statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief”. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073,

1078 (7th Cir. 1992). Dismissal is proper only if it
appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of a claim which would entitle her to
relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Plaintiff is not, however, entitled to allege mere legal

conclusions. Kunick v. Racine County, 946 F.2d 1574, 1579

(7th Cir. 1991). To withstand a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must allege facts which sufficiently set forth the
essential elements of the cause of action. Gray v. County
of Dane, 854 F.2d 179, 182 (7th Cir. 1988). However, the
complaint does not need to contain all of the facts that
will be necessary to prevail. Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d
761, 764 (7th Cir. 2003). With these principles in mind, we
turn to the motion presently before the court.
II. Retaliatory Discharge

The single count of Tanzer’s Complaint alleges that she
was discharged from her employment with the Art Institute in
retaliation for her refusal to comply with their
instructions that she remove the family members’ names from
the donor wall. “Illinois follows the common-law doctrine
that employment-at-will means termination-at-will and is
presumed to exist whenever an employee is hired without a

fixed term.” O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 121 F.3d



gift from the Siskel family, conditioned upon all of the
Siskel family members’ names being displayed on the donor
wali. Then the Art Institute tried to change the agreement,
without consulting with the donors and when it would be too
late for the donors to do anything if there was a change.
Under these circumstances, a reasonable person may think the
Art Institute was committing some type of fraudulent
activity. This Court is not making a determination that
fraud was involved. Rather, as the facts have been put
forth in the complaint, it is possible that Tanzer believed
there may have been fraud. Under the liberal notice-
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Tanzer has alleged enough to survive a motion to
dismiss.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, The Art Institute’s
motion to dismiss the Complaint is denied.
ENTER:
\

. We W arouse 4)

Marovich
tates District Judge



claims or for blowing the whistle on clear-cut law
violations. O’Regan, at 1064. The Illinois Supreme Court
first carved out a retaliatory discharge exception for the

Workers’ Compensation Act in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74

Il1.2a 172 (1978), and has now expanded that exception to
include cases where individuals have aided law enforcement
agencies or reported the illegal or improper conduct of

their employers. Buckner v, Atlantic Plant Maintenance,

Inc., 694 N.E.2d 565, 568 (1981); Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d 876,
880.

Cases that Illinois has allowed actions for retaliatory
discharge include Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (an
employee terminated for assisting with law enforcement
agencies in the investigation of his co-worker); Johnson v.
World Color Press, 147 I11.App.3d 746 (an employee
terminated for disclosing criminal and civil violations of

federal securities laws); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp.,

Ill. App. 3d 502 (1982) (an employee terminated for
reporting criminal conduct to supervisors instead of law
enforcement personnel); and Kelsay v. Motorola, 384 N.E.2d
353 (1978) (an employee fired for filing a workers’
compensation claim).

However, they have not allowed the claim of retaliatory

discharge in Gould v. Campbell’s Ambulance Service, 488

N.E.2d 993 (an employee terminated for voicing concern that



1060, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997). In Illinois, the tort of
retaliatory discharge is a narrow exception to that rule.
Id. It requires three elements: (1) the plaintiff was
discharged; (2) the plaintiff's discharge was in retaliation
for her activities; and (3) the discharge violated a clear
mandate or public policy. Id. Tanzer and the Art Institute
agree that Tanzer was discharged in retaliation for her
activities. The Art Institute does not believe, however,
that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public
policy.

Although there is no precise definition of the term
public policy, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated:

“In general, it can be said that public policy

concerns what is right and just and what affects

the citizens of the State collectively. It is

to be found in the State’s constitution and

statutes and, when they are silent, in its

judicial decisions. . .[A] matter must strike at

the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties,

and responsibilities before the tort will be

allowed.”

Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878

(1981).
Illinois has recognized retaliatory discharge claims

when employees are fired for filing workers’ compensation



illegal act. Bourbon v. K-Mart Corp., 223 F.3d 469,473 (7th

Cir. 2000). Tanzer’s Complaint alleges that she spoke with
her supervisors, Kiely and Scharres, and told them what they
were requesting of her was wrong. Tanzer’s claim does not
turn on whether the irregular conduct she reported was
actually criminal. Beliine, at 189. Public policy favors
Tanzer exposing her supervisor’s apparently criminal
activity. Id. That the conduct is proved to be legitimate
and authorized at a later day is not material. Id.

Tanzer’s complaint alleges that she refused to remove
certain names off the donor wall for ethical concerns and
reservations. Tanzer’s refusal to do so was accompanied by
an advisement that if the Art Institute was going to remove
the Siskel family names from the wall, then the Art
Institute needs to notify the family so they can discuss any
alterations to their gift. Tanzer’s supervisors were not
willing to comply with these regulations. Instead, they
directed Tanzer to remove the Siskel family names from the
donor wall the day of the dedication.

The issue is not whether the acts the Art Institute
requested that Tanzer commit were illegal or criminal. The
issue is whether Tanzer could have reasonably thought these
requests were improper or illegal acts. It is possible, as
Tanzer claims, that she believed the Art Institute would be

committing a type of fraud. The Art Institute accepted a


Minute Order Formn (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Winois

ame of Assigned Judge ‘i iting Judge if OF

vine Magitrateudge | __ O00t8 M. Marovich “Than Asignd Sage

CASE NUMBER 02 C 8115 DATE 7/30/2003
CASE Tanzer vs. Art Institute of Chicago
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, eg,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.)

