251

Authority Under International Law to Take Action If the 

Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

In the event that missile bases should be established in Cuba by the Soviet Union, international law 

would permit use by the United States of relatively extreme measures, including various forms and 

degree of force, for the purpose of terminating or preventing the realization of such a threat to the 

peace and security of the western hemisphere.

An obligation would exist to have recourse first, if time should permit, to the procedures of collective 

security organizations of which the United States is a member.

The United States would be obliged to confine any use of force to the least necessary to the end 

proposed.

August 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The attached memorandum makes reference to an appendix of historical materials which has not yet been typed in final form. It will be delivered later today.

As you will see, the memorandum has some of the tone of a brief; it devotes 

little space to any counter-arguments that might be made. This approach seemed 

desirable in order to avoid any appearance of doubt or indecision in case any 

public use of the material should be made. I do not mean to suggest that we doubt 

our conclusions, but only that greater emphasis could have been given to the 

opposing arguments that exist. Nick and I discussed the memorandum this 

morning and agreed that it might be a good idea to prepare a supplemental 

memorandum on the opposing arguments and some of the non-legal factors that 

may be relevant.

The form of any statement that might be made, and the question whether one 

should be made at all, depend greatly on what information and evidence are 

available. There are strong reasons for withholding any statement until the 

President is ready to take some action. If this subject is raised and discussed and 

nothing happens, the international community may grow used to the problem of 

Soviet missiles in Cuba and it will become more difficult for us as time passes to 

generate the sense of urgency needed to get action approved in the Organization of 

American States (“OAS”). On a political level, there might be charges of inaction 

and of “no win” policy. On the other hand, if no statement is made we would lose 

the chance that a mere warning would be sufficient. I think the Soviet Union and 

Cuba are already aware that any attempt to install missiles in Cuba might provoke 

the most extreme countermeasures on our part.*

 

* Editor’s Note: This opinion has previously been published in 6 Green Bag 2d 195 (2003), but 

without the cover memorandum (the material that precedes this note) and without the appendix of 

historical materials that starts on page 260. We have not been able to locate the supplemental memorandum that is mentioned in the second paragraph above.
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

252

* * * * *

This is in response to your request for the views of this Office as to certain 

legal issues bearing upon a proposed declaration by the President of the intentions 

of this government in the event that missile bases should be established in Cuba by 

the Soviet Union. In general, it is our view that international law would permit use 

by the United States of relatively extreme measures, including various forms and 

degree of force, for the purpose of terminating or preventing the realization of 

such a threat to the peace and security of the western hemisphere. An obligation 

would exist to have recourse first, if time should permit, to the procedures of 

collective security organizations of which the United States is a member. The 

United States would, further, be obliged to confine any use of force to the least 

necessary to the end proposed.

Part I of this memorandum deals with the function and content of the concept 

of self-defense in international law generally. The next part examines certain 

regional differences which have developed in the application of that concept as a 

result of historical attitudes and practices and other factors. The memorandum 

concludes with several concrete suggestions as to the form and content of the 

proposed statement by the President.

I.

International law relating to the use of force centers about the polar concepts of 

aggression and self-defense. Although forcible violation of a state’s boundaries or 

of its most highly developed systems of municipal law permit the use of force in 

self-defense within relatively narrow limits, in the international community, where 

there exists no centralized authority capable of maintaining order, states must 

have, and are accorded by law, a proportionately greater freedom to protect their 

vital interests by unilateral action. Not only customary international law but the 

United Nations Charter and substantially all other conventions and treaties which 

relate to this subject recognize the indispensable role of self-defense under present 

conditions.

The concept of self-defense in international law of course justifies more than 

activity designed merely to resist an armed attack which is already in progress.

Under international law every state has, in the words of Elihu Root, “the right . . .

to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to 

protect itself.”

1 Cases commonly cited as illustrative of this principle include that 

of the Virginius,

2

in which Spanish forces seized an American vessel on the high 

 

1 Elihu Root, The Real Monroe Doctrine, 8 Am. J. Int’l L. 427, 432 (1914).

2 2 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law §§ 309, 315, at 895–903, 980–83 (1906);

William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International law § 86, at 328–31 (A. Pearce Higgins, ed., 8th ed. 

1924).
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

253

seas en route to Cuba carrying arms for the use of insurgents. Britain demanded 

reparations for arbitrary treatment of its subjects found on board the vessel after 

the seizure was effected, but conceded the legality of the seizure itself. The United 

States withdrew its initial protest and eventually adopted the British view of the 

incident as its own. Similarly, in the case of the Caroline,

3 Canadian forces 

invaded the United States and destroyed the vessel, which was to be used by 

Canadian insurgents and American sympathizers in an attack on Canada. Many 

other illustrations of the principle could be cited.4

Although it is clear that the principle of self-defense may justify preventive 

action in foreign territory and on the high seas under some circumstances, it is also 

clear that this principle is subject to certain limitations. For example, such 

defensive action is subject to a rule of proportionality. Thus in the Caroline case 

the United States called upon Great Britain not only to justify the taking of 

preventive action, but also to show that its forces “did nothing unreasonable or 

excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited 

by that necessity and kept clearly within it.”

5

A further limitation on preventive action, at least unilateral action not sanctioned by any collective security arrangement, relates to the degree of urgency that 

must exist before it is invoked. In the next section of this Memorandum it is 

argued that, under the special regime applicable to the Western Hemisphere, the 

mere maintenance of facilities for certain kinds of armed attack, without more, 

may justify preventive action. However, apart from such special regimes, it is 

clear that preventive action in self-defense is warranted only where the need for it 

is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 

deliberation.”

6

It thus is clear that preventive action would not ordinarily be lawful 

to prevent the maintenance of missile bases or other armaments in the absence of 

evidence that their actual use for an aggressive attack was imminent.

Another limitation upon the concept of self-defense, as derived from customary 

law, is imposed by the United Nations Charter (59 Stat. 1031) and the charters of 

regional collective security organizations, such as the Organization of American 

States (“OAS”), of which the United States is a member. The charters of these 

organizations in each case preserve the right of individual states to use force in 

self-defense, and, although certain ambiguities are presented by the language used, 

it appears that none of the charters prohibits the taking of unilateral preventive 

 

3 Hall, supra note 2, § 84, at 322–25; 1 Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States § 66, at 239–40 (2d ed. 1945).

4 See, e.g., D.W. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law (1958).

5 Letter for Henry Stephen Fox, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, from Daniel 

Webster, Secretary of State, Apr. 24, 1841, reprinted in 29 British and Foreign State Papers 1129, 

1138 (1840–41).

