```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1164 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1164

   To state a policy of the United States that engages the People's 
 Republic of China in areas of mutual interest, promotes human rights, 
 religious freedom, and democracy in China, and enhances the national 
security interests of the United States with respect to China, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 11, 1997

Mr. Abraham (for himself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Coverdell, 
   Mr. DeWine, Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Mack, and Mr. Helms) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
                     Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To state a policy of the United States that engages the People's 
 Republic of China in areas of mutual interest, promotes human rights, 
 religious freedom, and democracy in China, and enhances the national 
security interests of the United States with respect to China, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``China Policy Act 
of 1997''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
                           TITLE I--SANCTIONS

Sec. 101. Denial of entry into United States of certain officials of 
                            the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 102. Limitations on multilateral assistance for the People's 
                            Republic of China.
Sec. 103. Sanctions regarding China North Industries Group, China Poly 
                            Group, and certain other entities 
                            affiliated with the People's Liberation 
                            Army.
Sec. 104. Consultations with allies regarding sanctions against the 
                            People's Republic of China.
Sec. 105. Termination of certain authorities.
   TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

Sec. 201. Findings on human rights abuses in the People's Republic of 
                            China.
Sec. 202. Findings on religious freedom in the People's Republic of 
                            China.
Sec. 203. Findings on Tibet.
Sec. 204. Findings on coercive family planning practices in the 
                            People's Republic of China.
Sec. 205. Combating slave labor and ``reeducation'' centers.
Sec. 206. International broadcasting to China.
Sec. 207. National Endowment for Democracy.
Sec. 208. United States Information Agency student, cultural, and 
                            legislative exchange programs.
Sec. 209. Annual reports on family planning activities in the People's 
                            Republic of China by recipients of United 
                            States funds.
Sec. 210. Sense of Congress regarding multilateral efforts to address 
                            China's human rights record.
Sec. 211. Sense of Congress regarding compliance by the People's 
                            Republic of China with the Joint 
                            Declaration on Hong Kong.
                  TITLE III--NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Findings on the proliferation of ballistic missiles by the 
                            People's Republic of China.
Sec. 302. Findings on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
                            by the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 303. Findings on the proliferation of destabilizing advanced 
                            conventional weapons by the People's 
                            Republic of China.
Sec. 304. Findings on the evasion of United States export control laws 
                            by the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 305. Findings on the inconsistent application of United States 
                            export control laws to the People's 
                            Republic of China and Hong Kong.
Sec. 306. Exports of supercomputers to the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 307. Dual-use exports to Hong Kong.
Sec. 308. Enforcement of Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act with 
                            respect to the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 309. Transfers of sensitive equipment and technology by the 
                            People's Republic of China.
Sec. 310. Annual reports on activities of the People's Liberation Army.
Sec. 311. Annual reports on intelligence activities of the People's 
                            Republic of China.
Sec. 312. Study of theater ballistic missile defense system for Taiwan.
Sec. 313. Sense of Congress regarding United States force levels in 
                            Asia.
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress regarding establishment of commission on 
                            security and cooperation in Asia.
                            TITLE IV--TRADE

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the accession of Taiwan to the 
                            World Trade Organization.
         TITLE V--HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WORLDWIDE

Sec. 501. Training for immigration officers regarding religions 
                            persecution.
Sec. 502. Promotion of religious freedom and human rights worldwide.
                        TITLE VI--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Termination of United States assistance for East-West Center.

SEC. 2. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

    The policy of the United States with respect to the People's 
Republic of China is as follows:
            (1) To encourage freedom and democracy in the People's 
        Republic of China and to deter the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China from engaging in activities that are contrary 
        to the national security interests of the United States.
            (2) To encourage the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China to make progress towards improving overall human rights 
        conditions in China and Tibet, including the taking of concrete 
        steps to assure freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and 
        freedom of association in compliance with international 
        standards on human rights.
            (3) To encourage the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China to channel its emerging power and influence along paths 
        that are conducive to peace, stability, and development in the 
        Asian Pacific region.
            (4) To preserve and protect the national security interests 
        of the United States and its allies by--
                    (A) deterring the proliferation of weapons and 
                sensitive equipment and technology by the Government of 
                the People's Republic of China; and
                    (B) sanctioning companies affiliated with the 
                People's Liberation Army that engage in the 
                proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the 
                importation of illegal weapons or firearms into the 
                United States, or espionage in the United States.
            (5) To support a strong United States presence in and 
        commitment to the leadership of the Asian Pacific region.
            (6) To support integration of the People's Republic of 
        China into the community of nations.
            (7) To limit the use of United States taxpayer funds for 
        the subsidization of the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China through such mechanisms as assistance through 
        multilateral development banks and other United States 
        Government programs.

                           TITLE I--SANCTIONS

SEC. 101. DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN OFFICIALS OF 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Denial of Entry.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the 
Secretary of State may not issue any visa to, and the Attorney General 
may not admit to the United States, any of the following officials of 
the Government of the People's Republic of China:
            (1) High-ranking officials of the People's Liberation Army, 
        as determined by the Secretary.
            (2) High-ranking officials of the Public Security Bureau, 
        as so determined.
            (3) High-ranking officials of the Religious Affairs Bureau, 
        as so determined.
            (4) Other high-ranking officials determined by the 
        Secretary to be involved in the implementation or enforcement 
        of laws and directives of the People's Republic of China which 
        restrict religious freedom.
            (5) High-ranking officials determined by the Secretary to 
        be involved in the implementation or enforcement of laws and 
        directives of the People's Republic of China on family 
        planning.
            (6) Officials determined by the Secretary to have been 
        materially involved in ordering or carrying out the massacre of 
        students in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
    (b) Waiver.--
            (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the President 
        may waive the applicability of subsection (a) with respect to 
        any official otherwise covered by that subsection if the 
        President determines that the waiver with respect to the 
        official is in the interests of the United States.
            (2) Notice.--
                    (A) Requirement.--The President may not exercise 
                the authority provided in paragraph (1) with respect to 
                an official unless the President submits to Congress a 
                written notification of the exercise of the authority 
                before the entry of the official into the United 
                States.
                    (B) Contents.--Each notice shall include a 
                justification of the exercise of the authority, 
                including--
                            (i) a statement why the exercise of the 
                        authority is in the interests of the United 
                        States; and
                            (ii) a statement why such interests 
                        supersede the need for the United States to 
                        deny entry to the official concerned in 
                        response to the practices of the Government of 
                        the People's Republic of China which limit the 
                        free exercise of religion and other human 
                        rights.

SEC. 102. LIMITATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.--
            (1) Opposition to assistance.--
                    (A) Opposition.--Except as provided in subparagraph 
                (B), the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the 
                United States Executive Director of the International 
                Bank for Reconstruction and Development to vote against 
                any loan or other utilization of the funds of the Bank 
                to or for the People's Republic of China.
                    (B) Exception.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to 
                any loan or other utilization of funds for purposes 
                of--
                            (i) meeting basic human needs; or
                            (ii) environmental improvements or 
                        safeguards.
            (2) Opposition to modification of single country loan 
        limit.--The Secretary shall instruct the United States 
        Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
        and Development to vote against any modification of the 
        limitation on the share of the total funds of the Bank that may 
        be loaned to a single country.
    (b) Asian Development Bank.--
            (1) Opposition to assistance.--Except as provided in 
        paragraph (2), the Secretary shall instruct the United States 
        Director of the Asian Development Bank to vote against any loan 
        or other utilization of the funds of the Bank to or for the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any loan 
        or other utilization of funds for purposes of--
                    (A) meeting basic human needs; or
                    (B) environmental improvements or safeguards.
    (c) International Monetary Fund.--
            (1) Opposition to assistance.--Except as provided in 
        paragraph (2), the Secretary shall instruct the United States 
        Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund to vote 
        against any loan or other utilization of the funds of the Fund 
        to or for the People's Republic of China.
            (2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any loan 
        or other utilization of funds for purposes of--
                    (A) meeting basic human needs; or
                    (B) environmental improvements or safeguards.
