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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

CHRISTOPHER KAPLAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED March 24, 2016

v No. 325246 Alpena Circuit Court Family Division NANCY HENDRICKS f/k/a NANCY KAPLAN, LC No. 10-003705-DM

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: S ERVITTO , P.J., and G ADOLA and O’B RIEN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Defendant appeals by leave granted 1 an order of the trial court denying her motion for spousal support on the ground that it was premature according t o the terms of the parties’ consent judgment of divorce. We affirm.

In 2010, after 16 years of marriag e, plaintiff filed for divor ce. The parties entered a consent judgment of divorce on June 17, 2011. At that time, on ly one of the couples’ two daughters was still a minor. The consent judgment of divorce ( JOD) awarded the parents joint legal custody of the 16-year-old minor, with defendant receivin g primary physical custody and plaintiff receiving liberal pare nting time. Defendant also rec eived the marital home, (purportedly encumbered by approximately $30,000.00 in debt and asserted to have approximately $6,000.00 in equity), and a vehicle valued at approximately $6,000. Plai ntiff was awarded his 401k, valued at approximately $15,000, and his personal property. The judgm ent reserved the issue of spousal support “until the expiration of f our years from the date of en try of this Judgme nt of Divorce.”

Subsequent to the divorce, defendant’s income consisted of soc ial security disability payments she received for depress ion and anxiety, the social se curity disability payments the minor child received based on her mother’s disability, and $415 .59 in monthly child support for the minor. Plaintiff’s income was derived from trucking employ ment where he netted approximately $3500 per month in the summer and approximately $ 2800 per month in winter.

1 Kaplan v Kaplan , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 3, 2 015 (Docket No. 325246).-2- In a June 11, 2014 motion for spousal support, defendant claim ed that her circumstances changed substantially when the minor child turned 18 years old in September 2013. Subsequent
to the end of the child’s minor ity, defendant lost the social s ecurity disability income and child support she had received on behalf of the child, causing her in come to drop by $981.59 per month. Defendant averred she was having a hard time making end s meet on the $1,140.90 she received in monthly social securi ty disability benefits, was be hind on her property taxes, and had
medical bills in collection. She asked the trial court for mon thly spousal support of $814, based on calculations by a 2013 spousal support prognosticator, using plaintiff’s income at the time of
the divorce.

After a hearing on the matter, the trial court found “that the re has been a substantial change in circumstances, at least to this point.” Nevertheless , the trial court denied defendant’s motion on the ground that it lacked the authority to consider a n award of spousal support prior to expiration of the four-year perio d subsequent to entry of the J OD. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion for reconsid eration for the same reason.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in i nterpreting the spousal support reservation clause in the JOD to preclude consideration of a petition for spousal support during the four years following entry of the judgment. A conse nt judgment is akin to a contract, Laffin v Laffin , 280 Mich App 513, 517; 760 NW2d 738 (2008), and we review de novo a trial court’s interpretation of a contract, Reed v Reed , 265 Mich App 131, 141; 693 NW2d 825 (2005).

“The cardinal rule in the inter pretation of contracts is to as certain the intention of the parties.” D’Avanzo v Wise & Marsac, PC , 223 Mich App 314, 319; 565 NW2d 915 (1997). Contract language that is clear and unambiguous must be enforce d as written. Lentz v Lentz , 271 Mich App 465, 472; 721 NW2d 861 (2006). “A contract is ambiguo us if it allows two or more reasonable interpretations, or if the provisions cannot be reco nciled with each other.” Woodington v Shokoohi , 288 Mich App 352, 374; 792 NW2d 63 (2010). “If the contract, although inartfully worded or clumsily arranged, fairly admits of but one interpretation, it is not ambiguous.” Id

.

In the instant case, the parties specifically reserved the iss ue of spousal support in their
consent JOD as follows:

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that the matter of spousa l support shall be RESERVED until the expiration of four years fr om the date of entry of this Judgment of Divor ce. Thereafter, if no spousal s upport is ordered by the Court after a showing, by either party, of a substantial ch ange of circumstances, spousal support shall be forev er barred.

Defendant interprets the above paragraph to mean that spousal support may be awarded only during the four years after entry of the JOD, otherwise, spousal suppo rt is forever barred. We disagree.

Unless otherwise defined, ter ms in a contract are given their plain and ordinary meanings.

Cole v Auto-Owners Ins Co , 272 Mich App 50, 53; 723 NW2d 922 (2006) . Courts may refer t o a-3- dictionary to determine the ordi nary meaning of a term that is not a legal term of art. Id . at 53- 54. Thus, “to reserve” means “to keep back,” “to hold in reser ve,” “to set aside,” “to retain or hold over to a future time or pla ce,” or “to defer,” as in to “ to defer one’s judgment on a plan.”

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (2014). “Until” is used as a preposition in the paragraph at issue, and as a preposition “until” can mean “up t o” or “to,” it can be “used as a function word to indicate continuance (as of an action or condi tion) to a specified time, e.g., stayed until morning,” and it can also mean “before,” e.g., “no t available until morning.” Id.

Considered in light of these definitions, the plain meaning of the paragraph is that the trial court will “defer” (or continue to defer) or “hold back” its decision on the matter of spousal support “to” (the specified time of) four years after the date of entry of the par ties’ JOD. In other words, an award of spousal support is not available until after expiration of the four-year period following entry of the JOD. As the second sentence of the para graph indicates, the trial court may award spousal support to whichever party is able to show a substantial change in circumstances after expiration of the four-year period. “There after” refers to after the four-year period, and “if no spousal support is ordered” clearly suggests its alternative, which is that the trial court may award spousal s upport after expi ration of that period. Admittedly, the second sentence is somewhat vague as written because it does not indic ate for how long after expiration of the four years the parties may file a petition for spousal s upport. However, both plaintiff and defendant testified at the hearing on defendant’s motion for sp ousal support that, at the time they entered into the consent judgment, each contemplated that the s ubstantial change in
circumstances would be somet hing that had occurred during the f our-year period.

Affirmed.

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Michael F. Gadola