NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 20a0403n.06

Case No. 19-2346

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

S. BAXTER JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN; SGT. 

REUBEN FLUKER; OFFICER ROBIN 

CLEAVER; SGT. EDWARD HUDSON;

COMMANDER ELVIN BARREN,

Defendants-Appellants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN 

BEFORE: MOORE, SUTTON, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Detroit police arrested Baxter Jones for disorderly conduct. 

They transported Jones, who uses a wheelchair, in a modified cargo van. Jones says riding in the

van aggravated his spinal injuries and hurt his shoulders and hands. The district court denied the 

officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. But the officers did not 

violate clearly established law based on Jones’s observable physical needs, and Jones did not ask 

them to treat him differently. We reverse.

On July 17, 2014, protestors gathered to draw attention to water shutoffs in Detroit. They 

blocked the driveway of a city water contractor, preventing workers and vehicles from entering 

or exiting. Police arrested nine protestors, including Jones, for disorderly conduct. They
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

2

transported eight protestors in a police bus. Because Jones uses a wheelchair, they transported 

him in a modified cargo van.

A video fully captures the next minute or so of the encounter. Readers can watch the 

video for themselves. https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/media/mediaopn.php. Commander 

Elvin Barren asked Jones if officers could lift him into the van in his wheelchair. Jones nodded 

yes. Barren and three other officers lifted Jones, still in his wheelchair, into the van. As they 

lifted him, someone said, “Watch his head!” R. 62-6 at 1:33–1:35. Consistent with the warning, 

an officer placed his hand on the back of Jones’s head as it passed through the van door. 

According to Jones, this aggravated a preexisting neck condition, and he felt a jolt of pain that 

brought tears to his eyes. He said “something like ow” as he was moved into the van. R. 34-5 at 

73. Sergeant Cleaver maneuvered Jones inside the van once the other officers lifted him in. As 

Sergeant Cleaver maneuvered him into place, Jones complained to him that there was not enough 

room in the van. But as the video shows, the wheelchair, with Jones in it, fit tightly into the back 

of the van. 

The video also confirms that the officers did not change the existing restraints holding 

Jones in his wheelchair. Once they had placed him in the van, they engaged his wheelchair’s 

brakes and relied on an intern to ride with him and use his feet to keep Jones’s wheelchair from 

moving in what the video confirms is a tight space moving from the right to left side of the van. 

The van did not have any specialized wheelchair restraints. The dissent, by the way, 

characterizes the events in the video differently. We encourage the interested reader to watch the 

video for herself.

Jones waited in the van while the officers arrested the other eight protestors and loaded 

them into another vehicle. He complained to the person in the back with him that he was in pain, 
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

3

because he was forced to bend his head forward due to the van’s low vertical clearance.

Once the van started moving, Jones says, his wheelchair jostled and bounced

uncomfortably, with his head constantly in contact with the van’s ceiling during the ride. He hit 

his head on the van’s ceiling until he slouched down in his wheelchair, injuring his spine and 

hurting his hands and shoulders as he gripped the wheelchair’s arms. Jones complained to the 

person riding with him and to the driver that he was in pain and should be transported with safety 

restraints. Jones’s medical records indicate that he suffered spinal changes and increased pain 

after his arrest. He attributes them to his handling during the arrest and transportation.

Jones sued the city and the officers who loaded him into the van, arguing that they used 

excessive force to arrest and transport him and that they failed to accommodate his disabilities as 

required by the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12132 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 794; Mich. Comp. L. § 37.1101 et seq. The defendants sought 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment 

on all the claims except the excessive-force claims against the officers.

