[Cite as In re B.S. , 2020-Ohio-6775.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ERIE COUNTY

In re B.S. Court of Appeals No. E-19-052

Trial Court No. 2019-JN-0030

DECISION AND JUDGMENT Decided: December 18, 2020

* * * * * Brent L. English, for appellant. Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristin R. Palmer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appelle e. * * * * * MAYLE, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, N.S. (“father”), appeals the September 3, 2019 judgm ent of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, awarding temporary custody of his child, B.S. (“the child”), to the child’s paternal aunt, T. S. (“aunt”), and granting appellee, Erie County Job and Family Services (“JFS”), protecti ve supervision over the2. child following the trial court’s June 20, 2019 adjudication of the child as dependent. The child’s mother, J.B. (“mother”), is not a party to this app eal. For the following reasons, we affirm. I. Background {¶ 2} JFS initiated an investigation in this case on March 15, 2019, after receiving a referral from the child’s daycare regarding unexplained bruis ing on the child’s face, neck, and ears. That day, Amanda Turner, the JFS intake invest igator assigned to the case, implemented a voluntary safety plan that placed the child in aunt’s custody and allowed mother and father supervised visitation. {¶ 3} Over the next few weeks, Turner conducted her investigation in the case, which included reporting the child’s injuries to the Erie Count y Sheriff’s Department (“ECSD”). An ECSD detective interviewed father, but did not fi le criminal charges related to the marks on the child. At JFS’s request, the ECSD offered to administer a computerized voice stress analysis (“CVSA”) to father. Father initially agreed to the CVSA, but upon consulting counsel, changed his mind and refused the test. {¶ 4} Also on the advice of counsel, on May 2, 2019, father informed Turner that he was terminating the safety plan, 48 days after it was initia ted. {¶ 5} The next day, on May 3, 2019, JFS filed a complaint alleging th at the child was neglected and dependent. Specifically, the complaint alleg ed that on March 15, 2019, the child had “bruising on the inside of his ear cartilag e, blood on the inside of both ears, bruising behind one of his ears, a bruise on his cheek, a scratch on his temple beside3. his eye, and petechiae bruising on his neck.” Although the bru ise on the child’s cheek and the scratch on his temple were the results of earlier accid ents—the child bruised his cheek by pulling a chair over on himself and cut his temple by running into a metal chair—neither father, mother (who had nearly equal parenting ti me with the child, despite father being the child’s legal custodian), nor mother’s boyfrie nd could explain the remaining injuries. The complaint also noted that the child ha d unexplained injuries in January 2019, including a burn mark on his neck, and bruising o n his arms, back, sides, and neck. Along with those injuries, the child had “significan t bruising to [the child’s] buttock * * *,” which mother admitted to causing, although she denied causing any of the other bruising or the burn mark. Father did not report the inc ident to JFS or police and allowed mother to continue having unsupervised visits with the child. JFS further alleged in its complaint that when father ended the safety plan on May 2, it still had concerns about the child’s safety because it did not know how the child was injured in January or

March of 2019. {¶ 6} In addition to the negligence and dependency allegations, JFS s ought emergency temporary custody of the child. On May 3, 2019, the trial court held a custody hearing, after which it granted JFS’s motion and awarde d emergency temporary custody of the child to aunt, with JFS retaining protective sup ervision over the child. Father and mother were allowed agency-supervised visitation wit h the child. {¶ 7} On May 30, 2019, JFS filed a case plan that required father to complete a mental health evaluation and follow any resulting recommendatio ns, complete an anger4. management assessment and follow any resulting recommendations, sign any releases of information required for the agency to obtain progress reports from his treatment providers, and cooperate with announced and unannounced home vi sits. {¶ 8} On June 17, 2019, the trial court held an adjudication hearing on JFS’s complaint. After JFS presented its case, father moved to dismi ss the complaint because JFS had failed to prove that the child was neglected or depende nt. The trial court granted the motion as to the neglect charge, but denied it as to the de pendency charge. After father presented his evidence, the court determined that the ch ild was dependent, continued custody with aunt and protective supervision with JFS , continued supervised visits for father and mother, and appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for the child. On June 21, 2019, the trial court filed a judgment entry reflectin g its findings from the hearing. On June 28, 2019, following father’s timely request, the trial court also filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law from the adjudication h earing. {¶ 9} On August 28, 2019, the trial court held the disposition hearin g where it heard testimony from the investigation supervisor at JFS, the o ngoing case supervisor at JFS, the family’s ongoing caseworker, father, aunt, and the GAL . On September 3, 2019, the court issued its judgment entry on the dispositional hearin g. {¶ 10} Father now appeals, raising three assignments of error: 1. The trial court’s judgment finding B.S. to be a dependent c hild was not supported by sufficient evidence.5. 2. The trial court’s judgment finding B.S. to be a dependent c hild was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 3. The trial court’s determination that Erie County Department of Job and Family Services sustained its burden of proof that it m ade

reasonable efforts not to remove B.S. from his father’s home wa s against the manifest weight of the evidence.

II. Facts A. Adjudication {¶ 11} The relevant facts were primarily presented at the June 17, 201 9 adjudication hearing. JFS presented the testimony of Turner an d Susan Morgan, the administrator of the child’s daycare center. Father presented the testimony of aunt and testified in his own behalf. The following facts were elicited at the hearing.

1. JFS’s case {¶ 12} Morgan, a long-time employee of the daycare, 1 testified that she and another employee noticed “alarming” marks on the child when he came to the center on March 14, 2018. Morgan completed a “Child Observation Form” to document the marks. Under the section for “Skin,” Morgan marked the check box for “ Rash” and wrote in the

blank for “Location” that it was “around neck.” She went on to describe the “Rash” as “ligature mark around neck[.]” She also marked the check box f or “Bruises” and

1 Morgan became the daycare’s administrator in October 2019.6. described the bruising as “small, purple bruise on cheek[,] bot h inner ears / cartilage / and

outer ears – visible trauma to both ears / and behind left ear. ” {¶ 13} Morgan also wrote a narrative account of events for the child’s file. According to her handwritten notes, she observed:

- ligature marks all around [the child’s] neck

- blood behind left ear

- scratch on right temple

- bruise under chin on right side

- post traumatic [sic] bleeds in both ears Morgan said that the injuries she listed in her notes correspon ded with the injuries she saw in the pictures of the child’s face, neck, and ears that sh e took on March 14, and that

JFS admitted into evidence. She clarified that the blood behin d the child’s left ear was dried blood and that the “post traumatic [sic] bleeds” in his e ars were bruises, not wounds that “ooze[d]” or “seep[ed].” Morgan also noticed a streak of blood on the left shoulder of the child’s shirt in one of the pictures. Based on her trai ning in child-abuse recognition, Morgan believed that someone might have inflicted the injuries on the child because of “[t]he continuation of the ligature mark around his neck” and “the bruising of

the interior of his ears.” {¶ 14} Morgan testified that the child did not indicate that he was in pain while she was taking the pictures and that she did not notice him tug ging on his ears during the day on March 14. She also said that nothing happened to the ch ild at the daycare that7. morning that could have caused the marks that she saw. But on cross-examination, Morgan explained that she only provided direct care in the todd ler room, which included an average of seven children, for a few hours that day, some of which was lunchtime and naptime. She also agreed with counsel that she was not “paying particular attention to”

the child and that she did not “know whether he had his hands i n his ears or not.” {¶ 15} Also according to Morgan’s notes, she called father to discuss the marks.

