violation of the FCRA as a matter of law on summary judgment also precludes an
award of statutory or punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees at this stage in
the litigation. See Chester v. Purvis, 2003 WL 22454885 at *3-4 (S.D.Ind. Oct. 22,
2003) (denying summary judgment as to damages because there was a question of
fact as to whether defendant's actions were willful under the Act).
Count Il - intrusion Upon Seclusion

Finally, plaintiff seeks summary judgment on her common law tort claim for
intrusion upon seclusion (Count Il). Initially, we note “it is unsettled whether the
common law of Illinois recognizes such a claim” because the Illinois Supreme Court
failed to recognize the tort in Lovgren.” Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743-44
(7th Cir. 2002) (citing Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 126 \l.2d 411,
534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ill. 1989); Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 311 Ill App.3d 573, 723
N.E.2d 1192, 1195 (Ill. App. 2000). In Muick, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
the tort was “generally recognized,” but failed to address whether it thought the Illinois
Supreme Court will recognize it. Muick, 280 F.3d at 743. For the purposes of this case,
we need not address whether the Illinois Supreme Court will recognize the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion because even if it exists, plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient
facts to support each element of the tort. Count Il must be dismissed.

To establish the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, plaintiff must plead and prove
the following four elements: “(1) an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff's
seclusion; (2) an intrusion that is offensive to a reasonable person; (3) the matter upon

which the intrusion occurs is private; and (4) the intrusion causes anguish and

13


report on April 3, 2002, and, therefore, plaintiff's claim must fail as a matter of law.*

A review of the FCRA is the natural starting point for our analysis. The FCRA is
a consumer protection statute regulating the actions of both credit reporting agencies
and those requesting credit information from them. See 15 U.S.C. §1681b stating :

[Alny consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under
the following circumstances and no other: ...

(2) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it
relates,

(3) To a person which it has reason to believe -...
(F) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information —
(i) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the
consumer, or
(ii) to review an account to determine whether the consumer
continues to meet the terms of the account. . .
15 U.S.C. §1681b (emphasis added).
Subject to subsection (c) of the section, 1681b(a) provides an exhaustive list of the
authorized or permissible purposes for obtaining a consumer credit report. §1681b(f)
further provides that “it is unlawful for any person to use or obtain a credit report for an
unauthorized purpose.” Castro v. Union Nissan, Inc., 2002 WL 1466810 at “3 (N.D. Ill.
July 8, 2002). Therefore, if plaintiff can show, through the undisputed facts in the
evidentiary record, that defendants did not access her credit report on April 3, 2002

under one of the circumstances outlined above, defendants have violated §1681b(f)

and plaintiff is entitled to judgment in her favor as a matter of law. Conversely, if

3Although we previously denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment for failure to
comply with Local Rule 56.1, for completeness we address the substantive arguments
contained therein.



440, 451 n.11 (7th Cir. 1988).° This broad definition “allows consumer reports to be
used for legitimate business purposes while preventing the use of consumer reports for
improper purposes.” /d. Preparation for litigation can qualify as a permissible purpose
under the broad language of §1681b(a)(3)(F). See Allen, 1992 WL 206285 at *2
(N.D.III. Aug. 17, 1992) (“Preparation for litigation regarding a business debt qualifies as
a permissible purpose under the broad language of [the subsection.]”).

In Allen, the defendant law firm requested plaintiff's credit report in preparation
for litigation regarding a business debt. /d. Specifically, defendant's client filed a
countersuit against the plaintiff alleging nonpayment of a corporate account. /d. at *1.
The court found that the obligations running between defendant's client and the plaintiff
were “business transactions” and lawsuits based on them were “in connection” with
those transactions. /d. at *2. The court also found that the collection of an allegedly
unpaid account constituted “a legitimate business need” under the Act. /d. Therefore,
the defendant law firm had a permissible purpose. /d. at 3. The court further noted that
“[a] different result may have been reached if the report had been acquired in
connection with litigation that did not involve liability for a commercial obligation deriving

from a business transaction between the parties.” /d. at 3, n. 4.

“Ippolito refers to §1681b(3)(E), the “business need exception,” which stated that a
consumer report could be furnished to a person who “otherwise has a legitimate business need
for the information in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer.” §1681b
was amended at least twice after /ppolito. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-07, §311(a), 111 Stat. 2248, *2256 (1997); Consumer Credit Reform Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §2403, 110 Stat. 3009-430 (1996). Pursuant to the 1996
amendment, the “business need exception” was re-labeled §1681b(a)(3)(F) and is now limited
to business transactions initiated by the consumer, as opposed to business transactions
involving the consumer.


