Constitutionality of Regulations Requiring Prepublication

Clearance of Books by Former Iranian Hostages

Under the Supreme C ourt’s holding in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), the 

broad prepublication clearance requirements in regulations of the International Communications Agency (ICA) would be held unenforceable through judicial process in a 

wide variety of applications, notably insofar as they apply to previously disclosed 

information or to the expression of personal opinions by persons who do not regularly 

have access to classified information.

The Supreme Court is not likely to uphold a prior restraint on publication by ICA 

employees in the absence of some powerful showing that substantial and specific harm 

to the United States would probably result if the publication were permitted. The 

expression of personal opinion not based on classified information would not satisfy this 

test.

While the issue is not free from doubt, a strong argument can be made that disciplinary 

action against an employee based on the need for a foreign policy free from internal 

dissension in the Foreign Service would not be constitutionally impermissible, particularly if the employee maintained responsibilities at a highly visible level. However, the 

courts might find discipline involving discharge appropriate only if the statements 

ultimately made severely and irreparably impaired an individual’s ability to perform 

some services as an employee.

June 11, 1981

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

This responds to your request for the views of this Office on the 

constitutionality of certain regulations of the International Communications Agency (ICA) 1 as applied to former Iranian hostages who, as you 

have informed us, are planning to write books or articles that may be 

inconsistent with national policy or otherwise injurious to the foreign 

policy of the United States. For the reasons that follow, we believe that 

the preclearance requirements of your regulations are probably unenforceable by injunction except to the extent that you seek to prevent 

publication of classified or sensitive, nonpublic factual information, and 

are thus able to make a persuasive showing that serious harm to the 

United States would be likely to result from publication. Despite the 

breadth of the regulations, however, a lesser showing would be sufficient under the Constitution to justify post-publication discipline such

1 The regulations also apply to employees of the Department of State and the Agency for International Development.

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as suspension or discharge if the regulations are violated, but the ICA 

may not discharge an employee for exercise of First Amendment rights 

unless it is able to establish that the speech at issue has jeopardized the 

effective performance of the Foreign Service or of the employee’s 

duties.

I. Background

Several officers of the ICA were among the American Embassy staff 

that was seized in Iran on November 4, 1979. Those officers were 

responsible for carrying out the Agency’s duties as press and cultural 

affairs officials. At least two of the officers 2 have written articles and 

are currently writing books on the subject. You have informed us that 

you anticipate that the officers will submit their books or articles to the 

ICA for clearance in advance of publication. You expect that some of 

the books may contain comments on current policies of the government 

that the ICA would prefer not to have published by a Foreign Service 

officer on active duty.3 The question presented is whether the ICA may

2 The specific duties of the officers in question are discussed infra.

3 A draft of one of this officer’s articles, for example, contains the following statements:

[The officer’s wife stated:] . . Terrorism has the American public all worked up. So 

now terrorism is suddenly a Soviet tool. All the terrorists around the world are being 

aided and egged on by the Soviets. T hat’s the new theory. The leftists in El Salvador 

therefore have to be defeated because they, like all terrorists, are the tools of the 

Soviets. Vested American interests once again con the American public and the U.S. 

government into protecting and promoting their private interests. Client State El 

Salvador Incorporated is safe for business and monkey business .... What’s the 

matter? You look perplexed.”

[The officer answered:] “I’m just surprised by the El Salvador thing. I’ve been cut off 

from the news. But what you say seems to fit with what 1 want to say in the book 

about U.S. foreign policy. O nly I thought I’d have to use Cuba* Nicaragua, Taiwan, 

Korea, the Philippines and o f course Iran. [. . .]

“W e’ve paid lip service to the ideals set forth in our Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, 

but our foreign policy has not only been aggressive, it has been selectively aggressive, 

manipulated by vested interests to promote profits for small groups. It hasn't been in 

the interests of the general public, of America, especially in recent years .... [I 

want] a foreign policy that is so tough-minded and practical that it can’t be manipulated by vested interests, bankers, manufacturers, farmers, import-export firms . . . [or] 

our own venturesome military ....

“T he American public gets conned into seeing fights in countries like Korea, Vietnam, 

Iran and now El Salvador as contests between the good guys and the bad guys. [. . .]

“The driving force of U S. foreign policy has for years been anti-communism, which in

itself is probably not in the real interests o f the U.S............ We make anti-communism

into a religious war. We’re emotional and irrational in our opposition to communism. 

