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Filed 3/27/24 Stebbins v. Cal. Public Utilities Commission CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ALICE STEBBINS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES 

COMMISSION,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A167141

 (San Francisco County

 Super. Ct. No. CGC20588148)

Alice Stebbins was the executive director of the California Public 

Utilities Commission (CPUC) from early 2018 until she was terminated from 

her position in September 2020. She filed suit against the CPUC, alleging 

she was terminated in retaliation for whistleblowing. After a trial lasting 

several weeks, the jury rejected her claims and awarded her no damages.

The only issues on appeal concern two jury instructions: one that the trial 

court gave, which stated that the CPUC and the State Personnel Board are 

separate legal entities, and one that the trial court did not give, CACI No. 

204, concerning the intentional destruction of evidence.

1 Because Stebbins 

has shown no prejudicial error, we affirm the judgment.

1 CACI No. 204, “Willful Suppression of Evidence,” states: “You may 

consider whether one party intentionally concealed or destroyed evidence. If 
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Stebbins’s Role at the CPUC

Stebbins was hired as the executive director of the CPUC in February 

2018. She reported to the five CPUC commissioners, including the CPUC 

president, all of whom are appointed by the Governor. There was testimony 

at trial that when Stebbins was hired, the commissioners recognized the 

CPUC needed a strong administrator and manager to improve the agency’s

policies, procedures, and processes, and they hired Stebbins because of her 

administrative skills and experience. 

B. Investigations into Stebbins’s Hiring Practices

In late March 2019, Candace Hyatt, then the human resources director 

at the CPUC, had concerns that Stebbins was inappropriately involved in 

personnel matters. Hyatt had heard from her staff that some recent CPUC 

hires had previous relationships with Stebbins and her staff; that some 

recent hires were being awarded higher-than-appropriate salaries; and that 

job candidates with higher qualifications were being passed over for less 

competitive candidates. Hyatt told the CPUC’s chief internal auditor,

Virginia Veneracion-Alunan, of her concerns. The chief internal auditor then 

began investigating the matter with her subordinate, Daniel Washburn. 

In July 2019, Marybel Batjer was appointed president of the CPUC. 

Before she was sworn into office, she spoke with Hyatt, who by then was no 

longer working at the CPUC. Batjer testified that Hyatt told her Stebbins 

had asked Hyatt to do things she thought were wrong, and that Hyatt 

implied that people were being hired at the CPUC in violation of state hiring 

rules. Batjer testified that, as a result of her conversation with Hyatt, she 

you decide that a party did so, you may decide that the evidence would have 

been unfavorable to that party.”
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contacted the executive officer of the State Personnel Board (SPB), Suzanne 

Ambrose. The SPB is the state agency that enforces the state’s civil service 

statutes. (Cal. Const., art. VII, §§ 1, 2, 3.

2) Batjer told Ambrose that she was 

concerned people were being hired into the CPUC outside the hiring rules. 

That conversation led to the SPB opening an investigation, which was 

conducted by an SPB employee named Lori Gillihan. 

The SPB directed Veneracion-Alunan and Washburn (from the CPUC) 

to provide the SPB with the information they had gathered during their 

internal investigation, which they did. As the SPB’s investigation continued, 

Veneracion-Alunan and Washburn continued to provide information as 

requested, and they reviewed and commented on drafts of the SPB’s report, 

at the request of the SPB. 

C. SPB Report 

The SPB prepared a draft investigation report dated June 12, 2020,

3

which included findings about Stebbins’s involvement in the hiring of five 

CPUC employees. The draft report stated that Stebbins pre-selected a 

candidate for a high-level CPUC position even though he was less qualified 

than several other candidates, and then increased his salary 49 percent just 

four months after he was hired. The report also stated that Stebbins hired 

four other people into positions for which they were not the most qualified 

candidates, and that those four employees were not doing work that rose to 

the level at which they were hired. The draft report was sent to the CPUC 

for response. 

2 The SPB consists of five members who are appointed by the Governor 

and who themselves appoint an executive officer to administer the civil 

service statutes. (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 2, subds. (a), (c); § 3, subd. (b).) 

3 Subsequent dates are in 2020 unless otherwise stated.
4

The CPUC commissioners directed the CPUC’s human resources 

department to assess the report’s findings and draft the CPUC’s written 

response, and also asked Stebbins to review the draft report and provide a 

written response. 

