to legal’’was an internal note for the RSI employee, Culeana Halim, a recovery specialist for RSI,
and other RSI personnel and was not communicated to Davis. (Def.’s Response to Plaint.’s | 21;
Declaration of Culeana Halim).

In September 2001, RSI received a telephone call from Plaintiffs union representative,

Tawni Major, RSI’s record of this telephone conversations reads:
INCOMING CALL
RCD A CALL FRM A PERSON BY THE NAME OF TONNIE
MAGOR ASSOC. OF FLIGHT ATTENDANCE CALL ON
BEHALF OF CX. [ADV HER THATI AM UNABLE TO S/W 3”
PARTY W/O AUTHORIZATION OF THE CX. SHE ASKED IF
DEAN WEBLEY STILL WORKED HERE AND ISAID NO & I’M
UNABLE TO GIVE YOU INFO ON HER & PERSONNEL IS NOT
PRIVILEGE TO GIVE YOU INFO EITHER. SHE SAID SHE
WILL CX W/ AUTHORIZATION TO S/W ME

(Plaint.s 56.1(b)(3) Statement ] 25; Def.’s Response § 25).

In June 2002, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, alleging that RSI communicated with United
Airlines regarding Plaintiff's debt in violation of the FDCPA. (Def.’s 56.1(a)(3) Statement ¥ 29).
Plaintiff has not produced any documentation evidencing an unlawful communication between RSI
and United Airlines. (Id., 430). At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she had no knowledge of
any communications between RSI and United Airlines. (Id., J 32; Plaint.’s Dep. p. 58).

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

All the evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence are viewed in

the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Miller v. American Family Mutual Ins, Co., 203 F.3d


woke

CONCLUSI'



¢

in the aniount of $50.00 from Plaintiff. RSI accepted the checks per instructions of CIGNA. (Id.,
{1 7; Def.’s Response to J 7). RSI contacted Plaintiff via letters in January and February 2001.
(Plaint.’s 56.1(b)(3) Statement ff 8-9). Copies of the January and February 2001 letters from RSI
to Plaintiff were included in Plaintiff's personnel file at United Airlines and were provided to United
Airlines by LINA . (Def.’s Response to Plaint.’s 10).

On April 3, 2001, Sam Berry of CIGNA reported to Dolores Kastel from the Life and
Disability Department at United Airlines that “preliminary feedback indicates that there have been
no agreements reached regarding a payment plan.” (Plaint.’s 56.1(b)(3) Statement { 13).

On June 25, 2001, RSI received a letter from Eric Berman’s office advising that all amicable
efforts to recover the overpayment had been exhausted because the Plaintiff refused to pay and
recommended that the matter be referred to CIGNA’s legal department. (Plaint.’s 56.1(b)(3)
Statement J 16). Eric Berman closed out Plaintiff's account in June 2001. The matter was then
referred to CIGNA’s legal department in July 2001. (Id., 4 17).

On June 27, 2001, RSI received a telephone call from Paul Davis of United Airlines. The
RSI “history screen”, a computerized record of the incoming call, reads:

INCOMING CALL

S/W PAUL DAVIS INFORMED ME HE IS FROM UNITED
AIRLINES AND HE WANTED TO KNOW IF CX WAS KEEPING
UP WITH HER PMT ARRANGEMENTS, , , INFORMED HIM I
WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE HIM WITH THIS
INFORMATION AGAINST THE FDCPA PROVIDING
INFORMATION TO A THIRD PARTY........ INFORMED HIM WE
WOULD HAVE TO HAVE THE CX CONTACT ME AND
INFORM MEI WOULD BE ABLE TO RELEASE INFORMATION
REGARDING HER ACCT WHICH HAS GONE TO LEGAL

(Plaint.’s 56.1(b)(3) Statement { 21; Def.’s Response J 21). The note that states the file “has gone


997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment may be granted when no “reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986).

Plaintiff’s allegations in Count I against RSI allege that RSI violated Sections 1692c(b) and
1692e(8) of FDCPA by communicating information about her debt to United Airlines.

Section 1692c(b) provides, in pertinent part:

Communication with third parties. Except as provided in section 804

[15 U.S.C. § 1692b], without prior consent of the consumer given

directly to the debt collector ... a debt collector may not communicate,

in collection with the collection of any debt, with any person other
than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if
otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor,

or the attorney of the debt collector.

Section 1692e(8) provides, in pertinent part:

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading
Tepresentation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.
Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the
following conduct is a violation of this section:

eke
(8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person
credit information which is known or which should be known to be
false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is
disputed.
“Communication” under the FDCPA is defined as “the conveying of information regarding a debt
directly or indirectly to any person through any medium. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).

Plaintiff contends that several “facts” demonstrate that RSI communicated with United


Minute Ordet Form (06/97)

a ‘ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
“svar Mapa Judge John W. Darrah “onan igor Suge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 5263 DATE 10/21/2003
CASE Wynne vs. Stevenson
TITLE

[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented]

DOCKET ENTRY:

ql) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon____—s set for__—_at

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—_—s set for__—aat

(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-setfor]on___setfor____—at__—.
(7) Q Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at

(8) Qo (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__-_ at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 OCOFRCP41(a\(1) OFRCP41(a)(2).