Father told her that the child had been with mother until the n ight before and said that he had not noticed the marks. Morgan sent father the pictures tha t she had taken of the child’s face and neck. After reviewing the pictures, father ag ain said that he had not noticed any of the marks, but said that he would ask mother abo ut them. {¶ 16} Morgan further noted that she met father when he arrived at the center to pick up the child that afternoon, and he again told her that he did not know how the child got the marks, but speculated that they might have been caused by the child’s older halfbrother while the child was at mother’s house. Morgan and anot her employee attempted to ask the child what had happened, but because the child was “ not a (well developed) fluent child,” they were unable to get a response. Morgan note d that father also “tried” to ask the child “who did that to him,” but did not note the child ’s response. According to father, the child said, “Bubby did it.” Bubby is the nickname of the child’s older halfbrother.8. {¶ 17} Morgan’s notes concluded with a note from the next day, March 1 5, 2019, that she asked father if he had any more information, to which father responded, “‘no, [the child’s] mom is denying that anything happened at her hous e.’” {¶ 18} Morgan decided to report the child’s injuries to JFS because of the “ligature mark all around his neck.” She did not make her repo rt immediately because she believed that she had 24 hours to report any suspected chil d abuse, but testified that she “got in trouble” from the state for not correctly reporting the incident. Other than being “a little” concerned that father did not notice the marks on the child on March 14, Morgan never saw or heard father do anything inappropriate with the child or that caused her any other concerns. {¶ 19} On cross-examination, Morgan admitted that she did not have any medical training and that she used the term “ligature mark” even though she did not know whether anything had ever been wrapped around the child’s neck and used the term “post traumatic [sic] bleed” even though she did not have any evidenc e that anyone traumatized

the child’s ears. She was also unaware of whether the child ha d ear tubes implanted or had an active ear infection, and conceded that middle ear infec tions could damage the eardrum, which, in turn, could result in bleeding. She also co nceded that a child putting his fingers in his ears could cause bruises on the inside part of the ear, and that the blood behind the child’s ear could have gotten there from the child r ubbing behind his ear when he had blood on his fingers. Morgan also admitted that one spo t inside the child’s right ear could have been a birthmark, although Morgan interpreted it as “a bleed.” Regarding9. the marks on the child’s neck, in at least one picture, Morgan agreed with father’s counsel that the marks looked like a rash, and she acknowledged that the child’s enrollment paperwork noted that the child has “[h]ighly sensiti ve skin and developes [sic] rashes easily.” In short, Morgan agreed with counsel that she had “no medical basis to conclude that these injuries were caused by some human being de liberately hurting this child * * *[.]” {¶ 20} However, on redirect examination, Morgan explained that the pic tures did not show the marks as clearly as she had seen them on March 14, and, although father was very concerned about the child, he did not offer her any ex planations—such as

sensitive skin or an ear infection—for the cause of the marks. Morgan also explained that the marks on the child’s neck were flat, and, in her experience , rashes tended to be raised.

She said that she marked the check box for “Rash” on the child observation form because “‘Rash’ was just like more than one spot. I was—it was lots of marks.” {¶ 21} Turner, the JFS intake investigator assigned to the case, also testified. When she went to the daycare center on March 15 to investigate Morgan’s report of the child’s injuries, Turner saw that the child had “a scratch on h is temple, he had a mark by his right eye, he had some bruising and dried blood in his one ear, he had bruising behind his other ear, and he had petechiae bruising around his neck.” She described the bruising on the child’s neck as “stippled bruising. Sometimes it looks like a rash, but it is distinctively different than a rash. * * * Rashes are generally raised bumps or areas; the petechiae bruising is not raised.” Based on her training in id entifying child abuse, Turner10. said that bruises on a child’s ears, neck, or stomach—areas tha t a child would not normally hit or run into things with—were concerning to the age ncy. {¶ 22} Regarding the marks in the child’s ears, Turner admitted that s he was not aware when she began her investigation that the child had a his tory of ear infections, had tubes in his ears, or had an active infection in his left ear, the ear in which she believed

that she saw blood. Turner was unable to tell whether the subs tance shown in one picture of the child’s left ear was discharge from the ear infection or wax buildup. However, she spoke with mother about the child’s history of ear infections, and mother said that the child typically experienced yellowish discharge that did not ha ve any blood in it. Turner also said that she had never seen bruising caused by an ear inf ection, and did not believe

that one of the marks in the child’s left ear looked like a bir thmark rather than a bruise. Turner did not believe that any of the marks could be explained by an ear infection. {¶ 23} Turner spoke to father about the marks on the child on March 15 . When she first spoke to him by phone, he said that he had gotten the child back from mother on the night of March 13, and, although father had changed the chi ld’s clothes the morning of March 14, he had not noticed any of the marks on the child’s body. Father did not provide Turner with explanations for any of the child’s injurie s—including the scratch on his temple and the bruise on his cheek—or speculate about what might have caused the

marks. {¶ 24} After seeing the photographs of the marks on the child, examini ng the child at the daycare, speaking to Morgan, and discussing the case wit h her supervisor, Turner11. decided to implement a safety plan because of the lack of expla nation for the bruising on the child’s head and neck. After making this decision, Turner spoke to father on the phone. Father told her that he was on his way to the daycare t o pick up the child, and Turner asked him if he could contact someone else to get the ch ild because JFS wanted to implement the safety plan. Although Turner explained to father that a safety plan is “voluntary,” she also explained to him that “the other option, if he did not agree, would be that [JFS] would have to file for custody” of the child. Fa ther asked aunt to get the child, and JFS agreed to allow her to take temporary custody of the child. The safety plan allowed father and mother to visit the child as long as au nt supervised the visitation. {¶ 25} Turner explained that she had between 45 and 60 days to complet e her investigation in this case. She interviewed father about the m arks on the child, and father verified for Turner that the scratch on the child’s temple and the bruise on his cheek were caused by accidents, not by acts attributable to either parent. In the course of Turner’s investigation, father also reported that the child was injured by mother in January 2019. Those injuries included “bruising on his buttocks, his side, a little bit on his back. He had petechiae bruising similar to the bruising that he had in March on his neck, and he had

some marks on his arms.” 2 Mother admitted to “having whooped” the child and believed that was the cause of the bruising on his buttocks, but Turner said that the parents did not

