lam granting summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims regarding a failure to provide a conditional offer of employment and for failure to hire
because they are barred by prior settlement of claims raised in action No. 96 C 0290. Plaintiff
claims that this agreement is “evidence of [defendants] intent to abuse the legal process by trying
to use a libel claim to coerce plaintiff into silence, and are not excludable as ‘offers of
compromise” and that he is suing defendants “over their conduct in bringing and continuing a
lawsuit that constituted an abuse of process and also retaliation under the statutes involved.”
However, defendants have not brought suit against plaintiff, nor are they seeking ro preclude
admissibility of the settlement agreement.

Plaintiffs petition for a rule to show cause based upon an alleged violation of the Dyer-
Neely Consent Decree (83 C 5386) is denied because (although it is questionable that the Decree
is applicable to plaintiff's claims), even if it was applicable, the Decree has been dissolved. See
Dyer y. City of Chicago, 1997 WL 308843 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (Willams, J.).

With respect to plaintiff's disability discrimination claim, plaintiff insists that “defendant
retaliated against him in violation of the ADA and ADEA by terminating her [sic] employment.”
Plaintiff cannot establish a claim of retaliation under the ADEA because there is no evidence that
he complained of age discrimination preceding his discharge. Plaintiff also cannot establish a
claim of retaliation under the ADA because he has not shown the requisite element that he was
treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in protected activity.
See Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2002). With respect to plaintiffs
discrimination claim under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff has not adequately responded

to defendants’ argument that he is not entitled to protection under these statutes because he does



EEOC y, AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-82 (7th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff does
not dispute that a defendant cannot be held individually liable under Title VI, the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA, but he argues that he has adequately pled conspiracy and cites
Haddle y. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998). However, plaintiff only alleges that defendants
conspired “to do something which, was actually carried out, did amount to another Federal crime
and offense.” This alone does not sufficiently allege civil conspiracy. Plaintiff alleges no facts
to indicate the basis of this conspiracy claim, nor does he identify an actual offense. It could be
inferred that his termination is that offense, but plaintiff still has not alleged any facts to show
how the individual defendants conspired to bring about the termination. In his response to
defendants’ motion, plaintiff mentions denial of his right to equal protection, but he does not
allege any class-based invidious discrimination, nor does he allege that any similarly situated
individual who is less than 40, not disabled, or did not engage in statutorily protected activity
was treated differently than he. Finally, there is no evidence that an individual defendant, other
than Superintendent Terry G. Hillard, made the decision to terminate plaintiff. The
Superintendent has the discretion to discharge probationary police officers without just cause or a
hearing. Romanik v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 338 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. 1975).
Superintendent Hillard based his decision to terminate plaintiff on a report that plaintiff became
ill and almost fainted at the firing range because he is allergic to pregnant women. Plaintiff
concedes that he himself reported this belief to his superiors; therefore any allegations that the
report on which Superintendent Hillard relied is false cannot be proven. Because plaintiff cannot

maintain any claims against the individual defendants, they are dismissed from the case.



not claim that he is disabled, nor does he show that he was erroneously regarded as disabled.
Plaintiff does not show that being allergic to pregnant women significantly restricts a major life
activity, and the only evidence offered by plaintiff that he is disabled is that an officer
commented that plaintiff was “dangerous and a threat” as a police officer because of this allergy,
which is insufficient. Defendants’ conclusion that plaintiff could not perform the duties of a
police officer is not the same as a belief that plaintiff's allergy significantly restricts the hfe
activity of working. Additionally, defendants’ belief that plaintiff was allergic to pregnant
women is not erroneous because plaintiff himself reported the allergy to defendants. Finally,
plaintiff cannot prove that with his allergic condition, he was qualified to perform the essential
functions of a probationary police officer. For these reasons, plaintiff cannot establish a claim of
disability discrimination, and summary judgment is granted with respect to this claim. Summary
judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim is also granted for the same reasons.

Plaintiff does not respond to defendants’ arguments with regard to his age discrimination
and harassment claims, namely that these are beyond the scope of his first and only timely EEOC
charge filed on July 10, 2001, which alleges only disability discrimination. While plaintiff's
second EEOC charge does allege age discrimination and harassment, it was not filed until April
26, 2002, which is 302 days after his discharge on Tune 28, 2001, and thus, exceeds the statute of
limitations for these claims. See Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th
Cir. 1998). Therefore, summary judgment is granted with respect to plaintiffs age
discrimination and harassment claims.

