and (2) whether the state court judgment caused the injury of which the plaintiffcomplains. See Schmitt
v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 2003). If the answer to both questions is in the affirmative, the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies, and the lower federal court is without subject matter jurisdiction.
See id,

I. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims are inextricably intertwined with the Judgment of the
Circuit Court. First, Plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to assert her claims that she had a right to
rescind the Mortgage and that the Mortgage is void. The facts on which Plaintiff relies to make her
claims existed when Defendant filed its foreclosure action. However, Plaintiff inexplicably failed to
raise these claims before the Circuit Court on in an appeal of the Judgment. We cannot hear Plaintiff's
claims simply because she chose not to raise the issues before the State court.

Second, Plaintiff is trying to get relief in federal court from a State Circuit Court Judgment.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's Truth-in-Lending Statement violated TILA, and asks this Court to
declare her March 2002 rescission valid. She also requests an injunction to prevent further foreclosure
proceedings on her home. In essence, Plaintiff's numerous past filings, as well as her present action, all
endeavor to remedy one injury ~ foreclosure on her home. This injury stems directly from the Circuit
Court Judgment of Foreclosure. Implicit in the Circuit Court Judgment was that court's determination
that the Mortgage was valid. Plaintiff's complaint asks us to draw a different conclusion than that
reached by the Circuit Court. As a consequence, we are without subject matter jurisdiction to hear

Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.

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1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires dismissal of claims over which the federal
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the “power to decide” and must be conferred upon
the federal court. Jn re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., 794 F.2d 1182, 1188 (7th Cir. 1986).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may look beyond the
complaint to other evidence submitted by the parties to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists. See United Transp. Union v. Gateway Western Ry. Co., 78 F.3d 1208, 1210 (7th Cir. 1996). The
plaintiff faced with a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss bears the burden of establishing that the jurisdictional
requirements have been met. See Kontos v. United States Dept. of Labor, 826 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir.
1987).

Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, we “lack jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of
state-court determinations.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1531, 95
L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 443, 44 S.Ct.
149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923)); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct.
1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has sole federal jurisdiction over
such judgments. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 486, 103 S.Ct. at 1314, 1317; see also Rooker, 263 U.S.
at 46, 44 S.Ct. at 150; Landers Seed Co. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank, 15 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1994).

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine further dictates that a district court may not entertain a claim that,
while not raised in the state court proceeding, is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16, 103 S.Ct. at 1316 n. 16; see also Ritter, 992 F.2d at 753. In examining
whether a federal claim is “inextricably intertwined,” the crucial inquiry “is whether 'the district court
is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.” Ritter, 992 F.2d at 754 (quoting
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-484 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1316 n. 16). To that end, the Seventh Circuit

considers: (1) whether the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise the current claims in state court,

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1)."

It is so ordered.

7a
MARVIN E. ASPEN /
United States District Judge

Dated ef gf oD

‘Because we have dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1), we need nto consider
Defendant’s alternative grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

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Minate Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judi i Sitting Judge if Oth
vor Magistrate Judge Marvin Aspen than Assigned dudge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 3256 DATE 8/19/2003
CASE Julia Thompson vs. Ameriquest Mortgage Co.
TITLE

of the motion being presented.)

Lin the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) im} Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) D Brief in support of motion due

(3) o Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___.

(4) O Ruling/Hearingon__sset fora

(5) o Status hearing(held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor att

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__—ssat_—
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for)on__at

(8) o (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto_—at_ i.

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

OD FRCP4(m) [Local Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a)(t1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

is granted. The status hearing set for 8/28/03 is stricken.

(i) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

(10) MH [Other docketentry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order: Defendant’s motion to dismiss (3-1)

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. number of notices

A | Notices maited by judge's staff.

AUG, 2,1 2003

Notified counsel by telephone. due docketed

Docketing to mail notices.

SY | Mail Ao 450 form pana Jot Si
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. Hat9
8/19/2003
es Io sted nti
courtroom si:o WY 12 te muiled notice
GL deputy’s deayg o
initials NSF ee cacaras cous

Date/time received if ; i

central Clerk’s Office railing deputy injtials



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Julia THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 03 C 3256

AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,

werner

DOEKETED

AUG 2 1 2093

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Julia Thompson (“Thompson” or “Plaintiff’) has filed a complaint before this Court alleging
that a debt owed to Ameriquest Mortgage Company (“Ameriquest” or “Defendant”) is invalid pursuant
to the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §1601 and its implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. §224
(“Regulation Z”). Presently before us is Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, we grant Defendant’s motion
to dismiss.
BACKGROUND

On April 11, 2001, Plaintiff entered into a $68,000 loan transaction (the “Mortgage”)with
Defendant to refinance her home. Pursuant to TILA, Plaintiff had the right to rescind the transaction
within three days. According to Plaintiff, the Truth-in-Lending disclosure statement provided by
Defendant did not accurately state all material terms of the transaction. Plaintiff contends that this
omission resulted in an extension of Plaintiff's right to rescind to three years. Plaintiff subsequently
defaulted on her mortgage payment. Defendant responded by filing an action to foreclose on the

Mortgage in the Circuit Court of Cook County. On August 13, 2002, the Circuit Court entered a

g


Judgment of Foreclosure and Order of Sale (the “Judgment”), scheduling the sale for November 14,
2002. Plaintiff neither challenged allegations in the foreclosure complaint nor appealed the Judgment.
Plaintiff also failed to redeem the property during the redemption period.

Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois on November 13, 2002. The Bankruptcy Court denied Plaintiff's petition.
On March 12, 2003, Plaintiff attempted to rescind the Mortgage by signing a “notice of cancellation”
and faxing a copy to Defendant’s counsel. Plaintiff then filed an Amended Chapter 13 Plan claiming
the Mortgage was void because of her attempted rescission. Plaintiff also filed a complaint in the
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District requesting declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a
modification of rescission procedures. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the Plaintiff's Amended Chapter
13 Plan and dismissed her complaint without prejudice on April 17, 2003.

On May 15, 2003, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint before this Court, alleging that the
mortgage held by Defendant is void due to her rescission. Plaintiff asks this Court to:(1) declare that
Plaintiff had a valid right to rescind the Mortgage and that the Mortgage is void; (2) enjoin Defendant
from further acting to foreclose on her home; and (3) modify the repayment method provided for by
TILA rescission procedures. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the instant complaint on June 12, 2003
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, alternatively, that Plaintiff's claims are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is to decide the adequacy of the

complaint, not the merits of the case. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.

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