On July 24, after Stebbins had submitted her response to the draft 

report, CPUC Commissioner Liane Randolph asked Stebbins to resign, 

saying that the commissioners had lost faith in her because of the SPB 

report. Stebbins did not agree to resign. On July 30, CPUC President Batjer 

asked Stebbins to resign, and again Stebbins refused. On August 4, Stebbins 

was placed on administrative leave. 

On August 10, CPUC President Batjer sent an email to CPUC 

employees, stating that on that day the SPB had issued a special 

investigation report about the CPUC’s hiring practices, and including a link 

to the final report, which included the CPUC’s response. The report stated 

that the SPB had reviewed information “to determine whether the actions of 

CPUC officials and employees violated the California Constitution’s 

requirement that appointment and promotion shall be made under a general 

system based on merit ascertained by competitive examination,” and that 

“the scope of SPB review includes appointments of certain employees made 

between June 2018 and March 2019 to determine whether Civil Service rules 

were violated, and, if so, by whom.” Batjer’s August 10 email stated that the 

commissioners shared the “SPB’s commitment to protecting the merit system 

as required by the California Constitution to ensure appointments and 

promotions are made under a system based on merit through competitive 

examination.” 

On September 2, Stebbins received a letter informing her that her 

employment at the CPUC would end on September 4. 
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D. Stebbins Files Suit

In December Stebbins filed a 17-page complaint against the CPUC in 

San Francisco Superior Court alleging four causes of action. She alleged that 

in her role as executive director of the CPUC she directed her staff to prepare 

various audits and reports that focused on fiscal accountability at the CPUC 

and the CPUC’s oversight of utilities. She further alleged that the work 

underlying those audits and reports revealed serious problems with the 

CPUC’s accounting processes, as well as financial mismanagement and 

operational deficiencies. Stebbins alleged that starting in December 2019, 

she made efforts to engage CPUC President Batjer and other CPUC 

commissioners on these issues, but was met with indifference. 

Stebbins alleged that the SPB report was a pretext for her termination, 

and was intended to cover up the fact that she was terminated because of her

efforts to address serious problems at the CPUC, including its failure to 

pursue the recovery of about $200 million from regulated utilities. She 

alleged that she was terminated in retaliation for refusing to close down 

investigations and for insisting on completing reports of the CPUC’s problems 

and failures. 

E. Trial and Verdict

By the time of trial, Stebbins was proceeding on only two causes of 

action against the CPUC: one for whistleblower retaliation in violation of 

Labor Code section 1102.5, and one for whistleblower retaliation in violation 

of the California Whistleblower Protection Act (Gov. Code, § 8547 et seq.). 

The trial proceedings ran for 26 days. 

After just one day of deliberation, the jury returned its verdict in favor 

of the CPUC. The jury specifically found that there was no retaliation: 
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Stebbins’s disclosure of information to the CPUC was not a contributing 

factor in the CPUC’s decision to fire her.4 

Judgment was entered in favor of the CPUC, and this appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Principles of Appellate Review

A judgment challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct, and it is 

the appellant’s burden to affirmatively show that the trial court erred 

(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham)) and to 

provide legal argument showing how the error was prejudicial. (Century 

Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 (Century Surety).) 

An appellant’s opening brief must include “a summary of the 

significant facts limited to matters in the record” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.204(a)(2)(C)) and must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by 

a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter 

appears.” (Id., rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) 

An appellant must “present each point separately in the opening brief 

under an appropriate heading, showing the nature of the question to be 

presented and the point to be made; otherwise the point will be forfeited.” 

(Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656, citing Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) In addition, an appellant must “support claims of error 

with meaningful argument and citation to authority. [Citations.] When legal 

4 The jury was given a special verdict form with a series of questions for 

each of the two causes of action. Although for each cause of action the jury 

found that Stebbins had made legally protected disclosures to the CPUC 

about information that she believed was “a violation of or non-compliance 

with a federal or state statute, rule, or regulation” or “a violation of law or 

government waste,” no disclosure was a “contributing factor in [the CPUC’s]

decision to discharge her.” Thus the jury never reached the question of 

damages. Neither Stebbins nor the CPUC asked to poll the jury. 
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argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a particular point, we 

may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without consideration.” Allen v. 

City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) We are “not required to 

examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.” (Ibid.) 

