Cook County Sheriff's official policy, he saw a doctor in receiving. He stated that “the doctor

wrote a prescription out for my medicine, wrote a prescription out for some diapers, and I never
received them for a while.” The plaintiff further claims that he was forced to “tear up [his] bed
sheet in order to wrap it around [him]” in place of the diapers he never received. The defendant,
however, claims that “plaintiff was given a supply of 20 diapers on May 30, 2002, during the 3
p.m. to 11 p.m. shift.” Daniel Brown, the Superintendent of the Records Division at the Cook
County Department of Corrections, testified in his affidavit that on May 30, 2002, “there are two
entries in the Officer’s Living Unit Log regarding [the plaintiff]. The first indicates his arrival
from Division 9 to Division 1 at 12:48 p.m. The second entry shows that Paramedic Horner was
on deck to deliver 20 diapers to Lawson at 3:30 p.m.” Brown’s affidavit also states that on June
18, 2002, the “plaintiff requested more diapers and the nurse is told by the warehouse that more
would be sent later. On June 19, 2002, the dispensary was called to request more Depends for
plaintiff.” Brown also testified that on June 27, 2002, four pairs of underwear were delivered to
Lawson. Thus, it is unclear from the record before this Court when plaintiff actually received
this supply of diapers, whether he received one supply or more, and how long he went, if ever,
without diapers.

The second factual discrepancy exists over the date the plaintiff actually received his
medication. The plaintiff initially stated in this litigation that he did not receive any medication
at the Cook County Jail until June 6, 2002. Plaintiff also testified in his deposition that he did
not receive any medication “until that sixth day-the date of the 6th.” However, plaintiff has
stated in his affidavit that he did not receive his medication until July 9, 2002, a discrepancy of

three weeks and four days. The defendant’s records show that the plaintiffs prescriptions were


when a prisoner is released is to first take him to the facility’s bullpen for holding while inmate

paperwork is sorted by category and disbursed to the proper offices for further action and
processing.” Besides the standard procedures, plaintiff was also discharged “as to this case
only.” Brown’s affidavit states that “there was a ‘writ return’ to send plaintiff back to the IDOC.
To expedite the process, a request was made to contact IDOC to determine if it was necessary to
return plaintiff there.” The IDOC Records Office closes at 4 p.m. daily. “At first opportunity,
IDOC was contacted via Fax by the Cook County Department of Corrections regarding plaintiff
requesting whether he was under any other sentences and need be returned or if he could be
released. IDOC responded at 2:09 p.m., July 18, 2002, that plaintiff had no further cases or
sentences and the returm writ was vacated. Plaintiff's division was notified at 3:30 p.m. Plaintiff
was sent for Dress and Release at 3:45 p.m. and was released at 6:15 p.m. on July 18, 2002.”
This delay here was due to the defendant’s careful consideration of the fact that plaintiff was
released “as to this case only.” The delay of a day is entirely reasonable given the undisputed
facts. Defendant took the time that was necessary to ensure that plaintiff was not being held for
any other case to ensure that he would not be released if plaintiff was to be held for another crime
and as soon as that inquiry was answered, plaintiff was released. Moreover, plaintiff has
submitted no evidence that contradicts the defendant’s factual assertions or explanations for the

delay in his release. Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to claim

two.


facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party as well as view all reasonable inferences in

that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). It is the function

of this Court to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. If a genuine issue of

material fact does exist then the motion for summary judgment must be denied.
DISCUSSION

Lawson’s first claim is that the defendant violated his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment when he was denied adequate medical treatment at the Cook County Jail
from May 29, 2002 until July 9, 2002 pursuant to the official policy of the Cook County Sheriff's
Office. Both the plaintiff and the defendant have failed to show that no genuine issue of material
fact exists and thus, both motions for summary judgment must be denied.

A state official violates the due process rights of a pretrial detainee when he acts with
“deliberate indifference” toward the detainee’s serious medical needs. Murphy v. Walker, 51
F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit has observed that “deliberate indifference” is
simply a synonym of intentional or reckless conduct, which is conduct so dangerous that the
deliberate nature of the defendant’s actions can be inferred. Brownell vy, Figel, 950 F.2d 1285,
1290 (7th Cir. 1991). The question that the fact-finder must determine in this case is whether the
conduct alleged by the plaintiff rises to the level of recklessness. There are two material factual
discrepancies in the record before the Court that are outcome determinative under the “deliberate
indifference” standard.

The first material discrepancy is whether or not the plaintiff received diapers upon his
arrival at the Cook County Jail on May 30, 2002. The plaintiff claims in his deposition that after

his two-week supply of medication and diapers from Menard was confiscated pursuant to the


being filled on a weekly basis, beginning on June 5, 2002. Brown’s affidavit does indicate that
the plaintiff complained that he had not received his medication on July 9, 2002. The
defendant’s records do not state whether these prescriptions were ever delivered to the plaintiff.

Furthermore, the deliberate indifference standard relevant to claim one includes a
subjective element. The relevant subjective inquiry in a deliberate indifference casc is whether
the official actually knew about the plaintiffs condition, not whether a reasonable official should
have known. Riccardo v. Rausch, 359 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2004). In order to prove the subjective
elements of deliberate indifference to his medical needs, the plaintiff must prove the defendant
knew there was a serious harm and refused to alleviate it. Although the plaintiff has indicated
that he carried with him a “Health Status” form at the time he was transferred to Cook County
Jail, nowhere in his deposition, affidavit, or complaint does he demonstrate that the defendant
subjectively knew of the plaintiff's medical condition. Likewise, nowhere in any of the affidavits
presented on behalf of the defendant does the defendant deny his knowledge of plaintiff's serious
medical condition.

