United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 21-50574 

____________ 

Charles E. Epley, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Samuel B. Itie, Medical official at Lynaugh; Roxie Ingram, Medical 

official at Lynaugh; M. Fuentes, Practice Manager at Lynaugh; 

Michelle D. Sellers, Classification at Lynaugh; Paul M. 

Robinson, Sergeant at Lynaugh; Heather M. Gonzales, Sergeant 

at Lynaugh; Raul Melero, Captain at Lynaugh, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:18-CV-34 

______________________________ 

Before Stewart, Clement, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: *

Charles Epley spent nearly thirty years incarcerated at various units 

within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Epley alleges that he 

suffered physical and mental distress over a three-week period, during which 

_____________________ 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

February 29, 2024 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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No. 21-50574 

2 

he was transferred seven times between several units across the state, 

including the Lynaugh and Montford units. He sued officials in the Lynaugh 

Unit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged First and Eighth Amendment 

violations related to the incidents he claims were the source of his injuries. 

In a series of opinions, the district court granted summary judgment for the 

defendants on all claims. Epley appeals; we now affirm. 

 We find that Epley raised no genuine issue of material fact on his 

Eighth Amendment claims. As to these claims, we summarily affirm the 

district court.1

 

Epley’s First Amendment claim, however, warrants our attention. 

Epley practices a pre-Christian religion originating in Europe. As part of his 

suit, Epley claims that Lynaugh supervisor Paul Robinson violated his 

constitutional right to exercise this religion. TDCJ had previously cleared 

Epley to acquire and wear a Celtic cross medallion. Epley wore the medallion 

as a form of religious observance. He alleges that he arrived at Lynaugh with 

the medallion, that it was taken alongside his other personal items when 

Epley was sent to an infirmary for medical observation, and that he never saw 

it again. He believes that Robinson intentionally confiscated the medallion 

and caused its loss. 

_____________________ 

1

 Epley’s suit against the Lynaugh officials, which comes to us from the Western 

District of Texas, was originally part of a larger suit in the Northern District of Texas 

against numerous officials in various TDCJ departments and the office of the Texas 

Attorney General. The Northern District sua sponte severed the claims against the 

Lynaugh officials and transferred the case to the Western District. In addition to appealing 

the Western District’s summary judgment rulings, Epley attempts to challenge the 

Northern District’s severance and transfer decision. Noting that Epley failed to seek 

mandamus after the transfer occurred, we decline to consider his arguments. See, e.g., Def. 

Distrib. v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 423, 426 n.13 (5th Cir. 2022). 

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The magistrate report adopted by the district court concluded that 

confiscation could not violate the First Amendment. 

We disagree with this conclusion. The right to exercise religion does 

not stop at the prison gate. See Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 25 (5th Cir. 1995). 

To be sure, this right, as it pertains to inmates, “is subject to reasonable 

restrictions and limitations necessitated by penological goals.” Id. It is also 

true that prisons can sometimes limit the possession of religious items 

without raising constitutional concerns. See, e.g., McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 

F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding TDCJ policy barring medallions worth 

more than twenty-five dollars). 

But no decisionmaker may act based on religious animus. See, e.g., 

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 533 (2021); see also Masterpiece 

Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 636 (2018). This is as 

true for prison officials as it is for other civil servants. See Jackson v. Godwin, 

400 F.2d 529, 533–35 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting that “courts will not shrink from 

scrutinizing administrative actions” “in the area of arbitrary official action in 

the administration of prisons which involves the constitutional rights of 

inmates to . . . enjoy the ‘preferred’ freedoms of the First Amendment,” 

including “freedom of religion.”). When a prison official deprives an inmate 

of a religious item because of hostility toward the inmate’s religion, the 

deprivation is not reasonable. 

Epley forfeited his right to argue deprivation with religious hostility, 

however. He does not accuse Robinson of religious hostility in either his pro 

se or counseled opening briefs on appeal. Nor do his legal arguments 

implicate the intent of policy enforcers. Not until Epley’s counseled reply 

brief is it intimated that Robinson possessed animus toward Epley’s religious 

exercise. 

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Parties cannot wait until the other side can no longer brief a response 

to raise important issues. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 

1993) (“This Court will not consider a claim raised for the first time in a reply 

brief.”). The failure to timely assert these issues results in them being 

forfeited. See Rollins v. Home Depot, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). 

Because Epley forfeited his right to raise the important issue of 

religious hostility, we affirm the decision of the district court. 

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