Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 70A01-1710-CR-2455 | January 31, 2018 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Laura R. Anderson

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

George F. Hauk, IV,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner.

January 31, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

70A01-1710-CR-2455

Appeal from the Rush Superior 

Court

The Honorable Brian D. Hill,

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

70D01-1404-FA-150

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 70A01-1710-CR-2455 | January 31, 2018 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] On January 8, 2015, Appellant-Respondent George F. Hauk IV was sentenced 

to eight years, with four years executed on home detention and four years 

suspended to probation after he pled guilty to Class B felony dealing in 

methamphetamine. On May 15, 2017, Appellee-Petitioner the State of Indiana 

(“the State”) filed a petition alleging that Hauk had violated the terms of his 

probation by being convicted of Level 3 felony rape and Level 6 felony sexual 

battery. Hauk subsequently admitted to the violation. After accepting Hauk’s 

admission, the trial court revoked Hauk’s four-year suspended sentence and 

ordered that the four-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction 

(“DOC”). 

[2] On appeal, Hauk contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he 

violated the terms of his probation. In raising this contention, Hauk concedes 

that the State sufficiently proved that he had been convicted of Level 3 felony 

rape, but claims that the State failed to prove that the rape occurred while he 

was on probation. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 1, 2014, the State charged Hauk with Class A felony dealing in 

methamphetamine, Class B felony possession of methamphetamine, Class B 

felony dealing in methamphetamine, Class D felony possession of 

methamphetamine, Class D felony dealing in a legend drug, and Class D felony 
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unlawful possession or use of a legend drug or precursor. Hauk subsequently 

agreed to plead guilty to Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine. In 

exchange for Hauk’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining 

charges and to an eight-year maximum sentence. The trial court accepted 

Hauk’s guilty plea on January 8, 2015, and imposed an eight-year sentence with 

four years suspended to probation. The trial court also ordered that the 

executed portion of Hauk’s sentence would be served on home detention.

[4] On May 15, 2017, the State filed a probation renovation petition. In this 

petition, the State alleged that Hauk had violated the terms of his probation by 

committing another criminal offense. Specifically, the State alleged that Hauk 

“was charged in Rush County Indiana on May 4, 2017 under cause 70C01-

1705-F3-343 [“Cause No. F3-343”] for Rape-Level 3 Felony and Sexual 

Battery-Level 6 Felony. The aforementioned charges were committed between 

March 1, 2016 and April 15, 2016.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 69. 

[5] The State filed a second probation revocation petition on August 10, 2017. In 

this petition, the State alleged that Hauk had violated the terms of his probation 

by failing to inform his probation officer that he had been in contact with law 

enforcement within twenty-four hours of being charged with rape under Cause 

No. F3-343. 

[6] On September 25, 2017, the parties appeared before the trial court for a hearing 

on the State’s petitions. At that time, Hauk, through counsel, indicated that he 

wished to admit the allegation contained in the petition that was filed on May 
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15, 2017. After Hauk indicated that he wished to admit to the alleged 

probation violation, the following exchange occurred:

[The Court]: Do you now, in fact admit to the allegations 

outlined in your Petition for Revocation of Probation filed on or 

about May 15th, 2017?

[Hauk]: Yes.

[The Court]: Does the State have a [factual basis] to offer?

[The State]: Yes, your Honor. If this matter were to proceed to 

an Adjudicatory hearing, the State would prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that [Hauk] was placed on 

probation for a period of thirty, forty-eight months after being 

convicted of Dealing in Methamphetamine as a Class “B” 

Felony. The State would show that Mr. Hauk, uh, was, one of 

the rules of probation was he would not commit another criminal 

offense. And that while he was still on probation here on March 

1

st, uh, through April 15th, sometime in that time-period, uh, Mr. 

Hauk, uh, committed the offense of Rape and he was charged 

with that on May 4th of 2017 under cause number 70C01-1705-

F3-343. Uh, rape as a Level 3 Felony and Sexual Battery [a]s a 

Level 6 Felony. He subsequently had a Jury trial on that and 

was convicted of both counts on or about August 23rd of 2017. 

