superior, Dr. Bell, in order to interpret that data. Such a team
approach has been explicitly condoned by the Seventh Circuit, which
held that testimony from a team leader who did not personally
examine the plaintiff was admissible. Walker v. Soo Line Railroad
Co., 208 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2000). The court explained, “we think
it is proper for a physician working in [a leadership role] on the
diagnostic and evaluation team to rely on the work of her team
members in forming her opinion.” Id. at 588. Psychiatrists as well
as other medical specialists may base their opinions on their
colleagues’ conclusions without interviewing litigants themselves.
United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 302 (7Lh Cir. 1981). Other
courts have consistently reached the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 779-80 (Sth Cir. 1965).
Defendants also point out that the data here consist largely
of plaintiffs’ self-reports as to their feelings and reactions
during and following the incident. It is difficult to imagine how
a psychiatric diagnosis could take place if a psychiatrist were not
permitted to rely on a patient's self-reports, as the patient’s
experience is the focus of study. At any rate, the Seventh Circuit
has stated that a medical expert witness may base his opinion on a
plaintiff’s self-report. See Cooper v. Nelson & Co., 211 F.3d 1008,
1019 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district court should have

allowed medical testimony as to the likely cause of the plaintiff's

injury, even though the experts relied on the plaintiff's



single case suggesting that psychiatrists must have forensic
training in order to qualify as expert witnesses. District courts
routinely accept expert testimony from psychiatrists who are not
forensic psychiatrists, much less board-certified ones, See, e.g.,
Janopoulos v. Walner, No. 93-5176, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4041, at
*5 (N.D. Il]. Mar. 31, 1994) (Conlon, J.) (holding that although
the defendant was permitted to inform the jury that the plaintiff's
expert was not board-certified, plaintiff “may show that [the
expert] nevertheless is a qualified psychiatrist.”).

The defendants argue next that neither expert should be
permitted to testify as to the condition of juvenile plaintifis
because neither is a child psychiatrist nor board-certified in that
field, This may affect the weight the jury chooses to give their
testimony, but not its admissibility. The defendants’ own expert,
Dr. Stephen Robinson, acknowledged that the treatment and diagnosis
of children by psychiatrists who are not board-certified
specialists in child psychiatry “happens all the time.” (Robinson
Dep. at 223.) If Drs. Bell and Williamson are qualified to diagnose
and treat children, I see no reason why they would be unqualified
to testify about their diagnostic conclusions in court.

Defendants next attack the methodology by which Drs. Bell and
Williamson studied the named plaintiffs. Dr. Bell did not interview

the plaintiffs himself. Instead, Dr. Wiiliamson met with the

plaintiffs to collect data, and then collaborated with his



assertions about his medical history and about his chronic back
pain following the incident in forming their opinions).
Defendants argue next that Drs. Bell and Williamson
impermissibly rely on pure speculation and conjecture when they
state that the named plaintiffs are representative of the plaintiff
class. But according to his curriculum vitae, Dr. Bell is president
of a large, comprehensive community mental health center serving
residents of Stateway Gardens and the surrounding South Side
neighborhoods. He has published extensively over the last thirty
years on topics concerning the psychiatric health of inner-city
African-Americans. Further, he is Director of Public and Community
Psychiatry at the University of Illinois School of Medicine. Thus,
his opinion that the named plaintiffs are typical members of the
South Side African-American community where he practices is more
than simple speculation. While it is true that each member of the
class is a unique individual who may or may not have responded to
the February 22 incident in the same way as the named plaintiffs,
this is true in every class action. Dr. Bell and his colleaque,
like any qualified experts, may answer hypothetical questions about
what sequelae are likely to follow from a given event. Estate of
Carey v. Hy-Temp Mfg. Inc., 929 F.2d 1229, 1235 (7th Cir. 1991).
If, as the defendants claim, the named plaintiffs are not fairly

representative of the class, that question must be addressed via

the pending motion to decertify the class, not by the exclusion of

5



Minae per Fam (77

United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

Naine of Assigned Judge Elaine E. Bucklo sudge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C3228 DATE 2/18/2003
CASE Williams, et al. vs. Brown, ct al.
TITLE

[In the following box (u) indicate the parly filing the motion, e.g. plaintiff, defendunt, 3rd purty plaintiff, and (b) stare briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented]

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

3) o Answer brief to motion due_____.- Reply to answer bricfdue__

(4) im) Ruling/Hearing on _ set for at.