Summary judgment is appropriate when only one party has introduced sufficient material 

facts to support a jury verdict in its favor. If a jury could reasonably find for either of the parties, 

the case proceeds to trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Qualified immunity precludes liability for police officers except when they commit (1) a 

violation of the law (2) that is clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 

(2009). Jones bears the burden of establishing that the officers’ conduct fails the test—that “each 

defendant officer, through his or her own individual actions, personally violated [his] rights 

under clearly established law.” Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015).
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

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What does “clearly established” mean? It means that “existing precedent” put the

“constitutional question beyond debate.” City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 

1765, 1774 (2015) (quotation omitted). In the light cast by “pre-existing law,” “the unlawfulness 

must be apparent.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (quotation omitted). That is an

“exacting standard.” Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774. General excessive force principles, without 

more, may clearly establish a behavior’s unlawfulness only in the most “obvious” cases. White, 

137 S. Ct. at 552. In all other cases, especially those “present[ing] a unique set of facts and 

circumstances,” courts must “identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances 

as [the defendant] was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Jones claims the officers used excessive force when they transported him in a van without 

using traditional safety restraints to secure the wheelchair and without enough headroom. But 

our cases say the opposite when it comes to the closest analogy, transporting non-wheelchair 

users. Faced with that question, courts within and outside our circuit have repeatedly rejected 

constitutional challenges to transportation of detainees without seatbelts. Ingram v. Herrington, 

No. 4:06-CV-P65-M, 2007 WL 2815965, *4–5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 26, 2007); Young v. Dep’t of 

Corr., No. 04-10309, 2007 WL 2214520, *4–6 (E.D. Mich. July 27, 2007); Spencer v. 

Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 1999); Taylor v. Stateville Dep’t of 

Corr., No. 10 C 3700, 2010 WL 5014185, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2010) (collecting cases).

Jones does not cite any contrary authority. The closest analogy, in other words, would not have 

warned the officers of a constitutional requirement to transport Jones only with the aid of safety 

restraints to secure the wheelchair. And those cases would not have shown that what the officers 

did do—allow an individual to hold the wheelchair in place with his feet in a tight space that left 

little room for movement anyway—violated clearly established law.
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

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Our cases about transporting people in wheelchairs similarly tell the officers nothing 

about whether they transgressed constitutional boundaries in transporting Jones. Jones identifies

just one case about transporting an arrestee who used a wheelchair. In St. John v. Hickey, 411 

F.3d 762, 766 (6th Cir. 2005), police carried the plaintiff out of his house in his wheelchair, 

instead of using his wheelchair ramp. They dropped him on the way out. Id. He protested that 

he could not fit into the patrol car because his legs could not bend, but the officers attempted to 

bend his legs and put him in the car anyway. Id. They dropped him two more times in the 

process and injured his leg by pinning it between the car and the door. Id. On those facts, we 

found excessive force and denied qualified immunity. Id. at 771–75.

Only one other case in our circuit has involved a claim that an officer used excessive 

force while arresting a wheelchair user. That case upheld a jury verdict against an officer who 

pulled a paraplegic driver out of his car by his neck, dropped him on the ground, kicked and 

kneed him in the head, and dragged him across the ground by his forearms. Koehler v. Smith, 

124 F.3d 198, at *5 (6th Cir. 1997) (table).

Our circuit thus has decided two cases about excessive force against wheelchair-bound

suspects, and neither one could have alerted the officers to constitutional headroom, headguiding, or safety-restraint requirements. The case’s scarce forebears suggest it “presents a

unique set of facts and circumstances” cutting in favor of qualified immunity, White, 137 S. Ct. 

at 552 (quotation omitted), not a constitutional rule that is “beyond debate,” Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 

at 1774 (quotation omitted).

To the extent cases from outside our circuit figure into the “clearly established” 

analysis—they usually do not, Ashford v. Raby, 951 F.3d 798, 804 (6th Cir. 2020)—they tell the 

same story. No case to our knowledge, and none cited by Jones, elaborates a Fourth Amendment 
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

6

standard for safety restraints, head-guiding, or headroom in transporting wheelchair users.

