NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JANNA G., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, K.G., A.G., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0281

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS20087

The Honorable Karen A. Mullins, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 4-6-2021
JANNA G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Janna G. appeals the superior court’s order terminating her 

parental rights to her children, K.G. and A.G. (“the children”). For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Janna has a more than twenty-year history of abusing drugs. 

She began using heroin and methadone in her late teens, continued using 

one or the other as an adult, and used marijuana and benzodiazepines in 

combination with heroin and methadone. K.G. was born in 2012 and A.G.

was born in 2014. Both children were born exposed to substances in utero.

¶3 In April 2016, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)

received multiple reports that Janna was using methamphetamine, asking 

neighbors for drugs, and neglecting the children. Janna was evicted from 

her apartment in May 2016, and reportedly was living in her car with the 

children. A DCS case manager contacted Janna in August 2016. The case 

manager observed that Janna was under the influence. She lied to the case 

manager, claiming to have been clean from heroin since 2009.1 Janna 

refused to take a drug test, and although she told the investigator she had 

sought methadone treatment in the past she refused to sign a release to 

allow DCS to obtain her methadone treatment records.

1 In June 2016 Janna went to Thunderbird Treatment Center (“TTC”) 

seeking to re-enter its methadone maintenance program. During intake 

Janna admitted she had been using heroin for thirteen years and that she 

had been “using every benzodiazepine in the World.” She admitted to 

having used heroin the day before the intake appointment. TTC performed 

a drug screen that day which was positive for opiates. The TTC LPN 

discussed the risks of taking methadone together with benzodiazepines 

with Janna, and reviewed TTC’s benzodiazepine policy with her.
JANNA G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 DCS removed the children from Janna’s care and filed a 

dependency petition. In August 2016 Janna submitted a hair follicle test 

which was positive for marijuana and opiates, and a urinalysis test that was 

positive for marijuana. The superior court found the children dependent 

and DCS put reunification services in place.

¶5 In December 2017, after Janna appeared to be making 

progress, DCS returned A.G. to her care and assigned a family reunification 

team. K.G. remained in foster care. The next month, police were called 

when four-year-old A.G. was found wandering alone outside in a parking 

lot near a busy street, and DCS again removed A.G. from Janna’s care. DCS 

then discovered that Janna had been mixing Xanax (for which she did not 

have a prescription) with her prescription methadone.

¶6 For more than three years, DCS offered Janna reunification 

services, including substance abuse testing and treatment, parent aide 

services, parenting classes, community-based psychiatric services, 

individual counseling, dialectical behavioral therapy (“DBT”), 

psychological evaluations, supervised visitation, therapeutic visitation, a 

best interests evaluation, and transportation. DCS invited her to attend the 

children’s medical appointments and monthly child and family team 

meetings. Janna participated in services but was resistant to therapeutic 

treatment and minimized her drug use. She continued to mix 

benzodiazepines or marijuana with her methadone, which caused 

impairment, and was unable to stop using multiple drugs for more than a 

few weeks at a time. She also resisted DCS’ attempts to obtain records from 

her service providers.

¶7 On April 25, 2018, Janna tested positive for 

methamphetamines, methadone, and benzodiazepines. Around the same 

time (on or about May 1, 2018), Janna accidentally sent a text message to her 

DCS case aide asking someone for “clear,” a street term for 

methamphetamines. The case aide also received texts from Janna stating, 

“Hello people Hello please call I have Stuff for u,” and several wherein she 

offered individuals marijuana edibles. Janna’s cell phone contact name 

appeared as “Deena Xanax” and her photograph appeared next to the text 

messages.

¶8 In July 2018, Janna’s outpatient drug treatment provider, 

TERROS, recommended that she enter residential treatment, noting her 

lack of progress over the past two years. DCS repeatedly asked Janna to 

follow TERROS’ recommendation for residential treatment, but she refused 

to do so. That same month, Janna’s latest methadone clinic told DCS that 
JANNA G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

the clinic had been unaware that (1) she had an extensive methadone and 

benzodiazepine history, and (2) other doctors had prescribed her opiates.

¶9 Between July and October 2018, Janna lived at five different

homes. In August 2018 she reported that she had stopped using medical 

marijuana but in October 2018 tested positive “for levels . . . well above the 

cut off.” Janna admitted to DCS that when she used THC together with 

methadone her functioning was impaired. During supervised visits with 

the children in 2018, Janna appeared drowsy and under the influence of 

drugs on multiple occasions. In addition, she was overly emotional during 

visits, causing the children to cry, despite constant reminders from case 

aides that her behavior was “not fair to [the children]” because it caused 

them “unneeded stress.” Janna often struggled with redirecting K.G., and 

often allowed “an excessive amount of screen time for [the] children that 

encompasse[d] most of the visitation time.”