(5) Oo Status hearing{held/continucd to) [set for/re-set for] on selfor al

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—s set for_ sat

2) (i) Triallset for/re-set for] on at

(8) oO [Rench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Qo ‘This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) = CLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCPAI (a1) OO FRCPA1(a)(2).

do) [Other docket entry] Defendants’ motion to exclude testimony of Dr. Carl C. Bell and Dr. Johnny
Lee Williamson, TV, is denied. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order.

(1) +f [For further detail sce order attached to the original minute order. ]

i ‘Document
ts Number

No notices required, udvised in upen court

2

No notices required. anniber of nlives

oY | Notices mailed by judge's staff. FEB 1 9 2003

Notified counsel by telephone.

date docketod,

Docketing to mail notices.

Mui! AQ 450 form.

Copy to judge/magisteate judge.

courtroom wees fi oul
MP) deputy's *
initials

Date/time rectived in:,
ventral Clerk’s OMMice racing, deputy wal



expert testimony.

Finally, defendants urge me to find that the testimony of Drs.
Bell and Williamson should be excluded because it would not help
the jury understand the evidence or determine any fact in issue -
in other words, that it is irrelevant. This argument has no merit.
Whether the plaintiffs suffered psychological injury following the
police action is a central question of fact in the case. Drs. Bell
and Williamson plan to testify that, in their professional opinion,
the plaintiffs were injured by the defendants’ conduct. Since such
testimony tends to make a fact of consequence in the case more or
less probable, it is relevant evidence. Fep. R. Evip. 401.

Defendants’ motion to exclude testimony of Dr. Carl C. Bell

and Dr. Johnny Lee Williamson, IV, is Drwiep.

ENTER ORDER:

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: February lf, 2003



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ANDRE WILLIAMS, t al. . n
ene FER 1 9 7003

Plaintiffs,

Vv.
No. G1 C 3228
LIEUTENANT ERNEST BROWN, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants’ motion to exclude testimony is DENIED.

I.

This case arose from the alleged detention and search of
numerous residents of the Stateway Gardens neighborhood during a
basketball tournament on February 22, 2001. the named plaintiffs,
spectators at the event, claim that they were injured when police
forced them to submit to these unlawful searches, and filed this
class action seeking damages and other relief.

The present motion concerns the reports and testimony of two
expert witnesses offered by the plaintiffs, Dr. Carl ©. Bell and
Dr. Johnny Lee Williamson, IV. Defendants, the City of Chicago
(“City”) and its police employees, move that these experts he
excluded from participation in the case because they are
unqualified to comment on the case, the methodology they used to
reach their conclusions is unreliable, their conclusions as to the

representativeness of the named plaintiffs is speculative, and



their input would be unhelpful to the jury. I deny the motion.
Il.

The primary case addressing the standards for admission of
expert testimony is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert emphasized that the role of a district
court is to act as a “gatekeeper,” ensuring that any expert
testimony that reaches the jury is not only relevant, but reliable.
Id. at 597. This standard is codified in Rule 702, which states
that a court should admit expert testimony only where “(1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.” Fen. R, Evin, 792. I will address each of the
defendants’ arguments in turn.

Defendants first attack the qualifications of the two doctors
on the grounds that neither is a forensic psychiatrist. Defendants
point to O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 807 F. Supp. 1376
(N.D. I11. 1992) (Mihm, J.), which holds that a generally qualified
expert may not necessarily be qualified to testify as to a highly
specialized subfield. But O’Conner involved an ophthalmologist
conmenting on radiation-induced cataracts, an obscure area of study
outside the realm of ordinary ophthalmological practice. Forensic

psychiatry, the application of psychiatry in a legal setting, is

not such a specialized field. Defendants are unable to point to a