UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4637

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

THOMAS ERECO CAMERON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:07-cr-00252-BO-1) 

Submitted: February 25, 2009 Decided: March 17, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion. 

C. Scott Holmes, BROCK, PAYNE & MEECE, PA, Durham, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States 

Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Denise Walker, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 

 Thomas Ereco Cameron pleaded guilty, pursuant to a 

plea agreement, to possession with intent to distribute more 

than 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 

(2006), and was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment. 

Cameron appeals, arguing that the court committed error in 

imposing his sentence and the Government breached the plea 

agreement. We dismiss Cameron’s appeal in part and affirm in 

part. 

 Cameron claims that the district court committed 

procedural error in imposing his sentence by failing to consider 

the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). However, as the 

Government contends, Cameron’s challenge to his sentence is 

barred by the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. 

 A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the 

right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United States v. 

Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This court reviews de 

novo the validity of a waiver, United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 

399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000), and will uphold a waiver of appellate 

rights if the waiver is valid and the issues raised are within 

the scope of the waiver. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 

168 (4th Cir. 2005). 

 In this case, the language in the plea agreement is 

clear and unambiguous. Under its terms, Cameron agreed to waive 

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his right to appeal the sentence imposed so long as it was not 

in excess of the advisory guideline range.1 In addition, the 

district court conducted a thorough inquiry pursuant to Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 establishing that Cameron understood the proceedings 

and the provisions of the plea agreement. Thus, the appeal 

waiver is both valid and enforceable, and Cameron’s challenge to 

his below-guidelines sentence clearly falls within the broad 

scope of the waiver. We therefore dismiss Cameron’s appeal with 

respect to this claim. 

 Cameron also contends that the Government violated the 

terms of his plea agreement by referring to a protected 

statement during the sentencing hearing.2 Because Cameron did 

not raise this claim before the district court, we review the 

issue for plain error. See United States v. McQueen, 108 F.3d 

64, 65-66 (4th Cir. 1997). 

 Cameron’s plea agreement provided that, in accord with 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 1B1.8 (2007), 

information he provided pursuant to the cooperation provisions 

 1

 Cameron’s guideline range was between 235 and 293 months 

of imprisonment. 

2

 A defendant’s waiver of appellate rights cannot foreclose 

an argument that the government breached its obligations under 

the plea agreement. See United States v. Cohen, 459 F.3d 490, 

495 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d 336, 342 

(4th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Government properly does not 

seek to enforce Cameron’s appeal waiver as to this claim. 

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of his plea agreement would not be used in determining the 

applicable guideline range. This provision was not violated. 

Cameron’s offense level of thirty-two was based on a drug 

quantity of 5.5 kilograms, consistent with Cameron’s stipulation 

in the plea agreement that the relevant quantity of cocaine was 

between five and fifteen kilograms. 

 While USSG § 1B1.8 does not permit the use of selfincriminating information provided pursuant to a cooperation 

agreement to be used in the calculation of the guideline range, 

the provision “shall not be applied to restrict the use of the 

information . . . in determining whether, or to what extent, a 

downward departure from the guidelines is warranted pursuant to 

a government motion under § 5K1.1.” USSG § 1B1.8(b)(5). In 

this case, the court considered Cameron’s protected statement 

only in addressing the Government’s substantial assistance 

motion, a permissible use under the guideline. Therefore, 

Cameron cannot establish error, plain or otherwise. 

 Accordingly, we dismiss Cameron’s appeal in part and 

affirm in part. In addition, because Cameron is represented by 

counsel, we deny his motion to file a pro se supplemental brief. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a), (c). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

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in the written materials before the court and argument would not 

aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED IN PART;

AFFIRMED IN PART