No, 02 C 4485 Page 3

Insurance, Ltd. y. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., 717 F.Supp. 1307 (N.D.II. 1989). The

terms of COGSA were extended to the land portions of the carriage here by the bill of lading.
Plaintiff, moreover, was familiar with those terms because of its past dealings with defendants.

See Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Lozen International, LLC. supra; Garnay, Inc. v. MV Linda

Maersk. 816 F.Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). State law may apply if the alleged wrong occurred

after the carriage had come to an end, Metropolitan Wholesale Supply, Inc. v. M/V Royal

Rainbow, 12 F.3d 58 (5" Cir. 1994); Pine Street Trading Corp. v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 364 A.2d

1103 (Md. 1976), but that is not what happened here.

Jerrnsa i Mose.

¢ | JAMES B. MORAN
seni r Judge, U. S. District Court



sm

Y

MEE" degen Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

WO

Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge James B. Moran than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 4485 DATE 9/4/2002
CASE Fischer International etc. Vs. Hyundai Merchant Marine etc. et al.
TITLE
[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
Memorandum Opinion and Order
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) gq Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) a Brief in support of motion due
(3) 0 Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) o Ruling/Hearing on set for at -
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) 0 [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CUFRCP4(m) CiLocal Rule 41.1 CO FRCP41(a)(1) Ol FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) =i [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendants remanded the case and
now move to dismiss, contending that the claim had to be brought within one year. That motion,
considered as a motion for summary judgment, is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
(dl) {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. numberof notices
Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Noted eos by lpn SEP 0,9,2002
* tc date dosketed
Y | Docketing to mail notices OF... |
1
V¥ | Mail AO 450 form. m\ Js deputy iniats
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom date mailed notice
WAH deputy's
initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office sailing deputy initials



}?

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

FISCHER INTERNATIONAL FORWARDERS, INC.,
an Illinois corporation,

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

)

)
vs. ) No. 02 C 4485

)

HYUNDAI MERCHANT MARINE CO., LTD., et al, )

)

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff sued a Hyundai corporation in state court because, it claims, a shipment of
kitchen equipment was supposed to go from California to China so as to be delivered by a
certain date, and it was not so shipped. Plaintiff therefore had to air freight the equipment at
a cost of $18,621.64. The relevant time frame was spring 1999, As it turned out, plaintiff had
sued the wrong Hyundai corporation, and it dismissed that claim on March 7, 2002. It tried
again, suing the defendants in state court on May 21, 2002, about three years after the dispute
arose. Defendants remanded the case and now move to dismiss, contending that the claim had
to be brought within one year. That motion, considered as a motion for summary judgment,
is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The complaint focuses on what happened in California. Plaintiff alleges that a bill of
lading was issued showing that the goods were loaded on a ship there, and they had not been.
Thus, plaintiff asserts, the wrong occurred before any international transport. Accordingly,
they argue, there never should have been a bill of lading and it is relying upon an oral

commitment to get the goods to the ship. Therefore, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act


No, 02 C 4485, Page 2

(COGSA). 46 U.S.C. §1300, et seq., with its one-year requirement for suit after intended date
of delivery, 46 U.S.C. §1303(6), does not apply. It contends that it is entitled to allege a state
law contract claim, which should be heard in state court, and it has done so.

But a plaintiff cannot assert a state law claim, thus avoiding federal jurisdiction, if the
dispute is necessarily controlled by federal law. And here COGSA controls. In so
determining, we recognize that we are relying upon facts that do not appear in the complaint
(although many implicitly do because they are contained in the bill of lading referenced by
plaintiff), so that the motion has become one for summary judgment. The parties do not
appear, however, to have any dispute about the underlying facts, and we take them at their
word.

Plaintiff, an international freight forwarder engaged in the shipping of goods and
merchandise throughout the world, had used Hyundai (we refer to both defendants as
“Hyundai” as a matter of convenience) as the shipper frequently in the past. In this instance
Hyundai, for $2,000, was to arrange for carrying the equipment from LaVergne, Tennessee
to San Pedro, California, where it was to be loaded on the APL China for discharge in Hong
Kong, and delivery thereafter to Lian Hau Shan, China. Unfortunately, the trucking carrier
that was supposed to take the equipment to the train in Tennessee failed to do so, and thus the
equipment never made it to the vessel in California.

While the COGSA, by its terms, applies port-to-port, it can be extended to the entire
period during which the carrier has custody, Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Lozen International,
LLC, 285 F.3d 808 (9% Cir. 2002);Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. y. Crowley
American Transport, Inc., 117 F.Supp.2d 663 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Tokio Marine & Fire