SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2480-17T2

C.S., 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.L.-S.

1

,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted March 13, 2019 – Decided March 29, 2019

Before Judges Nugent and Mawla.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket 

No. FM-20-0386-14.

Law Offices of Lawrence W. Luttrell, attorneys for 

appellant (John R. Voorhees III, of counsel and on the 

briefs).

DeTorres & DeGeorge, LLC, attorneys for respondent 

(Rosanne S. DeTorres, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

 

1 We utilize initials to protect the confidentiality of the parties and their children.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-2480-17T2

In this post-judgment matter, defendant J.L.-S. appeals from a December 

19, 2017 order, reinstating plaintiff C.S.'s parenting time pursuant to the terms 

of the parties' marital settlement agreement (MSA). We reverse and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We glean the following facts from the record presented. The parties were 

divorced in 2014, following a fourteen-year marriage. They entered into a 

comprehensive MSA, which addressed, among other things, custody and 

parenting time of their then eleven-, nine-, and six-year-old daughters. 

Specifically, the parties agreed to joint legal custody and affixed a detailed 

parenting plan to the MSA. The document designated defendant the parent of 

primary residence and plaintiff the parent of alternate residence. The parenting 

plan afforded plaintiff one midweek ninety-minute period of parenting time and 

alternating weekend parenting time from Friday evening until Sunday afternoon.

For reasons the parties dispute, plaintiff's parenting time did not occur. 

This resulted in the entry of an order on February 1, 2016, ordering a therapist 

to meet with the parties and the children, and provide recommendations 

regarding "visitation." Pursuant to the February 2016 order, the parties enrolled 

with a therapist to facilitate therapeutic visitation between the children and 

plaintiff. In May 2016, the counselor wrote to the motion judge advising the 
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children were uncomfortable having parenting time with plaintiff and attempts 

to work with the parties directly on co-parenting had failed. The therapist 

recommended future parenting time occur in a therapeutic setting, a bonding 

evaluation, individual therapy for the children, parenting classes for plaintiff, 

and individual therapy for defendant. 

On June 30, 2016, the motion judge entered an order which noted he had 

"read the written submissions of the parties, . . . heard oral argument on June 3, 

2016, and . . . reviewed the [therapist's] report[.]" The order suspended 

plaintiff's parenting time, ordered the parties to comply with the therapist's 

recommendations, and ordered visitation take place in a therapeutic setting. The 

order specifically stated: "Any further request for modification of this [o]rder or 

enforcement of the [MSA] shall be made by application of the party seeking 

further relief." 

On September 14, 2016, the motion judge signed an order appointing a 

therapist to provide therapeutic services for plaintiff and the children pursuant 

to the June 2016 order. On October 7, 2016, the judge signed an order permitting 

the parties' eldest daughter to continue treating with her own separate therapist,

who she had previously treated with. On October 15, 2016, the court-appointed 

therapist wrote to the judge recommending the therapeutic visitation be 
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suspended pending a best interest evaluation by a forensic psychologist. On 

October 21, 2016, the motion judge signed an order suspending therapeutic 

visitation and appointing a forensic psychologist. 

On February 7, 2017, the motion judge signed another order, which in 

pertinent part, mandated the parties make and attend their appointments with the 

forensic psychologist, and required the therapeutic providers to communicate 

and cooperate with the psychologist in the evaluation process. It also required

the psychologist to report to the court regarding whether therapeutic visitation 

should occur between plaintiff and the two younger children and the feasibility 

of parenting time with the eldest child with the aid of therapist. 

The forensic psychologist issued a report in March 2017 regarding the 

issue of therapeutic visitation. He recommended plaintiff have anger 

management therapy, the entire family engage in therapy, and for contact 

between plaintiff and the children to abide by the recommendations of the family 

therapist. 

In August 2017, the psychologist issued a best interest evaluation report. 

This report recommended the continuation of joint legal custody and 

maintaining defendant as the parent of primary residence. The report also 

reiterated the recommendations in the March 2017 report regarding therapeutic 
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visitation, but recommended plaintiff have psychotherapy, rather than merely 

anger management, and defendant participate in psychotherapy and a psychiatric 

evaluation. The purpose of the psychiatric evaluation was to determine the 

proper dosage of medicine for defendant to treat her panic attacks and general 

anxiety disorder. 

In response to the best interest evaluation, the motion judge issued an 

order on October 30, 2017, following a telephone conference with counsel, 

implementing the evaluation recommendations. On October 31, 2017, the 

psychologist sent the judge a letter, which he noted was "a follow-up to the 

phone conversation [they] had [on] . . . October 30, 2017." The record is unclear 

whether counsel participated in the conference call between the judge and the 

psychologist. Regardless, the purpose of the October 31 letter was to address 

the appointment of a family therapist and to opine whether the psychologist 

would recommend parenting time between plaintiff and the middle child. As to 

the latter issue, the psychologist recommended plaintiff visit with the child for 

two and one-half hours every Saturday and Sunday for lunch.

