RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2023

TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2022-SC-0038-MR

DAVID A. KIMMEL APPELLANT 

V. 

ON APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JOHN F. VINCENT, JUDGE

NO. 20-CR-00134

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

AND

2022-SC-0061-MR

DAVID A. KIMMEL APPELLANT 

V. 

ON APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JOHN F. VINCENT, JUDGE

NO. 21-CR-00141

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE BISIG

AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING

In March 2020, Appellant David A. Kimmel shoplifted from Walmart in 

Boyd County, Kentucky. He was charged and subsequently released on bond 

pending trial. Six months later, Kimmel shoplifted from Rural King. Prior to 

these 2020 shoplifting incidents, each store gave Kimmel notice prohibiting 
2

him from being on the premises. Kimmel agreed to have all charges tried at 

once and, after a jury trial, the trial court sentenced Kimmel to forty years in 

prison consistent with the jury’s recommendation. Kimmel now appeals as a 

matter of right. After review, we conclude that the forty-year sentence violates 

the aggregate cap on sentences prescribed by Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 

532.110(1)(c). For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and 

remand this case to the Boyd Circuit Court. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 12, 2020, Michael Knipp, an Asset Protection associate at 

Walmart in Boyd County, Kentucky observed Kimmel entering the store. Knipp 

was familiar with Kimmel because Kimmel had previously been caught 

shoplifting at Walmart. Because of this familiarity, Knipp called the sheriff’s 

department almost immediately after observing Kimmel in the store. Knipp 

watched Kimmel picking up two dolls, two sports bras, and a phone charger. 

He concealed the sports bras on his person and placed the other items in his 

cart. He then walked to the hardware department and placed the sports bras, 

one doll, and the phone charger inside a mailbox box.1 Kimmel resealed the 

box, walked to housewares, and concealed the other doll on his person. 

Kimmel proceeded to walk out the door without paying for the doll. 

1 In the Commonwealth’s proffered trial testimony, Kimmel’s actions were 

referred to as “box stuffing” where someone puts items inside a box and scans only the 

box to avoid paying for the items stuffed inside. On occasion, the box is left for an 

accomplice to purchase. 
3

After Kimmel returned to a vehicle, a sheriff’s deputy conducted a traffic 

stop on the van Kimmel was in. The doll was found inside the van and Kimmel 

could not produce a receipt for the merchandise. Inside the store, the mailbox 

box was photographed, showing it contained the doll, sports bras, and phone 

charger. Kimmel was ultimately charged with third-degree burglary given the 

prior notice to stay off the premises and theft by unlawful taking for shoplifting 

the doll. 

After being charged for the Walmart incident on March 19, 2020 and

subsequently released on bond, Kimmel committed another theft at the Rural 

King in Boyd County, Kentucky. On September 23, 2020, Jacob Thomas, a 

Rural King tractor manager, was walking into the store when he observed 

Kimmel pushing a shopping cart out of the store. Thomas was familiar with 

Kimmel because Kimmel stole from Rural King before and was previously given 

notice to stay off the premises. 

The shopping cart contained three boxes of ammunition. Thomas 

repeatedly asked Kimmel for a receipt, which he did not produce. Kimmel then 

lied and stated he was trying to return the ammunition. Thomas grabbed the 

cart and Kimmel picked up two of the boxes of ammunition from the cart. 

Kimmel then ran to his vehicle and left the premises. Thomas reported the 

theft and gave a statement to police. Kentucky State Police investigated the 

theft and later located Kimmel. On April 13, 2021, Kimmel was charged with 

third-degree burglary given the prior notice to stay off the premises and theft 
4

by unlawful taking for shoplifting the ammunition. He was also indicted for 

being a first-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO). 

Kimmel agreed to have all charges tried together and trial began on 

November 22, 2021. Deanna Harris, Kimmel’s girlfriend who accompanied him 

to Walmart, testified that an unknown individual had purchased the doll found 

in Kimmel’s vehicle and that they planned to return it. Harris also 

accompanied Kimmel to Rural King on September 23, 2020. Harris claimed 

she was the one pushing the shopping cart with the ammunition out of the 

store, and she was the one approached by Thomas. Harris also stated that 

Kimmel had no intention of stealing anything that day, and that Kimmel was 

unaware that she had taken the boxes of ammunition. Harris pled guilty to 

theft by unlawful taking for the two boxes of ammunition stolen from Rural 

King. 

Kimmel also testified and stated that two days prior to the Walmart 

incident, his mother purchased the doll found in his vehicle. He also stated 

that no Walmart staff approached him and told him to leave Walmart property. 

As to the Rural King incident, Kimmel advised that he entered the store with 

Harris. Kimmel testified that after a brief verbal argument, he left the store 

before Harris and Harris was the one who stole the ammunition. Kimmel did 

not recall being approached by Thomas but remembered that a store employee 

approached him while putting the ammunition in his car. On crossexamination, Kimmel admitted that he knew he was not permitted on Walmart 

or Rural King property. 
5

The jury found Kimmel guilty of two counts of third-degree burglary, two 

counts of theft by unlawful taking (under $500) and being a first-degree PFO. 

The jury initially recommended a sentence of five years on each burglary 

charge but enhanced those sentences to twenty years each after finding that 

Kimmel is a first-degree PFO. The jury also recommended that the sentences 

run consecutively, for a total sentence of forty years. The trial court followed 

the jury’s recommendation. Kimmel appeals as a matter of right. 

ANALYSIS

I. The trial court erred when it ordered Kimmel to serve a fortyyear sentence. 

In accordance with the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced 

Kimmel to five years for each burglary count, enhanced each count to twenty 

years based upon his PFO status, and then ran the sentences consecutively for 

a total sentence of forty years. Kimmel argues that the trial court erred by 

ordering him to serve a forty-year sentence. KRS 532.110(1)(c) states, in 

relevant part, that “[t]he aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not 

exceed in maximum length the longest extended term which would be 

authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime for which any of the 

sentences is imposed.” Third-degree burglary is a Class D felony. Because the 

maximum length authorized by KRS 532.080 for a Class D felony as enhanced 

by a PFO determination is twenty years, Kimmel argues that the trial court 

erred by entering an aggregate consecutive sentence doubling that amount. 

During sentencing, defense counsel argued that the maximum term of 

imprisonment for Class D felonies enhanced by the PFO statute is twenty 
6

years. Therefore, pursuant to KRS 532.110(1)(c), defense counsel requested 

that the trial court correct the illegal forty-year sentence recommended by the 

jury. The trial court inquired with the Commonwealth, and counsel for the 

Commonwealth advised the trial court that the Department of Corrections 

would automatically fix the error. The trial court agreed, classifying it as a 

computation issue, not a sentencing issue. The trial court followed the jury’s 

recommendation and ran the two twenty-year sentences consecutively for a 

total sentence of forty years and entered the final judgment. 

In McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Ky. 2010), the 

Court explained that for a PFO convicted of a Class C felony, the aggregate of 

the sentences imposed could not lawfully exceed twenty years. KRS 532.080 

provides the same sentence limitation for Class D felonies. However, albeit in a 

footnote, the Court also noted that “[t]here are several statutory exceptions to 

this general rule,” including KRS 533.060(3). McClanahan, 308 S.W.3d at 699 

n.8. 

KRS 533.060(3) states:

[w]hen a person commits an offense while awaiting trial for another 

offense, and is subsequently convicted or enters a plea of guilty to 

the offense committed while awaiting trial, the sentence imposed 

for the offense committed while awaiting trial shall not run

concurrently with confinement for the offense for which the person 

is awaiting trial.

This issue requires analysis of the interplay between KRS 532.110, KRS 

532.080 (the first-degree PFO statute), and KRS 533.060. 

