CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff Sienkiewicz’s motion for summary judgment is
denied, and defendant Commissioner Barnhart’s motion for summary judgment is granted. This
is a final and appealable order, terminating the case.
It is so ordered.

be CR

7 Wayne R. Andersen
United States District Judge

pace MO Vonclaes fl, 203

19



A. The ALJ’s Finding that Plaintiff Has Residual Functional Capacity Is
Supported by the Record

In evaluating the evidence, an ALJ must consider the objective medical evidence in
conjunction with subjective factors such as a claimant's daily activities, the nature of the
symptoms, the type and effectiveness of medications taken to relieve symptoms, treatments other
than medication and evidence relating to functional limitations. 20 C.F.R § 404.1545; Knight v.
Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 314 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ also considers whether the record contains
any inconsistencies and whether the claimant’s testimony conflicts with the rest of the evidence.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) and 416.929(c)(4).

In his decision, ALJ Karmgard discussed the objective medical evidence presented at the
hearing and concluded that, notwithstanding Plaintiff's impairments, she has a residual
functional capacity. Plaintiff again argues here that the ALJ did not consider the disabling effect
of all of her impairments and specifically argues that the ALI failed to sufficiently consider the
effect of Plaintiff's headaches and her exposure to moderate respiratory irritants. We disagree.

Clearly, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff was limited by certain symptoms and
concluded that Plaintiff, in fact, suffered severe impairments, including morbid obesity, asthma
and migraine headaches, among others. As stated above, an ALJ does not need to address every
piece of evidence in his decision. Sims, 309 F.3d at 429. Rather, he need only “build a bridge
from the evidence to this conclusion.” Green, 204 F.3d at 781.

In regard to Plaintiff's testimony about her headaches, the ALJ’s stated in his discussion
of the medical evidence that “the record in its entirety does not reflect any treatment history for

on-going headache symptoms or any specific source of intervention, No specific limitations

13


On January 12, 2000, Plaintiff sought treatment from an urgent care family practice for
chest pain, shortness of breath, weakness for one week, and pain in her back and left arm. On
examination, Plaintiff's lungs were clear, and her chest and back were tender. She was
prescribed Celebrex again and denied other medications.

On January 17, 2000, Plaintiff attended a second consultative exam, which was scheduled
by the state disability determination agency, with Stephen Epner M.D. Plaintiff again reported a
history of asthma with two hospitalizations in the last six years. She stated that her asthma
worsened in hot or humid weather and with activity and that she experienced shortness of breath
after walking 100 feet or climbing six stairs, Plaintiff admitted that she had smoked a pack of
cigarettes per day until she had quit two months earlier. Plaintiff also reported pain in her lower
back and right knee and that the pain was exacerbated by walking, sitting, standing, bending, and
lifting. Plaintiff reported that she had undergone an MRI, but that no herniated disc was
diagnosed. She complained of daily migraine headaches for two years and abdominal pain.
Plaintiff also reported an anxiety disorder, for which she took Zoloft, and a history of depression.
She reported that she often avoided leaving her house, that she felt panicked when in crowds, and
that she felt social isolation. She reported taking Lorazapam, Trazodone, Zoloft, Celebrex and
Incodin in addition to asthma medications and Pepcid.

On exam, Dr. Epner found that Plaintiff was obese and bad a slight limp and lumbering
gait. She was slow to arise from a chair and reported that her knee pain made it difficult to get
up. However, he observed that Plaintiff was able to get on and off the exam table without
assistance. Her lungs were normal, but she had epigastric tenderness and tendemess of the

lumbar vertebrae. Plaintiff also had pedal edema and some limitation of motion in her lumbar

4


contain any opinions from treating or examining physicians indicating that [Plaintiff] is disabled
or even has limitation greater than those determined in this decision.”
It is appropriate to contrast the complaints made to doctors with the complaints alleged in
a disability claim. See Welsh v. Halter, 170 F, Supp. 2d 807, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2001). In this case,
the record provides adequate support for the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff's testimony and
credibility finding, and we are not persuaded by Plaintiff's arguments that the ALJ was wrong.
See Jens v. Barnhart, F.3d __, 2003 WL 22319564, at *5 (7th Cir, Oct. 10, 2003). Indeed, it
is clear that the ALJ considered and weighed Plaintiff's testimony in light of the objective ;
medical evidence presented. ALJ Karmgard’s analysis and credibility determinations are i
sufficiently articulated in his decision, and his conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

IV. The Vocational Expert’s Testimony Supports the ALJ’s Determination that Plaintiff
Could Perform a Significant Number of Jobs

After listening to the testimony of Plaintiff and a vocational expert, ALJ Karmgard
concluded that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, but could perform a significant
number of jobs existing in the national economy. Therefore, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
was not disabled and denied her application for disability benefits. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
did not properly consider the vocational expert’s testimony and that, in fact, Plaintiff had
additional limitations that prevented her from working. We disagree.

