shorter because he started at the same time as the plaintiff and became a 2TM Vice
President at an earlier date. Foote’s promotion track was allegedly shorter because he
started work after the plaintiff but was promoted at the same time she was. Thus,
defendant's objections are not well taken and it must produce Magrini for redeposition.

The parties also spend time in their briefs arguing about documents the defendant
produced to the plaintiff the morning of Magrini’s deposition, which plaintiff contends she
did not have any time to review prior to the deposition. Defendant argues that plaintiff
should have reserved time at the end of the deposition so she could continue it on another
day after she reviewed the documents; plaintiff contends that the defendant informed her
that he refused to produce Magrini at another time to be deposed on the new documents.
Without deciding whose version of the facts is accurate, we order defendant to produce
Magrini to be redeposed on the documents first produced the morning of his deposition.
Plaintiff is responsible for the costs associated with this deposition.’ Plaintiff also asks that
Magrini be designated a 30(b)(6) deponent to testify on what are apparently entirely new
areas of inquiry regarding the general promotion structure at Northern Trust. We deny this
request because the current motion does not provide any basis or support for it.

Next, plaintiff asks in her reply brief to be allowed to reopen the depositions of two
of plaintiff's supervisors for the limited purpose of deposing them on documents that were
produced by defendant after the parties appeared in Court on plaintiff's first motion to

compel. Since these documents were arguably due prior to the depositions of the

*To the extent that Magrini testifies regarding the documents at the same deposition
where he appears as a 30(b)(6) deponent on the Foote promotion issue, the parties should
apportion the costs of the deposition appropriately.

4


with “reasonable particularity” as required by case law and Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6).?

We disagree with defendant's position and thus order it to produce Magrini at its
own cost to testify as a 30(b)(6) witness on the issues of Darrin Foote's qualifications and
why he was promoted in a shorter period of time than the plaintiff.> Prior to the deposition,
defendant had informed the plaintiff that it designated Magrini to testify about the reasons
that both Ross and Foote were promoted “sooner” than the plaintiff. In order to make such
a designation, the defendant needed to perform atleast a basic investigation regarding the
subject matter of the deposition so that it could adequately prepare Magrini to testify. See
Canal Barge Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 98 C 509, 2001 WL 817853 (N.D.IIl.,
July 19, 2001) (a corporation has the duty to designate and adequately prepare its 30(b)(6)
witness to testify on specified issues). If it was at all confused about the plaintiff's use of
the word “sooner”, it should have asked the plaintiff for clarification prior to the deposition
instead of indicating to her in writing that Magrini would testify about both Foote and Ross.
Further, contrary to the defendant's argument, we do not believe that the plaintiff's
characterization of the deposition topics is too vague. It is a reasonable interpretation of
the deposition notice that the plaintiff wished to inquire into the reasons that two individuals

were promoted in a shorter time period than she was. Ross’ promotion track was allegedly

2 Specifically, defendant notes that plaintiff used the word “sooner” to describe the
promotion track of both Foote, who was actually promoted on the same day as plaintiff,
and employee Rory Ross, who was in plaintiff's training class and was promoted to 2" Vice
President on an earlier date. Defendant contends that using the word “sooner” to mean
(in its view) two different things was not consistent with the notice requirement of Rule
30(b)(6).

* Defendant indicates that it told plaintiff's attorney that Magrini may not be the
person to testify on the “new” issue of Foote’s promotion history. If that is the case,
defendant must produce another properly prepared witness to testify, at its own expense.

3


supervisors, we will allow plaintiff to redepose Vicino and Alexander for one hour each on
the documents produced February 1, 2002, with the parties splitting the cost of such
depositions.®

Finally, plaintiff asks to be awarded the costs and fees associated with filing this
motion. Since a substantial part of the motion could have been avoided if defendant's
counsel had spoken to plaintiff's counsel about the meaning of the word “sooner” prior to
Magrini’s deposition, we order defendant to pay plaintiff's counsel for two hours of her time
at her regular hourly rate, to partially compensate her for the time she spent preparing this
motion.

Plaintiff's third motion to compel concerns a single document that was produced to
her with portions redacted, which she wishes to see in unredacted form. We deny this
request. Defendant explains that the redacted portions of the e-mail at issue concern
compensation information for employees other than the plaintiff who were not supervised
by the plaintiff's supervisors or otherwise related to her. We see no reason to allow the
plaintiff (or her attorney) to review this information, despite plaintiff's baseless speculation

that such information could lead to admissible evidence.®

5 We recognize that this request was not part of plaintiff's original motion, but we
wish to avoid the additional expense that would accrue if we required the plaintiff to file yet
another motion to compel and so deal with this issue here.