6

Id. Mr. Webster’s statement was quoted with approval by the International Military Tribunal at 

Nuremberg. Judgment of Oct. 1, 1948, reprinted in 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 172, 205 (1947).
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

254

action in self-defense prior to the occurrence of an armed attack. However, 

although it is arguable that there is no express commitment in these charters to 

utilize the procedures they afford in situations calling for preventive action, 

adherence to such an organization undoubtedly carries with it a commitment to 

have recourse to the organization’s procedures if at all possible before acting 

unilaterally.7Indeed, an obligation to this effect might well be deduced from the 

general rules as to preventive action, summarized above, to the effect that such 

action is lawful only as a last resort. In any event, the United States is heavily 

committed to the use of collective security procedures as a matter of policy.

A further principle recognized in the U.N. Charter (art. 51) is that action may 

be taken in self-defense, pursuant to a regional collective security arrangement, by 

a state which is not directly threatened. If a sufficient threat against any member 

state is established, the organization and all its members may act. In this respect, 

the Charter has the effect of expanding the area in which preventive action is 

regarded as lawful.

Both the U.N. Charter and the Charter of the OAS (Apr. 30, 1948, T.I.A.S. No.

2361, 2 U.S.T. 2416, 119 U.N.T.S. 48) authorize collective action upon less 

provocation than would be required to justify unilateral action. The Security 

Council may take action against any “threat to the peace” or “breach of the peace”

as well as any “act of aggression” (U.N. Charter art. 39). Such action may include 

not only the economic and political sanctions listed in article 41 but also “demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces,” as provided in 

article 42. Action proposed in the Security Council is, of course, subject to veto by 

any one of the five permanent members. Upon a less explicit legal basis, the 

General Assembly may take similar action under the “Uniting-for-Peace” resolution. Under article 25 of the Charter of the OAS and article 5 of the Rio Treaty (or 

“Rio Pact,” Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature

Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, reprinted in 17 Dep’t of State Bull. 565 (Sept. 21, 

1947)), which are interrelated, measures for the common defense may be taken not 

only in the event of an armed attack but also if the “territory or the sovereignty or 

political independence of any American State” is affected by “an act of aggression 

that is not an armed attack” or by “any other fact or situation that might endanger 

the peace of America . . . .” Under article 17 of the Rio Treaty, enforcement action 

requires a two-thirds vote in the Organ of Consultation.

 

7 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter requires that action taken in the exercise of the right of self-defense 

be reported to the Security Council. Unilateral action such as a blockade or an armed attack could, 

further, be brought before the OAS for review by any member nation. Decisions by two-thirds vote of 

the Organ for Consultation created by the Rio Pact are binding upon all member states (art. 20), except 

that no state can be required to use armed force without its consent.
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

255

II.

Since the Monroe Doctrine was announced in 1823, the United States has 

consistently maintained that it has the right to take all necessary action to prevent 

any non-American power from obtaining control over territory in the Western 

Hemisphere. Since 1846, when the so-called Polk Corollary of the Doctrine was 

added, it has been understood that this right is claimed regardless of whether the 

foreign intervention occurs with the consent of inhabitants of the area affected. In 

modern times, it has been understood that the right is claimed not only on behalf 

of the United States but on behalf of all American states. The right has repeatedly 

been respected and acknowledged throughout the Americas and the world.

Historical materials with respect to the Monroe Doctrine are collected in the 

Appendix which is attached. Perhaps the most relevant of these materials are those 

relating to action taken by the United States and other nations in the Western 

Hemisphere during the period of 1940–41, prior to their involvement in World 

War II. In 1940, by the Act of Havana, the American powers agreed to prevent by 

collective action, or by unilateral action if necessary, changes in the control of 

territory in the Western Hemisphere as a result of the European hostilities. In 

1941, the United States occupied Greenland and dispatched troops to Iceland.

Although the occupation of Greenland was justified in part under a treaty with the 

Danish government in exile, it seems clear that the true basis for the action taken 

by the United States was the concept of regional self-defense expressed in the 

Monroe Doctrine.8

The historical materials which are appended show that the Doctrine has from 

the beginning represented a regional variation in the international law of selfdefense. The Doctrine asserts that, in order to insulate the Americas from dangers 

to peace and security stemming from conflicts involving non-American states, the 

occupation or control of American territory by a non-American power in itself 

shall be deemed to present a sufficient danger to warrant exercise by the United 

States and other American powers of the right of self-defense. The result of the 

consistent adherence to this attitude by the United States and most other American 

states, together with the acquiescence of the rest of the civilized world, has been to 

create a specialized, regional body of law under which preventive action in selfdefense is, in the Americas, authorized under less restrictive conditions than would 

be required in some other regions.

In more recent years, the United States has ceased to maintain the Monroe 

Doctrine in the more extreme forms which it assumed in the late nineteenth and 

early twentieth centuries. The Doctrine today does not protect purely economic or 

political interests, as it once did, or even security interests which are less than 

fundamental. Thus the United States has refrained from direct intervention in Cuba 

 

8 See, e.g., Herbert W. Briggs, Editorial Comment, The Validity of the Greenland Agreement, 35 

Am. J. Int’l L. 506 (1941).
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

256

to prevent the mere continuance in office, apart from any specific military threat, 

of a government which is allied with the communist bloc and which has not 

hesitated to destroy economic interests of the United States in the island. The 

United States has further refrained from forcible intervention to prevent shipment 

of conventional arms to Cuba, thus tolerating a certain degree of danger that such 

arms might be used for aggressive purposes against the United States or against 

other American nations. So far the United States has withheld action in deference 

to conceptions, entertained strongly in some quarters in Latin America, of selfdetermination and non-intervention. However, thus far it has been arguable that 

under modern conditions, no critical danger to the peace and security of other 

countries in the Western Hemisphere was presented; that shipments of conventional arms to the Castro government could not necessarily be ascribed to any 

purpose beyond the defense of Cuba. The same cannot be said of missiles, 

certainly not of ground-to-ground missiles. The use of Cuban territory to mount 

such weapons, usable by the Soviet Union only to attack other states and not 

merely for the defense of Cuba against attack, falls wholly outside the reasons for 

mitigation by the United States of some aspects of the Monroe Doctrine. Equally 

important, it falls wholly outside the reasons advanced by our allies in Latin 

America for opposing interventionist aspects of the Doctrine.

