No. 188 March 27, 2024 599

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 

STATE OF OREGON

Christine MASON, 

an individual,

Plaintiff-Respondent

Cross-Appellant,

v.

Lavonne GRIFFIN-VALADE, 

Oregon Secretary of State,

Defendant-Appellant

Cross-Respondent,

and

Eric RICHARDSON, 

Gary Wilhelms, and Chris Telfer,

Intervenors-Appellants

Cross-Respondents.

Marion County Circuit Court

22CV42660; A181565

Jennifer K. Gardiner, Judge.

Argued and submitted February 21, 2024.

Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant Attorney General, 

argued the cause for appellant-cross-respondent, Lavonne 

Griffin-Valade. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, 

Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Daniel Meek argued the cause and filed the brief for 

intervenors-appellants-cross-respondents, Eric Richardson, 

Gary Wilhelms, and Chris Telfer.

Steven C. Berman argued the cause for respondent-crossappellant. Also on the brief were Lydia Anderson-Dana and 

Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C.

Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and 

Jacquot, Judge.

JOYCE, J.
600 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

Reversed and remanded on appeal; cross-appeal dismissed as moot.
Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 601

JOYCE, J.

Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution 

requires proposed amendments to the constitution to be submitted to voters in a manner that allows each amendment to 

be “voted on separately.” Initiative petition 2024-14 (IP 14) 

is a proposed amendment to the constitution that aims to 

replace the current framework for redrawing state legislative districts after each federal census with a framework 

better able to minimize partisanship. It is a multifaceted 

proposal that revolves around the creation of an independent 

commission tasked with drawing district boundaries according to specified mapping criteria. Among other things, IP 14 

would insulate the commission from outside interference by 

limiting the legislature’s ability to pass laws concerning the 

commission’s operation and by imposing a number of qualifications and disqualifications for commissioners based on the 

political affiliations and activities of the commissioners and 

their family members. It also establishes procedural, budgetary, and staffing provisions necessary to carry out the 

day-to-day operation of the commission. The question before 

us is whether this multifaceted initiative complies with our 

constitution’s “separate vote” requirement. We conclude that 

it does.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The chief petitioners filed the prospective petition 

for IP 14 with the Secretary of State. Plaintiff submitted 

comments to the secretary, asserting that IP 14 failed to 

comply with the separate-vote requirement. The secretary 

disagreed, concluding that IP 14 conformed to all procedural requirements of the constitution. Plaintiff then initiated this proceeding, challenging the secretary’s determination and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial 

court allowed chief petitioners to intervene in opposition to 

plaintiff’s claims.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing on those motions, the court ruled 

that IP 14 violated the separate-vote requirement, granting plaintiff’s motion in part and denying the secretary’s 

motion. The court stayed its judgment pending the outcome 
602 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

of an appeal, and it denied plaintiff’s request for additional 

declaratory and injunctive relief, which would have prevented IP 14 from continuing through the initiative process 

while awaiting the resolution of an appeal.

The secretary and intervenors appeal, challenging the denial of their summary-judgment motions and 

the granting in part of plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff crossappeals, challenging the denial of the additional declaratory 

and injunctive relief described above.

There are no factual disputes in this case; therefore, 

the question of whether IP 14 complies with the separatevote requirement is an issue of law that we review for legal 

error. See Anantha v. Clarno, 302 Or App 196, 200, 461 P3d 

282 (2020) (applying that standard in an analogous context). We ultimately conclude that the court erred in ruling 

that IP 14 violated the separate-vote requirement, and we 

reverse and remand the judgment on that basis, which renders plaintiff’s cross-appeal moot.

II. THE PROVISIONS OF IP 14

In the words of its preamble, IP 14 aims to prevent 

gerrymandering by establishing “an independent commission to draw fair and impartial districts so that every vote 

matters.” It contrasts its proposed framework with the current one, in which “Oregon politicians draw the boundaries for their own state legislative districts.” To accomplish 

its goal, IP 14’s provisions are detailed and cover various 

aspects of the commission’s operation.