The vested interests are sm art enough to play on our obsessive fear. They engineer 

client states which are profitable to them but most of the profits come from American 

tax money. The genera) public pays South Korea is a great example. They can lobby 

us with our money. . . T he vested-interest lobbies have an easy time of it. They play 

on America’s obsessive fear of communism and the American need to be loved and 

admired by foreigners. W e like our foreigners fawning and serving. We like client 

states

“W hat’s wrong with U.S. foreign policy now? It’s based on mindless, emotional 

opposition to communism. . . We should . . . never back any authoritarian regime 

anywhere. Not in Iran or K orea or El Salvador.”

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lawfully order deletions or modifications in the text of such books and 

discipline the officers should they fail to comply with such orders.

Under ICA regulations, employees must obtain clearance of all writing of “official concern,” broadly defined to include materials “which 

may reasonably be interpreted as relating to the current responsibilities, 

programs, or operations of any employee’s agency or to current U.S. 

foreign policies, or which reasonably may be expected to affect the 

foreign relations of the United States.” Uniform State/AID/USIA Regulations, 3 Foreign Affairs Manual 626.2. The purpose of the regulation 

is “to substitute the agency’s institutional judgment for the employee’s 

judgment when the question involved concerns either the release or 

accuracy of information concerning his agency’s responsibilities or 

what conclusions should be drawn from such information.” Clearance 

will be granted only if “all classified material and all material of official 

concern . . . which is inaccurate, inconsistent with current foreign 

policy, or can reasonably be expected to affect adversely U.S. foreign 

relations, has been deleted . . . .” Matters not on a subject of “official 

concern” need not be cleared.

II. Discussion

The starting point for analysis of this subject is the decision of the 

Supreme Court in Snepp v.. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). In that 

case Snepp, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA), had published a book about certain CIA activities in South 

Vietnam without submitting the manuscript to the CIA for 

preclearance. He did so in spite of his written pledge not to divulge 

without prior authorization any classified material or any information 

“concerning intelligence or [the] CIA” that had not been made public. 

The district court and court of appeals found that Snepp’s breach of his 

agreement had irreparably harmed the government. The Supreme 

Court agreed with the court of appeals that Snepp’s agreement was an 

“entirely appropriate exercise of the CIA Director’s statutory mandate 

to ‘protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.’ ” Id. at 509, n.3 (citation omitted). The Court added:

[T]his Court’s cases make clear that—even in the absence 

of an express agreement—the CIA could have acted to 

protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other 

contexts might be protected by the First Amendment.

The Government has a compelling interest in protecting 

both the secrecy of information important to our national 

security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential 

to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service. The agreement that Snepp signed is a reasonable 

means for protecting this vital interest.

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Id. (citations omitted). In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 

Brennan and Marshall, acknowledged that the CIA “has a vital interest 

in protecting certain types of information,” but added that “the CIA 

employee has a countervailing interest in . . . protecting his First 

Amendment rights.” Id. at 520. Accordingly, “[t]he public interest lies 

in a proper accommodation that will preserve the intelligence mission 

of the Agency while not abridging the free flow of unclassified information.” Id. In a supporting footnote, Justice Stevens agreed that the 

government may regulate certain categories of activities by its own 

employees that would in other contexts be protected by the First 

Amendment, but suggested that “none of the cases . . . cite[d] involved 

a requirement that an employee submit all proposed public statements 

for prerelease censorship or approval. The Court has not previously 

considered the enforceability of this kind of prior restraint or the 

remedy that should be imposed in the event of a breach.” Id. at 520-21, 

n.10.

After Snepp, the ICA regulations at issue raise three separate questions: (1) whether the preclearance requirement itself is enforceable 

through injunction; (2) whether, if clearance is denied, the ICA may, 

through judicial process, prevent publication if the employee refuses to 

comply with the denial; and (3) whether, if clearance is denied, the 

ICA may discipline or discharge an employee for publishing or disclosing the material in question.

A. Enforceability of preclearance requirement through injunction. You 

have informed us that the officers in question will voluntarily submit 

their publications to the ICA for preclearance. As a result, it appears 

that the officers will not contend that the preclearance requirement is 

unenforceable through injunction either on its face or as applied. Since, 

however, the regulations may well come under attack in any litigation 

on the general subject, we briefly examine the relevant constitutional 

issues by way of background.

