### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN

NO. 03-00-00763-CR Dougla s W. Fr

ieling , Appellant
v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE COUN TY COUR T AT LAW N O. 5 OF

TRAVI S COUNTY NO. 5325 31, HONOR

ABLE GISELA D . TRIANA , JUDGE P

RESIDIN G Appe llantDo uglas W. Fr

i el i ng ap pe al s h i s c onv i cti on f or p ros ti tuti on b y ag re ei n g to enga ge i n s ex ual cond uct f or a f ee. SeeTe x. P en. Co de Ann. 43. 02( a) (1 ) ( West 199 4) . T he jur y fou nd ap pe llan t gu ilt y. The trial cou rt as se ss ed

pun i sh men t at n i ne ty da y s i n c oun ty j ai l an d a f i ne of $1000. Th e tri

al cou rt, h owe ve r, suspe nd

ed the i m pos i ti on of the sente nc e a nd pl ac ed ap pe l l an t on
commun ity s upervisi on for o ne y

ear, subject to certa in

conditions.
Points of Error Appe llantad

v an ce s two poi

n ts of err or. F i rs t, appe l l an

t as serts th

at “ [s ]ecti on

43.02 of t he T ex as Pe na l Co de is o ve r br o ad in vio lat io n o f t he Fir st Am endm en t t o t he Un

ited States Cons tituti on.”It is cl

ear from appella nt’s argum

ent that his

federal constitutional

attack is di

rected to su bs ec ti on (a )( 1) of t he st at ut e, not t he entire s tatut e. Second, appell

ant contends that the “trial courtcomm

itted fun dam ental error in f ai li ng to instruct the jury

that a person must i

ntend to engage in se xu al c o nd uc t fo ra fe e in o r de rt o be co nvic t ed o f ‘a gr ee ing ’ t o do so . ” W e w ill affir m.2 Infor mation The i n f orm ati on i n perti n en t pa rt al l eg ed th at a pp el l an t:

on or about the 13th day

of May , A.D. 1999, did then

and t her e kno wingly offer a nd agree to en

gage i n sex ual con du ct to w i t: t he de fendant offer ed a nd ag re ed t o ha ve sexual in tercour se wi

th A. Hernan

dez, for a fe e.
Facts Appe llantdoes not chall

enge ei ther t he lega l or fact ual su ffi

ciency o f the evi

dence, b ut the facts wil

l pl ace our discus si on of the poin ts of error in proper perspective
. Th e i n sta n t ca se ari se s f rom an un derc ov er sti n g op er ati

on b y th e A us ti n P o lic e De pa rtm en t. Officer Ang ela He rna ndez t est ifi ed t hat on t he night of Ma y 13, 199 9, she w as w or king undercover

in east Aust in, st anding a t t he inte rse ct ion o f east 12t h St re et and Co leto , p re t ending to be a prostitut e. She was “ wired f or sound” with a polic e vi deotaping dev

ice t r ain ed on

her. Hernan dez descri bed h er att ire as bei ng bl ue j ean shorts, a butto ned-down sh

irt untucked, wi

th brown la ce-up boot s. About 9:00 p.m., a whi te pickup truck pull

ed up at the c orner. Hernan dez i dentif

ie d t he dr iver as app ellant. He w as a lone. The t ru ck w indo w wa s do wn. Appe llantstated, “ Howdy .” Hernan dez responded, “Hey

, what’s up.” Then

appella nt asked, “W

hat’s h appeni ng? ” Hernan

dez in quired, “Are yo u lo ok ing t o g et laid?” He rna ndez explained t hat ou t on t he st re et “laid” meant sexual in tercour se. In response to Hernandez’ s i nqui ry, appel la nt responded, “S ur e. ” H er na nd ez t o ld app ellant that she charged th i rty dol l ar s f or “ strai gh t sex .” A cc ordi

n g to Hernan

dez, appella

nt sai d, “Okay ,” an d n o dd ed his h ea d u p a nd do wn . He rna nd ez ac ce pt ed t his a s a n a gr ee men t . Sh e t o ld appe l l an t, “Co ol, meet me aro und he re ” and dire ct ed a ppe llant by po inting to a p l ac e e ast on 12 th3

Street wher e she wo uld meet him. As app ellant was rai si ng the truck win

dow, Hernandez ex

pla in ed that “the re wer e t oo many damn laws” a ro und. Appe llantdrove east on 12th Str eet as dire ct ed a nd stopped, even t hou gh t he t ra ffi c light wasgreen . The poli ce “take-down” team i

mm edi ately arrested appe l l an t. The St at e intr od uce d int o t he evide nce t he audio videot ape which confirm ed Her nandez’s t es t imo ny. Appe llanttestifi ed that he was f

if ty-f our years old, si

ngle, a tax accountant, and that he had l iv ed i n A ustin si nce 1955. Here late d t hat he had ser ved in t he mili t ar y for s ix years a nd

had been a m il itary policem an. Appel

la nt stated t hat he h

ad nev er been arrested bef

ore in h is li fe. On t he ev en ing in q ue st io n, ap pe llant wa s o n his wa y t o his n ine t y-ye ar - o ld mother ’s ho me on Concordia Street, about a m il e from the area where h

e encountered Hernan

dez. Appe llant expl ai ned that he was

his m other’ s pri

mary caret ake r a nd t ha t she ha d bec ome d isor iente d t he previous day . Appel

la nt acknowl edged that he once l iv ed o n C oncordi

a Street an

d he was “v ery f am i l i ar”wi th the n eighb orhood n ear 12 th Street and Col eto, and

that i t was a “b ad pa rt of town .” He was awa re t hat t her e had been drug sal es a nd pr os t itu t ion in t his high crime ar ea. Appe llant adm i tted that he h ad s een