The State would, uh, show that all of those events occurred while 

he was still on probation here in Rush County, Indiana.

[The Court]: Mr. Hauk, are those facts true?

[Hauk]: I admit I was convicted at trial. I’m pursuing my 

innocence and appealing it.

[The Court]: Court finds the, uh, Defendant to be twenty-one 

years of age. Understands the nature of the allegations, uh, the 

possible penalties. I’ll find the admission is freely and voluntarily 
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given and that there is a factual basis. I’ll accept the admission. 

Find the Defendant to have violated probation pursuant to the 

allegations contained in that Petition for Revocation of Probation 

on May 15th. 

Tr. Vol. II, p. 7. The trial court subsequently revoked the four-year previously 

suspended portion of Hauk’s sentence and ordered that the four years be served 

in the DOC. The trial court further ordered that the four years be served 

“consecutive to the executed sentence in [Cause No. F3-343].” Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II, p. 84 (emphasis removed from original). This appeal follows.

Discussion and Decision

[7] On appeal, Hauk challenges the revocation of his probation.

Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a 

right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court 

determines the conditions of probation and may revoke 

probation if the conditions are violated. Once a trial court has 

exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than 

incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in 

deciding how to proceed. If this discretion were not afforded to 

trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on 

appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to 

future defendants. Accordingly, a trial court’s sentencing 

decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse 

of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion occurs where the 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances.

Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (internal citations omitted). 
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[8] In challenging the revocation of his probation, Hauk contends that the State 

failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he violated the terms of his 

probation. As is stated above, Hauk concedes that the State sufficiently proved 

that he had been convicted of Level 3 felony rape, but claims that the State 

“presented no evidence to show that the rape occurred” while he was on 

probation. Appellant’s Br. p. 9. 

A probation revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil 

proceeding. Marsh v. State, 818 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. Ct. App.

2004). Therefore, an alleged violation of probation only has to 

be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. When we 

review the determination that a probation violation has occurred, 

we neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility. 

Id. “Instead, we look at the evidence most favorable to the 

probation court’s judgment and determine whether there is 

substantial evidence of probative value supporting revocation. If 

so, we will affirm.” Id. When, as here, the alleged probation 

violation is the commission of a new crime, the State does not 

need to show that the probationer was convicted of a new crime. 

Richeson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. 

denied. The trial court only needs to find that there was probable 

cause to believe that the defendant violated a criminal law. Id.

Whatley v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[9] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that probation revocation is a two-step 

process. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). “First, the court must 

make a factual determination that a violation of probation actually occurred. If 

a violation a proven, then the trial court must determine if the violation 

warrants revocation of the probation.” Id. When a probationer admits to the 
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violation, the first step is satisfied and the trial court may move to the second 

step and determine whether the violation warrants revocation of the 

probationer’s probation. Id.

[10] In this case, Hauk admitted that he had been convicted of a new crime, i.e., 

rape. While evidence of a conviction is not necessary to prove that a 

probationer committed a new crime, we conclude that evidence of a conviction 

is sufficient to prove that there was probable cause to believe that the 

probationer violated a criminal law. See Whatley, 847 N.E.2d at 1010 

(providing that the State is not required to show that a probationer has been 

convicted of a new crime, but only that there was probable cause to believe the 

probationer violated a criminal law). As such, we further conclude that the trial 

court could rely on Hauk’s admission that he had been convicted of rape in 

finding that Hauk had violated the terms of his probation. Therefore, the fact 

that Hauk also indicated that he was “pursuing his innocence and appealing 

it[,]” Tr. Vol. II, p. 7, did not invalidate his admission. 

[11] Further, the factual basis presented by the State clearly indicated that the new 

offense of which Hauk had been convicted of committing, i.e., the rape, 

occurred while Hauk was on probation in the instant case. Hauk did not 

dispute this fact when he admitted to the violation. As such, we conclude that 

Hauk’s contention that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove 

that he committed the rape while on probation is without merit.

[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.