In Snepp, the Court upheld the written agreement even though it 

covered all non-public information bearing on “intelligence” or the 

“CIA.” 4 Moreover, it stated that even in the absence of an express 

agreement, the CIA could have acted to prevent dissemination of 

information the disclosure of which would be protected by the First 

Amendment if it were not carried out by government employees. The 

Court justified its conclusion on the ground that there was a substantial 

governmental interest in preserving both the appearance and the reality

4 The Secretary of State, m conjunction with the Director, is authorized to promulgate the 

regulations in question here under the Foreign Service act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, 94 Stat. 2071. 

Under that Act, the Secretary o f State “may prescribe such regulations as [he] deems appropriate to 

carry out functions under this [Act].” 22 U.S.C. §3926 (Supp. IV 1980) In light of the clear necessity 

for confidentiality by those who represent the United States in the sensitive area of international 

relations, we believe that a requirement of preclearance is within this broad grant of rulemaking 

authority.

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of confidentiality with respect to non-public information coming into 

the hands of CIA officials.

The regulations at issue here are broader and more stringent than the 

restrictions contained in the agreement involved in Snepp. The regulations here are not limited to particular employees having access to 

sensitive information. They cover any writings—including those merely 

expressing personal opinions based on facts in the public domain—that 

relate to the activities of the employee’s agency or to current United 

States foreign policies. This exceptionally broad prohibition would, we 

believe, be unenforceable through judicial process in a number of its 

applications. For example, we are aware of no authority to support the 

conclusion that the many clerical workers of the Department of State 

or the ICA could be required to preclear any publications that express 

views that relate to United States foreign policies, but that contain no 

information that is either classified or classifiable and that is in the 

public domain. The reasoning of both Snepp and United States v. 

Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), 

suggests that such a requirement would be impermissible.

The Snepp case involved the potential for the disclosure of nonpublic information, the revelation of which could have resulted in 

irreparable harm to the United States. Any preclearance requirement 

that is designed to prohibit disclosure of public information or the 

expression of personal opinion by persons who do not regularly have 

access to classified or classifiable information, as did Snepp, raises more 

difficult questions under the First Amendment, for the compelling government interests involved in Snepp are largely absent in such circumstances. Such a requirement may be justified, if at all, by the potential 

harm that may occur if some preclearance mechanism is not applied to 

the expression of personal opinions, at least by a high-level employee of 

an agency responsible for the conduct of the foreign relations of the 

United States.

We are able to identify several such potential harms, falling in four 

general categories. First, the employee could be rendered less credible 

as a diplomat if he published writings inconsistent with United States 

policy. Second, the operation of the Foreign Service could be jeopardized if conflicting views were expressed by different officials, for highlevel officials might be unable to dissociate their personal and professional capacities, and foreign countries might thus be uncertain of the 

actual position of the United States. Third, American foreign policy 

could be undermined if disputes about that policy among high-level 

government officials were made public. Finally, the employee’s superiors might lose confidence that an employee who has sharply criticized 

current policy will faithfully represent the United States or accurately 

state its positions on related and other issues.

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In the context of an effort to obtain some form of prior restraint, 

these types of injury are likely to be considered less damaging to the 

United States than those created by the disclosure of non-public and 

sensitive information bearing on national defense and intelligence activities. In essence, the damage consists of the embarrassment caused to the 

United States by dissent among high-level officials. As we discuss in 

more detail infra, we believe that the courts would allow the Executive 

to undertake disciplinary action in order to sanction or deter such 

dissent. There is, however, no authority for the conclusion that the 

courts would uphold a prior restraint to prevent the expression of 

personal views when those views do not purport to contain any classified or sensitive information. Snepp stands for the proposition that 

preclearance may be supportable as a means of ensuring against disclosure of classified or sensitive information; it does not justify the use of 

such a mechanism, enforceable through an injunction issued by a court, 

in order to suppress the expression of personal opinion.