prosti tutes “ al l over th e pl ace i n that area .” Appe llantt est ifi

ed t hat Her nande z wa s pa cing bac k and forth on the corner when he
saw he r; t hat she lo ok ed liked a co llege gir l ou t of p lace in “a r ou gh ar ea. ” When he passe d Hernan dez, he made eye co nt act wit h her and d ecide d she was “in tr ou ble.” Appe llant cir cled t he bl ock an d cam e aroun d on C ole to Street and

stopped to determ

i ne i f she was “i n troub l e.” Appe llantt es t ified t ha t wh en He rna nd ez as ke d h im if he was “loo king t o g et laid,” he reali zed t ha t she wa s no t a c o lleg e g irl. He becam e concerned

that t he prostitute mi

ght be on drugs1 Wh

en sev eral m eans or m odes of comm

ittin g an off en se ar e a lleg ed in t he co nju nc t ive , it is pe r miss ible f

or th e tr i al cou rt to su bmit t he mo de s inthe d i sj unc tiv e i n the j ury ch arge. See Mc

Du ff v. State , 939 S.W .2d 607 , 614 n .2 (Tex . Cri m . App. 1997 ). 4 and a ca r- jacking w as a bou t t o ha ppe n. Ap pellant stat ed tha t he wa nte d to lea

ve bu t cou l d n ot because of the oncomi

ng tr affic . He

ad m i tted th at he s ai d “ oka y ” to her of

f er of thi rty dol l ars f or st ra ight sex b ecause h

e wanted to avoi d “ a c onf

ron tati on. ” A ppe l l an t sta ted tha t he di d n ot intend to agree to pay

Hernan dez for sex , that he was “try in g to get out of there, I mean I wasn’t concern

ed about thi s thi

ng. I mean , I d i dn ’t k

n ow th e cam

eras were on.” Appel

la nt related that Hernan

dez pointed f orhi m to go righ

t “ov er here acrossthe street,” and “mee t me acr os s t he st re et .” Appe llant t ur ne d e as t o n 1 2t h S t r ee t an d s aid he st o pp ed o nly when he saw the pol

ic e car red and blue l

igh ts. On cross-exam

in ation, appel

la nt acknowl edged

that he didn’t

th i n k “ y ou c an di spute wh a t’s o n t he t ap e. ” W he n a sk ed ab o ut his b elie f t ha t He rna nd ez wa s a co lleg e g irl a nd ge ne r ally about the way prostitutes dress, appella nt volun teered:
I see prost itutes in al

l ki nds o f are as . I m

ea n, I tra ve l on b us i ne ss to La s V eg ason busi ness and p ro st itu t es a re —lo ok like t he girl next door , I mean , very well-dress ed and v er y pri m an d ver y pr oper. S o, y

ou k n ow, I’ m n ot sure that you can say that i s—y ou know , wh at som

eb ody i s dre sse d li

ke s ays tha

t they ’re a

prosti tute.”
The Verdict In the jury charge the trial

court subm

itted in the dis jun ctive whether appel

la nt was gui l ty of knowi ngl y of feri ng to engage or kno wingly agr eeing to engage i n sex ual conduct for a fee
as al le ged. 1 The jury re t ur ned a gene ra l verd ict: “We, t he jur y, find the defend ant Do uglas Frieling Gu i l ty of the of f ense of prosti tution. ” B y

i ts acti on, the j ury obv i ous l y rej ec ted ap pe l l an t’s ve rs i on of th e ev en t.5 Wh en di f f eren t theori es of

l i ab i l i ty a re su bm i tted to the j ury

i n the di sj unc

tiv e, a general ve rdi ct i s s uf f i ci en t i f the ev i de nc e supp orts on

e of the theori es. See Ladd v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547, 557 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 99) ; Rabbani v. State, 84 7 S.W.2d 555, 558-59 (Tex. Crim . App. 1995) ; Fuller

v. State , 827 S.W.2d919 , 93 1 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 92) ; Kitchen s v. State , 823 S.W.2d 256, 25 7- 58 (Tex . C ri

m . A pp . 19 91 ). Th e ev i den ce

i s s uf f i ci en t to supp ort t he t heo ry t hat app ellant kn o win gly

agreed to engage in

sexual con duc t f or a f ee . A ppe l l an t i n h i s b ri ef agree s. H e doesnot chal le nge the suf

fi ci ency of the evi

dence. Appell ant’s Argument A pp el l an t’ s points o f error are in

terrelated, although one is a consti tut iona l a tt ack upon the statut e under wh ic h appell ant was convicted and the ot her is a cl ai m of f un da men tal err or in the jury charge. Appel

la nt att acks the plai

n statuto ry l

anguage of

section 43.02(a)(1) and a de ci si on construin

g the statut e—

Mattia s v. State , 7 31 S.W .2d 936 (Tex . Cri

m . App. 1987 ). Appe llantcon

ten dsth at “i n ten t” is a nece ssar y element of t he o ffense o f pro st itu t ion as char ged , a nd that t he Co ur t o f Cr iminal A pp ea ls w as in e rr o rwh en it he ld t o t he co nt ra ry in Mattias
. Id. at 937. For this reason, appella

nt urges that the t r ia l

cou rt f un da men tal l y erred i n i ts j ury ch arg e b y not including th e cul

pa b l e m en tal sta te of “ i n ten t.”A pp el l an t t hen argu es that section 43.02(a)(1) as int er pr et ed by Mattias is

constitutional

ly overbroad, as it suppresses a man ’s f re edom of sp ee ch to “jo kin gly of f er a wom an a m i l l i on d ol l ars to ha ve se x w i th h i m ” or agree to have sex f

or afee because he bel ie ves “ that pret ense i

s the bes t wa y to esc ape a situ ation. ” We shall fi rst discuss appellant’s
s eco nd point of error in

order t o pro vi

de a broader basis f

or co nsi deration of h

is constitutional chal le nge to the stat ute.2 Appel la nt acknowl edges that this Court cann

