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*********************************************** 
KATE L. DOYLE ET AL. v. ASPEN DENTAL OF

SOUTHERN CT, PC, ET AL.

(AC 39325)

Sheldon, Keller and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant oral surgeon,

K, for dental malpractice in connection with an implant procedure performed on the plaintiff by K. The trial court granted K’s motion to

dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to provide an opinion

letter from a similar health care provider, as required by statute (§§ 52-

190a and 52-184c [c]). Specifically, because the plaintiff had attached

an opinion letter authored by M, a general dentist, and K was trained

as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon and his treatment of the plaintiff

fell into the area of oral and maxillofacial surgery, the trial court determined that M’s opinion letter was not that of a similar health care

provider because M was not board certified in K’s specialty. On appeal

to this court, the plaintiff claimed that the opinion letter, authored by

a general dentist, was sufficient because there was no authentic public

record from which she could have discovered or verified that K had

training and experience in oral and maxillofacial surgery beyond the

information available on the website of the Department of Public Health,

which did not indicate that K was a board certified oral and maxillofacial

surgeon. Held that the trial court properly granted K’s motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction; because it was undisputed that M was

not a board certified specialist trained and experienced in oral and

maxillofacial surgery, M was not a similar health care provider as defined

in § 52-184c (c) and, thus, the opinion letter attached to the plaintiff’s

complaint was legally insufficient under § 52-190a (a), and the plaintiff’s

claim that she could rely solely on the department’s website to determine

K’s credentials was unavailing, as this court previously has rejected a

similar claim, the plain language of § 52-190a (a) requires the plaintiff

to conduct a reasonable inquiry for a defendant health care provider’s

credentials, there are other methods, aside from searching the department’s website, for ascertaining such credentials, including filing a bill

of discovery, and the plaintiff was put on notice of K’s credentials by

notations in the medical file referring to her treatment by an oral surgeon.

Argued October 17, 2017—officially released January 30, 2018

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defendants’ alleged dental malpractice, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Fairfield, where the court, Wenzel, J., granted the

defendants’ motions to dismiss and rendered judgment

thereon; thereafter, the court denied the plaintiffs’

motion to reargue, and the plaintiffs appealed to this

court; subsequently, the appeal was withdrawn as to

the named defendant et al. Affirmed.

Scott D. Camassar, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Beverly Knapp Anderson, with whom was Craig A.

Fontaine, for the appellee (defendant Brandon Kang).
Opinion

BISHOP, J. This appeal arises out of a dental malpractice action brought by the plaintiffs, Kate L. Doyle and

Brendan Doyle,1 against the defendants, Aspen Dental

of Southern CT, PC, and Aspen Dental Management, Inc.

(Aspen Dental), and Brandon Kang, DDS,2in connection

with a dental implant procedure performed by Kang.

The plaintiff appeals from the judgment rendered by

the trial court dismissing her action against the defendant on the basis of her failure to comply with General

Statutes § 52-190a (a),3 which required the plaintiff to

attach to her complaint an opinion letter authored by

a ‘‘similar health care provider,’’ as defined in General

Statutes § 52-184c (c).4 On appeal, the plaintiff argues

that the court erred in concluding that the opinion letter

written by a general dentist was not authored by a

‘‘similar health care provider’’ and that an opinion letter

from an oral and maxillofacial surgeon was required

instead. In support of this claim, the plaintiff alleges

that she had no method of discovering or verifying that

the defendant was an oral and maxillofacial surgeon in

addition to being a licensed general dentist because

there was no authentic public record from which the

plaintiff could have determined that the defendant had

training and experience as an oral and maxillofacial

surgeon. We conclude that the court properly determined that because the defendant did, in fact, have

training and experience in the specialty of oral and

maxillofacial surgery, the opinion letter submitted by

the plaintiff was not authored by a ‘‘similar health care

provider.’’5 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The plaintiff’s complaint, filed on August 19, 2015,

