alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10(bb)
                         AMENDMENT NO. 1


         Pursuant to Section 14 of that certain Employment
Agreement by and between Blount International, Inc. ("Company")
and Harold E. Layman ("Executive") dated as of the 22nd day of
August, 1994 ("Agreement"), the parties hereby amend and modify
such Agreement ("Amendment No. 1") and agree that effective from
and after the 11th day of October, 1998, the following be added
as a new Section 5.3 (c):
         "(c) As of Executive's date of termination as described
in this Section 5.3, any offset that would otherwise be
applicable to the benefit payable to Executive under the Blount
Deferred Compensation Plan adopted October 9, 1998 (or any
successor or substitute plan "SERP") for benefits payable under a
prior employer's retirement plan (whether qualified or non-
qualified) shall not apply, and Executive's SERP shall be
calculated without regard to any such offset."
         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this
Amendment No. 1 effective October 11, 1998.
                                 EXECUTIVE:


                                 _____________________________
                                 HAROLD E. LAYMAN
                                 Executive Vice President &
                                 Chief Financial Officer

                                 COMPANY:

                                 BLOUNT INTERNATIONAL, INC.
         

                                 By: ___________________________
                                 JOHN M. PANETTIERE
                                 President 
                                 & Chief Executive Officer
Witness:_____________________

_____________________________
Notary Public
<PAGE>
(121 App. Div. 558.)

#### ROBINSON v. UNION RY. CO. OF NEW YORK CITY.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 18, 1907.)

Street Railroads—Injuries to Persons Crossing Tracks—Contributory Negligence.

Where plaintiff, as he was about to step on a street railway' track in crossing a street at night, looked and saw a car which was approaching at a medium rate, 60, 75, or 80 feet away, and as he got to the middle of the track looked again, and the car was so close that he jumped, but was hit before he could get off the track, and there was nothing to prevent him from seeing the car all the time, he was not entitled to recover, it being an impossibility for him to have been struck unless he negligently remained in the way; and this was so, though the car’s headlight may have gone out as the car was approaching and then lighted up again.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Street Railroads, § 207.]

Appeal from Trial Term, Queens County.

Action by William Robinson for personal injuries against the Union Railway Company of New York City. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and WOODWARD, MILLER, and GAYNOR, JJ.

Archibald Foote Clark, for appellant.

Bayard H. Ames, for respondent.

GAYNOR, J.

The best phase of the testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses is that he was walking across Third avenue in Bronx borough near 180th street in the middle of the.block after dark; that as he was about to step on the uptown track (the first he reached) he looked south and saw a car approaching at a medium rate of speed 60, 75, or 80 feet away; that as he got to the middle of this track he looked again and the car was so close that he jumped back but was hit before he could get off the track and lost a leg. There was no other vehicle in the vicinity, and nothing to prevent the plaintiff from seeing the car all the time. Having seen the car that distance away as he was stepping on the track, it was impossible for him to be struck by the car by the time he got to the middle of the track unless he negligently remained in the way. One witness says the headlight *204went out as the car was going the said distance and then lighted up again; but if this be believed it makes no difference for the plaintiff says he saw the car.

The judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment unanimously affirmed on reargument, with costs. All concur.
#### Craig Matthew FREDERICKSON, petitioner, v. David D. COOP.

No. 08-950.

March 23, 2009.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Andrew Hamer, Chief Financial Officer of Keynote Systems, Inc. (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| |  |  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 14, 2006 (the
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | - |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the periods presented
therein.
| | - |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date:
February 14, 2006



|                                                                                 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ ANDREW HAMER                                                                 
|Andrew Hamer Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Keynote Systems, Inc. and will be retained by it and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request
#### LibertyPointe Bank, Respondent, v 75 East 125th Street, LLC, et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[946 NYS2d 26]-

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Robinson Edmead, J.), entered February 16, 2011, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendants-appellants’ (defendants) motion to vacate their default, reinstate their answer, and restore the action to the calendar, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted.

As an affirmative defense and counterclaim, defendants contend that they were fraudulently induced into entering into the mortgage transaction by the misrepresentations of plaintiffs former president, including his alleged assertion that plaintiff would not foreclose on the mortgage until the former president had paid a pre-existing debt which he owed to defendants’ “silent partner.” This alleged oral agreement would directly contradict the terms of the note and mortgage which plaintiff sues upon, and which vest plaintiff with an immediate right to foreclose upon occurrence of any default in payment. Nonetheless, the only merger clause here — that contained in the mortgage — is bare-bones, and certainly makes no reference to the “particular misrepresentations” allegedly made here by the former president *(Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v Wise Metals Group, LLC,*19 AD3d 273, 275 [2005]). Accordingly, neither the parol evidence rule, nor the agreements’ merger clause, bars defendants’ claim of fraudulent inducement.