Further, an appellant’s arguments must be supported by appropriate 

reference to the appellate record. (Air Couriers International v. Employment

Development Dept. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 923, 928 (Air Couriers).) We are 

not required to search the record for evidence, and we may disregard 

unsupported factual assertions. (Ibid.; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule

8.204(a)(1)(C) & (a)(2)(C) [appellant’s opening brief must include a summary 

of significant facts limited to matters in the record, with any reference to a 

matter in the record supported by a citation to the volume and page number 

of the record].) 

Stebbins was represented by counsel in the trial court but represented 

herself on appeal until after her opening brief was filed. The rules that 

govern appellate review and practice apply to self-represented litigants as 

well as to those represented by counsel. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 

Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247 [self-represented party “ ‘is entitled to the same, 

but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys’ ”].) 

Stebbins’s opening brief is deficient in several respects. The brief does not 

contain a coherent statement of facts: the facts are not presented 

chronologically or thematically. Many of the assertions in the statement are 

not supported by any citation to the record, while some apparently simple 

factual statements are followed by string cites containing up to 35 separate 

citations to the trial transcript, with no indication of whether the citations 

are to argument or testimony, or whose testimony is being cited, or how those 

citations support Stebbins’s claims of error. This is not “appropriate 
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reference to the appellate record” (Air Couriers, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p.

928), particularly in a case like this one where the reporter’s transcript of the

multi-week trial is nearly 5,000 pages long. Moreover, none of the assertions 

in the argument section of the brief are supported by citations to the record or 

by citations to legal authority. 

Nevertheless, we discern two issues on appeal: first, that the court 

erred in instructing the jury that the SPB and CPUC were separate entities

because, as argued by Stebbins on appeal, the agencies did not conduct 

themselves as independent agencies in their investigations, and second, that 

the court erred in refusing to give CACI No. 204, because, as argued by 

Stebbins on appeal, there was evidence that both the SPB investigator and 

CPUC employees destroyed or suppressed evidence. We address those issues

to the extent we can in light of the limitations of Stebbins’s briefing. 

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

A party has the “right to have the jury instructed as to the law 

applicable to all their theories of the case which were supported by the 

pleadings and the evidence, whether or not that evidence was considered 

persuasive by the trial court.” (Fish v. Los Angeles Dodgers Baseball Club 

(1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 620, 633.) 

We apply the de novo standard of review to claims that a court erred in 

giving or refusing a jury instruction. (Ted Jacob Engineering Group, Inc. v. 

The Ratcliff Architects (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 945, 961 (Ted Jacob 

Engineering).) Instructional error in a civil case is prejudicial “if it is 

reasonably probable the error affected the verdict.” (Id. at p. 962.) Although 

our review is de novo, the fundamental principles of appellate review apply: 

it is appellant’s burden to demonstrate both error (Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d 

at p. 564) and prejudice (Century Surety, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 963), 
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and our review is limited to the issues that are adequately raised and 

supported in appellant’s opening brief. (See Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 

Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6 [“[i]ssues not raised in an appellant’s brief are 

deemed waived or abandoned”].) We do not consider issues raised for the 

first time in a reply brief. (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 

764.) 

C. Additional Background on Jury Instructions

At trial, Lori Gillihan, who conducted the SPB’s investigation, testified 

in response to questions from Stebbins’s attorney that she did not save all the 

drafts of her investigation report, and that she sometimes wrote a new draft 

over an old one. Gillihan also testified that although she recorded interviews 

with certain witnesses, she retained only some of the recordings. She did not 

retain interviews that she considered “meaningless.” During a break in 

Gillihan’s testimony, and outside the presence of the jury, the trial court

judge stated that he was considering giving CACI No. 204, pending hearing 

from the CPUC about why the SPB’s decisions about retaining documents 

should not be used against the CPUC. Upon subsequent questioning by 

counsel for the CPUC, Gillihan testified that she alone made the decisions 

about what materials to retain; that neither her supervisor at the SPB nor 

anyone at the CPUC asked her to delete any recordings or documents, and 

that she did not tell her supervisor or anyone at the CPUC that she was 

going to delete material or that she had done so. 

After Gillihan’s testimony was concluded, the court stated in a 

conference with counsel that it had raised the question of the “relationship 

between the State Personnel Board and the CPUC and the connection with 
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CACI No. 204, and I’m looking forward to getting briefing on that issue.”5 

The court also stated that, because Stebbins had asked for CACI No. 204, and 

the CPUC opposed that request, there would be “a full hearing on that.” 

