IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JOHN BERTHOUD, individually 

and as trustee, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RANDALL VESELIK, et al., 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 01-cv-6895 

Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on the motions of Defendant Randall Veselik (“Veselik”) 

to alter or amend judgment [160] and to stay proceedings while the motion to alter or amend is 

pending [163]. Plaintiff John Berthoud (“Plaintiff”) opposes both motions. For the reasons stated 

below, the motion to alter or amend judgment [160] is denied on its merits and the motion to stay 

[163] is denied as moot. 

I. Background 

The extensive background of this 2001 case is set forth in detail in the Court’s December 

27, 2018 memorandum opinion and order [158], knowledge of which is assumed here. In that 

order, the Court revived “Plaintiff’s May 9, 2003 judgment against Veselik in the original amount 

of $1,400,000 (with Veselik to be credited at least $158,012.52 and perhaps as much as 

$290,762.52 in the event that Plaintiff attempts to collect additional amounts in supplement 

proceedings or execution), plus post-judgment interest in an amount to be determined in 

supplemental proceedings.” [158] at 1. 

 In determining that Plaintiff was entitled to revival of his judgment against Veselik, the 

Court took into consideration the parties’ supplemental briefs concerning the less-than-clear case 
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law concerning Illinois’ revival of judgment statute and, in particular, “what the courts mean when 

they confine the inquiry that a court may make in considering a petition to revive a judgment to 

the ‘face of the record.’” [158] at 4 (citing [144] at 3-4). Without ultimately resolving that 

particular issue, the Court concluded that, even if Plaintiff’s answer and affirmative defenses were 

considered to be part of the “record” considered by the Court, they were insufficient to justify 

denial of Plaintiff’s petition because 1) none of statutory authority or case law indicated that 

Veselik had a right to engage in discovery before the Court ruled on Plaintiff’s petition to revive 

judgment; and 2) Veselik’s affirmative defenses of satisfaction and release were wholly 

speculative in any event. 

 Veselik now asks the Court to alter or amend its judgment and to stay enforcement of the 

judgment while his motion to alter or amend is pending. 

II. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a party may file a motion to alter or 

amend judgment within 28 days of entry of the judgment. To prevail on its motion, “the movant 

must demonstrate a manifest error of law or fact or present newly discovered evidence.’” Ritacca 

v. Storz Medical, A.G., 298 F.R.D. 566, 568 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting Boyd v. Tornier, Inc., 656 

F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2011)). A manifest error of law is the “wholesale disregard, misapplication, 

or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th 

Cir. 2000) (quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). “This is a high 

standard that is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party.” Ritacca, 298 F.R.D. 

at 568 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “Once judgment has been entered, there is 

a presumption that the case is finished, and the burden is on the party who wants to upset that 

judgment to show the court that there is good reason to set it aside.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 
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F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009). “Whether to grant a motion to reconsider is a matter squarely within 

the Court’s discretion.” Ritacca, 298 F.R.D. at 569. 

III. Analysis 

Veselik argues that the Court committed manifest error by concluding that Plaintiff was 

entitled to revival of a nearly sixteen-year old judgment against him without first giving Veselik a 

chance to engage in discovery to support his alleged affirmative defenses of satisfaction and release 

and, after that, holding an evidentiary hearing concerning those defenses. Veselik’s motion does 

not address one of the primary bases of the Court’s decision, which was that, “regardless of 

whether Veselik’s answer and affirmative defenses should be considered part of the ‘record’ to 

which the Court’s inquiry must be confined, Veselik *** failed to identify any statutory authority 

or case law indicating that he has a right to engage in discovery before the Court rules on 

Defendant’s petition.” [158] at 9. Veselik’s current motion again fails to identify any “controlling 

precedent” that would give him a right to pre-revival discovery or, following discovery, an 

evidentiary hearing. Oto, 224 F.3d at 606. Therefore, Veselik cannot demonstrate that the Court’s 

decision to revive Plaintiff’s judgment was based on a “manifest error of law” as required by Rule 

59(e). 