    (d) Basic Human Needs Defined.--In this section, the term ``basic 
human needs'' refers to human needs arising from natural disasters or 
famine.

SEC. 103. SANCTIONS REGARDING CHINA NORTH INDUSTRIES GROUP, CHINA POLY 
              GROUP, AND CERTAIN OTHER ENTITIES AFFILIATED WITH THE 
              PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.

    (a) Finding; Purpose.--
            (1) Finding.--Congress finds that, in May 1996, United 
        States authorities caught representatives of the People's 
        Liberation Army enterprise, China Poly Group, and the civilian 
        defense industrial company, China North Industries Group, 
        attempting to smuggle 2,000 AK-47s into Oakland, California, 
        and offering to sell to Federal undercover agents 300,000 
        machine guns with silencers, 66-millimeter mortars, hand 
        grenades, and ``Red Parakeet'' surface-to-air missiles, which, 
        as stated in the criminal complaint against one of those 
        representatives, ``. . . could take out a 747'' aircraft.
            (2) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to impose 
        targeted sanctions against entities affiliated with the 
        People's Liberation Army that engage in the proliferation of 
        weapons of mass destruction, the importation of illegal weapons 
        or firearms into the United States, or espionage in the United 
        States.
    (b) Sanctions Against Certain PLA Affiliates.--
            (1) Sanctions.--Except as provided in paragraph (2) and 
        subject to paragraph (3), the President shall--
                    (A) prohibit the importation into the United States 
                of all products that are produced, grown, or 
                manufactured by a covered entity, the parent company of 
                a covered entity, or any affiliate, subsidiary, or 
                successor entity of a covered entity;
                    (B) direct the Secretary of State and the Attorney 
                General to deny or impose restrictions on the entry 
                into the United States of any foreign national serving 
                as an officer, director, or employee of a covered 
                entity or other entity described in subparagraph (A);
                    (C) prohibit the issuance to a covered entity or 
                other entity described in subparagraph (A) of licenses 
                in connection with the export of any item on the United 
                States Munitions List;
                    (D) prohibit the export to a covered entity or 
                other entity described in subparagraph (A) of any goods 
                or technology on which export controls are in effect 
                under section 5 or 6 of the Export Administration Act 
                of 1979;
                    (E) direct the Export-Import Bank of the United 
                States not to give approval to the issuance of any 
                guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or 
                participation in the extension of credit with respect 
                to a covered entity or other entity described in 
                subparagraph (A);
                    (F) prohibit United States nationals from directly 
                or indirectly issuing any guarantee for any loan or 
                other investment to, issuing any extension of credit 
                to, or making any investment in a covered entity or 
                other entity described in subparagraph (A); and
                    (G) prohibit the departments and agencies of the 
                United States and United States nationals from entering 
                into any contract with a covered entity or other entity 
                described in subparagraph (A) for the procurement or 
                other provision of goods or services from such entity.
            (2) Exceptions.--
                    (A) In general.--The President shall not impose 
                sanctions under this subsection--
                            (i) in the case of the procurement of 
                        defense articles or defense services--
                                    (I) under contracts or subcontracts 
                                that are in effect on October 1, 1997 
                                (including the exercise of options for 
                                production quantities to satisfy United 
                                States operational military 
                                requirements);
                                    (II) if the President determines 
                                that the person or entity to whom the 
                                sanctions would otherwise be applied is 
                                a sole source supplier of essential 
                                defense articles or services and no 
                                alternative supplier can be identified; 
                                or
                                    (III) if the President determines 
                                that such articles or services are 
                                essential to the national security; or
                            (ii) in the case of--
                                    (I) products or services provided 
                                under contracts or binding agreements 
                                (as such terms are defined by the 
                                President in regulations) or joint 
                                ventures entered into before October 1, 
                                1997;
                                    (II) spare parts;
                                    (III) component parts that are not 
                                finished products but are essential to 
                                United States products or production;
                                    (IV) routine servicing and 
                                maintenance of products; or
                                    (V) information and technology 
                                products and services.
                    (B) Immigration restrictions.--The President shall 
                not apply the restrictions described in paragraph 
                (1)(B) to a person described in that paragraph if the 
                President, after consultation with the Attorney 
                General, determines that the presence of the person in 
                the United States is necessary for a Federal or State 
                judicial proceeding against a covered entity or other 
                entity described in paragraph (1)(A).
            (3) Termination.--The sanctions under this subsection shall 
        terminate as follows:
                    (A) In the case of an entity referred to in 
                paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c), on the date 
                that is one year after the date of enactment of this 
                Act.
                    (B) In the case of an entity that becomes a covered 
                entity under paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (c) by 
                reason of its identification in a report under 
                subsection (d), on the date that is one year after the 
                date on which the entity is identified in such report.
    (c) Covered Entities.--For purposes of subsection (b), a covered 
entity is any of the following:
            (1) China North Industries Group.
            (2) China Poly Group, also known as Polytechnologies 
        Incorporated or BAOLI.
            (3) Any affiliate of the People's Liberation Army 
        identified in a report of the Director of Central Intelligence 
        under subsection (d)(1).
            (4) Any affiliate of the People's Liberation Army 
        identified in a report of the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation under subsection (d)(2).
    (d) Reports on Activities of PLA Affiliates.--
            (1) Transfers of sensitive items and technologies.--Not 
        later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act and 
        annually thereafter through 2002, the Director of Central 
        Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate members Congress a 
        report that identifies each entity owned wholly or in part by 
        the People's Liberation Army which, during the 2-year period 
        ending on the date of the report, transferred to any other 
        entity a controlled item for use in the following:
                    (A) Any item listed in category I or category II of 
                the MTCR Annex.
                    (B) Activities to develop, produce, stockpile, or 
                deliver chemical or biological weapons.
                    (C) Nuclear activities in countries that do not 
                maintain full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency 
                safeguards or equivalent full-scope safeguards.
            (2) Illegal activities in the united states.--Not later 
        than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act and 
        annually thereafter through 2002, the Director of the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the appropriate members 
        Congress a report that identifies each entity owned wholly or 
        in part by the People's Liberation Army which, during the 2-
        year period ending on the date of the report, attempted to--
                    (A) illegally import weapons or firearms into the 
                United States; or
                    (B) engage in military intelligence collection or 
                espionage in the United States under the cover of 
                commercial business activity.
            (3) Form.--Each report under this subsection shall be 
        submitted in classified form.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Affiliate.--The term ``affiliate'' does not include any 
        United States national engaged in a business arrangement with a 
        covered entity or other entity described in subsection 
        (b)(1)(A).
            (2) Appropriate members of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate members of congress'' means the following:
                    (A) The Majority leader and Minority leader of the 
                Senate.
                    (B) The chairmen and ranking members of the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
                Armed Services of the Senate.
                    (C) The Speaker and Minority leader of the House of 
                Representatives.
                    (D) The chairmen and ranking members of the 
                Committee on International Relations and the Committee 
                on National Security of the House of Representatives.
            (3) Component part.--The term ``component part'' means any 
        article that is not usable for its intended function without 
        being embedded or integrated into any other product and, if 
        used in the production of a finished product, would be 
        substantially transformed in that process.
            (4) Controlled item.--The term ``controlled item'' means 
        the following:
                    (A) Any item listed in the MTCR Annex.
                    (B) Any item listed for control by the Australia 
                Group.
                    (C) Any item relevant to the nuclear fuel cycle of 
                nuclear explosive applications that are listed for 
                control by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
            (5) Finished product.--The term ``finished product'' means 
        any article that is usable for its intended function without 
        being embedded in or integrated into any other product, but 
        does not include an article produced by a person or entity 
        other than a covered entity or other entity described in 
        subsection (b)(1)(A) that contains parts or components of such 
        an entity if the parts or components have been substantially 
        transformed during production of the finished product.
            (6) Investment.--The term ``investment'' includes any 
        contribution or commitment of funds, commodities, services, 
        patents, processes, or techniques, in the form of--
                    (A) a loan or loans;
                    (B) the purchase of a share of ownership;
                    (C) participation in royalties, earnings, or 
                profits; and
                    (D) the furnishing of commodities or services 
                pursuant to a lease or other contract,
        but does not include routine maintenance of property.
