J-A14040-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

CRYSTAL NOEL STALLINGS,

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

No. 1314 MDA 2014

 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 30, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000943-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JUNE 16, 2015

Crystal Noel Stallings (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following her conviction for two counts of aggravated 

assault. Upon review, we affirm.

The facts of this case can be summarized as follows. Around 10:00 

p.m. on November 15, 2012, an incident occurred between Appellant and 

the Victim, Shawntaya Council outside of the apartment shared by Appellant 

and her girlfriend, Brandy. Brandy’s six-year-old daughter was also at the 

home. Prior to the incident, Stacy Myers, Victim’s girlfriend and a friend of 

Appellant, picked up the Victim after work that night. Another friend, 

Sharday, called the Victim and told her that Appellant wanted to “resolve the 
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issue” with the Victim. N.T., 11/12/2013, at 82.1 Stacy and the Victim drove 

to Appellant’s apartment.2 Appellant, who resided on the second floor, went 

downstairs when the Victim and Stacy arrived. Sharday was also there, but 

had driven separately. The Victim testified that when Appellant came down 

the stairs, “she didn’t look like herself.” Id. at 114. Appellant was carrying 

“two knives, one in each hand[,]” and was “fidgety.” Id. at 114, 118. The 

Victim and Appellant engaged in a conversation, witnessed by Sharday and 

Stacy. The Victim, concerned for her safety, moved so she was standing on 

the other side of a fence, then “swung out of defense for” herself, missing

Appellant. Id. at 118. After the Victim took a second swing, which made 

contact with Appellant’s face, Appellant went around the fence and stabbed 

the Victim with both knives, injuring her upper abdomen and her neck.

The Victim then ran away, past Stacy and Sharday, with Appellant 

chasing her. The Victim then spotted a police officer, Officer Christopher 

Roosen, who called for an ambulance and backup. The Victim told Officer 

Roosen that she was stabbed by Appellant. The Victim required extensive 

 

1 The Victim testified that this “issue” involved Appellant’s telling Stacy that 

the Victim was “cheating on” Stacy. N.T., 11/12/2013, at 108. 

2 The Victim used to live at that apartment, and Appellant and Brandy 

moved in when she moved out. Both the Victim and Stacy went to 

Appellant’s home on a daily basis. It was their custom to park in the back of 

the apartment and take a walkway to access the front of the complex. 
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surgery to repair the damage to her abdomen and was hospitalized for 

several days.

Officer Timothy Clymer and two other police officers responded to the 

area. Appellant let Officer Clymer into the apartment where he observed an 

open pocketknife. Officer Matthew Irvin took Appellant into custody, and 

during this time, Appellant tried to explain why she stabbed the Victim. 

Appellant was charged with two counts of aggravated assault in 

connection with this incident. A jury trial commenced on November 12, 

2013, and Appellant was found guilty as to both counts. On December 30, 

2013, Appellant was sentenced, in the mitigated range, to 42 to 84 months’ 

incarceration. Appellant filed timely a post-sentence motion, which was 

denied on May 27, 2014. Appellant filed a notice of appeal; however, that 

appeal was quashed by this Court as untimely filed.3 Appellant’s direct 

appeal rights were restored nunc pro tunc, and she filed timely a notice of 

appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant sets forth three issues for our review. 

[1.] Whether the Commonwealth presented insufficient 

evidence to overcome Appellant’s belief that she was reasonably 

in immediate fear of serious bodily injury or death when

surrounded by multiple, potentially armed, attackers with no 

avenue of complete safety to retreat?

 

3 The notice of appeal was filed one day late.
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[2.] Whether the Commonwealth presented insufficient 

evidence to overcome Appellant’s belief that she was reasonably 

in immediate fear of serious bodily injury or death because 

Appellant had a reasonable belief that the victim was armed with 

a firearm at the time Appellant stabbed the victim?

[3.] Whether the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence because the evidence demonstrates Appellant’s use of 

deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances.

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers omitted).

Appellant’s first two claims challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.4 

She contends the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence to rebut 

her claim that she acted in self-defense. Appellant’s Brief at 12-15. We 

review this claim mindful of our well-settled standard of review.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

 

4 Appellant addresses her first two issues together, and we will do the same.
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and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, 

part or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa. Super. 2014).

According to our Supreme Court, the justified use of 

deadly force requires:

a) the actor was free from fault in provoking or 

continuing the difficulty which resulted in the use of 

deadly force; b) the actor must have reasonably 

believed that he was in imminent danger of death or 

serious bodily injury, and that there was a necessity 

to use such force in order to save himself or others 

therefrom; and c) the actor did not violate any duty 

to retreat or to avoid the danger.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 542 Pa. 134, 137, 665 A.2d 1172, 

1174 (1995). The defendant has no “burden to prove” his selfdefense claim. Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 219, 224, 

766 A.2d 342, 345 (2001). The Supreme Court explained the 

evidentiary burdens as follows:

While there is no burden on a defendant to prove the 

[self-defense] claim, before that defense is properly 

at issue at trial, there must be some evidence, from 

whatever source to justify a finding of self-defense. 

If there is any evidence that will support the claim, 

then the issue is properly before the fact finder.

Id. (internal citations omitted). If the defendant properly raises 

“self-defense under Section 505 of the Pennsylvania Crimes 

Code, the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant’s act was not justifiable 

self-defense.” Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 

1229–30 (Pa. Super. 2005).

