Filed 11/16/22 P. v. Arnold CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STEPHEN ARNOLD,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B311683

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. ZM011449)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Andrea C. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.

Lori E. Kantor for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Michael C. 

Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Appellant Stephen Arnold appeals an order of commitment 

the trial court entered pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator

Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (SVPA or 

Act).1 He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the 

order. He also argues the trial court erroneously permitted an 

expert psychologist to testify for the People. We reject both 

arguments and affirm the order.

BACKGROUND

Arnold was a troubled juvenile. He began drinking alcohol 

and smoking marijuana in his early teens. He dropped out of 

school in tenth grade. According to his mother, Arnold was a 

“very disturbed child” who went “crazy” when he became 

intoxicated. He was arrested on two occasions as a minor for 

petit larceny. 

In his early twenties, Arnold began regularly using crack 

cocaine and PCP. From 1980, when he was 20, to 1991 when he 

was 31, Arnold was repeatedly arrested for many different 

crimes, including larceny, theft, fraud, robbery, possession of 

stolen property, possession of narcotics, assault, and criminal 

possession of a firearm or knife. On at least nine occasions, he 

was convicted and sentenced. 

A. Arnold’s arrests and convictions for sexually violent 

crimes

On four occasions Arnold was arrested for committing 

sexually violent crimes. In June 1984, Arnold was arrested for 

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory 

references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
3

rape in concert with force or violence. The victim, however, 

declined to assist the prosecution, and the case was not pursued. 

In August 1984, Arnold was arrested and charged with 

forcible rape and sodomy. He pled guilty to “sexual misconduct,” 

a misdemeanor under New York law. 

On July 5, 1991, Arnold was arrested for sexually 

assaulting Cynthia S. He allegedly forced Cynthia S. to orally 

copulate him at knife point. Arnold also allegedly raped Cynthia 

S. twice. He was booked and released the same day. Later, when 

Cynthia S. did not appear at trial, the prosecution dropped the 

charges against Arnold. 

On July 12, 1991, while the Cynthia S. case was pending, 

Arnold committed the crimes that led to his long-term 

incarceration. Armed with a pellet rifle, Arnold forced his way 

into a residence, subdued two men, and demanded money from 

Diane L. and the men. 

During this incident, Arnold ordered Diane L. to orally 

copulate him. She complied after Arnold threatened to shoot her 

and the men if she did not do as he demanded. Arnold then 

ordered Diane L. to take off her pants and underwear and have 

intercourse with him. While Arnold was raping Diane L., the 

police arrived. Arnold fled but was apprehended that day. 

In March 1992, Arnold was convicted of forced rape, forced 

oral copulation, and first-degree robbery. He was sentenced to 

twenty-six years in prison. 

B. Arnold’s behavior in prison

While Arnold was in prison, correctional officers wrote twodozen reports charging him with violation of prison rules. Many 

of Arnold’s violations related to possession of alcohol. In 1998, he 

was accused of trying to physically force another inmate to 
4

perform a sexual act. There is no record, however, of whether 

any charges were brought related to this offense. In 2002, Arnold 

was found to have committed a serious rule violation for indecent 

exposure. Arnold lifted his penis over his underwear and stated 

to a correctional officer, “This is what you want.” 

C. The commencement of this action and Arnold’s 

confinement at a state hospital

Shortly before Arnold finished serving his sentence, the 

People commenced this action. On March 22, 2007, the People 

filed a petition for commitment pursuant to the SVPA. At the 

probable cause hearing on April 24, 2007, the court denied 

Arnold’s motion to dismiss, and ordered that he be confined in a 

secured facility pending trial. Arnold was then transferred to the 

Coalinga State Hospital (the hospital).

D. Arnold’s conduct at the hospital

For a variety of reasons not relevant here, the case was not 

brought to trial until January 2020. While Arnold was in the 

hospital waiting for trial, the authorities wrote 176 infraction 

reports for a wide range of offenses, including possession of 

alcohol, possession of pornography, and aggressive and 

threatening conduct. 

Arnold was frequently intoxicated at the hospital. On one 

occasion, when his psychiatrist told him he appeared intoxicated, 

Arnold responded, “I don’t fucking care what you think.” 

Arnold also showed no remorse for his sexually violent 

crimes. He denied committing any sexual offenses, claiming he 

was simply in the “wrong place at the wrong time.”