As the trial drew to a close, the court conducted several conferences 

with counsel to discuss jury instructions. At one such conference, the court 

acknowledged the parties’ disagreement as to whether CACI No. 204 should 

be given. The court stated that “there will be a further hearing as to whether 

or not there is evidence to support—that the CPUC or an employee of the 

CPUC in some respects [a]ffected evidence such that it should be given with 

regard to the CPUC, and no one is requesting that it be given with regard to 

any actions of the State Personnel Board, and so that will be an issue we’ll 

resolve later today. [¶] So there I’d be looking to the Plaintiff to identify the 

witness and/or the employee of the CPUC who you believed destroyed 

evidence or took other actions which would justify giving [CACI No.] 204 to 

the CPUC.” (Italics added.) Stebbins’s counsel confirmed that she would be 

prepared to address the issue of CACI No. 204. She did not dispute that no 

one requested that CACI No. 204 be given with regard to actions of the SPB. 

At the conclusion of that conference, in keeping with its practice throughout 

the proceedings, the court asked both parties whether they wanted to put 

anything on the record before the jury was admitted to hear further 

testimony. Both sides said no. 

At another jury instruction conference outside the presence of the jury

later that day, there was discussion of the CPUC’s request for a special 

5 Stebbins did not include any briefing on that matter, or any other, in 

the record on appeal. (See Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1349, 

1362 [appellant has the burden to provide an adequate record for review; we 

indulge “ ‘ “ ‘[a]ll intendments and presumptions . . . to support [trial court 

orders] on matters as to which the record is silent’ ” ’ ”].) 
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instruction that the “[CPUC] is a separate and distinct legal entity from the 

[SPB].” Stebbins’s counsel’s only response to that instruction was that she 

would not object to it being given as long as the court also gave CACI No. 204. 

Counsel for the CPUC argued that the instruction should not be contingent 

on CACI No. 204 “based on everything that the jury has heard to date about 

some of the decisions made by Lori Gillihan. [¶] So we think it’s important 

that the jury understand that we are a separate and distinct legal entity from 

the State Personnel Board.” 

At conferences held the next day, the court heard extensive argument 

on whether to give CACI No. 204. Stebbins’s counsel made two arguments 

for giving the instruction. The first, which Stebbins’s counsel characterized 

as “overt destruction of evidence,” was that Veneracion-Alunan and 

Washburn, who conducted the CPUC’s internal investigation, had both 

testified that they took handwritten notes of interviews they conducted, typed 

those notes into memoranda, and then destroyed the handwritten notes.6 

Stebbins’s counsel argued that the “best evidence” of what occurred in the 

interviews would have been the handwritten notes. The second argument, 

which Stebbins’s counsel characterized as “circumstantial evidence of 

destruction,” was that Veneracion-Alunan and Washburn had testified in 

deposition that there were “no writings” about findings they made concerning 

certain questionable employee travel expenses, but had testified at trial that 

there was a draft memorandum. Yet no such draft was ever produced in 

6 Veneracion-Alunan and Washburn testified at trial that the 

handwritten notes were typed into interview summaries, which were 

reviewed to make sure they included everything in the handwritten notes, 

and that the handwritten notes were then discarded. 
12

discovery. Stebbins’s counsel argued that the “document appears not to exist, 

[which] is circumstantial evidence that it was destroyed.” 

After hearing further argument from counsel, the trial court concluded 

that in view of Washburn’s testimony that the handwritten interview notes 

were “transcribed” into typed summaries, the failure to retain the notes did 

not justify giving CACI No. 204. With respect to the document about travel 

expenses, the trial court stated that it understood Stebbins to be arguing that 

a document related to the investigation into travel expenses should have been 

produced in discovery but was not. The parties disagreed as to whether a 

discovery request had ever been made that would have called for such a 

document. The court stated that it would have CACI No. 204 in hand to read 

to the jury the next day, but would not give it unless Stebbins’s counsel 

provided evidence that a request for production had been made that was 

“broad enough to have included that memorandum if it existed.” The court 

explained, “If it was never requested, then it wasn’t concealed [and] there’s 

no basis for giving [CACI No.] 204.” Stebbins’s counsel said she would find 

the discovery request.

Later during the same jury instruction conference, the court stated that 

whether or not it gave CACI No. 204, it would give the requested special 

instruction that the SPB and CPUC were separate entities, explaining, “I 

think it’s very important in this case that the difference between the two 

entities, the separation and distinct legal identity of each, be emphasized by 

the Court with an instruction. [¶] I think it’s certainly warranted under the 

circumstances of this case, and it will be given.” 

