COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick,* Judges Baker and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

KAMRAN RAHBARAN 

 

v. Record No. 2700-96-4 

SARA RAHBARAN 

 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

SARA RAHBARAN DECEMBER 23, 1997 

v. Record No. 2858-96-4 

KAMRAN RAHBARAN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Gerald Bruce Lee, Judge 

 Fred M. Rejali for Kamran Rahbaran. 

 (Manuel Trigo, Jr., on briefs), for Sara 

Rahbaran. 

 Kamran Rahbaran (husband) appeals the final decree of the 

trial court, contending the trial court erred by refusing to 

award him the separate portion of his business, awarding Sara 

Rahbaran (wife) spousal support, and refusing to order wife to 

pay his attorney's fees. Wife cross-appeals, contending the 

court erred in determining child and spousal support, the 

equitable distribution award, and when awarding custody of the 

parties' minor children. Husband contends the wife's appeal 

should be dismissed because she filed her opening and reply 

briefs without the signature of a member of the Virginia State 

 

 *On November 19, 1997, Judge Fitzpatrick succeeded Judge 

Moon as chief judge. 
 2 

Bar. We agree and dismiss wife's cross-appeal. We further 

affirm the trial court's decision with respect to the issues 

raised by husband in his appeal. 

 The parties were married in 1984; two children were born of 

the marriage. After a period of separation, wife filed for 

divorce in 1995. The report of the commissioner in chancery 

found that both parties had committed adultery and that the 

adulterous conduct on both their parts contributed to the 

dissolution of the marriage. The commissioner recommended that a 

divorce be granted on the ground that the parties had lived 

separate and apart for more than one year. 

 In 1983, prior to the marriage, husband's father transferred 

$34,382.56 to him from a foreign account. Husband used this 

money to open Royal Shoe, his first business. In 1986, after the 

parties married, husband moved the Royal Shoe inventory to a new 

location and opened Kami, Inc., utilizing the Royal Shoe 

inventory and additional funds provided to him by his father in 

the amount of $79,993. Husband's half-brother testified that 

their father had transferred nearly $105,000 in funds to husband. 

 Husband did not maintain separate records of his business and 

personal expenses, keeping one checking account for both. 

 During the course of the litigation, sanctions were imposed 

against wife on various grounds. Two motions for contempt she 

brought against husband were ruled frivolous, warranting 

sanctions in the amount of $750. Wife was sanctioned an 
 3 

additional $750 for making a significant misrepresentation of 

fact to the court. Wife also violated a court order to not 

remove the parties' children from the Washington area by taking 

them to Mexico. As a result, she was sentenced to serve one day 

in jail for contempt of court. Over the entire course of 

litigation, wife was sanctioned four times and held in contempt 

once. 

 On March 21, 1996, ruling from the bench, the court granted 

a divorce on the ground of the parties having lived separate and 

apart for one year and divided the assets and debts of the 

parties. The court treated Kami, Inc. as a marital asset and 

valued it at $158,000. The court noted that both husband and 

wife were guilty of adultery, but, concluding that it would be 

unjust to deny wife spousal support, it awarded her $28,000 per 

year in spousal support. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the 

court reduced its award of spousal support, noting that its 

previous figure of $28,000 per year mistakenly incorporated an 

earlier order of child support. The court awarded sole custody 

of the parties' children to the father. The parties' respective 

requests for payment of attorney's fees were denied. The court 

entered a final decree of divorce reflecting these decisions on 

October 18, 1996. 

 I. 

Dismissal of Wife's Appeal 

 On April 18, 1996, wife's counsel, Manuel Trigo, Jr., a 
 4 

member of the State Bar of Texas but not of the Virginia State 

Bar, was admitted to practice in the Circuit Court of Fairfax 

County pro hac vice. Wife's local counsel, Jahangir Ghobadi, 

moved to withdraw on May 9, 1996, citing unpaid fees. According 

to the record, the trial court never ruled on Ghobadi's motion to 

withdraw. However, only foreign counsel signed the notice of 

appeal and the briefs filed in this Court. 

