```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1083 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1083

    To provide structure for and introduce balance into a policy of 
       meaningful engagement with the People's Republic of China.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 29, 1997

Mr. Mack (for himself, Mr. Hutchinson, and Mr. Ashcroft) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                           Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To provide structure for and introduce balance into a policy of 
       meaningful engagement with the People's Republic of China.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States-People's Republic of 
China National Security and Freedom Protection Act of 1997''.

SEC. 2. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

    The policy of Congress with respect to the People's Republic of 
China is as follows:
            (1) To encourage the liberalization of the Government of 
        the PRC, responsible behavior by the PRC, and integration of 
        the PRC into the community of nations.
            (2) To support a strong presence, and commitment to 
        leadership and involvement in the Asian Pacific region, to 
        support integration of the PRC both regionally and globally, 
        and to share a stake in the future of China with the people of 
        the People's Republic of China, the region, and the world.
            (3) To encourage friendship between the United States and 
        the People's Republic of China, while protecting national 
        interests and acting on national values.
            (4) To recognize the PRC does not today, and will not for 
        the foreseeable future, pose a direct military threat to the 
        United States. To recognize that the PRC is not an enemy of the 
        United States and should not be made out as such.
            (5) To develop a policy toward the PRC that contains 
        resolute and straight-forward toughness, and to not paper over 
        issues which make the PRC feel uncomfortable, but to not allow 
        the issues to dominate the United States relationship with the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (6) To seek to overcome differences with the PRC, to act 
        honestly and directly, and to provide the American people with 
        a foreign policy that is honest and direct.
            (7) To implement a policy that is one of ``meaningful 
        engagement'' which includes the mechanisms set forth in this 
        Act.

SEC. 3. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
Sec. 3. Table of contents.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
                       TITLE I--NATIONAL SECURITY

Sec. 101. Congressional findings.
Sec. 102. Prohibition of PLA commercial activities in the United 
                            States.
Sec. 103. Reporting requirements.
Sec. 104. Taiwan relations.
Sec. 105. Missile nonproliferation enforcement.
                         TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS

Sec. 201. Congressional findings.
Sec. 202. International broadcasting.
Sec. 203. Freedom from religious persecution.
Sec. 204. Forced abortion.
Sec. 205. Combating slave labor and ``reeducation'' centers.
Sec. 206. Political freedom in China.
                            TITLE III--TRADE

Sec. 301. Findings.
Sec. 302. Statement of policy regarding People's Republic of China 
                            accession.
Sec. 303. Taiwan's accession to the World Trade Organization.
                       TITLE IV--REVIEW OF POLICY

Sec. 401. Review of policy.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) People's liberation army; pla.--For purposes of this 
        Act, the terms ``People's Liberation Army'', and ``PLA'' mean 
        any branch or division of the land, naval, or air military 
        service or the police of the Communist Government of the 
        People's Republic of China and any member of any such service 
        or such police.
            (2) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of 
        China.
            (3) Communist chinese military company.--The term 
        ``Communist Chinese military company'' has the meaning given 
        that term in section 102(b)(1)(B) of this Act.

                       TITLE I--NATIONAL SECURITY

SEC. 101. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.

    (a) Findings on the United States National Security Threat From the 
PLA.--Congress makes the following findings with respect to the 
national security threat from the PLA:
            (1) The People's Liberation Army poses no direct military 
        threat to the United States of America and will not have the 
        capability to do so for the foreseeable future, however, the 
        PLA's practice of weapons proliferation poses a clear and 
        present danger to the global interests of the United States.
            (2) Through the sale of weapons and weapons technology 
        sponsors of terrorism such as Iran, the PRC, and PLA threaten 
        United States security.
            (3) The PLA is an instrument of oppression within the 
        People's Republic of China which the United States finds 
        offensive and unacceptable.
            (4) The People's Liberation Army is engaged in a military 
        buildup, for undisclosed purposes, which since 1992 has 
        involved a doubling of military spending by the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (5) The People's Liberation Army is engaging in a major 
        ballistic missile modernization program which could undermine 
        peace and stability in East Asia, including 2 new 
        intercontinental missile programs, 1 submarine-launched missile 
        program, a new class of compact, long-range cruise missiles, 
        and an upgrading of medium- and short-range ballistic missiles.
            (6) The People's Liberation Army is working to co-produce 
        the SU-27 fighter with Russia, and is in the process of 
        purchasing several substantial weapons systems from Russia, 
        including the 633 model of the Kilo-class submarine and the SS-
        N-22 Sunburn missile system specifically designed to 
        incapacitate United States aircraft carriers and Aegis 
        cruisers.
            (7) The People's Liberation Army has carried out acts of 
        aggression in the South China Sea, including the February 1995 
        seizure of the Mischief Reef in the Spratley Islands, and the 
        July 1995 and March 1996 missile tests near Taiwan. These 
        actions cause concern over China's future intentions and 
        threaten regional stability.
            (8) In March 1996, the People's Republic of China 
        effectively demonstrated the capacity to blockade both the 
        international shipping lanes of the Taiwan Strait and the 
        airspace over Taiwan by means of repeated launches of M-9 
        ballistic missiles in the South China Sea. This was a 
        deliberate attempt to intimidate the people of Taiwan.
            (9) The effective blockade of Taiwan's two largest ports, 
        Keelung and Kaohsiung, and Taiwan's airspace interfered with 
        United States commercial shipping and aviation and impinged 
        upon the national security interests of the United States, 
        requiring the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to 
        the South China Sea.
            (10) The People's Liberation Army has contributed to the 
        proliferation of technologies relevant to the refinement of 
        weapons-grade nuclear material, including transferring ring 
        magnets to Pakistan.
            (11) The People's Liberation Army and associated defense 
        companies have provided ballistic missile components, cruise 
        missiles, and chemical weapons ingredients to Iran, a country 
        that the executive branch has repeatedly reported to Congress 
        as among the greatest sponsors of terrorism in the world.
            (12) In May 1996, United States authorities caught 
        representatives of the People's Liberation Army enterprise, 
        Poly Technologies, and the civilian defense industrial company, 
        Norinco, attempting to smuggle 2,000 AK-47s into Oakland, 
        California, and offering to sell to Federal undercover agents 
        300,000 machine guns with silencers, 66-millimeter mortars, 
        hand grenades, and ``Red Parakeet'' surface-to-air missiles, 
        which, as stated in the criminal complaint against one of those 
        representatives, ``. . . could take out a 747'' aircraft.