Two cases, it’s true, involved safety restraint failures. In Gorman v. Bartch, officers 

violated the law when they removed a paraplegic arrestee from his wheelchair and tied him into a 

van with a combination of his own belt and a standard seatbelt. 152 F.3d 907, 909–10 (8th Cir. 

1998). Gorman sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 909. But in today’s case, 

the officers never removed Jones from his wheelchair. And Gorman at any rate held that

qualified immunity shielded the officers from liability. Id. at 916.

In the second case, Sayers v. City of New York, officers transported a prisoner in his 

wheelchair in a police van. No. CV-04-3907, 2007 WL 914581, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2007). 

The van had safety restraints, and the officers attempted to use them. Id. Sayers told them they 

had secured him incorrectly, but they ignored his complaints. Id. During the drive, Sayers 

tipped over backwards in his wheelchair, hitting his head on the window and fracturing his 

pelvis. Id. at *2. On those facts, too, the court granted qualified immunity, without announcing 

a constitutional rule that could apply to Jones’s transportation. Id. at *4. Nothing, inside or 

outside our circuit, should have tipped off the officers to the existence of the constitutional rules

Jones claims they violated.

Jones insists that the officers violated Detroit Police Department policy when they 

transported him in the cargo van. The policy requires that officers have a supervisor determine 

“the most appropriate method” for transporting disabled arrestees. R. 40-14 at 2. “Whether or 

not an officer is following police procedures is certainly relevant to the question of 

reasonableness in excessive force cases.” Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 768 (6th Cir. 2015). 

But a policy violation “is not necessarily conclusive proof that the Constitution has been 

violated.” Id. Whatever a policy violation might prove, no violation of the policy occurred. The 
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

7

officers followed police procedures when the supervisor on the scene—Commander Barren—

determined what he believed to be the most appropriate transportation method, a prisoner 

transport van. Jones’s disagreement with Commander Barren’s decision does not transform the 

officers’ actions into a policy violation—or a constitutional violation.

Jones adds that St. John establishes that the officers violated clearly established rights by 

lifting him into the van while seated in his wheelchair. But he consented to being lifted in his 

wheelchair into the van.

Even if we analogize this lawsuit to handcuffing cases, it does not help Jones. In some 

situations, it is true, ordinarily reasonable police actions may injure arrestees, as happens 

occasionally with handcuffing. See, e.g., Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2005). 

In those cases, it is also true, an injured arrestee may show that the handcuffs obviously caused

or exacerbated a problem, Smith v. City of Wyoming, 821 F.3d 697, 717 (6th Cir. 2016), or that 

she alerted the officer to her pain and asked for the handcuffs to be loosened, Vance v. Wade, 

546 F.3d 774, 782–83 (6th Cir. 2008).

(By the way, the dissent, though not Jones, says Vance placed the officers on notice that 

they violated Jones’s rights by putting him in a vehicle without sufficient headroom. Vance said 

nothing of the sort. The plaintiff in that case complained that an officer “took his hand and put 

[it] on [Vance’s] shoulder and he twisted [Vance’s] upper trunk all the way around.” Id. at 778. 

The officer then used his hands and the door to shove Vance into the patrol car so that he “fell 

face forward into the floorboard,” where he became stuck for the next ten to fifteen minutes. Id.

at 778–79. That case told the officers nothing about how they should have transported Jones.)

Should officers have known, without a complaint, that their actions would hurt Jones? 

No. It was obvious that Jones used a wheelchair, and officers observed that Jones’s head 
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

8

touched the van’s ceiling. But nothing about wheelchair use in general would have alerted a 

reasonable officer that Jones could not slightly bend his neck or lean forward to avoid hitting his 

head. The use of a wheelchair by itself does not show a pre-existing neck injury. And we have 

already explained that nothing clearly established the officers’ duty to use safety restraints on 

Jones’s wheelchair, as opposed to the use of the intern’s feet to keep the wheelchair in place in 

the tight space in the back of the van. 

Is there anything Jones said that should have alerted officers that their actions hurt him? 