(10) MW (Otherdocketentry] Plaintiffs motion to extend the date for pretrial conference is granted. Pretrial
conference date of 10/21/03 at 11:00 a.m is stricken and re-set to 10/29/03 at 11:00 a.m. For the reasons
stated in the attached memorandum opinion and order, RSI’s motion for summary judgment is granted
[42-1]. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order.

(al) dg [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

wv | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/mapistrate judge. 5 oe A
ye Wer
courtroom
MF deputy's mn wd
initiala tee
Date/time received in ©
central Clerk's Office ‘

oe



Airlines ‘concerning her debt.’ First, Plaintiff cites to Sam Berry’s comment to Kastel on

April 3, 2001, that “preliminary feedback indicates that there have been no agreements reached
regarding a payment plan”. However, Barry is an employee of CIGNA; and his comments do not
show that such information was communicated by RSI.

Plaintiff also contends that the letters from RSI to her that were found within her personnel
file at United Airlines evidence that RSI communicated her debt to United Airlines, However, the
evidence shows that these letters were provided to United Airlines by LINA, not RSI.

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the computerized records of RSI’s telephone conversations
evidences that RSI communicated information about her debt to United Airlines because it indicates
that the matter “has gone to legal”. However, it is uncontroverted that this information was input
into the computer by the RSI employee as an internal note for the RSI employee and other RSI
personnel and that it was not relayed to the United Airlines caller. Furthermore, the computerized
records of these telephone calls show, contrary to Plaintiff's allegations, that RSI informed the
callers that they could not answer any questions or discuss the matter with the callers.

Based on the above, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any genuine issue as to any
material fact exists as to whether RSI communicated information about Plaintiff's debt to United

Airlines. Accordingly, RSI’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

"Plaintiff also, for the first time, alleges that summary judgment should not be granted for
RSI because RSI is liable for its agent, Eric Berman, P.C, However, no such allegations appear
in Plaintiff's Complaint; and Plaintiff cannot amend her Complaint through a response to the
Motion for Summary Judgment. See Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107

: (7th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, this issue is not properly before the Court and is not addressed.

6


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

EMILY WYNNE, } OCT 2 8 2003
Plaintiff, )
)

v. ) No. 02 C 5263

)

LOUIS STEVENSON; ERIC M. BERMAN, P.C.; ) Judge John W. Darrah
ERIC BERMAN; LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY __)
OF NORTH AMERICA; CIGNA; and RSI, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Emily Wynne, filed suit against Defendants, alleging a violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and defamation. Plaintiff's defamation claim was subsequently
dismissed without prejudice. Presently before the Court is RSI’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

RSI provides debt collection services for its clients, including CIGNA and Life Insurance of
North America (“LINA”). (Def.’s 56.1(a)(3) Statement J 1). LINA was a division of CIGNA
Integrated Insurance Company that provided disability benefits for Plaintiff. (id, ]3). Eric Berman,
P.C. was a third-party vendor retained by LINA to handle debt collection efforts where LINA and
RSI were unsuccessful. (Id., { 4).

From 1989 to 2001, Plaintiff was employed as a flight attendant for United Airlines. (Def.’s
56.1(a)(3) Statement J 15). In 1998, Plaintiff underwent surgery to correct problems she had been
experiencing with her feet. (Id., | 16). Before undergoing the surgery, Plaintiff sought Worker’s

Compensation benefits to cover the expense of the surgery and any lost time that she may have

SY



incurred’due to the surgery. United Airline’s Worker’s Compensation carrier ultimately denied
Plaintiff's request. (Id., J 17).

Plaintiff proceeded with the surgery, which caused her to miss significant time from work.
She also underwent at least two follow-up surgeries, which also caused her to miss more time from
work. (Def.’s 56.1(a)(3) Statement § 18). During this time, Plaintiff sought and received short-term
disability benefits from her disability carrier, LINA. (Id., J 19). In December 1999, Plaintiff began
receiving long-term disability benefits of approximately $1,373.65 per month. (Id., { 21).

On July 2, 1999, Plaintiff returned to work as a flight attendant for United Airlines. (Def.’s
56.1(a)(3) Statement J 22). From July 1999 through August 2000, Plaintiff continued to accept long-
term disability benefits despite the fact that she had returned to work. During this time, Plaintiff
accepted approximately $12,000 in long-term disability benefits. (Id., J 23).

On September 11, 2000, CIGNA/LINA contacted Plaintiff regarding the overpayment of
long-term disability benefits and informed her that she would be responsible for paying back the
overpayment. (Def.’s 56.1(a)(3) Statement 25). Pursuant to the terms of the service agreement
between LINA and RSI, CIGNA/LINA turned the collection efforts over to RSI. (Id., 9 25). RSI
contacted Plaintiff on several occasions and attempted to secure repayment of the overpayment debt.
(Id., 126). Unable to obtain full payment of the debt from Plaintiff, RSI turned the collection efforts
over to Eric Berman, P.C., the third-party vendor designated by CIGNA/LINA for such purposes,
pursuant to the terms of the service agreement between RSI and CIGNA/LINA. (id., § 27).

In October or November of 2000, Plaintiff made arrangements with CIGNA for repayment
of the debt whereby Plaintiff would make monthly payments in a minimum amount of $25.00 per

month. (Plaint.’s 56.1(b)(3) Statement J 6). Beginning in January 2001, RSI began receiving checks