            (13) The China National Precision Machinery Import-Export 
        Corporation is marketing the C-802 model cruise missile which 
        poses a clear and present danger to the United States Fifth 
        Fleet in the Persian Gulf. The United States escort vessel 
        U.S.S. Stark was struck by a cruise missile in the Persian 
        Gulf, causing the death of 37 United States sailors.
            (14) The China National Precision Machinery Import-Export 
        Corporation delivered 60 C-802 cruise missiles to Iran for use 
        by vessels of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy.
            (15) Iran is constructing sites and equipment to launch C-
        802 cruise missiles which will provide its armed forces with a 
        weapon of greater range, reliability, accuracy, and mobility 
        than before.
            (16) Fifteen thousand members of the United States Armed 
        Forces are stationed within the range of the C-802 cruise 
        missiles acquired by Iran.
            (17) Although the Department of State believes that 
        ``[t]hese cruise missiles pose new, direct threats to deployed 
        United States forces,'' the President has concluded that the 
        known types of C-802 cruise missiles are not of a 
        ``destabilizing number and type''.
            (18) The delivery of cruise missiles to Iran by the PRC is 
        a violation of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 
        (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
    (b) Findings on the United States National Security Interest in 
Taiwan.--Congress makes the following findings with respect to the 
national security interests in Taiwan:
            (1) The security of Taiwan is vital to the peace and 
        stability in East Asia and is a vital national security 
        interest of the United States.
            (2) The People's Republic of China's current missile 
        modernization program could threaten Taiwan, thereby 
        destabilizing East Asia.
            (3) Taiwan has requested further United States cooperation 
        on missile defense, including the conduct of a joint 
        architecture study of the requirements for the establishment 
        and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system for 
        Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu.
            (4) Establishment of an effective missile defense for 
        Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu, is a 
        direct and appropriate response to the threat posed by 
        increased development and aggressive use of ballistic missiles 
        by the People's Republic of China. Deployment of such a system 
        could deter attempts at intimidation in the future and would 
        thereby reduce the potential need for United States 
        intervention.
    (c) Findings on the Commercial Subsidization of the PLA.--Congress 
makes the following findings with respect to the PRC's subsidization of 
the PLA's commercial activities:
            (1) The estimated $2,000,000,000 to $3,000,000,000 in 
        annual earnings of PLA's commercial enterprises subsidize the 
        military expansion and activities of the People's Liberation 
        Army.
            (2) The aggregate value of outstanding Chinese securities 
        currently held by Chinese nationals and foreign persons is 
        $175,000,000,000, and from 1993 through 1995 foreign persons 
        invested $10,540,000,000 in Chinese stocks.
            (3) Entities controlled by the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China have issued 75 bonds since 1988, including 36 
        dollar-denominated bond offerings valued at more than 
        $6,700,000,000. The total value of long-term Chinese bonds 
        outstanding as of January 1, 1996, was $11,709,000,000.
            (4) The People's Republic of China received almost 
        $1,000,000,000 in foreign aid grants and an additional 
        $1,566,000,000 in technical assistance grants from 1993 through 
        1995. In 1995, the PRC received $5,540,000,000 in bilateral 
        assistance loans, including concessional aid, export credits, 
        and related assistance.
            (5) The bonds and stocks underwritten and sold on the 
        United States securities market by the People's Liberation Army 
        are used to subsidize the operations and modernization 
        activities of the People's Liberation Army.

SEC. 102. PROHIBITION OF PLA COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED 
              STATES.

    (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
commercial activities in the United States of the People's Liberation 
Army or any other Communist Chinese military company are prohibited.
    (b) Prohibition.--
            (1) Determination of communist chinese military 
        companies.--
                    (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraphs (B) and 
                (C), not later than 90 days after the date of enactment 
                of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation 
                with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney 
                General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the 
                Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall 
                compile a list of persons who are Communist Chinese 
                military and who are operating directly or indirectly 
                in the United States, its territories and possessions, 
                and shall publish the list of such persons in the 
                Federal Register. On an ongoing basis, the Secretary of 
                Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
                Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation, shall make additions or deletions to the 
                list based on the latest information available.
                    (B) Communist chinese military company.--For 
                purposes of making the determination required by 
                subparagraph (A), the term ``Communist Chinese military 
                company'' means a person that is--
                            (i) engaged in providing commercial 
                        services, manufacturing, producing, or 
                        exporting, and
                            (ii) provides financial subsidies derived 
                        from the commercial activities described in 
                        clause (i) to the People's Liberation Army.
                The term includes any person identified in the United 
                States Defense Intelligence Agency publication numbered 
                VP-1920-271-90, dated September 1990, or PC-1921-57-95, 
                dated October 1995, or any update of such reports.
            (2) Authority to ban commercial activities of pla and 
        military companies.--
                    (A) Ban on commercial activity.--
                            (i) In general.--Notwithstanding the 
                        provisions of section 202 of the International 
                        Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701), 
                        the President shall have the authority provided 
                        for in section 203 of such Act with respect to 
                        commercial activity of the PLA or of any 
                        Communist Chinese military company in the 
                        United States.
                            (ii) Penalties.--The penalties provided in 
                        section 206 of such Act shall apply to 
                        violations of any license, order, or regulation 
                        issued pursuant to the authority of clause (i).
                    (B) Ban on imports.--Notwithstanding any other 
                provision of law, the President shall prohibit the 
                importation of any product that is produced, 
                manufactured, or grown by the PLA or by a Communist 
                Chinese military company.
                    (C) Ban on certain securities transactions.--
                Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
                President shall prohibit the sale of any debt on the 
                United States bond market which benefits the PLA or a 
                Communist Chinese military company.

SEC. 103. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) Report on Intelligence Activities of the People's Republic of 
China.--
            (1) Report to congress.--The Director of Central 
        Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, jointly, in consultation with the heads of other 
        appropriate Federal agencies, including the National Security 
        Agency, and the Departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and 
        State, shall prepare and transmit to Congress a report on 
        intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China 
        directed against or affecting the interests of the United 
        States.
