to "determine whether or not a hearing occurred and supply Grievance Office with a copy of the
summary if possible." Cmplt. Attachment E, Steele never received a summary, and has
demanded to know by what authority he was kept in segregation for 35 days. Cmplt. Attachment F.

That demand will not be answered here. The disappearance of the disciplinary report from
Stateville's files and the absence of Adjustment Committee documentation may raise questions
about the integrity of the disciplinary process at Stateville, but they raise no issues under the
Constitution, even if Steele’s 35 days in segregated confinement violated IDOC regulations. A
state official's violation of a state law or regulation does not violate the Constitution unless it also
amounts to a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment -- a deprivation
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. See, e.g., Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076,
1078-79 (7th Cir. 2003); Shegog v. Washington, 194 F.3d 836, 837-38 (7th Cir. 1999). There was
no such deprivation here.

A prisoner may have "liberty interests" that may not be taken without due process of law,
but the Due Process Clause does not create a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to another
institution, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976), or in remaining in the general prison
population, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). The Hewitt Court held that mandatory language
in state laws or regulations can give prisoners a liberty interest in avoiding segregation unless state
officials follow prescribed procedures. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), however, the
Supreme Court sharply limited such liberty interests, holding that state law can create an
enforceable liberty interest in avoiding additional restraints only if the restraint "imposes atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." fd, at 484.

Because segregation is commonly employed to punish prisoners, it could be inferred that
it represents an “atypical and significant hardship." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in
Sandin that because prisoners held in non-punitive administrative segregation and protective
custody are confined under similar conditions, "[the plaintiff's] discipline in segregated confinement

4



Committee remanded the disciplinary report to Durrett for more information to substantiate the
charges. Cmplt. Attachment M.

The rewritten disciplinary report dated September 28, 2001, Cmplt. Attachment N, tied the
charges against Steele to Bealer’s August 19 assault. The report alleged that Bealer had stated
that he had overheard Steele and another inmate talking about assaulting someone, and Bealer
concluded that he was the intended victim. Steele's response, Cmplt. Attachment O, denied any
conflict with Bealer and stated that unnamed correctional officers told Steele that they knew who
had sent Bealer to stab him. Steele again denied planning an assault on Rivera and requested a
polygraph examination.

On October 8, 2001, the Pontiac Adjustment Committee found Steele guilty and
recommended that he be demoted to "C" grade for one year, serve one year in segregation and
forfeit a year of statutory good conduct credit. The punishment was approved by the warden of
Pontiac, Defendant James Schomig, on October 17, 2001. Cmplt. Attachment P.

Steele appealed the disciplinary conviction with a lengthy and incoherent grievance, Cmpit.
Attachment R, in which he attempted to link together the three incidents addressed in this suit: the
disciplinary report from Hill Correctional Center based on an informant's accusation that he was
planning an assault, the assault on Steele at Stateville by Bealer, and the charge that Steele had
conspired at Stateville to have Rivera assaulted. Steele alleges that the grievance was denied, but
does not provide a copy of the decision.

Although Steele's grievance raised various procedural objections, Steele does not appear
to be claiming that he was denied his constitutional right to due process of law in the disciplinary
proceeding. Rather, Steele complains that the disciplinary report

was ficticious [sic] and only created to cover up the fact that Plaintiff had repeatedly

informed Defendants Knight, Page and Briley that he was in danger and that they

did nothing to stop it. Also, the fact that Defendant Doe #3 had knowledge that

Plaintiff was going to be attacked during the shower time was to be covered up by

Defendant Durrett writing the fictitious [sic] disciplinary report.

9


and again John Doe #3 smiled at Steele,

Bealer then began stabbing Steele with a homemade knife. Steele alleges that the officers
did not enter the shower area to stop Bealer, and Steele would have been killed if another inmate
had not stepped between them. Steele alleges it took three to five minutes for Bealer to be
restrained, but if the officers did not enter the shower it is unclear who restrained Bealer. Steele
was taken to the prison health care unit and then sent to an outside hospital emergency room for
further treatment.

