Id at 747.
A. Prima Facie Case

Ms. Surico must demonstrate that: (1) she belongs to some protected class, (2) she performed her
job satisfactorily, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the District treated similarly-
situated employees outside her classification more favorably. /d. at 746. In establishing her prima facie
case, Ms. Surico creates a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption that the District unlawfully
discriminated against her. Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 339 (7th Cir. 1999),

Neither party disputes whether Ms. Surico satisfies the first, third and fourth prongs of the test.
However, the District does contend Ms. Surico cannot prove the second prong because she lacked the
requisite credentials for the SPA position, as set forth in the job description, and therefore was not a
qualified candidate. The question to be asked, though, is “not whether [Ms. Surico] should have [been
chosen for the position], but whether [s]he has presented sufficient evidence that [s]he was qualified for
the position. In other words, even if [Ms. Surico] was not the most qualified candidate, was [s]he
nevertheless a qualified candidate?” Jd. at 340. That Ms. Surico received the highest rating from the
interview committee and the recommendation of Dr. Murphy suggests she met the qualifications for the
SPA position. Consequently, Ms. Surico has established a prima facie case.

B. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason

The burden now shifts to the District to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring
Ms. Surico for the SPA position. The District maintains the Board selected Mr. Brownlee rather than Ms.
Surico based solely on its consideration of the job description and each applicant’s resume materials. Ms.
Thurman testified at her deposition that the Board was looking for someone with experience in finance,
marketing and management to fill the SPA position, and Mr. Brownlee’s background in these areas was
more extensive than any other candidate. The job description outlines a position requiring an individual
to possess not only the personal skills to act as a liaison between the District and the community, but also
the business skills to organize and run special projects and school programs. Thus, the Court finds the
Board’s emphasis on hiring a candidate with a strong business background is certainly in line with the

position description. Because Ms. Surico admittedly did not have the business experience possessed by

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admits she does not believe any Board members discriminated against her on the basis of her race or
gender. Thus, those innocuous remarks cannot constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Nevertheless
they may qualify as stray remarks that can be used to demonstrate pretext. Indurante v. Local 705, Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 160 F.3d 364, 367 (7th Cir. 1998) (defining stray remarks as “biased comments
made by the decision-maker but not related to the disputed employment action”). Obviously, Dr. Murphy
and Ms. Hogsett are not decision-makers; therefore their comments are irrelevant. The Board member on
the other hand was a decision-maker, but his comment was rather benign, and, significantly, raised neither
race nor gender concerns. He did not say anything at all that would imply the Board selected Mr. Brownlee
for the position only because he was an African-American male, or that it rejected Ms. Surico because she
was a White female. That one comment, standing alone, is not enough to create an issue on pretext. Jd
at 368.

Finally, Ms. Surico turns to statistical evidence, focusing on the fact that the entire Board, like Mr.
Brownlee, is African-American, and that 83% of the District’s administrative employees are African-
American. She does not offer any comparable evidence concerning the gender breakdown of the Board
or District. While statistical evidence is admissible and helpful, Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 554 (7th Cir.
2000), standing alone, it does not prove pretext, Guerrero, 253 F.3d at 315. Indeed, the Court looks to
see if the statistical evidence shows a causal relationship suggesting a protected classification makes a
difference in employment decisions. Bel/, 232 F.3d at 553. The figures presented by Ms. Surico do not
provide a clear picture to suggest the District discriminates against white women in its employment
decisions. In fact, the District counters the statistical evidence by pointing to three situations in which the
Board ignored Dr. Murphy’s recommendation in filling a position. In each case, the rejected employee
was African-American. Therefore, this is not one of the rare cases where statistics alone creates a triable
issue of pretext.

IV. Conclusion

The Court recognizes it is often difficult for individuals who feel they were the best qualified

candidate for a position to accept that an employer nonetheless chose someone else. Certainly it was not

unreasonable for Ms. Surico to believe that, given the high rating she received from the interview

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II. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). All facts and inferences are viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. James v. Sheahan, 137 F.3d 1003, 1006 (7" Cir. 1988). Additionally,
in employment discrimination cases, this standard is applied with added rigor because intent and credibility
are crucial issues. /d. However, the use of self-serving assertions, without factual support in the record,
will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. /d. Instead, the party opposing summary judgment must
go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Indeed, where a party “fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial,” there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322-23.
Iii. Analysis
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to ...
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin ...

A Title VII claim can be proven by either the direct or indirect method. Ms. Surico concedes she
has no direct evidence of discriminatory intent by the Board. Therefore the Court will focus its analysis
on the indirect method, which is more commonly referred to as the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting
method, Three steps are involved, First the employee must establish a prima facie case by satisfying a
four-prong test. Hughes v. Brown, 20 F.3d 745, 746 (7th Cir. 1994). Next the employee may rebut the
prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly biased employment

decision. /d. Finally the employee may then challenge the employer’s stated reason on pretextual grounds.

