Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's motion for judicial notice [doc, no, 22] is

granted in part and denied in part, and defendant’s motion for judicial notice and

estoppel, which is contained in its response to plaintiffs motion (doc. no. 24}, is granted

in part and denied in part.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

coer va Gy
su 27 2008 Cb Ae Tie,
HON. RONALD A. GUZMAN
United States District Judge



rendered, their motions are granted. To the extent they ask the Court to take notice of the

facts asserted in them, the motions are denied.

stoppel

In her first amended complaint, plaintiff secks a refund not only of the interest
and penalties that she contends were wrongly assessed for 1992, but of her
“Colverpayment of Federal Income Taxes” for that year. (First Am. Compl. at 2.) The
IRS argues that plaintiff is judicially estopped from arguing in this case that she overpaid
her 1992 taxes by her admission in the Tax Court case that she underpaid them by
$10,195.00,

Though the IRS invokes judicial estoppel, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
seems more apt. To apply that doctrine, four elements must be met:

(1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in

the prior litigation, (2) the issuc must have been actually litigated, (3) the

determination of the issue must have been essential to the final judgment,

and (4) the party against whom cstoppel is invoked must be fully

represented in the prior action.
Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). All of the
elements are prescnt here: the two proceedings involve the same parties (who, thus, were
fully represented in the prior procecding), the issue of plaintifi’s 1992 tax deficiency was
actually litigated and finally determined in the Tax Court proceeding, and plaintiff's first
amended complaint injects the deficiency issue into this suit. Having litigated her base

tax liability for 1992 to conclusion in the Tax Court, Thapedi cannot revisit the issue

here.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHER DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

FASTERN DIVISION
LLWELLYN GREENE-TITAPEDI,
Plaintiff,
No. 03 C 3294
ve Judge Ronald A. Guzman

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND_ ORDER

Liwellyn Greene-Thapedi filed this suit to force the government to refund
overpayments she allegedly made on her taxes. The case is before the Court on
plaintiff's motion for judicial notice and defendant's motion for judicial notice and
estoppel. For the reasons provided in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, both

parties’ motions are granted in part and denied in part.

Background
In June 1997, in a proceeding before the Tax Court, plaintiff stipulated and the
court determined, that she owed the government $10,195.00 for tax. year 1992. Greene-
Thapedi v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 126 T.C. 1, 2006 WT. 83125, at *2 (Tax Ct, Jan.
12, 2006). In December 1997, the government says, it issued to plaintiff a notice of
balance due. Jd. Plaintiff contends that she did not receive the notice and was unaware

that the deficiency had been finally assessed unti) July 2000, when she received a notice



of intent to levy assets from the IRS. Jd. According to that notice, plaintiff then owed a
total of $23,805.53 for the deficient taxes, intercst and penalties. Jd.

Of that amount, plaintiff paid $14,514.53: $10,195.00 for the deficiency and
$4,319.53 for interest that accrued between June 1992, when she admitted the deficiency,
and December 1997, when the government allegedly sent her the balance due notice. Jd.
at *2 & n.3. She also requested a hearing with respect to the proposed levy, which she
contended was improper because it was based on penalties and interest wrongly assessed.
dd. at *3. Sometime in 2001], the proposed levy was upheld. Zid.

In June 2001, plaintiff filed a petition with the Tax Court contesting the levy and
seeking a refund of the $4,319.53 interest payment she made for 1992. Jd. at *3-4.

At some point thereafter, the IRS extinguished her 1992 deficiency by offsetting
against it a $10,633.00 overpayment plaintiff made for tax ycar 1999, Id, at *4. The Tax
Court denied plaintiff's subsequent request to add to her petition a claim challenging the
offset. Id. As a result, in May 2003, plaintiff filed this suit for a refund of her 1999
overpayment. /d. at *5.

In January 2006, the Tax Court dismissed plaintiff's petition because: (1) the
government had abandoned the Icvy action afler the offsct extinguished the 1992 tax
liability on which it was based, thereby mooting plaintiffs challenge to it; and (2) it
lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs request for a refund of her alleged interest
overpayment for 1992. Jd. at *4-7, 13.

Given those developments, this Court has construed plaintiff's claim for the 1999
overpayment, which was climinated by the offsct, as one for a refund of the alleged 1992

overpayment.


Judicial Notice

Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of pleadings and briefs the parties
filed in the Tax Court proceedings. The IRS asks the Court to take judicial notice of two
of the Tax Court’s decisions. The Court may take judicial notice of matters that are
either “(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
be reasonably questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b).

The fact that the documents were filed and the decisions were rendered is capable
of accurate and ready determination by reference to the Tax Court docket. However, the
facts asserted in thosc documents and decisions are not.’ See Opoka v. INS, 94 F.3d 392,
395 (7th Cir, 1996) (stating that a court can take judicial notice of “[the] fact that [a]
decision has been made” by another court, but not “the rcasons underlying [the]
decision”); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d
Cir, 1992) (“A court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court not for
the truth of the matters asscrtcd in the other litigation, but rather to cstablish the fact of
such litigation and related filings.” (quotation omitted), Thus, to the extent the parties

ask the Court to take notice of the fact that the filings were made and the decisions were

‘In her reply brief, plaintilf says that “{there are certain judicial and other admissions in
the court records in question . . . |of] which the court is empowered to take judicial
notice.” (Pl.’s Reply Def.’s Resp. at 1.) Plaintiff does not, however, identify those
admissions or explain why they are appropriate subjects for judicial notice. Absent that
information, the Court has no reason to depart from the general rule that the contents of
documents filed in other proceedings are not subject to judicial notice.

3