fails to identify the “more than two acts” of which he claims constitute a pattern.
Reading his complaint liberally, however, it is clear that what Cherry deems a pattern
of racketeering activity is the allegedly fraudulent actions of the opposing attorneys,
the judge, the lending companies, and the judicial sales corporation. These acts (which
he deems a pattern of racketeering activity) resulted in only a single harm: the loss of
his home. A pattern of racketeering activity does not mean a pattern of fraudulent
behavior that facilitates a single fraudulent loss; rather, a pattern of racketeering
activity means (in a fraud context such as this) a pattern of fraudulent losses. Pizzo v.
Bekin Van Lines Co., 258 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2001). In Pizzo, the plaintiff sued
a furniture store for, among other things, violating RICO. Jd at 631. The district court
dismissed the RICO count because the complaint failed to establish a pattern of
racketeering activity. Jd. The plaintiff alleged that it was defrauded into buying
$16,200 worth of Styrofoam-like furniture under the misrepresentation that the
furniture would be made of solid walnut. Jd. The complaint alleged several mail and
wire fraud violations relating and leading up to the alleged fraudulent transaction. Id
at 632. The Court of Appeals held that only the alleged fraudulent transaction itself
should be considered in determining whether or not there was a pattern. /d. Taking
that transaction as well as another fraudulent transaction involving a different customer

of the furniture store, the Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the two incidents

4.



Count II of the Amended Complaint relies on bald assertions that, taken
together, identify the elements of a civil RICO violation without any
embellishment . . . The assertion that Defendant knowingly submitted
‘misleading, false and/or altered supporting documentation’ for use in the
credit-approval process, as well as forged credit applications and
misrepresentations of the services actually financed, is utterly devoid of
any particularity. It leaves us with no clear notion of what Defendants did
that could constitute fraud. Far from informing us of the ‘who, what,
when, where and why’ of the complaint, these assertions leave us with a
generalized, incomplete idea of the dimensions of the claim.

South Chicago Dodge, 2001 WL 1002463 at *4. Consistent with our holding in South
Chicago Dodge, we find the present allegations legally deficient under Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant the motion to dismiss. The complaint
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted because there is no alleged pattern
of racketeering activity and because the complaint fails to comply with Rule 9(b). The

complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

Qe Pleo

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Dated: \\ a\o3



as true all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, we need "not strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff]
which are not apparent on the face” of the complaint. Coates v. Board of Educ., 559
F.2d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1977). Because Cherry is proceeding pro se, we liberally
construe his complaint in determining whether or not it states a claim on which relief
may be granted. Greer v. Board of Educ., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001).
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[i]n all averments of fraud
or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In other words, Cherry’s complaint must state "the
who, what, when, where, and how” with respect to his allegations of fraud. DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Zahran v. Frankenmuth
Mut. Ins., 1995 WL 535088, *6 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 1995) (holding that Rule 9(b)'s
pleading with particularity requirement applies to a pro se plaintiff's RICO claim).
DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim on which
relief may be granted on two general grounds: (1) there is no pattern of racketeering
activity and (2) the allegations are vague and conclusory.
I. No Pattern of Racketeering Activity

In his complaint, Cherry asserts that Defendants “committed or abetted more
than two predicate acts rising to a pattern of racketeering.” Complaint at 2. Cherry

3.



were not enough to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. Id at 633. In the
instant case, there is not even a second allegation of fraud; there is only one: the loss
of Cherry’s home. Because Cherry does not allege that Defendants perpetrated any
additional frauds, other than defrauding him out of his home, he cannot establish a
pattern of racketeering activity.

IJ. Vague and Conclusory Allegations

As just discussed, Cherry’s complaint makes several allegations of fraudulent

acts that led to his being defrauded of his home. The allegations include:

1, Ms. Chukurov “committed two frauds by advancing two writings which
she signed that he [sic] knew we were with the intent that Cherry and
others rely on the writings to injure Cherry by depriving Cherry of
property and business interests.” Complaint at 2.

2. Judge Sophia Hall “aided and abetted the fraud of Milka Chukurov and
[her law firm] Pierce and Associates, by willfully acceding to the fraud
of Ms. Chukurov....” Jd.

3. Judge Hall “aided and abetted the fraud of Milka Chukurov and Pierce
and Associates when she will fully acceded to the May 20th 2002 [sic] by
issuing a summary judgment even though it was filed prematurely and

she knew or should have known Illinois law is clear with pending

5.



not

LM eS
Minute Order Form (06/97)
LZ v V United States District Court, Northern District of Dlinois
74 Name of Assigned Jud Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judne Charles P. Kocoras thawassitned Judes
CASE NUMBER 02 C 7895 DATE Jan 2, 2003
CASE Larry Cherry vs. Sophia Hall et al
TITLE

[In the foltowing box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) im} Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon___setfor____at.