ot overrule Mattias , a C o ur t o f Cr iminal A pp ea ls dec ision. 6 The Jury Charge The re was no obj ection to the jury charge n

or was a speci al

reque ste d charge subm itted to the tri al

court. SeeTex. Code Cri m . Proc. A

nn . arts. 36 .14, 36.1 5 (W est Sup p. 2001 ). Nevertheless, ap pe llant cla ims fun dam ental error—t hat the trial

court fai le d sua sp onte

t o inst ru ct t he j ury tha t a p ers on mus t ha ve t he int en t t o ac t ua lly eng ag e in se x f or a f eei n or de r to b e c onv

i cte d of “agr eeing t o d o s o. ” App ellant re lies upo n Almanza v . State , 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim . App. 1984) (op. on reh ’g). Almanza provi des , inter al

ia , that if a ju ry cha r ge er r o ris no t pr es er ve d a t t r ial,
as in the inst ant ca se , t he ac cu se d mu st cla im fun da men t al e rr o ran d “ will o bt ain a r ev er sa l o nly if the
err oris so egregious, and created such harm that he has n

ot had a f ai r and i m partial tria l —i n short egregious h

arm.” Id . at 171. Appe llantur ges t hat t he f i rs t question is whether section 43.02(a) (1) re quires a
cu lpa ble me

ntal s tate o ther th an “ kn owi n gl y ”; th at Mattias t o t he co nt ra ry was wr ong ly decided and sho uld be overruled; 2 and t hat t he st at ut e do es r equ ire an int ent t o c ons ummat e an o ffer o r a gr eement to engage i

n sex ual c o nd uc t fo ra fe e. Ap pe llant ar gu es t ha t “it is lik ely t ha t t he Le gis lat ur e o nly meant that th e def

en da n t h ad to ‘ kn ow’ wh at th e a gr eemen t wa s f i rs t, a n d th en i n ten d to hono r it by agree i ng.” Appe llantcontends that the off ense of whi ch he wa s c o nvic t ed wa s a “r es ult
- t ype ” c r ime in the sens e that a result i s int ended . Th e S tate argu es th at Mattias has rejecte d appe ll ant’s content ions. In

ord er to determi

ne wh ether appella nt suff ered egregious h

arm b y a ny unobj ectedto jury char ge e rr or , t he ac tua l de gre e of ha rm m us t be as sa yed ac cord i ng to Almanza , in

light o f the7

en tire jury char ge, t he st at e o f the evidenc e, including t he co nt est ed issu es a nd we ight of t he pr oba t ive evi dence, t he ar gument of e vidence and a ny ot her re levant informat ion r evea led by the re co rd of t he trial as a wh ole
. Id ., 686 S. W.2d at 171 ; Fros t v. State , 25 S.W.3d 395, 400 (Tex. App. —Au st in 2000, n o pet.). Appe llantdoe s n

ot refer to or analy

ze the forego in

g factor s. He argues that the trial courtsho uld have sua sp onte divined t he ar gument he no w make s t hat “intent ” is an es sent ial element of the off enses al le ged and sh

ould ha ve ch arged the j ury accordin gly . In exam in in g the record, we observe that appel

la nt fi le d no motion to quash or set aside the in form ation f or failure to all

ege an
essen tial element . H e t her eby

wai v ed an y ri gh t to co m pl ai n on appe al as to the ple adi

ngs. Tex. Code Cr im. Proc. An

n. art. 1.14( b) (West Supp. 2002) . No motion for an i nstructed ve r di ct o f “n o t gu ilt y”
was fi le d, and the suf

fi ci ency of the evi dence was

not challe

nged at trial . And, of

course, t here was
no obj ection to the j ury

i nstructi ons. A

motion f or new trial

was f il ed but was ove

rrul ed by ope rati on of la w wi thout a heari

ng. The trial

cou rt wa s n ever a l erte d to the c onte

nti on now adva nced as t o t he statutory constructi on of

section 43.02( a)(1). Ma ny o f

Almanz a’sfactors are not part ic

ula rly hel pful here i n l i gh t of appe l l an t’s pa rtic ul ar con tenti on. Theref

ore, we t urn to t he power of the legi sl ature, t he rul esof sta tutor y con str uc ti on , the h

i sto rica l b ac kg rou n d a n d c as e l aw con cern i n g th e statu te in que st ion.
The Pow er of t he L egi slat ure
— The Du ty of t he J ud ici ary

The l eg i sl atu rei s v ested wi th th e p owe r to c re ate cri mes a nd presc ri be pen al tie s. Te x. Con st. art. III, § 1; Willis

v. State , 790 S. W.2d 307 , 31 4 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 90) ; State ex rel Smit h
v. Blackw

ell , 50 0 S
. W. 2d 97 , 10 4 ( T ex . Cr im. A pp . 19 73 )
. Un les s lim ited b y c onstitutional8

pr ovisio ns t he legislat ur e has t he inhere nt po wer t o d efine and pun i sh an y act as a cri me. Ex parte Smith , 441 S.W .2d 544 , 54 7 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 69) ; Webb v . State , 9 91 S .W. 2d 4 08, 414 (T ex. App.—Houston [14th

