IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

February 6, 2006 Session

JAMES TORRENCE, ET AL. v. THE HIGGINS FAMILY LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP, ET AL.

 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Polk County

No. 7101 Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor

No. E2005-1549-COA-R3-CV - FILED APRIL 28, 2006 

James Torrence and J.T. Lemons (“the plaintiffs”) were lessees of a four-acre tract of land in Polk

County. During the original term of the lease, their lessor transferred acreage, which includes the

four acres under lease, to a family partnership, The Higgins Family Limited Partnership (“the

Higgins Family”). During an extended term of the plaintiffs’ lease, the Higgins Family, without the

consent or knowledge of the plaintiffs, granted Hunter Properties Inc., an option to purchase a 370-

acre tract – which includes the four acres – for $1,350,000. Upon subsequent written notice of the

option to the plaintiffs by the Higgins Family, the lessees attempted to exercise a right of first refusal

set forth in their lease. The right of first refusal provides that “[s]hould the Landlord, during the

lease term, or any extended term, elect to sell all or any portion of the Leased Property, the Tenant

shall have the right of first refusal to meet any bona fide offer of sale on the same terms and

conditions of such offer.” The plaintiffs assert that the right of first refusal extends to the entire 370-

acre tract. The Higgins Family refused to sell the lessees the property and this suit followed. The

trial court held that the lessees had properly exercised their right of first refusal and were entitled to

purchase the property for $1,350,000. Hunter Properties filed a notice of appeal and all parties raise

issues. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

CHARLES D.SUSANO,JR.,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HERSCHEL P.FRANKS,P.J.,

and D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J., joined.

James T. Williams and Robert F. Parsley, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Hunter

Properties, Inc.

James F. Logan, Jr., Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellees, James Torrence and J.T. Lemons.
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H. Chris Trew, Athens, Tennessee, for the appellees, The Higgins Family Limited Partnership,

Kenneth D. Higgins, Jr., and Jane Higgins Elliott.

OPINION

I.

On March 1, 1989, Jane Webb Higgins leased to the plaintiffs a four-acre tract of property

for a period of three years. The premises were described in the lease agreement as follows:

That property located at or near the intersection of U.S. Highway #64

and Matlock ValleyRoad (Benton-Parksville Road) together with the

improvements located thereon which are now being used by the

Tenant as a service station, deli, dance pavilion, whitewater rafting

business (in the old motel) and an overnight camping facility (Sugar

Loaf Campground), which property consists of an area that is to be

marked by boundary stakes by the Landlord and Tenant, hereinafter

called the “Leased Property”.

The lease contains the following pertinent provision:

Tenant’s Option to Purchase – Right of First Refusal. Should the

Landlord, during the lease term, or any extended term, elect to sell all

or any portion of the Leased Property, the Tenant shall have the right

of first refusal to meet any bona fide offer of sale on the same terms

and conditions of such offer. Upon the Tenant’s failure to meet such

bona fide offer, within thirty (30) days after notice thereof from the

Landlord, the Landlord shall be free to sell the Leased Property to

such third person in accordance with the terms and conditions of such

offer.

(Underlining in original; emphasis added). The lease term was extended on more than one occasion,

with the last extension being through December 31, 2003. 

In March, 1998, the plaintiffs’ lessor, Jane Webb Higgins, transferred her interest in

approximately 210 acres of real estate – which included the leased property – to the Higgins Family.

The partners of the Higgins Family were Mrs. Higgins’ children, Kenneth D. Higgins, Jr., and Jane

Higgins Elliott. The children owned an additional 160-acre tract of land adjacent to the 210-acre

parcel.

In 2002, the Higgins Family decided to market the combined 370-acre parcel of property for

sale. On April 8, 2003, the Higgins Family, during the term of the last extension of the plaintiffs’

lease, entered into an option agreement (“the option agreement”) with Hunter Properties, granting
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it the option to purchase the 370-acre tract for $1,350,000. The plaintiffs were not parties to this

option and were not aware that the Higgins Family intended to grant it. The option agreement states

that the option will remain in effect for four months at no charge to Hunter Properties. The option

agreement further provides that Hunter Properties is granted the right to extend the option for two

additional four-month periods, upon payment of $10,000 for each extension.

On April 16, 2003, the Higgins Family provided the plaintiffs with a written “Notice of Bona

Fide Offer of Purchase,” which states, in pertinent part, as follows:

Pursuant to numerical twenty (20) of the original lease agreement by

and between JANE WEBB HIGGINS as “landlord” and JAMES

TORRENCE AND J.T. LEMONS, as “tenant” dated March 1, 1989,

and the extensions of the term of that lease entered into thereafter, the

landlord hereby gives notice to the tenant of a bona fide offer of

purchase of the property presently leased by tenant.

