NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KARINA MARICELA GOMEZFIGUEROA; LESLI FRANCHESCA 

VASQUEZ-GOMEZ, 

Petitioners, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-72670 

Agency Nos. A206-804-098 

A206-804-099 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 10, 2022

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Karina Maricela Gomez-Figueroa and her daughter1 petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying Gomez-Figueroa’s application for 

asylum. Gomez-Figueroa argues that she qualifies for asylum due to persecution 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1 Karina Maricela Gomez-Figueroa’s minor daughter is included as a derivative 

beneficiary of Gomez-Figueroa’s asylum application.

FILED

JUN 14 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

on the basis of her membership in the particular social group of “female victims of 

domestic violence in El Salvador unable to leave a relationship.”

We have appellate jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.2 We review the 

Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. 

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 

Under the substantial evidence standard, the “administrative findings of fact are 

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 

the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1059. 

We deny the petition for review.

To establish eligibility for asylum, Gomez-Figueroa must show that she was 

unable or unwilling to return to El Salvador “because of persecution or a 

well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1101(a)(42); see Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2004). An asylum 

claim based upon membership in a particular social group requires that the 

applicant “demonstrat[e] the existence of a cognizable particular social group,” 

“[her] membership in that particular social group,” and “a risk of persecution on 

2 We lack jurisdiction over any challenge to the immigration judge’s denial of

withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture because

Gomez-Figueroa did not exhaust those claims before the Board. 8 U.S.C. §

1252(d)(1).
3 

account of [her] membership in the specified particular social group.” Reyes v. 

Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016).

Gomez-Figueroa claimed that she was persecuted on account of being “a 

female victim of domestic violence in El Salvador unable to leave a relationship.” 

The immigration judge held that Gomez-Figueroa’s proposed particular social 

group was not cognizable, citing Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) 

(A-B- I). The immigration judge further found that even if Gomez-Figueroa’s 

proposed particular social group was cognizable, she did not demonstrate 

membership in the group. The Board upheld the immigration judge’s decision that 

Gomez-Figueroa’s proposed particular social group was not cognizable, citing AB- I, and held that even if the group were cognizable, Gomez-Figueroa failed to 

establish membership in it.

We need not decide whether Gomez-Figueroa’s proposed particular social 

group of “female victims of domestic violence in El Salvador unable to leave a 

relationship” is cognizable. Rather, we hold that substantial evidence supports the

finding that Gomez-Figueroa failed to establish that she is a member of that group 

because she was able to leave her relationship with her husband. The immigration 

judge found that Gomez-Figueroa was able to leave her relationship with her 

husband because “her husband kicked her out of the marital home,” “she lived with 

her mother for over a year and a half prior to coming to the United States,” and 
4 

“[w]hile Mr. Vasquez initially attempted to get [Gomez-Figueroa] to return by 

going to her mother’s and threatening her, [Gomez-Figueroa’s] mother told him to 

leave them alone and he never returned.” The Board upheld the immigration 

judge’s finding that Gomez-Figueroa was able to leave her relationship with her 

husband, highlighting that she “was able to leave her relationship and reside with 

the mother for 16 months, unharmed.”

In view of the administrative record evidence, we hold that any reasonable 

adjudicator would not be compelled to conclude that Gomez-Figueroa could not 

leave her relationship with her husband. Thus, even if “female victims of domestic 

violence in El Salvador unable to leave a relationship” were a cognizable particular 

social group, the Board properly upheld the immigration judge’s finding that 

Gomez-Figueroa failed to demonstrate that she is a member of that group because 

she did not prove an inability to leave her relationship.

PETITION DENIED.