### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-02-00427- CV

Da vid M ic hae l Jo hnso n, A ppe lla nt

v. Erin Lyn n John son, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 201ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. FM 0-0 2572 , HO NORAB LE DARLENE B Y RNE, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Th is i s a div or c e c a se inv olv ingan aw ard of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a g a ins t a pp e lla nt D a vid John so n in

fa vo r o f a pp e lle e Er in Joh ns on

and he r t ri a l a tto rn e y , Patr ic ia

En g lis h. Al tho ug h D a vid filed this appea l and Eng lish filed a re sponse, Erin did not appea r. I n e ig ht i ssu e s, Da

vid argue s th at th e re is i ns uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to su pp or t c e rt a in fi nd ing s o f f

a c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw a

nd that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y (1 ) i mpo sin g a li e n o n h is separ ate pr operty

and homestea d located at 301 Woodl ake Circ le, (2) strikin g h i s orig inal counter claim ag ainst Eng lish, (3) awa rding attorney ’s fe es to Eng lish purs u an t to family code sections 2.501 and 3.201, (4) chang ing the date of the par ties’ divorce , (5) a

war ding attorney ’s fe es to E ng lish pursua

nt to family code se ction 106.002, (6) f ailing to f orfe it a portion of the attorne y ’s2

f e e s aw ar d , ( 7 ) e x c l u d i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y o f a w i t n e s s , an d ( 8 ) e n t e r i n g f

i n d i n g o f f a c tn u mb e r

t w e n t yseven a g ainst the weig ht of the evide nce a nd failing to file finding s of fa ct re quired by family code
se c tio n 1 54 .1 30 . We wi ll m od if y the de c re e and , a s mo dif

ie d, a ff ir m.
BACK GR OUND David and E rin J ohnson were marrie d on October 29, 1987. Af

t er a lmost t hirteen y ear s of marr iag e in which the couple had thre e childre n, Erin filed for divorce on g rounds of insupport ab i lity
. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.001 ( West 1998). David filed a n answe r and counter -petition for divorc e base d on the same g rounds. Se e id
. At a hea ring on Fe bruar

y 20, 2001, the trial court announce d that the divorce was g rante d. Erin was appo i n t ed s o l e manag ing
conser vator of the children, a

nd David was appointed possessory conser vator. A dec ree was e ntere d, assessing Erin’s attorne y ’s fe es ag ainst David in the amount of $40,000 and statingthat the divorce
was re ndere d in court on F ebrua ry 20 but minis terially

signe d on May

25. O nM ay 2 7 , D a v id

w a s tr a v e li n g w it

h a f e ma le c o mp an io n w h e n E r in p u ll e d u p n e xt to h is c ar, dr ivi ngon

the sh ou lde r. Tw o of David and Er in’ s mi no r c hil dr e n w e re in E ri n’ s c ar. Er in
re pe a te dly

sw e rv e d h e r c ar i nto Da

vid ’s lane in an a

pp are nt a tte mpt to hit his c ar. A T ra vis County deputy sheriff happene d to be trave ling be hind David and witnesse d the incident. Erin wa s arr ested for a ssault with a deadly

wea pon and child endang erme nt. The c hildren we re pla ced in the c ustody of Dav id , an d o n Ju n e 5 h e mo v e d f o r a n e w tr ia l o n a ll is s u e s e xc e p t th e g r an ti n g o f the divorce
. The c ourt g rante d his motion on the issues of custody and conser vatorship of the minor c hildren, the div isi on of the mari ta l est a te , an d att or ne y ’s fe e s. On Oc tob e r 25, Er in fi le d a jur y de mand and pa idOn Novembe r 20, the non-jur y setting w as struck. 1 3 the jury fee
. I n November , Erin’s divorc e attor n ey , Patricia Eng lish, int erve ned, see king 1
c omp e ns a tio n f

or un pa id atto rn e y ’s fe e s. Erin and Da

vid then s ettled all issues other than attorney ’s fees and signe d a wr itten ag ree ment, which was filed and subsequently approve d by the cour t. Se e id . § 7.006 (West 1998) (ag ree ment incident to divorce ); see also Te x. R. C iv. P. 11
. Th e a g re e me nt re c ite s, in r e le va nt p a rt , that both parties would be a ppointed joint manag ing c onservators of the thre e childre n and that Da vid wo uld a ssume fu ll o wn e rs hip of the pr op e rt y loc a te d at 30 1 Wo od lake Cir c le , w hic h w ou ld be deede d to him upon his pay ment of $100,000 to Erin in settlement of the pr operty division. The p ar t i es also ag ree d that “the issue of attorney ’s fe es is rese rved f or a be nch trial, to be c onducted within 120 day s and to include Interve nor [English], and any claim the par

ties have a g ainst the other, except that [David] rele ases his cla ims ag ainst Erin and Er in relea ses her claims ag ainst [David] .” Th e a g re e me nt i s si g ne d b y bo th p art ie s a

nd the ir re sp e c tiv e a tto rn e y s. The trial c ourt signe d a final decr ee of divorce on J une 25, 2002. The decr ee states that the par

ties were divorce d as of J une 13, as orde red in ope n court on that date. David’ s motion for ne w trial, which w as subseque ntly denied, as we l l as h is entry into bankruptcy

in September, extended the court’s plenar y jurisdiction over the c ase. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b; In re So uth weste rn Bell Tel. Co. , 35 S.W .3d 602, 604 (Tex. 2000) (whe n defe ndant files bankruptc y , automatic stay g oes int o e ff e c t and a bate s any jud ic ia l pr oc e e din g a g a ins t th a t pa rt y ). F oll ow inga

he ari ngon

po st-The re cord is not clear as to what post -judg ment motions wer e hea rd and a ddresse d in the 2 amende d decr ee. Finding of fa ct twenty -nine states that the automatic stay was li fted by the bankr uptcy court 3 on Dec ember

2, 2002. 4 judgme nt motions, an amended final decre e wa s signe d on Dec ember 10, 2002. Finding s of fa ct 2 3

and c on c lus ion s o f l aw w e re su bs e qu e ntl y

re qu e ste d b y

Da vid and filed by th e tr ia l c ourt . T his appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N