The property presently under lease to tenant is only a portion of the

property upon which the offer to purchase has been received, but the

offer in fact, encompasses all of the property presently leased to

tenant.

The owners of all the property have elected to accept the bona fide

offer and sell all of this property, including the portion presently

leased to the tenant.

Under numerical paragraph twenty (20) of the original lease

mentioned above, the landlord hereby gives notice to the tenant of the

receipt of the bona fide offer and the election of the landlord and

owners to accept such offer.

The offer is in fee simple for certain parcels or tracts of land,

containing 370 acres more or less, situated in Polk County, (Benton),

Tennessee. The consideration for the option is that the purchaser is

granted four (4) months at no cost within which to exercise the option

to purchase, then if the option has not been exercised within the first

four month period of time, the purchaser shall pay Ten Thousand

dollars ($10,000) for an additional four month option and if not

exercised within that period of time, the purchaser shall pay an

additional Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) for an additional four

month option. If the option to purchase is in fact exercised any sums

paid mentioned herein are applied as a credit toward the entire

purchase price at the closing. If the purchaser exercises the option,

the total price to the paid is One Million Three Hundred Fifty
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Thousand dollars ($1,350,000) payable at the closing. There are

additional terms set forth in the offer to purchase regarding notices,

default, owner’s warranties, assignment, damage to property, survey,

availability of utilities, closing, recording of option, parties bound,

condemnation, inspection and title, which the landlord will share with

the tenant if requested.

Pursuant to numerical paragraph twenty (20) of the original lease

mentioned above, this shall be deemed notice to tenant of tenant’s

right of first refusal to meet all terms of the bona fide offer mentioned

herein within thirty (30) days of this notice. If tenant does not

exercise its right of first refusal, the landlord is free to sell the leased

property to the third person having set forth the bona fide offer to

purchase in accordance with the terms and conditions of such offer.

(Capitalization in original; emphasis added).

On May 13, 2003, within 30 days of the receipt of the notice, the plaintiffs sent a letter (“the

Letter”) to the Higgins Family indicating that they were exercising their right of first refusal:

Re: Notice of Exercise of Right of First Refusal under Lease

Dated March 1, 1989 (the “Lease”) by and between The

Higgins Family Limited Partnership (successor-in-interest to

the interests of Jane Webb Higgins, deceased) (“Landlord”)

and J.T. Lemons and James Torrence (collectively, the

“Tenant”)

Dear Kenny [Higgins],

The undersigned, as Tenant under the above-referenced Lease, does

hereby provide its notice that it is exercising its Right of First Refusal

under Paragraph 20 of the Lease in accord with Landlord’s Notice of

Bona Fide Offer Of Purchase dated April 16, 2003 (the “Landlord’s

Offer Notice”) with respect to 370 + acres located in Benton, Polk

County, Tennessee (the “Property”) which Property includes the

leased premises of approximately 4 + acres and approximately 366 +

acres of additional land.

The Tenant does hereby request all information with respect to the

offer (the “Offer”) that is set forth in the Landlord’s Offer Notice,

including but not limited to information regarding the option that is

part of the Offer. Pursuant to the terms of the Offer set forth in the

Landlord’s Offer Notice, the Tenant is prepared to and desires to
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enter into agreements with the Landlord on the terms of the Offer set

forth in the Landlord’s Offer Notice.

Please execute a copy of this letter where indicated below signifying

Landlord’s acknowledgment of the exercise of the Right of First

Refusal by the Tenant and Landlord’s acknowledgment of the rights

of the Tenant to purchase the Property according to the terms of the

Offer set forth in the Landlord’s Offer [N]otice upon execution of

appropriate documentation. Thank you for your attention to this

matter.

