1The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 00-3167

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Jeffrey Jordan, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: May 15, 2001

Filed: August 15, 2001

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Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, HANSEN, Circuit Judge, and SCHREIER,1

District Judge.

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WOLLMAN, Chief Judge.
2The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

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Jeffrey Jordan appeals from his conviction entered in the district court2 for

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and §

841(a)(1). We affirm.

On October 18, 2000, Jordan was convicted of the conspiracy offense by a jury

and subsequently received a sentence of 384 months of imprisonment and 4 years of

supervised release. Evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of numerous persons

involved in the drug conspiracy and of several law enforcement officers. Various

witnesses testified that Jordan possessed a duffel bag of guns and that he had been seen

with other guns.

The two co-conspirators most relevant to this appeal are Joe Hartwig and Savino

Aguilar. Hartwig worked for Jordan and witnessed many methamphetamine

transactions. He testified about the transactions and the conspiracy and mentioned that

he had been transporting a sawed-off shotgun from Mark Bradfield to Jordan when he

was arrested in January of 1998. Bradfield, who bought methamphetamine from

Jordan, confirmed that Jordan had given a shotgun to Bradfield to be shortened and that

he (Bradfield) had given it to Hartwig. He also testified that Hartwig told him that

Hartwig had gotten a kilo of methamphetamine from Jordan in Cedar Rapids.

Hartwig’s brother testified that Hartwig stated that a package Jordan had brought

contained methamphetamine.

Savino Aguilar lived in Cedar Rapids and was Jordan’s source for

methamphetamine. The testimony of Eddie Mason, a methamphetamine user who had

contact with Aguilar, included statements by Aguilar to the effect that Aguilar was also

selling methamphetamine to someone in Indiana and that he owed $120,000 to his

methamphetamine source.
3

“A statement is not hearsay if – . . .

(2) . . . The statement is offered against a party and is . . . (E) a statement by a

coconspirator of a party during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”

Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).

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Jordan raises two evidentiary challenges to his conviction: (1) that the court

erred when it admitted the statements of Aguilar and Hartwig through other witnesses

because the statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy and (2) that the

court erred in admitting the firearms evidence.

We review the evidentiary rulings of a district court for abuse of discretion,

United States v. Jiminez-Perez, 238 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 2001), “keeping in mind

that its discretion is particularly broad in a conspiracy trial,” United States v. Dierling,

131 F.3d 722, 730 (8th Cir. 1997). The district court provisionally admitted the

statements of Aguilar and Hartwig as co-conspirator testimony pursuant to Federal Rule

of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).3 See United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir.

1978) (approving procedure of provisional admission of statement subject to later

scrutiny to discern if government met burden of proof). At the end of trial, the court

found that the government had met its burden, concluding that the statements were

admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because they described the source of the drugs and

explained and identified the extent, scope, and participants of the conspiracy.

Co-conspirator statements may be admitted against a defendant if the

government proves that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the declarant and the defendant

were members of that conspiracy, and (3) the declaration was made during the course

of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Jimenez-Perez, 238 F.3d at 974. “A statement

that simply informs a listener of the declarant’s criminal activities is not made in

furtherance of the conspiracy; instead, the statement must somehow advance the

objective of the conspiracy.” United States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir.

1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Jordan contends that the four co-conspirator statements, two from Aguilar and

two from Hartwig, should not have been admitted because they were not made in

furtherance of the conspiracy. Jordan acknowledges that we interpret the phrase “in

furtherance of” broadly, see United States v. Gjerde, 110 F.3d 595, 603 (8th Cir.

1997), but contends that Aguilar’s statements to Mason were no more than idle chatter

and did nothing to advance the conspiracy. He also contends that Hartwig’s statements

were solely informative and so did not advance the conspiracy.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

co-conspirator statements. The statement by Hartwig to his brother identified Jordan

as his source for methamphetamine and thus is admissible. See United States v.

Meeks, 857 F.2d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Statements . . . identifying a

co-conspirator’s source for [drugs] have been deemed to be statements made ‘in

furtherance’ of the conspiracy.”). Similarly, Hartwig’s statement to Bradfield again

identified Jordan as Hartwig’s source and also indicated the quantity of drugs involved

in the conspiracy, keeping Bradfield “abreast of current developments,” United States

v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1529 (8th Cir. 1995), and providing information on the scope

of Jordan’s methamphetamine enterprise. A statement informing a co-conspirator of

the methods of obtaining methamphetamine is admissible because it is designed to help

ensure continued involvement. Jiminez-Perez, 238 F.3d at 974-75. The statements

made by Aguilar to Mason identify other participants in the conspiracy and indicate

Aguilar’s source and are thus admissible. See United States v. Johnson, 925 F.2d

1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 1991) (statements identifying participants and discussing various

roles admissible).

Turning to the firearms evidence, Jordan argues that the testimony linking him

to a duffel bag of guns, a sawed-off shotgun, and other guns was irrelevant,

inflammatory, and highly prejudicial, and thus should have been excluded. The district

court allowed the evidence because guns are tools of the drug trade and because the

testimony about the shotgun was relevant to Jordan’s self-protection efforts.
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We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling that the firearms evidence

was relevant and more probative than prejudicial. “Weapons are key tools in the drug

trade and can be evidence of a drug conspiracy,” Dierling, 131 F.3d at 732, and in this

case there was evidence that the weapons were used for protection and for barter in the

conspiracy. The gun evidence also “‘completes the story’ or provides a ‘total picture’

of the charged crime.” United States v. Forcelle, 86 F.3d 838, 842 (8th Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted).

The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.