We thus conclude that the preclearance requirement would be enforced by an injunction only in order to prevent the disclosure of 

information of the sort involved in Snepp. The consequence of this 

conclusion is that the preclearance requirement is unenforceable 

through injunction in a wide variety of applications.5 Whether the 

number of impermissible applications is so great as to amount to “substantial overbreadth,” see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), 

is difficult to assess in the abstract. We believe, however, that the 

possibility that the preclearance requirement would be held unenforceable by injunction on its face may not be regarded as remote.6

B. Restraints in advance o f publication. The next question is whether 

the ICA may lawfully require the former hostages to delete material 

appearing in proposed writings. We interpret this question to mean 

whether the ICA may seek a court order imposing prepublication 

restraints in the event that its employees refuse to comply with the 

ICA’s decision not to clear certain material.

We note, first, that the exceptionally heavy burden ordinarily imposed on the government to justify a prior restraint, see New York

Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), will probably not be

s For this reason, we recommend that the applicability of the preclearance requirement be narrowed 

to conform to the standards suggested in Snepp and this memorandum. The preclearance requirement 

should be applicable only to employees who have access to and whose writings might contain 

sensitive or classified information, and to those w ho are subject to discipline under Pickering v. Board

o f Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), for statements critical of current policy. With respect to the former, 

a prior restraint and disciplinary remedies would generally be available m an appropriate case; with 

respect to the latter, only post-publication remedies would be permissible. C f n.9, infra. If so 

narrowed, it could be made clear that the purpose of the preclearance requirement is to prevent 

disclosure of classified or sensitive information, and that disciplinary action would be taken only for 

such disclosures or for criticism by employees not protected by Pickering. Otherwise, the preclearance 

requirement should be used as a voluntary measure to guard against improprieties.

6 We do not suggest, however, that the preclearance mechanism may not be used as a voluntary 

procedure to be used by employees, in order to ensure against improper-action on their part and as the 

basis for disciplinary action against them by their employer. See infra.

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applied with full force to a prior restraint imposed by the government 

on disclosure of information by a government employee. See Snepp v. 

United States, supra. The Snepp case did not, however, involve total 

suppression of information, but only preclearance and imposition of a 

constructive trust after the information had been disclosed. In light of 

the strong and consistent constitutional hostility to prior restraints, see

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), we do not believe that the 

Court would uphold the imposition of a prior restraint on an employee’s speech in the absence of some powerful showing that substantial 

harm would result if the speech were permitted.7 The only court that 

has addressed this issue reached a similar conclusion, stating that while 

the preclearance agreement was itself enforceable, a court should “decline enforcement of the secrecy oath . . . to the extent that it purports 

to prevent disclosure of unclassified information, for, to that extent, the 

oath would be in contravention of his First Amendment rights.” United

States v. Marchetti, supra, at 1317. According to the Marchetti court, 

even a former agent of the CIA “retains the right to speak and write 

about the CIA and its operations, and to criticize it as any other citizen 

may, but he may not disclose classified information obtained by him 

during the course of his employment which is not already in the public 

domain.” Id. See also Snepp v. United States, supra, 444 U.S. at 511.

This analysis suggests that the ICA may enjoin publication by its 

employees only if there is a probability that substantial harm to the 

United States would be produced by the disclosure.8 Mere speculation 

will probably be insufficient. See New York Times v. United States,

supra. Nor do we believe that a court would enjoin publication solely 

on the basis of the harm that would be produced by criticism of United 

States policy by a Foreign Service employee, at least if that criticism is 

based on or contains only facts within the public domain and facts 

which are neither classified nor classifiable. The courts have held that 

the harm produced by the expression of mere opinion is far less consti7 In the Snepp case itself, all three courts found that the publication had irreparably harmed the 

United States.

aWe note in addition that ICA employees are protected from reprisal for disclosing certain kinds of 

information. Under the Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-465, the Secretary of State is required 

to prescribe regulations to ensure that members of the Service, 

are free from reprisal for—

(A) a disclosure of information by a member or applicant which the member or 

applicant reasonably believes evidences—

(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or

(li) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial 

and specific danger to public health or safety, 

if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not 

specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national 

defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.

22 U.S.C. § 3905(b)(2). We are aware of no statutory provision or executive order that would bar 

disclosure of the information at issue here. On the other hand, the provisions afford no protection 

against the pure expression of views, as distinct from the disclosure of information. Furthermore, we 

are not aware of any information which is threatened to be disclosed in the instant case which is 

protected by 22 U.S.C. § 3905(bX2).