            (2) Contents of report.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
        shall include information concerning the following:
                    (A) political, military, and economic espionage;
                    (B) intelligence activities designed to gain 
                political influence, including activities undertaken or 
                coordinated by the United Front Work Department of the 
                Chinese Communist Party;
                    (C) efforts to gain direct or indirect influence 
                through commercial or noncommercial intermediaries 
                subject to control by the People's Republic of China, 
                including enterprises controlled by the People's 
                Liberation Army; and
                    (D) disinformation and press manipulation by the 
                People's Republic of China with respect to the United 
                States, including activities undertaken or coordinated 
                by the United Front Work Department of the Chinese 
                Communist Party.
            (3) Submission of report.--Not later than March 31 of each 
        year, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of 
        the Federal Bureau of Investigation, jointly, shall submit to 
        the Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
        Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the 
        Senate, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and 
        the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate, classified and unclassified 
        versions of the report described in paragraph (1).
    (b) Report on PRC Military Modernization.--
            (1) Report to congress.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
        prepare and transmit to Congress a report on the military 
        modernization of the People's Liberation Army.
            (2) Contents of report.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
        shall include developments within the People's Liberation Army 
        and the implications of the developments for United States 
        policy toward the People's Republic of China. Information 
        should describe the scope and pace of PLA modernization. The 
        report shall also analyze, to the extent possible, the intent 
        of the modernization programs. The report should complement and 
        not replace applicable sections of the State Department's 
        annual report on human rights in China.
            (3) Submission of report.--Not later than March 31 of each 
        year, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
        Secretary of State, shall submit to the Speaker and minority 
        leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and 
        minority leaders of the Senate, the Chairman and Ranking Member 
        of the International Relations and National Security Committees 
        of the House of Representatives, and the Chairman and Ranking 
        Member of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees 
        of the Senate, classified and unclassified versions of the 
        report described in paragraph (1).
    (c) Report on PLA Commercial Activities.--
            (1) Report to congress.--The Secretary of the Defense shall 
        prepare and transmit to Congress a report on the commercial 
        activities of the People's Liberation Army and any other 
        Communist Chinese military company.
            (2) Contents of report.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the list of all persons identified pursuant to 
        section 102(b)(1) and the commercial activities in which each 
        such person is engaged in the United States.
            (3) Submission of report.--Not later than March 31 of each 
        year, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
        Secretary of the Treasury, Director of Central Intelligence and 
        the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall 
        submit to the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of 
        Representatives, the Majority and Minority Leaders of the 
        Senate, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and 
        the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate, the report described in paragraph 
        (1).
    (d) Publication in the Federal Register; Public Availability.--The 
unclassified version of each report required by this section shall be 
published in the Federal Register and shall be available to the public.

SEC. 104. TAIWAN RELATIONS.

    (a) Applicability of Taiwan Relations Act.--Section 3 of the Taiwan 
Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection:
    ``(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) supersede any 
provision of the Joint Communique of the United States and China of 
August 17, 1982.''.
    (b) Taiwan Missile Defense.--
            (1) Joint study relating to establishment and operation of 
        a theater ballistic missile defense system for taiwan.--
                    (A) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry 
                out, with appropriate representatives of the Government 
                of Taiwan, a joint study of the architecture 
                requirements for the establishment and operation of a 
                theater ballistic missile defense system for Taiwan, 
                including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu. The 
                study shall include the following:
                            (i) An assessment of missile threats to 
                        Taiwan.
                            (ii) Identification of the requirements of 
                        Taiwan for deployment of an effective theater 
                        ballistic missile defense system.
                            (iii) Identification of existing theater 
                        ballistic missile defense systems or existing 
                        technology for such systems, that the United 
                        States could sell to Taiwan to assist in 
                        meeting the requirements identified under 
                        clause (ii).
                            (iv) Systems or technologies the United 
                        States is developing that could address the 
                        missile threats to Taiwan's security.
                            (v) Identification of potential joint 
                        cooperative efforts by the United States and 
                        Taiwan to develop theater ballistic missile 
                        defense systems.
                    (B) Report.--Not later than July 1, 1998, the 
                Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on 
                National Security and the Committee on Appropriations 
                of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
                Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of 
                the Senate the study conducted under subparagraph (A).
                    (C) Form of study.--The study under subparagraph 
                (A) shall be submitted in both classified and 
                unclassified form.
            (2) Sale of theater ballistic missile defenses to taiwan.--
        It is the sense of Congress that the President, if requested by 
        the Government of Taiwan and in accordance with the results of 
        the study conducted under paragraph (1), should sell to the 
        Government of Taiwan appropriate defense articles, defense 
        services, or design and construction services for the purpose 
        of establishing, deploying, and operating a defensive theater 
        ballistic missile defense system for Taiwan, including the 
        Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu.
            (3) Statement of policy relating to east asian missile 
        defense cooperation.--Congress declares that it is in the 
        national interest of the United States that Taiwan be included 
        in any effort at ballistic missile defense cooperation, 
        networking, or interoperability among East Asian nations.

SEC. 105. MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION ENFORCEMENT.

    Congress--
            (1) finds that the delivery of cruise missiles to Iran is 
        of a destabilizing number and type and, therefore, is a 
        violation of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 
        (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); and
            (2) urges the President to enforce the Iran-Iraq Arms 
        Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) with respect 
        to the acquisition by Iran of C-802 model cruise missiles.

                         TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS

SEC. 201. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.

    (a) Findings on the Human Rights Report.--Congress makes the 
following findings with respect to the report on human rights:
            (1) Congress concurs in the following conclusions of the 
        Department of State regarding human rights in the People's 
        Republic of China in 1996:
                    (A) The People's Republic of China is ``an 
                authoritarian state'' in which ``citizens lack the 
                freedom to peacefully express opposition to the party-
                led political system and the right to change their 
                national leaders or form of government''.
                    (B) The Government of the People's Republic of 
                China has ``continued to commit widespread and well 
                documented human rights abuses, in violation of 
                internationally accepted norms, stemming from the 
                authorities' intolerance of dissent, fear of unrest, 
                and the absence or inadequacy of laws protecting basic 
                freedoms''.
                    (C) ``[a]buses include torture and mistreatment of 
                prisoners, forced confessions, and arbitrary and 
                incommunicado detention''.