The Commonwealth argues that KRS 533.060(3) controls and, as such, 

the trial court did not err in sentencing Kimmel to forty years in prison. When 
7

a person commits an offense while awaiting trial for a prior offense, KRS 

533.060(3) prohibits the imposition of a sentence for the offense committed 

while awaiting trial that runs concurrently with confinement for the offense for 

which the person was awaiting trial. The practical effect is that the trial court 

must run the sentence for the offense committed while awaiting trial 

consecutively with the confinement for the offense for which the person was 

awaiting trial. Here, applying KRS 533.060(3) in isolation would lead to a 

conclusion that the trial court correctly imposed a forty-year sentence. 

However, we must also apply KRS 532.110(1)(c), which imposes a 

maximum aggregate sentence of the longest extended term authorized by KRS 

532.080. Based on the offenses for which Kimmel was convicted, the 

maximum term of imprisonment is twenty years, in accordance with KRS 

532.080(6)(b). Notably, KRS 532.110(1)(c) states:

The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not 

exceed in maximum length the longest extended term which would 

be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime for 

which any of the sentences is imposed.

(Emphasis added.) This subsection specifically references consecutive terms. 

Therefore, KRS 533.060(3) and KRS 532.110(1)(c) can both be applied to 

Kimmel’s sentence. 

Devore v. Commonwealth, 662 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. 1984), required analysis 

of both KRS 533.060(2) and KRS 532.110(1)(c). KRS 533.060(2) states that 

when a person has been convicted of a felony and is released on parole or 

probation and is then convicted of or enters a guilty plea to a felony committed 

while on parole or probation, the period of confinement for that felony “shall 
8

not run concurrently with any other sentence.” The Devore Court concluded 

that the maximum sentence rule in KRS 532.110(1)(c) is not applicable to 

individuals that fall within KRS 533.060(2). Id. at 831. In that multi-count 

case, the trial court imposed a seventy-five-year sentence for burglary, felony 

theft, receiving stolen property, trespass, and being a PFO. Id. At 829. The 

Devore Court upheld the trial court’s decision to run that seventy-five-year 

sentence consecutively to a prior five-year sentence for a total sentence of 

eighty years. 

Later, in Peyton v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 504 (Ky. 2008), the Court 

overruled Devore to the extent that it “require[d] all subsequent sentences for 

crimes committed while on probation or parole to be run consecutively to each 

other.” Id. at 511. The Court concluded that the

subsequent felony offense(s) committed while on probation or 

parole may not be run concurrently with the sentence for which 

the individual is on probation or parole. In the instance of 

multiple-count subsequent felony offenses committed while on 

probation or parole, however, these subsequent offenses may be 

run either consecutively or concurrently, at the court's discretion.

Id. The Peyton Court was not tasked with considering the interplay between 

KRS 533.060(2) and KRS 532.110(1)(c) because the sentence of imprisonment 

in Peyton did not exceed the maximum permissible under the statute. Id. at 

510. Although the Peyton Court recognized the legislature’s intent in enacting 

KRS 533.060(2) “was to strengthen the ramifications for repeat offenders,” the 

Court believed that Devore could lead to “incongruous and excessive sentencing 

results” and “sought to interpret this legislative intent with a much heavier 
9

hand than the statute, the legislature or the jails and prisons of this 

Commonwealth could have ever envisioned.” Id. at 509-10. 

In Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 395, 396 (Ky. 2011), the 

defendant was charged in two separate indictments, and each indictment 

charged Blackburn with one count of first-degree trafficking in a controlled 

substance, a Class C felony. At the time she committed these trafficking 

offenses, Blackburn was out of prison on parole. Id. The jury initially 

recommended ten-year sentences for each conviction, and that the sentences 

run consecutively. Id. Thereafter, the jury also found Blackburn guilty of 

being a second-degree PFO and recommended a twenty-year sentence for each 

conviction. Id. The trial court ordered that the sentences run consecutively for 

a total sentence of forty years in prison. Id. 

On appeal, Blackburn argued that the forty-year sentence violated the 

statutory maximum provided by KRS 532.110(1)(c). Id. at 398. In response, 

the Commonwealth cited KRS 533.060(2), which states that if a person is 

convicted of a felony and released on probation or parole and is then convicted 

of a felony committed while on probation or parole, the person shall not be 

eligible for probation or parole “‘and the period of confinement for that 

felony shall not run concurrently with any other sentence.’” Id. (Emphasis 

added.) As such, the Commonwealth asserted that the trial court did not err in 

sentencing Blackburn in excess of the aggregate cap. Id. 

After considering Devore and Peyton, the Blackburn Court concluded that 

KRS 533.060(2) does not modify the maximum aggregate sentence allowed by 
10

KRS 532.110(1). Blackburn, 394 S.W.3d at 401. Therefore, the trial court 

incorrectly sentenced Blackburn to forty years in prison. Id. Because the 

maximum sentence authorized by KRS 532.080 for an enhanced Class D felony 

is twenty years, the Court concluded that “the aggregate of [Blackburn’s] 

consecutive sentences (for the multiple subsequent offenses) could not exceed 

that amount.” Id. “To the extent Devore states otherwise, it is overruled.” Id. 

To summarize, in Devore, 662 S.W.2d at 531, the Court concluded that 

multiple-count felony convictions resulting from offenses committed while on 

parole must run consecutively to one another. In Peyton, 253 S.W.3d at 510-

11, the Court overruled that Devore holding and reasoned that it “leads to an 

unworkable interpretation of KRS 533.060(2).” But the Peyton Court did not 

address the effect of KRS 532.110(1)(c) on the trial court’s sentencing 

discretion because the punishment in Peyton did not exceed the maximum 

aggregate cap outlined in KRS 532.110(1)(c). Later, in Blackburn, 394 S.W.3d 

at 401, the Court concluded that “KRS 533.060(2) does not modify KRS 

532.110(1) so that subsequent offenses run consecutively may exceed the 

maximum aggregate duration allowed by KRS 532.110(1)(c).” Blackburn 

overruled Devore to the extent it states otherwise. Id.

The specific holding of Blackburn applies to KRS 533.060(2), and does 

not explicitly address KRS 533.060(3), which is the subsection raised by the 

Commonwealth in its argument. However, the reasoning espoused in 

Blackburn is equally applicable here. Treating subsequent crimes under KRS 

533.060(2) and (3) differently would lead to illogical and inconsistent results. 
11

In an unpublished opinion by this Court, Holbrook v. Commonwealth, 

2012-SC-0703 and 2012-SC-0704, 2014 WL 4160137, *1 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014), 

Holbrook appealed from two final judgments entered by the Fayette Circuit 

Court following two separate trials on theft by deception charges pertaining to 

cold checks. While released on bond pending a trial in the first case, Holbrook 

committed other offenses which led to the second trial. Id. Holbrook was 

sentenced to a total of sixty years in prison—twenty years from the first case 

and forty years from the second, both of which resulted from PFO 

enhancements. Id. In the second case, the trial court sentenced Holbrook to 

ten years for each theft by deception over $10,000 count, enhanced each count 

to twenty years based on his PFO status, and ran the sentences consecutively 

for a total of forty years. Id. at *15. The appeals from each trial were 

consolidated, and Holbrook argued, among other things, that his consecutive 

forty-year sentence from the second trial violated the maximum aggregate 

sentence allowed under KRS 532.110(1)(c), which was twenty years. Id. at *16. 

The Commonwealth conceded the error, citing Blackburn, 394 S.W.3d at 397-

402. Id. 

This Court followed Blackburn and concluded that the trial court 

incorrectly entered a total sentence of forty years based upon the jury’s 

recommendation that Holbrook’s sentences should run consecutively. Id. With 

little elaboration, the Court vacated Holbrook’s forty-year sentence and 

remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing by the court, not the jury. 