There is nothing unique about the concept of regional differences, based upon 

historical attitudes and practices, in the impact and requirements of international 

law. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,9for example, the International Court 

of Justice upheld a system for determining the baselines and boundaries of 

Norway’s territorial sea that could be valid outside Norway, if at all, only in the 

Scandinavian region. In so doing, the Court relied upon “interests peculiar to [the]

region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long 

usage,” and upon the “general toleration of foreign States” over an extended 

period.10 Regional variations are also familiar features of the law of the sea with 

respect to bays and with respect to sedentary fisheries.

In a memorandum for the Attorney General dated April 12, 1961, Assistant 

Attorney General Katzenbach noted that traditional legal doctrines relating to 

intervention date from the pre-World War I period and reflect the existence at that 

time of a security structure based upon flexibility of alignment. Since change of 

alignment to preserve a balance of power was the principal technique by which 

security was maintained, legal doctrines tended to develop that would promote 

freedom to change alignment and would discourage intervention for the purpose of 

maintaining existing alignments.

The memorandum continues as follows:

 

9 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).

10 Id. at 133, 138.
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

257

The political structure today is vastly different. Alignments within 

the Communist Bloc and within the West are long-term political

alignments with considerable aspects of supra-national authority. As 

a result, the security system from the point of view of each bloc depends less upon neutrality of alignment than it does upon preserving 

the alignments which exist. Therefore, . . . there is considerable pressure for intervention in situations where bloc security is threatened.

There is nothing in the existing legal structure which recognizes this 

state of affairs, but there are numerous instances where intervention 

has been tolerated in the postwar period; for example, Hungary, 

Guatemala, Lebanon, and, in 1948, Israel.

Memorandum for Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, from Nicholas deB. 

Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Intervention by States and Private Groups at 3 (Apr. 12, 1961).

Although it is true that traditional legal concepts of general application do not 

expressly recognize interests in bloc security, the Monroe Doctrine constitutes an 

explicit qualification on a regional basis of general legal concepts insofar as the 

Western Hemisphere is concerned. The history of the Doctrine includes many 

incidents which emphasize its purpose to prohibit flatly the adherence of territories 

in the Americas to European or Asiatic power blocs, or for that matter the transfer 

by them of allegiance from one bloc to another.11 The premise underlying this 

purpose—that peace and security in the Hemisphere could be assured only by 

insulating it from the unstable alliances and rivalries of Europe and Asia—

squarely contradicts the balance-of-power policies that infuse the doctrines of 

general application which are altered by the Doctrine.

Moreover, although publicists in the field of international law have not yet 

formulated concepts and doctrines which expressly recognize the changed world 

situation, it seems probable that international law, as reflected in the actual 

practices and expectations of states, already recognizes the decisive importance of 

bloc security today in certain geographic areas. International law is, after all, 

essentially a generalized statement in terms of rules and policies of the reasonable 

expectations of states as derived from their practices in making claims and 

reacting to the claims of others. The Western states have, of course, condemned as 

unlawful the Soviet intervention in Hungary, directed as it was against a revolt 

which at the time posed a purely political threat against the Soviet Union. It may 

be doubted, however, whether the United States would have protested seriously 

the use of force by the Soviet Union if it had been designed for the limited purpose 

of compelling abandonment of a plan to install Western missile bases in Hungarian territory.

 

11 See generally John A. Logan Jr., No Transfer: An American Security Principle (1961).
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

258

If in the future the government of Poland should become increasingly friendly 

to the United States, our government would undoubtedly defend strongly its legal 

right to withdraw from the communist political bloc. It seems altogether certain 

that we would, however, feel obliged to refrain from attempting to supply Poland 

with ground-to-ground missiles or other armaments readily susceptible of 

aggressive use. Yugoslavia, and perhaps Finland as well, provide examples of 

states which the international community as a whole probably regards as insulated, 

under threat of intervention by the Soviet Union, from full incorporation into the 

western military structure.

In appraising the rights of the United States vis-à-vis Cuba, the treaty of 193412

may have some relevance. The principal effect of the treaty was to abrogate the 

Cuban-American Treaty of 1903,13 under which the United States had the right to 

intervene in Cuba virtually at will. However, the treaty of 1934 preserved existing 

agreements indefinitely with respect to the leasing of naval stations in Cuba 

insofar as they applied to the naval station at Guantanamo. The Treaty of 1934 did 

not expressly obligate Cuba to refrain from permitting the use of its territory for 

military purposes by other states. However, the fair inference arising from the 

cession of naval rights to the United States is that the island was to be a part of, or 

at least not a breach in, the defensive military system protecting the continental 

United States and the Caribbean countries. At the time of the treaty, of course, a 

military threat to these areas from Cuba could arise only as a consequence of naval 

and air installations of the type which the treaty secured to the United States. The 

evident intention of the parties to the treaty, broadly stated, thus was to restrict 

intervention by the United States on political or economic grounds, but to preserve 

the position of Cuba in the defensive military system of the United States.

Certainly the treaty is not inconsistent with the position here expressed as to the 

legal rights of the United States in the event of military use of Cuban territory by 

the Soviet Union.

It should be apparent that the conclusions here reached do not undermine the 

legal position of the United States with respect to its own missile bases abroad. In 

no case of which we are aware is a country in which the United States maintains 

missile bases subject to a special regime comparable to the Monroe Doctrine.

Moreover, in no case is any such country a member or former member of the 

Communist Bloc or within the acknowledged periphery of the Soviet security 

system. Finally, there is a basic factual difference in the military relationships of 

such countries to the Soviet Union and that of Cuba to the United States. The 

states in which bases are maintained by the United States are in each case among 

the major targets of Soviet Military preparations. No impartial observer could 

conclude that Cuba is a major object of the military program of the United States, 

 

12 U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaty Info. Bull. No. 56 (May 31, 1934).

13 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 243 (1905).
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

259

or that Cuba is in any danger of a missile attack by the United States. The United 

Kingdom may harbor U.S. missiles in self-defense because it is a likely target of 

Soviet missiles. For Cuba to harbor Soviet missiles would constitute a wholly 

disproportionate response to any sane estimate of its defensive needs against the 

United States.

III.

We assume that any statement by the President on this subject would begin by 

announcing that there is reason to believe the governments of Cuba and the Soviet 

Union may be actively considering the installation of Soviet missiles on Cuban 

territory, and would be designed generally to warn those countries of the intentions of the United States in any such eventuality. We offer the following suggestions with regard to such a statement by the President:

1. The statement should emphasize the historical and regional aspects of the 

rights being asserted by the United States.