            (7) MTCR annex.--The term ``MTCR Annex'' has the meaning 
        given that term in section 74(4) of the Arms Export Control Act 
        (22 U.S.C. 2797c(4)).
            (8) United states national.--
                    (A) In general.--The term ``United States 
                national'' means--
                            (i) any United States citizen; and
                            (ii) any corporation, partnership, or other 
                        organization created under the laws of the 
                        United States, any State, the District of 
                        Columbia, or any territory or possession of the 
                        United States.
                    (B) Exception.--The term ``United States national'' 
                does not include a subsidiary or affiliate of 
                corporation, partnership, or organization that is a 
                United States national if the subsidiary or affiliate 
                is located outside the United States.

SEC. 104. CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES REGARDING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should begin consultations with the major allies and other 
trading partners of the United States in order to encourage such allies 
and trading partners to adopt sanctions against the People's Republic 
of China that are similar to the sanctions imposed on the People's 
Republic of China by section 102.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 45 days after the completion of the 
first Group of Seven summit meeting after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the results, if 
any, of consultations referred to in subsection (a).

SEC. 105. TERMINATION OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES.

    (a) Termination Date.--Sections 101 and 102 shall cease to apply at 
the end of the five-year period beginning on the date of enactment of 
this Act.
    (b) Sense of Congress on Review.--It is the sense of Congress that 
Congress should review the desirability of terminating the sanctions in 
this title before the date on which the sanctions would otherwise 
terminate under this title upon the occurrence of any of the following 
events:
            (1) The admission of the People's Republic of China into 
        the World Trade Organization on commercially viable terms.
            (2) A determination by the President that the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China is implementing fully all 
        applicable international agreements relating to the 
        proliferation of arms.
            (3) A determination by the President that the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China is actively and effectively 
        combatting all forms of religious persecution in China.
            (4) A determination by the President that the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China is reevaluating in a meaningful 
        manner its actions regarding the massacre of students in 
        Tiananmen Square in 1989.
            (5) The publication by the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China of a report on the national security strategy 
        of that government which includes a comprehensive description 
        and discussion of the elements of that strategy similar to the 
        description and discussion of the national security strategy of 
        the United States in the annual report required by section 108 
        of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a).
            (6) A determination by the President that the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China has taken meaningful actions 
        toward improving overall human rights conditions in China and 
        Tibet, including the release of political prisoners, improving 
        prison conditions, providing prisoners with adequate medical 
        care, and full compliance with any international human rights 
        accords to which that government is a signatory.

   TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

SEC. 201. FINDINGS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
              CHINA.

    Congress makes the following findings regarding human rights abuses 
in the People's Republic of China:
            (1) Congress concurs in the following conclusions of the 
        Department of State regarding human rights in the People's 
        Republic of China in 1996:
                    (A) The People's Republic of China is ``an 
                authoritarian state'' in which ``citizens lack the 
                freedom to peacefully express opposition to the party-
                led political system and the right to change their 
                national leaders or form of government''.
                    (B) The Government of the People's Republic of 
                China has ``continued to commit widespread and well 
                documented human rights abuses, in violation of 
                internationally accepted norms, stemming from the 
                authorities' intolerance of dissent, fear of unrest, 
                and the absence or inadequacy of laws protecting basic 
                freedoms''.
                    (C) ``Abuses include torture and mistreatment of 
                prisoners, forced confessions, and arbitrary and 
                incommunicado detention''.
                    (D) ``Prison conditions remained harsh [and] [t]he 
                Government continued severe restrictions on freedom of 
                speech, the press, assembly, association, religion, 
                privacy, and worker rights''.
                    (E) ``Although the Government denies that it holds 
                political prisoners, the number of persons detained or 
                serving sentences for `counterrevolutionary crimes' or 
                `crimes against the state' and for peaceful political 
                or religious activities are believed to number in the 
                thousands''.
                    (F) ``Non-approved religious groups, including 
                Protestant and Catholic groups . . experienced 
                intensified repression''.
                    (G) ``Serious human rights abuses persist in 
                minority areas, including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner 
                Mongolia [, and] [c]ontrols on religion and other 
                fundamental freedoms in these areas have also 
                intensified''.
                    (H) ``Overall in 1996, the authorities stepped up 
                efforts to cut off expressions of protest or criticism. 
                All public dissent against the party and government was 
                effectively silenced by intimidation, exile, the 
                imposition of prison terms, administrative detention, 
                or house arrest. No dissidents were known to be active 
                at year's end.''.
            (2) People's Republic of China authorities continue to hold 
        Wei Jingsheng in prison for his prodemocracy beliefs, and he is 
        suffering in prison from a lack of medical attention and 
        beatings by fellow prisoners.
            (3) On October 30, 1996, a People's Republic of China court 
        sentenced Wang Dan to 11 years in prison primarily for articles 
        published outside the People's Republic of China, and People's 
        Republic of China authorities are not providing him with 
        adequate medical care.
            (4) In addition to Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, hundreds, if 
        not thousands, of other political, religious, and labor 
        dissidents are imprisoned in China for peacefully expressing 
        their beliefs and exercising their internationally recognized 
        rights of free association and expression.
            (5) Labor activist Liu Nianchun, severely ill in a labor 
        camp, has not only been denied medical treatment but has been 
        tortured with electric batons and has had his 3 year 
        reeducation-through-labor sentence in prison arbitrarily 
        extended by 216 days.
            (6) Li Hai was charged with prying into and gathering state 
        secrets and subsequently sentenced to a 9-year term in prison 
        on December 18, 1996, for going door-to-door to collect the 
        names, ages, family situations, alleged crimes, lengths of 
        prison sentences, locations of imprisonment, and treatment 
        while imprisoned of people sentenced to prison for their 
        activities during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.
            (7) Gao Yu, serving a 6-year term in prison on charges of 
        ``leaking state secrets'' despite the fact that the information 
        in question was already common knowledge, has been denied 
        medical parole and adequate medical care despite life 
        threatening illness and was vilified by People's Republic of 
        China authorities after she was awarded the UNESCO Guillemo 
        Cano World Press Freedom Prize.
            (8) People's Republic of China companies still export 
        prison labor products to the United States. Since 1991, the 
        United States Customs Service has issued 27 detention orders 
        banning the importation of goods suspected to be products of 
        prison labor in China, including hand tools, artificial 
flowers, Christmas tree lights, and diesel engines.
            (9) The People's Republic of China has not fully complied 
        with the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on Prison Labor, and 
        People's Republic of China authorities often wait several years 
        before granting requests by United States Customs Service 
        officials to inspect prison facilities in China. In 1996, such 
        authorities granted just one of eight outstanding requests by 
        such officials to inspect prison facilities in China.
            (10) Under current law, People's Republic of China 
        authorities may administratively sentence China citizens to 3 
        years of labor reform without trial.
            (11) The People's Republic of China restricts the access of 
        its citizens to the Internet and blocks web sites operated by 
        foreign news organizations and human rights organizations.
            (12) The Government of the People's Republic of China 
        prohibits independent labor unions, and workers who attempt to 
        form unions without state approval are given severe prison 
        sentences as shown in the treatment of Zhang Jingsheng, a labor 
        leader in Hunan province who was arrested following the 1989 
        Tiananmen Square Massacre and sentenced to 13 years in prison 
        for organizing workers.

SEC. 202. FINDINGS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
              CHINA.

    Congress makes the following findings regarding religious freedom 
in the People's Republic of China:
            (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China 
        restricts the ability of religious adherents, including 
        Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, and others, to practice outside 
        of state-approved religious organizations, and detains 
        worshipers and clergy who participate in religious services 
        conducted outside state-approved religious organizations, as 
        well as those who refuse to register with the authorities as 
        required.
            (2) Bishop Zeng Jingmu, 76 years old, detained for the 
        third time in 7 months and in poor health from pneumonia, is 
        serving a reeducation through labor term for organizing 
        religious assemblies and masses not sanctioned by the official 
        Chinese Catholic Church.
