issue.

Mr. Brandt’s motion is denied. In Holt, the trial court expressly knew that the policy at 

issue, as applied to the inmate, did not advance the asserted governmental interest. It 

nevertheless ruled in favor of the government out of pure deference. The Supreme Court ruled 

that “unquestioning deference” is impermissible under RLUIPA. “Prison officials are experts in 

running prisons and evaluating the likely effects of altering prison rules, and courts should 

respect that expertise. But that respect does not justify the abdication of the responsibility, 

conferred by Congress, to apply RLUIPA’s rigorous standard.” Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 864.

Unlike in Holt, summary judgment here did not depend on unquestioning deference. The 

record included an affidavit asserting the governmental interest and need to further it by 

restricting materials of a graphic sexual nature. That is not “hard to swallow.” Id. It is 

reasonable on its face and supported by the record.

Mr. Brandt also argues that the policy cannot further the asserted governmental interest 

because the policy permits some depictions of nudity. The policy, he argues, must prohibit all 

depictions of nudity of any kind or it per se cannot serve the asserted governmental interest. He 

provides no reasoning or legal support for this assertion and the court does not find it persuasive.
2

Mr. Brandt’s motion to reconsider is denied.

Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this ____ day of October 2017.

_____________________________

Mary Miles Teachout,

Superior Judge
#### Maria CERDA-BECERRA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 07-71953.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 25, 2011.

Maria Cerda-Becerra, El Monte, CA, pro se.

Lisa Marie Arnold, Senior Litigation Counsel, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office Of The Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Maria Cerda-Becerra, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision pretermitting her application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law and claims of due process violations, *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir.2005), and we deny the petition for review.

The IJ properly determined that Cerda-Becerra abandoned her application for cancellation of removal because it was not filed by the IJ’s deadline. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (IJ may set filing deadlines and deem waived an application not filed by the deadline); *see also Matter of R-R-,*20 I. & N. Dec. 547, 549 (BIA 1992) (“The Board has long held that applications for benefits under the Act are properly denied as abandoned when the alien fails to timely file them.”). It follows that Cerda-Becer-ra’s due process rights were not violated. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (requiring error for a petitioner to prevail on a due process claim).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 12, 2021

No. 04-21-00026-CV

SOUTHEAST SNF, LLC d/b/a Southeast Nursing Rehabilitation Center, Texas Operations 

Management LLC and Advanced HCS LLC.,

Appellants

v.

Ruperto C. GUTIERREZ, Jr., Individually and on behalf of the Estate of Ruperto Q. Gutierrez, 

Sr., Deceased,

Appellees

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020-CI-12410

Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice 

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice 

On January 28, 2021, appellants filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order 

denying their motion to dismiss appellee’s healthcare liability claim. The appeal is accelerated. 

On February 2, 2021, the trial court signed an order requiring appellant Southeast SNF, LLC 

d/b/a Southeast Nursing Rehabilitation Center to comply with certain discovery requests on or 

before February 15, 2021. On February 10, 2021, appellants filed a motion for temporary relief 

seeking to stay discovery pending resolution of this appeal. On February 11, 2021, appellee filed 

a response opposing the motion.

We GRANT IN PART appellants’ motion for temporary relief. We ORDER the trial 

court’s February 2, 2021 “Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses from 

Southeast SNF, LLC d/b/a Southeast Nursing & Rehabilitation Center” STAYED pending 

further order from this court.
_________________________________

Irene Rios, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 12th day of February, 2021.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15D0348. MARK J. KERLIN v. CARTER BROWN et al.

Prison inmate Mark Kerlin attempted to file a pro se civil action against Walker

County Superior Court Clerk Carter Brown, the City of LaFayette, and Walker

County, claiming an intentional tort for the denial of his constitutional rights. On

February 27, 2015, the trial court dismissed his petition pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-2

(d). On April 2, 2015, Kerlin filed this application for discretionary appeal, seeking

review of the February 27, 2015 order.1

 We lack jurisdiction.

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the

entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). A party’s

failure to meet this statutory deadline deprives us of jurisdiction to consider the

application. Hill v. State, 204 Ga. App. 582, 583 (420 SE2d 393) (1992). Because

Kerlin filed this application 34 days after entry of the order he wishes to appeal, it is

untimely. The application is therefore DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

1 Because he was incarcerated when he initiated this action, Kerlin’s appeal is

controlled by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, OCGA § 42-12-1 et seq.

Under OCGA § 42-12-8, “[a]ppeals of all actions filed by prisoners shall be as

provided in Code Section 5-6-35,” the discretionary appeals statute. 

April 28, 2015
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

04/28/2015
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1172 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1172

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
                   For the relief of Sylvester Flis.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. GRANT OF NATURALIZATION TO SYLVESTER FLIS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
Sylvester Flis shall be naturalized as a citizen of the United States 
upon the filing of the appropriate application and upon being 
administered the oath of renunciation and allegiance in an appropriate 
ceremony pursuant to section 337 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.
    (b) Deadline for Application and Payment of Fees.--Subsection (a) 
shall apply only if the application for naturalization is filed with 
appropriate fees within 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.

            Passed the Senate November 13, 1997.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
105th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1172

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

                   For the relief of Sylvester Flis.
```