J-S18008-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EVAN T. CZARNECKI 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1510 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 23, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0005262-2019

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2022

Appellant, Evan T. Czarnecki, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of 2-10 years’ incarceration and 5 years’ consecutive probation, imposed 

following the trial court’s acceptance of his guilty plea to aggravated 

indecent assault (“AIA”), 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(7), and corruption of minors

(“COM”), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i). Herein, Appellant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his designation as a sexually violent 

predator (“SVP”). After careful review, we affirm.

On November 1, 2020, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to 

the above-stated offenses. At that hearing, Appellant admitted to facts 

sufficient to sustain his convictions for those offenses. N.T. Plea, 11/2/20, 

at 5-6. Specifically, Appellant admitted that on the evening of June 24,

2019 (and/or early morning of June 25, 2019), when he was 18 years old, 

Appellant engaged in multiple sexual acts with a 12-year-old female victim, 
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R.A, at her home in Berks County. Id. Specifically, Appellant admitted that 

he “placed his fingers into her vagina[,]” “had her put her mouth on his 

penis, and that he ... st[u]ck his penis into her vagina.” Id. at 6. In

exchange for his plea to AIA and COM, the Commonwealth agreed to a 

negotiated sentence of 2-10 years’ incarceration, a consecutive term of 5 

years’ probation, and restitution of $6,437.04. Id. Following its acceptance 

of Appellant’s negotiated guilty plea, the trial court ordered an evaluation of 

Appellant by the Sexual Offender Assessment Board (“SOAB”). Id. at 9-10. 

SOAB board member Dr. Veronique Valliere, a licensed psychologist,

conducted the court-ordered evaluation to determine if Appellant was an 

SVP, and testified at the SVP hearing held on July 14, 2021. N.T. SVP 

Hearing, 7/14/21, at 4-7. Appellant did not contest her qualifications as an 

expert.1 Id. at 5. Additionally, Dr. Valliere’s report was admitted without 

objection.2 Id. at 7. Dr. Valliere ultimately concluded that Appellant met 

the statutory criteria for an SVP. Id. at 10. Immediately following the

____________________________________________

1 Frustratingly, we must add a caveat due to the following note by the court 

reporter in the transcript: “At the direction of the [t]rial [j]udge, this 

transcript shall be considered as containing an exception to every ruling by 

the [c]ourt.” Id. at 3. Thus, but for this catch-all, waiver-avoidance 

mechanism of questionable utility, Appellant did not make any arguments at 

the hearing regarding Dr. Valliere’s expertise despite being specifically 

prompted for them. Id. at 5. 

2 Again, the report was admitted into evidence without any specific objection 

by Appellant, notwithstanding the court’s instructions discussed above. See

footnote 1, supra. 
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hearing, the trial court entered an order deeming Appellant to be an SVP, 

thereby subjecting Appellant to the corresponding registration and 

notification requirements under SORNA II.3 SVP Order, 7/14/21, at 1 (single 

page).

Appellant’s sentencing hearing occurred on August 23, 2021, when the 

court sentenced him in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, 

and he was notified by the court of his duty to register for life as an SVP in 

accordance with SORNA II. On September 13, 2021, Appellant filed a 

motion seeking to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc, which the trial 

court granted a day later. Following a post-sentence motion hearing held on 

October 13, 2021, the court ultimately denied Appellant’s post-sentence

motion on October 18, 2021. Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal, 

and a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court 

issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 27, 2022.

Appellant now presents the following question for our review:

Did the court err in determining Appellant to be a[n SVP], where 

the determination was based on a diagnosis of “Other Specified 

Paraphilic Disorder to non-consent,” which, as there is no law on 

the books that criminalizes consensual acts, would absurdly 

apply to render all defendants convicted of sexual offenses 

paraphilic; and where, moreover, the majority of the fourteen 

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3 “SORNA II” is shorthand for Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10–9799.41, as amended by 

the Act of Feb. 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (Act 10), and the Act of June 12, 

2018, P.L. 1952, No. 29 (“Act 29”). 
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factors that the Commonwealth’s expert considered actually 

favored a determination that Appellant is not an SVP?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant presents two distinct challenges to his designation as an 

SVP. First, he claims that his diagnosis by Dr. Valliere was legally 

insufficient to support his SVP designation. Id. at 10-19. Second, Appellant 

asserts that SVP factors considered by Dr. Valliere instead favored a 

conclusion that Appellant does not meet the criteria for designation as an 

SVP. Id. at 19-25. 