Id. While Holbrook did not implicate KRS 533.060, the Court cited Blackburn
12

for its holding that the “statutory maximums established by the interplay of 

KRS 532.080 and KRS 532.110(1)(c) control over the jury’s discretion in 

recommending consecutive sentences.” Id.

We note the existence of two opinions rendered over twenty years ago, 

Moore v. Commonwealth, 990 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Ky. 1999), and White v. 

Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Ky. 1999), in which the appellants 

committed subsequent offenses while released on bond and awaiting trial. This 

Court cited the legislature’s intent to punish persons convicted of committing

subsequent crimes while awaiting trial more severely by eliminating the 

possibility of concurrent sentences. Moore, 990 S.W.2d 618, did not implicate 

KRS 532.110(1)(c). In White, 5 S.W.3d at 142, the appellant argued that the 

trial court erred by not running the twenty-year sentence imposed for the 

offenses committed while on bond concurrently with a one-year sentence he 

was already serving. The White Court relied on Devore and concluded that KRS 

533.060(3) controls over KRS 532.110(1)(c). Id. Nevertheless, we find that the 

more recent rationale behind applying KRS 533.060, subject to the statutory 

limits contained in KRS 532.110(1), as explained in Blackburn controls. 

We also recognize that a 2002 amendment to KRS 532.110 supports our 

conclusions. In 2002, the General Assembly amended KRS 532.110(2) to 

indicate that where a judgment is silent as to whether multiple sentences run 

concurrently or consecutively, the sentences run concurrently “unless the 

sentence is required by . . . KRS 533.060 to run consecutively.” Thus, the 

General Assembly amended the maximum sentence statute in full 
13

recognition—and indeed with specific acknowledgement—that KRS 533.060 

mandates that certain sentences be run consecutively.

In amending KRS 532.110, the General Assembly could have indicated 

that such consecutively running sentences may be imposed even where they 

exceed the maximum aggregate sentence requirement in KRS 

532.110(1)(c). The General Assembly did not do so, and we will not write into 

the statute what the General Assembly has not said. This is particularly so 

given our previous ruling in Blackburn and our inability to perceive any logical 

basis to treat offenses committed while awaiting trial differently—and more 

harshly—than those committed by persons violating the privilege of probation.

We further recognize our obligation to harmonize apparently conflicting 

statutes when it is possible to do so. Indeed, we have often noted that “‘[w]here 

there is an apparent conflict between statutes or sections thereof, it is the 

duty of the court to try to harmonize the interpretation of the law so as 

to give effect to both sections or statutes if possible.’” Elliott v. Lanham, 

540 S.W.3d 353, 356 n.11 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Ledford v. Faulkner, 661 S.W.2d 

475, 476 (Ky. 1983)) (emphasis added). Here, the statutes conflict insofar as 

KRS 533.060 requires consecutive sentences for a total term that violates the 

maximum aggregate sentence cap set forth in KRS 532.110. Applying KRS 

533.060 alone, Kimmel should be sentenced to forty years. However, we must 

strive to give effect to both KRS 533.060 and KRS 532.110. To harmonize and 

give effect to both statutes, we conclude that while sentences under KRS 
14

533.060(3) must be consecutive, the resulting total term of years cannot violate 

the maximum aggregate sentence cap set forth in KRS 532.110(1)(c).

The dissent insists that our precedent interpreting KRS 533.060(2) is 

inapplicable here, focusing on the portion of that subsection that states “the 

period of confinement for that felony shall not run concurrently with any other 

sentence.” The dissent aptly notes that KRS 533.060(3) does not contain the 

“any other sentence” language but fails to recognize that inclusion of such 

language in subsection three would be illogical. In subsection two, a person 

has already been convicted of a felony and released on probation or parole. In 

subsection three, a person is “awaiting trial for another offense” and thus there 

is presumably no “other sentence” for a trial court’s consideration during 

sentencing. 

We recognize that KRS 533.060(3) is straightforward. But when 

construing statutes, we must give “words of a statute their literal meaning 

unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion.” 

Cosby v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 56, 59 (Ky. 2004) (quotation omitted). In 

applying subsections two and three differently, as the dissent suggests, we 

would have to assume that the legislature intended to be more lenient in 

sentencing persons that have already been found guilty of felony offenses and 

who commit subsequent offenses while on probation or parole. For subsection 

two to apply, these persons must have violated the “very special privilege” of 

probation or parole. Devore, 662 S.W.2d at 831. Conversely, we would also

need to assume that the legislature intended to punish persons who commit 
15

any offense (not just felony offenses) while awaiting trial for any offense more 

harshly than persons convicted of felony offenses who are probated or paroled 

only to commit another felony offense. That simply cannot be the legislative 

intent behind KRS 533.060. 

Kimmel also argues that this case does not involve subsequent 

convictions, as stated in KRS 533.060(3), because he was convicted 

simultaneously of both offenses. However, in assessing the plain language of 

the statute, we interpret it to mean that a person must commit a crime while 

awaiting trial and their conviction or plea must be subsequent to the crime

committed while awaiting trial – not that they must be subsequently 

convicted of committing a crime while awaiting trial after they have been 

convicted of the original crime. 

The trial court erred by imposing a forty-year sentence that exceeded the 

maximum aggregate cap delineated in KRS 532.110(1)(c). As such we vacate

Kimmel’s forty-year sentence and remand to resentence Kimmel to twenty 

years in prison. 

II. The trial court did not err when it permitted introduction of 

evidence of prior instances of shoplifting. 

Kimmel argues that the trial court erred in allowing admission of 

irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of two prior allegations of shoplifting. 

Specifically, Kimmel asserts that the evidence of him placing items in a mailbox 

at Walmart and stealing a lawnmower from Rural King was improperly 

admitted. On November 12, 2021, the Commonwealth gave notice under 

Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 404(c) of its intent to introduce evidence of 
16

seven prior instances of shoplifting at Walmart and one prior instance of 

shoplifting at Rural King. The Commonwealth indicated that the evidence 

would be offered to prove motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and 

absence of mistake or accident. While not mentioned in the body of the 

motion, there was in incident involving a mailbox referenced in one of the 

exhibits. 

That exhibit was an internal document prepared by Asset Protection 

Associate Michael Knipp for Walmart. Knipp observed Kimmel selecting two 

sports bras and two dolls from the shelf, then concealing the bras in his pants. 

Kimmel left the clothing area and went to the hardware section, where he 

selected a mailbox and concealed one doll, a phone charger, and the two sports 

bras he had hidden in his pants inside the mailbox. Kimmel resealed the 

mailbox packaging and left the area. Knipp clarified that while he observed 

Kimmel concealing items on his person, an Asset Protection trainee observed 

the actual box stuffing.

At trial, Knipp testified to those basic facts but clarified that he had not 

personally observed Kimmel put items in the mailbox. A trainee observed

Kimmel and relayed the events to Knipp. Knipp explained that this type of 

action is called box stuffing. After an individual fills the mailbox packaging 

with extra items, they will only pay for the mailbox. The individual then may 

try to return or exchange the items at Walmart, even though they did not pay 

for them. In this case, the total value of the items in the mailbox was $62.72. 

Deputy Mark Wheeler also testified about his familiarity with the practice of 
17

box stuffing, classifying this form of theft as either an individual act or an act 

done in concert with another individual. 