                    (D) ``[p]rison conditions remained harsh [and] 
                [t]he Government continued severe restrictions on 
                freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, 
                religion, privacy, and worker rights''.
                    (E) ``[a]lthough the Government denies that it 
                holds political prisoners, the number of persons 
                detained or serving sentences for `counterrevolutionary 
                crimes' or `crimes against the state' and for peaceful 
                political or religious activities are believed to 
                number in the thousands'';
                    (F) ``[n]on-approved religious groups, including 
                Protestant and Catholic groups . . experienced 
                intensified repression''.
                    (G) ``[s]erious human rights abuses persist in 
                minority areas, including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner 
                Mongolia [, and] [c]ontrols on religion and other 
                fundamental freedoms in these areas have also 
                intensified''.
                    (H) ``[o]verall in 1996, the authorities stepped up 
                efforts to cut off expressions of protest or criticism. 
                All public dissent against the party and government was 
                effectively silenced by intimidation, exile, the 
                imposition of prison terms, administrative detention, 
                or house arrest. No dissidents were known to be active 
                at year's end.''.
            (2) In addition to the State Department, credible 
        independent human rights organizations have documented an 
        increase in repression in China during 1996, and effective 
        destruction of the dissident movement through the arrest and 
        sentencing of the few remaining pro-democracy and human rights 
        activists not already in prison or exile.
            (3) Among the activists sentenced were--
                    (A) Wang Dan, a student leader of the 1989 pro-
                democracy protests, sentenced on October 30, 1996, to 
                11 years in prison on charges of conspiring to subvert 
                the Government;
                    (B) Li Hai, sentenced to 9 years in prison on 
                December 18, 1996, for gathering information on the 
                victims of the 1989 crackdown, which according to the 
                court's verdict constituted ``state secrets''; and
                    (C) Liu Nianchun, an independent labor organizer, 
                sentenced to 3 years of ``reeducation through labor'' 
                on July 4, 1996, due to his activities in connection 
                with a petition campaign calling for human rights 
                reforms.
            (4) Many political prisoners are suffering from poor 
        conditions and ill treatment leading to serious medical and 
        health problems, including--
                    (A) Wei Jingsheng, sentenced to 14 years in prison 
                on December 13, 1996, for conspiring to subvert the 
                government and for ``communication with hostile foreign 
                organizations and individuals, amassing funds in 
                preparation for overthrowing the government and 
                publishing anti-government articles abroad,'' is 
                currently held in Jile No. 1 Prison (formerly the Nanpu 
                New Life Salt Farm) in Hebei province, where he 
                reportedly suffers from severe high blood pressure and 
                a heart condition, worsened by poor conditions of 
                confinement;
                    (B) Gao Yu, a journalist who has a heart condition 
                sentenced to 6 years in prison on November 1994 and 
honored by UNESCO in May 1997; and
                    (C) Chen Longde, a leading human rights advocate 
                now serving a 3-year reeducation through labor sentence 
                imposed without trial in August 1995, has reportedly 
                been subject to repeated beatings and electric shocks 
                at a labor camp for refusing to confess his guilt.
            (5) Currently there is only 1 official in the United States 
        Embassy in Beijing assigned to monitoring human rights in the 
        People's Republic of China. There are no officials assigned to 
        monitor human rights in United States consulates in the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (6) The People's Liberation Army is a principal instrument 
        of repression within the People's Republic of China, 
        responsible for occupying Tibet since 1950, massacring hundreds 
        of students and demonstrators for democracy in Tiananmen Square 
        on June 4, 1989, and running the Laogai (``reform through 
        labor'') slave labor camps.
    (b) Findings on Coercive Family Planning Practices of the PRC.--
Congress makes the following findings with respect to family planning 
practices:
            (1) For over 15 years there have been frequent and credible 
        reports of forced abortion and forced sterilization in 
        connection with the coercive population control of the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (2) Forced abortion was rightly denounced as a crime 
        against humanity by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.
            (3) Although it is the stated position of the politburo of 
        the Chinese Communist Party that forced abortion and forced 
        sterilization have no role in the population control program, 
        in fact the policy of the Communist Chinese Government seems to 
        encourage both forced abortion and forced sterilization through 
        a combination of strictly enforced birth quotas and impunity 
        for local population control officials who engage in coercion. 
        Officials acknowledge that there have been instances of forced 
        abortions and sterilization, yet there is no evidence that the 
        perpetrators have been punished.
            (4) The People's Republic of China population control 
        officials, in cooperation with employers and works unit 
        officials, monitor women's menstrual cycles and subject women 
        who conceive without government authorization to extreme 
        psychological pressure, to harsh economic sanctions, including 
        unpayable fines and loss of employment, and to physical force.
            (5) Official sanctions for giving birth to unauthorized 
        children include fines in amounts several times larger than the 
        per capita annual incomes of residents of the People's Republic 
        of China. In Fujian, for example, the average fine is estimated 
        to be twice a family's gross annual income. Families who cannot 
        pay the fine have had their homes and personal property 
        confiscated and destroyed.
            (6) Especially harsh punishments have been inflicted on 
        those whose resistance is motivated by religion. For example, 
        according to a 1995 Amnesty International report, the Catholic 
        inhabitants of 2 villages in Hebei Province were subjected to 
        population control under the slogan ``better to have more 
        graves than one more child''. Enforcement measures included 
        torture, sexual abuse, and the detention of resisters' 
        relatives as hostages.
            (7) Forced abortions in Communist China often take place in 
        the very late stages of pregnancy, or even during the process 
        of birth itself.
            (8) Since 1994 forced abortion and sterilization have been 
        used in Communist China not only to regulate the number of 
        children, but also to eliminate those who are regarded as 
        defective in accordance with the official eugenic policy known 
        as the ``Natal and Health Care Law''.
    (c) Findings on Religious Persecution in the PRC.--Congress makes 
the following findings with respect to religious persecution:
            (1) Despite public assurances by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China that it would abide by the 
        principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
        despite the United Nations Charter requirement that all members 
        promote respect for and observance of basic human rights, 
        including freedom of religion, the Chinese Government continues 
        to place severe restrictions on religious expression and 
        practice.
            (2) It has been reported that at an internal Central 
        Communist Party meeting in 1994, President Jiang Zemin asserted 
        that religion is one of the biggest threats to Communist Party 
        rule in China and Tibet.