 The circumstances under which foreign counsel are permitted 

to practice before this Court are well delineated in our 

jurisprudence. In the exercise of its authority to establish 

rules governing the admission of attorneys pro hac vice in its 

courts, Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1979) (per curiam), 

the Supreme Court of Virginia has enacted Rule 1A:4, which 

provides: 

 An attorney from another jurisdiction 

may be permitted to appear in and conduct a 

particular case in association with a member 

of the Virginia State Bar, if like courtesy 

or privilege is extended to members of the 

Virginia State Bar in such other 

jurisdiction. The court in which the case is 

pending shall have full authority to deal 

with the resident counsel alone in all 

matters connected with the litigation. If it 

becomes necessary to serve notice or process 

in the case upon counsel, any notice or 

process served upon the associate resident 

counsel shall be as valid as if personally 

served upon the nonresident attorney. 

 Except where a party conducts his own 

case, a pleading, or other paper required to 

be served (whether relating to discovery or 

otherwise) shall be invalid unless it is 

signed by a member of the Virginia State Bar. 

 It is uncontested that wife's papers were not "signed by a 
 5 

 

member of the Virginia State Bar" as required by Rule 1A:4. 

Ghobadi's name does not appear on the notice of appeal, opening 

brief, or reply brief. Under Rule 1A:4, therefore, wife's briefs 

are "invalid" because they were not signed by a member of the 

Virginia State Bar. The question before us is whether the 

failure to have a member of the Virginia State Bar act as local 

counsel and sign the notice of appeal and briefs justifies 

dismissal of the appeal. This is an issue of first impression in 

Virginia. 

 The Rules of this Court which husband cites in support of 

his argument do not expressly provide that dismissal of an appeal 

shall follow from foreign counsel's failure to associate and 

appear with local counsel.1

 Our Rules do not specifically 

address the effect on court proceedings of Rule 1A:4 and its 

declaration rendering "invalid" all papers required to be served 

which do not contain the signature of local counsel. It would 

nonetheless follow logically and from the clear language of the 

Rule that an "invalid" document is, necessarily, a legally 

 1Rules 5A:20, 5A:21, and 5A:22 require the signature of at 

least one counsel on the opening brief of appellant, the brief of 

appellee, and the reply brief, respectively. "Counsel" is 

defined in Rule 1:5 to include "a partnership, a professional 

corporation or an association of members of the Virginia State 

Bar practicing under a firm name." See also Rule 5A:1(4) 

(adopting definition of counsel in Rule 1:5). 

 Rule 5A:26 states: "If neither party has filed a brief in 

compliance with these Rules, the Court of Appeals may dismiss the 

appeal. If one party has but the other has not filed such a 

brief, the party in default will not be heard orally, except for 

good cause shown." Under the dictate of Rule 5A:26, wife was not 

permitted to be heard orally in support of her appeal. 
 6 

ineffective predicate for a court proceeding. We have held that, 

in the exercise of our discretion, we may dismiss an appeal in 

which no opening brief has been filed or in which the opening 

brief does not comply with our rules. See Uninsured Employer's 

Fund v. Coyle, 22 Va. App. 157, 159, 468 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1996). 

 The failure to have local counsel's signature on the notice 

of appeal and the briefs implicates the fundamental supervisory 

power of this Court over the practice of law in this forum. "The 

right to practice law in Virginia is governed by statute as 

supplemented by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia." 

Brown v. Supreme Court, 359 F. Supp. 549, 553 (E.D. Va. 1973), 

aff'd, 414 U.S. 1034 (1973) (mem.); see also Horne v. Bridwell, 

193 Va. 381, 384, 68 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1952). While the matter is 

addressed by rule and statute, this Court has the inherent power, 

apart from statute or rule, to inquire into the conduct of any 

person to determine whether that individual "is usurping the 

functions of an officer of the court and illegally engaging in 

the practice of law and to put an end to such unauthorized 

practice where found to exist." Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. 