Sincerely,

Tenant

/s/ J.T. Lemons

/s/ James Torrence

As a part of the transmittal to the Higgins family, the plaintiffs included a separate unsigned

document (“the acknowledgment document”), soliciting the acknowledgment oftheHiggins Family

as follows:

The undersigned, as Landlord under the Lease, does hereby ratify and

affirm the terms of the Lease, acknowledges that the Lease is in full

force and effect, acknowledges the Lease shall remain in full force

and effect (provided Tenant continues the payments of rent and

performance of Tenant’s obligations under the Lease) for the period

that the Offer set forth in the Landlord’s Offer Notice shall remain

outstanding and acknowledges the rights of the Tenant to purchase

the Property under and according to the terms of the Offer set forth in

the Landlord’s Offer Notice. The undersigned, as Landlord under the

Lease, does hereby acknowledge that the rights of the Tenant to

purchase the Property shall have priority over any other purchaser and

shall continue for the time parameters set forth in the Offer. The

undersigned further agrees that the Tenant may record a copy of this

letter (or a similar document in recordable form) in the appropriate

deed recording offices to evidence Tenant’s rights to purchase the

Property and the undersigned agrees to promptly (within three (3)

days of Tenant’s request) execute a recordable document to such

effect if requested to do so by the Tenant. Executed this ___ day of

May, 2003.
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The following day, on May 14, 2003, an attorney for the plaintiffs faxed to the Higgins

Family a confirmation that the plaintiffs were exercising their right offirst refusal. Two weeks later,

counsel for the Higgins Family sent a letter to the plaintiffs, informing them that the Higgins Family

would not accept the plaintiffs’ “offer,” contending that the plaintiffs “did not exercise the right of

first refusal in a proper and timely manner” in that it added “a material and substantial change to the

offer received from Hunter Properties,” i.e., it “included an extension of the term of the Lease

beyond its current expiration of December 31, 2003,” and, accordingly, the “offer” was not “on the

same terms and conditions of the offer of Hunter Properties.” The letter then proceeded to inform

the plaintiffs that the Higgins Family intended to sell the entire 370-acre tract to Hunter Properties.

The following week, the plaintiffs’ then-attorney sent a letter to the attorney for the Higgins Family,

informing him that the plaintiffs “are dead serious about purchasing the Higgins Family property.”

The Higgins Family extended the term of Hunter Properties’ option on August 7, 2003, and

again on December 8, 2003, when, on both occasions, Hunter Properties paid it $10,000. 

On March 5, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the trial court against the Higgins

Family and Hunter Properties, seeking a determination as to the respective rights of the parties to the

370 acres at issue and, alternatively, “to recover damages against . . . Hunter Properties . . . for

procuring a breach of contract and/or [to recover damages against the Higgins Family] for breach

of contract.” In addition, the plaintiffs deposited $20,000 with the clerk of court, and asserted that

they were doing so to indicate “their willingness and desire to close the purchase of the subject

property at the stated purchase price” of $1,350,000. 

After filing answers and counterclaims, Hunter Properties and the Higgins Family each filed

a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs had “no right to purchase the

property at issue,” due to the plaintiffs’ alleged failure to properly exercise their right of first refusal.

The plaintiffs then filed their own motion for partial summary judgment, contending that they were,

in fact, entitled to purchase the 370 acres.

On February 15, 2005, the trial court entered an order granting the plaintiff’s motion for

partial summary judgment, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:

The matter is before the Court essentially on stipulated facts. Though

the parties may have differences on certain factual issues, the parties

announced in open Court that it is the opinion of each party that the

material and necessary facts for disposition of the Motions for Partial

Summary Judgment are undisputed. Specifically the parties

stipulated and acknowledge the authenticity of the following

documents.

1. The Lease of the plaintiffs which contained a Right of First

Refusal is as set forth in Paragraph 20 of said Lease . . . .
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2. A Standard Option Agreement which was entered into between

[the Higgins Family] and [Hunter Properties] on April 8, 2003, . . . .

3. The Notice of Bona Fide Offer of purchase from [the Higgins

Family] to the plaintiffs which was mailed on April 16, 2003, . . . .

4. The letter dated May 2003 bearing the signature of the plaintiffs

which was returned to [the Higgins Family] in a timely manner. . . .

There was accompanying the two signed pages an acknowledgment

of receipt form . . . .

5. Counsel for the plaintiffs returned via telefax . . . a fax letter dated

May 14, 2003 . . . . 

6. The next written communication between the parties is the letter

of counsel for [the Higgins Family] which is dated May 30, 2003, . .

. . 

7. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s letter ofJune 5, 2003 constituted the response

of [the plaintiffs] . . . .

* * *

The Court further announced that the contract being the Leases and

the letters involved in this matter are unambiguous. The Court

further announced that the first two pages of [the plaintiffs’ letter to

the Higgins Family dated May 13, 2003] was a signed acceptance by

the plaintiffs, and [the attached acknowledgment document] was not

a condition precedent to acceptance of the Right of First Refusal and

[that document], at the most, may have been an offer on a separate

part or separate issue that existed between the parties but was not a

condition precedent. The contract with the lease and the Right of

First Refusal which was accepted unconditionally by the plaintiffs in

this case is enforceable and their Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment is granted. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to purchase this

property at the price negotiated by [Hunter Properties].