First, IP 14 would repeal Article IV, section 6,1

 of 

the Oregon Constitution and replace it with a provision consisting of 13 subsections. The new section would establish 

the Citizens Redistricting Commission made up of 12 commissioners, and it would authorize the Secretary of State to 

adopt rules to ensure the commission’s effectiveness and to 

initiate a process to allow individuals to apply to the commission. It would also establish the qualifications and disqualifications for commissioners. For example, with some 

exceptions, to qualify for the commission, applicants must 

1 Article IV, section 6, sets out the current process for defining and apportioning legislative districts.
Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 603

be eligible to vote and must have been an Oregon resident 

for the preceding two years, have been registered with the 

same political party (or unaffiliated) for the last three years, 

and have voted in two of the last three general or tribal elections. In contrast, a person is disqualified from the board if, 

within three years of their application, the person or their 

close family members have been:

•	 A holder of or candidate for elective office;

•	 An officer, employee, or paid consultant of a political 

party;

•	 A member of a political party central committee;

•	 An employee or contractor for a campaign committee for 

federal or state office;

•	 A registered lobbyist;

•	 A paid congressional or state legislative employee;

•	 A member of an elected official’s staff or a contractor of 

an elected official; or

•	 An individual who has contributed more in a calendar 

year to any single candidate for federal or state office 

than the amount allowed per election by federal law for 

contributions to federal candidates.

Additionally, after a commissioner’s term of service, they are 

temporarily prohibited from seeking elected office, working 

for an official appointed by the state or federal legislature, 

serving as a consultant for a state or federal legislative candidate, and acting as a lobbyist.

The new section 6 would also establish a panel to 

review applicants for the commission, which would identify a pool of qualified candidates, of which a third would 

be members of the largest political party, a third would be 

members of the second largest party, and a third would be 

members of neither of those parties. From that pool, the 

Secretary of State would randomly select six commissioners 

(two from each category listed above), and those six commissioners would select six additional commissioners (again, 

two from each category listed above). The new section would 

authorize the governor to remove commissioners in very 
604 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

limited circumstances, and it would provide for the filling of 

vacancies.

Additionally, the new section 6 would allow the 

commission to hire necessary staff and consultants, and it 

would authorize the Secretary of State to provide staff and 

office support to the commission. It would authorize per diem 

compensation for commissioners and protect commissioners 

from negative employment consequences due to their participation in the commission. It would require the legislature 

to fund the commission as necessary to fulfill the commission’s obligations and prohibit the legislature from reducing 

the commission’s budget below that of the preceding years.

Finally, the proposed section 6 would insulate the 

commission from the legislature by prohibiting the legislature from passing laws that directly impact the functioning 

of the commission, except to appropriate money to the commission or to adopt verbatim legislative acts recommended 

by the commission itself.

Next, IP 14 would repeal and replace Article IV, section 7.2

 The new section 7 would require open and transparent 

processes to allow for public participation. It would establish 

quorum and voting rules. It would establish specific criteria 

for the drawing of legislative districts. Finally, it would authorize the Oregon Supreme Court to review the maps proposed 

by the commission and grant it original and exclusive jurisdiction over any challenge to a certified final map.

III. THE SEPARATE-VOTE REQUIREMENT

Having described IP 14, we turn to the question 

whether it violates the separate-vote requirement. Article 

XVII, section 1, provides that, “[w]hen two or more amendments shall be submitted * ** to the voters of this state 

2 Article IV, section 7, provides:

“A senatorial district, when more than one county shall constitute the same, 

shall be composed of contiguous counties, and no county shall be divided in 

creating such senatorial districts. Senatorial or representative districts comprising not more than one county may be divided into subdistricts from time 

to time by law. Subdistricts shall be composed of contiguous territory within 

the district; and the ratios to population of senators or representatives, as 

the case may be, elected from the subdistricts, shall be substantially equal 

within the district.”
Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 605

at the same election, they shall be so submitted that each 

amendment shall be voted on separately.” The purpose of 

that requirement, which we further explore below, is to 

ensure that voters are not forced to cast a single vote for or 

against what are, essentially, multiple standalone constitutional amendments. Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 275, 

277, 959 P2d 49 (1998).

To analyze whether a proposal satisfies the separatevote requirement, we follow the framework established 

in Armatta. That framework looks to (1) whether the proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution, 

(2) whether those changes are “substantive,” and (3) whether 

those changes are “closely related.” Id. at 277. Under that 

rubric, a proposal satisfies the separate-vote requirement if 

it makes only a single substantive change or if its multiple 

substantive changes are “closely related.” Id.