The Commonwealth also introduced evidence of Kimmel stealing a 

lawnmower from Rural King. Former Rural King tractor manager Jacob 

Thomas testified that in February 2020, Kimmel stole a lawnmower from Rural 

King. Thomas stated that Kimmel pulled a lawnmower from an outside display 

and brought it inside the store. Kimmel exited the store. Thomas walked in 

the store and asked other employees if anyone sold a lawnmower, and no one 

had made such a sale. By the time Thomas walked back outside, he saw 

Kimmel load the lawnmower into his vehicle before Thomas could ask him to 

produce a receipt. After the incident, Thomas saw Kimmel sign a notice 

restricting him from Rural King property. Former State Trooper Daniel 

Vossmer also testified that when they located the stolen lawnmower, Kimmel 

was “trespassed” from Rural King by the Boyd County Sheriff’s Department.2 

Kimmel acknowledges that this KRE 404(b) issue is unpreserved for 

appellate review and requests palpable error review. “A palpable error which 

affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered. . . by an appellate 

court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and 

appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice 

has resulted from the error.” Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26. An error 

is palpable when it is “‘easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily 

2 The term “trespassed from” was used throughout trial. The Commonwealth 

explains that this phrase means Kimmel was given notice to remain off the properties. 
18

noticeable.’” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006). The 

error must be “so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens 

the integrity of the judicial process.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 

(Ky. 2006). “A palpable error must be so grave that, if uncorrected, it would 

seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 620 

S.W.3d 16, 30 (Ky. 2021) Given the strength of the substantial evidence against 

Kimmel, the admission of the KRE 404(b) evidence did not seriously affect the 

fairness of the trial. 

KRE 404(b) provides that, generally, evidence of other crimes or wrongs 

is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show conformity 

therewith. However, such evidence may be admissible: 

(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident; or

(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to 

the case that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished 

without serious adverse effect on the offering party.

KRE 404(b). To determine whether evidence of other bad acts is admissible 

under KRE 404(b), the Court must consider relevance, probative value, and 

prejudice. Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky. 1994). Given the 

similarity of the conduct at issue, we address the prior Walmart and Rural King 

incidents together. 

First, the evidence of box stuffing and the lawnmower incident was 

relevant under KRE 401. “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any 

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
19

without the evidence.” KRE 401. Evidence of prior incidents at both stores are 

undoubtedly relevant to the burglary and theft charges. The fact that Kimmel 

engaged in similar conduct at both locations on prior occasions has a tendency 

to make it more probable that, on the day in question, he was present at both 

stores with the intent to commit a crime and that he shoplifted. The employees 

of both Walmart and Rural King indicated as much in their testimony – they 

identified Kimmel at their stores on the dates in question and recognized him 

from past incidents of shoplifting. As such, the evidence was relevant. 

Next, we consider whether the evidence was probative. “[E]vidence of 

other bad acts is sufficiently probative if ‘the jury could reasonably infer that 

the prior bad acts occurred and that [the defendant] committed such 

acts.’” Howard v. Commonwealth, 595 S.W.3d 462, 476 (Ky. 2020)(quoting 

Parker v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 217 (Ky. 1997)). Here, Knipp 

provided testimony indicating that he observed Kimmel conceal items on his 

person. The same items concealed on his person were soon after stuffed in the 

mailbox. Those items were later photographed inside the mailbox and the 

photograph was introduced at trial as evidence of the box stuffing. As to the 

Rural King incident, Thomas testified that he approached Kimmel on the day 

he stole ammunition because he recognized Kimmel from the lawnmower 

incident and knew he was not supposed to be on store property. Based on this 

testimony and evidence, “the jury could reasonably infer that the prior bad acts 

occurred.” Id. 
20

Kimmel also highlights what he perceives as uncertainty as to whether 

Knipp personally observed the acts in question. Kimmel asserts that it was an 

asset protection trainee that observed him stuffing the mailbox, not Knipp, so 

there is no competent evidence of the box stuffing incident. Kimmel also states 

it is unclear whether Knipp actually saw any of Kimmel’s actions. We agree 

that what actions Knipp personally observed is unclear. At the beginning of 

Knipp’s testimony, he states that he and the trainee were walking the sales 

floor at Walmart on the day in question. Knipp observed Kimmel and informed 

the trainee about Kimmel’s history at the store. Knipp then stated, “we 

continued watching him,” during which time they observed Kimmel carrying 

the two sports bras, a phone charger and two dolls. Kimmel then concealed 

the items on his person. Knipp further described the box stuffing incident. 

Then, the Commonwealth asked Knipp if he “personally had eyes” on Kimmel 

when he was in the store that day, to which Knipp responded “yes.” 

On cross-examination, Knipp stated he did not recall seeing Kimmel 

conceal the items in the mailbox, and that it might have been the trainee that 

observed that portion of the incident. He also admitted that the surveillance 

video did not show the box stuffing. It is unclear which of Kimmel’s actions 

that Knipp personally observed, and which of Kimmel’s actions the trainee 

observed. In any event, the Commonwealth introduced photo evidence of the 

mailbox that showed the items in question inside. Given Knipp’s general 

observations of Kimmel and the items he was carrying then concealed, this 
21

evidence is sufficiently probative because it allowed the jury to reasonably infer 

that the box stuffing incident occurred. 

Further, evidence of the lawnmower incident was necessary to prove the 

elements of third-degree burglary. The Commonwealth had to prove Kimmel’s 

knowledge that he was not allowed to be on Rural King property. The prior 

theft incident with the lawnmower served as proof that Kimmel was not 

permitted on the property. Thomas also testified that on the day at issue, he 

recognized Kimmel and knew he was not supposed to be on the property 

because of the lawnmower incident. This knowledge prompted Thomas to 

approach Kimmel to ask for a receipt for the ammunition. 

Finally, a trial court must weigh the prejudicial nature of the evidence 

against its probative value. Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 889. “Although relevant, 

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 

the danger of undue prejudice . . . .” KRE 403. “A proper balancing under 

KRE 403 requires that a trial court consider three factors: the probative worth 

of the evidence, the probability that the evidence will cause undue prejudice, 

and whether the harmful effects substantially outweigh the probative worth.” 

Yates v. Commonwealth, 430 S.W.3d 883, 897 (Ky. 2014) (citing Barnett v. 

Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Ky.1998)). 

The evidence of Kimmel previously stealing a lawnmower and engaging in 

box stuffing was undoubtedly prejudicial. But we must determine whether 

that prejudice was “unnecessary and unreasonable.” Price v. Commonwealth, 

31 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Ky. 2000). At trial, the Commonwealth produced a 
22

significant amount of evidence demonstrating that Kimmel committed the 

crimes for which he was charged. Both testimony and documentation 

indicated that Kimmel was not allowed on the premises and that he intended to 

commit crimes. Ultimately, the evidence of other acts demonstrated motive, 

intent, knowledge, and plan. KRE 404(b)(1). Admission of the evidence did not 

constitute manifest injustice. 

Kimmel argues that the Commonwealth only needed to prove that 

Kimmel knowingly entered Walmart and Rural King with the understanding 

that he could not be on the property and that he intended to commit a crime 

while on the property. Importantly, the Commonwealth was tasked with 

proving Kimmel was unlawfully at Walmart and Rural King with an intent to 

steal. KRS 511.040(1). The mailbox stuffing and lawnmower evidence directly 

contradicted Kimmel’s trial testimony that he did not intend to steal anything 

from either location. Further, “evidence of similar acts perpetrated against the 

same victim are almost always admissible . . . .” Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 

S.W.3d 813, 822 (Ky. 2008). This evidence serves “to prove the defendant’s 

intent, plan, or absence of mistake or accident.” Dant v. Commonwealth, 258 

S.W.3d 12, 19 (Ky. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

While Harp and Dant involved instances of physical abuse, the same 

rationale can and should be applied here. Here, we have a similar act 

(shoplifting) being perpetrated against the same victims (Walmart and Rural 

King). On several occasions, Kimmel attempted to or successfully perpetrated 

offenses to the detriment of Walmart and Rural King. Additionally, we note 
23

that the mailbox stuffing incident immediately proceeded Kimmel exiting 

Walmart with the stolen doll down his pants. This incident occurred at the 

same time, date, and place as the doll theft and during a continuous course of 

conduct. 