contained the following factual allegations, the truth of

which the court was required to assume for purposes

of deciding the defendant’s motion to dismiss. On March

15, 2011, the plaintiff underwent an examination and

treatment at Aspen Dental for a broken crown on one

of her front teeth. The tooth was removed on March

29, 2011, after which the plaintiff, under sedation,

received a dental implant for the missing tooth on July

29, 2011. By December 21, 2012, however, the plaintiff’s

implant was failing, allegedly because it had been

placed at an improper angle. It penetrated the nasal

floor, resulting in bone loss along the sides of the

implant. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant knew

or should have known that the implant was failing, but

failed to inform her of this circumstance. On August 4,

2013, the defendant performed a bone grafting procedure. At that time, the defendant informed the plaintiff

that the implant might have to be removed at a later

date.

The plaintiff commenced the present dental malpractice action, alleging medical negligence by the defendant, by complaint dated August 19, 2015. As required
by §§ 52-190a and 52-184c, the plaintiff attached to the

complaint a certificate of reasonable inquiry by the

plaintiff’s attorney and an opinion letter prepared by

Andrew Mogelof, a general dentist, who the plaintiff

claimed to be a ‘‘similar health care provider’’ to the

defendant.

On October 27, 2015, the defendant filed a motion

to dismiss the action against him for lack of personal

jurisdiction on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to provide a proper opinion letter, as required by § 52-190a (a),

authored by a similar health care provider, as defined

in § 52-184c (c). Specifically, the defendant claimed that

‘‘the author of the opinion letter must be a board certified, trained and experienced oral and maxillofacial

surgeon because the defendant is trained and experienced in the specialty of oral and maxillofacial surgery

and holds himself out as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon. . . . [Because] the [plaintiff] attached an opinion

letter authored by a general dentist . . . [she has]

failed to comply with . . . [§ 52-190a (a)].’’ In support

of his motion to dismiss, the defendant submitted an

affidavit dated October 22, 2015, in which he averred

that: ‘‘After obtaining my dental degree in 2004, I completed a four year residency program in [o]ral [and]

[m]axillofacial [s]urgery, which is one of the dental

specialties recognized by the American Dental Association. This four year training certificate program covered

the full scope of [o]ral and [m]axillofacial [s]urgery.

Rotations included . . . [thirty-six] months on service

with [o]ral and [m]axillofacial [s]urgery. . . . At all

times while working at Aspen Dental, I represented

myself to patients as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon.

. . . All of the treatment that I rendered to [the] plaintiff

. . . was in my capacity as an oral and maxillofacial

surgeon. The consent form signed by [the] plaintiff was

entitled ‘Consent for Oral Surgery and Anesthesia.’ ’’

On December 14, 2015, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant’s motion

to dismiss. In support of her opposition, the plaintiff

attached an affidavit from Mogelof, which stated, in

relevant part, that he is ‘‘experienced in all of the relevant services provided by . . . [the defendant] in the

case of [the plaintiff].’’ In this affidavit, Mogelof also

acknowledged that he is ‘‘not trained as an oral and

maxillofacial surgeon.’’ Mogelof further stated that ‘‘the

failure to properly place and treat [the plaintiff’s] dental

implant was due to a failure to meet the standards

of care of basic general surgery and diagnosis, which

standards were required to have been met not only by

general dentists but also oral surgeons such as [the

defendant].’’

Oral argument on the defendant’s motion to dismiss

took place on December 21, 2015. Subsequently, the

parties filed supplemental briefs and affidavits on

December 31, 2015.6 Oral argument on the defendant’s
motion to dismiss continued on January 14, 2016. On

May 5, 2016, the court, Wenzel, J., granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. In its memorandum of decision, the court held that ‘‘there is significant evidence

. . . that the treatment afforded to the plaintiff fell into

the area of oral and maxillofacial surgery. . . . [The

defendant] began treating the plaintiff immediately after

her referral to ‘the oral surgeon.’ Moreover, the records

which detailed the treatment of [the] plaintiff were

reviewed and quoted by the opinion author, including

this very notation [referencing an oral surgeon]. Of the

three criteria which can trigger a specialist level of

evaluation, the court finds that the evidence submitted

in support of this motion by the [defendant] proves

that . . . [1] [the defendant] was in fact trained and

experienced in the area of oral surgery and [2] was

referred to and held out as an oral surgeon. . . .