Bar Association, 167 Va. 327, 335-36, 189 S.E. 153, 157 (1937); 

see also Blodinger v. Broker's Title, Inc., 224 Va. 201, 205, 294 

S.E.2d 876, 878 (1982) (citing Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, 167 

Va. at 335, 189 S.E. at 157). Our response to the contention 

that wife's appeal should be dismissed is necessarily viewed in 
 7 

the context of a violation of Virginia law.2

 Thus, while we recognize that "there is no jurisdictional 

requirement that a litigant file a brief," Smith v. Transit Co., 

206 Va. 951, 953, 147 S.E.2d 110, 112 (1966), we are persuaded 

that under the dictate of our rules, together with that of Rule 

1A:4 and Virginia's regulations governing the unauthorized 

practice of law in our courts, wife's appeal must be dismissed.3

 II. 

 The Equitable Distribution of Husband's Business 

 Husband argues on appeal that the trial court should have 

treated as separate property a portion of his business, Kami, 

Inc., on the ground that its predecessor was partially funded by 

 

 2Wife argues that Trigo "received permission of the trial 

court to appear pro hac vice[] to pursue an appeal on [w]ife's 

behalf." Code § 54.1-3903 provides, however, that "an attorney 

who has qualified before a court other than the Supreme Court 

shall be qualified to practice only in the court which 

administered his oath." Thus, Trigo's pro hac vice appearance in 

the circuit court does not qualify him to practice in this Court. 

 Wife also argues that Trigo was in association with local 

counsel because Ghobadi was never granted leave to withdraw. We 

are not persuaded that Trigo's tenuous link with Ghobadi, if any, 

constitutes "association with a member of the Virginia State 

Bar." 

 3Wife contends that husband cannot be heard to complain that 

her counsel is not admitted to practice in Virginia because 

husband accepted the benefits of Trigo's participation in joint 

motions for extension of time. Wife misunderstands the nature of 

the Rules. The issue raised by the violation of the Rules of 

Court in this instance is not whether husband was prejudiced; 

the issue is the judicial system's obligation and authority to 

maintain control of its courts and prevent the unauthorized 

practice of law. Husband's participation in joint extensions of 

time with Trigo cannot divest this Court of its responsibility or 

authority to enforce its Rules and the standards set by Virginia 

for the practice of law. 
 8 

his father in 1983 before the marriage and that, after the 

marriage, it was further funded by his father by monetary gift to 

husband in 1986. A decision regarding equitable distribution 

rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not 

be reversed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. McDavid v. McDavid, 19 Va. App. 406, 407-08, 451 

S.E.2d 713, 715 (1994) (citing Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. 

App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990)). 

 The trial court held that in light of the abundant 

evidence of husband's commingling of the 1983 transfer funds with 

marital funds, "the funds from the 1983 transfer were transmuted 

into marital property due to its commingling with marital funds." 

 On appeal, husband contends that this ruling was "a clear 

misapplication of the current state of the law which allows for 

the tracing of commingled funds." Wife responds that the 1983 

transfer funds were properly deemed transmuted because husband 

produced no evidence that "the money from the 1983 wire transfer 

was kept separately." 

 The General Assembly adopted the concept of hybrid property 

in 1990 and established rules to govern its classification and 

distribution upon divorce. Under the amended statute, Code 

§ 20-107.3(A)(3) provides procedures for classifying property as 

part marital and part separate. As amended, Code § 20-107.3(A) 

provides in relevant part: 

 1. Separate property is (i) all 

property, real and personal, acquired by 

either party before the marriage; (ii) all 
 9 

property acquired during the marriage by 

bequest, devise, descent, survivorship or 

gift from a source other than the other 

party; (iii) all property acquired during the 

marriage in exchange for or from the proceeds 

of sale of separate property, provided that 

such property acquired during the marriage is 

maintained as separate property; and (iv) 

that part of any property classified as 

separate pursuant to subdivision A 3. . . . 

