tefers lo the use of the company car as a “‘perquisite” (Comp. {| 27) tending to show the use of
the District car is a perk and not a right or a necessity. Even with the change in car status, Bohse
is still allowed to use a company car (o perform his job duties. Although this change may be
inconvenient for Bohse, it did not affect his job responsibilities, pay, benefits, or his future
opportunities. Therefore, I find the change in car status does not amount to adverse employment

action and should be dismissed.

For the aforementioncd reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

ENTER:

James B. Zagel Z
United States District Judge

pate: 10 Ase %0$



The District also argues that all claims except the change of car status claim should be
dismissed because they are not like or reasonably related 1o Bohse’s February 25, 2003 EEOC
charge. As a general rule, “a Title VJ plaintiff may bring only those claims that were included in
her EEOC charge” or that are like or reasonably related to those EEOC allegations. McKenzie v.
Hlinois DOT,, 92 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff's February 25, 2003 EEOC charge lists
only one act of retaliation - the change in car status. 1 agree with The District and find these
claims should be dismissed for this reason as well.

This leaves only Bohse’s claim that the District retaliated against him by changing the
status of his company car from class II to class ILL. The District argues this claim should
be dismissed because the change in Bohse’s car class status cannot be considered as an adverse
employment action. Onc element an employce must prove to establish a prima jacie case of
retaliation is that he suffered a materially adverse employment action, Hilt-Dyson v, City of
Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir, 2002). The Seventh Circuit has stated “not everything that
makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d
437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996). An adverse employment action is one that is materially adverse,
“meaning more than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Hift-Dyson
282 F.3d at 465. While an adverse employment action does not have to include a loss of
monetary benefits, Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 1987), the change must have a
drastic effect on the employce’s future opportunities, [ferrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d
742, 744 (7th Cir. 2002).

The change in car status from a class II to a class IL resulted in Bohse having to leave the

company car at work and use his personal car to travel back and forth from home. Bohse himself


“Minute Order Font (08°97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Tlinois

Name of Assigned Judge ¢ Sitting Judge if Other

or Magistrate Judge James B. Zagel than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 03 C 3879 DATE 12/10/2003
CASE MERLIN A. BOHSE vs. METROPOLITAN WATER RECLAMATION DIST
TITLE
[Un the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g,, plaintitf, defendant, 2rd party plaintitY, and (2) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
qa) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above. |
(2) o Brief in support of motion due __.
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion duc. Reply to answer brief due _
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on _ set for _at .
(3) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-sct forlon___set for____at .
(6) a Pretrial conterence[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on___eset for__ ___at .
(7) Oo Trial{set for/re-set for] on at.
(8) Oo |Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at.
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) CG Local Rule 41.1 ClFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2),

(io) of [Other docket entry] Defendant’s motion (11-1) to dismiss is granted.
(11) [For further detail sec order attached to the original minute order, |

No notices required, advised in open court, Document’

No notices required. snuer of notices Number.

Notices mailed hy judge's staff. DEC 1 6 2003

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION ae

MERLIN A. BOHSE, ye NS
oN
Plaintiff, we
v. No. 03 C 3879
Judge James B. Zagel

METROPOLITAN WATER
RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF
GREATER CHICAGO,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Merlin A. Bohse filed suit alleging retaliation and discrimination under Title VII
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Bohse is a civil engineer employed by
Defendant Mctropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago (“District”). Bohse
alleges that the District has retaliated against him for making several charges of discrimination
between December 28, 1995 and February 25, 2003. The discrimination charges made by Bohse
include claims filed with the BEOC and two complaints filed in Federal Court. The alleged acts
of discrimination and retaliation are as follows: (1) discrimination based on race and/or other
considerations that led to “lesser qualified persons” being promoted, (2) exclusion from
competing in a July 1997 promotional examination for principal civil cngineers, (3) exclusion
from competing in a Junc 2001 open examination for supervising civil engineers, and (4)
diminution of district car status from a class II to a class LIT vehicle.

The District now moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim, which would entitle him to relief. Conley v.

—

IS



Gibson, 355 US. 41, 45-46 (1957). ln reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must construe all
ajlegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded
facts and allegations as truc. Bontkowski v. First Nat'l Bank, 998 F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993).

The District argues that the allegations regarding the promotion of “lesser qualified
persons,” the exclusion from the promotional exam in July 1997, and the exclusion from the
open examination for supervising civil engineers in June 2001 should be dismissed as untimely.
A Title VII complainant is required to file any charges with the EEOC within 300 days of the
discriminatory action. Marlowe v. Bottarelli, 938 F.2d 807, 813 (7* Cir. 1991). With the
exception of the change of car status, the alleged acts of retaliation occurred more than 300 days
before Bohse’s February 25, 2003 EEOC charge was filed.

Bohse argues that since the violations have been continuing, they are not timebarred. To
support this argument, Bohse relies on Jones v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 42 F.3d
1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 1994), which allowed time extension under three theories for continuing
violations. Bohse attempts to apply two of those theories to his case, In Jones, the 7" Circuit did
allow time extensions when “the cmployer’s decision-making process takes place over a period
of time, making it difficult to determine the actual date of the allegedly disctiminatory act” and
when “an employcr covertly follows a practice of discrimination over a period of time.” fd.
Hlowever, these theories simply do not apply here. The promotion of “lesser qualified persons”
and the exclusions from the July 1997 and June 2001 examinations were neither part of a
decision-making process that took place over a period of time such that the actual date of
discrimination was difficult to determine nor were they covert. Since there are no legal grounds

for extending the 300 day time limit, I find these claims should be dismissed as untimely.