Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-937 | October 8, 2019 Page 1 of 22

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:

A.E. (MOTHER) 

Justin R. Wall

Huntington, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:

D.M. (FATHER) 

Yvonne M. Spillers

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILD SERVICES

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Barrow

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-937 | October 8, 2019 Page 2 of 22

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of: E.M. (Minor 

Child), 

and

A.E. (Mother), and D.M. 

(Father)

Appellants-Respondents, 

v. 

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner. 

October 8, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-937 

Appeal from the Wells Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kenton W. 

Kiracofe, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

90C01-1808-JT-32 

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In this consolidated appeal, A.E. (“Mother”) and D.M., II (“Father”) appeal 

the termination of their parental rights to E.M. (the “Child”). We affirm. 

Issue 

[2] Mother and Father each raise one issue, which we restate as whether the 

evidence is sufficient to support the termination of Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights to the Child.
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Facts

[3] The Child was born in August 2009 to Father and Mother. The Child has an 

older half-sibling, M.E., who was born to Mother in December 2000. M.E., 

who “aged out” prior to the conclusion of these termination of parental rights 

proceedings is not a subject of this appeal. Mother’s Br. p. 7 n.1. 

[4] The Wells County Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved

with Mother and the children in November 2014 as a result of domestic 

violence between Mother and Father and concerns about Mother’s and Father’s

substance abuse. Mother and Father abused methamphetamine in 2012 and 

2013. A child in need of services (“CHINS”) case was initiated and was 

ultimately closed in December 2015. The children were reunified with Mother

at that time. Father pleaded guilty to battery resulting in bodily injury, a Level 

6 felony, and he was sentenced to 547 days with 182 days in the Department of 

Correction and the remainder suspended to home detention. 

[5] On September 21, 2016, DCS attempted to interview M.E. regarding a report 

that Mother was allowing the children to have interactions with a registered sex 

offender. Mother, however, refused to allow the interview. On September 27, 

2016, Mother was arrested for domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor; 

criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor; and residential entry, a Level 6 

felony. DCS then removed the children from Mother’s care. At that time, 

Father was incarcerated for a probation violation after he was charged with 

residential entry, a Level 6 felony.
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[6] DCS filed a petition alleging that the Child was a CHINS. DCS alleged:

f. On September 23, 2016 allegations were made that 

[Mother] was not making good decisions and allowing 

[M.E.] and [the Child] to be around random men.

g. [Mother] meets with men, sometimes at her own residence 

with [M.E.] present in the residence, she gets pills and 

money for meeting with men, she uses the money to pay 

bills, and she uses drugs.

h. [Mother] used to be romantically involved with Jeremy 

Williams.

i. Jeremy Williams has been convicted of a sex offense.

j. Jeremy Williams has spent time around both [M.E.] and 

[the Child].

k. [M.E.] rode with [Mother] to meet a man to get Aderol 

[sic] pills from him.

l. [M.E.] reported that [Mother] asked her to find someone 

to get [Mother’s] Adderall from [sic].

m. [M.E.] reported that she went to Fort Wayne with her 

mother on one occasion to meet a man.

n. [M.E.] reported that her mother didn’t want to go alone.

o. [M.E.] stated that her mother made her sit next to the man 

and he rubbed her arm and was stocking [sic] her leg.
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p. [M.E.] reported that her mother is verbally abusive and 

physically abusive by calling her names, yelling at her and 

shoving her.

q. [The Child] reported that her mother yells at her and says 

bad words.

r. [Mother] was uncooperative with the Indiana Department 

of Child Services trying to interview [M.E.].

s. [Mother] was arrested on charges of domestic battery for 

battering her own sister in from [sic] of her sister’s 

daughter. She was arrested and subsequently released on 

her own recognizance.

t. [M.E.] stated that she was able to get $3700.00 from her 

mother’s boyfriends to go towards [Mother’s] bond.

u. [M.E.] stated that “these men” that [Mother] has contact 

with is [sic] for the purpose of getting their bills paid.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 79-80.

