SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2418-17T4

L.A., on behalf of H.A.R.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SOUTH ORANGE-MAPLEWOOD

BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendant-Respondent.

_______________________________

Submitted February 6, 2019 – Decided 

Before Judges Currier and Mayer.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-8454-16.

L.A., appellant pro se.

Purcell, Mulcahy & Flanagan, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent (Robert M. Tosti, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 27, 2019
2

A-2418-17T4

Plaintiff L.A. appeals from a November 17, 2017 order dismissing her 

complaint against defendant South Orange-Maplewood Board of Education 

(Board) based on the statute of limitations. We affirm.

This matter arises from a settlement agreement reached by the parties in 

2002 in a matter pending before the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),

resolving plaintiff's claim that the Board failed to provide a suitable and proper 

education for her son (OAL matter). 

In September 2000, plaintiff sought reimbursement for her son's education 

and transportation costs. In the OAL matter, an administrative law judge (ALJ) 

scheduled hearings to determine an appropriate educational program and 

placement for plaintiff's son. On June 21, 2002, the parties reached an 

agreement in the OAL matter. The ALJ questioned plaintiff regarding her 

understanding of the settlement. The ALJ concluded plaintiff accepted the 

settlement terms "voluntarily and of her own free will." The agreement was 

reduced to writing and signed by plaintiff. In accordance with the settlement of 

the OAL matter, the Board agreed to pay plaintiff for her son's tuition at the 

designated school, transportation costs, and attorney's fees. The Board had to 
3

A-2418-17T4

pay plaintiff within three weeks of the Board's approval of the agreement, which 

was to be presented at the Board's next scheduled meeting.1

Before the Board had an opportunity to approve the agreement, plaintiff 

raised a concern regarding the transportation provision as agreed upon by the 

parties. Plaintiff asserted her son was required to take several buses to attend 

the designated school and the time her son would spend on the various buses 

would be difficult for him. Plaintiff wrote letters to the ALJ expressing this 

concern and asked the ALJ not to approve the agreement. The Board agreed to 

pay the additional cost for alternative transportation, but declined to address the 

matter until it approved the agreement. 

After the Board approved the agreement, plaintiff sought to set aside the 

settlement and filed a motion with the OAL. The ALJ, in a written opinion dated 

September 16, 2002, denied plaintiff's motion, finding the parties entered into 

the agreement "freely and voluntarily, and with the advice of counsel," "[t]he 

terms of the settlement agreement [were] fair and just," and "there was no fraud 

or other compelling circumstances" justifying repudiation of the settlement. The 

ALJ ordered the parties to comply with the agreement. 

 

1

 The settlement of the OAL matter was not presented to the Board until its 

August meeting. The Board approved the agreement on August 12, 2002.
4

A-2418-17T4

In this appeal, plaintiff claimed she attempted to collect payment from the 

Board in 2003 and 2008, including filing further legal action, but was 

unsuccessful. Plaintiff's appendix failed to include evidence of any subsequent 

legal actions, in 2003 or 2008, seeking payment from the Board. 

In December 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court, 

alleging the Board failed to make the required payments pursuant to the 

agreement. The Board filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 

a claim, asserting plaintiff's claims were barred by the six-year statute of 

limitations governing contract actions. 

The motion judge granted the Board's motion to dismiss. In a written 

statement of reasons, the judge found plaintiff's complaint was untimely because 

the statute of limitations governing enforcement of a contract is six years. See

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. The contract plaintiff sought to enforce, the agreement 

resolving the OAL matter, was dated September 2002. The judge concluded

plaintiff's cause of action, filed fourteen years after the agreement was signed,

was time barred. 

Plaintiff appeals, asserting the applicable statute of limitations is twenty 

years in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:14-5. She claims the ALJ's decision,
5

A-2418-17T4

enforcing the agreement in the OAL matter, was a court order or judgment and 

thus valid for twenty years. 

We review a trial court's decision determining a cause of action to be 

barred by the statute of limitations de novo. Catena v. Raytheon Co., 447 N.J. 

Super. 43, 52 (App. Div. 2016). In assessing dismissal of a complaint under 

Rule 4:6-2(e), we must "search the complaint 'in depth and with liberality to 

ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from 

an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.'" 

Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 165 (2005) (quoting Printing 

Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). "[I]f the 

complaint states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one, 

dismissal is the appropriate remedy." Banco Popular N. Am., 184 N.J. at 166 

(citing Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4.1 on R. 4:6-2 (2005)).

A motion to dismiss should be granted "in only the rarest of instances." 

Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 772. If, after a "meticulous and indulgent 

examination," a judge determines the complaint must be dismissed, the dismissal 

should be without prejudice "barring any other impediment such as a statute of 

limitations . . . ." Ibid. 
6

A-2418-17T4

An agreement to settle litigation is "governed by [the general] principles 

of contract law." Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016)

(alteration in original) (quoting Brundage v. Estate of Carmbio, 195 N.J. 575, 

600–01 (2008)). As such, "an agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract which, 

like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a court, absent a 

demonstration of fraud or other compelling circumstances, should honor and 

enforce as it does other contracts." Zuccarelli v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 326 

N.J. Super. 372, 380 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. 

Super. 118, 124–25 (App. Div. 1983)). 

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 imposes a six-year statute of limitations for "recovery 

upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied . . . ." The primary 

purpose of the statute of limitations is to "compel the exercise of a right of action 

within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to 

defend." Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 415 (2012) (quoting Hous. Auth. of 

Union City v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 25 N.J. 330, 335 (1957)). 

Plaintiff failed to file her complaint within the applicable statute of 

limitations governing contract actions. The parties signed a written agreement
7

A-2418-17T4

in the OAL matter in 2002.

2

 Plaintiff's claim arose sometime after August 2002,

when the Board signed the agreement but failed to make timely payments. 

Plaintiff filed her complaint in 2016, well beyond the six-year period of 

limitations under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. Consequently, dismissal of plaintiff's 

complaint was warranted. 

 We reject plaintiff's argument that the twenty-year statute of limitations 

under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-5 is applicable because the ALJ's written decision, dated 

September 12, 2002, is a judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-5 provides: "[a] judgment 

in any court . . . may be revived by proper proceedings or an action at law may 

be commenced thereon within [twenty] years next after the date thereof . . . ." 

The OAL is not a "court" within the State's judicial branch of government. 

The OAL is overseen by the Department of State as part of the executive branch 

of government. See N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1. Because the OAL is not a court, the 

statute governing judgments "in any court" is inapplicable to OAL 

determinations. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-5. Further, there was no judgment issued 

by the ALJ in the OAL matter. The parties "freely and voluntarily" signed a

written settlement resolving their issues. Thus, the twenty-year statute of 

 

2

 Plaintiff claims she contacted the Board several times between 2003 and 2008, 

seeking payment pursuant to the agreement. However, her claims are not 

substantiated in the record.
8

A-2418-17T4

limitations under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-5 is inapplicable and dismissal of plaintiff's 

complaint in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 was proper.

Affirmed.