ruling on pretrial and evidentiary matters is completely unreasonable. There is no
ruling in the court record by Judge Leinenweber or any other judge regarding the
admissibility of any evidence at trial. In regards to Judge Leinenweber’s ruling on
May 6, 2002, in another action, Karamuzis already raised this issue in his motion to
dismiss in the instant action which we denied. To the extent that any of his
objections are novel, the proper course would have been to include such argument in
a dispositive motion, but Karamuzis chose not to file a dispositive motion.
Karamuzis asks the court to bar Plaintiff from introducing testimony or
evidence that a loan ever existed between the Department of Education or the United
States because Judge Leinenweber previously ruled in his favor. (Mot. Par. 1).
Karamuzis asks the court to bar evidence indicating “that Karamuzis did not cancel
the uncompleted loan application before a loan was established or any payments
were made to ISAC or DePaul.” (Mot. Par 2). Karamuzis again argues that Judge
Leinenweber ruled on the issue previously. Karamuzis asks the court to bar
evidence of a loan summary statement that was allegedly mailed to Karamuzis
because Judge Leinenweber allegedly ruled previously in Karamuzis’ favor. (Mot.
Par. 6). Karamuzis asks the court to bar evidence relating to Karamuzis’ attempt to
cancel the loan, because, according to Karamuzis, Judge Leinenweber previously

ruled in Karamuzis’ favor on the issue. (Mot. Par. 7). Karamuzis asks the court to



argue his case in chief in his motion in limine. Therefore, we deny the motion to bar

evidence based on equitable defenses.

VIIL Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and All Objections

‘Karamuzis asks the court to bar Plaintiff from arguing that the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel apply in the instant action. In regards to this
objection, as with all of the above mentioned motions in limine, a denial is
warranted because Karamuzis is improperly attempting to argue the merits of his
case and is seeking to preclude Plaintiff from presenting its case. Such matters are
not within the purview of motions in limine. Therefore, we deny the motion to bar
Plaintiff from arguing that the doctrines ofres judicata and collateral estoppel apply

and we deny all of the above motions for the same reason.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, we deny all of Karamuzis’ motions in limine.

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan ; _ 5

United States District Court Judge

Dated: September 28, 2004



Ill. Relevancy and Prejudice Objections

~~ Several of Karamuzis’ motions in limine are based on Karamuzis’ claim that
certain evidence is irrelevant and/or would be unduly prejudicial to Karamuzis if
admitted. Karamuzis asks the court to bar evidence that indicates the payoff for the
loan was greater than the actual payoff amount because the evidence would be
irrelevant and would be unduly prejudicial. (Mot. Par. 4). Karamuzis asks the court
to bar evidence indicating why Plaintiff “made payments to ISAC on April 30, 1999,
and DePaul on May 3, 1999...” because the evidence is irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial. The scope of relevancy is broad. We disagree that the evidence
mentioned in these motions in limine or in any of Karamuzis’ motions in limine is
irrelevant and do not find that the evidence would be unduly prejudicial to

Karamuzis.

IV. Amounts of Money and Affidavits at Trial

Karamuzis asks the court to bar any reference to amounts of money at trial by
Plaintiff without the submission of proof of cancelled checks, drafts, or transfers of
funds. (Mot. Par. 9). Karamuzis also asks the court to bar all affidavits at trial in
lieu of witness testimony because such documents would be hearsay. (Mot. Par. 11).

These objections are far too general and vague to be summarily ruled on in a motion



bar evidence of the terms of Karamuzis’ uncompleted loan application because,
according to Karamuzis, Judge Leinenweber allegedly previously ruled in
Karamuzis’ favor on the issue, (Mot. Par. 8). Karamuzis asks the court to bar
evidence relating to any claim against Karamuzis for funds paid to DePaul because,
according to Karamuzis, Judge Leinenweber previously ruled on the issue in
Karamuzis’ favor. (Mot. Par. 10). We deny all of the above objections because
there is no record of any such rulings by Judge Leinenweber. Karamuzis has also
failed to properly support his instant motions with any citation to the record or to a
hearing transcript. We need not scour the record to support Karamuzis’ claims and
he has utterly failed to do so on his own. In regards to the ruling made in the prior

action, such issues were addressed in our ruling on the motion to dismiss.

IL Amount of Recovery

Karamuzis asks the court to bar Plaintiff from “seeking an amount greater
than would have been the payoffs on Karamuzis’ loans with ISAC and DePaul as of
April 1999.” (Mot. Par. 3). Arguments regarding the proper amount of recovery are
not properly before the court at this stage and should be resolved at trial after a full
presentation by both parties. Therefore, we deny the motion in limine to limit

Plaintiff's recovery.


Dia at aa nae

Karamuzis asks the court to bar evidence of the amounts of interest allegedly
paid to date that Plaintiff is seeking as recovery because such a recovery is not
allowed under the law. (Mot. Par. 14). Karamuzis also asks the court to bar
evidence relating to a “standing alone claim” of unjust enrichment. (Mot. Par. 16,
17). If Karamuzis believes that interest is not allowed and such claims are
unavailable to Plaintiff as a matter of law, then the proper course would have been to
file a dispositive motion on the issue. Dispositive motions rather than motions in
limine are intended to weed out the meritless legal claims prior to trial. Karamuzis
filed no such dispositive motions and chose to proceed to trial. If evidence relating
to such matters is presented at trial Karamuzis may object on a case-by-case basis
and must provide an evidentiary reason for each objection. Therefore, we deny the

motion to bar evidence of the amount of interest paid.

VII. Equitable Defenses

Karamuzis asks the court to bar any “claim, evidence, or testimony” based on
his equitable defenses such as unclean hands and based on a prior ruling by Judge
Leinenweber. (Mot. Par. 15). First of all, Karamuzis’ reference to “claim, evidence,
or testimony” is too vague to merit consideration. Secondly, there is no record of

such a ruling by Judge Leinenweber. Third Karamuzis is improperly attempting to



Minute Order Form (96/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan Sitting Judge if Other

or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 7993 DATE 9/28/2004
CASE USA vs. Karamuzis
TITLE

{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) qo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer briefto motion due___—. Reply to answer briefdue___.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon____—setfor___att

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__—_at

(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—ssetfor_——sat__—
(7) Qa Trial[set for/re-set for]on__—_—at

(8) ia} (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) OC FRCP41(a)(2).

do) ff [Other docket entry] Pretrial conference held. For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum
opinion, all of defendant’s motions in limine are denied. Bench trial set for 10/04/04 to stand. Enter
Memorandum Opinion.

(11) Ml. [For further, detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
eal umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

oY | Docketing to mail notices,

Mail AO 450 form. LUNs LoMisig ‘sta
ate
Copy to judge/magistrate judge, |
P23 NY 62 dls Hae
courtroom,
MW deputy’s,
initials

Daig/time received in
central Clerk's Office

mailing deputy initials



in limine. Objections to evidence regarding amounts of money and regarding
affidavits and hearsay objections may be made at trial on a case-by-case basis.
Therefore, we deny the motion to bar reference to amounts of money by Plaintiff and

deny the motion to bar affidavits at trial.

V. Evidence of Correspondence and Promissory Note

Karamuzis asks the court to bar evidence of correspondence between Katie
Butwin of DePaul and Plaintiff and to bar evidence regarding a promissory note
marked “paid in full” sent by DePaul to Karamuzis. (Mot. Par. 12, 13). Karamuzis
argues that no such correspondence was produced during discovery and the note was
not produced during discovery. Simply because the correspondence and the note
were not produced during discovery does not preclude the introduction of other
evidence referring to such matters if Plaintiff was forthcoming during discovery and
Karamuzis had the opportunity to depose Plaintiff's witnesses. Karamuzis’
objections are too general and he can make objections at trial on a case-by-case
basis. Therefore, we deny the motion to bar all evidence relating to the

correspondence and the promissory note.

VI. Amounts of Interest Paid and Unjust Enrichment Claim



DISCUSSION
Karamuzis has filed a litany of meritless motions in limine. Not only are the
motions completely without merit, the motions are also improper because the
remedies sought by Karamuzis are not the proper subject matter for motions in

limine.

I. Alledged Prior Rulings

Karamuzis bases several of his in limine motions on alleged prior rulings
made by Judge Leinenweber, the prior judge in this action. Karamuzis claims that
Judge Leinenweber, the prior judge in this case, already ruled on this issue in favor
of Karamuzis. Karamuzis’ motion in limine fails to provide anything other than a
conclusory statement regarding Judge Leinenweber’s alleged prior ruling and
Karamuzis’ allegation is not supported by the record and he provides no citations to
the record. In regards to rulings made by Judge Leinenweber in the instant action,
the court record reflects that Judge Leinenweber granted Defendant DePaul’s motion
to dismiss and Judge Leinenweber conducted a settlement conference. In regards to
the motion to dismiss, Judge Leinenweber was merely addressing the sufficiency of
the pleadings and was not making any evidentiary rulings at that stage. Karamuzis’

attempt to characterize Judge Leinenweber’s two sentence dismissal of DePaul as a



the UDE purchased Karamuzis’ loan from DePaul University (“DePaul”), DePaul
sent a promissory note to Karamuzis marked “paid in full.” UDE also purchased a
loan from the Illinois Student Assistance Commission (“Commission”) and the
Commission sent a promissory note to Karamuzis marked “paid in full.” Plaintiffs
allege that Karamuzis never made a single payment to UDE on the consolidated loan
and in May of 2001 Karamuzis filed a claim for injunctive relief to prevent the UDE
from taking action against Karamuzis for non-payment. On May 6, 2002, in another
action, Judge Leinenweber entered a declaratory judgment indicating that no valid
contract existed between Karamuzis and UDE and prohibiting the UDE from
attempting to enforce or collect the subject loan. Plaintiff alleges that on August 8,
2002, Karamuzis contacted DePaul and indicated that he would not sign anew
promissory note to DePaul and indicated that he would not repay the amount of the
loan even if DePaul took the loan back from UDE. Plaintiffs contend that
Karamuzis has not made full payment of his law school loans to UDE, DePaul, or
the Commission. Plaintiffs bring the instant action based upon the doctrine of unjust
enrichment. On March 30, 2004, we denied Karamuzis’ motion to dismiss. Neither
party in this action filed a dispositive motion and the case is scheduled for trial on

October 4, 2004.



{CERES ASE SSE SS ES REE

_ IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, J
)
v. ) No. 02 C 7993
— )
ANTHONY KARAMUZIS, DePAUL )
RSITY, and the ILLINOIS STUDENT)
ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant Anthony Karamuzis’
(“Karamuzis”) motions in limine. For the reasons stated below, we deny all of the

motions in limine.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff United States of America alleges that Karamuzis applied to the U.S.
Department of Education (“UDE”) for a federal direct consolidation loan application
and promissory note to consolidate his school loans totaling approximately $46,000.

Plaintiff alleges that Karamuzis used the loans to finance his legal education. After

2