The ALJ presented specific hypothetical questions to the vocational expert with
Plaintiff's particular limitations included as part of the hypothetical. In considering those
questions, the vocational expert testified that an individual with those specified limitations would |

be able to work and that jobs existed for an individual of Plaintiffs’ age, education, work |

17


DISCUSSION

L Standard of Review

We review an ALJ’s decision to determine if it is “supported by substantial evidence.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399-401 (1971); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434 (7th
Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence, although more than a mere scintilla of proof, is “no more than
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1995). Although we review “the entire record to
determine if there is relevant evidence adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion, we do not
decide the facts anew, reweigh evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”
Kepple v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 2001). A district court must affirm the ALI’s
decision if it is reasonably drawn from the record and is supported by substantial evidence, even
if some evidence may support the claimant’s position. Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 326 (7th
Cir. 1993).

I. The Record Supports the ALJ’s Finding that Plaintiff's Impairments Did Not Meet,
Equal or Exceed Any Listed Impairment

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant, who is the
Plaintiff in this case, must be disabled within the meaning of the statute, and the statute provides
that an individual is disabled if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant also must have a severe impairment that

makes her unable to perform her “previous work or any other substantial gainful activity which


On April 20, 2000, Plaintiff's record show that she underwent pulmonary function
testing, The testing showed borderline to moderate obstruction, as well as low vital capacity.

On September 18, 2000, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lim, eleven months after she last saw
him. Dr. Lim noted that Plaintiff had developed some pain and cracking in her thigh and she also
was treated for a calcaneus spur with plantar fascitis, which is an outgrowth on the heel of the
foot associated with pain on the bottom of the foot. Dr. Lim recommended massage and
exercises for the kneecap and supports for her shoes.

On November 8, 2000, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lim, complaining that the pain in her heel
was severe, and she wanted to try an injection for pain. Dr. Lim injected pain medication into the
outgrowth on Plaintiff's heel, which provided complete relief of her pain. Dr. Lim suggested that
Plaintiff perform stretching exercises and gave her a prescription for Lortab with no refill.

On November 14, 2000, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Evelyn Figeroa, one of Plaintiffs own
physicians. Dr. Figeroa diagnosed chest wall pain and prescribed Naprosyn. She diagnosed Tight
lower quadrant pain, scheduled a pelvic ultrasound, and refilled Plaintiff's medications. Dr.
Figeroa’s notes from a telephone call in December 2000 indicate that the ultrasound revealed a
1.5 cm fibroid and that Plaintiff's follow-up appointment was cancelled.

On January 31, 2001, Plaintiff visited to Dr. Lim again and reported that the November
2000 injection provided great improvement in her heel for three months. Plaintiff complained
that the pain had retumed, and she wanted another injection. Dr. Lim gave her the injection.

I. _— Hearing Testimony
On February 27, 2001, Administrative Law Judge Robert T. Karmgard (“ALJ”) held a

hearing at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. At the hearing, Plaintiff and a vocational


spine. Plaintiff's knees had limited ranges of motion and swelling. Dr. Epner diagnosed asthma,
low back pain, headaches, right knee pain, abdominal pain, and anxiety disorder. X-rays taken
on this date revealed spasm of Plaintiff's lumbar spine, but no fracture or dislocation in her right
knee,

Also on January 17, 2000, Plaintiff attended a second consultative psychiatric exam
scheduled for her by the state disability determination agency, which was performed by John
Conran M.D. Plaintiff reported that her daily activities included household tasks, picking her
daughter up from school, and walking her home. Dr. Conran recognized that Plaintiff's mood
was sad at times, however, concluded that her anxiety level and affect were appropriate to her
current problems. Dr. Conran diagnosed moderate depression related to her physical problems
and the pressures of raising a five-year old child.

On February 3, 2000, Young-Ja Kim M.D. reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and
concluded that: (1) Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; (2) she
could stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight-hour day; and (3) she could sit six hours in an
eight-hour day. Dr. Kim opined that Plaintiff should only occasionally climb ramps and stairs,
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl and that she never should climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds. He opined that Plaintiff did not have any environmental limitations.