(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——sset for___—_ att

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-setfor]on__—setfor__———sat_
{7) a Trial[set for/re-set for] on __at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial} [Hearing] held/continued toa

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

DOFRCP4(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 ClFRCP4i(a)\(1) OFRCP41(a)(2).

(0) =i [Other docket entry] ENTERMEMORANDUM OPINION: We grant defendants’ motion (Doc
6-1) to dismiss. The complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted because there is no
alleged pattern of racketeering activity and because the complaint fails to comply with Rule 9(b). The
complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Status hearing set for January 16, 2003 is stricken as moot.

(11) wf [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

ices required,
No notices required, number of notices

\|3|us

date docketed

Mie

docketing deputy initials

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

v | Docketing to mail notices,
| Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to iyfdermagistrate judge

courtroom

scT deputy’s _

initials _ rocunl

UL ©! -Dateléime received in
central Clerk's Office

ailing deputy initials



affirmative defenses, [sic] a motion for summary judgment cannot be
determined.” Jd at 3.
4. “Mr. Litton and Mr. Reynolds appeared to be engaged in an extensive
pattern of racketeering along with the assistance of their law firm, Pierce
and Associates.” Id at 4.
5. Litton Loan Servicing L.P. (one of the lending companies) colluded in the
alleged fraud by pursuing the judicially authorized sale. Id.
6. The Intercounty Judicial Sale Corporation fraudulently executed the
judicially authorized sale. Zd at 5.
None of these allegations or any other portion of the complaint explain what the fraud
was. All Cherry states is that fraudulent papers were filed with the state court, that the
state court fraudulently ruled for Defendants, that Litton Loan Services L.P.
fraudulently pursued a foreclosure, and that the Intercounty Judicial Sale Corporation
fraudulently executed the sale. The allegations are entirely devoid of what actually
constituted the fraud. See WFS Fin. vs. South Chicago Dodge, 2001 WL 1002463, *4
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2001) (“Plaintiffs cannot stand on the blanket assertion that the
Dealer Invoices were ‘altered and/or false.’ Instead, the Amended Complaint must
explain the nature of the alleged alteration and/or falsehood.”). Our holding in South

Chicago Dodge is instructive. In that case, we held:

-6-



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

LARRY CHERRY,
Plaintiff,

vs. 02 C 7895
SOPHIA HALL; PIERCE AND ASSOCIATES;
JUDY TIDWELL; LITTON LOAN SERVICING
LP; LARRY LITTON, SR.; RANDY
REYNOLDS; CAROL F. JOLLY; JENNIFER
LANNINGS; ANDREW D. SCHUSTEFF;
DONITA JONES; MILKA CHUKUROV;
ANGIE STEVENS; INTERCOUNTY JUDICIAL
SALES CORPORATION; and CREDIT-BASED
ASSET SERVICING AND SECURITIZATION
LLC,

JAN 3 2003

Be ta + a wtte sb

NTN SS SS SS SS SS WS OS DS WL

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth
below, we grant the motion.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Larry Cherry filed this action against several defendants alleging a

violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). 18 U.S.C.

\3


§ 1962. Cherry alleges that Defendants (a state judge, two lending companies, a law
firm, a judicial sales corporation and several individuals) acted in concert to defraud
him of his property and business interests. The story begins with Cherry’s default on
a loan that was subject to a mortgage on his home. At the state court level, his
mortgage was foreclosed and his home sold at a judicial sale. In the instant action, he
alleges that he was injured by this foreclosure and judicial sale and that his injury is the
result of illegal RICO activities committed by Defendants. The thrust ofhis allegations
is to collaterally attack the entire state court process. For example, Cherry alleges that
the opposing lawyers made misrepresentations in state court, that the state judge made
improper rulings, that it was improper for the mortgagee to pursue a judicial sale of the
property, and that the judicial sales officer improperly proceeded with the sale of
Cherry’s property over his objections. Previously, we dismissed all allegations against
the Honorable Sophia Hall. The remaining defendants now move to dismiss the case
in its entirety because Cherry’s allegations, revolving around the judicially-sanctioned
foreclosure of his property, fail to state a RICO claim on which relief may be granted.
LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a plaintiff has

properly stated a claim for which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(6);

Pickrel v. City of Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115, 1118 (7th Cir.1995). Although we accept

-2-