3-


Mr, Brownlee, the Board has advanced a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its hiring decision.
C, Pretext

Ms. Surico must now come forward with evidence showing her limited business experience was
not the true reason the Board rejected her for the SPA position, but instead was a pretext for
discrimination. “Pretext means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.” James, 137 F.3d at
1007 (internal quotations omitted). To establish pretext, Ms. Surico must show “either that the [District]
lied about why it opted not to [hire] {her] . . . or that the [District’s] reasons have no basis in fact.”
Guerrero y. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 2001).

Ms. Surico offers several grounds to support her claim of pretext. First she emphasizes her
qualifications for the SPA position, noting her higher interview rating, ties to the community and District,
and the fact that several years earlier she had proposed to the Board the creation of a similar position. But
to prove pretext, Ms. Surico must do more than demonstrate she was qualified for the position. James,
137 F.3d at 1007. Instead, “she must rebut the nondiscriminatory reason given for why she was not
[offered the job].” /d. Arguments about her qualifications simply do not show the District’s reasons for
choosing Mr. Brownlee were untrue. Indeed, Mr. Brownlee also possessed the requisite skills sought by
the Board and therefore he too was a qualified candidate. That the Board placed more weight upon the
resume materials than the interview selection process may seem unfair, but “unfairness is not
discrimination.” /d. at 1008.

Along the same lines, Ms. Surico also challenges the Board’s emphasis on finance experience for
the SPA position. She maintains the job description did not emphasize the need for finance, marketing or
management skills, in that the position required only a B.A. or B.S. ina related field, and not specifically
business. Thus she contends her Master’s Degree in early childhood education was more than sufficient.
As proof of pretext, she points to the Board’s creation of the job description after it already had Mr.
Brownlee’s resume, suggesting the Board tailored the position to his skills, and the fact that Mr. Brownlee
now admits he rarely uses finance skills in performing his duties as the SPA.

A similar situation was recently presented in Guerrero, supra. In that case, plaintiff, a Hispanic

FBI agent who was not promoted, sued claiming disparate treatment based on race and national origin.

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committee and the recommendation of Dr. Murphy, the Board would select her to fill the SPA position.
When it did not, Ms. Surico was understandably disappointed and sought to uncover the true reason behind
the rejection. She may never be satisfied that the Board gave her full and fair consideration in this process.
Nevertheless, it is clear to this Court Ms. Surico has not come forward with any evidence demonstrating
the Board’s decision was motivated by race or gender discrimination. Absent such proof, she has failed
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. Therefore, summary judgment is granted in

favor of the District.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

WILLIAM YMIBBLER, DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: March 15, 2002


ISG

Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

Nan ssigned Jt ili i Sitting Judge if Other
nor Magistrate Judge William J. Hibbler ian Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 00 C 6536 DATE March 15, 2002
CASE Surico v. Illinois School District No. 88
TITLE

Un the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the

nature of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #9)
DOCKET ENTRY:
(69) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
2) QO  __ Brief in support of motion due
(3) o Answer brief to motion due___._ Reply to answer brief due__.
(4) o Ruling/Hearing on__—sset for sat
(5) QO Status hearing [held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___s set for at
(6) o Pretrial conference [held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on ___—ssetfor_— ss at_
(7) im) Trial [set for/re-set for] on____at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs [by/agreement/pursuant to]
CFRCP4(m) (General Rule 21 OO FRCP41(a)(1) © FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) TM@ [Other docket entry] Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (doc. #9) is GRANTED. All pending

dates and motions are terminated as moot.

(11) a [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required, umber of notices
Notices mailed by judge's staff,
; MAR 1-9 2002
Notified counset by telephone. date docketed
v

Docketing to mail notices. .
Mail AO 450 form. : . - ewe Ce

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice

courtroom
JHC deputy’s
initials

<, Date/time recejved in
“central Clerk’ Office ‘mailing deputy initials



dd, at 311. The FBI explained it did not promote plaintiff because although his administrative skills were
superior to the other candidates, his operational skills were lacking. Id. at 313. The parties disagreed on
the question of whether the position plaintiff sought emphasized administrative or operational skills. /d at
314, The Seventh Circuit resolved the matter as follows:

Quoting the job description, Guerrero argues that administrative skills were paramount, while the
FBI argues operational skills were more important. Reviewing the job description in the light most
favorable to Guerrero, it is clear that the job demanded both administrative and operational skills.
That the FBI eventually based its promotion decision on the candidates’ operational skills,
specifically those listed in the job description, is legitimate.