[7] On January 10, 2017, Mother pleaded guilty to domestic battery, a Class A 

misdemeanor, and residential entry, a Level 6 felony. Mother was sentenced to 

730 days suspended to probation. Mother testified that she also has been 

charged with driving while suspended at least three times. It appears that 

Mother’s probation was revoked in July 2017 due to drug and alcohol usage, 

and she was required to serve fifty-eight days executed and 248 days on home 

detention. On February 3, 2017, Father pleaded guilty to residential entry, a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-937 | October 8, 2019 Page 6 of 22

Level 6 felony, and he was sentenced to 730 days with 290 days executed in the 

DOC and the remainder suspended to probation. 

[8] On March 2, 2017, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the 

Child was a CHINS. The trial court issued a dispositional order that required 

Mother and Father in part to: (1) maintain contact with DCS; (2) engage in a 

home-based counseling program; (3) complete a substance abuse assessment 

and follow all recommendations; (4) submit to random drug/alcohol screens; 

(5) refrain from committing acts of domestic violence and other illegal 

activities; and (6) attend all scheduled visitations with the Child.

[9] At the beginning of the CHINS proceedings, both Mother and Father 

maintained contact with DCS; however, contact between DCS and both 

Mother and Father decreased thereafter. Mother moved residences repeatedly, 

but Father has lived with his uncle throughout the proceedings.

[10] In February 2017, Mother was making progress toward a trial unsupervised 

home visit with the Child. Mother, however, tested positive for marijuana, and 

Mother’s visits with the Child returned to fully supervised visits. In November 

2017, Mother was again progressing toward a trial unsupervised home visit 

with the Child. Mother, however, got behind on her bills and lost her housing. 

Visitations again returned to fully supervised visits. 

[11] In late May 2018, a trial unsupervised home visit between the Child and Father 

was attempted. Father, however, was arrested for public intoxication in mid-
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June 2018 during the trial home visit, and the trial home visit was terminated. 

Father spent two months in jail and was then placed on home detention. 

[12] Between March 23, 2017, and December 27, 2018, DCS performed forty-three 

drug tests on Father, which were negative; however, Father missed twelve drug 

tests. Father claimed to have been working during the missed tests, but he 

failed to provide verification to DCS. Father completed a substance abuse 

assessment in September 2018, and individual therapy was recommended. The 

therapist wanted to work with Father on his “minimization” of the 

consequences of his drug and alcohol usage. Tr. Vol. II p. 136. Father 

attended one therapy session and canceled the second appointment. Father 

never returned to participate in the individual therapy. Father tested positive 

for methamphetamine in December 2018, but Father denies the validity of 

those results. Given the positive drug screen for methamphetamine, the 

therapist testified that she would now recommend “either a relapse prevention 

group setting or a modified intensive outpatient setting.” Id. at 137. 

[13] Between September 2016 and December 2018, Mother tested positive for 

marijuana, alcohol, and methamphetamine, and she tested positive for 

amphetamine sixty-eight times. Mother missed twenty-four drug screens. 

Mother last completed a drug screen on January 10, 2019. Mother completed 

two substance abuse assessments. The first assessment recommended group 

therapy, which Mother completed. Mother, however, relapsed. A second 

assessment also recommended group therapy, but Mother failed to complete the 

therapy. 
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[14] On August 9, 2018, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights to the Child. A hearing was held on January 31, 2019, and 

February 1, 2019. During the CHINS and termination of parental rights 

proceedings, the Child was placed in the same kinship placement as in the prior 

CHINS proceeding. 

[15] At the time of the hearing on the petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights, Father was still living with his uncle and was employed. Father 

did not have a driver’s license; however, Father’s uncle drove Father to places 

as needed. At the time of the termination of parental rights hearing, Father had 

a pending allegation that he violated his home detention by testing positive for 

methamphetamine.

[16] Mother was living with her mother and was unemployed at the time of the 

termination of parental rights hearing. Mother claimed to have completed 

some training and to have a job opportunity as a part-time funeral director 

assistant. Mother testified that she had been “clean” for “over six months”

other than occasional marijuana usage. Id. at 87. Mother testified that she also 

took medication for ADD and depression. 

[17] On March 26, 2019, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of 

law terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. Mother and 

Father now appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-937 | October 8, 2019 Page 9 of 22

Analysis

[18] Mother and Father challenge the termination of their parental relationship with 

the Child. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their 

children. In re K.T.K. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 

N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent’s interest in the upbringing of [his 

or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 

recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 

120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). We recognize that parental interests are not absolute 

and must be subordinated to the child’s best interests when determining the 

proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id. Thus, 

“‘[p]arental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling 

to meet their parental responsibilities by failing to provide for the child’s 

immediate and long-term needs.’” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230 (quoting In re 

D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). 