            (3) On January 31, 1994, Premier Li Peng signed decrees 
        number 144 and 145 which restrict worship, religious education, 
        distribution of Bibles and other religious literature, and 
        contact with foreign coreligionists.
            (4) The Chinese Government has created official religious 
        organizations that control all religious worship, activity, and 
        association in China and Tibet and supplant the independent 
        authority of the Roman Catholic Church, independent Protestant 
        churches, and independent Buddhist, Taoist, and Islamic 
        associations.
            (5) In July 1995, Ye Xiaowen, a rigid communist hostile to 
        religion, was appointed to head the Bureau of Religious 
        Affairs, a Chinese Government agency controlled by the United 
        Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party. The 
        Bureau of Religious Affairs has administrative control over all 
        religious worship and activity in China and Tibet through a 
        system of granting or denying rights through an official 
        registration system. Those who fail to or are not allowed to 
        register are subject to punitive measures.
            (6) In the past year, the Chinese Government has expressed 
        great concern over the spread of Christianity and particularly 
        over the rapid growth of Christian religious institutions other 
        than those controlled by the Chinese Government, including the 
        Roman Catholic Church and the evangelical Christian ``house 
        churches''.
            (7) Hundreds of Chinese Protestants and Catholics are among 
        those now imprisoned, detained, or continuously harassed 
        because of their religious beliefs or activities.
            (8) The prisons and labor camps which hold these religious 
        prisoners are run by the Ministry of Public Security and the 
        Ministry of Justice of the Chinese Government.
            (9) Although some negotiations have taken place, the 
        Chinese Government refuses to permit the appointment by the 
        Vatican of Catholic bishops and the ordination of priests not 
        approved by the Government and insists on appointing its own 
        ``Catholic bishops''.
            (10) The Tenth Panchen Lama died in January 1989 at 
        Tashilhunpo Monastery, his traditional spiritual seat in 
        Shigatze, Tibet's second largest city.
            (11) It has always been the right and the role of the Dalai 
        Lama to recognize the successor to the Panchen Lama. On May 14, 
        1995, His Holiness the Dalai Lama announced recognition of a 
        six-year-old boy, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, as the Eleventh Panchen 
        Lama, according to Tibetan tradition.
            (12) The young boy, recognized by the Dalai Lama, and his 
        family have been brought to Beijing by Chinese authorities and 
        have not been seen for months. The Chinese authorities 
        announced publicly in June 1996 that they are holding Gedhun 
        Choekyi Nyima.
            (13) Chadrel Rimpoche, abbot of Tashilhunpo Monastery and 
        head of the original search committee for the Eleventh Panchen 
        Lama, and his assistant, Champa Chung, are believed to have 
        been seized and detained by Chinese authorities in May of 1995.
            (14) Chinese Government authorities subsequently detained 
        other Tibetan Buddhists in connection with the selection of the 
        Eleventh Panchen Lama, including Gyatrol Rimposhe, Shepa 
        Kelsang, Lhakpa Tsering, and Ringkar Ngawang.
            (15) The Chinese Government convened a conference in 
        Beijing where Tibetan monks were coerced to select a rival 
        candidate to the child recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 
        Eleventh Panchen Lama.
            (16) On November 29, 1995, officials of the Chinese 
        Government orchestrated an elaborate ceremony designating a 
        six-year-old boy selected by the Chinese Government as the 
        Eleventh Panchen Lama and on December 8, 1995, a Government-
        sponsored ceremony was held in Shigatze, Tibet, where the boy 
        selected by the Government was enthroned as the Eleventh 
        Panchen Lama.
            (17) By seeking to impose its own candidate as the Eleventh 
        Panchen Lama and detaining the six-year-old boy recognized for 
        that position in accordance with Tibetan tradition, the Chinese 
        Government is infringing on a purely Tibetan religious matter, 
        in blatant violation of the fundamental human rights of the 
        Tibetan people.
    (d) Findings on Slave Labor and ``Reeducation'' Camps in the PRC.--
Congress makes the following findings with respect to slave labor and 
reeducation camps:
            (1) The People's Republic of China operates and maintains 
        an extensive forced labor camp system--the Laogai.
            (2) The Laogai is made up of more than 1,100 forced labor 
        camps, with an estimated population of 6,000,000 to 8,000,000 
        prisoners.
            (3) In one part of the Laogai system, known as laojiao, or 
        reeducation-through-labor, Chinese citizens can be detained for 
        up to 3 years without any judicial review or formal appearance 
        in the judicial system.
            (4) The Laogai sector of the export economy of the People's 
        Republic of China is engaged in the export to the United States 
        of the goods made with forced labor.
            (5) The Government of the People's Republic of China 
        employs a system of dual names for the camps to deceive the 
        international community.
            (6) The United States Customs Service has taken formal 
        administrative action banning the importation of 27 different 
        products found to have been made in the Laogai.
            (7) Despite the fact that the People's Republic of China 
        has entered into binding agreements with the United States (the 
        1992 Memorandum of Understanding on Prison Labor, and the 1994 
        Statement of Cooperation on the Implementation of the 
        Memorandum of Understanding on Prison Labor) to allow 
        inspections of its forced labor camps to determine the origins 
        of suspected Laogai imports to the United States, the People's 
        Republic of China has frustrated the implementation of these 
        agreements.
            (8) The State Department's Human Rights Country Reports in 
        1995 and 1996 each stated, ``Repeated delays in arranging 
        prison labor site visits called into question Chinese 
        intentions regarding the implementation of'' the agreements 
        referred to in paragraph (7).
            (9) Concerning the ability of the United States Customs 
        Service to identify Communist Chinese products that originate 
        in the Laogai, the Commissioner of Customs stated in testimony 
        before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 22, 1997: 
        ``We simply do not have the tools within our present arsenal at 
        Customs to gain the timely and in-depth verification that we 
        need.''.
    (e) Findings on the Need for International Broadcasting Into the 
PRC.--Congress makes the following findings with respect to broadcasts 
to the People's Republic of China:
            (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China 
        systematically controls the flow of information to the Chinese 
        people.
            (2) The Government of the People's Republic of China 
        threatened economic development by announcing in January 1996 
        that its official news agency Xinhua, will supervise wire 
        services selling economic information, including Dow Jones-
        Telerate, Bloomberg, and Reuters Business, and in announcing in 
        February of 1996 the ``Interim Internet Management Rules'', 
        which have the effect of censoring computer networks.