Here, the parties agree that IP 14 proposes multiple substantive changes to the constitution—although they 

disagree as to the number and nature of those changes. The 

mere existence of more than one substantive change means 

that our analysis necessarily turns on whether the multiple 

substantive changes are “closely related.”

A. Understanding the “Closely Related” Standard within the 

Context and Purpose of the Separate-Vote Requirement

Determining whether changes are “closely related” 

is a challenging endeavor because, by its very nature, it is 

not an analysis well-suited to brightline or categorical rules. 

The Oregon Supreme Court has primarily employed two 

factors to help determine whether substantive changes are 

“closely related” or not. In the first factor, the court examines the preexisting provisions of the constitution that will 

be affected either explicitly or implicitly by the proposal and 

asks whether those provisions are closely related. Lehman 

v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231, 246, 37 P3d 989 (2002). In the second factor, the court examines the changes that would be 

implemented by the proposal itself to determine whether 

those changes are closely related to each other. Id. Because 

those two factors can only be understood and applied with 

an understanding of their greater context and purpose, we 
606 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

turn back to Armatta and its description of the principles 

animating the separate-vote requirement and, by extension, 

the “closely related” inquiry.

First, in Armatta, the court observed that the 

separate-vote requirement originated as part of a larger 

provision aimed at allowing the constitution to adapt to “a 

change of popular sentiment” about subjects like the establishment of a state bank, slavery, or the rights of women. 

Armatta, 327 Or at 265 (quoting H. Fowler, 2 Report of the 

Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision 

of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, 1258-59 (1850) 

(statement of James G. Read) (emphasis omitted)). From 

that origin, the court recognized that the separate-vote 

requirement operates to restrict such proposals in scope to 

making “particular, specific changes to the constitution.” Id.

Second, drawing on Baum v. Newbry et al., 200 

Or 576, 267 P2d 220 (1954), the court explained that the 

separate-vote requirement aims to ensure that “voters are 

able to express their will in one vote as to only one constitutional change.” Armatta, 327 Or at 269. That is, “the purpose of the separate-vote requirement is to allow the voters to 

decide upon separate constitutional changes separately.” Id.

Third—again drawing on Baum, in which the court 

upheld a lengthy and detailed amendment regarding legislative redistricting in the face of a separate-vote challenge—the court recognized that a single proposal “may 

affect one or more constitutional provisions without offending the separate-vote requirement.” Id. Put differently, 

the separate-vote requirement does not restrict a proposal 

based solely on the breadth of its impact on existing provisions of the constitution—it is not a rule that limits the 

complexity of a proposal. See Lincoln Interagency Narcotics 

Team v. Kitzhaber, 341 Or 496, 503, 513, 145 P3d 151 (2006) 

(LINT) (holding that a lengthy measure complied with the 

separate-vote requirement despite the fact that it had “more 

in common, both in appearance and in substance, with legislation than with constitutional amendments”).

Finally, the separate-vote requirement “encompasses, to some extent, the notion that a single amendment 
Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 607

must contain a single ‘subject.’” Armatta, 327 Or at 269. In 

fact, this principle necessarily emerges from the two that 

precede it. After all, if voters cannot be compelled to cast a 

single vote for multiple proposals—and yet a proposal is not 

restricted merely by its complexity or the breadth of its effect 

on existing constitutional provisions—then the separatevote requirement must establish some type of content-based 

limitation. The court explained the nature of that limitation by comparing the separate-vote requirement with the 

single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d). Id.

at 272-75.

The single-subject requirement exists to prevent 

“log-rolling,” i.e., “the practice of inserting two or more unrelated provisions into a single bill ** * so that legislators 

favoring one provision would be compelled to vote for the bill 

despite their opposition to the other provisions.” Id. at 273. It 

requires a measure to contain “a unifying principle logically 

connecting all provisions in the act [or amendment], such 

that it can be said that the measure embraces one subject 

only.” Id. (quoting State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or 83, 91, 

949 P2d 724 (1997) (brackets in Armatta)).

The main similarity between the single-subject and 

separate-vote requirements is that “[b]oth serve to ensure 

that the voters will not be compelled to vote upon multiple ‘subjects’ or multiple constitutional changes in a single 

vote.” Id. at 275. The main difference is that the singlesubject requirement “concerns only the text of the proposed 

amendment viewed in isolation,” id. at 270 (emphasis in 

original), whereas the separate-vote requirement “focuses 

upon the form of the submission of the amendment, as well 

as the potential change to the existing constitution,” id. at 

276 (emphasis in original). Stated slightly differently, the 

separate-vote requirement incorporates the single-subject 

analysis, but it goes further. Id. at 277. It examines the 

effects of a proposal on the constitution itself.