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tutionally significant than that produced by disclosure of non-public 

information of the sort involved in Marchetti and Snepp and that there 

are very strong considerations in favor of allowing the broadest possible dissemination of opinion, cf. Pickering v. Board o f Education, supra;

Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). To support such a prior restraint— 

as distinct from subsequent punishment—a more substantial threat to 

United States interests must be shown. See United States v. Marchetti,

supra, at 1317. The expression of purely personal opinion not based on 

any closely held information or classified information would not satisfy 

this test. Id. Accordingly, we believe that the ICA may impose a prepublication restraint only in order to prevent or ensure against disclosure of classified or similar information.9

C. Discipline. The Supreme Court has indicated that the government 

may discharge or discipline employees for speech that would be protected by the First Amendment if made by a private citizen. In the 

leading case of Pickering v. Board o f Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the 

Court held that a Board of Education could not discharge a teacher for 

submitting to the local newspaper a letter attacking the school board’s 

handling of certain bond issue proposals and its subsequent allocation of 

financial resources between the schools’ educational and athletic programs. At the same time, the Court emphasized “that the State has 

interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that 

differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation 

of the speech of the citizenry in general,” and that “the problem is to 

arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in 

commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 

State, as an employer in promoting the efficacy of the public services it 

performs through its employees.” Id. at 565.

On the facts of Pickering, the Court observed that the teacher’s 

statements were not “directed toward any person with whom appellant 

would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a 

teacher.” Thus no question of maintaining either:

discipline . . . or harmony among coworkers is presented

here. Appellant’s employment relationships with the

Board and, to a somewhat lesser extent, with the superin9 It is not certain that an injunction would issue even in such cases. The regulations state that 

preclearance will be refused for speech simply because it is “inconsistent with current foreign policy.” 

The regulations thus have a number of impermissible applications and might be held substantially 

overbroad and therefore unenforceable even in a proceeding brought to prevent disclosure of classified 

information. T o prevent this possibility, the regulations should be narrowed in this regard as well, to 

provide that clearance will not in all cases be denied merely because the statements are inconsistent 

with United States policy. Clearance should be denied only when (1) sensitive or classified information 

would be disclosed, and (2)—for purposes of warning that discipline may result, but not seeking a 

judicially imposed prior restraint w hen Pickering v. Board o f Education, supra, discussed infra, does not 

protect the relevant employee from such discipline. Cf. n.S supra.

If the regulations are overbroad, a court might grant an injunction on the basis of the common law 

power to enjoin the disclosure of secrets by an employee. C f Snepp v. United States, supra. This is an 

untested remedy, however, and its availability cannot be assumed with any confidence.

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tendent are not the kind of close working relationships for 

which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty 

and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning.

Id. at 570. In a footnote, the Court added that it “is possible to 

conceive of some positions in public employment in which the need for 

confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public statements might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal.” Id. at 570 n.3. 

Finally, the Court noted that since “the fact of employment is only 

tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the 

public communication,” it would be proper “to regard the teacher as 

[a] member of the general public.” Id. at 574.

Following Pickering, the courts have examined a number of factors to 

determine whether a public employee may be discharged for exercising 

his right to freedom of speech. Those factors include: (1) whether the 

speech was directed toward a person with whom the employee would 

ordinarily be in contact during his daily work; (2) whether the speech 

might threaten harmony among coworkers; (3) whether the speech 

would damage the professional reputation of its target; (4) whether the 

speech reflected a difference of opinion on an issue of public concern, 

or whether it involved an essentially private matter; (5) whether the 

employment was substantially involved in the subject-matter of the 

speech, or whether the employee spoke as a member of the general 

public; (6) whether, because of the high level at which employee 

operates and because of his decisionmaking authority, restrictions on 

free expression are necessary; and (7) whether the nature of the particular occupation involved requires special limits on freedom of expression. Cf. Cooper v. Johnson, 590 F.2d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1979).

In the context of proposed publications by former hostages, some of 

these factors point toward the same conclusion reached by the Court in 

Pickering. The proposed publications will apparently relate to issues of 

public concern. Moreover, the disclosures will presumably not be directed toward a person with whom the employees have daily contact. 

