1994 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-21-1994

Jones v. Holvey

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 94-5011

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Recommended Citation

"Jones v. Holvey" (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 88.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/88
1 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

No. 94-5011 

 

KEITH JONES, 

 Appellant

v. 

ROLAND HOLVEY, I.A.; WILLIAM H. FAUVER, COMMISSIONER; 

EUGENE O'NEIL, CHIEF H.O.; VERNON JOHNSON, ASST. SUPT.; 

GARY SHEPPARD, H.O.; LT. BENNETT 

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

(D.C. Civil No. 93-cv-04258) 

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

May 31, 1994 

Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge

COWEN and LEWIS, Circuit Judges

 

 (Filed July 21, 1994) 

Keith Jones 

Trenton, NJ 08625 

 Appellant Pro Se 

Deborah T. Poritz 

 Attorney General of New Jersey 

Mary C. Jacobson 

 Assistant Attorney General - Of Counsel 

James I. O'Hern 

 Deputy Attorney General - On the Brief 

Trenton, NJ 98625 

 Attorney for Appellees 
2 

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 

 Appellant Keith Jones, who is currently incarcerated at 

New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, filed this complaint in the 

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for 

violation of his constitutional rights. Jones named as 

defendants six employees of the New Jersey Department of 

Corrections. The gravamen of Jones's claim is that his right to 

due process was denied in connection with a prison disciplinary 

charge for which he was originally adjudged guilty and served 

time in detention before it was reversed. 

 I. 

Facts and Procedural History

 The disciplinary charge was based on the following 

facts: On August 20, 1991, Senior Corrections Officer Marren of 

the New Jersey State Prison in Trenton found a letter that stated 

that "Twin, Malik and myself is [sic] waiting on those things 

(fiber Joints (shank) . . ." App. at 40. Prison officials 

determined that "Twin" referred to appellant Jones. Based on 

this letter, Jones was charged with attempting to possess a 

weapon. On August 21, 1991, Jones was removed from the 

mainstream prison population and placed in what the district 

court referred to as the "hole" pending a hearing. 

 On August 28, 1991, defendant Gary Sheppard, a hearing 

officer, conducted an administrative hearing in which this letter 

and a confidential report constituted the evidence against Jones, 
3 

and at which Jones was found guilty of attempting to possess 

weapons. As a result of the administrative ruling, Jones was 

placed in detention for fifteen days, and it was recommended that 

he lose 180 days commutation credits and that he be subjected to 

180 days of administrative segregation. Jones appealed this 

decision through administrative channels. On September 9, 1991, 

defendant Vernon Johnson, the Assistant Superintendent, upheld 

the decision of Hearing Officer Sheppard. Jones sought 

reconsideration of this decision, which was denied by 

Superintendent Howard Beyer on September 16, 1991. 

 Jones then appealed to the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Appellate Division. In an opinion dated July 14, 1993, 

that court reversed the decision of the prison officials and 

vacated the sanctions imposed on Jones, finding that the decision 

was not based on substantial evidence. The Appellate Division 

court found the confidential report to lack probative value and 

characterized the evidence against Jones "as superficial at 

best." Jones v. Department of Corrections, No. A-3121-91T5 (N.J. 

Super. Ct. App. Div. July 14, 1993) (per curiam) at 2, reprinted 

in App. at 41. 

 Jones then filed this action in federal court. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on two grounds. First they 

argued that Jones's complaint was barred by the statute of 

limitations, using as the filing date the official filing which 

followed the court's evaluation of Jones's in forma pauperis

application, rather than the date on which the complaint was 
4 

received. Second, the defendants interposed a res judicata 

defense. 

 The district court rejected defendants' argument that 

the suit was time barred, finding that the relevant date for 

statute of limitations purposes was the date of receipt of 

Jones's complaint. However, the district court granted 

defendants' motion for summary judgment, agreeing that Jones's 

action was barred by application of the doctrine of res judicata 

and New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine. The court reasoned 

that the judgment in the New Jersey state case was final, had 

been adjudicated on the merits, and involved the same parties and 

the same occurrence or transaction. As a result, Jones was 

barred from raising any claims which he could have raised in the 

first action. The court determined that Jones could have raised 

the section 1983 claim asserted here in the New Jersey state 

court proceeding, and thus found this action to be barred. 

 Jones filed a timely pro se appeal to this court. 

II. 

Discussion1

 Federal courts must apply the doctrine of res judicata 

to civil actions brought under section 1983 and in this context 

"must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect 

as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in 

which the judgment was rendered." Migra v. Warren City School 

 

1Defendants do not raise the statute of limitations issue on 

appeal, and thus we confine ourselves to the res judicata/entire 

controversy issue. 
5 

Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). The principles of res 

judicata are reinforced in New Jersey by the entire controversy 

doctrine which "requires that all issues of a single dispute 

between the parties must be completely determined in one action." 

Culver v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 559 A.2d 400, 406 (N.J. 1989). 