I n e ig ht i ssu e s, Da

vid argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by (1 ) i mpo sin g a

lie n o n h is separ ate pr operty

and homestea d located at 301 Woodl ake Circ le, (2) striki n g h is origina l
coun t er claim aga inst English, (3) a war ding attorney ’s fe es to Eng lish pursuant to family code sections 2.501 and 3.201, ( 4) chang ing the date of the parties’ divorce , (5) awa rding attorney ’s fe es to Eng lish pursuant to family code se ction 106.002, (6) f ailing to forf

eit a portion of the attorne y ’s f e e s aw ar d , ( 7 ) e x c l u d i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y o f a w i t n e s s , an d ( 8 ) e n t e r i n g f i n d i n g o f f a c tn u m b e r

t w e n t yseven a g ainst the weig ht of the evide nce a nd failing to file finding s of fac t require d by family code section 154.130.

Th e c ru x of D a vid ’s argum e nts re la te to w he the r t he tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y he ld h im liable for attorney ’s fe es that he did not per sonally incur a nd whether the re sulting judg ments were pr op e rl y se c ur e d by an e qu ita

ble lie n, ve nd or ’s lie n n ote , a nd ow e lty lie n d e e d o f t

ru st r e la te d to proper ty located a t 301 Woodl ake Circ le. W e will beg in by discussing thre shold issues reg arding the e ff e c tiv e date of

the pa rt ie s’ div or c e and

the awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.5

Ef fective date of the di vorce

Severa l of David’s a

rg uments depend upon the eff ective date of the parties’ divorce
. Thus, we will first addr ess his fourth issue allegin g that the trial cour t incorre ctly

deter mined the eff ective da te of the divorc e as June 13, 2002, rathe r than F ebrua ry 20, 2001. The trial c ourt orig inally

pronounce d the par

ties divorced a s of Fe bruar y 20, 2001 and signe d a dec ree on May 25, 2001. However , David filed a motion for new tria l which was
su bs e qu e ntl y

g ra nte d. Th e fi na l de c re e state s that Da vid ’s “ mot ion

fo r n e w t ri a l w a s g ra

nte d f or a ll issues other than the divor ce itself.” Fur thermore , “the divorce order ed on F ebrua ry 20, 2001, was interlocutory until the di sposition of all iss ues and or der r ender ed by this court on J une 13, 2002, and [] the par ties there fore rema ined marrie d up throug h that date; ac cording ly , I T I S ORDERED AND DECREED that ER I

N L YN N J OHNSON, Petitioner, a nd DAVI D MI CHAEL

J OHNSON, Respondent, be a

nd they are here by

divorce d as of June 13, 2002, and [] the marria g e betwe en them is d iss olv e d b y

or de r o f t

he Court ann ou nced i n o pe n Co ur t on that date .” Th is c on c lus ion is supporte d b y f in d in g o f f a c t t w e n ty
- s ix a s w e ll a s c o n c lu s io n s o f la w f o u rte e nan d

f if te e n , w h ich collectively

state that the “ divorce enter ed on Dec ember [si c] 20, 2001, was interlocutory until the dispositi on of all issues by order rende red by this court on J une 13, 2002, and the parties ther efor e
rema ined marr ied up to that date,” and that “[b]ecause the issues of prope rt y and the c hildren had not been disposed of, no final judg ment of divorce exis ted prior to the judg ment signe d by this court on J une 25, 2002.” David does not challeng e these finding s or conc lusions, but arg ues instead that beca use ora l rulings f

rom the benc h are valid, the orig inal pronounce ment of divorce on Fe bruar y 20, 2001, should stand. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 306a. Additionally , he conte nds that beca use the g rant of div or c e it se lf

wa s n ot c on sid e re d in

the ne w t

ri a l, i ts o ri g ina l e ff

e c tiv e date sh ou ld r e ma in undisturbed.6 When a motion for new tr ial is gr anted, the pr evious “fina l judgment” is no longe r eff ective. Se e Ol

d Re pu bli c In s. Co. v . S

c ott , 84 6 S.W. 2d 83 2, 83 3 (T e x. 19 93 ). F ur the rm or e , it

is well settled that the division of a marital estate is not a claim sever able from th e r es t o f a d i v orce proce eding
. Da wso n-

Au sti n v . A us tin , 968 S.W. 2d 31 9, 32 4 ( Te x. 19 98 ); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7. 00 1 (i n de c re e of div or c e , c ourt sh a ll or de r div isi on of e state o f part ie s) ; see also Vautrain v. Va utrain , 646 S.W .2d 309, 314 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1983, writ dis m’d). As a matter

of law, w hen David’s motion for new tr i al wa s grante d, the prior pronounce ment of the e ffect i v e d at e of the divorce beca me ineff ective. Se e Sc ott , 846 S.W .2d at 833. Be cause the g rant of divor ce itself c annot be se vere d from the division of the mar ital estate a nd leg al issues involving the c ouple’s children, the parties rema ined l eg ally marrie d until J une 13, 2002. Se e Au sti n , 9 68 S.W. 2d

a t 32 4; see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001; Dunn v. Dunn , 439 S.W .2d 83 0, 83 2- 33 (T e x. 19 69 ) ( or a l ju dg me nt b y c ourt is va lid ; w ri tte n ju dg me nt s ig ne d b y tr ia l ju dg e is not prere quisite to finality of judg ment). Ther efor e, the tria l court did not err by deter mini n g that the eff ective da te of the divorc e wa s J une 13, or by consideringevidenc e of e vents which oc curr ed subsequent to Fe bruar

y 20, 2001. We overrule David’s f ourth issue. We w i l l n o w c o n s i d e r

t h e m a i n i s s u e o na

p p e a l

— w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u rtpr op e rl y
awa rded attorney ’s fe es ag ainst David in favor of Eng lish.
Attor ney’s fees