¶10 In June 2019, DCS filed a petition to terminate Janna’s 

parental rights to the children pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(3) (chronic substance abuse) and 8-533(B)(8)(c)

(fifteen months’ out-of-home placement). Between June and August 2019,

Janna tested positive for THC and methadone seven times, and tested 

positive for THC, methadone, and benzodiazepines on June 21, 2019.

¶11 In July 2019, the ongoing DCS case manager attended a 

supervised visit between Janna, K.G.’s father, and the children and 

observed that Janna appeared to be “[u]nder the influence . . . or hindered 

in some sort of capacity.” Janna “was not clear headed, her eyes were half 

closed, her speech was slow, and her hands were shaking.” In December 

2019, the case manager discussed Janna with K.G.’s father, who told the 

case manager he agreed with her assessment that Janna seemed unable to 

maintain sobriety for more than two weeks at a time. At the time of the 

termination adjudication hearing, Janna’s methadone dose had increased 

from 15 milligrams to 105 milligrams. In addition, she admitted that she

was still using marijuana about five times a month and was still taking a 

benzodiazepine, Klonopin, despite TERROS’ recommendation to stop.

¶12 After a six-day termination adjudication hearing, the superior 

court terminated Janna’s parental rights on the grounds alleged in the 

petition. Janna timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).
JANNA G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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DISCUSSION

I. Fifteen Months’ Out-of-Home Placement

¶13 Janna argues that insufficient evidence supported the

superior court’s finding that termination was warranted under A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(8)(c). The superior court may terminate parental rights under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) if DCS has made diligent reunification efforts, the 

parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances causing the parent’s 

child to be in an out-of-home placement for fifteen months or longer, and 

“there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.” 

We view the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in 

the light most favorable to affirming the superior court’s order. Jordan C. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009). We will not 

reverse the superior court’s order unless reasonable evidence does not 

support the superior court’s factual findings. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. 

Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010).

¶14 The children had been in an out-of-home placement for more 

than three years at the start of the termination adjudication hearing. Janna 

argues that she remedied the circumstances causing the children to be in an 

out-of-home placement because she consistently participated in services 

and demonstrated behavioral changes during the dependency. She also 

argues that DCS failed to provide her with appropriate reunification 

services.

¶15 In making a determination that a parent has been unable to 

remedy the circumstances causing the child to be in an out-of-home 

placement, we construe those circumstances to mean the circumstances 

existing at the time of the termination that prevented a parent from 

appropriately providing for the parent’s child. Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007); see also Donald W. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 17, ¶ 26 (App. 2019) (court must consider “both the 

origin [of the dependency] and any cause arising during the dependency”).

¶16 DCS makes diligent efforts to provide reunification services 

when it provides a parent with the time and opportunity to participate in 

programs designed to help the parent become an effective parent. Maricopa 

Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). DCS need 

not provide “every conceivable service” or ensure that the parent actually 

participates in the services offered. Id. Nor is it required to provide a parent 

with unlimited time to take positive steps toward recovery. Maricopa Cnty. 
JANNA G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994). DCS is not 

required to undertake futile reunification efforts and is required to 

undertake only those measures with a reasonable prospect of success. Mary 

Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999).

¶17 Here, the superior court found that although DCS made 

diligent efforts to provide reunification services to Janna, she was unable to 

remedy the circumstances causing the children to be in an out-of-home 

placement—her drug use. The court also found that Janna’s housing had 

been unstable over the course of the dependency, and that at the time of the 

termination adjudication hearing she did not have stable housing or a stable 

income. Reasonable evidence supports the court’s findings.

¶18 Dr. Stephanie Leonard, a psychologist, evaluated Janna in 

February 2020 and diagnosed her with paranoid personality disorder, 

unspecified anxiety disorder (provisional), opioid use disorder, cannabis 

use disorder, and benzodiazepine use disorder (provisional). She opined 

that even though Janna had engaged in services, the prognosis that Janna 

would be able to demonstrate minimally adequate parenting skills was 

“poor” in light of her long history of drug abuse. Further, Janna’s prognosis 

was poor because she “fails, even after the amount of time of DCS 

involvement, to accept responsibility for the reason for DCS involvement, 

which may be an indicator that she has difficulties accepting responsibility 

for her behaviors, substance abuse, and thinking patterns.” Dr. Leonard 

testified that Janna had failed to make significant progress, noting that 

issues identified by a previous evaluator as problematic, such as her lack of 

insight into her behaviors and her minimizing and failure to accept 

responsibility for her actions, still existed. Given Janna’s lack of progress, 

Dr. Leonard believed she “would still need a lot more time to get to a place 

where her ability to function won’t impact the children in a negative light.” 

