IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

DARLENE MOORE,

Plaintiff,
02 C 5130
v.
Judge Moran
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S COMBINED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Now Comes Plaintiff, DARLENE MOORE, through her counsel,
LOEVY & LOEVY, and (a) respectfully moves for entry of judgment
on the jury's verdict, and (b) opposes Defendants' motion to stay
entry of judgment. In support, Plaintiff states as follows.

1. On April 30, 2008, the jury returned a verdict in
Plaintiff's favor in the amount of $250,000.

2. Entry of judgment on a general verdict is a
ministerial act. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 (without a contrary
order "the clerk must, without awaiting the court's direction,
promptly prepare, sign, and enter the judgment when the jury
returns a general verdict").

3. In this case, no just cause exists to delay entry
of the judgment on the verdict, nor does Defendants' motion even
intimate what that justification might conceivably be.

4. Instead, without providing any supporting cases,
Defendants ask this Court to deviate from the presumed procedure
and stay entry of judgment. The request should be denied for at

least three reasons.


5. First, there would be no prejudice to the defense
if the usual procedure is followed: any arguments Defendants
intend to raise in their Rule 50 motion could just as easily (and
more properly) be raised in a Rule 59 motion. In fact, the
argument Defendants seek to make is exactly the type contemplated
by Rule 59; conversely, the Rules do not contemplate the sort of
post-verdict-directed-verdict Defendants apparently seek.

6. Second, in contrast to the defense, Plaintiff
would be prejudiced by delay in entering judgment. Not only
would she be unfairly asked to forgo interest on the delayed
receipt of her judgment, but redundant briefing schedules
(Rule 50 motion followed by a Rule 59 motion) would only serve to
push back further the date on which she will receive the

compensation the jury awarded. Such a delay -- which unfairly

favors the defense at the expense of the Plaintiff
justification -- is unnecessary and entirely avoidable.

7. Third, in any event, the Defendants' anticipated
motion is frivolous. No matter how much the City believes that
Ms. Moore should have lost (and based on six years of litigation,
Plaintiff can see that the City believes this with all of its
municipal heart) the jury has now spoken. Put simply, it was
within the jury's prerogative to credit Plaintiff's evidence and
to reject that of the defense. The jury chose to do so, and once
the jury's verdict is given its proper deference -- and all of
the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff
-- there can be no genuine suggestion that the verdict can be

disturbed. While Defendants are certainly entitled to pursue a


Rule 59 motion, any unnecessary delay in moving the process
toward its long-awaited resolution is pointless and should be

avoided.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court
enter judgment on the jury's verdict so the Defendants can file
their Rule 59 motion, if any, and the case can proceed forward

toward its final resolution.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

s/ Jon Loev
Attorney for Plaintiff

Arthur Loevy
Jon Loevy
Amanda Antholt
LOEVY & LOEVY
312 North May

Suite 100

Chicago, IL 60607

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jon Loevy, an attorney, certify that on May 1, 2008, I

served this document by ECF electronic filing as to counsel for
all parties.

Jon Loevy