[Our] standard and scope of review is well-settled:

In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing 

court, must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found 

clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n 

SVP]. As with any sufficiency of the evidence claim, we 

view all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. We will 

reverse a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if 

the Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing 

evidence that each element of the statute has been 

satisfied.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1033 (Pa. Super.

2011)....

This Court has explained the SVP determination process as 

follows:

After a person has been convicted of an offense listed in 

[42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14], the trial [court] then orders an 

assessment to be done by the [SOAB] to help determine if 

that person should be classified as a[n SVP. An SVP] is 

defined as a person who has been convicted of a sexually 

violent offense ... and who [has] a mental abnormality or 

personality disorder that makes the person likely to 

engage in predatory sexually violent offenses. In order to 

show that the offender suffers from a mental abnormality 

or personality disorder, the evidence must show that the 
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defendant suffers from a congenital or acquired condition 

that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the 

person in a manner that predisposes that person to the 

commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes 

the person a menace to the health and safety of other 

persons. Moreover, there must be a showing that the 

defendant’s conduct was predatory.... Furthermore, in 

reaching a determination, we must examine the driving 

force behind the commission of these acts, as well as 

looking at the offender’s propensity to reoffend, an opinion 

about which the Commonwealth’s expert is required to 

opine. However, the risk of re-offending is but one factor 

to be considered when making an assessment; it is not an 

independent element.

Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034, 1038–1039 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and citations 

omitted).

When performing an SVP assessment, a mental health 

professional must consider the following 15 factors: whether the 

instant offense involved multiple victims; whether the defendant 

exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense; the 

nature of the sexual contact with the victim(s); the defendant’s 

relationship with the victim(s); the victim(s)’ age(s); whether 

the instant offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the 

defendant during the commission of the offense; the victim(s)’

mental capacity(ies); the defendant’s prior criminal record; 

whether the defendant completed any prior sentence(s); 

whether the defendant participated in available programs for 

sexual offenders; the defendant’s age; the defendant’s use of 

illegal drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental 

illness, mental disability, or mental abnormality; behavioral 

characteristics that contribute to the defendant’s conduct; and 

any other factor reasonably related to the defendant’s risk of 

reoffending. See 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9799.24(b).

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189–90 (Pa. Super. 

2015). 

Instantly, Appellant first contests whether the Commonwealth 

provided clear and convincing evidence that he possessed a mental 
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abnormality that was sufficient to meet the definition of an SVP. He argues 

that his diagnosis by Dr. Valliere of having a paraphilic disorder to nonconsent (hereinafter “non-consent paraphilia”) is insufficient to constitute a 

qualifying mental abnormality under the SVP statute.

As background, “Dr. Valliere diagnosed [Appellant] with [non-consent 

paraphilia].” Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 1/27/22, at 6. She described the 

condition as an “entrenched deviate sexual arousal pattern[,]” exhibited over 

more than 6 months, which resulted in “a significant disruption” in 

Appellant’s and/or “other people’s lives.” Id. Dr. Valliere discerned this

pattern from Appellant’s “long history of coercive and non-consensual sexual 

behavior that resulted in a previous adjudication[,] and now his current 

offense[,] which occurred while he was under the supervision of juvenile 

probation” for a previous sexual assault that Appellant committed as a 

juvenile. Id. Dr. Valliere determined that Appellant’s non-consent 

paraphilia “served as the impetus to his offending and that he engaged in 

predatory behavior as delineated in her report.” Id. 