From those principles, the Supreme Court concluded that “the proper inquiry” in applying the separatevote requirement “is to determine whether, if adopted, the 

proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution 

that are substantive and that are not closely related.” Id. If 
608 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

it would, “the proposal violates the separate-vote requirement *** because it would prevent voters from expressing 

their opinions as to each proposed change separately.” Id.

Given the nature of those animating principles, it is evident 

that the simple phrase “closely related” describes a rather 

complex concept. Ultimately, the touchstone is whether a 

proposal contains in a single package what could just as 

effectively be broken into two.

B. Using the Two Factors Identified in Lehman to Apply the 

“Closely Related” Standard

The challenge lies in answering that question of 

divisibility: When can a proposal just as effectively be broken 

into two? It is not the court’s role to judge the motivations of 

the drafters of a measure or the substantive merits, viability, or advisability of a given proposal—our role is simply to 

make sure a proposal complies with the form required by the 

constitution. See id. at 284 (“*** Article IV, section 1, grants 

the people the power to change the Oregon Constitution as 

they so desire, including modifying or repealing a provision of the Bill of Rights, so long as the proposed change 

or changes comply with the constitutional requirements for 

amending the constitution.”). Mindful of that limitation, we 

return to the two factors identified by the Supreme Court in 

Lehman and the different ways in which those factors have 

functioned as a diagnostic tool in different circumstances. 

Again, the first factor asks whether the preexisting provisions of the constitution that will be affected either explicitly or implicitly by the proposal are closely related. Lehman, 

333 Or at 246. The second asks whether the changes made 

by the proposal itself are closely related. Id. The court’s reliance on one or both of those factors has varied depending on 

the nature of the proposal at issue.

League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon, 334 Or 

645, 56 P3d 892 (2002), is an example of a case in which the 

separate-vote analysis turned primarily on the first factor. 

There, the court addressed Ballot Measure 7 (2000), which 

sought to amend Article I, section 18, to require the state 

to pay just compensation to property owners for any reduction in the value of real property resulting from a restrictive 

regulation. Id. at 665-67. However, the measure contained 
Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 609

an important caveat to its property protection—it did not 

require compensation for regulations that prohibited “selling 

pornography, performing nude dancing, selling alcoholic beverages or other controlled substances, or operating a casino or 

gaming parlor.” Id. at 668. The court found that that caveat 

had a rather profound impact on the Article I, section 8, right 

to free expression. Id. at 671-72. Under Article I, section 8, 

the state or a local government may not deny a generally 

available benefit to a property owner due to expressive activity. Id. at 671. But Measure 7 explicitly allowed that disparate treatment and “essentially plac[ed] a price tag upon the 

property owner’s right of free expression.” Id. at 672.

Ultimately, the court held that the existing constitutional provisions affected by the measure—Article I, section 18 (a regulatory-takings provision) and Article I, section 8 (a free-speech provision)—bore “no relation to each 

other.” Id. at 674. That lack of relationship highlighted the 

core problem with the measure. Rather than presenting one 

core proposal to voters, Ballot Measure 7 contained one core 

proposal and a constitutional non sequitur that restricted 

the freedom of expression.

Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 43 P3d 1094 (2002), 

is an example of a case in which the second factor was most 

useful. In Swett, the court evaluated Ballot Measure 62 

(1998), which required the disclosure of certain political contributions and required that petition-signature gatherers be 

registered Oregon voters. Id. at 599-600. In applying the 

second factor, the court considered the purported purpose 

of the measure, which was “designed to prevent, control, or 

expose the influence of money in the initiative [and] referendum * * * process.” Id. at 608-09 (alterations in Swett). The 

court took issue with the voter-registration requirement 

for signature gatherers, noting that the defendants “fail to 

explain how *** [that] requirement * ** bears any relationship to the suggested design.” Id. That discrepancy revealed 

that the measure actually contained two freestanding proposals, and it could have been broken apart to allow voters to separately decide “whether to require disclosure of 

campaign contributions and/or impose a requirement that 

signature gatherers for initiative petitions be registered 
610 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

Oregon voters.” State v. Rogers, 352 Or 510, 523, 288 P3d 

544 (2012).

