TI

CRI argues that the collection letter, taken as a whole, accurately states the amount allegedly
due, and thus does not does not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692p(a)(1). For the reasons that follow, we
disagree, While we do not express an opinion as to whether Mr. Ingram will be able to prove his
claim, we do find that Mr. Ingram’s allegations in Count {1 concerning CRI's compliance with
Section 1692g(a)(1) state a claim for relief

Tobe surc, CRIs collection letler states an “amount” — but, the letter docs not expressly state
as of what date that amount was due. Moreover, the letter states that the “balance (a different word
than the word “amount” used in the letter ta describe the $1,622.43 figure) includes the principal
amount due and may include interest and all late charges or other penalties, if applicable under the
default provisions of your contract with the creditor’- without squarcly saying whether the “balanceTM
or the “$1,622.43 amount” in fact included those charges.

In Miller vy. McCalla Ravmer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872 (7"
Cir, 2000), the Seventh Circuit held that a collection letter that specified the amount of the unpaid
principal balance, without stating how that amount was altered by unpaid interest, unpaid late
charges, escrow advances or other charges, failed to comply with the FDCPA. In so holding, the
Seventh Circuil recognized that it “might be impossible for the defendants to . . . determine what the
amount of the debt might be at some future dale if, for example, the interest rate in the loan
agreement was variable,” 214 F.3d at 875. The Court of Appeals therefore created a “safe harbor”
formula for complying with Section 1692g(a)( 1):

we hold that the following statement satisfies the debt collector’s duty to state the amount

of the debt in cases like this where the amount varies from day to day: “as of the date of this
letter, youowe$ [the exact amount due]. Because of interest, late charges, and



the absence of such a requirement in subsection (a)(3) is strong evidence ... that Congress advertently
omitted an analogous requirement in subscetion (a)(3).” 950 F.2d at 112. However, the court
rejected that argument:

Adopting [that] reading of the statute would thus create a situation in which,

upon the debtor’s non-written dispute, the debt collector would be without

any statutory ground for assuming that the debt was valid, but nevertheless

would not be required to verify the debt or advise the debtor of the identity

of the original creditor and would be permitted to continue debt collection

efforts. We sec no reason (o attribute to Congress an intent to create so

incoherent a system.
950 F.2d at 112. The appeals court further noted that requiring the dispute ofa debt to he in writing
would not contravene the congressional purpose underlying Section 1692g, Rather, the Court
recommended that implying the writing requirement in Section 1692g(a)(3) would serve the same
purpose as requiring the consumer to request in writing verification of the debt and the identity of
the original creditor: “a writing creates a lasting record of the fact that the debt has been disputed,
and thus avoids a source of potential conflicts.” Jd. Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that

“subsection (a)(3), like subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5), contemplates that any dispute, to be effective,

must be in writing.” /d."

‘Plaintiff hus cited the First Circuit decision in Brady v. Creditor Recavery Company, 160 F.3d 64 (1st Cir
1998), as ant appeals court decision that parts company with the Third Circuit's analysis in Graziano, We disayree. ‘The
question presented to the First Circuit in Brady was whether a debt collector would violate 15 U.S. C.§ 1692e(8), which
states that the failure of a debt collector to disclose the disputed status of a debt constitutes “false, discepuve, oF
misleading representation,” if the debt collector failed to disclase a dispute that was not made by Lhe consumer in wriling.
‘The Kirst Circuit held that, since Section 1692e(8) does not slate chat a debt collector is required to disclose u disputed
debt only if the dispute is reduced to writing, a wriling requirement should not be implied. The First Cireait did not
discuss Section 16929(a)(3)-(5), much less rule on whether subsection (a)(3) should be read to include a requirement
that disputes be made in writing.

The Brady court did state that “the fact that other sections of the FOCPA like Section 16929(b) explicitly
impose a wriling requirement suggests thal Congress's omission of such a requirement in Section 1692e(8) was nol
inadvertent.” 160 F.3d at 66-67, However, the cout also noted that the different purposes of Section 1692g(b) and
Section 1692e(8) underscored why Congress would impose a writing requirement in the former but not in the lauier
section. The First Circuit explained that Section 1692g(b) deals with the ability of the consumer to trigger the debt

9



which sent the consumer a collection letter that complied with the safe harbor formulation, except
that it stated the amount duc as of some dale other than the date of the collection letter), Taylor v.
Calvary Investments, LLC, 210 1, Supp, 2d 1001, 1003 (N.D TN. 2002) (granted judgment on the
pleadings for a debt collector which sent a collection letter stating the total balance duc, including
the amounts attributable to principal, interest and other charges, and further stated that the balance
“may be periodically increased due to the addition of accrued interest or other charges as provided
in your agrcement with the creditor”).