The record contains no further discussion of the special instruction or 

CACI No. 204. The next day the court instructed the jury, including the 

special instruction, and the parties gave their closing arguments. Counsel 
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never mentioned CACI No. 204 again; Stebbins’s attorneys never provided 

evidence that the document about travel expenses had been requested in 

discovery, as they had promised they would the night before; and the court 

did not give CACI No. 204. 

D. Stebbins’s Arguments on Appeal

Stebbins’s arguments are not clearly presented. Notably, however, 

Stebbins does not present any legal argument in her opening brief that CACI 

No. 204 should have been given to the jury on account of the destruction of 

Veneracion-Alunan’s and Washburn’s handwritten interview notes or on 

account of the failure to produce a memorandum about the investigation of 

travel expenses, which were the issues raised by her counsel in arguing for 

the instruction at trial. She does not even mention those issues. 

We understand Stebbins’s primary argument on appeal to be as follows: 

Lori Gillihan, the SPB investigator, destroyed the recording of an interview 

she conducted with CPUC employee Ellen Moratti, as well as notes Gillihan 

took during that interview; because the CPUC and SPB were working 

together on the SPB investigation, the destruction of that material was 

effectively destruction by the CPUC; and if the jury had been given CACI No. 

204, it would have understood that the Moratti interview notes tied the fiscal 

issues that Stebbins was investigating with the SPB investigation, therefore 

the jury would have “been able to say yes” as to whether Stebbins’s reporting 

on alleged fiscal malfeasance at the CPUC was a contributing factor in the 

CPUC’s decision to discharge her. 

The problem with this argument is that it was never made to the trial 

court in connection with the instruction of the jury, and therefore it has been 

forfeited. As a general matter, we will not consider issues that are raised for 

the first time on appeal when those issues could have been but were not 
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presented to the trial court. (Newton v. Clemons (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 

(Newton).) Further, the argument fails because Stebbins does not provide 

any citations to evidence that would suggest Moratti spoke with Gillihan 

about fiscal malfeasance at the CPUC. It is noteworthy that, although there 

was testimony at trial about Moratti, including testimony from Gillihan 

about her interview with Moratti, Moratti did not testify at trial, nor was she 

mentioned by either party in closing argument. 

Stebbins also argues that the trial court should have given CACI No. 

204 because there was evidence that investigators at the CPUC and SPB 

used their personal email accounts, instead of the state email system, in 

communicating about the investigations, and that they did so, allegedly, in 

order to avoid producing evidence. This argument has been forfeited for two 

reasons. First, it is not supported by any citations to the record, and we 

disregard unsupported factual assertions. (Air Couriers, supra, 150

Cal.App.4th at p. 928.) Second, Stebbins’s counsel never argued in the trial

court that the use of personal email accounts was a reason to give CACI No.

204. (Newton, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.) Because Stebbins has

forfeited her claim that the trial court erred by not giving CACI No. 204, we

do not discuss that issue further.

With respect to the trial court’s decision to instruct the jury that the 

SPB and CPUC are separate entities, Stebbins concedes—as she must—that 

the SPB and CPUC are legally distinct. She argues only that they acted 

together improperly in investigating her. Even if the special instruction was

given in error (and Stebbins has not demonstrated that it was), Stebbins fails 

to show how she was prejudiced by it, because she does not show how it is 

reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a different verdict if it 

had not been given the instruction. (Ted Jacob Engineering, supra, 187 
15

Cal.App.4th at p. 962.) Nothing about that jury instruction precluded 

Stebbins’s counsel from arguing in their closing arguments that the CPUC 

had been improperly involved in the SPB’s investigation, which counsel 

argued at length. Stebbins’s counsel also argued in closing that Gillihan had 

destroyed documents to prevent Stebbins from “ever being able to shine the 

light on what a rotten, biased house of lies this investigation really was,” that 

the investigation was a pretext for firing Stebbins, and that the SPB 

investigation “was a secret retaliation to basically give a report to the 

[c]ommissioners.” Yet notwithstanding all the evidence adduced over weeks 

of trial, the jury found that Stebbins’s disclosure of information about 

assertedly improper fiscal activities at the CPUC was not a contributing 

factor in the CPUC’s decision to discharge her. Stebbins fails to show on 

appeal how it is reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a 

different verdict if it had not been instructed that the SPB and CPUC were 

separate legal entities. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover any costs on 

appeal.
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_________________________

Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Richman, Acting P. J.

_________________________

Mayfield, J.*

A167141, Stebbins v. California Public Utilities Commission

* Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.