economy would have been served had THS brought its claims when they were on

the forefront in the Delta Romeo action.

II. Compulsory Counterclaims
Jet argues that the claims included in Counts I and VI should be barred

because, even if they are not barred under the doctrine ofres judicata, the claims
were compulsory counterclaims in the Delta Romeo litigation and could and should
have been raised in the Delta Romeo litigation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
13(a) states the following:

(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or
(2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or other
process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under
this Rule 13.

Fed. R. Civ. P.13(a). The goal in creating Rule 13(a) was to promote “judicial
economy; to avoid a multiplicity of actions by resolving in a single lawsuit all
disputes that ensue from a common factual background.” In re Price, 42 F.3d 1068,
1073 (7 Cir. 1994). Id. In determining whether Rule 13(a) applies “[t}he inquiry is

not intended to be ‘a wooden application of the common transaction label,’ but

13


granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice and as part of the dismissal Jet was not
required to transfer the trust balance to THS or Delta Romeo.

In a letter dated July 30, 2001, from Haskins to Michael Dreyfus, President
of THS (‘Haskins letter”), Haskins addressed certain issues in dispute between THS
and Jet. THS claims that two particular statements within the letter give rise to their
allegations of fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. THS
claims that Jet promised that: (1) Jet would transfer a credit or “trust balance” owed
to THS under Contract 436-1 to Contract 476-1, and (2) the trust balance equaled
$40,571.12. THS contends that the balance was never transferred by Jet and that the
balance of the trust account was in excess of $100,000. On September 14, 2001, Jet
informed THS by letter that Contract 476-1 was being terminated for delinquent
payments and in March of 2002, the contract was in fact cancelled.

On January 23, 2003, THS filed the instant action. On April 11, 2003, Jet
filed a motion to dismiss the fraud claim (Count VI), the negligent misrepresentation
claim (Count VII), and the breach of fiduciary duty claim (Count ‘VIT). On March
30, 2004, we granted the motion to dismiss Counts VII and VIII of THS’s amended
complaint, and denied the motion to dismiss Count VI. Jet has now filed a motion
for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim telating to Contract 436-1

(Count I) and on the fraud claim relating to Contract 436-1 (Count VI).



valuable role in the litigation process, especially in conserving judicial resources”
and, in balancing the “competing interests[,] . . .[t]he convenience of the party with a
compulsory counterclaim is sacrificed in the interest of judicial economy.”).
Therefore, even if the claims asserted by THS in Counts I and VI were not barred by
the doctrine of res judicata we would find that they are barred because they were

compulsory counterclaims in the Delta Romeo litigation.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis we grant Jet’s motion for summary judgment

on Counts I and VI. Counts II, HI, IV, and V remain alive in this action.

~
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan

United States District Court Judge

Dated: December 13, 2004

17



Delta Romeo Litigation, including the Stipulation to Dismiss, even purported to
address these matters.” (Ans. 5).

However, contrary to THS’s assertions, the same core of facts and issues in
the instant action in regards to Counts I and VI were raised in the Delta Romeo
litigation. In Count I of the amended complaint in the instant action THS asserts that
Jet breached Contract 436-1 by failing “to provide and/or pay for parts and labor for”
scheduled and unscheduled “maintenance items submitted by THS. .. .” (A. Compl.
Par. 16(a)(b)). THS also asserts in Count I that Jet breached Contract 436-1 by
improperly canceling the contract and refusing to provide a credit “toward and other
aircraft and/or EMS Contract... .” (A. Compl. Par 16). In Count VI of the amended
complaint in the instant action THS asserts that Jet engaged in fraud in July of 2001
when Haskins falsely indicated by letter that the trust balance was being transferred
from Contract 436-1 to 476-1. (A. Compl. Par. 50-51, 65).

Such matters are clearly intertwined with the facts included in the Delta
Romeo litigation. For example, THS admits, pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, that in the
Delta Romeo litigation, Jet brought an interpleader claim against Delta Romeo and
THS to resolve Jet’s liability regarding the trust account which is at issue in the
instant action and that in the interpleader claim Jet denied any wrongdoing. (R SF
15). THS does not provide a denial as to these facts, but instead indicates that the
allegation by Jet is “incomplete” and refers the court to the entire interpleader

document. (RSF 15). Even if such a response could be considered a denial, it is


favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences that favor the
non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport Co, 212
F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION
Jet argues that we should bar the claims included in Counts I and VI under the
doctrine of res judicata because the issues could have been raised and resolved in
the Delta Romeo litigation. Jet also argues that the claims included in Counts I and
VI should be barred because they were compulsory counterclaims in the Delta

Romeo litigation.