Di st.] 1999 , pet. ref

’d). Wh i l e i t is the d uty of the legi slature to enact laws , i t is the f unc tion of the j udici ary to in terpret those laws

when calle d upon to do so. State v. M ancuso , 91 9 S
. W. 2d 86 , 87 ( T ex . Cr im. App. 19 96 ). Th e l

eg i sl atu rei s c on sti

tuti on al l y en ti tl ed to ex pe ct th at t he jud icia ry will fa it hfu lly f oll ow the s peci f i c tex t of a statute that wa s ad

opted. Boykin v. State , 8 18 S .W. 2d 7 82, 785 (T ex. Cri m. Ap p. 19 91 )
. Co ur t s w ill nec es sa r ily fo cu s t he ir “ at t en t io n o n t he lit er al t ex t o f t he st at ue in que sti on and attempt

to dis cern

the f ai r obj ecti ve mean i ng of that tex t at the ti me of the e nactmen t.” Id . “Wher e t he st at ut e is clear and u nambiguo us, t he le gis la ture must be un

derstoo d to me an

what it h as ex pr es se d a n d i t i s n ot f or th e c our ts to add or subtract f

rom s uch a statute.” Coit v. Stat

e , 808 S.W.2d 473 , 47 5 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 91) ; see also Mason v. St ate , 98 0 S
. W. 2d 63 5, 63 8 ( T ex . Cr im. App. 19 98 )
. All s t at ut es ca rry a p r es umpt io n o f va lid it y. Visason v. Burger , 773 S.W.2d263, 266 (T ex. 1989 ). We now tur n our atte n ti on to th e of f ense of pr ost i tuti on an d, m orepa rti cul arl y , to
section 43.02( a)(1). Pros titution “The crim

in al off ense gen erall y kn own as ‘prostitution’ h

as persi sted sin

ce bibl ic al tim es.” 63 C Am. Jur. 2 d., Prostitution , § 1 (19 97). The law agai nst prostitution has l

ong prevai

le d in Texas, but we shall

concern our selv

es only with the current law and its hi sto rical notes.3 Sec t ion 4 3. 01 w as e nact ed a t t he same t ime by the sam e bi ll and provided i

n pertin ent part: “(2) ‘Pr os t itu t ion’ me ans the o ffens e d efi ne d in Se ct io n 4 3. 02
. ” 1 97 3 T ex . Ge n. La ws 95 8. T his provision has re

mai ne d un ch anged. Tex. Pe

n. C ode § 43 .01 (W

est 199 4). 9 Section 43.02(a)(1) was first enac t ed a s pa rt of t he 1974 P enal Code of Tex as. See Act of May

24 , 1973, 63d Leg., R.S. , ch. 399, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 958-59. Sect io n 43.02(a)(1) t hen

read: (a) A p er so n c o mmit s a n o ffe ns e if he kn o win gl y: (1) o ff ersto enga

ge, ag rees to enga ge or en gage s i n s ex ual cond uct i n return f or a f ee pa yab l e to the actor. 3
In thei r 1973 Practi

ce C omm en tary to section 43.0 2, S eth S. S earcy and Jam es R. Patt erson wrote: Sub se cti on (a)(1) defi

nes the of

fen se of prostitution f

ormerl y s et out in

various subd ivisi ons of the vagran

cy statut e, Penal

Code art. 607 (9 ), (16) to (20). It dif fers from prior law

by focusing on conduct rather than status or location
. (Em phasi s Added

).

The in itial ver sion c ont ained o nly the ex pres sed cul pab l e m en tal state—“ knowi ngl y .” In 1977, section 43.02(a)(1) was am ended. This am

endm ent si mpl y de le ted t he phr ase “in ret ur n” and “payable t o t he actor” pr ecedi ng an d followi ng “ for a f ee.” Thi s 1977 l egi sl ative

action was taken in orde r to “ eq ua l l y cri m i na l izeboth pa rti esi n a ny si tua ti on p ub l i c or priv ate where such

so licitive conduct o cc ur s. ” E d K ink ea de & S
. Mic ha el M cC o llo ch , Texas Penal Code Annotated § 43.02 (We st Group 2 000-0 1 ed.).4 Onl y Subsecti on (c) o f section 43.02 was amended i n 2001. It pro vides:
An o ffen se un de rt his s ec t io n is a Cla ss B mis de mea no r ; u nle ss t he ac t o rha s p r ev io us ly been convi cted one or two ti mesof an of f en se un de r thi s s ec ti on

in which even

t it is a Class A mi sdem eanor. If the actor has been convi cted three or more tim

es under t his se ct io n t he o ffe ns e is a s t at e ja il fe lo ny. Act of May 24, 2001, 77t h Leg ., R. S. , c h. 9 87, § 1, 200 1 T ex. Gen La w 2 03 5. Th i s a

men dm en t, of course, is n

ot applic abl

e to t he i nstant case.
5 Section 6.03 (b) of the Texas Penal Code pro vides: A pers on ac ts k n owi n gl y , or w i th knowle dge, with respe ct to the nature of his conduct orto ci rcu ms tances su rr o un din g h is c o nd uc t wh en he is a wa r e o f t he na t ur e o f his conduct or th at th

e c i rcu m sta nc esex i st. A pe rs on acts knowin

gly , or with knowle dge, 10 T his 1997 versi

on of secti on 43.02(a)(1) was reenacted unchange d as a pa rt of t he 1994 Tex asPen al Code. A ct of May 29 , 1 993 , 7 3d L eg. , R . S ., ch. 900 , § 1. 01, 199 3 T ex. Gen Law s 3586, 36 80-82. This v

ersion of 43.02(a) (1), under which appell ant was pro secuted, pro vides: (a) A p er so n c o mmit s a n o ffe ns e if he kn o win gl y: (1) off ers to engage, agrees to engage, or engages i n sex ual conduct for a f

ee; or (2) soli ci ts another in

a publ ic pla ce to en gagewi th h i m i n s ex ual con duc t f or hi re. (b) An o ffen se is establ

is hed un der Subsecti on (a)(1) whether t he ac t or is to re ceive orpay a f ee. An off ense i s establ is hed un der Subsecti on (a)(2) whether th e actor soli ci ts a person to hi

re hi m or off ers to hire the person sol

ic ited. (c) An of f en se un de r thi s s ec ti on

is a Cl ass B m

is dem eanor, unl ess the actor has bee n convi ct ed previously

under this section, in

which even

t it is a Class A m i sdemean or.
Tex Pen . Code A

nn . § 43.02(We st 1994 ). 4 T he cu lpa ble me ntal state o f “ knowin gly ” was retain