2. The statement should emphasize the threat to other countries as well as the 

United States, and the defensive character of any action that might be taken by the 

United States. Possibly the statement should expressly disclaim any intention to 

act for economic or political ends, or for any purpose other than to compel an 

abandonment of plans to create a specific military threat in Cuba.

3. The statement should indicate an intention to have recourse first, if at all 

possible, to collective security arrangements to which the United States is a party, 

particularly the Organization of American States. It should also, without qualifying the strong commitment of the United States to the principle of collective 

security, make the point that the United States has an ultimate responsibility for its 

own safety which in situations of extreme gravity necessarily would take precedence over all other commitments. Consideration should be given to withholding 

the statement until it can be made as a first step in an integrated plan to secure 

collective action by the OAS. If made in that context, the statement should 

announce a call for a meeting of the Organ of Consultation pursuant to the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact).

4. The statement should acknowledge an obligation on the part of the United 

States to observe a rule of proportionality. An express reference might be made to 

total blockade or to “visit and search” procedures as appropriate reactions by the 

American states or by the United States to meet a threat to install missile bases in 

Cuba. In this connection, care should certainly be exercised to avoid the implication that Cuba is under any immediate threat of nuclear attack.

NORBERT A. SCHLEI

Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

260

APPENDIX

Historical Material with Respect to the Monroe Doctrine

1. The Monroe Doctrine (1823)

The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by President Monroe in his message to 

Congress on December 9, 1823. This proclamation of fundamental principles of 

American foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere was induced by several 

factors—the intervention of the three leading absolute monarchies of Russia, 

Austria, and Prussia (the so-called “Holy Alliance”) in the affairs of other 

European countries, the fear that they might attempt to overthrow the newly 

independent Latin-American states and restore them as Spanish colonies, and 

Russian claims in the Western Hemisphere.14 President Monroe’s message stated 

in part:

[T]he occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle 

in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, 

that the American continents, by the free and independent condition 

which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be 

considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers . . . . 

. . . The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to 

candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United 

States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered 

and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared 

their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we 

have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, 

we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing 

them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. . . . 

. . . It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either [American] continent without 

endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that 

 

14 Alejandro Alvarez, The Monroe Doctrine 6–7 (1924).
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

261

our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their 

own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference.15

2. The Polk Corollary (1848)

In 1848 Mexican officials in Yucatan indicated a willingness to permit annexation of territory under their jurisdiction by Great Britain or Spain in return for 

protection against the rebellious native Indian population. To forestall any 

possibility of European intervention in Mexico, President Polk sent a special 

message to Congress on April 29, 1848, enunciating what is known as the Polk 

Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. The President’s message declared in part:

I submit for the consideration of Congress several communications received at the Department of State from Mr. Justo Sierra, 

commissioner of Yucatan, and also a communication from the Governor of that State, representing the condition of extreme suffering to 

which their country has been reduced by an insurrection of the Indians within its limits, and asking the aid of the United States.

. . . .

In this condition they have, through their constituted authorities, 

implored the aid of this Government to save them from destruction, 

offering in case this should be granted to transfer the “dominion and 

sovereignty of the peninsula” to the United States. Similar appeals 

for aid and protection have been made to the Spanish and the English 

Governments.

Whilst it is not my purpose to recommend the adoption of any 

measure with a view to the acquisition of the “dominion and sovereignty” over Yucatan, yet, according to our established policy, we 

could not consent to a transfer of this “dominion and sovereignty” either to Spain, Great Britain, or any other European power. In the 

language of President Monroe, in his message of December, 1823—

We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their 

system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our 

peace and safety.

. . . .

 

15 2 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New Series) 778, 787, 788 

(James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

262

Our own security requires that the established policy thus announced should guide our conduct, and this applies with great force 

to the peninsula of Yucatan. It is situate in the Gulf of Mexico, on 

the North American continent, and, from its vicinity to Cuba, to the 

capes of Florida, to New Orleans, and, indeed, to our whole southwestern coast, it would be dangerous to our peace and security if it 

should become a colony of any European nation.16

3. President Johnson and European Intervention in Mexico 

(1865–66)

In 1861 and 1862, during the Civil War, France, Great Britain and Spain invaded Mexico. After the British and Spanish withdrew, Emperor Napoleon III of 

France selected Archduke Maximilian of Austria as Emperor of Mexico. Maximilian accepted on the basis of “proof” given by Napoleon and by Mexican exiles in 

France that the Mexican people wanted him. Because of its involvement in the 

Civil War, the United States could not interfere. After the war, Secretary of State 

Seward reaffirmed the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, although he did not 

refer to it by name.17 The House of Representatives then adopted a resolution 

declaring that

it does not accord with the policy of the United States to 

acknowledge any monarchical government erected on the ruins of 

any republican government in America under the auspices of any 

European power.18

In his First Annual Message to Congress on December 4, 1865, President Johnson said in this connection:

From the moment of the establishment of our free Constitution 

the civilized world has been convulsed by revolutions in the interests 

of democracy or of monarchy, but through all those revolutions the 

United States have wisely and firmly refused to become propagandists of republicanism. It is the only government suited to our condition; but we have never sought to impose it on others, and we have 

consistently followed the advice of Washington to recommend it only by the careful preservation and prudent use of the blessing. . . . 

Twice, indeed, rumors of the invasion of some parts of America in 

the interest of monarchy have prevailed; twice my predecessors have 

had occasion to announce the views of this nation in respect to such 

 

16 5 Richardson, supra note 15, 2431, 2431–32.

17 Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy 342 (1955).

18 Id.
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

263

interference. On both occasion the remonstrance of the United States 

was respected from a deep conviction on the part of European Governments that the system of noninterference and mutual abstinence 

from propagandism was the true rule for the two hemispheres. . . . 

We should regard it as a great calamity to ourselves, to the cause of 

good government, and to the peace of the world should any European power challenge the American people, as it were, to the defense 

of republicanism against foreign interference. We can not foresee 

and are unwilling to consider what opportunities might present themselves, what combinations might offer to protect ourselves against 

designs inimical to our form of government. The United States desire 

to act in the future as they have ever acted heretofore; they never will 

be driven from that course but by the aggression of European powers, and we rely on the wisdom and justice of those powers to respect 

the system of noninterference which has so long been sanctioned by 

time, and which by its good results has approved itself to both continents.19

Finally, in 1866, the French Government withdrew its forces from Mexico and the 

Mexicans overthrew the Maximilian regime in 1867.

