decisions of these boards except for those involving discharge or removal solely because

reference to the Review Law occurs in section 10-2.1-17 of the Code.” Mueller, 267 Il.App. 3d
at 732. In this court’s view, fairness, economy, and deference to the special interests of state
courts in resolving issues of state law demand that such determinations be made by those courts
who are familiar with the statutory scheme and objectives of the Illinois Administrative Review
Act. While there may be some slight factual overlap between the state and federal claims, the
legal issues are sufficiently distinct that there is no substantial inefficiency in having the two
claims proceed in different courts.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Count I of the plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly, Count I is dismissed without prejudice.

Enter:
ia 1
() a | (
: (ie 7 “| Ay
David H. Coar

United States District Judge

Dated: JAN 10 2002


(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. $§ 1367(c).

In this case, assuming that a district court could rightfully exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Count I of the plaintiff's complaint, this court exercises its discretion pursuant
to §1367(c)(1) declines to do so. Count I of the plaintiffs’ complaint raises a still novel and
complex issue of state law. The determination of whether a state law is “novel” or “complex” is
largely measured by the number and clarity of state court decisions addressing the law. Where
there are conflicting lines of precedent interpreting the state law, or where the matter is one of
first impression, districts courts will generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under

$1367(c)(1). Green v. Zendrian 916 F. Supp. 493, 496-97 (D.Md. 1996); American Society of

Consultant Pharmacists v. Patla, 138 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2001).

The defendants contend that the issue of whether the Illinois Administrative Review Act
governs the review of final actions, including promotion decisions taken by boards of fire and
police commissioner, is neither novel nor complex. The defendants cite to Mueller v. Board of

Fire and Police Commissioners of the Village of Lake Zurich, 267 Ill.App. 726 (2d. Dist. 1994)

as evidence that Illinois law around this issue is settled. This court’s review of Mueller,
however, reveals that determinations concerning the construction and scope of the Illinois
Administrative Review Act are indeed complex. For example, in reaching its conclusion, the
Mueller court engaged in a lengthy discussion and considered the state statutory objectives of
hiring, promoting, and retaining applicants on the basis of ability and merit. Evincing its

expertise in Illinois state law, the Mueller court stated “we do not believe that the legislature,

through mere inadvertence or happenstance, intended to shield from review all other personnel


Min ge Order Form (0697)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge j 2 Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge David H. Coar than Assigned Judge
CASE BER 01 C 8504 DATE 1/10/2002
CASE Kevin Quinn, Howard Hall, and Brian McVeigh
TITLE vs.
Village of Elk Grove Village Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, et al.
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintif?, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented. ]

DOCKET ENTRY:

No notices required

Mail AO 450 form.

(1) im) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due.
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer briefdue_
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on___set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at.
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) ia) [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued toa
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CFRCP4(m) (General Rule21 OO FRCP41(a)(1) © FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) {Other docket entry} For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, this
court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count 1 of the plaintiffs complaint
Accordingly, Count I is dismissed without prejudice. >
Vaudhd ae
ai) @f (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order. ]
2 | No notices required, advised in open cout. apres Fiver oat in oPdn CWE Document
Number

Notices mailed by judge's staft.
Notitied counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge : fa

3)

é

umber of notices

JAN 1 1 2002

date docketed

date mailed notice

courtroom
deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office

mailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS bbe,
EASTERN DIVISION Me Tk
SAty i
Kevin Quinn, Howard Hall, and Brian v4 i Nyy

MeVeigh,

Plaintiffs,
No. 01 C 8504
vy.
HONORABLE DAVID H. COAR
Village of Elk Grove Village Board of Fire
and Police Commissioners, et al.

Vee ee ee eS SS ES LS

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pursuant to this court’s order of November 27, 2001, defendants’ have submitted a brief
arguing that this court must exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a)
and (c). For the following reasons, this court chooses declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Count I of the plaintiffs complaint.

Background

The plaintiffs’ complaint arises out of the Spring 2001 fire lieutenant eligibility test
administered by the Village of Elk Grove Board of Fire and Police Commissioners (“Board”).
The plaintiffs’ complaint consists of two counts. Plaintiffs bring Count I of the complaint under
the Illinois Administrative Review Act, 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq., alleging that plaintiffs’ scores
on the fire licutenant eligibility test, and their resulting rankings violate the Board of Fire and
Police Commissioners Act, 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-1.5. The plaintiffs bring Count II under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that plaintiffs’ low scores and rankings on the fire lieutenant exam were the

product of an effort by the defendants to retaliate against plaintiffs for the exercise of their rights


of freedom of association and speech under the First Amendment6, Pl. Compl.. 423. _
Discussion
The defendants argue that this court may not have sufficient grounds to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claim. This court disagrees.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1367 provides that "in any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of

the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." §§ 1367(a).

The United States Supreme Court held, however, in City of Chicago v. International College of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997), that to say that the terms of §§ 1367(a) authorize the district
courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for on-the-record review of
administrative decisions does not mean that the jurisdiction must be exercised in all cases. City of

Chicago, 522 U.S. at 171. The City of Chicago Court stated “[o]ur decisions have established

that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right, and that district courts
can decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims for a number of valid reasons.
Accordingly, we have indicated that district courts [should] deal with cases involving pendent
claims in the manner that best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Under §§ 1367(a), district courts may refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

state law claim for several reasons:

(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
under subsection (a) if --
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district

court has original jurisdiction,