Again, no. Take the events chronologically. Jones agreed to be lifted in his wheelchair into the 

van. That did not create notice. He said “something like ow” when an officer put a hand on his 

head as he passed through the van’s doorframe. R. 34-5 at 73. But indistinct or generic

expressions of discomfort do not place officers on notice. See Henry v. City of Flint, -- F. App’x 

--, 2020 WL 2520695, at *8 (6th Cir. 2020); Standifer v. Lacon, 587 F. App’x 919, 923 (6th Cir. 

2014). He complained to Sergeant Cleaver that there was “not enough room in here” just after 

he entered the van. R. 34-5 at 82. But that remark, too, would not have put a reasonable officer 

on notice that Jones was suffering neck pain or physical injury. 

True, Jones did complain once the ride and his posture caused him pain. That complaint 

put the people who heard it on notice that there might be a problem. But Jones voiced that 

complaint during the ride. The only people who heard it, according to Jones, were the 

unidentified van driver and the unidentified person riding in the back with him. Jones never 

claims that the four officers heard those complaints. And he does not argue that the four officers 

should be responsible on a supervisory, duty-to-protect, or failure-to-act theory. See Fazica v. 

Jordan, 926 F.3d 283, 289 (6th Cir. 2019).
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

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Why didn’t Jones sue the people who heard his complaint? He inquired about their 

identities in an interrogatory. The police department responded that it could not identify them. 

Best we can tell, Jones’s only follow-up was to ask four witnesses during depositions if they 

remembered who drove the van or rode in the back. At oral argument, the officers’ attorney 

explained that the van driver’s name should be available in a record held by the State, outside the 

city’s possession. When asked, Jones’s attorney could not recall seeking the district court’s aid

in identifying the unknown driver and rider through discovery.

Because the officers did not violate any clearly established law, qualified immunity 

applies.

We reverse.
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

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KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority opinion is viselike in its analysis of whether Jones’s constitutional rights are clearly established. Rather than 

considering “‘the salient question’ in evaluating the clearly established prong,” “whether 

officials had ‘fair warning’ that their conduct was unconstitutional,” Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 

907, 932 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)), the majority frames 

the question at the most granular level. It concludes that “[n]o case . . . elaborates a Fourth 

Amendment standard for safety restraints, head-guiding, or headroom in transporting wheelchair 

users.” Majority Op. at 5–6. If this definition of the constitutional right is not so narrowly 

defined as to “defeat[ ] the purpose of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983,” then it is difficult to imagine what 

definition would be too narrow. Hagans v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505, 509 (6th 

Cir. 2012). The majority treats the fact that Jones is wheelchair-bound as a feature that makes it 

less likely that a reasonable officer would know that his actions violated our excessive-force 

precedent because few cases address arrestees in wheelchairs. But this misses the obvious 

point—because of Jones’s apparent disability and because of the prevalence of persons without 

disabilities in our excessive-force precedent, we should conclude that this fact makes it more 

likely that a reasonable officer would be on notice that his treatment of Jones amounted to 

excessive force. Our caselaw about transferring persons who are observably disabled to police 

vehicles and about cramming persons who are not disabled into police vehicles establishes that 

nonviolent arrestees have the right to be free from unnecessary pain knowingly inflicted during 

an arrest, including when the arrestee is moved into and positioned within police vehicles for 

transport. Accordingly, a reasonable officer would have known that the force used during 

Jones’s arrest, specifically the force used to move Jones into and position him within the police 
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

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cargo van for transport without being secured, was excessive and hence unlawful under the 

Fourth Amendment.