4. President Hayes and the Isthmian Canal Question (1880)

In 1879 it appeared imminent that a private French company was about to 

undertake the construction of a canal across the Panama Isthmus. The United 

States feared that control of the canal would fall into the hands of the French 

Government just as the British Government had earlier obtained control of the 

Suez Canal. On March 8, 1880, President Hayes sent a message to Congress 

expressing his opposition to the project as follows:

The United States can not consent to the surrender of this control to 

any European power or to any combination of European powers. If 

existing treaties between the United States and other nations or if the 

rights of sovereignty or property of other nations stand in the way of 

this policy—a contingency which is not apprehended—suitable steps 

should be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and establish the American policy on this subject consistently with the 

rights of the nations to be affected by it.

The capital invested by corporations or citizens of other countries 

in such an enterprise must in a great degree look for protection to 

 

19 8 Richardson, supra note 15, 3551, 3566–67.
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

264

one or more of the great powers of the world. No European power 

can intervene for such protection without adopting measures on this 

continent which the United States would deem wholly inadmissible. 

If the protection of the United States is relied upon, the United States 

must exercise such control as will enable this country to protect its 

national interests and maintain the rights of those whose private 

capital is embarked in the work.

An interoceanic canal across the American Isthmus will essentially change the geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific 

coasts of the United States and between the United States and the 

rest of the world. It would be the great ocean thoroughfare between 

our Atlantic and our Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast 

line of the United States. Our merely commercial interest in it is 

greater than that of all other countries, while its relations to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of defense, our unity, 

peace, and safety, are matters of paramount concern to the people of

the United States. No other great power would under similar circumstances fail to assert a rightful control over a work so closely and 

vitally affecting its interest and welfare.

Without urging further the grounds of my opinion, I repeat, in 

conclusion, that it is the right and the duty of the United States to 

assert and maintain such supervision and authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus that connects North and South 

America as will protect our national interests. This, I am quite sure, 

will be found not only compatible with but promotive of the widest 

and most permanent advantage to commerce and civilization.20

In addition, both Houses of Congress formally protested against any canal which 

might be built by foreign capital or controlled by foreign nations.21

5. President Cleveland’s Intervention in the Venezuela 

Boundary Dispute (1895)

In President Cleveland’s second administration, he invoked the Monroe Doctrine in the British-Venezuela dispute concerning the boundaries between British 

Guiana and Venezuela. The British being unwilling to arbitrate the matter, the 

President in a special message to Congress on December 17, 1895, announced that 

under the principles of the Monroe Doctrine the United States would designate a 

 

20 10 Richardson, supra note 15, 4537, 4537–38.

21 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People 396–97 (1955).
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

265

commission which would itself investigate the boundary and render a report.22 In 

the event the report favored Venezuela in the dispute, he said,

it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by 

every means in its power as a willful aggression upon its rights and 

interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela.

In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may 

follow.23

He further said:

[I]t may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine upon which we 

stand is strong and sound, because its enforcement is important to 

our peace and safety as a nation, and is essential to the integrity of 

our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive 

form of government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our 

national life and can not become obsolete while our Republic endures. If the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety 

among the Governments of the Old World and a subject for our absolute noninterference, none the less is an observance of the Monroe 

doctrine of vital concern to our people and their Government.

Assuming, therefore, that we may properly insist upon this doctrine without regard to “the state of things in which we live” or any 

changed conditions here or elsewhere, it is not apparent why its application may not be involved in the present controversy.

If a European power by an extension of its boundaries takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring Republics against 

its will and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why to that 

extent such European power does not thereby attempt to extend its 

system of government to that portion of this continent which is thus 

taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe declared to 

be “dangerous to our peace and safety,” and it can make no differ-

 

22 13 Richardson, supra note 15, 6087, 6090 (1909).

23 Id. at 6090.
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

266

ence whether the European system is extended by an advance of 

frontier or otherwise.24

Addressing himself to the contention that the Monroe Doctrine found no support 

in any principle of international law derived from the general consent of nations, 

the President stated:

Practically the principle for which we contend has peculiar, if not 

exclusive, relation to the United States. It may not have been admitted in so many words to the code of international law, but since in international councils every nation is entitled to the rights belonging to 

it, if the enforcement of the Monroe doctrine is something we may 

justly claim it has its place in the code of international law as certainly and securely as if it were specifically mentioned; and when the 

United States is a suitor before the high tribunal that administers international law the question to be determined is whether or not we 

present claims which the justice of that code of law can find to be 

right and valid.

The Monroe doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of 

international law which are based upon the theory that every nation 

shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced.25

The British Prime Minister acknowledged that the interests of the United States 

in the Caribbean area were as natural as British concern would be over any attempt 

by a great European power to secure control over the Channel ports of Belgium 

and the Netherlands. The British finally submitted the controversy to arbitration.26

6. Cuba—The Platt Amendment—President Theodore 

Roosevelt (1901)

Congress, on March 1, 1901, passed the Platt Amendment to the Army appropriation bill. 34 Cong. Rec. 3332–84. The amendment defined the relations 

between Cuba and the United States following the establishment of the Cuban 

republic. It provided that in order to permit the United States to maintain Cuba’s 

independence, and to protect its people, Cuba would sell or lease to the United 

States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to 

be agreed upon with the President of the United States; and that Cuba would 

embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.27

 

24 Id. at 6088.

25 Id. at 6088–89.

26 Louis Martin Sears, A History of American Foreign Relations 431 (1938).

27 Act of Mar. 2, 1901, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 895, 897–98.
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

267

The amendment in effect contemplated a United States quasi-protectorate over 

Cuba. Later that year Cuba incorporated these provisions as an appendix to its 

constitution.28

In his message to Congress on December 3, 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt discussed the Monroe Doctrine in relation to Cuba. The President said:

The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign 

policy of all the nations of the two Americans, as it is of the United 

States. Just seventy-eight years have passed since President Monroe 

in his Annual Message announced that “The American continents are 

henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by 

any European power.” In other words, the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any nonAmerican power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old 

World. Still less is it intended to give cover to any aggression by one 

New World power at the expense of any other. It is simply a step, 

and a long step, toward assuring the universal peace of the world by 

securing the possibility of permanent peace on this hemisphere.

During the past century other influences have established the 

permanence and independence of the smaller states of Europe. 

Through the Monroe Doctrine we hope to be able to safeguard like

independence and secure like permanence for the lesser among the 

New World nations.

. . . .

