UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) Competitive Enterprise Institute, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil No. 14-cv-01806 (APM) ) Office of Science and Technology Policy, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION Starting on January 8, 2014, the White House’s website hosted a video featuring the Director of the White House Office of Science & Technology Poli cy (OSTP), Dr. John Holdren, in which Holdren asserted that there was a growing body of evid ence linking the weather phenomenon known as the “Polar Vo rtex” to global warming. A bl og post on the White House’s website on that same date made a similar claim. Plaintiff Comp etitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) thereafter petitioned OSTP under the Information Quality Act to correct the two claims, asserting that the linkage between the Pol ar Vortex and global warming—a connection some scientists had questioned—was dubious. In a letter addressed to CEI dated Jun e 6, 2014, OSTP refused to make the requested corrections. CEI then filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act ( FOIA) seeking two categories of records. First, CEI asked for documents concerni ng OSTP’s refusal to correct the claims made in the video and th e blog post. S econd, CEI sought disclosure of documents relating to OSTP’s production of the video. OSTP produced some document s with redactions and withheld2 others in full. According to OSTP, the redacted and withheld m aterial is subject to the deliberative process privilege and thus exemp t from production under FOIA Ex emption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). Before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary jud gment, along with a request by Plaintiff for discovery regarding the adequacy of OSTP’s sea rch. For the reasons explained herein, Defendant’s Motion is gra nted in part and denied in par t and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. CEI’s Request for Correction On January 8, 2014, a video entitled The Polar Vortex Explained in 2 Minutes , featuring the Director of OSTP, Dr. John P. Holdren, was posted to the Wh ite House website. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 9 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.], Exhibits [herein after Exs.], ECF No. 9-2, at 2. 1 In that video, Holdren stated that “[a] growing body of evidence s uggests that the kind of extreme cold [, i.e. , the Polar Vortex] being experienced by much of the United Sta tes as we speak is a pattern that we can expect to see with increasing frequency as global warming continues.” Id. at 3. That same day, OSTP Senior Communications Advisor and Web E ditor Becky Fried wrote a blog post that featured the video and asserted that “we also know that this week’s cold spell is of a type there’s reason to believe may become more frequent in a world that’s getting warmer, on average, because of gr eenhouse-gas pollution.” Id. Three months later, on April 14, 2014, CEI submitted to OSTP a request for correction of information under the Information Quality Act (also known as th e Data Quality Act) (the “Request

1 For ease of reference, the page citations to the exhibits to D efendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment correspond to the ECF electronic page numbers and will be cited as “Def.’s Mot., Exs. at #.”3 for Correction”). Id. at 2-12. CEI is a “public policy research and educational ins titute in Washington, D.C., dedicated to o pposing overregulation and to p romoting economically sustainable environmental pol icy.” Compl. ¶ 7. According to C EI, OSTP guidelines “require the agency to correct any published information that does not meet ‘basic standards of quality, including objectivity, ut ility and integrity.’” 2 CEI asked OSTP to correct Holdren’s and Fried’s statements posi ting a connection between the Polar Vortex and global warming. CEI sought correc tion of these statements because “the evidence (including the conclusions of peer-reviewed schol arly articles) indicates that the kind of extreme cold experienced in the United States this past winter is not linked to global warming” and that “Holdren’s claim of ‘a growing body of eviden ce’ is contradicted by peerreviewed studies.” Def.’s Mot., Exs. at 3. CEI summarized and cited numerous studies refuting and criticizing Holdren’s claim, id. at 4-9, and requested that OSTP remove the video and the blog post from the White House webs ite and also take other correctiv e measures. 2. OSTP’s Response to CEI’s Request for Correction On June 6, 2014, Tamara Dickinson, OSTP’s Principal Assistant D irector for Environment and Energy, sent a three-page letter to CEI denying its Request for Correction (the “OSTP Letter”).
Id. at 14-17. The OSTP Letter first acknowledged receipt of CEI’s Request for Correction and summarized it. Id. at 14. It then summarized Holdren ’s statements in the video ab out the possible link between the Polar Vortex and global warming and stated tha t “Dr. Holdren firmly stands by the integrity and accuracy of his statements in the polar vorte x video.” Id. at 15. The OSTP Letter continued: “The polar vortex video did not claim to present a comprehensive review of the

2 Def.’s Mot., Exs. at 2, n. 3 (citing Office of Science and Tec hnology Policy, Executive Office of the President, Final Guidelines for Ensuring the Quality of Disseminated Information (October 1, 2002) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/de fault/files/microsiftes/ostp/ ostp-iqg.pdf).4 scientific literature in its two-minute run time. Nor was it a recitation of relevant scientific literature that failed to refer ence contradictory citations. R ather, it was an expression of Holdren’s personal opinion and expert judgment on the balance of evidence.” Id. (emphasis added). The OSTP Letter noted that Holdren had used the words “‘I believe’” as “an expression of his expert judgment and personal opinion.” Id. (emphasis added). It characterized Fried’s blog post the same way: “Similarly, the blog post by Ms. Becky Fried express ed a viewpoint and opinion using language including ‘there’ s reason to believe.’” Id. The OSTP Letter then informed CEI why its Request for Correctio n was being denied. The Letter explained that OSTP’s “Information Quality Guidelines . . . state that opinions and policy positions are expressly excluded from the legal definition of ‘ information,’ and are not subject to OSTP’s Information Quality Act Guidelines.” Id. It concluded: “Accordingly, OSTP has determined that the Information Quality Act does not apply to t he opinions stated by Dr. Holdren and Ms. Fried in the polar vorte x video and blog pos t, respecti vely.” Id.