            (3) On January 31, 1994, Premier Li Peng signed decrees 
        number 144 and 145 which restrict worship, religious education, 
        distribution of Bibles and others religious literature, and 
        contact with foreign coreligionists.
            (4) The Government of the People's Republic of China has 
        created official religious organizations that control all 
        religious worship, activity, and association in China and Tibet 
        and supplant the independent authority of the Roman Catholic 
        Church, independent Protestant churches, and independent 
        Buddhist, Taoist, and Islamic associations.
            (5) In July 1995, Ye Xiaowen, a rigid communist hostile to 
        religion, was appointed to head the Bureau of Religious 
        Affairs, a government agency of the People's Republic of China 
        that is controlled by the United Front Work Department of the 
        Chinese Communist Party. The Bureau of Religious Affairs has 
        administrative control over all religious worship and activity 
        in China and Tibet through a system of granting or denying 
        rights through an official registration system. Those who fail 
        to or are not allowed to register are subject to punitive 
        measures.
            (6) Unofficial Christian and Catholic communities were 
        targeted by the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        during 1996. A renewed campaign aimed at forcing all churches 
        to register or face dissolution resulted in beating and 
        harassment of congregants, closure of churches, and numerous 
        arrests, fines, and sentences. In Shanghai, for example, more 
        than 300 house churches or meeting points were closed down by 
        the security authorities in April alone.

SEC. 203. FINDINGS ON TIBET.

    Congress makes the following findings regarding Tibet:
            (1) The Department of State China Country Report on Human 
        Rights Practices for 1996 states: ``Chinese government 
        authorities continued to commit widespread human rights abuses 
        in Tibet, including instances of death in detention, torture, 
        arbitrary arrest, detention without public trial, long 
        detention of Tibetan nationalists for peacefully expressing 
        their religious and political views, and intensified controls 
        on religion and on freedom of speech and the press, 
        particularly for ethnic Tibetans.''.
            (2) The report also cites three instances in which Tibetan 
        Buddhist monks died in prison in the People's Republic of China 
        in 1996.
            (3) Many victims of the brutality committed by the People's 
        Armed Police and the Public Security Bureau of the People's 
Republic of China have been young Tibetan Buddhist nuns and monks.
            (4) Between June 1994 and May 1995, three Tibetan nuns--15-
        year-old Sherab Ngawang, 24-year-old Gyaltsen Kelsang, and 20-
        year-old Phuntsok Yangkyi--died as a result of torture in 
        prison in Tibet.
            (5) On March 11, 1997, the Senate adopted a resolution 
        calling for the release by the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China of Tibetan ethnomusicologist and Fulbright 
        Scholar Ngawang Choephel, who was sentenced to 18 years in 
        prison in the People's Republic of China in December 1996, and 
        of other Tibetans who are prisoners in the People's Republic of 
        China for reasons of conscience.
            (6) In May 1995, authorities of the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China detained Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, then 
        6 years old, and his parents, just days after the boy was 
        recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama, and 
        authorities of that government continue to hold him and his 
        family.
            (7) In May 1997, the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China announced the sentencing of Chadrel Rinpoche, the head of 
        the search committee for the 11th Panchen Lama, to 6 years in 
        prison.
            (8) In April 1996, authorities of the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China banned the display of photographs of 
        the Dalai Lama, even in private homes, and the decision led to 
        demonstrations in Ganden monastery during which 90 monks were 
        arrested and 1 monk was shot to death by security forces of 
        that government.

SEC. 204. FINDINGS ON COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING PRACTICES IN THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    Congress makes the following findings regarding family planning 
practices in the People's Republic of China:
            (1) For more than 15 years there have been frequent and 
        credible reports of forced abortion and forced sterilization in 
        connection with the coercive population control practices of 
        the People's Republic of China.
            (2) Forced abortion was rightly denounced as a crime 
        against humanity by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.
            (3) Although it is the stated position of the politburo of 
        the Chinese Communist Party that forced abortion and forced 
        sterilization have no role in the population control program of 
        the Government of the People's Republic of China, the policy of 
        that government seems to encourage both forced abortion and 
        forced sterilization through a combination of strictly enforced 
        birth quotas and impunity for local population control 
        officials who engage in coercion. Officials acknowledge that 
        there have been instances of forced abortions and 
        sterilization, yet there is no evidence that the perpetrators 
        of such acts have been punished.
            (4) The People's Republic of China population control 
        officials, in cooperation with employers and works unit 
        officials, monitor women's menstrual cycles and subject women 
        who conceive without government authorization to extreme 
        psychological pressure, to harsh economic sanctions (including 
        unpayable fines and loss of employment), and to physical force.
            (5) Official sanctions for giving birth to unauthorized 
        children include fines in amounts several times larger than the 
        per capita annual incomes of residents of the People's Republic 
        of China. In Fujian, for example, the average fine is estimated 
        to be twice a family's gross annual income. Families who cannot 
        pay the fine have had their homes and personal property 
        confiscated and destroyed.
            (6) Especially harsh punishments have been inflicted on 
        those whose resistance to such policies is motivated by 
        religion. For example, according to a 1995 Amnesty 
        International report, the Catholic inhabitants of two villages 
        in Hebei Province were subjected to population control under 
        the slogan ``better to have more graves than one more child''. 
        Enforcement measures included torture, sexual abuse, and the 
        detention of resisters' relatives as hostages.
            (7) Forced abortions in the People's Republic of China 
        often take place in the very late stages of pregnancy, or even 
        during the process of birth itself.

SEC. 205. COMBATING SLAVE LABOR AND ``REEDUCATION'' CENTERS.

    (a) Authorizations for Appropriations for Additional Monitoring of 
Exportation of Slave Labor Products.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1998 and $2,000,000 for fiscal 
year 1999 for monitoring by the United States Customs Service and the 
Department of State of the export by the People's Republic of China to 
the United States of products which may be made with slave labor in 
violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) or 
section 1761 of title 18, United States Code.
    (b) Reports on Exportation of Products Made With Slave Labor.--
            (1) Reports.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the 
                date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, 
                the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of State 
                shall each submit to the Members of Congress referred 
                to in subparagraph (B) a report on the manufacturing 
                and exportation of products made with slave labor in 
                the People's Republic of China during the one-year 
                period ending on the date of the report. Each report 
                shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
                include a classified annex.
                    (B) Members of congress.--Reports under 
                subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the following 
                Members of Congress:
                            (i) The Majority leader and Minority leader 
                        of the Senate.
                            (ii) The chairman and ranking member of the 
                        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
                            (iii) The Speaker and Minority leader of 
                        the House of Representatives.
                            (iv) The chairman and ranking member of the 
                        Committee on International Relations of the 
                        House of Representatives.
            (2) Contents of reports.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
        shall include information concerning the following:
                    (A) The extent of the use of slave labor in 
                manufacturing products for exportation by the People's 
                Republic of China, as well as the volume of exports of 
                such slave labor products by that country.
                    (B) The progress of the United States Government--
                            (i) in identifying products made with slave 
                        labor in the People's Republic of China that 
                        are destined for the United States market in 
                        violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 
                        1930 or section 1761 of title 18, United States 
                        Code; and
                            (ii) in stemming the importation of such 
                        products.
    (c) Renegotiation of Memorandum of Understanding on Prison Labor 
With the People's Republic of China.--It is the sense of Congress that, 
since the People's Republic of China has substantially frustrated the 
purposes of the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding with the United States 
on Prison Labor, the President should immediately commence negotiations 
to replace the memorandum of understanding with one providing for 
effective monitoring of forced labor in the People's Republic of China, 
without restrictions on which prison labor camps international monitors 
may visit.

SEC. 206. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING TO CHINA.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to such sums as 
are otherwise authorized to be appropriated for ``International 
Broadcasting Activities'' for fiscal year 1998, there is authorized to 
be appropriated for ``International Broadcasting Activities'' for that 
fiscal year $5,000,000, which shall be available only for broadcasting 
by Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America to the People's Republic of 
China.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that United 
States international broadcasting through Radio Free Asia and Voice of 
America should be increased to provide continuous 24-hour broadcasting 
in Chinese and Tibetan dialects which include Mandarin Chinese, 
Tibetan, and at least one other dialect.