2 Although Turner described the January bruising on the child’s neck as similar to the March bruising on the child’s neck, the photographs of the Janu ary bruises confirm that they are dissimilar in appearance.12. provide explanations for the other bruises. Turner expressed c oncern that father did not report the child’s January 2019 injuries to JFS or any law enfo rcement agencies until the March 2019 JFS investigation occurred, but conceded on cross-ex amination that father was not legally required to report those injuries and that fath er reported to her that he had taken steps to keep the child away from mother for a period of time while he addressed

the issue with mother. {¶ 26} Turner said that any time JFS has a child with physical injurie s, it reports the case to local law enforcement, which is how the ECSD became involved in the case. According to Turner, father agreed at a “team decision-making m eeting” to take a CVSA—which Turner described as a “voice stress analysis test”—a dministered through the ECSD, and, if the results were “favorable” to father, JFS “ could have looked at ending his portion of the safety plan and returning [the child] to his care.” Turner said it was standard practice at JFS to ask parents to take a CVSA if t he agency could not determine how a child was injured. However, father was under n o obligation to take the CVSA, and after consulting counsel, he chose not to take the te st. Instead, on May 2, father left Turner a voicemail message that he was ending the s afety plan. Turner agreed that it was father’s “right” to end the safety plan because “[i ]t’s a voluntary safety plan.” {¶ 27} At the time she received father’s voicemail, Turner claimed tha t her investigation was still incomplete because she was still “[w]or king with the family and working with law enforcement.” However, she said that she had interviewed father and mother several times and conceded that there was not “any more interacting with the13. parents that [she] needed to do * * *.” Regarding working with law enforcement, Turner said that the only parts of her investigation that remained inc omplete were the CVSA for father and asking the police department where mother and her bo yfriend lived to administer CVSAs on them. According to a case note that Turner wrote on May 2, she spoke with father prior to him terminating the safety plan that day to ask about his reluctance to do the CVSA. Turner wrote that “if [father] were to do [the CVSA], and it comes back with no deception, they could end the safety plan.” Regardless of what Turner typed in her note, she testified that she does not have the final authority to end a safety plan; that decision must be made in conjunction with a s upervisor. {¶ 28} Father maintained throughout the course of Turner’s investigati on that he did not cause the marks on the child’s body. Turner testified that her investigation “found no explanation as to how the child got marks and bruises ,” and she agreed with father’s counsel’s assessment that “because you weren’t satisfi ed that an explanation was given to you, you determined that this was potentially child ab use[.]” So, because she was not finished with her investigation and had not found a sat isfactory explanation for the marks on the child when father ended the safety plan, Turne r consulted with the deputy director of JFS for advice on how to proceed. The agenc y decided to file for emergency temporary custody of the child “due to the fact that [the child] had injuries that we had no explanation for.” Turner also testified that th e safety plan father signed advised him that “court involvement” was a possibility if he fa iled to abide by or chose to end the voluntary plan.14. 2. Father’s motion to dismiss {¶ 29} After JFS presented its witnesses, father moved to dismiss the complaint because JFS had failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child was neglected or dependent. The trial court granted the motion as to the charge of neglect because the evidence JFS presented showed parental “nonfeasance as opposed to malfeasance” and “a lack of the appreciation of the condition o f [the child] and any reaction to that condition * * *,” which was insufficient to me et the requirement under R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) that the child lacks adequate parental care because of the fault of the parents. However, the court determined that the agency had sho wn that the child’s condition or environment justified the state, in the interests of the child, assuming guardianship of the child, as required by R.C. 2151.04(C). As the court put it, “when I consider the evidence, again, in the light most favorable to th e State, I have to say that very clearly and convincingly, if you will, that the Court’s co ncerned. The Court’s concerned about [the child’s] condition, concerned about the la ck of really much of an explanation as to why that condition is.” Accordingly, the cou rt denied father’s motion as to the dependency charge.

3. Father’s case {¶ 30} Following JFS’s case, father presented his witnesses. First, a unt—who is father’s sister-in-law—testified that she had been caring for t he child since March 15, 2019. She described him as a “normal three-year-old; spunky, r otten, good.” She noticed15. the marks on the child when she picked him up from daycare that day. According to aunt, the marks on the child’s neck and ears all faded within a pproximately one week. {¶ 31} Aunt did not initially notice that the child had an ear infecti on, but the next day, she noticed green drainage from the child’s left ear, he w as crying and saying that his ear hurt, and the tube implanted in his left ear fell out. The drainage did not have any blood in it. Aunt took the child to the emergency room, where he was diagnosed with an ear infection and given antibiotics. Aunt did not ask the emer gency room doctor to examine any of the other marks on the child, and the medical re cords from the visit do

not mention the marks. No one from JFS discussed the child’s e ar infection with aunt. {¶ 32} Aunt had never seen father be physically aggressive or abusive toward the child or administer inappropriate discipline. When father’s at torney asked aunt if she had any concerns about father’s ability to properly parent the chil d, she responded, “other than the marks, I don’t have any concern, no, because, like, I don’t know where they came from.” When aunt spoke to father on the phone on March 15 , he told her that he did not know how the child got the marks. Aunt also knew that mother denied causing the marks on the child, but had speculated that the child’s old er half-brother might have caused some of the marks. Aunt did not have any personal knowl edge about where the

marks came from. {¶ 33} Finally, father testified in his own behalf. Father was grante d legal custody of the child in April 2017, but mother and father each had poss ession of the child approximately 50 percent of the time.16. {¶ 34} Father said that he got the child from mother around 4:30 p.m. on March 13, 2019. At that time, he did not notice any marks on t he child other than the scratch on his right temple and the bruise on his left cheek, w hich resulted from earlier accidents during mother’s parenting time. The bruise happened a week earlier when the child pulled a chair over onto himself at mother’s house. The scratch resulted from the child running into the corner of a chair at a babysitter’s hous e and cutting his temple two weeks earlier. Although the cut on the child’s temple happened during mother’s parenting time, father picked the child up from the babysitter’ s and had a friend who is a

nurse examine the cut to see if the child needed stitches. The friend determined that the child did not need stitches, put sterile strip bandages on the cut, monitored him for two hours, and concluded that “‘He’ll be fine.’” {¶ 35} After getting the child, father, the child, and another of fath er’s children went to a friend’s house where they stayed until 9:00 p.m. Whe n they came home, father put the children to bed. The next morning, father overslept, s o he was rushing to get the children to daycare. He did not bathe the child the evening of March 13 or the morning of March 14 and very quickly dressed the child the morning of M arch 14, so he did not get a good look at the child’s body. Father did not notice any issues with the child’s ears, either; the child was not complaining of pain, and father did n ot see any discharge. When father dropped the child off at daycare, the child began crying , which father said was unusual, although the child would be fussy when he was developi ng ear infections.17. {¶ 36} Approximately an hour later, father received a call from Morgan at the daycare asking if he had noticed any marks on the child. When he told her he had not, she offered to send pictures. When father reviewed the picture s, he claimed that he had not seen the marks on the child’s neck or any of the marks in o r behind his ears before receiving the pictures. Father forwarded the pictures to mothe r, who also claimed that she had not seen the marks and did not know how the child got t hem. Mother suggested that they had happened at the daycare. {¶ 37} When father returned to the daycare that afternoon, he examined the marks

on the child’s neck and ears. He said that the mark behind the child’s left ear was dried blood that he easily wiped away. He then spoke with Morgan and reported that neither he nor mother knew how the child got the marks. At that point, father asked the child “what happened and how did those marks get put there, and he re sponded, right in front of his day care [sic] provider, ‘Bubby did it.’” Father conced ed, though, that he did not know whether the child’s half-brother actually caused the marks