The pa rties’ a rg uments reg arding attorney ’s fee s revolve around thre e sec tions of the family code: 2.501, 3.201, a

nd 106.002. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 2.501 (duty to support), 3.201 (spousal liability), 106.002 (attorne y ’s fee s in suit af fec ting pa rent-c hild relationship) (West 2002).7 First, David does not dispute the g ener al application of section 106.002, but argues that it is i napplicable in this case bec ause ( 1) issues re lated to the childre n had bee n resolved by Fe bruar y 20, 2001 , (2 ) E rin was not a pr evailing party entitled to attorney ’s fe es, and ( 3) the attorney ’s fe es should have be en segr eg ated between issues relating to the childre n and those re lating to property
. Se e id . §§ 101.032 (West 2002) (de fining “suit aff ectingthe par ent-c hild relationship”), 10 6. 00 2; see also London v. London , 94 S.W .3d 139, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002,
no pe t.) (t ri a l c ourt ha s dis c re tio n to awa

rd re a so na ble a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in

su it a ff e c tin g pa re nt- c hil d relationship). I n suits affect i n g t he par ent-c hild relationship, the court may rende r judg ment for
re a so na ble a tto rn e y ’s fe e s and e xpe ns e s and or de r the jud g me nt an d pos tju dg me nt int e re st to b e pa id direc tly to an attorne y . Se e id . § 106.002. A divorce proceed i n g i n v olving c ustody of childre n includes a suit af

fec ting the pa

rent-c hild relationship. See Cape llen v. Capellen , 888 S.W .2d 539, 54 5 (Tex
. App.—E l Pa so 19 94 , w ri t de nie d) . A n uns uc c e ssf ul p art y may be awa rd e d r e a so na

ble attorney ’s fe es under

section 106.002 when the rec ord shows that the attorne y ’s fe es we re ne cessa ry and we re pe rfor

med for the benef

it of the child. Marichal v. M arichal , 8 3 2 S. W. 2 d

7 9 7 , 7 9 9 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1992, no writ); see D rexe l v. Mc Cutcheon , 604 S.W .2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1980, no wr it).

On pa g e tw e nty -o ne of

the fi na l di vo rc e de c ree, th e tr ia l c ourt awa rd e d $ 40 ,0 00 in
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to En g lis h. I n d oin g so , th e c ourt fo un d th at ( 1) Er in i nc ur

re d $4 0, 00 0 in r e a so na

ble and nec essar

y attorney ’s fe es, (2) pay

ment was owingand past due , and (3 ) j u dg ment should be
re nd e re d in

fa vo r o f E ng lis h a

nd a g a ins t E ri n. Th e c ourt

a lso fo un d th a tEn g lis h’ s w ri tte n a g re e me nt w ithEr in w a s in tr od uc e d in to e vid e nc e . D a vid ob je c te d to 4 En g lis h’ s te sti mony

tha t sh e re pr e se nte d th e c hil dr e n, a sse rt ingthat th e parole e vid e nc e ru le prec luded evi dence of ora l ag ree ments outside the four c orner s of the contr act r eg arding repr esentation of Erin in the divorce
. See Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley , 626 S.W .2d 726, 732 (Tex. 1981). Parole e vidence is inadmissi ble if it will vary or contra dict a writing intended by the par ties as a f inal and c omp le te e xpre ssi on

of their agreemen t, p ro vid e d th e wr iti ngis n ot a mbi g uo us . See Carr v. Chr ist ie , 970 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied). The wr itten a g ree ment ref ere nces “In the Matter of

the Marr iag e of Er in L y

nn J ohnson and [David ] Mic ha e l John so n, and I n th e I nte re sts of

[N. J.], [H. J.], and

[E. J.], Mi no r C hil dr e n. ” Da vid po int s o ut t

hat th e se c on d p ara g ra

phstate s th at th e re ta ine r f e e do e s n ot i nc lud e c on te ste d c hil d custody issues. Howeve r, the ag ree ment does not pr eclude repr esentation of the best intere sts of the children, e x clusive of issues that a re c ontested. F urthermor e, evide nce that En gl i s h had an a g re e me nt w ith Er in r e g a rd inghe r r e pr e se ntatio n in the div or c e do e s n ot r e nd e r i na dmi ssi ble Eng lish’s testimony

of a subse quent and se parat e o ra l agr eeme nt reg ardingrepr esentation of the children. See H

obbs Trail ers v. J

. T. Arnett Grain Co., Inc. , 560 S
. W .2d 85, 87 (Tex. 1977) (consider ing la

w re g ardingparole evidenc e, collate ral c ontr ac t may stand so long a s it is not inc on sis te nt wi th ano the r c on tr a c t) ; see also Hubacek v . Ennis State Bank , 1 5 9 T e x. 1 6 6 , 1 7 0 ( T e x. 19 58 ) ( pa ro le e vid e nc e do e s no t prec lud e e nf or c e me nt o f p ri or

or c on te mpo ra

ne ou s a g re e me nts which ar e collate ral to integ rate d ag ree ment and which a re not inconsistent with and do not var y or contra dict express or implied terms or oblig ations thereof ). 8 s u c h a t t o r n e y s e r v i c e s an d f e e s w e r e n e c e s s ar i e s f

u r n i s h e d f o r t h e s u p p o rto f E R IN L Y N N J O H N S O N an d

t h e c h i l dr e nt h e s u

b j e c to f t h i s s u i tan d

t h a tD A V ID MI CHAEL

J OHNSON f

ailed to pay

or provide the m. Accor dingly , the Court finds t h a tD A V ID M IC H A E L J O H N S O N s h o u l d b e an d i s p e r s o n a l l y l i a

b l e t o b o t h E R IN L YNN JOHNSON and PATRI CI A A. ENG L I SH for such fee s . T h e cour t further fi nd s p ur su ant t o Se c tio n 1 06 .0 02 of the Te xas F a mil y