[19] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the 

evidence or judge witness credibility. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 

2011). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most 

favorable to the judgment. Id. We must also give “due regard” to the trial 

court’s unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. 

(quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). 
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[20] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), “[t]he trial court shall enter 

findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections 

(a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.1

 Here, the 

trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in granting DCS’s 

petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. When reviewing 

findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in a case involving the 

termination of parental rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, 

we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we 

determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the 

trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly 

erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the 

conclusions do not support the judgment. Id. 

[21] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the 

allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true, 

the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section 

1 Indiana Code Sections 31-35-2-8(a) and (b), governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a 

delinquent child or CHINS, provide as follows:

(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the 

allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall 

terminate the parent-child relationship.

(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall 

dismiss the petition.
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31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship 

involving a child in need of services must allege, in part: 

(A) That one (1) of the following is true: 

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for 

at least six (6) months under a dispositional 

decree. 

(ii) The court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-

21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family 

preservation or reunification are not required, 

including a description of the court’s finding, the 

date of the finding, and the manner in which the 

finding was made. 

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and 

has been under the supervision of a local office 

or probation department for at least fifteen (15) 

months of the most recent twenty-two (22) 

months, beginning with the date the child is 

removed from the home as a result of the child 

being alleged to be a child in need of services or 

a delinquent child. 

(B) that one (1) of the following is true: 

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal 

or the reasons for placement outside the 

home of the parents will not be remedied. 
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(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to the well-being of the child. 

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, 

been adjudicated a child in need of services; 

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; 

and 

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and 

treatment of the child. 

DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re 

V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).

A. Father’s Challenge to Findings 

[22] Father challenges the following findings:

16. Mother and Father have a history of substance abuse.

17. Beginning in March 2017, DCS began drug screening Father. 

Father failed to call in and/or take a drug screen on twelve (12) 

occasions when requested. He was tested forty-three (43) times, 

and tested positive for methamphetamine on December 3, 2018.

* * * * *

29. Father completed a substance abuse assessment. The 

assessment recommended Father complete individual therapy. 

Father minimized the consequence of substance abuse. Father 
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only met with the alcohol and drug therapist at Park Center one 

(1) time after the completion of the assessment.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 32-33.

[23] Father argues that he passed multiple drug screens during the proceedings and 

denies the use of methamphetamine. Mother, however, testified that she and 

Father abused methamphetamine in 2012 and 2013 and that Father was 

“cooking it at that time.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 76, 78. Father admitted to having

drug usage issues prior to the first CHINS proceeding. 

[24] Father tested positive for methamphetamine on December 3, 2018. On that

day, Father contacted the family case manager to tell her “he was unable to 

make it to the office” because he was sick. Id. at 122. The family case manager 

knew that Father failed to call for drug testing the prior week and knew that 

Father was scheduled for a drug test. When the family case manager told 

Father that she would come to his house, Father told her “he might be 

sleeping” and his uncle could wake him. Id. The family case manager then 

went to Father’s house to collect the drug test, and Father tested positive.

[25] Father completed a substance abuse assessment in September 2018, which 

recommended individual therapy. The therapist wanted to work with Father 

on his “minimization” of the consequences of his drug and alcohol usage. Id. at

136. Father attended one therapy session and canceled the second 

appointment. Father never returned to participate in the individual therapy. 
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[26] The evidence presented by DCS supports the trial court’s findings regarding 

Father’s drug usage. The trial court’s findings on this issue are not clearly 

erroneous.2

B. Remedy of Conditions Resulting in Removal

[27] Mother and Father challenge the trial court’s conclusion that there is “a 

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or 

the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.”3

 I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). “In determining whether ‘the conditions 

that resulted in the [Child’s] removal . . . will not be remedied,’ we ‘engage in a 

two-step analysis.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting

K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to 

removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability

that those conditions will not be remedied.’” Id. In analyzing this second step, 

the trial court judges the parent’s fitness “as of the time of the termination 

2 Father also challenges the trial court’s findings regarding the testimony of the guardian ad litem (“GAL”). 

We will address Father’s argument in the context of analyzing the Child’s best interest.