On February 9, 2000, Man Mohan Singh M.D. reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and
offered an opinion on her mental impairments. Dr. Singh concluded that Plaintiff's moderate
situational depression caused slight restriction of activities of daily living, slight difficulties in
maintaining social functioning, and seldom caused deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or

pace.


experience and residual functional capacity. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have presented
all of the limitations to which Plaintiff testified and that the ALJ disregarded certain testimony
presented by the vocational expert. However, an ALJ’s hypothetical question to a vocational
expert need only include those work-related limitations supported by the medical evidence and
found to exist by the ALJ. Steele, 290 F.3d at 942; Cass v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir.
1993) (vocational expert testimony supports the Commissioner’s decision when a hypothetical
question presented to the expert adequately reflects a claimant’s work-related limitations).

As we explained above, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding is supported by the
evidence and when eliciting testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ included all of the
restrictions from the residual functional capacity finding. That is all that is required. The ALJ
explained why he did not find credible certain of Plaintiff's alleged limitations, and those
limitations, which were rejected by the ALJ, did not need to be presented to the vocational
expert. Thus, the vocational expert’s testimony was sufficient to carry the burden of
demonstrating that other jobs existed for an individual with Plaintiff's limitations and

Testrictions.

18


Plaintiff testified that, since she stopped working, she spent her days trying to clean
around the house, doing laundry and dishes, taking her daughter to school and helping her with
homework. She testified that she did not vacuum or sweep. She visited her neighbor and her
sister a couple of times a week. She socialized every couple of weeks with a friend from her
neighborhood. Plaintiff testified that she could stand for 20 or 30 minutes, sit for 40 minutes,
and walk for 20 minutes before she experienced symptoms. She testified that she could lift a
maximum of 20 pounds.

The vocational expert testified that a person of Plaintiff's age and education could not
perform Plaintiff's past relevant work. However, the vocational expert testified that an individual
with Plaintiff's limitations could work if: (1) it was limited to sedentary work, with standing and
walking no more than 15 minutes at a time; (2) with no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
(3) with only occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching,
and crawling; (4) with no more than moderate exposure to pulmonary irritants and temperature
extremes; (5) with only the capacity for simple tasks, and not complex or detailed tasks; and (6)
with no more than incidental contact with the general public. The vocational expert testified that,
with such limitations, a person could perform 2,000 hand packager jobs, 1,000 production
inspector jobs and 4,500 assembler jobs in the Chicagoland area.

On June 29, 2001, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's claim for disability
benefits. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, but her request for review was denied.
Defendant Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, adopted the ALJ’s decision as final, and
Plaintiff has filed this appeal seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of her claim

for disability insurance and supplemental security income.



‘Minute Order Fora (0697)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

wesseeratcar | WayneR Andersen | Sarat
CASE NUMBER 2C 6332 DATE 11/14/2003

CASE Lynne A. Sienkiewicz vs. Jo Anne B, Barnhart

TITLE

[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
DOCKET ENTRY:
(49) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) QO Answer brief to motion due__. Reply to answer briefdue__.
(4) Oo Roling/Hearingon___ssetfor__—_at
(5) o Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor__—_at.
() oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-setfor] on_____setfor__—ssat_—
mM a Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at
(8) Q [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) OC Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(aX(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

(ao ff [Other docket entry] Enter MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing

reasons, plaintiff Sienkiewicz’s motion for summary judgment [9-1] is denied, and defendant
Commissioner Barnhart’s motion for summary judgment [12-1] is granted. This is a final and

appealable order, terminating the case.

(il) @

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.)

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone,

‘a | Docketing to mail notices,

vo | Mail AO 450 form.

ay
3
‘Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
date mailed notice
courtroom
TSA deputy’s gy
initials — =
Date/time received i |'~ ;
central Clerk's Office mailing deputy initials



Principles of administrative law require the ALJ to rationally articulate the grounds for
his decision, and our review the ALJ’s determination is confined to the reasons provided by the
ALJ, which are articulated in his decision. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002).
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ “adequately explained his conclusion in this case and the
record amply supports his finding that Plaintiff did not equal any listed impairment.”

In his decision, ALJ Karmgard concluded that Plaintiff's condition did not meet the
requirements or equal the level of severity contemplated for any impairment listed in the
regulations and incorporated his analysis of Plaintiff's residual functional capacity as support for
those findings. Also, in connection with his evaluation of Plaintiff's condition, the ALJ found
“that the claimant has a mild limitation in activities of daily living, moderate limitation in social
functioning, moderate limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace and no
evidence of decompensation in a work or work-like setting.”