Cod e that su c h d e bt i s enfor cea ble by PATRI CI A A. ENG L I SH in her own name.
The rec ord in this ca se supports a f inding that the attorney ’s fe es we re ne cessa ry and
wer e per formed f

or the be nefit of the children. See Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 06 .0 02 ; Marichal , 832 S.W .2d at 799. Eng lish testified at the final hear ing that, in addition to her repr esentation of Erin, she re prese nted the childre n in the divorce
. We disag ree with David’s asse rtion that issues relate d 4 to the children ha d been c ompletely resolved by

Fe bruar y 2001. The fina l decr ee in this case , signe dDavid also c ontends that he wa s found liable for f ees inc urre d afte r the orig inal decr ee w as 5 pronounce d in Febr

uary 2001. I n Fe bruar

y , the cour

t f ound that Erin had “ incurre d $40,000 as of Fe bruar y 20, 2001, as attorne y ’s fe es” and awa rded Er in a judg ment of $40,000 ag ainst David, for the be ne fi t of

En g lis h. Th e fi na l de c re e on a pp e a l do e s n ot a

wa rd En g lis h a

ny thi ngin a dd iti on

to the $4 0, 00 0 David wa s ori g ina lly or de re d to pa y . F ur the rm or e , th e arb itr a tio n r e po rt , s ig ne d Apr il 11, 2001, values the attorney ’s fee s, expert witness fee s, and litigation expenses incurre d by Erin at $40,000. 9 in 2002, contains over te n pag es of details reg arding possession and care of the c ouple’s childre n. Fur thermore , provisions of the dec ree reg ardingconser vatorship of t he childre n chang ed betwe en the 20 01 and

20 02 de c re e s. 5 David also a

rg ues th at t h e attorne y ’s fe e aw ard is inappr opriate be cause Erin’s conduct c aused the filing of the motion for new tr ial. Howeve r, in the final de cre e, David was
awa rded attorney ’s fe es ag ainst Erin related t o the time period a fter he filed the motion for ne w trial
and be fo re the fi nal decr ee was e nte re d. Er in d id n ot a pp e a l th a t awa

rd . Cl e arl y , th e $4 0, 00 0 in attorney ’s fe es asse ssed ag ainst David was for services incurre d prior to the filing of the motion for
ne w tri a l. Addit i onally , David’s a rg ument that Erin was not a preva iling par

ty is irreleva

nt beca use sec tion 106.002 does not require Erin to preva il in order to collect attorney ’s fe es. See T e x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 06 .0 02 ; Marichal , 832 S.W .2d at 799. Moreove r, David did not object at trial
re g ard ingse g re g a tio n o f atto rn e y ’s fe e s b e tw e e n c hil dr e n a nd pro perty iss ue s. Thus , h e fa ile d to prese rve a

ny err or re lated to the fa ilure to seg reg ate. Gr e e n Int ’l , Inc . v . S oli s , 951 S.W .2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997); Hr us k

a v . F irs t St ateBa nk of D e an v ill e , 74 7 S.W. 2d 78 3, 78 5 ( Te x. 19 88 ); see T e x. R. App. P. 33.1. W e over rule Da vid’s six th issue.10 Be cause we f

ind that fa mily

code se ction 106.002 provided the tria l court a pr oper basis on which to orde r David to pay attorney ’s fe es to Erin and Eng lish, we do not rea ch David’s thi rd iss ue re g ard ingthe pr op ri ety of the awa rd purs ua nt t o s e c tio ns 2. 50 1 o r 3 .2 01 of the fa mil y code.
Charact eriz ation of

attor ney’s fees as child su pport David also c ontends that the trial cour t err ed by awa rding attorney ’s fe es of “ $40,000 as past due c hild and spousal support” to Eng lish.

We review de novo an awa rd of attorney ’s fee s as child support. Finley v . May , 154 S.W .3d 196, 199 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2004, no pet.). Wit h the excepti o n o f c h i l d support enfor cemen t ac t i o n s , attorney ’s fe es may only be aw arde d as costs enf

orce able by

debt. See T e x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 06 .0 02 ; May , 154 S.W .3d at 199. Texas law prohibit s imprisoning a person f or de bt. Te x. Con st. a

rt . I , § 18 ; see M

ay , 154 S.W .3d at 1 9 9
. Ho we ver, attorney ’s fe es aw arde d as child support are not viewed a s debt and may b e en forced by contempt. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.167 (West Supp. 2005). Moreover , char acte rizing fe es as c hild support pe rmits the trial court to issue an orde r withholding e arning s for such f ees. Id . § 158.0051 (West 2004). En g lis h i s a

t h i r d

- p art y

w h o i s n o te n t i t l e d

t o a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s i nt h e n a tu r e o f

c h i ld support. We sustain David’s eig hth issue and m odify the j udg ment to delete the char acte rization of
an aw ard of

attorney ’s fe es in the nature of child support.
F ailure to forfeit attorney’ s fees

I n his fifth issue, David ar g ues that a por tion of the attorney ’s fees award should have been f orfe ited as the re sult of a violation of the disciplinary rules. Gay le Cipriano, an attorney , wasAlthough t h e m o t i o n to disqualify is not in t he re cord, w e have g ather ed the f acts fr om 6 Da vid ’s te sti mony

and the br ie fs
. 11 h i r e d b y E n g l i s h t o a s s i s ti n h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o no f