ed. 5wi

th r es pe ct t o a r es ult o f his c o nd uc t wh en he is aw ar e t ha t his co nd uc t is r ea so na bly certai n to ca us e th e r es ul t. Tex . Pen . Code A

nn . § 6.03 (

b) (W est 199 4). 11 It i s c l ea r f rom th e statu te th at there are threem

ode s of the of f en se of prosti tution under se ct io n 4 3. 02 ( a) ( 1) —k no win gly ( 1) o ffer s t o en ga ge , ( 2) ag r ee s t o en ga ge , o r( 3) en ga ge s in sexual c onduc t for a fee. “Each act i s di stin ctive .” West

v. State , 6 26 S .W. 2d 1 59, 166 (T ex. App. —Be aumo nt 19 81 , p et . r ef’d ). Th us , k no wing ly off er in g t o en ga ge o rag r ee ing t o en ga ge in sexual co nd uct ar e two di sti

nc t me an s of

com m i ttin g prosti tution und er se cti on 43.0 2(a)(1 ). Milczano wiski v. Sta te , 645 S.W .2d 445 , 446 (Tex. Cri m . App. 1983 ). In Mattias , a

de ci si on of whi ch appel la nt bi tt erly compl ai ns, the f em al e defe ndan t was convi cted of the di stin

ct offense of kn

owingl y of feri ng to engage i

n sex ual conduct for a fee. 731 S.W.2d at 936. The facts sh

owed that t he def

endan t and another woman

from an escort service arriv ed at a co nd o minium oc cup ied by tw o u nder co ver Dallas p olice o ffi cer s who had c alled t he
esc ort servi

ce. The undercover of

fi cers were told that there was a $65.00 escort agency f ee for each of the women . One of the of fi cers asked def

endan t Matt ia s f

or “a head j ob,” a deviate sexual in tercour se. Wh

en sh e set the fee a

t $250, she was arrested. The defendan t t estifi ed that she was a nudeand l

in gerie m odel an d fel t unsaf e after arri

vi ng at the condomi

ni um b ecause of s cattered beer
cans an d a di sconnected tel ephone. She s et a hi gh f ee so they c ould “ get ou t of t her e. ” She stated th at s h e h ad n o i n ten ti on of en gagi n g i n sex ual con du ct. In a ben ch t rial, t he t rial co ur t fou nd t he de fendant guilt y but in a spe cial finding found app ellant di d not i

nten d to eng age i

n the sexua

l act. The co ur t of a ppe als re ver sed t he con vi cti on on12

t he basi s o f insuffi

cient evidenc e ho lding t hat t he t rial co ur t ’s finding o f lack o f intent nega t ed t he
cu lpa ble men

tal sta te of “knowi ngl

y.” Mattias v. St

ate , 6 83 S .W. 2d 7 89 ( Te x. Ap p. —E ast land 1984)
. The Court o f Cri mi nal Appeals reversed the de ci si on stating:
A pla in readin g of the statute reveals that the particul ar off ense ch arged is not a spe ci f i c i nten t or resul t-type off en se. See gen erally , S ear cy and P at t er so n, Practice Co mmen t ar y, V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 6.03. A per son may kn owi n gl y of f er to engage i n or ag ree to en gage i n s ex ual cond uct f or afee and comm

it an of fen se under § 43.02(a)(1), supr a, without havi ng the i ntent to actuall

y c onsum ma te the sexual con du ct. In Car

dena s v. S tat e , 640 S.W .2d 291 (Tex .Cr.A pp.198 2), this Court wrot e, “The i

ntent that must accompan y f uture sexual

contact need not acc omp any t he of f er or agr eemen

t to en gage i n sex ual con du ct. ” W

e h ol d th at i nten t to con su m mate an o ffer o rag r ee men t t o en ga ge in sexu al co nduc t is not an element of t he o ffense o f pro st itu t ion u nder § 43 .0 2( a) (1 ), as c har ged in the info rmat ion.
Mat tias , 731 S.W .2d at 93 7. See als o Anguiano v . State , 774 S.W.2d 344, 34 6 (Tex
. A pp. —H ous ton

[14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (not necessary for def endan ts accused

of prosti tution to have in tended that undercover off ic er, to whom pri

ces were quoted, be recipi ent of sex ual servi ces f ordefend ant s t o be fou nd gu ilty of kno wingly offering t o e ngag e o r a gr eeing t o e ng age in sexual conduct unde r se ct ion 4 3. 02( a) (1 )) . I n inter pr et ing sec t ion 4 3. 02( a) (1 ), t he co ur t s have co nsis t en t ly
re ject ed a ppe llant’s c laim that “intent ” is a nec essa ry element of p ro st itu t ion.

It i s pre sum

ed th at the l

egi slature is aw areof

the ca se l aw af f ec ti ng orre lating t o t he stat utes. Miller v. St

ate , 33 S.W .3d 257 , 260 (Tex. Cri m . App. 2000 ). Wh

en the l egi slature meets after a particul

ar statut e has b een j udic al ly construed and does not change t hat st at ut e, co ur t s w ill pr es ume the le gi sl ature in tended that the same

construction should continue to be appl

ie d to that statute. Id . (citin

g Marin v. State , 891 S.W .2d 267 , 271-7 2 (Tex . Cri m . App. 1994 )). Moreover,6 Tex

Pen . Code A

nn . §§ 1.07 (a), 43.0 1 (West 199 4). 13 when a statu te is r ee na ct ed wit ho ut mat er ial c ha ng e, it is g en er ally presum ed that the legisl ature knew and ado pt ed o r a ppr ove d t he inte rp re t at ion p laced on t he origi nal or an earli

er act and i

ntended that t he new e nact ment s hou ld re ceive t he sa me constructi on as the ol der one. Miller , 33 S.W.3d at 260. The Mattias deci si on was han ded dow n b y the Cou rt of Cri m i na l A ppe al s on April 29, 1987, wh ile t he 70 t h Le gis lat ur e w as st ill in sessio n. T he legislat ur e met aga in in 1989 and 1 991 and adj ournedwithoutma

kin g any chan ge i n section 43.02(a)(1). In 1993, the 73rd Legi sl ature enacted t he 1994 Penal

Code without any

chan ge in sec t ion 4 3. 02( a) (1 ) a s ea rlier no t ed. Unde r t he fo re go ing autho rities, we

m us t pres um e th at th e l eg i sl atu rei n ten de d th at th e c on str uc ti on of t he st at ut e in Mattias wa s to be t he inte rp re t at ion t o be given t o t he 19 93 e nact ment under whi ch appel la nt was prosecuted and convicted.