As a result, there would appear to be little danger that the speech will 

reflect adversely on a person under whom the employees must work in 

a direct ongoing relationship. Further, the employees will presumably 

be criticizing decisions that are made by officials operating at a considerably higher level. Finally, it appears that the former hostages would 

be expressing their views as members of the public, and not as officials 

of the United States. This latter factor would not clearly support a First 

Amendment claim, however, for, simply by virtue of their positions, 

the continuing employment of the former hostages might be “substantially involved” in the expression of views. Moreover, their views are 

presumably noteworthy (and marketable) only because of their employment-related experience. Further, these employees are in the Foreign 

Service. Presumably, any statement by a foreign policy official highly

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critical of the United States and its foreign policy may be very damaging to the United States and its efforts to promote its foreign policy. 

Therefore, the nature of their occupation makes their statements more 

newsworthy, embarrassing, and damaging to their employer.

Although the issue is not entirely free from doubt, we believe that a 

strong argument can be made that, as a general rule, disciplinary action 

based on the need for a foreign policy free from internal dissension 

within the Foreign Service would not be constitutionally impermissible. 

There is a clear necessity for a consistent position bn issues of policy by 

all those representing the United States at a high level in the sensitive 

area of international relations. Both the appearance and the reality of 

consistency are critical in the area of foreign relations, and any criticism of United States policy by an officer in a high-level position in the 

Foreign Service threatens that goal. As indicated above, the result of 

such criticism could be to render the employee less credible as a 

diplomat, to harm the functioning of the Foreign Service by sending 

conflicting signals from different Foreign Service officials, and to 

impair the foreign relations of the United States by revealing disputes 

among high-level officials.

The strength of this argument will vary according to the level and 

nature of the duties of the particular officer. Plainly, the First Amendment rights of a Cabinet-level employee do not immunize him from 

discharge by the President for the expression of views that are contrary 

to those of the Administration. By contrast, an employee performing 

clerical or other nonpolicymaking functions would generally be entitled 

to greater constitutional protection against discharge for expressing 

personal views on matters of foreign relations. The more highly placed 

the official, the more destructive the statement; the lower the official, 

the more the statements appear to be personal views. Cf. Branti v. 

Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (government may not discharge 

nonpolicymaking assistant public defender because of political party to 

which he belongs); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (same with 

respect to employees of county sheriff).

One of the officials under consideration here is a Foreign Service 

Information Officer who acted as the Public Affairs Officer at the 

United States Embassy in Iran.10 In the course of his diplomatic duties,

10His position description includes the following

Is responsible for the over-all administration of a total USIS country program and for 

the maintenance of effective working relationships with the Diplomatic Mission and 

other United States government agencies. This involves the planning, conduct and 

continuing evaluation of a coordinated program of information and cultural activities 

designed to reach selected audience groups throughout the country for the purpose of 

(a) explaining and interpreting United States objectives and policies and winning 

support therefor by identifying the country's legitimate aspirations with those of the 

United States; (b) projecting those aspects of American life and culture which will 

promote -an understanding of our country, our people, our way of life and what we 

stand for; and (c) countenng false and hostile anti-United States propaganda. . . . In

Continued

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he performed functions as spokesman for the Embassy in matters involving all aspects of diplomacy, explaining and interpreting United 

States objectives, winning support for United States policies, and countering false propaganda. He represented the United States in communications with the Iranian press, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry 

of Education. His immediate superior was the Deputy Chief of Mission, 

who operates directly under the Ambassador. Among his functions was 

the preparation of a country-wide plan on an annual basis for approval 

by the Department of State.

The second official is a Foreign Service Reserve officer." In Iran he 

worked under the first official as a subordinate press official. His responsibilities included communications with the press and the Iranian 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a wide range of subjects, including 

statements of United States policy. Although his contacts with the 

Iranian government and press were less frequent and on a lower level 

than those of the first official, such contacts were an ordinary part of 

his responsibilities at the Embassy.

We cannot, of course, express a definitive view as to the extent to 

which these individuals could be disciplined for expressing views critical of the United States without knowing facts and circumstances 

which we do not have at our disposal. It is, however, apparent that

accordance with United States policy and in consultation with the other members of 

the Country Team, develops the Country Plan which translates the Agency’s global 

mission into definite objectives appropriate to political, psychological, economic and » 

cultural conditions in the country, and which outlines a USIS program of action 

leading to the achievement of these objectives . . Insures the fulfillment of USIS 

responsibilities for (a) the conduct of the educational and cultural exchange programs 

administered for the Department of State; (b) participation in such other United States 

government and private exchange programs as are conducted in the country; (c) 

assisting private local organizations in a position to contribute to the achievement of 