In this case, there was compelling evidence that Kimmel committed the 

crimes in the indictment. The additional evidence of prior incidents at Walmart 

and Rural King likely had little impact on the jury’s determination of guilt, 

particularly in light of the substantial evidence presented. There is no 

substantial possibility that the result would have been different if this evidence 

was not admitted. Davis, 620 S.W.3d at 30. As such, we cannot find that 

admission of the KRE 404(b) evidence rose to the level of palpable error. 

III. The trial court did not err in permitting the Commonwealth to 

elicit narration from Michael Knipp during the Walmart video. 

Finally, Kimmel argues that the trial court erred in allowing the 

Commonwealth to elicit narration from Knipp while the Walmart video was 

played at trial. This issue is unpreserved, and therefore reviewed under the 

same palpable error standard outlined in Section II above. 

During Knipp’s testimony, the Commonwealth introduced surveillance 

video purporting to show Kimmel 1) removing a doll from his car; 2) turning his 

back to the surveillance camera; 3) raising his shirt; and 4) covering his 

waistline up with his hoodie. Knipp testified briefly just before or after each 

video clip, in part, as follows: 

Video 1:

Commonwealth: What did we just observe? 
24

Knipp: David Kimmel entering the facility. 

Video 2: 

Commonwealth: What did the video show?

Knipp: That was David Kimmel making a selection on the phone 

charger from the shelf. 

Video 3: 

Commonwealth: I guess before I click this, you had mentioned 

that there’s not video in every single section of the store. Is that 

correct? 

Knipp: Correct. 

Commonwealth: And, is that why you walk the floor, to observe?

Knipp: Correct.

Commonwealth: Okay . . . . It appears this video is a little more 

grainy. You had testified earlier that Mr. Kimmel had gone down a 

particular aisle and concealed the remaining doll. Which aisle was 

that? 

Knipp: It’s going to be this aisle right here.

(resumes playing video)

Commonwealth: What did we observe there? 

Knipp: David [Kimmel] remove the doll from the top of the buggy, 

turned his back to the camera, raised up his shirt, concealed the 

merchandise into his pants, covered his waistline back up with his 

hoodie. 

Video 4: 

Commonwealth: What did we observe there?

Knipp: David Kimmel exiting the facility. 

Kimmel did not object to this testimony. 
25

Knipp provided narrative testimony in conjunction with the surveillance 

videos. KRE 602 and KRE 701 govern the admissibility of narrative testimony. 

KRE 602 requires a witness to have personal knowledge before being permitted 

to testify about something. KRE 701 limits a lay witness’s testimony to matters 

“a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; [and] b) helpful to a clear 

understanding of the witnesses' testimony or demonstration of a fact in issue.” 

In Boyd v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.3d 126, 131 (Ky. 2014), this Court 

explained that 

narration of a video may be proper but only if it is comprised of 

opinions and inferences that are rationally based on the witnesses' 

own perceptions of which he had personal knowledge and that are 

helpful to the jury. Furthermore, witnesses are limited to a 

description of events when narrating video footage and any 

interpretation of that footage is improper.

(Citing Cuzick v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 260, 265–66 (Ky.2009)).

In arguing that Knipp’s narration was improper, Kimmel again classifies 

Knipp’s testimony as inconsistent and uncertain, creating a question as to 

whether Knipp had personal knowledge of what was shown on the surveillance 

videos. See discussion supra, Section II. While Knipp’s testimony as to what 

he personally observed and what the asset protection trainee observed lacked 

clarity, Knipp nonetheless possessed some degree of personal knowledge about 

Kimmel and his actions in the store that day based on his testimony that “we 

continued watching him” and that he personally had eyes on Kimmel. While 

Knipp did not observe everything Kimmel did that day, Knipp clearly followed 

Kimmel and observed him committing portions of the burglary at Walmart. 
26

In videos 1, 2 and 4, Kimmel is shown entering Walmart, selecting a 

phone charger from the shelf, and exiting Walmart. Kimmel spends time in the 

relevant aisle and is shown with the phone charger in his hand. These actions 

are clearly depicted by the video, and Knipp’s narration did not add to what 

jurors could view on the video themselves. Video 3 is of poor quality, and it is 

difficult to ascertain where Kimmel is located in the video or his actions.3 

Knipp testified that Kimmel removed the doll from the cart, turned his back, 

raised his shirt and concealed the merchandise in his pants. The difficulty in 

observing Kimmel in the video, paired with the uncertainty as to which of 

Kimmel’s actions Knipp personally observed, leads us to conclude that Knipp’s 

narration as to Video 3 exceeded the bounds of KRE 602 and 701. Because we 

cannot definitively conclude whether Knipp’s testimony exceeded his personal 

knowledge of the events, this narration should not have been permitted. 

Nevertheless, we cannot say this error was palpable. The jurors watched 

the video and “were in a position to interpret the security footage independently 

from the testimony.” Boyd, 439 S.W.3d at 132. Additionally, the evidence 

against Kimmel was substantial, making it difficult to conclude that the jury 

was improperly persuaded by Knipp’s one-line testimony describing Kimmel’s 

actions. The error certainly was not palpable and so fundamental that it 

threatened the integrity of the judicial process. Brewer, 206 S.W.3d at 

349; Martin, 207 S.W.3d at 5.

3 The trial exhibits are not available in the record from the trial court. 

Therefore, we watched the surveillance videos through the trial footage, making video 

3 even more difficult to interpret. 
27

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm Kimmel’s convictions. 

However, his forty-year sentence is vacated, and this case is remanded to the 

trial court for resentencing to reduce Kimmel’s sentence to twenty years 

pursuant to KRS 532.110(1)(c). 

All sitting. Lambert and Nickell, JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs by 

separate opinion. Conley, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate 

opinion in which VanMeter, C.J., and Keller, J., join. 

THOMPSON, J., CONCURRING: I write separately to: (1) express my 

concern with the majority’s decision to endorse the admission of Kentucky 

Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b) evidence at trial; (2) explain why I strongly 

concur that Kimmel should receive twenty-year concurrent sentences rather 

than consecutive sentences for a total of forty years of incarceration; and (3) 

express my frustration with the current state of sentencing laws in our 

Commonwealth and urge the General Assembly to carefully consider what its 

“tough on crime” stance is costing our state and its citizens by diverting our 

treasure to incarcerate low-level non-violent offenders to lengthy terms which 

are not proportional to their offenses. 

I. KRE 404(b) Evidence Should Not Have Been Admitted

I believe the Commonwealth, in proving that Kimmel committed the 

crimes of third-degree burglary, should only have been authorized to establish 

that Kimmel had been banned from patronizing the Walmart and Rural King 
28

and not the reasons behind such bans. Pursuant to the Kentucky Rules of 

Evidence 404(b): 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 

the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 

therewith. It may, however, be admissible:

(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

or absence of mistake or accident; or

(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential 

to the case that separation of the two (2) could not be 

accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering 

party.

While it was of course essential to prove that Kimmel had been banned from 

these stores to establish third-degree burglary, the basis for the bans was not 

offered for any appropriate purpose and was not so inextricably intertwined 

with the evidence of the bans as to require its admission. Kimmel’s previous 

history of shoplifting was only relevant for the penalty phase of the trial. 

However, given the overwhelming evidence that Kimmel committed the 

crimes at issue, which included video surveillance and eyewitness testimony, I 

believe the admission of this evidence in his trial was harmless. I caution, 

however, that this may not be true in other cases and that the Commonwealth 

should avoid introducing such improper character evidence in other cases. 

