54 (electric company’s act of shutting off service not state action). Here, defendants’ conduct of
either transporting or refusing to transport an individual cannot be fairly treated as that of action of
the state.

A nominal private entity can also be considered a state actor when it has been delegated a
public function by the state. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (elective process); Public
Utilities Comm’n of Dist. of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (public transit system), Marsh
y, Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945) (streets of a company town). In the instant case, the defendants
are privately owned cab companies that have not been delegated a public function by the State. The
defendant cab companies offer transportation to individuals only on an on-demand basis.

Conduct ofa private entity may also constitute state action if the private party conspired with
state actors to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (white school teacher alleged that restaurant had conspired with local
police to deny her service and later have her arrested because she was in the company of black
students). Here, there are no allegations or inferences that may be drawn from Warren’s complaint
that the defendants conspired with any state actors in refusing to provide him with transportation.

For the reasons stated above, the defendants’ conduct does not constitute state action. While
not condoning the alleged conduct of the defendants, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed without

prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffis given leave to file anjamended complaint, if any,

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within 21 days of the date of this order.
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Dated: why 8,

vom W. DARRAH

United States District Judge


ct -Miayes Order Form (06/97)

WA United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
NipGesaesent sos | John W, Dara Sting Seas fOr
CASE NUMBER 01 C 5395 DATE 1/30/2002
CASE MELVIN WARREN vs. HOWARD CAB COMPANY
TITLE

{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented}

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) o Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.

(4) QO Ruling/Hearingon____setfor___att

(5) a Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__at

(6) i) Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor__—sat__
(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at

(8) im) (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued toa.

(9) Qa This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

CUFRCP4(m) (General Rule2! OO FRCP4I({a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

co) «off [Other docket entry] Status hearing held. Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. Plaintiff's
complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is given leave to file an
amended complaint, if any, within 21 days of the date of this order.

ad ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required, number of notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff. FES 67 2002

Notified counsel by telephone.

date docketer
VW | Docketing to mail notices
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETED

FEB 1 2002
MELVIN WARREN,

Plaintiff,
No. 01 C 5395
Vv.
Judge John W. Darrah
HOWARD CAB COMPANY and STAR CAB
COMPANY,

Defendants,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Melvin Warren (Warren), filed a complaint, pro se, against defendants, Howard Cab
Company and Star Cab Company. Presently before the Court is defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff did not file a response to defendants’ motion.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the events as specified in the
complaint as true, and all ambiguities are construed in favor of the plaintiffs. Curtis v. Bembeneck,
48 F.3d 281, 283 (7th Cir 1995). Federal notice pleading requires that a plaintiff “set out in [the]
complaint a short and plain statement of the claim that will provide the defendant with fair notice
of the claim.” Scott v. City of Chicago, 195 F.3d 950, 951 (7th Cir. 1999). When a complaint is
prepared by a pro se litigant, the complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only when
it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Haines y. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972).

Plaintiff, a double amputee, alleges that the defendants refused to transport him because of
his disability. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his “Civil Rights by

refusing to transport [him] because of [his] disability (a double amputee).” The complaint further


alleges that jurisdiction properly lies in this Court because the taxi cab companies’ refusal to
transport plaintiff violated his “rights to the Equal Protection of the law under the 14" Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution” and his “Rights to Due Process of law.” The complaint repeatedly refers
to the cab companies’ actions as infringing on plaintiffs constitutional rights under the 14"
Amendment.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is directed at the states;
therefore, it can only be violated by conduct that is characterized as “state action”. Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 923 (1982) (Lugar). Whether conduct falls under the purview of
the Fourteenth Amendment is determined in a two-part analysis. “First, the deprivation must be
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by rule of conduct imposed
by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible ... Second, the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person fairly said to be a state actor.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.

Plaintiff does not allege, nor can it be inferred from his complaint, the alleged deprivation
is caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state or by rule of conduct imposed
by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible.

As to the second part of the analysis, conduct by private parties can, under certain
circumstances, constitute state action. The Supreme Court has articulated several tests to determine
whether a party should be considered a state actor. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (listing several tests).

Under the “nexus test”, there must be a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the
challenged action of a regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
the state itself. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (Jackson). Even

heavily regulated businesses’ conduct may not constitute state action. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-