I. Doctrine of Res Judicata

The doctrine of res judicata is utilized by the courts to bar “relitigation of
claims that were or could have been asserted in an earlier proceeding.” D & K
Properties Crystal Lake v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York 112 F.3d 257, 259 (7?
Cir. 1997). Three required elements for the doctrine ofres judicata are: “(1) an
identity of the parties or their privies; (2) an identity of the causes of action; and (3)
a final judgment on the merits.” Jd. The doctrine of res judicata “is designed to
ensure the finality of judicial decisions.” Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co, 789
F.2d 589, 593-97 (7* Cir. 1986)(indicating that the doctrine is not “a mere matter of

practice or procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. . .[but,



LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment the moving party must
identify “those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This initial
burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by
pointing out “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. "Jd. at
325. Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest
on the allegations in the pleadings, but, “by affidavits or as otherwise provided for in
[Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A “genuine issue” in the context of a motion for
summary judgment is not simply a “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc. 216 F.3d 596,

599 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must consider the record as a whole, in a light most


854). Thus, under the doctrine of res judicata, “[o]nce a transaction has caused
injury, all claims arising from that transaction must be brought in one suit or be lost.
. [and] ‘a mere change in the legal theory does not create a new cause of action.””
Id. (quoting in part Alexander, 773 F.2d at 854).

Jet argues that in the Delta Romeo litigation Jet and Delta Romeo sought to
have the court determine the parties’ rights in relation to Contract 436-1. According
to Jet, the claims brought by THS in the instant action relating to Jet’s alleged breach
of the contract and the alleged fraud concerning THS’s right to the trust balance all
could have been raised in the Delta Romeo litigation and, because the claims
involved the same core of facts, the claims were required to be raised. Jet contends
that the Delta Romeo litigation dealt with THS’s right to the same trust balance that
is at issue in the instant action. Jet claims that in the Delta Romeo litigation the
court did not require Jet to transfer Contract 436-1 or any trust balance to THS or
Delta Romeo

THS failed to directly address any of the elements forres judicata in its
answer and instead provided a vague and convoluted dialogue conceming the
similarity of the claims in the instant action and those in the Delta Romeo litigation.
THS claims that “ownership of Contract 436-1 remained where it had been all along
-- with THS.” (Ans. 5). THS argues that the set of facts at issue in the Delta
Romeo litigation “provides no basis for preclusion of THS’s claims regarding JSSI’s

improper actions in connection with Contract 436-1. . .[and that] [nJothing in the



‘Mioute Onder Form (0697)

Unt States District Court, Northern District of Iinois

Moe Magistrate duage || Samuel Der-Yeghiayan | STNtAtwed Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 498 DATE 12/13/2004
CASE Trans Helicoptere vs. Jet Support Svc
TITLE i
[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: PtH motion being presented}
DOCKET ENTRY:
(i) Dd Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
2 oa Brief in support of motion due.
@) oO ‘Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__.
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on___setfor__—_aatt
(5) D Status hearingfbeld/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor___at
(6) 0 Pretrial conferencefheld/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_—ssetfor__—saat__—.
(7) 0 Trial[set forte-set forJon___at
(8) 0 BenchvFury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at
(9) Oo This case is é ‘missed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

OOFRCP4(mn)/! C) Local Rule 41.1 CIFRCP41(a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) =o (Other de entry] For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion, defendant’s
motion for s } judgment on Counts I and VI is granted. Counts II, II and V remain alive in this

action. Enter Memorandum Opinion.
eu

(11) IB. For further detail see order attached to the original minute order:]

"No notices required, advised in open court.
vim ope
‘No notices required. : ruuriber of notices
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Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Notified counsel by telephoné. DEC 14 2008
Vv Docketing to mail noticed. vot xy)
Mail AQ 450 form, Poaea rrrereig ‘SN deputy inte
Copy to judge/rmagistrate judge. a ne °
| 13 wy 4h j RAVAN date mailed notice
MW deputy’s ‘
initials =
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further alleged that Jet “wrongfully refused to . . . allow the balance of funds relating
to the EMS contract to be used for the maintenance and service of the Citation II’s
engines.” (DR. Compl. Par. 27). These are a few examples of why the core of
operative facts in the Delta Romeo litigation and in the instant action are the same.
We also note that the Haskins letter that is the main piece of evidence relied
upon by THS to support its fraud claim was allegedly dated July 30, 2001, which is
well before the dismissal with prejudice in the Delta Romeo litigation. THS clearly
could and should have brought the claims regarding Jet’s alleged breach of contract
and fraud relating to Contract 436-1 in the Delta Romeo litigation. Therefore, we

conclude that there is an identity of the causes of action.