E r i ni nt h e d i v o r c e p r o c e e d i n g s . S u b s e qu e n t l y, Eng lish hired Cipriano to assist her in suing Er in fo r re covery of Eng lish’s attorney ’s fe es. Afte r David filed a mot ion to disqualify Cipriano, see Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 1.06(a), reprinted in T e x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. , ti t. 2 , s ub tit . G a pp . A -1 (We st 199 8) , Eng lis h hir e d a new a tto rn e y . On a pp e a l, 6 David ar g ues for

the first time that bec ause Cipriano’ s fee s were improperly included in the $40,000 attorney ’s fe e aw ard ag ainst him, the issue should be rema nded for a deter

mination of how much of the fe e is attr ibuta

ble to C ipr iano ’s a lle g e dly imp ro pe r r e pr e se ntatio n. Ho we ve r, Da vid f a ile d to prese rve a

ny err or re g ardingthis iss ue bec ause he did not object t o t h e i ntroduction of the billing
r e c o r d s , w h ic h in c lu d e d ti me s u b mi tt e d b y an d p a id to Ci p r ia n o . See T ex . R. App. P. 33.1. Fur thermore , the issue was not r aised in his motion for ne w trial. We overr ule David’ s fifth issue. Havingfound that the trial court prope rly awa rded attorney ’s fe es in favor of Eng lish,
we ne x t consider whe ther the a war d was prope rly

secur ed.
Motion for judi cial notice of deed

As a pre liminary

matter to dete rmining w hether it was proper to secur e the attorney ’s fee awa rd by imposing a lien on the Woodlake Circle proper ty , David urg es us to take judicial notice of a nota rized, rec orded, a

nd cer tified warra n t y d ee d relating to this proper ty . The de ed is dated Apr il 26 , 2 00 2, andrefl ect s t h a t E ri n co nv ey ed t o Da vi d h er i nt eres t i n “L ot 11 , Bl ockB, WOODL AKE TRAI L S, a subdivision in Travis Count y , Texas, acc ording to the map or plat ther eof
rec orded in Volume 69, Pag e 49, Plat Records of Travis County , Texas” (301 Woodlake Circle ).12

David conte nds that the dee d evidenc es that the proper ty beca me his homestead upon a

transfe r fr om Erin to him. Although Da vid testified at t he trial in J une 2002 that he borrowe d money to refina nce the house a fter E rin conve y ed h er i n tere st in the house to him, he expl ains that the dee d was unavailable at the time of trial be cause it was being proce ssed. Erin did not respond to the motion for judicial notice or file a brief i n t h i s ca s e, but Eng lish arg ues that the motion should be denied beca use i t was not ac companied by an af fidavit of authe nticity

and wa s not “ca

pable of acc urate and
rea dy deter mination by

resor t to sources whose acc urac y cannot r easona

bly be questioned.” See T e x. R. Evid. 201. We disag ree . The de ed re fl ec t s o n i t s fac e that it is a ce rtified docume nt that was
rec orded w ith the c ounty cler k of Travis County . The de ed mee ts the require ments of rule 201, a nd we will take judicia l notice of it. Se e id
. We gr ant David’ s motion and will c onsider the mer its of his c la ims
. Lien on property t o secure award of attor ney’s fees Da vid argue s th a t th e e qu ita

ble lie n, ve nd or ’s lie n n ote , and ow e lty lie n de e d o f t ru st
wer e improper

beca use 301 Woodlake Circle is his homestead, a s evidenc ed by the dee d. Eng lish arg ues that 301 Woodlake Circle w as not David’s homestead, that there was
no fi nd ingof

fa c t th a t it

wa s h is h ome ste a d, and

that th e e vide nc e do e s n ot c on c lus ive ly e sta bli sh that it was his homestead. We disag ree .

I n addition to the deed in which Erin convey ed her interest in the prope rty

to David, Da vid te sti fi e d at tr ia l that he ha d p a id E ri n f or the pr op e rt

y , th a t sh e ha d c on ve y e d h e r i nte re st t o him, and that he had rec ently ref inance d the m ortg ag e on the hous e in his name. Signific antly , the13

fi na l de c re e awa

rd s D a vid the pr op e rt

y a s h is s ole and

se pa ra te pr op e rty and des c ri be s it a s h is homestead. O n pag e twenty -two of the decr ee, an equitable lien is c reated ag ainst the proper ty , and the dec ree rec ites that the “amount secure d is lim ited to the amount of homestead intere st awar ded to [David] and is to compensate [ Erin] for her i ntere st in the hom estea d.” On pag e twenty -three , the decr ee e stablishes an enc umbranc e fo r o w e lt y p artition and states that the c ourt had a lrea dy “aw arde d the family homestead of the parties to [David].” I n the next sentenc e, it “ is or dere d and decr eed that
an enc umbranc e for owelty of par tition i s imposed ag ainst the entirety of the homestea d proper

ty ,” descr ibed as 301 Woodlake Circle . Fur thermore , there is e vidence in the rec ord that 301 Woodlake Circle wa s the only

rea l property

owned by

the parties; that it was the home a ddress listed on Erin’s contra ct for r epre sentation and billing invoice s submitt ed by Eng lish; and that in 1996, the parties lis te d it a s the ir ho me a dd re ss on a ta x r e tur

n. Th e re wa s su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e that the pro perty located a t 301 Woodl ake Circ le was D avid’s homestea d. A homestea d i s ex empt from seizure f or the c laims of cre ditors except for encumbr ance s proper ly

fix ed on homestead proper ty
. Tex. P rop. Code Ann. § 41.001 ( West S upp. 2005). The leg islature has specifie d seven circ umstances under which an encumb ra n ce m ay be proper ly fix ed. Se e id . § 41.001(b). F urthermor e, the Te x as Constitut ion enumerates ce rtain limited circ umstances unde r which an encumbranc e may proper ly attach to a homestead. See Te x. Con st. art. XV I , § 50. A lien that is illeg ally levied ag ainst homestead pr operty is void. Se e Las te r v . F

irs t Huntsville Props. Co. , 8 2 6 S. W. 2 d 1 2 5 , 1 2 9

- 1 3 0 ( T e x. 1 9 9 1 ) ( cit in g Tole r v . F e rti tta , 67 S.W .2d 229, 230-31 (Te x . Comm’n App. 1934, judgm’t a dopted)).