Arnold was frequently verbally abusive to hospital staff, 

especially when he was intoxicated. He often called women at 
5

the hospital sexualized names. On one occasion, referring to a 

staff member, Arnold stated, “If that bitch says one more word, 

I’m going to rape her.” 

In September 2017, while psychiatric technician Froila 

Fernandez was treating another patient, Arnold walked by and 

dropped a letter on her lap. In the letter, Arnold solicited 

Fernandez to buy a throw-away phone so they could speak freely. 

He also praised her physical attributes and stated she had a “well 

shape[d] butt.”

E. The trial

Both parties waived their right to a jury trial. The bench 

trial lasted from January to December, 2020, taking nearly a 

year to complete due to delays associated with the COVID-19 

pandemic.

Both parties called two psychologists as expert witnesses: 

the People called Dr. Harry Goldberg and Dr. Laljit Sidhu; 

Arnold called Dr. Amy Phenix and Dr. Brian Abbott. Doctors 

Goldberg, Sidhu, and Phenix diagnosed Arnold with anti-social 

personality disorder (ASPD) and alcohol abuse disorder. Dr. 

Abbott did not diagnose Arnold with ASPD because he could not 

substantiate one criterion, namely conduct disorder before age 

15. Dr. Abbott agreed with the other expert psychologists that 

Arnold had alcohol abuse disorder.

Dr. Goldberg opined that Arnold was a sexually violent 

predator (SVP) within the meaning of the statute. Doctors Sidhu, 

Phenix, and Abbott opined that Arnold did not meet the criteria 

for an SVP. Because we must review the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the People, we shall discuss Dr. Goldberg’s testimony 

in detail below. 
6

F. The order of commitment 

On March 8, 2021, the trial court issued a proposed 

statement of decision in which it found the People’s petition true 

and that Arnold was an SVP.2 The court also entered an order of 

commitment. The court ordered Arnold committed to the custody 

of the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for 

appropriate treatment and confinement for an indeterminate 

time.

On March 22, 2021, Arnold filed a notice of appeal from the 

March 8, 2021, “judgment.”3

DISCUSSION

I. There is Substantial Evidence Supporting the 

Commitment Order

Under the SVPA, a sexually violent predator is defined as 

“a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense 

against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental 

disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety 

of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually 

violent criminal behavior.” (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) 

2 The proposed statement of decision stated that if the 

parties did not file objections within 15 days, “this Statement of 

Decision shall become the final judgment.” There is nothing in 

the record indicating whether any objections to the proposed 

statement of decision were filed.

3 The order of commitment was a final determination 

of Arnold’s rights under the SVPA, equivalent to a final judgment 

(People v. Whaley (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 779, 782), from which 

an appeal may be taken. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).)
7

The People must prove three elements beyond a reason a 

reasonable doubt to prevail: “(1) the person has suffered a 

conviction of at least one qualifying ‘sexually violent offense,’ (2) 

the person has ‘a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the 

person a danger to the health and safety of others,’ and (3) the 

mental disorder makes it likely the person will engage in future 

predatory acts of sexually violent criminal behavior if released 

from custody.” (People v. Yates (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 474, 477.) 

The term “diagnosed mental disorder” includes “a 

congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or 

volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the commission 

of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a 

menace to the health and safety of others.” (§ 6600, subd. (c), 

italics added.) 

Arnold does not dispute there is substantial evidence 

showing he committed qualifying sexually violent offenses. He 

also does not dispute there is substantial evidence supporting the

trial court’s finding he has ASPD.

Arnold instead contends there is no substantial evidence 

supporting a finding that he has a “diagnosed mental disorder” 

within the meaning of the Act. He argues there is insufficient 

evidence showing a causal nexus between his ASPD and his 

predisposition to commit sexual crimes. In other words, Arnold 

argues there is insufficient evidence that his “ASPD predisposed 

him to the commission of criminal sexual acts.” 

A. Standard of review

We review the sufficiency of the evidence in SVPA cases 

under the same substantial evidence test used in criminal 

appeals. (People v. Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529, 560 (Orey).) 

“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire 
8

record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine 

whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of 

solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant [is a sexually violent predator] beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) “Reversal 

for insufficiency of the evidence is warranted only if it appears 

that ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient 

substantial evidence to support [the judgment].” ’ ” (Orey, supra,

63 Cal.App.5th at p. 561.) 

We cannot reweigh the facts or the credibility of the 

witnesses. (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 67.) “The 

testimony of just one witness is enough to support the judgment 

“so long as that testimony is not inherently incredible.” (In re 

Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830; accord People v. 

Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 870, 879 [“A single psychiatric 

opinion that an individual is dangerous because of a mental 

disorder constitutes substantial evidence”].) 

In an SVP trial, the People must present expert testimony

by a psychologist or psychiatrist to establish the elements for 

commitment. (See People v. Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 

478; People v. Ward (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 368, 374 (Ward); Evid. 

Code, §§ 800, 801.) “Although an expert’s opinion on an ultimate 

issue of fact is admissible, and may constitute substantial 

evidence [citation], the conclusion by itself does not constitute 

substantial evidence without an adequate factual foundation.” 

(People v. $47,050 (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1325.)

B. Dr. Goldberg’s testimony is sufficient to uphold the 

commitment order

Dr. Goldberg found that Arnold met all the criteria for 

ASPD: (1) conduct disorder before age 15, (2) violation of social 
9

norms, (3) aggressiveness, (4) impulsivity, (5) manipulation of 

others and deceitfulness, and (6) lack of remorse. 

To determine whether Arnold’s was likely to commit 

sexually violent crimes if released, Dr. Goldberg pursued a 

“structured actuarial approach.” He applied two actuarial 

instruments: the Static-99 and Static-2002R. Under the Static99, Dr. Goldberg placed Arnold in a group with a 5-year 

recidivism rate of 30.7 percent, and a 10-year recidivism rate of 

42.8 percent. Arnold’s “relative risk” under this assessment is 

97.2 percent, which means that he has a higher risk of recidivism 

than 97.2 percent of sex offenders. Under the Static-2002R, Dr. 

Goldberg placed Arnold in a group with a 19.2 percent recidivism 

rate in 5 years.

Dr. Goldberg also concluded idiosyncratic factors indicated 

that Arnold was more likely to commit sexually violent crimes 

than other individuals with similar scores on the Static-99 and 

Static-2002R. Unlike most men of his age, Arnold’s aggression, 

impulsivity, and sexual desire were not diminishing. Arnold’s 

behavior at the hospital generated an extraordinary 176 reports 

of misconduct, demonstrating unabated aggression and a lack of 

impulse control. Further, Arnold stated that his sex drive had 

gone up, and he reported he continued to masturbate 2 times a 

week. 

Dr. Goldberg testified, “I think this combination of his 

sexual preoccupation, impulsivity, aggressivity and history of 

sexual aggression is a really bad combination for him.” He also 

stated that Arnold was a psychopath with no empathy for others, 

further increasing the risk he would reoffend. Dr. Goldberg 

concluded: “I just can’t see this man controlling himself once he 

is released.” 
10

Dr. Goldberg explained that there is a nexus between 

Arnold’s ASPD and his predisposition to commit sexually violent 

crimes in a predatory manner. According to Dr. Goldberg, ASPD 

includes “characteristics, such as aggressiveness, lack of remorse, 

impulsivity . . . that were associated with the . . . convicted 

charge.” 

Dr. Goldberg noted that Arnold has been arrested four 

times for sexually violent crimes, two of which resulted in 

convictions.4 According to Dr. Goldberg, this set Arnold apart 

from most sex offenders, about 70 percent of whom are “one-time 

offenders.” Only seven percent of rapists and eight percent of 

child molesters have three or more arrests for sexual offenses. 

Dr. Goldberg opined that Arnold’s multiple arrests and 

convictions indicate “he has difficulty controlling his urges 

toward sex, whether . . . the alleged victim is agreeing to it or 

not.” 

Dr. Goldberg found particularly troublesome the proximity 

of the events involving Cynthia S. and Diane L. in July of 1991. 

Arnold’s arrest for raping Cynthia S. on July 5 did not deter him 

from raping Diane L. just a week later on July 12. In Dr. 

Goldberg’s view, this indicates “problems in the volitional 

capacity, which is one of the definitions of a mental disorder 

under the sexually violent predator statute.” 

Dr. Goldberg’s testimony is substantial evidence that 

Arnold is a sexually violent predator within the meaning of the 

Act. Moreover, Dr. Goldberg provided a sufficient foundation for 

4 The Static-99 and Static-2002R consider arrests for 

sexual offenses, as well as convictions, as part of the “actuarial 

process.” 
11

his opinions. Although a reasonable trier of fact could have found 

the testimony of the other expert psychologists more convincing, 

we do not reweigh the evidence. Dr. Goldberg’s testimony, by 

itself, is sufficient to support the trial court’s findings and order 

of commitment.

