we

for members of the class will exceed $75,000.

Although Plaintiffs attempt to defeat federal jurisdiction by citing their intent to amend the
Complaint to remove the claims for personal injuries, this argument is not persuasive. “[W]hether
subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question answered by looking at the complaint as it existed at
the time the petition for removal was filed.” Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir.
1997).

Since the personal injury claims of Lilly and the other potential members of the class are
sufficient for federal jurisdiction, the issue of whether Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief
constitutes a “common and undivided interest,” need not be reached. Furthermore, since at least one
of the class member’s claims exceeds $75,000, supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims
is appropriate. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is DENIED.

Date: LO (Jorn Darrah, Judge
ited States District Court

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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a

a
finute Order 81m (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

Nat ig Jud;
me of sed Jae John W. Darrah eaten
CASE NUMBER 00 C 7372 DATE 8/21/2001
CASE LILLY vs. FORD MOTOR COMPANY
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g, plaintif¥, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im} Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due, . Reply to answer brief due__.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon__setfor___at

(5) Qo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor____—_ at.

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for]on__setfor__—at__

7”) Oo Trial{set for/re-set for]on______—aat

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at

9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule21 OO FRCP41(a)(1) OFRCP41(a)(2).

ao =f [Other docket entry] Status hearing held. Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. Plaintiffs’

(1)

motion to remand is denied. Plaintiff granted leave to file an amended complaint on or before 9/11/01.

Defendant’s response to be filed by 10/02/01. Status hearing set for 10/9/01 at 9:30 a.m.

a [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.}

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required,

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone,
Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form.

&

Copy to judge/magistrate judge. ae

courtroom 1 FUG 23. Atl & 93
LG deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in 7
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

EASTERN DIVISION.
)
LILLY, et. al., )
)
Plaintiffs, ) Case 00 C 7372
)
v. y The Honorable John W. Darrah
)
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, )
a Delaware Corp. )
)
Defendant. )
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand the case to the Circuit

Court of Cook County. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is DENIED.
BACKGROUND

On December 21, 2000, Plaintiffs moved to remand the case to the Circuit Court of Cook
County. This Motion was granted without prejudice on April 27, 2001, for Defendant Ford Motor
Company’s (“Ford” or “Defendant”) failure to comply with Local Rule 81.2. See Lilly v. Ford
Motor Company, 2001 WL 456406 (N.D.Il] 2001). However, this order was vacated; and the case
was reinstated on May 31, 2001, to afford Defendant an opportunity to comply with Local Rule 81.2.

DISCUSSION

Since the 4/27/01 order was vacated, Ford has made a good-faith effort to comply with Local
Rule 81.2 and served interrogatories on Plaintiffs. Local Rule 81.2 requires the defendant to include
in its notice of removal: .

(1) a statement by each of the defendants previously served in the state court action
that it is his, her or its good faith belief that the amount in controversy exceeds the

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jurisdictional amount; and
(2) with respect to at least one plaintiff in the Ilinois action, either—

(A)a response by such plaintiff to an interrogatory or interrogatories as to the amount
in controversy, either (i) stating that the damages actually sought by that plaintiff

exceeds the jurisdictional amounts or (ii) declining to agree that the damage award
to that plaintiff will in no event exceed the jurisdictional amount; [emphasis added]

or

(B) an admission by such plaintiff in response to a request for admissions, or a

showing as to the deemed admission by such plaintiff by reason of plaintiff's failure

to serve a timely denial to such a request, in either event conforming to the statement

or declination to agree described in subparagraph (2)(A) of this rule.

Defendant has now complied with Local Rule 81.2 since it has filed a response by Plaintiff to a
request to admit, which essentially refuses to agree that Plaintiff Lilly’s recoverable damages will
not exceed $75,000. The request to admit and response read as follows:

4. Please admit that Plaintiff, James Lilly, is not entitled to an award for damages

based on the claims asserted in the Complaint or claims arising out of the facts

alleged in the complaint in excess of $75,000.00.

Answer: Objection. This request is inappropriate. The amount of the award that the

Plaintiff is entitled to receive should be decided by the trier of fact. Nonetheless,

Plaintiff, James Lilly reiterates that he does not seek an individual award for damages

in excess of $75,000.00.

Def. Ex. B at 3.

Although Plaintiffs state that Lilly will not seek damages in excess of $75,000, it is clear
from the face of the complaint that the stated damages, if proven, will exceed that amount. In the
Complaint, Lilly claims that he suffered “permanent and disabling injuries which continue to cause
his loss of a normal life.” (Compl. 4/7). Lilly further claims that “he has incurred extensive medical
bills, a loss of earning potential and extreme pain and suffering.” (Compl. { 7). Furthermore, the

Complaint seeks to certify a class of people who “suffered personal injuries,” including death. It is

clear from the allegations in the complaint that the case constitutes one in which individual damages

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