A lien g rante d to a third-par ty cre ditor seeking

pay ment for attorney ’s fe es pursua nt to section 106.002 of the f amily code doe s not qualify

as an e ncumbra

nce that is properly

fix ed on14

a homestea d pursuant to the prope rty code or otherwise a

uthorized by

the Texas constitution. See Tex. Cons t. art. XVI , § 50; Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 41.001. The c ourt err ed in g ranting a lien of a ny kind in favor of

Eng lish on 301 W oodlake Circle
. Vendor’s lien note

David also contends that the court err ed by requiring him to sign a vendor’ s lien note. The de cre e re cites that [David ] is O RD ERE D t o s ig n a ve nd or ’s lie n note fo r $ 40 ,0 00 .0 0 p ay a ble to [ E n g l i s h ]
. T h e n o t e s h a l l b e ar i n t e r e s t a t 1 0 p e r c e n tp e r ye ar , c o mp o u n d e d

an n u a l l y. I t is to be pay able a ccor ding to the foll owing terms: on demand, or if not [ sic] demand is made, on or be fore J anuar y 15, 2003. An unsig ned “Real Estate L ien Note” is attache d to the judg ment. Howeve r, Eng lish’s pleading s do not reque st r elief in the form of or deringDavid to sig n any ty pe of note . There fore , the cour t erre d by awa rding judgme nt which was not supported by the pleading s. See D avidow v. Inwood N. Prof’l Group-Phase I

, 747 S.W .2d 373, 377 (Tex. 1988) (plea ding he ld ins u ff i ci en t to support awar d of aff irmative re lief).
Division of com m uni ty propert y

Nex t, in another sec tion of his first issue, David argues that the trial c ourt err ed by fai li ng to i mpl e me nt t

he pa rt ie s’ se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, wh ic h w a s a pp ro ve d b y

the c ourt
. Specifica lly , he asse rts that his r ight to a jury trial was violated be cause the final de cre e ef fec tuated a prope rty division not contemplated by the agr eeme nt when it awa rded Er in an additional $40,000.15 Section 7.006 of t he family code provides t hat s pouses i n a divorc e ca se may enter into wr itten a g ree ments conce rning the division of the proper ty and the liabilities of the spouses a nd maintenanc e of e ither spouse. See Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 7 .0 06 . I f t he c ourt fi nd s th a t th e te rm s of the wr itten ag ree ment are just and rig ht, those terms are binding on the c ourt. Id
.

The pa rties’ a g ree ment, dated Ma rch 27, 2002, rec ites that it is a rule 11 “a g ree ment and contr act se ttling all terms and disputes.” I n resolving issues surrounding conser vatorship of the
c hil dr e n a nd ow ne rs hip of

the pa rt ie s’ pr op e rt

y , it state s th a t D a vid

wo uld be e nti tle d to the ho us e at “301 Woodlake Circle (dee ded to [David] upon full pay ment of 9.b. below)” and re sponsible for the m ortg ag e on the hous e. In section 9.b. of the a g ree ment, Erin is entitled to “[p] roper ty division of $100,000 pay able by

[David] to Erin in cashier ’s che ck in the foll o wi n g manner and not disch ar g e a

b le in b an kr

u p tc y . ” A p ay

me n t s c h e d

u le f o ll o w s , a lo n g w it

h a d e s c r ip ti o n of the pa y me nts . F ur

the rm or e , s e c tio n thir

te e n is ent itl e d “ F ina l D e c re e ” and state s th a t th e “ pa

rt ie s w ill prove up this ag re em en t on March 25, 2002, how ever , the dec ree will not be entere d until after [David] has made the final pa y ment of $100,000 as se t forth above .” The fina l decr ee inc ludes a provision stating that
F o r t h e p u r p o s e o f a j u s tan d r i g h td i v i s i o no f

p r o p e rt y m a d e i n t h i s d e c r e e , IT IS FURTHE R ORDERED AND DE CREED that Petiti oner, ERI N L YNN JOHNSON, is awar ded judg ment of $40,000.00 ag ainst Respon d en t , DAVI D MI CHAEL J OHNSON, pa

y able in accor dance with the t erms of the closing documents orde red in this d e c r e e to b e e xe c u te d , w it h in te r e s t at 1 0 p e r c e n t p e r y e ar c o mp ounded annually from the date of judg ment, for whic h let execution lie. This judgment is par

t of the division of community proper ty betwee n the par

ties and shall not constitute or be inter prete d to be any

form of spousa l support, alimony , or c hil d s up po rt
.16

The Court finds that this decr ee is a p ar t i t i on of the c ommunity proper ty of the pa rt ie s. B e c a

us e of the natur e of the pr op e rt ie s makin g up the e state, th e pro per ty c ann ot b e div ide d in

a jus t and ri g ht m ann e r w ith ou t impai ri ng the va lue of a ll portions. A vendor’ s lien note in the amount of $40,000.00 is ne cessa ry to make a just and rig ht pa

rtition of the prope rty . I T I S ORDERED AND DECREED that a n equitable lien is cre ated ag ainst [301 Woodlake Circle]. This lien is in t he natur e of a purcha se-money lien. The proper ty descr ibed above is a part of this partition order. The e ntire intere st in the property descr ibed above is subject to the lien.
David also c halleng es finding s of fa ct twelve thr oug h fourtee n, which support this section of the decr ee. E rin did not f

ile a brief in r esponse, a

nd Eng lish’s only

response to David’s ar g ument is that

“ [a]s c an b e se e n f

ro m th e Rul e 11 Ag re e me nt, a lth ou g h [David ] re c e ive d mo st o f t he pr op e rt

y in the marital e state, its value wa s obviously very minimal. The trial court there fore was c lear ly entitled to f in d , a s it d id , th a t i t w a s u n a

b le to p arti ti o n th e p r o p e rty s o a s to g iv e $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 in

v a lu e to [E r in ], and hence the decision t o require a secured note was we ll within i ts discretion.” Eng lish does not point to any

evidenc e in the re cord, a

nd we have found none, which would support her c onclusion. Although she argues t hat t he court was entitl ed to find that the property was una ble to be par

titioned, she mistakes the e ffe ct of the parties’ ag ree ment, which the court approved, settli ng all disputes other than attorne y ’s fe es. More over, Eng lish acknowledg es that the court approve d the ag ree ment and that the only

issue submitt ed to the cour t was attorne y ’s fee s, but states that David “ha d no issues
o nc h arac terizati o nan d

v a lu e , ” th

u s th e c o u rt d id

n o t m a k e a

d e te r mi n a ti o no nth o s e is s u e s . We disag ree . Th e fi na l de c re e inc lud e s a fi nd ingthat the c omm

un ity pr op e rt y is n ot s us c e pti ble to p art i t i o n , r e s u l t i n g i nanaw ar d t o E r i no f