° Plaintiff argues that defendant made certain arguments against production of the
unredacted document during Magrini’s deposition that are different from the ones it makes
in its brief, and that this is evidence that the redacted portions could be relevant. We
disagree. It is not unreasonable that defendant’s attorney could not be certain during the
deposition of the reasons that defendant redacted one particular e-mail out of many
documents it has produced and we see no reason to disbelieve defendant.

5


Minute Order Form (06/97)
* °

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name asigned ue Donald B. Walter sig Jae ote Michael T. Mason
CASE NUMBER 01 C2290 DATE 3/11/2002
CASE Stallings-Daniel vs. Northern Trust Co.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___._ Reply to answer brief due

(4) ao Ruling/Hearing on______ set for____att

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——set for at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—ssetfor_ at.

(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Do This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) ClGeneral Rule 21 CIFRCP41(a)(1) © FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) =o [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order,

plaintiffs second motion to compel [37-1] is granted in part and denied in part and plaintiff's third motion
to compel [44-1] is denied. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order.

we

(11) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document

Number.

56

No notices required. nuaiber of notices

vo | Notices mailed by judge’s staff. MAR 1 2 2002

Notified counsel by telephone. date docketed.

Cm

docketing deputy initials

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

oY | Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
3/1/2002

date mailed notice
courtroom

KF deputy’s

Paris KF
initials

mailing deputy initials



For the above reasons, we grant plaintiff's second motion to compel in part and

deny it in part and deny plaintiff's third motion to compel. It is so ordered.

ENTER:

Mucha A piyn

MICHAEL T. MASON
United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: March 11, 2002


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DIVISION
SHIRLEY STALLINGS-DANIEL

Plaintiff,
No. 01 C 2290
Vv.
Judge Donald E. Walter

THE NORTHERN TRUST COMPANY, Mag. Judge Mason

wee SS SES ESS SS

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before us are plaintiff's second and third motions to compel documents and other
information from the defendant. We will address each motion in turn.

Plaintiffs second motion to compel and defendant's response are quite
representative of the misunderstandings, half-truths and disingenuous behavior that has
characterized both sides of the discovery disputes in this case so far. Given that the
plaintiff has two other pending discovery motions, this is not the last time that the Court will
be compelled to referee, even though it seems that at least some of the disputes could be
resolved if the parties would talk to each other honestly instead of looking for areas in
which to disagree.

This particular motion on its face requests only that we order the re-deposition of
defendant's Rule 30(b)(6) deponent on the sole issue of the qualifications of Mr. Darren
Foote, an individual whom plaintiff contends was unfairly promoted “sooner” than she was
(the need for the quotations will subsequently become clear). However, elsewhere in the
body of the motion, plaintiff also asks for the opportunity to depose this 30(b)(6) witness

on additional documents that she received from the defendant on the morning of the

TED

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS MAR 1 2 2002


deposition, too later for her to review them, and also to have him testify about entirely new
issues. In her reply, she additionally asks for the right to redepose several of plaintiff's
supervisors regarding documents the defendant did not produce until after the initial
depositions had been completed.

In her initial notice of deposition for a 30(b)(6) witness, plaintiff asked defendant to
identify a person who could testify about, inter alia, “the qualifications of Rory Ross and
Darrin Foote for the 2"? Vice President promotion and why they were qualified to be
promoted sooner than Plaintiff.” Defendant responded by letter that it had designated Pete
Magrini to testify on this and one other issue, and that it would address any objections or
resolutions it had to the remaining matters listed in the notice of deposition shortly.

At the deposition and again in its reply brief, defendant argued that Magrini should
not have to testify about Foote’s qualifications or the reasons he was promoted “sooner”
than plaintiff because in fact, Foote and the plaintiff were promoted on the same day. The
plaintiff explains that because Foote was hired approximately two years after she was, and
because he held the general officer position for a shorter period of time than she did before
they were both promoted to 2TM Vice President, Foote was in fact promoted sooner.'
Defendant objected at the deposition to having Magrini testify about the reasons Foote was

promoted in a shorter amount of time because it contends that this topic was not identified

‘ Defendant states in its reply that in fact, Foote held the general officer title for one
month less than plaintiff at the time they were both promoted. Plaintiff does not dispute
this fact, but notes that Foote had worked for defendant for two years less than the plaintiff
at the time he was promoted.