Steele's grievance relating to this incident is not among the exhibits to the complaint, but
he has provided IDOC’s final response dated December 17, 2001, written by Defendant Leora
Harry on behalf of IDOC's Administrative Review Board, with the concurrence of the Director of
IDOC at the time, Defendant Donald N. Snyder, Jr. The response states:

Conceming your allegations of "indifference of staff,” protocol requires a ranking

officer be present before the escorting officers could enter the shower room and

subdue the inmates. The investigation found that none of the staff delayed coming

to your aid.

Cmplt. Attachment S.

Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners. "Having incarcerated persons with demonstrated proclivities for antisocial criminal, and
often violent, conduct, having stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and
foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state
of nature take its course." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citations and internal
quotations omitted). Liability, however, depends upon actual knowledge of a risk to the inmate's
safety. "[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane
conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." /d., 511 U.S. at 847.

A correctional officer who knew in advance that Bealer planned to assault Steele would be



did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create
a liberty interest." fd, at 486. Although the prisoner in Sandin had only spent thirty days in
segregation, Sandin has been understood as holding that disciplinary segregation generally is not
an atypical and significant hardship -- in effect, that segregation, even arbitrarily imposed, is one
of the “ordinary incidents of prison life." Consequently, whether state officials follow state
regulations in committing prisoners to segregation is not of constitutional concern. See Walker v.
O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 630 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir.
14997); Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1997). Neither Steele's confinement in
segregation nor his transfer to Stateville states a constitutional claim.
I. Assault on August 19, 2001

Steele alleges that on August 19, 2001, at about 6:45 p.m., Steele and other inmates on
his gallery were taken to the showers by three correctional officers whom Steele has named as
"John Doe" defendants. Steele alleges that John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 were ordered to allow
an inmate named Bealer to be handcuffed with his hands in front, while Steele and the other
inmates were handcuffed behind their backs.’ Steele does not state who gave this order. He
alleges that John Doe #3 gave him a knowing look after handcuffing him, suggesting that
something was afoot.

Steele alleges the officers “failed to recognize" that Bealer was wearing magazines around
his body, improvised armor in preparation for a fight. When the group arrived at the shower room,

John Doe #3 began rernoving the inmates' handcuffs through a "chuckhole."“ Steele went first,

# Steele gives the inmate's name as "Bealor," but it is spelled "Bealer" in IDOC's
documentation of the incident.

¥ The court infers that the inmates entered the shower room with cuffed hands, a solid
door was closed separating the inmates in the shower area from the correctional officers outside,
and the inmates then presented their cuffed hands at a small port in the door for a correctional
officer to remove the cuffs.


latter date. In the second statement, Steele similarly asserts, "I never had any problem with this
inmate [Bealer] nor did | have any problem with any inmates.”

These statements indicate that Steele never made his alleged pleas for help. Whether or
not these statements (that Steele had no problems with other inmates) are true, Steele would
hardly have made them if he had previously pleaded with Knight, Page or Briley to protect him from
his enemies. The court accordingly dismisses Steele's claim that Defendants Knight, Page and
Briley were deliberately indifferent to the risk that Bealer would attack him. In the October 2001
statements, copies of which Steele has attached as exhibits, he has effectively “pleaded himself
out of court” with respect to these Defendants.

MM The Disciplinary Charge of August 29, 2001

When Steele returned to Stateville from the hospital emergency room he was placed in
segregation. He was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center twelve days later, where he was
served with a disciplinary report dated August 29, 2001, charging him with gang activity and
conspiracy to assault another inmate at Stateville. The disciplinary report alleged that on
August 21, 2001, Defendant Correctional Officer T.1. Durrett learned from a confidential informant
that Steele had spoken with an inmate named Diaz cancerming a planned assault on an inmate
named Rivera. The planned assault was allegedly to punish Rivera for informing on three
members of the Maniac Latin Disciples, Steele's gang, who had assaulted Rivera in January of
2001.

