* No. 03 C 8691 Page 4

908 (N.D.IIL. 1999).

Plaintiff also alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. First, he claims that the defendants
conspired to deprive him of his due process rights by towing his vehicle without prior notice.
As both §§ 1985(1) and 1985(2) are inapplicable, the only section under which plaintiff could
be asserting this claim is § 1985(3). Under § 1985(3), plaintiff must allege “‘(1) the existence
of a conspiracy, (2) a purpose of depriving a person or class of persons of equal protection of
the laws, (3) an act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, and (4) an injury to person or
property or a deprivation of a right or privilege granted to U.S. citizens.’” Brokaw vy. Mercer
County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1024 (7 Cir. 2000) citing Majeske v. Fraternal Order of Police, Local
Lodge No. 7, 94 F.3d 307, 311 (7 Cir. 1996). In order to establish that the purpose of the
conspiracy is to deprive a person or class of persons equal protection, the plaintiff must allege
“some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators’ action.” Griffin y. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); Brokaw, 235 F.3d at
1024. Saniat has not done so, His complaint gives no indication that defendants were
motivated by class-based discrimination.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants conspired to deter him from pursuing his case
against the City and EAR in federal court. This claim falls under § 1985(2). To state a claim
under this section plaintiff must allege: “(1) a conspiracy by the defendants; (2) to injure a
party or witness in his or her person or property; (3) because he or she attended federal court
or testified in any matter pending in federal court; (4) resulting in injury or damages to the
plaintiff.” Wright v. Minos Dept. of Children & Family Services, 40 F.3d 1492 (7 Cir. 1994).
Unlike a § 1985(3) claim, a § 1985(2) claim, which alleges a conspiracy to deter a federal court

action, does not require that the plaintiff show a discriminatory class-based animus. Kush v.



No. 03 C 8691 Page3

plaintiff was using to document damage to his property.

From these allegations plaintiff asserts three claims. First, defendants deprived him
of his due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by impounding his property without
prior notice. Second, defendants conspired to deprive him of his property and to impede him
from pursuing a suit against the City in federal court in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Finally,
plaintiff alleges that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege that “(1) ‘the conduct complained
of was committed by a person acting under color of state law’; and (2) that ‘this conduct
deprived [plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.” Moore vy. Muncie Police and Fire Merit Commission, 312 F.3d 322, 326
(7* Cir. 2002) citing Townsend vy. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 669 (7" Cir. 2001). Plaintiff alleges that
the defendants deprived him of his due process rights by towing his vehicles without prior
notice and damaging them in the process. However, as Judge Coar made clear in his dismissal
of one of plaintiff’s prior complaints, the impoundment of an individual’s vehicle without prior
notice is not a violation of the due process clause, as long as the individual has an adequate
post-deprivation remedy. Saniat v, City of Chicago, 2003 WL 21251976 at *3 (N.D.DL 2003).
In Saniat, this plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against the City after an administrative law
Judge found that the City had not proved that the towing of plaintiff’s vehicles was authorized
under the city code. Id. Judge Coar held that there was still no violation of due process
because the City provided a prompt hearing following the towing. Jd. This decision is
supported by the Seventh Circuit’s finding that vehicle owners in Illinois have adequate post-

deprivation remedies for the impoundment of their cars, even when they are damaged. Gable

y, City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 540 (7" Cir. 2002); see Ernst v. City of Chicago, 63 F. Supp.2d


* No. 03 C 8691 Page 5

Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 727-28 (1983). For the purposes of this petition, after liberally
construing plaintiff's pro se complaint, we find that plaintiff does state a claim under § 1985(2).
Plaintiff states that John and Jane Doe, employees from the City’s Streets and Sanitation
Department and Police Department, conspired to tow his vehicles, which were allegedly
damaged, “to cause a chilling effect on the plaintiff and to avert his attention from proceeding
with a pending action in this court and U.S. appellate court.” Plaintiff also alleges that a John
Doe off-duty police officer and a John Doe employee of EAR conspired against him by falsely
arresting him and taking some of his possessions, including court documents and a video
camera which were related to plaintiff’s pending court action.

While these allegations state a claim against the various John and Jane Doe employees
of the City and EAR, they do not state a claim against the City or EAR. To state a claim
against a city under § 1985, a plaintiff “must allege an official policy or custom which relates
to matters stemming from or resulting in the conspiracy.” Eiland y. Hardesty, 564 F. Supp.
930, 934 (N.D.IN. 1982). A claim against the City cannot be based merely on its employees’
actions because a “municipality cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior
for the Section 1985 violations of its employees.” Johnson y. Chicago Board of Education,
2000 WL 1785311 at *6 (N.D.IL 2000);. Eiland, 564 F. Supp. at 934. Nor can EAR be held
liable solely on the basis of its employee’s actions. See Boyden v. Troken, 352 F. Supp 722, 723
(N.D.UI. 1973)(“The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in civil rights cases... .”).
Plaintiff does not make any allegations which indicate that the John and Jane Doe defendants
were acting in accordance with a City policy or custom, nor has plaintiff made any allegations
against EAR.