3. CEI’s Appeal and OSTP’s Denial On June 19, 2014, CEI submitted an appeal to OSTP’s General Co unsel Rachael Leonard, arguing that Holdren’s and Fried’s statements were facts, not o pinions, and thus were “information” covered by the Information Quality Act. Id. 19-29. Leonard affirmed OSTP’s decision not to issue a correction. Id. at 31-33. She concurred that the video contained “an expression of [Holdren’s] expert judgment and personal opinion” and concluded that his “expression of his opinion is legally determinative here.” Id. at 33. Because “[o]pinions are expressly excluded from the legal definition of ‘information,’ and therefore are not subject to correction under the Information Quality Guidelines,” she wrote , OSTP was not legally required5 to correct the Director’s statements. Id. Leonard concluded the same with respect to Fried’s blog post statement. Id.
4. CEI’s FOIA Request On June 13, 2014, CEI submitted a FOIA request to OSTP seeking information about (1) the production of the Polar V ortex video and (2) the OSTP L etter rejecting CEI’s Request for Correction. Specifically, CEI sought: (a) All documents referencing or dis cussing whether the above-quote d claim by Holdren is, or should be regar ded as, the posit ion or view of O STP, or whether it is, or should be regarded as, t he personal opinion of Holdre n. (b) All documents related to the produ ction of the video. That inc ludes documents related to its cost of producti on, what agency resources were u sed in producing it, the amount of staff time that was spent producing it, and w hose time was spent producing it. (c) All documents referencing or dis cussing whether the above-quote d claim by Ms. Fried is, or should be regard ed as, the position or view of OSTP, or whether it is, or should be regarded as, t he personal opinion of Ms. Fr ied.
Id. at 39. OSTP responded to the FOI A request on July 9, 2014. Id. at 46-59. OSTP explained that it had conducted a search of its records and had located 11 pag es responsive to CEI’s request. Id. at 46. OSTP enclosed those 11 pages, but withheld selected por tions of those pages under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(5) and (b)(6). Id. at 46-58. Although OSTP’s respons e did not specify the basis for its invocation of Exemption 5, it later defended the redactions on the ground that the withheld material was subject to the deliberative pr ocess privilege. Def.’s Mot. at 10-14. By letter dated August 4, 2014, CEI appealed OSTP’s response t o Leonard, arguing that Defendant had fallen short of its obligations under FOIA to ade quately search for and produce documents in response to CEI’s request. Id. at 61-80. In particular, CEI complained that the production did not contain any r ecords (1) supporting the cost of producing the video or6 (2) reflecting internal discussions concerning the conclusion t hat Holdren’s and Fried’s statements were personal opinions. Id. Leonard agreed that OSTP had conducted an inadequate search. Id. at 78-96. Accordingly, she ordered the OSTP staff to conduct an additional record sear ch “based on [CEI’s] original” FOIA request. Id. at 79. After the staff conducted an additional search, Leonard reported that OSTP did not have any invoices or bills relating to the video’s production. Id. The staff did, however, locate a copy of the original OSTP Letter, as well as a one-page calendar entry, which OSTP produced. Id. Finally, the staff identified 47 pages consisting of drafts of the OSTP Letter.
Id. These drafts were “marked with r edline edits, track changes, co mments and/or notations[.]”
Id. Leonard determined that, although these pages were responsive t o CEI’s FOIA request, they were subject to the deliberative process privilege and therefor e exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 5. Id. She also concluded that there was “no reasonably segregable fac tual or non-deliberative information” in those 47 pages. Id.