II. The Twenty-Year Sentence “Cap” Should Have Limited the 

Possible Sentence Imposed Over Other Statutes

We are tasked with interpreting how three statutes should be interpreted 

together: KRS 532.110, KRS 532.080 and KRS 532.060. KRS 532.110(1) states:

When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a 

defendant for more than one (1) crime, including a crime for which 
29

a previous sentence of probation or conditional discharge has been 

revoked, the multiple sentences shall run concurrently or 

consecutively as the court shall determine at the time of sentence, 

except that: . . .

(c) The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall 

not exceed in maximum length the longest extended term 

which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest 

class of crime for which any of the sentences is imposed. 

The “shall not exceed” language in KRS 532.110(1)(c) is of paramount 

importance.

KRS 532.080(6) provides:

A person who is found to be a persistent felony offender in the first 

degree shall be sentenced to imprisonment as follows: . . . 

(b) If the offense for which he presently stands convicted is a 

Class C or Class D felony, a persistent felony offender in the 

first degree shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of 

imprisonment, the maximum of which shall not be less than 

ten (10) years nor more than twenty (20) years.

Therefore, the maximum length of the longest extended term authorized by 

KRS 532.080 for Class D felonies as a PFO-1 is twenty-years’. The “shall not 

exceed” language is a cap providing an absolute upper limit.

KRS 533.060(3) adds an additional wrinkle as follows:

When a person commits an offense while awaiting trial for another 

offense, and is subsequently convicted or enters a plea of guilty to 

the offense committed while awaiting trial, the sentence imposed 

for the offense committed while awaiting trial shall not run 

concurrently with confinement for the offense for which the person 

is awaiting trial.

“When all else is said and done, common sense must not be a stranger 

in the house of the law.” Cantrell v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Commission, 

450 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Ky. 1970). All things being equal, I will use common 
30

sense in interpreting the overlapping laws that apply to determining Kimmel’s 

maximum sentence. I will not interpret the language “shall not run 

concurrently” in KRS 533.060(3) to trump the stronger “shall not exceed” 

language of KRS 532.110(1)(c) because doing so does not make any logical 

sense.

By its terms, KRS 533.060(3) could have an effect if Kimmel had been 

sentenced to less than the maximum PFO-1 sentences for his crimes, but it 

cannot break through the “cap” provided by KRS 532.110(1)(c). Therefore, I 

strongly agree with the majority opinion that the maximum sentence Kimmel 

could receive was twenty years’ total.

Capping Kimmel’s sentence to a total of twenty-years’ is as much as we 

can do in our role as Kentucky’s highest court as we are tasked with 

interpreting the laws as they are written and have no authority to change them. 

I could end my concurring opinion here, but Kimmel’s case has brought to the 

forefront my thoughts about Kentucky’s problem with overincarceration in 

general, and especially our overincarceration of low-level offenders. Our Court 

should rule that a cap statute is a cap and encompasses or applies to all 

enhancement statutes enacted before or after the cap statute.

III. Lengthy Sentences for Low Level Crimes Wastes our Limited 

Resources and is Counterproductive

Our incarcerated population has grown rapidly. 

In the early 1970s, [Kentucky] had about 3000 convicted felons in 

custody, operated two prisons for men and a small prison for 

women, made no use of private prisons, had no inmates housed in 

county jails, and had a corrections budget of about 10 million 

dollars a year. By February of 2008, the state had 22,719 felons 
31

under incarceration, owned and operated 13 full-sized state 

prisons (with very few if any empty beds), supervised the 

incarceration of about 1,600 inmates in three private prisons, had 

more than 8000 inmates serving their sentences in county jails 

across the state, and had a corrections budget of about 450 million 

dollars and rapidly bearing down on half-a-billion (not including 

the very heavy costs of prison construction).

Robert G. Lawson, PFO Law Reform, A Crucial First Step Toward Sentencing

Sanity in Kentucky, 97 Ky. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2009) (PFO Law Reform) (internal 

citation footnotes omitted).

In 2011, Kentucky enacted sweeping reforms designed to curb the out-ofcontrol growth in our prison populations through House Bill (HB) 463, the 

“Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act.” These reforms included a 

mandatory reentry supervision policy, a reduction of classification for low level 

possession type drug charges, expanded access to evidence-based drug abuse 

treatment programs both in and out of correctional facilities, and the option for 

graduated sanctions to be used for minor probation violations. HB 463 has 

certainly done some good. “HB 463 has resulted in fewer inmates than would 

otherwise be the case, some savings to the state and better access to substance 

abuse treatment and programs that help reduce recidivism.” Ashley Spalding, 

Corrections Data Shows Positive Impact of HB 463 that Additional Criminal 

Justice Reforms Can Build On (Sep. 28, 2016), https://kypolicy.org/new-datashows-positive-impact-hb-463-additional-criminal-justice-reforms-canbuild/. However, “[t]he impact of Kentucky’s 2011 criminal justice reforms on 

the state’s inmate population and budget have been much less than what was 

projected[.]” Id. “In fact, the state’s inmate population is now higher [in 2016] 
32

than it was in 2011, and the rate of inmates returning to prison after release —

“recidivism” — is on the rise.” Id.

“Between 2011 and 2016 the number of people incarcerated in Kentucky 

grew by 8%, resulting in Kentucky having the 10th highest incarceration rate 

in the country.” Carmen Mitchell, Pam Thomas, Ashley Spalding & Dustin 

Pugul, In Decade Since Major Criminal Justice Reform, the Kentucky General 

Assembly Has Passed Six Times as Many Laws Increasing Incarceration as 

Decreasing It, Kentucky Center for Economic Policy 3 (Dec. 9, 2021), 

https://kypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Criminal-PenaltiesFINAL.pdf. (Decade Since HB 463). 

The problem of overincarceration in Kentucky has only continued to 

worsen since then. In 2018, Kentucky had the fifth highest rate of 

incarceration nationwide. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice 

Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 11-12 (Aug. 2020), https://bjs.ojp.

gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus1718.pdf. This adds up to 37,500 incarcerated 

adults in Kentucky. Id. If states were countries, Kentucky would rank at least 

seventh-highest in the world for its rate of incarceration, worse than all 

countries outside of the United States. Decade Since HB 463 at 1. There has 

been a temporary drop in Kentucky’s prison population due to Covid-19 

commutations, but the upward trend continues. Id. at 2. 

So why does Kentucky have such a high incarceration numbers relative 

to other states? It is not because our citizens are less law abiding than in other 

states. Part of that growth is due to the Kentucky General Assembly choosing 
33

to pass legislation that “establishes new crimes and penalties, expands the 

parameters of existing crimes, enhances already harsh sentencing practices 

and lengths of incarceration, or otherwise increases punishment.” Id. at 5. “[A] 

review of legislation enacted between 2011 and 2021 relating to felony criminal 

punishment found that just ten bills reduced criminalization and incarceration 

while 59 bills increased or enhanced criminal punishment in some way.” Id.

(citation footnote omitted). Additionally, our laws mandatorily impose far too 

lengthy sentences for repeated low-level crimes by providing enhancement after 

enhancement. Our Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) statutes are a prime 

example of this practice.

As noted in Robert G. Lawson’s, PFO Law Reform, A Crucial First Step

Toward Sentencing Sanity in Kentucky, 97 Ky. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2009), Kentucky’s 

persistent felony offender law “clearly heads the list of tough-on-crime 

measures that have filled prisons and jails beyond capacity, pushed the state’s 

corrections budget off the charts, and changed the balance of power over 

punishment in ways that threaten the basic fairness of the justice system.”

While things have changed around the margins, in the time since this article 

was published our PFO laws continue to sweep low level offenders into 

increasingly lengthy sentences. 