“A defendant enjoys qualified immunity on summary judgment unless the facts alleged 

and the evidence produced, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would 

permit a reasonable juror to find that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and 

(2) the right was clearly established.” Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 532 (6th Cir. 2020) 

(quoting Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 724 F.3d 687, 695 (6th 

Cir. 2013)). To be clearly established, a right’s “contours” must be “sufficiently definite that any 

reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Id. 

at 533 (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018)). Notice to officials is the 

touchstone of qualified immunity. Id. “We do not require a prior, ‘precise situation,’ a finding 

that ‘the very action in question has previously been held unlawful,’ or a ‘case directly on 

point.’” Guertin, 912 F.3d at 932 (citations omitted). If we did require such factual similarity, 

we would not be able to consider “the general reasoning that a court employs,” in addition to 

“direct holdings” and “specific examples describing certain conduct as prohibited,” to discern 

what rights are clearly established. Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 612 (6th Cir. 2015). 

Indeed, both the Supreme Court and this court have rejected “rigid, overreliance on factual 

similarity.” Id.

Jones argues that the defendants violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment 

rights when they lifted his wheelchair into the van and pushed his head down to get him inside 

the van, and then left him unsecured and crammed into the van for transport. Appellee Br. at 

11.1 At least two cases demonstrate that he is correct: St. John v. Hickey, 411 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 

1The majority helpfully includes a link to the video footage. Majority Op. at 2. Viewers should pay 

particular attention to the video at minute 1:46, which shows that Jones must keep his head down and his neck bent 
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

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2005), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 246 

n.6 (6th Cir. 2017)), and Vance v. Wade, 546 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2008).

In St. John, we addressed the transport of a person with a physical disability who was in a 

wheelchair. There, we concluded that the right at issue was “the right of a nonviolent arrestee to 

be free from unnecessary pain knowingly inflicted during an arrest” and that the right “was 

clearly established.” 411 F.3d at 774. In St. John, the officers took the plaintiff out of his 

wheelchair and forced the plaintiff’s rigid legs to bend in an attempt to place him in the back of a 

police cruiser. Id. at 771–72. The plaintiff was nonviolent; he was arrested for disorderly 

conduct, a non-serious crime; he did not present a risk to others or a risk of flight; and the 

circumstances were not remotely exigent as to require the officers immediately to force the 

plaintiff into the back of the car. 411 F.3d at 772; see also id. at 771 (setting forth factors courts 

consider in excessive-force cases, “including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 396 (1989))).

This is how we should define the right at issue here. Jones was also a nonviolent arrestee 

and the portion of his arrest where the defendants pushed his head down is materially 

indistinguishable from the arrest in St. John. Jones was arrested for disorderly conduct, the same 

crime as the plaintiff in St. John; he did not present a risk of flight; he posed no threat to others; 

and there were no exigent circumstances necessitating his immediate transport or confinement in 

the van. Additionally, the defendants here were aware that they were causing Jones unnecessary 

to avoid hitting the cargo van’s ceiling. The majority argues that “Jones . . . fit tightly into the back of the van.” 

Majority Op. at 2. It is worth pointing out that Jones also would have “fit tightly” in a multitude of spaces 

depending on how he contorted his body. But, semantics aside, it is most useful for our purposes to note that Jones 

could not straighten his neck and keep his head from hitting the ceiling because of the height of his wheelchair.
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

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pain. First, it was readily apparent that he was wheelchair-bound, like the plaintiff in St John. 

Id. at 772. Second, Jones cried out, “ow,” to the officers as they pushed his head down. R. 40-2 

(Jones Dep. at 72) (Page ID #915). The fact that Jones did not apprise the officers of the 

specifics of his disability is not fatal to his case. In St. John, the plaintiff explained to the 

officers that his legs could not bend due to muscular dystrophy. 411 F.3d at 772, 775. But the 

issue was whether the officers were aware that they were causing the plaintiff, “an obviously 

disabled and wheelchair-bound man,” pain—not that he gave a particular verbal warning. Id. To 

that end, we considered the plaintiff’s verbal warning and the fact that he used a wheelchair. Id. 

at 775. The majority opinion interprets “knowingly” from St. John to require a particular verbal 

warning, even if the arrestee has an obvious disability that a reasonable officer would appreciate 

and has otherwise communicated his pain to the officers. This makes little sense.