Our attitude in Cuba is a sufficient guaranty of our own good 

faith. We have not the slightest desire to secure any territory at the 

expense of any of our neighbors. We wish to work with them hand in 

hand, so that all of us may be uplifted together, and we rejoice over 

the good fortune of any of them, we gladly hail their material prosperity and political stability, and are concerned and alarmed if any of 

them fall into industrial or political chaos. We do not wish to see any 

Old World military power grow up on this continent, or to be compelled to become a military power ourselves. The peoples of the 

Americas can prosper best if left to work out their own salvation in 

their own way.29

 

28 See Dep’t of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 243, 244 

(1905).

29 14 Richardson, supra note 15, 6641, 6664–65 (1909).
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

268

In the Cuban-American treaty of 1903,30 Cuba agreed not to enter into any 

treaty or other compact with a foreign power which would impair the independence or permit military or naval control by a foreign power. It also agreed that the 

United States should have the right to intervene to preserve Cuban independence. 

The United States, for its defense as well as that of Cuba, was to have the right to 

maintain naval bases in Cuba. Pursuant to the treaty, a permanent naval base was 

established at Guantanamo.31

In 1905 the President addressed a message to Congress, stating:

One of the most effective instruments for peace is the Monroe 

Doctrine as it has been and is being gradually developed by this 

Nation and accepted by other nations. No other policy could have 

been as efficient in promoting peace in the Western Hemisphere and 

in giving to each nation thereon the chance to develop along its own 

lines. If we had refused to apply the doctrine to changing conditions 

it would not be completely outworn, would not meet any of the 

needs of the present day, and, indeed, would probably by this time 

have sunk into complete oblivion. It is useful at home, and is meeting with recognition abroad because we have adapted our application 

of it to meet the growing and changing needs of the hemisphere. 

When we announce a policy such as the Monroe Doctrine we thereby commit ourselves to the consequences of the policy, and those

consequences from time to time alter. It is out of the question to 

claim a right and yet shirk the responsibility for its exercise. Not 

only we, but all American republics who are benefited by the existence of the doctrine, must recognize the obligations each nation is 

under as regard foreign peoples no less than its duty to insist upon its 

own rights.

That our rights and interests are deeply concerned in the maintenance of the doctrine is so clear as hardly to need argument. This is 

especially true in view of the construction of the Panama Canal. As a 

mere matter of self-defense we must exercise a close watch over the 

approaches to this canal; and this means that we must be thoroughly 

alive to our interests in the Caribbean Sea.

 

30 U.S.-Cuba, May 22, 1903, 33 Stat. 2248.

31 Lease of Coaling or Naval Stations to the United States, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, in Dep’t of 

State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 350 (1904); Lease to the United 

States by the Government of Cuba of Certain Areas of Land and Water for Naval or Coaling Stations in 

Guantanamo and Bahia Honda, U.S.-Cuba, Oct. 2, 1903, in Dep’t of State, Papers Relating to the 

Foreign Relations of the United States 351 (1904).
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

269

There are certain essential points which must never be forgotten 

as regards the Monroe Doctrine. In the first place we must as a Nation make it evident that we do not intend to treat it in any shape or 

way as an excuse for aggrandizement on our part at the expense of 

the republics to the south. We must recognize the fact that in some 

South American countries there has been much suspicion lest we interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince all the other nations of this continent once and for all that no just and orderly Government has 

anything to fear from us. . . . It must be understood that under no circumstances will the United States use the Monroe Doctrine as a 

cloak for territorial aggression. We desire peace with all the world, 

but perhaps most of all with the other peoples of the American Continent.32

7. Elihu Root on the Monroe Doctrine (1914)

Elihu Root was President Roosevelt’s Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909. 

Subsequently Root became President of the American Society of International 

Law. In his exposition in 1914 in the American Journal of International Law of the 

Monroe Doctrine, he said:

No one ever pretended that Mr. Monroe was declaring a rule of 

international law or that the doctrine which he declared has become 

international law. It is a declaration of the United States that certain 

acts would be injurious to the peace and safety of the United States 

and that the United States would regard them as unfriendly. The declaration does not say what the course of the United States will be in 

case such acts are done. That is left to be determined in each particular instance.

. . . .

The doctrine is not international law but it rests upon the right of 

self-protection and that right is recognized by international law. The 

right is a necessary corollary of independent sovereignty. It is well 

understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may and 

frequently does extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial 

jurisdiction of the state exercising it. The strongest example probably 

would be the mobilization of any army by another Power immediately across the frontier. Every act done by the other Power may be 

 

32 15 Richardson, supra note 15, 6973, 6994–95.
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

270

within its own territory. Yet the country threatened by the state of 

facts is justified in protecting itself by immediate war. The most 

common exercise of the right of self-protection outside of a state’s 

own territory and in time of peace is the interposition of objection to 

the occupation of territory, of points of strategic military or maritime 

advantage, or to indirect accomplishment of this effect by dynastic 

arrangement. For example, the objection of England in 1911 to the 

occupation of a naval station by Germany on the Atlantic coast of 

Morocco; the objection of the European Powers generally to the vast 

forces of Russia extending its territory to the Mediterranean; the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano by the Treaty of Berlin; the establishment of buffer states; the objection to the succession of a 

German prince to the throne of Spain; the many forms of the eastern 

question; the centuries of struggle to preserve the balance of power 

in Europe; all depend upon the very same principle which underlies 

the Monroe Doctrine; that is to say, upon the right of every sovereign 

state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it 

will be too late to protect itself. Of course each state must judge for 

itself when a threatened act will create such a situation. If any state 

objects to a threatened act and the reasonableness of its objection is 

not assented to, the efficacy of the objection will depend upon the 

power behind it.33

8. The Magdalena Bay Episode (1912)

In 1912 it was asserted that a Japanese private fishing company was about to 

lease from the Government of Mexico an extensive tract of land on the shore of 

Magdalena Bay, in Lower California, Mexico. This land could be used as the site 

of a naval base capable of intercepting communications between the Pacific coast 

of the United States and the Panama Canal. The Senate adopted a resolution 

proposed by Senator Lodge as follows:

Resolved, That when any harbor or other place in the American 

continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the 

United States, the Government of the United States could not see 

without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place 

by any corporation or association which has such a relation to anoth-

 

33 Root, supra note 1, at 431–32 (emphasis added).
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

271

er Government, not American, as to give that Government practical 

power of control for naval or military purposes.34

9. President Wilson and Vera Cruz (1914)

In 1914 President Wilson was notified that a German merchantman was approaching Vera Cruz, Mexico, with a large cargo of arms which it was suspected 

the Huerto Government intended to use against the United States. The President 

ordered American forces to seize the port; a battle ensued, and the objective of 

preventing the arms from reaching Huerto’s forces was attained.35 American forces 

then occupied the city, and a proclamation was issued prohibiting the importation 

of arms into Mexico.