A repeat offender law that throws a blanket over all offenders with 

a felony record, as Kentucky’s does, is destined to squander 

corrections resources by filling prison beds with many inmates 

who are more threatening to themselves than to others. And . . . it 

is destined to produce results that are totally at odds with core 

values of a justice system that is committed above all else to the 

belief that “all offenders should receive their particular deserts-no 
34

more and no less.”

Id. at 22–23.

Incarcerating felons in our state prisons is not cheap. The Department of 

Corrections expenditures for Fiscal year 2021-2022 was a total of more than 

$605 million.

4 Annual Report 2021, Kentucky Department of Corrections, 21, 

https://corrections.ky.gov/About/researchandstats/Documents/Annual%20R

eports/2021%20Annual%20Report%20-%2011-2022.pdf. To put that in 

context, the similarly priced, $626 million DOC enacted budget from the 

General Fund for 2022 constituted “a 72% increase from [the DOC enacted 

budget in] 2010 in actual terms” while “[o]ver that same period of time, total 

General Fund expenditures have grown just 45%[.]” Decade Since HB 463 at 5. 

Kentucky’s total state facility average cost comes in at $38,409.45 per 

inmate, with the costs varying substantially depending upon the facility, with a 

bed at the Kentucky State Penitentiary costing significantly higher at 

$65,378.02 per year.5 Cost to Incarcerate – FY22, Kentucky Department of 

Corrections, https://corrections.ky.gov/About/researchandstats/Documents

/Annual%20Reports/FY22%20CTI.pdf

4 The total of $605,727,967.91 included the costs for corrections management, 

community services, adult institutions and a local jail allotment, with these categories 

including personnel, operating costs, care and support, debt service (for the 

construction of facilities) and capital outlays, with adult institutions constituting 59% 

of the total budget at more than $355 million. 

5 In contrast, a bed at the Lee Adjustment Center is the least, at $29,154.83 per 

year; county jails who house state inmates cost $18,288.94, those without state 

inmates cost $14,638.94, and halfway houses cost $17,040.14. In comparison, 

electronic monitoring only costs $2,413.46 per year and the cost to supervise through 

Probation and Parole is only $1,499.78 per year.
35

Kimmel’s example provides a pertinent case study in just what is wrong 

with Kentucky’s incarceration practices. Kimmel is a habitual shoplifter, who is 

a potentially undiagnosed kleptomaniac, and has a lengthy history of 

committing these types of low-level, non-violent crimes. In 2009, Lawson 

provided numerous examples of how low-level offenders were sentenced to 

disproportionate sentences based on the application of our PFO statutes in PFO 

Law Reform and, more than a decade later, Kimmel fits right in with those 

examples. 

Kimmel shoplifted a $12.88 doll from Walmart and $142.68 worth of 

ammunition from Rural King. Each of these events constituted theft by 

unlawful taking. As the property taken was valued under $500, these were 

Class B misdemeanors. KRS 514.030(2). Class B misdemeanors are subject to 

a term of imprisonment that “shall not exceed ninety (90) days.” KRS 

532.090(2).

However, Kimmel was subject to a new crime and a longer sentence for 

each because he previously had been banned from the two stores where he 

shoplifted and, pursuant to KRS 511.090(2), no longer had a license to enter or 

remain in such premises which were generally open to the public. This made 

his conduct in entering such stores with intent to commit theft by unlawful 

taking constitute the crime of burglary in the third degree, a Class D felony. 

KRS 511.040. Class D felonies have a sentencing range of one to five years’. 

KRS 532.060(2).
36

Next, based on Kimmel’s previous record, which included felony

convictions for theft by unlawful taking for property of higher values, and 

burglary in the third degree (based on having been banned from other stores 

for shoplifting), and having committed a felony, Kimmel qualified as a 

persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO-1) pursuant to KRS 

532.080(3). As a PFO-1 convicted of either a Class C or Class D felony,6 he was 

subject to a sentence of between ten and twenty years of incarceration. KRS 

532.080(6)(b). The jury then determined Kimmel should serve the maximum 

term for each count as a PFO-1 through consecutive sentences and the circuit 

court decided to impose this sentence as specified, thinking that the 

Department of Corrections would correct this sentence as needing to be 

concurrent. On appeal, the Commonwealth asserted that Kimmel must serve 

each sentence consecutively based upon the most punitive reading of our 

sentencing laws possible.

While I agree that repeat offenses are appropriately subject to longer 

sentences as provided by our sentencing structure, I do not agree with the 

manner in which Kimmel has been subjected to enhancement after 

enhancement for shoplifting. Twenty-year sentences, whether served 

6 The General Assembly thus conflates two classes of crimes, Class C and Class 

D felonies, which originally have different sentencing ranges (five to ten years for Class 

C felonies and one to five years for Class D felonies as provided in KRS 532.060(2)(c) 

and (d)), into one PFO-1 sentencing range resulting in a ten-to-twenty-year sentencing 

range. This results in an increased minimum sentence for Class D felonies which is 

ten times greater than would be available without such an enhancement, or four times 

greater maximum sentence, as compared with only a doubling in the minimum and 

maximum sentences for Class C felonies. 
37

concurrently or consecutively are clearly disproportionate to the crimes which 

he committed, with the shoplifting offenses themselves only subject to ninetyday maximums. 

Incarcerating low level criminal felons with lengthy sentences does not 

make financial sense. Just as with low level drug users, there are other options 

that may place offenders on a more positive trajectory. I urge members of the 

General Assembly in the strongest terms possible to consider what reforms 

may be enacted to limit punitive sentences imposed on low level offenders.

While legislative reform is clearly needed, I need not solely depend on 

legislative reform for improvements in our situation. There are still things that 

can be done at the trial level to remove low level offenders from the path of 

continued recidivism and increasingly punitive sentences subject to lengthy 

mandatory minimums. I urge prosecutors, defense attorneys and my brother 

and sister judges who serve on our trial level courts to consider what they may 

do to help put low level offenders on a different path. Prosecutors, rather than 

seeking to “win” through the imposition of the lengthiest sentences possible 

whether through plea agreements or during the sentencing phase of a trial, 

should consider what sentences would be just given the nature of the 

underlying offense. Defense attorneys should advocate for alternatives which 

will realistically allow their clients to successfully address and reform their 

criminal behavior. Prosecutors and judges should consider whether probation 

with appropriate treatment is a valid option. 
38

As Kimmel is a shoplifter, I address what can be done for shoplifters 

before they are classified as burglars and then PFOs for their shoplifting 

conduct. Shoplifting is a very common crime. Approximately one in eleven 

Americans shoplift and there are 550,000 shoplifting incidents per day in this 

country. National Association for Shoplifting Prevention (NASP), The Shoplifting 

Problem, https://www.shopliftingprevention.org/the-shoplifting-problem/ (last 

visited Apr. 6, 2023). Just as with drug addiction, “many individuals who 

shoplift experience a pleasurable rush of dopamine throughout the body, 

similar to other addictive behaviors, and seek to feel that pleasure again and 

again.” Steven Petrow, Perspective, Struggling with Mental Health, I Began to 

Shoplift, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wellness

/2022/09/26/shoplifting-depression-mental-health/ (quoting interview with 

Adam Borland, psychologist at the Cleveland Clinic’s Center for Behavioral 

Health).

Treatment options for shoplifting include cognitive behavioral talk 

therapy, the administration of psychotropic medications, participation in 

support groups, and twelve-step recovery programs. Id. There are also 

educational programs with very encouraging results in documented studies. 