The Supreme Court also found the second factor 

to be largely dispositive in Rogers—in that instance, to 

confirm that a proposal complied with the separate-vote 

requirement. Id. at 522-24. In Rogers, the court analyzed 

Ballot Measure 6 (1984), which provided:

“Notwithstanding sections 15 and 16 of this Article, the 

penalty for aggravated murder as defined by law shall be 

death upon unanimous affirmative jury findings as provided by law and otherwise shall be life imprisonment with 

minimum sentence as provided by law.”

Id. at 514. Challenging the measure on separate-vote 

grounds, the defendant argued that the measure made multiple changes to the existing provisions of the constitution, 

because it limited the scope of the constitution’s ban on “vindictive justice,” its ban on “cruel and unusual punishment,” 

and its requirement of proportionate penalties. Id. at 518.

The court agreed that the measure implicated those 

three constitutional provisions. Id. at 521-22. But it recognized that “Measure 6 * ** contains only one provision and 

proposes to do only one thing—prescribe the penalty for 

aggravated murder.” Id. at 522. Its effects on existing constitutional provisions were directed only “at eliminating the 

potential constitutional barriers to the imposition of that 

penalty.” Id. Stated differently, the court recognized that “the 

three changes that the measure makes to Article I, sections 

15 and 16, are necessary corollaries to the new provision that 

permits the imposition of the death penalty.” Id. at 523.

What Rogers demonstrates is that, so long as a 

measure’s provisions are themselves closely related and the 

measure’s effects on existing constitutional provisions are 

limited to those necessary to allow the measure to function, 

the first factor is of little utility. Regardless of the relationship between those existing provisions, the measure cannot be broken apart and presented to the voters in separate 

initiatives without compromising the “scheme that is at the 

measure’s heart.” Id. at 525.
Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 611

Although Rogers is the starkest example of that 

principle, the plurality took a similar approach in LINT. 

There, the Supreme Court addressed Ballot Measure 3 

(2000), which “impose[d] various procedural and substantive limitations on forfeiture proceedings, establishe[d] priorities for and limitations on the distribution of forfeiture 

proceeds (including proceeds from federal forfeiture proceedings that are available to the state), create[d] a state 

agency to monitor and report on forfeitures, and provide[d] 

a civil penalty for violating its provisions.” LINT, 341 Or at 

503. As opposed to the short and simple provision at issue 

in Rogers, the measure in LINT was rather lengthy and followed “the unfortunate practice, sometimes questioned, of 

inserting provisions in the state constitution that have more 

in common, both in appearance and in substance, with legislation than with constitutional amendments.” Id.

Nonetheless, the crux of the separate-vote issue was 

the relationship between two parts of the measure. One part 

of the measure set out constitutional protections for property 

owners by prohibiting civil forfeiture unless the owner had 

been convicted of a crime and there was clear and convincing 

evidence that the property was an instrumentality or proceed 

of that crime. Id. at 512. The second part set out an administrative process for collecting and disbursing funds derived 

from forfeited property, including a provision that directed 

those funds to be spent on drug-treatment services and prohibited their use for law-enforcement purposes. Id. The measure itself did not affect preexisting provisions of the constitution, id. at 509, so the question reduced to whether those 

two parts of the measure were “closely related” to each other.

The opponents of the measure argued that those 

two parts of the measure were no more closely related than 

the measure that the court disapproved of in Armatta. Id.

at 511. In essence, they argued that a directive to the legislative and executive branches about the permissible uses of 

forfeiture proceeds was not a necessary corollary to increasing property protections by narrowing the availability of 

forfeiture in the first place. Id.