The Pontiac Adjustment Committee conducted a hearing on this charge on September 5,
2001. Steele received a continuance to prepare his defense, and the disciplinary report was
remanded to be rewritten for unspecified reasons, On September 17, 2001, Steele presented a
written statement denying the charges, and requesting that both he and the informant be given

polygraph examinations and that Diaz be asked whether the alleged conversation took place. The


Minute Onter Fann (Ge

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge or " Fi : Sitting Judge if Other
: Muyistrate Judge eet PALLMEYER hau Asslened Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 1839 DATE August 12, 2003
CASE Stanfield Steele (IDOC #N-50702) v. B. Kane, et al.
TITLE
Un the following box (a) indicate the party filing the imotion, e.g, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the

MOTION: nature of the motion heing presented.|

DOCKET ENTRY:

(ap) a Filed motion of { use listing in “Motion” box above. |

2) a Briet in support of motion due .

3) u ‘Answer brief to motion duc. . Reply to answer brief due _

a) a Ruling/Hearing on _Setfor at

5) u Status hearing[held/continucd to] [set for/re-set for] on ____set for at

(6) o Pretrial conterence[held/continucd to] [set for/te-set for] on set for _ at 7

K7) 1 Trial|set for/re-set for] on _ at

8) o |Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

9) m ‘This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant. to]

O FROP4(m) © General Rule 21) 1] FRCP41(ay(1) Lt FRCP41(a)(2).

10) a [Other docket entry] — inter Memorandum Opinion and Order. PMaintiff may proceed with his claim that the "John
Doc" Defendants failed to protect him from assault. All othcr Defendants are dismissed, except Briley, who is retained as
nomunal Defendant, dismissing Defendants Kanc, Johnson, Knight, Page, Welsh, Durrett, Schomig, Reider, Pierson, Robinson,
Dallas, Lazar, Harry and Snyder. ‘The clerk shall issuc summons for Defendant Briley, and the U.S. Marshal shall serve him
with summons and copies of the complaint and this order. Briley is not required to answer the complaint, but within thirty days
of service Briley (or his attorney or agent) shall name and provide identification photographs of the officers involved in the
incident of August 19, 2001, and certify to the court ihat this has been donc. Within thirly days thereafter Plaintiff shall file an
amended complaint naming these officers as Defendants.

Kil) a For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.

[No notices required. advised in open court. Document’;
Namber
No wotives required umber al notices
Notices mailed by judge's staff, AUG 1 3 7003 ~ |
[Notified counsel by telephone. sie docketed
Y¥ — |Duckeling to mail notices. x IZ
-—+
Mail AQ 450 form, Adbeeting Hepey inirnts
Copy (1 judge/magistrate judge.
tate led nate
courtroom
leputy’s “O8
is tun09 dal te sn
Date/time ree c
Daten rece hil ig epi

Hhet Wd @1 SAW EO
OHI SHOE Yud CIM
1-09


unavailing, through a federal writ of habeas corpus. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
Because nothing in the complaint indicates that this has occurred, Steele has no claim arising from
this incident.

CONCLUSION

Steele is left with the single claim that the three "John Doe" officers failed to protect him.
So that Steete can jearn their identities and name them as Defendants, Warden Briley will remain
a nominal Defendant, but will not be required to answer the complaint.

The clerk shall issue summons to Defendant Briley, and the U.S. Marshal is directed to
serve him with the summons, a copy of the complaint, and a copy of this order. Briley is not
required to answer the complaint. Within thirty days of service, Briley, or his attorney or agent,
shall provide Steele with the names and identification photographs of the correctional officers who
escorted Steele to the showers on August 19, 2001, and certify to the court when this has been
done. Steele shall then have thirty days to file an amended complaint against the Defendants
identified as "John Does #1-3," limited to his claim that they failed to protect him from Bealer's

assault.

ENTER:

Dated: August 12, 2003

11



Cmplt. ] 29. Steele's "Third Cause of Action" claims that Defendants “conspired to cover up
Plaintiff being attached [sic] by inmate Bealor by writing Plaintiff a fictitious [sic] ticket, finding him
guilty of that ticket and taking one year of statutory good conduct credits away from Plaintiff."
Cmpit. J 34(a).