II. Under the Law of the Case, Arnold is Barred from

Asserting His Argument Regarding the Testimony of 

an Independent Evaluator

The SVPA provides that before a person is committed, the 

person “shall be evaluated by two practicing psychiatrists or 

psychologists, or one practicing psychiatrist and one practicing 

psychologist.” (§ 6601, subd. (d).) “If one or more of the original 

evaluators is no longer available to testify for the [People] in 

court proceedings,” the People’s attorney may request the DSH to 

perform replacement evaluations. (§ 6603, subd. (d)(1).) The 

People’s attorney may also request “updated evaluations” if 

necessary. (Ibid.)

In 2013, Dr. George Joseph Grosso and Dr. Laljit Sidhu 

were appointed as replacement evaluators for Arnold. They both 

determined that he did not meet the requirements for 

commitment under the Act. 

The People then filed a motion pursuant to Code of Civil 

Procedure section 2032.020 (section 2032.020) to permit a third 

psychologist, Dr. Richard Ramanoff, to conduct an examination. 

The trial court granted the motion. 

Arnold challenged this order by filing a petition for writ of 

mandate. In an unpublished opinion, this division affirmed the 

order, stating: “Consistent with People v. Landau (2013) 214 

Cal.App.4th 1, 24–27 (Landau), we hold the respondent court had 

discretion to order a mental evaluation of an alleged sexually 
12

violent predator by Dr. Romanoff.” (Arnold v. Superior Court

(Nov. 14, 2014), B254887 [nonpub. opn.] (Arnold I).)

Dr. Romanoff never evaluated Arnold. While the case was 

delayed, he stopped working for the DSH. 

In 2019, the People filed a motion for an updated 

evaluation by Dr. Sidhu, but not from Dr. Grosso, who was no 

longer under contract with the DSH. That motion was granted. 

The People subsequently retained Dr. Goldberg. Although 

the record is unclear on this point, the parties agree that Dr. 

Goldberg was not one of the original or replacement evaluators; 

he was instead retained as an independent expert pursuant to 

section 2032.020. At trial, the court denied Arnold’s motion to 

exclude Dr. Goldberg’s testimony.

Arnold contends that the SVPA does not permit the People 

to retain an expert “to prepare an independent evaluation of an 

alleged SVP and testify to their opinion.” He further contends

that Landau and Arnold I were “incorrect” in holding to the 

contrary. This argument is barred by the law of the case.

“Under the doctrine of the law of the case, a principle or 

rule that a reviewing court states in an opinion and that is 

necessary to the reviewing court’s decision must be applied 

throughout all later proceedings in the same case, both in the 

trial court and on a later appeal.” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 

Cal.4th 72, 94 (Jurado).) Generally, the doctrine applies to the 

Court of Appeal’s denial of a petition for writ of mandate when 

the matter is fully briefed, there is an opportunity for oral 

argument, and the cause is decided by a written opinion. (See 

Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894.) 

Arnold does not dispute these requirements are satisfied. 

Arnold I was decided on the merits after the matter was fully 
13

briefed and the parties had an opportunity for oral argument. In 

a substantive written opinion, we rejected the same legal 

argument that Arnold makes in this appeal regarding the 

retention of an independent expert. 

Arnold argues that we should nonetheless revisit the issue 

in the interests of justice. The law of the case doctrine does not 

apply “when the rule stated in the prior decision was a ‘ “manifest 

misapplication” of the law resulting in “substantial injustice.” ’ ” 

(Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 95.) We reject this argument. 

Although good faith arguments can be made that Landau and 

Arnold I were decided incorrectly, there was no manifest 

misapplication of the law.

Arnold also argues that this court should reconsider the 

issue based on new facts. He contends “[t]he facts not previously 

considered by the court . . . consist of the legislative history of 

section 6603, subdivision (d)(1).” It is true we may reconsider a

legal issue when presented with new facts that could change the 

result. (Krumdick v. White (1895) 107 Cal. 37, 40; accord In re 

Estate of Baird (1924) 193 Cal. 225, 234–236 [prior appellate 

decision on sufficiency of the evidence is not law of the case when 

evidence on retrial materially changed].) But the legislative 

history of the Act does not amount to “new facts” in this case. 
14

DISPOSITION

The March 8, 2021, order of commitment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

TAMZARIAN, J.*

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

KIM, J.

*

Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the 

California Constitution.