This armed intervention terminated diplomatic relations between the United 

States and Mexico. However, Argentina, Brazil and Chile offered to mediate the 

controversy and President Wilson accepted.

10. Charles Evans Hughes and the Monroe Doctrine (1923)

Mr. Hughes, Secretary of State in the Harding Administration, delivered an 

address in 1923 on the Monroe Doctrine before the American Bar Association 

which is often cited as an authoritative statement. He said:

It is not my purpose to review the historical applications of what 

is called the Monroe doctrine or to attempt to harmonize the various 

redactions of it. Properly understood, it is opposed (1) to any nonAmerican action encroaching upon the political independence of 

American States under any guise and (2) to the acquisition in any 

manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by 

any non-American power.

The Monroe doctrine is not a legislative pronouncement; it has 

been approved by action of Congress, but it does not rest upon any 

congressional sanction. It has had the implied indorsement of the 

treaty-making power in the reservations to the two Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, but it is not defined by treaty and does not 

draw its force from any international agreement. It is not like a constitutional provision deriving its authority from the fact that it is a 

part of the organic law transcending and limiting executive and legislative power. It is not a part of international law, maintained by the 

consent of the civilized powers and alterable only at their will. It is a 

 

34 48 Cong. Rec. 10,045–46 (1912).

35 Bailey, supra note 21, at 555–60.
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

272

policy declared by the Executive of the United States and repeated in 

one form and another by Presidents and Secretaries of State in the 

conduct of our foreign relations. Its significance lies in the fact that 

in its essentials, as set forth by President Monroe and as forcibly and 

repeatedly asserted by our responsible statesmen, it has been for 100 

years, and continues to be, an integral part of our national thought 

and purpose, expressing a profound conviction which even the upheaval caused by the Great War, and our participation in that struggle upon European soil, has not uprooted or fundamentally 

changed.36

Mr. Hughes summarized the principles of the Doctrine as follows:

First. The Monroe doctrine is not a policy of aggression; it is a 

policy of self-defense. It was asserted at a time when the danger of 

foreign aggression in this hemisphere was very real, when the new 

American States had not yet established a firm basis of independent 

national life, and we were menaced by threats of Old World powers 

directed against republican institutions. But the achievements of the 

century have not altered the scope of the doctrine or changed its basis. It still remains an assertion of the principle of national security. 

As such, it is obviously not exclusive. Much time has been wasted in 

the endeavor to find in the Monroe doctrine either justification, or 

the lack of it, for every governmental declaration or action in relation 

to other American States. Appropriate action for our defense may 

always be taken, and our proper influence to promote peace and 

good will may always be exerted, with the use of good offices to that 

end, whether or not the particular exigency comes within the range 

of the specific declarations which constitute the doctrine.37

. . . .

Second. As the policy embodied in the Monroe doctrine is distinctively the policy of the United States, the Government of the 

United States reserves to itself its definition, interpretation, and application. This Government has welcomed the recognition by other 

governments of the fact and soundness of this policy and of the appropriateness of its application from time to time. Great powers have 

signified their acquiescence in it. But the United States has not been 

disposed to enter into engagements which would have the effect of 

 

36 Charles Evan Hughes, Observations on the Monroe Doctrine, in Alvarez, supra note 14, at 413, 

417–18.

37 Id. at 418–19.
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

273

submitting to any other power or to any concert of powers the determination either of the occasions upon which the principles of the 

Monroe doctrine shall be invoked or of the measures that shall be 

taken in giving it effect. This Government has not been willing to 

make the doctrine or the regulation of its enforcement the subject of 

treaties with European powers; and, while the United States has been 

gratified at expressions on the part of other American States of their 

accord with our Government in its declarations with respect to their 

independence and at their determination to maintain it, this Government in asserting and pursuing its policy has commonly avoided 

concerted action to maintain the doctrine, even with the American 

Republics. As President Wilson observed: “The Monroe doctrine 

was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It always 

has been maintained and always will be maintained upon her own responsibility.”38

. . . .

Third. The policy of the Monroe doctrine does not infringe upon 

the independence and sovereignty of other American States. Misconception upon this point is the only disturbing influence in our relations with Latin American States.39

This notion springs from a misunderstanding of the doctrine itself 

and of our national sentiment and purpose . . . .

The Monroe doctrine does not attempt to establish a protectorate 

over Latin American States. . . .

. . . That ground [of the declaration] is found in the recognized 

right which every State enjoys, and the United States no less than 

any other, to object to acts done by other powers which threaten its 

own safety. The United States has all the rights of sovereignty, as 

well as any other power; we have lost none of our essential rights 

because we are strong, and other American States have gained none 

either because of increasing strength or relative weakness. . . .

40

. . . .

 

38 Id. at 419–20.

39 Id. at 421.

40 Id. at 422.
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

274

Fourth. There are, indeed, modern conditions and recent events 

which can not fail to engage our attention. We have grown rich and 

powerful, but we have not outgrown the necessity, in justice to ourselves and without injustice to others, of safeguarding our future 

peace and security. . . .

41

. . . .

Fifth. It is apparent that the Monroe doctrine does not stand in the 

way of Pan American cooperation; rather it affords the necessary 

foundation for that cooperation in the independence and security of 

American States.42

11. The Clark Memorandum and President Hoover (1928)

In 1928, a Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine was prepared by J. Reuben 

Clark, then Undersecretary of State, for use by the Secretary of State. It repudiated 

the (Theodore) “Roosevelt Corollary” that “in case of financial or other difficulties 

in weak Latin American countries, the United States should attempt an adjustment 

thereof lest European Governments should intervene, and intervening should 

occupy territory.”43 Clark’s thesis was that this was not “justified by the terms of 

the Monroe Doctrine, however much it may be justified by the application of the 

doctrine of self-preservation.”44 Clark’s conclusions about the Doctrine were as 

follows:

The Doctrine does not concern itself with purely inter-American relations; it has nothing to do with the relationship between the United 

States and other American nations, except where other American nations shall become involved with European governments in arrangements which threaten the security of the United States, and 

even in such cases, the Doctrine runs against the European country, 

not the American nation, and the United States would primarily deal 

thereunder with the European country and with the American nation 

concerned. The Doctrine states a case of the United States vs. Europe, and not of the United States vs. Latin America. Furthermore, 

the fact should never be lost to view that in applying this Doctrine 

during the period of one hundred years since it was announced, our 

Government has over and over again driven it in as a shield between 

 

41 Id. at 424.

42 Id. at 431.

43 J. Reuben Clark, Undersecretary of State, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, Dep’t of State 

Publication No. 37, at xxiii (Dec. 17, 1928).