On June 10, 2005, the trial court entered an order, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, stating that

the primary issue in the case centered on the plaintiffs’ right to purchase the subject property and that

there was “no just reason for delay of entry of final judgment on this issue.” From this judgment,

Hunter Properties filed a notice of appeal. 
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II.

In deciding whether a grant ofsummary judgment is appropriate, courts are to determine “if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. In this case, the parties

announced to the trial court that “the material and necessary facts for disposition of the Motions for

Partial Summary Judgment are undisputed.”

Since a motion for summary judgment presents a pure question of law, our review is de novo

on the record of the proceedings below with no presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s

judgment. Gonzales v. Alman Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). 

III.

The plaintiffs, by way of a motion to dismiss this appeal, challenge the right of Hunter

Properties to raise issues regarding the propriety of the trial court’s action. The plaintiffs point out

that the trial court’s order required the Higgins Family to convey the subject property to the

plaintiffs; thus, according to the plaintiffs, the Higgins Family is an “indispensable party” to an

appeal challenging the propriety of that decision. Because, so the argument goes, the Higgins

Family, an “indispensable party,” did not file a notice of appeal, Hunter Properties cannot raise

issues that directly bear upon the rights of an indispensable party. In essence, the plaintiffs are

contending that, before Hunter Properties could raise these issues, the Higgins Family had to pursue

an appeal by way of a separate notice of appeal. 

The plaintiffs’ argument is bottomed on a false premise – that an aggrieved party, here the

Higgins Family, must file a notice of appeal before issues pertaining to it can be raised. This is

simply not true. Under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e), “[a]n appeal as of right to the . . . Court of Appeals

. . . shall be taken by timely filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court . . . .” The timely

filing of a notice of appeal, by any party involved in the trial court litigation, vests the Court of

Appeals with jurisdiction to hear and resolve all issues thereafter raised, not only the issues raised

by the party filing the notice of appeal but also the issues raised by any other party aggrieved by

some action of the trial court. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(a). In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 996 S.W.2d 803

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), we stated the following:

As a general rule, a party to an appeal may present any question of

law for this court’s review. Rule 13(a) governs this court’s scope of

review and provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Rule

3(e) [addressing waiver of certain issues in jury trials], any question

of law may be brought up for review and relief by any party.”

T.R.A.P. 13(a). In its comment on rule 13(a), the advisory

commission explained that
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this subdivision rejects use of the notice of appeal as

a review-limiting device. In federal practice the

notice of appeal has limited review in two principal

ways. Some courts have limited the questions an

appellant may urge on review to those affecting the

portion of the judgment specified in the notice of

appeal. However, since the principal utility of the

notice of appeal is simply to indicate a party’s

intention to take an appeal, this limitation seems

undesirable. The federal courts have also limited the

issues an appellee may raise on appeal in the absence

of the appellee’s own notice of appeal. Here again,

since neither the issues presented for review nor the

arguments in support of those issues are set forth in

the notice of appeal, there seems to be no good reason

for so limiting the questions an appellee may urge on

review. The result of eliminating any requirement

that an appellee file the appellee’s own notice of

appeal is that once any party files a notice of appeal

the appellate court may consider the case as a whole.

Id. at 810-11(emphasis added; bracketing in original). See also Edwards v. Hunt, 635 S.W.2d 696,

698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that “[i]t was the intention of Rule 13 TRAP that only one notice

of appeal be filed”); Scott v. Noland Co., No. 03A01-9502-CV-00072, 1995 WL 440375, at *1 n.1

(Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed July 26, 1995) (holding that “[a] party who does not file a notice of appeal

can still raise issues in its brief”); Glidden v. Glidden, No. 86-320-II, 1987 WL 9452, at *2 (Tenn.

Ct. App. M.S., filed April 16, 1987) (holding that “once an appeal has been taken from a final order

pursuant to [Tenn. R. App. P.] 3, any question of law or fact involved in the case as a whole may be

considered by the appellate court”).

The Special Workers’ Compensation Panel of the Supreme Court was faced with a somewhat

similar situation in Hughes v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, in which the defendant utility appealed

the judgment of the trial court, after which the Second Injury Fund, another party to the case, raised

an issue on appeal. Id., No. W2000-01056-WC-R3-CV, 2001 WL 468581, at *1 (Tenn. Sp.

