[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-13703

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:10-cv-01425-JA-GJK

CRYSTAL COLEMAN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

CIRCLE K. STORES, INC., et al.,

 Defendants,

CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICES, LLC, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(May 24, 2013)

Before CARNES, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Crystal Coleman appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of Constitution State Services, LLC, (CSS) on her malicious prosecution 

claim. After careful review, we affirm.1

While working for Circle K. Stores, Inc., (Circle K) on June 28, 2006, 

Coleman injured her back. She filed a worker’s compensation claim and received 

benefits until October 25, 2006, when her treating physicians concluded she had 

reached maximum medical improvement. Coleman then filed a petition in state 

court for additional benefits. In connection with this petition, Coleman stated she 

had never had any serious prior lower-back problems. CSS received a portion of 

Coleman’s medical records, however, which revealed that she had previously 

complained of, and sought treatment for, lower-back pain on numerous occasions. 

Based on this inconsistency, CSS referred Coleman’s case to the Florida 

Department of Financial Services (DFS). DFS investigated and concluded there 

was probable cause to believe Coleman made false, fraudulent, and misleading 

statements for the purpose of obtaining workers’ compensation benefits, in 

violation of Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 440.105(4)(b). Coleman was charged 

with theft and workers’ compensation fraud but acquitted in state court.

 1 We issued a jurisdictional question in this case and ordered Coleman to amend her complaint to 

properly plead citizenship of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1653. After review of the amended 

complaint and CSS’s response to the jurisdictional question, we conclude we have subject matter 

jurisdiction.

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Coleman then sued CSS and Circle K for malicious prosecution.2 The 

district court rendered summary judgment in favor of CSS, concluding CSS had 

probable cause to refer Coleman’s case to DFS. This is Coleman’s appeal.

“We review a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, 

viewing the record and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party.” Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1330 n.2 

(11th Cir. 2013). The movant bears the initial burden to demonstrate that there are 

no disputed material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party 

must then “show that specific facts exist that raise a genuine issue for trial.” Dietz 

v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 598 F.3d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 2010).

To prevail in a malicious prosecution action, Coleman must establish, 

among other things, “that the criminal proceeding was initiated by [CSS] without 

probable cause, i.e., without a reasonable ground of suspicion . . . that [Coleman] is 

guilty of the offense with which [s]he is charged.” Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. 

Campbell, 78 So. 3d 595, 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The district court found CSS was entitled to summary judgment because 

CSS had probable cause to refer Coleman’s case to DFS.

 2 Coleman settled her claims with Circle K and they are not a part of this appeal.

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We agree. Coleman’s statements that she had no previous lower-back 

problems were inconsistent with her medical history. Specifically, Coleman stated 

in her deposition that she had only had minor pulled muscles in her lower back 

before the June 2006 injury. On the intake form that she completed for the 

physician who treated her for the June 2006 accident, she also indicated that she 

had not had lower-back pain in the past. But Coleman’s medical records told a 

different story. She sought treatment for significant lower-back pain from Dr. 

Barry Rose beginning in 1995 and culminating with a visit on June 20, 2006, less 

than one week before her work accident.

Coleman argues it was improper for CSS to rely on Dr. Rose’s medical 

records because he later corrected them and CSS was aware of this correction prior 

to referring Coleman’s case to DFS. Dr. Rose testified, however, that his records 

were erroneous only as to one visit and that he had treated Coleman for lower-back 

pain on numerous occasions in the past. Given these inconsistencies, CSS had 

probable cause to believe that Coleman had violated Florida law by making a false 

statement in connection with her worker’s compensation claim. See Alterra, 78 

So. 3d at 595. The district court therefore did not err in rendering summary 

judgment in CSS’s favor. See id.; see also Dietz, 598 F.3d at 815.

For the above reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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