NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUKHWINDER SINGH,

Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 23

- 1065 Agency No. A208

- 203

- 444

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 13, 2024 ** San Francisco , California
Before: GOULD, TALLMAN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges

. Sukhwinder Singh petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmance of a decision by an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUN 17 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 23

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Against Torture (“CAT”), and ordering his deportation to India. Singh c ontends
that the agency violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights because the official Punjabi interpreter at Singh’s merits hearing provided inadequate interpretation services, prevent ing Singh from reasonably presenting his case. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny Singh’s petition for
review. In cases where “the BIA agrees with and incorporates specific findings of the IJ while adding its own reasoning, we review both decisions.” Bhattarai v. Lynch , 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). We review due process challenges to deportation proceedings de novo

. Benedicto v. Garland , 12 F.4th 1049, 1058 (9th
Cir. 2021)

. We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, “under the deferential substantial evidence standard.” Zhi v.
Holder , 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014) . Under that standard, “we must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary
conclusion.” Duran

- Rodriguez v. Barr , 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019);
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The deference we give to the agency’s credibility
determination s pursuant to the REAL ID Act “makes sense because IJs are in the best position to assess demeanor and other credibility cues that we cannot readily
access on review.” Shrestha v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010).
1. “Due process requires that an applicant be given competent translation3 23

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services.” He v. Ashcroft , 328 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2003). “To prevail on a due process challenge to deportation proceedings, [a noncitizen] must show error and substantial prejudice.” Grigoryan v. Barr , 959 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Lata v. INS , 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000)). Singh urges that there were several potential mistranslations or misunderstandings in the transcript , including moments when : (1) Singh misunderstood his attorney’s question about whether he had lived in any Indian state other than Punjab; (2) the interpreter did not include the word “Khalistan” in her interpretation but the attorney asked additional questions and Singh explained the meaning of “Khalistan ” ; (3) the interpreter initially did not understand Singh’s

response , but Singh’s attorney proceeded to ask additional questions so that Singh could clarify his answer ; and (4) the interpreter could not translate a specific word about Singh’s wife’s reaction but explained the meaning of the word

. However, Singh does not show that any English

- Punjabi interpretation issues substantially prejudiced the proceedings or “prevented” him “from reasonably presenting his case.” Gutierrez v. Holder , 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ibarra

- Flores v. Gonzales , 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006))

. I n each instance of potential mistranslation or miscommunication, the IJ was aware that there was an issue, and Singh was afforded opportunit ies to clarify his

answers. Moreover, for Singh to establish a d ue process violation, the errors he4 23

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identifies must “substantial[ly] prejudice” the proceedings. Grigoryan , 959 F.3d at
1240. The IJ based her adverse credibility determination on inconsistencies, otherwise consistent testimony, demeanor, and inherent implausibility

. The
inconsistencies that the IJ identified did not relate to the potential mistranslations that had been clarified; rather, they related to the medical treatment Singh received after being attacked , discrepancies between Singh’s testimony and the letters from hospitals he submitted as evidence, and Singh’s changing testimony about whether
he was a member of the Mann political party. The IJ also noted that Singh’s testimony was otherwise consistent with the typed statement he submitted with his application, but that his recitation of those facts “lacked the ring of truth.” Finally, the IJ found Singh’s testimony inherently implausible because (1) Singh articulated

a choice to leave his family behind ; and (2) Singh’s explanation of his injuries did not align with the medical treatment he received

. Because Singh neither showed
that the issues with interpretation prejudiced the IJ’s credibility determination, nor that the interpretation was inadequate and prevent ed him from reasonably presenting his cas e , we deny the petition for review of his asylum and withh olding
of removal claims.
2. Singh does not appear separately to petition for our review of the agency’s denial of his application for CAT relief, and it appears that he waived any CAT claim before the BIA. Even if Singh petitioned for review of the CAT5 23

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determination and his claim is not waived, there is not substantial evidence that would compel us to grant the petition as to Singh’s CAT claim . Relying on Singh’s testimony an d documentary evidence, the IJ reasonably concluded that Singh neither established that he suffered past harm rising to the level of torture ;

n or that he is more likely than not to be tortured upon return to India

. W e have not found substantial evidence in the record that would compel us to conclude that Singh is more likely than no t to be tortured if removed to India

. See Plancarte
Sauceda v. Garland , 23 F.4th 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2022).
PETITION DENIED