B. Procedural History On October 29, 2014, CEI filed its complaint in this court seek ing declaratory and injunctive relief against OSTP, claiming primarily that the age ncy had improperly withheld the 47 draft pages of the OSTP Letter. See generally , Compl., ECF No. 1. On January 23, 2015, OSTP filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. See generally , Def.’s Mot. OSTP supported its Motion with a declaration from Rachael Leonard, OSTP’s General Counsel and Chief FOIA Officer, which included as an attachment a Vaughn Index describing the 11 pages of responsive records that OSTP had produced but had redacted in part, mainly pursuant to FOIA Exemption 5. 3

3 OSTP also redacted certain portions of the 11 pages under FOIA Exemption 6, which shields from disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure o f which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Plaintiff does no t challenge OSTP’s invocation of that exemption. See Compl. at 6-8.7 See Def.’s Mot., Exs. at 82-96 [hereinafter Vaughn Index]. On February 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgme nt, challenging OSTP’s invocat ion of Exemption 5 to withhold responsive material. See Pl.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No 10 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.]. In its Reply, OSTP made an unexpected admission. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Leonard had declared that “the 47 [draft] pages [of the OSTP Le tter] remained internal to the Executive Branch,” Def.’s Mot., Decl. of Rachael Leonard [herei nafter Leonard Decl.], ECF No. 9-1, ¶ 26, leaving two distinct impressions: (1) that there we re only 47 draft pages of the OSTP Letter and (2) that only Executive Branch officials had reviewe d the draft pages. Those impressions were, in fact, incorrect. In truth, according to a supplemental declaration submitted by Leonard, OSTP staff consulted with Holdren after filing its summary judgment motion and learned that he “had shared one version of the draft response l etter with Dr. Jennifer Francis, a professor at Rutgers University. . . . Dr. Francis then return ed the five-page draft to Dr. Holdren with edits and comments” (the “ Francis Draft”). Def.’s Reply, Suppl. Decl. of Rachael Leonard [hereinafter Suppl. Leonard Decl.], ECF No. 12-1, ¶¶ 7, 8. Eve n though Dr. Francis was not employed by the Executive Branch, OSTP nevertheless claimed tha t it was entitled to withhold the Francis Draft under the consul tant corollary to the deliber ative process privilege. Def.’s Reply
at 6-8. Plaintiff, for its part, vigorously contested OSTP’s attempt to apply the consultant corollary. Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 14 at 5. Additionally, Plaint iff asserted that, in light of OSTP’s belated disclosure of the Francis Draft, it should be entitled to discover “whether OSTP [had] conducted an adequate search for all responsive documents, whet her the relationship between Jennifer Francis and OSTP Director Holdren qualified her as an agency consultant for purposes of8 the consultant corollary . . . a nd whether the remaining drafts withheld truly did remain internal to the Executive Branch.” Id. at 23-24.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any mat erial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). T o make this determination, the court must review all “evidence . . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 245 n.2 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party, while a fact is “material” only if it is capable of affecting the outcome of litigation. Id. at 248-49. A non-material factual dispute is insufficient to prevent the court from g ranting summary judgment. Id. at 249. Most FOIA cases are appropriatelydecided on motions for summary judgment. See Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol , 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009). A court may award summary judgment in a FOIA case by relying on the informa tion included in the agency’s affidavits or declarations if they are “relatively detailed and non-conclusory,” SafeCard Servs.,
Inc. v. SEC , 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), and if they describe “the documen ts and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logi cally falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith,” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). “Unlike the review of other agency action that must be upheld i f supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious, the FOIA expressly pl aces the burden ‘on the agency to9 sustain its action’ and directs the district courts to ‘determi ne the matter de novo .’” DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press , 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, an agency must demonstrate that “each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is unidentifiable, or is wholly [or partially ] exempt from the Ac t’s inspection requi rements.” Goland v. CIA , 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Students Against Ge nocide v. Dep’t of State , 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
B. Exemption 5 and the Deliberative Process Privilege Under FOIA Exemption 5, an agency may withhold “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). To fall wi thin Exemption 5, the document must satisfy two conditions: (1) “its source must be a Government a gency[,]” and (2) “it must fall within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under judicial stand ards that would govern litigation against the agency that holds it.” Dep’t of Interior v. Klamat h Water Users Protective Ass’n , 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001). The deliberative process privilege is among the privileges cove red by Exemption 5. That privilege shields from disclosure “all papers which reflect the agency’s group thinking in the process of working out its polic y and determining what its law shall be.” Arthur Andersen & Co.
v. IRS , 679 F.2d 254, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citation and internal quo tation marks omitted). To determine whether a document is covered by the privilege, court s look to two factors. First, courts ask whether the document is “predecisional,” that is, “whether it was generated before the adoption of an agency policy.” Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy , 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). And, second, courts ask whether the document is “delibe rative,” meaning “whether it10 reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process.” Id. As with all FOIA Exemptions, an agency invoking Exemption 5 bear s the burden of establishing th at it applies. Access Reports v.