A. | believe | may have. Yeah, | may have. ...

Q. Do you remember when the call was?

A. Dol remember? Only by reading the file. Yeah, | think it was April
2001. ...

Q. Why did you call her?

A. Because we got this lawsuit that you had initiated. ...

Q. What was — other than the fact that you got the lawsuit papers, what
was the purpose of your call?

A. To find out what was — what she was talking about. | didn’t know what
her claim was about. That's all.

Q. What did you say to her and what did she say to you in that call?

A. ...But| know she said something about her credit bureau file and if |

could get a copy of it, and! did. ...

Q. Did you have any discussions during that conversation about obtaining

her credit report?

A. Yes, she asked me to getit. ...

Based on the foregoing exchange, plaintiff concludes that “Mr. Hoffman’s own
testimony indicated that he did not think he had a permissible purpose to get the report
until plaintiff asked him to do so.” Pi.’s Response to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.
Plaintiff further argues that “If, as defendants contend, plaintiff's filing a lawsuit in state
court gave them a permissible purpose to pull the report, there would have been no
need for Mr. Hoffman to telephone plaintiff, and only after she allegedly asked him to
obtain her credit report, for him to get the report.” /d. We cannot accept plaintiff's
inferences on summary judgment. As stated supra, we must construe the evidence
and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party, in this instance, defendants. See Pitasi, 184 F.3d at 714.

After reviewing Hoffman's deposition and the remainder of the evidentiary



defendants had a permissible purpose for accessing plaintiff's credit report under the
Act, then they necessarily did not access it under false pretenses.* Pappas v. City of
Calumet, 9 F.Supp.2d 943, 949 (N.D.ill 1998); Allen v. Kirkland & Ellis, 1992 WL
206285 at *2 (N.D.III. Aug. 17, 1992).

Before we can determine whether defendants’ purpose in accessing plaintiff's
credit report was “permissible”, we must first identify their purpose. Without a citation to
the record, plaintiff argues that defendant Hoffman accessed her credit report on behalf
of AAACCC for the purpose of “trying to help a former client,” or based on plaintiffs
alleged oral consent. Pl.’s Memo at 4. Also without a citation to the record, defendants
disagree, arguing that they accessed plaintiff's credit report in connection with the
defense of plaintiff's State Case against them.

After reviewing the evidentiary record before us, we find a factual dispute as to
defendants’ purpose in accessing Minter’s credit report on April 3, 2002. Plaintiff cites
to pages 136-37 of Hoffman's deposition, which contain the following questions from
plaintiffs attorney and answers from Hoffman:

Q. Only one phone call between you and Ms. Dennis?
A. | believe that was it, yes. ...

Q. Who initiated that call, you or her?

Without citation to applicable law, plaintiff argues that defendants accessed her report
under false pretenses because they did not access it to “check for [a consumer] who [was]
consolidating fher] bills,” the purpose stated on defendants’ membership application with
Experian. Pl.’s 56.1 Statement, Ex. H (membership application). This argument is contrary to
the law in this district. See Allen, 1992 WL 206285 at *2 (“[I]n order to maintain [a] false
pretenses claim against [defendant], plaintiff must allege and establish that [defendant]
obtained the consumer report for an ‘impermissible purpose.”). As long as defendants had a
permissible purpose is accessing plaintiff report, whether that purpose coincided with the one
listed on its membership application with Experian is of no import.

5



does not merit the remedy plaintiff seeks. Regardless of whether we consider
defendants’ purported purpose, to aid in preparing a defense to plaintiff's State Case,
there is still a genuine issue as to a material fact in the evidentiary record before us.
The record leaves open the question of defendants’ “real” purpose. Defendants’ “real”
Teason for accessing plaintiff's credit report is a question of fact, which we must leave
for the jury to decide. On the record before us, a reasonable jury could find that
defendants accessed the report (1) based on plaintiff's alleged oral consent, (2) to aid
their defense of plaintiff's state claim, or (3) for some other reason. Because we cannot
determine defendants’ purpose in accessing the report, we cannot determine whether
Or not it was permissible as a matter of law, precluding summary judgment on Count |
as to liability.

However, for completeness, we will address plaintiff's argument that even if
defendants accessed her credit report to aid in defending against her State Case, that
does not constitute a permissible purpose under §1681 b(a)(3)(F), and, therefore, was a
violation of the Act as a matter of law.> Specifically, Minter seeks a ruling that the
defense of her State Case does not constitute “a legitimate business need for the
information in connection with a business transaction that [was] initiated by [her].”

