J-S49001-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LASHAWN D. SANDERS

Appellant No. 3521 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered October 27, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008238-2009

BEFORE: PANELLA J., and OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 05, 2016

Lashawn D. Sanders (“Appellant”) appeals pro se from the order 

dismissing as untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history may be summarized as 

follows. On December 16, 2008, Appellant was arrested and charged with 

rape, robbery, and related offenses. Following various continuances 

requested by the both the Commonwealth and Appellant, as well as a mental 

health evaluation for Appellant and the denial of his suppression motion, 

Appellant pled guilty on May 27, 2011. On August 31, 2011 the trial court 

sentenced him, in accordance with the plea agreement, to an aggregate 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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term of 121⁄2 to 25 years imprisonment, followed by 15 years of probation. 

Appellant did not file a direct appeal.

On October 18, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel, who filed a “no-merit” letter and petition to 

withdraw, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 

1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en 

banc), based upon PCRA counsel’s conclusion that Appellant’s petition was 

untimely. On September 14, 2015, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent 

to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Appellant sent his response directly 

to the PCRA court’s chambers. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition 

as untimely, and permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw. This timely appeal 

follows. 

Appellant raises five issues involving trial court error, constitutional 

violations, or the ineffectiveness of counsel. See Appellant’s Brief at e.- f. 

Before addressing them, however, we must first determine whether the 

PCRA court correctly concluded that Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition was 

untimely filed. 

The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. See 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an 
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exception to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met. A PCRA petition invoking one of these 

statutory exceptions must “be filed within 60 days of the date the claims 

could have been presented.” Id., at 651-52 (citations omitted). See also 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 30, 

2011, when the thirty-day time period for filing an appeal to this Court 

expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Appellant needed to file 

the petition at issue by September 30, 2012, in order for it to be timely. As 

Appellant filed the instant petition over a year later, it is untimely unless he 

has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated 

exceptions applies. 

Within his PCRA petition, Appellant neither acknowledged the PCRA’s 

time bar nor attempted to prove any exception thereto. Thus, the PCRA 

court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s 

untimely PCRA petition. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying 

Appellant post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/5/2016