The plurality disagreed. It explained that those 

objections required one to “stand[] as close as possible to 
612 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

each provision and ignore[] the others.” Id. Taking into 

account the purported goal of the measure—which was to 

“rein[] in” forfeitures and “remov[e] the carrot, which otherwise would tempt the two political branches of government 

to treat the criminal law as a revenue-raising source”—the 

court concluded that the “administrative funding and disbursal scheme *** ha[d] a place in the constitution because 

of the new [more limited] civil forfeiture process.” Id. at 

512. In other words, the second part of the measure “wholly 

derive[d]” from the first. Id. at 513.

The plurality’s reasoning in LINT is consistent with 

what we understand to be the rule in Rogers: Where application of the second factor shows that a measure is incapable 

of being broken apart and presented to voters in separate 

freestanding proposals without undermining the “scheme 

that is at the measure’s heart,” then the measure must necessarily satisfy the separate-vote requirement. Rogers, 352 

Or at 525. In such situations, the ripple effects that the measure may send throughout diverse provisions of our constitution do not offend the separate-vote requirement so long as 

they are limited to those “necessary to give effect” to that 

scheme. Id. In such situations, “a separate vote on whether 

those effects should logically follow [is] not possible,” because 

a voter cannot cast a vote in favor of measure’s core proposal 

without endorsing the necessary corollaries that make the 

proposal possible. Id.

IV. APPLICATION

Turning to IP 14, we recognize that the measure’s 

stated purpose is to establish an independent commission that will draw “fair and impartial districts” and not 

be unduly influenced in the execution of that duty by conflicts of interest or partisanship. Consequently, our analysis 

turns on whether IP 14 is one standalone proposal aimed 

at that goal or whether it is capable of being presented to 

the voters in separate standalone proposals. We start our 

analysis with the second factor because, tracking the reasoning of Rogers and the plurality in LINT, we find it to be 

dispositive.
Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 613

IP 14 seeks to completely replace Article IV, sections 6 and 7, of the constitution. Its replacement for section 6 contains 13 subsections that establish a redistricting 

commission:

•	 Subsection (1) establishes a Citizens Redistricting 

Commission consisting of 12 commissioners.

•	 Subsection (2) authorizes the Secretary of State to adopt 

rules necessary to facilitate the application and selection of commission members.

•	 Subsection (3) authorizes the Secretary of State to initiate an application process that promotes “a diverse and 

qualified applicant pool.” It then sets out a long list of 

qualifications and disqualifications for applicants to the 

commission.

•	 Subsection (4) provides for the creation of a review panel 

made up of administrative law judges tasked with creating an applicant pool for the commission.

•	 Subsection (5) sets out a process by which the review 

panel will select a pool of 150 applicants.

•	 Subsection (6) instructs the Secretary of State to “randomly select by lot” six applicants from that pool to 

serve as commissioners.

•	 Subsection (7) authorizes those six commissioners to 

select six more from the applicant pool.

•	 Subsections (8) and (9) contain provisions regarding 

the removal of commissioners for neglect, incapacity, or 

misconduct and for the filling of out-of-cycle vacancies.

•	 Subsection (10) authorizes the commission to hire necessary staff and consultants, orders the Secretary of 

State to provide staffing and office support as needed, 

provides for the payment of commission members, and 

establishes employment protections for commissioners.

•	 Subsection (11) establishes the term of the commissioners’ service and sets a waiting period on a former commissioner’s ability to seek elective office, work or consult 

for the state or federal legislature, or work as a lobbyist.

In short, subsections (1) through (11) provide for the creation 

and day-to-day operation of the nonpartisan citizen committee that is at the very heart of IP 14. We find those provisions 
614 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

to be “closely related,” as we are hard pressed to identify a 

way that those provisions could logically be subdivided and 

presented to voters as separate proposals—nor has plaintiff 

proposed one. As was the case in LINT, all of the subsections 

are “wholly derived” from the establishment of the Citizens 

Redistricting Commission and have no function apart from 

that commission.

Continuing to subsection (12), that subsection 

requires the legislature to appropriate the funds “necessary to permit the commission to fulfill the commission’s 

obligations,” and it prohibits the legislature from reducing 

the commission’s budget to a level below that of the previous redistricting cycle. Meanwhile, subsection (13) prohibits the legislature from enacting laws that directly impact 

the functioning of the commission, unless three prerequisites are satisfied: (1) the commission votes to seek legislation that enhances its ability to carry out its function, 

(2) the commission provides the requested language to the 

legislature, and (3) the legislature enacts that language 

verbatim.