. {¶ 38} That evening, the child was acting normally and told father “no ” when father “asked him if it hurt * * *,” so father did not seek any medical attention for the child. Father also asked the child again what had happened. T his time, the child responded, “‘At mommy’s house.’” {¶ 39} The next morning, on March 15, when father took the child to da ycare, Morgan asked if father had learned anything more about how the child had gotten the marks. He told her that he had talked to mother again, who sti ll claimed that she did not18. know where the marks had come from and thought that they had ha ppened at the daycare. Morgan told him that “there’s no way it could have happened at the day care [sic].” Father also reported the child’s statement from the night befor e that the marks happened “‘At mommy’s house.’” {¶ 40} That afternoon, father received a call from Turner inquiring ab out the

marks on the child. He told her that he did not know how the c hild had gotten the marks and that—with the exception of the mark on the child’s temple—h e had not seen any of the marks until he received the pictures from Morgan. Father a lso told Turner about his conversations with Morgan and mother the day before and about t he statements the child made to him regarding “Bubby” and “mommy’s house.” {¶ 41} Shortly after, as father was driving to the daycare to pick up his children, Turner called him again. According to father, Turner had talked to [mother] and neither of us know what happened and

that I am to—that she was at the school and I am more than welc ome to come, but that I needed to call somebody else to pick up my chi ldren.

* * * I said “Why both of my children,” and she said that I—she said because there was marks on [the child] that they didn’t have an y reason—or any explanation where they came from. And I said, “But that has nothing to do with [father’s other child], and [father’s other child] never had any marks.”19. She said, “I don’t care. They’re both in your care. You dropp ed [the child] off. You need to call somebody else.” I said, “So I cannot even come and pick up my kids?” She said, “No. You need to call somebody else. It has to be somebody else—” or, “It has to be somebody who can pass a backg round check or they cannot take your kids as well.” I said, “Okay. Let me see if I can contact somebody.” I said, “Can I ride with them?” She said, “No. You can meet them here but you cannot ride in t he

car with them.” Father said that Turner told him someone else had to pick up th e children because she was concerned for their safety. During the phone call, Turner did not discuss a safety plan with father. {¶ 42} After this conversation with Turner, father called aunt to ask if she could pick up the child. When she agreed to do so, father went to th e daycare where he spoke with Turner in person. {¶ 43} Turner first asked who was coming to pick up the child and whet her that person would be able to pass a background check. After father provided aunt’s details to Turner, Turner again asked what had happened to the child. Fat her20. explained to her again where the marks—both marks, the cut on h is forehead and the bruise on his cheek—came from, and that it was not at my

house.

* * * She asked me what had happened with the ear and the neck, and I

said “I have no idea.”

* * * And she asked me how I wouldn’t know something like that in the morning, and I said I was in a rush. I woke up late, I had to get my kids to school, hurried up, got them undressed, got them dressed, and o ut the door

we went. {¶ 44} It was at this point that Turner first discussed a safety plan with father. She gave him a document that said the child would be placed in aunt ’s care and his other

child would be returned to her mother’s care and that he could only have supervised visitation with each child. He signed the safety plan because Turner “made it sound like that if I didn’t agree to her plan, that my kids were going to be taken away from me.” {¶ 45} Father said that he was cooperative and truthful throughout the entire process and spoke with Turner and the ECSD detective each time they requested interviews. He claimed that the issue of the CVSA came up at a meeting that included him, Turner, Turner’s supervisor, mother, and mother’s boyfrien d. According to father, at the meeting, mother’s boyfriend “recommended that we all tak e a lie detector test21. because we did not do it.” Father initially agreed to the lie detector test because he was willing to “‘do whatever I got to do to get this safety plan do ne and over with so I can get my kids back. My kids are not in harm’s way with me.’” JFS ag reed to ask the ECSD if it could facilitate a polygraph, but it took several weeks for the detective to contact father. When he did, he told father that he was going to administer a C VSA, which father did not consider equivalent to a polygraph because it was “a stress tes t, not a lie detector test.” After talking to the detective about the CVSA, father consulted with his attorney—who

advised him not to take the test—and declined the detective’s r equest that father come to the ECSD for the test. After that, on May 2, Turner called fat her and told him that if he took the CVSA, JFS would end the safety plan and return the chi ld to father’s care. After that conversation, father decided to end the safety plan and to ok the child home from aunt’s house. The next day, JFS filed the complaint and motion for emergency temporary custody. {¶ 46} Regarding the marks on the child in January 2019, father explai ned that the child was with mother when the injuries occurred, and father fo und out about them from the child’s babysitter, who sent father pictures of the bruises . Father described them as “marks on his butt from a handprint, he had marks on his side t hat looked like fingerprints. He had one mark on his back that was old; you co uld barely see it [and h]e had marks around his neck * * *” that looked like finger marks, and a mark on the back of his neck that looked like a burn. Father went to the babysi tter’s house and waited for mother to get there. When she did, he asked about the child’s injuries, but mother “did22. not fess up to it[,]” so father took the child home with him an d told mother that she could not have parenting time with the child “‘until further notice.’ ” He let mother call the child and offered mother supervised visits with the child at hi s house, but mother did not accept the supervised visits. Father did not report the child’ s injuries to police or JFS “[b]ecause I’m my kid’s dad and he was safe with me.” Mother e ventually told father that she had caused the hand-shaped bruise on the child’s butto cks, the finger-shaped bruises on his sides could have come from her trying to hold hi m down so that he did not slide off of his chair and then holding him up to make him stan d in the corner, and the mark on the back of his neck that looked like a burn might have been from the child sliding off of his chair. {¶ 47} On cross-examination, JFS introduced text messages between fath er and mother following the January injuries to the child showing that mother provided this explanation for the child’s injuries at the time they happened, but father did not believe her. Mother’s text messages also noted that she had “busted [t he child’s] ass WHILE [sic] [she] was on the phone with [father] * * *,” that father told her to “whoop his ass good and he wouldn’t act like that[,]” and that mother had toldfather that the child’s halfbrother “was caught Sunday morning holding a blanket down over [the child].” Although father was unwilling to accept mother’s explanation for the chi ld’s injuries over text message, he said that he later spoke to mother in person and, f ollowing that conversation, he accepted mother’s explanation for the injuries and allowed h er to resume parenting time with the child. In total, father restricted mother’s pare nting time for approximately23. one week. Father also talked to mother about not letting injur ies like these happen to the child again, and he did not see any other marks or injuries on the child until March. Father did not speak to mother’s boyfriend about the incident a nd could not say one way or the other if the boyfriend had anything to do with the child ’s January injuries. {¶ 48} Assuming that the marks inside of the child’s ears were bruises , father did not have an explanation for how the bruises might have gotten t here. Father said he was

