PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 

Millette, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 

PETER MARK MILAZZO 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 080178 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B.STEPHENSON, JR. 

 October 31, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 The issue in this appeal is whether the evidence was 

sufficient as a matter of law to prove that Peter Mark Milazzo 

was guilty of felony hit and run, in violation of Code § 46.2-

894. 

I 

 Milazzo was tried without a jury in the Circuit Court of 

Mecklenburg County. The court found Milazzo guilty of felony 

eluding the police, in violation of Code § 46.2-817(B); felony 

destruction of property, in violation of Code § 18.2-137(B); 

felony failing to stop at the scene of an accident, in violation 

of Code § 46.2-894; and misdemeanor reckless driving, in 

violation of Code § 46.2-852. 

 Milazzo appealed to the Court of Appeals his conviction for 

failing to stop at the scene of an accident. A judge of the 

Court of Appeals, in a per curiam order, denied the petition for 

appeal. Milazzo v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0795-07-2 (Sept. 

26, 2007). Thereafter, a three-judge panel of the Court of 
Appeals also denied the appeal. Milazzo v. Commonwealth, Record 

No. 0795-07-2 (Dec. 20, 2007). We awarded Milazzo this appeal. 

II 

 The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. On 

August 9, 2006, Milazzo was the operator of a motor vehicle in 

the Town of South Hill. Corporal W.S. Johnson of the town 

police department stopped Milazzo for speeding. When Corporal 

Johnson advised Milazzo why he was stopped, Milazzo became 

belligerent, put his car in gear, and sped away. 

 Corporal Johnson pursued Milazzo’s car through several 

streets of the town. During this pursuit, Milazzo exceeded the 

posted speed limit and ignored several stop signs and red 

traffic lights. He also crossed a double solid line to pass 

several cars. Eventually, Milazzo drove onto Interstate 85 

where South Hill Police Officer Mike Waters joined in the 

pursuit. When Corporal Johnson endeavored to pass Milazzo’s 

car, Milazzo swerved his car toward Johnson. Milazzo drove his 

vehicle onto an exit ramp where he lost control of his car 

temporarily. The car spun around and came to a stop. 

 Corporal Johnson placed his police car behind Milazzo’s 

car, and Officer Waters placed his car in front of Milazzo’s 

car. Milazzo first drove forward and “rammed” Officer Waters’ 

car. He then backed up, striking Corporal Johnson’s vehicle, 

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and again drove forward, striking Officer Waters’ car a second 

time. 

 When Milazzo was unable to drive away from the scene, he 

exited his car, jumped over a guardrail, and fled on foot into a 

wooded area. The police apprehended him later that night. 

III 

 Code § 46.2-894 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

 The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident 

. . . in which an attended vehicle . . . is damaged 

shall immediately stop as close to the scene of the 

accident as possible . . . and report his name, 

address, driver's license number, and vehicle 

registration number forthwith to the State Police or 

local law-enforcement agency . . . or to the driver or 

some other occupant of the vehicle collided with. 

In denying Milazzo's petition for appeal, the Court of Appeals 

noted in its per curiam order that "[t]he purpose of Code 

§ 46.2-894 'is to prevent motorists involved in accidents from 

evading civil or criminal liability by leaving the scene of an 

accident and to require drivers involved in an accident to 

provide identification information and render assistance to 

injured parties.' " Milazzo, slip op. at 2 (quoting Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 109, 115, 379 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1989) 

(decided under former Code § 46.1-176)). The Court of Appeals 

also noted that the word "accident" is defined, in part, as 

" 'an unfortunate event.' " Id. (quoting Smith, 8 Va. App. at 

114, 379 S.E.2d at 377 (quoting Webster's Seventh New Collegiate 

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Dictionary 5 (1963))). The Court of Appeals determined that the 

trial court could conclude, from the evidence presented, that 

Milazzo had been involved in an "unfortunate event" and, 

pursuant to Code § 46.2-894, had the duty to remain at the scene 

and provide information. 

IV 

 On appeal, Milazzo contends, as he did in the Court of 

Appeals, that his conduct was intentional and that, therefore, 

he was not involved in an "accident." The Commonwealth contends 

that the term "accident," as used in a so-called hit-and-run 

statute, is not limited to unintentional incidents. The 

Commonwealth relies, in part, upon State v. Smyth, 397 A.2d 497 

(R.I. 1979). 

 In Smyth, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered the 

meaning of the word "accident," as used in a statute that 

requires a driver involved in a highway accident resulting in 

personal injury to render aid to injured persons, to provide 

certain information to the other parties to the accident, and to 

notify the police. Id. at 499. The defendant had been charged 

with, and convicted of, leaving the scene of an accident in 

which personal injury had occurred, and he contended that the 

collision, because it was intentional, was not an accident 

within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 498. In affirming 

the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island 

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stated that the purpose of the statute is to protect injured 

persons and to assure the fair assessment of financial 

responsibility. Id. at 499. The Court further stated that the 

statute "is unconcerned with the cause of the accident—whether 

it be by act of God, by negligent conduct, by willful or wanton 

conduct, or by intentional act." Id. The Court explained its 

rationale as follows: 

 We do not believe that the statute's reporting 

requirements should depend on the mental state of the 

actor involved in a vehicular collision. From the 

viewpoint of the perpetrator of an intentional act, 

the act is surely not an accident within the more 

common definition of the term. But from the 

perspective of the injured victim, the primary 

beneficiary of the statute, he or she has been 

involved in an accident and needs the same protections 

afforded other highway casualties. Therefore, we 

believe that the Legislature intended the term 

"accident" to include all automobile highway 

collisions—intentional as well as unintentional—where 

personal injury occurs. 

Id. (footnotes omitted). 

V 

 In the present case, we agree with the Commonwealth and the 

reasoning of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Smyth. The 

purpose of Code § 46.2-894 is to protect persons injured as the 

result of, and to ensure the assessment of liability arising out 

of, an unfortunate vehicular event. The statute's primary 

beneficiary is the injured victim, and it makes no difference 

whether the collision was intentional or unintentional. 

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Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Milazzo was 

guilty of felony hit and run, in violation of Code § 46.2-894. 

VI 

 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

Affirmed.