Grand Honda argues it is inappropriate for Imtiazuddin to asserthe is seeking enforcement of the
statutes as private attomey general. Moreover, Grand Honda contends Imtiazuddin’s motivation in filing
suit and the issue of attorneys’ fees are irrelevant. Therefore, Grand Honda asserts the court should
prohibit Imtiazuddin from presenting evidence regarding his motivation for this lawsuit to the extent recovery
of attorneys’ fees or the public good is concerned.

The parties’ arguments are totally deficient and completely lack legal support. To the extent the
court can make any sense out of them, it appears both parties agree that discussion of attorneys’ fees to
the jury is inappropriate. Indeed, the parties’ J joint Pre-Trial Order indicates Imtiazuddin seeks attorneys”
fees “in the amount determined by the Court.” PTO at Tab I. Evidence regarding attorneys’ fees is
therefore irrelevant and the motion in limine is granted. Neither party shall mention attorneys’ fees in the
jury’s presence. Nor may Imtiazuddin refer to his purported status as a private attorney general or that he
brought the suit in the public’s interest.

Ill. Settlements and Circuit Court Case

Imtiazuddin seeks to exclude evidence regarding: (1) his settlements with other defendants; and (2)
his pending action in the Circuit Court of Cook County. He argues evidence of settlement agreements with
other defendants is irrelevant because those defendants were not joint tortfeasors who acted with Grand
Honda. Rather, the settlements involved independent allegations of consumer protection violations and
have no bearing on the determination of the disputed facts fortrial. Further, Imtiazuddin alleges he is
prosecuting a separate lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County regarding alleged illegal repossession
ofatrade-in vehicle. He argues the issues before the Circuit Court have no bearing on the ECOA and

FCRA violations here and the evidence is irrelevant.

4



in obtaining financing. Because the law states that “selecting creditors to whom application will be made”
does not make one a “creditor” for purposes of the ECOA, Grand Honda contends the evidence is relevant
to its defense that it acted as a car seller as opposed to a creditor. Further, Grand Honda asserts
Imtiazuddin’s reliance on state case law is erroneous.

The Seventh Circuit recently explained that merely selecting creditors to whom applications will be
made does not make one a creditor under the ECOA. Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet Oldsmobile,
Inc., 362 F.3d 971, 980 (7th Cir. 2004). “There is a continuum of participation in a credit decision from
no participation, to referring applicants to the decision maker, to final decisionmaking. Atsome pointalong
the continuum, a party becomes a creditor for purposes of the notification requirements of the Act.” Jd.

This court denied the parties’ summary judgment motions, in part, because a genuine issue of material facts
exists as to whether Grand Honda’s financing activities rise to the level of regular participation in credit
decisions. Therefore, the form is relevant to the issue of Grand Honda’s participation in the credit decision
and Imtiazuddin’s understanding. The challenged evidence is not clearly inadmissible for all purposes. The
motion in limine must be denied.

Il. Attorneys’ Fees

Imtiazuddin seeksto preclude Grand Honda from referencing attorneys’ fees at trial. Imtiazuddin
asserts “Congress intended that the federal consumer protection statutes be enforced primarily by private
attorneys general, rather than law enforcement agencies,” Further, Imtiazuddin contends it was within
Grand Honda’s power to keep Imtiazuddin’s attorneys fees to a minimum and, because it launched a

“stalwart” defense, Grand Honda may not now complain fees are too high.


Grand Honda argues Imtiazuddin has failed to produce any settlement documents. Therefore, it
cannot determine whether the evidence is irrelevant. Grand Honda contends it is inappropriate for
Imtiazuddin to refuse to produce settlement documents while arguing the documents are ofno evidentiary
value. Grand Honda contends itis possible the settlement agreements contain offsets or a release of the
claims against it. As to the Circuit Court action, Grand Honda argues: (1) Imtiazuddin has not produced
the Circuit Court documents, despite Grand Honda’s request; (2) the Circuit Court documents Grand
Honda did obtain indicate Imtiazuddin seeks damages from American Honda for repossession of his
vehicle, damages that he also seeks here and to which Grand Honda contends Imtiazuddin is untitled; and
(3) Grand Honda is entitled to offer evidence, such as the Circuit Court pleadings, to show illegal actions
were not the natural consequence of the violations alleged in this suit.

hrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is defined as “evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, waste of time, and jury confusion. Fed. R. Evid. 403. The relevance and probative
value of the settlement agreements and the Circuit Court case is doubtful. There is a substantial likelihood
that the introduction of evidence regarding settlements and the Circuit Court case will be a waste of time
and will lead to jury confusion. The motion in limine is granted. The evidence relating to Imtiazuddin’s

settlements with other defendants and his Circuit Court lawsuit is inadmissible.


snute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Suzanne B. Conlon Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 04 C 286 DATE 10/25/2004
CASE IMTIAZUDDIN vs. NORTH AVENUE AUTO, INC.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly
the nature of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

(3) Qo Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) a Ruling/Hearingon___set for__at

(5) 6 Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—s set for____—_—att

(6) a Pretrial conference(held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____setfor__-—sat__

(7) Qa Trial(set for/re-set for]on__—__at.