MOTION;

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) Qo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due

@ oO Ruling/Hearingon___setfor___—_at

(5) QO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor______at

(6) 0 Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor__—at__.

(7) Qo Trial[set for/re-set for] on_____at

(8) ina [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto____aat.

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) CFRCP41(a)(2).

Cae [Other docket entry] | ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. The Art Institute’s
motion to dismiss the complaint is denied. Status hearing set for 8/13/03 at 11:00am.

(11) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
ot quires pumber of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

AUG 0 1 2088

Notified counsel by telephone. date docketed

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. : LA ia
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. 3

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4ynod el [aus 0 1 2epy

courtroom sy a
JD de af
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Date/time received in 40

central Clerk’s Office QA) 29 °f Ch Srsting deny inate



a co-employer was not certified pursuant to a city

ordinance); Lambert v. City of Lake Forest, 186 Ill. App. 3d

937 (an employee fired for refusing to lie to an
investigator and an attorney in an entirely internal city

investigation); and Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 588 N.E.2d

870 (a city manager fired by the mayor for refusing to
perform his official duties improperly for the political
benefit of the mayor). In sum, “the cause of action [has
been] allowed where the public policy is clear, but [has
been] denied where it is equally clear that only private
interests are at stake.” Palmateer, at 878-79.

The Seventh Circuit has held that “only when such
terminations would have a wide reaching effect on the public
at large and involve an important public policy that goes
‘to the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties, and
responsibilities,’ do they reach the level of the narrowly
crafted retaliatory discharge exception.” Long v.

Commercial Carriers, Inc., 57 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 I11.2da 495

(1991)). An important public policy in Illinois favors
employees exposing what they feel are crimes by their

employers. Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184,188 (7th

Cir. 1991). For purposes of Illinois law, all that matters
is that when Tanzer reported the conduct to her supervisors,

she reasonably believed they were engaging in an unlawful or



most of the names would have to be removed. If any family
members inquired about their names not being on the
dedication wall, Tanzer was instructed to tell them “the
names just fell off.” (Compl. J 26).

Tanzer refused to do what Kiely and Scharres instructed
her to do, citing personal and ethical reasons. Tanzer then
advised Kiely and Scharres that what they were asking her to

do was wrong and violated the Associated Fundraising

Professional Guidelines (“AFPG”). (The AFPG required that

there be time for the Siskel family to meet and discuss any
alterations that might be made to their gift.) However,
these requests were ignored, and on the day of the
dedication Tanzer was instructed to leave the premises.
Tanzer’s employment with The Art Institute was suspended and
she was subsequently terminated “for failing to follow work
related instructions.” (Compl. @ 40).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard for _a Motion to Dismiss

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must view
the complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and all well-pleaded facts in the complaint
must be accepted as true. Wilson v. Formigoni, 42 F.3d
1060, 1062 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure states that a complaint must identify the

basis of jurisdiction and contain “a short and plain


the Film Center in honor of his late brother, Gene, on
behalf of the Siskel family. Bill Siskel specified that his
gift would require all of the family members’ names to
appear on the Film Center’s donor wall. Tanzer knew that
having all of the family members’ names on the donor wall
would have been contrary to the Art Institute’s policy of
“one gift, one name”. Before she committed to the Siskel
family’s wish, she asked Tony Jones, President of the School
of the Art Institute, Barbara Scharres (“Scharres”),
Director of the Siskel Film Center, Elizabeth Range Kiely
(“Kiely”), Vice President of Development, Alice Dubose, Vice
President of Development of the Art Institute, and Ed
Horner, Executive Vice President of Development if this
would be acceptable. None of these individuals objected to
this request, so Tanzer notified the family it would be
permissible to have all of the family names’ on the wall.

On May 29, 2001, two days before the dedication of the
film center, Kiely, Tanzer’s direct supervisor berated her
for having all of Bill’s family members’ names on the donor
wall. Kiely instructed Tanzer to have the wall designer
remove most of the names before the ceremony. Scharres
requested that Tanzer “steer . . .Gene Siskel’s widow.
away from the donor wall during the press preview.” (Compl.
f@ 24). Tanzer was instructed to contact the family members

before the dedication ceremony and inform the family that



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARINA TANZER,
Plaintiff,

02 C 8115

Judge George Marovich
THE ART INSTITUTE OF
CHICAGO,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Marina Tanzer (“Tanzer”) filed a one-count
Complaint against The Art Institute of Chicago (the “Art
Institute”) alleging a claim for retaliatory discharge. The
Art Institute now moves to dismiss the lawsuit pursuant to
Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). For the reasons set forth below,

the motion is denied. pocnereo

BACKGROUND 4 2003

Aue ®
The Complaint alleges the following relevant facts
which, for purposes of deciding this motion, are taken as

true. Hishon v. Kemp & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

Tanzer was an employee of The Art Institute from October 8,
2000 through June 7, 2001. Tanzer served as the Assistant
Director of Development for the Gene Siskel Film Center of
the School of the Art Institute of Chicago (the “Film

Center”). In April 2001, Bill Siskel offered a donation to