Trustees absent being executed by the chief of staff. But even
if it is assumed that General Rule 4(c) is a permissive exception
to a mandatory provision that was not otherwise satisfied, it
cannot be determined on defendant's motion to dismiss that
plaintiff's Resident Agreement was not properly executed.

First, defendant points to nothing to establish who the
chief of staff of the Hospital actually is. Defendant contends
chief of staff refers to the Hospital Director, but provides
nothing to support that contention. See generally University
Statutes Art. III, § 4 (organization of departments such as a
hospital). But even assuming neither of the persons who signed
plaintiff's Resident Agreement was the chief of staff, defendant
ignores that persons entitled to execute contracts on behalf of
the University may delegate such authority. See General Rules
Art. II, §§ 4(i), 9; Business & Financial Policies & Procedures
Manual § 2.4 On the motion to dismiss, it cannot be determined
that the persons who signed the Resident Agreement on behalf of
the University were not adequately delegated the authority to do
so.

On defendant's motion to dismiss, it cannot be held that
plaintiff's Resident Agreement is unenforceable as against the

University. Since the Resident Agreement contains a provision

“This manual is linked to the General Rules on
the University of Illinois's website and may be found at
http: //www.vpaa.uillinois.edu/policies.

-13-


12 F.3d at 718; Early v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 959 F.2d

75, 79 (7th Cir. 1992).

As long as they are consistent with the allegations of
the complaint, a plaintiff may assert additional facts in his or
her response to a motion to dismiss. Brokaw v. Mercer County,
235 F.3d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 2000); Forseth, 199 F.3d at 368;
Albiero, 122 F.3d at 419; Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364,
1367 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997); Hrubec_v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp., 981 F.2d 962, 963-64 (7th Cir. 1992). Additionally,
there is a narrow exception that a document (particularly a
contract) that has not been made part of the complaint but which
has been provided by a party, can nevertheless be considered on a
Rule 12(b) (6) motion if the document is referred to in the
complaint and is central to a claim contained in the complaint.
Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998);

Wright v. Associated Insurance Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir.

1994). The contents of such documents will override inconsistent
descriptions of those documents alleged in the body of the
complaint. See In re Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 249 (7th Cir. 1992);
Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242, 244-45 (7th Cir. 1988).
Furthermore, without converting a motion to dismiss to one for
summary judgment, judicial notice may be taken of historical
documents, documents contained in the public record, and reports,

decisions, and regulations of administrative bodies. Anderson,


Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1080 (2001).

Therefore, in the Seventh Circuit, a class of one claim
is subject to dismissal if vindictiveness, ill will, or some
other similarly malevolent animus is not alleged. Olech v.
Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998),
aff'd, Qlech II; Northwestern University v. City of Evanston,
2001 WL 219632 *3 (N.D. Ill. March 6, 2001); Byers v. Illinois
State Police, 2000 WL 1741723 *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2000);

Singleton v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees of Board

of Education of City of Chicago, 2000 WL 777925 *9 (N.D. Ill.

June 13, 2000); Kevin v. Thompson, 2000 WL 549440 *6 (N.D. Ill.
May 1, 2000), aff'd, 235 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 2000). See also

Purze v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 454-55 (7th

Cir. 2002); Cruz v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 275 F.3d 579, 587 (7th
Cir. 2001). Because plaintiff has not alleged such an animus,
his equal protection claim will be dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ruling date of May 15,
2002 is vacated. Defendants' amended motion to dismiss [5] is
granted in part and denied in part. Defendant Board of
Governors of the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical
School is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's equal
protection claims are dismissed. Within two weeks, defendant

Feld shall answer the remaining allegations of the complaint.

-17-


486 U.S. 1033 (1988). See also Manheim, 2001 WL 185170 at *6.

See, e.g., Levenstein v. Salafsky, 2002 WL 187505 *6-11 (N.D.

Ill. Feb. 6, 2002). Article I, section 6 of the Statutes
provides:

The General Rules supplement the Statutes. The
General Rules are subordinate to the Statutes and
deal with administrative organization, with the
powers, duties, and responsibilities of officers
of the University, and with university employment
policies, property, and other matters. The
General Rules are adopted by the Board of
Trustees acting on the advice of the president of
the University. The board reserves the right to
make changes in The General Rules after
consultation with the president. Before
providing such advice or consultation, the
president shall consult with the University
Senates Conference, with due regard for the
provisions of Article XII, Section 4. However,
consultation with the conference is not required
when because of exceptional circumstances a
proposed action of the Board of Trustees would
authorize a deviation from The General Rules for
a specific transaction.