This claim makes little sense. Assuming that the accusation in the disciplinary report from
Stateville was false, and even assuming that everyone involved in the disciplinary proceeding at
Pontiac knew it to be false, how could this be a “cover-up? What could it conceal, and from
whom? Only the last version of the disciplinary report made any reference to the assault on Steele,
and it contained nothing at all relating to correctional officials’ prior knowledge of any danger to
Steele generally, or the assault perpetrated by Bealerin particular. Convicting Steele of conspiracy
to assault another inmate would permit IDOC officials to characterize him as a dangerous gang
leader -- as they apparently already did -- but that characterization could not affect their duty to
protect him from known dangers or their liability if they had failed to do so.

A conspiracy to punish Steele on false charges could give rise to a claim of denial of due
process, but such a claim would be premature. Illinois law confers upon prisoners a right not to be
deprived of good conduct credit except in accordance with state law and regulations, a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir.
1992). Because loss of good conduct credit affects the length of a prisoner's incarceration, this
\iberty interest survives Sandin.

Nevertheless, although loss of good time credit implicates the constitutional fight to due
process of law, Steele cannot seek damages under § 1983 for the deprivation of that right.
Because the length of a prisoner's incarceration may be challenged in federal court only by way
of a habeas corpus proceeding, a prisoner ajleging official misconduct that would, if proven,
invalidate a disciplinary conviction may not sue for damages resulting from the conviction until it
has been overturned through state administrative and judicial procedures, or, if these are

10


liable for letting it happen. Otherwise, the officers’ liability would depend on whether they
responded reasonably once they realized that Steele was being stabbed. Correctional officers are
not required to risk their own lives to protect inmates, but at this stage we assume that the three
officers could have intervened without undue tisk to themselves. If, as IDOC's response to Steele's
grievance indicates, an administrative directive prohibited their doing so until a superior officer
could be summoned, the court will have to address what effect, if any, such a directive may have
on their potential liability.

Steele has stated a claim against the "John Doe" correctional officers. As to the other
Defendants, Steele alleges he "pleaded with Defendant[s] Knight, Page and Briley to be transferred
from Stateville which had been going on since June of 2000 to August of 2001, due to Plaintiff
having enemies at Stateville who had wanted to attempt to kill him," and that "Plaintiff gave the
names of person{[s] who could possible make an attempt upon his life, but Plaintiff's pleas for help
went unanswered.” Cmplt. J 17, 18.

In contrast to his other claims, Steele has alleged no particulars regarding these "pleas for
help," nor furnished copies of letters or grievances. The Federal Rules do not require him to do
SO in order to state a claim, Nevertheless, a plaintiff may not make allegations knawn to be false,
see Rule 11(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., and a claim based on such allegations is to be dismissed as
malicious, See Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1984). Steele's allegation that he
pleaded with Knight, Page and Briley to protect him is contradicted by two written statements
Steele submitted in response to a disciplinary report issued against him at Stateville and offered
by Steele as Complaint Attachment O.

in the first statement dated October 4, 2001, Steele claims he "never had any problem with
Mr. Bealer, #K68852. Since | have being [sic] in Stateville C.C. nor have | ever had problem with
any other inmate." The second statement is dated August 19, 2001, but a notation "10-4-001" in
the upper right corner indicates that it was copied and submitted with the first statement on the

7


At Stateville, Steele appeared at a disciplinary hearing on June 7, 2000, before the Stateville
Adjustment Committee chaired by Defendant A. Johnson. Steele points out that under IDOC rules,
Adjustment Committee hearings are to be held within 14 days of the observation or discovery of
the alleged offense. Although the disciplinary report was dated May 24, 2000, the observations had
Obviously been made priar to April 26. At the hearing, Steele presented a written statement
denying the charges and asking that certain witnesses be contacted, a request he alleges Johnson
refused,

Steele never received a summary of the findings of the Adjustment Committee, and perhaps
the Committee never prepared such a summary. Although he had been released from segregation,
Steele, apparently believing the charges were still pending, filed an emergency grievance on
June 19, 2000, Cmpit. Attachment A-3, asking for a polygraph examination to prove his innocence.
The grievance was rejected as a non-emergency matter by Defendant James Page, the warden
of Stateville at the time. Cmpit. Attachment A-4.