DOJ , 926 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
1. Drafts of the OSTP Letter The court first addresses whethe r the 47 pages of drafts of the OSTP Letter were properly withheld under the deliberative process privilege. OSTP claims that these pages are “predecisional inasmuch as they were generated to assist the Agency in prepari ng its final response to CEI’s request” and “deliberative in that they reflect edits, comments and advice related to the content of that response.” Def.’s Mot. at 11-12. According to declaratio ns submitted by Rachael Leonard, the 47 pages were drafts “of the final OSTP Data Quality Act re sponse provided to CEI . . . [which] remained internal to the Executive Branch. In these 47 pages, OSTP staff were engaged in deliberative conversations and ed its in order to help formulate OSTP’s response to CEI’s Request for Correction.” Leonard Decl. ¶¶ 26-27. Moreover, “[a]ll 47 pages were marked DRAFT when created, and several pages cont ain draft edits, including redli nes and comment bubbles from OSTP staff.” Id. In her supplemental declaration, Leonard identified each OSTP s taff member who reviewed at least one draft versi on of the Letter: “Holdren, O STP’s Principal Assistant Director for Environment and Energy, OSTP’s Chief of Staff, two career a ttorneys at OSTP, and two OSTP communications staff.” Suppl. Leonard Decl. ¶ 4. The Court of Appeals has recogni zed that drafts can be subject to the deliberative process privilege, and thus exempt from FOIA disclosure, if the drafts are both deliberative and predecisional. In Russell v. Department of the Air Force , the Court considered whether the privilege applied to a draft manuscript of an Air Force histori cal document discussing the use of Agent Orange and other herbicid es during the Vietnam War. 682 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The11 draft manuscript, “which emerge d from the [Office of Air Force History’s (OAFH)] editorial review process, constitute[d] the Air Force’s official statemen t concerning the history of herbicide use in the Vietnam conflict.” Id. at 1048. The Court of Appeals found that the draft manuscript was “the product of creative debate and candid consideration of the alternatives within the Air Force” as well as other agencies with which it consulted. Id. If the draft was disclosed to the public, the Court feared that its authors in the future would b e “less inclined to state their own interpretations candidly.” Id. Disclosing the draft might also confuse the public, the Court explained, because the public could mistakenly interpret the views within a draft as the views of the agency. Id. at 1048-49. And, because the only difference between the fina l document and the draft—the deletion of 20 pages—would reveal what material made the final cut and what was edited out, the Court of Appeals was concerned that disclosure would contravene the purpose of Exemption 5 to “prevent such dis robing of an agency decision-ma ker’s judgment.” Id. at 1049. For these reasons, the Court of A ppeals affirmed the withholdin g of the draft sought in that case.
In Dudman Communications Corporation v. Department of the Air Force , the Court of Appeals applied Russell to another draft OAFH document. See 815 F.2d 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Court held that the risks identified in Russell —that the “disclosure of editorial judgments” would “stifle the creative thinking and candid exchange of idea s necessary to produce good historical work”—are present even when the public cannot “segre gate and specifically identify editorial changes.” Id. at 1569. As the Court explained, “[t]he d anger of ‘chilling’ arises from disclosure that the Air Force as an institution made changes in a draft at some point[—]not from disclosure that particular Air Force employees at particular st ages in the editorial process made such changes.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court held, therefore, that the draft at issue in that case “falls within Exemption 5 as clearly as did the draft in Russell .” Id. ; accord Arthur Anderson &12 Co., 679 F.2d at 259 (holding that drafts of IRS Revenue Ruling and accompanying notes are protected by the delibera tive process privilege); Pies v. IRS , 668 F.2d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that draft proposed re gulations and related documents that were never subjected to final review were predecisional and t hus exempt under Exemption 5). Following Russell and Dudman , courts in this District have held, in many instances, that drafts are protected by the deliberative process privilege. See, e.g. , Elec. Privacy Info. Cntr. v.
DHS , 928 F. Supp. 2d 139, 151-52 (D.D.C . 2013) (deeming numerous draft documents to be protected under the de liberative process privilege and rejectin g plaintiff’s assertion that to protect a “draft” document, an agency must identify a corresponding fin al document); ViroPharma Inc. v.
DHS , 839 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that various draft documents were properly withheld by the FDA because “[t] he choice of what factual mater ial and prior final agency opinions to include or remove during the drafting process is itself often part of the deliberative process , and thus is properly exempt under Exemption 5”) (emphasis added); Techserve Alliance v. Napolitano , 803 F. Supp. 2d 16, 28 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that a draft of t he Office of the Inspector General’s review of the Benef it Fraud Referral Pro cess containing predeci sional commentary was protected by the deliberative pr ocess privilege); Goodrich Corp. v. EPA , 593 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that EPA was permitt ed to withhold the factual c ontent and data contained within a draft model under Exemption 5 because “evolving iterations of the model’s inputs and calibration reflect the opinions of the staff currently developing the mode l, which may not represent EPA’s ultimate opinions relating to these matters”; “[E]ven if the da ta plugged into the model is itself purely factual, the selection and calibration of data is part o f the deliberative process to which Exemption 5 applies.”); Reliant Energy Power Generation, Inc. v. FERC , 520 F. Supp. 2d 194, 206 (D.D.C. 2007) (drafts of FERC report reflecting staff’s tho ughts during the process of13 determining whether alleged market abuses caused the California energy crisis were protected by the deliberative process privilege). Applying the foregoing decisions, the court finds that the 47 draft pages of the OSTP Letter were covered by the deliberative process privilege and