process claim that landlord used judicial process to evict tenant, causing her to lose her
possessions, job, and custody of her child barred by Rooker-Feldman); Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d
1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants retaliated against them for expressing
political views by causing property to be condemned barred by Rooker-Feldman). Crestview’s
claim that the Defendants’ violated its civil rights by subjecting it to excessively harsh sanctions
cannot be considered independently from the state court judgment, and therefore is precisely the
type of collateral attack upon state court decisions Rooker-Feldman requires this Court to avoid.

Crestview also argues that its injury has been caused by the conspiracy amongst the
Defendants, and not by the state court decisions — pointing to the paragraphs of its complaint
which allege that Perry sent letters to the state court judge urging the judge to impose harsh
administrative sanctions against Crestview for its building code violations. Under this theory,
Crestview argues that it was injured because it was “forced to defend unsubstantiated lawsuits.”
Crestview offers Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 1995) in support of its argument that
its injuries were caused by the conspiracy between the Defendants and not by the state court
judgment, and thus are independent from that judgment. But Nesses is not on point. In Nesses,
the plaintiff alleged that the conspiracy infected the state court process. 68 F.3d at 1004-05. The
Nesses plaintiff clearly alleged that the defendants lawyers “conspired with the trial judge” in the
state court proceedings and thus violated an independent right of his —the right “to be judged
by a tribunal that is uncontaminated by politics.” Nesse, 68 F.3d at 1004-05. Here, Crestview
makes no such allegation; the alleged conspiracy consisted only of a plot amongst the Defendants
to harass Crestview with unsubstantiated lawsuits, not a plot to infect the judicial process by
corrupting the state court tribunal. The conspiracy to bring a baseless lawsuit, in and of itself,

4



be no injury but for the state court’s action. Id. (collecting cases). On the other hand, if the
injury about which the plaintiff complains was not caused by the state court, but by its adversay’s
conduct, and the plaintiff merely alleges that the state court failed to remedy that injury, Rooker-
Feldman does not apply. Id.

In determining whether Rooker-Feldman bars Crestview’s claims against Perry it is
therefore essential to examine the nature of the injury about which it complains. In this case,
Crestview alleges that the Defendants engaged in a vast conspiracy to damage it through improper
use of the State of Illinois’ courts. In each of its five counts Crestview alleges that as a result the
Defendants’ conduct it “has been damaged in that it has been forced to defend unsubstantiated
lawsuits, and excessively harsh administrative actions which have diverted funds from Crestview
and the daily operation” of its apartment complex.

No matter the spin Crestview places upon its claims, the bottom line remains that
Crestview’s injury is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision. But for the settlement
agreement in the state court proceeding (under which Crestview admitted to 378 specific
violations of the local building code and agreed to make necessary repairs in order to avoid
demolition), Crestview would not have been injured. Crestview did not suffer an injury outside
of court that the state court failed to remedy, it was only injured when the state court imposed
“excessively harsh sanctions” as a result of several Defendants’ lawsuit against it. Its federal claim
thus directly implicates the state court judgment. Indeed, Crestview’s claim that Perry and the
other Defendants used the state judicial process to deprive it of property by subjecting it to
excessively harsh sanctions is similar to other claims that the Seventh Circuit has held to be barred
by Rooker-Feldman. See, e.g., Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1999) (due

3



did not injure Crestview. Only after the Crestview agreed to the remedy its building code
violations in order to settle the allegedly baseless lawsuit could it have been injured. Cf Long, 182
F.3d at 556 (plaintiffs due process claim that Defendants conspired to bring baseless lawsuit,
which resulted in her eviction, was barred by Rooker-Feldman).