Jd. Likewise, in reviewing the job description here, the SPA position clearly required “applicable
knowledge and background in finance, management and marketing.” Therefore no improper motive can
be attributed to the Board’s decision to focus on that particular element of the job description in its search
for the best candidate to fill the position. This Court is not a super-personnel board, and as such, it may
not punish an employer for choices that constitute business decisions alone, no matter how unwise or
mistaken they may seem. Jd.

Moreover, this Court is not persuaded to presume pretext on the Board’s part solely because Mr.
Brownlee may not frequently utilize his finance background in the SPA position. First, Ms. Surico’s
assertion that the Board deliberately crafted a job description centered on Mr. Brownlee’s skills is
completely unfounded. She points to no support in the record for that allegation, and therefore the Court
will disregard the accusation. Furthermore, the mere fact that Mr. Brownlee uses other skills in fulfilling
his job duties does not invalidate the legitimate business reason given for choosing him over Ms. Surico.
At the time the job description was created and the Board made its hiring decision, it intended for the SPA
to focus on the finance, marketing and management aspects of the job. Ms. Surico has not provided a
scintilla of evidence demonstrating the Board’s business rationale was a sham or was not based in fact. Id.

Next, Ms. Surico points to comments by others as evidence of pretext. She claims a Board
member commented they should keep their fingers crossed that Mr. Brownlee does the job. In addition,
she contends both Dr. Murphy, the District Superintendent, and the other rejected candidate, Ms. Hogsett,

encouraged her to legally pursue the matter of not being hired. Regardless of those comments, Ms. Surico

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION Dom
ETE
MA R On
JULIE SURICO, ) Lom
Plaintiff, ) 02
)
) CASE NO. 00 C 6536
y. )
) JUDGE WILLIAM J. HIBBLER
)
ILLINOIS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 88, )
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending in this employment discrimination action is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The Court has examined the submissions by the parties, and now determines summary judgment should
be granted in favor of Defendant.

I, Background

Plaintiff Julie Surico is a White female who is currently employed by Defendant Illinois School
District No. 88 (“District”) as a schoolteacher. In August 1999, during a School Board meeting Marilyn
Thurman, President of the Board and chairperson of the Personne] Committee, recommended the Board
establish the position of Special Projects Assistant (“SPA”). At the same meeting, Ms. Thurman suggested
the Board offer the SPA position to Edward Brownlee, an African-American male who was not a District
employee. The Board followed both of Ms. Thurman’s recommendations. Upon learning of the Board’s
actions, the teacher’s union filed a grievance alleging the Board violated the collective bargaining
agreement by filling a position without first posting it for five days. In response, the Board rescinded the
creation of the position and the hiring of Mr. Brownlee,

On September 16, 1999, the District posted the position of Special Projects Assistant. According
to the job description, the qualifications sought included: (1) B.A. or B.S. in related field; (2) Applicable

knowledge and background in finance, management, and marketing; (3) Minimum of three years


experience in either fund raising, educational training or community based social services agency group
organizing. The primary goal of the job was identified as organizing and planning educational
projects/programs that would extend learning opportunities for students in the District. Three applicants
submitted resumes for the position, Ms. Surico, Mr. Brownlee, and Hilder Hogsett, an African-American
female District employee, and each was subsequently interviewed by a team of school administrators
appointed by Dr. Phylistine Murphy, the District Superintendent. Following those interviews, the
committee ranked the applicants. Ms. Surico scored 188 points, Ms. Hogsett scored 164 points and Mr.
Brownlee scored 160 points. Consequently, Dr. Murphy recommended Ms. Surico to the Board for the
SPA position.

However, after considering Dr. Murphy’s non-binding recommendation and reviewing the
applicant’s resumes, the Board decided Mr. Brownlee, not Ms. Surico, was the applicant best suited for
the SPA position. Specifically, the Board noted Mr. Brownlee had a MBA from Dominican University,
as well as prior experience in the areas of finance, management and marketing, while Ms. Surico held a
Master’s degree in Early Childhood Education from Concordia University along with several years of
teaching experience. After comparing the resumes to the criteria listed in the job description, the Board
concluded Mr. Brownlee with his more extensive financial background was a better match for the SPA
position than Ms. Surico. Therefore the Board re-offered the position to Mr. Brownlee, who accepted the
job and is currently employed by the District in that role.

After being denied the SPA position, Ms. Surico filed a charge with the EEOC, and then brought
this lawsuit against the District claiming race and gender discrimination. The District moves for summary
judgment, contending Ms. Surico cannot point to any evidence demonstrating the Board impermissibly
relied on race or gender in selecting Mr. Brownlee for the SPA position. Ms. Surico maintains the record
contains a wealth of circumstantial evidence that raises an issue of fact as to whether the District’s reasons
for not hiring her are pretextual, and therefore summary judgment must be denied.

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