not “in” the child’s ears and did not hit him in the head. How ever, he said that the child was rambunctious and “pretty accident-prone. He trips a lot[,] ” and that the child and his half-brother “wrestle around and play rough.” He also explaine d that the child has extremely sensitive skin and chronic ear infections. After aun t began caring for the child, he was diagnosed with a cyst and a ruptured eardrum in his left ear, which required surgery. He could not say whether whatever caused the bruising on the child’s ears was also responsible for rupturing his eardrum. The trial court as ked father about his understanding of the function of the child’s ear tubes and any restrictions on the child’s

activities because of the tubes. Father was not the child’s le gal custodian at the time of the ear-tube surgery, so he did not know every detail about the function and care of the ear tubes. For example, he knew that the tubes helped with dra inage in the child’s ear,

but he did not know if there were restrictions on the child’s a ctivity beyond keeping water out of his ears for a period of time immediately followin g surgery. The court’s questioning ended with the following exchange:24. THE COURT: * * * Having heard the testimony and everything, when I see this, I—w hy didn’t it ever occur to you that this had something to do—or th ese pictures had something to do with his ear problems? Did you ever tell a nybody, “Hey, he’s got tubes in his ears and maybe that’s got something to do with bruising,” or whatever was wrong with his ears? [FATHER]: I didn’t—it didn’t cross my mind.

THE COURT: It never connected? [FATHER]: No.

4. The trial court’s decision {¶ 49} When father rested his case, he again moved for the court to di smiss JFS’s complaint. The court explained that it was only considering wh ether the child “is a dependent child in whose condition or environment is [sufficien t] to warrant the State, in the interest of the child, in assuming the child’s guardianship [,]” pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C). The court found that JFS had presented clear and c onvincing evidence that the child was dependent. {¶ 50} First, the court noted that the child had suffered from frequen t ear infections his whole life and had tubes surgically implanted to help with his ear condition, but that father was not “really aware of what condit ions [he] needed to be aware of because of those tubes.” In the court’s view, conside ring the evidence in the light most favorable to the parents, it was possible that the c ondition of the child’s ears on25. March 14 could have been related to his history of ear infectio ns, and it was also understandable that father might not have noticed the marks on the child’s ears the morning of March 14 as he was rushing to get out of the house. However, once father knew of the marks, he did not take the child to the doctor or m ake anyone inquiring about the marks in the child’s ears aware of the child’s history of e ar issues. {¶ 51} The court was also concerned that father “stopped short” of res ponding to mother’s inappropriate discipline of the child in January in a way that would ensure the child’s safety. The court recognized that father was disturbed by mother’s treatment of the child and the injuries she caused, but did not think that “ a promise from Mom that it won’t happen again” was sufficient to resolve the situation. F ather’s insufficient response to mother’s treatment of the child, combined with the court’s belief that the March bruising likely happened at mother’s house—although the c ourt could not say who, if anyone, caused the marks or how they happened—led the c ourt to conclude that the child’s environment was such that JFS was justified, in the interests of the child, in assuming the child’s guardianship. Despite adjudicating the ch ild dependent, the court did not believe that JFS needed to supervise the child’s visits with the parents, so the court allowed visits to be supervised by aunt, as they had been under the safety plan. {¶ 52} On June 20, 2019, the trial court issued its judgment entry adj udicating the child dependent. The court found that it would be contrary to the child’s best interest to stay in the home and that JFS made reasonable efforts to preven t the removal of the child from the home, prevent the continued removal of the child from the home, or make it26. possible for the child to return home by initiating a safety pl an after learning of the marks on the child’s ears and neck in March 2019. After aunt was gra nted emergency temporary custody of the child, JFS provided case management se rvices, coordinated supervised visits, and had monthly contact with the child and p arents. The court continued temporary custody with aunt and protective supervisio n with JFS, terminated JFS-supervised visits, and allowed aunt to supervise the parent s’ visits with the child. {¶ 53} Father requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court filed on June 28, 2019. The findings of fact generally c onform to the testimony as outlined above, although the trial court did not accept father’ s testimony that the child told him that “Bubby did it” or that the injuries happened “‘At mommy’s house.’” The

court concluded that the child’s environment was such that his interests warranted JFS assuming guardianship of the child because [n]either the parents, nor [JFS] offered any explanation on how the injuries to [the child’s] neck and ears occurred. The bruising of both ears and the

blood found around them is not the result of a left ear infecti on. Father denied (Mother did not testify) that [the child] showed any sig ns of discomfort in his ears, nor did he observe [the child] pulling on or otherwise touching his ears. Further, father didn’t notice any of the concerning injuries during the time in question. At best, Fath er was not attentive to [the child] in supervising and assessing his condi tion which is27. more necessary for a child as young as and as non-communicative as [the child] is.

* * * * * * [T]he failure of both parents to see, assess, investigate and treat the various injuries to [the child] places him at serious risk of physical harm. Father’s lack of knowledge, understanding of and monitor ing of [the child’s] ear condition, likewise, places the child at risk of p hysical harm, including but not limited to pain and hearing loss. Further, M other’s lack of appropriate skills to correct a three year old and Father’s encouragement of her inappropriate use of discipline places the child at risk of emotional and physical harm. Lastly, Father’s decision to resume visits with [the child] and Mother without any conditions (other than details ab out what happened) after she “whooped” him indicates that he assented to the behaviors of Mother and placed the child at risk of further phy sical and