As a pa rt of his ar gument unde r t he se co nd po int o f err or , a ppe llantalso contends that t he trial cou rt sua sponte

fai le d t o de fine t he wo r d “ ag r ee ” s o as t o r eq uir e a n int en t t o en ga ge in sexual co nd uc t . T he t er m ha s no t be en st at ut o r ily de fine d in ei ther section 1.07(a) or section 43.01 6
o f t he Pe na l Co de o rels ew he r e in that code o r the code of c riminal pro ced ur e. In d et er mini ng t he pla in me ani ng of the l

an gu ag e of

a s ta t ut e, “[w] or ds a nd phr ase s sho uld be r ead in cont ext and construed ac cordi

n g to the rules

of gram ma r and usage.” Tex . Gov’t Code Ann . § 311. 011(a) ( West 1998) ; Dow

thitt v. State , 9 31 S .W. 2d 244, 25 8 ( T ex . Cr im. A pp . 19 96 )
. Wo r ds no t st at ut o r ily defi ned and wh ic h ha ve n ot acqui red a techni

cal me ani ng sh ould be gi ve n th ei r o rdin ary m eani ng. Garc ia v. State , 8 87 S .W. 2d 8 46, 859 (T ex. Crim. Ap p. 199 4) . N o s pec ifi c jur y instr uct ions ar e14

needed regar di ng s uch term s. Id . Court s presum e that jurors appl

y the ordinary me ani ng of s uch words. Id
. Appe llantcites William s v. State , 646 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Crim . App. 198 3) , invo lving
a con vi cti on for conspi

racy to comm

it aggravated ki

dnapi ng that was reverse d

beca use of insufficient
ev i de nc e. It wa s n

ot a j ury ch

arge error case. The crim in al conspi racy s tatut e i n questi on required
a speci fi c i ntent to co mmit a fe lo ny, a c ulp ab le me nt al s t at e u nlik e t he inst an t ca se . T he co ur t in Williams f

ound th at the c o-cons

pi rato r wa s a poli

ce i nf ormant and the pa

rticular agreeme

nt as required b

y s ection 15.02(3) of the Penal Code as an

elem en t of the off en se w as n

ot shown
. Id . at 224. Williams can b e di stin guis hed f rom the i nstant case b

y i ts facts and the l

aw. We rejec t appell ant’s cl ai m that the trial

court comm

itted funda menta l err or in fail

ing to ch ar ge t he ju ry sua sp onte on an addi

tional cul pa bl e m en tal sta te of “intent ” o r in faili

ng t o d efine “a gree” f or the j ury . No error b ei

ng s hown, Almanza is ina pp lica ble
. T he se co nd po int o f er r o ris overruled. The Constitutional Question

Ne xt, wesh

al l con si de r ap pe l l an t’s i ni ti al con ten ti on th at s ec ti on 43.02(a)(1) is fa cia lly
ove rbr oa d in violat ion o f the First Amendment t o t he Unit ed S t at es Co nst itu t ion.

Re ce nt ly in State v. Wof

ford , 34 S. W. 2d 67 1 ( T ex . Ap p. —A us t in 2 00 0, no pe t . ) , t his Co ur t dis cu ss ed t he st an da r ds fo rr ev iew ing a c o nst it ut io na l cla im.

In de term i ni ng a s tatute ’s

con sti tuti ona l i ty , we be gi n w i th a pre su m ption of t he statute’ s val

i di ty. Ex parte Anderson, 902 S.W.2d 69 5, 69 8 ( T ex . Ap p. —A us t in 1995, pe t. ref’d) ; Skiller

n v. State , 890 S.W.2d 849, 860 (Tex. App.—Austi n 1994, pe t. ref ’d ). W e p res um e that the l

eg i sl atu re d i d n ot ac t un rea son ab l y orar bit r ar ily in enac t ingthe statute and tha t it h ad due rega

rd f or cons tituti

onal requi rem en ts. Ex15

parte Granviel , 561 S.W.2d 503, 511 (T ex. Crim. Ap p. 197 8) . I t is the chall enger’s burden to show that the statue is u nc o nst it ut io na l. Id .; Anderson , 903 S.W.2d at 698, Eve ry r ea so na ble i

n ten dm en t an d p re su m pti on i s m ade i n f av or of th e c on sti tuti on al i ty and va l i di ty of the statute. Skillern , 890 S.W.2d at 86 0. T he st at ut e mu st be up he ld if a r ea son

ab l e c on str

uc ti on ca n b e a sc er

tai n ed wh i ch wi l l re n der the statu

te constitutional

and carr y ou t t he legislat ivei

nten t. Ely v. State , 582 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex .Cri m .App.1979 ). Co nst it ut io na l iss ue s w ill not be de cid ed up o n a br o ad er ba sis than the re cord req

ui res. State v. Gar

cia , 823 S.W .2 d 793 , 799 (Tex.App.—San An toni o 1992, pe

t. ref ’d).
Id . at 678. The Stat e has, withi n i ts p ol i ce power , t he righ

t t o pr ot ect its legiti

mate in terest s. Kovacsv. Cooper , 33 6 U. S. 77, 83 ( 194 9); Blanco v. State , 76 1 S .W. 2d 3 8, 40 ( Te x. A pp. —H ous ton