Accordingly, having determined that . . . the author

of the opinion letter submitted was not a similar health

care provider having not been board certified in [the

defendant’s] specialty, the court grants the [defendant’s] motion to dismiss.’’

On May 18, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue

or reconsider, which the court denied on June 6, 2016.

This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court erred

in dismissing her malpractice action for her failure to

attach to the complaint an opinion letter authored by

a board certified specialist in oral and maxillofacial

surgery. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that she ‘‘met

the requirement of [§ 52-190a (a)] because counsel

made a good faith inquiry into whether or not there

was dental malpractice, and found a ‘similar health care

provider’ in accordance with the [d]efendant’s credentials on file with the public health authorities.’’ We

are unpersuaded.

We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘The court

granted the [defendant’s] motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction on the ground that the . . . opinion letter [attached to the plaintiff’s complaint] was not

legally sufficient.’’ Gonzales v. Langdon, 161 Conn. App.

497, 503, 128 A.3d 562 (2015). In reviewing ‘‘a challenge

to a ruling on a motion to dismiss. . . [w]hen the facts

relevant to an issue are not in dispute, this court’s task

is limited to a determination of whether, on the basis

of those facts, the trial court’s conclusions of law are

legally and logically correct. . . . Because there is no

dispute regarding the basic material facts, this case

presents an issue of law, and we exercise plenary

review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Helfant

v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 168 Conn. App. 47, 56,

145 A.3d 347 (2016); see also Torres v. Carrese, 149

Conn. App. 596, 608, 90 A.3d 256 (‘‘[o]ur review of a

trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to

§ 52-190a is plenary’’), cert. denied, 312 Conn. 912, 93
A.3d 595 (2014).

‘‘[D]ismissal is the mandatory remedy when a plaintiff

fails to file an opinion letter that complies with § 52-

190a (a).’’ Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300

Conn. 1, 28, 12 A.3d 865 (2011); see also General Statutes

§ 52-190a (c) (‘‘[t]he failure to obtain and file the written

opinion required by subsection (a) of this section shall

be grounds for the dismissal of the action’’); Morgan

v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 401, 21 A.3d 451

(2011) (failure to attach a proper opinion letter constitutes lack of jurisdiction over the person). ‘‘Section 52-

190a (a) provides in relevant part that, prior to filing a

[malpractice] action against a health care provider, the

attorney or party filing the action . . . [must make] a

reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances

to determine that there are grounds for a good faith

belief that there has been negligence in the care or

treatment of the claimant. . . . To show the existence

of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant’s attorney . . . shall obtain a written and signed opinion of

a similar health care provider, as defined in [§] 52-

184c . . . that there appears to be evidence of medical

negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzales v. Langdon, supra, 161 Conn. App. 504.

‘‘Pursuant to [§ 52-184c], the precise definition of similar health care provider depends on whether the defendant health care provider is certified by the appropriate

American board as a specialist, is trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as

a specialist.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

General Statutes ‘‘§ 52-184c (b) establishes the qualifications of a similar health care provider when the defendant is neither board certified nor in some way a

specialist, and § 52-184c (c) [establishes] those qualifications when the defendant is board certified, trained

and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself

out as a specialist.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center,

314 Conn. 709, 725, 104 A.3d 671 (2014).

In the present case, it is undisputed that the defendant

is trained and experienced in the specialty of oral and

maxillofacial surgery. Pursuant to § 52-184c (c), ‘‘[i]f

the defendant health care provider . . . is trained and

experienced in a medical specialty . . . a ‘similar

health care provider’ is one who: (1) [i]s trained and

experienced in the same specialty; and (2) is certified by

the appropriate American board in the same specialty.’’