In determining whether a consumer report was obtained for a permissible

purpose §1681b(a)(3)(F) should be broadly construed. See Ippolito v. WNS, 864 F.2d

SAt one time, defendants may have contemplated arguing that they had a permissible
Purpose in accessing plaintiff's credit report pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681b(a)(2), which provides
for the furnishing of a consumer report “[ijn accordance with the written instructions of the
consumer to whom it related.” However, both parties agree that plaintiff never provided
AAACCC or Hoffman written consent to access her credit report on April 3, 2002, rendering
§1681b(a)(2) inapplicable to the facts of this case.

8


Minute ORier Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Michael T. Mason

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 8698 DATE 7/19/2004
CASE Minter vs. AAA Cook County Consolidation et al
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
ag a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) im Brief in support of motion due
QB) Qo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) ao Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) QO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) i) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) OlLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a\(2).
ao) «xf (Other docket entry} For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion, plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment [16-1] is denied. There is a genuine issue of fact as to defendants’ purpose
in accessing plaintiff's credit report, precluding a finding on summary judgment as to liability in Count
I. Plaintiff's claim for actual damages in Count I is denied. Count II is dismissed with prejudice. Status
hearing set for 8/19/04 at 9:00 a.m. At that time, a date for a settlement conference or trial will be set. The
trial, if necessary, will be solely as to Count I and will address liability and, if applicable, statutory and
punitive damages.
al) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
2
No notices required, umber of notices
o | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

2004

keted

L dg.

Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

ansi2004

courtroom ar yout . date miled notice
KF deputy’s «
initials \

Sregeividen

mailing deputy initials

ani



need” for the credit report. See Spence, 92 F.3d at 383. Furthermore, the alleged
contractual obligation of AAACCC to pay Minter’s creditors on a timely basis is a
“business transaction” that was “initiated by the consumer, [Minter]." The facts of our
case appear to fit within the purview of §1681b. However, as stated supra, because
defendants’ “real” purpose for accessing the report is disputed and thus a question for
the jury, we cannot reach the issue of whether or not their purpose was permissible as
a matter of law.

Damages

Next, plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the issue of damages. Plaintiff is
seeking actual, statutory and punitive damages for defendants’ alleged negligent and/or
willful noncompliance with the FCRA. §16810 governs damages for negligent
noncompliance stating, “[alny person who is negligent in failing to comply with any
requirements imposed under [the Act] with respect to any consumer is liable to that
consumer” for actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees for a successful action to
enforce liability.

As a matter of law, plaintiff cannot succeed on her negligent noncompliance
damage claim because there is no evidence in the record to support her claim for actual
damages. Plaintiff merely states that “[ulpon finding out that [AAACCC] had obtained
her credit report without her permission, plaintiff felt angry, humiliated, frustrated and
embarrassed.” PI.’s 56.1 Statement, Ex. F (Minter Aff. 94). “When an injured party
provides the only evidence of any emotional distress or mental anguish, [she] must

reasonably and sufficiently explain the circumstances of the injury, and not rely on mere

11



In Spence, the Sixth Circuit held that the defendant reporting agency did not
violate the Act by providing a credit report to a party (“requestor”) who requested it to
aid in preparing a defense to a lawsuit, initiated by the subject of the credit report,
alleging false reporting of a past-due debt. Spence v. TRW, Inc., 92 F.3d 380, 383 (6th
Cir. 1996). The court held that ‘the filing of the lawsuit obviously gave the [reporting
agency] reason to believe that the [requestor] had a ‘legitimate business need’ for the
report, such a need having arisen in connection with the preparation of [requestor’s]
defense to the lawsuit.” /d. (citing /ppolito, 864 F.2d 440, 450-52).

The Sixth Circuit revisited the issue in Duncan v. Handmaker, noting that
“{w]hile a lawsuit occasionally may give rise to a ‘legitimate business need’ for a
consumer report, trial preparation generally does not fall within the scope of §1681b.”
149 F.3d 424, 427 n.4 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). However, the court
also recognized that litigation has been found to be a permissible purpose under the
Act when the litigation relates to the collection of a debt. /d. “As the litigation moves
outside the realm of debt collection, however, it is less likely — although not altogether
impossible — that an attorney will obtain the report for a purpose that is within the
purview of §1681b.” /d. (citing Spence, 92 F.3d at 383).