Plaintiff's final claim is under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which derives from § 1985. Section


Minute Order For (06497)

ue United States District Court, Northern District of Minois

ware Magis ate Junge James B. Moran Sree Ashtead Sade

CASE NUMBER 03 C 8691 DATE 12/15/2003
CASE THOMAS SANIAT, pro se vs. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al
TITLE

[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DOCKET ENTRY:

q@) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Qo Brief in support of motion due__.

@) ao Answer brief to motion due__. Reply to answer brief'due__.

(4) Q Ruling/Hearingon__setfor__at

(5) QO Status hearing[held/continued to) [set for/re-set for]on__—_—ssetfor___—_at

(6) im} Pretrial conference[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for]on___setfor__——sat__
(7) i] Trial[set for/re-set for] on___—_at

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__—_at

(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) C)Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).

qo ff [Other docket entry} | Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in
forma pauperis on his 1983 and 1985(3) claims is denied, along with all claims against the City of
Chicago and EAR. However, his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on his 1985(2) and1986 claims
against the John and Jan Doe defendants is granted.

(1) @ (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices maited by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. date docketed

ov | Docketing to mail notices. .
Mail AO 450 form, docking

Cor gral Lunoo Jansisia sin
“s crim £2:S WY SI J30cu —
initials r
OR Gralla meee i



,

No. 03 C 8691 Page 6

1986 imparts liability on those who know of a § 1985 conspiracy and do nothing to prevent it,
despite their power to do so. The elements of a § 1986 claim are (1) knowledge that
conspiratorial wrongs are going to be committed, (2) the power to prevent or aid in preventing
the wrongs, (3) failure to do so (4) resulting in the wrongful acts being committed (5) even
though they could have been prevented by reasonable diligence. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746
F.2d 1205, 1233 (7" Cir. 1984). Though plaintiff does not plainly account for each element, we
cannot find that no facts would support plaintiff's claim under this section. Plaintiff has
alleged that the John and Jane Doe defendants took part in the conspiracy, thus their
knowledge of it and failure to stop it can be inferred. Likewise, based on the nature of
defendants’ alleged actions (impoundment of vehicles, false arrest, and confiscation of
possessions), we can infer that they could have been prevented by reasonable diligence. As
plaintiff's § 1985 claim survives, so too does his § 1986 claim, although he has yet to identify
any individual defendants.
ON! SIO

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on his § 1983
and § 1985(3) claims is denied, along with all claims against the City of Chicago and EAR.
However, his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on his § 1985(2) and § 1986 claims against

the John and Jane Doe defendants is granted.

JAMES B. MORAN
jor Judge, U. S. District Court

Qe. 1S, 2003.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
THOMAS SANIAT, pro se, )
)
Plaintiff, ) a
) if geet |
vs. ) No. 03 C 8691 -
) DEC 1 6 2093
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MORAND Pp. IN. ORD

Plaintiff Thomas Saniat brought this action against the City of Chicago, EAR Towing
(EAR), and numerous John and Jane Does who work for the City and EAR, alleging violations
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. Along with his complaint plaintiff filed a petition to
proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, plaintiff's petition is granted in part and
denied in part.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) we may authorize plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis
if he demonstrates an inability to pay the required costs and fees. In his affidavit plaintiff
States that he has been unemployed since June 1970, that his only income is $807 per month
from a Veteran’s Administration pension, and that his only assets are $515 in savings. The
plaintiff has shown his inability to pay court costs.

Our inquiry does not end there, however. As part of the initial review of a petition to
proceed in forma pauperis, we analyze the claims and dismiss the complaint if we determine
that the action is frivolous or malicious, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Alston v Debruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7" Cir. 1994). We review the claim


* No. 03 C 8691 Page2

using the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Zimmerman v, Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7 Cir. 2000). Pursuant to Rule 20K
we dismiss a claim only if it appears beyond a doubt that there exist no facts to support the
allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Complaints by pro se parties should
“be liberally construed and not held to the stringent standards expected of pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” McCormick y. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7 Cir. 2000).

This complaint details yet another incident in the ongoing saga between plaintiff and
the City of Chicago. Since 2001, plaintiff has filed four cases against the City (three of which
also stated claims against EAR Towing) involving the impoundment of his vehicles. All of
these previous cases have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim.

According to plaintiff's complaint, the facts are as follows. On November 29, 2002,
Chicago Streets and Sanitation workers and Chicago police officers entered property located
at 2724 W. 23" Street in Chicago. The complaint states that the property was fenced and
marked with “No Trespassing” signs. It does not, however, state who owned the property.
The City employees, with the aid of EAR employees, removed three vehicles, a camper and
computer components, belonging to plaintiff, from the site. The employees allegedly took the
property without prior notice and the Streets and Sanitation workers did not show plaintiff
any identification or order for removal. Plaintiff asserts that defendants damaged his vehicles
during the move.

As we understand the complaint, on January 3, 2003, plaintiff went to the lot operated
by EAR, where his vehicles had been impounded. At the pound an unnamed off-duty Chicago
police officer arrested plaintiff, and an EAR employee confiscated court papers which related

to one of plaintiffs prior cases against the City and EAR, and part of a video camera that