Moreover, St. John also gave the defendants here fair notice that they could not leave a 

person with an apparent disability in an unsafe position. If officers cannot transfer an arrestee to 

a police vehicle using unnecessary force, it should be clear that they certainly cannot leave the 

arrestee in that physical position and avoid further constitutional liability. Even in St. John, the 

unlawfulness of leaving the plaintiff in the back of the police cruiser once his pain was apparent 

was so clear that the officers “attempted to return him to his wheelchair.” Id. at 772.

Vance likewise demonstrates that the defendants violated Jones’s clearly established right 

to be free from excessive force regarding how any arrestee, a person with a disability or 

otherwise, is transferred to and then left in a police vehicle. In Vance, we concluded that the 

defendants used excessive force in “cramming him in the backseat of the police vehicle.” 546 

F.3d at 780, 786. The defendants left the plaintiff facedown into the floorboard of the car for ten 

to fifteen minutes. Id. at 778–80. Critical to our analysis was that there was a low degree of 
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

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“tension and concern for keeping order.” Id. at 785 (discussing the fact that the officer left the 

vehicle and then came back to forcefully stuff the plaintiff into the car). In Jones’s case, it is 

undisputed that there was no tension and no concern for keeping order—it was a peaceful-protest 

demonstration. And though the level of force in Vance was arguably more egregious, the 

plaintiff in Vance was not a person with an obvious physical disability. Because Jones was in a 

wheelchair, a reasonable officer would have known that even less force was permissible to 

position Jones within the cargo van; he was left squeezed into the back of the van, his head and 

neck compressed due to the height of wheelchair. The majority points out that Vance does not 

discuss the transport of an arrestee. Majority Op. at 7. But Vance certainly discusses leaving an 

arrestee in a compromised position in a police vehicle. It is unclear how the fact that the vehicle 

in Vance was not yet moving factors into the majority’s analysis without requiring unnecessary 

factual similarity. Based on our reasoning in Vance, the defendants were on notice that under 

these circumstances, their insistence on cramming Jones into the cargo van and leaving him there 

to be transported without being adequately secured was objectively unreasonable.

It is also important that in Vance it made no difference to the constitutional analysis that 

the plaintiff did not inform the officers he had just had neck surgery before being forcefully 

crammed into the police car. 546 F.3d at 779. Rather, this detail went to the extent of his 

injuries. See id.; see also id. at 783–86 (omitting mention of the neck surgery in the qualifiedimmunity analysis). The unreasonableness of the officers’ actions in Vance was clear even 

without knowledge of the plaintiff’s recent neck surgery. Such is the case here—Jones was 

wheelchair-bound and crammed into a van in a position that left him unable to keep his head 

from hitting the van’s ceiling, to straighten his neck, or to stay in a secure, stable position. For 

these reasons, Jones had a clearly established Fourth Amendment right as a nonviolent arrestee 
Case No. 19-2346, Jones v. City of Detroit

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to be free from unnecessary pain knowingly inflicted during his arrest, including when he was 

moved into the cargo van and then left in a dangerous position for transport.2

I would affirm the district court, upholding its denial of qualified immunity. Thus, I 

dissent.

2The majority indicates that Jones should have named the officer driving the van and the officer that rode 

with Jones in the back of the van, and then it chastises Jones for failing to find the identities of these officers during 

discovery. Majority Op. at 8–9. Jones pursued the issue, but the City of Detroit stated that no records identifying 

these officers existed. R. 40-11 (Answers to Interrogs. at 1) (Page ID #990). It is unclear how Jones could have 

asked the district court to compel the defendants to provide what was presented as a non-existent record, much less 

divine that the true location of the records was with the State of Michigan—a fact that counsel for defendants 

disclosed during rebuttal at oral argument, three years into this case, and to which Jones was not afforded the 

opportunity to respond. Oral Arg. at 31:30–32:08.