An ALJ does not have to address every piece of evidence in his decision. Sims v.
Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir. 2002). Rather, the ALJ need only build “a bridge from the
evidence to his conclusion.” Green v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 780, 781 (7th Cir. 2000). Although the
ALJ combines his discussion of whether Plaintiff's impairments meet, equal or exceed a listed
impairment with his consideration of Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, it is clear from this
record that the ALJ considered all of the evidence presented to him, including whether the
combination of Plaintiff's impairments equaled the level of severity contemplated in the listings,
in reaching his decision.

Specifically, the ALJ sets forth an analysis of the medical evidence presented to him in

conjunction with the testimony provided at the hearing. In reviewing the ALJ’s analysis and

sa


exists in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. The fact finder must follow a five-step
inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) is the claimant currently employed?; (2)
is the claimant’s impairment severe?; (3) does the impairment meet, equal or exceed a listed
impairment enumerated in the regulations?; (4) is the claimant able to perform her past work?;
and (5) is the claimant capable of performing any work in the national economy? Clifford v.
Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).

In this case, ALJ Karmgard found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
employment since April 20, 1993, which is the date identified in her amended application for
disability benefits. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's asthma, low back pain, problems with her
tight knee, abdominal pain, chest pain, morbid obesity, migraine headaches, depression and
anxiety significantly limited her ability to perform basic work activities. As a result, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff had “severe” impairments. However, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's
impairments did not meet, equal or exceed the level of severity contemplated for any impairment
listed in the regulations.

In order to establish that a claimant’s condition medically equals a listed impairment, a
claimant must present medical findings which are “at least equal in severity and duration” to the
medical findings in a listing. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526(a)-(b) (2003); see also Maggard v. Apfel,
167 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The claimant bears the burden of proving his condition
meets or equals a listed impairment.”). Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ’s decision does not
contain adequate analysis of the question of whether the combination of her impairments equaled

the level of severity contemplated in the listings. We disagree.

10


expert testified. Plaintiff testified that she began experiencing panic disorder, anxiety, insomnia,
stomach pain, and migraines in April 1993. She testified that she stopped working as a nanny
because the pain in her legs made it hard to stand and that the pain started to really bother her
around 1994. Plaintiff testified that she started having problems with her knee in 1998 or 1999
and with her heel in 2000.

Plaintiff also testified that, about five years earlier in approximately 1996, she started
experiencing headaches so severe that she had to lie down and that they lasted between 15
minutes and one hour. She testified that the headaches occurred twice a week for the past year
and that they occurred once a month for the previous four years. Plaintiff testified that, since
around 1998, she experienced burning in her stomach about three times a week. She testified
that, if she vacuumed, lifted too much or walked more than one block, she would have a hard
time breathing. Plaintiff explained that, although she first started having problem with
depression about five years ago, for the past six months she experienced symptoms such as
crying, mood swings, and not wanting to leave the house. She testified to panic attacks twice a
week for the past six months.

Plaintiff represented that she saw her two doctors at least every other week. Yet some of
those medical records were not part of the record before the ALJ. Plaintiff also testified that the
orthopedist who treated her foot and knee problems told her she had rheumatoid arthritis and
recommended surgery on her knee. Plaintiff also submitted pharmacy print-outs, showing that
she was prescribed antidepressants, asthma medications, and analgesics, among other
medications, by several physicians. However, those records do not indicate the dates of the

prescriptions, the number of doses filled, or whether refills were permitted.


On July 9, 1999, Carl Hermsmeyer Ph.D. reviewed Plaintiff's records and offered an
opinion on her mental impairments. Dr. Hermsmeyer found that Plaintiff had an affective
disorder that caused slight restriction of daily activities, slight difficulties in maintaining social
functioning, and seldom caused deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace. He opined
that Plaintiff would have moderate limitations relating to detailed instructions, but no other
significant mental limitations. Dr. Hermsmeyer also concluded that Plaintiff's mental status
exam and her daily activities indicated that she had the capacity to perform simple tasks.

On August 2, 1999, Mohammad Irahad M.D. reviewed Plaintiff’s records and offered an
opinion on her physical impairments, He opined: (1) Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds occasionally
and 10 pounds frequently; (2) she could stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight-hour day; and
(3) she could sit six hours in an eight-hour day. He concluded that Plaintiff should avoid a
concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants and extremes of temperature, but that moderate
exposure could be tolerated.