The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it 

establishes at least one of the following: 1) the 

accused did not reasonably believe that he was in 

danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the 

accused provoked or continued the use of force; or 
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3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the retreat 

was possible with complete safety.

Commonwealth v. Hammond, 953 A.2d 544, 559 (Pa. Super. 

2008). The Commonwealth must establish only one of these 

three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to insulate its case 

from a self-defense challenge to the evidence. The 

Commonwealth can negate a self-defense claim if it proves the 

defendant did not reasonably believe he was in imminent danger 

of death or great bodily injury and it was necessary to use 

deadly force to save himself from that danger. 

The requirement of reasonable belief encompasses 

two aspects, one subjective and one objective. First, 

the defendant must have acted out of an honest, 

bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger, 

which involves consideration of the defendant’s 

subjective state of mind. Second, the defendant’s 

belief that he needed to defend himself with deadly 

force, if it existed, must be reasonable in light of the 

facts as they appeared to the defendant, a 

consideration that involves an objective analysis.

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 617 Pa. 527, 551, 53 A.3d 738, 

752 (2012). 

Smith, 97 A.3d at 786-87 (some citations omitted).

Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that she 

“did not reasonably believe that [s]he was in danger of death or serious 

bodily injury.” Id. at 787. Appellant contends her belief that she feared for 

her life was subjectively reasonable because she knew that the Victim “had a 

concealed weapons permit, owned a firearm, and was known to carry a razor 

[blade] in her purse.” Appellant’s Brief at 13.
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The trial court concluded that there was “no evidence that the [V]ictim 

was armed with any weapon or that it was reasonable for [Appellant] to 

think the [V]ictim was armed under the circumstances.” Trial Court Opinion, 

10/30/2014, at 7. “Simply put, [Appellant] brought not just one but two 

knives to a fist fight.” Id.

Appellant’s testimony is instructive. When asked if she could see any 

weapons during the altercation, Appellant testified as follows: “Not visibly, 

but there was an incident, like, when we were on talking terms, that [the 

Victim] and Sharday were kind of joking around and [the Victim] knocked 

[Sharday’s] purse over and a razor blade fell out. [The Victim] also has a 

permit to carry a gun.” N.T., 11/12/2013, at 178. Appellant further testified 

that she saw the Victim with a gun about a month earlier, and she saw 

Sharday with a razor blade the week prior.

It is well-settled that “issues of whether a defendant acts out of an 

honest, bona fide belief and whether such belief was reasonable are 

questions properly resolved by the finder of fact.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 

629 A.2d 949, 952 (Pa. Super. 1993). Here, the Commonwealth called into 

doubt Appellant’s testimony by presenting evidence that Appellant did not 

bring this information to the attention of the police when she was 

interviewed after the incident. N.T., 11/12/2013, at 186-87. Moreover, 

Appellant conceded that she never saw a weapon on either the Victim or 
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Sharday during the altercation. “Although the Commonwealth is required to 

disprove a claim of self-defense arising from any source beyond a 

reasonable doubt, a jury is not required to believe the testimony of the 

defendant who raises the claim.” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 

818, 824 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, this evidence, which the jury 

clearly credited, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant did not 

reasonably believe she was in danger of imminent death or serious bodily 

injury. Thus, this claim for relief fails.

Because the evidence was sufficient to show that Appellant’s belief 

that she was in danger was unreasonable, the Commonwealth satisfied its 

burden to prove that Appellant’s stabbing of the Victim was not justifiable 

self-defense. As the Commonwealth is only required to satisfy one element 

of the aforementioned test, we need not consider Appellant’s arguments as 

to the others. Therefore, we hold that the Commonwealth sustained its 

burden “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s act was 

not justifiable self-defense.” Smith, 97 A.3d at 787.

In Appellant’s final issue, she contends that the verdict was against 

the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 16-18. In her brief, 

Appellant sets forth several purported inconsistencies in the Victim’s 

testimony and contends the jury “ignored facts that were of such greater 
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weight than what they used to convict her that [Appellant’s] conviction 

shocks [the] conscience[.]” Id. at 18.

We set forth our well-settled standard of review. 

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 

Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial 

court’s discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled 

that the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial 

based on a weight of the evidence claim is only warranted where 

the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks 

one’s sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has 

been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s 

discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted 

where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable 

abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135-36 (Pa. 2011) (quotations 

and citations omitted).

The trial court concluded the following.

[Appellant] took the stand and testified to her version of 

events. The jury was free to believe all, part or none of 

[Appellant’s] testimony, as they were with each and every 

Commonwealth witness. [Appellant] is not entitled to a new trial 

when challenging the weight of the evidence simply because 

[Appellant’s] version of events may conflict with another 

witness’s version. In this case, the jury found the testimony of 

the [V]ictim and other Commonwealth witnesses to be credible. 

The jury weighed this testimony with [Appellant’s] testimony and 

found [Appellant’s] acts were not justified under the theory of 

self-defense. This conclusion by the jury does not shock [the 

trial court’s] sense of justice. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/2014, at 10.
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We discern no abuse of discretion in the manner in which the trial 

court disposed of Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence claim. Accordingly, 

Appellant is not entitled to relief on her claim that the verdict was against 

the weight of the evidence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/16/2015