Thus, the General Rules are incorporated into the Statutes and
also have the effect of administrative rules and hence law in

Illinois. See Black Knight Productions, Inc. v. University of

Illinois at Chicago Black Student Association, 50 Ill. Ct. Cl.
406, 1998 WL 1669060 *3 (1998).

Defendant contends that Upadhya holds that "contracts
between the University and third parties must be approved and
signed in accordance with the formalities set forth in the

University's published rules." Def. Amended Motion to Dismiss


thirty (30) days of the commencement of this
Agreement. In lieu of termination, the
University may take such disciplinary action
against the Resident it deems appropriate
including suspension without pay from the
program.

b) by the University upon the failure of the
Resident to comply with the terms and duties
described in this Agreement.

c) by the Resident upon the University's
failure to comply with the terms of this
Agreement provided the Resident furnishes
thirty (30) day advance written notice to
the University.

d) by mutual agreement of the parties as
evidenced in writing.

Plaintiff alleges that "[w]ithout notice, provocation, or
just cause, on August 4, 2000, Plaintiff received a telephone
message from Dr. Feld telling him that he had been terminated
from the anesthesiology residency program at the University of
Illinois at Chicago Medical School." Complaint @ 9. Plaintiff
clarified in his answer brief that no hearing or process of any
kind was provided. In the complaint, it is also alleged that no
opportunity for appeal was provided.

Count I of the complaint is denominated as a due process
violation and Count II as an equal protection violation.

Count III is denominated as a "Violation of § 1983," but again
xefers to due process and equal protection violations. It is

unclear how Count III differs from the other two counts.?

2In his answer brief, plaintiff makes passing reference
to possible state law claims, but does not make any argument in


217 F.3d at 474-75; Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v.

Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1066 (1999); Manheim v. University of Illinois Board

of Trustees, 2001 WL 185170 *6 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2001);

Northgate Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d

1071, 1077 (E.D. Wis. 2000); Demick v. City of Joliet, 108 F.

Supp. 2d 1022, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2000).

According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff
is a medical doctor, a citizen of Canada, and a former
anesthesiology resident at the Medical School. Feld is alleged
to be the Medical School's Director of Anesthesiology. On
June 7, 2000, plaintiff accepted the Medical School's offer to
matriculate into the anesthesiology residency program. In
response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff provides a copy of
his "Resident Agreement." The Agreement is dated June 23, 2000
and Fenje's signature is dated July 17, 2000. The signatures on
behalf of the University are labeled as that of the Program
Director dated July 24, 2000 and the Associate Dean of Graduate
Medical Education dated August 1, 2000. The Agreement provides
that it commences August 1, 2000 and terminates July 31, 2001.
Paragraph 10 of the Agreement provides:

Termination: This Agreement may be terminated as
follows:

a) by the University in the event the Resident

fails to obtain the appropriate medical
license from the State of Illinois within


All discovery is to be completed by September 6, 2002. A status

hearing will be held on May 29, 2002 at 11:00 a.m.

ENTER:

_ Elda k.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: MAY ¢ r 2002

- 18 -


executed by the appropriate University of Illinois Hospital official.

Defendant relies on a document entitled the General Rules
Concerning University Organization and Procedure.* Section 4(c)
of Article II of the General Rules provides:

Contracts relating to appointments to the staff

may be executed by the secretary of the Board of

Trustees. Agreements providing for the

appointments of resident physicians and dentists

may be executed by the chief of staff of the

University of Illinois Hospital. . . . Unless

otherwise ordered by the Board of Trustees in

specific cases, other contracts to which the

University is a party shall be signed by the

comptroller of the Board of Trustees and attested

to by the secretary of the Board of Trustees.
Defendant contends the "chief of staff" is the Director of the
University of Illinois Hospital. Since the Agreement provided by
plaintiff is denominated as being signed by the Program Director
and Associate Dean, defendant contends it is not enforceable
against the University and therefore cannot support a property
interest.

The University of Illinois has a set of rules known
as the "Statutes," which are "bylaws having the force of

administrative rules and hence ‘law’ in Illinois." Upadhya v.

Langenberg, 834 F.2d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,

‘The University of Illinois General Rules, as well
as the University of Illinois Statutes may be found at
http: //www.uillinois.edu/trustees.