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto_____aat.

(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
OFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) MM [Otherdocketentry] Plaintiffs motions in imine {58-1], [61-1] are granted. The parties may not present

ah

evidence at trial regarding attorneys’ fees, settlement agreements between plaintiff and other defendants, or
plaintiffs pending Circuit Court lawsuit. Plaintiffs motions in limine [57-1], [66-1] are denied. In addition,
plaintiffmay not present any evidence at trial regarding his motivation to sue as a private attomey general or in
the public’s interest. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND O: R.

baw 3 On Lor!

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

number of notices

Notified counsel by telephone. of 204
Dockcting to mail notices,
° 19 LOLS Sn ya 4
Mail AO 450 form. 7 dockeiing députy batials “
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
10/25/2004

CB

date mailed notice

courtroom j ey
deputy’s “Lig and pw
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office mailing deputy initials



IV. Retail Installment Contract

Imtiazuddin asserts the parties entered into a retail installment contract on January 25,2004 and
moves to preclude Grand Honda from arguing the contract did notexist. Imtiazuddin contends the contract
was subject to a condition enabling Grand Honda to unwind the deal if unable to assign the contract toa
financing company. He asserts this condition is immaterial because the contract became effective when he
signed the document and became obligated under it.

Grand Honda argues Imtiazuddin’s motion in limine is actually a motion for summary judgment on
contested facts. Grand Honda contends the retail contract was never effectuated because, on account of
its inability to obtain financing, Grand Honda never signed the contract. Grand Honda argues the evidence
supports its position that the buyer’s order was executed, but the retail installment contract was not.

The evidence is not clearly inadmissible. Admissibility of the retail installment contract must await
trial when objections may be considered in context. The motion in imine must be denied.

CONCLUSION

Imtiazuddin’s motions in limine are granted in part and denied in part. The parties may not present
evidence at trial regarding attorneys’ fees, settlement agreements between Imtiazuddin and other
defendants, or Imtiazuddin’s pending Circuit Court lawsuit. In addition, Imtiazuddin may not present any
evidence at trial regarding his motivation to sue as a private attorney general or in the public’s interest.

October 25, 2004 ENTER:

SS) B. Conlon

United States District Judge


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETEN
SYED IMTIAZUDDIN, ) OCT 27 2004
Plaintiff, ) No. 04 C 286
v. } Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
NORTH AVENUE AUTO, INC., }
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Seyd Imtiazuddin sues North Avenue Auto, Inc., d/b/a Grand Honda (“Grand Honda”)
for violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (““FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 ef seq., arising out of the failed purchase of a Honda
Civic. On July 14, 2004, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment were denied because: (1)a
genuine issue of material facts exists as to whether Grand Honda’s financing activities rise to the level of
regular participation in credit decisions, thereby subjecting it to the notice requirements imposed on
creditors by the ECOA; (2) Grand Honda’s argument that itis not a “creditor” was an insufficient legal
basis warranting summary judgment under the FCRA; and (3) areasonable fact finder could conclude that
Grand Honda’s conduct did not constitute an adverse action based in whole or in part on consumer report

information. Imtiazuddin moves in limine to bar evidence at trial.

Ab


DISCUSSION

I Standard of Review

Evidence is excluded ona motion in limine only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any
purpose. See Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T Technologies, 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
Motions in limine are disfavored; admissibility questions should be ruled upon as they arise at trial. Jd.
Accordingly, ifevidence is not clearly inadmissible, evidentiary rulings must be deferred until trial to allow
questions of foundation, relevancy and prejudice to be resolved in context. Jd. at 1401. Denial ofamotion
inlimine does not indicate evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at trial. Instead, denial
ofthe motion means the court cannot or should not determine whether the evidence in question should be
excluded before trial. United States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1989).
L Creditor Status

Imtiazuddin seeks to preclude Grand Honda from arguing it lacks creditor status based on a
document that states: (1) “I understand that no guarantee, verbal or written has been given to me that my
credit has been approved for the purchase ofa vehicle;” and (2) “I acknowledge that Grand Honda has
agreed only to assist me in obtaining financing and is not the decision maker as to whether my credit will
be approved.” Imtiazuddin argues the signed statements are not relevant or probative on the issue of
whether Grand Honda isa creditor because a self-serving denial of status in the form of a legal conclusion
does not make the degree of Grand Honda’s participation in the credit process more or less clear. In
addition, Imtiazuddin refers to Illinois law prohibiting waiver of liability.

Grand Honda argues the signed form is relevant to its defense it had an agreement with Imtiazuddin

that he was given no guarantee his credit would be approved and that Grand Honda would only assist him