# Официален вестник C 135/2008

| | ISSN 1830-365X |
| --- | --- |
| Официален вестник
  на Европейския съюз | C 135 |
| | |
| Издание на български език | Информация и известия | Година 513 юни 2008 г. |

ISSN 1830-365X

Официален вестник

на Европейския съюз

C 135

Издание на български език

Информация и известия

Година 513 юни 2008 г.

---

| Известие No | Съдържание | Страница |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Известия |
| | ИЗВЕСТИЯ ОТ ИНСТИТУЦИИТЕ И ОРГАНИТЕ НА ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЯ СЪЮЗ |
| | Комисия |
| 2008/C 135/01 | Комуникация в съответствие с член 12, параграф 5, буква а) от Регламент (ЕИО) No 2913/92 на Съвета, за информацията, предоставена от митническите органи на държавите-членки относно класирането на стоки в митническата номенклатура | 1 |

Известие No

Съдържание

Страница

II   Известия

ИЗВЕСТИЯ ОТ ИНСТИТУЦИИТЕ И ОРГАНИТЕ НА ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЯ СЪЮЗ

Комисия

2008/C 135/01

Комуникация в съответствие с член 12, параграф 5, буква а) от Регламент (ЕИО) No 2913/92 на Съвета, за информацията, предоставена от митническите органи на държавите-членки относно класирането на стоки в митническата номенклатура

1

| | IV   Информация |
| --- | --- |
| | ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОТ ИНСТИТУЦИИТЕ И ОРГАНИТЕ НА ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЯ СЪЮЗ |
| | Комисия |
| 2008/C 135/02 | Обменен курс на еврото | 3 |

IV   Информация

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОТ ИНСТИТУЦИИТЕ И ОРГАНИТЕ НА ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЯ СЪЮЗ

Комисия

2008/C 135/02

Обменен курс на еврото

3

| | V   Обявления |
| --- | --- |
| | АДМИНИСТРАТИВНИ ПРОЦЕДУРИ |
| | Комисия |
| 2008/C 135/03 | Покана за предложения — Подготвително действие относно способността на ЕС за бързо реагиране | 4 |
| | ПРОЦЕДУРИ ОТНОСНО ИЗПЪЛНЕНИЕТО НА ОБЩАТА ТЪРГОВСКА ПОЛИТИКА |
| | Комисия |
| 2008/C 135/04 | Известие на Комисията относно страните, освободени съгласно Регламент (ЕО) No 88/97 на Комисията относно разрешението за освобождаване на вноса на някои велосипедни части с произход от Китайската народна република от разширението, въведено с Регламент (ЕО) No 71/97 на Съвета на антидъмпинговото мито, наложено с Регламент (ЕИО) No 2474/93 на Съвета, потвърдено с Регламент (ЕО) No 1524/2000 на Съвета и последно изменено с Регламент (ЕО) No 1095/2005 на Съвета: промени в наименованието и адреса на освободените страни | 5 |
| | ПРОЦЕДУРИ ОТНОСНО ИЗПЪЛНЕНИЕТО НА ПОЛИТИКАТА НА КОНКУРЕНЦИЯ |
| | Комисия |
| 2008/C 135/05 | Държавна помощ — Франция — Държавна помощ C 56/07 (ex C 49/07, ex E 15/05) — Неограничена държавна гаранция в полза на La Poste — Покана за представяне на мнения съгласно член 88, параграф 2 от Договора за ЕО (
  1
  ) | 7 |
| 2008/C 135/06 | Държавна помощ — Обединено кралство — Държавна помощ C 14/08 (ex NN 1/08) — Помощ за преструктуриране на Northern Rock — Покана за представяне на мнения съгласно член 88, параграф 2 от Договора за ЕО (
  1
  ) | 21 |
| 2008/C 135/07 | Предварително уведомление за концентрация (Дело COMP/M.5190 — Nordic Capital/ConvaTec) (
  1
  ) | 38 |

V   Обявления

АДМИНИСТРАТИВНИ ПРОЦЕДУРИ

Комисия

2008/C 135/03

Покана за предложения — Подготвително действие относно способността на ЕС за бързо реагиране

4

ПРОЦЕДУРИ ОТНОСНО ИЗПЪЛНЕНИЕТО НА ОБЩАТА ТЪРГОВСКА ПОЛИТИКА

Комисия

2008/C 135/04

Известие на Комисията относно страните, освободени съгласно Регламент (ЕО) No 88/97 на Комисията относно разрешението за освобождаване на вноса на някои велосипедни части с произход от Китайската народна република от разширението, въведено с Регламент (ЕО) No 71/97 на Съвета на антидъмпинговото мито, наложено с Регламент (ЕИО) No 2474/93 на Съвета, потвърдено с Регламент (ЕО) No 1524/2000 на Съвета и последно изменено с Регламент (ЕО) No 1095/2005 на Съвета: промени в наименованието и адреса на освободените страни

5

ПРОЦЕДУРИ ОТНОСНО ИЗПЪЛНЕНИЕТО НА ПОЛИТИКАТА НА КОНКУРЕНЦИЯ

Комисия

2008/C 135/05

Държавна помощ — Франция — Държавна помощ C 56/07 (ex C 49/07, ex E 15/05) — Неограничена държавна гаранция в полза на La Poste — Покана за представяне на мнения съгласно член 88, параграф 2 от Договора за ЕО (
  1
  )

1

7

2008/C 135/06

Държавна помощ — Обединено кралство — Държавна помощ C 14/08 (ex NN 1/08) — Помощ за преструктуриране на Northern Rock — Покана за представяне на мнения съгласно член 88, параграф 2 от Договора за ЕО (
  1
  )

1

21

2008/C 135/07

Предварително уведомление за концентрация (Дело COMP/M.5190 — Nordic Capital/ConvaTec) (
  1
  )

1

38

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Текст от значение за ЕИП |

---

(1)   Текст от значение за ЕИП

1

| BG | |
| --- | --- |

BG

---

II Известия

ИЗВЕСТИЯ ОТ ИНСТИТУЦИИТЕ И ОРГАНИТЕ НА ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЯ СЪЮЗ

Комисия

| 3.6.2008 | BG | Официален вестник на Европейския съюз | C 135/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2008

BG

Официален вестник на Европейския съюз

C 135/1

---

Комуникация в съответствие с член 12, параграф 5, буква а) от Регламент (ЕИО) No 2913/92 на Съвета, за информацията, предоставена от митническите органи на държавите-членки относно класирането на стоки в митническата номенклатура

(2008/C 135/01)

Обвързващата тарифна информация престава да бъде валидна от този ден, ако стане несъвместима с тълкуването на митническата номенклатура в резултат на следните международни тарифни мерки:

Изменения в Обяснителните бележки към Хармонизираната система и Сборника мнения за класиране, одобрени от Съвета за митническо сътрудничество (док. CCC No NC1248 — доклад от 40-та сесия на Комитета за Хармонизираната система):

ИЗМЕНЕНИЯ В ОБЯСНИТЕЛНИТЕ БЕЛЕЖКИ, КОИТО СЛЕДВА ДА СЕ ИЗВЪРШАТ СЪГЛАСНО ПРОЦЕДУРАТА ПО ЧЛЕН 8 ОТ КОНВЕНЦИЯТА ЗА ХАРМОНИЗИРАНАТА СИСТЕМА И МНЕНИЯ ЗА КЛАСИРАНЕ, РЕДАКТИРАНИ ОТ КОМИТЕТА ПО ХАРМОНИЗИРАНАТА СИСТЕМА НА СВЕТОВНАТА МИТНИЧЕСКА ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ

(40-ТА СЕСИЯ НА КОМИТЕТА ПО ХАРМОНИЗИРАНАТА СИСТЕМА — СЕПТЕМВРИ 2007 Г.)

ДОК. NC1248

Изменения в Обяснителните бележки към Номенклатурата, приложена към Конвенцията по ХС

| 29.27 | P/20 |
| --- | --- |
| 44.12 Обяснителна бележка към подпозиция | P/10 |
| 61.12 | P/20 |
| Глава 84 Общи положения | P/12 |
| 84.72 | P/13 |
| 85.09 | P/13, P/15 |
| 85.19 | P/7 |
| 85.41 | P/21 |
| 90.21 | P/8 |
| 95.04 | P/19 |

29.27

P/20

44.12 Обяснителна бележка към подпозиция

P/10

61.12

P/20

Глава 84 Общи положения

P/12

84.72

P/13

85.09

P/13, P/15

85.19

P/7

85.41

P/21

90.21

P/8

95.04

P/19

Мнения за класиране, приети от Комитета по Хармонизираната система

| 2103.90/5 | P/2 |
| --- | --- |
| 2202.90/5 | P/3 |
| 2209.00/1 | P/4 |
| 3307.90/1 | P/5 |
| 3307.90/2 | P/5 |
| 5603.12/1 | P/6 |
| 5603.13/1 | P/6 |

2103.90/5

P/2

2202.90/5

P/3

2209.00/1

P/4

3307.90/1

P/5

3307.90/2

P/5

5603.12/1

P/6

5603.13/1

P/6

Информация за съдържанието на тези мерки може да бъде получена от Генерална дирекция „Данъчно облагане и митнически съюз“ на Европейската комисия (rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200, B-1049 Brussels) или да бъде изтеглена от нейната интернет страница:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/tariff_aspects/harmonised_system/index_en.htm

---

IV Информация

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОТ ИНСТИТУЦИИТЕ И ОРГАНИТЕ НА ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЯ СЪЮЗ

Комисия

| 3.6.2008 | BG | Официален вестник на Европейския съюз | C 135/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2008

BG

Официален вестник на Европейския съюз

C 135/3

---

Обменен курс на еврото (1)

2 юни 2008 г.

(2008/C 135/02)

1 евро=

| | Валута | Обменен курс |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | щатски долар | 1,5521 |
| JPY | японска йена | 162,64 |
| DKK | датска крона | 7,4591 |
| GBP | лира стерлинг | 0,7915 |
| SEK | шведска крона | 9,3454 |
| CHF | швейцарски франк | 1,6182 |
| ISK | исландска крона | 116,52 |
| NOK | норвежка крона | 7,9425 |
| BGN | български лев | 1,9558 |
| CZK | чешка крона | 25,03 |
| EEK | естонска крона | 15,6466 |
| HUF | унгарски форинт | 241,06 |
| LTL | литовски лит | 3,4528 |
| LVL | латвийски лат | 0,7025 |
| PLN | полска злота | 3,3809 |
| RON | румънска лея | 3,612 |
| SKK | словашка крона | 30,331 |
| TRY | турска лира | 1,903 |
| AUD | австралийски долар | 1,6243 |
| CAD | канадски долар | 1,546 |
| HKD | хонконгски долар | 12,1129 |
| NZD | новозеландски долар | 1,9796 |
| SGD | сингапурски долар | 2,1173 |
| KRW | южнокорейски вон | 1 588,96 |
| ZAR | южноафрикански ранд | 11,9883 |
| CNY | китайски юан рен-мин-би | 10,7607 |
| HRK | хърватска куна | 7,2468 |
| IDR | индонезийска рупия | 14 442,29 |
| MYR | малайзийски рингит | 5,0001 |
| PHP | филипинско песо | 67,361 |
| RUB | руска рубла | 36,8485 |
| THB | тайландски бат | 50,583 |
| BRL | бразилски реaл | 2,533 |
| MXN | мексиканско пeсо | 16,0573 |

Валута

Обменен курс

USD

щатски долар

1,5521

JPY

японска йена

162,64

DKK

датска крона

7,4591

GBP

лира стерлинг

0,7915

SEK

шведска крона

9,3454

CHF

швейцарски франк

1,6182

ISK

исландска крона

116,52

NOK

норвежка крона

7,9425

BGN

български лев

1,9558

CZK

чешка крона

25,03

EEK

естонска крона

15,6466

HUF

унгарски форинт

241,06

LTL

литовски лит

3,4528

LVL

латвийски лат

0,7025

PLN

полска злота

3,3809

RON

румънска лея

3,612

SKK

словашка крона

30,331

TRY

турска лира

1,903

AUD

австралийски долар

1,6243

CAD

канадски долар

1,546

HKD

хонконгски долар

12,1129

NZD

новозеландски долар

1,9796

SGD

сингапурски долар

2,1173

KRW

южнокорейски вон

1 588,96

ZAR

южноафрикански ранд

11,9883

CNY

китайски юан рен-мин-би

10,7607

HRK

хърватска куна

7,2468

IDR

индонезийска рупия

14 442,29

MYR

малайзийски рингит

5,0001

PHP

филипинско песо

67,361

RUB

руска рубла

36,8485

THB

тайландски бат

50,583

BRL

бразилски реaл

2,533

MXN

мексиканско пeсо

16,0573

---

(1)

Източник: референтен обменен курс, публикуван от Европейската централна банка.

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V Обявления

АДМИНИСТРАТИВНИ ПРОЦЕДУРИ

Комисия

| 3.6.2008 | BG | Официален вестник на Европейския съюз | C 135/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2008

BG

Официален вестник на Европейския съюз

C 135/4

---

Покана за предложения — Подготвително действие относно способността на ЕС за бързо реагиране

(2008/C 135/03)

| I.1. | Отдел „Гражданска защита“ на Генерална дирекция „Околна среда“ на Европейската комисия отправя покана за представяне на предложения с цел определяне на проекти относно способността на ЕС за бързо реагиране за гражданска защита, които евентуално отговарят на условията за финансова подкрепа. Тази финансова подкрепа ще бъде под формата на безвъзмездни средства. |
| --- | --- |

I.1.

Отдел „Гражданска защита“ на Генерална дирекция „Околна среда“ на Европейската комисия отправя покана за представяне на предложения с цел определяне на проекти относно способността на ЕС за бързо реагиране за гражданска защита, които евентуално отговарят на условията за финансова подкрепа. Тази финансова подкрепа ще бъде под формата на безвъзмездни средства.

| I.2. | Съответните области, характерът и съдържанието на тези дейности, както и условията за финансиране са изложени в указанията за кандидатстване за безвъзмездни средства, които съдържат и подробни инструкции относно мястото и времето за подаване на предложенията. Ръководството, както и необходимите формуляри за кандидатстване за безвъзмездни средства, могат да бъдат изтеглени от интернет страницата Europa, на следния адрес:
  http://ec.europa.eu/environment/funding/intro_en.htm |
| --- | --- |

I.2.

Съответните области, характерът и съдържанието на тези дейности, както и условията за финансиране са изложени в указанията за кандидатстване за безвъзмездни средства, които съдържат и подробни инструкции относно мястото и времето за подаване на предложенията. Ръководството, както и необходимите формуляри за кандидатстване за безвъзмездни средства, могат да бъдат изтеглени от интернет страницата Europa, на следния адрес:

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/funding/intro_en.htm

| I.3. | Предложенията трябва да бъдат изпратени до Комисията на посочения в указанията адрес най-късно до 22 август 2008 г. Те трябва да бъдат изпратени по пощата или с частна куриерска служба не по-късно от 22 август 2008 г. (за доказателство се взема датата на изпращане по пощата, пощенското клеймо или датата на разписката, издадена от пощенската служба). Те могат да бъдат подадени и на ръка на определения адрес, посочен в указанията, най-късно до 17:00 ч. на 22 август 2008 г. (за доказателство се взема подписаната от отговорното длъжностно лице разписка с посочена дата на приемане).
  Предложенията, изпратени преди посочения краен срок, но получени в Комисията след 5 септември 2008 г. (крайна дата за получаване), няма да се допускат за разглеждане. Организацията, която кандидатства е тази, която трябва да следи за това, дали са взети необходимите мерки за спазване на крайния срок.
  Предложенията подадени по факс, по електронна поща, както и непълните заявления и тези, получени на части, няма да бъдат приемани. |
| --- | --- |

I.3.

Предложенията трябва да бъдат изпратени до Комисията на посочения в указанията адрес най-късно до 22 август 2008 г. Те трябва да бъдат изпратени по пощата или с частна куриерска служба не по-късно от 22 август 2008 г. (за доказателство се взема датата на изпращане по пощата, пощенското клеймо или датата на разписката, издадена от пощенската служба). Те могат да бъдат подадени и на ръка на определения адрес, посочен в указанията, най-късно до 17:00 ч. на 22 август 2008 г. (за доказателство се взема подписаната от отговорното длъжностно лице разписка с посочена дата на приемане).

Предложенията, изпратени преди посочения краен срок, но получени в Комисията след 5 септември 2008 г. (крайна дата за получаване), няма да се допускат за разглеждане. Организацията, която кандидатства е тази, която трябва да следи за това, дали са взети необходимите мерки за спазване на крайния срок.

Предложенията подадени по факс, по електронна поща, както и непълните заявления и тези, получени на части, няма да бъдат приемани.

| I.4. | Процедурата по отпускане на безвъзмездни средства ще протече по следния начин:






  — | получаване, вписване и потвърждение за получаване от страна на Комисията, |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.4.

Процедурата по отпускане на безвъзмездни средства ще протече по следния начин:

—

получаване, вписване и потвърждение за получаване от страна на Комисията,

| — | оценка на предложенията от Комисията, |
| --- | --- |

—

оценка на предложенията от Комисията,

| — | решение за отпускане на безвъзмездни средства и уведомяване на кандидатите за резултата. |
| --- | --- |

—

решение за отпускане на безвъзмездни средства и уведомяване на кандидатите за резултата.

Бенефициерите ще бъдат подбрани на основата на критериите, изложени в точка I.2. от посоченото ръководство и в съответствие с бюджетните наличности.

В случай на одобрение от страна на Комисията, между нея и страната, подала предложението, ще се сключи споразумение за безвъзмездни средства (в евро).

Процедурата е строго поверителна.

---

ПРОЦЕДУРИ ОТНОСНО ИЗПЪЛНЕНИЕТО НА ОБЩАТА ТЪРГОВСКА ПОЛИТИКА

Комисия

| 3.6.2008 | BG | Официален вестник на Европейския съюз | C 135/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2008

BG

Официален вестник на Европейския съюз

C 135/5

---

Известие на Комисията относно страните, освободени съгласно Регламент (ЕО) No 88/97 на Комисията относно разрешението за освобождаване на вноса на някои велосипедни части с произход от Китайската народна република от разширението, въведено с Регламент (ЕО) No 71/97 на Съвета на антидъмпинговото мито, наложено с Регламент (ЕИО) No 2474/93 на Съвета, потвърдено с Регламент (ЕО) No 1524/2000 на Съвета и последно изменено с Регламент (ЕО) No 1095/2005 на Съвета: промени в наименованието и адреса на освободените страни

(2008/C 135/04)

Регламент (ЕО) No 88/97 на Комисията (1) („регламентът за освобождаване“) разрешава освобождаването от разширеното антидъмпингово мито върху вноса на някои велосипедни части с произход от Китайска народна република. Въпросното мито следва от разширяването с Регламент (ЕО) No 71/97 на Съвета (2) на антидъмпинговото мито, наложено с Регламент (ЕИО) No 2474/93 на Съвета (3), потвърдено от Регламент (ЕО) No 1524/2000 на Съвета (4) и последно изменено с Регламент (ЕО) No 1095/2005 на Съвета (5).

В този контекст чрез последователни решения на Комисията определен брой производители на велосипеди бяха освободени от разширеното антидъмпингово мито, inter alia:

| | Athletic Manufacturing Sp. z o.o. (допълнителен код по Тарик A568) (6), Cicli Esperia SpA (допълнителен код по Тарик 8068) (7), Cycleurope International/Peugeot (допълнителен код по Тарик 8963) (8), Euro.T Polska Sp. z o.o. (допълнителен код по Тарик A549) (9), Jan Janssen Fietsen v.o.f (допълнителен код по Тарик 8078) (10), Kurt Gudereit (допълнителен код по Тарик 8524) (11), MIFA Mittdeldeutsche Fahrradwerke GmbH (допълнителен код по Тарик 8009) (12), Rabeneick GmbH (допълнителен код по Тарик 8489) (13). |
| --- | --- |

Athletic Manufacturing Sp. z o.o. (допълнителен код по Тарик A568) (6), Cicli Esperia SpA (допълнителен код по Тарик 8068) (7), Cycleurope International/Peugeot (допълнителен код по Тарик 8963) (8), Euro.T Polska Sp. z o.o. (допълнителен код по Тарик A549) (9), Jan Janssen Fietsen v.o.f (допълнителен код по Тарик 8078) (10), Kurt Gudereit (допълнителен код по Тарик 8524) (11), MIFA Mittdeldeutsche Fahrradwerke GmbH (допълнителен код по Тарик 8009) (12), Rabeneick GmbH (допълнителен код по Тарик 8489) (13).

| | Athletic Manufacturing Sp. z o.o. информира Комисията, че юридическият адрес на дружеството е променен от ul. Drawska 21, PL-02-202 Warszawa, на ul. Strefowa 7, PL-75-202 Koszalin. |
| --- | --- |

Athletic Manufacturing Sp. z o.o. информира Комисията, че юридическият адрес на дружеството е променен от ul. Drawska 21, PL-02-202 Warszawa, на ul. Strefowa 7, PL-75-202 Koszalin.

| | Cicli Esperia SpA (първоначално Esperia SpA) информира Комисията, че юридическият адрес на дружеството е променен от via Meucci 27, I-35028 Piove di Sacco (PD) на via Bellini Vincenzo 5, I-35131 Padova. |
| --- | --- |

Cicli Esperia SpA (първоначално Esperia SpA) информира Комисията, че юридическият адрес на дружеството е променен от via Meucci 27, I-35028 Piove di Sacco (PD) на via Bellini Vincenzo 5, I-35131 Padova.

| | Cycleurope International/Peugeot информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование на дружеството е променено от Cycleurope International/Peugeot на Cycleurope Industries. |
| --- | --- |

Cycleurope International/Peugeot информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование на дружеството е променено от Cycleurope International/Peugeot на Cycleurope Industries.

| | Euro.T Polska Sp. z o.o. информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование и юридическият адрес на дружеството са променени от Euro.T Polska Sp. z o.o., ul. Drogowców 12, PL-42-200 Czestochowa на Alliance Bikes Sp. z o.o., ul. Janiszewska 9A, PL-02-264 Warszawa. |
| --- | --- |

Euro.T Polska Sp. z o.o. информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование и юридическият адрес на дружеството са променени от Euro.T Polska Sp. z o.o., ul. Drogowców 12, PL-42-200 Czestochowa на Alliance Bikes Sp. z o.o., ul. Janiszewska 9A, PL-02-264 Warszawa.

| | Jan Janssen Fietsen v.o.f. информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование на дружеството е променено от Jan Janssen Fietsen v.o.f. на Jan Janssen Fietsen BV. |
| --- | --- |

Jan Janssen Fietsen v.o.f. информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование на дружеството е променено от Jan Janssen Fietsen v.o.f. на Jan Janssen Fietsen BV.

| | Kurt Gudereit информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование на дружеството е променено от Kurt Gudereit на Kurt Gudereit GmbH & Co. KG. |
| --- | --- |

Kurt Gudereit информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование на дружеството е променено от Kurt Gudereit на Kurt Gudereit GmbH & Co. KG.

| | MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke GmbH (първоначално SFG Sachsen-Anhalt Fahrradbau GmbH) информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование на дружеството е променено от MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke GmbH на MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke AG. |
| --- | --- |

MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke GmbH (първоначално SFG Sachsen-Anhalt Fahrradbau GmbH) информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование на дружеството е променено от MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke GmbH на MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke AG.

| | Rabeneick GmbH информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование на дружеството е променено от Rabeneick GmbH на Cycle-Union GmbH. |
| --- | --- |

Rabeneick GmbH информира Комисията, че юридическото наименование на дружеството е променено от Rabeneick GmbH на Cycle-Union GmbH.

След като разгледа предоставената информация, Комисията счете, че измененията в наименованията и юридическите адреси на дружествата не засягат дейностите по сглобяване що се отнася до условията на регламента за освобождаване и поради това Комисията не смята, че тези промени следва да се отразят върху освобождаването от разширеното антидъмпингово мито.

Поради това, препратките към Athletic Manufacturing Sp. z o.o. в Решение на Комисията 2006/772/ЕО, към Cicli Esperia SpA (първоначално Esperia SpA) в Решение на Комисията 97/447/ЕО и в Известие 2007/C 158/06 на Комисията, към Cycleurope International/Peugeot в Регламент (ЕО) No 88/97, към Euro.T Polska Sp. z o.o. в Решение 2006/22/ЕО на Комисията, към Jan Janssen Fietsen v.o.f. в Решение 97/447/EC на Комисията, към Kurt Gudereit в Решение 98/115/ЕО на Комисията, към MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke GmbH (първоначално SFG Sachsen-Anhalt Fahrradbau GmbH) в Решение 98/115/ЕО и в Известие 1999/C 294/03 на Комисията, към Rabeneick GmbH в Решение 98/684/ЕО на Комисията следва да се четат както е отбелязано в приложението по-долу.

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(1)  ОВ L 17, 21.1.1997 г., стр. 17.

(2)  ОВ L 16, 18.1.1997 г., стр. 55.

(3)  ОВ L 228, 9.9.1993 г., стр. 1.

(4)  ОВ L 175, 14.7.2000 г., стр. 39.

(5)  ОВ L 183, 14.7.2005 г., стр. 1.

(6)  ОВ L 313, 14.11.2006 г., стр. 5.

(7)  ОВ L 193, 22.7.1997 г., стр. 32, ОВ C 158, 11.7.2007 г., стр. 6.

(8)  ОВ L 17, 21.1.1997 г., стр. 17.

(9)  ОВ L 17, 31.1.2006 г., стр. 16.

(10)  ОВ L 193, 22.7.1997, стр. 32.

(11)  ОВ L 31, 6.2.1998 г., стр. 25.

(12)  ОВ L 31, 6.2.1998 г., стр. 25, ОВ C 294, 14.10.1999 г., стр. 3.

(13)  ОВ L 320, 28.11.1998, стр. 60.

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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ

| Предишна препратка | Нова препратка | Държава | Допълнителен код по Тарик |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Athletic Manufacturing Sp. z o.o. |
| ul. Drawska 21 |
| PL-02-202 Warszawa |

Предишна препратка

Нова препратка

Държава

Допълнителен код по Тарик

Athletic Manufacturing Sp. z o.o.

ul. Drawska 21

PL-02-202 Warszawa

| Athletic Manufacturing Sp. z o.o. |
| --- |
| ul. Strefowa 7 |
| PL-75-202 Koszalin |

Athletic Manufacturing Sp. z o.o.

ul. Strefowa 7

PL-75-202 Koszalin

Полша

A568

| Cicli Esperia SpA |
| --- |
| Via Meucci, 27 |
| I-35028 Piove di Sacco (PD) |

Cicli Esperia SpA

Via Meucci, 27

I-35028 Piove di Sacco (PD)

| Cicli Esperia SpA |
| --- |
| Via Bellini Vincenzo, 5 |
| I-35131 Padova (PD) |

Cicli Esperia SpA

Via Bellini Vincenzo, 5

I-35131 Padova (PD)

Италия

8068

| Cycleurope International/Peugeot |
| --- |
| F-10100 Romilly-sur-Seine |

Cycleurope International/Peugeot

F-10100 Romilly-sur-Seine

| Cycleurope Industries |
| --- |
| F-10100 Romilly-sur-Seine |

Cycleurope Industries

F-10100 Romilly-sur-Seine

Франция

8963

| Euro.T Polska Sp. z o.o. |
| --- |
| ul. Drogowców 12 |
| PL-42-200 Czestochowa |

Euro.T Polska Sp. z o.o.

ul. Drogowców 12

PL-42-200 Czestochowa

| Alliance Bikes Sp. z o.o. |
| --- |
| ul. Janiszewska 9A |
| PL-02-264 Warszawa |

Alliance Bikes Sp. z o.o.

ul. Janiszewska 9A

PL-02-264 Warszawa

Полша

A549

| Jan Janssen Fietsen v.o.f. |
| --- |
| 4631 SR Hoogerheide |
| Nederland |

Jan Janssen Fietsen v.o.f.

4631 SR Hoogerheide

Nederland

| Jan Janssen Fietsen B.V. |
| --- |
| 4631 SR Hoogerheide |
| Nederland |

Jan Janssen Fietsen B.V.

4631 SR Hoogerheide

Nederland

Нидерландия

8078

| Kurt Gudereit |
| --- |
| D-33607 Bielefeld |

Kurt Gudereit

D-33607 Bielefeld

| Kurt Gudereit GmbH & Co. KG |
| --- |
| D-33607 Bielefeld |

Kurt Gudereit GmbH & Co. KG

D-33607 Bielefeld

Германия

8524

| MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke GmbH |
| --- |
| Kyselhäuser Strasse 23 |
| D-06526 Sangerhausen |

MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke GmbH

Kyselhäuser Strasse 23

D-06526 Sangerhausen

| MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke AG |
| --- |
| Kyselhäuser Strasse 23 |
| D-06526 Sangerhausen |

MIFA Mitteldeutsche Fahrradwerke AG

Kyselhäuser Strasse 23

D-06526 Sangerhausen

Германия

8009

| Rabeneick GmbH |
| --- |
| D-26135 Oldenburg |

Rabeneick GmbH

D-26135 Oldenburg

| Cycle-Union GmbH |
| --- |
| An der Schmiede 4 |
| D-26135 Oldenburg |

Cycle-Union GmbH

An der Schmiede 4

D-26135 Oldenburg

Германия

8489

---

ПРОЦЕДУРИ ОТНОСНО ИЗПЪЛНЕНИЕТО НА ПОЛИТИКАТА НА КОНКУРЕНЦИЯ

Комисия

| 3.6.2008 | BG | Официален вестник на Европейския съюз | C 135/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2008

BG

Официален вестник на Европейския съюз

C 135/7

---

ДЪРЖАВНА ПОМОЩ — ФРАНЦИЯ

Държавна помощ C 56/07 (ex C 49/07, ex E 15/05) — Неограничена държавна гаранция в полза на La Poste

Покана за представяне на мнения съгласно член 88, параграф 2 от Договора за ЕО

(текст от значение за ЕИП)

(2008/C 135/05)

С писмо от 29 ноември 2007 г., възпроизведено на езика, чийто текст е автентичен, на страниците след това резюме, Комисията уведоми Франция за решението си да открие процедурата, предвидена в член 88, параграф 2 от Договора за ЕО относно неограничената държавна гаранция, предоставена на La Poste.

Заинтересованите страни могат да представят мненията си относно мерките, по отношение на които Комисията открива процедурата, в срок от един месец от датата на публикуване на настоящото резюме и на писмото, което следва, на следния адрес:

| Commission européenne |
| --- |
| Direction générale de la Concurrence |
| Greffe Aides d'Etat |
| SPA 3 6/5 |
| B-1049 Bruxelles |
| Факс (32-2) 296 12 42 |

Commission européenne

Direction générale de la Concurrence

Greffe Aides d'Etat

SPA 3 6/5

B-1049 Bruxelles

Факс (32-2) 296 12 42

Тези мнения ще бъдат предадени на Франция. Запазването в тайна на самоличността на заинтересованата страна, която представя мнението, може да бъде поискано писмено, като се посочат причините за искането.

РЕЗЮМЕ

1.   ПРОЦЕДУРА

На 4 октомври 2006 г. Комисията прикани Франция, съгласно член 18 от Регламент (ЕО) No 659/1999 на Съвета (1), да прекрати най-късно до 31 декември 2008 г. гаранцията, предоставена в полза на La Poste, по силата на статута й и обхващаща всички нейни задължения.

2.   ОПИСАНИЕ НА МЕРКИТЕ

Неограничената държавна гаранция в полза на La Poste е резултат от следните мерки:

| i) | неприложимост към La Poste на производствата за установяване на неплатежоспособност и на фалит

  Член 1 от Закон No 90-568 от 2 юли 1990 г. определя La Poste като юридическо лице на публичното право. Юридическите лица на публичното право са изключени обаче от производствата по оздравяване и съдебна ликвидация, предвидени в търговското право. Следователно спрямо La Poste не се прилага общият правен режим на производствата по оздравяване и съдебна ликвидация на предприятия в затруднение; |
| --- | --- |

i)

неприложимост към La Poste на производствата за установяване на неплатежоспособност и на фалит

Член 1 от Закон No 90-568 от 2 юли 1990 г. определя La Poste като юридическо лице на публичното право. Юридическите лица на публичното право са изключени обаче от производствата по оздравяване и съдебна ликвидация, предвидени в търговското право. Следователно спрямо La Poste не се прилага общият правен режим на производствата по оздравяване и съдебна ликвидация на предприятия в затруднение;

| ii) | приложимост на принципа на отговорност на държавата като крайна мярка за задължения на юридически лица на публичното право

  В рамките на приложимото към юридическите лица на публичното право производство, предвидено в закона от 16 юли 1980 г., държавата може да се окаже отговорна за изпълнението на задълженията на La Poste, в случай че последната не е в състояние да ги изпълни.
  Между впрочем, Комисията отбеляза, че някои търговски и промишлени организации на публичното право (EPIC) са могли да се възползват от следните две мерки и не е невъзможно La Poste също да бъде бенефициер на тези две мерки; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

приложимост на принципа на отговорност на държавата като крайна мярка за задължения на юридически лица на публичното право

В рамките на приложимото към юридическите лица на публичното право производство, предвидено в закона от 16 юли 1980 г., държавата може да се окаже отговорна за изпълнението на задълженията на La Poste, в случай че последната не е в състояние да ги изпълни.

Между впрочем, Комисията отбеляза, че някои търговски и промишлени организации на публичното право (EPIC) са могли да се възползват от следните две мерки и не е невъзможно La Poste също да бъде бенефициер на тези две мерки;

| iii) | прехвърляне на задълженията на прекратена търговска и промишлена организация на публичното право (EPIC) на друга публичноправна организация или на държавата

  В случая на ликвидация задълженията на организация на публичното право, в която има назначен държавен счетоводител, се прехвърлят на държавата или на друг публичноправен субект. Така, вземането на кредитора е гарантирано; |
| --- | --- |

iii)

прехвърляне на задълженията на прекратена търговска и промишлена организация на публичното право (EPIC) на друга публичноправна организация или на държавата

В случая на ликвидация задълженията на организация на публичното право, в която има назначен държавен счетоводител, се прехвърлят на държавата или на друг публичноправен субект. Така, вземането на кредитора е гарантирано;

| iv) | пряк достъп до бюджетните сметки |
| --- | --- |

iv)

пряк достъп до бюджетните сметки

3.   ПОЗИЦИЯ И ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ НА ФРЕНСКИТЕ ВЛАСТИ

Френските власти оспорват съществуването на неограничена държавна гаранция и на икономическо предимство в полза на La Poste.

Въпреки това, за да отстранят съмненията на Комисията относно приложимостта на принципа за отговорност на държавата за задължения на юридически лица на публичното право на основание закона от 1980 г., френските власти са предложили Указ No 81-501 от 12 май 1981 г. (2) да се измени с цел да се уточни, че надзорният орган отпуска необходимите средства от бюджета на юридическото лице или от този на организацията и по този начин се изключва възможността за отпускане на средства от държавния бюджет (3).

Френските власти, между впрочем, са предложили да се задължат заедно с La Poste, всеки договор за финансиране (всеки инструмент, предвиден в договор) да съдържа следната бележка: „издаването/програмата/заемът не се ползват с каквато и да е пряка или непряка гаранция от страна на държавата. Държавата не е задължена да замести La Poste, в случай на неплатежоспособност, във финансовите й задължения относно изпълнение на вземането“.

4.   ОЦЕНКА

Съгласно Известието на Комисията за прилагане на членове 87 и 88 от Договора за ЕО по отношение на държавните помощи под формата на гаранции (4) се счита, че е налице държавна помощ, от момента в който може да се изключат производството за установяване на фалит или на неплатежоспособност, изрична държавна гаранция или покриване на загубите от държавата. В конкретния случай, обаче, юридическите лица на публичното право са изключени от приложното поле на производствата по оздравяване и съдебна ликвидация, предвидени по общия правен режим във Франция. Комисията смята, че законът от 16 юли 1980 г. предвижда като крайна мярка държавна гаранция за цялата съвкупност от задължения на La Poste.

В тази връзка Комисията признава, че предложенията на френските власти ще ограничат възможностите на кредиторите да се обръщат директно към държавата за да получат изпълнение на вземането си. Тези предложения обаче не решават проблема с институционалната гаранция, от която се ползва La Poste по силата на своя статут като юридическо лице на публичното право, приравнено към търговска и промишлена организация на публичното право (EPIC). Такава гаранция, която следва да се разграничи от изрична държавна гаранция за специфични задължения, осигурява на кредиторите на La Poste, че техните вземания няма да бъдат погасени.

По-конкретно, въпреки че няма назначен държавен счетоводител в La Poste, в случай на неплатежоспособност или на прекратяването й не е изключено прехвърлянето на задълженията към публичноправен субект, което ще доведе до ангажиране на публични средства и ще гарантира непогасяемостта на вземанията на кредиторите.

Комисията подчертава, че нищо не пречи на Франция да изясни действащия непрозрачен правен режим, като предвиди производство по фалит, приложимо към La Poste, чието прилагане ще гарантира на кредиторите на La Poste, че те ще бъдат в същото положение като кредиторите на предприятие на частното право. При липса на такова уточнение Комисията заключава, че Франция оставя участниците на пазара с убеждението, че въпреки изчерпване на активите на La Poste вземанията няма да се погасят, благодарение на държавната гаранция относно самото съществуване на правния субект и относно прехвърлянето на задължения на La Poste на друг публичноправен субект.

На основание получената информация тази гаранция е неограничена по отношение на своята продължителност, размер и обхват. Освен това, тя е безвъзмездна.

Според становището на Комисията La Poste се възползва от това положение, основно чрез по-благоприятните условия за финансиране, предоставени й на капиталовите пазари.

Прилагайки член 2.1.3 от горепосоченото известие на Комисията, по-благоприятните условията за кредитиране, получени от предприятия, чийто правен статут изключва прилагането на производства за установяване на фалит или на неплатежоспособност или пък изрично предвижда държавна гаранция или поемане от държавата на загубите, се определят като помощ под формата на гаранция.

Това предимство, финансирано с държавни средства, би представлявало държавна помощ по смисъла на Известието на Комисията относно прилагането на членове 87 и 88 от Договора за ЕО по отношение на държавните помощи под формата на гаранции (5).

Преди 1 януари 1958 г. (датата на присъединяване на Франция) La Poste се е ползвала от държавна гаранция за своите дейности, тъй като е била публична администрация. Поради това става въпрос за съществуваща помощ.

Освен това, Комисията счита, че неограничената държавна гаранция в полза на La Poste не отговаря на нито едно от условията за прилагане на изключенията, предвидени в Договора за ЕО, от което следва, че тя е несъвместима с общия пазар.

ТЕКСТ НА ПИСМОТО

„Par la présente, la Commission européenne (“la Commission”) a l'honneur d'informer la France qu'après avoir examiné les informations fournies par vos autorités sur la garantie citée en objet, elle a décidé d'ouvrir la procédure prévue à l'article 88, paragraphe 2, du traité CE.

1.   PROCÉDURE

| 1. | Le 21 décembre 2005, la Commission a approuvé le transfert des activités bancaires et financières de La Poste à sa filiale, La Banque Postale (6). Dans sa décision, la Commission a souligné que la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ferait l'objet d'une procédure séparée. |
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1.

Le 21 décembre 2005, la Commission a approuvé le transfert des activités bancaires et financières de La Poste à sa filiale, La Banque Postale (6). Dans sa décision, la Commission a souligné que la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ferait l'objet d'une procédure séparée.

| 2. | Le 21 février 2006, conformément à l'article 17 du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil (7) portant modalités d'application de l'article 88 du traité CE (ci-après “le règlement de procédure”), la Commission a informé les autorités françaises de ses conclusions préliminaires quant à l'existence d'une garantie illimitée de l'État qui découlerait du statut de La Poste et les a invitées à présenter leurs observations. Dans la mesure où cette supposée garantie illimitée de l'État était en vigueur dès avant le 1er janvier 1958, la Commission a appliqué les règles de procédure concernant les aides existantes, conformément à l'article 1er, point b), du règlement de procédure précité. |
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2.

Le 21 février 2006, conformément à l'article 17 du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil (7) portant modalités d'application de l'article 88 du traité CE (ci-après “le règlement de procédure”), la Commission a informé les autorités françaises de ses conclusions préliminaires quant à l'existence d'une garantie illimitée de l'État qui découlerait du statut de La Poste et les a invitées à présenter leurs observations. Dans la mesure où cette supposée garantie illimitée de l'État était en vigueur dès avant le 1er janvier 1958, la Commission a appliqué les règles de procédure concernant les aides existantes, conformément à l'article 1er, point b), du règlement de procédure précité.

| 3. | La Commission a reçu la réponse des autorités françaises le 24 avril 2006. |
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3.

La Commission a reçu la réponse des autorités françaises le 24 avril 2006.

| 4. | Le 4 octobre 2006, conformément à l'article 18 du règlement de procédure, la Commission a invité la France à supprimer la garantie dont bénéficie La Poste en vertu de son statut sur tous ses engagements au plus tard le 31 décembre 2008. |
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4.

Le 4 octobre 2006, conformément à l'article 18 du règlement de procédure, la Commission a invité la France à supprimer la garantie dont bénéficie La Poste en vertu de son statut sur tous ses engagements au plus tard le 31 décembre 2008.

| 5. | Le 6 décembre 2006, la Commission a reçu une note des autorités françaises contestant les conclusions présentées par la Commission dans sa lettre du 4 octobre 2006. |
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5.

Le 6 décembre 2006, la Commission a reçu une note des autorités françaises contestant les conclusions présentées par la Commission dans sa lettre du 4 octobre 2006.

| 6. | A la suite d'une réunion avec les services de la DG concurrence, par lettre du 16 janvier 2007, les autorités françaises ont soumis à la Commission un projet de modification du décret d'application de la loi de 1980, le décret no 81-501 du 12 mai 1981 (8). |
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6.

A la suite d'une réunion avec les services de la DG concurrence, par lettre du 16 janvier 2007, les autorités françaises ont soumis à la Commission un projet de modification du décret d'application de la loi de 1980, le décret no 81-501 du 12 mai 1981 (8).

| 7. | Après une demande de clarification de la Commission, les autorités françaises ont communiqué une note, reçue le 1er février 2007, expliquant la situation des créanciers de La Poste dans le cas où celle-ci se trouverait en difficulté financière. |
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7.

Après une demande de clarification de la Commission, les autorités françaises ont communiqué une note, reçue le 1er février 2007, expliquant la situation des créanciers de La Poste dans le cas où celle-ci se trouverait en difficulté financière.

| 8. | Par note du 19 mars 2007, les autorités françaises ont fait une proposition additionnelle, consistant à s'engager, conjointement avec La Poste, à mentionner l'absence de garantie dans tout contrat de financement et prospectus d'émission de La Poste. |
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8.

Par note du 19 mars 2007, les autorités françaises ont fait une proposition additionnelle, consistant à s'engager, conjointement avec La Poste, à mentionner l'absence de garantie dans tout contrat de financement et prospectus d'émission de La Poste.

2.   DESCRIPTION DE LA MESURE

| 9. | La loi française no 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990 a transformé l'ancienne direction générale des Télécommunications en deux personnes morales de droit public: La Poste et France Telecom. |
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9.

La loi française no 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990 a transformé l'ancienne direction générale des Télécommunications en deux personnes morales de droit public: La Poste et France Telecom.

| 10. | Certaines personnes morales de droit public n'ont pas été qualifiées par la loi d'établissements publics à caractère administratif (EPA) ou d'Etablissements publics à caractère industriel et commercial (EPIC) (9). Tel est le cas de La Poste. La Cour de Cassation a toutefois retenu le principe selon lequel La Poste est assimilée à un EPIC dans son arrêt du 18 janvier 2001 (2e chambre civile) (10)
   (11). Les conséquences juridiques du statut de La Poste sont les suivantes: |
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10.

Certaines personnes morales de droit public n'ont pas été qualifiées par la loi d'établissements publics à caractère administratif (EPA) ou d'Etablissements publics à caractère industriel et commercial (EPIC) (9). Tel est le cas de La Poste. La Cour de Cassation a toutefois retenu le principe selon lequel La Poste est assimilée à un EPIC dans son arrêt du 18 janvier 2001 (2e chambre civile) (10)
   (11). Les conséquences juridiques du statut de La Poste sont les suivantes:

(1)   Inapplicabilité des procédures d'insolvabilité et de faillite

| 11. | En France, les personnes morales de droit public ne sont pas soumises au droit commun en matière de redressement et de liquidation judiciaires d'entreprises en difficulté. L'inapplicabilité des procédures d'insolvabilité et de faillite aux personnes morales de droit public découlerait du principe général d'insaisissabilité des biens des personnes morales de droit public reconnu par la jurisprudence française depuis la fin du 19e siècle, et notamment par la Cour de Cassation (12). |
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11.

En France, les personnes morales de droit public ne sont pas soumises au droit commun en matière de redressement et de liquidation judiciaires d'entreprises en difficulté. L'inapplicabilité des procédures d'insolvabilité et de faillite aux personnes morales de droit public découlerait du principe général d'insaisissabilité des biens des personnes morales de droit public reconnu par la jurisprudence française depuis la fin du 19e siècle, et notamment par la Cour de Cassation (12).

| 12. | Comme l'article premier de la loi no 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990 a qualifié La Poste de personne morale de droit public, La Poste n'est pas soumise au droit commun en matière de redressement et de liquidation judiciaires d'entreprises en difficulté. |
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12.

Comme l'article premier de la loi no 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990 a qualifié La Poste de personne morale de droit public, La Poste n'est pas soumise au droit commun en matière de redressement et de liquidation judiciaires d'entreprises en difficulté.

| 13. | En outre, l'article 2 de la loi du 25 janvier 1985, qui définit le champ d'application des procédures de redressement et liquidation judiciaires de droit commun en France, devenu l'article L620-2 du code de commerce, dispose: “Le redressement et la liquidation judiciaires sont applicables à tout commerçant, à toute personne immatriculée au répertoire des métiers, à tout agriculteur et à toute personne morale de droit privé.” Il résulte de la lettre de cet article ainsi que de l'interprétation qui en est faite par la jurisprudence française (13), que les procédures collectives du droit commun ne s'appliquent pas aux personnes morales de droit public et donc notamment aux EPIC. |
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13.

En outre, l'article 2 de la loi du 25 janvier 1985, qui définit le champ d'application des procédures de redressement et liquidation judiciaires de droit commun en France, devenu l'article L620-2 du code de commerce, dispose: “Le redressement et la liquidation judiciaires sont applicables à tout commerçant, à toute personne immatriculée au répertoire des métiers, à tout agriculteur et à toute personne morale de droit privé.” Il résulte de la lettre de cet article ainsi que de l'interprétation qui en est faite par la jurisprudence française (13), que les procédures collectives du droit commun ne s'appliquent pas aux personnes morales de droit public et donc notamment aux EPIC.

(2)   Applicabilité du principe de la responsabilité en dernier recours de l'État pour les créances des personnes morales de droit public (loi du 16 juillet 1980)

| 14. | La loi no 80-539 du 16 juillet 1980 relative aux astreintes prononcées en matière administrative et à l'exécution des jugements par les personnes morales de droit public est applicable à La Poste, qualifiée de personne morale de droit public par la loi no 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990. |
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14.

La loi no 80-539 du 16 juillet 1980 relative aux astreintes prononcées en matière administrative et à l'exécution des jugements par les personnes morales de droit public est applicable à La Poste, qualifiée de personne morale de droit public par la loi no 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990.

| 15. | Notons tout d'abord que cette loi est uniquement destinée à faire exécuter les décisions juridictionnelles passées en force de chose jugée condamnant soit l'État, soit une collectivité locale, soit un établissement public au paiement d'une somme d'argent. Elle ne fixe donc pas une procédure de redressement ou de liquidation. La Poste n'est en fait soumise à aucune loi fixant une procédure en matière de redressement et de liquidation judiciaire, que ce soit une procédure de droit commun ou une procédure spécifique. |
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15.

Notons tout d'abord que cette loi est uniquement destinée à faire exécuter les décisions juridictionnelles passées en force de chose jugée condamnant soit l'État, soit une collectivité locale, soit un établissement public au paiement d'une somme d'argent. Elle ne fixe donc pas une procédure de redressement ou de liquidation. La Poste n'est en fait soumise à aucune loi fixant une procédure en matière de redressement et de liquidation judiciaire, que ce soit une procédure de droit commun ou une procédure spécifique.

| 16. | L'article premier de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 dispose: “Le représentant de l'État dans le département ou l'autorité de tutelle adresse à la collectivité ou à l'établissement une mise en demeure de créer les ressources nécessaires; si l'organe délibérant de la collectivité ou de l'établissement n'a pas dégagé ou créé de ressources, le représentant de l'État dans le département ou l'autorité de tutelle y pourvoit et procède, s'il y a lieu, au mandatement d'office”. Le décret d'application (8) prévoit que “l'autorité de tutelle dégage, le cas échéant, les ressources nécessaires” et que ce “dégagement” est réalisé “soit en réduisant les crédits affectés à d'autres dépenses et encore libres, soit en augmentant les ressources”. L'État pourrait donc être tenu responsable en dernier recours des créances d'une personne morale de droit public, et donc de La Poste, en étant contraint de fournir à La Poste les ressources nécessaires pour que la décision de justice puisse être exécutée. |
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16.

L'article premier de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 dispose: “Le représentant de l'État dans le département ou l'autorité de tutelle adresse à la collectivité ou à l'établissement une mise en demeure de créer les ressources nécessaires; si l'organe délibérant de la collectivité ou de l'établissement n'a pas dégagé ou créé de ressources, le représentant de l'État dans le département ou l'autorité de tutelle y pourvoit et procède, s'il y a lieu, au mandatement d'office”. Le décret d'application (8) prévoit que “l'autorité de tutelle dégage, le cas échéant, les ressources nécessaires” et que ce “dégagement” est réalisé “soit en réduisant les crédits affectés à d'autres dépenses et encore libres, soit en augmentant les ressources”. L'État pourrait donc être tenu responsable en dernier recours des créances d'une personne morale de droit public, et donc de La Poste, en étant contraint de fournir à La Poste les ressources nécessaires pour que la décision de justice puisse être exécutée.

| 17. | Outre les deux éléments précédents (inapplicabilité des procédures d'insolvabilité et applicabilité du principe de responsabilité en dernier recours de l'État), la Commission a relevé que des règles applicables à certains EPIC pourraient s'appliquer également à La Poste: |
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17.

Outre les deux éléments précédents (inapplicabilité des procédures d'insolvabilité et applicabilité du principe de responsabilité en dernier recours de l'État), la Commission a relevé que des règles applicables à certains EPIC pourraient s'appliquer également à La Poste:

(3)   Transfert des obligations d'un EPIC dissous à un autre établissement public ou à l'État

| 18. | L'instruction codificatrice no 02-060-M95 du 18 juillet 2002 sur la réglementation financière et comptable des établissements publics nationaux à caractère industriel et commercial, publiée dans le Bulletin Officiel de la Comptabilité publique, prévoit que deux hypothèses peuvent se présenter en cas de fermeture d'un EPIC doté d'un comptable public:






  — | soit un nouvel établissement public se substitue à l'ancien EPIC et reprend les biens, droits et obligations de celui-ci, |
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18.

L'instruction codificatrice no 02-060-M95 du 18 juillet 2002 sur la réglementation financière et comptable des établissements publics nationaux à caractère industriel et commercial, publiée dans le Bulletin Officiel de la Comptabilité publique, prévoit que deux hypothèses peuvent se présenter en cas de fermeture d'un EPIC doté d'un comptable public:

—

soit un nouvel établissement public se substitue à l'ancien EPIC et reprend les biens, droits et obligations de celui-ci,

| — | soit un texte prononce la dissolution de l'établissement public; dans ce cas, “le texte portant dissolution de l'établissement peut, d'ores et déjà, désigner le dévolutaire du solde de liquidation, en général l'État” (14). |
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—

soit un texte prononce la dissolution de l'établissement public; dans ce cas, “le texte portant dissolution de l'établissement peut, d'ores et déjà, désigner le dévolutaire du solde de liquidation, en général l'État” (14).

| 19. | Le guide sur l'organisation financière des créations, transformations et suppressions des établissements publics nationaux et des groupements d'intérêt public du 14 novembre 2006, disponible sur le site internet du ministère des finances, précise (15): “Le texte supprimant l'établissement doit explicitement prévoir le transfert des droits, biens et obligations de l'établissement supprimé à la structure qui reprendra son activité ou son patrimoine (c'est-à-dire soit un établissement public ou l'État)” ... “Plus généralement, il doit être prévu que le nouvel établissement est substitué aux personnes morales dont il reprend l'activité dans les droits et obligations résultant des contrats passés pour l'accomplissement des missions qui lui sont attribuées”. |
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19.

Le guide sur l'organisation financière des créations, transformations et suppressions des établissements publics nationaux et des groupements d'intérêt public du 14 novembre 2006, disponible sur le site internet du ministère des finances, précise (15): “Le texte supprimant l'établissement doit explicitement prévoir le transfert des droits, biens et obligations de l'établissement supprimé à la structure qui reprendra son activité ou son patrimoine (c'est-à-dire soit un établissement public ou l'État)” ... “Plus généralement, il doit être prévu que le nouvel établissement est substitué aux personnes morales dont il reprend l'activité dans les droits et obligations résultant des contrats passés pour l'accomplissement des missions qui lui sont attribuées”.

| 20. | Bien que les dispositions de l'instruction codificatrice et du guide sur l'organisation financière ne soient applicables qu'aux seuls EPIC dotés d'un agent comptable public, certains éléments indiquent que des EPIC non dotés d'un agent comptable public verraient également, en cas de clôture, leurs dettes transférées à l'État ou à un autre établissement public. |
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20.

Bien que les dispositions de l'instruction codificatrice et du guide sur l'organisation financière ne soient applicables qu'aux seuls EPIC dotés d'un agent comptable public, certains éléments indiquent que des EPIC non dotés d'un agent comptable public verraient également, en cas de clôture, leurs dettes transférées à l'État ou à un autre établissement public.

| 21. | Ainsi Charbonnages de France a publié dans les notes à ses comptes financiers du 31 décembre 2000 que tous les droits et obligations d'un EPIC doivent être transférés soit à une autre entité publique, soit au gouvernement français lui-même, et les termes et conditions d'un tel transfert doivent être précisés dans la loi adoptée pour clôturer l'EPIC en question. Cette affirmation ne se limite pas aux seuls EPIC dotés d'un agent comptable public; d'ailleurs, Charbonnages de France est un EPIC sans agent comptable public. |
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21.

Ainsi Charbonnages de France a publié dans les notes à ses comptes financiers du 31 décembre 2000 que tous les droits et obligations d'un EPIC doivent être transférés soit à une autre entité publique, soit au gouvernement français lui-même, et les termes et conditions d'un tel transfert doivent être précisés dans la loi adoptée pour clôturer l'EPIC en question. Cette affirmation ne se limite pas aux seuls EPIC dotés d'un agent comptable public; d'ailleurs, Charbonnages de France est un EPIC sans agent comptable public.

| 22. | Par ailleurs, selon certaines agences de notation, dans l'hypothèse d'une dissolution de l'ERAP (16), bien que l'ERAP soit également un EPIC sans agent comptable public, le solde de sa dette et de ses actifs serait également transféré à l'État. Selon Fitch (17),“en tant qu'EPIC, l'ERAP n'est pas soumis aux procédures de liquidation. Il ne peut être dissous que par une procédure législative et, dans cette hypothèse, le solde de sa dette et de ses actifs reviendront à l'État.” Selon Moody's (18), “l'ERAP ne peut faire l'objet de restructurations imposées par le tribunal de procédures de liquidation judiciaire. Ainsi, en cas de dissolution de la société, ses actifs/passifs seraient transférés à l'autorité responsable de sa création, à savoir l'État lui-même”. |
| --- | --- |

22.

Par ailleurs, selon certaines agences de notation, dans l'hypothèse d'une dissolution de l'ERAP (16), bien que l'ERAP soit également un EPIC sans agent comptable public, le solde de sa dette et de ses actifs serait également transféré à l'État. Selon Fitch (17),“en tant qu'EPIC, l'ERAP n'est pas soumis aux procédures de liquidation. Il ne peut être dissous que par une procédure législative et, dans cette hypothèse, le solde de sa dette et de ses actifs reviendront à l'État.” Selon Moody's (18), “l'ERAP ne peut faire l'objet de restructurations imposées par le tribunal de procédures de liquidation judiciaire. Ainsi, en cas de dissolution de la société, ses actifs/passifs seraient transférés à l'autorité responsable de sa création, à savoir l'État lui-même”.

| 23. | A la vue de ces éléments, et bien que La Poste ne soit pas dotée d'un agent comptable public (19), la Commission n'exclut pas que dans l'hypothèse d'une liquidation, le principe du transfert des dettes à l'État ou à une autre entité publique soit applicable à La Poste compte tenu de son assimilation à un EPIC. Dès lors, le créancier aurait la garantie de ne pas perdre sa créance et pourrait se contenter d'un taux d'intérêt moindre. Un tel transfert aurait donc les mêmes effets qu'une garantie. |
| --- | --- |

23.

A la vue de ces éléments, et bien que La Poste ne soit pas dotée d'un agent comptable public (19), la Commission n'exclut pas que dans l'hypothèse d'une liquidation, le principe du transfert des dettes à l'État ou à une autre entité publique soit applicable à La Poste compte tenu de son assimilation à un EPIC. Dès lors, le créancier aurait la garantie de ne pas perdre sa créance et pourrait se contenter d'un taux d'intérêt moindre. Un tel transfert aurait donc les mêmes effets qu'une garantie.

(4)   Accès direct aux comptes du Trésor

| 24. | Toujours selon Fitch (17), “la liquidité de l'ERAP est garantie par son accès immédiat aux comptes d'avance du Trésor”. Comme l'ERAP est un EPIC, la Commission s'interroge sur l'accès que pourrait également avoir La Poste aux comptes d'avance du Trésor. |
| --- | --- |

24.

Toujours selon Fitch (17), “la liquidité de l'ERAP est garantie par son accès immédiat aux comptes d'avance du Trésor”. Comme l'ERAP est un EPIC, la Commission s'interroge sur l'accès que pourrait également avoir La Poste aux comptes d'avance du Trésor.

3.   POSITION DE LA COMMISSION PRÉSENTÉE DANS LES LETTRES DU 21 FÉVRIER ET 4 OCTOBRE 2006

| 25. | Dans ses lettres datées du 21 février et du 4 octobre 2006, la Commission a informé les autorités françaises de ses conclusions préliminaires quant à l'existence d'une garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste (20):






  — | d'une part, La Poste, en tant que personne morale de droit public, n'est pas soumise aux procédures de redressement et liquidation judiciaire de droit commun, |
| --- | --- | --- |

25.

Dans ses lettres datées du 21 février et du 4 octobre 2006, la Commission a informé les autorités françaises de ses conclusions préliminaires quant à l'existence d'une garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste (20):

—

d'une part, La Poste, en tant que personne morale de droit public, n'est pas soumise aux procédures de redressement et liquidation judiciaire de droit commun,

| — | d'autre part, dans le cadre de la procédure prévue par la loi du 16 juillet 1980, l'État peut être tenu responsable du paiement des créances de La Poste dans le cas où elle serait dans l'impossibilité de faire face à ses dettes. |
| --- | --- |

—

d'autre part, dans le cadre de la procédure prévue par la loi du 16 juillet 1980, l'État peut être tenu responsable du paiement des créances de La Poste dans le cas où elle serait dans l'impossibilité de faire face à ses dettes.

| 26. | De l'avis de la Commission, La Poste tirerait un avantage de cette situation, principalement au travers de conditions de financement réputées plus favorables dont elle bénéficierait sur les marchés des capitaux. Cet avantage, financé au moyen de ressources d'État, constituerait une aide d'État au sens de la communication de la Commission sur l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité CE aux aides d'État sous forme de garanties (21). |
| --- | --- |

26.

De l'avis de la Commission, La Poste tirerait un avantage de cette situation, principalement au travers de conditions de financement réputées plus favorables dont elle bénéficierait sur les marchés des capitaux. Cet avantage, financé au moyen de ressources d'État, constituerait une aide d'État au sens de la communication de la Commission sur l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité CE aux aides d'État sous forme de garanties (21).

| 27. | De surcroît, la Commission considère que la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ne remplit aucune condition d'application des dérogations prévues par le traité CE et que par conséquent, elle est incompatible avec le marché commun. |
| --- | --- |

27.

De surcroît, la Commission considère que la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ne remplit aucune condition d'application des dérogations prévues par le traité CE et que par conséquent, elle est incompatible avec le marché commun.

4.   POSITION DES AUTORITÉS FRANÇAISES

| 28. | Les autorités françaises contestent d'une part l'existence d'une garantie illimitée de l'État dérivée du statut de l'entreprise et d'autre part la présence d'un avantage économique pour La Poste. |
| --- | --- |

28.

Les autorités françaises contestent d'une part l'existence d'une garantie illimitée de l'État dérivée du statut de l'entreprise et d'autre part la présence d'un avantage économique pour La Poste.

4.1   Sur l'existence d'une garantie illimitée

4.1.1.   Sur la non soumission de La Poste aux procédures collectives de droit privé définies par la loi de 1985

| 29. | De l'avis des autorités françaises (22), la loi de 1985 n'étant qu'une loi de procédure, la circonstance que La Poste n'entre pas dans son champ d'application ne signifie nullement qu'elle ne peut se trouver en situation de cessation de paiement ou de faillite, pas plus qu'elle n'interdit la mise en œuvre à son encontre d'une procédure de redressement, de liquidation ou de faillite. |
| --- | --- |

29.

De l'avis des autorités françaises (22), la loi de 1985 n'étant qu'une loi de procédure, la circonstance que La Poste n'entre pas dans son champ d'application ne signifie nullement qu'elle ne peut se trouver en situation de cessation de paiement ou de faillite, pas plus qu'elle n'interdit la mise en œuvre à son encontre d'une procédure de redressement, de liquidation ou de faillite.

| 30. | Par ailleurs, le fait que les procédures fixées par les lois de 1980 et de 1985 ne soient pas strictement équivalentes dans leurs modalités ne signifie pas que la procédure de la loi de 1980 serait susceptible de conférer un avantage au sens des règles en matière d'aide d'État. Selon les autorités françaises, la longueur de la procédure de recouvrement des créances instituée par la loi de 1980 et l'impossibilité de recourir aux voies d'exécution de droit privé ne sauraient être considérées comme des avantages pour le créancier. |
| --- | --- |

30.

Par ailleurs, le fait que les procédures fixées par les lois de 1980 et de 1985 ne soient pas strictement équivalentes dans leurs modalités ne signifie pas que la procédure de la loi de 1980 serait susceptible de conférer un avantage au sens des règles en matière d'aide d'État. Selon les autorités françaises, la longueur de la procédure de recouvrement des créances instituée par la loi de 1980 et l'impossibilité de recourir aux voies d'exécution de droit privé ne sauraient être considérées comme des avantages pour le créancier.

4.1.2   Sur l'existence d'un principe autonome de garantie résultant de la loi du 16 juillet 1980

| 31. | Les autorités françaises soutiennent qu'aucun texte, pas plus qu'une décision juridictionnelle, n'a posé le principe selon lequel l'État garantirait, par principe, indéfiniment l'ensemble des dettes des EPIC. |
| --- | --- |

31.

Les autorités françaises soutiennent qu'aucun texte, pas plus qu'une décision juridictionnelle, n'a posé le principe selon lequel l'État garantirait, par principe, indéfiniment l'ensemble des dettes des EPIC.

| 32. | En particulier, selon les autorités françaises, on ne saurait déduire de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 une obligation pour l'État de se substituer financièrement aux personnes publiques. Selon elles, “le dégagement des ressources nécessaires” dont il est question dans la dite loi, n'entraîne pas d'obligation de financement par l'État. À l'appui de cette position, elles citent les travaux préparatoires de ladite loi, où le gouvernement se serait opposé aux amendements visant à faire une obligation de la possibilité pour l'État d'aider une collectivité locale par une subvention exceptionnelle. Elles citent également un article de doctrine (23), selon lequel l'attribution d'une subvention exceptionnelle serait en dehors de l'exercice du pouvoir de substitution visé par l'article 1 de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 (24). |
| --- | --- |

32.

En particulier, selon les autorités françaises, on ne saurait déduire de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 une obligation pour l'État de se substituer financièrement aux personnes publiques. Selon elles, “le dégagement des ressources nécessaires” dont il est question dans la dite loi, n'entraîne pas d'obligation de financement par l'État. À l'appui de cette position, elles citent les travaux préparatoires de ladite loi, où le gouvernement se serait opposé aux amendements visant à faire une obligation de la possibilité pour l'État d'aider une collectivité locale par une subvention exceptionnelle. Elles citent également un article de doctrine (23), selon lequel l'attribution d'une subvention exceptionnelle serait en dehors de l'exercice du pouvoir de substitution visé par l'article 1 de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 (24).

| 33. | Les autorités françaises affirment que cette analyse est confirmée par la jurisprudence. Elles citent un arrêt du Conseil d'État du 1er avril 1938 (25) qui aurait posé ce principe, fondé sur le principe d'autonomie des établissements publics. Le Conseil d'État a ainsi jugé: “l'office national du tourisme doté de la personnalité civile et de l'autonomie financière (...) constituait un établissement public, que par suite, l'État ne saurait être tenu d'acquitter les dettes contractées par cet établissement; qu'ainsi, c'est avec raison que le ministre des travaux publics a refusé de faire droit à la demande [du créancier]”. Cet arrêt, bien qu'ancien, n'aurait jamais été démenti. |
| --- | --- |

33.

Les autorités françaises affirment que cette analyse est confirmée par la jurisprudence. Elles citent un arrêt du Conseil d'État du 1er avril 1938 (25) qui aurait posé ce principe, fondé sur le principe d'autonomie des établissements publics. Le Conseil d'État a ainsi jugé: “l'office national du tourisme doté de la personnalité civile et de l'autonomie financière (...) constituait un établissement public, que par suite, l'État ne saurait être tenu d'acquitter les dettes contractées par cet établissement; qu'ainsi, c'est avec raison que le ministre des travaux publics a refusé de faire droit à la demande [du créancier]”. Cet arrêt, bien qu'ancien, n'aurait jamais été démenti.

| 34. | Les autorités françaises invoquent également (26) deux arrêts du Conseil d'État relatifs à l'affaire Campoloro (10 novembre 1999 et 18 novembre 2005). D'une part, ces arrêts montreraient que la substitution financière ne figure pas dans la liste des obligations imposées par la loi du 16 juillet 1980 telle qu'interprétée au contentieux par le Conseil d'État. D'autre part, en recherchant s'il y a avait lieu de mettre en jeu la responsabilité de l'État sur le terrain de la faute — lourde qui plus est —, le Conseil d'État aurait par principe exclu toute forme de responsabilité “de plein droit”. En effet, si la loi de 1980 impliquait une responsabilité de l'État en dernier recours sur les dettes des personnes morales de droit public, le Conseil d'État n'aurait pas eu à analyser la responsabilité de l'État sur le terrain de la faute: il se serait contenté d'appliquer ce principe et aurait condamné l'État à rembourser aux créanciers les dettes de la commune. |
| --- | --- |

34.

Les autorités françaises invoquent également (26) deux arrêts du Conseil d'État relatifs à l'affaire Campoloro (10 novembre 1999 et 18 novembre 2005). D'une part, ces arrêts montreraient que la substitution financière ne figure pas dans la liste des obligations imposées par la loi du 16 juillet 1980 telle qu'interprétée au contentieux par le Conseil d'État. D'autre part, en recherchant s'il y a avait lieu de mettre en jeu la responsabilité de l'État sur le terrain de la faute — lourde qui plus est —, le Conseil d'État aurait par principe exclu toute forme de responsabilité “de plein droit”. En effet, si la loi de 1980 impliquait une responsabilité de l'État en dernier recours sur les dettes des personnes morales de droit public, le Conseil d'État n'aurait pas eu à analyser la responsabilité de l'État sur le terrain de la faute: il se serait contenté d'appliquer ce principe et aurait condamné l'État à rembourser aux créanciers les dettes de la commune.

| 35. | Les autorités françaises ajoutent qu'en application de l'article 61 de la loi organique du 1er août 2001 relative aux lois de finances (LOLF), si les EPIC bénéficiaient de la garantie de l'État, il aurait été nécessaire d'inscrire cette garantie en loi de finances (26). En effet, depuis l'entrée en vigueur de la LOLF, dont l'autorité est supérieure à celle des lois ordinaires, aucune garantie ou reprise de dette de tiers par l'État ne peut être mise en œuvre en l'absence d'une autorisation dans la loi de finances. Par ailleurs, les autorités françaises citent le Conseil d'État (27), selon lequel tout mécanisme “équivalent” à une garantie de l'État doit être considéré comme une garantie au sens de la LOLF. |
| --- | --- |

35.

Les autorités françaises ajoutent qu'en application de l'article 61 de la loi organique du 1er août 2001 relative aux lois de finances (LOLF), si les EPIC bénéficiaient de la garantie de l'État, il aurait été nécessaire d'inscrire cette garantie en loi de finances (26). En effet, depuis l'entrée en vigueur de la LOLF, dont l'autorité est supérieure à celle des lois ordinaires, aucune garantie ou reprise de dette de tiers par l'État ne peut être mise en œuvre en l'absence d'une autorisation dans la loi de finances. Par ailleurs, les autorités françaises citent le Conseil d'État (27), selon lequel tout mécanisme “équivalent” à une garantie de l'État doit être considéré comme une garantie au sens de la LOLF.

| 36. | Enfin, selon les autorités françaises, si le principe de la garantie de l'État sur les établissements publics existait, la transformation d'un établissement public en société anonyme serait impossible, sauf à être accompagnée de mesures de garanties explicites de nature à préserver les droits des créanciers nés antérieurement à la transformation de la personne publique concernée. Or selon les autorités françaises, jamais un tel mécanisme n'a été mis en place. En outre, jamais le Conseil constitutionnel, pourtant saisi des transformations de France Télécom, de Gaz de France, d'Edf et d'ADP (28), n'a soulevé cette question. |
| --- | --- |

36.

Enfin, selon les autorités françaises, si le principe de la garantie de l'État sur les établissements publics existait, la transformation d'un établissement public en société anonyme serait impossible, sauf à être accompagnée de mesures de garanties explicites de nature à préserver les droits des créanciers nés antérieurement à la transformation de la personne publique concernée. Or selon les autorités françaises, jamais un tel mécanisme n'a été mis en place. En outre, jamais le Conseil constitutionnel, pourtant saisi des transformations de France Télécom, de Gaz de France, d'Edf et d'ADP (28), n'a soulevé cette question.

| 37. | A l'inverse, lors de la transformation au 1er janvier 1991 de l'administration des postes en personne morale autonome, l'État a par arrêté du 31 décembre 1990 accordé une garantie explicite aux dettes contractées antérieurement au 31 décembre 1990 et transférées à La Poste. Selon les autorités françaises, une telle mesure n'aurait pas été nécessaire si La Poste en tant qu'EPIC avait bénéficié statutairement de la garantie de l'État. Similairement, l'article 80 de la loi de finances rectificative pour 2002 prévoit la garantie de l'État pour les emprunts que contracterait l'ERAP et autorise une garantie à l'Agence Française de Développement pour les prêts aux pays les plus endettés. Selon les autorités françaises, si ces deux EPIC avaient bénéficié de la garantie de l'État du seul fait de leur nature d'établissement public, il n'aurait pas été nécessaire de la leur accorder. |
| --- | --- |

37.

A l'inverse, lors de la transformation au 1er janvier 1991 de l'administration des postes en personne morale autonome, l'État a par arrêté du 31 décembre 1990 accordé une garantie explicite aux dettes contractées antérieurement au 31 décembre 1990 et transférées à La Poste. Selon les autorités françaises, une telle mesure n'aurait pas été nécessaire si La Poste en tant qu'EPIC avait bénéficié statutairement de la garantie de l'État. Similairement, l'article 80 de la loi de finances rectificative pour 2002 prévoit la garantie de l'État pour les emprunts que contracterait l'ERAP et autorise une garantie à l'Agence Française de Développement pour les prêts aux pays les plus endettés. Selon les autorités françaises, si ces deux EPIC avaient bénéficié de la garantie de l'État du seul fait de leur nature d'établissement public, il n'aurait pas été nécessaire de la leur accorder.

4.2.   Sur l'existence d'un avantage économique pour La Poste

| 38. | Après avoir rappelé que les affirmations des agences de notation n'engagent pas l'État, les autorités françaises (29) indiquent qu'à chacune des rencontres avec les agences de notation, l'État actionnaire de La Poste a réaffirmé l'absence de garantie. |
| --- | --- |

38.

Après avoir rappelé que les affirmations des agences de notation n'engagent pas l'État, les autorités françaises (29) indiquent qu'à chacune des rencontres avec les agences de notation, l'État actionnaire de La Poste a réaffirmé l'absence de garantie.

| 39. | Selon la France, les analyses des agences de notation reposent non pas sur une analyse juridique mais sur une appréciation subjective de ce que serait le soutien de l'État en cas de difficulté de La Poste. Pour étayer cette affirmation, la France indique qu'après l'annonce par la Commission de sa lettre de recommandation, Standard and Poor's a maintenu sa notation de La Poste inchangée à AA-/stable et a précisé qu'un éventuel changement de La Poste ne la conduirait pas nécessairement à modifier son appréciation. Similairement, le coût de financement de La Poste sur le marché obligataire n'aurait pas augmenté (30). |
| --- | --- |

39.

Selon la France, les analyses des agences de notation reposent non pas sur une analyse juridique mais sur une appréciation subjective de ce que serait le soutien de l'État en cas de difficulté de La Poste. Pour étayer cette affirmation, la France indique qu'après l'annonce par la Commission de sa lettre de recommandation, Standard and Poor's a maintenu sa notation de La Poste inchangée à AA-/stable et a précisé qu'un éventuel changement de La Poste ne la conduirait pas nécessairement à modifier son appréciation. Similairement, le coût de financement de La Poste sur le marché obligataire n'aurait pas augmenté (30).

| 40. | Selon les autorités françaises (31), un autre élément vient contredire la thèse d'un impact économique des dispositions de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 qui serait assimilable à celui d'une garantie: les notations des collectivités territoriales, qui sont soumises aux dispositions de la loi de 1980, varient entre BBB+ et AAA. Selon les autorités françaises, si les dispositions de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 étaient interprétées par les agences comme instituant au profit des créanciers des personnes morales visées un mécanisme assimilable à une garantie de l'État, on verrait mal comment une notation de BBB+ ou AA- et comment de telles variations entre collectivités pourraient se justifier. |
| --- | --- |

40.

Selon les autorités françaises (31), un autre élément vient contredire la thèse d'un impact économique des dispositions de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 qui serait assimilable à celui d'une garantie: les notations des collectivités territoriales, qui sont soumises aux dispositions de la loi de 1980, varient entre BBB+ et AAA. Selon les autorités françaises, si les dispositions de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 étaient interprétées par les agences comme instituant au profit des créanciers des personnes morales visées un mécanisme assimilable à une garantie de l'État, on verrait mal comment une notation de BBB+ ou AA- et comment de telles variations entre collectivités pourraient se justifier.

| 41. | Les autorités françaises concluent que le statut de La Poste est sans influence sur la notation de La Poste et sur ses conditions de financement. |
| --- | --- |

41.

Les autorités françaises concluent que le statut de La Poste est sans influence sur la notation de La Poste et sur ses conditions de financement.

5.   PROPOSITIONS DES AUTORITÉS FRANÇAISES À LA SUITE DE LA DÉCISION DE LA COMMISSION DE PROPOSER DES MESURES UTILES

5.1.   La proposition des autorités françaises du 16 janvier 2007

Le contenu de la proposition

| 42. | Pour lever les doutes de la Commission sur l'applicabilité du principe de la responsabilité en dernier recours de l'État pour les créances des personnes morales de droit public sur le fondement de la loi de 1980, les autorités françaises ont proposé de modifier le 4e alinéa de l'article 3-1 du décret no 81-501 du 12 mai 1981 (32) (décret d'application de la loi de 1980 qui organise le pouvoir de tutelle conféré au représentant de l'État ou à l'autorité de tutelle). |
| --- | --- |

42.

Pour lever les doutes de la Commission sur l'applicabilité du principe de la responsabilité en dernier recours de l'État pour les créances des personnes morales de droit public sur le fondement de la loi de 1980, les autorités françaises ont proposé de modifier le 4e alinéa de l'article 3-1 du décret no 81-501 du 12 mai 1981 (32) (décret d'application de la loi de 1980 qui organise le pouvoir de tutelle conféré au représentant de l'État ou à l'autorité de tutelle).

| 43. | La version actuelle de cette disposition se présente comme suit:
  “Lorsque la mise en demeure est restée sans effet à l'expiration de ces délais, le représentant de l'État ou l'autorité chargée de la tutelle procède à l'inscription de la dépense au budget de la collectivité ou de l'établissement public défaillant. Il dégage, le cas échéant, les ressources nécessaires soit en réduisant des crédits affectés à d'autres dépenses et encore libres d'emploi, soit en augmentant les ressources.” |
| --- | --- |

43.

La version actuelle de cette disposition se présente comme suit:

“Lorsque la mise en demeure est restée sans effet à l'expiration de ces délais, le représentant de l'État ou l'autorité chargée de la tutelle procède à l'inscription de la dépense au budget de la collectivité ou de l'établissement public défaillant. Il dégage, le cas échéant, les ressources nécessaires soit en réduisant des crédits affectés à d'autres dépenses et encore libres d'emploi, soit en augmentant les ressources.”

| 44. | La proposition consiste à préciser que le représentant de l'État ou l'autorité de tutelle dégage les ressources nécessaires au sein du budget de la collectivité ou de l'établissement. Ainsi modifiée, la disposition du décret deviendrait:
  “Lorsque la mise en demeure est restée sans effet à l'expiration de ces délais, le représentant de l'État ou l'autorité chargée de la tutelle procède à l'inscription de la dépense au budget de la collectivité ou de l'établissement public défaillant. Il dégage, le cas échéant, les ressources nécessaires au sein du budget de la collectivité ou de l'établissement soit en réduisant des crédits affectés à d'autres dépenses et encore libres d'emploi, soit en augmentant les ressources” (modifications soulignées). |
| --- | --- |

44.

La proposition consiste à préciser que le représentant de l'État ou l'autorité de tutelle dégage les ressources nécessaires au sein du budget de la collectivité ou de l'établissement. Ainsi modifiée, la disposition du décret deviendrait:

“Lorsque la mise en demeure est restée sans effet à l'expiration de ces délais, le représentant de l'État ou l'autorité chargée de la tutelle procède à l'inscription de la dépense au budget de la collectivité ou de l'établissement public défaillant. Il dégage, le cas échéant, les ressources nécessaires au sein du budget de la collectivité ou de l'établissement soit en réduisant des crédits affectés à d'autres dépenses et encore libres d'emploi, soit en augmentant les ressources” (modifications soulignées).

Échanges entre la Commission et les autorités françaises sur la proposition

| 45. | La modification proposée par les autorités françaises semble établir que le préfet ne pourrait pas puiser directement dans les ressources de l'État pour combler le passif d'un établissement ou d'une collectivité défaillants en application des dispositions de la loi de 1980. |
| --- | --- |

45.

La modification proposée par les autorités françaises semble établir que le préfet ne pourrait pas puiser directement dans les ressources de l'État pour combler le passif d'un établissement ou d'une collectivité défaillants en application des dispositions de la loi de 1980.

| 46. | Toutefois, la Commission a souhaité clarifier ce qui se passerait en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs de l'établissement ou de la collectivité soumise à la procédure prévue par la loi de 1980. |
| --- | --- |

46.

Toutefois, la Commission a souhaité clarifier ce qui se passerait en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs de l'établissement ou de la collectivité soumise à la procédure prévue par la loi de 1980.

| 47. | Les autorités françaises ont alors communiqué à la Commission une note expliquant la situation des créanciers de La Poste dans le cas où celle-ci se trouverait en difficulté financière. Cette note occulte la question d'une éventuelle responsabilité sans faute de l'État dans le cas où la procédure spécifique mise en place par la loi de 1980 buterait sur une insuffisance d'actifs de La Poste. |
| --- | --- |

47.

Les autorités françaises ont alors communiqué à la Commission une note expliquant la situation des créanciers de La Poste dans le cas où celle-ci se trouverait en difficulté financière. Cette note occulte la question d'une éventuelle responsabilité sans faute de l'État dans le cas où la procédure spécifique mise en place par la loi de 1980 buterait sur une insuffisance d'actifs de La Poste.

| 48. | Par conséquent, dans un courrier du 22 février 2007, la Commission a indiqué aux autorités françaises qu'“afin de mettre fin à toute incertitude relative à l'interprétation de la loi de 1980, il semble nécessaire de compléter la modification proposée par les autorités françaises en incluant dans un texte juridiquement contraignant une disposition qui exclurait la possibilité pour un créancier d'engager la responsabilité de l'État dans le cas de figure précité (lorsque le refus du Préfet serait motivé par l'insuffisance d'actifs)”. |
| --- | --- |

48.

Par conséquent, dans un courrier du 22 février 2007, la Commission a indiqué aux autorités françaises qu'“afin de mettre fin à toute incertitude relative à l'interprétation de la loi de 1980, il semble nécessaire de compléter la modification proposée par les autorités françaises en incluant dans un texte juridiquement contraignant une disposition qui exclurait la possibilité pour un créancier d'engager la responsabilité de l'État dans le cas de figure précité (lorsque le refus du Préfet serait motivé par l'insuffisance d'actifs)”.

5.2.   La proposition complémentaire des autorités françaises du 19 mars 2007

Les commentaires des autorités françaises concernant la proposition de la DG concurrence

| 49. | Dans leur courrier du 19 mars 2007, les autorités françaises répondent qu'il serait contraire à la Constitution française de préciser le champ de responsabilité de l'État par voie réglementaire et que la capacité d'action du législateur lui-même est étroitement encadrée. En effet, le régime de responsabilité de la puissance publique se fonde sur des principes à valeur constitutionnelle qui ne peuvent pas être remis en cause par des normes juridiques inférieures (33). Si le législateur peut aménager un régime de responsabilité de l'État, il ne peut exclure totalement la réparation de certains préjudices. Dès lors, l'hypothèse évoquée par la Commission d'une mise en jeu d'une responsabilité sans faute de l'État en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs pour un établissement public, ne lui permettant pas de faire face à ses dettes, ne peut pas être écartée par l'adoption d'un texte législatif. |
| --- | --- |

49.

Dans leur courrier du 19 mars 2007, les autorités françaises répondent qu'il serait contraire à la Constitution française de préciser le champ de responsabilité de l'État par voie réglementaire et que la capacité d'action du législateur lui-même est étroitement encadrée. En effet, le régime de responsabilité de la puissance publique se fonde sur des principes à valeur constitutionnelle qui ne peuvent pas être remis en cause par des normes juridiques inférieures (33). Si le législateur peut aménager un régime de responsabilité de l'État, il ne peut exclure totalement la réparation de certains préjudices. Dès lors, l'hypothèse évoquée par la Commission d'une mise en jeu d'une responsabilité sans faute de l'État en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs pour un établissement public, ne lui permettant pas de faire face à ses dettes, ne peut pas être écartée par l'adoption d'un texte législatif.

| 50. | Par ailleurs, dans cette même note, les autorités françaises citent les “commentateurs autorisés” (34) de l'arrêt Campoloro qui préciseraient que cet arrêt ne peut pas être interprété comme “signifiant que la responsabilité sans faute de l'État peut être engagée y compris lorsque c'est la situation financière et patrimoniale de la collectivité qui interdit au préfet de prendre la moindre mesure susceptible de permettre l'exécution de la chose jugée.” |
| --- | --- |

50.

Par ailleurs, dans cette même note, les autorités françaises citent les “commentateurs autorisés” (34) de l'arrêt Campoloro qui préciseraient que cet arrêt ne peut pas être interprété comme “signifiant que la responsabilité sans faute de l'État peut être engagée y compris lorsque c'est la situation financière et patrimoniale de la collectivité qui interdit au préfet de prendre la moindre mesure susceptible de permettre l'exécution de la chose jugée.”

| 51. | Les autorités françaises indiquent en outre pourquoi, selon elles, “la responsabilité de l'État n'est pas susceptible d'être engagée au seul motif que le Préfet ou l'autorité de tutelle n'a pu prendre aucune mesure susceptible de permettre le remboursement de la créance en raison de la situation financière et patrimoniale de la collectivité ou de l'établissement public. Sur le terrain de la faute, l'abstention du Préfet ou de l'autorité de tutelle de mettre en œuvre ses compétences lorsqu'aucune mesure n'est susceptible de permettre le remboursement de la créance par la collectivité ou l'établissement public ne saurait par elle-même être fautive. Quant à la responsabilité sans faute, deux éléments au moins conduisent à l'écarter. En premier lieu, la responsabilité de la personne à qui réparation est demandée ne peut être engagée que si le fait (y compris l'abstention) qu'on lui impute a été la cause directe du préjudice (...). Or en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs, ce n'est pas l'action ou l'abstention de l'autorité administrative qui serait à l'origine du préjudice subi par le créancier, mais bien l'insolvabilité caractérisée de la collectivité ou de l'établissement public. En second lieu, la responsabilité sans faute dérive du principe d'égalité devant les charges publiques (...) (35) Or on distingue difficilement au cas d'espèce en quoi le préjudice subi par le créancier pourrait se traduire par une rupture de l'égalité devant les charges publiques.” |
| --- | --- |

51.

Les autorités françaises indiquent en outre pourquoi, selon elles, “la responsabilité de l'État n'est pas susceptible d'être engagée au seul motif que le Préfet ou l'autorité de tutelle n'a pu prendre aucune mesure susceptible de permettre le remboursement de la créance en raison de la situation financière et patrimoniale de la collectivité ou de l'établissement public. Sur le terrain de la faute, l'abstention du Préfet ou de l'autorité de tutelle de mettre en œuvre ses compétences lorsqu'aucune mesure n'est susceptible de permettre le remboursement de la créance par la collectivité ou l'établissement public ne saurait par elle-même être fautive. Quant à la responsabilité sans faute, deux éléments au moins conduisent à l'écarter. En premier lieu, la responsabilité de la personne à qui réparation est demandée ne peut être engagée que si le fait (y compris l'abstention) qu'on lui impute a été la cause directe du préjudice (...). Or en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs, ce n'est pas l'action ou l'abstention de l'autorité administrative qui serait à l'origine du préjudice subi par le créancier, mais bien l'insolvabilité caractérisée de la collectivité ou de l'établissement public. En second lieu, la responsabilité sans faute dérive du principe d'égalité devant les charges publiques (...) (35) Or on distingue difficilement au cas d'espèce en quoi le préjudice subi par le créancier pourrait se traduire par une rupture de l'égalité devant les charges publiques.”

Contenu de la proposition

| 52. | Cependant, afin de lever les doutes de la Commission en ce qui concerne l'hypothèse d'une responsabilité sans faute de l'État en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs, les autorités françaises ont proposé dans leur note du 19 mars 2007 de confirmer officiellement, dans tout contrat de financement ou prospectus d'émission de La Poste, que l'émission, le programme ou l'emprunt ne bénéficient pas de la garantie de l'État. |
| --- | --- |

52.

Cependant, afin de lever les doutes de la Commission en ce qui concerne l'hypothèse d'une responsabilité sans faute de l'État en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs, les autorités françaises ont proposé dans leur note du 19 mars 2007 de confirmer officiellement, dans tout contrat de financement ou prospectus d'émission de La Poste, que l'émission, le programme ou l'emprunt ne bénéficient pas de la garantie de l'État.

| 53. | Cette mesure additionnelle repose sur “l'exception de risque accepté”, qui s'applique indifféremment à l'ensemble des régimes de responsabilité de l'État (sans faute et pour faute). Conformément aux règles régissant la responsabilité de la puissance publique, le préjudice résultant d'une situation à laquelle la victime s'est sciemment exposée en connaissance de cause ne lui ouvre pas droit à réparation (36). |
| --- | --- |

53.

Cette mesure additionnelle repose sur “l'exception de risque accepté”, qui s'applique indifféremment à l'ensemble des régimes de responsabilité de l'État (sans faute et pour faute). Conformément aux règles régissant la responsabilité de la puissance publique, le préjudice résultant d'une situation à laquelle la victime s'est sciemment exposée en connaissance de cause ne lui ouvre pas droit à réparation (36).

| 54. | Concrètement, afin d'assurer l'application de ce principe, les autorités françaises ont proposé de s'engager, conjointement avec La Poste, pour chaque opération, à porter la mention suivante dans le contrat de financement (pour tout instrument couvert par un contrat): “l'émission/le programme/l'emprunt ne bénéficient d'aucune garantie d'aucune sorte, directe ou indirecte, de la part de l'État. En cas d'insolvabilité, l'État ne serait pas tenu de se substituer financièrement à La Poste pour le paiement de la créance.” |
| --- | --- |

54.

Concrètement, afin d'assurer l'application de ce principe, les autorités françaises ont proposé de s'engager, conjointement avec La Poste, pour chaque opération, à porter la mention suivante dans le contrat de financement (pour tout instrument couvert par un contrat): “l'émission/le programme/l'emprunt ne bénéficient d'aucune garantie d'aucune sorte, directe ou indirecte, de la part de l'État. En cas d'insolvabilité, l'État ne serait pas tenu de se substituer financièrement à La Poste pour le paiement de la créance.”

6.   ÉVALUATION DE LA MESURE

6.1.   Qualification de la mesure

| 55. | L'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE dispose: “sauf dérogations prévues par ledit traité, sont incompatibles avec le marché commun, dans la mesure où elles affectent les échanges entre États membres, les aides accordées par les États ou au moyen de ressources d'État sous quelque forme que ce soit qui faussent ou qui menacent de fausser la concurrence en favorisant certaines entreprises ou certaines productions ”. |
| --- | --- |

55.

L'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE dispose: “sauf dérogations prévues par ledit traité, sont incompatibles avec le marché commun, dans la mesure où elles affectent les échanges entre États membres, les aides accordées par les États ou au moyen de ressources d'État sous quelque forme que ce soit qui faussent ou qui menacent de fausser la concurrence en favorisant certaines entreprises ou certaines productions ”.

6.1.1.   Existence d'une garantie illimitée de l'État: présence de ressources étatiques

| 56. | Grâce à son statut de personne de droit public assimilée à un EPIC, La Poste bénéficie d'une situation juridique particulière tant pour ce qui concerne le remboursement de ses créanciers que pour le maintien de son existence en cas d'insolvabilité. Ces deux types de garanties, garantie sur le remboursement des créances individuelles et garantie sur le maintien de l'existence de La Poste et/ ou de ses obligations, sont étroitement liées dans le cas de La Poste. |
| --- | --- |

56.

Grâce à son statut de personne de droit public assimilée à un EPIC, La Poste bénéficie d'une situation juridique particulière tant pour ce qui concerne le remboursement de ses créanciers que pour le maintien de son existence en cas d'insolvabilité. Ces deux types de garanties, garantie sur le remboursement des créances individuelles et garantie sur le maintien de l'existence de La Poste et/ ou de ses obligations, sont étroitement liées dans le cas de La Poste.

—   Garantie sur le remboursement des créances individuelles

| 57. | La Commission estime que la loi du 16 juillet 1980 implique une garantie de l'État en dernier ressort sur l'ensemble des engagements de La Poste (37). L'article premier de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 dispose en effet: “Le représentant de l'État dans le département ou l'autorité de tutelle adresse à la collectivité ou à l'établissement une mise en demeure de créer les ressources nécessaires; si l'organe délibérant de la collectivité ou de l'établissement n'a pas dégagé ou créé de ressources, le représentant de l'État dans le département ou l'autorité de tutelle y pourvoit et procède, s'il y a lieu, au mandatement d'office” (38). Son décret d'application en suggère même l'existence (39): “L'autorité de tutelle dégage, le cas échéant, les ressources nécessaires, soit en réduisant des crédits affectés à d'autres dépenses et encore libres d'emploi, soit en augmentant les ressources”. Le décret n'exclut pas que l'augmentation des ressources provienne de ressources externes à l'entreprise, ni du budget de l'État. |
| --- | --- |

57.

La Commission estime que la loi du 16 juillet 1980 implique une garantie de l'État en dernier ressort sur l'ensemble des engagements de La Poste (37). L'article premier de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 dispose en effet: “Le représentant de l'État dans le département ou l'autorité de tutelle adresse à la collectivité ou à l'établissement une mise en demeure de créer les ressources nécessaires; si l'organe délibérant de la collectivité ou de l'établissement n'a pas dégagé ou créé de ressources, le représentant de l'État dans le département ou l'autorité de tutelle y pourvoit et procède, s'il y a lieu, au mandatement d'office” (38). Son décret d'application en suggère même l'existence (39): “L'autorité de tutelle dégage, le cas échéant, les ressources nécessaires, soit en réduisant des crédits affectés à d'autres dépenses et encore libres d'emploi, soit en augmentant les ressources”. Le décret n'exclut pas que l'augmentation des ressources provienne de ressources externes à l'entreprise, ni du budget de l'État.

| 58. | A cet égard, la Commission relève que la proposition française consistant à préciser que le représentant de l'État dégage les ressources au sein du budget de la collectivité n'est pas satisfaisante en ce qu'elle n'exclut pas que ce dégagement de ressources puisse se faire grâce à une augmentation des ressources permise par une subvention ou une injection de ressources publiques. |
| --- | --- |

58.

A cet égard, la Commission relève que la proposition française consistant à préciser que le représentant de l'État dégage les ressources au sein du budget de la collectivité n'est pas satisfaisante en ce qu'elle n'exclut pas que ce dégagement de ressources puisse se faire grâce à une augmentation des ressources permise par une subvention ou une injection de ressources publiques.

| 59. | Par ailleurs, cette proposition ne permet pas d'exclure que dans l'hypothèse où les ressources de La Poste seraient épuisées, le créancier qui n'aurait pas obtenu le remboursement de sa créance dans le cadre de l'application de la loi de 1980 se tourne vers la justice pour engager la responsabilité de l'État sur le fondement de la rupture de l'égalité devant les charges publiques. En particulier, la Commission a des doutes sur l'affirmation des autorités françaises selon laquelle la responsabilité de l'État ne pourrait être engagée pour rupture de l'égalité devant les charges publiques. En effet, la prétendue absence de pouvoir discrétionnaire du préfet ne semble pas prouvée dans le cas d'espèce. En particulier, face à une demande de remboursement de créances et devant une éventuelle nécessité de dégager des ressources au sein de l'établissement, le représentant de l'État doit apprécier si une éventuelle vente d'actifs n'empêcherait pas de facto la prestation par la Poste d'une de ses multiples missions de service public (service postal universel, territoriale, distributions de presse, etc.). Si le représentant de l'État privilégiait le maintien de la continuité du service public sur le droit du créancier à voir sa dette remboursée, il ne serait pas exclu que la responsabilité sans faute de l'État puisse être engagée. |
| --- | --- |

59.

Par ailleurs, cette proposition ne permet pas d'exclure que dans l'hypothèse où les ressources de La Poste seraient épuisées, le créancier qui n'aurait pas obtenu le remboursement de sa créance dans le cadre de l'application de la loi de 1980 se tourne vers la justice pour engager la responsabilité de l'État sur le fondement de la rupture de l'égalité devant les charges publiques. En particulier, la Commission a des doutes sur l'affirmation des autorités françaises selon laquelle la responsabilité de l'État ne pourrait être engagée pour rupture de l'égalité devant les charges publiques. En effet, la prétendue absence de pouvoir discrétionnaire du préfet ne semble pas prouvée dans le cas d'espèce. En particulier, face à une demande de remboursement de créances et devant une éventuelle nécessité de dégager des ressources au sein de l'établissement, le représentant de l'État doit apprécier si une éventuelle vente d'actifs n'empêcherait pas de facto la prestation par la Poste d'une de ses multiples missions de service public (service postal universel, territoriale, distributions de presse, etc.). Si le représentant de l'État privilégiait le maintien de la continuité du service public sur le droit du créancier à voir sa dette remboursée, il ne serait pas exclu que la responsabilité sans faute de l'État puisse être engagée.

| 60. | La proposition additionnelle des autorités françaises consistant à inclure une clause dans tous les contrats de financement et les prospectus d'émission de La Poste devrait, selon les autorités françaises, empêcher de façon définitive que la responsabilité de l'État puisse être engagée. |
| --- | --- |

60.

La proposition additionnelle des autorités françaises consistant à inclure une clause dans tous les contrats de financement et les prospectus d'émission de La Poste devrait, selon les autorités françaises, empêcher de façon définitive que la responsabilité de l'État puisse être engagée.

| 61. | La Commission reconnaît qu'il s'agit d'une mesure susceptible de restreindre les possibilités pour le créancier ayant signé un tel contrat d'obtenir le remboursement de sa créance par une action en justice. Elle garde néanmoins des doutes sur la pérennité de cette solution, l'exception pour risque accepté étant une règle établie par la jurisprudence qui pourrait toujours évoluer (le revirement jurisprudentiel est d'autant moins à exclure que la jurisprudence évolue vers une extension du régime de responsabilité sans faute de l'État). En outre, cette proposition, découlant des principes fondamentaux du droit public, par le biais d'instruments de droit secondaires, semble imparfaite, car ces instruments seraient susceptibles d'être annulés assez facilement en cas de conflit. Enfin, la Commission souligne que les créances de La Poste ne sont pas seulement financières, mais également commerciales ou d'autre nature encore. Suivant la proposition des autorités françaises, les fournisseurs de La Poste, par exemple, ne seraient pas informés de l'absence de garantie de l'État sur leur créance. Dès lors, il n'est pas à exclure que pour une fourniture de bien ou de service impliquant une créance, ils octroient à La Poste de meilleures conditions que ce qu'ils octroieraient à une entreprise ne bénéficiant pas de la garantie de l'État. |
| --- | --- |

61.

La Commission reconnaît qu'il s'agit d'une mesure susceptible de restreindre les possibilités pour le créancier ayant signé un tel contrat d'obtenir le remboursement de sa créance par une action en justice. Elle garde néanmoins des doutes sur la pérennité de cette solution, l'exception pour risque accepté étant une règle établie par la jurisprudence qui pourrait toujours évoluer (le revirement jurisprudentiel est d'autant moins à exclure que la jurisprudence évolue vers une extension du régime de responsabilité sans faute de l'État). En outre, cette proposition, découlant des principes fondamentaux du droit public, par le biais d'instruments de droit secondaires, semble imparfaite, car ces instruments seraient susceptibles d'être annulés assez facilement en cas de conflit. Enfin, la Commission souligne que les créances de La Poste ne sont pas seulement financières, mais également commerciales ou d'autre nature encore. Suivant la proposition des autorités françaises, les fournisseurs de La Poste, par exemple, ne seraient pas informés de l'absence de garantie de l'État sur leur créance. Dès lors, il n'est pas à exclure que pour une fourniture de bien ou de service impliquant une créance, ils octroient à La Poste de meilleures conditions que ce qu'ils octroieraient à une entreprise ne bénéficiant pas de la garantie de l'État.

| 62. | Enfin, dans l'hypothèse même où les propositions françaises bloqueraient toute possibilité pour un créancier financier de La Poste d'engager la responsabilité de l'État pour obtenir le remboursement de sa créance, ces propositions ne permettent pas d'établir clairement ce qui se passerait en cas d'insolvabilité de La Poste. En effet, un créancier de La Poste qui n'a pu obtenir le remboursement de sa créance en demandant l'exécution de sa créance individuelle pourrait toujours espérer qu'il obtiendra le remboursement de sa créance dans le cadre d'un redressement global de La Poste, financé par l'État. |
| --- | --- |

62.

Enfin, dans l'hypothèse même où les propositions françaises bloqueraient toute possibilité pour un créancier financier de La Poste d'engager la responsabilité de l'État pour obtenir le remboursement de sa créance, ces propositions ne permettent pas d'établir clairement ce qui se passerait en cas d'insolvabilité de La Poste. En effet, un créancier de La Poste qui n'a pu obtenir le remboursement de sa créance en demandant l'exécution de sa créance individuelle pourrait toujours espérer qu'il obtiendra le remboursement de sa créance dans le cadre d'un redressement global de La Poste, financé par l'État.

—   Garantie sur le maintien de l'existence de La Poste et/ ou de ses obligations

| 63. | Comme indiqué dans la partie 2 (1) de la présente décision, les personnes morales de droit public sont exclues du champ d'application des procédures de redressement et liquidation judiciaires de droit commun en France. Ceci n'est pas contesté par les autorités françaises. |
| --- | --- |

63.

Comme indiqué dans la partie 2 (1) de la présente décision, les personnes morales de droit public sont exclues du champ d'application des procédures de redressement et liquidation judiciaires de droit commun en France. Ceci n'est pas contesté par les autorités françaises.

| 64. | Or, aux termes de la communication de la Commission sur l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité CE aux aides d' État sous forme de garanties (40), la qualification d'aide d'État est établie dès lors que l'on est en présence de l'exclusion d'une procédure de faillite ou d'insolvabilité, d'une garantie de l'État explicite ou d'une couverture des pertes par l' État (41) |
| --- | --- |

64.

Or, aux termes de la communication de la Commission sur l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité CE aux aides d' État sous forme de garanties (40), la qualification d'aide d'État est établie dès lors que l'on est en présence de l'exclusion d'une procédure de faillite ou d'insolvabilité, d'une garantie de l'État explicite ou d'une couverture des pertes par l' État (41)

| 65. | De surcroît, dans le cas de La Poste, aucune procédure de redressement ou de liquidation n'est définie a priori. La procédure spécifique de protection des créanciers de personnes morales de droit public en difficulté, créée par la loi du 16 juin 1980, ne peut être considérée comme une procédure de liquidation et en tout état de cause, elle n'est pas équivalente à la procédure de droit commun tant du point de vue de son déclenchement, de ses modalités que de ses effets. |
| --- | --- |

65.

De surcroît, dans le cas de La Poste, aucune procédure de redressement ou de liquidation n'est définie a priori. La procédure spécifique de protection des créanciers de personnes morales de droit public en difficulté, créée par la loi du 16 juin 1980, ne peut être considérée comme une procédure de liquidation et en tout état de cause, elle n'est pas équivalente à la procédure de droit commun tant du point de vue de son déclenchement, de ses modalités que de ses effets.

| 66. | Il est donc impossible d'être certain que la procédure qui serait suivie en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs de La Poste conduirait au même résultat que l'application de la procédure de liquidation suivie dans le droit commercial en termes de droits et obligations de La Poste, de ses créditeurs et de son propriétaire. En particulier, alors que le créancier d'une entreprise de droit commercial sait qu'il encourt le danger d'une perte de sa créance, ce danger n'est pas établi dans le cas de La Poste. |
| --- | --- |

66.

Il est donc impossible d'être certain que la procédure qui serait suivie en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs de La Poste conduirait au même résultat que l'application de la procédure de liquidation suivie dans le droit commercial en termes de droits et obligations de La Poste, de ses créditeurs et de son propriétaire. En particulier, alors que le créancier d'une entreprise de droit commercial sait qu'il encourt le danger d'une perte de sa créance, ce danger n'est pas établi dans le cas de La Poste.

| 67. | Interrogées sur la procédure qui serait suivie en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs de La Poste, les autorités françaises ont indiqué que si la procédure instituée par la loi du 16 juillet 1980 butait sur l'insuffisance d'actifs de La Poste et si l'autorité de tutelle se trouvait dans l'impossibilité de créer les ressources nécessaires au paiement de la somme due, “la procédure prévue par la loi du 16 juillet 1980 serait terminée” (42). Les autorités françaises ne donnent pas davantage d'informations sur ce qui se passerait par la suite. |
| --- | --- |

67.

Interrogées sur la procédure qui serait suivie en cas d'insuffisance d'actifs de La Poste, les autorités françaises ont indiqué que si la procédure instituée par la loi du 16 juillet 1980 butait sur l'insuffisance d'actifs de La Poste et si l'autorité de tutelle se trouvait dans l'impossibilité de créer les ressources nécessaires au paiement de la somme due, “la procédure prévue par la loi du 16 juillet 1980 serait terminée” (42). Les autorités françaises ne donnent pas davantage d'informations sur ce qui se passerait par la suite.

| 68. | Or pour démontrer que La Poste ne bénéficie pas d'un avantage sur les entreprises soumises au droit commercial, il conviendrait de définir et de rendre publique la procédure qui serait suivie en cas d'insolvabilité de La Poste et, au cas où cette procédure serait différente de celle définie par le droit commercial, de montrer qu'une telle procédure donne aux créanciers de La Poste des droits qui ne sont pas supérieurs à ceux qu'ils auraient en application des règles de droit commercial. |
| --- | --- |

68.

Or pour démontrer que La Poste ne bénéficie pas d'un avantage sur les entreprises soumises au droit commercial, il conviendrait de définir et de rendre publique la procédure qui serait suivie en cas d'insolvabilité de La Poste et, au cas où cette procédure serait différente de celle définie par le droit commercial, de montrer qu'une telle procédure donne aux créanciers de La Poste des droits qui ne sont pas supérieurs à ceux qu'ils auraient en application des règles de droit commercial.

| 69. | La Commission n'exclut pas qu'après l'épuisement des ressources de l'établissement public, la procédure suivie soit celle fixée par l'instruction codificatrice no 02-060-M95 du 18 juillet 2002 sur la réglementation financière et comptable des établissements publics nationaux à caractère industriel et commercial et par le guide sur l'organisation financière des créations, transformations et suppressions des établissements publics nationaux et des groupements d'intérêt public du 14 novembre 2006. |
| --- | --- |

69.

La Commission n'exclut pas qu'après l'épuisement des ressources de l'établissement public, la procédure suivie soit celle fixée par l'instruction codificatrice no 02-060-M95 du 18 juillet 2002 sur la réglementation financière et comptable des établissements publics nationaux à caractère industriel et commercial et par le guide sur l'organisation financière des créations, transformations et suppressions des établissements publics nationaux et des groupements d'intérêt public du 14 novembre 2006.

| 70. | L'instruction codificatrice prévoit que deux hypothèses peuvent se présenter en cas de fermeture d'un EPIC doté d'un comptable public:






  — | soit un nouvel établissement public se substitue à l'ancien EPIC et reprend les biens, droits et obligations de celui-ci, |
| --- | --- | --- |

70.

L'instruction codificatrice prévoit que deux hypothèses peuvent se présenter en cas de fermeture d'un EPIC doté d'un comptable public:

—

soit un nouvel établissement public se substitue à l'ancien EPIC et reprend les biens, droits et obligations de celui-ci,

| — | soit un texte prononce la dissolution de l'établissement public; dans ce cas, “le texte portant dissolution de l'établissement peut, d'ores et déjà, désigner le dévolutaire du solde de liquidation, en général l'État” (43). |
| --- | --- |

—

soit un texte prononce la dissolution de l'établissement public; dans ce cas, “le texte portant dissolution de l'établissement peut, d'ores et déjà, désigner le dévolutaire du solde de liquidation, en général l'État” (43).

| 71. | L'application de cette instruction aurait pour effet de reporter la charge de la dette sur une entité publique (et donc d'engager les ressources publiques) et de garantir au créancier la pérennité de sa créance, ce qui aurait les mêmes effets qu'une garantie illimitée. |
| --- | --- |

71.

L'application de cette instruction aurait pour effet de reporter la charge de la dette sur une entité publique (et donc d'engager les ressources publiques) et de garantir au créancier la pérennité de sa créance, ce qui aurait les mêmes effets qu'une garantie illimitée.

| 72. | La Commission a également des doutes sur la possibilité qu'aurait La Poste d'accéder aux comptes d'avance du Trésor, à l'instar de l'ERAP, ce qui engagerait directement les ressources de l'État. |
| --- | --- |

72.

La Commission a également des doutes sur la possibilité qu'aurait La Poste d'accéder aux comptes d'avance du Trésor, à l'instar de l'ERAP, ce qui engagerait directement les ressources de l'État.

| 73. | La Commission souligne que rien n'empêche la France de clarifier un cadre juridique actuellement opaque en soumettant La Poste aux procédures de redressement et de liquidation du code du commerce ou bien, si la France estime qu'une telle soumission est incompatible avec la forme de droit public de La Poste et que la France souhaite garder la forme de droit public de La Poste, en définissant une procédure de faillite spécifique en application de laquelle les créanciers de La Poste seraient dans la même situation que les créanciers d'une entreprise de droit privé. À défaut d'un tel éclaircissement, la Commission conclut que la France laisse le marché croire qu'en cas d'épuisement des ressources de La Poste, la créance serait néanmoins maintenue grâce à une garantie de l'État sur l'existence même de La Poste ou sur la transmission des obligations de La Poste à une autre entité publique. |
| --- | --- |

73.

La Commission souligne que rien n'empêche la France de clarifier un cadre juridique actuellement opaque en soumettant La Poste aux procédures de redressement et de liquidation du code du commerce ou bien, si la France estime qu'une telle soumission est incompatible avec la forme de droit public de La Poste et que la France souhaite garder la forme de droit public de La Poste, en définissant une procédure de faillite spécifique en application de laquelle les créanciers de La Poste seraient dans la même situation que les créanciers d'une entreprise de droit privé. À défaut d'un tel éclaircissement, la Commission conclut que la France laisse le marché croire qu'en cas d'épuisement des ressources de La Poste, la créance serait néanmoins maintenue grâce à une garantie de l'État sur l'existence même de La Poste ou sur la transmission des obligations de La Poste à une autre entité publique.

| 74. | Par conséquent, la France pourrait être considérée comme responsable des attentes créées dans les chefs des créanciers de La Poste quant à l'existence d'une garantie. L'État pourrait donc être obligé de rembourser les dettes de La Poste si celle-ci n'était plus en mesure de respecter ses engagements. Cette situation juridique opaque procure un avantage à La Poste et est susceptible d'engager les ressources de l'État. |
| --- | --- |

74.

Par conséquent, la France pourrait être considérée comme responsable des attentes créées dans les chefs des créanciers de La Poste quant à l'existence d'une garantie. L'État pourrait donc être obligé de rembourser les dettes de La Poste si celle-ci n'était plus en mesure de respecter ses engagements. Cette situation juridique opaque procure un avantage à La Poste et est susceptible d'engager les ressources de l'État.

| 75. | Par ailleurs, la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste induit un transfert de ressources d'État au sens du point 2.1.2 de la communication susmentionnée, selon lequel: “Une garantie de l'État présente l'avantage de faire supporter par l'État le risque associé à la garantie. Cette prise de risque devrait normalement être rémunérée par une prime appropriée. Lorsque l'État y renonce, il y a à la fois avantage pour l'entreprise et ponction sur les ressources publiques. Par conséquent, même si l'État n'est pas amené à faire des paiements au titre de la garantie accordée, il y a aide au sens de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité”. |
| --- | --- |

75.

Par ailleurs, la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste induit un transfert de ressources d'État au sens du point 2.1.2 de la communication susmentionnée, selon lequel: “Une garantie de l'État présente l'avantage de faire supporter par l'État le risque associé à la garantie. Cette prise de risque devrait normalement être rémunérée par une prime appropriée. Lorsque l'État y renonce, il y a à la fois avantage pour l'entreprise et ponction sur les ressources publiques. Par conséquent, même si l'État n'est pas amené à faire des paiements au titre de la garantie accordée, il y a aide au sens de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité”.

| 76. | La garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste est imputable à l'État parce qu'elle découle de la combinaison de deux actes législatifs, à savoir la loi du 25 janvier 1985, devenue le code de commerce, et la loi no 80-539 du 16 juillet 1980, ainsi que d'actes réglementaires. |
| --- | --- |

76.

La garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste est imputable à l'État parce qu'elle découle de la combinaison de deux actes législatifs, à savoir la loi du 25 janvier 1985, devenue le code de commerce, et la loi no 80-539 du 16 juillet 1980, ainsi que d'actes réglementaires.

6.1.2.   Existence d'un avantage sélectif

| 77. | L'inapplicabilité de la procédure de droit commun en matière de redressement et de liquidation judiciaire aux personnes morales de droit public implique que La Poste bénéficie d'avantages économiques au sens du point 2.1.3 de la communication de la Commission susmentionnée, notamment des conditions de financement plus favorables sur les marchés des capitaux. |
| --- | --- |

77.

L'inapplicabilité de la procédure de droit commun en matière de redressement et de liquidation judiciaire aux personnes morales de droit public implique que La Poste bénéficie d'avantages économiques au sens du point 2.1.3 de la communication de la Commission susmentionnée, notamment des conditions de financement plus favorables sur les marchés des capitaux.

| 78. | En application de l'article 2.1.3 de la communication de la Commission susmentionnée, les conditions de crédit plus favorables obtenues par les entreprises dont le statut légal exclut la possibilité d'une procédure de faillite ou d'insolvabilité ou prévoit explicitement une garantie de l'État ou une couverture des pertes par l'État, sont regardées comme une aide sous forme de garantie. |
| --- | --- |

78.

En application de l'article 2.1.3 de la communication de la Commission susmentionnée, les conditions de crédit plus favorables obtenues par les entreprises dont le statut légal exclut la possibilité d'une procédure de faillite ou d'insolvabilité ou prévoit explicitement une garantie de l'État ou une couverture des pertes par l'État, sont regardées comme une aide sous forme de garantie.

| 79. | Les conditions de crédit sont fixées notamment sur la base de la notation (44) financière: plus la notation d'une entreprise se dégrade à cause d'un risque d'insolvabilité accru, plus la rémunération exigée par l'investisseur sera élevée. A contrario, une entreprise bénéficiant d'un risque d'insolvabilité très faible, voire nul dans le cas d'une garantie illimitée et pérenne de l'État, pourra emprunter dans des conditions très favorables. |
| --- | --- |

79.

Les conditions de crédit sont fixées notamment sur la base de la notation (44) financière: plus la notation d'une entreprise se dégrade à cause d'un risque d'insolvabilité accru, plus la rémunération exigée par l'investisseur sera élevée. A contrario, une entreprise bénéficiant d'un risque d'insolvabilité très faible, voire nul dans le cas d'une garantie illimitée et pérenne de l'État, pourra emprunter dans des conditions très favorables.

| 80. | Dans une étude intitulée “L'influence du soutien du gouvernement sur les notations dans le secteur postal” (45) (22 novembre 2004), Standard and Poor's, une agence de notation externe de premier plan, indique que le statut légal de La Poste, qui assure une garantie souveraine ultime, confère aux obligations de La Poste une garantie statutaire ultime de la République française (46). Standard and Poor's ajoute qu'alors que certaines entreprises telles Deutsche Post ou TPG opèrent de façon commerciale et autonome du gouvernement, La Poste bénéficie d'un soutien extrêmement fort de l'État; ceci constitue un élément essentiel qui sous tend la qualité de signature de La Poste (47). Entre le 2 juin 1993 et le 18 novembre 2003, La Poste a bénéficié d'une notation AAA, qui correspond aux obligations sans risque de la République française. Le 31 mars 2006, l'agence de notation Fitch confirme la notation AAA attribuée à La Poste en rappelant que La Poste est un groupe public qui bénéficie de la garantie de l'État français. La notation de La Poste a été ultérieurement abaissée à AA- par Standard and Poor's. |
| --- | --- |

80.

Dans une étude intitulée “L'influence du soutien du gouvernement sur les notations dans le secteur postal” (45) (22 novembre 2004), Standard and Poor's, une agence de notation externe de premier plan, indique que le statut légal de La Poste, qui assure une garantie souveraine ultime, confère aux obligations de La Poste une garantie statutaire ultime de la République française (46). Standard and Poor's ajoute qu'alors que certaines entreprises telles Deutsche Post ou TPG opèrent de façon commerciale et autonome du gouvernement, La Poste bénéficie d'un soutien extrêmement fort de l'État; ceci constitue un élément essentiel qui sous tend la qualité de signature de La Poste (47). Entre le 2 juin 1993 et le 18 novembre 2003, La Poste a bénéficié d'une notation AAA, qui correspond aux obligations sans risque de la République française. Le 31 mars 2006, l'agence de notation Fitch confirme la notation AAA attribuée à La Poste en rappelant que La Poste est un groupe public qui bénéficie de la garantie de l'État français. La notation de La Poste a été ultérieurement abaissée à AA- par Standard and Poor's.

| 81. | La Commission estime que cette étude indique clairement que la garantie en dernier ressort de l'État français sur l'ensemble des engagements de La Poste constitue un élément décisif, mais pas unique, dans l'attribution de la notation externe de l'entreprise. |
| --- | --- |

81.

La Commission estime que cette étude indique clairement que la garantie en dernier ressort de l'État français sur l'ensemble des engagements de La Poste constitue un élément décisif, mais pas unique, dans l'attribution de la notation externe de l'entreprise.

| 82. | Dans un rapport au Sénat français, la Commission des finances a même déclaré au sujet de Réseau Ferré National: “Ce mécanisme [de financement], combiné à la garantie implicite illimitée et inconditionnelle de l'État, grâce à son statut d'EPIC, est susceptible de donner au ‘Réseau Ferré National’ une capacité d'emprunt importante, à des niveaux de taux d'intérêt très proches de ceux de la SNVOIR” |
| --- | --- |

82.

Dans un rapport au Sénat français, la Commission des finances a même déclaré au sujet de Réseau Ferré National: “Ce mécanisme [de financement], combiné à la garantie implicite illimitée et inconditionnelle de l'État, grâce à son statut d'EPIC, est susceptible de donner au ‘Réseau Ferré National’ une capacité d'emprunt importante, à des niveaux de taux d'intérêt très proches de ceux de la SNVOIR”

| 83. | Ainsi qu'il a été mentionné plus haut, les autorités françaises contestent l'impact économique des dispositions de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 en arguant que si les dispositions de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 étaient interprétées par les agences comme instituant au profit des créanciers des personnes morales visées un mécanisme assimilable à une garantie de l'État, on verrait mal comment des collectivités territoriales pourraient être notées BBB+ ou AA-. |
| --- | --- |

83.

Ainsi qu'il a été mentionné plus haut, les autorités françaises contestent l'impact économique des dispositions de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 en arguant que si les dispositions de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 étaient interprétées par les agences comme instituant au profit des créanciers des personnes morales visées un mécanisme assimilable à une garantie de l'État, on verrait mal comment des collectivités territoriales pourraient être notées BBB+ ou AA-.

| 84. | A cet égard, la Commission renvoie à l'analyse de Standard and Poor's en date de 2007 sur La Poste. Selon cette analyse, la notation d'une entreprise qui bénéficie d'un fort soutien de l'État dérive de la notation attribuée à l'État; toutefois, elle peut être abaissée de deux catégories dans la mesure où les liens financiers entre ladite entreprise et l'État peuvent évoluer à moyen ou long terme (48). La notation inférieure de La Poste par rapport à l'État peut donc s'expliquer par le fait que Standard and Poor's anticipe une baisse du soutien de l'État dans les années à venir, ce qui montre bien que le soutien de l'État, dont la garantie est un élément décisif, permet à La Poste d'obtenir une meilleure note que ce qu'elle aurait autrement obtenu. |
| --- | --- |

84.

A cet égard, la Commission renvoie à l'analyse de Standard and Poor's en date de 2007 sur La Poste. Selon cette analyse, la notation d'une entreprise qui bénéficie d'un fort soutien de l'État dérive de la notation attribuée à l'État; toutefois, elle peut être abaissée de deux catégories dans la mesure où les liens financiers entre ladite entreprise et l'État peuvent évoluer à moyen ou long terme (48). La notation inférieure de La Poste par rapport à l'État peut donc s'expliquer par le fait que Standard and Poor's anticipe une baisse du soutien de l'État dans les années à venir, ce qui montre bien que le soutien de l'État, dont la garantie est un élément décisif, permet à La Poste d'obtenir une meilleure note que ce qu'elle aurait autrement obtenu.

| 85. | Standard and Poor's ajoute: “En 1991, La Poste est devenue une entité autonome de droit public avec un statut d'établissement public, ce qui assure à La Poste une garantie ultime de l'État sur ses obligations, mais pas une garantie immédiate et explicite ainsi que le reflète la différence de notation entre La Poste et la République française” (49). Ainsi, bien que Standard and Poor's dégrade la notation de La Poste par rapport à celle de l'État, Standard and Poor's considère bel et bien que La Poste bénéficie d'une garantie implicite de l'État du fait de son statut d'établissement public et ceci a une influence directe sur la méthode employée pour fixer la notation. |
| --- | --- |

85.

Standard and Poor's ajoute: “En 1991, La Poste est devenue une entité autonome de droit public avec un statut d'établissement public, ce qui assure à La Poste une garantie ultime de l'État sur ses obligations, mais pas une garantie immédiate et explicite ainsi que le reflète la différence de notation entre La Poste et la République française” (49). Ainsi, bien que Standard and Poor's dégrade la notation de La Poste par rapport à celle de l'État, Standard and Poor's considère bel et bien que La Poste bénéficie d'une garantie implicite de l'État du fait de son statut d'établissement public et ceci a une influence directe sur la méthode employée pour fixer la notation.

| 86. | Selon les autorités françaises également, les analyses des agences de notation reposeraient non pas sur une analyse juridique mais sur une appréciation subjective de ce que serait le soutien de l'État en cas de difficulté de La Poste. Pour étayer cette affirmation, la France indique qu'après l'annonce par la Commission de sa lettre de recommandation, Standard and Poor's a maintenu sa notation de La Poste inchangée à AA-/stable et a précisé qu'un éventuel changement de statut de La Poste ne la conduirait pas nécessairement à modifier son appréciation. |
| --- | --- |

86.

Selon les autorités françaises également, les analyses des agences de notation reposeraient non pas sur une analyse juridique mais sur une appréciation subjective de ce que serait le soutien de l'État en cas de difficulté de La Poste. Pour étayer cette affirmation, la France indique qu'après l'annonce par la Commission de sa lettre de recommandation, Standard and Poor's a maintenu sa notation de La Poste inchangée à AA-/stable et a précisé qu'un éventuel changement de statut de La Poste ne la conduirait pas nécessairement à modifier son appréciation.

| 87. | Standard and Poor's a effectivement précisé qu'un changement dans la structure de propriété de La Poste conduirait à un changement dans la méthodologie appliquée pour déterminer la notation, mais que ce changement ne conduirait pas nécessairement à changer la note de La Poste, étant donnée l'amélioration attendue de la situation intrinsèque de La Poste dans les années à venir (50). En revanche, dans l'hypothèse où la situation intrinsèque de La Poste demeurait constante, alors l'affaiblissement du soutien donné par l'État à La Poste pourrait bien conduire à abaisser la note de cette dernière (51). |
| --- | --- |

87.

Standard and Poor's a effectivement précisé qu'un changement dans la structure de propriété de La Poste conduirait à un changement dans la méthodologie appliquée pour déterminer la notation, mais que ce changement ne conduirait pas nécessairement à changer la note de La Poste, étant donnée l'amélioration attendue de la situation intrinsèque de La Poste dans les années à venir (50). En revanche, dans l'hypothèse où la situation intrinsèque de La Poste demeurait constante, alors l'affaiblissement du soutien donné par l'État à La Poste pourrait bien conduire à abaisser la note de cette dernière (51).

| 88. | La Commission reconnaît que l'existence ou non d'une garantie n'est pas le seul élément pris en compte par les agences de notation lorsqu'elles évaluent le degré de soutien que les autorités publiques sont prêts à apporter à une entreprise qui connaitrait des difficultés. La Commission considère néanmoins que l'existence d'une garantie est prise en compte par les agences de notation et est appréciée comme une preuve du soutien qu'apporterait l'État, ainsi que le précise l'étude intitulée “L'influence du soutien du gouvernement sur les notations dans le secteur postal” (52) susmentionnée. |
| --- | --- |

88.

La Commission reconnaît que l'existence ou non d'une garantie n'est pas le seul élément pris en compte par les agences de notation lorsqu'elles évaluent le degré de soutien que les autorités publiques sont prêts à apporter à une entreprise qui connaitrait des difficultés. La Commission considère néanmoins que l'existence d'une garantie est prise en compte par les agences de notation et est appréciée comme une preuve du soutien qu'apporterait l'État, ainsi que le précise l'étude intitulée “L'influence du soutien du gouvernement sur les notations dans le secteur postal” (52) susmentionnée.

| 89. | Sur la base des informations actuellement disponibles, cette garantie est illimitée en ce qui concerne la durée, le montant et l'ampleur et n'est pas rémunérée. De surcroît, elle couvre à la fois les activités de service postal universel et les activités concurrentielles. La Commission considère à ce stade que, compte tenu du caractère illimité de la garantie de l'État en faveur de La Poste et conformément à la pratique décisionnelle de la Commission (53), il n'est même pas possible de calculer le montant de la prime de marché que La Poste devrait payer à l'État pour l'octroi de sa garantie illimitée. |
| --- | --- |

89.

Sur la base des informations actuellement disponibles, cette garantie est illimitée en ce qui concerne la durée, le montant et l'ampleur et n'est pas rémunérée. De surcroît, elle couvre à la fois les activités de service postal universel et les activités concurrentielles. La Commission considère à ce stade que, compte tenu du caractère illimité de la garantie de l'État en faveur de La Poste et conformément à la pratique décisionnelle de la Commission (53), il n'est même pas possible de calculer le montant de la prime de marché que La Poste devrait payer à l'État pour l'octroi de sa garantie illimitée.

| 90. | Cette garantie constitue un avantage sélectif puisque les concurrents de La Poste n'en bénéficient pas. |
| --- | --- |

90.

Cette garantie constitue un avantage sélectif puisque les concurrents de La Poste n'en bénéficient pas.

6.1.3.   Distorsion de la concurrence et affectation des échanges

| 91. | La mesure examinée est susceptible de conduire à une réduction des coûts de fonctionnement de La Poste, ce qui aurait pour effet de favoriser une entreprise déterminée et donc de fausser la concurrence au sens de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE. En outre, dans la mesure où les secteurs dans lesquels La Poste est active sont largement ouverts aux échanges intracommunautaires, de telles mesures pourraient avoir un impact défavorable sur les entreprises qui ont, ou qui souhaitent développer, une activité économique similaire en France. Dans ces conditions, elles sont susceptibles d'affecter les échanges au sens de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE. |
| --- | --- |

91.

La mesure examinée est susceptible de conduire à une réduction des coûts de fonctionnement de La Poste, ce qui aurait pour effet de favoriser une entreprise déterminée et donc de fausser la concurrence au sens de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE. En outre, dans la mesure où les secteurs dans lesquels La Poste est active sont largement ouverts aux échanges intracommunautaires, de telles mesures pourraient avoir un impact défavorable sur les entreprises qui ont, ou qui souhaitent développer, une activité économique similaire en France. Dans ces conditions, elles sont susceptibles d'affecter les échanges au sens de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE.

| 92. | La Commission estime donc que la mesure en cause peut être considérée comme une aide d'État au sens de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE. |
| --- | --- |

92.

La Commission estime donc que la mesure en cause peut être considérée comme une aide d'État au sens de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE.

6.2.   Aide existante

| 93. | La Poste était une administration publique au 19e siècle et soumise en tant que telle au principe d'universalité du budget jusqu'à 1923. En reconnaissance de la spécificité économique de ses activités, La Poste s'est vu allouer un budget supplémentaire en 1923. Entre 1923 et 1990, cette structure administrative n'a pas subi de réforme importante. La loi no 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990 a transformé l'ancienne direction générale des télécommunications en deux personnes morales de droit public (54) (La Poste et France Telecom). |
| --- | --- |

93.

La Poste était une administration publique au 19e siècle et soumise en tant que telle au principe d'universalité du budget jusqu'à 1923. En reconnaissance de la spécificité économique de ses activités, La Poste s'est vu allouer un budget supplémentaire en 1923. Entre 1923 et 1990, cette structure administrative n'a pas subi de réforme importante. La loi no 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990 a transformé l'ancienne direction générale des télécommunications en deux personnes morales de droit public (54) (La Poste et France Telecom).

| 94. | L'article 1er, point b), du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil du 22 mars 1999 portant modalités d'application de l'article 93 du traité CE définit la notion d'“aide existante” notamment comme suit: “Toute aide existante avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité d'un État membre concerné, c'est-à-dire les régimes d'aides et aides individuelles mis à exécution avant, et toujours applicable après, ladite entrée en vigueur”. |
| --- | --- |

94.

L'article 1er, point b), du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil du 22 mars 1999 portant modalités d'application de l'article 93 du traité CE définit la notion d'“aide existante” notamment comme suit: “Toute aide existante avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité d'un État membre concerné, c'est-à-dire les régimes d'aides et aides individuelles mis à exécution avant, et toujours applicable après, ladite entrée en vigueur”.

| 95. | Il est clair qu'avant le 1er janvier 1958 (date d'adhésion de la France), La Poste bénéficiait déjà de la garantie de l'État sur ses activités puisque La Poste était une administration publique. Conformément à l'article 1er, paragraphe c), du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 “toute modification d'une aide existante” doit être considérée comme une aide nouvelle. |
| --- | --- |

95.

Il est clair qu'avant le 1er janvier 1958 (date d'adhésion de la France), La Poste bénéficiait déjà de la garantie de l'État sur ses activités puisque La Poste était une administration publique. Conformément à l'article 1er, paragraphe c), du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 “toute modification d'une aide existante” doit être considérée comme une aide nouvelle.

| 96. | Aux termes de l'article 4, du règlement (CE) no 794/2004 de la Commission du 21 avril 2004 concernant la mise en œuvre du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil portant modalités d'application de l'article 88 du traité CE, “on entend par modification d'une aide existante tout changement autre que les modifications de caractère purement formel ou administratif qui ne sont pas de nature à influencer l'évaluation de la compatibilité de la mesure d'aide avec le marché commun”. Dans ce cas, l'État membre doit notifier la modification. |
| --- | --- |

96.

Aux termes de l'article 4, du règlement (CE) no 794/2004 de la Commission du 21 avril 2004 concernant la mise en œuvre du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil portant modalités d'application de l'article 88 du traité CE, “on entend par modification d'une aide existante tout changement autre que les modifications de caractère purement formel ou administratif qui ne sont pas de nature à influencer l'évaluation de la compatibilité de la mesure d'aide avec le marché commun”. Dans ce cas, l'État membre doit notifier la modification.

| 97. | Dans le cas de La Poste, la modification consistant en sa transformation en une personne morale de droit public n'affecte pas la substance même de la garantie illimitée de l'État. La Commission considère par conséquent la garantie publique accordée à La Poste comme une aide existante. |
| --- | --- |

97.

Dans le cas de La Poste, la modification consistant en sa transformation en une personne morale de droit public n'affecte pas la substance même de la garantie illimitée de l'État. La Commission considère par conséquent la garantie publique accordée à La Poste comme une aide existante.

6.3.   Compatibilité

| 98. | Étant donné que la mesure examinée tombe dans le champ d'application de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE, il est nécessaire d'examiner si cette mesure peut être déclarée compatible par la Commission au titre des dérogations prévues par les articles 87, paragraphes 2 et 3 et 86, paragraphe 2 du traité CE. |
| --- | --- |

98.

Étant donné que la mesure examinée tombe dans le champ d'application de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE, il est nécessaire d'examiner si cette mesure peut être déclarée compatible par la Commission au titre des dérogations prévues par les articles 87, paragraphes 2 et 3 et 86, paragraphe 2 du traité CE.

| 99. | Il apparaît que la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ne remplit aucune des conditions d'application des exemptions prévues à l'article 87, paragraphe 2, du traité CE, étant donné que la mesure examinée n'est destinée à aucun des objectifs prévus par ces dérogations. |
| --- | --- |

99.

Il apparaît que la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ne remplit aucune des conditions d'application des exemptions prévues à l'article 87, paragraphe 2, du traité CE, étant donné que la mesure examinée n'est destinée à aucun des objectifs prévus par ces dérogations.

| 100. | Au titre de l'article 87, paragraphe 3 (a), du traité CE, une mesure d'aide peut être déclarée compatible avec le marché commun lorsqu'elle est destinée à promouvoir le développement économique de régions communautaires où le niveau de vie est anormalement bas ou dans lesquelles sévit un grave sous-emploi. Etant donné que la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste est une mesure individuelle octroyée de manière discrétionnaire, qui ne poursuit aucun objectif régional, qu'elle est illimitée dans le temps, qu'elle n'est liée à aucun investissement et qu'elle n'est pas dégressive, la dérogation prévue à l'article 87, paragraphe 3 (a), du traité CE ne s'applique pas. |
| --- | --- |

100.

Au titre de l'article 87, paragraphe 3 (a), du traité CE, une mesure d'aide peut être déclarée compatible avec le marché commun lorsqu'elle est destinée à promouvoir le développement économique de régions communautaires où le niveau de vie est anormalement bas ou dans lesquelles sévit un grave sous-emploi. Etant donné que la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste est une mesure individuelle octroyée de manière discrétionnaire, qui ne poursuit aucun objectif régional, qu'elle est illimitée dans le temps, qu'elle n'est liée à aucun investissement et qu'elle n'est pas dégressive, la dérogation prévue à l'article 87, paragraphe 3 (a), du traité CE ne s'applique pas.

| 101. | S'agissant des dérogations prévues à l'article 87, paragraphes 3 (b) et (d), du traité CE, l'aide en question n'est pas destinée à promouvoir la réalisation d'un projet important d'intérêt européen ou à remédier à une perturbation grave de l'économie française. La garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste n'est pas non plus destinée à promouvoir la culture et la préservation du patrimoine. |
| --- | --- |

101.

S'agissant des dérogations prévues à l'article 87, paragraphes 3 (b) et (d), du traité CE, l'aide en question n'est pas destinée à promouvoir la réalisation d'un projet important d'intérêt européen ou à remédier à une perturbation grave de l'économie française. La garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste n'est pas non plus destinée à promouvoir la culture et la préservation du patrimoine.

| 102. | La dérogation prévue à l'article 87, paragraphe 3 (c), du traité CE dispose qu'une aide peut être considérée comme compatible si elle est destinée à faciliter le développement de certaines activités ou de certaines régions économiques, quand elle n'altère pas les conditions des échanges dans une mesure contraire à l'intérêt commun. La garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ne concerne ni un investissement, ni de la création d'emploi et constitue, par conséquent, une aide opérationnelle et inconditionnelle. Conformément à sa pratique décisionnelle, la Commission ne peut considérer une telle aide comme destinée à faciliter le développement de certaines activités ou de certaines régions économiques. |
| --- | --- |

102.

La dérogation prévue à l'article 87, paragraphe 3 (c), du traité CE dispose qu'une aide peut être considérée comme compatible si elle est destinée à faciliter le développement de certaines activités ou de certaines régions économiques, quand elle n'altère pas les conditions des échanges dans une mesure contraire à l'intérêt commun. La garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ne concerne ni un investissement, ni de la création d'emploi et constitue, par conséquent, une aide opérationnelle et inconditionnelle. Conformément à sa pratique décisionnelle, la Commission ne peut considérer une telle aide comme destinée à faciliter le développement de certaines activités ou de certaines régions économiques.

| 103. | Enfin, la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ne peut être considérée comme compatible sur la base de l'article 86, paragraphe 2, du traité CE. Cette dérogation prévoit que les entreprises chargées de la gestion de services d'intérêt économique général ou présentant le caractère d'un monopole fiscal sont soumises aux règles du présent traité, notamment aux règles de concurrence, dans les limites où l'application de ces règles ne fait pas échec à l'accomplissement en droit ou en fait de la mission particulière qui leur a été impartie. Le développement des échanges ne doit pas être affecté dans une mesure contraire à l'intérêt de la Communauté. |
| --- | --- |

103.

Enfin, la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ne peut être considérée comme compatible sur la base de l'article 86, paragraphe 2, du traité CE. Cette dérogation prévoit que les entreprises chargées de la gestion de services d'intérêt économique général ou présentant le caractère d'un monopole fiscal sont soumises aux règles du présent traité, notamment aux règles de concurrence, dans les limites où l'application de ces règles ne fait pas échec à l'accomplissement en droit ou en fait de la mission particulière qui leur a été impartie. Le développement des échanges ne doit pas être affecté dans une mesure contraire à l'intérêt de la Communauté.

| 104. | La législation française a confié à La Poste des obligations de service public. A ce titre, l'opérateur postal pourrait percevoir une compensation financière ou jouir de certaines prérogatives dérogeant à certaines règles de droit généralement applicables. Toutefois, de telles mesures financiers ou prérogatives doivent être limitées à ce qui est nécessaire pour compenser les coûts additionnels pour La Poste au titre des obligations de service public. |
| --- | --- |

104.

La législation française a confié à La Poste des obligations de service public. A ce titre, l'opérateur postal pourrait percevoir une compensation financière ou jouir de certaines prérogatives dérogeant à certaines règles de droit généralement applicables. Toutefois, de telles mesures financiers ou prérogatives doivent être limitées à ce qui est nécessaire pour compenser les coûts additionnels pour La Poste au titre des obligations de service public.

| 105. | L'encadrement communautaire des aides d'État sous la forme de compensation de service public définit les conditions dans lesquelles la Commission considère une telle compensation compatible au titre de l'article 86, paragraphe 2, du traité CE. En particulier, la compensation versée ne peut excéder les coûts de fourniture du service public, en tenant compte des recettes y relatives ainsi que d'un bénéfice raisonnable pour l'exécution de ces obligations. |
| --- | --- |

105.

L'encadrement communautaire des aides d'État sous la forme de compensation de service public définit les conditions dans lesquelles la Commission considère une telle compensation compatible au titre de l'article 86, paragraphe 2, du traité CE. En particulier, la compensation versée ne peut excéder les coûts de fourniture du service public, en tenant compte des recettes y relatives ainsi que d'un bénéfice raisonnable pour l'exécution de ces obligations.

| 106. | En l'espèce, une telle analyse supposerait une valorisation de marché de la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste de manière à vérifier que sa valeur ne dépasse pas les coûts nets de fourniture du service postal universel. Or, compte tenu du point 88, cette analyse est impossible à effectuer, ce qui exclut l'application de la dérogation prévue à l'article 86, paragraphe 2, du traité CE. |
| --- | --- |

106.

En l'espèce, une telle analyse supposerait une valorisation de marché de la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste de manière à vérifier que sa valeur ne dépasse pas les coûts nets de fourniture du service postal universel. Or, compte tenu du point 88, cette analyse est impossible à effectuer, ce qui exclut l'application de la dérogation prévue à l'article 86, paragraphe 2, du traité CE.

| 107. | En outre, quand bien même une telle valorisation serait possible, elle ne pourrait bénéficier qu'aux activités couvertes par la mission de “service postal universel”. Or, la garantie illimitée de l'État dans sa forme actuelle couvre toutes les activités de La Poste, en ce compris les activités non couvertes par la mission de “service postal universel”. |
| --- | --- |

107.

En outre, quand bien même une telle valorisation serait possible, elle ne pourrait bénéficier qu'aux activités couvertes par la mission de “service postal universel”. Or, la garantie illimitée de l'État dans sa forme actuelle couvre toutes les activités de La Poste, en ce compris les activités non couvertes par la mission de “service postal universel”.

| 108. | La Commission est d'avis que le développement des échanges est de ce fait affecté dans une mesure contraire à l'intérêt de la Communauté. |
| --- | --- |

108.

La Commission est d'avis que le développement des échanges est de ce fait affecté dans une mesure contraire à l'intérêt de la Communauté.

| 109. | En conclusion, conformément à la pratique décisionnelle de la Commission concernant les garanties illimitées d'État octroyées à des entreprise en charge d'activités économiques (55), la Commission considère que la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ne remplit aucune des conditions d'application des dérogations prévues par le traité CE. Par conséquent, la garantie illimitée de l'État susmentionnée est incompatible avec le marché commun. |
| --- | --- |

109.

En conclusion, conformément à la pratique décisionnelle de la Commission concernant les garanties illimitées d'État octroyées à des entreprise en charge d'activités économiques (55), la Commission considère que la garantie illimitée de l'État en faveur de La Poste ne remplit aucune des conditions d'application des dérogations prévues par le traité CE. Par conséquent, la garantie illimitée de l'État susmentionnée est incompatible avec le marché commun.

7.   CONCLUSION

| 110. | Dans sa lettre en date du 4 octobre 2006, conformément à l'article 18 du règlement de procédure, la Commission a invité la France à supprimer la garantie dont bénéficie La Poste en vertu de son statut sur tous ses engagements au plus tard le 31 décembre 2008. |
| --- | --- |

110.

Dans sa lettre en date du 4 octobre 2006, conformément à l'article 18 du règlement de procédure, la Commission a invité la France à supprimer la garantie dont bénéficie La Poste en vertu de son statut sur tous ses engagements au plus tard le 31 décembre 2008.

| 111. | Par lettre du 16 janvier 2007, les autorités françaises ont soumis à la Commission un projet de modification du décret d'application de la loi de 1980, le décret no 81-501 du 12 mai 1981 (56). Par lettre du 19 mars 2007, les autorités françaises ont fait une proposition additionnelle, consistant à s'engager, conjointement avec La Poste, à mentionner l'absence de garantie dans tout contrat de financement ou tout prospectus d'émission de La Poste. |
| --- | --- |

111.

Par lettre du 16 janvier 2007, les autorités françaises ont soumis à la Commission un projet de modification du décret d'application de la loi de 1980, le décret no 81-501 du 12 mai 1981 (56). Par lettre du 19 mars 2007, les autorités françaises ont fait une proposition additionnelle, consistant à s'engager, conjointement avec La Poste, à mentionner l'absence de garantie dans tout contrat de financement ou tout prospectus d'émission de La Poste.

| 112. | La Commission considère que la mesure en cause, même amendée suivant les propositions françaises, constitue une aide d'État existante au sens de l'article 1er, point b), du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 et que celle-ci est incompatible avec le marché commun. |
| --- | --- |

112.

La Commission considère que la mesure en cause, même amendée suivant les propositions françaises, constitue une aide d'État existante au sens de l'article 1er, point b), du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 et que celle-ci est incompatible avec le marché commun.

| 113. | Par conséquent, la Commission décide d'ouvrir la procédure formelle d'examen sur la garantie illimitée de l'État dont bénéficie La Poste. |
| --- | --- |

113.

Par conséquent, la Commission décide d'ouvrir la procédure formelle d'examen sur la garantie illimitée de l'État dont bénéficie La Poste.

| 114. | En ce qui concerne la garantie illimitée dont jouit La Poste de par son statut de personne morale de droit public assimilé à un EPIC, il est important de souligner que la Commission ne remet en aucune façon en cause le statut public du capital de La Poste, ni ne conteste le statut de personne morale de droit public en tant que tel. La Commission estime problématique l'effet économique lié à la mise en œuvre d'une des particularités du statut de personne morale de droit public poursuivant des activités économiques et commerciales, à savoir la dérogation prévue aux procédures de redressement et de liquidation judiciaires et le rôle de l'État en qualité de garant en dernier ressort des dettes de la société, qui est applicable à La Poste qui exploite des activités économiques sur des marchés concurrentiels. Elle estime aussi problématique que la France ne prenne pas toute mesure utile pour éviter que ce statut produise des effets économiques en faveur d'une entreprise qui opère sur des marchés concurrentiels. |
| --- | --- |

114.

En ce qui concerne la garantie illimitée dont jouit La Poste de par son statut de personne morale de droit public assimilé à un EPIC, il est important de souligner que la Commission ne remet en aucune façon en cause le statut public du capital de La Poste, ni ne conteste le statut de personne morale de droit public en tant que tel. La Commission estime problématique l'effet économique lié à la mise en œuvre d'une des particularités du statut de personne morale de droit public poursuivant des activités économiques et commerciales, à savoir la dérogation prévue aux procédures de redressement et de liquidation judiciaires et le rôle de l'État en qualité de garant en dernier ressort des dettes de la société, qui est applicable à La Poste qui exploite des activités économiques sur des marchés concurrentiels. Elle estime aussi problématique que la France ne prenne pas toute mesure utile pour éviter que ce statut produise des effets économiques en faveur d'une entreprise qui opère sur des marchés concurrentiels.

| 115. | Aux termes de l'article 295 CE, la Communauté est neutre en ce qui concerne le régime de la propriété dans les États membres et aucune disposition du traité ne fait obstacle à ce que l'État détienne (entièrement ou partiellement) des entreprises. Cela étant, les règles de concurrence doivent s'appliquer de la même manière aux entreprises privées comme aux entreprises publiques. Aucun de ces deux types d'entreprises ne saurait être avantagé ou désavantagé par l'application de ses règles. Dans le cas présent, la garantie ne résulte pas de la propriété mais du statut juridique de l'entreprise. Comme cela est expliqué au point 2.1.3 de la Communication de la Commission sur les aides octroyées sous forme de garanties (57), si la forme juridique d'une entreprise est associée à des avantages entraînant une distorsion de concurrence prohibée par le traité, et particulièrement par les règles en matière d'aides d'État, cette forme juridique doit être soumise à la discipline des aides d'État. Les États membres sont libres de choisir la forme juridique des entreprises mais doivent, dans leur choix, respecter les règles de concurrence du traité. En particulier, le simple fait que la garantie de l'État soit automatiquement liée à un statut juridique particulier n'empêche pas ladite garantie de constituer une aide d'État aux termes de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE si les conditions applicables sont réunies. Cette conclusion n'est pas affectée par l'article 295 CE. Bien au contraire, dans un scénario concurrentiel, le principe de neutralité impliquerait la suppression de tout avantage injustifié au bénéfice des entreprises publiques au détriment de leurs concurrents privés. Une approche identique a été suivie par la Commission, à titre d'illustration, dans le cas concernant les institutions publiques de crédit en Allemagne (58), ainsi que dans le cas relatif à EDF (59). |
| --- | --- |

115.

Aux termes de l'article 295 CE, la Communauté est neutre en ce qui concerne le régime de la propriété dans les États membres et aucune disposition du traité ne fait obstacle à ce que l'État détienne (entièrement ou partiellement) des entreprises. Cela étant, les règles de concurrence doivent s'appliquer de la même manière aux entreprises privées comme aux entreprises publiques. Aucun de ces deux types d'entreprises ne saurait être avantagé ou désavantagé par l'application de ses règles. Dans le cas présent, la garantie ne résulte pas de la propriété mais du statut juridique de l'entreprise. Comme cela est expliqué au point 2.1.3 de la Communication de la Commission sur les aides octroyées sous forme de garanties (57), si la forme juridique d'une entreprise est associée à des avantages entraînant une distorsion de concurrence prohibée par le traité, et particulièrement par les règles en matière d'aides d'État, cette forme juridique doit être soumise à la discipline des aides d'État. Les États membres sont libres de choisir la forme juridique des entreprises mais doivent, dans leur choix, respecter les règles de concurrence du traité. En particulier, le simple fait que la garantie de l'État soit automatiquement liée à un statut juridique particulier n'empêche pas ladite garantie de constituer une aide d'État aux termes de l'article 87, paragraphe 1, du traité CE si les conditions applicables sont réunies. Cette conclusion n'est pas affectée par l'article 295 CE. Bien au contraire, dans un scénario concurrentiel, le principe de neutralité impliquerait la suppression de tout avantage injustifié au bénéfice des entreprises publiques au détriment de leurs concurrents privés. Une approche identique a été suivie par la Commission, à titre d'illustration, dans le cas concernant les institutions publiques de crédit en Allemagne (58), ainsi que dans le cas relatif à EDF (59).

| 116. | À la lumière des considérations qui précédent, la Commission invite les autorités françaises, dans le cadre de la procédure de l'article 88, paragraphe 2, du traité, à lui présenter leurs observations et à fournir toute information utile pour l'évaluation des aides susmentionnées, dans un délai d'un mois à compter de la réception de la présente. La Commission voudrait notamment obtenir une copie de l'avis non public du Conseil d'État rendu le 31 août 1995 à l'occasion du projet de loi relatif à l'action de l'État dans les plans de redressement du Crédit Lyonnais et du Comptoir des entrepreneurs (60). La Commission invite les autorités françaises à transmettre immédiatement une copie de la présente lettre à La Poste. |
| --- | --- |

116.

À la lumière des considérations qui précédent, la Commission invite les autorités françaises, dans le cadre de la procédure de l'article 88, paragraphe 2, du traité, à lui présenter leurs observations et à fournir toute information utile pour l'évaluation des aides susmentionnées, dans un délai d'un mois à compter de la réception de la présente. La Commission voudrait notamment obtenir une copie de l'avis non public du Conseil d'État rendu le 31 août 1995 à l'occasion du projet de loi relatif à l'action de l'État dans les plans de redressement du Crédit Lyonnais et du Comptoir des entrepreneurs (60). La Commission invite les autorités françaises à transmettre immédiatement une copie de la présente lettre à La Poste.

| 117. | La Commission avise également la France qu'elle informera les intéressés par la publication de la présente lettre et d'un résumé de celle-ci au Journal officiel de l'Union européenne. Elle informera également les intéressés dans les pays de l'AELE signataires de l'accord EEE par la publication d'une communication dans le supplément EEE du Journal officiel, ainsi que l'autorité de surveillance de l'AELE en leur envoyant une copie de la présente. Tous les intéressés susmentionnés seront invités à présenter leurs observations dans un délai d'un mois à compter de la date de cette publication.“ |
| --- | --- |

117.

La Commission avise également la France qu'elle informera les intéressés par la publication de la présente lettre et d'un résumé de celle-ci au Journal officiel de l'Union européenne. Elle informera également les intéressés dans les pays de l'AELE signataires de l'accord EEE par la publication d'une communication dans le supplément EEE du Journal officiel, ainsi que l'autorité de surveillance de l'AELE en leur envoyant une copie de la présente. Tous les intéressés susmentionnés seront invités à présenter leurs observations dans un délai d'un mois à compter de la date de cette publication.“

---

(1)  ОВ L 83, 27.3.1999 г., стр. 1.

1

(2)  Указ от 12 май 1981 г., приет в изпълнение на Законът от 16 юли 1980 г. за глобите, налагани в административното право и за изпълнение на решенията от юридически лица на публичното право.

2

(3)  Изменената по този начин разпоредба на указа би гласила: „След като поканата за доброволно изпълнение не е изпълнена след изтичането на тези срокове, представител на държавата или на надзорния орган пристъпва към вписване на разхода в бюджет на юридическото лице или в този на разпадащата се организация. В конкретния случай се освобождават необходими средства в рамките на бюджета на юридическото лице или на този на организацията, като се намаляват или бюджетните кредити, предназначени за други разходи и все още неизползвани, или като се увеличават средствата“ (подчертаните изменения).

3

След като поканата за доброволно изпълнение не е изпълнена след изтичането на тези срокове, представител на държавата или на надзорния орган пристъпва към вписване на разхода в бюджет на юридическото лице или в този на разпадащата се организация. В конкретния случай се освобождават необходими средства в рамките на бюджета на юридическото лице или на този на организацията, като се намаляват или бюджетните кредити, предназначени за други разходи и все още неизползвани, или като се увеличават средствата

(4)  Известие на Комисията за прилагане на членове 87 и 88 от Договора за създаване на Европейската общност по отношение на държавните помощи под формата на гаранции (ОВ C 71, 11.3.2000 г., стр. 14).

4

(5)  ОВ C 71, 11.3.2000 г., стр. 14.

5

(6)  C(2005) 5412 final

6

(7)  JO L 83 du 27.3.1999, p. 1.

7

(8)  Décret no 81-501 du 12 mai 1981 pris pour l'application de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 relative aux astreintes prononcées en matière administrative et à l'exécution des jugements par les personnes morales de droit public.

8

o

(9)  En France, outre les pouvoirs publics eux-mêmes comme l'État et les collectivités locales, il existe deux catégories principales de personnes morales de droit public: les Établissements Publics et les Groupes d'Intérêt Public, institués par la loi du 15 juillet 1982. Au sein des “Établissements Publics”, il est possible d'opérer une distinction de principe entre les établissements publics à caractère administratif (EPA), qui assurent les missions traditionnelles de l'administration, et les Établissements publics à caractère industriel et commercial (EPIC), qui exercent des activités de nature économique.

9

(10)  La Cour de Cassation a retenu le principe établi par un arrêt de la Cour d'Appel de Douai du 22 octobre 1998 qui assimile La Poste à un établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial.

10

(11)  Dans un rapport au Sénat français de 2003, la Commission des affaires économiques souligne que: “Chacun sait que la maison mère La Poste relève, depuis la réforme de 1990, d'un statut assimilable à celui d'établissement public industriel et commercial”.

11

(12)  Voir notamment l'arrêt du 21 décembre 1987 (1ère chambre civile).

12

ère

(13)  CA Paris, 15 février 1991, DA 1991, no 184.

13

o

(14)  Voir chapitre 3 de l'instruction sus mentionnée.

14

(15)  Voir partie IV, B: quelles dispositions juridiques prévoir? P. 21.

15

(16)  Créé en 1965, l'ERAP est un EPIC dont l'objet social est de prendre, à la demande de l'État, des participations dans des entreprises des secteurs de l'énergie, de la pharmacie et des télécommunications.

16

(17)  Voir article “Fitch attribue la note préliminaire AAA au programme EMTN garanti de 10 milliards d'euros de ERAP”.

17

(18)  Voir article “Moody's attribue la notation Aaa au programme d'EMTN de l'ERAP portant sur 10 milliards d'euros”.

18

(19)  En application de l'article 15 de la loi no 90-568 du 2 juillet 1990 telle que modifiée par la loi no 2000-516 du 20 mai 2005, la comptabilité de La Poste obéit aux règles applicables aux entreprises du commerce.

19

o

o

(20)  Il n'a en revanche pas été fait mention du transfert des obligations d'un EPIC dissous à un autre établissement public ou à l'État, ni de l'accès direct aux comptes du Trésor, ces deux questions ayant été identifiées ultérieurement par la Commission.

20

(21)  JO C 71 du 11.3.2000, p. 14.

21

(22)  Voir note des autorités françaises pour la Commission européenne reçue le 6 décembre 2006.

22

(23)  Le préfet face à l'inexécution par une collectivité territoriale d'un jugement la condamnant pécuniairement; P. Bon, RFDA, mars avril 2006; Le pouvoir du préfet en cas d'inexécution de la chose jugée par les collectivités territoriales; C. Landais et F. Lenica, AJDA, 23 janvier 2006, p. 137.

23

(24)  Selon les autorités françaises, il est rappelé dans l'article de doctrine en question que l'expression “y pourvoit” mentionnée à l'article 1er de la loi de 1980 renvoie à un pouvoir de substitution, dans lequel “il est de principe que le substituant dispose des mêmes compétences que le substitué”, l'attribution d'une subvention exceptionnelle se trouvant par ailleurs “hors de l'exercice d'un pouvoir de substitution”.

24

er

(25)  Voir lettre des autorités françaises du 24 avril 2006: décision du Conseil d'État, 1er avril 1938, société de l'hôtel d'Albe, recueil p. 341.

25

er

(26)  Voir lettre des autorités françaises du 24 avril 2006.

26

(27)  Rapport annuel du Conseil d'État de 2006: dans la mesure où certaines des stipulations de ces protocoles [protocoles modifiant respectivement les conventions de Paris et Bruxelles relatives à la responsabilité civile dans le domaine de l'énergie nucléaire] doivent être regardées comme “équivalentes” à des garanties d'État, il y a lieu d'appliquer le cinquième alinea de l'article 34 de la loi organique no 2001-692 du 1er août 2001 relative aux lois de finances.

27

équivalentes

o

er

(28)  Décisions no 96-380 DC, 2004-501 DC, 2005-513 DC.

28

o

(29)  Voir note reçue le 6 décembre 2006 par la Commission.

29

(30)  Après l'annonce de la Commission, La Poste a émis un emprunt obligataire de 1,8 milliard d' EUR sur deux maturités, 7 et 15 ans: le spread sur mid swap fut de 12 points de base pour l'émission à 15 ans. La précédente émission obligataire, réalisée en 2004, portait sur une obligation à 15 ans de 580 milliards d'euros et a conduit à un spread de 8 points de base sur le mid swap.

30

(31)  Cf paragraphe 19 de la note pour la Commission européenne reçue le 17 janvier 2007.

31

(32)  Décret du 12 mai 1981 pris pour l'application de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 relative aux astreintes prononcées en matière administrative et à l'exécution des jugements par les personnes morales de droit public.

32

(33)  Ainsi, sur la base du principe d'égalité devant les charges publiques, principe à valeur constitutionnelle (en tant qu'inclus dans le principe d'égalité), le Conseil constitutionnel a censuré une disposition écartant la réparation d'une partie du préjudice indemnisable résultant de travaux (CC 13.12.1985, no 85-198 DC); il a de la même manière écarté des dispositions instituant au profit de catégories particulières de personnes des régimes d'irresponsabilité civile totale (CC 22.10.1982, no 82-144 DC).

33

o

o

(34)  AJDA 23 janvier 2006, p.137.

34

(35)  Les autorités françaises affirment: ‘Nous ne sommes en effet en aucun cas dans la ligne de la jurisprudence Couitéas, dans laquelle le Conseil d'État a accepté d'engager la responsabilité de l'État pour rupture de l'égalité devant les charges publiques lorsqu'un jugement passé en force de chose jugée demeure inexécuté pour des motifs d'intérêt général. Le ressort de la jurisprudence Couitéas réside dans le pouvoir que le Conseil d'État reconnaît à l'autorité publique de s'abstenir, pour des motifs éminents d'intérêt général, de prendre les mesures nécessaires à l'exécution d'un jugement (30 novembre 1923, Couitéas38; Ass 3 juin 1938, Société la cartonnerie et l'imprimerie Saint Charles38), voire d'une décision administrative (4 février 1976, Société Établissement Omer Decugis, p. 79). La responsabilité sans faute de l'État résulte alors de l'existence de ce pouvoir d'appréciation de l'autorité publique à prendre en compte des motifs d'intérêt général dont le Conseil d'État estime que la charge ne doit pas retomber sur certains particuliers mais sur la collectivité tout entière. C'est pourquoi, dans ces hypothèses, le particulier qui subit un préjudice anormal et spécial peut rechercher la responsabilité sans faute de l'État. Mais dans le cas qui intéresse la Commission, aucune autorité de l'État ne déciderait de ne pas procéder à l'exécution du jugement pour des motifs d'intérêt général; au contraire, le cas visé est celui dans lequel l'autorité publique se heurterait à l'impossibilité „pratique“ de prendre des mesures efficaces permettant d'exécuter la décision de justice et de rembourser les créanciers, et non pas à une impossibilité „décidée“ en raison d'impératifs d'intérêt général’.

35

(36)  Voir arrêt Sille, CE 16 novembre 1998.

36

(37)  Ceci semble confirmé par un avis non public du Conseil d' État rendu à l'occasion du projet de loi relatif à l'action de l'État dans les plans de redressement du Crédit Lyonnais et du Comptoir des entrepreneurs. Dans cet avis, le Conseil d'État a considéré à propos d'un établissement public “que la garantie de l'État (...) découlera, sans disposition législative explicite, de la nature même d'établissement public de l'organisme”. La Commission ne dispose toutefois pas de l'intégralité de l'avis.

37

(38)  Les dictionnaires LITTRE et de l'Académie française définissent le verbe “pourvoir” comme “suppléer à ce qui manque”.

38

(39)  Décret d'application no 81-501 du 12 mai 1981, article 3-1, quatrième alinéa.

39

o

(40)  Communication de la Commission sur l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité CE aux aides d'État sous forme de garanties (JO C 71 du 11.3.2000, p. 14).

40

(41)  Le point 2.1.3 dispose: “La Commission estime que constitue également une aide sous forme de garantie les conditions de crédit plus favorables obtenues par les entreprises dont le statut légal exclut la possibilité d'une procédure de faillite ou d'insolvabilité ou prévoit explicitement une garantie de l'État ou une couverture des pertes par l'État”.

41

(42)  Voir note reçue par la Commission le 1er février 2007.

42

er

(43)  Voir chapitre 3 de l'instruction sus mentionnée.

43

(44)  La notation financière est le passage obligé du financement des entreprises sur les marchés des capitaux; elle est en outre de plus en plus utilisée comme référence pour les emprunts bancaires. En effet, selon un rapport de l'Autorité des Marchés Financiers en France sur les agences de notation (2004), “les notations financières sont de plus en plus utilisées au-delà des émissions d'emprunt pour servir de référence aux contrats privés, notamment de financement bancaire”. La notation financière d'une entreprise, attribuée par des agences de notation indépendantes telles que Standard and Poor's ou Moody's, mesure la probabilité de défaut de l'entreprise qui emprunte, et sa capacité de rembourser entièrement et à temps ses engagements financiers de dette. Elle consiste donc en une appréciation, par une agence indépendante, du risque de défaillance de l'emprunteur, mesuré sur une échelle de notes. L'attribution d'une notation financière se fonde en partie sur des informations publiées sur l'emprunt, l'entreprise, le contexte économique et sectoriel. Les agences indépendantes ont également accès, lors de visites, d'entretiens avec les principaux dirigeants, à des éléments d'information plus confidentiels sur les performances, les finances, les projets et les perspectives de l'emprunteur. L'attribution d'une notation financière s'effectue donc sur la base d'un faisceau d'informations.

44

(45)  “Influence of government support on ratings in the postal sector”

45

Influence of government support on ratings in the postal sector

(46)  “La Poste's legal status, which ensures a last-recourse sovereign guarantee, confers the ultimate statutory guarantee of the Republic of France on its obligations”.

46

(47)  “unlike the credit quality of companies that operate in a commercial manner at arm's length from the government, like Deutsche Post or TPG, a major factor underpinning La Poste's robust credit quality is its extremely strong state support” (Contrairement à la qualité de signature des entreprises qui opèrent de façon commerciale et autonome du gouvernement, comme Deutsche Post ou TPG, un facteur majeur d'explication de la qualité de signature robuste de La Poste est le soutien extrêmement fort de l'État).

47

(48)  “The entities' credit standing is linked to that of the government, but ratings can be notched down from those on the State by up to two categories as the financial links between these companies and the state may be increasingly subject to change in the medium or long term”(...) (La qualité de signature des entités est liée à celle du gouvernement, mais les notations peuvent être abaissées de deux catégories dans la mesure où les liens financiers entre ladite entreprise et l'État peuvent évoluer à moyen ou long terme).

48

(49)  “In 1991, La Poste became an independent publicly owned entity with Etablissement Public status, which ensures La Poste an ultimate State guarantee on its obligations, but not a timely and explicit guarantee as reflected by the rating differentiation between La Poste and the Republic of France”.

49

(50)  Voir le rapport de Standard and Poor's sur La Poste, 2007: “A change in the group's ownership structure would lead Standard and Poor's to shift to a bottom-up rating approach, focusing more on La Poste's stand-alone business and financial profiles. This rating approach may not necessarily translate into rating changes given the expected improvement in La Poste's stand-alone situation in the coming years” (Un changement dans la structure de propriété du groupe conduirait Standard and Poor's à passer à une approche de notation ascendante se concentrant davantage sur les profils commercial et financier propres de La Poste. Cette approche de notation ne se traduirait pas nécessairement par un changement de la notation, étant donnée l'amélioration attendue de la situation intrinsèque de La Poste dans les années à venir).

50

(51)  “The ratings on La Poste could be downgraded, however, if state backing for the company were to weaken” (les notations de La Poste pourraient toutefois être abaissées si le soutien de l'État pour cette entreprise venait à faiblir).

51

(52)  Influence of government support on ratings in the postal sector.

52

(53)  En particulier, dans sa décision EDF [paragraphe 57 de la décision de la Commission du 16 décembre 2003 relative aux aides d'État accordées par la France à EDF et au secteur des industries électriques et gazières (JO L 49 du 22.2.2005, p. 9)], la Commission a considéré que “l'impossibilité pour EDF d'être soumise à une procédure de redressement et de liquidation judiciaires, et par conséquent de faire faillite, équivaut à une garantie générale portant sur l'ensemble des engagements de l'entreprise. Une telle garantie ne peut faire l'objet d'aucune rémunération selon les règles du marché. Cette garantie, qui est illimitée dans sa couverture, dans le temps et dans son montant, constitue une aide d'État”.

53

(54)  Décision no 2001 — 448 DC du 25 juillet 2001, point 110.

54

o

(55)  Voir par exemple JO L 49 du 22 février 2005, Décision de la Commission du 16 décembre 2003 relative aux aides d'État accordées par la France à EDF et au secteur des industries électriques et gazières (2005/145/CE).

55

(56)  Décret du 12 mai 1981 pris pour l'application de la loi du 16 juillet 1980 relative aux astreintes prononcées en matière administrative et à l'exécution des jugements par les personnes morales de droit public.

56

(57)  JO C 71 du 11.3.2000, p. 14.

57

(58)  Point 5 de la proposition de mesures utiles du 8.5.2001.

58

(59)  Cas E 3/2002 “Aides en mesure d'Electricité de France”.

59

(60)  Cet avis est également cité dans l'article no 47 d'études et documents du Conseil d'État de 1995.

60

o

---

| 3.6.2008 | BG | Официален вестник на Европейския съюз | C 135/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2008

BG

Официален вестник на Европейския съюз

C 135/21

---

ДЪРЖАВНА ПОМОЩ — ОБЕДИНЕНО КРАЛСТВО

Държавна помощ C 14/08 (ex NN 1/08) — Помощ за преструктуриране на Northern Rock

Покана за представяне на мнения съгласно член 88, параграф 2 от Договора за ЕО

(текст от значение за ЕИП)

(2008/C 135/06)

С писмо от 2 април 2008 г., възпроизведено на езика, чийто текст е автентичен, на страниците след това резюме, Комисията уведоми Обединеното кралство за решението си да открие процедурата, предвидена в член 88, параграф 2 от Договора за ЕО, относно посочената по-горе мярка.

Заинтересованите страни могат да представят мненията си относно мярката, по отношение на които Комисията открива процедурата, в срок от един месец от датата на публикуване на това резюме и на писмото, което следва, на следния адрес:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| B-1049 Brussels |
| Факс (32-2) 296 12 42 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

B-1049 Brussels

Факс (32-2) 296 12 42

Тези мнения ще бъдат предадени на Обединеното кралство. Запазването в тайна на самоличността на заинтересованата страна, която представя мнението, може да бъде поискано писмено, като се посочат причините за искането.

РЕЗЮМЕ

I.   ПРОЦЕДУРА

| 1. | С решение от 5 декември 2007 г. Комисията реши, че мерките отпуснати от държавата в полза на Northern Rock (по-надолу „NR“) на 17-20 септември и 9 октомври 2007 г. съдържат помощ, която до 17 март 2008 г. е съвместима с общия пазар като помощ за оздравяване в съответствие с Насоките на Общността за държавната помощ за оздравяване и преструктуриране на предприятия в затруднение (1) (по-надолу упоменати като „Насоките за О&П“). |
| --- | --- |

1.

С решение от 5 декември 2007 г. Комисията реши, че мерките отпуснати от държавата в полза на Northern Rock (по-надолу „NR“) на 17-20 септември и 9 октомври 2007 г. съдържат помощ, която до 17 март 2008 г. е съвместима с общия пазар като помощ за оздравяване в съответствие с Насоките на Общността за държавната помощ за оздравяване и преструктуриране на предприятия в затруднение (1) (по-надолу упоменати като „Насоките за О&П“).

| 2. | С писмо от 17 март 2008 г. властите на Обединеното кралство уведомяват за мерки за помощ за преструктуриране в полза на NR. |
| --- | --- |

2.

С писмо от 17 март 2008 г. властите на Обединеното кралство уведомяват за мерки за помощ за преструктуриране в полза на NR.

II.   ФАКТИ

| 3. | Бенефициерът на помощта е NR, която е петата по големина ипотечна банка в Обединеното кралство с общ счетоводен баланс, възлизащ на 101 млрд. GBP (към 31 декември 2006 г.). Отпускането на жилищни ипотеки е основната дейност на NR. През последните 8 години банката приблизително утрои своя дял на ипотечния пазар в Обединеното кралство. NR финансира растежа на своите заеми главно чрез междубанково финансиране и по-специално чрез секюритизация на активите си. Това се оказа проблем, когато нестабилността на световните финансови пазари доведе до практическо затваряне на пазарите на ипотечна секюритизация, а набирането на средства на междубанковия паричен пазар се затрудни поради нежеланието на банките да отпускат заеми помежду си. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Бенефициерът на помощта е NR, която е петата по големина ипотечна банка в Обединеното кралство с общ счетоводен баланс, възлизащ на 101 млрд. GBP (към 31 декември 2006 г.). Отпускането на жилищни ипотеки е основната дейност на NR. През последните 8 години банката приблизително утрои своя дял на ипотечния пазар в Обединеното кралство. NR финансира растежа на своите заеми главно чрез междубанково финансиране и по-специално чрез секюритизация на активите си. Това се оказа проблем, когато нестабилността на световните финансови пазари доведе до практическо затваряне на пазарите на ипотечна секюритизация, а набирането на средства на междубанковия паричен пазар се затрудни поради нежеланието на банките да отпускат заеми помежду си.

| 4. | На 18 декември 2007 г. властите на Обединеното кралство разшириха обхвата на гаранционните договорености, постигнати на 17 септември 2007 г. и 9 октомври 2007 г., с определени неподчинени междубанкови задължения на NR, както настоящи, така и възникващи в бъдеще. |
| --- | --- |

4.

На 18 декември 2007 г. властите на Обединеното кралство разшириха обхвата на гаранционните договорености, постигнати на 17 септември 2007 г. и 9 октомври 2007 г., с определени неподчинени междубанкови задължения на NR, както настоящи, така и възникващи в бъдеще.

| 5. | През февруари 2008 г. властите на Обединеното кралство национализираха NR. |
| --- | --- |

5.

През февруари 2008 г. властите на Обединеното кралство национализираха NR.

| 6. | На 17 март 2008 г. властите на Обединеното кралство уведомиха Комисията за план за преструктуриране, чиито основни елементи са:






  — | намаляване на счетоводния баланс от приблизително 107 млрд. GBP през 2007 г. до приблизително половината от тази сума в края на 2011 г., |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.

На 17 март 2008 г. властите на Обединеното кралство уведомиха Комисията за план за преструктуриране, чиито основни елементи са:

—

намаляване на счетоводния баланс от приблизително 107 млрд. GBP през 2007 г. до приблизително половината от тази сума в края на 2011 г.,

| — | стабилизиране на счетоводния баланс чрез увеличаване дяла на депозитите на дребно като част от общото финансиране, но запазвайки баланса на предкризисно ниво, |
| --- | --- |

—

стабилизиране на счетоводния баланс чрез увеличаване дяла на депозитите на дребно като част от общото финансиране, но запазвайки баланса на предкризисно ниво,

| — | постепенно приключване и закриване на дейността в Дания през 2008 г. и запазване на малки ограничени операции в Ирландия и Guernsey, |
| --- | --- |

—

постепенно приключване и закриване на дейността в Дания през 2008 г. и запазване на малки ограничени операции в Ирландия и Guernsey,

| — | възстановяване на пазарното доверие в марката Northern Rock, |
| --- | --- |

—

възстановяване на пазарното доверие в марката Northern Rock,

| — | нов управленчески екип, |
| --- | --- |

—

нов управленчески екип,

| — | подготвяне на компанията за връщане в частния сектор. |
| --- | --- |

—

подготвяне на компанията за връщане в частния сектор.

| 7. | Планът би бил подкрепен от помощ за преструктуриране, състояща се главно от продължаването на мерките за помощи за оздравяване, включително гаранционните договорености, постигнати на 18 декември 2007 г. Намерението бе ликвидните средства да бъдат изцяло върнати до 2010 г. и гаранционните договорености постепенно да отпаднат до края на 2011 г. в случай на нормално развитие (и да бъдат запазени до 2013 г. в случай на неблагоприятно развитие). Правителството е готово да се ангажира със следните конкретни компенсаторни мерки с цел да ограничи нарушаването на конкуренцията и търговията, причинено от помощта:






  — | планирано намаляване на счетоводния баланс до около 48-53 милиарда GBP до 2011 г., |
| --- | --- | --- |

7.

Планът би бил подкрепен от помощ за преструктуриране, състояща се главно от продължаването на мерките за помощи за оздравяване, включително гаранционните договорености, постигнати на 18 декември 2007 г. Намерението бе ликвидните средства да бъдат изцяло върнати до 2010 г. и гаранционните договорености постепенно да отпаднат до края на 2011 г. в случай на нормално развитие (и да бъдат запазени до 2013 г. в случай на неблагоприятно развитие). Правителството е готово да се ангажира със следните конкретни компенсаторни мерки с цел да ограничи нарушаването на конкуренцията и търговията, причинено от помощта:

—

планирано намаляване на счетоводния баланс до около 48-53 милиарда GBP до 2011 г.,

| — | чувствително намаляване на нови жилищни ипотеки, |
| --- | --- |

—

чувствително намаляване на нови жилищни ипотеки,

| — | възприемане на агресивна политика за погасяване на дълговете, включваща активно насърчаване на клиенти, връщащи заеми, да се прехвърлят към конкуренцията, |
| --- | --- |

—

възприемане на агресивна политика за погасяване на дълговете, включваща активно насърчаване на клиенти, връщащи заеми, да се прехвърлят към конкуренцията,

| — | постепенно приключване и закриване на операциите на NR в Дания през 2008 г. и поемане на задължение за отказ от разширяване към други пазари от ЕС преди 2011 г., |
| --- | --- |

—

постепенно приключване и закриване на операциите на NR в Дания през 2008 г. и поемане на задължение за отказ от разширяване към други пазари от ЕС преди 2011 г.,

| — | възприемане на „Харта за конкуренцията“, която ще бъде оповестена публично и ще представлява основата, според която дружеството ще се конкурира на пазарите на спестявания на дребно и ипотечни заеми, |
| --- | --- |

—

възприемане на „Харта за конкуренцията“, която ще бъде оповестена публично и ще представлява основата, според която дружеството ще се конкурира на пазарите на спестявания на дребно и ипотечни заеми,

| — | задължение за отказ от отпускане на необезпечени заеми на лица и фирми през периода на преструктуриране, |
| --- | --- |

—

задължение за отказ от отпускане на необезпечени заеми на лица и фирми през периода на преструктуриране,

| — | задължение за отказ от увеличаване на общия брой клонове в Обединеното кралство. |
| --- | --- |

—

задължение за отказ от увеличаване на общия брой клонове в Обединеното кралство.

III.   ОЦЕНКА

| 8. | Комисията стигна до заключението, че гаранционните договорености от 18 декември 2007 г. представляват съвместима помощ за преструктуриране. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Комисията стигна до заключението, че гаранционните договорености от 18 декември 2007 г. представляват съвместима помощ за преструктуриране.

| 9. | Що се отнася до национализацията на NR, Комисията заключи, че тя не включва елементи на държавна помощ в съответствие с член 87, параграф 1 от Договора за ЕО, поради факта, че акционерите се компенсират само въз основа на стойността на компанията, без подкрепа от държавата. Въпреки това, ангажиментът на Министерството на финансите на Обединеното кралство към Службата по надзор на финансовите услуги (FSA) за предприемане на необходимите стъпки за осигуряване на дейността на NR над минималните изисквания за капитал би могъл да представлява допълнителна помощ за преструктуриране. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Що се отнася до национализацията на NR, Комисията заключи, че тя не включва елементи на държавна помощ в съответствие с член 87, параграф 1 от Договора за ЕО, поради факта, че акционерите се компенсират само въз основа на стойността на компанията, без подкрепа от държавата. Въпреки това, ангажиментът на Министерството на финансите на Обединеното кралство към Службата по надзор на финансовите услуги (FSA) за предприемане на необходимите стъпки за осигуряване на дейността на NR над минималните изисквания за капитал би могъл да представлява допълнителна помощ за преструктуриране.

| 10. | Що се отнася до помощтта за преструктуриране, предмет на уведомление от 17 март 2008 г., Комисията реши да открие подробна процедура за разследване.






  — | Първо, отбелязвайки, че намаляването на счетоводния баланс ще допринесе за възстановяване на жизнеспособността на дружеството, Комисията не бе в състояние да оцени подробно, дали планът за преструктуриране ще бъде способен да възстанови неговата жизнеспособност в дългосрочен план. Следва да се установи, дали планираното съотношение 50:50 между депозитите на дребно и междубанковото финансиране е достатъчно да стабилизира счетоводния баланс и да избегне риска от прекалена зависимост от един източник. Комисията се съмнява, дали продължителността на плана е възможно най-кратка. В заключение, Комисията не бе в състояние да оцени подробно, дали планът е съставен с оглед на реалистични предположения за бъдещите условия на дейността. |
| --- | --- | --- |

10.

Що се отнася до помощтта за преструктуриране, предмет на уведомление от 17 март 2008 г., Комисията реши да открие подробна процедура за разследване.

—

Първо, отбелязвайки, че намаляването на счетоводния баланс ще допринесе за възстановяване на жизнеспособността на дружеството, Комисията не бе в състояние да оцени подробно, дали планът за преструктуриране ще бъде способен да възстанови неговата жизнеспособност в дългосрочен план. Следва да се установи, дали планираното съотношение 50:50 между депозитите на дребно и междубанковото финансиране е достатъчно да стабилизира счетоводния баланс и да избегне риска от прекалена зависимост от един източник. Комисията се съмнява, дали продължителността на плана е възможно най-кратка. В заключение, Комисията не бе в състояние да оцени подробно, дали планът е съставен с оглед на реалистични предположения за бъдещите условия на дейността.

| — | Второ, Комисията се съмнява, дали са предприети достатъчни компенсаторни мерки за избягване на нарушаването на конкуренцията и търговията. От анализа си на въпросните пазари и присъствието на NR на тях Комисията заключи, че пазарът, на който NR е притежавал и ще продължи да притежава значителен дял, е ипотечния пазар на Обединеното кралство. Затова компенсаторните мерки трябва да бъдат насочени предимно към ограничаване на присъствието на NR на този пазар. В допълнение мерките, насочени към ограничаване на присъствието на NR на британските и чуждестранните пазари на депозити на дребно, също биха могли да се окажат необходими. Комисията оценява положително факта, че свиването на размера на банката ще ограничи силно нейното присъствие на ипотечния пазар на Обединеното кралство. Въпреки това Комисията се съмнява дали размерът и продължителността на това свиване ще бъдат достатъчни, за да се избегнат нарушенията на конкуренцията. Също така Комисията отбелязва, че ако NR извършва „Through-lending“, т.е. предлагане на продукти с марката на трета страна директно на клиенти с изискуеми ипотечни сделки, това би намалило значимостта на свиването като ограничаване на пазарното присъствие. На последно място Комисията се съмнява, дали в случай на продажба на NR през следващите години, новият собственик не би бил принуден да осъществи прилагането на компенсаторните мерки. |
| --- | --- |

—

Второ, Комисията се съмнява, дали са предприети достатъчни компенсаторни мерки за избягване на нарушаването на конкуренцията и търговията. От анализа си на въпросните пазари и присъствието на NR на тях Комисията заключи, че пазарът, на който NR е притежавал и ще продължи да притежава значителен дял, е ипотечния пазар на Обединеното кралство. Затова компенсаторните мерки трябва да бъдат насочени предимно към ограничаване на присъствието на NR на този пазар. В допълнение мерките, насочени към ограничаване на присъствието на NR на британските и чуждестранните пазари на депозити на дребно, също биха могли да се окажат необходими. Комисията оценява положително факта, че свиването на размера на банката ще ограничи силно нейното присъствие на ипотечния пазар на Обединеното кралство. Въпреки това Комисията се съмнява дали размерът и продължителността на това свиване ще бъдат достатъчни, за да се избегнат нарушенията на конкуренцията. Също така Комисията отбелязва, че ако NR извършва „Through-lending“, т.е. предлагане на продукти с марката на трета страна директно на клиенти с изискуеми ипотечни сделки, това би намалило значимостта на свиването като ограничаване на пазарното присъствие. На последно място Комисията се съмнява, дали в случай на продажба на NR през следващите години, новият собственик не би бил принуден да осъществи прилагането на компенсаторните мерки.

| — | Трето, като признава, че намаляването на счетоводния баланс позволява бързото редуциране на помощта, Комисията изразява съмнение, дали помощта е ограничена до необходимия минимум като размер и продължителност. По-бързо и по-драстично намаляване вероятно би могло да бъде реализирано, като по този начин се позволи по-бързото връщане на държавните средства. В допълнение, Комисията се съмнява, дали държавните гаранции не биха могли да бъдат прекратени по-рано от предвиденото в плана за преструктуриране. И последно, Комисията има съмнения относно цената, която държавата би трябвало да изиска за тези средства и гаранции с цел да ограничи до минимум помощта и нарушаването на конкуренцията, предизвикано от нея. |
| --- | --- |

—

Трето, като признава, че намаляването на счетоводния баланс позволява бързото редуциране на помощта, Комисията изразява съмнение, дали помощта е ограничена до необходимия минимум като размер и продължителност. По-бързо и по-драстично намаляване вероятно би могло да бъде реализирано, като по този начин се позволи по-бързото връщане на държавните средства. В допълнение, Комисията се съмнява, дали държавните гаранции не биха могли да бъдат прекратени по-рано от предвиденото в плана за преструктуриране. И последно, Комисията има съмнения относно цената, която държавата би трябвало да изиска за тези средства и гаранции с цел да ограничи до минимум помощта и нарушаването на конкуренцията, предизвикано от нея.

ТЕКСТ НА ПИСМОТО

„The Commission wishes to inform the United Kingdom that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty.

1.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | By decision of 5 December 2007 (hereinafter “the decision of 5 December 2007”) the Commission (2) found the measures implemented by the Bank of England (hereinafter “BoE”) of 14 September 2007 in favour of Northern Rock (hereinafter “NR”) not to constitute State aid and decided that the measures granted by the UK authorities on 17-20 September and 9 October 2007 contained State aid which until 17 March 2008 is compatible with the common market as rescue aid in conformity with the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (hereinafter “the R & R Guidelines”) (3). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By decision of 5 December 2007 (hereinafter “the decision of 5 December 2007”) the Commission (2) found the measures implemented by the Bank of England (hereinafter “BoE”) of 14 September 2007 in favour of Northern Rock (hereinafter “NR”) not to constitute State aid and decided that the measures granted by the UK authorities on 17-20 September and 9 October 2007 contained State aid which until 17 March 2008 is compatible with the common market as rescue aid in conformity with the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (hereinafter “the R & R Guidelines”) (3).

| (2) | On 17 December 2007, the UK authorities provided informal background information regarding the extension of the guarantee arrangements to be announced on the next day. The UK authorities officially informed the Commission about this measure on 21 December 2007. On 8 January, 24 January, 6 February, 13 February, and 10 March 2008 meetings were held between representatives of the UK and the Commission services. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 17 December 2007, the UK authorities provided informal background information regarding the extension of the guarantee arrangements to be announced on the next day. The UK authorities officially informed the Commission about this measure on 21 December 2007. On 8 January, 24 January, 6 February, 13 February, and 10 March 2008 meetings were held between representatives of the UK and the Commission services.

| (3) | On 17 February 2008, the UK authorities announced that NR was to be nationalised. On 17 March 2008 the UK sent to the Commission a restructuring plan for NR and notified State aid measures which would accompany that plan and enable it to be implemented. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 17 February 2008, the UK authorities announced that NR was to be nationalised. On 17 March 2008 the UK sent to the Commission a restructuring plan for NR and notified State aid measures which would accompany that plan and enable it to be implemented.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The beneficiary

| (4) | NR, which is based in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, was the 5th biggest UK mortgage bank. Its balance-sheet total was GBP 101 billion on 31 December 2006 and GBP 113,5 billion on 30 June 2007. In 2006, its interest income represented GBP 5 billion, with a profit of GBP 443 million. The bank has a staff of 6 000 persons. NR has 77 branches throughout the UK, and is present in Ireland, Denmark and Guernsey (4). NR does not belong to a larger group. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

NR, which is based in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, was the 5th biggest UK mortgage bank. Its balance-sheet total was GBP 101 billion on 31 December 2006 and GBP 113,5 billion on 30 June 2007. In 2006, its interest income represented GBP 5 billion, with a profit of GBP 443 million. The bank has a staff of 6 000 persons. NR has 77 branches throughout the UK, and is present in Ireland, Denmark and Guernsey (4). NR does not belong to a larger group.

| (5) | Residential mortgage lending is NR's core activity. It represents more than 90 % of all outstanding loans to customers. NR's lending has significantly increased over the last 8 years until mid 2007. The bank roughly trebled its share of the UK mortgage market over that period. In the first half of 2007, the bank achieved gross lending of GBP 19,3 billion and net lending of GBP 10,7 billion, representing market shares of UK gross mortgage lending of 9,7 % and of net mortgage lending of 18,9 % (5). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Residential mortgage lending is NR's core activity. It represents more than 90 % of all outstanding loans to customers. NR's lending has significantly increased over the last 8 years until mid 2007. The bank roughly trebled its share of the UK mortgage market over that period. In the first half of 2007, the bank achieved gross lending of GBP 19,3 billion and net lending of GBP 10,7 billion, representing market shares of UK gross mortgage lending of 9,7 % and of net mortgage lending of 18,9 % (5).

| (6) | Whereas retail funds and deposits constituted the main source of financing for the bank in 1998, it has since then funded the growth of its mortgage lending mainly via wholesale funding, including issuing mortgage-backed securities, covered bonds and medium term and short term unsecured funding. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Whereas retail funds and deposits constituted the main source of financing for the bank in 1998, it has since then funded the growth of its mortgage lending mainly via wholesale funding, including issuing mortgage-backed securities, covered bonds and medium term and short term unsecured funding.

| (7) | The success of the business model was dependent on (a) the ability of Northern Rock to raise money in the wholesale markets in order to repay its short term borrowing from those markets and to fund its lending; and (b) its ability to pay a lower rate of interest on the money which it borrowed from the wholesale markets than the interest which it charged to its mortgage customers. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The success of the business model was dependent on (a) the ability of Northern Rock to raise money in the wholesale markets in order to repay its short term borrowing from those markets and to fund its lending; and (b) its ability to pay a lower rate of interest on the money which it borrowed from the wholesale markets than the interest which it charged to its mortgage customers.

| (8) | The structure of its liabilities therefore changed so that, in recent years, unlike most UK banks, NR financed the majority of its long-term mortgage loans by issuing securitised notes (6). In March 2001 NR established a “master trust” securitisation structure known as “Granite” of which it has since made extensive use (it had previously carried out standalone securitisations not forming part of the master trust). The Granite structure involved the creation of a trust into which NR sells mortgages and under which both Granite and NR are beneficiaries. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The structure of its liabilities therefore changed so that, in recent years, unlike most UK banks, NR financed the majority of its long-term mortgage loans by issuing securitised notes (6). In March 2001 NR established a “master trust” securitisation structure known as “Granite” of which it has since made extensive use (it had previously carried out standalone securitisations not forming part of the master trust). The Granite structure involved the creation of a trust into which NR sells mortgages and under which both Granite and NR are beneficiaries.

| (9) | NR also funded itself through the issue of “covered bonds”. Covered bonds are another form of mortgage-backed security. The bonds in question are issued by NR itself (unlike Granite where the bonds are issued by SPVs) but a pool of mortgage loans and related security is transferred to an SPV, which provides a guarantee of the bonds secured over the SPV's assets. Investors therefore have direct recourse against NR as well as recourse to a pool of mortgage loans and related security. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

NR also funded itself through the issue of “covered bonds”. Covered bonds are another form of mortgage-backed security. The bonds in question are issued by NR itself (unlike Granite where the bonds are issued by SPVs) but a pool of mortgage loans and related security is transferred to an SPV, which provides a guarantee of the bonds secured over the SPV's assets. Investors therefore have direct recourse against NR as well as recourse to a pool of mortgage loans and related security.

2.2.   The difficulties and the approved rescue aid measures

| (10) | In the summer of 2007, the world's financial markets entered a period of turbulence, which began with markets' fears over exposure to American sub-prime mortgages. A consequence of this turbulence has been a significant shift in trading conditions in the sterling and global money markets and the virtual closure of the mortgage securitisation market. Banks and other institutions started to retain cash to meet their own potential and actual liquidity requirements and to reduce their exposure to other institutions until it becomes clear what the impact of the turbulence has been on the assets and liquidity of those other institutions. This has created severe liquidity difficulties that especially threatened institutions whose business model is reliant on raising finance in the wholesale markets to fund their business. This is the case of NR, which funded new loans principally through money raised on the wholesale markets. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

In the summer of 2007, the world's financial markets entered a period of turbulence, which began with markets' fears over exposure to American sub-prime mortgages. A consequence of this turbulence has been a significant shift in trading conditions in the sterling and global money markets and the virtual closure of the mortgage securitisation market. Banks and other institutions started to retain cash to meet their own potential and actual liquidity requirements and to reduce their exposure to other institutions until it becomes clear what the impact of the turbulence has been on the assets and liquidity of those other institutions. This has created severe liquidity difficulties that especially threatened institutions whose business model is reliant on raising finance in the wholesale markets to fund their business. This is the case of NR, which funded new loans principally through money raised on the wholesale markets.

| (11) | As a result, NR had difficulties in meeting its funding needs (7). Funding needs in this context mean the funds it has to raise on a day to day basis in order to meet its day to day liquidity requirements and in particular to refinance its maturing wholesale borrowings, including short term commercial paper, as and when they fall due for repayment. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

As a result, NR had difficulties in meeting its funding needs (7). Funding needs in this context mean the funds it has to raise on a day to day basis in order to meet its day to day liquidity requirements and in particular to refinance its maturing wholesale borrowings, including short term commercial paper, as and when they fall due for repayment.

| (12) | Its ongoing difficulties in meeting its funding needs as at 13 and 14 September 2007 were so serious that there was a real likelihood that, in order to meet its funding requirements (new lending and repayment of wholesale liabilities as they fell due), it would have to draw down on its buffer stock of high quality finite sterling liquid assets (8) and/or sell assets, probably at distressed sale values. Against this backdrop NR's auditors recorded their concerns that the firm might not be able to draw up its accounts on a going concern basis. In this context, NR explored all possible financing options, including a possible takeover, without success. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Its ongoing difficulties in meeting its funding needs as at 13 and 14 September 2007 were so serious that there was a real likelihood that, in order to meet its funding requirements (new lending and repayment of wholesale liabilities as they fell due), it would have to draw down on its buffer stock of high quality finite sterling liquid assets (8) and/or sell assets, probably at distressed sale values. Against this backdrop NR's auditors recorded their concerns that the firm might not be able to draw up its accounts on a going concern basis. In this context, NR explored all possible financing options, including a possible takeover, without success.

| (13) | NR, therefore, requested the support of the Bank of England (the “BoE”) as lender of last resort for a substantial liquidity facility pending a longer term resolution of its difficulties (9). The liquidity support was provided on 14 September. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

NR, therefore, requested the support of the Bank of England (the “BoE”) as lender of last resort for a substantial liquidity facility pending a longer term resolution of its difficulties (9). The liquidity support was provided on 14 September.

| (14) | The difficulties of NR were further aggravated by a bank-run, which started after the news on the BoE granting support to NR was made public. In order to stop it and avoid contagious effects, the Treasury announced guarantee arrangements for all existing accounts in NR on 17 September 2007. Further, HM Treasury clarified the assumed liability guarantee backed by State resources via a publication on HM Treasury's website on 20 September 2007. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The difficulties of NR were further aggravated by a bank-run, which started after the news on the BoE granting support to NR was made public. In order to stop it and avoid contagious effects, the Treasury announced guarantee arrangements for all existing accounts in NR on 17 September 2007. Further, HM Treasury clarified the assumed liability guarantee backed by State resources via a publication on HM Treasury's website on 20 September 2007.

| (15) | On 9 October 2007, the Treasury extended the guarantee to new retail deposits and, together with the BoE, modified the terms and conditions of the emergency liquidity assistance (hereinafter “facility of 9 October”, consisting of so-called B and C facilities, according to the Decision of 5 December 2007). |
| --- | --- |

(15)

On 9 October 2007, the Treasury extended the guarantee to new retail deposits and, together with the BoE, modified the terms and conditions of the emergency liquidity assistance (hereinafter “facility of 9 October”, consisting of so-called B and C facilities, according to the Decision of 5 December 2007).

| (16) | By decision of 5 December 2007, the Commission authorised the above measures until 17 March 2008. Whereas the Commission considered that the measures implemented by the BoE on 14 September 2007 did not constitute aid until their amendments on 9 October 2007, all the measures implemented from 17 September 2007 onwards were found to constitute aid, which is however compatible as rescue aid pursuant to the R & R Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

By decision of 5 December 2007, the Commission authorised the above measures until 17 March 2008. Whereas the Commission considered that the measures implemented by the BoE on 14 September 2007 did not constitute aid until their amendments on 9 October 2007, all the measures implemented from 17 September 2007 onwards were found to constitute aid, which is however compatible as rescue aid pursuant to the R & R Guidelines.

2.3.   The persistence of the difficulties and the measures subject to the present decision

2.3.1.   The extended guarantees of 18 December 2007

| (17) | [...] (10) a ratings downgrade would have had a further serious adverse affect on the company's financial position [...] (11). A ratings downgrade could therefore have prevented any restructuring plan from being designed and implemented, and therefore condemn the firm to exit the market. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

[...] (10) a ratings downgrade would have had a further serious adverse affect on the company's financial position [...] (11). A ratings downgrade could therefore have prevented any restructuring plan from being designed and implemented, and therefore condemn the firm to exit the market.

| (18) | In order to avoid the adverse effects of such a downgrade, on 18 December 2007 the UK authorities extended the State guarantee arrangements to the following unsubordinated wholesale obligations, whether existing or arising in the future:






  — | all uncollateralised and unsubordinated wholesale deposits which are outside the guarantee arrangements previously announced by HM Treasury, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

In order to avoid the adverse effects of such a downgrade, on 18 December 2007 the UK authorities extended the State guarantee arrangements to the following unsubordinated wholesale obligations, whether existing or arising in the future:

—

all uncollateralised and unsubordinated wholesale deposits which are outside the guarantee arrangements previously announced by HM Treasury,

| — | all payment obligations of NR under any uncollateralised swap transactions, |
| --- | --- |

—

all payment obligations of NR under any uncollateralised swap transactions,

| — | in respect of all collateralised swaps and all wholesale borrowings which are collateralised (including, without limitation, covered bonds of NR), the payment obligations of NR to the extent that those obligations exceed the available proceeds of the realised collateral for the relevant swap or borrowing, and |
| --- | --- |

—

in respect of all collateralised swaps and all wholesale borrowings which are collateralised (including, without limitation, covered bonds of NR), the payment obligations of NR to the extent that those obligations exceed the available proceeds of the realised collateral for the relevant swap or borrowing, and

| — | all obligations of NR to make payments on the repurchase of mortgages under the documentation for the “Granite” securitisation programme. |
| --- | --- |

—

all obligations of NR to make payments on the repurchase of mortgages under the documentation for the “Granite” securitisation programme.

| (19) | These measures [...] were the minimum [...] to ensure that NR's ratings were not downgraded. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

These measures [...] were the minimum [...] to ensure that NR's ratings were not downgraded.

| (20) | NR pays to HM Treasury a monthly guarantee fee of GBP [...] for so long as these new guarantee arrangements shall remain in force. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

NR pays to HM Treasury a monthly guarantee fee of GBP [...] for so long as these new guarantee arrangements shall remain in force.

| (21) | As regards the duration of the guarantee arrangements implemented on 18 December 2007, the UK authorities publicly announced that this measure should “remain in place during the current instability in the financial markets” in accordance with the wording used in the previous notices with regard to the guarantee arrangements granted on 17-20 September and 9 October 2007. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As regards the duration of the guarantee arrangements implemented on 18 December 2007, the UK authorities publicly announced that this measure should “remain in place during the current instability in the financial markets” in accordance with the wording used in the previous notices with regard to the guarantee arrangements granted on 17-20 September and 9 October 2007.

2.3.2.   The search for a private sector solution

| (22) | The UK Government aimed to ensure that the process for considering proposals from third parties for the merger or acquisition of NR rigorously tests the scope of the private sector to deliver a viable restructuring of the company with the minimum aid necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The UK Government aimed to ensure that the process for considering proposals from third parties for the merger or acquisition of NR rigorously tests the scope of the private sector to deliver a viable restructuring of the company with the minimum aid necessary.

| (23) | Throughout the months of August and September 2007 various attempts were made to seek a speedy and orderly transaction for the sale of the whole entity, especially in the period after the need for BoE intervention became public. These attempts by NR and its adviser, Merrill Lynch, failed to achieve the desired results. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Throughout the months of August and September 2007 various attempts were made to seek a speedy and orderly transaction for the sale of the whole entity, especially in the period after the need for BoE intervention became public. These attempts by NR and its adviser, Merrill Lynch, failed to achieve the desired results.

| (24) | Following the failure of the initial sale process, NR having also retained Citigroup and Blackstone alongside Merrill Lynch on 3 and 31 October respectively proceeded to put in place a revised and restructured sale process. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Following the failure of the initial sale process, NR having also retained Citigroup and Blackstone alongside Merrill Lynch on 3 and 31 October respectively proceeded to put in place a revised and restructured sale process.

| (25) | NR's advisors asked for indications of interest from potential buyers in October 2007. The revised auction was designed to target a wide range of potential acquirers and contemplated different transaction structures, including sale of the whole or parts of NR, in an effort to maximise prospects for a commercial solution to be affected. Three companies expressed their interests for the whole entity, and one for part of it. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

NR's advisors asked for indications of interest from potential buyers in October 2007. The revised auction was designed to target a wide range of potential acquirers and contemplated different transaction structures, including sale of the whole or parts of NR, in an effort to maximise prospects for a commercial solution to be affected. Three companies expressed their interests for the whole entity, and one for part of it.

| (26) | On 26 November, NR declared the Virgin Consortium (hereinafter “Virgin”) as the preferred bidder and decided to attempt to reach an agreement on a potential sale. On 6 December, JC Flowers withdrew from the sale process. [...], discussions with Olivant Advisers were resumed and NR effectively initiated a two-party auction process. The original Virgin proposal submitted in November 2007 would have reduced the asset book to [...] and the aborted Olivant bid — to [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

On 26 November, NR declared the Virgin Consortium (hereinafter “Virgin”) as the preferred bidder and decided to attempt to reach an agreement on a potential sale. On 6 December, JC Flowers withdrew from the sale process. [...], discussions with Olivant Advisers were resumed and NR effectively initiated a two-party auction process. The original Virgin proposal submitted in November 2007 would have reduced the asset book to [...] and the aborted Olivant bid — to [...].

| (27) | In the discussions that followed, [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

In the discussions that followed, [...].

| (28) | Indeed, as the bid process progressed it became increasingly clear that [...]. Therefore the Tripartite Authorities asked Goldman Sachs, their financial advisor, to explore the possibility of devising a flexible financing solution that could be used by bidders in an effort to facilitate a private-sector solution. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Indeed, as the bid process progressed it became increasingly clear that [...]. Therefore the Tripartite Authorities asked Goldman Sachs, their financial advisor, to explore the possibility of devising a flexible financing solution that could be used by bidders in an effort to facilitate a private-sector solution.

| (29) | On 21 January 2008, HM Treasury publicly announced a new financing structure that would be made available to NR and other interested parties, in order to facilitate a private sector solution for the entire company. It was indicated that the financing structure — which consisted in the sale of an assets pool belonging to NR to a vehicle which would issue bonds covered by a State guarantee — would only be available for proposals that meet the Tripartite Authorities' publicly stated objectives (12). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

On 21 January 2008, HM Treasury publicly announced a new financing structure that would be made available to NR and other interested parties, in order to facilitate a private sector solution for the entire company. It was indicated that the financing structure — which consisted in the sale of an assets pool belonging to NR to a vehicle which would issue bonds covered by a State guarantee — would only be available for proposals that meet the Tripartite Authorities' publicly stated objectives (12).

| (30) | On 4 February 2004, the Tripartite Authorities received two proposals compliant with the above-mentioned announcement: from Virgin and NR. Olivant Advisors had announced that they were not pursuing their bid. The two business plans presented by the bidders, even though neither was definitive, given that the bank's nationalisation intervened before they could be agreed upon, did not diverge substantially and both required similar aid measures. They are described here below as potential benchmarks against which the plan notified on 17 March 2008 could be assessed. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

On 4 February 2004, the Tripartite Authorities received two proposals compliant with the above-mentioned announcement: from Virgin and NR. Olivant Advisors had announced that they were not pursuing their bid. The two business plans presented by the bidders, even though neither was definitive, given that the bank's nationalisation intervened before they could be agreed upon, did not diverge substantially and both required similar aid measures. They are described here below as potential benchmarks against which the plan notified on 17 March 2008 could be assessed.

2.3.3.   The restructuring plans submitted by NR and Virgin

| (31) | The key elements of the restructuring plans were (a) a reduction and restructuring of the balance sheet; (b) a growth of the retail deposit base as a proportion of total funding; (c) a new commercial policy; (d) a rebranding of the firm; and (e) the grant of restructuring aid. These elements will be described in the next paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The key elements of the restructuring plans were (a) a reduction and restructuring of the balance sheet; (b) a growth of the retail deposit base as a proportion of total funding; (c) a new commercial policy; (d) a rebranding of the firm; and (e) the grant of restructuring aid. These elements will be described in the next paragraphs.

2.3.3.1.   Reduction and restructuring of the balance sheet

| (32) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

[...].

| (33) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

[...].

2.3.3.2.   Growth of the retail deposit base

| (34) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

[...].

| (35) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

[...].

2.3.3.3.   A new commercial policy

| (36) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

[...].

| (37) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

[...].

| (38) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

[...].

2.3.3.4.   A rebranding of the company

| (39) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

[...].

2.3.3.5.   Restructuring aid

| (40) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

[...].

| (41) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

[...].

| (42) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

[...].

2.3.3.6.   Expected financial results

| (43) | [...] (13)
   (14). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

[...] (13)
   (14).

| (44) | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

[...].

2.3.4.   The nationalisation of the bank

| (45) | On 17 February 2008 the UK government announced that neither of the two private sector offers met the test of protecting the taxpayer's interest and that, accordingly, it would take the company in temporary public ownership. Legislation enabling this was introduced and passed in the UK Parliament over the following days, and NR became publicly owned on 22 February 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

On 17 February 2008 the UK government announced that neither of the two private sector offers met the test of protecting the taxpayer's interest and that, accordingly, it would take the company in temporary public ownership. Legislation enabling this was introduced and passed in the UK Parliament over the following days, and NR became publicly owned on 22 February 2008.

| (46) | According to the UK authorities, the nationalisation did not result in any additional aid measures in favour of NR. The authorities did however provide an assurance to the FSA that its present intention was, subject to any constraints imposed by EC State aid rules and by Government Accounting rules, to take appropriate steps to ensure that NR will operate above the minimum capital requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

According to the UK authorities, the nationalisation did not result in any additional aid measures in favour of NR. The authorities did however provide an assurance to the FSA that its present intention was, subject to any constraints imposed by EC State aid rules and by Government Accounting rules, to take appropriate steps to ensure that NR will operate above the minimum capital requirements.

| (47) | The UK authorities also informed the Commission that existing shareholders will be compensated by a procedure for independent valuation of the shares on the assumption that all State support had been withdrawn and that no financial assistance would be provided by the State in future (apart from ordinary market assistance offered by the BoE subject to its usual terms). On this basis the purchase price paid would not contain State aid to the former shareholders of NR or to NR itself. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The UK authorities also informed the Commission that existing shareholders will be compensated by a procedure for independent valuation of the shares on the assumption that all State support had been withdrawn and that no financial assistance would be provided by the State in future (apart from ordinary market assistance offered by the BoE subject to its usual terms). On this basis the purchase price paid would not contain State aid to the former shareholders of NR or to NR itself.

2.3.5.   The notified restructuring plan

2.3.5.1.   Reduction in balance sheet

| (48) | The plan envisages that the NR balance sheet would contract in the first five years of the plan from about GBP 107 billion in 2007 to about GBP 48-53 billion at the end of 2011. Mortgage assets would contract from around GBP 98 billion in 2007 to GBP [30-50] billion by 2011. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The plan envisages that the NR balance sheet would contract in the first five years of the plan from about GBP 107 billion in 2007 to about GBP 48-53 billion at the end of 2011. Mortgage assets would contract from around GBP 98 billion in 2007 to GBP [30-50] billion by 2011.

| (49) | This would be achieved through:






  (i) | an active retail mortgage redemption programme with the aim of encouraging at least 60 % of customers with maturing products to remortgage with another lender; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(49)

This would be achieved through:

(i)

an active retail mortgage redemption programme with the aim of encouraging at least 60 % of customers with maturing products to remortgage with another lender; and

| (ii) | exiting all new commercial lending and new standalone unsecured lending. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

exiting all new commercial lending and new standalone unsecured lending.

| (50) | The company plans to achieve this through a pro-active redemption policy under which customers with products approaching maturity would be [...] contacted and encouraged to seek a new deal elsewhere. Customers who remain with NR once their current arrangements expire would mature in line with their mortgage contract terms onto the standard variable rate (hereinafter “SVR”) [...]. NR is also exploring the implementation of a “through-lending” facility for prime residential customers i.e. making an arrangement with a mortgage provider in order to be able to offer third party branded products directly to customers with maturing mortgage deals. The financial benefit of these proposals (which are not yet included in the plan) would be marginal: the business rationale for this proposal is that it would increase the probability and speed of redemptions, allow NR to maintain full control of the sales and advice process and by assisting its customer to achieve a good outcome would better maintain Northern Rock's brand promise and reputation. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The company plans to achieve this through a pro-active redemption policy under which customers with products approaching maturity would be [...] contacted and encouraged to seek a new deal elsewhere. Customers who remain with NR once their current arrangements expire would mature in line with their mortgage contract terms onto the standard variable rate (hereinafter “SVR”) [...]. NR is also exploring the implementation of a “through-lending” facility for prime residential customers i.e. making an arrangement with a mortgage provider in order to be able to offer third party branded products directly to customers with maturing mortgage deals. The financial benefit of these proposals (which are not yet included in the plan) would be marginal: the business rationale for this proposal is that it would increase the probability and speed of redemptions, allow NR to maintain full control of the sales and advice process and by assisting its customer to achieve a good outcome would better maintain Northern Rock's brand promise and reputation.

| (51) | A 60 % redemption rate (compared to [...]) is considered to be a more realistic target in view of deteriorating mortgage conditions, and represents a substantial change compared to the pre-crisis rate of around [< 40] %. The mortgage market landscape has changed significantly in recent months: the 100 % loan-to-value (hereinafter “LTV”) mortgage market has effectively closed and the decreased lending appetite of mortgage lenders is particularly affecting less credit-worthy borrowers and those seeking high income multiples. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

A 60 % redemption rate (compared to [...]) is considered to be a more realistic target in view of deteriorating mortgage conditions, and represents a substantial change compared to the pre-crisis rate of around [< 40] %. The mortgage market landscape has changed significantly in recent months: the 100 % loan-to-value (hereinafter “LTV”) mortgage market has effectively closed and the decreased lending appetite of mortgage lenders is particularly affecting less credit-worthy borrowers and those seeking high income multiples.

| (52) | NR would also continue to conduct limited levels of new lending over this period (on the base case about 18-23 billion in total for the four years from 2008 to 2011 compared with about GBP 30-35 billion in 2007). This new lending would be offered predominantly to high credit quality new customers. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

NR would also continue to conduct limited levels of new lending over this period (on the base case about 18-23 billion in total for the four years from 2008 to 2011 compared with about GBP 30-35 billion in 2007). This new lending would be offered predominantly to high credit quality new customers.

| (53) | The company intends that most of the new lending would be originated through intermediaries so as to maintain this important distribution channel. This channel historically represented approximately [85-90] % of the company's lending volumes and the retention of a minimum presence in the market is essential, given NR's small number of branches and low percentage of origination through them in the past; and given the significance of intermediaries in the UK mortgage market as a whole, in order to retain a basis for a long term return to viability. If NR were to withdraw completely from the intermediary channel it would take a considerable amount of time and investment to rebuild this franchise. The company therefore proposes to originate the minimum volumes (approximately GBP [3-5] billion a year or 14-16 % of historic volumes through this channel) necessary through this channel in order to maintain panel membership with key intermediaries and write a minimal yet meaningful mortgage capacity with each key group. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The company intends that most of the new lending would be originated through intermediaries so as to maintain this important distribution channel. This channel historically represented approximately [85-90] % of the company's lending volumes and the retention of a minimum presence in the market is essential, given NR's small number of branches and low percentage of origination through them in the past; and given the significance of intermediaries in the UK mortgage market as a whole, in order to retain a basis for a long term return to viability. If NR were to withdraw completely from the intermediary channel it would take a considerable amount of time and investment to rebuild this franchise. The company therefore proposes to originate the minimum volumes (approximately GBP [3-5] billion a year or 14-16 % of historic volumes through this channel) necessary through this channel in order to maintain panel membership with key intermediaries and write a minimal yet meaningful mortgage capacity with each key group.

| (54) | The aim would be to restrict new lending to high credit quality borrowers. On the basis of the assumed total market volumes it is estimated that NR's market share of gross new mortgage lending would fall back from about 8 % in 2007 to [1,5-2,5] % for four years before rising to just over [< 4 %] in [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The aim would be to restrict new lending to high credit quality borrowers. On the basis of the assumed total market volumes it is estimated that NR's market share of gross new mortgage lending would fall back from about 8 % in 2007 to [1,5-2,5] % for four years before rising to just over [< 4 %] in [...].

| (55) | According to the UK authorities, given the quality of the Northern Rock mortgage book, it is expected that there will be alternative offers available in the market for customers switching away from Northern Rock. Much of the maturing mortgage portfolio comprises customers with good credit scores and LTV of below [...] %, who should not experience any difficulty in finding more competitive products with other providers. Higher risk residential customers would be directed to a specialist panel of brokers who specialise in providing sub-prime or other non-mainstream mortgage products. For the proportion of customers who may experience difficulty in transferring their mortgage under current market conditions [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

According to the UK authorities, given the quality of the Northern Rock mortgage book, it is expected that there will be alternative offers available in the market for customers switching away from Northern Rock. Much of the maturing mortgage portfolio comprises customers with good credit scores and LTV of below [...] %, who should not experience any difficulty in finding more competitive products with other providers. Higher risk residential customers would be directed to a specialist panel of brokers who specialise in providing sub-prime or other non-mainstream mortgage products. For the proportion of customers who may experience difficulty in transferring their mortgage under current market conditions [...].

| (56) | High quality new lending would be achieved by imposing high customer credit quality standards for any new business that is taken on and offering lower loan to value ratios. It is anticipated that lending margins would be in the middle of the industry range between 2008 and [...], gradually being managed down thereafter [...] to achieve target increases in mortgage lending under the plan. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

High quality new lending would be achieved by imposing high customer credit quality standards for any new business that is taken on and offering lower loan to value ratios. It is anticipated that lending margins would be in the middle of the industry range between 2008 and [...], gradually being managed down thereafter [...] to achieve target increases in mortgage lending under the plan.

| (57) | The unsecured and commercial lending portfolios would be discontinued and existing book would be run down over the period of the plan. On the basis of historical trends NR expects the unsecured lending portfolio to reduce from GBP 4,023 million to about GBP [< 1 billion] and the commercial portfolio (including commercial buy-to-let) to reduce [...] from GBP 1,317 million to about GBP [< 600] million by the end of 2013. Earlier sale or other options to liquidate these portfolios would be considered if appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The unsecured and commercial lending portfolios would be discontinued and existing book would be run down over the period of the plan. On the basis of historical trends NR expects the unsecured lending portfolio to reduce from GBP 4,023 million to about GBP [< 1 billion] and the commercial portfolio (including commercial buy-to-let) to reduce [...] from GBP 1,317 million to about GBP [< 600] million by the end of 2013. Earlier sale or other options to liquidate these portfolios would be considered if appropriate.

2.3.5.2.   Stabilisation of the retail deposit base as a proportion of total funding

| (58) | Under the plan the proportion of retail funding to total funding would increase from 15-20 % in 2008 to about [...] % in 2011 and about 48-52 % in 2012, re-balancing the balance sheet. This would be reflected in:






  (i) | a decrease in total funding from GBP 103 billion in 2007 to about GBP [40-50] billion in 2011, and; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(58)

Under the plan the proportion of retail funding to total funding would increase from 15-20 % in 2008 to about [...] % in 2011 and about 48-52 % in 2012, re-balancing the balance sheet. This would be reflected in:

(i)

a decrease in total funding from GBP 103 billion in 2007 to about GBP [40-50] billion in 2011, and;

| (ii) | an increase in retail deposits from GBP 10,5 billion at the end of 2007 to about GBP [...] billion in 2011, which remains below the pre-crisis level of GBP 24 billion. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

an increase in retail deposits from GBP 10,5 billion at the end of 2007 to about GBP [...] billion in 2011, which remains below the pre-crisis level of GBP 24 billion.

| (59) | The strategic objectives would be to recapture some recently lost customers of NR; to encourage a better balance of high value and lower balance depositors; and to encourage a higher percentage of accounts with balances of less than GBP 35 000. The projected growth in the deposit base represents only a moderate increase in share of the total market compared to current levels (about 1,2-1,5 % compared to 0,8 % currently) and below the pre-crisis share of 1,9 % for the duration of the period. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The strategic objectives would be to recapture some recently lost customers of NR; to encourage a better balance of high value and lower balance depositors; and to encourage a higher percentage of accounts with balances of less than GBP 35 000. The projected growth in the deposit base represents only a moderate increase in share of the total market compared to current levels (about 1,2-1,5 % compared to 0,8 % currently) and below the pre-crisis share of 1,9 % for the duration of the period.

| (60) | Beyond the period of the stabilisation plan, a key strategic objective would be to achieve broadly a 50:50 ratio of retail deposits to non-retail funding. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Beyond the period of the stabilisation plan, a key strategic objective would be to achieve broadly a 50:50 ratio of retail deposits to non-retail funding.

2.3.5.3.   Overseas activities

| (61) | NR proposes that its Danish operations would be closed and put into run-off in 2008 and no additional overseas businesses would be started prior to 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

NR proposes that its Danish operations would be closed and put into run-off in 2008 and no additional overseas businesses would be started prior to 2013.

| (62) | A small capability would be retained in Ireland and Guernsey to maintain some diversification of the funding base. NR's share in the Irish market is small, and has already significantly reduced. Even by 2013 this share is expected to be [35-50] % lower than pre-crisis levels (compared to UK shares which would remain [15-35] % lower). |
| --- | --- |

(62)

A small capability would be retained in Ireland and Guernsey to maintain some diversification of the funding base. NR's share in the Irish market is small, and has already significantly reduced. Even by 2013 this share is expected to be [35-50] % lower than pre-crisis levels (compared to UK shares which would remain [15-35] % lower).

2.3.5.4.   Repayment of BoE facilities and release of guarantee arrangements

| (63) | The plan's priority is the rapid repayment of the BoE facilities. The plan envisages that these facilities would be fully repaid around [...] 2010 in the base case, although there would be a BoE/Treasury liquidity facility that might remain in place until [...] (the company intends to seek early replacement with a third party facility if conditions are appropriate). NR aims to achieve a long term credit rating of at least A- on a standalone basis during 2011 on the basis of significantly improved financial profile as a result of reduced borrowing, retail deposits as a greater proportion of the balance sheet, a return to profitability and discharge of the BoE facilities. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The plan's priority is the rapid repayment of the BoE facilities. The plan envisages that these facilities would be fully repaid around [...] 2010 in the base case, although there would be a BoE/Treasury liquidity facility that might remain in place until [...] (the company intends to seek early replacement with a third party facility if conditions are appropriate). NR aims to achieve a long term credit rating of at least A- on a standalone basis during 2011 on the basis of significantly improved financial profile as a result of reduced borrowing, retail deposits as a greater proportion of the balance sheet, a return to profitability and discharge of the BoE facilities.

| (64) | The intention is that there would be a staggered release of the guarantee arrangements as the different aspects of the company's position stabilise. There is limited practical experience of the consequences of releasing State guarantees of bank deposits, and the practicability of implementing these proposals set out in the plan would need to be kept under review in the light of customer feedback and other market circumstances. However, the plan envisages, on the base case, the removal of all guarantees by the end of 2011 [...]. As regards the retail funding guarantee arrangements (which currently cover all new and existing retail deposits) on the base case:






  (i) | the indicative earliest release date for the guarantee arrangements for new retail deposits would be [...]. At this point it is anticipated that returning confidence would enable the company to raise new retail savings without them; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(64)

The intention is that there would be a staggered release of the guarantee arrangements as the different aspects of the company's position stabilise. There is limited practical experience of the consequences of releasing State guarantees of bank deposits, and the practicability of implementing these proposals set out in the plan would need to be kept under review in the light of customer feedback and other market circumstances. However, the plan envisages, on the base case, the removal of all guarantees by the end of 2011 [...]. As regards the retail funding guarantee arrangements (which currently cover all new and existing retail deposits) on the base case:

(i)

the indicative earliest release date for the guarantee arrangements for new retail deposits would be [...]. At this point it is anticipated that returning confidence would enable the company to raise new retail savings without them;

| (ii) | The indicative earliest release date for the guarantee arrangements for existing retail deposits would be [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

The indicative earliest release date for the guarantee arrangements for existing retail deposits would be [...].

| (65) | For non-retail deposits, release of the guarantee arrangements would be determined by the company's ability to maintain [...] capital requirements (also relevant to the retail guarantee arrangements) and a sufficient long term credit rating. The indicative date for removal of the guarantees on the base case would be during [...], subject, in particular, to rating agency approval. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

For non-retail deposits, release of the guarantee arrangements would be determined by the company's ability to maintain [...] capital requirements (also relevant to the retail guarantee arrangements) and a sufficient long term credit rating. The indicative date for removal of the guarantees on the base case would be during [...], subject, in particular, to rating agency approval.

| (66) | On the base case, in addition, there would be an early release of certain specific aspects of the non-retail guarantee arrangements. The company expects that [...], subject to ratings agency approval, it would be possible to release the guarantee arrangements in relation to: [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

On the base case, in addition, there would be an early release of certain specific aspects of the non-retail guarantee arrangements. The company expects that [...], subject to ratings agency approval, it would be possible to release the guarantee arrangements in relation to: [...].

| (67) | Under the recession case scenario, the guarantee arrangements would be withdrawn at the same time as on the base case subject to rating agency and regulatory capital (FSA) considerations, which could mean that the guarantee arrangements would be required until about 2013. The precise timing of the release of the guarantee arrangements would be driven by capital requirements and market conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Under the recession case scenario, the guarantee arrangements would be withdrawn at the same time as on the base case subject to rating agency and regulatory capital (FSA) considerations, which could mean that the guarantee arrangements would be required until about 2013. The precise timing of the release of the guarantee arrangements would be driven by capital requirements and market conditions.

2.3.5.5.   Retention of “Northern Rock” brand

| (68) | Although retail customer confidence has been eroded, the brand retains strong loyalty with certain customer groups (in particular in the north-east of England and with IFAs) and, in the light of evidence from recent customer focus groups, the company believes that the credibility of the brand can be restored. It therefore proposes to retain the “Northern Rock” branding, although a continuous detailed research programme would be undertaken to confirm the validity of this strategy. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Although retail customer confidence has been eroded, the brand retains strong loyalty with certain customer groups (in particular in the north-east of England and with IFAs) and, in the light of evidence from recent customer focus groups, the company believes that the credibility of the brand can be restored. It therefore proposes to retain the “Northern Rock” branding, although a continuous detailed research programme would be undertaken to confirm the validity of this strategy.

2.3.5.6.   Management

| (69) | There has been a significant change in the composition of the board with the appointment of a new executive Chairman, Ron Sandler, a new Chief Financial Officer, Ann Godbehere, and three new non-executive directors appointed by the Government: Tom Scholar from the Treasury, Philip Remnant from the Shareholder Executive and Stephen Hester, the former chief operating officer of Abbey National plc. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

There has been a significant change in the composition of the board with the appointment of a new executive Chairman, Ron Sandler, a new Chief Financial Officer, Ann Godbehere, and three new non-executive directors appointed by the Government: Tom Scholar from the Treasury, Philip Remnant from the Shareholder Executive and Stephen Hester, the former chief operating officer of Abbey National plc.

2.3.5.7.   Preparing the company to return to the private sector

| (70) | Although no final decisions can be made on timing, the plan envisages the return of the company to private sector ownership [...]. This could take the form of either a sale or flotation of the business. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Although no final decisions can be made on timing, the plan envisages the return of the company to private sector ownership [...]. This could take the form of either a sale or flotation of the business.

2.3.5.8.   Alternative scenarios

| (71) | The plan also involves three alternative scenarios: |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The plan also involves three alternative scenarios:

| (72) | An “upside” scenario, under which a more benign market outlook and higher redemption rates enable the company to achieve accelerated repayment of the BoE/Treasury financing and earlier release of guarantee arrangements. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

An “upside” scenario, under which a more benign market outlook and higher redemption rates enable the company to achieve accelerated repayment of the BoE/Treasury financing and earlier release of guarantee arrangements.

| (73) | A “downside — execution challenges” scenario, under which difficulties in implementing the commercial and financial strategy delays rebalancing of the portfolio and a delay in the repayment of BoE/Treasury financing until about the end of 2011. There should not be any impact on the planned timetable for release of the guarantee arrangements; and |
| --- | --- |

(73)

A “downside — execution challenges” scenario, under which difficulties in implementing the commercial and financial strategy delays rebalancing of the portfolio and a delay in the repayment of BoE/Treasury financing until about the end of 2011. There should not be any impact on the planned timetable for release of the guarantee arrangements; and

| (74) | A “downside — recession case” scenario, which extends the “execution challenges” scenario to take account of the impact of a severe and prolonged downturn in the UK leading to significantly higher provisions being made over the period. Repayment of the BoE/Treasury financing would again be delayed until about the end of 2011. Under unfavorable circumstances, the guarantee arrangements may be delayed until 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

A “downside — recession case” scenario, which extends the “execution challenges” scenario to take account of the impact of a severe and prolonged downturn in the UK leading to significantly higher provisions being made over the period. Repayment of the BoE/Treasury financing would again be delayed until about the end of 2011. Under unfavorable circumstances, the guarantee arrangements may be delayed until 2013.

| (75) | The current financial forecasts for 2008-2013 would indicate that on the base and upside case NR would move into modest profit before tax in [...] and on the recession case in [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The current financial forecasts for 2008-2013 would indicate that on the base and upside case NR would move into modest profit before tax in [...] and on the recession case in [...].

2.3.5.9.   Financing proposals

| (76) | Subject to a potential increase in the margin for the BoE facilities and a revised facility fee (which are under consideration) the current economic terms of the BoE facilities (and the Repo Facility until it is repaid) would continue to apply until the Commission has reached a decision on the company's restructuring plan. The current economic terms are as follows:






  (i) | interest on the BoE facilities at BoE rate plus [...] bps margin (as part of the PIK facility); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(76)

Subject to a potential increase in the margin for the BoE facilities and a revised facility fee (which are under consideration) the current economic terms of the BoE facilities (and the Repo Facility until it is repaid) would continue to apply until the Commission has reached a decision on the company's restructuring plan. The current economic terms are as follows:

(i)

interest on the BoE facilities at BoE rate plus [...] bps margin (as part of the PIK facility);

| (ii) | interest on the Repo Facility at BoE rate plus [...] bps margin (which is not part of the PIK facility); |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

interest on the Repo Facility at BoE rate plus [...] bps margin (which is not part of the PIK facility);

| (iii) | facility fee of [...] bps which is calculated on the maximum aggregate principal amount of advances outstanding under the BoE facilities minus the average principal amount of advances outstanding during the life of the BoE facilities; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

facility fee of [...] bps which is calculated on the maximum aggregate principal amount of advances outstanding under the BoE facilities minus the average principal amount of advances outstanding during the life of the BoE facilities;

| (iv) | fees for the guarantee arrangements on new retail deposits of [...] bps; and |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

fees for the guarantee arrangements on new retail deposits of [...] bps; and

| (v) | fee for the additional balance sheet guarantee arrangements of GBP [...] per month. This fee relates to the guarantee arrangements announced on 18 December 2007; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

fee for the additional balance sheet guarantee arrangements of GBP [...] per month. This fee relates to the guarantee arrangements announced on 18 December 2007;

| (vi) | the economic terms for the period of implementation of the restructuring plan, until the BoE facilities are repaid, would be set by reference to the anticipated profitability and viability of NR. They are likely to be finalised during the course of the State aid investigation, in particular to the extent that forecasts and other financial information are amended. The economic terms would be included in a schedule to the amended facility agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

the economic terms for the period of implementation of the restructuring plan, until the BoE facilities are repaid, would be set by reference to the anticipated profitability and viability of NR. They are likely to be finalised during the course of the State aid investigation, in particular to the extent that forecasts and other financial information are amended. The economic terms would be included in a schedule to the amended facility agreement.

| (77) | On this basis, the plan assumes that the cost to the company of the guarantee arrangements and funding costs would be about GBP [400-700] million between 2008 and 2011. The exact structure of the fee arrangements is, however, still being finalised (e.g. the division between fees in relation to the guarantee arrangements and fees relating to the BoE facilities) but it is intended that these fees will be set at the maximum level consistent with maintaining the ongoing viability of the business, and that these will be direct payments out of the business as the sums fall due. However, to the extent that the fees paid by the company under the rescue aid arrangements exceed the fees that the company would pay under the revised arrangements, the plan envisages a retrospective reimbursement of the difference, conditional on State aid approval being obtained, with respect to payments between 17 March 2007 and implementation of revised financing arrangements following receipt of final State aid approval. This would reduce the quantum of losses in 2008 and thus ensure the Company's capital position remains above prudential regulatory requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

On this basis, the plan assumes that the cost to the company of the guarantee arrangements and funding costs would be about GBP [400-700] million between 2008 and 2011. The exact structure of the fee arrangements is, however, still being finalised (e.g. the division between fees in relation to the guarantee arrangements and fees relating to the BoE facilities) but it is intended that these fees will be set at the maximum level consistent with maintaining the ongoing viability of the business, and that these will be direct payments out of the business as the sums fall due. However, to the extent that the fees paid by the company under the rescue aid arrangements exceed the fees that the company would pay under the revised arrangements, the plan envisages a retrospective reimbursement of the difference, conditional on State aid approval being obtained, with respect to payments between 17 March 2007 and implementation of revised financing arrangements following receipt of final State aid approval. This would reduce the quantum of losses in 2008 and thus ensure the Company's capital position remains above prudential regulatory requirements.

| (78) | It is recognised that NR would need to return gradually to the wholesale market prior to the repayment of the BoE facilities and the lifting of the guarantee arrangements. The Government would encourage NR to finance itself via operating cash flow and the wholesale markets to the maximum extent possible, rather than relying on the UK State support. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

It is recognised that NR would need to return gradually to the wholesale market prior to the repayment of the BoE facilities and the lifting of the guarantee arrangements. The Government would encourage NR to finance itself via operating cash flow and the wholesale markets to the maximum extent possible, rather than relying on the UK State support.

| (79) | A liquidity framework document would be developed to set out the circumstances in which NR would be able to access the wholesale markets for short-term liquidity purposes. Proposals for new wholesale funding would be considered by the Government against this framework, which would include a test of acceptable value for money. In addition, counterparty limits and other limits on amount and duration would be set out in this liquidity framework document. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

A liquidity framework document would be developed to set out the circumstances in which NR would be able to access the wholesale markets for short-term liquidity purposes. Proposals for new wholesale funding would be considered by the Government against this framework, which would include a test of acceptable value for money. In addition, counterparty limits and other limits on amount and duration would be set out in this liquidity framework document.

2.3.6.   Avoidance of undue distortions of competition and mitigating measures

| (80) | The Government is prepared to commit to the following specific compensatory measures reflecting the company's current base case plan:






  (i) | a targeted reduction in the balance sheet by [...] % to about GBP 48-53 billion by 2011; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(80)

The Government is prepared to commit to the following specific compensatory measures reflecting the company's current base case plan:

(i)

a targeted reduction in the balance sheet by [...] % to about GBP 48-53 billion by 2011;

| (ii) | a reduction of new residential mortgage origination from (on the base case) about GBP 30-35 billion in 2007 to about GBP 18-23 billion in total for the four years from 2008 to 2011, and in any event within the limits of the market share cap on gross new lending. This would clearly benefit its rivals who would be able to take up the additional demand; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

a reduction of new residential mortgage origination from (on the base case) about GBP 30-35 billion in 2007 to about GBP 18-23 billion in total for the four years from 2008 to 2011, and in any event within the limits of the market share cap on gross new lending. This would clearly benefit its rivals who would be able to take up the additional demand;

| (iii) | a commitment to an aggressive redemption policy including the active encouragement of redeeming customers to move to competitors; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

a commitment to an aggressive redemption policy including the active encouragement of redeeming customers to move to competitors;

| (iv) | closure and run-off of NR's operations in Denmark in 2008 and a commitment not to expand in other EU markets before 2011; |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

closure and run-off of NR's operations in Denmark in 2008 and a commitment not to expand in other EU markets before 2011;

| (v) | a commitment to a “Competitive Charter”, described further below, which would set out the basis on which the business would compete in the retail savings and mortgage lending markets. Again, this would facilitate rivals in attracting the re-mortgage business of NR's existing customers; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

a commitment to a “Competitive Charter”, described further below, which would set out the basis on which the business would compete in the retail savings and mortgage lending markets. Again, this would facilitate rivals in attracting the re-mortgage business of NR's existing customers;

| (vi) | a commitment to withdraw from unsecured personal lending and commercial lending for the restructuring period. A withdrawal would directly benefit rivals; |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

a commitment to withdraw from unsecured personal lending and commercial lending for the restructuring period. A withdrawal would directly benefit rivals;

| (vii) | a commitment not to increase the overall number of branches in the UK. |
| --- | --- |

(vii)

a commitment not to increase the overall number of branches in the UK.

| (81) | According to the UK authorities, competition in the marketplace for deposits and lending is based on a complex set of factors e.g. product availability and flexibility, speed and quality of service, brand reputation, channel offering and pricing features (rates, fees, charges, structure). This complexity of product design and day-to-day competitive activity in the market prevents effective management of price controls based in real time. However, NR would commit to a published “Competitive Charter” which would ensure that NR would not be able to use its Government support in order to compete unfairly in the market. The Competitive Charter would be designed to ensure that NR has no sustained presence as market leader, whilst allowing the company sufficient flexibility to take account of seasonal changes and tactical variations which mean that the levels of deposits and lending, and the competitive positioning of NR, would fluctuate (for example, the business can see a significant outflow of deposits as a result of a large number of fixed term deposits maturing, or may see a significant inflow as a result of rate cuts by competitors which make NR products more competitive). The Competitive Charter would include commitments that:






  (i) | NR would not promote its Government backing in any market; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(81)

According to the UK authorities, competition in the marketplace for deposits and lending is based on a complex set of factors e.g. product availability and flexibility, speed and quality of service, brand reputation, channel offering and pricing features (rates, fees, charges, structure). This complexity of product design and day-to-day competitive activity in the market prevents effective management of price controls based in real time. However, NR would commit to a published “Competitive Charter” which would ensure that NR would not be able to use its Government support in order to compete unfairly in the market. The Competitive Charter would be designed to ensure that NR has no sustained presence as market leader, whilst allowing the company sufficient flexibility to take account of seasonal changes and tactical variations which mean that the levels of deposits and lending, and the competitive positioning of NR, would fluctuate (for example, the business can see a significant outflow of deposits as a result of a large number of fixed term deposits maturing, or may see a significant inflow as a result of rate cuts by competitors which make NR products more competitive). The Competitive Charter would include commitments that:

(i)

NR would not promote its Government backing in any market;

| (ii) | NR would not allow its share of retail deposit balances to exceed 1,5 % in the UK and [0,8-1] % in Ireland (well below its historic levels); |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

NR would not allow its share of retail deposit balances to exceed 1,5 % in the UK and [0,8-1] % in Ireland (well below its historic levels);

| (iii) | NR would limit its share of gross new mortgage origination to below 2,5 % in any calendar year; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

NR would limit its share of gross new mortgage origination to below 2,5 % in any calendar year;

| (iv) | NR would ensure that it would not hold [...] ranking [...] in [...] product categories, [...] in [...]; |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

NR would ensure that it would not hold [...] ranking [...] in [...] product categories, [...] in [...];

| (v) | NR would strive to differentiate itself on the basis of its service levels and product innovation, rather than simply on price; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

NR would strive to differentiate itself on the basis of its service levels and product innovation, rather than simply on price;

| (vi) | NR would at all times treat its customers fairly. |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

NR would at all times treat its customers fairly.

| (82) | The UK estimates that NR's savings attrition since August 2007 will in any event curtail its ability to sustain aggressive price-based competition. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The UK estimates that NR's savings attrition since August 2007 will in any event curtail its ability to sustain aggressive price-based competition.

| (83) | The Government currently envisages that these compensatory measures, unless otherwise specified above, would remain in place until such time as the BoE/Treasury financial assistance has been fully repaid (and the liquidity facility transferred to a third party provider) and the balance sheet guarantee arrangements have been released in full. In the event of an earlier sale of assets or a part of the business, the Government envisages that these assets would be sold without the benefit of any guarantee arrangements or Government financial assistance (other than, for example, to manage execution risk), and therefore also would not need to be subject to compensatory measures, even if these continue to apply to the retained business. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Government currently envisages that these compensatory measures, unless otherwise specified above, would remain in place until such time as the BoE/Treasury financial assistance has been fully repaid (and the liquidity facility transferred to a third party provider) and the balance sheet guarantee arrangements have been released in full. In the event of an earlier sale of assets or a part of the business, the Government envisages that these assets would be sold without the benefit of any guarantee arrangements or Government financial assistance (other than, for example, to manage execution risk), and therefore also would not need to be subject to compensatory measures, even if these continue to apply to the retained business.

3.   POSITION OF THE UK

| (84) | The UK Government believes that in current market conditions the plan presented in this notification is most likely to meet the conditions specified in the R & R Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The UK Government believes that in current market conditions the plan presented in this notification is most likely to meet the conditions specified in the R & R Guidelines.

| (85) | Overall, the effect of the plan will be to establish NR as a much smaller rival in the market. There will be a significant reduction in new mortgage origination and in NR's market share. Although there will be some growth in retail deposit taking over the period of the plan, this increase will not significantly exceed the anticipated growth in the total UK onshore retail savings market. NR's share of the deposit-taking market will remain significantly below pre-crisis levels for most or all of the restructuring period and will represent only a moderate increase in share of the total market compared to current levels. The potential for a distortive effect on any of the markets where NR will continue to be active therefore appears to be limited. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Overall, the effect of the plan will be to establish NR as a much smaller rival in the market. There will be a significant reduction in new mortgage origination and in NR's market share. Although there will be some growth in retail deposit taking over the period of the plan, this increase will not significantly exceed the anticipated growth in the total UK onshore retail savings market. NR's share of the deposit-taking market will remain significantly below pre-crisis levels for most or all of the restructuring period and will represent only a moderate increase in share of the total market compared to current levels. The potential for a distortive effect on any of the markets where NR will continue to be active therefore appears to be limited.

4.   ASSESSMENT

4.1.   Existence of aid

4.1.1.   The guarantees of 18 December 2007

| (86) | The Commission must first assess whether the measure implemented on 18 December 2007 constitutes State aid. Article 87(1) EC lays down that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, incompatible with the common market. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Commission must first assess whether the measure implemented on 18 December 2007 constitutes State aid. Article 87(1) EC lays down that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, incompatible with the common market.

| (87) | The Commission observes that this measure fulfils all conditions laid down in Article 87(1) EC. It involves State resources since the State would have to indemnify the creditors of NR if the guarantees were invoked. It is selective since it is granted only to NR. It gives an advantage since in the absence of State guarantees NR's rating would have been downgraded, what would have created several problems for NR, as previously described. As regards the existence of an advantage, it must also be recalled that the Commission has already established in its decision of 5 December 2007 that NR is a firm in difficulty. The absence of access to the financial market at commercially-viable rates was precisely the reason for the State intervention. The behaviour of the State is therefore not similar to the one of a market economy guarantor in similar circumstances. As a consequence, this selective measure provides a clear advantage to NR since it allows NR to remain in the market. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The Commission observes that this measure fulfils all conditions laid down in Article 87(1) EC. It involves State resources since the State would have to indemnify the creditors of NR if the guarantees were invoked. It is selective since it is granted only to NR. It gives an advantage since in the absence of State guarantees NR's rating would have been downgraded, what would have created several problems for NR, as previously described. As regards the existence of an advantage, it must also be recalled that the Commission has already established in its decision of 5 December 2007 that NR is a firm in difficulty. The absence of access to the financial market at commercially-viable rates was precisely the reason for the State intervention. The behaviour of the State is therefore not similar to the one of a market economy guarantor in similar circumstances. As a consequence, this selective measure provides a clear advantage to NR since it allows NR to remain in the market.

| (88) | By preventing NR from exiting the market and allowing it to remain active, the State intervention distorts competition. This affects intra community trade since some competitors of NR on the UK mortgage loans and retail deposits markets are subsidiaries of foreign banks. In addition, NR is active in the Irish and Danish retail deposits markets. Due to all the above considerations, the measure implemented on 18 December 2007 constitutes State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

By preventing NR from exiting the market and allowing it to remain active, the State intervention distorts competition. This affects intra community trade since some competitors of NR on the UK mortgage loans and retail deposits markets are subsidiaries of foreign banks. In addition, NR is active in the Irish and Danish retail deposits markets. Due to all the above considerations, the measure implemented on 18 December 2007 constitutes State aid.

| (89) | It should be noted that the UK authorities do not contest this conclusion. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

It should be noted that the UK authorities do not contest this conclusion.

4.1.2.   The nationalisation of NR

| (90) | As noted at paragraph 47 above, the UK authorities consider that the terms on which NR was nationalised did not provide further aid either to the bank or to its former shareholders. The Commission has noted that the terms of the legislation provide for the discounting of Government or BoE assistance when the price paid to shareholders is determined by an independent valuer. In these circumstances, i.e. if the shareholders are only compensated on the basis of the value of the company without any State support, the purchase of the shares from the existing shareholders does not in itself seem to contain aid to the bank or to its former shareholders. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

As noted at paragraph 47 above, the UK authorities consider that the terms on which NR was nationalised did not provide further aid either to the bank or to its former shareholders. The Commission has noted that the terms of the legislation provide for the discounting of Government or BoE assistance when the price paid to shareholders is determined by an independent valuer. In these circumstances, i.e. if the shareholders are only compensated on the basis of the value of the company without any State support, the purchase of the shares from the existing shareholders does not in itself seem to contain aid to the bank or to its former shareholders.

| (91) | However, the Commission notes that in conjunction with the nationalisation of NR, HM Treasury addressed a letter to the FSA in which it confirms its intention to take appropriate steps to ensure that NR will operate above the minimum capital requirements, subject to State aid rules. Based on this commitment, the FSA did not force the new owner to proceed to an immediate capital injection, different from what would have been imposed on private sector bidders. It is arguable that this formal promise to inject capital if needed qualifies as State aid (15). Indeed, as with any other State guarantee, it seems to involve State resources, since the State would have to inject the amount needed if the capital of the bank became insufficient. Also, it constitutes an advantage to NR since the bank can continue to operate. If the State had not made this commitment, the FSA would have limited NR's operations. The Commission therefore doubts that this specific measure does not constitute State aid and therefore intends to review it. The Commission notes, however, that according to the NR's preliminary financial forecasts for the period of 2008-2013, no capital injection is envisaged even under the downside case scenarios. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

However, the Commission notes that in conjunction with the nationalisation of NR, HM Treasury addressed a letter to the FSA in which it confirms its intention to take appropriate steps to ensure that NR will operate above the minimum capital requirements, subject to State aid rules. Based on this commitment, the FSA did not force the new owner to proceed to an immediate capital injection, different from what would have been imposed on private sector bidders. It is arguable that this formal promise to inject capital if needed qualifies as State aid (15). Indeed, as with any other State guarantee, it seems to involve State resources, since the State would have to inject the amount needed if the capital of the bank became insufficient. Also, it constitutes an advantage to NR since the bank can continue to operate. If the State had not made this commitment, the FSA would have limited NR's operations. The Commission therefore doubts that this specific measure does not constitute State aid and therefore intends to review it. The Commission notes, however, that according to the NR's preliminary financial forecasts for the period of 2008-2013, no capital injection is envisaged even under the downside case scenarios.

| (92) | In the context of the investigation procedure, the Commission invites the UK and interested parties to submit comments as to whether the commitment of HM Treasury to the FSA involves State aid elements. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

In the context of the investigation procedure, the Commission invites the UK and interested parties to submit comments as to whether the commitment of HM Treasury to the FSA involves State aid elements.

4.1.3.   The notified restructuring aid measures

| (93) | The Commission observes that, except the one mentioned in the next paragraph, all the notified restructuring measures are basically the continuation of the rescue aid measures granted by the UK. The Commission has already established in its decision of 5 December 2007 and — as regards the measures implemented on 18 December 2007 — in the present decision that they constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Commission observes that, except the one mentioned in the next paragraph, all the notified restructuring measures are basically the continuation of the rescue aid measures granted by the UK. The Commission has already established in its decision of 5 December 2007 and — as regards the measures implemented on 18 December 2007 — in the present decision that they constitute State aid.

| (94) | In addition to the continuation of the rescue aid measures, the UK indicates that, to the extent that the fees paid by the company under the rescue aid arrangements exceed the fees that the company would pay under the revised arrangements, the plan envisages a retrospective reimbursement of the difference, conditional on State aid approval being obtained, with respect to payments between 17 March 2008 and implementation of revised financing arrangements following receipt of final State aid approval. Such a retrospective reimbursement seems to constitute additional restructuring aid to NR. |
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(94)

In addition to the continuation of the rescue aid measures, the UK indicates that, to the extent that the fees paid by the company under the rescue aid arrangements exceed the fees that the company would pay under the revised arrangements, the plan envisages a retrospective reimbursement of the difference, conditional on State aid approval being obtained, with respect to payments between 17 March 2008 and implementation of revised financing arrangements following receipt of final State aid approval. Such a retrospective reimbursement seems to constitute additional restructuring aid to NR.

4.2.   Amount of aid

| (95) | The Commission notes that the bulk of the aid measures takes the form of loans and guarantees. The Commission notes that the quantification of the aid is particularly problematic in the present case. Indeed, the calculation of the aid element in loans and guarantees is normally derived from the comparison of the market rate with the rate effectively paid by the firm. In the present case, the State intervened precisely because the firm no longer had access to the market, and certainly not in the amounts granted by the State. |
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(95)

The Commission notes that the bulk of the aid measures takes the form of loans and guarantees. The Commission notes that the quantification of the aid is particularly problematic in the present case. Indeed, the calculation of the aid element in loans and guarantees is normally derived from the comparison of the market rate with the rate effectively paid by the firm. In the present case, the State intervened precisely because the firm no longer had access to the market, and certainly not in the amounts granted by the State.

| (96) | The Commission observes that the calculation of the aid amount does not alter the nature and effect of the restructuring aid measures, which is to rescue NR and allow its restructuring and thus keep it — in a reduced form — on the market. The calculation of the aid amount is however relevant to the assessment of the compliance with certain conditions laid down in the R & R Guidelines for finding restructuring aid compatible (it is recalled that for rescue aid measures, the R & R Guidelines do not request the quantification the aid amount in the loans and guarantees). Therefore, the Commission intends to analyse possible quantification methodologies. First, the aid element in each loan and guarantee could be estimated by use of the Commission's reference rate methodology. Second, if NR could not have received the liquidity and the guarantees at all on the markets, then the aid element might be as high as the full amounts guaranteed or granted. Third, the aid element could be estimated by using market indicators like NR's credit default swaps prices or interest rate on credit facilities offered to NR by private banks since 17 September 2007. At this stage, the Commission doubts that the latter indicators are a valid reference point since they already take into account the rescue of the bank by the State. Such a State involvement dramatically improves the chances of viability. The Commission invites the UK authorities and interested parties to comments on this point in the context of the formal investigation procedure. |
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(96)

The Commission observes that the calculation of the aid amount does not alter the nature and effect of the restructuring aid measures, which is to rescue NR and allow its restructuring and thus keep it — in a reduced form — on the market. The calculation of the aid amount is however relevant to the assessment of the compliance with certain conditions laid down in the R & R Guidelines for finding restructuring aid compatible (it is recalled that for rescue aid measures, the R & R Guidelines do not request the quantification the aid amount in the loans and guarantees). Therefore, the Commission intends to analyse possible quantification methodologies. First, the aid element in each loan and guarantee could be estimated by use of the Commission's reference rate methodology. Second, if NR could not have received the liquidity and the guarantees at all on the markets, then the aid element might be as high as the full amounts guaranteed or granted. Third, the aid element could be estimated by using market indicators like NR's credit default swaps prices or interest rate on credit facilities offered to NR by private banks since 17 September 2007. At this stage, the Commission doubts that the latter indicators are a valid reference point since they already take into account the rescue of the bank by the State. Such a State involvement dramatically improves the chances of viability. The Commission invites the UK authorities and interested parties to comments on this point in the context of the formal investigation procedure.

4.3.   Legality of the measures

| (97) | Article 88(3) EC indicates that a Member State shall not put an aid measure into effect before the Commission has taken a decision authorising this measure. The Commission observes that on 18 December 2007 the UK implemented the new guarantee arrangements and therefore did not comply with this provision. Consequently, these arrangements constitute non notified aid. As regards the HM Treasury's letter to the FSA in February 2008, if it were to involve aid, it would also constitute non notified aid. As regards the measures notified on 17 March 2008, they have not yet been put into effect as of today and therefore the standstill obligation is currently complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Article 88(3) EC indicates that a Member State shall not put an aid measure into effect before the Commission has taken a decision authorising this measure. The Commission observes that on 18 December 2007 the UK implemented the new guarantee arrangements and therefore did not comply with this provision. Consequently, these arrangements constitute non notified aid. As regards the HM Treasury's letter to the FSA in February 2008, if it were to involve aid, it would also constitute non notified aid. As regards the measures notified on 17 March 2008, they have not yet been put into effect as of today and therefore the standstill obligation is currently complied with.

4.4.   Legal basis for the assessment

| (98) | Article 87(1) EC Treaty lays down a general prohibition of State aid. Article 87(2) lays down some automatic exemptions to this general principle, but none of these apply to the present case. Article 87(3) indicates some categories of aid which may be considered compatible with the common market. |
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(98)

Article 87(1) EC Treaty lays down a general prohibition of State aid. Article 87(2) lays down some automatic exemptions to this general principle, but none of these apply to the present case. Article 87(3) indicates some categories of aid which may be considered compatible with the common market.

| (99) | Given that, as already established in the 5 December Decision, NR had financial difficulties, the aid could essentially be assessed under Article 87(3)(c) EC, and in particular under the Community Guidelines on aid for rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty (16) (hereinafter “Guidelines”), in which the Commission has laid down the terms under which it may find aid in favour of a firm in difficulty compatible as rescue or as restructuring aid. Aid to such banks is amongst the potentially most harmful forms of aid, carrying in particular the risks of “moral hazard” under which economic operators are encouraged to take excessive risks because they will not endure the consequences of their actions. Rescue and restructuring measures in favour of such banks must necessarily aim at restoring its long-term viability, including a possible reorganisation, whilst any associated potentially serious distortions of competition must be limited to the minimum. It follows that, while measures in favour of individual banks in difficulties may in parallel also pursue wider public interest objectives such as to prevent harmful spill-overs on other banks or the financial system as a whole, they need in all circumstances and in any event to comply with the conditions set out in the Guidelines. |
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(99)

Given that, as already established in the 5 December Decision, NR had financial difficulties, the aid could essentially be assessed under Article 87(3)(c) EC, and in particular under the Community Guidelines on aid for rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty (16) (hereinafter “Guidelines”), in which the Commission has laid down the terms under which it may find aid in favour of a firm in difficulty compatible as rescue or as restructuring aid. Aid to such banks is amongst the potentially most harmful forms of aid, carrying in particular the risks of “moral hazard” under which economic operators are encouraged to take excessive risks because they will not endure the consequences of their actions. Rescue and restructuring measures in favour of such banks must necessarily aim at restoring its long-term viability, including a possible reorganisation, whilst any associated potentially serious distortions of competition must be limited to the minimum. It follows that, while measures in favour of individual banks in difficulties may in parallel also pursue wider public interest objectives such as to prevent harmful spill-overs on other banks or the financial system as a whole, they need in all circumstances and in any event to comply with the conditions set out in the Guidelines.

| (100) | The aid could finally in principle be considered under Article 87(3)(b) EC, which allows aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. However, the Commission would first like to point out that the Court of First Instance has stressed that Article 87(3)(b) EC needs to be applied restrictively so that aid cannot be benefiting only one company or one sector but must tackle a disturbance in the entire economy of a Member State (17). The Commission has consequently decided that a serious economic disruption is not remedied by an aid that “resolve[s] the problems of a single recipient [...], as opposed to the acute problems facing all operators in the industry” (18). Also in all cases of banks in difficulty, the Commission has refrained from invoking this provision, as it already did in its Decision of 5 December (19). |
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(100)

The aid could finally in principle be considered under Article 87(3)(b) EC, which allows aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. However, the Commission would first like to point out that the Court of First Instance has stressed that Article 87(3)(b) EC needs to be applied restrictively so that aid cannot be benefiting only one company or one sector but must tackle a disturbance in the entire economy of a Member State (17). The Commission has consequently decided that a serious economic disruption is not remedied by an aid that “resolve[s] the problems of a single recipient [...], as opposed to the acute problems facing all operators in the industry” (18). Also in all cases of banks in difficulty, the Commission has refrained from invoking this provision, as it already did in its Decision of 5 December (19).

| (101) | The Commission observes that the problems of NR are due to specific (risky) activities of significant size compared to the overall size of the bank. Therefore, the present case seems rather to be based on individual problems, and thus requires tailor made remedies, which can be addressed under the rules for companies in difficulties. As regards the claim that the default of this single firm would have affected other banks and created a systemic crisis, the Commission does not contest that the bankruptcy of NR would have had negative spill-over effects for other banks. However, the information provided by the UK authorities has not convinced the Commission that these negative consequences could have reached a size constituting “a serious disturbance in the economy” of the UK within the meaning of Article 87(3)(b). It can in particular be noted that the risk of systemic crisis was contained by the measures approved on 5 December and that the measures notified for the restructuring of NR are not therefore primarily seeking to address this issue. |
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(101)

The Commission observes that the problems of NR are due to specific (risky) activities of significant size compared to the overall size of the bank. Therefore, the present case seems rather to be based on individual problems, and thus requires tailor made remedies, which can be addressed under the rules for companies in difficulties. As regards the claim that the default of this single firm would have affected other banks and created a systemic crisis, the Commission does not contest that the bankruptcy of NR would have had negative spill-over effects for other banks. However, the information provided by the UK authorities has not convinced the Commission that these negative consequences could have reached a size constituting “a serious disturbance in the economy” of the UK within the meaning of Article 87(3)(b). It can in particular be noted that the risk of systemic crisis was contained by the measures approved on 5 December and that the measures notified for the restructuring of NR are not therefore primarily seeking to address this issue.

4.5.   Compatibility under the R & R Guidelines

4.5.1.   Eligibility of the firm

| (102) | The decision of 5 December 2007 already established that NR is a firm in difficulty. Its situation has not improved since then. In particular, if all the rescue aid measures were withdrawn, the firm would immediately exit the market. |
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(102)

The decision of 5 December 2007 already established that NR is a firm in difficulty. Its situation has not improved since then. In particular, if all the rescue aid measures were withdrawn, the firm would immediately exit the market.

4.5.2.   Compatibility as rescue aid of the measures implemented on 18 December

| (103) | According to point 25 of the R & R Guidelines, rescue aid can only be granted during a six months period after the first implementation of a rescue aid measure. According to Commission decision of 5 December 2007, the first aid measures were implemented on 17 September 2007 and therefore the six month period ends on 17 March 2008. |
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(103)

According to point 25 of the R & R Guidelines, rescue aid can only be granted during a six months period after the first implementation of a rescue aid measure. According to Commission decision of 5 December 2007, the first aid measures were implemented on 17 September 2007 and therefore the six month period ends on 17 March 2008.

| (104) | The Commission has assessed whether the non notified aid implemented on 18 December 2007 constitutes compatible rescue aid, taking into account that NR was already in receipt of rescue aid since 17 September 2007 and that these further measures represented therefore an increase in the total rescue aid being granted to the beneficiary. |
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(104)

The Commission has assessed whether the non notified aid implemented on 18 December 2007 constitutes compatible rescue aid, taking into account that NR was already in receipt of rescue aid since 17 September 2007 and that these further measures represented therefore an increase in the total rescue aid being granted to the beneficiary.

| (105) | First, the aid must comply with the conditions of point 25(a) of the R & R Guidelines, according to which it must consist of liquidity support in the form of loan guarantees or loans. The Commission considers that the measures implemented on 18 December 2007 consist of liquidity support equivalent to a loan guarantee. In particular, as described above, the State guarantees insure third parties that have a claim against NR that they will receive the amounts due under these claims. It is equivalent to insuring a lender that he will be reimbursed the amounts due under a loan contract. |
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(105)

First, the aid must comply with the conditions of point 25(a) of the R & R Guidelines, according to which it must consist of liquidity support in the form of loan guarantees or loans. The Commission considers that the measures implemented on 18 December 2007 consist of liquidity support equivalent to a loan guarantee. In particular, as described above, the State guarantees insure third parties that have a claim against NR that they will receive the amounts due under these claims. It is equivalent to insuring a lender that he will be reimbursed the amounts due under a loan contract.

| (106) | The Commission observes that these guarantees do not diminish the cost of funding for NR below that of healthy banks, since after implementing this measure, NR's costs of funding rose: NR continues to pay the normal interest rates to the various categories of lenders (e.g. bond holders of Granite) and depositors and to bear respective administrative costs, but in addition NR is charged a monthly guarantee fee of GBP [...] to the State. It therefore complies with the condition of the R & R Guidelines that the interest rate is “at least comparable to those observed for loans of healthy firms”. In line with the Commission practice (20), even though the remuneration might be under the reference rate adopted by the Commission, since the cost of financing of NR is at least comparable to the one of a healthy firm, the Commission considers that this condition is fulfilled. Point 25(a) of the R & R Guidelines further indicates that “any guarantee must come to an end within a period of not more than six months after the disbursement of the first instalment of the firm”. The Commission observes that no formal date has been set for the end of the guarantees. However, since the UK authorities undertook to communicate within six months from 17 September 2007 a restructuring or liquidation plan for NR — an undertaking which has since then been fulfilled — the Commission considers that these measures fulfilled the time limit of the R & R Guidelines. |
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(106)

The Commission observes that these guarantees do not diminish the cost of funding for NR below that of healthy banks, since after implementing this measure, NR's costs of funding rose: NR continues to pay the normal interest rates to the various categories of lenders (e.g. bond holders of Granite) and depositors and to bear respective administrative costs, but in addition NR is charged a monthly guarantee fee of GBP [...] to the State. It therefore complies with the condition of the R & R Guidelines that the interest rate is “at least comparable to those observed for loans of healthy firms”. In line with the Commission practice (20), even though the remuneration might be under the reference rate adopted by the Commission, since the cost of financing of NR is at least comparable to the one of a healthy firm, the Commission considers that this condition is fulfilled. Point 25(a) of the R & R Guidelines further indicates that “any guarantee must come to an end within a period of not more than six months after the disbursement of the first instalment of the firm”. The Commission observes that no formal date has been set for the end of the guarantees. However, since the UK authorities undertook to communicate within six months from 17 September 2007 a restructuring or liquidation plan for NR — an undertaking which has since then been fulfilled — the Commission considers that these measures fulfilled the time limit of the R & R Guidelines.

| (107) | Second, the aid is in line with point 25(b) of the R & R Guidelines warranted on the grounds of serious social difficulties and has no unduly adverse spill-over effects on other Member States. On the one hand, since the alternative scenario would have led to the rapid liquidation of Granite, and as a consequence of NR, which may have led to job losses, the aid was justified on the grounds to avoid serious social difficulties. On the other hand, since these guarantees are the minimum necessary to keep the bank viable, the Commission considers that the condition concerning the absence of unduly adverse spill-over effects is fulfilled. |
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(107)

Second, the aid is in line with point 25(b) of the R & R Guidelines warranted on the grounds of serious social difficulties and has no unduly adverse spill-over effects on other Member States. On the one hand, since the alternative scenario would have led to the rapid liquidation of Granite, and as a consequence of NR, which may have led to job losses, the aid was justified on the grounds to avoid serious social difficulties. On the other hand, since these guarantees are the minimum necessary to keep the bank viable, the Commission considers that the condition concerning the absence of unduly adverse spill-over effects is fulfilled.

| (108) | Third, in line with point 25(c) of the R & R Guidelines the UK authorities undertook to communicate within six months from 17 September 2007 a restructuring or liquidation plan for NR, an undertaking which has now been fulfilled. |
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(108)

Third, in line with point 25(c) of the R & R Guidelines the UK authorities undertook to communicate within six months from 17 September 2007 a restructuring or liquidation plan for NR, an undertaking which has now been fulfilled.

| (109) | Fourth, the amount must be the minimum necessary to keep the firm in business during the six months period as stipulated in point 25(d) of the R & R Guidelines. [...], these measures were necessary to keep the existing rating and avoid a downgrade which, as previously explained, would have probably led to the bankruptcy of the firm, despite the presence of the measures already in place. The Commission therefore considers that this condition is fulfilled. |
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(109)

Fourth, the amount must be the minimum necessary to keep the firm in business during the six months period as stipulated in point 25(d) of the R & R Guidelines. [...], these measures were necessary to keep the existing rating and avoid a downgrade which, as previously explained, would have probably led to the bankruptcy of the firm, despite the presence of the measures already in place. The Commission therefore considers that this condition is fulfilled.

| (110) | Finally, the UK authorities confirm that NR has not benefited from any rescue or restructuring aid in the last ten years, with the exception of the rescue measures implemented from 17 September 2007 and of which the measures implemented on 18 December 2007 are the continuation and extension, since they aim at keeping the firm alive during the same six months period. Therefore the notified aid complies with the “one time, last time principle” as set out in points 72 et seq. and point 25(e) of the R & R Guidelines. |
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(110)

Finally, the UK authorities confirm that NR has not benefited from any rescue or restructuring aid in the last ten years, with the exception of the rescue measures implemented from 17 September 2007 and of which the measures implemented on 18 December 2007 are the continuation and extension, since they aim at keeping the firm alive during the same six months period. Therefore the notified aid complies with the “one time, last time principle” as set out in points 72 et seq. and point 25(e) of the R & R Guidelines.

| (111) | From the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that the aid measures implemented as of 18 December 2007 constitute compatible rescue aid (21), in addition to the measures authorised on 5 December, until 17 March 2008. |
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(111)

From the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that the aid measures implemented as of 18 December 2007 constitute compatible rescue aid (21), in addition to the measures authorised on 5 December, until 17 March 2008.

4.5.3.   The compatibility of aid potentially included in HM Treasury's letter to the FSA in February 2008

| (112) | To the extent that State aid is involved in the commitment given by the UK authorities to the FSA, it would constitute aid to NR. Consequently, the Commission would assess it in conjunction with the restructuring aid measures notified on 17 March 2008. The preliminary assessment of the latter measures is described in the next Section. The Commission notes that the letter addressed to the FSA does not contain any limit to the amount of capital which could be made available to NR, and could therefore be assimilated to an unlimited guarantee in the sense of paragraph 3.4 of the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees (22). |
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(112)

To the extent that State aid is involved in the commitment given by the UK authorities to the FSA, it would constitute aid to NR. Consequently, the Commission would assess it in conjunction with the restructuring aid measures notified on 17 March 2008. The preliminary assessment of the latter measures is described in the next Section. The Commission notes that the letter addressed to the FSA does not contain any limit to the amount of capital which could be made available to NR, and could therefore be assimilated to an unlimited guarantee in the sense of paragraph 3.4 of the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees (22).

4.5.4.   Compatibility of the measures notified for the financing of NR during the interim period

| (113) | The Commission has noted that, to the extent that the measures authorised on 5 December remain in place unchanged or are adjusted to the disadvantage of NR, they remain authorised until a Commission decision on the restructuring plan by virtue of paragraph 26 of the R & R Guidelines (23). |
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(113)

The Commission has noted that, to the extent that the measures authorised on 5 December remain in place unchanged or are adjusted to the disadvantage of NR, they remain authorised until a Commission decision on the restructuring plan by virtue of paragraph 26 of the R & R Guidelines (23).

| (114) | The same analysis applies also to the measures implemented on 18 December, since these are authorised as rescue aid by the current decision. |
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(114)

The same analysis applies also to the measures implemented on 18 December, since these are authorised as rescue aid by the current decision.

4.5.5.   Compatibility of measures notified for the financing of NR after the interim period

| (115) | In this Section, the Commission will assess whether the measures notified on 17 March 2008 for the financing of NR after the interim period, i.e. the period of the examination by the Commission, comply with the conditions laid down in points 32 to 51 of the R & R Guidelines and therefore constitute compatible restructuring aid. |
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(115)

In this Section, the Commission will assess whether the measures notified on 17 March 2008 for the financing of NR after the interim period, i.e. the period of the examination by the Commission, comply with the conditions laid down in points 32 to 51 of the R & R Guidelines and therefore constitute compatible restructuring aid.

4.5.5.1.   Restoration of long term viability

| (116) | According to point 36 of the R & R Guidelines, “[t]he restructuring plan must describe the circumstances that led to the company's difficulties, thereby providing a basis for assessing whether the proposed measures are appropriate. [...] It must enable the firm to progress towards a new structure that offers it prospects for long-term viability and enable it to stand on its own feet”. In their different submissions, the UK authorities have analysed the sources of NR's current difficulties. Over the last eight years, NR increased rapidly mortgage lending and funded this growth thanks to securitisation and other secured borrowing. The weakness in NR's business model that the current crisis has revealed is that, were the market appetite for securitisation notes or covered bonds suddenly to falter, NR would need to have access to alternative sources of funding to fund the mortgages planned to be securitised. If at that moment, it also faced difficulties in raising funds in the wholesale money market, the bank would find itself in a liquidity crisis. As explained earlier, this is exactly what started to happen in the summer of 2007, following the beginning of the US subprime crisis. The envisaged restructuring plan seems to address these weaknesses in the business model. In particular, as a result of the downsizing of the firm, retail deposits, which are a more stable source of funds, will account for a significantly higher share of the liabilities of the bank compared to June 2007. However, the Commission has at this stage not enough information to confirm whether a 50:50 ratio of retail deposits to non-retail funding is sufficient to stabilise the balance sheet and avoid the risk of being overly dependent on any one source. It invites the UK authorities to explain why this ratio is sufficient. Third parties are also invited to comment on that point. |
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(116)

According to point 36 of the R & R Guidelines, “[t]he restructuring plan must describe the circumstances that led to the company's difficulties, thereby providing a basis for assessing whether the proposed measures are appropriate. [...] It must enable the firm to progress towards a new structure that offers it prospects for long-term viability and enable it to stand on its own feet”. In their different submissions, the UK authorities have analysed the sources of NR's current difficulties. Over the last eight years, NR increased rapidly mortgage lending and funded this growth thanks to securitisation and other secured borrowing. The weakness in NR's business model that the current crisis has revealed is that, were the market appetite for securitisation notes or covered bonds suddenly to falter, NR would need to have access to alternative sources of funding to fund the mortgages planned to be securitised. If at that moment, it also faced difficulties in raising funds in the wholesale money market, the bank would find itself in a liquidity crisis. As explained earlier, this is exactly what started to happen in the summer of 2007, following the beginning of the US subprime crisis. The envisaged restructuring plan seems to address these weaknesses in the business model. In particular, as a result of the downsizing of the firm, retail deposits, which are a more stable source of funds, will account for a significantly higher share of the liabilities of the bank compared to June 2007. However, the Commission has at this stage not enough information to confirm whether a 50:50 ratio of retail deposits to non-retail funding is sufficient to stabilise the balance sheet and avoid the risk of being overly dependent on any one source. It invites the UK authorities to explain why this ratio is sufficient. Third parties are also invited to comment on that point.

| (117) | Point 35 of the R & R Guidelines indicates that “[t]he restructuring plan, the duration of which must be as short as possible, must restore the long-term viability of the firm within a reasonable timescale and on the basis of realistic assumptions as to future operating conditions. [...] The improvement in viability must derive mainly from internal measures contained in the restructuring plan”. The Commission considers positively the fact that the plan is mainly based on internal measures which will lead to the downsizing of the balance sheet. If the restructuring plan had aimed to keep the current size of the balance sheet, NR would have needed much more funds, which could only be achieved through a slower reduction of the State guarantees and/or by assuming a rapid and full reopening of the securitised notes market and the wholesale money market. This alternative scenario illustrates that the restructuring measures notified by the UK contribute to limiting the duration of the restructuring period and of the aid, and that the plan seems not to be depending on overly optimistic assumptions as to future operating conditions. However, the Commission doubts that the duration of the plan is “as short as possible”. [...] In addition, the Commission has some concerns that, by encouraging existing customers to refinance their mortgages with other banks, the restructuring plan may lead to adverse selection. Indeed, the high credit quality borrowers can more easily get a proposal from another bank than low credit quality borrowers. A high proportion of the latter customers risks therefore to remain within NR's mortgage loans portfolio, which could endanger the return to long term viability. The Commission therefore invites the UK to explain why the restructuring plan can be implemented without overly increasing the risk of the mortgage loans portfolio. Finally, whereas point 35 of the R & R Guidelines requests that “The plan must be submitted in all relevant detail to the Commission”, the Commission has not received a viability analysis, as well as the opinion of the FSA on the plan. In addition, the Commission was not yet provided with the final financial figures of NR for 2007. The Commission has not been provided with the assumptions underlying the base case, the recession case, the upside case and the downside scenarios either (notably, regarding loss provisions, the interest margin). At this stage, the Commission has therefore not been able to assess in details the restructuring plan and to verify whether it was made “on the basis of realistic assumptions as to future operating conditions”. |
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(117)

Point 35 of the R & R Guidelines indicates that “[t]he restructuring plan, the duration of which must be as short as possible, must restore the long-term viability of the firm within a reasonable timescale and on the basis of realistic assumptions as to future operating conditions. [...] The improvement in viability must derive mainly from internal measures contained in the restructuring plan”. The Commission considers positively the fact that the plan is mainly based on internal measures which will lead to the downsizing of the balance sheet. If the restructuring plan had aimed to keep the current size of the balance sheet, NR would have needed much more funds, which could only be achieved through a slower reduction of the State guarantees and/or by assuming a rapid and full reopening of the securitised notes market and the wholesale money market. This alternative scenario illustrates that the restructuring measures notified by the UK contribute to limiting the duration of the restructuring period and of the aid, and that the plan seems not to be depending on overly optimistic assumptions as to future operating conditions. However, the Commission doubts that the duration of the plan is “as short as possible”. [...] In addition, the Commission has some concerns that, by encouraging existing customers to refinance their mortgages with other banks, the restructuring plan may lead to adverse selection. Indeed, the high credit quality borrowers can more easily get a proposal from another bank than low credit quality borrowers. A high proportion of the latter customers risks therefore to remain within NR's mortgage loans portfolio, which could endanger the return to long term viability. The Commission therefore invites the UK to explain why the restructuring plan can be implemented without overly increasing the risk of the mortgage loans portfolio. Finally, whereas point 35 of the R & R Guidelines requests that “The plan must be submitted in all relevant detail to the Commission”, the Commission has not received a viability analysis, as well as the opinion of the FSA on the plan. In addition, the Commission was not yet provided with the final financial figures of NR for 2007. The Commission has not been provided with the assumptions underlying the base case, the recession case, the upside case and the downside scenarios either (notably, regarding loss provisions, the interest margin). At this stage, the Commission has therefore not been able to assess in details the restructuring plan and to verify whether it was made “on the basis of realistic assumptions as to future operating conditions”.

4.5.5.2.   Avoidance of undue distortions of competition

| (118) | According to point 38 of the R & R Guidelines, “[i]n order to ensure that the adverse effects on trading conditions are minimized as much as possible, so that the positive effects pursued outweigh the adverse ones, compensatory measures must be taken”. Point 40 further indicates that “The measures must be in proportion to the distortive effect of the aid and, in particular, to the size and the relative importance of the firm on its market or markets. They should take in place in particular in the market(s) where the firm will have a significant market position after restructuring”. |
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(118)

According to point 38 of the R & R Guidelines, “[i]n order to ensure that the adverse effects on trading conditions are minimized as much as possible, so that the positive effects pursued outweigh the adverse ones, compensatory measures must be taken”. Point 40 further indicates that “The measures must be in proportion to the distortive effect of the aid and, in particular, to the size and the relative importance of the firm on its market or markets. They should take in place in particular in the market(s) where the firm will have a significant market position after restructuring”.

| (119) | In order to apply these principles, it is necessary to identify the relevant markets on which NR was and would remain a significant player. In this respect, it is necessary to analyse the funding side and the lending side of NR's balance sheet. |
| --- | --- |

(119)

In order to apply these principles, it is necessary to identify the relevant markets on which NR was and would remain a significant player. In this respect, it is necessary to analyse the funding side and the lending side of NR's balance sheet.

| (120) | As regards the funding, NR was raising funds from three main markets: secured wholesale funding (24), unsecured wholesale market and retail deposits.






  (i) | As regards secured wholesale funding, the UK considers the relevant market to be non-government-guaranteed secured wholesale funding in a global market. In this regard, the Commission observes, that NR issued RMBS denominated in US dollars, Sterling, Euros and Canadian dollars. These issues were marketed in the US, Europe and Scandinavia. It more recently started to issue covered bonds. Since issuers of different continents try to raise funds from investors of different continents, it seems that, as regards secured wholesale funding, the relevant geographical market is at least European and possibly worldwide (25). In view of this geographical scope, it seems that, even if a narrower relevant product market is considered, the market share of NR was very limited and will remain so. |
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(120)

As regards the funding, NR was raising funds from three main markets: secured wholesale funding (24), unsecured wholesale market and retail deposits.

(i)

As regards secured wholesale funding, the UK considers the relevant market to be non-government-guaranteed secured wholesale funding in a global market. In this regard, the Commission observes, that NR issued RMBS denominated in US dollars, Sterling, Euros and Canadian dollars. These issues were marketed in the US, Europe and Scandinavia. It more recently started to issue covered bonds. Since issuers of different continents try to raise funds from investors of different continents, it seems that, as regards secured wholesale funding, the relevant geographical market is at least European and possibly worldwide (25). In view of this geographical scope, it seems that, even if a narrower relevant product market is considered, the market share of NR was very limited and will remain so.

| (ii) | As regards the wholesale money market, the UK considers the relevant market to be unsecured wholesale funding in a global market. NR issued different types of bonds and notes, including commercial paper. These securities differ from the secured securities because they are not backed by any specific bank assets and cover a wide range of maturities. Regarding the geographical scope of that market, the same consideration seems to apply as for secured wholesale funding. Indeed, over the last five years, NR has issued unsecured notes in US dollars, Euros, Sterling, Japanese Yen and Australian dollars. These notes have been sold to US, European and Asian investors. In view of this at least European and possibly worldwide geographical scope, it seems that, even if a narrower relevant product market is considered, the market share of NR was very limited and will remain so. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

As regards the wholesale money market, the UK considers the relevant market to be unsecured wholesale funding in a global market. NR issued different types of bonds and notes, including commercial paper. These securities differ from the secured securities because they are not backed by any specific bank assets and cover a wide range of maturities. Regarding the geographical scope of that market, the same consideration seems to apply as for secured wholesale funding. Indeed, over the last five years, NR has issued unsecured notes in US dollars, Euros, Sterling, Japanese Yen and Australian dollars. These notes have been sold to US, European and Asian investors. In view of this at least European and possibly worldwide geographical scope, it seems that, even if a narrower relevant product market is considered, the market share of NR was very limited and will remain so.

| (iii) | As regards the retail deposits market, the UK authorities consider the relevant markets to be the respective national markets (26) and the Commission agrees with such definition of the relevant markets. It seems that nearly all the retail customers do not consider making deposits in other Member States. NR's share of UK retail deposits varied between 1,6 % and 1,9 % during recent years. In Ireland and Denmark, NR's market share reached respectively 3 % and less than 1 % in 2006. The market share is therefore limited in all these markets, but it is not negligible. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

As regards the retail deposits market, the UK authorities consider the relevant markets to be the respective national markets (26) and the Commission agrees with such definition of the relevant markets. It seems that nearly all the retail customers do not consider making deposits in other Member States. NR's share of UK retail deposits varied between 1,6 % and 1,9 % during recent years. In Ireland and Denmark, NR's market share reached respectively 3 % and less than 1 % in 2006. The market share is therefore limited in all these markets, but it is not negligible.

| (121) | From the foregoing preliminary analysis of the funding activities of NR, it seems that the presence of NR on these three markets is limited. Nevertheless, the markets like the retail deposits markets appear to be transparent and competitive in the sense that deposits can be switched between deposit-takers without incurring significant switching costs. More favourable terms offered by a deposit-taker, even if with a modest market share, could therefore have significant market effects, forcing the competitors to adjust their prices. The Commission invites the UK authorities and the parties to comment on this aspect, and whether the “Competitive Charter” described at paragraph 81 above, and the arrangements for its enforcement, are sufficient to address any concerns about distortion of competition in the future or whether other measures should be implemented. |
| --- | --- |

(121)

From the foregoing preliminary analysis of the funding activities of NR, it seems that the presence of NR on these three markets is limited. Nevertheless, the markets like the retail deposits markets appear to be transparent and competitive in the sense that deposits can be switched between deposit-takers without incurring significant switching costs. More favourable terms offered by a deposit-taker, even if with a modest market share, could therefore have significant market effects, forcing the competitors to adjust their prices. The Commission invites the UK authorities and the parties to comment on this aspect, and whether the “Competitive Charter” described at paragraph 81 above, and the arrangements for its enforcement, are sufficient to address any concerns about distortion of competition in the future or whether other measures should be implemented.

| (122) | As regards the lending side of the balance sheet, the Commission observes that NR's lending is concentrated on one product, mortgage loans. Indeed, at the end of June 2007, 85 % of NR's assets were loans to customers, of which 91 % were mortgages. That market seems to be national since almost no customer contracts a mortgage with a bank located in another country. The Commission observes that in the recent years NR became one of the largest players on the UK mortgage market. In 2006, it accounted for 13,4 % of UK net lending, 8,3 % of UK gross lending and 7,1 % of the UK closing balances. In the first half of 2007, these market shares increased respectively to 18,9 %, 9,7 %, and 7,6 %. The growth of the market share was achieved by proposing very low interest rates. It seems that this aggressive pricing policy, which was made possible by the low cost of raising funds on the secured wholesale market and on the unsecured wholesale market, has forced competitors to revise downwards their own prices. The Commission observes that, without downsizing, NR would keep a significant position on this market after restructuring. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

As regards the lending side of the balance sheet, the Commission observes that NR's lending is concentrated on one product, mortgage loans. Indeed, at the end of June 2007, 85 % of NR's assets were loans to customers, of which 91 % were mortgages. That market seems to be national since almost no customer contracts a mortgage with a bank located in another country. The Commission observes that in the recent years NR became one of the largest players on the UK mortgage market. In 2006, it accounted for 13,4 % of UK net lending, 8,3 % of UK gross lending and 7,1 % of the UK closing balances. In the first half of 2007, these market shares increased respectively to 18,9 %, 9,7 %, and 7,6 %. The growth of the market share was achieved by proposing very low interest rates. It seems that this aggressive pricing policy, which was made possible by the low cost of raising funds on the secured wholesale market and on the unsecured wholesale market, has forced competitors to revise downwards their own prices. The Commission observes that, without downsizing, NR would keep a significant position on this market after restructuring.

| (123) | From the prior analysis of the markets in which NR is active, the Commission at this stage concludes that the market were NR held and will continue to hold a significant market share is the UK mortgage market. Compensatory measures, which aim at avoiding undue distortions of competition, should therefore in priority aim at reducing the presence of NR on this market. Measures aimed at limiting NR's presence on the UK, Irish and Danish retail deposits markets could also prove necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

From the prior analysis of the markets in which NR is active, the Commission at this stage concludes that the market were NR held and will continue to hold a significant market share is the UK mortgage market. Compensatory measures, which aim at avoiding undue distortions of competition, should therefore in priority aim at reducing the presence of NR on this market. Measures aimed at limiting NR's presence on the UK, Irish and Danish retail deposits markets could also prove necessary.

| (124) | The Commission notes that the measures proposed by the UK authorities should provoke a reduction of NR's presence on the UK mortgage market. First, during the restructuring period NR would strongly reduce the granting of new mortgage loans. This means that NR would only account for a small percentage of gross lending in the UK market during these years. The UK authorities explain that if NR were to stop completely any new lending, this would trigger the rapid amortisation of Granite and different early redemption provisions under different notes issued by NR, which would consequently exit the market. Second, during these three years NR would actively incite its existing customer to refinance their mortgages with competitors. This increase of the prepayment rate entails that NR would account for an even more limited share of the net lending during these years. Third, the combination of the two prior actions will cause a reduction of the mortgage portfolio to [30-55 %] the size recorded in June 2007, which means that NR will account for a much more limited share of the closing balances. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

The Commission notes that the measures proposed by the UK authorities should provoke a reduction of NR's presence on the UK mortgage market. First, during the restructuring period NR would strongly reduce the granting of new mortgage loans. This means that NR would only account for a small percentage of gross lending in the UK market during these years. The UK authorities explain that if NR were to stop completely any new lending, this would trigger the rapid amortisation of Granite and different early redemption provisions under different notes issued by NR, which would consequently exit the market. Second, during these three years NR would actively incite its existing customer to refinance their mortgages with competitors. This increase of the prepayment rate entails that NR would account for an even more limited share of the net lending during these years. Third, the combination of the two prior actions will cause a reduction of the mortgage portfolio to [30-55 %] the size recorded in June 2007, which means that NR will account for a much more limited share of the closing balances.

| (125) | It could be questioned whether the measures described in the previous paragraph are disqualified as compensatory measures on the basis of point 40 of the R & R Guidelines, which indicates that “[w]rite-offs and closure of loss-making activities which would at any rate be necessary to restore viability will not be considered reduction of capacity or market presence for the purpose of the assessment of compensatory measures”. After a preliminary analysis, the Commission considers that it is probably not the case since the mortgage lending activities have not been loss-making, and therefore do not constitute “loss-making activities”. The Commission notes that the problem of the viability of the bank appears, on the basis of information provided, to be rather a liquidity issue (i.e. lack of sufficient funding) than a solvency issue (i.e. insufficient capital following losses). In addition, the downsizing results from a dramatic reduction of its lending activity and from an active redemption policy of the existing mortgages during the restructuring period. It could also be argued that if the State would have been ready to provide guarantees during longer period, the firm would probably not have had to implement such drastic measures (27). Therefore, the downsizing seems to qualify, at least to a certain extent, as compensatory measure. Interested parties are invited to give comments on this preliminary assessment. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

It could be questioned whether the measures described in the previous paragraph are disqualified as compensatory measures on the basis of point 40 of the R & R Guidelines, which indicates that “[w]rite-offs and closure of loss-making activities which would at any rate be necessary to restore viability will not be considered reduction of capacity or market presence for the purpose of the assessment of compensatory measures”. After a preliminary analysis, the Commission considers that it is probably not the case since the mortgage lending activities have not been loss-making, and therefore do not constitute “loss-making activities”. The Commission notes that the problem of the viability of the bank appears, on the basis of information provided, to be rather a liquidity issue (i.e. lack of sufficient funding) than a solvency issue (i.e. insufficient capital following losses). In addition, the downsizing results from a dramatic reduction of its lending activity and from an active redemption policy of the existing mortgages during the restructuring period. It could also be argued that if the State would have been ready to provide guarantees during longer period, the firm would probably not have had to implement such drastic measures (27). Therefore, the downsizing seems to qualify, at least to a certain extent, as compensatory measure. Interested parties are invited to give comments on this preliminary assessment.

| (126) | Nevertheless, the Commission doubts at this stage that the size and the duration (i.e. until 2011) of the downsizing proposed by the UK are sufficient to avoid undue distortions of competition. Indeed, the size of the aid measures (in terms of the total potential exposure of the UK Government) is particularly large. In addition, as previously indicated, NR's growth has been particularly rapid over the last years, hurting competitors who lost market shares and had their margins squeezed. This rapid growth has been achieved by adopting a strategy which, at least with the benefit of hindsight, was highly risky. All these elements seem to warrant a particularly significant and durable reduction of the market presence and the adoption of measures to limit the distortion created by the State support during the restructuring phase. The UK authorities and interested parties are invited to comment on whether and why the proposed compensatory measures are sufficient to avoid undue distortions of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(126)

Nevertheless, the Commission doubts at this stage that the size and the duration (i.e. until 2011) of the downsizing proposed by the UK are sufficient to avoid undue distortions of competition. Indeed, the size of the aid measures (in terms of the total potential exposure of the UK Government) is particularly large. In addition, as previously indicated, NR's growth has been particularly rapid over the last years, hurting competitors who lost market shares and had their margins squeezed. This rapid growth has been achieved by adopting a strategy which, at least with the benefit of hindsight, was highly risky. All these elements seem to warrant a particularly significant and durable reduction of the market presence and the adoption of measures to limit the distortion created by the State support during the restructuring phase. The UK authorities and interested parties are invited to comment on whether and why the proposed compensatory measures are sufficient to avoid undue distortions of competition.

| (127) | The Commission also observes that NR is considering to implement “through-lending” i.e. making arrangements with other mortgage providers in order to be able to offer third party branded products directly to customers with maturing mortgage deals. The business rationale is that this method would increase the probability and speed of redemptions, allow NR to maintain full control of the sales and advice process and by assisting its customer to achieve a good outcome will better maintain NR's brand promise and reputation. At this stage, the Commission considers that if NR would implement “through-lending”, this would limit the reduction of NR's market presence and limit the extent in which the downsizing could be considered as a valid compensatory measure. Indeed, as just described, NR would remain the contact point for the customer and would maintain full control of the sales and advice process. In addition, at the end of the restructuring period, NR could probably rather easily replace third party branded products by its own products and grow rapidly. The UK authorities and interested parties are invited to comment these considerations. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

The Commission also observes that NR is considering to implement “through-lending” i.e. making arrangements with other mortgage providers in order to be able to offer third party branded products directly to customers with maturing mortgage deals. The business rationale is that this method would increase the probability and speed of redemptions, allow NR to maintain full control of the sales and advice process and by assisting its customer to achieve a good outcome will better maintain NR's brand promise and reputation. At this stage, the Commission considers that if NR would implement “through-lending”, this would limit the reduction of NR's market presence and limit the extent in which the downsizing could be considered as a valid compensatory measure. Indeed, as just described, NR would remain the contact point for the customer and would maintain full control of the sales and advice process. In addition, at the end of the restructuring period, NR could probably rather easily replace third party branded products by its own products and grow rapidly. The UK authorities and interested parties are invited to comment these considerations.

| (128) | The UK authorities indicate that if NR were sold to a new owner in the course of the restructuring period, the bank would be sold free of any obligations, and in particular the compensatory measures indicated previously or any other appropriate measures. The Commission doubts that this can be accepted. Indeed, in order to avoid undue distortion of competition following from the rescue of the bank by the State, the market presence of the rescued economic entity has to remain limited during a sufficiently long period, whoever the owner of this economic entity is (28). |
| --- | --- |

(128)

The UK authorities indicate that if NR were sold to a new owner in the course of the restructuring period, the bank would be sold free of any obligations, and in particular the compensatory measures indicated previously or any other appropriate measures. The Commission doubts that this can be accepted. Indeed, in order to avoid undue distortion of competition following from the rescue of the bank by the State, the market presence of the rescued economic entity has to remain limited during a sufficiently long period, whoever the owner of this economic entity is (28).

4.5.5.3.   Aid limited to the minimum: real contribution, free of aid

| (129) | According to point 43 of the R & R Guidelines, “[t]he amount and intensity of the aid must be limited to the strict minimum of the restructuring costs necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken in the light of the existing financial resources of the company [and] its shareholders”. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

According to point 43 of the R & R Guidelines, “[t]he amount and intensity of the aid must be limited to the strict minimum of the restructuring costs necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken in the light of the existing financial resources of the company [and] its shareholders”.

| (130) | At this stage, the Commission doubts that the aid is limited to the minimum necessary for the following reasons. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

At this stage, the Commission doubts that the aid is limited to the minimum necessary for the following reasons.

| (131) | First, while it seems clear that the downsizing of the balance sheet contributes to reduce the aid amount necessary in the next years by allowing a reimbursement of the State facilities and a decrease of the amounts covered by the State guarantees, the Commission observes that [...]. The Commission therefore doubts that, while preserving the firm as a viable independent entity, a deeper and more rapid downsizing could not be implemented:






  (i) | the Commission doubts whether the 60 % redemption rate which is targeted is the maximum possible, or whether a higher rate would be achievable (e.g. [...] %, as envisaged in the private sector proposals); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(131)

First, while it seems clear that the downsizing of the balance sheet contributes to reduce the aid amount necessary in the next years by allowing a reimbursement of the State facilities and a decrease of the amounts covered by the State guarantees, the Commission observes that [...]. The Commission therefore doubts that, while preserving the firm as a viable independent entity, a deeper and more rapid downsizing could not be implemented:

(i)

the Commission doubts whether the 60 % redemption rate which is targeted is the maximum possible, or whether a higher rate would be achievable (e.g. [...] %, as envisaged in the private sector proposals);

| (ii) | it also doubts whether NR really need to conduct new lending of approximately GBP [3-5] billion a year over the period 2008 to 2011 “in order for the company to retain a footprint in the mortgage market, to manage average credit quality effectively, to avoid any cessation of business triggers in existing financing and structured finance programmes (including Granite) and to originate sufficient new lending to provide for the continuation of the Granite and covered bond programmes”. In particular, the Commission does not have at its disposal sufficient information which would allow it to agree with the foregoing claim of the UK authorities. It requests the UK to provide full documentation and explanation of the Granite structure and other structured finance programmes, including a description and status of all the legal entities involved. The Commission cannot exclude at this point that these structures result in undertakings other than NR being beneficiaries, for the purposes of Article 87(1) EC, of the State aid measures under consideration in the investigation. The Commission will be examining this issue further during the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

it also doubts whether NR really need to conduct new lending of approximately GBP [3-5] billion a year over the period 2008 to 2011 “in order for the company to retain a footprint in the mortgage market, to manage average credit quality effectively, to avoid any cessation of business triggers in existing financing and structured finance programmes (including Granite) and to originate sufficient new lending to provide for the continuation of the Granite and covered bond programmes”. In particular, the Commission does not have at its disposal sufficient information which would allow it to agree with the foregoing claim of the UK authorities. It requests the UK to provide full documentation and explanation of the Granite structure and other structured finance programmes, including a description and status of all the legal entities involved. The Commission cannot exclude at this point that these structures result in undertakings other than NR being beneficiaries, for the purposes of Article 87(1) EC, of the State aid measures under consideration in the investigation. The Commission will be examining this issue further during the investigation.

| (132) | Second, the Commission doubts whether the State guarantees can not be abolished earlier than foreseen in the current plan. In particular, the UK authorities have not precisely justified the choice of the proposed dates. |
| --- | --- |

(132)

Second, the Commission doubts whether the State guarantees can not be abolished earlier than foreseen in the current plan. In particular, the UK authorities have not precisely justified the choice of the proposed dates.

| (133) | Thirdly, the Commission does not have at its disposal information on the price which would be charged by the State for the guarantees (i.e. the guarantee premiums) and for the facilities (i.e. the interest rate and the facility fee) and only a mere indication of the total amount of fees that NR would be charged. In this regard the Commission doubts whether this amount could not be higher while not endangering the viability of NR. In particular, the UK authorities have not explained in detail how these premiums and rates will be set so as to ensure that NR's funding costs do not fall significantly below the revenues from the existing loans portfolio and thereby to prevent NR from generating profits from these existing assets which are financed or insured by the State. In conclusion, the Commission has doubts as to the level of funding costs and the premium for the different guarantees appropriate to ensure that the aid and thereby the distortion of competition is limited to the minimum. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

Thirdly, the Commission does not have at its disposal information on the price which would be charged by the State for the guarantees (i.e. the guarantee premiums) and for the facilities (i.e. the interest rate and the facility fee) and only a mere indication of the total amount of fees that NR would be charged. In this regard the Commission doubts whether this amount could not be higher while not endangering the viability of NR. In particular, the UK authorities have not explained in detail how these premiums and rates will be set so as to ensure that NR's funding costs do not fall significantly below the revenues from the existing loans portfolio and thereby to prevent NR from generating profits from these existing assets which are financed or insured by the State. In conclusion, the Commission has doubts as to the level of funding costs and the premium for the different guarantees appropriate to ensure that the aid and thereby the distortion of competition is limited to the minimum.

| (134) | On these three points, the Commission invites the UK to submit the relevant missing information and to justify its claims and proposals, and it invites third parties to comment. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

On these three points, the Commission invites the UK to submit the relevant missing information and to justify its claims and proposals, and it invites third parties to comment.

| (135) | As regards the own contribution that the beneficiary has to make to the costs of the plan, first of all, it should be underlined that point 43 of the R & R Guidelines indicates that “[s]uch contribution is a sign that the markets believe in the feasibility of the return to viability”. The own contributions planned in the restructuring plando not include injections of funds in the form of loans or capital from private investors. They mainly consist in the sale/redemption of existing assets. It is therefore doubtful whether any of these own contribution can be considered as a sign that the markets believe in the feasibility of the return to viability. On the other hand, the Commission observes that one of the private bidders had in February 2008 gathered sufficient promises from investors to make a capital increase of several hundreds millions of pounds, in the framework of a restructuring plan which was similar to the plan notified by the UK on 17 March 2008. It is therefore not excluded that this could be considered as a sign that the markets believe in the feasibility of the return to viability. In the framework of the formal investigation, the Commission will therefore analyse whether this condition is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

As regards the own contribution that the beneficiary has to make to the costs of the plan, first of all, it should be underlined that point 43 of the R & R Guidelines indicates that “[s]uch contribution is a sign that the markets believe in the feasibility of the return to viability”. The own contributions planned in the restructuring plando not include injections of funds in the form of loans or capital from private investors. They mainly consist in the sale/redemption of existing assets. It is therefore doubtful whether any of these own contribution can be considered as a sign that the markets believe in the feasibility of the return to viability. On the other hand, the Commission observes that one of the private bidders had in February 2008 gathered sufficient promises from investors to make a capital increase of several hundreds millions of pounds, in the framework of a restructuring plan which was similar to the plan notified by the UK on 17 March 2008. It is therefore not excluded that this could be considered as a sign that the markets believe in the feasibility of the return to viability. In the framework of the formal investigation, the Commission will therefore analyse whether this condition is fulfilled.

| (136) | For large companies, point 44 of the R & R Guidelines requires that the own contribution amounts to at least 50 % of the restructuring costs. This raises the issue of the calculation of the restructuring costs. Indeed, as already explained, NR does not face a solvency problem following loss of value of assets. NR faces a liquidity shortage, and therefore needs sufficient liquidity to be rescued and return to viability. It could be considered that the amount of funds which is lacking to finance the existing assets (and which was provided by the State as rescue aid — including the State guarantees which prevented that additional sources of funds vanished) constitutes the restructuring costs. The Commission has doubts about whether NR could be held, under the notified plan, to have attracted an own contribution of half this amount. The Commission invites comments on how this condition can be applied to the case in question. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

For large companies, point 44 of the R & R Guidelines requires that the own contribution amounts to at least 50 % of the restructuring costs. This raises the issue of the calculation of the restructuring costs. Indeed, as already explained, NR does not face a solvency problem following loss of value of assets. NR faces a liquidity shortage, and therefore needs sufficient liquidity to be rescued and return to viability. It could be considered that the amount of funds which is lacking to finance the existing assets (and which was provided by the State as rescue aid — including the State guarantees which prevented that additional sources of funds vanished) constitutes the restructuring costs. The Commission has doubts about whether NR could be held, under the notified plan, to have attracted an own contribution of half this amount. The Commission invites comments on how this condition can be applied to the case in question.

DECISION

The Commission has accordingly decided that the measures implemented on 18 December 2007 are compatible with the EC Treaty and that if the shareholders are only compensated on the basis of an independent valuation of the company without any State support, the purchase of the shares from the existing shareholders does not constitute State aid.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty with respect to the HM Treasury's commitment to the FSA in February 2008 and with respect to the measures notified on 17 March 2008. The Commission requires the UK, within one month of receipt of this letter, to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures.

In particular, the Commission would wish to receive comments on the points on which it raised doubts.

The UK is requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission wishes to remind the UK that Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty has suspensory effect, and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

The Commission warns the UK that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.“

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(1)  ОВ C 244, 1.10.2004 г., стр. 2.

1

(2)  OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p. 2.

3

(4)  In the case of the Guernsey operation, the UK authorities consider that the majority of these deposits are from UK customers. These are likely to represent a small segment of high net worth UK individuals who make large deposits in order to gain from interest being paid on a gross rather than net basis and hence gain from the roll up of interest.

4

(5)  Gross lending is total advances, and net lending is advances less redemptions and repayments.

5

(6)  The Bank of England Financial Stability Report of October 2007 indicated that the industry average for UK banks' wholesale funding as a percentage of total funding was 50 %, while for NR it amounted to 66 % in 2006 and over 70 % at the first half of 2007. This difference is highly significant because experience shows that retail deposits are less likely to be withdrawn than wholesale funding in the event of a tightening of credit conditions in the market.

6

(7)  A more detail description of the causes of NR's liquidity crisis can be found in the Financial Stability Report of the Bank of England dated October 2007, pages 10 to 12.

7

Financial Stability Report

(8)  Liquid assets such as bonds and securities that can be sold quickly to provide cash.

8

(9)  Financial regulation in UK is ensured by the “tripartite” system in which the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and HM Treasury have different responsibilities as set out in the Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA of 22 March 2006.

9

(10)  Business secret. Where possible, figures have been replaced by ranges in [ ].

10

(11)  [...].

11

(12)  They mainly concern protection of taxpayers' interests, financial stability, protection of consumers.

12

(13)  [...].

13

(14)  [...].

14

(15)  Case C-13a/2003, France Telecom.

15

France Telecom

(16)  Communication from the — Commission Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring of firms in difficulty (OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p. 2).

16

(17)  Cf. in principle Case Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96, Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167.

17

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG Commission

(18)  See Commission Decision in Case C-47/1996, Crédit Lyonnais, OJ 1998 L 221, p. 28, point 10.1.

18

Crédit Lyonnais

(19)  See also Commission Decision in Case C-47/1996, Crédit Lyonnais, OJ 1998 L 221, p. 28, point 10.1, Commission Decision in Case C-28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin, OJ 2005 L 116, p. 1, points 153 et seq. and Commission Decision in Case C-50/2006, BAWAG, not yet published, point 166, Case C-9/2008, Sachsen LB, not yet published, and Case C-10/2008, IKB, not yet published.

19

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Sachsen LB

IKB

(20)  See Commission Decision of 26 September 2006 in Case NN 16/06, concerning rescue aid to CIT.

20

(21)  Since, as part of the restructuring plan notified on 17 March 2008, the UK notified its intention to prolong the guarantees implemented on 18 December 2007 beyond 17 March 2008 and beyond the date of a final Commission decision on the extended aid measures, the Commission will also analyse the compatibility of these measures as restructuring aid in the following parts of the decision.

21

(22)  OJ C 71, 11.3.2000, p. 14.

22

(23)

23

“Where the Member State has submitted a restructuring plan within six months of the date of authorization or, in the case of non-notified aid, of implementation of the measure, the deadline for reimbursing the loan or for putting an end to the guarantee is extended until the Commission reaches its decision on the plan, unless the Commission decides that such an extension is not justified”.

(24)  Such as securitisation through the issuance of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS), Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) and Covered Bonds. The Covered bonds differ from RMBS in that the payments are guaranteed by the bank. Thus the credit risk remains on the balance sheet.

24

(25)  In particular, it seems that the relevant market is not the UK. Indeed, it seems that NR has not prevented other UK banks to raise funds by attracting funds at their expenses. It seems rather that NR has incited other banks to raise funds on that market by copying NR's model.

25

(26)  In the case of the Guernsey operation, it is believed that the majority of these deposits are from UK customers. Therefore, the UK authorities consider that for this operation the relevant geographic market is also believed to be the UK.

26

(27)  [...].

27

(28)  This also implies that the State could not grant to the new owner a guarantee that if any aid would be recovered from NR, it would receive an equivalent compensation. Indeed, without threat of recovery, the new owner would have no incentive to manage the bank in compliance with the compensatory measures.

28

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| 3.6.2008 | BG | Официален вестник на Европейския съюз | C 135/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2008

BG

Официален вестник на Европейския съюз

C 135/38

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Предварително уведомление за концентрация

(Дело COMP/M.5190 — Nordic Capital/ConvaTec)

(текст от значение за ЕИП)

(2008/C 135/07)

| 1. | На 27 май 2008 г. Комисията получи уведомление за планирана концентрация в съответствие с член 4 от Регламент (ЕО) No 139/2004 на Съвета (1), чрез която предприятие Nordic Capital („Nordic Capital“, Джърси) придобива по смисъла на член 3, параграф 1, буква б) от регламента на Съвета контрол над цялото предприятие ConvaTec („ConvaTec“, САЩ) — изцяло притежавано стопанско звено от Bristol-Myers Squibb Co („BMS“, САЩ), посредством покупка на дялове/акции и активи. |
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1.

На 27 май 2008 г. Комисията получи уведомление за планирана концентрация в съответствие с член 4 от Регламент (ЕО) No 139/2004 на Съвета (1), чрез която предприятие Nordic Capital („Nordic Capital“, Джърси) придобива по смисъла на член 3, параграф 1, буква б) от регламента на Съвета контрол над цялото предприятие ConvaTec („ConvaTec“, САЩ) — изцяло притежавано стопанско звено от Bristol-Myers Squibb Co („BMS“, САЩ), посредством покупка на дялове/акции и активи.

| 2. | Търговските дейности на въпросните предприятия са:






  — | за Nordic Capital: компания за частни капиталови инвестиции, |
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2.

Търговските дейности на въпросните предприятия са:

—

за Nordic Capital: компания за частни капиталови инвестиции,

| — | за ConvaTec: производство, маркетинг и продажба на усъвършенствани продукти за третиране на рани, остомия и фекална инконтиненция. |
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—

за ConvaTec: производство, маркетинг и продажба на усъвършенствани продукти за третиране на рани, остомия и фекална инконтиненция.

| 3. | След предварително проучване Комисията констатира, че операцията, за която е уведомена, би могла да попадне в обхвата на Регламент (ЕО) No 139/2004. Въпреки това Комисията си запазва правото на окончателно решение по тази точка. |
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3.

След предварително проучване Комисията констатира, че операцията, за която е уведомена, би могла да попадне в обхвата на Регламент (ЕО) No 139/2004. Въпреки това Комисията си запазва правото на окончателно решение по тази точка.

| 4. | Комисията приканва заинтересованите трети страни да й представят евентуалните си забележки по планираната операция.
  Забележките трябва да бъдат получени от Комисията не по-късно от 10 дни след датата на настоящата публикация. Забележките могат да се изпращат до Комисията по факс ((32-2) 296 43 01 или 296 72 44) или по пощата, с позоваване на COMP/M.5190 — Nordic Capital/ConvaTec, на следния адрес:





  European Commission |
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| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| J-70 |
| B-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |

4.

Комисията приканва заинтересованите трети страни да й представят евентуалните си забележки по планираната операция.

Забележките трябва да бъдат получени от Комисията не по-късно от 10 дни след датата на настоящата публикация. Забележките могат да се изпращат до Комисията по факс ((32-2) 296 43 01 или 296 72 44) или по пощата, с позоваване на COMP/M.5190 — Nordic Capital/ConvaTec, на следния адрес:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

J-70

B-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

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(1)  ОВ L 24, 29.1.2004 г., стp. 1.

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