Under these circumstances, we find that defendants’ claim of fraudulent inducement is sufficiently substantial and meritorious to support vacatur of their default, and the order appealed from should be reversed *(see Crespo v A.D.A. Mgt.,*292 AD2d 5, *7079 [2002]; *38 Holding Corp. v City of New York,*179 AD2d 486, 487 [1992]). Concur — Gonzalez, P.J., Andrias, Saxe and De-Grasse, JJ.
#### Peter H. Davis, Appellant, v John G. Wills, Respondent.

[942 NYS2d 797]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gazzillo, J.), dated May 6, 2011, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant submitted evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical region of the plaintiff’s spine did not constitute a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Rodriguez v Huerfano,*46 AD3d 794, 795 [2007]).

However, in opposition, the plaintiff submitted evidence rais*1039ing a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged injuries to the cervical region of his spine constituted a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use and/or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Perl v Meher,*18 NY3d 208, 217-218 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Rivera, J.E, Eng, Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.
#### Emmanuel Ogbonnaya NWANKWO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 11-1126.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 12, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 24, 2011.

Emmanuel Ogbonnaya Nwankwo, Petitioner Pro Se. Kiley L. Kane, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

*635Petition dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Emmanuel Ogbonnaya Nwankwo, a native and citizen of Nigeria, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s decision denying Nwankwo’s request for a continuance, pretermitting his request for a § 212(c) waiver of inadmissibility,* and ordering his removal to Nigeria. For the reasons discussed below, we dismiss the petition for review.

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2006), we lack jurisdiction, except as provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006), to review the final order of removal of an alien who is removable for having been convicted of certain enumerated crimes, including a controlled substance violation. Because Nwankwo conceded before the immigration court that he is an alien who was found removable for having been convicted of a controlled substance violation, a concession which he does not challenge on appeal, our review is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); *Mbea v. Gonzales,*482 F.3d 276, 278 n. 1 (4th Cir.2007).

We have thoroughly reviewed Nwank-wo’s informal brief and the administrative record and conclude we are without jurisdiction to consider Nwankwo’s claims. Nwankwo failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by presenting his claims on appeal to the Board. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2006); *Massis v. Mukasey,*549 F.3d 631, 638-40 (4th Cir.2008). We also find that he failed to raise a colorable constitutional claim or question of law that would fall within the exception set forth in § 1252(a)(2)(D). *See Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales,*516 F.3d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir.2008) (finding that a criminal alien must raise a *colorable*constitutional claim or question of law in order for a federal appellate court to have jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D)).

We therefore dismiss the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DISMISSED.*

*

*See*8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996).
# C_2013225EN.01007001.xml

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 225/70 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 225/70

---

Judgment of the General Court of 27 June 2013 — International Engine Intellectual Property Company v OHIM (PURE POWER)

(Case T-248/11) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Application for the Community word mark PURE POWER - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

2013/C 225/154

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: International Engine Intellectual Property Company, LLC (Warrenville, Illinois, United States) (represented by: C. Thomas and B. Reiter, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 15 February 2011 (Case R 2310/2010-2), relating to an application for registration of the word sign PURE POWER as a Community trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders each party to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 211, 16.7.2011.

1

---
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 29, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50568

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JESUS FERNANDO DIAZ-SALAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP–02-CR-1961-ALL

--------------------

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jesus Fernando Diaz-Salas appeals his jury trial convictions

for importation of more that 100 kilograms of marijuana and

possession with intent to deliver more than 100 kilograms of

marijuana. Diaz argues on appeal that the evidence is

insufficient to show that he had knowledge that the marijuana was

in a hidden compartment in the trailer he was towing and that the
No. 03-50568

-2-

district court erred in instructing the jury on deliberate

ignorance. 

There was testimony that Diaz suspected that the trailer

might contain drugs, that he never requested an X-ray, that Diaz

had looked inside the trailer before approaching the border and

that the alterations were obvious to the inspecting officer, that

Dias was hesitant in answering the X-ray inspector’s questions,

and that the trailer contained marijuana worth at least

$1,000,000. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and accepting the jury’s credibility determinations,

we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Diaz’s

convictions. See United States v. Chavez, 119 F.3d 342, 347 (5th

Cir. 1997); United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir.

2001).

The evidence at trial raised the inferences necessary to

support the district court’s decision to instruct the jury on 

deliberate ignorance. See United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919

F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990).

