This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 1 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 2 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 3 deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 4 filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 29,591 9 FERNANDA COBRERA, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Kenneth H. Martinez, District Judge 13
Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Andrea Sassa, Assistant Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acti ng Chief Public Defender 18 Allison H. Jaramillo, Assist ant Appellate Defender 19 Santa Fe, NM 20 for Appellant 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 KENNEDY, Judge. 232 Fernanda Cobrera (Defendant) broke into her ex-husband’s house and destroyed 1 the personal property of her ex-husband’s new girlfriend (Victim), who had recently 2 moved into his house. Defendant was charged and convicted of criminal damage to 3 property over $1000. Defendant argues that the State failed to introduce sufficient 4 evidence regarding the value of the property. We agree and reverse Defendant’s 5 conviction. 6 As we review the case for sufficient evid ence to support the verdict, we analyze 7 “whether the evidence . . . could justify a finding by any rational trier of fact that each 8 element of the crime charged has b een established beyond a reasonable doubt.”State 9 v. Sanders , 117 N.M. 452, 456, 872 P.2d 870, 874 ( 1994). “When determining the 10 sufficiency of the evidence, the court views the evidence ina light most favorable to 11 the verdict, considering that the [s]tat e has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 12 doubt.” State v. Garcia , 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 12, 138 N.M. 1, 116 P.3d 72. 13 In this case, the jury was correctly instructed, in accordance with UJI 14-1510 14 NMRA, that the “Amount of Damage” 15 means the difference between the price at which the property could 16 ordinarily be bought or sold prior to the damage and the price at which 17 the property could be bought or sold after the damage. If the cost of 18 repair of the damaged property ex ceeds the replacement cost of the 19 property, the value of the damage d property is the replacement cost. 203 “It is clear that an owner of personal property may testify concerning the value of the 1 property and that such testimony is sufficient to support a jury’s determination of 2 value.” State v. Hughes , 108 N.M. 143, 145-46, 767 P.2d 382, 384-85 (Ct. App. 3 1988). Nonetheless, we have consistently held that, to establish value of the goods 4 just prior to the damage, the State must produce evidence of some thing more than the 5 original cost of the goods. In cases like th is, we have determined the evidence to be 6 sufficient when the State has provided evidence of the pri ce of the goods when 7 purchased if such information was coupledwith evidence regarding “the age and 8 condition of the goods [when destroyed or stolen,]” State v. Barr , 1999-NMCA-081, 9 ¶ 30, 127 N.M. 504, 984 P.2d 185, or “the amountthat [the testifying owner], as an 10 informed buyer, would pay for each item in its condition at trial.” Hughes , 108 N.M. 11 at 146, 767 P.2d at 385. 12 Here, the State contends that Victim tes tified “about the cost she paid for these 13 items and the condition the items were in before and after Defendant damaged them[, 14 thus] provid[ing] sufficient evidence for the jury to determine value.” After careful 15 review of the record, we conclude that th e testimony produced at trial was insufficient 16 to provide the jury with enough evidence to determine the value of the goods prior to 17 being damaged. At trial, the State introduced testimony from Victim about how much 18 it cost her to purchase the property that Defe ndant damaged. Victim testified that the 194 following items were damaged: a living room set consisti ng of three sofas and three 1 coffee tables, several paintings, six dining room chairs, dishes for twelve settings, a 2 television, stereo, VCR, and a set of porcel ain dolls. She testified that she purchased 3 the living room set for $1900, the paintings for $1400, the dining room set for $550, 4 the stereo for $40, the television for $100, and the collectable doll set for $500. The 5 State also provided photographs of the property in its damaged state. 6 Yet, none of this evidence informs the jury about the worth of the property at 7 the time it was damaged, or “the differen ce between the price at which the property 8 could ordinarily be bought or sold prior to the damage and the price at which the 9 property could be bought or sold after th e damage.” UJI 14-1510. The State’s 10 reference to Victim testifying about “the condition the items were in before and after 11 Defendant damaged them” merelyrefers to Victim stating that the items had been “all 12 destroyed as if they had been slashed with a knife” and that the items were not 13 damaged “[p]rior to [Victim] going to wo rk.” We know nothing about the age or 14 condition of the goods prior to the crime, th e possible cost of repair, or how much it 15 would cost to purchase an equivalent replacement for the goods should the cost of 16 repair exceed the replacement cost. 17 Testimony solely about purchase price without evidence of present value cannot 18 justify a finding by a rational trier of f act that Defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, 195 damaged property worth more than $1000. Therefore, we reverse Defendant’s 1 conviction for criminal damage to property over $1000. 2 We also hold that double jeopardy bars retrial because Defendant’s conviction 3 was not supported by sufficient evidence. State v. Sanchez , 2000-NMSC-021, ¶ 30, 4 129 N.M. 284, 6 P.3d 486 (“[T]he Double Jeopar dy Clause, U.S. Const. art. V, . . . 5 bar[s] retrial if [the d]efendant’s convictions are not supported by sufficient 6 evidence.”). We remand to the district c ourt for proceedings consistent with this 7 opinion. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

_______________________________ 10 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 11

WE CONCUR: 12

___________________________ 13 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 14

___________________________ 15 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 16