Unlike the letters in Joly and Taylor, CRI’s collection letter here did not notify Mr, Ingram
that the specific amount stated in the letter could be adjusted due to the future accrual of interest, late
charges or penalties; and, unlike the letter in Joldy, it did not provide a specific statement as to the
effective date of the stated amount duc. While CRI might attempt to link the date of the letter, June
5, 2002, and the stated amount of $1,622.43, the letter does not specifically say this, and the Court
is unpersuaded that it can make a determination as a matter of law that this is the only reasonable
inference that unsophisticated readers could draw from a review of the letter. “The debt collector
may not defeat the [FDCPA’s ] purpose by making the required disclosures in a form or within a
context in which they are unlikely to be understood by the unsophisticated debtors who are the
particular objects of the [FDCPA’s] solicitude.” Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 l.3d, 497, §000 (7" Cir, 1997);
see also Walker v. National Recovery, Inc., 200 F.3d 500, 501 (7° Cir. 1999) (noting that “district
judges are not good proxies for the ‘unsophisticated consumers’ whose interests the statute

protects”),

For these reasons, the Court denies CRI’s motion to dismiss Count TT insofar as it asserts a

claim based on the failure to disclose the amount of the debt as required by Section 1692g(a)(1).

6



other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be

greater. Hence, if you pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after

we receive your check, in which event we will inform you before depositing the check for
collection. For further information, write the undersigned or call 1-800-[phone number|.”
214 F.3d 876; see ulso Veuch v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 693 (7" Cir. 2003).

CRIs collection letter does not comply with this “safe harbor” formula established by the
Seventh Circuit for cases “where the amount varies from day to day.” The CRI collection letter
does not expressly stale that the amount of $1,622.43 was due as of the date of the Teter, June 5,
2002, as opposed to some other date. CRI’s collection letter did not contain language informing Mr.
Ingram that the $1,622.43 amount may increase by the time he chose to pay (if in fact he did choose
to pay) the alleged debt, or that if he paid the stated amount, CRI might inform him that greatcr
payment was a requirement, Thus, CRI is not entitled to dismissal of this claim based on the safe
harbor formula provided in Miller.

However, Miller made clear that the “safe harbor” language was just thal: a sale harbor, and
not a statutory requirement. “Of course, we do not hold that a debt collector mvst use this form of
words to avoid violating the statute; but if he does, and (to repeat an essential qualification) does not
add other words that confuse the message, he will as a matter of law have discharged his duty (o state
clearly the amount duc.” Miller, 214 F.3d at 876 (emphasis in original). And, courts within this
district have found that various ways of stating the amount of the debt have satisfied Section
1692p(a)(1), even though not precisely tracking the safe harbor language of Miller, See Jolly v.

Shapiro, 237 Supp. 2d 888, 889, 891-93 (granted summary judgment in favor of a debt collector

*Drawing all rcusonable inferences from the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, as we must on a motion to
dismiss, we treat this case as one, like Miller, where the amount allegedly due from the consumer would vary from
duy to day by virtue of interest, lute charges and/or penaltics

5



the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or
any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of
the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original
creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of
the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.

15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3)-(5) and (b) (emphasis added).

Section 16929(a)(3) does not expressly state that a debt, or any portion of it, will be assumed
valid unless the consumer disputes it fm writing. On the other hand, subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5)
both specifically require the debt collector to inform the consumer that the debt collector will obtain
verification of the debt and provide it lo the consumer, and will provide the consumer with the name
and address of the original debtor, if the consumer so requests in writing. Section 1692g(b) further
states that (he debt collector will halt any collection efforts ifthe consumer provides written notice
within the 30-day period described in subsection (a) that the debt or any portion of it is disputed, or
that the name of the original creditor is being sought, The statutory construction question presented
here is whether Congress's failure to state in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) that challenges to the validity
of a debt are to be in writing was purposeful, or was instead an inadvertent slip of the dralter’s pen
that should be corrected by implying a writing requirement in subsection (a)(3), so as to harmonize
(hat subsection with the express writing requirements in subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5).

The Seventh Circuit has not addressed this question, but the only appeals court to do so has
held that the writing requirement is implied in subsection (a)(3). In Graziano v, Harrison, 950 F.2d
107 (3d Cir. 1991), the Third Circuit held that telling a consumer that any dispute of the alleged debt
must be in writing did not render the statutory notice invalid. In reaching that conclusion, the
appeals court considered the interplay between subsections (a)(3), (4) and (5). The court considered

the argument that “[s]ince subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) expressly call for written communications.



