on its face - is not so devoid of all merit to allow this Court to
interfere with the state court proceedings.

This is not to say, however, that Doe or the EEOC are without
potential recourse in the present lawsuit. Although the authority
provided by the BEOC does not support the extreme act of enjoining
state court litigation, it does establish that the EEOC may be able
to use Custom’s acts as evidence of impermissible retaliation. The
nature and timing of Custom’s actions appear to be, in charitable
terms, somewhat curious. A jury may view these actions in even
less charitable light. The Court, of course, expresses no opinion
on the legal significance, if any, of Custom’s acts, but rather
notes only that Custom proceeds at its own peril in this
litigation.

Finally, the BEOC also argues that the state court proceeding
violates the governing protective order in this case. ‘he parties
disagree about the scope of the governing protective order.
Unfortunately, neither party attaches transcripts of any of the
court dates during which the parameters of the protective order
were discussed, In any event, even when considering the EEOC’s
version of the protective order, the operative language there does
not support the type of relief that the EEOC requests. I[t states,
in pertinent part: “Defendant . . . shall not have any contact
with an identified class member regarding the allegations or

defenses raised in this case,“ &EROC Reply Br., Ex. B, par. 11


law, instruct that only in the rarest of circumstances will a
federal court interfere with the right of a state court to
adjudicate state interests. A federal court may enjoin a lawsuit
if it is retaliatory and baseless. See, @.g., Bill Johnsons’
Restaurant v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983). If the lawsuit has any
reasonable basis in fact or law, a federal court cannot intrude in
the state court proceedings. See id. at 748-749. In addition to
demonstrating that the challenged litigation is baseless, the party
seeking an injunction must also show “equitable entitlement to an
injunction,” including irreparable harm. Ramsden v. Agribank, FCB,
214 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2000).

The EEOC argues that the state court action at issue here is
retaliatory and groundless, The EROC notes that Custom ignored
Doe’s purported obligation until after the EEOC filed suit. In
addition, Custom filed suit only after it failed to convince the
EEOC to drop Doe from the class. The EEOC also claims that Custom
has never filed a similar suit against any of its previous sales
representatives. Finally, the BEOC notes that although the state
court action alleges a breach of contract, Custom fails to attach
any contract to the complaint.

This, alone, cannot justify the injunctive relief requested
here. There is no argument that Doe indeed drew an excess against
her commissions. Doe may have valid affirmative defenses, such as

waiver, laches, or estoppel, but nonetheless Custom’s complaint -


(emphasis added). The plain terms of this provision indicate that
Defendants are barred solely from any discussion with identified
class members regarding the claims and defenses in this matter

This is not a wholesale prohibition against any and all
communications - otherwise, it would operate as a de
facto injunction prohibiting Custom from pursuing any potential
legal action, irrespective of the merit of such action. As noted
above, this Court does not have such plenary powers.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the EEOC’s for a Protective

Order is DENIED. The Motion to Compel Defendant Custom Companies

to Produce a Witness Pursuant to Ruye 30(b) is DENIED As MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED,

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court

Date: Y, 0



eee

+ Minute Order Forni (06°97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge ff Other
or Magistrate Sudge Harry D. Leinenweber than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER | 02 C 3768 cons.wiQ3-C-2293 DATE 7/20/2004
CASE Equal Employment Opportunity vs. Catherine Copello, et al
| TITLE
[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: vf the motion being presented.]
—_
DOCKET ENTRY;
ie5) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.)
(2) a Bricfin support of motion due.
(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief duc.
(4) oO RulingHearingon set for_ at.
(5) Q Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on_ set for at.
(6) aa] Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [sct for/re-set for] on setfor at
(7) a) Trial[sct for/re-set for] on at.
(8) oO |Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at__
(9) a This case is dismissed (with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant (o]
OFRCP4(m) CLocalRule dl.) OFRCP41(a\(1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).

ao [Other docket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: EEOC’s Motion for

a Protective Order is DENIED. The Motion to Compel Defendant Custom Companies to Produce a

Witness Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) is DENTED AS MOOT,
dl) gf {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No nolices required,
No nolices required, umber of notices

Notives muiled by judge's staff:

UL 217008

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Notified counsel by telephone

Docketing to mail notives

Mail AO 450 form.

Cony to judge/magistrate judge

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coutoom SU Ke 62 Te aon semaine
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initials

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOL -
EASTERN DIVISION E D

UAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
Conatzsazee, aaun JUL 9g 2004

fay 0, LEINENWEBER
Plainti£é, suo GH NgTRICT COURT WUOGE
Case No. 02 C 3768

and
Consolidated for all
CATHERINE COPELLO and ALLISON Purposes with
RENNEDY, Case No. 03 C 2293
Plaintiffs- Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
Intervenors,
v. wot os

ert
CUSTOM COMPANIES, INC., CUSTOM go’ re
EXECUTIVE GROUP, INC. and " h
CUSTOM DISTRIBUTION NETWORK, wr 21H
INC.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the EEOC’s Motion for Entry of a
Protective Order and Motion to Compel Defendant to Produce a
Witness Pursuant to Rule 30(b) (6). Custom Companies has agreed to
produce the Rule 30(b)(6) witness, and thus that Motion is denied
as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

The EEOC moves for a protective order barring Defendants from
proceeding with state court litigation against a class member, wha
will be identified as “Doe” in this opinion. The EEOC raises two

arguments in support of its motion. First, the EEOC claims that

Ne


the state court litigation is retaliatory and will cause
irreparable harm to Doe and the EEOC. Second, the EEOC contends
that the state court litigation violates the protective order in
this case.

The overall facts are undisputed. Doe performed services for
Custom from approximately October 2000 to November 2001. on
November 20, 2003, counsel for Custom sent a letter to the BEOC
reguesting that Poe be dropped from the class because she
purportedly had been an independent contractor and not an employee.
The next day, on November 21, 2003, corporate counsel for Custom
sent a letter to Doe demanding return of approximately $19,000
which Custom claimed was the excess amount that Doe had drawn as an
advance against commissions, but had failed to repay when her work
ended in November 2001. Custom apparently did not request these
funds at any point during the two years following Doe’s departure.
In December 2003, the BEOC sent a letter to counsel for Custom
warning that it considered the threats of litigation against Doe to
be retaliatory and in violation of the protective order. In May
2004, Custom filed suit against Doe in Illinois state court,
seeking return of the excess funds.

II. DISCUSSION

The EEOC’s request for a protective order here is effectively

a demand for an injunction aimed at the state court proceedings.

Basic concepts of federalism, coupled with the controlling case

-2-+