Defendants move to strike the 27 counts set forth in “Item No. 12” on the ground that

these counts consist of legal definitions, not separate cognizable claims, and even if the court


‘Minute Order Form (06/97)

. CF co ed States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assighed Judge
or Magistkate Jud

James B. Zagel

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER

02 C6604 (

DATE

8/1/2003

CASE SAMUEL DENT vs. CITY OF CHICAGO, ET AL
TITLE
{in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢-g., plaintitt, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state brielly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) Qo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) oO Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for _ at _
(6) Qa Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on ___ set for ___ at
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) a (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at _.
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) OC Local Rule 41.1 OI FRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).
qo) 4 [Other docketentry] Defendant motion (16-1 and 16-2) to strike and dismiss (treated as motion
for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff’s motion (23-1 and 24-1) for summary judgment is
denied. Summary judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff.
(1) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.}

No notices required, advised in open court

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephione

| Docketing to mail notices.

VY | Mail AO 450 form

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

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were to construe facts alleged elsewhere into any of these counts, the facts as alleged are vague
and confusing and do not state any claims. Although plaintiff correctly argues that a pro se civil
rights complaint cannot be dismissed unless there is no set of facts under which plaintiff could
obtain relief, McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319 (7th Cir. 2000), “Item No. 12” does
not contain any claims. There is no indication in this document of the basis for asserting these
alleged “claims,” and even though the pleading standards are more relaxed for a pro se plaintiff,
plaintiff has not met these standards. Therefore, the counts alleged in “Item No. 12" are stricken.

Finally, summary judgment is granted with respect to plaintiffs claim Count V of “Item
13 continued” asserting “Discrimination in Violation of the Direct Threat Qualification
Standards” because direct threat is a defense available to employers under the ADA.

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of

plaintiff's claims is GRANTED.

ENTER:
Ne Ss) ie
James|B, Zagel 0S

Inite@ States DistrietJudge

DATE: _[ Quanch 2)



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RRA

SAMUEL DENT,
Plaintiff, AUG 0 0 CuUs
v No. 02 C 6604

Judge James B. Zagel
CITY OF CHICAGO, MAYOR RICHARD
DALEY, POLICE SUPERINTENDENT
TERRY G. HILLARD, DEPUTY
SUPERVISOR GARY H. SCHENKEL, LT.
BANKS, and SGT. WILLIAM SHERWIN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff is a former probationary officer who alleges that the Chicago Police

Department (1) failed to give him a conditional offer of employment prior to a medical
evaluation; (2) failed to hire him because of his disability (imperfect vision); (3) failed to
accommodate his disability; (4) harassed him upon hire; and (5) discharged him in retaliation for
filing a prior complaint of discrimination and based upon a perceived disability (becoming ill at
the Training Academy) in violation of Titles I and V of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Plaintiff further checks the box alleging discrimination based upon his age, in violation of the
Age Discrimination Employment Act (“ADEA”).

In addition, plaintiff attaches to his pro se complaint a document entitled “Item 12
continued,” which sets forth 27 counts, titled consecutively from J and XXVII as follows:

“adverse action, breach of trust, conspiracy, allegata and probata, civilii conspiracy, malicious

1

conduct, defamation, default, decree, evidence opinion, expert witness, fact or opinion re



defamation, false/fraudulent statement, false pretences [sic], false testimony, formality, fraud to
defraud, knowingly, knowledge, misleading conduct, motive, nonperformance and breach of
contract, prima facie evidence case, settlement agreement, reasonable doubt, surplusage, and
wrongful discharge.” Plaintiffs complaint also incorporates an “Item 13 contnued” consisting of
a same captioned complaint containing six counts.' Count I alleges termination due to a
perceived disability in violation of Titles I and V of the ADA. Count II alleges unlawful
subjection to a preemployment medical examination and termination in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act. Count II is titled “Discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act,” but alleges that defendant automatically terminated him because it regarded
him as disabled in violation Titles I and V of the ADA and “Sections SEC. 12203 [Section 503]”
(ADA non-retaliation provision). Count IV alleges termination in retaliation for engaging in
protected activity. Count V alleges that plaintiff's termination violated the “Direct Threat’
Qualifications Standards” of the ADA, and Count VI seeks a rule to show cause based upon an
alleged violation of the Dyer-Neely Consent Decree (83 C 5386).

Plaintiff has named both the City of Chicago and individuals as defendants. The
individual defendants, as well as the City of Chicago, move for summary judgment on all of
plaintiff's claims.

Iam dismissing the individual defendants because (1) plaintiff has not alleged any
specific actions attributable to any particular defendant; and (2) the law is well-settled that there

is no individual liability under Title VU, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA. See

' This document appears to be a modified version of the complaint previously filed on plaintiff's behalf in
action No. 96 C 0290, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to settlement.

2