Manure Orday Barns (06297)

United States District Court, Northern District of Dlinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Sidney L. Schenkicr

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER

02 C 6608

DATE

5/2/2003

CASE Terrence N. Ingram vs. Corporate Receivables, Inc., et al.
TITLE
[tn the following box (a) indicawe the party filing the motion, ¢.45, plaintiff, detindant, 3rd party plaintitt, and (b) state brielly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

ql) | Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) im Brief in support of motion duc
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. » Reply to answer brief due.
(4) Oo Ruling/Ifearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing|held/continued to} (set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) O Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for’re-set for] on _ Set for _ at _
(7) 0 Trial{set for/re-set for} on al
(8) ao [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9} ia ‘This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CFRCP4(n) CLocalRuledt.l OFrrerdi(ad) O PROPS! (a2).
co) = [Other docket entry} ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Corporate
Receivables, Inc.’s motion to dismiss [doc.# 18] is GRANTED in part (as it pertains to the “writing
requirement” claim), and DENIED in part (as it pertains to the “amount of debt” claim).
(il) of [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
equired, advised in open court, Document
. Number

No notices required. umber ot novices
VY | Notices mailed by judge's stall. MAY 0 5 2608

Notilied counsel by Wlephone. hse doehete

Docketing to mail notices. Cn A,

Mail AO 430 form. poo Brien dovkcing dey infin

Copy to judge/magistrate judas . :

sn
deputy's vk
initials
Ss Datestime seegived in
conteal Clerk's Olfise tvnting caput



of strict adherence to the statutory language yields when “the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions ofits draflers.” Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc,
489 U.S. at 243 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)), In such
cases, “the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.” Ron Pair Enterprises,
Inc., 489 U.S, at 243. See generally Roell v, Withrow, 538 U.S.___, 2003 WL 1960602, *4 (2003).
Here, we are faced with a situation in which a literal application of subsection (a)(3) would
tend Lo undermine the purposes underlying the validation process contemplated by Section 1692z{a)
and (b). Notices that strictly comply with the language of subsection (a)(3) could cause consumers
(whom the law presumes to be “unsophisticatcd”) to advise debt collectors of disputes about alleged
debts only orally, and thus to forego the important rights (hey have under subsections (a)(4), (a)(5)
and (b) if— but only if'— the dispute is made in writing. That would have the untoward effect of
depriving the unsophisticated consumers, “who are the particular objects of the |FDCPA’s}
solicitude,” Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 500, of important rights that Congress sought to confer on them.
Thus, by implying a writing requircment in subsection (a)(3), the Court is not implementing a policy
preference contrary to congressional intent, but rather is interpreting the statute to avoid an
“incoherent result,” Graziano, 950 F.2d at 113-114, aresult that we believe Congress did not intend
linally, we have considered plainui {Is citation to Wiitlen v. ARS, National Services, Ine., No,
00 C 6080, 2002 WL 1050320 (N.D. IIL, May 23, 2002) (Pl’s Mem. at 12-13), but find that decision
inapposite. In Whitten, the court did not consider whether subsection (a)(3) should be construed to
contain a requirement thal disputes be set forth in writing. Rather, the court considered whether a
collection letter, which told the consumer that “suitable dispute documentation” must be submitted,

violated the FDCPA. /d. at *4, ‘The court reasoned that a collection Ictter telling the consumer that

I



The Court finds the reasoning of the Graziane opinion to be persuasive. Morcover, anumber
of courts within the Seventh Circuit have held that a writing is required to effectively dispute a debt.
See Jolly v. Shapiro, 237 F.Supp.2d 888, 889 (N.D. lil. 2002); Castillo v. Carter, No. 99-1767, 2001
WL 238121, at ¥3 (S.D.Ind., eb, 28, 2001); Blair v. Collectech Svstems, Inc., No, 97-7930, 1998
WL. 214705, at #2 (N.D. Til, April 24, 1998); Flowers v. Accelerated Bureau of Collections, Inc.,
No.96-4003, 1997 WL 136313 at *6 (N.D. IIL, 1997); Sturdevant v. Jolas, 942 F.Supp. 426, 430
(W._D. Wis. 1996), Indeed, in Flowers, the court held that a collection letter that told aconsumer that
she could dispute the validity of a debt by telephone, rather than in writing, “contradicts the
validation notice.” Flowers, 1997 WL 136313, at *7.

