allegations as true, is flat-out wrong. If Jack Gray's

Answer were to have admitted all of the allegations of the

Complaint, a judgment against it on the pleadings would have

been in order.

To avoid the patchwork type of pleading that would result if
the errors here were to be addressed via an amendment to the
Answer, the entire Answer is stricken, Jack Gray is of course
granted leave to file a self-contained Amended Answer--but with
AD 1 recast and AD 2 omitted--in this Court's chambers (with a
copy of course to be delivered contemporaneously to plaintiff's
counsel) on or before February 9, 2004, failing which (1) all of
the allegations in the Complaint paragraphs that correspond to
the Answer's earlier-mentioned paragraphs will be deemed to have
been admitted and (2) the two ADs will remain stricken.

Finally, no charge is to be made to Jack Gray by its counsel
for the added work and expense incurred in correcting counsel's
errors. Counsel are ordered to apprise Jack Gray to that effect
by letter, with a copy to be transmitted to this Court's chambers

as an informational matter (not for filing).

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: January 28, 2004


Ming Order Fora (Qg/57)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Namestamienciie | Milton. Shadur_—__‘| Sterner
CASE NUMBER 03 C 7770 DATE 1/28/2004

CASE Sompo Japan Insurance vs. M/V Commander, et al

TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY: (ail |
03) Oo Filed motion 6} r listing in “Motion” box above.)
(2) oO Brief in supp motion due.
@) o Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__.
(4) o Ruling/Hearingon___—_sset ffor__—_—at
(5) imi Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__..._setfor__at.
(3) oOo Pretrial conference{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—ssetfor__—s—sat_
(0) im Trial{set for/re-set for]on_at
(8) im [Bench/Jury tial [Hearing] held/continuedto__—_ at.
9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
CUFRCP4(m) | C)Local Rule 41.1 C1FRCP41(a\(1) C1 FRCP41(a)(2).

do) [Other docket entiy] Enter Memorandum Order. To avoid the patchwork type of pleading that

would result if the errors here were to be addressed via an amendment to the Answer, the entire Answer
is stricken. Jack Gray is of course granted leave.to file a self-contained Amended Answer - - but with AD

1 recast and Ad 2 omitted -- in this Court’s chambers on or before February 9, 2004.

(1) mf [For further detail'see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. umber of notices
| Notices mailed by judge's staff. JAN 2972 nina

Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices.

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TGF Spatestime received in
central Clerk's Office



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SOMPO JAPAN INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 03 C 7770

DOCKETED

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
M/V COMMANDER, et al., )
)
)

Defendants. JAN 2 9 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER

Jack Gray Transport, Inc. and Chicago Stevedoring Company
(collectively “Jack Gray,” treated as a singular noun) have filed
their Answer, including affirmative defenses (“ADs”), to the
admiralty Complaint brought against Jack Gray and other
defendants by Sompo Japan Insurance Company of America (*“Sompo”),
with the Complaint including supplemental jurisdiction claims as
well. This memorandum order is issued sua sponte because the
Answer includes some patent violations of federal pleading
principles that need to be corrected.

In the main those violations involve a repeated disregard of
the clear roadmap that the second sentence of Fed. R. Civ. P.
("Rule”) 8(b) marks out for any party that can qualify for a
deemed denial in those terms--see App. §1 to State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. f11. 2001).
Here each of Answer 4§2 through 6, 8, 9, 12, 15 and 18 reads in
these terms:

JACK GRAY lacks sufficient information to either admit


or deny the allegations of Paragraph --, and, therefore
denies said allegations.

That locution omits the essential reference to a lack of belief,
which the drafters of the Rule inserted deliberately to create a
substantial hurdle for those who seek to assert the required
disclaimer to obtain a deemed denial.

Moreover, it is of course a contradiction in terms to follow
even a defective disclaimer (one that states an inability “to
either admit or deny”) with an outright denial (“and, therefore
denies said allegations”). That language must be omitted when
Jack Gray's counsel returns to the drawing board to restate any
answers that can qualify for a deemed denial in the objective
good faith required of every litigant and every lawyer.

As for the two ADs, each of them is also problematic, Here
are their difficulties:

1. AD 1 asserts in generic terms that any relief
against Jack Gray is “governed and limited by the terms and
conditions of the relevant tariffs and shipping
documents...." Even under the notice pleading regime that
exists in the federal courts, that type of assertion
provides inadequate information to plaintiff and this Court.
If Jack Gray wishes to assert any such limitations, it must
do so in more particular form.

2. AD 2, which is the essential equivalent of a Rule

12(b) (6) motion and must thus accept all of the Complaint's