In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-3354

Ronnie L. McAtee,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

Roger D. Cowan,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00-C-1339--Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

Submitted April 23, 2001--Decided April 23, 2001

Opinion May 15, 2001/1

 Before Easterbrook, Manion, and Diane P.

Wood, Circuit Judges.

 Per Curiam. Illinois inmate Ronnie

McAtee filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus challenging two prison dis

ciplinary proceedings that resulted in

his loss of good-time credits. The

district court dismissed McAtee’s

petition after concluding that he failed

to exhaust all state judicial remedies,

thus procedurally defaulting his claims.

We affirm.

 In February 1997, McAtee scuffled with

several guards outside of his cell at Big

Muddy Correctional Center. The incident

resulted in his immediate transfer to the

segregation unit at Menard Correctional

Center and charges of violating prison

rules, assault, and disobeying a direct

order. Eleven days after his transfer to

Menard, McAtee appeared at a disciplinary

hearing before the Prison Adjustment

Committee (PAC). He denied committing the

infractions, but the PAC found him

guilty, revoked one year of good-time

credits, and imposed other sanctions not

relevant here. McAtee appealed to the

Prison Review Board (PRB) and to the

Director of the Department of

Corrections. The PRB and the Director

denied his appeal on August 14, 1997.

McAtee then filed a grievance with the
Administrative Review Board (ARB). The

ARB referred the grievance to Internal

Affairs, which discovered that one of the

officers who squabbled with McAtee had

falsified and concealed his actions in

relation to the incident. McAtee

petitioned the PRB for restoration of his

good-time credits, but never received a

response. Some time later McAtee was

transferred to Pontiac Correctional

Center. In July 1998 he was involved in a

similar altercation with several Pontiac

guards and charged with violating prison

rules, damaging state property, and

disobeying a direct order. The PAC found

him guilty and revoked three months of

good-time credits. McAtee’s

administrative appeals and grievances

seeking relief from this sanction were

denied in August 1998.

 McAtee filed a timely action for

mandamus in Illinois court seeking

restoration of his good-time credits./2

McAtee claimed that his due process

rights were violated because his first

disciplinary hearing was not held within

eight days after the Big Muddy incident

occurred, there was insufficient evidence

to support the charges, the PAC failed to

adequately explain in writing its reasons

for sanctioning him, and the PAC failed

to disclose exculpatory evidence. The

state court dismissed his complaint on

May 3, 1999, concluding that McAtee’s

hearing was timely, the PAC adequately

explained its findings, and the evidence

was sufficient to support the charges.

The court also found that McAtee could

not show that the PAC members failed to

carry out their ministerial duties, a

requirement for mandamus relief. McAtee

did not appeal this decision to the

Illinois Appellate Court because he

missed the deadline to file his notice of

appeal. Instead, McAtee petitioned for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

sec. 2254 in the Central District of

Illinois. The district court determined

that McAtee was in custody in the

Northern District of Illinois, and

transferred his petition there pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241(d). The district

court dismissed, concluding that McAtee

procedurally defaulted his claims by not

appealing the adverse judgment.

 State prisoners challenging the

deprivation of good-time credits by way

of a habeas corpus petition must exhaust
adequate and available state remedies

before proceeding to federal court. 28

U.S.C. sec. 2254 (b)(1); Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973).

The state remedies that must be exhausted

in the prison-disciplinary context,

however, vary from state to state. For

instance, Indiana has no judicial

procedure for reviewing prison

disciplinary hearings, so Indiana inmates

may immediately petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in federal court after

exhausting their internal administrative

remedies. Harris v. Duckworth, 909 F.2d

1057, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing

Hasty v. Broglin, 531 N.E.2d 200, 201

(Ind. 1988)). On the other hand,

Wisconsin inmates have a judicial remedy-

-a petition for a common law writ of

certiorari to the Wisconsin state courts,

see Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 637

(7th Cir. 2000); Hamlin v. Vandenberg, 95

F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1996); Peckham v.

Krenke, 601 N.W.2d 287, 289-90 (Wis. Ct.

App. 1999)--that they must exhaust before

filing their federal petitions. Like

their Wisconsin neighbors, Illinois

inmates seeking restoration of good-time

credits lost due to constitutionally

infirm disciplinary hearings have a

judicial remedy: they can file a

complaint for an order of mandamus from

an Illinois circuit court. See Johnson v.

McGinnis, 734 F.2d 1193, 1198-99 (7th

Cir. 1984). If dissatisfied with the

result, the inmate must invoke one

complete round of the normal appellate

process, including seeking discretionary

review before the state supreme court.

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

845-48 (1999). McAtee started the process

but failed to finish it.

 McAtee argues that under the

circumstances he should be allowed to

proceed. First, relying on Wilwording v.

Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), he asserts

that he was not required to seek a state

mandamus remedy as a prerequisite to

proceeding in federal court. He misreads

Wilwording. Wilwording holds that state

prisoners are not required to pursue

separate state remedies that could be

available before filing a habeas corpus

petition in federal court, so long as the

prisoner has allowed the state courts one

fair opportunity to pass upon and correct

the alleged violations. 404 U.S. at 250.

Thus, if McAtee had another adequate and

available avenue for relief and took

advantage of it, he would not be required
to seek an order of mandamus as well. An

action for mandamus, however, is the

preferred procedure in Illinois for

remedying unfair prison disciplinary

hearings. McAtee started on the correct

procedural route but failed to see it

through.

 He also claims that under Smith v.

Digmon, 434 U.S. 332 (1978), he was not

required to appeal the dismissal of his

mandamus action. But Smith holds that

federal courts cannot assume a claim has

been procedurally defaulted merely

because the state courts fail to mention

the claim in their opinions. 434 U.S. at

333-34. Here, the Illinois appellate and

supreme courts were never presented with

the opportunity to discuss McAtee’s

claims because he did not appeal.

 Finally, McAtee contends that his

failure to appeal should be excused

because the state court erroneously

believed it lacked the authority to

review his disciplinary hearing by way of

an action for mandamus. That is not a

fair reading of the court’s order--the

state court did review McAtee’s due

process claims. But in any event, the

power of the Illinois courts to review

prison disciplinary proceedings and

restore good time credits for violations

of both federal and state law is wellestablished. See Durbin v. Gilmore, 718

N.E.2d 292, 294-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999);

Armstrong v. Washington, 682 N.E.2d 761,

762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Shea v.

Edwards, 581 N.E.2d 822, 823 (Ill. App.

Ct. 1991); Taylor v. Franzen, 417 N.E.2d

242, 247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People ex

rel. Stringer v. Rowe, 414 N.E.2d 466,

469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). If the state

court dismissed McAtee’s complaint

because it erroneously believed

otherwise, McAtee should have appealed.

Moreover, to excuse procedural

defaulthabeas corpus petitioners must

show cause and prejudice for failing to

fairly present their claims to the state

courts or that a fundamental miscarriage

of justice will occur, Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991), and

McAtee did not attempt to make either

showing, see Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d

325, 329 (7th Cir. 2001).

 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.
FOOTNOTES

/1 Pursuant to Circuit Rule 53, this opinion was

originally issued as an unpublished order on

April 23, 2001. The court, upon request, issues

this decision as an opinion.

/2 Illinois has abolished "writs" of mandamus.

Instead, litigants must file a complaint requesting an order of mandamus as relief. See 735 ILCS

5/14-102; People ex rel. Braver v. Washington,

724 N.E.2d 68, 70 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).