Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1813 | January 30, 2020 Page 1 of 7

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mario Garcia

Brattain Minnix Garcia

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Myriam Serrano-Colon

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Charles R. Tyson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

January 30, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1813 

Appeal from the Henry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable David L. McCord, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

33C03-1707-CM-652

Riley, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1813 | January 30, 2020 Page 2 of 7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Charles Tyson (Tyson), appeals his conviction for 

resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-

1(a)(1).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Tyson presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State 

presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Tyson of 

resisting law enforcement.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] At approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 14, 2017, New Castle police officer Brandy 

Pierce (Officer Pierce) was traveling northbound in a marked police vehicle on 

South 15th Street in New Castle, Indiana. Officer Pierce observed Tyson 

walking eastbound on a cross street. As Officer Pierce passed by Tyson, Tyson 

looked at her vehicle, turned around, and went the other way. When Officer 

Pierce passed the intersection, she observed Tyson turning back around and 

continuing to walk east. Tyson appeared to sway and “he stumbled or tripped” 

as he turned. (Transcript p. 39). Officer Pierce became suspicious as it 

“seemed like [Tyson] was trying to avoid [the officer] when he saw the marked 

patrol car.” (Tr. p. 39). Officer Pierce turned her vehicle around and 

approached Tyson. 
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[5] At the corner of Shroyer and 15th Street, Officer Pierce initiated contact with 

Tyson. She could smell an odor of alcohol and marijuana. Tyson “was 

uncooperative, refusing to stop, continuously having his hands in his pockets, 

backing away, telling me that he had done nothing wrong, that he did not have 

to stop.” (Tr. p. 39). As the situation appeared to escalate, Officer Pierce 

requested backup. Tyson persisted in keeping his hands in his pockets and 

Officer Pierce “could see that there were items in his pockets.” (Tr. p. 39). 

Officer Pierce tried to explain that Tyson could not keep his hands in his 

pockets and to keep his hands where she could see them. “He was warned 

repeatedly if he didn’t keep his hands where [Officer Pierce] could see them, 

that he would be tased.” (Tr. p. 40). Tyson turned around, his hands still 

hidden from view, and began climbing steps to a house, continuing to disregard 

Officer Pierce’s commands. Officer Pierce administered her taser, which 

caused Tyson to fall down the steps. When the taser stopped, Tyson was again 

belligerent and uncooperative, and refused to put his hands behind his back. 

Officer Pierce administered her taser a second time and was able to handcuff 

Tyson. He was subsequently placed under arrest. 

[6] On July 14, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Tyson with resisting 

law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor; public intoxication, a Class B 

misdemeanor; and possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor. 

Following a bench trial, Tyson was found guilty of resisting law enforcement 

and not guilty of the remaining charges. 

[7] Tyson now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] Tyson contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction for resisting law enforcement. Our 

standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well-settled. In 

reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court does not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Clemons v. State, 987 N.E.2d 

92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We consider only the evidence most favorable to 

the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if 

the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative 

value to support the judgment. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when 

reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material 

element of the offense. Id. 

[9] To convict Tyson of resisting law enforcement, the State was required to 

establish that Tyson “knowingly or intentionally . . . forcibly resiste[d], 

obstruct[ed], or interfere[d] with a law enforcement officer . . . while the officer 

[was] lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties[.]” See I.C. § 35-

44.1-3-1(a)(1). The term “forcibly” is a distinct element of the offense that 

modifies all three verbs “resists, obstructs, or interferes.” See K.W. v. State, 984 

N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013). It means “something more than mere action.” 

Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ind. 1993). “[O]ne ‘forcibly resists’ law 

enforcement when strong, powerful, violent means are used to evade a law 
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enforcement official’s rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Id. at 723. “[A]ny 

action to resist must be done with force in order to violate this statute. It is 

error as a matter of law to conclude that ‘forcibly resists’ includes all actions 

that are not passive.” Id. at 724.