3 Mother and Father also argue that there was no reasonable probability that the continuation of the parentchild relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the Child. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is 

written in the disjunctive. Consequently, the DCS was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing 

evidence of a reasonable probability that either: (1) the conditions that resulted in the Child’s removal or the 

reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied, or (2) the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Child. See, e.g., Bester v. Lake County Office of 

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 n.5 (Ind. 2005). The trial court here found a reasonable probability 

that the conditions that resulted in the Child’s removal or reasons for placement outside the home of the 

parents will not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. Accordingly, we do 

not address whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

Child.
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proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” Id. 

(quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152). “We entrust that delicate balance to the 

trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily 

than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts 

to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding 

that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id. 

[28] The trial court concluded, here, that there is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the Child’s removal or the reason for continued 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. In support of 

this conclusion, the trial court made extensive findings of fact. The trial court 

found:

12. Father has an extensive criminal history as evidenced 

by State’s Exhibits 26-38 and 47-51, which includes 

convictions for battery, invasion of privacy, 

residential entry, as well as violations of community 

supervision.

13. Mother also has an extensive criminal history as 

evidenced by State’s Exhibits 39-46.

14. During the pendency of the CHINS matter, Mother 

was convicted of domestic battery and residential 

entry. She was sentenced to two hundred seventyfive (275) days of home detention.

15. At the time of the child’s removal from the home, 

Father was incarcerated.
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16. Mother and Father have a history of substance abuse.

17. Beginning in March 2017, DCS began drug screening 

Father. Father failed to call in and/or take a drug 

screen on twelve (12) occasions when requested. He 

was tested forty-three (43) times, and tested positive 

for methamphetamine on December 3, 2018.

18. During the underlying CHINS case, Mother has 

missed twenty-four (24) drug screens and tested 

positive for THC and methamphetamine, which were 

not prescribed to her, and alcohol.

19. Mother’s use of substances caused her to violate the 

terms and conditions of her home detention and 

probation. Consequently, Mother was ordered to 

serve twenty (20) days in jail.

20. [The Child] was returned to Father’s care under a 

trial home visit in May 2018.

21. During the trial home visit, Father was arrested for 

public intoxication. At the time of his arrest, [the 

Child] was in the care of Father’s aunt. Father was 

incarcerated for six (6) days and placed on probation.

22. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, a petition 

seeking revocation of Father’s suspended sentence 

and probation had been filed and was pending.

23. Throughout the pendency of the CHINS matter, 

Father has resided with his uncle.

24. Father has also maintained employment.
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25. Father does not have a valid driver’s license.

26. Mother has not been able to maintain stable housing 

and currently resides with her mother more than an 

hour away from Wells County, Indiana.

27. Mother has a valid driver’s license, but does not have 

a source of transportation. Due to the lack of 

transportation, Mother frequently missed visitations 

with the child.

28. Mother has frequently missed drug screens and as of 

the date of the fact-finding hearing, DCS could not 

verify her claims of sobriety.

29. Father completed a substance abuse assessment. The 

assessment recommended Father complete individual 

therapy. Father minimized the consequence[s] of 

substance abuse. Father only met with the alcohol 

and drug therapist at Park Center one (1) time after 

the completion of the assessment.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 32-33.

[29] The Child was initially removed because Father was incarcerated, Mother 

allowed the Child to be around a registered sex offender, and Mother abused

drugs. Father and Mother argue that they remedied the conditions that caused 

removal. Father argues that, although he was incarcerated at the time of the 

Child’s removal, he is no longer incarcerated and that he is maintaining 

employment. Mother’s main argument seems to be that she has not been 

provided with enough time to demonstrate her ability to parent the Child. 
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Mother contends that she has demonstrated “remarkable change.” Mother’s 

Br. p. 21. According to Mother, she has taken classes, has employment 

arranged, has been “clean” for six months except occasional marijuana usage, 

and has been actively engaged in therapy and case management services. Id. at

22. Mother argues that she should have been given the opportunity to start her 

new employment and continue with her services.

[30] The family case manager testified that Mother has not remedied the conditions 

resulting in the Child’s removal. Mother does not have housing or employment 

and continues to be dependent on various men. Father has housing and 

employment; however, “he has had a history of being in and out of jail.” Tr. 