Workers’ Comp. Panel, filed May 3, 2001). The plaintiff argued that the Second Injury Fund did not

have standing to participate in the appeal because it did not file a notice of appeal. Id., at *3. The

panel rejected that argument, noting that Tenn. R. App. P. 13(a) does not require separate appeals.

The panel held that “[a]ny question of law may be brought up for review by any party once a party

has appealed.” Id.

The notice of appeal filed by Hunter Properties brought with it, not only Hunter Properties

and the plaintiffs, but the Higgins Family as well. All were properly before the trial court and, by
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virtue of Hunter Properties’ notice of appeal, all are now properly before us. All parties are allowed

to raise such issues as they see fit.

IV.

A.

Hunter Properties contends – and the Higgins Family supports its contention – that the trial

court erred in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and in holding that the

plaintiffs were entitled to purchase the whole 370-acre tract of land. Hunter Properties raises the

following three issues:

1. Did the trial court err in determining that the plaintiffs properly

exercised their right of first refusal?

2. Even if the plaintiffs properly exercised their right of first refusal,

should they be prevented from purchasing the subject property due to

their failure to satisfy the terms of the option agreement?

3. Are the plaintiffs entitled to purchase the entire 370-acre parcel of

land, as opposed to the four-acre parcel that had been leased to them?

We will address each issue in turn.

B.

Hunter Properties argues that the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiffs were entitled

to purchase the subject property because, according to Hunter Properties, the plaintiffs failed to

properly exercise their right of first refusal. Hunter Properties points out that the right of first refusal

contained in the lease agreement requires the plaintiffs “to meet any bona fide offer of sale on the

same terms and conditions of such offer.” When the plaintiffs exercised their right of first refusal

in the Letter, the plaintiffs included with the Letter the acknowledgment document seeking the

acknowledgment of the Higgins Family to various things, including the Higgins Family’s assent to

the proposition that “the Lease shall remain in full force and effect . . . for the period that the Offer

set forth in the Landlord’s Offer Notice shall remain outstanding.” According to Hunter Properties,

the addition of the acknowledgment document had the effect of varying the terms and conditions of

Hunter Properties’ offer, thereby invalidating the plaintiffs’ attempted exercise of the right of first

refusal.

A right of first refusal “limits the right of the owner to dispose freely of his property by

compelling him to offer it first to the party who has the first right to buy.” Koella v. McHargue, 976

S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. Herren, No. 88-160-II, 1988 WL

119278, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Nov. 10, 1988)). “[T]he party exercising the right of first
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refusal must strictly match the terms of the third party’s offer, . . . .” In re New Era Resorts, 238

B.R. 381, 385 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1999):

An acceptance that fails to mirror an offer is no acceptance at all, but

is a rejection of the offer and a counter-offer. The property owner

may accept the counter-offer, but is no longer bound by the right of

first refusal because that right lapses when the holder fails to accept

the offer.

Id. at 386 (internal citations omitted).

Hunter Properties contends that the plaintiffs violated the “mirror image rule” by including

terms in their attempted acceptance of the Higgins Family’s offer that did not match the terms of the

offer made by Hunter Properties. We disagree.

The acknowledgment document is on a separate piece of paper. It does not state that its terms

are a part of the terms of the plaintiffs’ exercise of their right of first refusal. By the same token, the

Letter does not state that the plaintiffs’ acceptance of the offer of the Higgins Family is conditioned

upon the Higgins Family agreeing to the requests set forth in the acknowledgment document. In a

straightforward manner, the Letter recites that the plaintiffs

as Tenant under the above-referenced Lease, does hereby provide its

notice that it is exercising its Right of First Refusal under Paragraph

20 of the Lease in accord with Landlord’s Notice of Bona Fide Offer

Of Purchase dated April 16, 2003 (the “Landlord’s Offer Notice”)

with respect to 370 + acres located in Benton, Polk County,

Tennessee (the “Property”) which Property includes the leased

premises of approximately 4 + acres and approximately 366 + acres

of additional land.

As can be seen, the Letter does not state, expressly or by implication, that if the Higgins Family does

not agree to the requested extension of the lease, the plaintiffs’ acceptance, as set forth above, is

withdrawn, or null and void, or other than fully and completely valid and enforceable.