emotional harm. {¶ 54} Regarding JFS’s reasonable efforts to prevent the continued rem oval of the child from the home, the court found that JFS tried to resolve the situation through the voluntary safety plan while it investigated, but father unilate rally canceled the safety plan before JFS completed its investigation. The court also found t hat after filing the complaint and motion for emergency temporary custody, JFS28. advocated for and arranged placement with a relative which is l east restrictive under the circumstances. However, [the child’s] in juries, the parent’s [sic] lack of concern or explanation justified [JFS’s] actions and limited their ability to return the child to his home before fu rther proceedings and orders can take place. As a result, it would b e contrary to the safety, welfare and best interest of the child to continue in the home. B. Disposition {¶ 55} Following the August 28, 2019 dispositional hearing, the trial court issued its dispositional judgment entry on September 3, 2019. The cou rt found that JFS met its statutory duty of maintaining and filing a case plan, and that the concerns and goals JFS identified in the case plan were justified based on the inappropriate discipline that [the child] endured in Januar y, the lack of explanation of the March injuries, and the lack of detection of the marks by both parents despite the fact they both cared for [the child] s hortly before the marks were discovered. Additionally, [JFS] discovered that both parents had prior drug and alcohol issues that resulted in crim inal justice intervention * * *. They also pointed to the lack of explanati on for the injuries as causing them to have to rule out mental health, ang er and

substance abuse issues. Although the court recognized that father had “mounted a vigoro us defense at every stage of these proceedings” and that “it appears that Father objects to the case plan in its29. entirety[,]” the court determined that proceeding without a cas e plan “is not an option in this situation, as R.C. §2151.412(A) mandates a case plan.” Th e court approved JFS’s proposed case plan, with some amendments, and continued tempora ry custody with aunt. {¶ 56} The court determined that JFS made reasonable efforts to return the child to the home “in that the removal occurred under emergency circumst ances (at father’s unilateral termination of the safety plan); and now the concern s of the mother and the father have not been satisfactorily addressed, as they are both uncooperative and resistant to any activities before the Court orders such.” The court als o determined that it would be contrary to the child’s best interest to continue residing i n the home. {¶ 57} This appeal followed. II. Law and Analysis A. Competent and credible evidence supports the trial court’s finding that JFS proved that the child was dependent by clear and convincing evi dence. {¶ 58} In his first assignment of error, father argues that the trial court’s finding of dependency is not supported by sufficient evidence because “the trial court cherry-picked testimony and ignored important facts to reach a conclusion tha t B.S. was a dependent child by sophistry.” In his second assignment of error, father argues that the dependency finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence because “[t]he trial court’s findings are not consistent with the evidence and grossly misstate what the evidence actually

was.”30. {¶ 59} JFS counters that father minimizes and mischaracterizes the tes timony presented at the adjudication hearing. Based on the evidence p resented at the hearing, the agency contends, the trial court correctly determined that the child was a dependent child.

1. Standard of review {¶ 60} A trial court’s adjudication of a child as dependent must be su pported by clear and convincing evidence. R.C. 2151.35(A)(1); Juv.R. 29(E )(4). Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence “‘produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be establ ished.’” In re Adoption of

Holcomb , 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syl labus. Clear and convincing evidence is a higher degree of proof than prepondera nce of the evidence, but a lower degree than beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Alexander C. , 164 Ohio App.3d 540, 2005-Ohio-6134, 843 N.E.2d 211, ¶ 37 (6th Dist.). {¶ 61} When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s adjudication to determine whether the judgment is supported by clear and convincing evide nce, the reviewing court

must determine whether the trial court had before it evidence s ufficient to satisfy the requisite degree of proof. Id. at ¶ 7. That is, we conduct a manifest-weight review to determine whether the agency sustained its burden of producing clear and convincing evidence of dependency as defined by R.C. 2151.04. In re C.T. , 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-18-005, 2018-Ohio-3823, ¶ 53. An appellate court will not re verse a trial court’s31. adjudication where competent and credible evidence supports the findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Alexander C. at ¶ 7. {¶ 62} Our manifest weight analysis is guided by a presumption that th e trial court’s findings are correct. In re A.C. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1025, 2010-Ohio-4933, ¶ 40, citing In re Williams , 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 01AP-867 and 01AP-868, 2002- Ohio-2902, ¶ 9. This presumption exists because the trial cour t is in the best position to evaluate the evidence by viewing the witnesses and observing th eir demeanor, gestures,

and voice inflections. Id. , citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland , 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). Thus, a judgment supported by “‘so me competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will n ot be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.’” In re Kristen V. , 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-07-031, 2008-Ohio-2994, ¶ 65, quoting Seasons Coal at 80, and C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. , 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), syllabus. {¶ 63} As relevant here, a dependent child is a child “[w]hose conditi on or environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interests o f the child, in assuming the child’s guardianship.” R.C. 2151.04(C). Generally speaking, c ourts apply R.C. 2151.04(C) broadly to protect the health, safety, and welfare of children. In re L.H. , 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2018-09-106, CA2018-09-109, CA2018-09-110, and CA2018-09 -111, 2019-Ohio2383, ¶ 41. “A finding of dependency under R.C. 2151.04 must b e grounded on whether the children are receiving proper care and support; the focus i s on the condition of the

children.” In re A.B.C. , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011 CA 00073,32. 2011-Ohio-6570, ¶ 15. As such, a dependency finding “requires no showing of fault, but focuses exclusively on the child’s situation * * *.” In re Riddle , 79 Ohio St.3d 259, 262, 680 N.E.2d 1227 (1997). And although the focus of the trial co urt’s analysis is on the child’s present condition or environment, “‘the law does not re quire the court to experiment with the child’s welfare to see if * * * [the child] will suffer great detriment or harm.’” (Brackets sic.) A.C. at ¶ 75, quoting In re Burchfield , 51 Ohio App.3d 148, 156, 555 N.E.2d 325 (4th Dist.1988). {¶ 64} In a dependency case, a trial court may only consider a parent’ s conduct to the extent that the conduct forms part of the child’s environme nt. Id. at ¶ 74. The parent’s conduct is significant only if the conduct has an adve rse impact on the child

sufficient to warrant state intervention. In re Burrell , 58 Ohio St.2d 37, 39, 388 N.E.2d 738 (1979). Indeed, “the fact that the physical needs of [the children] were met and that they generally lived in an appropriate home does not automatica lly lead to the conclusion that they are not dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C).” L.H. at ¶ 47, citing In re Bugaj , 7th Dist. Belmont Nos. 06-BE-24, 06-BE-25, and 06-BE-26, 2008-Ohio- 871, ¶ 32. Unexplained injuries that are atypical of normal childhood inju ries can support a finding of dependency. See A.B.C. at ¶ 27 (upholding the trial court’s finding of dependency when parents did not provide a “viable” explanation for the inf ant’s injuries and no other explanation for the injuries could be determined).33. 2. The trial court’s dependency findings {¶ 65} In this case, the trial court found that JFS proved by clear an d convincing evidence that the child was dependent based on his condition or environment. The court relied on (1) “bruises, marks and blood around [the child’s] ne ck, face and ears” that did not appear to be the result of normal childhood activity and th at neither parent could explain; (2) the lack of evidence that the marks in both of the child’s ears and the dried blood in and around his ears were caused by an infection in his left ear, including father’s testimony that the child was not showing any signs of discomfor t or pulling at his ears; (3) father’s lack of attention to the child’s condition, which the court based on father’s failure to notice the marks on the child either after getting h im back from mother on the afternoon of March 13 or on the morning of March 14, and which the court found was “more necessary for a child as young as and as non-communicativ e as [the child] is”; (4) father’s apparent encouragement of mother’s inappropriate d iscipline of the child, as evidenced in the text messages from January 2019 in which mothe r wrote that she “busted [the child’s] ass WHILE [sic] [she] was on the phone wi th [father] * * *” and that father told her to “whoop his ass good and he wouldn’t act like that”; and (5) father’s