            (3) Under the May 30, 1997, order of Premier Li Peng, all 
        organizations that engage in business activities related to 
        international computer networking must apply for a license, 
        increasing still further government control over access to the 
        Internet.
            (4) Both Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America, as a 
        surrogate for a free press in the People's Republic of China, 
        provide an invaluable source of uncensored information to the 
        Chinese people, including objective and authoritative news of 
        in-country and regional events, as well as accurate news about 
        the United States and its policies.
            (5) Radio Free Asia currently broadcasts only 5 hours a day 
        in the Mandarin dialect and 2 hours a day in Tibetan.
            (6) Voice of America currently broadcasts only 10 hours a 
        day in Mandarin and 3\1/2\ hours a day in Tibetan.
            (7) Radio Free Asia and Voice of America should develop 24-
        hour-a-day service in Mandarin, Cantonese, and Tibetan, as well 
        as further broadcasting capability in the dialects spoken in 
        Xinjiang and other regions of the People's Republic of China.
            (8) Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, in working toward 
        continuously broadcasting to the People's Republic of China in 
        multiple languages, have the capability to immediately 
        establish 24-hour-a-day Mandarin broadcasting to that nation by 
        staggering the hours of Radio Free Asia and Voice of America.
            (9) Simultaneous broadcasting on Voice of America radio and 
        Worldnet television 7 days a week in Mandarin are also 
        important and needed capabilities.

SEC. 202. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations for Increased Funding for Radio 
Free Asia and Voice of America.--
            (1) Authorization of appropriations for international 
        broadcasting to china.--In addition to such sums as are 
        otherwise authorized to be appropriated for ``International 
        Broadcasting Activities'' for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, there 
        are authorized to be appropriated for ``International 
        Broadcasting Activities'' $46,900,000 for fiscal year 1998 and 
        $31,200,000 for fiscal year 1999, which shall be available only 
for broadcasting to the People's Republic of China.
            (2) Limitations.--
                    (A) Radio free asia.--
                            (i) Of the funds authorized to be 
                        appropriated under paragraph (1), $26,900,000 
                        is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
                        year 1998 and $21,200,000 is authorized to be 
                        appropriated for fiscal year 1999 for Radio 
                        Free Asia.
                            (ii) Of the funds under paragraph (1), 
                        $1,200,000 is authorized to be appropriated for 
                        each such fiscal year for additional personnel 
                        to staff Cantonese language broadcasting.
                            (iii) Of the total funds under paragraph 
                        (1), $900,000 is authorized to be appropriated 
                        for additional advanced editing equipment.
                    (B) Fiscal year 1998.--
                            (i) Of the funds under paragraph (1) 
                        authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
                        1998, $11,800,000 is authorized to be 
                        appropriated for capital expenditures for the 
                        purchase and construction of transmission 
                        facilities.
                            (ii) Of the funds under paragraph (1) 
                        authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
                        1998, $3,000,000 is authorized to be 
                        appropriated to facilitate the timely 
                        augmentation of transmitters at Tinian, 
                        Marshall Islands.
            (3) Allocation.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated under paragraph (1), the Director of the United 
        States Information Agency and the Board of Broadcasting 
        Governors shall seek to ensure that the amounts made available 
        for broadcasting to nations whose people do not fully enjoy 
        freedom of expression do not decline in proportion to the 
        amounts made available for broadcasting to other nations.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act, in consultation with the Board of 
Broadcasting Governors, the President shall prepare and transmit to 
Congress a report on a plan to achieve continuous broadcasting of Radio 
Free Asia and Voice of America to the People's Republic of China in 
multiple major dialects and languages.

SEC. 203. FREEDOM FROM RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION.

    (a) Congressional Statement of Policy.--It is the sense of Congress 
that the President should make freedom of religion one of the major 
objectives of United States foreign policy with respect to the People's 
Republic of China. As part of this policy, the Department of State 
should raise in every relevant bilateral and multilateral forum the 
issue of individuals imprisoned, detained, confined, or otherwise 
harassed by the Chinese Government on religious grounds. In its 
communications with the Chinese Government, the Department of State 
should provide specific names of individuals of concern and request a 
complete and timely response from the Chinese Government regarding the 
individuals' whereabouts and condition, the charges against them, and 
sentence imposed. The goal of these official communications should be 
the expeditious release of all religious prisoners in China and Tibet 
and the end of the Chinese Government's policy and practice of 
harassing and repressing religious believers.
    (b) Prohibition on Use of Funds for the Participation of Certain 
Chinese Officials in Conferences, Exchanges, Programs, and 
Activities.--
            (1) Prohibition.--
                    (A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other 
                provision of law, for fiscal years after fiscal year 
                1997, no funds appropriated or otherwise made available 
                for the Department of State, the United States 
                Information Agency, or the United States Agency for 
                International Development may be used for the purposes 
                of providing travel expenses and per diem for the 
                participation of a national of the People's Republic of 
                China described in subparagraph (B).
                    (B) National described.--A national described in 
                this subparagraph means any military or civilian 
                official or employee of the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China who is directly involved in any of 
                the following policies or practices or who was 
                responsible for the supervision of persons directly 
                involved in such policies or practices:
                            (i) Formulating, drafting, or implementing 
                        repressive religious policies.
                            (ii) Imprisoning, detaining, or harassing 
                        individuals on religious grounds.
                            (iii) Promoting or participating in 
                        policies or practices which hinder religious 
                        activities or the free expression or religious 
                        beliefs.
            (2) Certification.--
                    (A) In general.--Each Federal agency subject to the 
                prohibition of paragraph (1) shall certify in writing 
                to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
                the Committee on International Relations of the House 
                of Representatives, not later than 120 days after the 
                date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 
                that the agency did not pay for, either directly or 
                through a contractor or grantee, travel expenses or per 
                diem of any national of the People's Republic of China 
                described in paragraph (1)(B).
                    (B) Contents of certification.--Each certification 
                under subparagraph (A) shall be supported by the 
                following information:
                            (i) The name of each employee of any agency 
                        of the Government of the People's Republic of 
                        China whose travel expenses or per diem were 
                        paid by funds of the reporting agency of the 
                        United States Government.