thus pro perly withheld from production under Exemption 5. The drafts pl ainly were predecisional—they preceded in time the final version of OSTP Letter. And they were de liberative—they reflect the op inions, reactions, and comments of OSTP employees to the OSTP Letter. See Coastal States Gas Corp. , 617 F.2d at 866 (describing as “deliberative” documents that “reflect[] the give-and-take o f the consultative process” and stating that the “exemption thus covers recommendations, draft documents , proposals, suggestions, and other subjective documents which reflect perso nal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the agency”) (emphasis added). Moreover, th e same concerns over disclosure that animated Russell and Dudman —stifling creative thinking, c onfusing the public, and “disrobing the agency decision maker’s judgment”—apply equally here. Court-ordered disclosure of the 47 pages unquestionably would have a chilling effect on the free exchange of ideas and viewpoints that the de liberative process privilege is meant to encourage and protect. Plaintiff raises a handful of ar guments to contest application of the deliberative process privilege to the 47 draft pages. First, Plaintiff argues that the privilege does not apply because the drafts do not “relate to developi ng agency policies or regulati ons[; rather, the] documents . . . relate merely to a video that OSTP claimed was just the ‘personal opin ion’ of its staff and not the agency itself.” Pl.’s Mot. at 9. Plaintiff’s argument correctly fram es the law, but misapplies it to the facts at issue. It is true that, for the privilege to apply, “the do cument [at issue] must be a direct part of the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or ex presses opinions on legal or policy
matters.” Vaughn v. Rosen , 523 F.2d 1136, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also Petroleum14 Information Corp. v. Dep’t of Interior , 976 F.2d 1429, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that the deliberative process privilege “ is centrally concerned with pro tecting the process by which policy is formulated”). In other words , “[t]he privilege does not pro tect a document which is merely peripheral to actua l policy formation.” Ethyl Corp. v. EPA , 25 F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir. 1994). But the drafts at issue here are not “merely peripheral” to a l egal or policy matter. On the contrary, they relate directly t o a legal matter. The OSTP Let ter expressed OSTP’s legal position on whether the Information Quality Act and implementing guideli nes required it to correct statements made in the Polar Vortex video and in the related bl og post. Def.’s Mot., Exs. at 15 (“On this legal basis , OSTP denies your request for i nformation correction under the Information Quality Act.”) (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiff mischaracteri zes the OSTP Letter when it asserts that the Letter simply concerns Holdren’s “‘personal opinion’ u nconnected to agency policy formulation.” Pl.’s Mot. at 12. A nd, although the agency came to the conclusion that the views expressed by Holdren and Fried were expressions of their person al opinions rather than of agency policy, the process by which the agency arrived at that legal conclusion is protec ted. Next, Plaintiff argues that the agency failed to meet its burde n to demonstrate that the privilege applies, because it failed to specify the individuals who “received, reviewed or authored” the drafts and failed to explain “what their respective positio ns are in the decisional hierarchy.”
See Pl.’s Reply at 11-15. The court disagrees. There is no catego rical rule that an agency must provide such detail to assert the deliberative process privileg e. It is true that the lack of such information may, in some cases, prevent a court from making a p rivilege determination. See, e.g ., Ethyl Corp. , 25 F.3d at 1250 (holding that because the agency did not iden tify the authors or recipients, the court could not i dentify those “persons’ relati onships to the decisionmaking process”); Center for Biological Diversity v. Gutierrez , 451 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68 (D.D.C. 2006)15 (holding that, because the agency did not identify senders and recipients, the court could not determine whether the withheld documents were “part of a clear process leading to a . . . decision” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But the absence of such d etail is not necessarily fatal. What is essential is that an agency provide information sufficient t o allow a court to determine that the document is part of a deliberative process. See, e.g ., SafeCard Servs. , 926 F.2d at 1204 (stating that “to carry its burden, the a gency must describe not only th e contents of the document, but also enough about its context, viz. the agency’s decisi onmaking process”). Here, OSTP has met its burden. In her Supplemental Declaration , Leonard identified the OSTP staff members who reviewed the drafts. They included “Hol dren, OSTP’s Principal Assistant Director for Environmen t and Energy, OSTP’s Chief of Staff, two career attorneys at OSTP, and two OSTP communications staff.” Supp. Leonard Decl. ¶ 4. OSTP also consulted with three Office of Management and Budget (OMB) staff members— one of whom provided written comments—“to confirm that OSTP was correctly interpreti ng and applying OMB’s . . . Information Quality Act guidelines.” Id. ¶ 5. The court agrees that Defendant could have provided a more fulsome explanation of the drafting process, for example , by distinguishing between who authored the original draft and who made edits or comments and by specifying the dates on which those edits and comments were made. But the information OSTP p rovided is sufficient. It identified the positions of the OSTP employees who reviewed and commented on the OSTP Letter. From that information, the court readily can infer that the dra fts were “part of the process by which [OSTP] came to [its] final decision.” Abtew v. DHS , 808 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Finally, Plaintiff ar gues that, even if por tions of the drafts are exempt from disclosure, the drafts in their entirety cannot b e withheld because much of the OSTP Letter includes recitations of historical facts, such as what Holdren said in the video, th at are “reasonably segregable.”16 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also Pl.’s Mot. at 17. The court disa grees. The Court of Appeals r ecently rejected a similar argument that factual material in a draft wa s reasonably segregable: “Our cases have made clear that a draft age ncy history may not be dissecte d by the courts in the manner suggested by” the plaintiff. National Sec. Archive v. CIA , 752 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Dudman , 815 F.2d at 1568-69; Russell , 682 F.2d at 1048-49). The Court explained that, “[i]n producing a draft agency h istory, the writer necessarily must ‘cull the relevant documents, extract pertinent facts, organize them to suit a specific purpo se,’ and ‘identify the significant issues.’” Id. (quoting Mapother v. DOJ , 3 F.3d 1533, 1538 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). The drafts of the three-page OST P Letter are obviously far less robust than an agency history. But some of the same c oncerns with respect to segrega bility identified in National Security
