alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
31.1








CERTIFICATION




I, the Chief
Executive Officer of PHL Variable Insurance Company (the “registrant”), certify
that:




1.   
I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the
registrant;




2.   
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;




3.
   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;




4.    The
registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:




(a) designed such
disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this report is being prepared;




(b) evaluated the
effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and




(c) disclosed in
this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and




5. 
  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the
registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):




(a) all significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and




(b) any fraud,
whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting.






Date:
      November 14, 2008
                /s/ Philip K.
      PolkinghornName:
                Philip K.
      PolkinghornTitle:
                President
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 31.2
                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Mitchell Cohen, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Asta Funding, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

         (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

         (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

         (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

         (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

         (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.

December 13, 2004

/S/ Mitchell Cohen
------------------
Mitchell Cohen
Chief Financial Officer



                                      -42-
Case: 1:03-cv-02702 Document #: 11 Filed: 09/12/03 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:140
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Department of Justice
 On July 27, 2021, the Department of Justice filed a Complaint and simultaneously lodged a Consent Decree with the United States District Court for the Central District of California in *United States* v. *Advanced Flow Engineering, Inc.,* Civ. No. 5:21-cv-01249 *.* The proposed Consent Decree settles claims brought by the United States for violations of the Clean Air Act arising from Defendant's manufacture and sale of motor vehicle parts that bypass, defeat, and/or render inoperative the vehicle's installed emission controls, commonly known as “defeat devices.” *See*42 U.S.C. 7522(a)(3)(B). The Consent Decree resolves these claims and prohibits Defendant from: (1) Manufacturing, selling or installing defeat devices; (2) providing technical support for defeat devices; (3) transferring intellectual property for defeat devices; and (4) owning any interest in any person or entity that manufacturers, sells, offers to sell, or installs defeat devices or earning income from the distribution or installation of defeat devices. It also requires Defendant to pay a civil penalty of $250,000, which was based on its financial condition. The publication of this notice opens a period for public comment on the proposed Consent Decree. Comments should be addressed to the Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division and should refer to *United States* v. *Advanced Flow Engineering, Inc.* D.J. Ref. No. 90-5-2-1-12079. All comments must be submitted no later than thirty (30) days after the publication date of this notice. Comments may be submitted either by email or by mail: *To submit comments:*
*Send them to:*By email
*pubcomment-ees.enrd@usdoj.gov.*By mail
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DOJ—ENRD, P.O. Box 7611, Washington, DC 20044-7611.
 During the public comment period, the proposed Consent Decree may be examined and downloaded at this Justice Department website: *https://www.justice.gov/​enrd/​consent-decrees.* We will provide a paper copy of the proposed Consent Decree upon written request and payment of reproduction costs. Please mail your request and payment to: Consent Decree Library, U.S. DOJ—ENRD, P.O. Box 7611, Washington, DC 20044-7611. Please enclose a check or money order for $17.25 (25 cents per page reproduction cost) payable to the United States Treasury. Lori Jonas, Assistant Section Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division.


[FR Doc. 2021-16623 Filed 8-3-21; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4410-15-P
#### Westchester Medical Center, as Assignee of Shaheen Akhtar, Appellant, v Hereford Insurance Company, Respondent.

[944 NYS2d 900]—

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance contract, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its notice of appeal and brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sher, J.), entered September 1, 2011, as denied its motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint is granted.

The plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that the prescribed statutory billing form had been mailed to and received by the defendant insurer, which failed to either pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period *(see*Insurance *1307Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [c]; *NYU-Hosp. for Joint Diseases v American Inti. Group, Inc.,*89 AD3d 702, 703 [2011]; *Mount Sinai Hosp. v Country Wide Ins. Co.,*85 AD3d 1136, 1137 [2011]; *Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co.,*60 AD3d 1045, 1045-1046 [2009]).

