2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-11-2015

Cassandra Scipio v. Commissioner Social Security

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Recommended Citation

"Cassandra Scipio v. Commissioner Social Security" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 476.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-3770

___________

CASSANDRA SCIPIO

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Cassandra Y. Scipio,

Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-04562)

District Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 15, 2015

Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: May 11, 2015)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
2

Appellant Cassandra Scipio appeals the District Court’s order affirming the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her request for disability 

insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) under the Social 

Security Act (the “Act”). For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District 

Court’s judgment.

Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly 

summarize the essential facts. In 2008, Scipio filed applications for DIB and SSI. She 

alleged that she was disabled, and thus entitled to these benefits, as a result of a stroke 

and difficulty with walking and breathing. After Scipio’s application was denied, she 

requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Before the ALJ, the 

parties presented a variety of documentary evidence, including medical and mental-health 

evaluations from several physicians. In February 2009, after holding a hearing, the ALJ 

denied Scipio’s request for benefits. Scipio appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals 

Council, which denied review.

Scipio then sought review in the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania. On June 7, 2010, the District Court remanded the case for 

further administrative proceedings, determining that the ALJ failed to fully discuss all of 

the relevant medical evidence in the case and, therefore, did not support his finding with 

substantial evidence. On remand, the ALJ held another administrative hearing in the case 

 

constitute binding precedent.
3

at which Scipio testified. The ALJ issued a new decision on March 24, 2011, finding that 

Scipio was not disabled. In rendering this decision, the ALJ applied the five-step 

sequential evaluation process for determining disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) 

and § 416.920(a); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).1 Specifically, the 

ALJ concluded that there was no objective medical evidence demonstrating that Scipio 

had ever had a cerebrovascular accident (“CVA” or stroke) or a transient ischemic attack 

(“TIA”). Although the ALJ did find that Scipio had a medically determinable mental 

impairment, he concluded that there was no evidence that the impairment was so severe 

as to significantly limit Scipio’s ability to do basic work activities. As part of this 

finding, the ALJ determined that Scipio’s subjective complaints of pain were not entirely 

credible because they were contradicted, at least in part, by the medical evidence. 

Consequently, the ALJ determined that Scipio was not disabled and thus not entitled to 

DIB or SSI.

On July 6, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Scipio’s exceptions to the decision, 

and accordingly, the ALJ’s March 24, 2011 decision became the Commissioner’s final 

decision. Scipio commenced another civil action in the District Court seeking review of 

 

1 The Commissioner must determine: (1) whether the applicant has engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date; (2) whether the applicant has a 

severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment or 

combination of impairments meets the criteria of a listed impairment; (4) whether, 

despite the severe impairment, the applicant retains the residual functional capacity to 

perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the applicant is capable of performing 

other jobs that exist in the national economy, considering her age, education, work 
4

that decision. The District Court, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation over Scipio’s counseled objections, affirmed the ALJ’s decision. 

Scipio filed a timely notice of appeal from the District Court’s order.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). Like the District Court, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings — including 

credibility determinations — if they are supported by substantial evidence. See

Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005); Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 

113, 130 (3d Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552 

(quotation marks omitted). It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less 

than a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

In her informal brief, Scipio primarily disputes the ALJ’s finding that she did not 

have a stroke. Scipio claimed that, in August 2007, she suffered a stroke and that she had 

several mini-strokes thereafter. Scipio indicated that as a result of those strokes, she has 

experienced various impairments, including memory loss and difficulty ambulating. The 

ALJ determined that the medical record of evidence did not document Scipio’s ever 

having experienced a CVA or TIA, or any resultant limitations. Thus, Scipio’s alleged 

stroke was not a medically determinable impairment.

Eligibility for disability insurance benefits under the SSA is conditioned on 

 

experience, and residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). 
5

compliance with all relevant requirements of the statute. “[A] disability is established 

where the claimant demonstrates that there is some medically determinable basis for an 

impairment that prevents [her] from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a 

statutory twelve-month period.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38-39 (3d Cir. 

2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A). A “medically determinable” impairment is one that results from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities demonstrable by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

We agree that the available records documenting Scipio’s neurological or 

cardiovascular health during the relevant period supported the ALJ’s conclusion that 

Scipio did not experience a CVA or TIA. As the ALJ discussed, although the record is 

replete with Scipio’s subjective complaints that she experienced strokes, there is simply 

no clinical or objective evidence to support her claims. To the contrary, the evidence in 

the form of MRI and MRA results reasonably supported a finding that she did not, at any 

point, experience a CVA or TIA. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

determination.

Scipio also argues in her brief that the ALJ improperly assessed her credibility. 

However, we agree with the District Court that the ALJ’s credibility finding was fully 

explained and supported by substantial evidence. When making determinations as to a 

claimant’s credibility, an ALJ must “determine the extent to which a claimant is 
6

accurately stating the degree of pain or the extent to which he or she is disabled by it.” 

Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). In assessing Scipio’s credibility, 

the ALJ found that Scipio had made numerous misrepresentations to medical providers 

regarding her medical conditions. Specifically, although Scipio repeatedly claimed that 

she had suffered a stroke, there was no medical evidence to support her claim. And, 

although Scipio claimed that she was unable to work or perform daily activities as a 

result of her symptoms, the ALJ noted that no treating or evaluating physician has ever 

suggested that Scipio cannot work because of her impairment. See id. at 363 (holding 

that the ALJ properly evaluated credibility where he “cited specific instances where 

[claimant’s] complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent 

with” the objective medical evidence of record). Accordingly, we will not disturb the 

ALJ’s findings on this ground. 

We have considered Scipio’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that 

they are without merit. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.