Thus, to satisfy the requirements of §§ 52-190a (a) and

52-184c (c), the plaintiff was required to obtain an opinion letter from one who was (1) ‘‘trained and experienced in’’ oral and maxillofacial surgery and (2)

‘‘certified by the appropriate American board in’’ oral

and maxillofacial surgery. See General Statutes §§ 52-

190a (a) and 52-184c (c).
The plaintiff attached to her complaint an opinion

letter authored by a general dentist. It is undisputed

that Mogelof was not board certified in the specialty

of oral and maxillofacial surgery. In his affidavit dated

November 12, 2015, Mogelof acknowledged that he is

‘‘not trained as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon.’’ Thus,

although Mogelof claimed to have knowledge of the

procedure performed by the defendant, and the relevant

standard of care applicable to that procedure, the possession of such knowledge, alone, is insufficient to meet

the credentialing requirements of § 52-184c (c). See

Gonzales v. Langdon, supra, 161 Conn. App. 505 (‘‘Our

precedent indicates that under § 52-184c [c], it is not

enough that an authoring health care provider has familiarity with or knowledge of the relevant standard of

care. . . . A similar health care provider must be

trained and experienced in the same specialty and certified by the appropriate American board in the same

specialty.’’ [Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted.]). Given that Mogelof was

not trained and experienced, or board certified, in the

defendant’s specialty of oral and maxillofacial surgery,

as required by § 52-184c (c), the opinion letter submitted

by the plaintiff was not legally sufficient under § 52-

190a (a).

Despite the defendant’s training and experience in

oral and maxillofacial surgery, the plaintiff maintains

that an opinion letter from a general dentist was sufficient in the present case because ‘‘there was no authentic public record by which to determine or verify that

[the defendant] had training as an oral and maxillofacial

surgeon’’ and she could verify only that the defendant

was a licensed general dentist.7 More specifically, the

plaintiff argues that because the defendant’s profile on

the website of the Department of Public Health (department) did not indicate that he was a board certified

oral and maxillofacial surgeon, she was not required

to obtain an opinion letter from a board certified oral

and maxillofacial surgeon. In response, the defendant

argues that ‘‘there is no statutory requirement that the

defendant’s specialty training be verifiable on the website of a public health authority.’’ We agree with the

defendant.

As an initial matter, we reject the plaintiff’s reliance

on Gonzales v. Langdon, supra, 161 Conn. App. 497, to

support her argument that she could rely solely on the

information available on the department’s website to

determine the defendant’s credentials. This court previously has rejected that argument. In Gonzales, ‘‘[t]he

plaintiff argue[d] that she was only required to obtain

an opinion letter authored by a board certified dermatologist because that was the only certification that was

listed on [the defendant’s] profile on the [department’s]

website.’’ Id., 503. This court disagreed, concluding that

the plaintiff had failed to obtain an opinion letter from
a similar health care provider. See Gonzales v. Langdon,

supra, 503.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff in the present case claims

that this court, in Gonzales, described reliance on the

department’s website as a ‘‘good faith effort . . . to

attach an opinion letter authored by a similar health

care provider.’’ Id., 515. Our review of the case reveals

that the plaintiff takes this quote out of context. In

Gonzales, this court was simply explaining why the

situation it confronted, where ‘‘the plaintiff made a good

faith effort in her original complaint to attach an opinion

letter authored by a similar health care provider’’; id.,

515; by looking at the department’s website, differed

from the situation in New England Road, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 308 Conn. 180, 189, 61

A.3d 505 (2013), where ‘‘the plaintiff failed to comply

in any fashion with one or more of the process requirements.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzales

v. Langdon, supra, 161 Conn. App. 515. More importantly, the reference to the plaintiff’s ‘‘good faith effort’’

in Gonzales is found in this court’s analysis of whether

the trial court in that case improperly denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the complaint, not

whether the plaintiff’s reliance on the department’s

website rendered the opinion letter legally sufficient in

the first place. Id., 509, 515. Accordingly, we find the

plaintiff’s reliance on Gonzales unavailing.8

The plaintiff argues that, aside from the department’s

website, she had no way of verifying the defendant’s

training in oral and maxillofacial surgery, and she ‘‘cannot be expected to match credentials that [she has] no

way of discovering and verifying.’’ We disagree.