C. Final Judgment

In the Delta Romeo litigation the case was dismissed with prejudice pursuant
to a stipulation. THS has not responded at all to Jet’s contention that the dismissal
with prejudice constitutes a final judgment forres judicata purposes. The Seventh
Circuit has made it clear that if a suit is “dismissed with prejudice, any issue
concerning the bar of the statute of limitations to the refiling of the suit will be moot
because a suit that has been dismissed with prejudice cannot be refiled; the refiling is
blocked by the doctrine of res judicata.” Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1011
(7* Cir. 2000). However, in regards to the doctrine ofres judicata the Seventh

Circuit has also stated that “(t]he test for finality is not whether the suit is dismissed

11


an evasive response and THS failed to provide a citation to the page in the document
that supported such a denial. See Local Rule 56.1; Dent v. Bestfoods, 2003 WL
22025008, at *1 n.1 (NLD. III. 2003)(indicating that a 56.1 denial is improper if the
denial is not accompanied by specific references to admissible evidence or at least
evidence that represents admissible evidence.”); Jankovich v. Exelon Corp., 2003
WL 260714, at *5 (N.D. IH. 2003)(indicating that evasive denials that do not directly
oppose an assertion are improper and thus the contested fact is deemed to be
admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.1). Thus, THS acknowledges that in the Delta
Romeo litigation that Jet brought the interpleader claim against Delta Romeo and
THS in order to resolve the rights concerning Contract 436-1 and that in the claim
Jet asserted that it was not guilty of any wrongdoing. Thus, that would have been
the appropriate juncture for THS to bring its claims if THS believed that Jet had
engaged in fraud and other wrongdoing concerning Contract 436-1.

As indicated above, Contract 436-1 dealt with both engines of a Cessna
Citation II aircraft. In the complaint in the Delta Romeo litigation, Delta Romeo
specifically alleged that “JSSI has refused either to transfer the funds relating to the
EMS contract to another THS aircraft or to allow Delta Romeo to use those funds
with respect to the engines on the Citation II.” (DR. Compl. Par. 23). Delta Romeo
alleged in the Delta Romeo litigation that Jet wrote both to THS and Delta Romeo
indicating that unti) THS and Delta Romeo resolved the rights concerning the trust

funds, Jet would hold the balance in the trust. (DR. Compl. Par. 23). Delta Romeo

10


rather][i]t is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, 'of public policy and of
private peace,’ which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts... .
-”\(quoting Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co, 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917)). The
doctrine of res judicata also “encourages reliance on judicial decisions, bars
vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other disputes.” Jd. (quoting
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979)). In addition, the doctrine ofres
judicata has been deemed to be “essential to the maintenance of social order; for, the
aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person
and property, if... conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals.”

Id. (quoting Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist, 773 F.2d 850, 853 (7* Cir. 1985)).

A. Identity of Parties

Jet argues that both Jet and THS were parties in the Delta Romeo litigation.
Although Jet and THS were not the only parties in the Delta Romeo litigation we

agree that there is an identity of the parties.

Identi uses of Acti
The Seventh Circuit uses the “same transaction test” to determine if there is an
identity of the causes of action. Car Carriers, Inc., 789 F.2d at 593. Under the
“same transaction test” the scope of a cause of action “consists of ‘a single core of

operative facts' which give rise to a remedy.’” Jd. (quoting Alexander, 773 F.2d at


On or about August 24, 1998, THS entered into another EMS Contract with Jet for
coverage of both engines of a Falcon F100 aircraft (“Contract 476-1”).

