LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In seeking a

grant of summary judgment the moving party must identify “those portions of ‘the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact .” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)). This initial burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on
a particular issue or by pointing out “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving,
party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant has met this burden, the
non-moving party cannot simply rest on the allegations in the pleadings, but “must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(e). A “genuine issue” in the context of a motion for summary judgment is not

simply a “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co..

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); rather, “[a] genuine issue exists

when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the non-movant,”

Buscaglia v. United States, 25 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1994). When reviewing the

record we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant; however,

-4-


involves one of suicide, the first element of the test is satisfied. Next, regarding
deliberate indifference, liability can be established if a prison official knows of and
disregards a serious risk to an inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
However, no liability will attach if the official responded reasonably to the risk, even
if the underlying harm was not averted. Id. at 844. The plaintiff is required to show
more than mere or gross negligence, but less than purposeful infliction of harm, on the
part of the prison official. Matos, 335 F.3d at 557.

Here, the facts do not support the conclusion that the Defendants acted with
deliberate indifference toward Mr. Collins’ health and safety, but rather acted
reasonably under the circumstances. Specifically, the record before us establishes that
approximately 28 minutes elapsed between the time Mr. Collins told Shuck that he
needed to see a crisis counselor and that he was “feeling suicidal,” and when Bucalo
found him hanging. The record further establishes that during that time: (1) Shuck
told Officer Forsyth, the control officer, that Mr. Collins had called for a crisis
counselor; (2) Officer Forsyth contacted Seeman, the Shift Commander, to alert her to
the situation; (3) Seeman ordered Officer Forsyth to contact the crisis counselor,
Beethem, to let her know that Mr. Collins needed to see her; (4) Seeman told the
officers to keep an eye on Mr. Collins pending arrival of the crisis team member; and

(5) Shuck returned to Mr. Collins’ cell and informed him that a crisis counselor had

-7-


At approximately 5:30 p.m., Bucalo returned from dinner and met with Seeman,
Shuck, and Officer Forsyth. Seeman told Bucalo to keep an eye on Mr. Collins until
the crisis counselor arrived. Bucalo conducted a hall check at 5:32 p.m. and returned
at approximately 5:50 p.m. to conduct another check. It was during this second check
that inmates in the C-7 upper gallery began telling Bucalo to check on Mr. Collins.
When he arrived at the cell door, Bucalo saw Mr. Collins hanging from a bed sheet
wrapped around a ceiling pipe. Bucalo then called a “code 3” medical emergency. .

Meanwhile, Beethem had just finished returning the inmates in the gymnasium
line to their cells. At approximately 6:50 p.m., she was in Sheridan’s Health Care Unit
reviewing Mr. Collins’ medical file in preparation for her meeting with Mr. Collins
when she heard the “code 3” medical emergency call. Mr. Collins died of his self-
induced injury.

Plaintiff Denise Collins (“Ms. Collins”) is Mr. Collins’ mother. After his death,
she filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to a known risk of suicide, in violation of Mr. Collins’ Eighth Amendment
rights, The Defendants now move for summary judgment that their actions did not

amount to deliberate indifference to a known serious risk of suicide.


“we are not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record — only those

inferences that are reasonable.” Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236

(7th Cir. 1991). With these principles in mind, we turn to the present motion.
DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, we must first address the sufficiency of Ms. Collins’
Rule 56.1(a)(3)(B) and Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) statements. The Defendants in their reply
argue her statements are not in compliance with the applicable local rules. We agree.

Pursuant to U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Ill, R. 56.1, when a party files a motion for
summary judgment, the moving party must prepare a statement of material facts. The
opposing party then submits a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of
any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references
to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon. All
material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed
to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party. A denial is
deemed improper if the denial is not accompanied by specific references to admissible
evidence or at least evidence that represents admissible evidence. Koszola v. Bd. of

Edue., 385 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (7th Cir. 2004); see Dent v. Bestfoods, 2003 WL

22025008, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Tl. 2003); see also Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 585

(N.D. Il. 2000). In order to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a

5.


been called and that the crisis team member would be there as soon as she was able to
which Mr. Collins responded that he would be alright until she arrived; (6) Bucalo
conducted the first of two hall checks; and (7) Beethem was in the process of reviewing
Mr. Collins’ medical file in order to prepare for her meeting with him. These activities
collectively indicate a reasonable response on the part of the Defendants to the
situation. Accordingly, we find no issues of material fact that require fact finding by
ajury and therefore judgment can be entered as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

is granted.
Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
United States District Court
(JAN 1.1 2005
Dated:


Minute Order Form (06/97)

oO

ONY United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge Charles P. Kocoras Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 4493 DATE 1/11/2005
CASE Collins vs. Capt. Seeman et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qi) im} Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) qa Brief in support of motion due

@) o Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for___—_att

(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor at

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___——ssetfor__——sat_
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for]on_ at

(8) a (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

DOFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a\(2).