Vol. II p. 113. The family case manager repeatedly talked to Father about his 

“poor judgment and poor choices.” Id. at 115. Neither Mother nor Father has 

benefitted from substance abuse services offered, and they continue to test 

positive for illegal substances. 

[31] Although Mother has plans for the future that are admirable, the fact remains 

that the Child has been removed from Mother’s care for more than two years 

with minimal improvement in Mother’s situation. Mother and Father continue 

to make poor choices, and the Child should not be required to be put “on a 

shelf” to wait any longer. See Matter of Campbell, 534 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1989) (“We are unwilling to put [the child] on a shelf until her parents are 

capable of caring for her appropriately. Two years without improvement is 

long enough.”). Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion is not clearly 

erroneous.
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B. Child’s Best Interests

[32] Both Mother and Father argue that it was not in the Child’s best interests to 

terminate their parental rights. In determining what is in the best interests of a 

child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Z.B. v. 

Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. 

denied. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents 

to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is 

proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. 

K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is 

irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social 

development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child 

relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is a “central 

consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[33] Mother argues that she has “the ability, and plan, to provide adequate housing, 

stability and care for the Child” and that it is in the Child’s best interest that 

Mother be allowed “the chance to complete services, maintain housing, start 

her employment and be reunified with the Child.” Mother’s Br. p. 25.

[34] Father argues that he and the Child love each other and get along well, that he 

has stable housing and employment, and that he can provide a safe 

environment for the Child. Father also contends that the GAL “did not 

perform a reasonable investigation” because the GAL was merely “an echochamber for the DCS.” Father’s Br. p. 16. According to Father, the GAL had 
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never met the Child and “did nothing more than talk with the DCS case 

manager and read the DCS reports.” Id. 

[35] The GAL testified that she was also involved with the prior CHINS proceeding

and that, although she was only around the Child once during this termination 

of parental rights proceeding, she spent “significant time” with M.E. Tr. Vol. II 

p. 153. The GAL testified that she gathers information “from lots of different 

sources.” Id. at 151. The GAL had many concerns with Mother and Father—

mainly that they have shown little improvement over the course of two CHINS 

proceedings. The GAL testified that her concern is that Mother and Father 

“really haven’t been able to address the things that continue to get into their 

way to provide any kind of stable home for this child.” Id. at 155. The record 

does not support Father’s assertion that the GAL was merely an “echo-chamber 

for the DCS.” Father’s Br. p. 16. The GAL demonstrated that she was familiar 

with the family due to her involvement with the current and prior CHINS 

proceedings; she spent significant time with the Child’s sister, M.E.; and she 

was well aware of the issues Mother and Father continued to present. The trial 

court did not err by relying on the GAL’s testimony. 

[36] The Child has been in one kinship placement for over two years, and she was in 

the same placement during the prior CHINS proceedings. She is “very 

familiar” with the placement, and “she has never had any concerns in that 

home.” Id. at 113-114. The Child loves the family, “knows what to expect in 

their home,” knows that “things are not gonna [sic] change,” and “feels 

extremely comfortable and is able to talk to them about anything.” Id. at 114. 
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The family case manager “see[s] a whole different side of [the Child] when [she 

sees] her with them than with anybody else.” Id. Both the GAL and the family 

case manager testified that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights 

was in the Child’s best interest. Given the circumstances here, we cannot say 

the trial court’s conclusion that termination of parental rights was in the Child’s 

best interest is clearly erroneous.

C. Adequate Plan

[37] Finally, Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that there is a satisfactory 

plan for the care and treatment of the Child. Indiana courts have held that for a 

plan to be “‘satisfactory’” for the purposes of the termination statute, it “‘need 

not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the 

child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.’” In re A.S., 

17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of 

Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), 

trans. denied. 

[38] DCS is only required to offer a general sense of the plan for the Child after 

termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. DCS’s plan is for the 

Child to be adopted by her current kinship placement, and adoption is a 

satisfactory plan. See, e.g., Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 375 (holding that adoption and 

independent living are satisfactory plans). The trial court’s finding that DCS 

had a satisfactory plan is not clearly erroneous. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-937 | October 8, 2019 Page 22 of 22

Conclusion

[39] The trial court’s termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is not 

clearly erroneous. We affirm.

[40] Affirmed.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.