In the instant case, AAACCC purportedly obtained Minter’s credit report to aid in
defending against her claim that they, inter alia, breached their contractual obligation to
pay her creditors on a timely basis. It seems to us that under the broad interpretation of
§1681b(a)(3)(F), and the relevant case law, defendants’ proposed purpose would be

permissible. The filing of the lawsuit against AAACCC provided a “legitimate business

10



record, we cannot find any evidence conclusively stating defendants’ purpose for
accessing plaintiff's credit report. Hoffman was not asked his purpose in his deposition.
Additionally, neither side provided us with interrogatory answers or any other evidence
containing defendants’ purpose for accessing the report. On summary judgment we
cannot infer that defendants’ purpose was to access plaintiff's credit report based on
plaintiffs oral consent.

ot

Because we cannot determine defendants’ “real” purpose in accessing the credit
report, we cannot analyze whether it was permissible under §1681b(a)(3)(F). See
Larason v. Logan Consumer Discount Co., 1991 WL 34308 at *2 (E.D.Pa. March 8,
1991) (In an FCRA case, the court cannot reach the issue of whether a purpose is
permissible if there is “a genuine dispute on the factual question of whether defendants’
proffered reason was their real reason for obtaining the report.”); see also Sawyer v.
United States, 831 F.2d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[Blecause the evidentiary record was
incomplete and genuine issues of material fact could exist . . . summary judgment is
inappropriate.”).

In an attempt to sidestep this factual dispute, plaintiff argues that defendants’
averment that they accessed the report to aid in defending against plaintiff's State Case
should be disregarded because defendants’ failed to provide factual support for the
statement. True, defendants should not make unsubstantiated factual averments in
their submissions to the court. Local Rule 56.1 mandates that instead of speculating as

to Hoffman’s purpose, defendants should have submitted an affidavit from Hoffman

stating his actual purpose for accessing Minter’s credit report. However, this oversight



orally requesting, or consenting to, Hoffman accessing her credit report on April 3,
2002.?
Legal Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), Flores v. Preferred Technical Group, 182 F.3d 512, 514 (7th
Cir.1999). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court construes the
evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Pitasi v. Gartner Group, Inc., 184 F.3d 709,
714 (7th Cir. 1999). The movant bears the burden of establishing that there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Count | - Violation of the FCRA
Liability

Plaintiff argues the evidentiary record shows beyond dispute that defendants
violated 15 U.S.C. §1681b because they lacked a permissible purpose to obtain her
credit report on April 3, 2002, and they used false pretenses to obtain the report in
violation of 15 U.S.C. §1681q. PI.’s Memo in Support of Mot. (“PI.’s Memo’) at 3-4.

Defendants disagree, arguing had a permissible purpose for requesting plaintiff's credit

*This factual dispute, as discussed infra, is not material to the outcome of plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment.



suffering.” Mlynek v. Household Fin. Corp., 2000 WL 1310666, *3 (Sept. 13, 2000
N.D.IIL.) (citing Johnson, 311 IIL App.3d at 577.). We begin by analyzing element four
because it is dispositive of plaintiff's claim. Under Illinois law, to succeed on Count Il,
Minter must prove that the alleged intrusion “caused anguish and suffering.” “Schmidt v.
Ameritech Illinois, 768 N.E.2d 303, 315 (tll. App. Ct. 2002). To meet her burden, she
“must prove actual injury in the form of, for example, medical care, an inability to steep
or work, or a loss of reputation and integrity in the community.” /d. at 316. “Injury is not
presumed.” /d. Additionally, a causal relationship between plaintiff's anguish and
defendant's alleged intrusion must be established. /d. at 317.

As discussed supra, Minter has failed to provide any evidence to support her
alleged anguish and suffering. The extent of plaintiffs evidence is her own statement
that she felt “angry, humiliated, frustrated and embarrassed.” PI.’s 56.1 Statement, Ex.
F (Minter Aff. 9/4). This is insufficient as a matter of law. Moreover, plaintiff has failed
to produce any evidence to support a causal relationship between her unproven
anguish and defendants’ alleged intrusion. Therefore, Count II is dismissed with
prejudice.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is
denied. There is a genuine issue of fact as to defendants’ purpose in accessing
plaintiff's credit report, precluding a finding on summary judgment as to liability in Count
|. Plaintiff's claim for actual damages in Count | is denied. Count Il is dismissed with

prejudice. The parties are ordered to appear for a status hearing on August 19, 2004.