The earliest treatment note in the record is dated July 19, 1999. On that date, Plaintiff
consulted with Dr. Lim, an orthopedist, and complained of pain and numbness in her right leg
and foot. Dr. Lim recommended heat, massage and rest for a few weeks and prescribed
Naprosyn. Three months later, on October 27, 1999, Plaintiff retumed to Dr. Lim and reported
additional problems with her right leg, including numbness, tingling and pain down the right
peroneal nerve. Dr. Lim took an x-ray of Plaintiff's lumbosacral spine, which looked normal,
and prescribed Celebrex, which is an anti-inflammatory used to relive arthritis and to manage

acute pain.


were imposed regarding the headaches by any treating or evaluating source.” The ALJ also noted
that one of Plaintiff's doctors concluded that “the reported headaches (lasting ten minutes to an
hour) are likely cluster headaches rather than migraines.”

In regard to the respiratory irritants, the ALJ specifically considered a pulmonary function
study, which was performed in April 2000, and concluded that although the study revealed some
obstructive lung symptoms, those impairments did not satisfy any listing level of severity.
Plaintiff argues that it was not reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that she could tolerate
moderate exposure to pulmonary or respiratory irritants. However, the medical evidence shows
that Plaintiff should avoid concentrated exposure to such irritants. Moreover, Plaintiff testified
that she had difficulty breathing with physical exertion like vacuuming, lifting too much weight
or walking too much. She also identified panic attacks, which clearly is not a respiratory irritant,
as a trigger for her breathing problems. In light of this testimony, the ALJ limited Plaintiff's
level of physical activity to accommodate her limitations and eliminated the possibility of
exposure to concentrated levels of respiratory irritants to prevent any asthmatic exacerbations.

The ALJ has provided a sufficient bridge of evidence for the finding of Plaintiff's
residual functional capacity. Specifically, ALJ Karmgard acknowledged that Plaintiff's
impairments, including her headaches and asthma, were limiting and discussed the her
impairments and the relevant medical records in conjunction with his assessment of her residual
functional capacity. Moreover, none of the evidence that Plaintiff contends the ALJ ignored or
misstated establishes that Plaintiff had any significant limitations which would effect her residual
functional capacity. Thus, the ALJ's finding of residual functional capacity is supported by the

evidence.

14


Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently consider “the type, dosage,
effectiveness and side effects of [her] medications.” The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff
submitted an exhibit which identified various medications that were prescribed to Plaintiff. In
addition, the medical evidence presented identifies some of the medications Plaintiff was
prescribed. In his decision, the ALJ specifically discussed certain of those medications,
including Zoloft and Naprosyn. However, in considering the appropriate weight to give this
evidence, the ALJ states that “the exhibit also contains no evidence as to the actual
symptomology observed regarding the claimant or as to the actual side effects reported by any
medical source.” It is appropriate for the ALJ to consider Plaintiff's testimony and claims of
disability in light of the medical evidence and when faced with evidence that both supports and
detracts from Plaintiff's claims, the Seventh Circuit recognizes that “the resolution of competing
arguments based on the record is for the ALJ, not the court.” Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d.
441, 444 (7th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ's observations that Plaintiff had not received or
sought any treatment from a psychiatrist for her depression and anxiety. Even though lack of
treatment or failure to seek treatment may not be a valid basis to reject a claim of disability due
to depression, courts have held that a failure to seek medical attention may cast doubt upon the
seriousness of an individual’s alleged symptoms or ailments. Ca/darulo v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 410,
413 (7th Cir. 1988). Specifically, the ALJ concluded that the type of medical care Plaintiff has
teceived is not “the type of medical treatment one would expect for a totally disable individual.

Her care has been routine and conservative.” In addition, the ALJ noted that “the record does not

16


L Medical History

Although Plaintiff alleges a disability as of April 1993, the earliest medical evidence in
the record is dated December 1998 and consists solely of a report of a pelvic ultrasound, which
revealed a cyst in the right ovary. The remaining records are dated after Plaintiff had submitted
her application for disability benefits.

On June 7, 1999, Plaintiff attended a consultative internal medicine examination
performed by Scott Kale M.D. and a psychiatric examination conducted by Allen Nelson M.D.,
which were requested by the state disability determination agency. In the internal medicine
consultative exam with Dr. Kale, Plaintiff reported that she suffered from frequent migraine
headaches and that she had a history of asthma. Plaintiff also reported pain in her right knee.
Dr. Kale diagnosed obesity, a history of asthma with no present evidence, and a history of pain
in the lower right extremity with no abnormalities identified.