SEC. 207. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY.

    In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for grants to the National Endowment 
for Democracy, there is authorized to be appropriated for that fiscal 
year $2,000,000 for grants to the Endowment which shall be available 
only for purposes of programs relating to the People's Republic of 
China.

SEC. 208. UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY STUDENT, CULTURAL, AND 
              LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.

    In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be 
appropriated to the United States Information Agency for fiscal year 
1998, there is authorized to be appropriated for the Agency for that 
fiscal year $2,000,000, which shall be available only for the purposes 
of student, cultural, and legislative exchange activities in or with 
the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 209. ANNUAL REPORTS ON FAMILY PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY RECIPIENTS OF UNITED STATES FUNDS.

    (a) Annual Reports.--
            (1) Requirement.--Not later than January 15 each year, the 
        Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report that 
        describes the family planning activities in the People's 
        Republic of China during the preceding year of each covered 
        family planning organization that carried out such activities 
        in the People's Republic of China during that year.
            (2) Additional information.--Each report under paragraph 
        (1) shall include the filing submitted to the Secretary for 
        purposes of such report by each covered family planning 
        organization whose activities are covered by such report.
    (b) Covered Family Planning Organization Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``covered family planning organization'' means any for-profit 
or non-profit entity that receives United States funds to conduct 
family planning activities abroad.

SEC. 210. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 
              CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On April 15, 1997, members of the United Nations Human 
        Rights Commission voted 27-17 to block a resolution, sponsored 
        by Denmark, critical of the human rights record of the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China.
            (2) The United States Government failed to vigorously lobby 
        other nations to support the resolution in a timely and 
        effective manner, and France, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
        Australia, and Japan did not cosponsor the resolution.
            (3) In response to support for the resolution by Denmark 
        and the Netherlands, the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China has adopted punitive measures against Denmark and 
        Netherlands businesses--including the denial of contracts to 
        Netherlands companies and undue delays in authorizing expansion 
        plans by the Denmark shipping line Maersk--thereby linking 
        human rights and trade.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States Government should greatly increase 
        efforts in the United Nations Human Rights Commission and other 
        international fora to draw attention to and condemn the gross 
        violations of international standards on human rights by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China;
            (2) the President should vigorously lobby other countries 
        for passage of future Commission resolutions on the human 
        rights record of the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China; and
            (3) such lobbying should begin not later than 6 months 
        before the commencement of the next annual meeting of the 
        Commission.

SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING COMPLIANCE BY THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION ON HONG 
              KONG.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China resumed sovereignty over 
        Hong Kong on July 1, 1997.
            (2) In the Joint Declaration, a legally binding document in 
        all its parts and the highest form of commitment between 
        sovereign states, the People's Republic of China pledged that 
        after its resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong ``[t]he 
        current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain 
        unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, 
        including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of 
        association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of 
        strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and 
        religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong 
        Special Administrative Region''.
            (3) The People's Republic of China further pledged in the 
        Joint Declaration that the policies of the ``... Joint 
        Declaration will be stipulated in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
        Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
        China, by the National People's Congress of the People's 
        Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 
        years''.
            (4) The Basic Law prescribes the systems to be practiced in 
        the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region after the 
        resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong by the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (5) According to Article 2 of the Basic Law: ``The National 
        People's Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special 
        Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and 
        enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, 
        including that of final adjudication''.
            (6) According to Article 5 of the Basic Law: ``The 
        socialist system and policies (of the People's Republic of 
        China) shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special 
        Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and 
        way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years''.
            (7) According to Article 27 of the Basic Law: ``Hong Kong 
        residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and 
        publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession 
        and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and 
        join trade unions, and to strike''.
            (8) According to Article 32 of the Basic Law: ``Hong Kong 
        residents shall have freedom of religious belief and freedom to 
        preach and to conduct and participate in religious activities 
        in public''.
            (9) According to Article 34 of the Basic Law: ``Hong Kong 
        residents shall have freedom to engage in academic research, 
        literary and artistic creation, and other cultural 
        activities''.
            (10) According to Article 39 of the Basic Law: ``The 
        provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
        Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
        Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions as 
        applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be 
        implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special 
        Administrative Region''.
            (11) President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of 
        China, in his statement of July 1, 1997, at the ceremony in 
        Hong Kong marking the establishment of the Hong Kong Special 
        Administrative Region, said that ``... Hong Kong will enjoy a 
        high degree of autonomy as provided for by the Basic Law, which 
        includes the executive, legislative and independent judicial 
        power, including that of final adjudication''.
            (12) President Jiang further said that the Hong Kong 
        Special Administrative Region has the ``ultimate aim of 
        electing the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council by 
        universal suffrage''.
            (13) President Jiang further said that ``[n]o central 
        department or locality (of the People's Republic of China) may 
        or will be allowed to interfere in the affairs which, under the 
        Basic Law, should be administered by the Hong Kong Special 
        Administrative Region on its own''.
            (14) President Jiang further said that ``the provisions of 
        the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
        International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
        and international covenants as applied to Hong Kong shall 
        remain in force to be implemented through the laws of Hong 
        Kong's regional legislation''.
            (15) President Jiang further said that adherence to these 
        principles ``serves Hong Kong, serves the (People's Republic of 
        China) and serves the entire nation as well. Therefore there is 
        no reason whatsoever to change them. Here I want to reaffirm 
        that `one country, two systems, Hong Kong administering Hong 
        Kong' and `a high degree of autonomy' will remain unchanged for 
        50 years''.
            (16) President Jiang, in another statement of July 1, 1997, 
        at a rally in Beijing marking the establishment of the Hong 
        Kong Special Administrative Region, said that the People's 
        Republic of China ``will unswervingly carry out the principles 
        of `one country, two systems', `Hong Kong people administering 
        Hong Kong' and `high degree of autonomy', and make sure that 
        the previous socio-economic system and way of life of Hong Kong 
        remain unchanged and that laws previously in force will remain 
        basically unchanged. We will firmly support the Hong Kong SAR 
        in its exercise of the functions and powers bestowed on it by 
        the Basic Law and the Hong Kong SAR Government in its 
        administration in accordance with law.''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the statements of President Jiang Zemin of the People's 
        Republic of China constitute a welcome reaffirmation of the 
        obligations of the People's Republic of China under the Joint 
        Declaration to ensure that Hong Kong remains autonomous, the 
        human rights of the people of Hong Kong remain protected, and 
        the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
        is elected democratically; and
            (2) the fulfillment by the People's Republic of China of 
        the obligations under the terms of the Joint Declaration and 
        the Basic Law constitutes a crucial test of Beijing's ability 
        to play a responsible global role.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Basic law.--The term ``Basic Law'' means the Basic Law 
        of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's 
        Republic of China, as adopted on April 4, 1990, by the Seventh 
        National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China.
            (2) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration'' 
        means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United 
        Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of 
        Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.

                  TITLE III--NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

SEC. 301. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES BY THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    Congress makes the following findings regarding the proliferation 
of ballistic missiles by the People's Republic of China:
            (1) In December 1992, the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China violated the Arms Export Control Act and the 
        Export Administration Act of 1979 with the transfer by the 
        Ministry of Aerospace Industry of approximately 24 M-11 
        missiles to Sargodha Air Force Base in Pakistan.
            (2) From September 1994 to June 1996, the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China again violated the Arms Export 
        Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979 with the 
        transfer by the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of as many as 30 
        M-11 ballistic missiles to Sargodha Air Force Base.
            (3) In June 1995, the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China violated the Arms Export Control Act and the Export 
        Administration Act of 1979 with the transfer by the Chinese 
        Aerospace Corporation to Iran of possibly hundreds of missile 
        guidance systems and computerized machine tools for the 
        production of ballistic missiles.