AFFIRMED.
Document

AMENDMENT NO. 1
TO THE
STATE AUTO FINANCIAL CORPORATION
OUTSIDE DIRECTORS RESTRICTED SHARE UNIT PLAN


The State Auto Financial Corporation Outside Directors Restricted Share Unit Plan (the “Plan”) is hereby amended pursuant to the following provisions:
1    Definitions:  For the purposes of the Plan and this amendment, all capitalized terms used in this amendment which are not otherwise defined herein shall have the respective meanings given such terms in the Plan.
2.    Amendment:
(a)    Section 1.1(f) of the Plan is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows:
(f)    Common Shares.  The common shares, without par value, of the Company.  The total number of Common Shares reserved and available for issuance in connection with Awards under the Plan shall be 125,000. The total number of Common Shares available is subject to adjustment as provided by the Plan.  Any Common Shares delivered under the Plan shall consist of authorized and unissued shares or treasury shares.
3.    Effective Date; Construction: The effective date of this amendment is May 14, 2021, and this amendment shall be deemed to be part of the Plan as of such date. In the event of any inconsistencies between the provisions of the Plan and this amendment, the provisions of this amendment shall control. Except as modified by this amendment, the Plan shall continue in full force and effect without change.
The Company’s shareholders have approved this Amendment No. 1 to the Plan and the Company has executed this Amendment No. 1 to the Plan in Columbus, Ohio, effective as of the 14th day of May, 2021.


STATE AUTO FINANCIAL CORPORATION
						
		
		/s/   Melissa A Centers
		Melissa A. Centers
		Senior Vice President, Secretary and General Counsel
#### Victor Oswaldo GUERRA BAUTISTA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-70654.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*999Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 25, 2011.

Christopher John Stender, Esquire, Stender & Associates, P.C., San Diego, CA, for Petitioner.

Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Jessica Eden Sherman, Esquire, Trial, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Victor Oswaldo Guerra Bautista, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, and we review de novo questions of law, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. *Hernandez v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2008). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Guerra Bautista’s motion to reopen on the ground that he failed to show he was prejudiced by his former counsel’s conduct. *See Iturribarria v. INS,*321 F.3d 889, 899-90 (9th Cir.2003) (prejudice results when the performance of counsel “was so inadequate that it may have affected the outcome of the proceedings”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Guerra Bautista’s contention that an immigration consultant provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel is foreclosed. *See Hernandez,*524 F.3d at 1020 (knowing reliance upon the advice of a non-attorney cannot support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in a removal proceeding).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### In the Matter of Anthony Medina, Petitioner, v Sing Sing Correctional Facility, Respondent.

[944 NYS2d 910]—

Froceeding pursuant to CFLR article 78 to review determinations of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (1) dated April 12, 2010, which affirmed a determination of a hearing officer dated February 27, 2010, made after a tier *1332III disciplinary hearing, and (2) dated May 21, 2010, which affirmed a determination of a hearing officer dated April 28, 2010, made after a tier II disciplinary hearing, both finding that the petitioner was guilty of violating prison disciplinary rules, and imposing penalties.

Adjudged that the determinations are confirmed, without costs or disbursements, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits.

Contrary to the petitioner’s claims, the subject misbehavior reports and the hearing testimony provided substantial evidence to support the hearing officers’ determinations that the petitioner violated prison disciplinary rules *(see Matter of Kendrick v New York State Dept. of Correctional Serv.,*88 AD3d 881, 882 [2011]; *Matter of Mills v*Fischer, 85 AD3d 1033 [2011]; *Matter of Maxwell v Fischer,*74 AD3d 1342, 1343 [2010]; *Matter of Reyes v Goord,*49 AD3d 546 [2008]; *Matter of Johnson v Selsky,*45 AD3d 595, 596 [2007]).

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, he was adequately apprised of the charges against him arising from an incident that took place on February 14, 2010, and he was not denied due process with respect to the proceedings stemming from that incident. Among other things, the petitioner admittedly received a legible copy of the misbehavior report, which provided sufficient particulars to enable him to prepare an adequate defense *(see Matter of Salvatierra v Weeden,*88 AD3d 728, 729 [2011]; *Matter of Mills v Fischer,*85 AD3d at 1034).

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.E, Florio, Roman and Miller, JJ., concur.
# Official Journal C 294A/2010

| | ISSN 1725-2423
  doi:10.3000/17252423.CA2010.294.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 294A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5329 October 2010 |

ISSN 1725-2423

doi:10.3000/17252423.CA2010.294.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 294A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5329 October 2010

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2010/C 294A/01 | Common catalogue of varieties of vegetable species — 29th complete edition | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2010/C 294A/01

Common catalogue of varieties of vegetable species — 29th complete edition

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
Order entered July 1, 2021

In The 

### Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05

- 21

- 00424

- CV
MAR ICELA A. PEREZ, ET AL. , Appellant s V. ARNS INVESTMENTS, LLC , Appellee On Appeal from th e County Court at Law No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC

- 19

- 02341

- C
O RDER By order dated June 30, 2021, we ordered the court reporter to file records from two hearings. Appellants have now filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.
Accordin gly, we VACATE our June 30th order. The appeal will be dismissed in
due course.
We DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to send a copy of this order to Janet Wright, Official Court Reporter for County Court at Law No. 3, and all parties.
/s/ KEN MOLBERG JUST ICE
#### Ronald Tutsky *v.*YMCA of Greenwich et al.

Decided March 28, 1990

*Lawrence E. Larson,*in support of the petition.

*Thomas A. Mulligan,*in opposition.

The plaintiff’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 21 Conn. App. 806, is denied.