* * * * * * * 

 3. The court shall classify property as 

part marital property and part separate 

property as follows: 

* * * * * * * 

 e. When marital property and separate 

property are commingled into newly acquired 

property resulting in the loss of identity of 

the contributing properties, the commingled 

property shall be deemed transmuted to 

marital property. However, to the extent the 

contributed property is retraceable by a 

preponderance of the evidence and was not a 

gift, the contributed property shall retain 

its original classification. 

 This case presents the issue of the operation of the 

transmutation and tracing provisions of the amended statute. In 

earlier cases, we briefly addressed the operation of these 

provisions. In Rowe v. Rowe, 24 Va. App. 123, 480 S.E.2d 760 

(1997), we applied the tracing provisions of the amended statute. 

 In Rowe, the parties moved into husband's separately owned home 

at the time of the marriage. Id. at 132, 480 S.E.2d at 764. 

Four years later, husband sold his separately owned home and 

invested the $82,000 proceeds in a new, jointly-titled home. Id.

 This Court held that husband's evidence that he had invested the 
 10 

$82,000 into the new home "is sufficient for purposes of Code 

§ 20-107.3(A)(3)(d)4

 to retrace the property claimed as separate 

by husband." Id. at 136, 480 S.E.2d at 766. Analogously, in 

Mann v. Mann, 22 Va. App. 459, 463-65, 470 S.E.2d 605, 606-07 

(1996), we applied the "conceptually equivalent" pension fund 

tracing provisions of Code § 20-107.3(A)(2) and (A)(3)(b) and 

held that the trial court "erred in failing to classify as 

separate the income earned passively by husband's separate 

contributions," despite the fact that the marital and separate 

contributions were contained in a single pension fund. Id. at 

465, 470 S.E.2d at 608. 

 Despite these rulings, we have yet to squarely hold that 

tracing under the hybrid property provisions of Code 

§ 20-107.3(A)(1)(iv) and (A)(3) does not require, as did prior 

law, that a party segregate property claimed to be separate. 

See, e.g., Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. App. 435, 441, 357 S.E.2d 728, 

731 (1987) (If "a spouse fails to segregate and instead, 

commingles, separate property with marital property, the 

chancellor must classify the commingled property as marital 

property subject to equitable distribution."). We now hold, 

contrary to wife's contention, that tracing of the separate 

portion of hybrid property does not require the segregation of 

 

 4Code § 20-107(A)(3)(d) and Code § 20-107(A)(3)(e) are 

parallel provisions addressing, respectively, commingling "by 

contributing one category of property to another," and 

commingling "into newly acquired property." 
 11 

the separate portion. See Loeb v. Loeb, 324 S.E.2d 33, 39 (N.C. 

App. 1985) ("Moreover, it is true that the wife's mere act of 

depositing her cash gifts . . . in the parties' joint bank 

account would not have deprived them of their 'separate property' 

status . . . if she had been able to trace the proceeds."). 

 The tracing process under Code § 20-107.3(A)(1)(iii) 

dictates that property acquired in exchange for separate property 

be "maintained as separate property," but the tracing process for 

hybrid property under Code § 20-107.3(A)(1)(iv) and (A)(3) 

contains no such requirement. See Marion v. Marion, 11 Va. App. 

659, 665, 401 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1991) (citing Code 

§ 20-107.3(A)(1)(iii) as the source of the segregation 

requirement). Indeed, a segregation requirement makes little 

sense in the context of the statutory scheme. Code 

§ 20-107.3(A)(3) addresses hybrid property, that is, property 

which is by definition part marital and part separate. The 

concept of hybrid property presupposes that separate property has 

not been segregated but, rather, combined with marital property. 

 Furthermore, Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d)-(f) provides that 

tracing of hybrid property is only performed after separate and 

marital property have been commingled by contribution of one 

category to another, acquisition of new property, or retitling of 

property in the names of both parties. Construing the statute to 

contain a segregation requirement would make tracing a classic 

Catch 22: the statute would only allow tracing of the separate 
 12 

portion of hybrid property if the property were commingled, but 

commingling would violate the segregation requirement and prevent 

tracing. 

 We reject wife's argument that husband is not entitled to 

tracing because he did not keep the wire transfer funds separate. 

The absence of a segregation requirement, however, does not mean 

that contributions of separate property to the marriage are 

automatically classified as separate upon divorce. This Court 

has not yet established standards for tracing under the amended 

statute. On this issue, we are guided by both the language of 

the statute and principles developed in our sister states. 

 In order to trace the separate portion of hybrid property, a 

party must prove that the claimed separate portion is 

identifiably derived from a separate asset. This process 

involves two steps: a party must (1) establish the identity of a 

portion of hybrid property and (2) directly trace that portion to 

a separate asset. Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d)-(f). 

 If, however, separate property is contributed to marital 

property, contributed to the acquisition of new property, or 

retitled in the names of both parties, and suffers a "loss of 

identity," the commingled separate property is transmuted to 

marital property. Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d)-(f). In other words, 

if a party "chooses to commingle marital and non-marital funds to 

the point that direct tracing is impossible," the claimed 

separate property loses its separate status. Melrod v. Melrod, 
 13 

574 A.2d 1, 5 (Md. App. 1990). Even if a party can prove that 

some part of an asset is separate, if the court cannot determine 

the separate amount, the "unknown amount contributed from the 

separate source transmutes by commingling and becomes marital 

property." Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property

268 (1994); see In re Marriage of Patrick, 599 N.E.2d 117, 123 

(Ill. App. 1992) (holding separate portion of hybrid property 

transmuted to marital property because party was unable to prove 

the value of his separate contribution); Melrod, 574 A.2d at 4 

("[I]nability to trace property acquired during the marriage 

directly to a non-marital source simply means that all property 

so acquired was marital property."); Loeb, 324 S.E.2d at 39 

(holding separate portion of hybrid property transmuted to 

marital property because party was "unable to state the value of 

her alleged 'separate property'"). One commentator has 

summarized these rules succinctly: "separate property does not 

become untraceable merely because it is mixed with marital 

property in the same asset. As long as the respective marital 

and separate contribution to the new asset can be identified, the 

court can compute the ratio and trace both interests." Turner, 

supra, at 266 n.591. 

 Having identified the relevant law, we examine husband's 

claim that the 1983 wire transfer funds may be traced. We are 

guided by the basic principle that "property acquired during the 

marriage is presumed to be marital and property acquired before 
 14 

marriage is presumed to be separate." Barnes v. Barnes, 16 Va. 

App. 98, 104, 428 S.E.2d 294, 299 (1993). As a starting point, 

therefore, the 1983 wire transfer is presumed to be husband's 

separate property. 

 Husband used the funds from the 1983 transfer to start his 

first business, Royal Shoe. Husband testified, however, that he 

freely commingled money from his business with his personal 

funds. The wire transfer funds were also commingled with marital 

funds in starting Kami, Inc. after the marriage began. Under 

Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d) and (e), contribution of separate 

property to the marital estate, as well as commingling of 

separate and marital properties into newly acquired property, 

transmutes the separate property into marital property unless 

husband, as the party seeking to invoke the exception to the 

general rule of transmutation, proves that "the contributed 

property is retraceable by a preponderance of the evidence." 

Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d) and (e). 

