pay any and all just costs and actual expenses, including
attorneys! fees, that Peggy may have incurred (or may hereafter
incur before receiving notice of this opinion and order), as the
same section permits. Finally, as is authorized by this District
Court's LR 81.2(b), the Clerk is ordered to mail the certified

copy of the remand order forthwith.

CMe DE cele

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: July 8, 2002


U.S. 46, 54-55 (1981) is patently beside the mark.

Just a few additional comments as to the total absence of
federal subject matter jurisdiction are worth making.
Christopher's Notice, filed on July 2, jumped the gun on Peggy's
Petition, which the attached papers show had been noticed up for
presentment to the state Circuit Court on that same day. Nothing

in the Petition, although it does refer to Christopher's Southern

District Action, seeks to enjoin that lawsuit. And even were the
Circuit Court induced by Peggy to enter an order hereafter that

might have some collateral impact on that Southern District

Action, Rooker-Feldman principles (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)) would preclude this Court from
interfering with that judgment. And even if it were somehow
arguably appropriate, in aid of federal jurisdiction, to enter
some federal restraining order despite Rooker-Feldman and despite
the proscriptions of the Anti-Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. §2283),
it would be for the District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois--and not for this Court--to consider that possibility.

In sum, each of several different perspectives confirms that
federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking here. That being
so, 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) mandates the remand of this action to its
state court of origin, and this Court so orders. Under the

circumstances it is also appropriate to require Christopher to


"Minute Order Feb (067)

LR United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Nam signed i Sitting Judge if Oth
or Magistrate Judge Milton I. Shadur than assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 4700 DATE 7/8/2002
CASE Peggy J. Wickline-Briggs vs. Christopher A. Briggs
TITLE

[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature.

of the motion being presented,]

ay

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im] Brief in support of motion due

(3) im} Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue____.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on setfor sat

(5) Oo Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—sset for at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—ssetfor_—at_

(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for]on at

(8) o {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto at.

(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CUFRCP4(m) O General Rule21 OFRCP41(a)(1) CM FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) ff [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. In sum, each of several different

perspectives confirms that federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking here. That being so, 28 U.S.C.
1447(c) mandates the remand of this action to its state court of origin and this Court so orders. As
authorized by this District Court’s LR 81.2(b), the clerk is ordered to mail the certified coy of the remand

order forthwith.

a [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. number of notices

Document
‘Number

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. JUL 9.9.2002

wv | Docketing to mail notices.
v Mail AO 450 form. docketing/dgputy initials
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. : 4
courtroom 21:8 WY G~ nr 20 date nied notice
SN deputy's
initials
UT Galrideddigte in ; :
central Clerk’s Office snaiing deputy initials

a



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
PEGGY J. WICKLINE-BRIGGS,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 02 € 4700

CHRISTOPHER A. BRIGGS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Christopher Briggs (“Christopher”), defendant in a state
court action for dissolution of marriage brought by Peggy
Wickline-Briggs (“Peggy”)--an action from which an appeal by
Christopher is now pending in the Illinois Appellate Court--has
filed a Notice of Removal (“Notice”) by which he seeks to shift
that action to this District Court. Christopher's theory (see
Notice 42) is that federal subject matter jurisdiction over that
lawsuit, which was concededly lacking from its outset in the year
2000, was created when on June 14, 2002 Peggy filed a Verified
Petition for Restraining Order, Injunction and Other Relief, and
Petition To Compel Compliance with Court Order (“Petition”).

According to one of the exhibits attached to the bulky
Notice,’ the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,

Lake County, Illinois entered its judgment of dissolution of

1 That document is attached as Ex. C to the Complaint in
another federal action, which was initiated by Christopher in
dune of this year in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois (“Southern District Action”).


os ot

marriage (which it awarded to both parties) on February 21, 2002.
What remains hotly contested in the post-judgment phase of that
divorce action are the parties' respective rights and obligations
in what had been marital real estate in Carbondale,
Illinois--that dispute has spawned (1) Christopher's appeal to
the Illinois Appellate Court, (2) Peggy's Petition and

(3) Christopher's Southern District Action.

Although the 1-1/2” thick Notice and its attachments reveal
no end of imagination on Christopher's part (he has launched
attacks of every kind on the multifarious court proceedings that
have marked the parties' acrimonious disputes) ,? this current
effort by Christopher to move the parties' battles to still
another arena is singularly ill-conceived. Even where diversity
of citizenship exists (as it does not here), the federal courts
have historically stayed out of domestic relations disputes as a
judicially created exception to federal jurisdiction (see the
extended discussion beginning at 13 B Charles Wright, Arthur

Miller and Edward Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure:

Jurisdiction 2d §3609 (2d ed. 1984)). And there is no arguable
federal question jurisdiction here either: Notice 94's statutory
and federal constitutional references are clearly inapplicable

bootstraps, and Notice 9's reference to Ridqway v. Ridqway, 454

2 This Court of course expresses no substantive views on

whether either ex-spouse's grievances against the other were or
are either with or without merit.

2