disposition at this point, so that by definition the current
denial of Household's motion is without prejudice to the

possibility that some future dispositive motion might be more

Co Mar. P Lacttuce

successful.

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: December 3, 2002


has adduced some facts that would at least arguably render the
Contract void rather than voidable.. And if such is the case,
Household would have no enforceable rights vis-a-vis Smith other
than those possessed by its assignor Gateway--that is, no rights
at all.* Under those circumstances its reports under the Act,
purporting to reflect a default under the Contract by Smith,
would have been inaccurate.

As for the issue of rescission, Household's supporting

Mem. 3 is incorrect in invoking Smith v. First Nat'l Bank of

Danville, 254 I1l.App.3d 251, 624 N.E.2d 899 (4 Dist. 1993) for

the proposition that Smith had to make Household whole by paying

the $20,810 that Household had laid out to Gateway. Instead
Smith's rescission obligation--to return the parties to their
pre-Contract position--simply called for her to return the
benefit that she had received: the automobile itself. And on
that score Smith has represented that when she gave her notice of
rescission she stood ready to do so (with the vehicle being
stored and not driven in the interim) and that her attorney so
notified Household.

As stated earlier, then, Household's Rule 56 motion must be
and is denied at this stage. This Court recognizes that the

entirety of this action has not been placed in issue for

+ Of course Household would then have a claim against

Gateway for recovery of the price that it had paid for
assignment, but that issue is not involved in this case.

3



Miou' Order Forma (06497)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assi ¢ ‘ itt ifo
nme of ined de Milton I Shadur Siting Sus if Other
CASE NUMBER 02 C 2476 DATE 12/3/2002
CASE Pearlie Smith vs. household Automotive Finance Corp.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented,]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(a) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) 0 Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___._ Reply to answer brief due

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon_sset for__— at

(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—ssetfor__— at

(6) im Pretrial conference{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on __—sset for at
) im Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at

(8) Qo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to_____at

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) OC Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)\(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) «of [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. As stated earlier, Household’s Rule
56 motion must be and is denied at this stage. This Court recognizes that the entirety of this action has
not been place in issue for disposition at this point, so that by definition the current denial of Household’s
motion is without prejudice to the possibility that some future dispositive motion might be more
successful. (20-1)

add ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document

Number

No notices required. umber of naices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Nolified counsel by telephone.

S| Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom Sj sh Wd fH date mailed notice
SN deputy’s " 330 20
initials
U Dakhidre beagiv} i
cmt te ne



uw

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

PEARLIE SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 02 C 2476

HOUSEHOLD AUTOMOTIVE FINANCE
CORPORATION,

DOCKETED

Dec ~ 5 2002

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This lawsuit, originally brought by Pearlie Smith (“Smith”)
solely against Household Automotive Finance Corporation
(“Household”) under the auspices of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“Act,” 15 U.S.C. §1681n), has since been expanded considerably
by (1) Smith's addition of claims against automobile seller
Gateway Chevrolet, Inc. (“Gateway,” the real culprit according to
Smith) and (2) Household's insertion of Counterclaims against
Smith. At this point Household has moved for summary judgment on
Smith's Amended Complaint's claims against it, not on Household's
own Counterclaims. True to form, Smith's counsel have responded
in part by filing cross-motions for summary judgment against
Household and Gateway as well.

In principal part Smith's filing sets out in harrowing
detail the story of an automobile purchase from Gateway resulting
from its high-pressure pursuit of her granddaughter Tonja
Treadway (“Treadway”), with Smith having signed the purchase

document as a straw purchaser because she had good credit an



Treadway did not. Household entered the picture by accepting an
assignment of the retail installment contract (“Contract”) six
days after it was executed by Smith, an assignment for which
Household paid Gateway $20,810.

This Court declines Smith's newest effort to treat this
litigation as the legal equivalent of the “big bang” theory of
creation, with its notion of an expanding universe. Instead this
memorandum opinion and order properly focuses not on Smith's
cross-motions, but only on the area of dispute that has been
raised by initial movant Household. But even in those narrower
terms, what the parties have tendered to this Court calls for
denial of Household's Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 56 motion.

Household's premise for its claimed insulation from any
claim under the Act is that its reporting of Smith's defaults
under the Contract was truthful. That premise in turn hinges on
two propositions: that the Contract was valid in the first
instance (which Smith disputes) and that it was not properly
rescinded by Smith (as she claims). But in each instance it
appears that those underpinnings present genuine issues of
material fact--or alternatively, that if either poses a legal
rather than a factual question, the input that this Court has
received to date does not provide enough grist for the decisional
mill.

As for the Contract validity issue itself, Smith's counsel