We first note that the plain language of § 52-190a

(a) requires that a plaintiff, prior to filing a medical

malpractice action against a health care provider, make

‘‘a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good

faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or

treatment of the claimant.’’ (Emphasis added.) General

Statutes § 52-190a (a). As part of that reasonable

inquiry, a plaintiff ‘‘shall obtain a written and signed

opinion of a similar health care provider, as defined in

[§] 52-184c, which similar health care provider shall be

selected pursuant to the provisions of said section.

. . .’’ See General Statutes § 52-190a (a). Our legislature

amended § 52-190a (a) in 2005 to include this requirement that a plaintiff obtain ‘‘the written opinion of a

similar health care provider that there appears to be

evidence of medical negligence . . . [as] part of a comprehensive effort to control significant and continued

increases in malpractice insurance premiums by

reforming aspects of tort law, the insurance system

and the public health regulatory system.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilkins v.

Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center, supra, 314
Conn. 728. Thus, to the extent that the plaintiff suggests

that she should not be expected to conduct a reasonable

inquiry for a defendant health care provider’s credentials, we disagree because the plain language of § 52-

190a (a) requires her to do so.

Further, in focusing her argument solely on information that was available on the department’s website,

the plaintiff ignores the existence of other methods for

ascertaining a defendant health care provider’s credentials. She specifically could have asked Aspen Dental

or the defendant for the defendant’s credentials or

resume, a simple request that she does not allege she

undertook unsuccessfully in her affidavit in opposition

to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Even if the defendant was not forthcoming with the plaintiff’s requests

for information on the defendant’s credentials, the

plaintiff could have filed a bill of discovery. See, e.g.,

Journal Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co.,

261 Conn. 673, 680–81, 804 A.2d 823 (2002) (‘‘The bill

of discovery is an independent action in equity for discovery, and is designed to obtain evidence for use in

an action other than the one in which discovery is

sought. . . . As a power to enforce discovery, the bill

is within the inherent power of a court of equity . . .

[and] is well recognized . . . . [B]ecause a pure bill of

discovery is favored in equity, it should be granted

unless there is some well founded objection against the

exercise of the court’s discretion. . . . To sustain the

bill, the petitioner must demonstrate that what he seeks

to discover is material and necessary for proof of, or

is needed to aid in proof of or in defense of, another

action already brought or about to be brought. . . .

Although the petitioner must also show that he has no

other adequate means of enforcing discovery of the

desired material, [t]he availability of other remedies

. . . for obtaining information [does] not require the

denial of the equitable relief . . . sought.’’ [Internal

quotations marks omitted.]). In sum, the department’s

website is not, as the plaintiff suggests, the only reliable

method of obtaining or verifying a defendant health

care provider’s credentials.

The plaintiff’s argument that she had no way of discovering or verifying the defendant’s training and experience as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon is further

undercut by Mogelof’s identification, in his opinion letter, of notations in the medical file referring to the

plaintiff’s treatment by an ‘‘oral surgeon.’’ Even if the

plaintiff was unaware up to that point that the defendant

had training as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon, she

was put on notice once Mogelof identified the references in the medical file to treatment by an ‘‘oral surgeon.’’ Moreover, if the plaintiff had become aware of

the defect in the opinion letter before the statute of

limitations had expired, she could have requested leave

to amend the complaint and cured the defect. See Gonzales v. Langdon, supra, 161 Conn. App. 510 (‘‘if a plain-
tiff alleging medical malpractice seeks to amend his or

her complaint in order to amend the original opinion

letter, or to substitute a new opinion letter . . . the

trial court . . . has discretion to permit such an

amendment if the plaintiff seeks to amend within the

applicable statute of limitations but more than thirty

days after the return day’’). On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the plaintiff’s argument that she had no

way of discovering or verifying the defendant’s credentials in order to obtain an opinion letter authored by a

similar health care provider.