4

Minutes rder Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Ni f Assigned Jud; Sitting Judge if Or
oor Magistrate Judge WILLIAM T. BART than Aesitned Judge DP
CASE NUMBER 01 C 9684 DATE MAY 6 2002
CASE PAUL FENJE, M.D. v. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
TITLE ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO MEDICAL SCHOOL, et al.
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state bricfly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due___-

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon_____esetfor_—at_—

6) Status hearing will be held on May 29, 2002 at 11:00 a.m.

(6) im Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—ssetfor_ ss at_—.

() im Trial[set for/re-set for] on______at

(8) QO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto______at

(9) 0 This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule21 CIFRCP41(a)(1) C1 FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) so [Other docket entry] Ruling date of May 15, 2002 is vacated. Defendants’ amended

motion to dismiss [5] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendant Board of Governors of
the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical School is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs
equal protection claims are dismissed. Within two weeks, defendant Feld shall answer the
remaining allegations of the complaint. All discovery is to be completed by September 6,
2002.

(1)

No notices required, advised in open court.

(For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

2

No notices required, number of notices:

ov | Notices mailed by judge’s staff,

MAY iced O2

Notified counsel by telephone,

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date maited notice
courtroom

cw deputy’s if
initials w

mam

Datc/time received in
central Clerk's Office

mailing initials



contended the official's signature made the University a party to
the contract. In ruling on the University’s motion to dismiss,
the Court of Claims assumed the official was acting as an agent
of the University and not merely a witness to the contract.
Nevertheless, the court held that the University could not
possibly be bound by the contract because General Rule 4(c)
required that such a contract be signed by the Board of Trustee's
comptroller and attested to by the Board's secretary. Black
Knight, 1998 WL 1669060 at *3-4.

. . it is a well settled principle of law
that in dealing with an agent of the State one
must ascertain at his peril the authority of the
agent, and the mere assertions of the agent are
not sufficient to bind the State. (New Life
Development Corp. v. State (1992), 45 Ill. ct.
Cl. 65, 86; Melvin v. State (1989), 41 Ill. Ct.
Cl. 88; Dunteman v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl.
51.) “There are statutes dealing with State
purchases and there are rules and regulations.
These statutes, rules and regulations are all
published and available to any vendor who cares

to acquaint himself with them." (Central Office
Equipment Co. v. State (1979), 33 Ill. Ct. Cl. 90
at 91.) "[A] purchase order emanating from an

office or official authorized to obligate the
funds of the State is a prerequisite to the
establishment of an obligation *** against the
State." 33 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 91.

Respondent, citing Rend Lake College

Federation of Teachers v. Community College
District (Sth Dist. 1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 308,

405 N.E.2d 364, 39 Ill. Dec. 611, argues that the
same principles apply in the case of Respondent.
This Court agrees. The general rules concerning
university organization and procedure of the
University of Illinois are quite clear as to the
party[ies] having authority to execute contracts

on behalf of Respondent.
kk ok

-~1l1-


at 2-3. However, Upadhya did not concern the formalities of
execution of an employment contract, particularly who had the
authority to sign the contract. It held that no clear oral
promises were made that could override the written terms of the
professor's contract which incorporated terms of the Statutes.
Upadhya, 834 F.2d at 663-66. In dictum, the court stated that
Upadhya "did not obtain an express promise that five years would
be his minimum term, and any implication to that effect was
unauthorized by the President and Board of Trustees of the
University--the only persons who could bind the University to
such contracts.” Id. at 666. Similarly, in McElearney v.
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle Campus, 612 F.2d 285,
290-91 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit held that informal
assurances by a department head could not override formal,
explicit tenure provisions contained in the Statutes. Neither of
those cases address the issue of who has authority to sign an
employment contract with the University.

Although not cited by either side, an Illinois Court of
Claims case addresses the issue of authority to sign a contract
on behalf of the University of Illinois. In Black Knight, a
University student group contracted with the plaintiff to promote
and manage a fair. Although the contract was expressly stated as
being between the plaintiff and the student group, a University

official signed the contract as a "witness." The plaintiff

-10-


Plaintiff prays for compensatory and punitive damages. He also
prays for injunctive relief prohibiting future violations as well
as reinstatement into the residency program.

Plaintiff does not dispute that the Eleventh Amendment
bars any damages claim against Feld in his official capacity and
the complaint expressly limits the damages claim against Feld
to being in his individual capacity. See Complaint 99 17-18.