decision to allow mother to resume unrestricted visits with the child following the January incident, which the court construed as father’s assent to mother’s behavior. In reaching these conclusions, the trial court specifically found “the testimony and evidence presented to be credible.”34. {¶ 66} Father takes issue with every single finding the trial court ma de and claims that it is only because the trial court “cherry-picked testimon y and ignored important

facts * * *” that it was able to conclude that the child was de pendent. We disagree. 3. Bruises, marks, and blood around the child’s neck and ears {¶ 67} First, regarding the marks in and around the child’s ears and n eck, father argues that the photographs of the child that were admitted int o evidence at the hearing “clearly show no bruising, or blood * * *.” Father is correct that the quality of the photographs makes it difficult to determine whether the marks i nside and behind the child’s ears are bruises, dried blood, birthmarks, or shadows. However, the marks on the child’s neck are clearly identifiable as stippled bruises in th e photographs. And the photos are not the only evidence the trial court based its find ings on. Morgan, Turner, and aunt each testified that they saw some type of bruising and blood in or around the child’s ears and on the child’s neck when they observed the chi ld in person. {¶ 68} For example, Morgan said that the pictures “don’t look the same ” as the marks she saw on the child on March 14, and that the marks on t he child’s neck were flush with the skin, not raised, like Morgan would expect a ras h to be based on her experience as a childcare provider. Turner testified that she “saw, personally, blood inside of [the child’s] ear.” She also said that the marks on the child’s neck were bruises, not a rash, because they were flat, not raised like rashes are. And aunt said that she saw blood “on the inner part of * * *” the child’s left ear when sh e picked him up from daycare on March 15. Additionally, aunt said that all of the m arks on the child went35. away within about a week, and she never noticed a birthmark on the inside of the child’s

ear. {¶ 69} Bolstering the women’s testimony, father testified that there w as dried blood behind the child’s left ear, and the pictures show streak s of blood on the shoulder

of the child’s shirt. We also note that father did not mention in his testimony that the child has a birthmark in his ear. Additionally, the fact that the trial court used the word “blood” without saying whether it was “fresh” or “dried” is imm aterial. {¶ 70} Based on the testimony presented at the adjudication hearing, w e find that there is some competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s findings regarding the marks on the child’s ears and neck, and the trial court did not “grossly overstate[] and unfairly skew[] the evidence,” as father claims.

4. Father’s inattentiveness to the child, failure to “observe, assess, investigate and treat” the child’s injuries, and lack of understanding of the c hild’s “ear condition” {¶ 71} Next, father takes issue with the trial court’s conclusions tha t he was

inattentive to the child because he did not notice the marks on the child from approximately 4:30 p.m. on March 13 until Morgan sent him pictu res of the marks around 11:00 a.m. on March 14, did not appropriately respond to the marks on the child, and—despite a lack of medical evidence in the record—did not fu lly understand the

child’s medical needs relative to his ear tubes. {¶ 72} We agree with father regarding the trial court’s findings about the child’s “ear condition.” Although the child has a history of ear infec tions and has tubes in his36. ears, by finding that the marks and blood in the child’s ears w ere not caused by an ear infection (i.e., because the child was not showing signs of dis comfort or pulling at or touching his ears), the trial court implicitly found that the c hild did not have an ear infection (at least not a symptomatic one) on March 14. And th ere was no evidence that father failed to seek medical attention for any ear infections or other ear issues that the child developed while in father’s care. {¶ 73} The trial court acknowledged that it did not “have the medical evidence to draw where I will say a medical conclusion about * * *” the con dition of the child’s ears or the onset of an infection, but with the parents’ knowledge o f the child’s history of ear problems and the pictures that showed that “obviously there’s s omething very wrong with his ears[; t]hey were very injured[,]” the court expected fathe r to associate the ear tubes with any injuries to the child’s ears and be more proactive abo ut seeking medical advice for anything involving the child’s ears. Further, although fat her was unaware of the precise way the ear tubes worked, he understood that they helpe d the child’s ears drain

and knew that the child’s ear infections had decreased since th e tubes had been placed. Father was unable to recite specific care instructions for the child’s ear tubes, but the only evidence of any special care required for ear tubes came from t he trial judge discussing his personal experience with having ear tubes as a child, which may or may not be the standard of care for ear tubes today. {¶ 74} Frankly, there was no evidence in the record connecting the bru ising and

dried blood in and around the child’s ears to his ear tubes or an ear infection, or any37. indication that the child’s medical needs related to his ears w ere not being attended to. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s findings regard ing the child’s “ear condition” do not rise to the level of clear and convincing evi dence that the child’s condition or environment justified the state in assuming guardi anship. {¶ 75} Regardless, the trial court’s other findings are supported by c ompetent, credible evidence. Father’s arguments regarding his failure to observe or investigate the injuries present on the child’s body are based on his belief th at there was nothing for him to observe, assess, or investigate because the marks on the chi ld’s neck were from a “slight rash” and that “no competent evidence was presented tha t there was ‘blood’ in, or on, B.S.’s ears, and the alleged ‘bruises’ were not obvious (an d in one instance, mistaken by Turner and Morgan for a birthmark).” Contrary to father’s b elief, as previously discussed, there was competent, credible evidence supporting th e trial court’s findings that the child had bruising on his neck and bruising and blood in and around his ears. {¶ 76} We also find that the trial court had competent, credible evide nce upon which to base its finding that the child’s environment warrante d state intervention

because of father’s failure to attend to the child’s condition. The child had three clusters of concerning marks on his ears and neck. Morgan—whose testimo ny the trial court found credible—testified that nothing happened at the daycare t he morning of March 14 that might have caused the marks, so the marks either happened while the child was in father’s care and he did not notice them, or they happened when the child was in mother’s care, and father did not notice them after the child w as returned to his care.38. Although father testified that he did not bathe the child, the marks were on parts of the child’s body that are clearly visible with his clothes on, and father changed the child’s clothing at least twice—the night of March 13 at bedtime and th e morning of March 14 before taking him to daycare—without observing any marks. {¶ 77} Standing alone, father’s failure to notice the marks on the chi ld would be insufficient to support a finding of dependency, but this was n ot the only fact supporting the trial court’s adjudication. Rather, it was one of several factors that the trial court appropriately took into consideration in reaching its decision. {¶ 78} Accordingly, based on the testimony presented at the adjudicati on hearing, we find that there is some competent, credible evidence support ing the trial court’s findings regarding father’s failure to observe, assess, and att end to the child’s condition. 5. Inappropriate discipline of the child {¶ 79} Finally, father objects to the trial court’s findings related t o mother’s inappropriate use of discipline on the child in January 2019 an d father’s alleged endorsement of mother’s disciplinary methods. He claims that t he punishment mother inflicted on the child—that resulted in, among other things, fi nger-shaped bruises on his sides and a hand-shaped bruise on his buttocks—was reasonable c orporal punishment, which is a lawful form of parental discipline. He also claims that the trial court’s