[14th D i st.] 1988 , n o pet.). “The p olice p ow er of a st at e ext ends beyond healt h,
m oral s a n d s af ety , a n d c om pr eh en dsth e d uty , w i th i n con sti tuti on al l i m i tati on s, to pr ot ect t he we llbeing and tranquil

ity of a comm

uni ty.” Kovacs , 336 U.S. at 83. The righ t o f the State is

li mi ted o nly by in div idual constitut ional

rights, such a s the

Fi rst A mendm en t’s ri ght to f ree s peec h. Clark v. State , 665 S. W.2 d 47 6, 482 (T ex. Crim. Ap p. 198 4) . An a t t ack on a stat ut e a s be ing co nst it ut io na lly overbroadis

normal ly and traditional ly

reserved for compl ai nts concerni

ng al le ged First Amendment vi ola tions. Bynum v. Stat

e , 767 S.W.2d 679, 772 (T ex. Crim. Ap p. 198 9) . T he First Amendment is, of co urse, appli

cabl e to t he states by

vi rtue o f the F ourt eenth A

me ndm ent to t he Un

ited States Co nst itu t ion. See Olvera v. State , 806 S.W.2d 546, 548 n.2 (Tex. Crim . App. 1991) (citi ng Gitlow
v. United States , 26 8 U. S. 652 (19 25) ); see also Edw ards v. South Carloina , 372 U .S. 229, 23 5 (1963 ). Appe llantasse rt s t hat he has st anding to chal l en gef ac i al l y the ove rbrea dth of se cti on 43.02( a)(1), ci

ting Rabb v. State , 730 S.W .2d 75 1, 7 52 (Tex . C ri

m . A pp . 19 87 ). A

pp el l an t i s c orre ct.16

An individual who se o wn ac t ivities may validly be pr oh i b i ted i s p er m i tted n on eth el es s to chal

le nge
a st at ut e as ove rbr oa d bec aus e it a lso t hre at ens othersnot be f ore the c ourt. Dubuisson v. State , 572 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex . Cri

m . Ap p. 1978 ). Thus, a cri

mi nal statut e m ay be h el d faci al ly in val id e ven though it may no t be unconsti tut iona l as a ppl i ed to a def

endan t. Gooding v. Wilson , 405 U.S. 518, 521 (19 92) ; Dombrow

ski v. Pfister , 380 U.S. 479 , 486 (1 965). “The ove rbreadth doctrine h

as often been unde rst oo d as an exc ept ion t o t he rul e that i nd i vi dua l s g en era l l y may not l i ti ga te the ri gh ts of thi rd parti es.” Law rence Tri be , American Constitutional Law, § 1 2-2 7 (1 988 ); see also Commission for Lawyer

Discipline v. Benton , 980 S.W .2d 425 , 435 (Tex. 19 98). Al though app ellant hast he nec essa ry st anding, his facial challenge t o t he st at ut e is t he
mo st dif f i cul t ch al l en ge to m oun t su cc es sf ul l y , a s th e ch al l en ger m us t demon strate

th at th e statu te alw ays op er at es u nco ns ti tution al l y . Wi l so n v. A n d

re ws , 1 0 S .W. 3d 6 63, 670 (T ex. 199 9) (c iting United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) and Santikos v. State , 836 S.W.2d631 , 6 33 ( Te x. Cr i m . A pp . 19 92 ) (c

h al l en ger m us t estab l i sh

th at n o se t of ci rc um sta n ce ex i sts un der w h i ch sta tute wil l be va l i d)). Now

that appell

ant’s standi

ng an d burden have be en es t ablished, t he cru ci al que sti on is whether the statute sweeps withi n i ts prohibi tions wh at may not be puni shed

unde r t he First and Fo urte en th Amendment s. T he do ct rine o f ove rbr ead t h is desig ned t o p ro t ect First Amendment f ree dom o f exp re ss io n fr o m laws wr it t en s o br o ad ly th at t he fe ar o f pun i sh m en t mi ght dis courage pe o ple f rom ta ki ng a dva ntag e of that f reedom
. SeeBroadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973 ).17 In di scu ssi ng th i s doctri ne , the c ourt i n Smith v. Stat e , 9 59 S .W. 2d 1 (T ex. App.—Wac o 1997, pet . ref’d), stated:

A sta tute i s i m perm i ss i b l y ov er b roa d w h en , “ i n addi ti on to pr os cr ibing activ ities wh i ch may con sti tution all y b e forbi

dden, i t sweeps wi

thin its coverage speech or co nduct whi

ch i s protect ed by

the Fi rst Ame ndm ent.” Bynum v. Stat

e , 767 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.Crim

.App.1989) (quot in

g Clark v. State , 665 S.W.2d476, 482 (T ex .Cri m .App.1984 )). However, even if the statut e reaches

both lawf

ul a n d unl awful co nd uc t , it wil

l n ot be consi

dered ov er b road u n l es s i t substa ntially

in terferes wi th protected c onduc

t. Bynum , 767 S.W .2d at 77 2-73 (e m phasi s ad ded). “[S]peech i s not p rot ec t ed by t he Fir st Amen dme nt wh en it is t he ve ry veh icle o f t he cr ime i tself .” United States v. Rowlee , 899 F.2d 1275, 1278 (2d Cir.1990) (quot in g United States v. Varani , 435 F .2d 758 , 762 (6 th Ci r.1970 )).
Id . at 24. Appe llantacknowl edges that Texas h as a legi ti m at e inte re st in pre vent ing pr os t itu t ion, butargues that if

the statut ory words of “of fer or agree” m ea

nwh at t he Mattias deci

sion sa y s, a pe rs on wh o i s on l y j oki n g or pr ete n di n g to a gr ee i s g ui l ty of prosti tution und er se cti on 42.0 3(a)(1 ), and th at th

e statu te sh oul d b e “ n ar row l y tai l ore d” to prohi bi t onl y unprotected sp eech. He contends that wo r ds lik e “ o ka y” or “sure” a re harm le ss ab sent any

crim in al in tent, and sin

ce section 42.03(a)(1) does no t impo se t he cu lpa ble men t al s t at e o f int en t t he st at ut e is un co nst it ut io na lly o ve r br o ad
. T his is the same ar gument pr eviou sly reject ed bu t pr ese nt ed a gain in app ar ent co nst itu t ional ga rb.