USIS objectives, such as Bi-National Centers, United States Chambers of Commerce, 

United States-host country societies; and (d) publicizing in accordance with Mission 

policy the Agency for International Development program . . . Advises and assists on 

Mission press and public relations, including the preparation of official announcements, 

statements and public addresses . . . Provides for establishing and maintaining effective working relationships with (a) appropriate officials in the national government; (b) 

leaders in the mass media, educational , industrial, labor, professional and technical 

fields, (c) appropriate representatives of Diplomatic Missions of friendly foreign countries; and (d) representatives of other United States government agencies. . Represents USIS and, as required, represents the Ambassador at important information, 

cultural or other functions, and in meeting and assisting distinguished visitors from the 

United States and other countries

11 His position description includes the following

Officer directs a Branch of the Program Division which has one other American * 

Officer (Publications Officer) and 30 other staff members . . . As Chief of one of four 

branches of the Program Division, Officer is responsible for the application of all post 

media capabilities to the support of post programs. . . . [C]arries out publicity activities 

on behalf of the Iran America Society as coordinated by the Chief, Program Division. 

Officer is responsible for all other post print and broadcast medial placement activities. 

(Ojbtains, prepares, publishes and distributes a variety of materials supportive of speakers, panels, seminars, exhibits and other programs designed to achieve post objectives.

The Branch is responsible for all press and broadcast publicity in support under 

the supervision of the Country Public Affairs Officer In order to accomplish this 

responsibility, officer is expected to have working knowledge of Iranian media and to 

establish solid contacts with media professionals.

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these individuals maintained responsibilities at highly visible levels. 

Statements highly critical of United States foreign policy could be 

severely damaging to that foreign policy and to the ability of these 

individuals to represent the United States in any similar capacities. 

Because of the high level of their employment, we believe that the ICA 

could refuse to return these employees to their prior capacities and 

could impose disciplinary sanctions to guard against the publication in 

the future of statements which are highly critical of and damaging to 

United States foreign policy.

Of course, discharge is the most severe form of discipline.12 If the 

statements ultimately made do not severely and irreparably impair the 

abilities of these individuals to perform some services as employees, the 

courts might find that discipline short of termination is more appropriate. Since this is largely a subjective decision based upon the proven 

facts as to the employee’s conduct and its compatibility with past and 

future service, it will serve no purpose to speculate further as to the 

permissible discipline under a variety of potential circumstances. We do 

believe, however, that discharge may well be permissible if the employee in question cannot be retained in his present position without 

maintaining a high-visibility or policymaking rule.

III. CoQclmsDon

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the preclearance 

requirements of the ICA regulations would probably not serve to support injunctive relief against the disclosure of personal opinions and 

previously disclosed facts. Injunctive relief could be obtained, if at all, 

only on the basis of a persuasive showing that serious and specific harm 

to the United States would result if disclosure were permitted. Thus, 

injunctive relief might be available to guard against potential disclosure 

of classified or closely held information.

Finally, we believe that, if the relevant employees make policy or 

otherwise perform significant functions as representatives of the United 

States, they may be disciplined for disclosing information that is not in 

the public domain, or for expressing views that are plainly inconsistent 

with the foreign policy of the United States.13 Whether they can be

12 By statute, members of the Service may be separated from the Service “for such cause as will 

promote the efficiency of the Service.” 22 U.S.C. §4010. This provision, which afTords a right to a 

hearing, is designed to “continue! ] the Secretary’s authority . . . to separate any member of the 

Service for cause." See S. Rep. No. 913, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1980). We note that the “efficiency 

of the Service” standard has been upheld against an overbreadth challenge on the ground that 

Congress did not intend to allow discharge for speech protected by the Constitution. See Arnett v. 

Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). We believe that the ICA regulations, to the extent that enforcement is 

taken through disciplinary action, would probably be similarly treated, and thus narrowly construed so 

as not to violate the First Amendment. T o avoid a contrary judicial conclusion, however, the 

regulations should be narrowed. See nn. 5 & 9, supra.

13 O f .course, we express no views on the policy implications of undertaking disciplinary action 

against a former hostage.

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discharged depends on the specific nature of the duties that they are 

currently performing and the extent to which the public statements may 

affect their ability to perform those duties.

T h e o d o r e B. O lson

Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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