Archive are applicable here. The deliber ative process privilege prote cts not only the content of drafts, but also the drafting process itself. See National Sec. Archive , 752 F.3d at 465; Dudman , 815 F.2d at 1569; see also Marzen v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 825 F.2d 1148, 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that the “exem ption protects not only the o pinion, comments and recommendations in the draft but a lso the process itself”). Th e 47 pages at issue here consisted of 10 different drafts of the OSTP Letter, reviewed by seven diffe rent people within OSTP. Suppl. Leonard Decl. ¶ 3. Any effort to segregate the “factual ” portions of the drafts, as distinct from their “deliberative” portions, would run the risk of revea ling “editorial judgments—for example, decisions to insert or de lete material or to change a draft’s focus or emphasis.” Dudman , 815 F.2d at 1569. Such differences easily could be discerned b y comparing the final letter with an earlier version. Accordingly, because even disclosure of the f actual material in the OSTP Letter, and nothing more, could reveal judgments made during the drafti ng process itself, the court will not order disclosure of any portion of the drafts.17 2. The Consultant Corollary The court turns next to the five draft pages of the OSTP Lette r that Holdren shared with Dr. Francis, a Rutgers University professor. OSTP insists that those five pages are subject to the deliberative process privilege under the “consultant corollary” and thus are exempt from disclosure. Def.’s Reply at 6-8. Consistent with the statutory text, the Supreme Court has emph asized that to qualify for protection under Exemption 5 “the communication must be ‘inter- agency or intra-agency.’” Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Wa ter Users Protective Ass’n , 532 U.S. 1, 9 (2001) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)). Our Court of Appeals, however, has recognized th at protection under Exemption 5 can extend to some communications between agency employees and outside consultants. As the Court of Appeals explained in Public Citizen v. Department of Justice : “[R]ecords of communications between an agen cy and outside consultants qualif y as intra-agency for purposes of Exemption 5 if they have been created for the purpose of aid ing the agency’s deliberative process.” 111 F.3d at 170 (D.C . Cir. 1997) (citations and inte rnal quotation marks omitted); see also Ryan v. DOJ , 617 F.2d 781, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“When an agency record is submitted by outside consultants as part of the deliberative process, and it was solicited by the agency, we find it entirely reasonable to deem the resulting document to b e an ‘intra-agency’ memorandum.”). Under what has come to be known as the “consultant corollary,” it is “‘irrelevant’ whether the author of the document is ‘a regular agency employee or a tempo rary consultant.’” Public Citizen , 111 F.3d at 170 (quoting Formaldehyde Inst. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. , 889 F.2d 1118, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
In Klamath , the Supreme Court observed th at a number of circuits, includi ng ours, have recognized the “consultant corollary.” 532 U.S. at 9. Without passing on the validity of the18 exception itself, the Court held that it did not apply to commu nications exchanged between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and cert ain Indian Tribes regarding th e allocation of water rights. The Court explained that in the lo wer court cases recognizing the c orollary, “the consultant does not represent an interest of its own . . . when it advises the agen cy that hires it. Its o nly obligations are to truth and its sense of what good judgment calls for, and in those respects the consultant functions just as an employee would be expected to do.” Id. at 10-11. Because the Tribes communicated “with the Bureau [of Indian Affairs] with their own, albeit ent irely legitimate, interests in mind,” the Court held that their communi cations did not fall within th e corollary. Id. at 12. The Court added, “[w]hile this fact alone distinguishes tribal communicat ions from the consultants’ examples recognized by several Courts of Appeals, the distinction is eve n sharper, in that the Tribes are selfadvocates at the expense of othe rs seeking benefits inadequate to satisfy everyone.” Id. Since Klamath , the Court of Appeals has continued to recognize the consultan t corollary in cases where the consultants were deemed not be advocating th eir own interests. See , e.g ., Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. DOD , 512 F.3d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Unlike the Indian tribes in
Klamath , the [consultants] had no individual interests to promote in t heir submissions[.]”); McKinley v. Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys. , 647 F.3d 331, 337-38 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Unlike the Indian tribes, the FRBNY [did] not represent an in terest of its own, or the interest of any other client, when it advise [d] the [Board]” (internal quot ation marks omitted)). OSTP asserts that the consulta nt corollary applies here becaus e “Dr. Holdren sought advice from Professor Francis because she is an expert on the climate- change issues raised by CEI’s Request for Correction and the Response the Agency was in the p rocess of drafting.” Def.’s Reply at 8 (citing Leonard Supp. Decl. ¶ 8). Unlike the Indian Tribe s in Klamath , OSTP argues,19 Dr. Francis was “not advancing her own interests or seeking a g overnment benefit.” Def.’s Reply