            (4) In August 1996, the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China violated the Arms Export Control Act and the Export 
        Administration Act of 1979 with the transfer to Pakistan of 
        factory plans and equipment capable of constructing a ballistic 
        missile factory.
            (5) In August 1996, the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the Export 
        Administration Act of 1979, and the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1992 with the transfer by the China 
        Precision Engineering Institute to Iran's Defense Industries of 
        gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment for the 
        construction and test of ballistic missile guidance systems.
            (6) It has been reported that the Central Intelligence 
        Agency discovered a shipment by the People's Republic of China 
        to the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, a Syria 
        Government agency that oversees missile development, of 
        guidance equipment for M-11 ballistic missiles. This alleged 
        shipment would be a violation of the Missile Technology Control 
        Regime. This alleged shipment would have taken place after the 
        limited sanctions imposed by the United States on the People's 
        Republic of China for shipments of M-11 missiles and components 
        to Pakistan had been lifted following the assurances of the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China that it would 
        comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime.
            (7) After each of these violations, the President either 
        failed to take appropriate actions to deter future violations 
        of such Acts and the Regime, took the least onerous action 
        against the Government of the People's Republic of China that 
        was possible under such Acts and the Regime, or rescinded 
        previous actions thereby diluting or eliminating the deterrent 
        effect of sanctions under such Acts and the Regime with respect 
        to the Government of the People's Republic of China.
            (8) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative 
        action in the bilateral relations between the United States and 
        the People's Republic of China in order to respond sufficiently 
        to these violations of United States law.

SEC. 302. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
              BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    Congress makes the following findings regarding the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction by the People's Republic of China:
            (1) In January 1996, the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the 
        Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, and the Export-
        Import Bank Act of 1945 with the transfer by the China Nuclear 
        Energy Industry Corporation to the Abdul Qadeer Khan Research 
        Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, of as many as 5,000 ring-
        magnets for the extraction of enriched uranium for the 
        potential use in nuclear weapons.
            (2) In September 1996, the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the 
        Export Administration Act of 1979, and the Nuclear 
        Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 with the transfer by the 
        China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation to a nuclear reactor 
        facility in Khushab, Pakistan, of an industrial furnace and 
        special diagnostic equipment capable of converting plutonium 
        and uranium to weapons grade material.
            (3) In March 1996, the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the Export 
        Administration Act of 1979, the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1992, and Executive Order 12938 with the 
        transfer by the Jiangsu Corporation to Iran organizations 
        affiliated with the Iranian Defense Industries Organization and 
        the Revolutionary Guards of virtually complete chemical weapons 
        production facilities.
            (4) After each of these violations, the President either 
        failed to take any action to deter future violations of such 
        Acts or took such trifling action as to have no meaning or 
        effect on the future proliferation of weapons of mass 
        destruction by the People's Republic of China.
            (5) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative 
        action in the bilateral relations between the People's Republic 
        of China and the United States in order to respond sufficiently 
        to these violations of United States law.

SEC. 303. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF DESTABILIZING ADVANCED 
              CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    Congress makes the following findings regarding the proliferation 
of destabilizing advanced conventional weapons by the People's Republic 
of China:
            (1) In January 1996, the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China violated the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation 
        Act of 1992 with the transfer by the Chinese Precision 
        Machinery Import-Export Corporation to the Iran military of 60 
        C-802 advanced anti-ship missiles and 20 Houdong fast-attack 
        patrol craft, 15 of which were equipped with C-802 missiles.
            (2) In test firings of this missile from land-based 
        batteries and from naval vessels, and test firings of a similar 
        missile from fighter aircraft, the Iran Government claimed 
        direct hits on the intended targets. This operational ability 
        restores an anti-surface warfare capability lost by the Iran 
        military during the Iran-Iraq War.
            (3) The Commander of the United States Fifth Fleet 
        commented that these missiles represented a new dimension to 
        the threat faced by the United States Navy, stating ``[i]t used 
        to be we just had to worry about land-based cruise missiles. 
        Now [the Iranians] have the potential to have that throughout 
        the [Persian] Gulf mounted on ships.''.
            (4) It was reported in numerous press sources that the 
        Department of Defense found these transfers destabilizing, and 
        pressed for the imposition of sanctions under the Iran-Iraq 
        Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 but that the Department of 
        State did not wish to impose such sanctions for fear of 
        damaging bilateral relations between the People's Republic of 
        China and the United States.
            (5) The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 does 
        not differentiate between transfers of destabilizing weapons 
        that will and will not damage bilateral relations. Any 
        determination of whether to impose sanctions on the People's 
        Republic of China for this transfer should have been made 
        strictly on the basis whether this transfer was or was not 
        destabilizing.
            (6) In light of these reports, it is likely that sanctions 
        would have been imposed if the Clinton Administration had been 
        more concerned with the stability of the region and the 
        security of United States troops than with the maintenance of 
        cordial relations between the People's Republic of China and 
        the United States.
            (7) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative 
        action in the bilateral relations between the People's Republic 
        of China and the United States in order to respond sufficiently 
        to this violation of United States law.

SEC. 304. FINDINGS ON THE EVASION OF UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL LAWS 
              BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    Congress makes the following findings regarding the evasion of 
United States export control laws by the People's Republic of China:
            (1) On November 14, 1994, the President issued Executive 
        Order 12938, relating to the emergency regarding weapons of 
        mass destruction, declaring that the proliferation of weapons 
        of mass destruction and the means of delivering them constitute 
        ``an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, 
        foreign policy, and economy of the United States'' and that he 
        had therefore decided to ``declare a national emergency to deal 
        with that threat''.
            (2) The President reaffirmed Executive Order 12938 on 
        November 15, 1995, and again on November 11, 1996.
            (3) The Director of Central Intelligence stated in the 
        report entitled ``The Acquisition of Technology Relating to 
        Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional 
        Munitions'' that, from July to December 1996, ``China was the 
        most significant supplier of W[eapons of] M[ass] D[estruction]-
related goods and technology to foreign countries.''.
            (4) United States supercomputers are the computer of choice 
        for the nuclear weapons agencies of the People's Republic of 
        China as highlighted by the comments of the Chinese Academy of 
        Sciences, an agency known to work on nuclear weapons 
        development, that its United States-built supercomputer 
        provides the Academy with ``computational power previously 
        unknown'' and is available to ``all the major scientific and 
        technological institutes across China''.
            (5) The People's Republic of China has consistently 
        provided technical and scientific assistance for the 
        development of nuclear weapons to both Iran and Pakistan, and 
        it is illogical to believe that such assistance would not also 
        include computational assistance if needed.
            (6) According to the Under Secretary of Commerce for Export 
        Administration, 47 United States high-performance 
        supercomputers were exported to the People's Republic of China 
        between January 1996 and March 1997. Press reports indicate 
        United States intelligence sources consider the actual number 
        of such supercomputers exported to the People's Republic of 
        China during that period to have been in the hundreds.
            (7) Current United States export regulations require an 
        export license for shipments of supercomputers to the People's 
        Republic of China only if the end-use will be militarily 
        related. However, the determination of that end-use is left to 
        the exporter, thereby providing an incentive for inadequate 
        investigations of the end-use of supercomputers exported to the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (8) The Department of Commerce has initiated investigations 
        of United States supercomputer manufacturers who, as last as 
        June 1996, allegedly sold supercomputers to the Chinese Academy 
        of Sciences, which also administers research in nuclear weapons 
        and missiles, in violation of existing United States export 
        control regulations relating to supercomputers.
            (9) On 14 July 1997, the ``China Daily'', the newspaper of 
        the Government of the People's Republic of China, stated that 
        ``China will open up its defense sector to foreign investors'' 
        by ``strengthening international military-related electronic 
        technology exchanges'' and that ``China's defense-related 
        electronics should no longer be hidden from foreign 
        investors''.
            (10) It was exactly this concern of diversion to military 
        end-use and to third nation proliferators that prompted the 
        President, on June 16, 1997, to tighten export controls for 
        supercomputers so as to address the concern of ``[t]he 
        potential diversion to military use of technology acquired'' 
        through experience developed in operating supercomputers and 
        customizing software and the concern that ``the People's 
        Republic of China may transfer advanced-weapons related 
        technology to other countries, as in the case of ballistic 
        missile transfers''.