The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not preclude injunctive
relief as against Feld in his official capacity. See Luder v.
Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (7th Cir. 2001); Power v.
Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2000).

Defendant contends the due process claim must fail
because plaintiff had no property interest in the resident
position. Defendant misreads the complaint as alleging that the
offer was withdrawn before a contract was signed or the residency
begun. The complaint, however, alleges that plaintiff began the
residency and then was terminated. Plaintiff's answer brief
makes this clear and provides a copy of his signed contract. The
contract further shows that it has a provision that precludes
termination absent cause or mutual agreement. Defendant still

contends that the contract is without effect because it was not

support thereof. Possible state law claims are not being
considered.


defendant has at least minimal notice of the claim. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a) (2); Scott, 195 F.3d at 951; Albiero v. City of Kankakee,

122 F.3d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1997); Jackson v. Marion County,

66 F.3d 151, 153-54 (7th Cir. 1995). In the complaint itself, it
is unnecessary to specifically identify the legal basis for a
claim as long as the facts alleged would support relief.

Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000);
Scott, 195 F.3d at 951; Albiero, 122 F.3d at 419; Bartholet v.

Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992).

However, in response to a motion to dismiss that raises the
issue, the plaintiff must identify the legal basis for a claim
and make adequate legal arguments in support of it. Kirksey v.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041-42 (7th Cir.

1999); Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1335 (7th

Cir. 1995); Levin v. Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 46 (6th Cir. 1996);

Carpenter v. City of Northlake, 948 F. Supp. 759, 765 (N.D. Ill.

1996). It is also unnecessary to plead facts that would negate

an affirmative defense. Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648,

651-52 (7th Cir. 2001); Pregenza v. Great American Communications
Co., 12 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S.

1085 (1994); Wade v. Henderson, 2002 WL 15697 *1 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 4, 2002). It is also true, however, that a plaintiff can
plead himself or herself out of court by alleging facts showing

there is no viable claim. Jackson, 66 F.3d at 153-54; Tregenza,


that, absent agreement of the parties, it can only be terminated
for cause, plaintiff had a property interest in his employment as

a resident. See Lalvani v. Cook County, Ill., 269 F.3d 785, 791

(7th Cir. 2001).

Defendant also contends that the due process claim fails
because plaintiff does not expressly allege that he timely
requested a hearing. Plaintiff alleges that he demanded a
hearing; federal pleading rules do not require more. Plaintiff's
due process claim will not be dismissed.

As to his equal protection claim, plaintiff does not
allege that he was discriminated against based on being a member
of a protected group. Instead, he alleges that he "was
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.” Complaint 9 14. There is no allegation that
defendant was motivated by reasons of a personal nature or that
he was vindictive, nor are any facts alleged from which such an
inference may be drawn. In his briefs, plaintiff does not
contend that he is alleging vindictiveness and instead argues
that it is sufficient to allege that defendant's conduct was
irrational and wholly arbitrary.

Plaintiff relies on the "class of one" equal protection

theory recognized in Village of Willowbrook v. Qlech, 528 U.S.

-14-


Circuit subsequently recognized that Olech IZ is unclear in that
it refers to conduct that is both intentional and irrational.
Subsequent to Qlech Ii, the Seventh Circuit continues to hold
that vindictiveness is required for a class of one claim.

The role of motive is left unclear by the
Supreme Court's decision. On the one hand the
Court recited the standard formula that the equal
protection clause forbids intentional differences
in treatment for which there is no rational
basis. On the other hand it said that the claim
that the difference in treatment was "irrational
and wholly arbitrary" (emphasis added) was
sufficient and that the Court was not reaching
our "alternative theory of 'subjective ill
will.'" 120 S. Ct. at 1075. If a merely
unexplained difference in police treatment of
similar complaints made by different people
established a prima facie case of denial of equal
protection of the laws, the federal courts would
be drawn deep into the local enforcement of petty
state and local laws. Repeating what we said in
our opinion in Olech, and Justice Breyer in his
concurring opinion in the Supreme Court, 120
S. Ct. at 1075, we gloss "no rational basis"
in the unusual setting of "class of one" equal
protection cases to mean that to make out a prima
facie case the plaintiff must present evidence
that the defendant deliberately sought to deprive
him of the equal protection of the laws for
reasons of a personal nature unrelated to the
duties of the defendant's position. We described
the class of equal protection cases illustrated
by Olech as "vindictive action" cases and said
that they require "proof that the cause of the
differential treatment of which the plaintiff
complains was a totally illegitimate animus
toward the plaintiff by the defendant." 160 F.3d
at 388. No evidence of such an animus was
presented in this case.