These discrepancies demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that is outcome
determinative under the deliberate indifference standard. The deliberate indifference standard
rests on a differentiation between reckless conduct and conduct that does not rise to that level. It
is entirely plausible that a jury may determine that an initial delay of a week due to a gaffe in
delivering the May 29, 2002 prescription does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference
necessary for the plaintiff's claim to prevail. However, it is also quite possible that a jury may
determine that a five-week delay is indeed reckless. Thus, the factual discrepancies detailed

above yield a genuine issue of material fact. A jury must be allowed to make a factual



CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment [31-1] is
denied and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment [33-1] is denied in part and granted in
part.

This matter is set for status on February 17, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. It is so ordered.

Ta
Ld Ce
7“ Wayne R. Andersen
United States District Judge

pack pasty Sey 005


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
)
GERALD LAWSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 02 C 6508
v. )
) Wayne R. Andersen
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, ) District Judge
)
Defendant. )
)

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on plaintiffs partial motion for summary judgment and
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff has brought two claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. First, he claims that the defendant violated his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying him adequate medical treatment. Second, he claims that the
defendant unlawfully prolonged his detention in police custody after he was released by a court
order. Lawson has moved for summary judgment on his first claim. The defendant has moved
for summary judgment on both claims. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment is denied and defendant’s motion is denied in part and granted in part.

BACKGROUND
The plaintiff alleges the Cook County Sheriff's Office failed to provide him with

appropriate medical treatment while he was detained at the Cook County Jail in 2002. According



determination regarding whether or not the defendant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's

medical condition as well as when and for how long the plaintiff was without diapers or his
medication. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment must be denied and defendant’s
motion for summary judgment must fail as to this claim.

Plaintiff's second claim is that the defendant unlawfully detained him for one day after
his criminal case was dismissed by court order. To maintain this cause of action, plaintiff must
demonstrate that the delay in his release was unreasonable. Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d 1366
(7th Cir. 1988). Here, the defendant has successfully carried his burden of demonstrating the
lack of any genuine issue of material fact and his motion for summary judgment is granted as to
this claim.

First, we note that the Sheriff is given wide discretion in releasing a discharged prisoner.
Bell v, Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). Second, a reasonable time must be allowed to process
the release of the inmate when the basis for detention has ended. In this case, the delay was
approximately twenty-four hours. Finally, considerations other than the time of detention should
be considered in assessing whether a delay was reasonable. Llaguno y. Mingey, 739 F.2d 1186,
1196 (7th Cir. 1984). Other factors may include the reasons for delay, whether the delay was
justified by administrative steps that were necessary to be taken, and the number of people to be
processed. Llaguno v, Mingey, 739 F.2d 1186, 1196 (7th Cir. 1984). In this case, plaintiff was
released by court order on July 17, 2002 but was not released from custody of the Cook County
Jail until July 18, 2002. It appears that the delay of one day was justified by the necessary
administrative procedures to be taken. Daniel Brown, Superintendent of the Records Division at

the Cook County Department of Corrections, indicates in his affidavit that “standard procedure



to the plaintiff's complaint, he suffers from serious medical problems for which he takes

prescribed medication. In 1989, Lawson was shot and as a result suffered an “L5 cord
dysfunction,” which resulted in bowel and bladder incontinence, which he has suffered from
continuously since the shooting. Due to these injuries, Lawson requires several medications on a
daily basis, including oxybutinin for pain and bladder control, and baclofen, a muscle relaxant,
which minimizes involuntary twitching and lower back pain. Lawson also needs constant access
to a toilet or diapers for his bowel incontinence.

In March of 1996, Lawson he was charged with, inter alia, armed robbery for a robbery
and shooting that occurred on February 17, 1996. He was subsequently convicted of armed
robbery in the Circuit Court of Cook County and was sentenced in July of 1999 to a term of life
in prison. On December 28, 2001, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed his conviction and
remanded the case for a new trial. People v. Lawson, 762 N.E.2d 633 (1st Dist. 2001).

On May 29, 2002, Lawson was transported from the Menard Correctional Facility
(“Menard”) to the Cook County Jail. Lawson maintains that when he left Menard, he was given
a two-week supply of his medications and diapers, along with paperwork for County officials
detailing his medical problems. Upon arriving at the Cook County Jail, he alleges that County
officials confiscated his prescriptions under an official policy that bans prescribed medication
unless issued by Cermak Hospital, which was not the case with plaintiff's medications. He
further alleges that he was denied access to medication until July 9, 2002 and that his requests to
officers and paramedics for medication were ignored. As a result, the plaintiff allegedly
experienced pain in his back and legs and involuntary twitching. He also had trouble sleeping

and was afraid to leave the toilet due to lack of bowel control.


Lawson was released on July 18, 2002, after pending criminal charges were dropped. He

alleges, however, that the defendant unlawfully prolonged his detention in police custody after he
was released by a court order on July 17, 2002. The court order stated that he was to be
discharged “‘as to this case only.” On July 17, 2002, County officials determined that a request
should be made to the Illinois Department of Corrections (“TDOC”) to determine if the plaintiff
should be released or held on other charges. On July 18, 2002, County officials sent a fax to the
IDOC requesting information regarding plaintiff's status. IDOC officials responded that he had
no prior sentences and Lawson was released. He filed this lawsuit on September 12, 2002.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper
“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

To determine whether any genuine fact exists, the court must pierce the pleadings and
assess the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and
affidavits that are part of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Advisory Committee’s Notes. The
party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In response, the nonmoving
party cannot rest on bare pleadings alone but must use the evidentiary tools listed above to
designate specific material facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Jd. at 324; Insolia
v, Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). A material fact must be outcome

determinative under the governing law. Insolia, 216 F.3d at 598-99. The Court must construe all