at 8. In the court’s view, the issue is not so clear cut. Whether a person is self-interested in a particular situation is not a b inary question. Rather, self-in terest exists on a spectrum, with altruism at one end and greed or avarice on the other. The point at whi ch selflessness passes into selfinterest is not demarcated by a bright line. Here, OSTP offers little more than bald assertions to support Dr. Francis’ purported l ack of self-interest in comment ing on the OSTP Letter. According to Leonard, “Dr. Francis has pub lished numerous articles concer ning climate science and weather patterns in peer-reviewed journa ls. Holdren shared one draft r esponse with Dr. Francis to seek her outside technical expertise related to the polar vortex.” Leon ard Supp. Decl. ¶ 8 (citation omitted). Leonard then states in conclusory terms that “Dr. Francis effec tively functioned as an agency employee, providing advice to OSTP similar to what Holdren woul d have sought and received from an OSTP agency employee. In addition, Dr. Francis operate d as a technical science expert solely on OSTP’s behalf, not advancing her own interests or see king government benefit.” Id. Leonard offers no other details about the “consultancy” that Dr . Francis provided to Holdren. She does not explain why Holdren needed to confer with Dr. Francis about the OSTP Letter; to what portions of the letter Dr. Francis contributed her “technical s cience” expertise about the Polar Vortex; or to what extent Dr. Francis has conferred with Holdre n and OSTP in the past about scientific or other issues. Against this skeletal record, Pl aintiff has amassed convincing evidence, without the benefit of discovery and based solely on the public record, showing tha t Dr. Francis’ consultancy was not as selfless as OSTP would have t he court believe. Dr. Francis is not just any climate scientist. As Plaintiff states, she is the “originator and chief proponent ” of the theory that “global warming20 is leading to more severe winter cold.” Pl.’s Reply at 5. Dr . Francis’ research is the “growing body of evidence” that Holdren touted in his video, the very re ference that Plaintiff sought to have OSTP correct. According to various news articles cited by Plai ntiff, the theory linking extreme cold events to global warming was “first proposed” by “Jennifer Francis and her collaborators” 4 and is described as “her theory.” 5 Further, she is considered to be its most-known proponent. 6 These articles also highlight that other climate scientists hav e questioned Francis’ theory, see id. at 7, n. 19, and that she has st aunchly defended it, see id. at 6-7 & n. 26. More over, Dr. Francis is the recipient of federal research grants “[i]nvestigating the l ink between a warming Artic and weather patterns in the c ontinental United States.” Id. at 7, n.28. None of the foregoing should be interpreted as a criticism of Dr. Francis. Nor should it be interpreted as the court taking a position in the debate that h er theory has provoked. That is not the court’s purpose. Rather, the court recites the foregoing b ecause it clearly shows that, at a minimum, Dr. Francis had a professional and reputational stake in OSTP’s decision to reject Plaintiff’s request to correct Holdren’s and Fried’s statements , which endorsed her climate theory. A government consultant, of course, is permitted to have a poin t of view. See Klamath , 532 U.S. at 10 (observing that “nor do we read the cases [applying the c onsultant corollary] as necessarily assuming that an outside consulta nt must be devoid of a definit e point of view when the agency

4 Pl.’s Reply at 7 (citing Jason Samenow, Scientists: Don’t make “extreme co ld” centerpiece of global warming argument: Climate scientists are pushing back against the notion global warming could mean more extreme cold , Wash. Post (Feb. 20, 2014) (Jennifer Francis “first proposed” the hypothesis that “ global warming [is] the culprit for bone-chilling cold .”) (in Westlaw at 2014 WLNR 4759052). 5 Pl.’s Reply at 8 (citing Seth Borenstein, Scientists: Americans Are Becoming Weather Wimps , Pittsburgh PostGazette, Jan. 14, 2014, at A2 (“Her theory... says melting Arctic sea ice [caused by global warming] is chang ing polar weat her.”) (available in Westlaw at 2014 WLNR 936324); Why Global Warming Does Not Necessarily Result in Warmer Winter , The Economist, March 4, 2015 (citing her “controversial” theo ry that there is “ a connection between climate change and colder winters.” ). 6 Pl.’s Reply at 8 (citing Amy Ellis Nutt, The 100+ Club: The Most Influential People in New Jersey , Star-Ledger, June 1, 2014, at M27 (describing Francis as “ one of the leading researchers into how climate-induced alterat ions of the jet stream may b e causing persistent extreme weather.” ) (in Westlaw at 2014 WLNR 14892397).21 contracts for its services”). But here, Dr. Francis cannot be likened to a government employee whose “only obligations are to tr uth and its sense of what good judgment calls for[.]” Id. at 10-
11. A decision by OSTP to correct Hol dren’s and Fried’s statements would have been contrary to Dr. Francis’ self-interest. Ind eed, such an action likely woul d have been perceiv ed as a rebuke of her climate theory. Thus, Dr. Francis was not “enough like the agency’s own personnel to justify calling [her] communications ‘intra-agency.’” Klamath , 532 U.S. at 12; see also People for the Am. Way Found. v. Dep’t of Educ ., 516 F. Supp. 2d 28, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that contractors who have an interest in being awarded a subsequent contract did not fall under the corollary). Critical to the court’s conclusion is the context in which Dr. Francis consulted with Holdren. See SafeCard Servs. , 926 F.2d at 1204 (stating that t he agency must present facts about both the “content[]” and “context” of the document). Dr. Franc is did not deliver her advice in this case to assist OSTP with forming a policy position on the claim ed connection between the Polar Vortex and global warming. Instead, the letter that Dr. Franci s reviewed concerned OSTP’s legal

response to a demand for correction made under Information Quality Act. Indeed, having carefully read the final OSTP letter, the court is left wondering what as pect of the draft letter required Dr. Francis’ expertise either on climate science generally or t he Polar Vortex in particular. The overwhelming majority of the OSTP Letter (1) repeats the conten t of CEI’s Request for Correction and (2) reiterates Holdren’s remarks in the Polar Vortex video, before ultimately concluding that the views expressed by Holdren and Fried are their personal opi nions and therefore are not subject to the Information Quality Act. Def.’s Mot., Exs. at 14-16. N othing apparent on the face of the final letter would have demanded Dr. Francis’ “technical expert ise related to the polar vortex.”