Dr. Leonard opined that DCS had provided Janna with appropriate 

reunification services, including DBT therapy to help her develop coping 

skills and increase her mood regulation and impulse control.

¶19 Dr. Al Silberman, a psychologist who evaluated Janna in 

December 2016, also testified. Dr. Silberman reviewed DCS’ court reports 

and Dr. Leonard’s more recent psychological evaluation. Dr. Silberman 

agreed with Dr. Leonard’s assessment that Janna had not made substantial 

progress. He explained, “[Janna] still seems to be out of it at times. That 

appears to be [the result of] a type of drug use or overuse of methadone or 

other types of drugs. . . . [S]he may love her children, but they don’t seem 

to be put first. The drugs seem to be first.” Dr. Silberman found Janna’s 

mixing of prescription benzodiazepines with benzodiazepines she obtained 
JANNA G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

without a prescription “very concerning,” because it indicated she was 

“looking to be stoned.” And even though Janna had a prescription for 

medical marijuana, Dr. Silberman also found Janna’s use of marijuana in 

conjunction with methadone and benzodiazepines concerning. Dr. 

Silberman testified that Janna’s potential for being able to parent in the 

foreseeable future was “highly question[able].”

¶20 Dr. Steven Bennett, who completed a bonding and best 

interests assessment, similarly opined that it was unlikely Janna would 

“continue to make any significant progress towards improving her ability 

to be a caregiver for [the children].” DCS case manager Nora Al Nasser 

testified that Janna had failed to demonstrate sobriety and had not made 

substantial progress towards reunification despite the length of the 

dependency and the many services she had received.

¶21 Janna completed a year of DBT therapy about a year before 

the termination adjudication hearing. She now argues DCS failed to 

provide her with appropriate reunification services solely because it “failed 

to continue to offer . . . DBT therapy.” DCS argues she waived this 

argument by failing to raise the issue before the termination adjudication 

hearing. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 349, ¶ 19 

(App. 2013); Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178-79, 

¶¶ 16-18 (App. 2014) (any claim that DCS is failing to provide appropriate 

reunification services must be timely raised in the superior court or the 

issue is waived). Janna does not assert that she ever requested, before the 

termination adjudication hearing, that DCS provide her with additional 

DBT therapy. And Janna’s DCS case manager testified that Janna had 

received DBT therapy but that after it ended, she resisted his efforts “to get 

her back into therapy. It was a challenge . . . .” Although Janna testified 

that she would have participated in additional DBT therapy had it been 

available, the superior court was not required to find her testimony

credible.2 In addition, Dr. Leonard, who was familiar with all of the services 

provided to Janna, including one year of DBT therapy, concluded that the 

reunification services were appropriate. Sufficient evidence supports the 

superior court’s finding that DCS made diligent efforts to provide 

reunification services.

2 Indeed, the superior court found that Janna’s “repeated false 

statements on critical issues to this court under oath and to her service 

providers render her wholly incredible. The court declines to rely upon 

Mother’s self-serving testimony at trial to any degree.”
JANNA G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

¶22 Because sufficient evidence supported the superior court’s 

finding that termination was warranted pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), 

we need not consider Janna’s challenge to the alternate ground of chronic 

substance abuse. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, 

¶ 3 (App. 2002).

II. Best Interests

¶23 Next, Janna argues the superior court erred by finding that 

termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We 

do not reweigh the evidence and will affirm the superior court’s factual 

findings if supported by reasonable evidence. Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 97, ¶ 6 (App. 2016). “Although fundamental, parental 

rights are not inviolate; a court may still sever those rights if it finds clear 

and convincing evidence of one of the statutory grounds for severance, and 

also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the best 

interests of the child[].” Id. at 98, ¶ 7. Termination is in a child’s best 

interests if the child would “derive an affirmative benefit from termination 

or incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 6 (App. 2004). A current adoptive plan 

is a well-established affirmative benefit to a child. Id.

¶24 Reasonable evidence supported the superior court’s best 

interests finding. The children were in an adoptive placement that wished 

to adopt them. The placement was meeting all of the children’s needs, 

including K.D.’s special needs as a result of his autism diagnosis. Janna 

argues she is bonded with the children and she is able to meet their needs. 

Although the bond between a parent and child is a factor in assessing best 

interests, it is not dispositive. Dominique M., 240 Ariz. at 98, ¶ 12. “Even in 

the face of such a bond, the [superior] court is required to evaluate the 

totality of circumstances and determine whether severance is in the best 

interests of the children.” Id. at 99, ¶ 12. The superior court considered the 

totality of the circumstances and found that termination was in the 

children’s best interests. Reasonable evidence supports that finding.
JANNA G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶25 For the following reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

order terminating Janna’s parental rights to the children.