THS alleges that in or about February, 2001, THS contacted Jet to inform Jet
that the aircraft covered by Contract 436-1 was sold to a new owner and contract
436-1 had not been transferred with the aircraft. THS claims that, pursuant to
§V(d)(iv) of contract 436-1, THS requested the account balance of Contract 436-1
be transferred to Contract 476-1, which covered the Falcon F100 aircraft which was
still owned by THS. According to THS, Jet contacted the new owner of the Cessna
Citation II aircraft, Delta Romeo, Inc. (“Delta Romeo”), and induced Delta Romeo
to assert a claim of ownership over Contract 436-1 against THS.

THS contends that around February of 2001 Jet decided not to transfer the
balance from Contract 436-1 to Contract 476-1. In April of 2001, John Haskins
(“Haskins”), President of Jet, wrote a letter to THS and Delta Romeo addressing
certain issues and requesting that the parties resolve the dispute regarding Contract
436-1. Jet informed Trans H via letter dated May 2, 2001, that Contract 476-1 was
being placed on “credit hold” due to arrearage in payments. From June 20, 2001,
until March 5, 2002, Delta Romeo and THS litigated the issue of ownership to
Contract 436-1 in the Northern District of Illinois (case number: 01 C 4684)(“Delta
Romeo litigation”). The Delta Romeo litigation terminated when Delta Romeo filed

a stipulation to dismiss the action with prejudice and on March 5, 2002, the court



rather a careful examination of the factual allegations underlying each claim in
determining whether the test is met.” Jn re Price, 42 F.3d 1068, 1073 (7* Cir.
1994)(quoting Burlington Northern R.Co. v. Strong 907 F.2d 707, 711 (7* Cir.
1990)). A compulsory counterclaim is a counterclaim “that must be filed to preserve
the defendant's rights. . [and] if made the basis of a separate suit it would be barred

either by the force of Rule 13(a) itself, or by the prohibition in the doctrine of res

judicata against splitting one's cause of petion: ” Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson

Wax Development Corp. 908 F.2d 1363, 1367 (F Cir. 1990), The Seventh Circuit
utilizes the "logical relationship" test to determine whether or not a “transaction or
occurrence” is the same under Rule 13(a). Burlington Northern R.Co., 907 F.2d at
741. Under the test “the words ‘transaction or occurrence’ should be interpreted
liberally in order to further the general policies of the federal rules and carry out the
philosophy of Rule 13(a) . . .[and][a]s a word of flexible meaning, ‘transaction’ may
comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the

immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship . . . .” Id.

THS argues that any claims that it would have had against Jet in the Delta
Romeo litigation would have been permissive cross-claims rather than counter-
claims and THS argues that cross claims are not required to be raised. In regards to

cross claims Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g) states the following:

(g) Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a

14



«

could be brought in response to a crossclaim. As indicated above, Rule 13(a) is
intended to promote judicial economy and to ensure that all claims relating to a set
of facts are resolved together. Thus, such goals would only be served by requiring
responsive compulsory counterclaims to be filed when a crossclaim is filed because
the court will necessarily have to address the issues and facts connected to the
crossclaim. If the court is going to address the merits of the crossclaim, then all of
the same goals behind Rule 13(a) would apply to ensuring that related responsive

claims to the crossclaim are resolved in the same action as the crossclaim.

THS contends that its responsive claim to Jet’s crossclaim in the Delta Romeo
litigation is a cross claim and is governed by Rule 13(g). However, in reality such a
claim by THS would be both a crossclaim and a counterclaim, and thus, the claim
would need to comply with both Rule 13(g) and Rule 13(a). Although Rule 13(g)
would only render its filing permissive, THS would also need to comply with Rule
13(a) which renders the claim mandatory. Courts in other Circuits have agreed with
this application of Rule 13(a) to crossclaims. See e.g. Rainbow Mgmt. Group, Ltd. v.
Atlantis Submarines Hawaii, L.P, 158 F.R.D. 656, 659 (D. Hawaii 1994). The
facts and issues included in the Delta Romeo litigation were such that THS’s claims
in response to the crossclaim by Jet were compulsory counterclaims and THS
thereby waived its right to file such claims by not doing so in the Delta Romeo
litigation. See Burlington Northern R.Co., 907 F.2d at 710 (recognizing that the

compulsory counterclaim rule is a “harsh rule,” but stating that “the rule serves a

16



BACKGROUND

Jet provides programs that fund the maintenance and repair of jet aircraft
engines for the benefit of their customers who are the owners and operators of the jet
aircraft engines. Jet does not personally provide engine maintenance and repair
services, but rather provides a program to fund the services by third parties in the
form of an engine maintenance service contract (“EMS Contract”). To obtain an
EMS Contract, the customer must pay a one-time enrollment fee, an initial engine
inspection fee and a monthly fee.