 Further, Veselik’s attack on the remainder of the Court’s reasoning is not convincing. 

Veselik claims that the Court improperly and “sua sponte struck” his affirmative defenses, even 

though no motion to strike was pending. [160] at 2, 4. But the Court did not “strike” the 

affirmative defenses. Instead, it determined that—even if there were any statutory authority or 

case law authorizing discovery or evidentiary hearings in the context of a motion to revive 

judgment—the affirmative defenses advanced by Veselik would nonetheless be insufficient “to 
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justify discovery” or to “stave off the Court’s entry of an order reviving Plaintiff’s judgment” 

because they were wholly speculative. [158] at 12. 

 Veselik contends that, in concluding that his affirmative defenses were speculative, the 

Court improperly held him to a heightened fact pleading standard. As to his affirmative defense 

of “satisfaction,” Veselik recognizes that he did not actually plead facts indicating full satisfaction 

of the $1.4 million judgment, but nonetheless claims to be “entitled to th[at] inference.” [160] at 

6. The Court is not persuaded by Veselik’s reasoning. The Court need not “accept as true” 

Veselik’s “legal conclusion” that Plaintiff’s judgment has been fully satisfied, because the “factual 

matter” pled in support of that conclusion, “accepted as true,” does not convince the Court that the 

satisfaction defense is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). As the 

Court explained in its prior opinion, the facts alleged do not suggest that Plaintiff collected 

anywhere near his full $1.4 million investment. For instance, the counterclaim identifies a $5 

million payment that Defendant Tower Square made to unspecified parties to settle two 

unspecified claims. [147] at 7. But it does not allege that these were payments were made in 

whole or in part to Plaintiff. The counterclaim also alleges on information and belief that “NASD 

had also ordered Tower Square to pay restitution to Plaintiff and others,” id., but does not identify 

any amount or any basis for this belief. The counterclaim further alleges on “information and 

belief” that Plaintiff may have received settlement or restitution payments from other entities, who 

are not parties to the lawsuit. Id. But again, the counterclaim does not identify any amounts, or 

any basis for the belief that any of these entities made payments to Plaintiff. As the Court 

previously explained, the allegations, taken as a whole, suggest that Veselik may be entitled to 

some credits against the judgment. See [158] at 10-11. But they are insufficient to plausibly 
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suggest, “above a speculative level,” that the full judgment has been satisfied. Cochran v. Illinois 

State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2016). 

 As to his affirmative defense of release, Veselik argues that the Court “improperly struck 

[it] as speculative” even though “the docket in this case shows that Plaintiff settled with one or 

more of the other defendants and that Plaintiff dismissed his claims pursuant to that settlement.” 

[160] at 7. Veselik asserts that he is “entitled to an inference that pursuant to the terms of that 

settlement agreement, Plaintiff released all claims arising under the complaint including the claims 

against Veselik.” [160] at 7. However, this is not a reasonable inference, for the reasons identified 

in the Court’s prior opinion, [158] at 12, which Veselik ignores. The Court explained: “Veselik 

does not identify any case law suggesting that a plaintiff’s settlement with and dismissal of some 

defendants results in the release of the plaintiff’s claims against all other defendants. Nor does 

Veselik contend that he was a party to or intended third-party beneficiary of any settlement 

between Plaintiff and other Defendants. Instead, at the time that the remaining Defendants settled 

and were dismissed, judgment had already been entered against Veselik for $1.4 million. Under 

these facts, there is no plausible basis for concluding that Plaintiff entered into any settlement 

agreement that provided for a release of his judgment against Veselik.” Id. Given Veselik’s failure 

to even acknowledge the Court’s reasoning—let alone to show that it is contrary to “controlling 

precedent,” Oto, 224 F.3d at 606—there is no reason for the Court to second-guess itself now. 

IV. Conclusion 

 For these reasons, Veselik’s motion to alter or amend judgment [160] is denied on its merits 

and his motion to stay [163] is denied as moot. 
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Dated: April 9, 2019 _________________________________ 

 Robert M. Dow, Jr. 

 United States District Judge