We have considered the contrary authorities ciled by the plaintiff from district courts in other
circuits (P1.’s Mem. at 10-12), which take the view that a writing requirement should not be implied
for subsection (a)(3). Plaintiff argues that those cases should be followed because they employ the
means of statutory construction required by the Seventh Circuit an approach that plaintiff clainis
is contrary to the one used by the Third Cireuit in Graziano (P1.’s Mem. at 13-14), We recognize
that the Seventh Circuit has counseled that “our charge is lo interpret statutes as they are written, and
not to revise them by reading into them policies we deem advisable,” United States Department of

the Navy v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 975 F.2d 348, 356 (7" Cir. 1992). However, this rule

validation process, which requires a debt collector to cease all further debt collection activity until it complies wilh
various verification obligations. The court said that when granting consumers “the ultimate power vis-a-vis debt
collectors: the power lo demand the cessation of all collection activities,” itrmade sense for Congress lo require that this
“ultimate power” be triggered by a request in writing. 160 f.3dat67, By contrast, the First Circuit reasoned that Section
1692e(8) does not affect debi collection practices at all, but only requires a debt collector “who knows or should know
that a piven debt is disputed to disclose its disputed stams to persons inquiring about a consumer's credit history.” Ad.
The First Circuit explained that “[g]iven the much more limited effect of this provision, Congress” decision not to
condition its exercise on the submission of written notilication makes logical sense.” fd. In the Court’s view. this
reasoning supports, rather than undermines, the implication ofa writing requirement in Section 1692y(a)(3). which like
Section 1692y(b) and unlike Section 1692e(8) - is part of the validation process.

10



Iv.

Plaintiffs remaining allegation against CRI concerns a statement in the June 5, 2002 Ictter
that “unless you notily this office, in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice that you
dispute the validity of the debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid”
(Compl. Ex. G (emphasis in original)). Mr. Ingram contends that this sentence violates Section
1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA, by stating that any dispute must be in writing when that subsection docs
not expressly impose a writing requirement (Compl. {| 32). This claim raises the Icgal question of
whether Section 1692g(a)(3) contemplates that a dispute concerning the validily of the debt is to be
submitted in writing, which we may decide on this motion to dismiss

‘Vo answer this question of statutory construction, we begin “where all such inquirics must
begin: with the language of the statute itself” U/aited States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 US.
235, 241 (1989), In relevant part, Section 1692g reads as follows:

(a) within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in
conncetion with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the
following information is contained in the initial communication or the
consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing -

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days alter reccipt of the
notice, dispules the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will
be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within
the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt
collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against
the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to
the consumer by the debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day
period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and
address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

(b) If the consumer notifies (he debt collector iv writing within the thirty-day
period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion
thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of



THE ABOVE ACCOUNT HAS BEEN PLACED WITH TIS OFFICE FOR
COLLECTION. THE BALANCE INCLUDES THE PRINCIPAT. AMOUNT DLE
AND MAY INCLUDE INTEREST AND ALL LATE CHARGES OR OTHER
PENALTIES, Ii) APPLICABLE, UNDER THE DEL'AULT PROVISIONS OF
YOUR CONTRACT WITH THE CREDITOR. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSULT
THE DEFAULT PROVISIONS OF YOUR CONTRACT TO CONIIRM THESE
ADDITIONAL CHARGES, Il’ ANY.

(Compl, Ex. G). And, the body of the letter also contained the following statement (again, in all
capital letters) concerning the alleged debt:
UNLESS YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE IN WRITING, WITHIN THIRTY DAYS
AFTER RECEIVING THIS NOTICE THAT YOU DISPUTL THE VALIDITY OF
THE DLBYT OR ANY PORTION THEREOF, THIS OFFICE WILL ASSUME THIS
DEBT IS VALID. IF YOU NOTIFY TLUS OFFICE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS
FROM RECEIVING THIS NOVICE THIS OFFICE WILL: OBTAIN
VERIFICATION OF THE DEBT OR OBTAIN A COPY OF AJUDGEMENT AND
MAIL YOU A COPY OF SUCH JUDGEMENT OR VERIFICATION, IF YOU
REQUEST THIS OFFICE WITHIN TILIRTY DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THIS
NOVICE, THIS OFFICE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH THE NAME AND
ADDRESS OF THLE ORIGINAL CREDITOR, Lf DIFFERENT FROM THLE
CURRENT CREDITOR.
(Compl., Ex, G).
Mr. Ingram’s claims against CRI arisc out of the foregoing statements in the collection letter.
Mr. Ingram alleges that CRI’s collection letter violates 15 U.S.C, § 1692g(a)(1), because il failed to
clearly describe the amount Mr. Ingram allegedly owed (Compl. ff] 30,31). Mr. Ingram also claims
that CRI’s collection leiter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3), because il told Mr. Ingram that, unless
he notified CRI ia writing that he disputed the validity of the debt, CRI would assume the debt was

valid (Compl. 4 32). CRI argues that neither of these claims states a cause of action, We address

cach of CRI’s arguments in the order that CRI presents them



Count | (Compl. {ff 30-31), but grants the motion to dismiss the “writing requirement” claim in