 Under New Jersey law, res judicata or claim preclusion 

applies when (1) the judgment in the first action is valid, final 

and on the merits; (2) there is identity of the parties, or the 

parties in the second action are in privity with those in the 

first action; and (3) the claim in the later action grows out of 

the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the first 

action. See Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 

A.2d 592, 599 (N.J. 1991); Culver, 559 A.2d at 405-06. 

 It is evident that the first condition for application 

of res judicata has been met in that the Appellate Division 

decision was final, valid and on the merits. In addition, it 

appears that the employees of the Department of Corrections, who 

are the defendants in this action, may be considered to be the 

same or in privity with the Department of Corrections, which was 

the defendant in the first action, and may claim the benefit of 

res judicata if it would apply to the Department itself. See 

Rodziewicz v. Beyer, 809 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (D.N.J. 1992) 

(employees of Department of Corrections held to be in identity 

with the Department for claim preclusion under New Jersey law). 

Moreover, the entire controversy doctrine is applicable not only 

to related claims but also to related parties. See Cogdell v. 

Hospital Ctr. at Orange, 560 A.2d 1169, 1178 (N.J. 1989). 
6 

 Nonetheless, we do not decide whether the second prong of res 

judicata has been met in this case, nor do we decide whether the 

third prong, which requires that the claim in the second action 

grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in 

the state court action, applies here. The New Jersey Supreme 

Court has directed courts to consider: 

(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for 

relief are the same (that is, whether the wrong for 

which redress is sought is the same in both actions); 

(2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) 

whether the witnesses and documents necessary at trial 

are the same (that is, whether the same evidence 

necessary to maintain the second action would support 

the first); and (4) whether the material facts alleged 

are the same. 

Culver, 559 A.2d at 406 (citations omitted) (quoting United 

States v. Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)). The 

district court applied the criteria set forth in Culver and 

concluded that Jones's federal action involved the same 

transaction or occurrence as at issue in the earlier New Jersey 

Superior Court action. 

 We believe that a persuasive argument can be made that 

neither the acts complained of nor the demand for relief in the 

two actions are the same. In the first action, Jones challenged 

the administrative determination of his guilt on the attempted 

possession of weapons charge; thus the acts at issue in that case 

were those of Jones. By contrast, in the federal action, Jones 

challenges the conduct of the Department of Corrections' 

officials in proceeding with the disciplinary hearing and 

sanctions "knowing they had no just cause." App. at 7. Although 

the district court was correct that whether plaintiff's right to 
7 

due process was violated will be implicated in both cases, there 

are differences, albeit subtle, between the two actions. Because 

we believe another issue is dispositive, for our purposes we will 

assume that the district court did not err in finding the 

similarity requisite for application of res judicata. 

 Instead, we part with the district court in its 

determination that the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate 

Division would have heard Jones's section 1983 claim as part of 

its review over the prison disciplinary action, had Jones 

presented it at that time. 

 It is unquestioned that state courts have concurrent 

jurisdiction with federal courts to hear section 1983 claims. See 

Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980). However, under the 

entire controversy doctrine, a party will not be barred from 

raising claims that he could not have brought in the initial 

action. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated, if 

the court in the first action would clearly not have 

had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or 

ground (or, having jurisdiction, would clearly have 

declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion), 

then a second action in a competent court presenting 

the omitted theory or ground should not be held 

precluded. 

Watkins, 591 A.2d at 599 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 

Judgments § 25 cmt. e (1982)); see also Culver, 559 A.2d at 406. 

Thus, to invoke the principles of res judicata, the first court 

must not only have had jurisdiction to hear the claim now sought 

to be precluded, but there must also be some likelihood that it 

would have exercised that jurisdiction to hear that claim. 
8 

 Under New Jersey Rules of Appellate Practice 2:2-3(2), 

the Appellate Division of the Superior Court has jurisdiction 

over appeals from administrative agencies. New Jersey Rule of 

Appellate Practice 2:10-5 provides that "[t]he appellate court 

may exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the 

complete determination of any matter on review." This Rule was 

relied upon by the district court in its decision that New Jersey 

law would not have barred Jones from raising his section 1983 

claim at the time he appealed the administrative action to the 

Appellate Division. 

 The New Jersey courts have suggested that under this 

Rule the appellate courts have jurisdiction to make factual 

findings that ordinarily would be remanded to the trial courts 

when this is necessary to the complete determination of disputes 

before them. See, e.g., State v. Jarbath, 555 A.2d 559, 567 

(N.J. 1989) ("[W]hen an appellate court finds a clear abuse of 

discretion, it has the power to make new fact-findings. The 

power to review evidence and reach independent determinations of 

the facts encompasses the power to call for additional evidence 

to supplement the record") (citations omitted)); State v. 

