significantly limit the claimant's ability to work.” /d.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(c),
416.920(a)-(c). In step three the ALJ compares evidence of impairments with “a list
of impairments presumed severe enough to preclude any gainful work.” Rice, 384
F.3d at 365; 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant’s impairment “meets
or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant qualifies for benefits and no
further inquiry is necessary.” Rice, 384 F.3d at 365; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
416.920(d). However, if the claimant’s impairment is not sufficient under step three,
the court proceeds on to steps four and five. Rice, 384 F.3d at 365. In the fourth
step of the analysis, the court determines whether the “claimant's residual functional
capacity,” which is defined as the tasks “a claimant can still do, despite his or her
limitations,” Rice, 384 F.3d at 365; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a), “will allow the
claimant to pursue her past work.” Rice, 384 F.3d at 365; 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant’s impairment “precludes the performance
of past work, the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience are
considered to determine if other work exists that would accommodate the claimant.

Rice, 384 F.3d at 365; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).

1. Opinion of Treating Physici
Gregory argues that the ALJ erred in not adopting the opinion of Dr. Nicholas

Bellios (“Bellios”), the treating physician. Bellios concluded that Gregory was

completely disabled. A treating physician’s opinion is generally “give[n] more


was limited to one or two days a week and was only for three months.

The ALJ had ample support to conclude that Gregory’s testimony was not
credible. For instance, the ALJ considered the fact that the various medical reports
and tests indicated that Gregory’s condition has improved and that his alleged
symptoms of fatigue are not as severe as Gregory claims. The ALJ considered the
fact that the record indicated that the surgeries performed on Gregory were
successful and alleviated some of his problems and that the record reflected that the
surgeries and medication alleviated his symptoms and Gregory no longer sought
frequent medical treatment. The ALJ considered the above-mentioned daily tasks
such as cooking and cleaning and there is no indication from his decision that he
failed to take into consideration the limited extent that Gregory engaged in such
tasks. The performance of the tasks, even for a limited period, is evidence of
Gregory’s ability to live alone and maintain his household and evidence that he is
capable of performing sedentary work. Likewise, although Gregory’s landscaping
work was not full time, it is still evidence that Gregory’s alleged symptoms were not
as severe as he claims and that he is capable of performing sedentary work. The
ALJ specifically acknowledged, in his ruling, that the landscaping work was one or
two days a week for one or two hours a day. (AR 15). Gregory also criticizes the
AL] for stating that Gregory “frequently” drove to his sister’s house in Kenosha.
Gregory claims that he only drove to his sister’s house a few times. Such a

distinction is insufficient to warrant a finding in favor of Gregory in regards to the



other evidence. (AR 16). When addressing the opinion of Bellios the ALJ noted
that portions of Bellios’ own reports indicated that Gregory was not completely
disabled and unable to perform light work, and the ALJ found that Bellios’ opinion
was not supported by the evidence and that Bellios’ opinion conflicted with other
evidence in the administrative record. The ALJ stated that Bellios’ “own treatment
notes do not indicate findings that would support” his ultimate conclusion of
complete disability. (AR 16). The ALJ also pointed out that although Bellios
indicates that Gregory has certain physical restrictions, Gregory himself admitted to
engaging in “numerous activities that are greater than the doctor’s limitations.” (AR
16). In addition, the ALJ noted that although Bellios indicated that Gregory had
certain restrictions, “there were no such restrictive opinions from the cardiologist.”
The ALJ also relied upon the opinions of the state agency physicians that indicated
that Bellios could perform light work. The ALJ noted that the opinions of the state
agency physicians were entitled to considerable weight because they were consistent
with the majority of the other evidence in the record. (AR 16). W cannot find that
the ALJ erred in regards to any of its findings pertaining to Bellios’ opinion and we
shall provide some examples of the basis for our conclusion. For instance, on May
10, 1999, Bellios received a letter from Dr. Russell C. Dabrowski (“Dabrowski”), a
physician that examined Gregory. (AR 205). In the letter, Dabrowski states that
Gregory had undergone surgery in March of 1999, and that an “[e]xamination shows
the patient to appear well.” (AR 205). Dabrowski further explains the



weight” than non-treating physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). If the treating
physician’s opinion “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the] case record” the ALJ should “give it controlling weight.” 20
CFR. § 404.1527(d)(2) See also Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7* Cir.
2003)(stating that an ALJ may “reject an examining physician's opinion only for
Teasons supported by substantial evidence in the record; a contradictory opinion of a
non-examining physician does not, by itself, suffice.”). This rule only applies
“where a treating physician’s opinion was disregarded in favor of the opinion of a
consulting physician,” and does not apply when the “examining physician's opinion
was contradicted by several other examining and non-examining physicians’
opinions.” Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001-02 (7* Cir. 2004). Also, if the
treating physician for some reason, such as an absence from his practice, is not able
to provide a more insightful and detailed opinion based on his personal examination
of the patient, then the treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to more weight.
Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 702-03 (7* Cir. 2004).

In the instant action the ALJ did not neglect to accord the proper weight to
Bellios’ opinion. The ALJ specifically noted that generally the opinions of non-
examining physicians do not “deserve as much weight as those of treating
physicians. ...” (AR 16). The ALJ continued on to state that such weight is

accorded to the treating physician’s opinion as long as it is not inconsistent with the


several times in his decision thus providing further indication that he did not fail to
consider Leone’s findings. (AR 14, 15). The ALJ extensively addressed Gregory’s
heart condition in his ruling, The ALJ did not ignore an entire line of evidence in
Gregory’s case as Gregory alleges, and Gregory’s attempt to pick out one finding in
one of many medical reports that was not specifically referred to by the ALJ is

unpersuasive.

. Credibility of Gre;

Gregory also argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Gregory’s testimony
regarding his symptoms was not credible. An ALJ’s credibility determination is
entitled to substantial deference and “there has developed a firm and tenable rule of
law ‘that an ALJ's credibility determination will not be disturbed unless it is
“patently wrong.” Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 758 (7° Cir.
2004)(quoting Cannon v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 970, 977 (7* Cir. 2000)). According to
Gregory, the ALJ improperly relied on testimony by Gregory indicating that he
could perform tasks such as cooking, cleaning, grocery shopping, changing sheets,
and mowing the lawn. Gregory argues that although he stated that he could perform
the tasks, the ALJ failed to take into consideration Gregory’s additional testimony
that he was only able to perform the tasks to a limited extent. Gregory also criticizes
the ALJ for relying on the fact that Gregory was employed by a landscaping
business. Gregory contends that the ALJ failed to consider the fact that the activity



Minate Order Form (06/97)

He

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge “ F Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 9381 DATE 11/3/2004
CASE Gregory vs. Barnhart
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.)

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.

(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .

(6) Q Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :

@ Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) Oo {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4m) CLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) «+f [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion, defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. All
pending dates and motions are hereby stricken as moot. Terminating case. Enter Memorandum Opinion.

dl) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.

~ | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. m
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. }
countwon 1:3 NY 9 AGNAOOZ
MW deputy's
initials . +
® <i <3 Datedtimd roadived in
central Clerk's Office

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instant motion.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment and deny Gregory’s motion for summary judgment.

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan a ‘ a

United States District Court Judge

Dated: November 3, 2004

10



improvements in Gregory’s condition. Id.

Gregory argues that the ALJ erred in failing to address Dr. Karen A. Leone’s
(“Leone”) diagnosis of atrial fibrillation. Although an ALJ cannot “ignore an entire
line of evidence that is contrary to the ruling,” an ALJ does not have the burden of
“discuss[ing] every piece of evidence in the record.” Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322
F.3d 912, 917 (7* Cir. 2003). In the instant action, the ALJ discussed Gregory’s
heart condition and the diagnosis was considered by the other state agency
physicians. Gregory points to a report of an examination made by Dr. Leone on
October 28, 2000, in which Leone states that there were irregularities in Gregory’s
heart beat. (AR 304-05). Leone also indicated in the report that Gregory was “in no
acute distress,” was “alert” and “responded appropriately to questions,” that Gregory
“could dress/undress himself and get on/off the examination table, unassisted,” and
that he “ambulated 100' with a normal gait, without assisting device.” (AR 304).
Leone also indicated that Gregory’s lungs were clear, “[t]here was a full range of
motion of all the joints,” and although Leone commented on minor tenderness in
regards to certain joints, he did not indicate any significant symptoms or limitations.
Id. Leone reported that “[t]here was a full range of motion of the cervical spine
without tenderness,” and stated that there was only “tenderness to palpitation over
the lower lumbar vertebrae, with mild muscle spasm present.” Jd. The ALJ also
specifically mentioned that Gregory “had an abnormal EKG with abnormal clinical
findings in October 2000.” (AR 14). The ALJ also specifically refers to the report



431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000)(quoting Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir.
1990)). By contrast, the ALJ's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Nelson v.
Bowen, 855 F.2d 503, 506 (7* Cir. 1988); Aidinovski v. Apfel, 27 F.Supp.2d 1097,
1101 (N.D. Ill. 1998). However, an ALJ must provide some explanation that would
allow the parties to understand his reasoning for his decision. See Clifford, 227 F.3d
at 872 (stating that “[w]hile the ALJ is not required to address every piece of
evidence, he must articulate some legitimate reason for his decision. . . [and] he must
build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.”). Further,
in reviewing the decision, the court must confine its review to the explanation and

reasoning given by the ALJ. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

Gregory argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Gregory retains the RFC to
perform light work because the ALJ did not properly consider the opinion of
Gregory’s treating physician and because the ALJ improperly concluded that
Gregory’s testimony was not credible.

The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration employs a five-step
analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f),
416.920(a)-(f); Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 365 (7* Cir. 2004). In the first two
steps the ALJ determines “whether a claimant is not presently working, and second,

whether the complained of impairment(s) are of the required duration and



congestive heart failure and that his heart condition causes him to become easily
fatigued and unable to work. Gregory also claims that he has diabetes and suffers
from spondylolisthesis in the lower back with scoliosis. On February 2, 2002, the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ruled against Gregory. The ALJ concluded that
although Gregory has severe impairments, Gregory has the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform limited light work. On October 24, 2003, the Appeals
Council denied Gregory’s request for a review. Gregory brought the instant action,

seeking a review of the ALJ’s decision.

LEGAL STANDARD

A reviewing court will uphold an ALJ's decision if it is supported by
"substantial evidence" in the record and the ALJ applied the correct legal standards.
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit defines
“[s]Jubstantial evidence” as what a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001).
When determining if substantial evidence exists, the court must review the record as
a whole but is not allowed to substitute its judgment for the ALJ's by “reconsidering
facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of
credibility.” Williams v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1066, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 1999). Deference
should be given to an ALJ's determinations relating to credibility and should be

reversed only if the determinations are "patently wrong." Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM GREGORY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 03 C 9381

JO ANNE BARNHART, Commissioner )
of Social Security, ) TO 2 sen
) bead ey
Defendant. ) hav ~ 4 2004

MEMORANDUM OPINION «
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff William Gregory’s (“Gregory”)
motion for summary judgment. This matter is also before the court on Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, we grant Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment and deny Gregory’s motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND
Gregory filed a claim for social security disability benefits and sought a
hearing regarding the denial of the benefits. Gregory contends that in March of

1999, he became permanently disabled. Gregory claims that he suffers from

\2