The NASP educational programs, the Shoplifters Alternative Course and 

the Youth Educational Shoplifting Program, which are typically assigned 

through the justice system as a condition of probation or alternative 

sentencing, are online programs that boast of a recidivism rate upon 

completion averaging 2.9% nationally compared to a 30-40% recidivism rate 
39

among offenders who do not participate in such a program. NASP, Criminal and 

Juvenile Justice, https://www.shopliftingprevention.org/criminal-juvenilejustice/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2023). These programs cost $75 per offender and

take approximately four hours to complete. Email from Renee Sirianni, Deputy 

Executive Director of the National Association for Shoplifting Prevention (March 

28, 2023, 10:24am CST) (on file with author) (Sirianni Email 1). Court ordered 

participation in such programs potentially offers substantial savings to our 

Commonwealth if recidivism is thereby reduced but they are currently 

underutilized in our state.7

While I do not know if programs like this would help Kimmel, I do believe 

it is our duty to try to help offenders become productive citizens and this is one 

low-cost option that ought to be considered.

7 These programs feature video scenarios and 124 questions designed to test 

their comprehension. Too many incorrect answers results in the participant having to 

restart the program and a certain level of comprehension must be obtained to pass the 

program. Sirianni Email 1. The programs also contain a Psychological Profile Analysis 

and Risk Assessment to help identify offenders at risk of repeating shoplifting offense 

who may need referral for additional services. Id. However, only a few of Kentucky’s 

120 counties have referred offenders to this program. Email from Renee Sirianni, 

Deputy Executive Director of the National Association for Shoplifting Prevention 

(March 31, 2023, 11:36 CST) (on file with author) (Sirianni Email 2). Sirianni reported 

that Jefferson, Paducah, Pulaski, Carter, Lexington-Fayette Marion, Mercer, Letcher, 

and Graves Counties have referred offenders to this program in conjunction with a 

retailer-initiated program. Id. The number of offenders in Kentucky to have gone 

through this program is relatively small at under 3,000, with this number including 

individuals managed by county court systems in other states who use the NASP 

programs for transfer and out of town cases as well as the United States Army in Fort 

Knox. Id. In comparison, the number of county-wide adoption of this program in other 

states ranges as high as 95% in New Jersey, 87% in Florida and 76% in Michigan. 

Email from Renee Sirianni (Apr. 3, 2023, 12:43pm CST) (on file with author) (Sirianni 

Email 3). Nationwide, NASP’s programs have helped more than one million adults and 

juveniles to stop shoplifting, and “are appropriate for both first and repeat offenders 

and provide benefit to any offender who has not already completed this type of 

comprehensive education.” Sirianni Email 1.
40

Accordingly, I concur with the majority opinion.

CONLEY, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: I 

concur with the Court’s conclusion that there were no evidentiary errors as to 

the admittance of prior instances of shoplifting or the narration of Michael 

Knipp. Respectfully, however, I dissent as to its application of KRS 533.060(3) 

and KRS 532.110(1)(c). These two statutes present an actual, irreconcilable 

conflict, or, at the least, present an apparent conflict. Rules of statutory 

construction counsel that we apply KRS 533.060(3). Therefore, I would affirm 

the trial court’s sentence of forty years total imprisonment for consecutive 

twenty-year sentences. 

“Apparent conflicts or requgnancies [sic] between statutes on the same 

general subject enacted at different times should be reconciled in the light of 

the existing statutes and Constitution.” Brown v. Hoblitzell, 307 S.W.2d 739, 

744 (Ky. 1956). But “[i]f the conflict cannot be reconciled, the later statute 

controls.” Id. Here, application of KRS 533.060(3) leads to a forty-year 

sentence. Application of KRS 532.110(1)(c) leads to a twenty-year sentence. 

This is a conflict. Typically, we would apply the statute passed latter in time, 

which in this case is KRS 532.110(1)(c). Id. Two other rules of statutory 

construction, however, are more compelling in this instance. First, the rule that 

the more specific statute controls over the general. Abel v. Austin, 411 S.W.3d 

728, 738 (Ky. 2013). KRS 533.060(3) is undoubtedly more specific. Second, the 

rule that “[t]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of the existing law at the 

time of enactment of a later statute.” Stogner v. Commonwealth, 35 S.W.3d 831, 
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835 (Ky. 2000). These two principles obviate any concern over the General 

Assembly’s amendments of KRS 532.110 in 2002 and 2006, making it the 

statute passed later in time. 

Briefly, I do not agree that our precedent interpreting KRS 533.060(2) is 

applicable here. Peyton v. Commonwealth ruled that under that provision’s 

language “‘the period of confinement for that felony shall not run concurrently 

with any other sentence,’ should be construed as meaning [only] that 

subsequent felony offense(s) committed while on probation or parole may not 

be run concurrently with the sentence for which the individual is on probation 

or parole.” 253 S.W.3d 504, 511 (Ky. 2008) (quoting KRS 533.060(2)) 

(emphasis added). Blackburn v. Commonwealth explicitly relied on that 

construction of “any other sentence” in Peyton to hold that KRS 533.060(2) did 

not control for multiple sentences received at the same time and ran 

consecutively by the trial court with one another, because “such an 

interpretation would ‘take the phrase “with any other sentence” and extend it 

beyond the context and statutory framework where it is found.’” 394 S.W.3d 

395, 400 (Ky. 2011) (quoting Devore v. Commonwealth, 662 S.W.2d 829, 831 

(Ky. 1984) (Leibson, J., dissenting)). 

But more to the point is that both Peyton and Blackburn are cases 

interpreting a different provision other than KRS 533.060(3) and were rendered 

two and five years after the last amendments to KRS 532.110, respectively. 

Thus, when the General Assembly passed those amendments, it was aware of 

previous judicial constructions that had been given to both KRS 532.110 and 
42

533.060(3). Specifically, Commonwealth v. Martin had held that the latter 

statute controlled over the former. 777 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Ky. App. 1989). The 

Court has not cited this case in its opinion. Moreover, another appellate court 

case had previously held KRS 533.060(3) controlled over KRS 532.110(1)(a). 

Handley v. Commonwealth, 653 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ky. App. 1983). And as the 

Court accurately states, this Court had already spoken on the issue of KRS 

533.060(3) controlling over KRS 532.110(1)(c) in the event of a conflict in White 

v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Ky. 1999), holding the former applies 

over the latter. Thus, by the time the General Assembly amended KRS 532.110 

in 2002, it was presumably aware for thirteen years that the courts of the 

Commonwealth were applying KRS 533.060(3) over KRS 532.110(1)(c), despite 

the latter’s statutory cap. “The failure of the legislature to change a known 

judicial interpretation of a statute is extremely persuasive evidence of the true 

legislative intent. There is a strong implication that the legislature agrees with 

a prior court interpretation of its statute when it does not amend the statute 

interpreted.” Bloyer v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 219, 225 (Ky. 2020).

The amendment to KRS 532.110 in 2002 was not to subsection (1)(c) of 

that statute. Instead, it added language to subsection (2), making that section 

read: “If the court does not specify the manner in which a sentence imposed by 

it is to run, the sentence shall run concurrently with any other sentence which 

the defendant must serve unless the sentence is required by subsection (3) 

of this section or KRS 533.060 to run consecutively.” Act of Mar. 11, 2002, 

ch. 11, § 5, 2002 Ky. Acts 227, 228-29 (emphasis added). This addition post-
43

dates the language in KRS 532.110(1)(c) referring to KRS 532.080, and 

indicates legislative intent that KRS 533.060 is controlling. Thus, the General 

Assembly was well aware that KRS 533.060 creates exceptions to the general 

scheme created by KRS 532.110. Moreover, none of its amendments changed 

the known interpretation that KRS 533.060(3) was more specific and 

controlling over the statutory cap of KRS 532.110(1)(c). Thus, because Kimmel 

committed one offense while awaiting trial for another offense those two 

sentences cannot be run concurrently (which is the functional result of the 

Court’s opinion), therefore the forty-year sentence is lawful, and I would affirm 

the trial court.

VanMeter, C.J.; Keller, J., join.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Jennifer Leigh Wade

Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph A. Beckett

Assistant Attorney General