action because employer was also the plan administrator, and the employer and the plan were
otherwise closely intertwined); Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998);
Garren y. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir. 1997); Taft v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc’y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993). The “administrator” is “the person
specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated”, 29
U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(i).

In the instant case, Hackner’s Complaint does not allege that Hartford is the Plan
administrator. Furthermore, the copy of the Plan attached to the Complaint identifies the Plan
administrator as Havi. Therefore, Hartford is not a proper defendant in Hackner’s ERISA claim
brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(e)(1) and 1132(f).

For the foregoing reasons, Hartford’s Motion to Dismiss is i

2), LOL

“soph W. DARRAH
United States District Judge


“

Minute Orders (06097)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge John W. Darrah Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 1855 DATE 6/27/2002
CASE BARRY HACKNER vs. LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.

e23)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(6) i) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due

(4) a Ruling/Hearingon ss setfor__—sat__

(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_—setfor__—_at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_—ssetfor__——sat_—

1) o Trial[set for/re-set for]on____at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto_—aat__

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) [General Rule 21 OFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Ml [Otherdocketentry] Status hearing held and continued to 8/27/02 at 9:00 a.m. Enter Memorandum

Opinion And Order. Hartford’s motion to dismiss is granted.

| [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

notices required.
No not quired, number of notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff. “WL 01 202

Notified counsel by telephone. date docketed

Docketing to mail notices. a
Mail AO 450 form, 4 ‘Ss ;
4 by} ia} 9 3 ling dept fals

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

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LG deputy's U
initials 43414
Datettimedcivd AU SS

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central Clerk’s Office



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
BARRY HACKNER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 02 C 1855
v. )
) Judge John W. Darrah
LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN FOR )
EMPLOYEES OF THE HAVI GROUP LP and )
HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT ) DOCKETER
INSURANCE COMPANY, )
) JUL 6 1 208g;
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Barry Hackner (“Hackner”), filed suit against Defendants, Long Term Disability
Plan for Employees of the Havi Group LP (“Plan”) and Hartford Life and Accident Insurance
Company (“Hartford”), alleging violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”). Presently before the Court is Hartford’s Motion to Dismiss.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court reviews all facts alleged in the complaint and
any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir.2000). Dismissal is
warranted only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claims that would entitle
it to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

A reading of the Complaint supports the following summary of the alleged conduct of the
parties.

Hackner was an employee of the Havi Group LP (‘“Havi”). Hartford issued and

underwrote a group long-term disability insurance plan provided to Havi’s employees. In

rol


December 1996, Hackner ceased working at Havi due to acute bipolar disorder. Subsequent to
ceasing his employment, Hackner made a claim for benefits under the Plan. Hartford approved
Hackner’s claim and began paying benefits on March 3, 1997. Hartford continued to pay
benefits until March 2, 1999,

In addition to Hartford’s benefits, Hackner was approved to receive social security
disability benefits. The Social Security Administration determined that Hackner was “disabled”
since September 1996. Hackner continues to receive social security benefits.

As a result of Hackner’s receipt of social security benefits, Hartford demanded that
Hackner reimburse the social security benefit payments that duplicated payments made by
Hartford. Hartford also demanded reimbursement of dependent benefits paid by social security
on Hackner’s social security wage earners account. Hackner remitted all payments demanded by
Hartford.

Following the termination of his benefits by Hartford, Hackner appealed the denial of his
continued receipt of benefits from Hartford. Hartford denied reinstating Hackner’s benefits.
Hackner alleges that Hartford had no basis for demanding and receiving his dependent payments
from social security and has wrongfully refused to reinstate his benefits.

Hartford argues that it should be dismissed because it is not a proper party under ERISA.

Ordinarily, in a suit to recover benefits of a Plan brought pursuant to ERISA, the plaintiff
may only bring suit against the Plan. See Riordan v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 549,
551 (7th Cir. 1997); Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1490 (7th Cir.
1996). However, suits for benefits may also be brought against the plan administrator. See Mein

v. Carus Corp., 241 F.3d 581, 583 (7th Cir. 2001) (employer was proper defendant in ERISA