21

- 890

- pr Morales v. United States
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “ SUMMARY O RDER ” ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Squar e, in the 2 City of New York, on the 1 3 t h day of O c t o b e r , two thousand twenty

- two

. 3 4 PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK , 5 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, J R., 6 MYRNA PÉREZ
, 7 Circuit Judges

. 8

------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 JOSEPH DAVID MORALES , 10 11 Petitioner

- Appellant , 12 13

v. No. 21

- 890

- pr 14 15 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , 16 17 Respondent

- Appellee

. 18

------------------------------------------------------------------ 19 FOR PETITIONER

- APPELLANT: R ONALD P AUL H ART , E SQ ., 20 New York, NY

. 21 22 FOR RESPONDENT

- APPELLEE: K YLE A. W IRSHBA ( Stephen J. 232 Ritchin , on the brief ), Assistant 1 United States Attorneys, for 2 Damian Williams, United 3 States Attorney, Southern 4 District of New York, New 5 York, NY

. 6 7 Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern 8
District of New York ( Loretta A. Preska , Judge ). 9
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 10

AND DECREED that the order of the District Court is AFFIRMED

. 11
Joseph David Morales appeals from a March 26, 2021 order of the District 12
Court ( Preska , J. ) denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 , wh ich the District 13

Court construed as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis because Morales had 14

been released from custody while the motion was pending . On appeal, Morales 15
argues that the District Court should have granted the writ because he continues 16
to suffer legal consequences from his criminal convictions and because his trial 17
counsel provided ineffective assistance

. We assume familiarity with the 18
underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as 19

necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 20

“A writ of error coram nobis is an “extraordinary remedy , ” Kovacs v. 21

United States , 744 F. 3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted) , and 223 “relief under the writ is strictly limited to those cases in which errors

. . . of the 1
most fundamental character have rendered the proceeding itself irregular and 2

invalid , ” Foont v. United States , 93 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1996) (quotation marks 3
omitted). “A petitioner seeking c oram nobis relief must demonstrate that 4
1) there are circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice, 2) sound 5
reasons exist for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief, and 3) the petitioner 6
continues to suffer legal consequences from his conviction that may be remedied 7
by granting of the writ.” Kovacs , 744 F.3d at 49 (quotation marks omitted). 8
In denying Morales’s petition , the District Court cited his failure to show 9

that he continues to suffer any legal consequences from his conviction s

. Urging a 10
contrary conclusion, Morales claims that his conviction s will “hamper [him] 11

with

. . . civil disabilities and stigma that will cause serious and lasting harm, 12

not to mention the life

- long psychological effects of a criminal conviction and 13
ensuing sentence to Federal prison .” Appellant’s Br. 20

. We conclude that the 14

District Court did not e xceed its discretion when it refused to grant the writ on 15
the ground that Morales’s unsubstantiated , vague , and speculative claims f e ll 16

short of demonstrating “ a concrete threat that an erroneous conviction’s 17
lingering disabilities will cause serious harm.” Fleming v. United States , 146 F.3d 184 88, 91 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted)

. Neither “purely speculative 1
harms” nor “the stigma of a conviction” const itute sufficiently “serious harm” to 2

warrant relief. Id. at 90

- 91 (quotation marks omitted). 3

Morales’s failure to establish that he suffer s continued legal consequences 4

from his conviction s is reason alone to deny his petition

. S ee , e.g. , Fleming, 146 5

F.3d at 90

- 91

. But the District Court also considered and rejected his argument 6
that ineffective assistance of counsel compel s granting the writ

. On appeal, as in 7

the District Court , Morales identifies three grounds for his ineffective assistance 8

of counsel claim : f irst, that his counsel failed to object to the District Court’s 9
decision to allow a police officer to testify as both a fact and expert witness; 10

second, that his counsel failed to present an expert witness regarding the 11

identification of altered v ehicle i dentification n umbers (“VIN s ”) ; and t hird, that 12

his counsel recommend ed that Morales not testify on his own behalf

. S ee 13
Appellant’s Br. 15

- 16

. The District Court did not err in rejecting all three 14
grounds

. 15

First , counsel’s decision not to object to the police officer’s dual testimony 16
as both a fact and expert witness was not “ objectively unreasonable

. ” Kovacs , 17

744 F.3d at 49. We have described a similar record of dual testimony as “not 185 objectionable in principle

. ” United States v. Feliciano , 223 F.3d 102, 121 (2d Cir. 1
2000)

. H ere , the District Court exercised “ particular vigilance to ensure that the 2

witness’s dual role ” did not “ impair the jury’s ability properly to evaluate 3
credibility , ” by explaining to the jury where the expert portion of the officer’s 4
testimony ended and the fact portion began. United States v. Barrow , 400 F.3d 5
109, 124 (2d Cir. 2005). Morales fails to specify why the officer’s dual testimony 6
nonetheless merited an objection , or how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure 7
to object

. 8
We also reject Morales’s argument that counsel rendered ineffective 9
assistance by declining to call an expert witness on the identification of altered 10

VINs

. Courts considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 11
“especially deferential to defense attorneys’ decisions concerning which 12
witnesses to put before the jury.” Greiner v. Wells , 417 F.3d 305, 323 (2d Cir. 13
2005) ; see United States v. Luciano , 158 F.3d 655, 660 (2d Cir. 1998)

. Here , 14

Morales does not explain why counsel’s failure to call an expert witness 15
amounted to ineffective assistance or how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure. 16
Finally, we reject Morales’s argument that counsel re ndered ineffective 17
assistance by preventing Morales from testifying even though he wanted to do 186 so. See , e.g. , Appellant’s Br. 18 (“[C]ounsel decided that it was he, and not the 1
Appellant, who would make [the] decision [to testify].” ). B ecause Morales did 2

not make that claim before the District Court, we consider only his claim that 3
counsel “wrongly advise[d]” him about the decision to testify

. App’x 4 2. As to 4

that claim, we see no error. We have recognized that “ c ounsel should always 5

advise the defendant about the benefits and hazards of testifying and of not 6
testifying, and may strongly advise the course that counsel thinks best

. ” Brown 7

v. Artuz , 124 F. 3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1997). In addition , Morales has not 8

demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel’s advice

. 9

We have considered Morales ’s remaining arguments and conclude that 10
they are without merit or abandoned . For the foregoing reasons, the order of the 11

District Court is AFFIRMED

. 12

FOR THE COURT: 13 Catherine O ’ Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 14 15