See Leonard Supp. Decl. ¶ 8. Admittedly, Dr. Francis could have pr oposed or commented on text22 that ultimately was cut from the final version, which might hav e required her technical expertise. But, if that is the case, OSTP bore the burden of making such i nformation known to the court. See SafeCard Servs. , 926 F.2d at 1204. It has offered nothing of the sort. The court therefore rejects Defe ndant’s attempt to apply the c onsultant corollary in this case and finds that the five draft pages shared with Dr. Franci s are not covered by the deliberative process privilege and cannot be w ithheld under Exemption 5. Th ose pages must be disclosed to Plaintiff.
3. Email Communications Turning now to the 11 pages of emails produced to Plaintiff, th e court ordered that those pages be produced in camera

. See Minute Order, December 15, 2015. Based on a review of those pages, as well as OSTP’s Vaughn Index, the court concludes that OSTP has failed to demonstrate that the deliberative process pr ivilege applies to the withheld material. As explained earlier, the deliberative process privilege “is ce ntrally concerned with protecting the process by which policy is formulated.” Petroleum Info. Corp. , 976 F.2d at 1435. Generally speaking, the emails concern discussions within OSTP regarding the production of the Holdren video. See generally , Vaughn Index at 83-86. But the video, and withheld communications about it, do not concern an OSTP policy position. Rather, when OSTP rejected Plaintiff’s request for correcti on, it explained that the video ’s statements were “an expression of Dr. Holdren’s personal opinion.” Def.’s Mot., Exs. at 15. If the video was an expression only of Holdren’s personal opinion, then it follows that internal commu nications about the video cannot be part of a process of formula ting agency policy. The court’s review of the emails confirms that conclusion. Accordingly, OSTP will be ordered to produce in fu ll the 11 pages of emails, except for those portions protected by Exemption 6. See n. 3, supra .23 C. Plaintiff’s Request for Discovery In its final submission to this court, Plaintiff asked to take discovery based on “OSTP’s tardy admission” that it had submitted an inaccurate declaratio n in support of its motion for summary judgment and had “overlooked” a draft that had been sha red outside the government. Pl.’s Reply at 23. Permitting discovery, Plaintiff argues, wou ld shed light on “whether OSTP conducted an adequate search for all responsive documents” and “whether the remaining drafts withheld truly did remain interna l to the Executive Branch.” Id. at 23-24. Discovery in FOIA cases is rare. Schrecker v. DOJ , 217 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d , 349 F.3d 657 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Agency affidavits must be acc orded a “presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims ab out the existence and discoverability of other documents.” SafeCard , 926 F.2d at 1200 (citations a nd internal quotation marks omitted). Courts must deny requests for discovery “where an agency’s declarations are reasonably detailed, submitted in good faith, and the court is satisfied that no factual dispute remains.” Schrecker , 217 F. Supp. 2d at 35. Applying these principles, the court holds that OSTP’s correct ion of the record does not warrant the limited discovery sought in this case. Although th e initial Leonard Declaration contained a significant error—a sserting that none of the drafts were shared outside the Executive Branch—mistakes alone do not imply bad faith. See Fischer v. DOJ , 723 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D.D.C. 2010) (“To be sure, defendant has not performed its dut ies under FOIA perfectly, but error-free performance is not required.”). “[T]he agency’s coo perative behavior of notifying the court and plaintiff that it had discovered a mistake, if anythi ng, shows good faith.” Fischer , 723 F. Supp. 2d at 109. Here, the Supplemental Leonard Declarationexplains to the court’s satisfaction24 why the draft shared with Dr. Francis was not discovered earlie r. Supp. Leonard Decl. ¶¶ 6-7. Thus, discovery is not warrant ed on the ground that OSTP has ac ted in bad faith. Nor has Plaintiff shown through evidence that there is a factual dispute about the existence of other drafts that were shared outside the Executive Branch. Rather, Plaintiff merely speculates that such other drafts might exist because of the late disclosu re of the draft shared with Dr. Francis. But speculation that other documents might exist is not enough to overcome the good faith presumption that must be accorded to agency affidavits, even th ose that admit error. See SafeCard , 926 F.2d at 1200. Plaintiff’s requestfor discovery is therefo re denied.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiff’s Cro ss-Motion is granted i n part and denied in p art. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: February 10, 2016 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge