IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2016-IA-00442-SCT MISSISSIPPI STATE REPRESENTATIV E HOUSE SPEAKER, PHILIP A. GUNN

v. REPRESENTATIV

E J. P. HUGHES, JR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/23/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W INSTON L. KIDD TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: MICHAEL B. W ALLACE REBECCA L. HAW KINS CHARLES EDW ARD COW AN SIDNEY RAY HILL, III COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL B. W ALLACE REBECCA L. HAW KINS CHARLES EDW ARD COW AN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: SIDNEY RAY HILL, III NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 02/09/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. This ca s e t e s t s the lim its of our judicial power to review the m anner in which the Legislature carries out its procedural c onstitutional responsibilities. Article 4, Section 59 of the Mississippi Constitution provides that in the Mississippi Legislature “every b ill shall be read in f u ll im m ediately bef

o re the vote on its f

inal passa g e u p o n t h e d em and of any

m em ber.” W hen J. P. Hughes Jr., a m em ber of the Legislature, requested that certain bills be read as required by that article, Speaker Phlip Gunn had the bills read by a m a chine at aspeed that Rep. H u g h e s c l a i m s w a s i n c o m p r e h ensible a nd theref

ore a constitutional v iolation, leading him

to f ile suit to stop the practice. W e granted interlocutory a ppeal and now hold that we a re without constitutional authority to resolve this dispute. W e rem a nd this case to the circuit court with instructions to dism iss the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On March 23, 2016, R ep. H ughes f iled a petition a gainst S peaker Gunn in the circuit court, seeking a tem

porary restraining order, a prelim inary i njunction, and, alternatively , a writ of m anda m u s . Rep. H ughes’s petition asked the circuit judge to order the Speaker’s

com pliance—by injunction or writ of m andam u s—with A rticle 4, Section 59 o f the Mississippi Constitution, which states “every bill shall be read in f ull im m e diately bef

ore the

vote o n its f

inal passage upon th e d e ma n d o f any m e m ber.” In his petition, Rep. Hughes acknowledges that Speaker Gunn had recognized m em bers’ requests to have bills read under Article 4, Section 59, but in doing so, he had only partially obliged that request by h aving the words of the bills r ead b y an electronic device ( set on the highest s peed adjustm ent, # 10) such that the sam e i s b e i n g r e a d artif

icially and so q

uickly that no hum an ear nor m ind can com prehend the words of

the bills. ¶3. A f t e r f i n ding that the circuit court had jurisdiction to resolve the d ispute, a Hind s County circuit judge granted a tem porary restraining order which stated that the Respondent shall, consistent w ith A r t i cle 5 9 of the Mississippi Constitution, read o r cause to be read all bills p resented to the H o use of Representatives in a norm al speed and audible level com prehensive lever [ sic] so that each m em

ber of the House of Repre s e ntatives has an opportunity to hear and understand each word of each such properly

requested reading.
2¶4. The o rder also set a hearing f or March 28, 2016, but the next day , the Speaker m oved

to dissolve the tem

p orary restraining order, a r g u i n g that he had com plied with Article 5, Section 59; that Rep. H ughes had f ailed to satisf

y several requirem ents to o btain a tem porary

r estraining order ex parte ; and that judicial intervention into the legislative m atter was inappropriate. ¶5. That sam e day , the Speaker f iled in this Court a petition f or interlocutory

appeal, or
f or writ o f m andam

us o r prohibition f

rom the circuit court’s tem porary restraini ng order, arguing that Rep. H ughes h a d f ailed t o s atisf

y the requirem ents to obtain an ex parte
tem porary restraining order, and that this Court should order the c ircuit court “to restrain the exercise of i ts supposed j urisdiction in contravention of t h e s e p a r ation of powers doctrine

em bodied in Miss. Const. Art. 1 §§ 1-2 (1890).” ¶6. O n M a rch 24, 2016, w e dissolved the tem porary r estraining order a n d s t a y e d a l l proceedings in the c ircuit court, and we ordered Rep. Hughes t o r e s p o nd to the Speaker’s petition f or interlocutory appeal, which he did. W e then granted interlocutory appeal to “address (1) whether the j udiciary has jurisdiction over this dispute i n light of Sections 1 and 2, Article I of the Mississippi Constitution, and/or (2) whether this Court should ref rain f rom exercising its jurisdiction over the issues raised in this m atter.”
ANALYSIS ¶7. T h e M i s s i s s i p p i C o n s t i t u t ion’s f i rst section states that “ [ t ] h e p o w e r s o f t h e
governm ent of the State of Mississippi shall be divided i nto three distinct departm ents, and

3each of them conf ided to a s e p a r a te m agistracy , to-wit: those which are legislative to one, those which are judicial to another, and those which are executive to another.” 1 I ts second

s e c t i o n states that “[ n]o person or collection of persons, being one or belonging to o n e o f these departm ents, shall e xercise any power properly belonging to either o f the others.” 2 The jurisdictional question p r esented is whether judicial intervention in this dispute would be an encroachm ent on a power conf e rred upon the Legislature in violation of Article 1, Section
2. ¶8. Rep. Hughes claim s the Speaker has f a iled to com

ply with the requirem ents of Article 4, Section 59 of

the Mississippi Constitution. He a sks the judiciary to order the Speaker’s

com pliance through injunctive relief

. B u t we hold that t his Court lacks constitutional authority to interf

e re in t he procedur a l workings of the Legislature, e ven when those procedures are constitutionally m a ndated. This lim itation on our power has b een recognized by this Court f

or m ore than a century

. 3 ¶9. In Hunt v. Wright , we recognized that our power to r eview statutes f or constitutional inf irm i ty “com m ences af

ter the term ination of legislative action.” 4 In doing so, the Hunt Court m ade clear that the judiciary is “ not an overseer of t he legislature during i ts labors, but

1 M iss. C o n st. art. 1 , § 1

. 2 M iss. C o n st. art. 1 , § 2

. 3 E x p a rte W

ren , 6 3 M iss. 5 1 2 , 5 3 3

– 3 4 ( 1 8 8 6 ); H u n t v. W rig h t , 7 0 M iss. 2 9 8 , 1 1 S o . 6 0 8 , 6 1 0 (1 8 9 2 ).

4 H u n t , 1 1 S o . at 6 1 0

. 4[ this Court] takes its com pleted work, and t r i e s it by the constitution, starting with the conclusive and irrebuttable presum ption that as t o all the requirem ents o f that instrum ent they who swore to observe it did it.” 5 ¶10. W h ile this case c oncerns a request f or injunctive r elief

to order the Speaker to carry
out a constitutional procedural requirem ent, not a r e q u e s t to invalidate a statute f or som e constitutional procedural d e f ect in its enactm ent, Hunt reco g n izes t hat the L e gislature possesses exclusive power over its own procedures. ¶11. The H

unt d ecision r elied on this Court’s opinion i n Ex parte Wren —decided bef ore the a doption of our present Constitution—which unequivocally h eld that the judiciary lacks
any constitutional authority to interf ere in the Legislature’s internal procedure: The legislature is one o f

the three co-ordinate and co-equal departm e nts into w h i c h t he powers of governm ent are divided by t he c onstitution, possessin g all legislative power and n ot subject to supervision and control duri n g its perform ance of its constitutional functions , nor to j udicial revision af terward of the m an n e r in which it obey ed the constitution its m em bers are sworn to support. 6 ¶12. But in T

uck v. Blackm on —a m ore recent opinion that has m uddied the constitutional

water surrounding Articl e 4, Section 59—several Mississippi senators s ought injunctive relief to enf

orce that p r ovision. 7 Lieutenant Governor Am y Tuck, acting in her capacity as President of the Senate, had d eterm ined that A rticle 4, Section 59’s r equirem e nt that bills be

5 Id .
6 E x p a rte W

ren , 6 3 M iss. at 5 3 3

– 3 4 (em p h asis ad d ed ).

7 T u ck v. B la ck m o n , 7 9 8 S o . 2 d 4 0 2 , 4 0 4 (M iss. 2 0 0 1 ). 5read u

pon request d id n ot apply to conf erence com m ittee reports. 8 T he senators who h a d requested a reading sought judicial review and injunctive relief on the question of whether a conf erence com m ittee report constituted a bill f or purposes of

Article 4, Section 59. 9 ¶13. Af ter a chancellor granted the senators an i njunction, Lt. Gov. Tuck appealed, and this
Court f ailed to apply the strict s eparation of powers required by t he Mississippi C onstitution, as recognized in Hunt

and Wren

. 10 The Tuck Court stated:
W i th respect to the s eparate powers of each branch of governm ent, t he courts will g enerally r efrain f

rom i n t e r fe r i n g w ith the L egislature’s interpretation and application of

its procedural rules and with its internal operations. 11 By say i ng we “generally ref r ain f rom interf

e ring,” this Co u r t c o m m itted e r ror born of two

sources. ¶14. First, the Tuck Court purported t o apply t his Court’s decision in Dye v. S tate ex rel.
Hal e , w h i c h co n s id ered a co n s titu tio n al ch allen g e o n sep a ratio n -o f -p o w ers g r o u n d s b y

sev eral M i ssissip p i sen ato rs to S en ate ru les g ran tin g t he Li e ut e na

n t G ov ern o r— an ex ecu t iv e

o f f icer— co n tro l o v er leg islativ e m atters. 12 But Dye addressed a dif f e rent issue: this Court’s authority to enf o rce the Mississippi Constitution’s substantive separation of powers.

8 Id .
9 Id . at 4 0 5

. 10 Id .
11 Id . (em p h a sis ad d ed )

. 12 D ye v. S t a te ex rel. H

a le , 5 0 7 S o . 2 d 3 3 2 , 3 3 4

– 3 5 (M iss. 1 9 8 7 ).

6¶15. Second, the Tuck Court characterized the constitutional l im its on t his Court’s power

as a m atter o f discretion lef t to the whim s of this Court. In other words, this C ourt f o u nd that, although it had j urisdiction to review the constitutionality of the Legislature’s internal actions, it should not—as a m atter of judicial restraint—exercise that jurisdiction unless the challenged conduct was m a nif e stly unconstitutional. 13 The C ourt described this a s the “well
pr e c e d e n ted and respected political question doctrine itself grounded in prudent judicial restraint.” 14 ¶16. But while Tuck correctly identif ied that the political question doctrine was at issue, it incorrectly described that doctrine as one of discretionary judicial restraint. The political
q u e s t i o n d o c trine em

bodies the constitutional separation o f p o w e r s b e t w e e n c o e q

u a l b r a n c h e s of governm ent, 15 setting t he lim it o f t h e j udiciary ’s c onstitutional authority to resolve disputes when there arise s e ither “‘a t extually dem onstrable constitutional com m itm ent of the issue to a coordinate branch political departm ent; or a lack of j udicially discoverable and

m anageable standards f

or resolving i t.’” 16 T he Tuck C o u r t ’s holding t o t he c o ntrary was

e r r o n e o u s . At least to the extent that the political question doctrine t urns on “‘a textuall y dem onstrable consti t u tional com m itm ent of the issue to a coordinate branch political

13 T u ck , 7 9 8 S o . 2 d at 4 0 6

. 14 Id . at 4 0 7

. 15 P o w ell v. M

c C o rm ick , 3 9 5 U .S

. 4 8 6 , 5 1 2 , 8 9 S

. C t. 1 9 4 4 , 2 3 L

. E d

. 2 d 4 9 1 (1 9 6 9 ).

16 N ix o n v. U .S . , 5 0 6 U .S

. 2 2 4 , 2 2 8 , 1 1 3 S

. C t

. 7 3 2 , 1 2 2 L

. E d

. 2 d 1 (1 9 9 3 ) (q u o tin g B a k er v. C

a rr , 3 6 9 U .S

. 1 8 6 , 2 1 7 , 8 2 S . C t. 6 9 1 , 7 L . E d . 2 d 6 6 3 ( 1 9 6 2 )). 7departm ent” it c annot b e c o n s i dered a m atter of discretion given the Mississippi

Constitution’s absolute separation of powers. 17 ¶17. I n sum , w hen the Tuck Court em ploy e d language suggesting the j udici a r y w o u l d ref rain f rom exercising its p o wer to interf ere in legislative procedure, i t necessarily im plied it had t hat power in the f irst place. T his ran af

o ul of Wren , Hunt , and the Mississippi Constitution’s absolute separation of powers. So t o be clear, t o the extent Tuck held that the judiciary possesses som e power to interf ere in the Legislature’s internal procedure, we overrule it today

. ¶18. By requesting the courts to f orce Speaker G unn to read bills in a particular m anner, Rep. H ughes seeks t o involve t he judiciary in l egislative procedural m atters. The text of our
state Constitution that im poses u pon the Legislature the obligation to read bil l s u p o n a

m em ber’s request, n ecessarily com m its upon the Legislature the obligation to determ ine how

17 In this sense, this case is on all f o urs w i t h the United States Suprem e Court’s decision in Nixon v. United States

. In Nixon , the United States House of Representatives b r o u ght articles of im

peachm ent against W alter L. Nixon, Jr.—Chief Judge of t he U n i t e d States District Court f

or the Southern District of Mississippi—af ter Judge Nixon had been convicted of m aking f

alse statem ents to a f

ederal grand j ury . W h en the House presented the articles t o t h e U n i t ed States Senate, the Senate invoked a procedural r ule by which a com m ittee of Senators reviewed t he evidence supporting im peachm ent, and then t he whole Senate reviewed a report on that evidence bef ore voting t o rem ove Nixon f rom of f ice. Nixon sought judicial review, arg u i n g t h a t because the United States C onstitution states that the Senate shall try all c ases of im peachm ent, the Senate could not adopt a rule delegating that duty to a com m i ttee. Rather, he argued, the e ntire Senate m ust hear t he evidence s u

pporting im p eachm ent. W hen the case reached t h e U n i t e d States Suprem e Court, that court considered whether Nixon’s constitutional claim i m plicated the political question doctrine. Th e S uprem e Court concluded that the power to try im peachm ents had been com m itted to the Senate, not the judiciary

. N ix o n , 5 0 6 U .S

. at 2 2 6

– 2 3 7

.

8that requirem ent will b e carried o ut. So this case m u st b e d i s mi ssed, n ot a s a m atter of judicial discretion, but because we are without constitutional a uthority to adjudicate it. The constitutional authority , and duty , to d ecide th e matter lies s q uarely within t he l egislative branch of our governm ent. CONCLUSION ¶19. B e c a u s e Rep. Hughes’s petition raises an issue the j udiciary lacks con s t i t u t i o n a l authority to adjudicate, we rem and this case to t he circuit court with instructions to dism iss it. ¶20. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALLER, C.J., COLEMAN, M A XW E LL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P .J., C O N C U RS IN RESULT ONLY WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION J OINED IN PART BY BEAM, J. KING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, J. C HAMBERLIN, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: ¶21. My esteem ed colleagues e ngage in verbal sparring on a n issue which d oes n ot dem and

our attention. “[ I]t is well-settled that ‘a constitutional q uestion will be passed on where the issues involved i n a particular case are such that the case m ay b e decided on other grounds.’”
Miss. Power Co., Inc. v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Com m ’n , 168 So. 3d 905, 91 0 (Miss. 2015) (quoting Warner–Lam bert Co. v. Potts , 909 So. 2d 1092, 1093 ( Miss. 2005)). W it h out delving into an extended study and resulting discourse concerning the Constitution and the

9separation of powers, can we n o t a g r e e that this C ourt has jurisdiction t o review a circuit

court’s order? ¶22. Rep. J. P

. Hughes f iled a petition in Hinds County Circuit Court seeking a tem porary restraining order (TRO) without e v e r noticing Speaker Philip Gunn. The grant o f a TRO without notice is governed by Rule 65(b) of t he Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.
A t em porary r estraining order m ay be granted, without notice t o t he a dve r s e party or his attorney if (1) it clearly appears f r o m specif

ic f acts shown by af f idavit or by the v erif

ied com plaint that im m ediate a nd i r r e p arable injury , l o s s , or dam age will r e sult to the applicant bef ore the adverse party or hi s attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant’s attorney certif i es to the c ourt in writing the ef f orts, if any , which have be e n m a de to give the notice and r e asons supporting his claim that notice s hould n ot be r equired. Every t e m

p o rary r estraining order granted without notice s h all be endorsed with the d ate and hour of issuance; shall be f iled f orthwith in the clerk’s of

f ice and entered o f record; shall def ine the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and s hall expire by its term s within such tim e af

t er entry , not to exceed ten day s . . . . M.R.C.P. 65(b). ¶23. W h ile Rep. Hughes’s petition is notarized and sworn t o, he f iled neither a com

plaint

nor an af f idavit. Although he a lleges “irreparable harm ,” h e f ails t o specif

y any p hy sical or
psy c h ological injury that he has suf f ered—or would s uf

f er—or how the undescribed injury would be irreparable. He does not aver t hat he or any other m em b er of the House was unable

to read, d id not h ave access to the f ull text of any bill, was uninf o rm e d r egarding the text of
any bill, or that he was unable to understand the t e x t , s u b s t a n c e, or i m p ort of any bill. 18 In

18 A lthough Rep. Hughes alleges that the bills were being r ead at an “unintell i g ible speed,” he does not dispute the af f idavit of t he Clerk of the House of Representatives, who 1 0short, H ughes f ailed to show the urgency a n d necessity which p recipitates a need f o r a TRO. Equally f atal to Rep. Hughes’s petition is his f ailure to certif

y h is ef f orts to p rovide notice

to Speaker Gunn and t he reasons why notice should not be required. The petition is totally devoid of any ef f orts to provide notice and/or reasons why notice should not be required. ¶24. The TRO issued is sim ilarly f atally def e c tive. The o rder f

a i ls to decree (1) why

the undescribed, undef

ined “injury ” is irreparable and (2) why the trial court granted the order without notice. ¶25. The TRO w as dissolved by an en banc order of this C ou r t , w h i c h a l s o stay ed all proceedings in the circuit court until f urther ordered by this Court. Due t o the p rocedural def iciencies of

both the petition and the TRO, the TRO issued in this case is void. Speaker
Gunn was wrongf

ully restrained. Thu s , I agree with rem anding this m atter to t he circuit

court. However, I would i n c l u de an instruction to the circuit judge to conduct a hearing to determ ine the r e a s o n a b le costs, expenses, and attorney ’s f ees incurred by the Speaker, as

swears that [ a]t the beginning of t he term every Mem ber o f t he Hou s e , b y t a x p ay er expense, is of

f ered either a laptop c o m

puter or a n iPad f

or purposes of access to t h e Internet. This technology is of f ered to give legislators a platf o rm to research legislation, to read bills, and to d o o f f icial work of the House. Every Mem ber of the House accepted and received eithe r a laptop com puter o r an iPad, except f

or the S p e a k e r a n d Speaker Pro Tem pore. T he current text of every bill is a vailable onlin e a t a ll tim es. All Mem bers theref

ore have im m e diate access to th e t e x t o f e v e r y bill as it is being read in the H ouse. In a d d i t i o n to a laptop or iPad, legislators are of f ered hard copies of bills in com m ittee and c an obtain a hard copy of a b ill, by request, on the House f loor.

1 1provided by Rule 65(c). 19 The citizens of t his State should not be saddled with the costs of this litigation. BEAM, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART. KING, JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶26. B e c a u s e I b e l i e v e t h a t a n a p p e l l a t e d e c i sion in this case is prem ature, a n d consequently s h ould rem and the case to the circuit court to b e p r o p e r ly developed, I respectf ully dissent. ¶27. I would allow this m atter to proceed in the circuit court, where a f ull record could be developed. S

ee M.R.A.P. 10(a) ( t h e c o n t ent of the appellate record “shall consist of designated p apers and exhibits f iled in t he t rial c ourt, the transcript of proceedings, if any , and

. . . a c ertif

ied copy of the docket entries

. . .”); Hardy v. Brock , 8 26 So. 2d 71, 76 (Miss. 2002) (“Mississippi appellate c ourt s m a y n ot consider inf orm ation that is outside the record.”).

19 S e e M.R.C.P. 65(c) (requiring a TRO applicant t o post security “ in such sum as the court deem s proper, f

o r the pay m e nt of such costs, dam ages, and reasonable attorney ’s f ees as m ay b e incurred or suf

f ered by any party who is f ound to have been wrongf u lly enjoined or restrained”). 1 2¶28. The m a jority d ecides this c ase without proper developm ent in the circuit court. 20 I n order f or the m ajority to f

i nd insuf f icient grounds to justif

y judicial i n t e r v ention, it m ust determ ine whether the actions at issue were m anif estly u nconstitutional. Such a determ ination depends partially on the f acts of the case, which were c o m pletely undeveloped in th e c i rcuit court. For exam p l e, Rep. H ughes has not had the opportunity to provide evidence that m em

bers of the House m ay be uninf orm ed as to the text of the bills, or that the

m achine’s speed c aused conf u sion or m isunderstanding o f t h e b ills. Pleadings m ust only contain “a short and plain statem ent of the claim showing t hat the pl e a d e r i s e ntitled to relief

. ” Miss. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). At the pleading stage, a party is required only to place the def enda n t o r respondent “on reasonable notice of the claim s against” him and “to dem onstrate that [ the plaintif f or petitioner] has alleged a recognized c a use of action upon which, under some set of facts , he m ight prevail.” Children’s Med. Grp., P.A. v . Phillips , 940 So. 2d 931, 934 (Miss. 2006). Thus, Rep. Hughes was not r equired to allege or prove specif ic f acts. It was thus not necessary at this j uncture that Rep. Hughes c onduct extensive investigations and discovery in order to d eterm i ne w hether or how m a n y House of Representative m em

bers encountered problem s due to the alleged incoherent reading of the

20 T o b e clear, I a g ree, as ev in ced b y th e C o rrected E n B an c O rd er in th is case f i led o n M arch 2 4 , 2 0 1 6 , th at th e p lead in g s w ere in su f f icien t u n d er R u le 6 5 to g ran t a T em p o rary R e strain in g O rd er (T R O ). T h e p l ead in g s f ailed to m eet th e h eig h ten ed p lead in g s tan d ard s req u ired b y R u le 6 5 to o b tain a T R O

. B u t o n ce th e stag es o f th e litig atio n g o b e y o n d R u le 6 5 an d a T R O , w h at w e are d ealin g w ith are g e n eral p lead i n g issu es, in o th er w o rd s, sim p le n o tice p lead in g . T h u s, I clarif y th at w e are n o lo n g er e x am in in g th e p l ead in g s u n d er R u le 6 5 , b u t ex am i n in g th em

as su f f icien t u n d er n o tice p lead in g stan d a r d s.

1 3bills. He needed only to m ake allegations suf f icient to p ut Speaker Gunn on reasonab le notice o f his claim s , which he h a s done. As such, the record should b e developed in the circuit c ourt, s o t h a t Rep. H ughes m ay be af f orded the opportunity to gather evidence that the m achine reading t he bills r e s u l t e d i n problem s f or any r epresentatives and/or was

unc o n s t i t u t i o nal f

or any num

ber of reasons, and f

o r Speaker Gunn to be af f orded the opportunity

to gather evidence that it did and was not. ¶29. Moreover, Rep. Hughes clearly alleged critical harm 21 i n his petition, stating in that petition that “[ b]y f

ailing to f ollow the letter and s p i r it of the Mississippi Constitution and having t h e b i l l s r e a d a loud f o r the body in a m anner s o they can be understood, there is irreparable harm which has o ccurred and will c ontinue to occur, all as a direct and proxim ate result of the actions and inactions of ” Speaker Gunn. But such was i m p ossible f or him to
prove because this Court denied him the opportunity to d evelop his case in the circuit court. ¶30. Moreover, the c ircuit c ourt was not only p revented f rom developing the f

acts in this

case, it was not allowed to issue any sort of f inal judgm ent apply ing the law f rom which we

can f ind e rror. It is the role of the judiciary to apply the law to the f acts of a particular case; this C ourt does not issue advisory opinions and in cases such as this, t he trial court is the trier of f act a nd the original court assigned to a pply the law to the f

acts. See Ram sey v. Auburn
Univ. , 191 S o. 3d 102, 112 (Miss. 2016) (where circuit court d id not address certain issues

21 U n d er T

u c k , t h e co u rt m ay ex am in e leg islativ e actio n w h ere i t ex ercises its co n stitu t io n al resp o n sib ilities i n a m an if estly w r o n g m an n er th at d o e s critical h arm to th e leg islativ e p ro cess. M aj . O p . ¶1 5

. 1 4and the a

ppellant essentially asked this Court to preem ptively resolve those issues, t his Court noted that it does not issue advisory opinions). ¶31. Because this Court decides these issues pree m p t i v e l y a n d p r e ma t u r e l y , without af f ording the parties the opportunity to develo p t he f acts, and without allowing the circuit

court to apply the law t o t h ose developed f acts, I respectf

ully dissent. I would rem and the case f or f urther proceedings in the circuit court. KITCHENS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

1 5