After Steele was subsequently denied a transfer to medium-security Danville Correctional
Center in November of 2000, Cmplt. Attachment B, he filed a new grievance on December 6, 2000,
Cmpit. Attachment C, demanding to know the disposition of the charges against him. Defendant
Correctional Counselor Dawn Knight responded on January 5, 2001, Cmpit. Attachments A-2, C,
that not only was there no Adjustment Committee summary in Steele's master file, but the
corresponding disciplinary report, a copy of which Steele had received, was also missing.

Steele pursued his grievance to the next level, and on March 2, 2001, Defendant Kenneth
Briley, who had succeeded Page as warden of Stateville, approved Defendant Grievance Officer

Judy Welsh's recommendation that Johnson, the Adjustment Committee chairperson, be asked

(...continued)

at 9:45 p.m. on April 26, 2000, and was sent to Stateville at 8:00 a.m. the next day. Having been
confined in segregation less than twelve hours, he could hardly have complained to Warden
Pierson about the length of his confinement at that time

3



was transferred from Hill, a medium-security facility, to the disciplinary segregation unit at
maximum-security Stateville Correctional Center, where he was kept in segregation until June 1,
2000. That evening, Steele was served with a disciplinary report dated June 1, 2000, prepared by
Defendant Captain B. Kane, whom Steele identifies as "Internal Affairs Operations Officer" at Hill
Correctional Center. Complaint Attachment A-1.

Kane's disciplinary report identified May 24, 2000 as the "observation date," the date of the
charged offense, but recited information obtained from confidential informants at an earlier date.
The disciplinary report stated that Steele was second in command of the "Maniac Latin Disciples"
gang at Hill, part of the "Latin Folks" alliance.” According to the report, Steele and the gang leader,
an inmate named Williams, had ordered two inmates to leave Hill immediately, because they were
suspected of being traitors to the Latin Folks. (How the gang leadership expected to control
IDOC's transfer decisions is not explained.) According to the report, because the two inmates had
not left Hill, a meeting of the Latin Folks had been planned for April 29, 2000, where the gang
leaders would "dictate the punitive measures to be taken" against the suspected "traitors." The
meeting was thwarted when Steele and Williams were placed in investigative confinement on
April 26.

Steele complains that his purportedly investigative confinement (also referred to as
administrative segregation) violated IDOC rules, which require the approval of the institution's chief
executive officer (i.¢., the warden) for investigative confinement lasting more than three days.
Steele alleges in the complaint that before being transferred to Stateville he wrote both Kane and

Defendant Mark Pierson, at that time the warden at Hill, and received no response.2

u IDOC now uses the term “Security Threat Group,” or "STG," rather than "gang,” but
the four-letter terrn suffices here.

2 This statement is inconsistent with Steele's grievance dated June 19, 2000,
conceming the incident, Cmplt. Attachment A-3, where he states that he was taken to segregation
(continued...)



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

STANFIELD STEELE,

)
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 03 C 1839

v. )

) Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer
B. KANE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Stanfield Steele, a prisoner in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)
at Menard Correctional Center, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
IDOC officials at Hill, Stateville and Pontiac Correctional Centers. The court permitted Steele to
proceed without prepaying the filing fee; and the initial partial payment required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b) has been received. The court proceeds to review the complaint as directed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A to identify cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint it finds is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant immune from such relief. In making this assessment, the court accepts the allegations
of the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Steele's favor. Wynn v. Southward,
251 F.3d 588, 591-92 (7th Cir. 2001).

Steele's complaint arises from three incidents: two disciplinary actions based on the
statements of confidential informants and the failure of certain Defendants to protect him from
assault by another inmate. Only the last states a claim upon which relief may be granted.

I. Segregation and Transfer in April-May 2000

The following account is taken from Steele's cornplaint and attached exhibits. On April 26,

2000, while Steele was confined at Hill Correctional Center at Galesburg, Illinois, he was placed

in the segregation unit although he had not been charged with a rule violation. The next day Steele