$ 4 0 , 0 0 0 a s p arto f

t h e d i v i s i o no f

c o m m u n i t y p r o p e rt y. That sec tion of the dec ree direc tly conflicts with the agr eeme nt of t he parties reg arding division of community proper

ty , which wa s approve d by the trial cour

t and is, theref

ore, binding
. See Te x. F a m.Th e de c re e pr ov ide d th a t D a vid “ is O RD ERE D t o s ig n a n o wel ty li en deed o f t

ru st t o 7 secur e the note.
. . . The purpose of the e ncumbra nce is to sec ure the pay

ment of the de bt of [David] in favor of [ Erin] of $40,000.00, as assigne d to [ Eng lish] . The de bt shall bear inter est at 10 per cent per y ear and shall be pay able as follows: Principal and Intere st shall be due and pa y able on January 15 , 2 00 3. ” Ho we ve r, be c a us e the c ourt

e rr e d in awa rd ing Er in $4 0, 00 0 in div isi on of the c omm un ity pr op e rt y , it a lso e rr e d b y

g ra nti ngthe ow e lty

lie n d e e d o f t

ru st. 17 Code Ann. § 7.006 (“ I f the c ourt finds that the terms of the written ag ree ment in a divorce or
annulm e nt a

re jus t and

ri g ht, tho se te rm s a

re bin ding on th e court .” ). F ur the rm or e , th e fa c t th a t a jury reque st was on file a

nd a jury fee had bee n paid pre cluded a subsequent deter

mination by

the court, in co n fl ict with the parties’ ag ree ment, reg ardingthe cha rac terization of or division of community

proper ty
. See Te x. R. Civ
. P. 2 16 (r e qu e st a nd fe e fo r j ur

y tr ia l) ; G. M. Cor

p. v . G ay le , 951 S.W .2d 469, 476 (Tex. 1997). The tria l court er red by awa rding Erin $40,000 as p ar t of a division of community

proper ty contra ry to the parties’ approve d ag ree m en t
. Ac cording ly , as discussed pre viously

in this opi nion, the trial court a lso erre d by secur ing that awar d with owelty and vendor’ s liens, a note, and de ed of trust. There fore , the order ed tra nsfer s from Erin to Eng lish are 7 also void. We sustain David’s first issue.
Da vid ’s c ount e r c lai m ag ain stEngl ish

I n his second issue, David argues that the trial c o u rt err ed by striking his orig inal counter claim ag ainst Eng lish. We r eview the decision for an abuse of discre tion. See G reenhalgh v. Serv ice Lloyds Ins. Co. , 787 S.W .2d 938, 939 (Tex. 1990).

Te xas Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 63 pr ov ide s that pa rt ie s “ may

a me nd the ir ple a din g s,

. . . b y fi lin g su c h p le a s w iththe c le rk a t su c h ti me a s n ot t o o pe ra te a s a su rpr is e to the op po sit e pa rt y ; pr ov ide d, that any

ple a din g s, re sp on se s or ple a s off e re d for fi lin g wi thi n sev e n d ay s o f t he date of trial or the rea fter, or afte r such time a s may be orde red by the judg e under

Rule 166, shall be filedAt the he ari ngbe fo re the tr ia l c ourt , D avid e xpla ine d that the c a us e of a c tio n is re la te d to 8 an alleg ation that in J une 2001, Eng lish advised E ri n that she wa s permitted to take possession of the c hil dr e n. Al le g e dly fo llo wi ngEn g lis h’ s a dv ic e , E ri n to ok po sse ssi on

of the c hil dr e n in Oklah o ma , a

p p ar e n tl y in v io lati o n o f a c o u rt o r d e r . E n g li s h te s ti f ie d th a t s h e w a s n o t awar e that Erin’s possession of the c hildren would have been in violation of a court orde r. 18 on ly a ft e r l e a ve of

the jud g e is o bta ine d, wh ic h le a ve sh a ll b e g ra nte d b y the jud g e un le ss t

he re is a showing that such filing will operate as a sur prise to the opposite party .” Tex. R. Civ. P. 63. Under
ru le 63 , a tr ia l c ourt

has no dis c re tio n to re fu se an a me ndme nt u

nle ss t he op po sin g pa

rt y pr e se nts evidenc e of sur

prise or pr ejudice, or

the amendme nt asserts a ne w ca use of a ction or defense, a nd thus is prejudicia l on its fa ce, and the opposing party objects to the ame ndment. Id .; Gree nhalgh , 787 S.W .2d at 939. The bur den of showingprejudice or surprise rests on the pa rty resisting the amendment. Gree nhalgh , 7 8 7 S
. W
. 2 d a t9 3 9; see Har di n v . H

ar din , 5 9 7 S. W. 2 d

3 4 7 , 3 4 9 ( T e x. 1980). This show ing may be based on the trial court’s conclusion that the amendment on its face is calculated to surprise or that the amendment would r eshape the ca use of a ction, prejudicingthe opposing pa

rty and unnec essar ily

delay ing the trial. Id
. On May 21 , 20 01 , tw e nty -o ne da

y s be fo re tr ia l, D a vid

fi le d a c ounte rc la im a g a ins t En g lis h, re qu e sti nga tto rn e y ’s fe e s r e la te d to c la ims br ou g ht b y En g lis h, and

a sse rt inga

ne w c a us e of ac tion ag ainst Eng lish for “any and all torts she ha s committed ag ainst [David] and his children
and fo r co ns pir a c y

to c omm it v ari ou s to rt s a g a ins t hi m and his c hil dr e n. ” En g lis h ti me ly mov e d to 8 strike David’s counter claim, alleging surprise and inadequate t ime to prepa re a defe nse. See T e x. R. Civ. P . 63. David moved fo r a continuanc e, which w as denie d. A benc h trial then beg an as schedule d on J une 12. The trial court g rante d Engl i s h ’s m o t i o n to strike the tort and c onspiracy
c la ims . I t su