Both of Crestview’s alleged injuries (excessively harsh sanctions for building code
violations and attorney’s fees that piled up in defending itself from those sanctions) are dependent
on the state court’s judgment. But for the state court decision, Crestview would have no injuries.
Its claims are nothing more than a collateral attack upon the state court judgment. Even though
Crestview dresses up its claims against the Defendants as civil rights violations, they amount to
nothing more a request for this Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the state court
judgment. Rooker-Feldman prevents this Court from doing so, and Crestview’s claims against
Perry are therefore DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

TT IS SO ORDERED.

tL7foas kj. 1 XE

Dated The Hono: William J. Hibbler
United States District Court



Minute Orgler Fore (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

NS

Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/ magistrate judge.

courtroom

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initials

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Latamne f Assigned Jud ‘Ili i Sitting Judge if Other
Sr Magieats utes William J. Hibbler prong berate Judge
CASE NUMBER 01C: 6913 DATE 07/07/2003
CASE Crestview Village Apart. v. HUD et al.
TITLE
[la the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, eg., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the
MOTION: nature of the motion being presented.)
Defendant Perry’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. # 36)
DOCKET ENTRY:
()) in) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
@) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due. :
(4) ia) Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing [held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
© o Pretrial conference [held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
~” o Trial [set for/re-set for] on at
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) ia] This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs [by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) (General Rule2i OFRCP41(a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) HM [Other docket entry] . Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendant Perry’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. # 36)
is GRANTED.

ay a [For further detail see order on the reverse side of the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in opea court.

No notices required.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION acKETED
CRESTVIEW VILLAGE APARTMENTS ) D
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ) JuL 08 2003
)
Plaintiff, )
) No.01C 6913...
v. )
) The Honorable William J. Hibbler
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING )
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET. AL., )
)
Defendants. )
ORA’ OPINION ORDER

Crestview Village Apartments sued the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), the City of Kankakee, various HUD and Kankakee officials (in both their
individual and official capacities) and developer Tony Perry. Crestview alleged that the
Defendants engaged in a massive conspiracy to violate its civil rights. On February 5, 2002, the
Court granted the Federal Defendants’ and the Kankakee Defendants’ motions to dismiss.' The
remaining Defendant, Tony Perry, now moves to dismiss Crestview’s claim against him, asserting
that they are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For the reasons stated herein, the Court
GRANTS Perry’s motion.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars review by lower courts of state court judgments.

Rooker. Fidelity Tr, Co., 263 US. 412, 415-16, 44S. Ct, 149 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. App.

| A recitation of the relevant facts can be found in the Court's order dismissing the Federal
Defendants and the Kankakee Defendants. Crestview Village Apartments v. HUD et al, No01C

6913 (N_D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2002).
\ Lb \}-



v. Feldman, 460 USS. 462, 482-86, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983); Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 486-87
(7th Cir. 2003); Ritter v. Ross, 992 F. 2d 750, 753 (7th Cir, 1993). In assessing whether a claim is
barred by Rooker-Feldman, a court asks “whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state
court judgment or whether he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim. Put another way, if
the injury which the federal plaintiff alleges resulted from the state court judgment itself, then
Rooker-Feldman controls, and the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction over the claim.” Schmitt,
324 F.3d at 486 (quoting Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996).
Rooker-Feldman bars attacks on state court judgments, including a “losing party’s claim that the
state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-
06, 114 S. Ct, 2647 (1994). Thus a federal plaintiff may not manufacture federal jurisdiction by
disguising an attack on a state court judgment as a civil rights action. Schmitt, 325 F.3d at 486;
Maple Lanes, Inc. v. Messer, 186 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1999); Ritter, 992 F.2d at 754.
Moreover, Rooker-Feldman bars claims that are “inextricably intertwined with a state court
decision, such that success in the federal court would require overturning the state court decision.
Epps v. Creditnet, Inc., 320 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir.2002). The Seventh Circuit has noted the difficulty
in identifying claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with state court judgments. See, e.g,
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct. for the St, of Cal., 326 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting
cases). In clarifying the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Zurich identified two
situations under which federal claims are inextricably intertwined with state court judgments: (1)
claims that are related to the judgment the plaintiff is attacking, but which were not raised before
the state court; and (2) claims that were in fact dependent on the judgment, such as if there would

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