[Cite as Scott v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-2796.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Aaron Scott, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 14AP-98 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2011-11157)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

Joseph N. Williams, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 14AP-105 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2012-01554)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

Jameel Haamid, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 14AP-106 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2011-11432)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 
Nos. 14AP-98, 14AP-105, 14AP-106, 14AP-107, 14AP-108, 2 

14AP-109, 14AP-110, 14AP-111, 14AP-112, and 14AP-113 

John W. Forester, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 14AP-107 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2011-12056)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

Frank E. Tyson, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 14AP-108 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2011-13249)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

Anthony Moody, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 14AP-109 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2011-11173)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 
Nos. 14AP-98, 14AP-105, 14AP-106, 14AP-107, 14AP-108, 3 

14AP-109, 14AP-110, 14AP-111, 14AP-112, and 14AP-113 

Michael Evans, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 14AP-110 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2012-02089) 

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

Lavance Turnage, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 14AP-111 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2011-13061)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

Larry Solomon, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 14AP-112 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2011-11165)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 
Nos. 14AP-98, 14AP-105, 14AP-106, 14AP-107, 14AP-108, 4 

14AP-109, 14AP-110, 14AP-111, 14AP-112, and 14AP-113 

Thomas Stallings, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 14AP-113 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2011-12137)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on June 26, 2014 

 

Swope and Swope – Attorneys at Law, and Richard F. 

Swope, for appellants. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Christopher L. Bagi, and 

Randall Knutti, for appellee. 

 

APPEALS from the Court of Claims of Ohio 

SADLER, P.J. 

{¶ 1} In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs-appellants, Aaron Scott, Joseph N. 

Williams, Jameel Haamid, John W. Forester, Frank E. Tyson, Anthony Moody, Michael 

Evans, Lavance Turnage, Larry Solomon, and Thomas Stallings, appeal from the 

judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio rendered on January 8, 2014 pursuant to a 

remand ordered by this court in Scott v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 

12AP-755, 2013-Ohio-4383. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

I. BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} As explained by this court in Scott: 

The ten individual plaintiffs-appellants are all inmates at the 

Mansfield Correctional Institution ("MCI") who allege that 
Nos. 14AP-98, 14AP-105, 14AP-106, 14AP-107, 14AP-108, 5 

14AP-109, 14AP-110, 14AP-111, 14AP-112, and 14AP-113 

their confidential medical records were negligently released to 

the general prison population. Their separately-filed 

complaints state claims for invasion of privacy through 

wrongful dissemination of medical information. They also 

generally claim a violation of the right to privacy under other, 

unspecified, state and federal law. 

The Court of Claims granted summary judgment for [plaintiffappellee, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 

("ODRC")] on the basis that the nonspecific invasion-ofprivacy claims were constitutional in nature and could not be 

considered by the Court of Claims. With respect to the claims 

for wrongful dissemination of medical information, the court 

addressed this as a common-law claim for the tort of 

unauthorized disclosure of privileged medical information. 

The court found that the circumstances under which plaintiffs' 

medical information was disclosed did not meet the elements 

set forth in Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 86 Ohio St.3d 395 

(1999), for this tort. As an alternative ground for ruling in 

favor of ODRC, the court held that ODRC was entitled to the 

defense of discretionary immunity for the actions and inaction 

of MCI staff that resulted in the disclosure of medical 

information. 

Id. at ¶ 2-3. 

{¶ 3} On appeal, appellants asserted six assignments of error. In addressing said 

assignments of error, this court agreed that ODRC was entitled to summary judgment on 

appellants' common-law claims for the tort of unauthorized disclosure of privileged 

medical information. Id. at ¶ 25, 29. Additionally, this court agreed that appellants' nonparticularized claims for invasion of privacy under unspecified state or federal laws 

constituted general constitutional claims over which the Court of Claims would not have 

jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 21. However, because the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction over 

said claims, the Scott court concluded that the Court of Claims should have dismissed 

those claims without prejudice instead of granting summary judgment thereon. 