[10] But even so, “the statute does not demand complete passivity.” K.W., 984 

N.E.2d at 612. In Graham, our supreme court clarified that “[t]he force 

involved need not rise to the level of mayhem.” Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 

963, 966 (Ind. 2009). In fact, even a very modest level of resistance might 

support the offense. Id. at 965 (“‘stiffening’ of one’s arms when an officer grabs 

hold to position them for cuffing would suffice.”). Furthermore, our supreme 

court has “never held that actual physical contact between the defendant and 

the officer [is] required to sustain a conviction for resisting law enforcement.” 

Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 727 (Ind. 2013). 

[11] In fact, as noted in Walker, from the beginning our supreme court has stated the 

opposite. Id. See Spangler, 607 N.E.2d at 724 (noting “no movement or 

threatening gesture made in the direction of the official”); Price v. State, 622 

N.E.2d 954, 963 n.14 (Ind. 1993) (citing Spangler for the proposition that “an 

individual who directs strength, power, or violence towards police officers or 

who makes a threatening gesture or movement in their direction,” may be 

charged with resisting law enforcement.) And this notion has been applied to 

affirm convictions when a defendant makes such a threatening gesture or 

movement, or otherwise presents an imminent danger of bodily injury. See 

Pogue v. State, 937 N.E.2d 1253, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (display of box cutter 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1813 | January 30, 2020 Page 6 of 7

and refusal to drop it “amounted to a visual showing of strength and a threat of 

violence” sufficient to sustain conviction), trans. denied; Stansberry v. State, 954 

N.E.2d 507, 511-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (vacating conviction for “attempted” 

resisting law enforcement when defendant charged at officer and had to be 

pepper-sprayed, but citing Pogue as holding that “merely showing strength and a 

threat of violence is sufficient to prove forcible resistance, obstruction, or 

interference.”) Accordingly, “not every passive—or even active—response to a 

police officer constitutes the offense of resisting law enforcement, even when 

that response compels the officer to use force.” Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 727. 

Instead, a person “forcibly” resists, obstructs, or interferes with a police officer 

when he or she uses strong, powerful, violent means to impede an officer in the 

lawful execution of his or her duties. Id. The statute does not solely 

contemplate actual physical contact but can also be satisfied by an active threat 

of such strength, power, or violence when that threat impedes the officer’s 

ability to lawfully execute his or her duties. Id. 

[12] In the present case, the trial court, as the trier of fact, reasonably concluded that 

Tyson’s actions amounted to an active threat that impeded Officer Pierce’s 

ability to lawfully execute her duties. Officer Pierce repeatedly ordered Tyson 

to stop and keep his hands out of his pockets. Despite these commands, Tyson 

refused to comply. Officer Pierce was concerned about Tyson’s refusal to keep 

his hands visible as she did not know what was in his pockets. She observed 

“things in his pockets that he continued to reach[.]” (Tr. p. 25). She perceived 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1813 | January 30, 2020 Page 7 of 7

these objects as dangerous because in her experience, “[i]t only takes a split 

second for them to remove it and try to hurt you with it.” (Tr. p. 40). 

[13] In an attempt to persuade this court that the State failed to carry its burden of 

proof, Tyson likens his situation to Spangler, in which our supreme court 

concluded that no forcible resistance was present. Spangler, 607 N.E.2d at 724. 

In Spangler, a sheriff’s deputy attempted to serve the defendant with process. Id. 

at 721. Spangler refused to accept the papers, turned away from the officer, and 

walked away despite the officer’s order to return. Id. While the Spangler court 

noted that the element of resistance was satisfied, Spangler’s action did not 

amount to forcible resistance. However, unlike the situation in Spangler, Tyson 

did not merely walk away; rather, Tyson’s refusal to take his hands out of his 

pockets, which clearly contained items, amounted to a threatening gesture 

presenting an imminent danger of bodily injury to Officer Pierce. See A.A. v. 

State, 29 N.E.3d 1277, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Accordingly, we affirm 

Tyson’s conviction for resisting law enforcement.

CONCLUSION

[14] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Tyson’s conviction for resisting law 

enforcement. 

[15] Affirmed. 

[16] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur