alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2006224EN.01000501.xml

| 16.9.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.9.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/5

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 18 July 2006 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Nuova società di telecomunicazioni SpA v Ministero delle Comunicazioni, ENI SpA,

(Case C-339/04) (1)

1

(Telecommunication services - Directive 97/13/EC - Fees and charges applicable to individual licences)

(2006/C 224/08)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Nuova società di telecomunicazioni SpA

Applicant:

Defendants: Ministero delle Comunicazioni, ENI SpA,

Defendants:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Consiglio Di Stato (Italy) — Interpretation of Articles 6 and 11 of Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services (OJ 1997 L 117, p. 15) — Compatibility with Community law of a national provision requiring companies providing a public service and having created telecommunications networks to create a separate company for the exercise of any activity in the field of telecommunications

Operative part of the judgment

Article 11 of Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services precludes a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires the holder of an individual licence for the provision of a public telecommunications network, for which it has paid a fee as provided for in that article, to pay an additional fee in respect of the private use of that network calculated in accordance with criteria which do not correspond to those laid down in that article.

---

(1)  OJ C 251, 9.10.2004.

1

---
#### Marjorie J. Kleinberg, Formerly Known as Marjorie J. Gershman, Appellant, v Richard S. Gershman, Respondent.

— In a matrimonial action, the plaintiff wife appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Levitt, J.), dated October 12, 1984, as denied her application for an increase in child support and an award of counsel fees, without a hearing, and which further denied her motion for leave to conduct an examination before trial of the defendant husband.

Order reversed, insofar as appealed from, with costs, plaintiff’s motion to conduct an examination before trial of the defendant granted and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a hearing in accordance herewith. The *556examination shall proceed at a time and place to be fixed in a written notice of not less than 10 days to be given by the plaintiff, or at such other time and place as the parties may agree.

Special Term erred to the extent that it disposed of plaintiff’s application for an upward modification in child support without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. It is readily apparent, from the motion papers submitted, that a sharp dispute exists with respect to whether the current level of child support defendant is obligated to pay is sufficient to satisfy the needs of the two children of the marriage. Legal precedent, as well as the dictates of conscience, requires that a hearing be conducted in order to insure that the best interests of these children are met and that adequate support is provided *(see, e.g., Tarr v Tarr, 70*AD2d 504; *Solimine v Solimine,*60 AD2d 647; *Huber v Huber,*59 AD2d 1063).

We further note that in the stipulation of settlement executed by the parties, defendant, in exchange for the right to automatically reduce the amount of his support obligation in the event of plaintiff’s remarriage, agreed that plaintiff would have the right to seek a de novo hearing on the support issue. Accordingly, the court erred in denying plaintiff the opportunity to exercise this right.

On remand, the hearing court is also directed to consider any evidence presented with regard to whether plaintiff is entitled to an award of counsel fees in connection with the instant application.

Finally, we see no reason to deny plaintiff the opportunity to examine defendant, before the hearing, as to his present financial circumstances, in view of the policy favoring liberal disclosure of finances in matrimonial actions *(see, Colella v Colella,*99 AD2d 794; *Garrel v Garrel,*59 AD2d 885). Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Niehoff and Fiber, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.112



                      EXTENSION LETTER FOR PROMISSORY NOTES
                          DATED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1998


         This Extension Letter hereby amends that certain Promissory Note dated
as of December 31, 1998 for $30,000.00, by and between American Artists Film
Corporation (therein called "Obligor") and Vivian W. Jones, (therein called
"Holder") and extends the due date of said Promissory Note for a period of 365
days with all principal and any accrued but unpaid interest due on or before
December 31, 1999.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this Extension Letter to
be duly executed under the seal on the date and year first above written.

                                        "OBLIGOR"



                                        By:     /s/ ROBERT MARTINEZ 
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           American Artists Film Corporation
                                           1245 Fowler St., N.W.
                                           Atlanta, Georgia 30318

"HOLDER"



   /s/ VIVIAN W. JONES
----------------------------------- 
       Vivian W. Jones
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#### Milton Rodriguez, Respondent, v Camaway Realty, Inc., Appellant et al., Defendants.

[947 NYS2d 6]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louis B. York, J.), entered September 28, 2011, which denied defendant Camaway Realty, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted, and the complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendant established its entitlement to summary judgment, by tendering evidence that there was no prior criminal activity at its premises likely to endanger the safety of plaintiff *(see Jacqueline S. v City of New York,*81 NY2d 288, 293-294 [1993]; *Jean v Wright,*82 AD3d 1163 [2011], *lv denied*17 NY3d 704 [2011]; *M.D. v Pasadena Realty Co.,*300 AD2d 235, 237 [2002]). Both the owner and plaintiff testified that they knew of no such activity.

In opposition, plaintiff failed to come forward with sufficient evidence of prior criminal activity on the premises. The identical affidavits plaintiff presented of other tenants failed to raise a triable issue of fact, since the affidavits lacked the necessary specificity to support his negligence claim.

Although the affidavits reported one prior assault at the premises, the alleged victim of that assault, the superintendent of the building, came forward with an affidavit stating that he *480was struck by a boyfriend of a tenant’s daughter, not an intruder. Such an attack is insufficient to establish the necessary notice of prior criminal activity *(see Simms v St. Nicholas Ave. Hotel Co.,*187 AD2d 373 [1992], *lv denied*81 NY2d 704 [1993]). Thus, the attack on plaintiff was unforeseeable as a matter of law *(see Ortiz v Wiis Realty Corp.,*66 AD3d 429, 429-430 [2009]; *Maria S. v Willow Enters.,*234 AD2d 177 [1996]).

In light of our determination of unforeseeability, we need not reach the remaining issues raised by the parties. Concur — Tom, J.P., Andrias, Moskowitz, Acosta and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.
#### In the Matter of John E. Mirch, Respondent, v State of New York Office of Court Administration et al., Appellants.

Mikoll, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Cholakis, J.), entered May 18, 1984 in Albany County, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul respondents’ determination regarding reclassification of petitioner’s part-time position.

Petitioner sought judgment annulling certain administrative determinations of respondents in classifying petitioner’s part-time legal assistant position to a salary grade 24, and sought reclassification of the position as a Principal Law Clerk to Judge, grade 31. The issue before us is whether Special Term properly found that the Chief Administrative Judge was not vested with the authority to classify and allocate petitioner’s position to the classification of Law Clerk to Judge, part time, grade 24, and that respondent Classification Review Board’s ruling upholding the classification was irrational and unreasonable as applied to petitioner.

Special Term’s reason for granting the petition was not based on the reasonableness of differentiating between part-time and full-time law clerk positions, but was premised on the fact that the title of part-time Law Clerk to Judge was promulgated one year after the initiation of the new classification plan and that 22 NYCRR 25.5 forbids the diminution of petitioner’s entitlement to a grade 31 appointment. Special Term reasoned that such grade was conferred on him when the new classification plan was initiated because it included only the full-time Law Clerk to Judge title and failed to contain a classification for part-time law clerk position. This being so, Special Term concluded that petitioner fell into the grade 31 category.

There must be a reversal. We find no prohibition to the Chief Administrative Judge’s authority to defer the creation of title standards for part-time positions when the classification plan was first established. Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 80.1 (b) (16), the Chief Administrative Judge is empowered to “adopt classifications and allocate positions [in the courts] and revise them when appropriate” *(see also,*Judiciary Law § 39 [8] [a]). His promulgation of the part-time classification, after study and evaluation could be made, is entirely reasonable and within his powers. Nothing in the empowering legislation (see, Judiciary Law § 39 [8] [a]) prevents the implementation of such part-time classification retroactively. We concur with respondents’ observation that axiomatic with the right to establish the plan is the authority to revise or correct the plan. We find that there was a rational basis for the challenged classification.

*966Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs, determination confirmed and petition dismissed. Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur; Kane, J. P., and Main, J., dissent and vote to affirm upon the opinion of Justice Con. G. Cholakis at Special Term.
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 147 (Wednesday, August 4, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 41983]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-16609]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


Center for Scientific Review; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: Center for Scientific Review Special Emphasis 
Panel; Fellowship: Cardiovascular and Respiratory Sciences Overflow.
    Date: August 27, 2021.
    Time: 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, Rockledge II, 6701 
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual Meeting).
    Contact Person: Kimm Hamann, Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, 
Center for Scientific Review, National Institutes of Health, 6701 
Rockledge Drive, Room 4118A, MSC 7814, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 
435-5575, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4e262f232f202025240e2d3d3c6020272660292138"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="523a333f333c3c3938123121207c3c3b3a7c353d24">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.306, 
Comparative Medicine; 93.333, Clinical Research, 93.306, 93.333, 
93.337, 93.393-93.396, 93.837-93.844, 93.846-93.878, 93.892, 93.893, 
National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: July 30, 2021.
Miguelina Perez,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2021-16609 Filed 8-3-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eric Corse, Also Known as Erik Corse, Appellant.

[941 NYS2d 890]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated May 25, 2010 *(People v Corse,*73 AD3d 1208 [2010]), affirming a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered June 30, 2008.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz, 2*NY3d 277 [2004]). Mastro, A.P.J., Rivera, Florio and Austin, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-41382 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ARMANDO MERCADO-JARAMILLO, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. L-97-CR-209-1

- - - - - - - - - - August 18, 1998 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Court-appointed counsel for Armando Mercado-Jaramillo has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the brief and record discloses no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
See 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v *462FRANK PETERSON, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Burton B. Roberts, J.), rendered June 9, 1980, which convicted defendant of two counts each of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, and robbery in the first degree, affirmed.

We affirm in view of the overwhelming proof of the guilt. He committed rape, robbery and sodomy of two women on different days and at different places. The graphically demonstrated the wantonness of the crimes. The 12 Vi- to 25-year sentences were appropriate.

We must note, however, the inappropriateness of Criminal Term’s unwarranted and excessive intrusion into the conduct of the trial. There is no need to set forth examples or details. As the Court of Appeals stated in *People v Yut Wai Tom*(53 NY2d 44, 57): "A Trial Judge’s examination of witnesses carries with it so many risks of unfairness that it should be a rare instance when the court rather than counsel examines a witness. For example, where the court elicits crucial testimony on direct examination, the witness may be less likely to change his testimony on cross-examination. There is an increased risk that the Trial Judge will convey to the jury his disbelief of a witness, not only by his reaction to answers, but by his phrasing of questions and tone of voice. Apart from these risks there is a substantial danger that the court’s participation in the trial will result in an unfair tactical advantage to a party.”

Had the proof of guilt not been established by such evidence as was here presented, the result of our review might well be different. Concur&emdash;Fein, Milonas and Rosenberger, JJ.

Asch, J., concurs in the result only.

Kupferman, J. P., concurs in the following memorandum: I would merely affirm.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DAMIR WILLIAMS,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 517 EAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 10th day of May, 2021, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
#### Magdalena Castro, Also Known as Lina Castro, Respondent, v New York City Transit Authority et al., Appellants.

[943 NYS2d 901]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Gavrin, J.), entered October 3, 2011, which granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

*1057The plaintiff pedestrian was crossing the street within a crosswalk with the traffic light and pedestrian crossing signal in her favor when she was struck on her left side by a bus operated by the defendant New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA) as it was making a right turn. The NYCTA acknowledges that the plaintiff was walking within the crosswalk and had the traffic and pedestrian signals in her favor at the time of the accident. The evidence submitted by the plaintiff established that, as a matter of law, the defendant driver violated the Traffic Rules and Regulations of the City of New York (34 RCNY) § 4-03 (a) (1) (i) *(see Lariviere v New York City Tr. Auth.,*82 AD3d 1165 [2011]) and that the plaintiff was free from comparative fault *(see Klee v Americas Best Bottling Co., Inc.,*60 AD3d 911 [2009]; *Hoey v City of New York,*28 AD 3d 717 [2006]). In opposition, the NYCTA failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability was properly granted. Skelos, J.E, Florio, Belen and Sgroi, JJ., concur.