In the psychiatric consultative exam with Dr. Nelson, Plaintiff reported that she had been
depressed for eighteen months and that she had crying spells, insomnia and a tendency to overeat.
She reported taking two medications, Lorazapam and Zoloft, for anxiety, panic attacks and
depression, but she did not report any current psychiatric treatment or any prior psychiatric
hospitalizations. Plaintiff's daily activities included performing light household chores when
possible, interacting with her daughter, watching television, listening to the radio and
maintaining contact with her sister and father. Dr. Nelson diagnosed moderate dysthymia
disorder, which is depressive disturbance characterized by sadness, loss of interest and
withdrawal. He concluded that for the past eighteen months, Plaintiff had become increasingly

chronically depressed and anxious and had undergone a marked social withdrawal.



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
LYNNE A. SIENKIEWICZ, )
Plaintiff, ;
v. } No. 02 C 6332
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner } Wayne R. Andersen
of Social Security, ) District Judge

Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM. OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. For
the reasons stated below, the motion of plaintiff Lynne Sienkiewicz is denied, and the motion of |
Jo Anne Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lynne Sienkiewicz is 38 years old. She has a high school education, and from
1983 through 1993, she was employed as a child care provider and as an egg inspector. Plaintiff
applied for disability insurance and supplemental security income on January 29, 1999. In her
application for disability benefits, Plaintiff claimed a disability since January 31, 1990. However,
the record reflects that Plaintiff was employed through April 20, 1993. Thus, Plaintiff submitted
an amended application for disability which alleged a disability date of April 20, 1993. Plaintiff's
application for disability benefits and supplemental security income was denied, and she

requested a hearing.



decision in its entirety, it is clear that the ALJ did, in fact, consider the combination of Plaintiff's
impairments, including her claims of disabling symptoms and limitations, and what effect the
totality of her symptoms and limitations had on her activities of daily living. The record also
shows that Plaintiff's counsel in his submission to the ALJ for closing arguments concedes that
Plaintiff's impairments may not, in fact, meet the level of severity of any listing enumerated in
the regulations, In addition, the ALJ specifically considered an April 2000 pulmonary function
study, which revealed some obstructive lung symptoms, but were “not of listing level severity.”

Although Plaintiff now asserts that the ALJ did not consider whether the combination of
her impairments equaled the level of severity contemplated in the listings, Plaintiff does not offer
any specific listing that the ALJ should have considered. Thus, the record sufficiently supports
the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet, equal or exceed any listed
impairment contemplated the regulations.

III. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Finding that Plaintiff Has Residual
Functional Capacity

Since the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet, equal or exceed the
level of severity contemplated in a listed impairment, the ALJ then had to determine Plaintiff's
residual functional capacity or, in other words, what work-related activities Plaintiff could
perform despite her impairments. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity
finding is not supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ did not properly assess the

credibility of Plaintiff's testimony.

12



B. The Record Supports the ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff's Testimony

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not properly assess the credibility of Plaintiff's
testimony. Again, we disagree. As we have previously stated, “because hearing officers are in
the best position to see and hear the witnesses and assess their forthrightness, we afford their
credibility determinations special deference. We will reverse an ALJ’s credibility determination
only if the claimant can show it was patently wrong.” Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 421, 435 (7th
Cir. 2000).

ALJ Karmgard specifically concluded that Plaintiff's “allegations of disabling symptoms
and limitations cannot be accepted and that the residual functional capacity finding in this case is
justified.” In reaching this conclusion, ALJ Karmgard offered the following analysis to support
his assessment:

The claimant has described daily activities which are not limited to the extent one

would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitation. The

claimant is apparently able to care for young children at home, which can be quite

demanding both physically and emotionally. When asked how she spends an

average day, she said she does various household tasks. She picks up her daughter

from school and walks her home. She looks after her own household tasks. It

takes her a couple of hours to get to sleep, but she does sleep through much of the

night when she does get to sleep. She has no close friends, but maintains regular

contacts with her father and sister. Although she alleges an inability to

concentrate, she drives, does errands visit[s] family, reads, watches television,

fixes things and plays cards and games.
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff has not received the type of medical care one would expect for
a completely disabled person. Furthermore, the ALJ pointed out that the record does not contain
“any opinions from treating or examining physicians indicating that [Plaintiff] is disabled or even

has limitations greater than those determined in this decision.”

15