CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES LaGrou Entities’ motions to dismiss
Third-Party Plaintiffs’ First Amended Third-Party Complaint [162-1, 165-1 to 179-1, 204-1,

221-1 to 232-1]. It is so ordered.

ENTERED: 4 .
BLANCHE M. MANNING

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

DATE:_7-4 7 -O


the Wax was in route to be delivered to a buyer, who had paid the seller/shipper for the Wax. Id.
The purchaser of the wax subsequently filed a claim to the wax in the forfeiture proceeding and
moved to implead the seller/shipper as a third-party defendant under Rule 14. Id. The third-
party defendant moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the grounds that: (1) the claimant
was not a defendant so did not fall within the scope of the Rule 14; and (2) the original action
was a forfeiture action in rem and not therefore a claim which the third-party defendant/seller
could be liable to the third-party plaintiff/buyer. Id. Rejecting these contentions, the court found
that the purchaser of the Wax was “‘to all intents and purposes a defendant, contesting the
Government’s claim to forfeiture.” Id, at 403-04.

Here, similar to Parafin Wax, although the meat and poultry subject to the forfeiture
proceeding are “the nominal defendant,” the “{C]laimants are the real party in interest.” United
States v. $100,000 in United States Currency, 602 F. Supp. 712, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Therefore, because the Claimants have a legal interest in the property at issue, they should be
permitted to implead third-party defendants whose liability is “dependent on the outcome of the

main claim and... liability is secondary or derivative.” United States v. One 1977 Mercedes

Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, this Court DENIES the LaGrou Entities

Motions to Dismiss.



Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

N: f Assigned Judgt ‘9 i Sitting Judge if Other
ior Magistrate Judge Blanche M. Manning than Asigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 5145 DATE July 29, 2003
CASE United States v. All Meat and Poultry Products Stored at LaGrou
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the

nature of the motion being presented. ]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im} Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___._ Reply to answer brief due.

(4) a Ruling/Hearing on___sset for at

(3) QO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetffor_— at.

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor_ at.

(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on at

(8) i) [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) im) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) General Rule21 © FRCP41(a)(1) © FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) @ [Other docket entry] For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, this Court

DENIES LaGrou Entities’ motions to dismiss Third-Party Plaintiffs’ First Amended Third-Party
Complaints [162-1, 165-1 to 179-1, 204-1, 221-1 to 232-1]. It is so ordered.

ql) Oo [For further detail see order on the reverse side of the original minute order.J

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. number of notices inset
V_ | Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. JUL 3.0 2003

VINA Eatutortca
Docketing to mail notices. °
Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date maited notice
courtroom

RTS deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials:



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Hon. Blanche M. Manning t
ve ) we
) No, 02 € 5145 AYO)
All MEAT and POULTRY PRODUCTS ) ie 3
STORED at LAGROU COLD STORAGE) V a
) yp?
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff United States of America (“the Government”) brought this in rem proceeding,
under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (“FMIA”) and the Poultry Products Inspection Act
(“PPIA”), seeking forfeiture of 14,000,000 pounds of meat and poultry stored at the LaGrou
Cold Storage Warehouse (“the Warehouse”) in Chicago, Illinois, after inspectors from the
United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) found significant evidence of rodent
infestation at the Warehouse. Pursuant to statute, owners of the meat and poultry filed verified
claims to the meat and poultry (“the Claimants”) and filed a third-party complaint, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, against various corporate entities and individuals associated
with the LaGrou Warehouse (generally, “the LaGrou Entities”), seeking a declaration that the
LaGrou Entities are liable to the Claimants for costs and loss of products and seeking damages
under various state law theories.

The present motions come before this Court on the LaGrou Entities’ motions to dismiss

Third-Party Plaintiffs’ First Amended Third-Party Complaint on the grounds that the Claimants

ABV



lack standing to file a third-party complaint under Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Rule 14(a) states in relevant part that:

[a]t any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party

plaintiff, may cause summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the

action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs
claim against the third-party plaintiff.
Without citing to any authority, other than the Rule, the La Grou Entities contend that because
the Government's seizure action was filed in rem against meat and poultry, and not against an
individual or entity, that the Claimants cannot bring third-party claims because there are not
actually any claims made against the Claimants.

While this argument appears to make sense under the plain language of Rule 14, it is
contrary to the policies underlying Rule 14 and has been rejected by courts that have permitted
third-party complaints by claimants in forfeiture proceedings. The decision to permit third-party
defendants to be impleaded is “entrusted to the sound discretion” of this Court. Design/Craft
Fabric Corp. v. Lit-Pac, Inc., 1989 WL 106681, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1989) (Williams, J.).

Congress enacted Rule 14 “to permit the liberal joinder of parties so that judicial energy could be

conserved and consistency of results guaranteed.” State of New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., Inc.

179 F.R.D. 90, 93 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). Therefore, motions to implead third-party defendants
“should be freely granted . . . unless [it] would prejudice the plaintiff, unduly complicate the
trial, or would foster an obviously unmeritorious claim.” Id.

In United States v. Paraffin Wax, 141 F. Supp. 402, 403 (E.D.N.Y. 1956), the

Government brought an in rem proceeding seeking forfeiture of 2255 boxes of wax (“the Wax”)

because the shipper failed to file the proper paper work for shipping. At the time it was seized,