                            (ii) The procedures employed by the 
                        reporting agency of the United States 
                        Government to ascertain whether each individual 
                        under clause (i) did or did not participate in 
                        activities described in paragraph (1)(B).
                            (iii) The reporting agency's basis for 
                        concluding that each individual under clause 
                        (i) did not participate in such activities.
    (c) Certain Officials of the PRC Ineligible To Receive Visas and 
Excluded From Admission.--
            (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        law, any national of the People's Republic of China described 
        in subsection (b)(1)(B) shall be ineligible to receive a visa 
        and shall be excluded from admission into the United States.
            (2) Waiver.--The President may waive the provisions of 
        paragraph (1) in order to carry on the normal course of foreign 
        policy.

SEC. 204. CONDEMNATION OF FORCED ABORTION.

    (a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to condemn those 
officials of the Chinese Communist Party, the Government of the 
People's Republic of China, and other persons who are involved in the 
enforcement of forced abortions, by preventing such persons from 
entering or remaining in the United States.
    (b) Denial of Entry Into the United States of Persons in the 
People's Republic of China Engaged in Enforcement of Forced Abortion 
Policy.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State may not issue any 
        visa to, and the Attorney General may not admit to the United 
        States, any national of the People's Republic of China, 
        including any official of the Communist Party or the Government 
        of the People's Republic of China including regional and local 
        authorities of the People's Republic of China, who the 
        Secretary finds, based on credible information, has been 
        involved in the establishment or enforcement of population 
        control policies resulting in a woman being forced to undergo 
        an abortion against her free choice, or resulting in a man or 
        woman being forced to undergo sterilization against his or her 
        free choice.
            (2) Waiver.--The President may waive the provisions of 
        paragraph (1) in order to carry on the normal course of foreign 
        policy.

SEC. 205. COMBATING SLAVE LABOR AND ``REEDUCATION'' CENTERS.

    (a) Authorization for Additional Customs and State Department 
Personnel To Monitor Exportation of Slave Labor Products by the 
People's Republic of China.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
$2,000,000 for fiscal year 1998 and $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 for 
monitoring by the United States Customs Service and the Department of 
State products exported by the People's Republic of China to the United 
States of products which may be made with slave labor, in violation of 
section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or section 1761 of title 18, 
United States Code.
    (b) Reporting Requirement on Exportation of Products Made With 
Slave Labor.--
            (1) Report to congress.--The Commissioner of Customs and 
        the Secretary of State shall each prepare and transmit to 
        Congress reports on the manufacturing and exportation of 
        products made with slave labor in the People's Republic of 
        China.
            (2) Contents of report.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
        shall include information concerning the following:
                    (A) The extent of the use of slave labor in 
                manufacturing products for exportation by the People's 
                Republic of China, as well as the volume of exports of 
                such slave labor products by that country.
                    (B) The progress of the United States Government--
                            (i) in identifying products made with slave 
                        labor in the People's Republic of China that 
                        are destined for the United States market in 
                        violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 
                        1930 or section 1761 of title 18, United States 
                        Code, and
                            (ii) in stemming the importation of such 
                        products.
            (3) Submission of report.--Not later than 1 year after the 
        date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 
        Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of State shall each 
        submit to the Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
        Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the 
        Senate, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on 
        International Relations of the House of Representatives, and 
        the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate, classified and unclassified versions 
        of the report described in paragraph (1).
    (c) Renegotiation of the Memorandum of Understanding on Prison 
Labor With the People's Republic of China.--It is the sense of Congress 
that, since the People's Republic of China has substantially frustrated 
the purposes of the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding with the United 
States on Prison Labor, the President should immediately commence 
negotiations to replace the current Memorandum of Understanding on 
Prison Labor with one providing for effective monitoring of forced 
labor in the People's Republic of China, without restrictions on which 
prison labor camps international monitors may visit.

SEC. 206. POLITICAL FREEDOM IN CHINA.

    There are authorized to be appropriated $2,200,000 for fiscal year 
1998 and $2,200,000 for fiscal year 1999, to support personnel in the 
United States Embassy in Beijing, as well as the American consulates in 
Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Chengdu, and Hong Kong to monitor 
political repression in the People's Republic of China and the use of 
the Laogai system of forced labor and reeducation as tools of political 
repression.

                            TITLE III--TRADE

SEC. 301. FINDINGS.

    (a) Findings on United States Interests.--Congress makes the 
following findings with respect to United States interests:
            (1) The United States has an interest in seeing that the 
        People's Republic of China's membership in the World Trade 
        Organization (in this title referred to as the ``WTO'') is 
        based on a commitment to open its economy to international 
        trade and investment and to adhere to all World Trade 
        Organization rules.
            (2) The purpose of the World Trade Organization is to 
        enable member countries to conduct trade based upon free market 
        principles, by limiting government intervention in the form of 
        state subsidies, by limiting non-tariff barriers, and by 
        encouraging reciprocal reductions in tariffs among members.
            (3) The WTO is based on the assumption that the import and 
        export of goods are conducted by independent enterprises 
        responding to profit incentives and market forces.
            (4) The WTO requires that countries with non-market 
        economies implement significant reforms to change centralized 
        and planned economic systems before they may be considered for 
        WTO membership, and the existence of a decentralized and a free 
        market economy is considered a condition for fair trade among 
        WTO members.
    (b) Findings on Taiwan's Admission Into the WTO.--Congress makes 
the following findings with respect to Taiwan:
            (1) Pursuant to its charter and rules, membership in the 
        WTO is not limited to nations nor indicative of sovereignty.
            (2) Taiwan has applied for membership in the WTO as a 
        separate customs territory including Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, 
        and Matsu. Taiwan's application is under review by a Working 
        Party appointed under Article XXXIII of the GATT 1994 (as 
        defined in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 
        U.S.C. 3501)).
            (3) Taiwan has a free market economy that has existed for 
        more than 3 decades, and is currently the 14th largest trading 
        nation in the world.
            (4) Taiwan's gross national product is the 20th largest in 
        the world, its foreign exchange reserves are the 3rd largest in 
        the world, and it has become the world's 7th largest foreign 
        investor.
            (5) Taiwan is the 7th largest trading partner of the United 
        States and its purchases of United States exports are more than 
        60 percent greater than those of the People's Republic of 
        China.