On November 2, 2017, the motion judge entered an order for interim 

parenting time in accordance with the psychologist's recommendation. The 

judge noted the order was opposed. In pertinent part, the preamble to the order 
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stated: "[The] [c]ourt . . . read the written objections of defense counsel by letter 

dated November 2, 2017, and [found] that based upon the record those 

objections are without merit and based upon a misinterpretation of [the forensic 

psychologist]'s letter[.]" 

Pursuant to the best interest evaluation, the parties commenced family 

therapy. Following her initial meeting with the parties, the therapist wrote to 

the motion judge on December 11, 2017, and stated: 

It is clear to me that [defendant] is in need of a 

psychiatric evaluation, medication monitoring and 

individual therapy[] once a week for her anxiety and 

depression. [Plaintiff] should remain in individual 

therapy to help him reduce the stress levels that he has 

been feeling in his life as a result of his divorce and to 

increase his understanding in being empathetic to his 

three, minor, female children. The two parties will 

receive individual therapy with this writer as a means 

to assist them in parental concerns and needs on a 

monthly basis.

This being said, I would have difficulty 

addressing concerns between the three minor children 

and their parents if both parents are not a functioning 

part of their lives. It is my recommendation that the 

two parties share joint legal custody of the three minor 

children and remain in family therapy for at least the 

next six months to address any and all concerns as they 

happen. 

A dispute arose regarding whether the family therapist could also provide 

individual therapy. This prompted a conference call between counsel and the 
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A-2480-17T2

motion judge. Plaintiff's counsel argued the family therapist could not also 

provide individual therapy and also addressed the therapist's December 11, 2017 

letter. Counsel argued the judge should reinstate parenting time due to "the 

drama and the dynamics between . . . both parents and the children, when the 

children don't see their parent except on Saturday for three hours[.]" 

Defendant's counsel argued the issue of individual therapy had been 

addressed because the family therapist had clarified she could not provide both 

family and individual therapy. Regarding plaintiff's request to reinstate 

parenting time, counsel noted the family therapist

did not recommend that parenting time be reinstated . . . 

if she wanted to say that, she certainly would have put 

that in her letter. All she recommends is that the joint 

legal custody continue and that the parties remain in 

family talk therapy for at least six months. . . .

So if [plaintiff's] counsel wants to go ahead and 

make further recommendations or [seek] a 

reinstatement [of parenting time], then I suggest that 

she file a motion[.]

In response, plaintiff's counsel conceded the family therapist had not stated 

parenting time should be reinstated, but that counsel and her client had 

interpreted the December 11, 2017 letter accordingly. 

The motion judge asked counsel to forward the therapist's letter for his 

review and stated "unless you have an objection, I'll call [the therapist] on my 
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own and see what she's saying and try and schedule a four-way." After the 

judge's suggestion, the following colloquy took place:

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: [J]udge, [the therapist] 

just emailed us. . . .

[THE COURT]: [O]kay.

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: . . . I can forward it to you 

. . . [i]t's one sentence,

"I would have to recommend that the couple revert back 

to whatever prior arrangement they had agreed upon at 

the time of their divorce." That is what she says.

[THE COURT]: Okay. All right. So send that.

Plaintiff's counsel then offered to forward a proposed form of order for 

parenting time for the judge and defendant's consideration. The judge indicated 

he would then "schedule something[.] . . . And we'll try to figure something out 

so we can break this logjam with the assistance of an expert."

The record before us does not include the email from the therapist that 

plaintiff's counsel offered to send the judge. However, the therapist sent the 

judge a letter on December 14, 2017. Notably, the letter did not expressly state 

parenting time should be reinstated and did not suggest a specific parenting time 

schedule, but rather, addressed "some questions regarding 'joint custody[.]'" 

Specifically, the therapist advised the court that defendant had "allowed the 
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children to make the decision to visit or not visit their father[.] . . . This has 

allowed the children to have the power, which they have used at their discretion 

and there is now a need to put the power back in the parents' control." The 

therapist recommended the judge place a structure "in place to help with the 

adjustment process for each minor child. . . . This cannot be done if [plaintiff]

is not permitted to see the children as was initially scheduled in the divorce

agreement." 

Following the judge's receipt of this letter, he entered the December 19, 

2017 order challenged in this appeal. Paragraph three of the order stated as 

follows: "Based on the recommendation of [the therapist], [p]laintiff's parenting 

time under the terms of the parties['] . . . [MSA] is hereby reinstated to the parties 

shared [j]oint [l]egal [c]ustody with slight modifications to reduce future 

conflict and occasioned by the distance between the parties' respective 

residences." The order attached the therapist's December 11, 2017 letter, which 

according to its preamble, the judge had considered in addition to having 

conducted a telephone conference with counsel.2 

 

2 The record does not reflect that the judge scheduled another proceeding 

following the December 14, 2017 conference, as he had indicated. Therefore, 

we assume the December 19, 2017 order's mention of a telephonic conference 

referenced the December 14, 2017 event.
10 A-2480-17T2

I.

We defer to a trial judge's factfinding "when 

supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." 

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing 

Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J 474, 

484 (1974)). "[W]e do not weigh the evidence, assess 

the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about 

the evidence." Mountain Hill, LLC v. Twp. of 

Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498 (App. Div. 2008) 

(quoting State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997)). 