Accordingly, this court sustained appellants' second assignment of error and sustained in 

part and overruled in part appellants' first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of 

error. In accordance therewith, this court stated "[t]he judgments of the Court of Claims 

of Ohio granting summary judgment in favor of ODRC on plaintiffs' claims for 
Nos. 14AP-98, 14AP-105, 14AP-106, 14AP-107, 14AP-108, 6 

14AP-109, 14AP-110, 14AP-111, 14AP-112, and 14AP-113 

unauthorized disclosure of medical information are affirmed. The court of claims' grant 

of summary judgment on plaintiffs' remaining claims is reversed, and the matter 

remanded to modify its judgments to reflect a dismissal of these claims for lack of 

jurisdiction." Id. at ¶ 32. 

{¶ 4} Scott was rendered on October 3, 2013. Thereafter, on January 8, 2014, the 

trial court modified its previous August 1, 2012 judgment entry in accordance with Scott's 

instruction and stated "judgment is rendered in favor of defendant on plaintiffs' claims for 

unauthorized disclosure of medical information, and plaintiffs' remaining claims are 

DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Emphasis sic.) 

(Entry, 6.) 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶ 5} Appellants filed an appeal from the January 8, 2014 judgment entries and 

assert three assignments of error for our review: 

[I.] The trial court lacked jurisdiction since the case is still on 

appeal subject to a ruling on a timely motion for 

reconsideration. 

[II.] The trial court erred in granting a motion for summary 

judgment. 

[III.] In light of this court's ruling, sustaining the first, third, 

fourth and fifth assignments of error, the common law 

invasion of privacy, contract, defamation and statutory 

prohibition of disclosure survive, and the trial court's ruling is 

erroneous. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. First Assignment of Error 

{¶ 6} In their first assignment of error, appellants assert the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to render the January 8, 2014 judgment because, at that time, appellants' 

application for reconsideration remained pending in this court. Though a remand order 

gives a trial court jurisdiction to carry out the directive of the court of appeals, it is 

appellants' position that a timely application for reconsideration stays execution of an 

appellate court judgment and divests the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with a 
Nos. 14AP-98, 14AP-105, 14AP-106, 14AP-107, 14AP-108, 7 

14AP-109, 14AP-110, 14AP-111, 14AP-112, and 14AP-113 

remand until the application for reconsideration is decided. Appellants do not cite any 

authority in support of their position. Instead, appellants direct this court to the Supreme 

Court of Ohio's Rules of Practice, which provide in relevant part: 

(a) When a party timely files an application for 

reconsideration in the court of appeals pursuant to App.R. 

26(A)(1), the time for filing a notice of appeal from the court 

of appeals' entry of judgment shall be tolled. 

(b) If a timely application for reconsideration is filed in the 

court of appeals, and the appellant seeks to appeal from the 

court of appeals' entry of judgment, the appellant shall file a 

notice of appeal within forty-five days of the court of appeals' 

decision denying the application for reconsideration, or if 

reconsideration is granted, from the subsequent entry of 

judgment. 

S.Ct.Pract.R. 7.01(A)(5). 

{¶ 7} While this rule tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal in the Supreme 

Court of Ohio, notably absent from the rule is any language indicating that a judgment of 

the court of appeals is automatically stayed by a party's act of filing an application for 

reconsideration. Additionally, our research has revealed two sister appellate courts that 

have addressed and rejected arguments comparable to appellants'. In State v. Pippen, 4th 

Dist. No. 12CA3526, 2013-Ohio-2239, the defendant appealed from the sentence imposed 

upon a remand for re-resentencing. The defendant argued the trial court had no 

jurisdiction to re-sentence him because his application for reconsideration was still 

pending in the appellate court. The Fourth District Court of Appeals found "no express 

prohibition against the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction in re-sentencing Appellant, 

pursuant to [its] remand order, despite the fact that an application for reconsideration 

had been filed and was still pending at the time of the re-sentencing hearing." Id. at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 8} Similarly, in State v. Moore, 7th Dist. No. 13 MA 60, 2014-Ohio-2525, the 

defendant appealed from a judgment of the trial court rendered after a sexual offender 

classification hearing held pursuant to a remand ordered by the court of appeals. The 

defendant argued the trial court had no authority to proceed with the classification 

hearing while his application for reconsideration remained pending in the appellate court. 
Nos. 14AP-98, 14AP-105, 14AP-106, 14AP-107, 14AP-108, 8 