Appellant argues that, narrowly understood, his non-consent paraphilia 

diagnosis was not supported by the facts of this case:

First, the circumstances of Appellant’s offense, as admitted to by 

D[r.] Valliere herself, far from clearly and convincingly 

supporting her diagnosis of [non-consent paraphilia,] positively 

contradicted the diagnosis: for the offense did not even involve 

“non-consent” in the ordinary non-legal sense. Therefore[,] this 

mental abnormality of [non-consent paraphilia] could not

possibly have served as “the primary impetus” or indeed as any

“motivating factor” at all ... behind his offense: because nonconsent in the everyday nonlegal sense was not even present.
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Appellant’s Brief at 13 (emphasis omitted). 

Appellant further contends that the diagnosis of non-consent 

paraphilia, broadly read, would result in the absurdity of SVP status being 

applicable to all sex offenders:

The second and only alternative inference is that by [nonconsent paraphilia,] Doctor Valliere means that Appellant’s 

“mental abnormality” lies in a perverted attraction to lack of 

legal consent; that the “primary impetus for his behavior” was 

the fact that the victim was unable to consent in a legal sense to 

the sexual act. But neither could such a “disorder” as this, if this 

is what she meant, be reasonably supposed to qualify as a 

“mental abnormality” in the statutory sense under SORNA:

otherwise, absurdly, all sexual offenders would necessarily be 

SVPs, for there is no law on the books that criminalizes legally 

consensual sexual acts. At the very least, it would mean that all 

sexual offenders against victims under the age of sixteen and 

four years younger, anyone guilty of statutory sexual assault or 

worse, must be automatically designated as having a mental 

abnormality.

Id. at 14-15.

Finally, Appellant also argues that “[o]n a separate and more 

substantive level, too, the [trial] court erred in adopting D[r.] Valliere’s 

conclusion that Appellant is an SVP, where a majority of the fourteen factors 

that she considered, by her own standards, actually heavily favored the

contrary conclusion.” Id. at 19-20. 

The Commonwealth counterargues that,

when reviewing the record and the determination of the trial

court in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the 

verdict winner, the Commonwealth met its burden of proving 

[Appellant’s] SVP status by clear and convincing evidence. After 

her unchallenged qualification as an expert in the evaluation of 

individuals for SVP status, Dr. Veronique Valliere ... testified that 
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she reviewed multiple documents and concluded that [Appellant]

met the criteria to be classified as an SVP. [N.T.] SVP Hearing, 

[1/21/22, at] 7-9[]. [Appellant] met the diagnostic criteria for 

[non-consent paraphilia] due to his escalating non-consensual 

actions with juvenile females. [Id. at] 8[]. [Appellant’s] pattern 

of behavior including his actions in this event and the prior event 

for which he was still under supervision showed a deviant 

arousal to forcing sexual contact on non-consenting females. 

[Id.]

This disorder is also related to the future likelihood of 

reoffending, as [Appellant’s] specific disorder makes treatment 

and even remission difficult, as a cure is impossible. [Id. at]

10[]. He further recidivated while under supervision and 

treatment thereby himself proving his likelihood of reoffending, 

and consequences having no deterrent effect on his deviant 

sexual desires and his lack of volitional control. [Id. at] 9[]. 

Because [Appellant] exploited his access to the sister and/or 

girlfriends of his own friends (in both events) for the purpose of 

victimization, he also met the statutory definition of predatory 

behavior as he was facilitated or promoted these relationships 

for the purpose of victimization. [Id.] Dr. Valliere’s opinion was 

made within a reasonable degree of certainty within her field of 

practice. [Id. at] 10[].

Commonwealth’s Brief at 8-9.

To the extent that Appellant’s challenge is directed at the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting his SVP designation, we agree with the 

Commonwealth that this claim is meritless. Affording the Commonwealth all 

reasonable inferences under our standard of review, we conclude that Dr.

Valliere’s expert testimony and corresponding report adequately described a

“personality disorder that makes” Appellant “likely to engage in predatory 

sexually violent offenses[,]” in satisfaction of each of the elements of the 

statutory criteria for what constitutes an SVP. Stephens, supra. We note 

that “an expert’s opinion, which is rendered to a reasonable degree of 
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professional certainty, is itself evidence.” Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991 

A.2d 935, 944 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Appellant’s attempts to attack the diagnosis underpinning the mentalabnormality element as overbroad, illogical, and/or the mere product of 

“obscurantist gobbledygook” of the social sciences, see Appellant’s Brief at 

24, go to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. It is generally

beyond the purview of this Court, in the context of a sufficiency claim, to 

entertain direct challenges to the science underlying the evidence that is 

used by the Commonwealth to fulfill its statutory burden under the SVP 

statute. As this Court has previously stated, “while a defendant is surely 

entitled to challenge such evidence by contesting its credibility or reliability 

before the SVP court, such efforts affect the weight, not the sufficiency of 

the Commonwealth’s case. Accordingly, they do not affect our sufficiency 

analysis.” Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 382 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (citations omitted). Thus, even had Appellant directly challenged the 

credibility or reliability of the non-consent-paraphilia diagnosis below, we 

would still conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support his 

designation as an SVP given our obligation to view the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth. Accordingly, Appellant’s argument 
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that his non-consent paraphilia diagnosis was insufficient to support his SVP 

designation is meritless.4

Even if we were to entertain Appellant’s sufficiency claim(s) under the 

rubric of a challenge to the weight of the evidence,5 despite Appellant

explicitly framing it as a sufficiency claim, we would still be unconvinced that 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief. 

____________________________________________

4 We also note that Appellant’s assertation that a non-consent paraphilia 

diagnosis would apply to all sex offenders is untrue on its face. According to 

Dr. Valliere, the diagnosis requires a finding that the deviant arousal must 

“persist for greater than six months.” N.T. SVP Hearing, 7/14/21, at 8. 

Thus, the diagnosis clearly requires something more than a single conviction 

for a sexual offense. 

5 The Commonwealth argues that Appellant waived any challenge to the 

weight of the evidence supporting his SVP designation 1) because his postsentence motion was ambiguous as to whether a weight claim was being 

raised therein; 2) because his Rule 1925(b) statement did not explicitly raise 

a weight claim; and 3) because Appellant does not explicitly raise a weight 

claim in his brief. Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. However, in its Rule 

1925(a) opinion, the trial court appears to have treated Appellant’s Rule 

1925(b) statement as having raised a weight claim, specifically indicating 

that Appellant preserved that claim in his post-sentence motion. TCO at 4. 

Notably, however, Appellant has not specifically raised a weight claim in his 

brief, nor does he reference any weight-of-the-evidence caselaw in his 

statement of the scope and standard of review. See Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

Accordingly, even if we were to agree with the trial court that Appellant 

preserved a weight-of-the-evidence challenge to his SVP designation in his 

post-sentence motion and in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant 

nevertheless waived the claim by failing to develop it in his brief. 

Commonwealth v. Ellis, 700 A.2d 948, 957 (Pa. Super. 1997) (holding

that the appellant waived a claim when he failed to “develop any argument 

or cite any authority in support” of that claim in his brief). 
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An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of 

review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of 

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear 

and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will 

give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons 

advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s 

determination that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting 

or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that 

the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the 

interest of justice.

[Commonwealth v.] Widmer, ... 744 A.2d [745,] 753 [Pa. 

2000]....

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial 

court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In 

describing the limits of a trial court’s discretion, we have 

explained:

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion 

within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for 

the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge.

Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, 

as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or 

arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused where the course 

pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but 

where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where 

the law is not applied or where the record shows that the 

action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

[Id.] (quoting Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., ... 625 A.2d 1181, 

1184–85 ([Pa.] 1993)).

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (some citations 

omitted). 
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Here, Appellant had multiple opportunities in the trial court to test the 

science pertaining to a diagnosis of non-consent paraphilia as it related to 

the mental abnormality, such as challenging the diagnosis by providing his 

own expert (either to contest the diagnosis as unmoored from the relevant

science as it pertains to the SVP statute and/or to challenge its applicability 

to Appellant), or by challenging Dr. Valliere’s qualifications to testify as an 

expert witness. He failed to avail himself of these opportunities. 

Consequently, the record is effectively devoid of any evidence relevant to 

Appellant’s designation as an SVP but for Dr. Valliere’s expert opinion. In 

these circumstances, Appellant cannot meet the high burden of 

demonstrating that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in 

denying his claim that the SVP designation was against the weight of the 

evidence. 

Appellant also argues that the evidence supporting his designation as 

an SVP was insufficient “where a majority of the fourteen factors that [Dr. 

Valliere] considered, by her own standards, actually heavily favored the 

contrary conclusion.” Appellant’s Brief at 19-20. Appellant contends that he 

“is not asking this Court to ‘reweigh’” these factors, and instead asserts that 

the SVP designation was based on such tenuous inferences that, “as a 

matter of law[,] no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances.” Id. at 20 (quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 

159, 166 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting, as part of our standard of review of 

sufficiency claims, that “[a]ny doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 
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resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive 

that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances”)). Specifically, Appellant claims:

Speaking in extremely rough and simplistic terms (for within 

each factor there might be smaller sub-factors of ambiguous or 

conflicting weight), of the fourteen factors statutorily to be 

considered for purposes of this SVP[ ]analysis, about two fifths 

favored Appellant, about two fifths were of neutral or equivocal 

tendency, and just one fifth tended to favor D[r.] Valliere's 

conclusion that Appellant is an SVP. If the small minority of 

adverse factors were to be accorded more weight than the 

others, for whatever reason, D[r.] Valliere did not explain.

Factors tending to favor her conclusion were that the sexual 

offense was not his first, as he had been adjudicated delinquent 

for [i]ndecent [c]ontact; he failed to comply with the 

probationary requirements entailed by that offense, and 

committed the present offense while still on probation; his 

conduct was opportunistic and exploitative, and he impulsively 

engaged in it this second time in reckless disregard of legal risks 

well known to him. (It must be noted, however, that the doctor 

who officially evaluated Appellant following his first offense 

concluded that he did not need juvenile sex-offender 

treatment.[)]

In significant extenuating contrast, the [instant] offense involved 

a single incident with one victim[,] did not involve physical

compulsion, and occurred mere feet away from the victim’s 

tacitly or perhaps explicitly encouraging older sister. As 

conceded by D[r.] Valliere, too, the victim was not in an 

unusually vulnerable or compromised position, and Appellant did 

not exceed the means necessary to commit the particular kind of 

[AIA] of which he was convicted, the essential element of which

was simply the victim’s age. But Appellant was practically a

juvenile himself, being freshly eighteen years old at the time[.] 

[T]his, the relative lack of disparity between the parties’ ages, 

both of them adolescents, should have been the most important

circumstance to be considered—along with the circumstance of

there being no physical coercion involved—and yet it was passed

over without comment. 
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Id. at 20-22.

Despite initially assuring this Court explicitly that he was not inviting 

us to reweigh these statutory factors, Appellant’s argument nevertheless 

implicitly demands that we reweigh the statutory factors in his favor. This is 

precisely what our Supreme Court rejected in Commonwealth v. Meals, 

912 A.2d 213 (Pa. 2006), as improper argument in a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting an SVP designation. The Meals Court 

rejected the very premise that the statutory “factors operate as a checklist 

where each factor weighs, in some absolute fashion, either for or against an 

SVP classification.” Id. at 222. Yet, this is precisely Appellant’s argument: 

that more factors weighed against his SVP designation than weighed in favor

of it. As a sufficiency claim, this argument is meritless. Moreover, as 

discussed above, Appellant waived any weight-of-the-evidence claim by 

failing to properly develop such a claim in his brief. 

In any event, we would also deny relief had Appellant preserved this 

matter as a weight claim. Appellant has failed to meet the high burden of 

showing that the SVP designation was against the weight of the evidence. 

As noted above, Appellant had the opportunity to challenge the 

Commonwealth’s expert by challenging her expertise, or by proffering his 

own expert testimony, yet he failed to do so, or was otherwise unable to 

procure such testimony. In these circumstances, we would ascertain no 

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding Dr. Valliere’s report and 
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testimony credible or in its weighing of the statutory factors, had Appellant 

properly preserved such a claim for our review. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/09/2022