 Husband fails to establish that a portion of Kami, Inc. is 

traceable to the 1983 funds transfer. Husband paid both personal 

and business expenses from his business checking account, and 

maintained a single credit card for both business and personal 

use. According to husband, he paid "everything" out of his 

business account. The record does not establish that any funds 

in Royal Shoe and Kami, Inc. are identifiable as funds from the 

1983 wire transfer. 
 15 

 With regard to the 1986 transfer, we find that the evidence 

fails to support husband's contention that the 1986 wire transfer 

funds were a "gift from a source other than the other party" and, 

thus, separate property. Code § 20-107.3(A)(1)(ii). "A person 

who claims ownership to property by gift must establish by clear 

and convincing evidence the elements of donative intent and 

actual or constructive delivery." Dean v. Dean, 8 Va. App. 143, 

146, 379 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1989) (citing Rust v. Phillips, 208 Va. 

573, 578, 159 S.E.2d 628, 632 (1968)). "In the case of a gift to 

one of the spouses, if there is credible evidence presented to 

show that the property was intended by the donor to be the 

separate property of one of the spouses, the presumption [of 

marital property] is overcome, and the burden shifts to the party 

seeking to have the property classified as marital to show a 

contrary intent on the part of the donor." Stainback v. 

Stainback, 11 Va. App. 13, 17-18, 396 S.E.2d 686, 689 (1990). 

 Husband does not point to any evidence in the record to 

establish that his father intended the wire transfer as a gift 

rather than a loan or an investment or that his father intended 

the wire transfer funds to be treated as separate property. 

Husband testified that he received loans and investment funds 

from his family and wife's family. Husband's brother 

characterized their father's wire transfers to husband as 

investments. Furthermore, husband's brother testified that he 

had received similar funds transfers which he described as loans. 
 16 

 When asked on direct examination if he had returned the money 

from the 1986 wire transfer to his father, husband answered, "No, 

I wasn't able to." From this evidence, the trial court could 

reasonably infer that the 1986 wire transfer was intended as a 

loan or investment. This evidence is not contradicted by any 

evidence of donative intent. 

 In short, no evidence proved that a portion of Kami, Inc., 

as it existed at the time of the equitable distribution hearing, 

was attributable to the 1983 or 1986 transfer funds or that the 

1986 funds transfer was intended as a gift to husband separate 

from the marital estate. We hold that the trial court did not 

err in finding that the husband failed to present sufficient 

evidence to prove that the wire transfer funds were retraceable 

to his separate property. 

 III. 

 Spousal Support 

 In awarding wife spousal support, notwithstanding evidence 

of her adultery, the trial court stated: 

 I am mindful of the fact that there is 

evidence that she has been found guilty of 

adultery and I'm also mindful of the fact the 

husband's been found guilty of adultery and 

the Code allows the Court to consider not 

awarding spousal support but it seems to me 

that it would be unjust under the 

circumstances to punish her and to provide 

her with no support given the length of the 

marriage and the contributions she has made 

and the lifestyle that she was afforded 

during the course of the marriage and so I 

will award some spousal support. 
 17 

The court awarded wife $28,000 per year in spousal support, later 

amending its award to $18,000 per year. Husband challenges both 

the propriety and the amount of this award. We find no abuse in 

the trial court's exercise of discretion in making this award. 

 A party who has committed adultery will not be awarded 

spousal support unless the trial court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that denial of support would constitute a 

"manifest injustice, based on the respective degrees of fault 

during the marriage and the relative economic circumstances of 

the parties." Code § 20-107.1; Barnes v. Barnes, 16 Va. App. 98, 

102, 428 S.E.2d 294, 298 (1993). The trial court's decision to 

award spousal support to a party despite his or her adultery will 

not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it. Williams v. Williams, 14 Va. App. 217, 

219, 415 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1992). 

 The trial court's finding that denial of spousal support 

would be unjust to wife is supported in the record. The trial 

court determined that the parties were both at fault in the 

dissolution of the marriage but that economic factors would make 

the denial of spousal support unjust to wife. See Bandas v. 

Bandas, 16 Va. App. 427, 433, 430 S.E.2d 706, 709 (1993) 

(upholding a finding of manifest injustice where both parties 

were guilty of adultery where the finder of fact had considered 

the disparity of the parties' non-marital assets, the eight and 

one-half year length of the marriage, and the fact that wife's 
 18 

adultery arose partly from husband's incarceration during the 

marriage). 

 In finding the denial of an award would be unjust, the trial 

court considered, inter alia, the adulterous conduct of both 

parties, the ten-year length of the marriage, wife's 

contributions to the marriage, the lifestyle of the parties 

during the marriage, and the parties' relative economic resources 

and needs. Furthermore, contrary to husband's contention, the 

court did not find, nor does the record establish, that wife was 

living with another man and that the spousal award, for that 

reason, would be inappropriate. In short, we find no abuse in 

discretion in the trial court's determination that wife was 

entitled to receive spousal support. 

 Husband also contends the trial court abused its discretion 

in determining the amount of support to be awarded. The trial 

court's determination of the amount of an award of spousal 

support will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Moreno v. 

Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 194-95, 480 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1997) 

(citing Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 574, 421 S.E.2d 635, 

644 (1992)). In determining the amount of spousal support to be 

awarded, the trial court applied the relevant statutory factors 

set forth in Code § 20-107.1, including earning capacity, 

financial resources, education and training, the standard of 

living during the marriage, and the duration of the marriage. 
 19 

 

The trial court explicitly noted that the parties enjoyed a 

lavish lifestyle for ten years and considered the wife's current 

medical disability and its effect on her ability to work. With 

respect to the wife's employability, the court further stated 

that it had considered the testimony of husband's vocation and 

rehabilitation expert that wife could earn $20,000 per year. 

Husband earned $120,000 per year. Based on all the relevant 

evidence, the court concluded that $28,000 per year was a 

reasonable amount of spousal support, given the needs and income 

of both parties. After a motion for reconsideration, the court 

reduced the award to $18,000 per year because it had made a 

mathematical error; the $28,000 figure mistakenly incorporated an 

earlier order of child support. We find the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in making its spousal support award. 

IV. 

 Attorney's Fees 

 Husband contends that the court erred in denying his request 

for attorney's fees on the ground that wife's conduct during the 

litigation was egregious, specifically noting wife's adultery, 

her "exaggerated claims during the equitable distribution 

hearing,"5

 and the number of times wife was sanctioned for 

 5During the trial, wife's attorney needed to take a witness 

out of turn and agreed to compensate husband for any extra expert 

fees incurred as a result of the delay. Husband cites this 

agreement as a further basis for an award of attorney's fees to 

him. He cites no authority in support of this position, and we 

find none. 
 20 

misconduct by the court. A trial court's denial of attorney's 

fees is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Head v. Head, 24 

Va. App. 166, 181, 480 S.E.2d 780, 788 (1997). This case was 

hotly contested between the parties, and the trial court found 

that both parties had spent over $100,000 in attorney's fees. 

While it is true, as husband argues, that wife filed false 

charges against him, violated a court order, and pursued 

frivolous motions, the record also makes clear that wife was 

sanctioned four times and that she spent one day in jail for 

contempt of court. In one of the orders sanctioning wife, the 

court required wife to pay attorney's fees to husband's counsel. 

 In another, the court required both wife and her counsel to pay 

sanctions. A third order required that wife pay sanctions but 

does not disclose whether payment was to the court or to counsel. 

 After discussing the conduct of the parties and the amount of 

money spent in litigating the divorce action, and upon 

considering all the equities in the case, the trial court denied 

attorney's fees to each party. We find no abuse of discretion 

with respect to an award of attorney's fees. 

 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we dismiss wife's 

cross-appeal and affirm the decision of the trial court. 

 Record No. 2700-96-4, affirmed.

 Record No. 2858-96-4, dismissed.