            (11) Throughout this period, the President has consistently 
        acted in a manner so as to loosen controls on the export of 
        supercomputers from the United States and thereby make it 
        easier for the Government of the People's Republic of China to 
        divert United States supercomputers to military end-uses and to 
        assist in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
            (12) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative 
        action in the bilateral relations between the People's Republic 
        of China and the United States in order to respond sufficiently 
        to these violations of United States law.

SEC. 305. FINDINGS ON THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES 
              EXPORT CONTROL LAWS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND 
              HONG KONG.

    Congress makes the following findings regarding the inconsistent 
application of United States export control laws to the People's 
Republic of China and Hong Kong:
            (1) While Hong Kong was sovereign territory of the United 
        Kingdom, United States control of United States exports to Hong 
        Kong of items listed on the United States Munitions List and 
        the Commerce Control List was considerably more lax than United 
        States control of exports of such items to the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (2) On June 19, 1997, at a time when Hong Kong was still 
        territory of the United Kingdom, the Department of Commerce 
        discovered that a supercomputer exported to a Hong Kong based 
        company without the need of an export license because it was 
        being exported to Hong Kong was reexported to a defense 
        research institute in Changsha, People's Republic of China.
            (3) A Federal grand jury is currently investigating the 
        1995 diversion by the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China to military aviation production of aircraft machining 
        equipment that was originally exported from the United States 
        for civilian end-use.
            (4) The People's Republic of China is the only country 
        which does not allow United States officials to investigate the 
        final end-use of exported technology and recently refused 
        United States requests to examine the location of the 
        supercomputer diverted from Hong Kong.
            (5) The continuation of this inconsistent export control 
        regime without specific assurances and verification measures to 
        prevent unauthorized reexport from Hong Kong, or diversion to 
        military end-use, provides the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China with the means to circumvent United States 
        export controls and gain access to critical technology 
        necessary both for defense modernization and the proliferation 
        of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
            (6) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative 
        action in the bilateral relations between the People's Republic 
        of China and the United States in order to respond sufficiently 
        to these violations of United States law.

SEC. 306. EXPORTS OF SUPERCOMPUTERS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Prior Approval of Exports and Reexports.--The President shall 
require that no covered computer may be exported or reexported to the 
People's Republic of China without the prior written approval of each 
of the designated officials.
    (b) Export or Reexport Without Unanimous Approval.--If any one of 
the designated officials does not approve of the export or reexport of 
a covered computer to the People's Republic of China, the computer may 
be exported or reexported to the People's Republic of China only 
pursuant to a license issued by the Secretary of Commerce under the 
export administration regulations of the Department of Commerce, and 
without regard to the licensing exceptions otherwise authorized under 
section 740.7 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on 
June 10, 1997.
    (c) Deadline for Response to Application.--Each designated official 
shall approve or disapprove in writing of the export or reexport of a 
covered computer to the People's Republic of China not later than 10 
days after receipt by the United States of the application for the 
export or reexport of the computer.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Covered computers.--The term ``covered computers'' 
        means the digital computers listed as ``eligible computers'' in 
        section 740.7(d)(2) of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, 
        as in effect on June 10, 1997.
            (2) Designated officials.--The term ``designated 
        officials'' means the following:
            (1) The Secretary of Commerce.
            (2) The Secretary of Defense.
            (3) The Secretary of Energy.
            (4) The Secretary of State.
            (5) The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
        Agency.

SEC. 307. DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO HONG KONG.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
provisions of this section shall apply with respect to exports of 
covered items to Hong Kong.
    (b) Pre-License Verifications.--The Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Commerce shall not approve an export license application 
for the export of a covered item to Hong Kong if United States 
officials are denied an opportunity to conduct a pre-license 
verification with respect to the end-use of such covered item and the 
recipient of such item.
    (c) Post-Shipment Verification.--If United States officials are 
denied the ability to a conduct post-shipment verification of the 
location, recipient, and end use of a covered item that has been 
exported to Hong Kong from the United States pursuant to an export 
license granted by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Commerce, thereafter any application to export a covered item to Hong 
Kong shall be treated in the same manner as a request to export such 
item to the People's Republic of China.
    (d) Diversion of Covered Items.--If the President, or any other 
official of the United States, obtains credible evidence that a covered 
item exported from the United States to Hong Kong on or after July 1, 
1997, has been diverted--
            (1) to the People's Republic of China;
            (2) to an end use not authorized under the export control 
        laws or regulations of the United States, or
            (3) to a recipient, other than the recipient specified in 
        the export license application,
any application to export a covered item to Hong Kong that is pending 
or filed after the date on which such evidence is obtained shall be 
treated in the same manner as a request to export such item to the 
People's Republic of China.
    (e) Covered Item Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered 
item'' means the following:
            (1) Any item on the United States Munitions List.
            (2) Any item on the Commerce Control List of the Department 
        of Commerce.

SEC. 308. ENFORCEMENT OF IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION ACT WITH 
              RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States that--
            (1) the delivery of 60 C-802 cruise missiles by the China 
        National Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation to Iran 
        poses a new, direct threat to deployed United States forces in 
        the Middle East and materially contributed to the efforts of 
        Iran to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of advanced 
        conventional weapons; and
            (2) the delivery is a violation of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
    (b) Implementation of Sanctions.--
            (1) Requirement.--The President shall impose on the 
        People's Republic of China the mandatory sanctions set forth in 
        paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) of section 1605(b) of the Iran-
        Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992.
            (2) Nonavailability of waiver.--For purposes of this 
        section, the President shall not have the authority contained 
        in section 1606 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 
        1992 to waive the sanctions required under paragraph (1).

SEC. 309. TRANSFERS OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY BY THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Credible allegations exist that the People's Republic 
        of China has transferred equipment and technology as follows:
                    (A) Gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment 
                for missiles to Iran.
                    (B) Chemical weapons equipment and technology to 
                Iran.
                    (C) Missile guidance systems and computerized 
                machine tools to Iran.
                    (D) Industrial furnace equipment and high 
                technology diagnostic equipment to a nuclear facility 
                in Pakistan.
                    (E) Blueprints and equipment to manufacture M-11 
                missiles to Pakistan.
                    (F) M-11 missiles and components to Pakistan.
            (2) The Department of State has failed to determine whether 
        most such transfers violate provisions of relevant United 
        States laws and Executive orders relating to the proliferation 
        of sensitive equipment and technology, including the Arms 
        Export Control Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 
        1994, the Export Administration Act of 1979, and the Export-
        Import Bank Act of 1945, and Executive Order 12938.
            (3) Where the Department of State has made such 
        determinations, it has imposed the least onerous form of 
        sanction, which significantly weakens the intended deterrent 
        effect of the sanctions provided for in such laws.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the transfers of equipment and technology by the 
        People's Republic of China described in subsection (a)(1) pose 
        a threat to the national security interests of the United 
        States;
            (2) the failure of the Clinton Administration to initiate a 
        formal process to determine whether to impose sanctions for 
        such transfers under the provisions of law referred to in 
        subsection (a)(2) contributes to the threat posed to the 
        national security interests of the United States by the 
        proliferation of such equipment and technology; and
            (3) the President should immediately initiate the 
        procedures necessary to determine whether sanctions should be 
        imposed under such provisions of law for such transfers.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) Requirement.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a 
        report setting forth--
                    (A) the date, if any, of the commencement and of 
                the conclusion of each formal process conducted by the 
                Department of State to determine whether to impose 
                sanctions under the provisions of law referred to in 
                subsection (a)(2) for each transfer described in 
                subsection (a)(1);
                    (B) the facts providing the basis for each 
                determination not to impose sanctions under such 
                provisions of law on the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China, or entities within or having a 
                relationship with that government, for each transfer, 
                and the legal analysis supporting such determination; 
                and
                    (C) a schedule for initiating a formal process 
                described in paragraph (1) for each transfer not yet 
                addressed by such formal process and an explanation for 
                the failure to commence such formal process with 
                respect to such transfer before the date of the report.