Rodriguez, 357 A.2d 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (per 

curiam) (Appellate Division exercised original jurisdiction to 

determine whether there had been manifest denial of justice under 

the law, an issue not decided by the Superior Court, but 

necessary to completely determine the matter); State v. Odom, 273 

A.2d 379 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (per curiam) (Appellate 

Division could make findings of fact justifying denial of post-
9 

conviction relief where trial court had failed to do so rather 

than remand). 

 The leading case applying this Rule in the context of 

an appeal of an administrative decision is Pascucci v. Vagott, 

362 A.2d 566 (N.J. 1976), where the Supreme Court of New Jersey 

construed Rules of Appellate Practice 2:2-3(2) and 2:10-5 

together as permitting appellate courts in actions arising under 

administrative review to exercise original jurisdiction as to 

related matters necessary to the complete resolution of a matter 

properly before an appellate court. In that case, the Court 

determined that the Appellate Division, in reviewing a challenge 

to a regulation of the Department of Public Welfare which varied 

the amount of public assistance paid to employable versus 

unemployable persons, could exercise original jurisdiction to 

completely resolve the questions raised and decide the claim of 

one of the appellants who had argued that the local welfare 

director's discretionary authority exceeded that provided by 

statute, a claim that ordinarily would be brought in Juvenile and 

Domestic Relations Court. See id. at 572-73. The Pascucci court 

determined that because the Appellate Division had jurisdiction 

over the administrative proceedings, and because under Rule 2:10-

5 it could "exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary 

to the complete determination of any matter on review," the 

Appellate Division could also hear the challenge that would 

otherwise be heard in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. See

id.
10 

 It does not follow from Pascucci that a New Jersey 

appellate court would exercise its power of original 

jurisdiction--ordinarily reserved for situations in which 

judicial efficiency dictates that the appellate court not remand 

a case--to resolve claims best heard by a trial court. The 

majority of New Jersey cases applying Rule 2:10-5 represent 

instances in which appellate courts, despite the absence of trial 

court findings, had an adequate factual basis in the record to 

resolve questions that were essential to the determination of the 

issues before them. See, e.g., In re S.H., 293 A.2d 181, 185 

(N.J. 1972) (Supreme Court reviewed undisputed evidence of record 

only, finding that it established that juvenile had committed the 

act with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt); Bruder 

v. Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 142 A.2d 225, 229 (N.J. 

1958) (where dispute involved exclusively legal questions 

appellate court would invoke power of original jurisdiction based 

on undisputed evidence presented to judge who incorrectly 

dismissed case for lack of jurisdiction); African Council v. 

Hadge, 604 A.2d 604, 609 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("Given 

. . . the completeness of the record, the interest of justice 

dictates that we exercise original jurisdiction pursuant to R. 

2:10-5 in fixing a counsel fee allowance."); Marion v. Manasquan, 

555 A.2d 699, 704 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) ("Although 

this specific question was not presented to the trial judge, we 

raise it now sua sponte since its resolution is necessary for a 

complete determination of the matter under review and the facts 

to resolve it are present in the record." (emphasis added)); 
11 

Young v. Savinon, 492 A.2d 385 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) 

(based on factual testimony and expert opinion presented at 

trial, Appellate Division found it unreasonable to enforce a 

particular provision in tenants' lease); Ferrari v. Melleby, 342 

A.2d 537, 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) ("We have 

carefully reviewed the record and are satisfied that appellant's 

charges are essentially true as outlined previously, and that in 

substance they are not denied by respondents."); but cf. State v. 

Jarbath, 555 A.2d 559, 568 (N.J. 1989) (affirming appellate 

court's decision to call for additional documentary evidence, 

including autopsy report, to supplement the record in limited 

context of criminal sentencing). 

 Although an appellate court reviewing administrative 

decisions may invoke Rule 2:10-5, the scope of appellate review 

of agency decisions is generally narrow. See, e.g., T.R. v. New 

Jersey Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 592 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J. 

Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (appellate court must not substitute 

own judgment for that of agency). 

 Based on our review of New Jersey cases, we predict 

that a New Jersey appellate court faced with Jones's section 1983 

claim at the time that it was evaluating his appeal of the 

administrative sanctions imposed on him would not exercise 

original jurisdiction under Rule 2:10-5. 

 Our prediction that the New Jersey Appellate Division 

court would not have exercised jurisdiction over Jones's section 

1983 claim is based in part on the sparsity of his complaint. He 

states only that the named defendants denied him due process 
12 

rights by instigating administrative proceedings against him 

knowing that they lacked the requisite just cause. Analysis of 

this claim would have required evidence not of record at the time 

of the appeal of the administrative ruling. Because res judicata 

does not apply where a court "having jurisdiction, would clearly 

have declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion," Watkins, 

591 A.2d at 599 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25 

cmt. e), and we conclude this is such a case, we cannot sustain 

the district court's dismissal of Jones's complaint on that 

ground. Of course, we intimate no view as to whether there is 

any other facial defect in the pleading, as that issue was not 

considered by the district court. 

III. 

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment 

dismissing Jones's complaint and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. Each party to bear its own costs.