Count I (Compl. * 32),

The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide
the merits of the lawsuil. Triad Assocs. v. Chicago Housing Auth,, 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7" Cir, 1990),
For purposes of reviewing the motion, we must take all the plaintif?'s well-pled allegations as true,
Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7" Cir. 1992). The court must also view the plaintiff's

heuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974);

allegations in the light most favorable to the plainti

the plaintiff is entitled lo all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therelrom. Elisworth v, Racine,

774 F.2d 182, 184 (7" Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475

S$. 1047 (1986). “The issue is not whether a
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is cntitled to offer evidence to support the
claims.” Triad Assoe., 892 F.2d al 586. The allegations of the complaint, which we take as true lor
purposes of ruling on this motion, are as follows.

IL.

Mr, Ingram alleges that CRI is engaged in the business of a collection agency and is a debt
collector as defined in the FDCPA (Compl. ff] 4-5). Mr. Ingram alleges that, on or about June 5,
2002, CRI mailed him a collection letter, which sought to collect an amount allegedly incurred by
Mr. Ingram in connection with improvements made to his home (Compl. 12). The upper left hand
portion of the collection letter bore the date June 5, 2002. The tear-away portion of the letter
designated for return with Mr, Ingram’s payment, located in the upper right hand portion of the letter.

stated the “Amount: $1622.43" (Compl, Ex. G). The body of the collection letter contained the

following statement (in capital leWers) regarding the amount of the alleged debt:

2?



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TERRENCE N. INGRAM,

Plaintiff.
vs. No, 02 C 6608

CORPORATE RECEIVABLES, INC,
and O81 COLLECTION SERVICES, INC.,

Magistrate Judge Schenkier

Vee eee Se SS SL

Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Terrance M. Ingram, brings this action pursuant to Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et. seq., against defendants OS! Collection Services, Inc.

(“OSI”), in Count 1, and Corporate Receivables, Inc. (“CRI”), in Count I. This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and IS U.S.C § 1692k(d). OSI has answered the claim

by Mr, Ingram; CRI has filed a motion to dismiss Count IT pursuant to Rule 12(1)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (doc. # 18).!

In Count H, Mr, Ingram alleges that: (i) CRI violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) when it sent

a collection letter that failed to clearly state the amount of the debt due (Compl. 4 30-31); and (ii)

CRI violated 15 U.S.C. § 16929(a)(3) when it sent Mr. Ingram a collection letter stating that CRI

would consider the alleged debt valid unless Mr. Ingram notified CRM, in writing, within 30 days of

receiving the collection letter that he disputed the debt or any portion of it (Compl. 4} 32). For the

reasons given below, the Court denies CRI’s motion to dismiss the “amount of debt” claim in

'On December 16, 2002, by the consent of the parties and pursuant to 28 1
reassigned to this Court for all proceedings: including the entry of final judgiment (doc.## 14-17)

* §G36(¢). the cuse wis



he or she had to supply “suitable dispute documentation” within the 30-day period specified in
Section 1692g(a) imposed a requirement not contemplated by the FOCPA. dd. at *4-5, The Whitren
court thus rejected the debt collector's effort lo impose a requirement that the consumer provide
written proof of the basis for the dispute about the debt; the opinion did not consider, much less
decide, the different question of whether subscction (a)(3) should be construed to require that the
consumer stale in writing the existence ofa dispute. The Jolly court found this to be a proper basis
to distinguish the Whizten decision, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 895 n. 4, and sa do we. Accordingly, the
Court grants the motion to dismiss the claim in Count IT insofar as il is based on an alleged violation
of Section 1692g(a)(3)
CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, CRI’s motion lo dismiss (doc. #18) is GRANTED in part (as

il pertains to the “writing requirement” claim), and DENIED in part (as it pertams to the “amount

of debt” claim).

ENTER:

SIDNEY I. SCHENKIER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated: May gh. 2003