Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50438

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

HENRY CHARLES KNEZEK, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:08-CR-3116-1

Before JOLLY, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Henry Charles Knezek, Jr., appeals his conviction

and 48-month prison sentence for failure to register as a sex offender as required

by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. §

2250(a). Knezek contends that his conviction should be reversed because there

was insufficient evidence to establish that he knowingly violated SORNA. He

also asserts that (1) his conviction violates due process because no state has

implemented SORNA, (2) Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 26, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 09-50438 Document: 00511091091 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2010
No. 09-50438

2

Clause to enact SORNA, and (3) he was denied due process because he did not

have actual notice of SORNA’s requirements.

To sustain a criminal conviction for a violation pursuant § 2250, the

government had to prove that Knezek (1) was required to register under

SORNA, (2) traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, and (3) “knowingly

fail[ed] to register or update a registration as required by [SORNA].” See § 2250.

Knezek insists that the plain language of the statute makes clear that the term

“knowingly” applies not only to failure either to register or update a registration,

but also to the specific requirements of SORNA. He argues that because he was

not notified of the specific provisions of SORNA, the government could not prove

that he “knowingly” failed to register.

In United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 262 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2009), we

rejected a similar argument, noting that ignorance of the law is not a defense

and that the statute contains “‘no language requiring specific intent or willful

failure to register such that [the defendant] must know his failure to register

violated federal law.’” Whaley, 577 F.3d at 262 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2009)(quoting

United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 468 (4th Cir. 2009)). As the government

was not required to prove Knezek knew that he violated SORNA, and as the

evidence presented at trial supported a finding that Knezek knowingly failed to

register, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit. 

We also reject Knezek’s contention that, because SORNA has not been

implemented by any state, his conviction violates due process. See United States

v. Heth, 596 F.3d 255, 258-60 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2010). Finally, as Knezek concedes,

his contention that Congress lacked authority to enact SORNA and that lack of

notice of SORNA violates due process are foreclosed. See Whaley, 577 F.3d at

261-62 (5th Cir. 2009). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Case: 09-50438 Document: 00511091091 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/26/2010