In sum, it is undisputed that the defendant is trained

and experienced in oral and maxillofacial surgery. It is

also undisputed that Mogelof is not trained and experienced in, or board certified in, the defendant’s specialty

of oral and maxillofacial surgery. Because Mogelof was

not a ‘‘similar health care provider’’ as defined in § 52-

184c (c), the opinion letter attached to the plaintiff’s

complaint was legally insufficient under § 52-190a (a),

requiring dismissal of the case. See Bennett v. New

Milford Hospital, Inc., supra, 300 Conn. 28; General

Statutes § 52-190a (c). Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Brendan Doyle’s claim for loss of consortium is a derivative claim of

Kate L. Doyle’s claims. Therefore, we refer in this opinion to Kate L. Doyle

as the plaintiff.

2 On February 17, 2017, the plaintiff withdrew her appeal as to Aspen

Dental of Southern CT, PC, and Aspen Dental Management, Inc. Accordingly,

references herein to the defendant are to Kang.

3 General Statutes § 52-190a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No civil action

. . . shall be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . .

in which it is alleged that such injury . . . resulted from the negligence of

a health care provider, unless the attorney or party filing the action . . .

has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been

negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant. . . . To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant’s attorney. . . shall

obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider, as

defined in section 52-184c, which similar health care provider shall be

selected pursuant to the provisions of said section, that there appears to

be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the

formation of such opinion.’’

4 General Statutes § 52-184c (c) provides: ‘‘If the defendant health care

provider is certified by the appropriate American board as a specialist, is

trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as a

specialist, a ‘similar health care provider’ is one who: (1) [i]s trained and

experienced in the same specialty; and (2) is certified by the appropriate

American board in the same specialty; provided if the defendant health care

provider is providing treatment or diagnosis for a condition which is not

within his specialty, a specialist trained in the treatment or diagnosis for

that condition shall be considered a ‘similar health care provider.’ ’’

5 The plaintiff additionally claims on appeal that the court erred in concluding that the requirement in § 52-184c (c) to obtain an opinion letter from

an oral and maxillofacial surgeon also was triggered because the defendant

‘‘held himself out’’ as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon. Specifically, the

plaintiff claims that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was

‘‘held out’’ as a specialist trained and experienced in oral and maxillofacial

surgery at the time of her treatment. Because our resolution of the plaintiff’s

first claim is dispositive of this appeal, we do not address this claim.
We also do not address the plaintiff’s argument on appeal that ‘‘dismissal

notwithstanding, the plaintiff still has a remedy under the accidental failure

of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592.’’ As the plaintiff’s counsel conceded

at oral argument, this claim is not one that this court can address on appeal,

as the plaintiff has not commenced an action pursuant to § 52-592.

6 Attached to the defendant’s supplemental memorandum of law in further

support of his motion to dismiss was a supplemental affidavit, dated December 18, 2015, in which the defendant stated in relevant part: ‘‘Extractions,

bone grafting procedures and implant placements are among the procedures

that I was trained to perform during my post-graduate residency training

program in oral and maxillofacial surgery. Extractions, bone grafting and

implant placements are within the scope of practice of oral and maxillofacial surgery.’’

7 To the extent that the plaintiff suggests that a plaintiff should not need

to conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain a defendant health care provider’s

credentials prior to bringing an action, this may be a worthy issue for our

legislature to address, but our role is not to contort legislation and is to

apply its clear and unambiguous requirements and limitations. See Bennett v.

New Milford Hospital, Inc., supra, 300 Conn. 15–16 (‘‘[g]iven the legislature’s

specific articulations of who is a similar health care provider under § 52-

184c [b] and [c], we have hewn very closely to that language and declined

to modify or expand it in any way’’).

8 More generally, we also reject the plaintiff’s argument that reliance on the

information in a defendant health care provider’s profile on the department’s

website is sufficient because such an interpretation would render meaningless the other two potential triggers of the requirements under § 52-184c

(c)—trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or held out as a specialist—that our legislature has clearly defined. See Bennett v. New Milford

Hospital, Inc., supra, 300 Conn. 15–16. In other words, if we were to agree

with the plaintiff, only board certification would trigger the requirements

of § 52-184c (c), since it is alleged that only board certification is available

on that website.