Those two subsections serve to insulate the commission from interference by the legislature—either by the 

tightening of the purse strings or by direct legislative interference. As with the prior 11, subsections 12 and 13 exist 

only to support the function of the commission and have 

no independent purpose for existence in the absence of the 

commission. Furthermore, we cannot see how those provisions can be removed from IP 14 and presented to voters in 

a separate amendment without undermining the scheme at 

the heart of IP 14—a redistricting commission safe from the 

influence of politically interested legislators.

That brings us to section 7 and its subsections. 

Whereas section 6 would establish the commission and provide for its administrative functioning, section 7 sets out the 

guidelines for the commission itself:

•	 Subsection (1) directs the commission to conduct an 

open and transparent process, to draw district lines in 

accordance with map criteria to follow, and to conduct 

its business with integrity, impartiality, and fairness.
Cite as 331 Or App 599 (2024) 615

•	 Subsection (2) establishes quorum and voting rules.

•	 Subsection (3) requires public notice of meetings and 

hearings and makes the commission’s records and data 

publicly available.

•	 Subsection (4) sets out the mapping criteria that the 

commission is directed to use.

•	 Subsection (5) orders the commission to hold a certain 

number of public hearings and facilitate public accessibility to those hearings.

•	 Subsection (6) sets a timeline for the adoption of final 

maps and a procedure for use when the commission 

does not approve a final map.

•	 Subsection (7) establishes a mechanism for judicial 

review of redistricting maps.

•	 Subsection (8) provides that the measure supersedes 

any conflicting provisions of the constitution and allows 

for the severability of invalid portions of the measure.

Again, we find all of these subsections “closely 

related” to each other and to the provisions in section 6. 

Each subsection serves to set out the means by which the 

commission is to carry out its task and provides alternatives for conflicts that may arise—either between members 

of the commission or before the courts. We cannot say that 

any subsection could be separated from IP 14 and presented 

to voters as its own amendment without compromising the 

purpose of IP 14.

Turning back to the first Lehman factor, we 

acknowledge plaintiff’s argument that IP 14 would have 

wide-ranging effects on the existing provisions of our constitution if enacted, and that those provisions are not themselves closely related. For example, plaintiff argues that 

the qualifications and disqualifications for commissioners 

alone would implicitly affect the freedom of expression contained in Article I, section 8; the privileges-and-immunities 

clause of Article I, section 20; the freedom of assembly in 

Article I, section 26; and the political-contribution provision 

of Article II, section 8(2)(a). With regard to the function of 

the commission and its insulation from the budgetary and 

legislative power of the legislature, plaintiff argues that 
616 Mason v. Griffin-Valade

IP 14 would make implicit changes to Article III, sections 1 

and 2, and Article VI, sections 1 and 18.

While we doubt that the implicit effects of IP 14 are 

quite as extensive as plaintiff fears, we readily acknowledge that IP 14 may make many implicit changes to existing provisions of our constitution. Even still, we conclude 

that IP 14 complies with the separate-vote requirement. 

That is because, insofar as IP 14 makes those changes, they 

are limited in scope. Except for the explicit replacement of 

Article IV, sections 6 and 7, IP 14 does not render other provisions wholly inoperable. Instead, its implicit changes are 

limited to those necessary to effectuate the “scheme at the 

measure’s heart”—the creation of a nonpartisan redistricting commission. As was the case in Rogers, such implicit 

changes are “necessary corollaries” to the creation and 

function of that commission as intended.

In the end, we have a limited role to play in how 

Oregonians employ the initiative process for their own 

self-governance, asking only whether Oregonians are able 

to cast one vote for each constitutional change proposed. 

In keeping with the analysis in Rogers and LINT, we are 

unable to conceptualize a way in which IP 14 could be subdivided and presented to voters in separate proposals without 

undermining the very function and goal of IP 14. As such, 

we conclude that the multiple substantive changes that 

it makes are “closely related” and, thus, comply with the 

separate-vote requirement. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the trial court erred in granting in part plaintiff’s motion 

for summary judgment and denying defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment, and we reverse and remand for entry of 

judgment consistent with our decision.

Reversed and remanded on appeal; cross-appeal 

dismissed as moot.