evidence of a waiver of the conflict, we would decline to recognize it. The commentary to LR
83.51.7 explains that “when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree
to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such
agreement or provide representation on the basis of the clients’ consent.” This is just such a case.
A lawyer owes a duty of loyalty to a client, which includes — among other things — a duty on the part
of the lawyer to zealously (but within the bounds of the law and ethical conduct) advance the client’s
interest, If Mr. Strong were to represent both Mohna and the Curtisses, he could not advance the
interests of one client without undermining the interest of the other. No disinterested lawyer could,
in good conscience, ask clients to permit a dual representation in those circumstances, See, e.g,
Pearson vy, First NH Mortgage Corp., 200 F.3d 30, 41 (1* Cir. 1999) (“under the governing ethical
rules, some conflicts of interest are considered so fundamental that even an anxious prospective
client is deemed incapacitated from providing informed consent”).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Mr. Strong’s oral motion for leave to file an appearance

on behalf of Sheila and Latasha Curtis.

ENTER:

Leh

‘SIDNEY 1. SQHENKIER
United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: September 22, 2006


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MIDFIRST BANK,
Plaintiff,

No. 03 C 4975

VS.
Magistrate Judge Schenkier

SHEILA CURTIS and

LATASHA CURTIS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This mortgage foreclosure action is before the Court pursuant to the consent of the parties
(doc. # 34), On July 18, 2003, plaintiff Midfirst Bank filed a complaint for mortgage foreclosure
(doc. #1), The complaint alleged that defendants Shcila and Latasha Curtis were in default on their
mortgage debt in the principal amount of $77,756.90 (with interesting accruing at a rate of $17.04
each day) on properly located at 5043 W. Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Illinois (“the Property”). On
April 26, 2005, the presiding district judge entered an amended judgment of foreclosure in the
amount of $94,271.06 (doc. # 12). The amended judgment provided for a redemption period to
extend through June 27, 2005. The Curtisses did not redeem the property by paying the judgment
amount during that redemption period,

Accordingly, a Special Commissioner was appointed, and the Property was offered for sale

at a public auction. The Special Commissioner has stated that the Property was offered for sale on

May 23, 2006 at the Front Door of the Cook County Building, Inside Entrance, 118 N. Clark Street,
Chicago, Illinois at approximately 3:00 p.m., and that Emdadul Haque and Mohammed Bakey Billah

were the successful bidders at the sale with an offer of $64,224.00. The Special Commissioner has



moved for the court to approve the sale to those bidders, to grant them possession of the Property,
and to approve the distribution of proceeds (doe, # 24).

Mohna, Inc. claims that it wanted to bid on the Property, but was prevented from doing so
because the Property was not in fact offered for public sale on the date and/or place asserted by the
Special Commissioner. Mohna has been given leave lo intervene in the case (doc. # 26), and has
filed a motion opposing confirmation of the sale (doc. #28). The motion has drawn responses from
both Midfirst (doc. # 29) and Messrs. Haque and Billah (doc. # 31), both seeking approval of the
sale. All of those filings raise the question of what the notice disclosed about the time and place of
the sale, and whether the sale took place at the time and place so indicated. The Court has set the
matter for hearing on the Special Commissioner’s motion and Mohna’s opposing motion for October
19, 2006."

The present issue before the Court arises from an oral motion by Mohna’s counsel of record,
Lamont Strong, to file an additional appearance on behalf of the Curtisses, who have not previously
been represented in this case. During a proceeding on September 14, 2006, Mr. Strong explained
that he wishes to appear on behalf of the Curtisses to attack the April 26, 2005 judgment of
foreclosure. At that time, the Court expressed the concern that this dual representation of Mohna
and the Curtisses would create a conflict of interest. In representing the Curtisses, Mr. Strong would
seek to persuade the Court that the foreclosure judgment should be lifted and they should retain the

Property. In representing Mohna, Mr. Strong would seek to persuade the Court that the sale should

'We note that in response lo Mohna’s motion, the Special Commissioner attached copies of notices for the sale
that appeared in local newspapers indicating a sale date of April 4, 2006 (Special Commn’r Reply, Exs. 1-2) -. not on
May 23, 2006, the date the Special Commissioner states the sale took place (/d, at 2). We expect the Special
Commissioner to address that discrepancy at the October 19, 2006 hearing,

2



go forward (which would require that the foreclosure judgment remain in effect) so that Mohna
could buy the Property. In short, Mr. Strong would be in a position of representing clients who both
want the Property, but both could not have it.

‘The Court invited Mr. Strong to submit an explanation of why this would not create a clear
conflict of interest. On September 21, 2006, Mr. Strong submitted in open court a memorandum in
support of the dual representation, which states only in summary fashion that there would not be a
conflict, and if there were one, the Curlisses waive the conflict “by affixing their signature to this
document.” However, the document did not contain their signatures, and said nothing about how
Mohna would feel about its attorney taking on a conflicting representation of the Curtisses in this
case.

Local Rule 83.51.7(a) states: “A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and (2) each client
consents after disclosure.” We have little trouble in finding that Mr. Strong’s proposed
representation of the Curtisses would be “directly adverse to another client” —Mohna. “The classic
conflict of interest situation arises when a lawyer represents . .. two clients with opposing interests.”
Daniels v. United States, 54 F.3d 290, 294 (7* Cir. 1995), That is certainly true here, where Mr.
Strong seeks to represent both Mohna and the Curtisses, who both want the Property but both cannot
obtain it through this action.

Nor is this a case where the patent conflict here can be overcome by consent. At the
threshold, we note that Mr. Strong has provided no evidence that Mohna and the Curtisses have

purported to waive the conflict, or did so “after disclosure.” Moreover, even if Mr. Strong presented