14



Background

The following facts are drawn from parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements and are
undisputed unless otherwise noted. Minter was a customer of AAACCC, a debt
consolidation company, from approximately January, 2001 to May, 2001. During that
period, Minter and AAACCC entered into an agreement relative to plaintiff's credit
obligations. Plaintiff terminated the agreement in May, 2001. Thereafter, on March 27,
2002, plaintiff filed suit against AAACCC in the Circuit Court of Cook County alleging,
inter alia, damages relating to her previous contractual relationship with AAACCC. See
Dennis v. AAA Cook County Consolidation, Inc., No. 02 CH 6207 (“State Case”).
Specifically, plaintiffs state complaint alleges, in pertinent part, :

[Minter] enrolled as a client with [AAACCC] because she wanted to

consolidate her credit card bills into one bill with one lump-sum payment

to her creditors, in order to avoid late fees and possible harm to her credit

rating. [AAACCC}] charged [Minter], and [Minter] paid, client account fees.

As part of its agreement with [Minter], [AAACCC] promised to pay

creditors on a timely basis. However, [AAACCC] failed to pay creditors on

a timely basis.

States Case Complaint Jf] 12-15.

At the time Minter filed her State Case, she did not have a business relationship
with AAACCC. AAACCC was served in the State Case on April 3, 2002. That same
day, Hoffman, then president of AAACCC, accessed Minter’s credit report from
Experian, a credit reporting agency, on behalf of AAACCC. Minter did not provide
AAACCC with written consent to access her credit report on April 3, 2002. In his

deposition, Hoffman stated that Minter provided him oral consent to access her credit

report in a telephone conversation. This fact is disputed. In her affidavit, Minter denied



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SHYLONDA Y. MINTER fik/a/
SHYLONDA Y. DENNIS,

nl ag
! t

Plaintiff, JUL F 9 2004

No. 02 C 8698

v.

Mag. Judge Michael T. Mason

AAA COOK COUNTY CONSOLIDATION,

INC. and BEN HOFFMAN,

~eree SSS SS SS

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Michael T. Mason, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Yolanda Minter (“Minter”) filed a two-count complaint against defendants
AAA Cook County Consolidation, Inc. (‘AAACCC”) and Ben Hoffman (“Hoffman”)
alleging a violation of The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681 ef seg. (“FCRA”
or “Act”) and the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. The parties filed cross
motions for summary judgement. We denied defendants’ motion for summary
judgment in open court on March 25, 2004.' Now, we address plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment. For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion is DENIED and Count

ll is dismissed with prejudice.

' We denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment because they failed to comply
with Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 for a second time. See Waldrige v. American
Hoeschst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1994). At that time, we also ordered defendants
to provide a supplemental response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and supporting
material because defendants’ original response failed to address a number of the issues raised
therein.


conclusory statement.” Quinn v. Experian Solutions, 2004 WL 609357 at *5 (N.D.ill.
Mar. 24, 2004) (quoting Field v. Trans Union L.L.C, 2002 WL 849589 at *6 (N.D.III. May
3, 2002); see also Schmit v. Trans Union L.L.C, 2004 WL 785098 at *4 (N.D.ill. Apr. 12,
2004) (“generalized claims of emotional injury are not enough to establish damages.”).
Minter has failed to sufficiently explain her emotional distress and thus cannot recover
damages for defendants’ alleged negligent noncompliance with the FCRA as a matter
of law. See Quinn, 2004 WL 609357 at *5.

Plaintiff also seeks summary judgement on her damage claim for defendants’
allegedly willful noncompliance with the FCRA. §1681n governs damages for willful
noncompliance stating :

Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed

under [the Act] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer

[for]...

(1) (A)... actual damages . . . of not less than $100 and not more than

$1,000; or

(B) in the case of liability of a natural person for obtaining a consumer
report under false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible
purpose, actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of
the failure or $1,000, whichever is greater;

(2)... punitive damages .. . ; and

(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under this

section, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney's fees as

determined by the court.

15 U.S.C. §1681n.

As stated above, there is a genuine dispute as to defendants’ purpose in

obtaining plaintiff's credit report, precluding definitive findings as to the permissibility of

the disputed purpose and whether the Act was violated. Plaintiff's failure to establish a

12


At that time, we will set a date for a settlement conference or a trial. The trial, if
necessary, will be solely as to Count | and will address liability and, if applicable,

statutory and punitive damages. It is so ordered.

ENTER:

MICHAEL T. mea

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: July /7 , 2004

15