            (6) Taiwan has already agreed to reduce the tariff level of 
        many products, and to eliminate other non-tariff barriers as a 
        condition of its admission to the WTO.
            (7) The United States and Taiwan have enjoyed a 
        longstanding and uninterrupted friendship, which has only 
        increased in light of the remarkable economic development and 
        political liberalization in Taiwan in recent years.
            (8) Taiwan reached a historic turning point in the 
        development of Chinese democracy on March 23, 1996, when it 
        conducted the first competitive, free, fair, direct, and 
        popular election of a head of state in over 4,000 years of 
        recorded Chinese history, leading to Lee Teng-hui's 
        inauguration as President on May 20, 1996.
            (9) For the past century the United States has promoted 
        democracy and economic freedom throughout the world, and the 
        evolution of Taiwan is an outstanding example of the success of 
        that policy.
            (10) Taiwan's accession to the WTO is important to the 
        United States because it is the largest importer of United 
        States goods of any country that is not a member of the WTO, 
        and because Taiwan's entry into the WTO would promote 
        significant new market opportunities for United States 
        exporters and investors.
            (11) A declaration of the European Parliament made on July 
        18, 1996, rightly found that ``the people of Taiwan ought to be 
        better represented to international organizations than they are 
        at present, which would benefit both Taiwan and the whole of 
        the international community''.
            (12) Notwithstanding these circumstances, the People's 
        Republic of China has sought to block the admission of Taiwan 
        to the WTO until the People's Republic of China accedes to 
        membership.
            (13) The People's Republic of China, in contrast to Taiwan, 
        has applied for membership in the WTO not as a developed 
        nation, but rather as a developing nation, so that it would be 
        relieved of the obligations to reduce its tariffs and eliminate 
        its subsidies for government-controlled industries, even after 
        its admission to the WTO.
            (14) In contrast to Taiwan, the Communist government of the 
        People's Republic of China maintains strict government controls 
        over most trade within its territory, restricts and often 
        outlaws free market competition, and denies legal and 
        regulatory protection of property rights, all in ways that are 
        incompatible with WTO principles.
    (c) Findings on the People's Republic of China's Admission Into the 
WTO.--Congress makes the following findings with respect to the 
People's Republic of China:
            (1) The Communist Government of the People's Republic of 
        China maintains an intricate system of restrictive and punitive 
        tariff and non-tariff administrative controls to implement its 
        centrally planned industrial and trade policies, with tariffs 
        on foreign goods, such as automobiles, as high as 150 percent, 
        even though the People's Republic of China has made commitments 
        in the Memorandum of Understanding on market access it signed 
        with the United States on October 10, 1992, and reaffirmed in 
        March of 1995, to reform significant parts of its import 
        regime.
            (2) The Communist Government of the People's Republic of 
        China has denied conditions necessary for free trade in 
        announcing in January of 1996 that its official news agency, 
        Xinhua, will supervise wire services selling economic 
        information, including Dow Jones-Telerate, Bloomberg, and 
        Reuters Business, and in announcing in February of 1996 the 
        ``Interim Internet Management Rules'', which have the effect of 
        censoring computer networks.
            (3) Under the May 30, 1997, order of Premier Li Peng of the 
        People's Republic of China, all units which engage in business 
activities related to international computer networking must now apply 
for a license, increasing government control over access to the 
Internet.
            (4) The People's Republic of China's failure to implement 
        its March 11, 1995, agreement with the United States to curtail 
        piracy of products protected by intellectual property rights, 
        including music, videos, books, and software, prompted a threat 
        by the United States to impose trade sanctions proportionate to 
        the estimated loss of $2,300,000,000 to the United States 
        economy in 1995 caused by the piracy.
            (5) The Communist Government of the People's Republic of 
        China continues to use direct and indirect government subsidies 
        to unfairly advantage its own exports in contravention of 
        market principles.
            (6) Approximately 100,000 state enterprises are currently 
        operating in the People's Republic of China, accounting for 
        over a third of the total industrial production and employing 
        two thirds of the urban workforce in that country.
            (7) The People's Liberation Army contributes to the 
        People's Republic of China's failure to meet the standards of 
        the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding with the United States on 
        intellectual property rights by running factories which pirate 
        videos, compact discs, and computer software that are products 
        of the United States.
            (8) The People's Liberation Army contributes to the 
        People's Republic of China's failure to meet the standards of 
        the February 1997 Memorandum of Understanding with the United 
        States on textiles, by operating enterprises engaged in the 
        transshipment of textile products to the United States through 
        third countries.
            (9) The commercial activities of the People's Liberation 
        Army are frequently conducted on noncommercial terms, or for 
        noncommercial purposes such as military or foreign policy 
        considerations.
            (10) As a consequence of these practices, the People's 
        Republic of China is not ready for, and does not meet the 
        criteria for, admission to the WTO either as a developed nation 
        or a developing nation.

SEC. 302. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
              ACCESSION.

    It is the policy of Congress that the United States should 
aggressively support the People's Republic of China's accession to the 
WTO under commercially viable terms.

SEC. 303. TAIWAN'S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) Taiwan should be admitted to the WTO as a separate 
        customs territory without making such admission conditional on 
        the previous or simultaneous admission of the People's Republic 
        of China to the WTO, whether as a developing or a developed 
        nation; and
            (2) it should be United States policy to support Taiwan's 
        admission to the WTO forthwith, without making such admission 
        conditional on the previous or simultaneous admission of the 
        People's Republic of China to the WTO.

                       TITLE IV--REVIEW OF POLICY

SEC. 401. REVIEW OF POLICY.

    The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the 
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives 
shall review the provisions of this Act at the request of the President 
or upon any of the following conditions being met:
            (1) The People's Republic of China's entry into the WTO.
            (2) The President's certification to Congress that the 
        People's Republic of China has fully implemented and is in 
        compliance with bilateral and international nonproliferation 
        agreements and standards.
            (3) The President's certification to Congress that the 
        People's Republic of China is actively and effectively 
        combatting all forms of religious persecution.
            (4) The People's Republic of China's reevaluating its 
        official view of the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4, 1989, 
        consistent with the findings of this Act.
            (5) The People's Republic of China's publication of a 
        defense white paper that provides a comprehensive description 
        and transparency of the PLA's modernization program roles and 
        missions.
                                 <all>
```