We also recognize the Family Part has "special 

jurisdiction and expertise in family matters," which 

often requires the exercise of reasoned discretion. 

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413. Thus, if we conclude there is 

satisfactory evidentiary support for the Family Part 

judge's findings, our "task is complete and [we] should 

not disturb the result." Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 

(1981) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 

(1964)).

[M.G. v. S.M., 457 N.J. Super. 286, 293 (App. Div. 

2018) (second alteration in original).]

Defendant argues the December 19, 2017 order was erroneous because it 

was entered over her objections without a plenary hearing or opportunity to be 

heard. She also argues the record lacked evidence to support the reinstatement 

of parenting time. We agree.

It is fundamental that "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or memorandum 

decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law

thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of 
11 A-2480-17T2

right[.]" R. 1:7-4(a); Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980); see also

Ronan v. Adely, 182 N.J. 103, 110-11 (2004) (finding the record in a child name 

change dispute "deficient to make a meaningful review" because "the trial court 

received no testimony from either of the parties and made no findings of fact. 

Additionally, the record [did] not contain a certification by the parties setting 

forth their respective reasons for or against the name change.") 

In custody cases, it is well settled that the court's 

primary consideration is the best interests of the 

children. Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 317 

(1997). The court must focus on the "safety, happiness, 

physical, mental and moral welfare" of the children. 

Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956). See also

P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193, 215 (App. Div. 1999) 

("In issues of custody and visitation '[t]he question is 

always what is in the best interests of the children, no 

matter what the parties have agreed to.'") (internal 

quotation marks omitted and alteration in original) 

(quoting Giangeruso v. Giangeruso, 310 N.J. Super. 

476, 479 (Ch. Div. 1997)). Custody issues are resolved 

using a best interests analysis that gives weight to the 

factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). V.C. v. M.J.B., 

163 N.J. 200, 227-28.

A party seeking to modify custody must 

demonstrate changed circumstances that affect the 

welfare of the children. Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 

115-16 (1978); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 51 N.J. Super. 276, 

287 (App. Div. 1958). A plenary hearing is required 

when the submissions show there is a genuine and 

substantial factual dispute regarding the welfare of the 

children, and the trial judge determines that a plenary 

hearing is necessary to resolve the factual dispute. 
12 A-2480-17T2

Shaw v. Shaw, 138 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App. Div.

1976); see Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 (1980) 

(holding "a party must clearly demonstrate the 

existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before 

a hearing is necessary," and noting that "[w]ithout such 

a standard, courts would be obligated to hold hearings 

on every modification application"). See also R. 5:8-6 

(requiring the court to "set a hearing date" if it "finds 

that the custody of children is a genuine and substantial 

issue").

In some cases, there is clearly a need for an 

evidentiary hearing to resolve custody or parenting time 

issues. See, e.g., P.T., 325 N.J. Super. at 215, 222 

(evidentiary hearing required prior to entry of order of 

joint custody and unsupervised visitation with father 

who had been accused of sexually abusing the child); 

Mackowski v. Mackowski, 317 N.J. Super. 8 (App.

Div. 1998) (holding that father's motion to transfer 

custody of sixteen-year-old daughter, who repeatedly 

expressed preference to live with father, should not 

have been decided without a plenary hearing); Fusco v. 

Fusco, 186 N.J. Super. 321 (App. Div. 1982) (holding 

that plenary hearing was necessary to determine nature 

and extent of visitation to be granted to father who was 

serving a thirty-two-year prison term for first-degree 

murder). See also Dorfman v. Dorfman, 315 N.J. 

Super. 511, 518 (App. Div. 1998) (noting that detailed 

and documented evidence demonstrating that "child 

was experiencing significant behavioral problems" 

warranted court intervention "to at least order an 

investigation of the problem"). In many cases, 

however, where the need for a plenary hearing is not so 

obvious, the threshold issue is whether the movant has 

made a prima facie showing that a plenary hearing is 

necessary. 
13 A-2480-17T2

[Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105-06 (App. Div. 

2007) (second alteration in original).]

We appreciate the motion judge's efforts to actively manage a difficult 

custody dispute without the necessity of successive, and undoubtedly costly, 

motion practice. However, the de jure suspension of plaintiff's parenting time

for excess of a year, and de facto for a greater period, constituted a changed 

circumstance requiring the motion judge to make findings and explain the 

reasons for reverting to the MSA's parenting time schedule. Even if the judge 

believed he was enforcing the MSA pursuant to Rule 1:10-3 and 5:3-7(a),

because he accepted the argument by plaintiff's counsel and the therapist's 

insinuation that defendant's conduct had hampered parenting time, defendant 

had a right to be heard and the judge owed the parties an explanation of his 

decision. Without insight into the judge's thought process, we are unable to 

conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the December 19, 

2017 order. 

For these reasons, we reverse and remand the matter for the judge to 

render findings of fact and conclusions of law. The judge shall provide both 

parties the opportunity to be heard through certification and then determine 

whether a plenary hearing is necessary before adjudicating the custody and 

parenting time issues in dispute. 
14 A-2480-17T2

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.