While it is obvious that the plaintiffs wanted the Higgins Family to sign the acknowledgment

document in order to have written proof of various things – including that the plaintiffs could

continue to occupy the four acres beyond the period of the then-existing lease extension – we find

nothing in the plaintiffs’ correspondence of May 13, 2003, that constitutes the addition of a new term

or provision to the offer of the Higgins Family to sell the 370 acres on the terms of the offer made

to the Higgins Family by Hunter Properties.

We hold that the plaintiffs properly exercised their right of first refusal by indicating their

willingness to match the terms of the offer of Hunter Properties to buy the 370 acres. In short, the
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plaintiffs did “strictly match the terms” of the option agreement when they exercised their right of

first refusal. Id. at 385. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s decision holding that the

plaintiffs properly exercised their right of first refusal.

 C.

Hunter Properties contends that, even if the plaintiffs properly exercised the right of first

refusal, they should not be permitted to purchase the subject property because of their failure to

satisfy the terms of the option. The option gave Hunter Properties two opportunities to extend the

option period, provided it made a timely payment of $10,000 for each extension. The plaintiffs did

not make a $10,000 payment to the Higgins Family by either August 8, 2003, or December 8, 2003

(the deadlines for extending each of the option periods). Therefore, according to Hunter Properties,

this failure by the plaintiffs to meet the requirements of the option vitiates their right to purchase the

property.

The position of Hunter Properties misses the mark. The right of first refusal in the lease is

triggered by a third party’s offer to buy the property. When Hunter Properties indicated to the

Higgins Family that it was interested in purchasing the 370-acre tract, the Higgins Family, in

violation of the plaintiffs’ right of first refusal, granted Hunter Properties an unqualified option. In

notifying the plaintiffs of the relationship it had developed with Hunter Properties with respect to

the property, the Higgins Family treated the option to purchase as if it were an offer to purchase.

This is clear from the Higgins Family’s “Notice of Bona Fide Offer of Purchase.” (Emphasis added).

Under the right of first refusal, the plaintiffs had to match the “offer” part of the deal between the

Higgins Family and Hunter Properties. This the plaintiffs did. The plaintiffs did not have to meet

the option part of the deal. They actually did more than simply assent to enter into an option to buy

the property; they made an outright acceptance ofthe “offer.” While the plaintiffs, in exercising their

right of first refusal, asked for information regarding the option granted to Hunter Properties, this

request for information does not change the fact that the plaintiffs agreed to buy the property for

$1,350,000. The Higgins Family, in notifying the plaintiffs of its dealings with Hunter Properties,

chose to bypass the option part of the deal and treat it as if it were an outright offer to purchase. The

Higgins Family said, in effect, “we have an offer for the property and here is the offer. Will you

match it?” The plaintiffs clearly responded “yes.”

The Higgins Family ultimately offered to sell the property to the plaintiffs as it was required

to do by the terms of the lease. The plaintiffs’ acceptance of that offer created a binding contract.

The option – a grant to Hunter Properties that the Higgins Family was without authority to make –

is a “red herring.” It is simply not material to the issue of whether the plaintiffs matched the “offer”

part of Hunter Properties’ option.

D.

Finally, Hunter Properties argues that, even if the plaintiffs properly exercised their right of

first refusal, they were only entitled to purchase the four acres which were the subject of the lease,
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rather than the entire 370-acre tract of land. Our review of the record reveals a fatal deficiency with

respect to this issue; it was never raised below by Hunter Properties or the Higgins Family. It is

well-settled that issues not raised at the trial court level may not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Simpson v. Frontier Cmty. Credit Union, 810 S.W.2d 147, 153 (Tenn. 1991). However, even had

this issue been raised, we doubt that it would have had merit. We note that the “Notice of Bona Fide

Offer of Purchase” that the Higgins Family sent to the plaintiffs – after detailing the terms of the

“offer of purchase” by Hunter Properties – recites that the plaintiff’s right of first refusal extends to

“all terms of the bona fide offer mentioned [in the Notice].” Since the “offer of purchase” pertains

to all of the 370 acres, and not just the premises leased to the plaintiffs, we do not understand how

it can be seriously argued that the tenant’s right of first refusal only extended to the leased premises.

It is clear to us that the Higgins Family – in drafting the Notice to the plaintiffs – interpreted the

“right of first refusal” language in the lease to encompass the entire 370 acres.

V.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. This case is remanded to the trial court for

enforcement of that court’s judgment and for the collection of costs assessed below, all pursuant to

applicable law. Costs on appeal are taxed half to Hunter Properties, Inc., and half to the Higgins

Family Limited Partnership.

_______________________________

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE