route must be exhausted before any suit can proceed. See Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct.
983, 992 (2002).

Defendants’ argument that the complaint is still legally deficient centers on
Ricky. They contend that his individual failure to file an administrative grievance
means that this suit is barred by the PLRA. Although Defendants do not expressly say
so, their argument necessarily contains two independent parts: first, only Ricky can
bring the instant suit; second, because Ricky did not personally pursue any
administrative remedies, the PLRA’s bar is triggered.

Defendants’ argument is legally and logically flawed. In cases of prisoner
suicide, § 1983 claims are regularly brought on behalf of the deceased by an estate
representative. See, e.g., Matos ex rel, Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.
2003); Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2001). It is entirely proper for
us to consider actions taken on Ricky’s behalf in addition to those he took himself.
Furthermore, it goes without saying that it would be nonsensical to read the PLRA as
requiring a prisoner to pursue administrative remedies with respect to his imminent
suicide either before or after its occurrence. The injury that is the basis of the alleged
constitutional violation is the deprivation of Ricky’s right to life. There could be no
remedy for this injury under the circumstances of this case until Ricky could no longer

take action on his own behalf. Once the alleged injury occurred, Mrs. Collins avers

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plaintiff, construe allegations of a complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Bontkowski
y. First Nat’L Bank of Cicero, 998 F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993); Perkins v, Silverstein,
939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991). The allegations of a complaint “should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). With these principles in mind, we turn
to the motion at hand.
DISCUSSION

The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act provides that

{nJo action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal Jaw, by a prisoner confined

in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The threshold question under this statutory provision is

“whether any ‘remedies’ are ‘available’” for the injury allegedly caused by the

conditions of confinement. Perez v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532,

537 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., McDonald v. Snyder, 2003
WL 22427797, at *3 (N.D. Il. Oct. 23, 2003). If the answer is yes, the administrative


that she explored the potential for a remedy with Sheridan to no avail. Taking all her
allegations as true, as we must, this court concludes that Mrs. Collins did what she
could to resolve her dispute through administrative channels, but Sheridan provided
her with no remedies to pursue. The PLRA requires no less and no more. See Perez,
182 F.3d at 537. She is now free to bring a § 1983 claim in federal court on Ricky’s
behalf. The third amended complaint states a cognizable claim, and the motion to
dismiss is correspondingly denied.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Dated: FEB 2 5 2004


Mingge Ordes Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Dlinois

Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Charles P. Kocoras than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 4493 DATE 2/25/2004
CASE Collins ys. Seeman et al
TITLE
{in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.)

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) Q Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) Qa Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.

(4) D0 Ruling/Hearing on set for at :

(5) a Status hearing set for 4/8/2004 at 9:30 A.M..

(6) Qa Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .

(7) im] Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) QO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Qo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) CO Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP4i(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

Qo [Other docket entry) Ruling held. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: Defendants’ motion
(Doc 38-1) to dismiss is denied. Defendants are given to March 10, 2004 to answer or otherwise plead.
Defendants are given to April 7, 2004 to respond to outstanding discovery.

addy [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document:
a Number...
No notices required. umber of notices PES
Notices mailed by judge's staff. FEB 26 yay
Notified counsel by telephone. date docketod
wo | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form. (acct ha U2
Copy to iRaeinasi Fudge.
date mailed notice
courtroom
SscT deputy’s
; initials 7
i ‘Doateltime received in! 7 7
central Clerk's Office oiling deputy witials



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

BOCHKETED

DENISE COLLINS, Individually and as Personal ) FEB 26 2004
Representative of the Estate of RICKY COLLINS, )

Deceased,
Plaintiff,

vs. 02 C 4493
CAPT. SEEMAN, SGT. BEETHEM,
CORRECTIONAL OFCR. STEVEN SCHUCK,
CORRECTIONAL OFCR. SAM BUCALO, and
any other correctional officers presently unknown
responsible for RICKY COLLINS’ supervision
and care, jointly and severally,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on the motion of Defendants Deborah
Seeman, Julie Beethem, Steven Schuck, and Sam Bucalo to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case was detailed in our prior opinion. Collins

y. Seeman, 2003 WL 23144867 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2003). Familiarity with the facts

ur


and the procedural history to date is assumed, and we recite here only the
developments in the case since the dismissal of the first amended complaint. Pursuant
to our prior opinion, Plaintiff Denise Collins (“Mrs. Collins”) amended her complaint
to allege exhaustion of remedies as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The third amended complaint! differs from the first by alleging
that, after her son Ricky committed suicide while an inmate at Sheridan Correctional
Center (“Sheridan”), Mrs. Collins requested that Sheridan conduct an investigation into
the circumstances surrounding Ricky’s death. She was informed that Sheridan had no
procedures for investigating inmate suicide. Her counsel later confirmed that Sheridan
provided no administrative remedies in situations such as this one. Defendants have
again moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the PLRA exhaustion
requirement has not been satisfied.
LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is used to test the legal sufficiency of a

complaint. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In ruling

on a motion to dismiss, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

' The second amended complaint contained paragraphs that had previously been
stricken. On the representation of Mrs. Collins’ counsel that their inclusion was
inadvertent, we allowed a corrected complaint to be filed with those allegations
deleted. This pleading was styled “third amended complaint.”

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