On or about December 29, 1997, Plaintiff Trans Helicoptere Service (“THS”)
entered into an EMS Contract with Jet for both engines of a Cessna Citation II
aircraft (“Contract 436-1”). Section V(d)(iv) of Contract 436-1 is pertinent for the
fraud claim in the instant action and it outlines Jet’s policy for early termination of
the contract, allowing a credit towards a replacement aircraft when certain
conditions are met. In relevant part, Section V(d)iv) states:

In the event... the Customer sells the Aircraft and the purchaser does
not wish to enroll in the Program . . . then the Customer shall be
eligible for a credit (the “Credit”) for certain amounts paid into the
Trust to be applied toward any subsequently acquired aircraft (the
“Replacement Aircraft”) which the Customer enrolls in the Program.
Once a Replacement Aircraft is accepted by [Jet] as being eligible for
the Program, the Credit may be used to reduce the amount of the Pro
Rata or Buy-In due on the Replacement Aircraft. The amount of the
Credit shall be equal to 100% of all amounts paid with respect to the
Engine(s) after deducting all expenditures made on behalf of, and
expenses attributable to, the Engine(s).

2


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TRANS HELICOPTERE SERVICE,
a French limited company,

Plaintiff,
v.

JET SUPPORT SERVICES, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

JET SUPPORT SERVICES, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,

Counterclaimant,
vy.

TRANS HELICOPTERE SERVICE,
a French limited company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) No. 03 C 0498
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Counterdefendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Defendant Jet Support Services, Inc.’s
(“Jet”) motion for summary judgment on Counts I and VI of Plaintiff Trans
Helicopter Service’s (“THS”) amended complaint. For the reasons below, we grant

summary judgment on both counts.


with prejudice or without prejudice, on the merits or on a jurisdictional ground or on
a procedural ground such as failure to exhaust administrative remedies when
exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement . . .[but, rather the] test is whether the
district court has finished with the case.” Hill v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1144 -1145
(7 Cir. 2003); See also Golden v. Barenborg, 53 F.3d 866, 871 (7" Cir. 1995)
(finding that there was a final judgment for res judicata purposes where plaintiff
agreed to a stipulated dismissal with prejudice). Under either standard elucidated by
the Seventh Circuit, we find that there was a final judgment in the Delta Romeo

litigation for res judicata purposes.

D. Further Considerations

As indicated above, all of the elements for the doctrine ofres judicata are met
in regards to the instant action. We also conclude that the interests of the courts are
served by the application of the doctrine ofres judicata in this action and such a
tuling promotes fairness and the administration of justice. It would be unfair after
the resolution of the issues surrounding THS and Contract 436-1 in the Delta Romeo
litigation, for THS to years later spring claims upon Jet that were or could have been
addressed in the Delta Romeo litigation. It was necessary for THS to bring its
claims at that juncture to ensure finality regarding the Contract 436-1 ownership and
all issues surrounding the same core of facts and to avoid future vexatious litigation

by THS. The interests of the efficient operation of the judicial system and judicial

12



counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter of
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g). Jet responds by arguing that in the Delta Romeo litigation Jet
asserted an interpleader claim against THS and Jet became the interpleader-plaintiff.
According to Jet, at that juncture Jet and THS became opposing parties with respect
to Contract 436-1 and the trust balance. Jet also contends that since it filed the
interpleader claim, which was a cross-claim, THS was obligated to respond with
cross-claims against Jet that THS could and should have brought. According to Jet,
once a cross-claim is filed, the co-parties become opposing parties for the purposes

of compulsory counter-claims.

We agree with the reasoning presented by Jet. A counterclaim is not limited
to a claim brought by a defendant against a plaintiff. Rather a counterclaim is
defined merely as “[a] claim for relief asserted against an opposing party after an
original claim has been made. . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (7" ed. 1999).
This definition is consistent with the reference in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
13(a) to an “opposing party” rather than to a plaintiff and defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P.
13(a). While the initial filing of a crossclaim in an action is permissive, once the
cross claim is filed, it is a claim like any other claim in an action. Thus, the

compulsory counterclaim provisions would logically apply to any counterclaims that

15