(do) «ot (Other docket entry} ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: Defendants’ motion (Doc 49-1) for

summary judgment is granted. This is a final order.

ail) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. number of notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

JAN 1 1 2005

date dockered

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.
1B

7 | Mail AO 450 form. penny panes

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

\ poe hg dps e
\ rtroom a

SCT deputy's
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office

nating deputy initials



plaintiff must be able to point to some evidence that would be admissible at trial which
a reasonable jury could rely upon in finding for the non-movant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The Defendants are correct in their assertion that Ms. Collins’ statements and
responses to the Defendants’ statements are insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact under the local rules, Ms. Collins fails to cite to any material which could
be used as evidence at trial to refute the facts as stated in the Defendants’ Rule 56.1
(a)(3)(B) statement. The remainder of the Defendants’ statements are either admitted
ornotcontested. Thus, the Defendants’ statements of fact are deemed admitted in their
entirety.

Moving forward to the substantive issues, Ms. Collins has failed to demonstrate
that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of suicide. In order
to successfully state a cause of action under § 1983, she must establish two elements:
(1) that the harm to Mr. Collins was objectively sufficiently serious, and a substantial
risk to his health and safety; and (2) that the individual Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to Mr. Collins’ health and safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

832 (1994); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-06 (1976).

First, courts have held that suicide is clearly an objectively serious risk of harm

Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 2003). As the present situation

-6-


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DENISE COLLINS, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of RICKY COLLINS, deceased,

Plaintiff,

vs.

02 C 4493

CAPT. SEEMAN; SGT. BEETHEM; CORRECTIONAL
OFCR. STEVEN SCHUCK; CORRECTIONAL OFCR. SAM
BUCALO; and any other correctional officers, presently
unknown, responsible for RICK Y COLLINS’ supervision and
care, jointly and severally,

I ee ee

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

The present matter comes before the court on the motion of the Defendants,
Deborah Seeman, Sam Bucalo, Steven Shuck, and Julie Beethem (referred to
collectively as “the Defendants”), for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is
granted.

BACKGROUND
Ricky Collins (“Mr. Collins”) was an inmate at the Illinois Department of

Corrections at Sheridan Correctional Center (“Sheridan”). Mr. Collins had been moved

53


into Building C-7 at Sheridan, a segregation unit, and was placed in cell 65 on the
upper gallery of the institution. Shortly before 7 p.m. on September 27, 2001, Mr.
Collins committed suicide in his cell.

On the day in question, Bucalo was assigned to Sheridan’s C-7 upper gallery,
and Shuck was assigned to Sheridan’s C-7 lower gallery. When Bucalo left for his
dinner break, Shuck covered for him, per Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)
procedure, thus taking over supervision duties of both C-7 upper and lower galleries
for approximately one half hour. While Bucalo was at dinner, Mr. Collins told Shuck
that he needed to see a crisis counselor and that he was “feeling suicidal.” Shuck told
Officer Forsyth, the control officer, that Mr. Collins had called for a crisis counselor.
Officer Forsyth then contacted Seeman, the Shift Commander, to alert her to the
situation. Seeman, in turn, ordered Officer Forsyth to contact Beethem (the Sheridan
crisis counselor on duty that evening between 3 p.m. and 11 p.m. and the individual
assigned to run cafeteria lines and to bring inmates to and from their gymnasium and
yard activities) to let her know that Mr. Collins needed to see a crisis counselor.
Seeman also told the officers to keep an eye on Mr. Collins pending arrival of the crisis
team member. Shuck then returned to Mr. Collins’ cell and informed him that a crisis
counselor had been called and that the crisis team member would be there as soon as

she was able. Mr. Collins responded that he would be alright until she arrived.

2.