bs e qu e ntl y

de nie d E ng lis h’ s mo tio n to str ike Da vid ’s re qu e st f

or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a g a ins tAlthoug h D a v id ’ s r e qu e s t f o r a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s a g a in s t E n g li s h w a s u lt im a te ly d e n ie d , he 9 d o es n o tap p ea l t h at fi n d i n g. 19 Eng lish. Thus, we only

consider w hether the cour t abused its discretion by

striking Da

vid’s tort and 9 conspirac y

claims ag ainst Eng lish. See G reenhalgh , 787 S.W .2d at 939. Da vid argue s th a t a lth ou g h Eng lis h all e g e d s ur pr ise in r e sp on se to h is c ounte rc la im, Eng lish did not produce evidenc e to s upport her c ontention. Furthe rmore, he asser ts that his March 27, 20 0 2 le tt e r n o ti f

ie d h e r o f h is c la im an d is e v id e n c e th a t s h e w a s n o t s u r p r is e d by the
c ounte rc la im. Ho we ve r, Da vid ’s c ounte rc la im all e g ing tor t and c on sp ir a c y a c tio ns a g a ins t E ng lis h for advice g iven to E rin in June 2001 was not r elated to the issue of whether Eng lish wa s enti tled to rec over he r attorne y ’s fe es related to represe ntation of Erin and the children—the sole issue befor e the court pursuant to the par ties’ ag ree ment. See Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 7.006. Fur thermore , the Marc h 27 letter states that David incurr ed attorne y ’s fe es due to a writ o f attachme nt issued after Er in’ s p os se ssi on

of the c hil dr e n, and

that he wa s “ loo kin g to Ms. En g lis h to make him wh ole in t

his
re g ard .” Th e le tte r v a g ue ly su g g e ste d settle me nt o f a ll c la ims “ be fo re Mr . Joh ns on e ng a g e s se pa

rate counsel to pursue his claims ag ainst Ms. Eng lish and y our law f irm.” I t did not put English on notice of the spec ific ca

uses of action that would be asserted, aid Eng lish in conducting discovery related to the alleg ations or ot herw ise serve as not ification t hat s he would be required to defe nd ag ainst the
a lle g a tio ns . At the hear ing on her motion to strike, Eng lish a rg ued that the additional ca uses of
a c tio n, wh ic h w e re a sse rt e d a lmo st a y ear aft er the a dv ic e wa s a lle g e dly g ive n, c on sti tut e d unf

a ir
surp ri se and

we re me re ly Dav id ’s a tte mpt to d e lay tr ia l. S he c la ime d th a t th e a lle g a tio ns , if20

pe rm itt e d, wo uld

have to b e tur

ne d ove r t o h e r m a lpr a c tic e c arr ie r, wh o w ou ld t he n “ be e nti tle d to have the ir own lawy ers c ome in and dec ide who’s g oing to de fend the claim.”

Under these c ircumstance s, we hold that the district cour t did not abuse its discretion in determining that the new, substantive amendment would resha pe the cause of ac tion, constitut ing surprise, prejudicing Eng lish, and unnecessar ily delay ing the trial. See G reenhalgh , 787 S.W .2d at 939. We overrule David’s se cond issue.
Exc lusi on o f te st im ony

I n his seventh issue, David a sserts that the trial c ourt improperl y ex cl uded the testimony of De puty

Knig ht. D avid argues that Deputy Knig ht’s testimony reg arding the arr est of Erin for a ssault with a deadly wea pon and child enda

ng erme nt would have led “a rea sonable pe rson to c on c lud e that a

tr ie r o f f a c t w ou ld n ot a

wa rd a tto rn e y ’s fe e s” a g a ins t hi m. Whether to admit or exclude evidence is within the trial cour t’s sound discretion. National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen , 15 S.W .3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). David’s a rg ument at trial primarily revolve d around the asser tion that he was e ntitled to attorney ’s fe es fr om Erin beca use her conduct on Ma

y 27, which the office r would have testified to, cause d David to incur attorney ’s fe es in seeking the new tr ial. Howeve r, the trial court did g rant David’s reque st f or attorney ’s fee s from Erin re lated to fe es incurr ed by him after Ma

y 27. David’s only

other a rg ument is that the testimony
was ne cessa

ry beca use the children w ere in the car that day , and the of

fice r could testify

about the dang er that they wer e in. But Er in’s conduct is not rele vant to our inquiry of whe ther attorney ’s fe es
wer e cor rec tly awa rd ed as pa

rt of a suit af

fec ting the pa

rent-c hild relationship or whethe r the fe es incurre d befor e May

27 wer e for

the bene fit of the childre n. See Te x. R. E vid . 4 01 ; see also T e x.21

Fam. Cod e Ann. § 1 06 .0 02 ; Marichal , 8 3 2 S
. W
. 2 d a t 7 9 9
. T h u s , t h e t r i a l c o u rt d i d n o t abu se its discretion in excluding De puty Knig ht’s testimony . We overrule David’s se venth issue.
CO NC LU SION Havings u s t ained Da

vid’s first issue, we modify the dec ree to delete: (1) the ref ere nces to liens, notes, a

nd deeds of

trust to secu re t h e at t o rn ey ’s fe es owe d to Eng lish; (2) the
awa rd of $4 0, 00 0 to Er in a s a

div isi on of c omm un ity pr op e rt y and any lie ns , n ote s o r d e e ds of

tr us t to s e c ur e that awa

rd ; and (3 ) the c ha

ra c te ri zat ion of the a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to E ng lis h a s c hil d s up po rt
. As modified, we a ffirm the a war d of attorney ’s fee s in f avor of Eng lish a g ainst David in the amount of $4 0, 00 0, a nd

oth e rw ise a ff

ir m th e de c re e of

the tr ia l c ou

rt
.

__________________________________________ W. Kenneth L aw, Justi ce Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pury ear Modified and, a s Modified, Aff irmed Filed: De cembe r 16, 2005