- 16 -


Medical School and since plaintiff has misnamed the entity that
governs the Medical School,’ the Board of Governors will be
dismissed without prejudice. It is sufficient to name Feld in

his individual and official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); A. Kelley's Garage, Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 2000 WL 1889671 *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2000); Davis v.

Sheahan, 1997 WL 49307 *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 1997).
Presently pending is defendant's motion to dismiss.

On a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff's
well-pleaded allegations of fact are taken as true and all
reasonable inferences are drawn in plaintiff's favor.
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Stachon v. United
Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 2000). A
complaint need not set forth all relevant facts or recite the
law; all that is required is a short and plain statement showing
that the party is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a);
Anderson v. Simon, 217 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 1073 (2001); Scott v. City of Chicago, 195 F.3d

950, 951 (7th Cir. 1999); Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d

318, 322 (7th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff in a suit in federal court

need not plead facts; conclusions may be pleaded as long as the

‘The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
apparently is the correct governing board.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

PAUL FENJE, M.D.,

MAY 9 ~ dubz

No. 01 C 9684

Plaintiff,
v.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
CHICAGO MEDICAL SCHOOL and
JAMES FELD, M.D., in his
official capacity and in his
individual capacity,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Paul Fenje was accepted into the anesthesiology
residency program at the University of Illinois at Chicago
Medical School. Allegedly, a few days after his residency began,
plaintiff was terminated from the program. Plaintiff brought the
present lawsuit naming as defendants the Board of Governors of
the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical School and James
Feld, the Director of Anesthesiology for the Medical School.

Feld is named in his individual and official capacity. Since

suing Feld in his official capacity is the same as suing the

(7


In view of the general rules, Respondent
cannot be considered as a party to the contract
in issue because it was not signed by the
comptroller of the Board of Trustees and attested
to by the secretary of the Board of Trustees.
Assuming that Ms. Grgurich was in fact acting as
an agent of Respondent and not merely as a
witness to the execution of the contract in
issue, the burden remained on Claimant to
ascertain whether she had the authority to
execute the contract on behalf of Respondent.
Claimant failed to do so and, therefore, its
claim against Respondent for breach of contract
must also fail.

The language of General Rule 4(c) is that resident
agreements "may be executed” by the Hospital chief of staff. The
General Rule does not state that such agreements "shall be" or
"may only be" executed by the chief of staff. Perhaps this
provision contains permissive language because it is an exception
to the otherwise mandatory method of executing such an agreement.
Defendant, however, points to no such mandatory rule. General
Rule 4(a) provides: “Purchases, construction contracts, and
other contracts shall be awarded by the Board of Trustees in
accordance with applicable state and federal law and with
regulations adopted by the Board of Trustees. Contracts
involving major changes in or deviations from university policy
shall be approved specifically by the Board of Trustees." Thus,
unless other regulations so provide, it is not mandatory that the

agreement have been specifically approved by the Board of

-12-


562, 564 (2000) ("Olech II"). In Qlech II, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Seventh Circuit, stating:

Our cases have recognized successful equal
protection claims brought by a "class of one,”
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been
intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational
basis for the difference in treatment. See Sioux
City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,
43 S. Ct. 190, 67 L. Ed. 340 (1923); Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster
Cty., 488 U.S. 336, 109 S. Ct. 633, 102 L. Ed. 2d
688 (1989). In so doing, we have explained that
"'[t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every
person within the State's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through duly constituted
agents.'" Sioux City Bridge Co., supra, at 445,
43 S. Ct. 190 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.
Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352, 38
S. Ct. 495, 62 L. Ed. 1154 (1918)).

. . The complaint also alleged that the
Village's demand was "irrational and wholly
arbitrary" and that the Village ultimately
connected her property after receiving a clearly
adequate 15-foot easement. These allegations,
quite apart from the Village's subjective
motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for
relief under traditional equal protection
analysis. We therefore affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, but do not reach the
alternative theory of "subjective ill will”
relied on by that court.

Id. at 564-65.
Although Olech II could be read as holding that
allegations of irrational and wholly arbitrary conduct will

suffice even absent an allegation of vindictiveness, the Seventh

- 15 -