14AP-109, 14AP-110, 14AP-111, 14AP-112, and 14AP-113 

The Seventh District Court of Appeals noted that, while an application for reconsideration 

extends the time to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, "from a procedural 

standpoint[,] it does little else on its own." Id. at ¶ 10. After noting that the defendant 

failed to seek and obtain a stay of the appellate court's judgment pending its resolution of 

the defendant's application for reconsideration, the Moore court concluded the trial court 

properly proceeded with the classification hearing. 

{¶ 9} In the case before us, appellants have appealed from a judgment of the 

Court of Claims of Ohio issued pursuant to this court's remand instructing that court to 

modify its judgment to reflect the dismissal of certain claims for lack of jurisdiction. 

Though filing an application for reconsideration with this court, appellants did not seek 

and obtain a stay of this court's judgment and now contend the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to act until the reconsideration application was decided. However, like the 

appellants in Pippen and Moore, appellants have not cited any authority to support their 

proposition that an application for reconsideration automatically stays an appellate 

court's judgment, and we decline appellants' invitation to read S.Ct.Pract.R. 7.01 in a 

manner that would suggest the same. For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellants' 

first assignment of error. 

B. Second and Third Assignments of Error 

{¶ 10} Because they are interrelated, appellants' second and third assignments of 

error will be addressed together. In their second assignment of error, appellants argue 

the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of ODRC and assert "[i]t is 

clear the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissed only the newly created unauthorized 

disclosure of medical records, leaving all other common law and statutory claims alive 

and well." (Appellants' Brief, 12.) In their third assignment of error, appellants contend 

their claims for invasion of privacy, contract, defamation, and statutory prohibition of 

disclosure survive, and the trial court's ruling is erroneous. 

{¶ 11} We find these arguments quite peculiar given that this court clearly 

determined (1) that summary judgment in favor of ODRC on appellants' claims for 

unauthorized disclosure of medical information was proper and (2) that appellants' 

remaining claims should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In accordance with 
Nos. 14AP-98, 14AP-105, 14AP-106, 14AP-107, 14AP-108, 9 

14AP-109, 14AP-110, 14AP-111, 14AP-112, and 14AP-113 

said determinations, this court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the 

matter with instructions for the trial court to modify its judgment to reflect a dismissal 

without prejudice of certain claims. 

{¶ 12} Though appellants disagree with the trial court's disposition of their claims 

and this court's treatment of their claims on appeal, when this matter was remanded to 

the trial court with instructions, no viable causes of action remained, and the trial court 

was required to proceed in accordance with the remand issued by this court. Cugini & 

Capoccia Builders, Inc. v. Ciminello's, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-210, 2006-Ohio-5787, 

¶ 32, citing Blackwell v. Internatl. Union, U.A.W., 21 Ohio App.3d 110, 112 (8th 

Dist.1984) (when an appellate court remands a case for a limited purpose, the trial court 

must accept all issues previously adjudicated as finally settled); Orrville Prods., Inc. v. 

MPI, Inc., 8th Dist. No. 65184 (June 9, 1994) ("On remand, a trial court must obey the 

mandate of the court of appeals[,] * * * [t]he order of remand restores the trial court with 

jurisdiction to carry out the directive of the court of appeals."). A trial court is without 

authority to extend or vary the mandate given by the appellate court. State v. Harper, 

10th Dist. No. 06AP-733, 2007-Ohio-2590, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 13} Upon review, we conclude the trial court properly modified its judgment in 

accordance with the remand and instructions issued by this court in Scott. Accordingly, 

we overrule appellants' second and third assignments of error. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 14} Having overruled appellants' three assignments of error, we hereby affirm 

the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio. 

Judgment affirmed.

TYACK and O'GRADY, JJ., concur. 

_____________________________