In opposition to the plaintiffs motion, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact. A presumption of receipt was created by the certified mail receipt and the signed return receipt card, such that the defendant’s mere denial of receipt was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact *(see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Countrywide Ins. Co.,*44 AD3d 729, 730-731 [2007]; *Westchester Med. Ctr. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,*40 AD3d 981, 982-983 [2007]). Further, the defendant’s failure to respond to the no-fault billing within the requisite 30-day period precluded it from raising the defenses that it was not provided with timely notice of the underlying motor vehicle accident or proof of claim *(see Bayside Rehab & Physical Therapy, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co.,*24 Misc 3d 542, 545 [2009]; *Rockman v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co.,*21 Misc 3d 1118[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52093[U] [Civ Ct, Richmond County 2008]; *Vincent Med. Servs., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,*21 Misc 3d 142[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52442[U] [App Term, 2d Dept 2008]). Finally, although the defense of lack of coverage is not precluded by the defendant’s failure to pay or deny the subject no-fault claim within the requisite 30-day period *(see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co.,*9 NY3d 312, 318 [2007]; *Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos.,*90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]), here, the defendant’s submissions were insufficient to raise triable issues of fact with respect to a lack of coverage defense *(see Mercury Cas. Co. v Encare, Inc.,*90 AD3d 475 [2011]; *D.S. Chiropractic, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co.,*24 Misc 3d 138[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51584[U] [App Term, 2d Dept 2009]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint. Rivera, J.P., Belen, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2011 NY Slip Op 32398(U).]
#### Antoni George Gordon, Appellant, v James T. Blaha, Respondent.

[943 NYS2d 774] —

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lane, J.), entered March 30, 2011, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant provided competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the lumbosacral region of the plaintiffs spine did not constitute a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Rodriguez v Huerfano,*46 AD3d 794, 795 [2007]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Skelos, J.E, Dickerson, Hall, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2011 NY Slip Op 31062(U).]
#### Joseph Jimenez, Respondent, v Joseph A. Kimmerling, Appellant.

[943 NYS2d 756] —

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Tanenbaum, J.), entered October 12, 2011, which granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when his vehicle was struck by the defendant’s vehicle. In support of this motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, the plaintiff *954established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. However, in opposition, the defendant raised a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability should have been denied. Skelos, J.E, Eng, Belen and Cohen, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Land O'Lakes, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q/A for the period ending March 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 16, 2004 (the "Report"), I, Daniel Knutson,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

                             By /s/ Daniel Knutson
                                -----------------------------------------------
                             Daniel Knutson
                             Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### In re: Jerry W. SMITH New York Community Bank, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry W. Smith, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07-4136-bk.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Dec. 16, 2008.

*684Gary M. Kushner, Esq., Forchelh, Cur-to, Schwartz, Mineo, Carlino & Cohn, LLP, Mineóla, N.Y., for Appellant.

Jerry W. Smith, pro se, Ossining, N.Y., for appellee.

PRESENT: Hon. JOSEPH M. McLaughlin, Hon. b.d. parker, Circuit Judges, Hon. JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable John G. Koeltl of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

Summary Order

Plaintiff-appellant New York Community Bank (“NYCB”) appeals from a judgment of the United States Court for the Southern District of New York (Robinson, /.), affirming an order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Hardin, *J.)*granting Jerry W. Smith’s motion to reopen his bankruptcy case and ordering NYCB to refund the sum of $44,912.71 to Smith. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“In an appeal from a district court’s review of a bankruptcy court’s decision, we conduct an independent examination of the bankruptcy court’s decision.” *In re Flanagan,*503 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir.2007) (citing *In re Bethlehem Steel Corp.,*479 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir.2007)). We review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions *de novo. Id.*“The ultimate determination of whether or not to impose an equitable remedy ... is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” *Id.*at 179-80 (citing *Adelphia Bus. Solutions, Inc. v. Abnos,*482 F.3d 602, 607 (2d Cir.2007)). “However, legal determinations upon which the dispensation of equitable relief may depend are reviewed *de novo.” Id.*at 180 (citing *In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.,*377 F.3d 209, 213 (2d Cir.2004)). A bankruptcy court’s decision to reopen should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, because that decision invokes the bankruptcy court’s exercise of its equitable powers. *See In re Chalasani,*92 F.3d 1300, 1307 (2d Cir.1996).

A bankruptcy court has broad discretion to reconsider allowance or disallowance of proofs of claim under 11 U.S.C. § 502(j) “for cause.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(j); *see also*Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3008. If reconsideration is granted, the court may allow or disallow the claim “according to the equities of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(3). Here, the bankruptcy court acted well within its discretion when it granted Smith’s motion to reopen once it was brought to the court’s attention that it had made a mathematical mistake with regard to the correct amount of NYCB’s claim based on the inconsistent and unreliable figures supplied by NYCB. The bankruptcy court also acted within its discretion when it calculated the applicable interest rate by averaging the interest rates used in NYCB’s proofs of claim. We have carefully considered NYCB’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
#### Horn Construction Co., Inc., Respondent, v MT Security Service Corp., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

In an action to recover damages for breach of an indemnity contract, defendant MT Security Service Corp. appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (DiPaola, J.), entered February 27, 1984, as awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $650,000 payable by appellant, upon a jury verdict.

Judgment affirmed, insofar as appealed from, with costs.

On a previous appeal concerning the instant matter, we held that “defendants are bound by any reasonable good-faith settlement made by the current plaintiff in the earlier action” *(Horn Constr. Co. v MT Sec. Serv. Corp.,*97 AD2d 786). After considering all of the facts presented in this record, we find that Horn has met its burden of proving that the settlement it entered into of the underlying action was reasonable. Moreover, ample evidence exists to support the jury’s finding that Horn could have been found liable had it proceeded to trial in the underlying action.

Contrary to appellant’s assertions, the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury as to the law of constructive notice. The evidence established that, had the underlying action gone to trial, the jury could have found that the conditions at the construction site were inherently dangerous, and the wooden beams, which ultimately caused the accident, had been utilized for a sufficient length of time for Horn to have become aware of the dangers *(see, Batton v Elghanayan,*43 NY2d 898; *Burden v Cadillac Developers Massapequa Corp.,*19 AD2d 716, *affd*14 NY2d 523). Since Horn should have reasonably foreseen that injury could result from the conditions it created, a finding of liability would have been justified in that underlying action *(see, Paul v Kagan,*92 AD2d 988; *Lacanfora v Goldapel,*37 AD2d 721).

We have reviewed appellant’s other contentions and have found them to be without merit. We therefore affirm the judgment, insofar as appealed from. Mollen, P. J., Mangano, Gibbons and Bracken, JJ., concur.
II

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1079

To permit the leasing of mineral rights, in any case in which the Indian

owners of an allotment that is located within the boundaries of the

Fort Berthold Indian Reservation and held in trust by the United States

have executed leases to more than 50 percent of the mineral estate

of that allotment.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 29, 1997

Mr. DORGAN (for himself and Mr. CONRAD) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs

A BILL

To permit the leasing of mineral rights, in any case in

which the Indian owners of an allotment that is located

within the boundaries of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation and held in trust by the United States have

executed leases to more than 50 percent of the mineral

estate of that allotment.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. LEASES OF ALLOTTED LANDS OF THE FORT

4 BERTHOLD INDIAN RESERVATION.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—
2

•S 1079 IS

1 (1) APPROVAL BY SECRETARY OF THE INTE2 RIOR.—

3 (A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any

4 other provision of law (including the Act of

5 March 3, 1909 (35 Stat. 783, chapter 263; 25

6 U.S.C. 396) and the regulations issued under

7 that Act), the Secretary of the Interior or a

8 designee of the Secretary may approve mineral

9 leases of an allotment described in paragraph

10 (2) in any case in which the Indian owners of

11 that allotment have executed leases to more

12 than 50 percent of the mineral estate of that al13 lotment.

14 (B) BENEFITS OF LEASES.—At such time

15 as mineral leases on an allotment have been ap16 proved for all Indian ownership interests pursu17 ant to this section, all Indian owners of the al18 lotment shall be entitled to the benefits of the

19 leases.

20 (2) ALLOTMENT.—An allotment described in

21 this paragraph is an allotment that—

22 (A) is located in the Fort Berthold Indian

23 Reservation, North Dakota; and

24 (B) is held in trust by the United States.
3

•S 1079 IS

1 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—This Act supersedes

2 the Act of March 3, 1909 (35 Stat. 783, chapter 263; 25

3 U.S.C. 396) only to the extent provided in subsection (a).

Æ
#### GORMAN, Respondent, v. NEW YORK, C. & ST. L. R. CO., Appellants.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

November 13, 1907.)

Action by William J. Gorman against the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.

WILLIAMS, J., dissents.