            (2) Form.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified 
        form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 310. ANNUAL REPORTS ON ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.

    (a) Entities Owned by PLA.--Not later than January 31 each year, 
the Secretary of State shall publish in the Federal Register a list of 
each corporation or other business entity that was owned in whole or in 
part by the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China 
as of December 31 of the preceding year.
    (b) Report on PRC Military Modernization.--
            (1) Requirement.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than March 31 each year, 
                the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
                Secretary of State, shall submit to Congress a report 
                on the military modernization activities of the 
                People's Liberation Army.
                    (B) Submittal.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
                submit each report to the following:
                            (i) The Majority leader and Minority leader 
                        of the Senate.
                            (ii) The chairmen and ranking members of 
                        the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                        Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
                            (iii) The Speaker and Minority leader of 
                        the House of Representatives.
                            (iv) The chairmen and ranking members of 
                        the Committee on International Relations and 
                        the Committee on National Security of the House 
                        of Representatives.
                    (C) Form.--The report shall be submitted in 
                unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
            (2) Contents of report.--
                    (A) Contents.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
                shall include the following:
                            (i) A description of developments within 
                        the People's Liberation Army, including the 
                        implications of the developments for United 
                        States policy toward the People's Republic of 
                        China.
                            (ii) A description of the scope and pace of 
                        modernization by the People's Liberation Army.
                            (iii) To the maximum extent practicable, an 
                        analysis of the intent of such modernization 
                        programs.
                    (B) Relationship to annual human rights report.--
                The report shall complement and not replace applicable 
                sections of the annual report on human rights in China 
                by the Department of State.
    (c) Protection of Sources and Methods.--In publishing a list under 
subsection (a) and preparing a report under subsection (b), the 
Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate actions to ensure the 
protection of sources and methods of gathering intelligence.

SEC. 311. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Reports.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than March 31 each year, the 
        Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation, jointly and in consultation 
        with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies (including 
        the Departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and State), 
        shall submit to the Members of Congress referred to in 
        paragraph (2) a report on the intelligence activities of the 
        People's Republic of China directed against or affecting the 
        interests of the United States.
            (2) Submittal.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted to the following:
                    (A) The Majority leader and Minority leader of the 
                Senate.
                    (B) The chairman and ranking member of the Select 
                Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
                    (C) The Speaker and Minority leader of the House of 
                Representatives.
                    (D) The chairman and ranking member of the 
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (3) Form.--Each report shall be submitted in unclassified 
        form, but may include a classified annex.
    (b) Contents of Reports.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
include information concerning the following:
            (1) Political and military espionage.
            (2) Intelligence activities designed to gain political 
        influence, including activities undertaken or coordinated by 
        the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist 
        Party.
            (3) Efforts to gain direct or indirect influence through 
        commercial or noncommercial intermediaries subject to control 
        by the People's Republic of China, including enterprises 
        controlled by the People's Liberation Army.
            (4) Disinformation and press manipulation by the People's 
        Republic of China with respect to the United States, including 
        activities undertaken or coordinated by the United Front Work 
        Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

SEC. 312. STUDY OF THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM FOR TAIWAN.

    (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out, with 
appropriate representatives of the Government of Taiwan, a study of the 
architecture requirements for the establishment and operation of a 
theater ballistic missile defense system for Taiwan, including the 
Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu. The study shall include the 
following:
            (1) An assessment of missile threats to Taiwan.
            (2) Identification of the requirements of Taiwan for 
        deployment of an effective theater ballistic missile defense 
        system.
            (3) Identification of existing theater ballistic missile 
        defense systems or existing technology for such systems, that 
        the United States could sell to Taiwan to assist in meeting the 
        requirements identified under paragraph (2).
            (4) Systems or technologies the United States is developing 
        that could address the missile threats to Taiwan's security.
            (5) Identification of potential joint cooperative efforts 
        by the United States and Taiwan to develop theater ballistic 
        missile defense systems.
    (b) Submittal to Congress.--
            (1) Submittal.--Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary 
        of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services and 
        the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee 
        on National Security and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        House of Representatives a report on the study conducted under 
        subsection (a).
            (2) Form.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified 
        form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 313. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES FORCE LEVELS IN 
              ASIA.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the current force levels in the Pacific Command Theater 
        of Operations are necessary to the fulfillment of the military 
        mission of that command and are vital to continued peace and 
        stability in the region covered by that command;
            (2) any reductions in such force levels should only be done 
        in close consultation with Congress and with a clear 
        understanding of their impact upon the capacity of the United 
        States to fulfill its current treaty obligations with other 
        states in the region as well as to the continued ability of the 
        United States to deter potential aggression in the region; and
            (3) the annual report on the national security strategy of 
        the United States required by section 108 of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a) should include specific 
        information on the adequacy of the capabilities of the United 
        States Armed Forces to support the implementation of the 
        national security strategy of the United States as it relates 
        to the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION ON 
              SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN ASIA.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President and the Secretary of 
State should initiate negotiations with the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the governments of other countries in Asia to 
establish a commission on matters relating to security and cooperation 
in Asia that would be modeled after the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.

                            TITLE IV--TRADE

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE ACCESSION OF TAIWAN TO THE 
              WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.

    It is the sense of Congress that Taiwan should be admitted to the 
World Trade Organization as a separate customs territory when Taiwan 
meets the established criteria of the Organization for membership on 
that basis.

         TITLE V--HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WORLDWIDE

SEC. 501. TRAINING FOR IMMIGRATION OFFICERS REGARDING RELIGIOUS 
              PERSECUTION.

    Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(e) Training on Religious Persecution.--The Attorney General 
shall establish and operate a program to provide to immigration 
officers performing functions under subsection (b), or section 207 or 
208, training on religious persecution, including training on--
            ``(1) the fundamental components of the right to freedom of 
        religion;
            ``(2) the variation in beliefs of religious groups; and
            ``(3) the governmental and nongovernmental methods used in 
        violation of the right to freedom of religion.''.

SEC. 502. PROMOTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORLDWIDE.

    (a) Reports on Religious Persecution.--
            (1) Reports.--Not later than March 30, 1998, and annually 
        thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 
        on International Relations of the House of Representatives a 
        report on religious persecution worldwide.
            (2) Contents.--Each report shall include a list of the 
        government officials of any country worldwide who have been 
        materially involved in the commission of acts of persecution 
        that are motivated by a person's religion.
    (b) Prisoner Information Registry.--
            (1) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish 
        and maintain a registry to be known as the Prisoner Information 
        Registry.
            (2) Contents.--The registry shall be a repository of 
        information on matters relating to the penal systems of the 
        various countries and of individuals in such systems, 
        including--
                    (A) the charges brought against the individuals in 
                such systems;
                    (B) the judicial or administrative processes to 
                which such individuals were subject;
                    (C) the length of imprisonment of such individuals 
                in such systems;
                    (D) the use (if any) of forced labor in such 
                systems;
                    (E) the incidences (if any) of torture in such 
                systems;
                    (F) the physical and health conditions in such 
                systems; and
                    (G) such other matters as the Secretary considers 
                appropriate.
            (3) Allocation of resources.--The Secretary may make funds 
        available to non-governmental organizations currently engaged 
        in monitoring penal systems worldwide or individuals in such 
        systems in order to assist in the establishment and maintenance 
        of the registry.

                        TITLE VI--OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 601. TERMINATION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE FOR EAST-WEST CENTER.

    (a) Repeal of Authorization of Assistance.--The Center for Cultural 
and Technical Interchange Between East and West Act of 1960 (chapter 
VII of Public Law 86-472; 22 U.S.C. 2054 et seq.) is repealed.
    (b) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Center.--Notwithstanding any 
other law, no funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the 
Director of the United States Information Agency for any fiscal year 
after fiscal year 1997 may be used for any purposes (including grants 
and payments and expenses of operation) relating to the Center for 
Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West.
                                 <all>
```