United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 21, 2019*

Decided November 25, 2019

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 19‐1571

RAFEAL D. NEWSON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF PIMA COUNTY

and MILWAUKEE COUNTY CIRCUIT

COURT,   

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 19‐C‐219

William C. Griesbach,

Judge.

O R D E R

Rafeal Newson was convicted of first‐degree intentional homicide and sentenced

to life in prison after he was extradited from Arizona, where he was incarcerated, to

Wisconsin pursuant to a detainer. Almost twenty years after his conviction, he sued the

                                                 

* The defendants were not served with process and are not participating in this

appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19‐1571    Page 2

Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court for

violating the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, during his

extradition. At screening, the district court ruled that it lacked subject‐matter

jurisdiction over the case, which Newson framed as a breach‐of‐contract suit, because

the parties were not completely diverse. See 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Because Newson’s

complaint fails to state a valid claim for relief, and any attempt at amendment would be

futile, we affirm the district court’s dismissal.

In his complaint, Newson claims that the defendants violated the Detainer Act

when an Arizona judge allowed him to be extradited to Wisconsin in 2000 based on an

allegedly incomplete extradition packet. According to Newson, the 1996 criminal

complaint on which the extradition was based had never been filed or approved by a

judge. He seeks $32 million in compensatory and punitive damages for his loss of

liberty. He also alleges that he was “kidnapped” from Arizona and is now being “held

in slavery,” and he asks the district court to order the State of Wisconsin to dismiss the

criminal complaint on which he was convicted.

The district court dismissed Newson’s case at screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b),

for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction. Taking Newson’s breach‐of‐contract theory at

face value, the court concluded that Newson’s complaint did not present a federal

question and that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because Newson and the

Milwaukee County Circuit Court were both citizens of Wisconsin. The court then

denied Newson’s two motions for reconsideration, determining that he failed to state a

claim and that any attempt at amending the complaint would be futile.   

On appeal, Newson continues to insist that the defendants breached a contract

with him and contends that the district court should have either dismissed the

Milwaukee County Circuit Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 or allowed

him to amend the complaint to cure the lack of complete diversity. Newson is correct

that a court can cure jurisdictional defects by dismissing non‐essential parties, see Hurley

v. Motor Coach Industries, 222 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2000); FED. R. CIV. P. 21, and that

litigants in this circuit are ordinarily given the chance to amend their pleadings once as

a matter of course. See Luevano v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir.

2013). But dismissal may still be appropriate if “it is certain from the face of the

complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” O’Boyle v.

Real Time Resolutions, Inc., 910 F.3d 338, 347 (7th Cir. 2018). That is true here.   

In reviewing federal complaints, courts must analyze a plaintiff’s claims, not his

legal theories. See Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2012). To state a claim, a
No. 19‐1571    Page 3

plaintiff need only narrate his claim with sufficient clarity to put the defendants on

notice of its basis; he need not present legal theories at all. See Chapman v. Yellow Cab

Coop., 875 F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2017). Instead of simply adopting Newson’s breach‐of‐

contract theory, then, the district court should have considered whether his allegations

of an illegal extradition could plausibly entitle him to relief under any theory.

Newson’s suit alleges that he was extradited to Wisconsin in violation of the

Detainer Act. A suit to enforce the violation of a federal law by state actors is one under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner can state a claim under

that statute for violations of the Detainer Act. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 449 (1981).

(There are also direct remedies under the Act, but those are not relevant here.) The

district court was therefore incorrect to state in its order on reconsideration that

Newson’s complaint “raised no constitutional questions or questions of federal law.”   

Nevertheless, we agree that dismissal of the complaint was proper. Leaving aside

the problem of seeking damages from an entity of the state, which is not a “person”

under § 1983, see Will v. Mich. Depʹt of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), or from state

judges over performance of their judicial functions, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

359–60 (1978), Newson cannot state a claim under § 1983 for the wrong he alleges—one

that took place decades ago. His request for damages for “illegal extradition” and

incarceration is blocked by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Unless his Wisconsin

conviction or sentence has been invalidated, his claim necessarily impugns their

validity. Id. at 487; Knowlin v. Thompson, 207 F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 2000).   

A dismissal under Heck is without prejudice and does not prevent Newson from

seeking relief that is not inconsistent with the validity of his conviction. See Polzin v.

Gage, 636 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2011). For example, if Newson seeks release from

prison, he must proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, naming his custodian as the

respondent. We express no opinion, however, on whether the violation of the Detainer

Act of which Newson complains (extradition on the basis of an allegedly incomplete

extradition package) could lend itself to collateral review. See Reed v. Clark, 984 F.2d 209,

212 (7th Cir. 1993).   

We assess Newson with one “strike” for filing his complaint and a second for

pursuing this appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Flynn v. Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990, 992

(7th Cir. 2016). Although he did not proceed in forma pauperis in the district court or in

this court (where he paid the filing fee after the appeal was certified to not be in good

faith), he is a “prisoner” within the meaning of § 1915(h) and therefore can incur strikes

to deter groundless litigation in the future. The judgment is AFFIRMED.