44 Id. at xxiii–xxiv.
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

275

Europe and the Americas to protect Latin America from the political 

and territorial thrusts of Europe; and this was done at times when the 

American nations were weak and struggling for the establishment of 

stable, permanent governments; when the political morality of Europe sanctioned, indeed encouraged, the acquisition of territory by 

force; and when many of the great powers of Europe looked with eager, covetous eyes to the rich, undeveloped areas of the American 

Hemisphere. Nor should another equally vital fact be lost sight of, 

that the United States has only been able to give this protection 

against designing European powers because of its known willingness 

and determination, if and whenever necessary, to expend its treasure 

and to sacrifice American life to maintain the principles of the Doctrine. So far as Latin America is concerned, the Doctrine is now, and 

always has been, not an instrument of violence and oppression, but 

an unbought, freely bestowed, and wholly effective guaranty of their 

freedom, independence, and territorial integrity against the imperialistic designs of Europe.45

In embarking on a “Good Neighbor” policy, it has been said that President 

Hoover gave his support to the views expressed by Clark.46

12. President Franklin D. Roosevelt—Abrogation of the Platt 

Amendment—the Inter-American Conference—Canada (1934–38)

The Good Neighbor Policy was followed and implemented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in an attempt to make the policy of non-intervention acceptable in 

both hemispheres. As an integral part of the new policy, the United States decided 

to release Cuba from the provisions of the Platt Amendment. This was accomplished by a treaty between the United States and Cuba signed in May 1934.47

Article III of this treaty, which continued the right of the United States to maintain 

a naval base at Guantanamo, provided as follows:

Until the two contracting parties agree to the modification or abrogation of the stipulations of the agreement in regard to the lease to 

the United States of America of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval 

stations signed by the President of the Republic of Cuba on February 

16, 1903, and by the President of the United States of America on 

the 23d day of the same month and year, the stipulations of that 

agreement with regard to the naval station of Guantanamo shall con-

 

45 Id. at xxiv–xxv.

46 Bailey, supra at note 21, at 681.

47 Dep’t of State, Treaty Info. Bull. No. 56 (May 31, 1934).
Supplemental Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 1

276

tinue in effect. The supplementary agreement in regard to naval or

coaling stations signed between the Governments on July 2, 1903, 

also shall continue in effect in the same form and on the same conditions with respect to the naval station of Guantanamo. So long as the 

United States of America shall not abandon the said naval station of 

Guantanamo or the two Governments shall not agree to a modification of its present limits, this station shall continue to have the territorial area that it now has, with the limits that it has on the date of the 

signature of the present Treaty.48

In 1936 President Roosevelt proposed a special Inter-American peace conference. At this conference, held at Buenos Aires, he invited all American states to 

resort to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine in dealing with aggressive threats 

by non-American totalitarian states and declared that such states seeking “to 

commit acts of aggression against us will find a Hemisphere wholly prepared to 

consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good.”49

In 1938 Canada supported President Roosevelt’s statement in a speech at Kingston, Canada, that “the people of the United States will not stand idly by if dominion of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.”50

13. Congressional Resolution of 1940 on Transfers of 

Territory in the Western Hemisphere

The collapse of the Low Countries, France, and Denmark in 1940 aroused 

serious concern in the Americas. Seizure by Hitler of the American possessions of 

these countries, it was felt, would pose not only a grave threat to the Panama 

Canal and the Caribbean trade routes but also to the mainland of the United States. 

Congress promptly passed a resolution expressing opposition to the transfer of 

territory in the Western hemisphere from one non-American power to another. The 

resolution, which had been drafted by the Department of State with the President’s 

approval, declared:

That the United States would not recognize any transfer, and 

would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of this hemisphere from one non-American power to another 

non-American power; and

That if such transfer or attempt to transfer should appear likely, 

the United States shall, in addition to other measures, immediately 

 

48 Id. at 30–31.

49 Bailey, supra note 21, at 684.

50 Id. at 686.
Authority To Take Action If the Soviet Union Establishes Missile Bases in Cuba

277

consult with the other American republics to determine upon the 

steps which should be taken to safeguard their common interests.51

14. The Greenland Action (1941)

In April 1941, United States forces occupied the Danish possession of Greenland. This action was taken pursuant to an agreement signed by Secretary of State 

Hull, acting on behalf of the United States, and the Danish Minister in Washington.52 The agreement noted the danger that Greenland might be converted into a 

base of aggression against American states and recognized the responsibility of the 

United States to assist in the maintenance of the existing status of Greenland. 

Article I of the Agreement provided:

The Government of the United States of America reiterates its 

recognition of and respect for the sovereignty of the Kingdom of 

Denmark over Greenland. Recognizing that as a result of the present 

European war there is danger that Greenland may be converted into a 

point of aggression against nations of the American Continent, the 

Government of the United States of America, having in mind its obligations under the Act of Habana signed on July 30, 1940, accepts 

the responsibility of assisting Greenland in the maintenance of its 

present status.53

The Hitler-dominated government in Denmark disapproved the agreement as 

contrary to its constitution. Mr. Hull replied that the Denmark government was 

acting under duress and refused to acknowledge that the agreement was invalid.

15. Act of Havana of 1940—Implementing Treaty of 1942

After the defeat of France, representatives of the American states, convening in 

Havana in July 1940, adopted the Act of Havana, by which they agreed to prevent 

by collective action, or by unilateral action if necessary, changes in the control of 

territory in the Western Hemisphere as a result of the European hostilities. The Act 

was adopted in connection with the negotiation of a treaty thereafter ratified by 

fourteen states—the necessary two-thirds—in 1942.54 It provided that if it 

appeared that American possessions of European powers might fall into the hands 

of any Axis power, they could be taken over and administered jointly by the 

American republics as trustees. In the event that the situation called for it, an 

individual state, such as the United States, could assume temporary control.

 

51 Logan, supra note 11, at 327.

52 Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland, 4 Dep’t of State Bull. 443, 445–47 (1941).

53 Id. at 445.

54 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States 367–73 (1943).