Wh en governmental acti on im

pli cates First Am

endm ent righ ts, cour ts must bal

ance those i n di v i du al ri gh ts a gai n st g ov er n men tal i n terest i n l i m i ti n g th e acti v i ty in ques t ion. Georgene
v. Amchen Prods,. Inc ., 160 F.R .D . 4 78, 512 (E .D . P a. 199 5) . T he pr ot ect ion ava ilable for t he f ree dom of ex pre ss i on tu

rn s on the na ture both of t he expression and of the governm ental i nterest served by the regul

ati on. Id
. Whe n a n o ve r

br ea dt h c laim is pr es en

ted , i t i s th e d uty of th e c our ts to18

det er mine whi ch of the c onfl

icting i nterests deman

ds the greater pro tection under the particul ar ci rcum stan ces . American Communication Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds , 339 U .S. 383, 3 99 (19 50). The Fi rst A men dm en t to t he Un it ed St at es Co nst it ut io n p r o vid es t ha t Co ng r es s s ha ll
ma ke no law ab r id gi ng t he fr ee do m o f sp ee ch , pr es s, o ras se mbly. It has, howev er, long b een estab li shed th at th es e f re edom s a

rede pen den t up on th e p owe

r of con sti tuti on al gov er n men t t o survi ve. Douds , 3 39 U .S . a t 394 . T he se f reedom s “ do not gi

ve ab sol ute protection to ev ery individual to spe ak w heneve r o r w her ever he plea ses, or t o u se a ny form o f add re ss in any ci rcumstance s t hat he ch

ooses.” Cohen v

. California , 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971). The righ t t o free speech is not an unl

im ited, unqual

i f i ed ri ght. On o cca sion t he so ciet al value o f spee ch must be subordin ated to ot her va

l uesand con siderati

ons. Dennis v. United States , 341 U.S. 499, 503 (1951 ). Stat utes regulati

ng acti vi ties i n ordert o pr o t ec t pu blic heal th are considered to be a la wful exer cise o f the police power of a state. No rman J. Si nge r, Sutherland Statutory Construc tion, § 71.02 ( 5th e d. 1992 ). I t has been held t hat t he ena ct ment o f sect ion 4 3. 02 w as t o p ro t ect t he healt h, sa fet y and we lfare o f the po pulat ion and was wit hin the d iscre t ion o f the legislat ur e and t he police power of

the state. Tisdale

v. State , 64 0 S .W .2d

40 0 ( Te x . A

pp .—S an A n toni o 19 82 , pe

t. ref’ d). In speaki

ng of s ection 43.02 i

t has been stated:
Re gul ati on of prosti tution i s i m portant to the s

ubs tantial gove rn ment i nte res t of pr ot ect ingcitizen

s’ he al th an d sa f ety . Th e re gul

ati on i s n ot rel ate d to the suppres si

on of free ex pr es si on an d th e i n ci den tal re str i cti on i s n o gr ea ter th an n ec es sa ry to further t he su b sta n ti al gov er n men t i n terest. See Tisd ale v. State , 6 40 S .W. 2d 4 09 ( Te x. App.—San

An toni o 1982, pe

t. ref ’d). Young S un Lee v. Sta te , 681 S.W .2d 656 , 662 (Tex. A pp.—H ouston [14th Dist.] 1984 , pet ref ’d).19 Thus, i t i s c l ea r th at the c onte

nti on appella nt rais es ha s b een

deci ded to the contrar y in Young Sun Lee , 6 81 S .W. 2d a t 662 . I n Tisdale , the c our t also r ej ec te d th e c l ai

m tha t se cti on 43.02( a)(1) w as c onsti

tution al l y overb road as to depri ve ci tiz en s of thei r ri ght to pri

vacy . Id ., 640 S.W.2d at 413-14. T he statute h as als o wit hstood an att ack agai nst a clai

m that i t was
co nst it ut io na lly

va gue. McCarty

v. State , 616 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex . Cri m . App. 1981 ). Moreover, it h as b een de ter m i n ed th at th e w o r d “ o ffer ” a s u se d in se ct io n 4 3. 02 ( a) ( 1) is no t co nst it ut io na lly vague. Ozack

v. State , 646 S.W .2d 941 , 942 (Tex. Cri m . App. 1983 ); McCarty , 616 S.W.2d at 196. In balanci ng the in terest s, we c onc lude t hat t he St at e’s c omp elling inter est in quelling prosti tution ou t weighs the de mini

mis i nt er est of a n individual in ut t er ing cer t ain wo rd s as u rg ed by appe l l an t. We re ject app ellant’ s co nt ention tha t 42. 03( a) (1 ) is co nst itu t ionally over bro ad a s he cl ai ms . The fi

rst point of error is overrul ed. The j udgme

nt is aff irm ed.

John F . Onion, Jr., Justice Be f ore J us ti ce s K i dd, Pur yea r an d O ni on * Af fi rmed File d: January

17, 2002 Publish20 * Bef ore Joh n F. On i on , J r., Pre si di n g J udge (re ti re d) , C our

t of Cr i m i n al A pp ea l s, si tt in g b y ass i gnm en t. SeeTex . Gov’ t Code A nn . § 74.00 3(b ) (We st 1998 ).