conclusion that he assented to mother’s behavior because he all owed mother to resume unrestricted parenting time after the January incident is “illo gical.”39. {¶ 80} The trial court relied on mother’s use of inappropriate physica l discipline and father’s assent to her disciplinary methods to show that th e child’s environment was placing him at risk of physical and emotional harm. The court had before it evidence that mother “busted [the child’s] ass” in January, to the point of l eaving bruises on the child’s sides and buttocks. Mother also wrote in her text messages tha t she beat the child while she was on the phone with father and that father “told [her] to whoop [the child’s] ass good and he wouldn’t act like that.” Although father makes muc h in his brief about the fact that the trial court relied on text messages written by mother to find that father assented to and encouraged mother’s disciplinary methods, fathe r did not deny that he told mother to “whoop [the child’s] ass good.” Moreover, altho ugh mother gave father explanations for some of the bruising on the child’s body, she did not or could not explain the bruise on his back that looked older than the otherbruising or the fingershaped bruises on his neck. Despite this, father did not talk to mother’s boyfriend about the child’s bruises, and, after initially restricting mother’s visits for about a week, did not require anything more from mother than a promise that she would not beat the child again. {¶ 81} However, just two months later, the child again had unexplained bruises on his body. The trial court found this significant. It determin ed that father’s decision not to report mother to law enforcement or JFS and to continue to allo w mother unrestricted access to the child after only a brief hiatus, combined with mo ther’s lack of skills for appropriately disciplining a three-year-old, placed the child i n an environment where he40. was at risk of physical and emotional harm. This conclusion is supported by competent

and credible evidence. {¶ 82} In sum, after carefully reviewing the record, we find that JFS proved that the child was a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04(C) by clear and convincing evidence, and that the trial court’s finding of dependency is supported b y competent and credible evidence. Accordingly, father’s first and second assignments o f error are not well-taken. B. JFS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. {¶ 83} In his final assignment of error, father argues that the trial court erred by finding that JFS made reasonable efforts to eliminate the conti nued removal of the child from the home or to make it possible for the child to safely re turn home. His only complaint in this regard is that JFS failed to act in good fait h once he told Turner that he would not take the CVSA because the agency immediately sought e mergency custody of the child. JFS counters that the record contains competent, cr edible evidence that it made reasonable efforts to return the child to the home throughout t he course of the case. {¶ 84} Under R.C. 2151.419(A)(1), at any emergency custody, shelter ca re, adjudication, or disposition hearing at which the court removes a child from the home or continues the removal of the child from the home, the court is required to determine whether the children services agency that filed the complaint o r removed the child from the home “made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home, to eliminate the continued removal of the child from the child’s home, or to make it possible for the child to return safely home.” “Reasonable eff orts” are “ ‘honest,41. purposeful effort[s], free of malice and the design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.’” In re S.R. , 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-12-1298 and L-12-1326, 2013-Ohio-2358, ¶ 21, quoting In re Weaver , 79 Ohio App.3d 59, 63, 606 N.E.2d 1011 (12th Dist.1992). “In a reasonable efforts determination, the issue is not whethe r the agency could have done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the reasonablen ess standard under the

statute.” Id. The agency has the burden of proving its reasonable efforts. R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). {¶ 85} We review the trial court’s reasonable-efforts determination un der a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. In re E.H. , 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-15-044, 2016-Ohio-8170, ¶ 23. Accordingly, if there is some competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, we will not reverse on m anifest weight grounds.

Kristen V. , 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-07-031, 2008-Ohio-2994, at ¶ 65. {¶ 86} Here, the only complaint father has regarding JFS’s reasonable efforts is that the agency acted in bad faith by removing the child from t he home immediately after father refused to take the CVSA and terminated the safety plan. He claims that Turner did no further investigation after father declined to take the CVSA, and argues that JFS “did not act honestly and in good faith after [father] terminat ed the safety plan after being totally cooperative with the agency and after it was clear that there was no end in sight unless he waived his constitutional rights and took a CVSA * * *.” However, Turner testified at the adjudication hearing that father’s refusal to take a CVSA and his termination of the safety plan—which both happened on May 2—lef t her without “any42. time to make further investigations * * *” and that she and her supervisor still had concerns for the child’s safety because he had sustained injuri es to his neck and ears— places where children do not typically get hurt—that Turner had been unable to find a cause for. As Turner specifically explained, the agency “filed a motion for emergency custody due to the fact that [the child] had injuries that we h ad no explanation for.” {¶ 87} In its June 20, 2019 judgment entry following the adjudication hearing, the trial court found that JFS made reasonable efforts by implement ing a safety plan when it first learned of the child’s injuries in March 2019. After the agency became involved with the family, it learned that the child had also been injure d in January 2019, so when father terminated the safety plan, JFS sought emergency tempora ry custody of the child. When the court granted aunt emergency temporary custody of the child, JFS made reasonable efforts by providing case management services, coord inating visitation schedules, and maintaining regular monthly contact with the chi ld and the family. {¶ 88} The court echoed many of the same reasonable efforts findings i n its June 28, 2019 findings of fact and conclusions of law. It note d that JFS implemented a safety plan before filing formal legal proceedings, but that fa ther unilaterally terminated the safety plan before JFS completed its investigation. After filing the complaint, JFS advocated for the child to be placed with aunt, which was the l east restrictive placement available under the circumstances. The court also found, howev er, that the child’s “injuries, [and] the parent’s [sic] lack of concern or explanat ion justified [JFS’s] actions and limited their ability to return the child to his home befor e further proceedings and43. orders can take place. As a result, it would be contrary to th e safety, welfare and best

interest of the child to continue in the home.” {¶ 89} Our review of the record convinces us that there is no evidence that JFS acted in bad faith or filed its complaint in neglect and depend ency and motion for emergency temporary custody in retaliation for father exercisin g his right to refuse the CVSA. Rather, the agency did what it thought was best for the child’s safety under the circumstances—i.e., that he was returning, unsupervised by an o utside adult, to a home environment where he may or may not have recently sustained inj uries that were consistent with child abuse. Accordingly, we find that the tri al court’s reasonable-efforts findings are supported by some competent, credible evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶ 90} Father’s third assignment of error is not well-taken.

III. Conclusion {¶ 91} Based on the foregoing, the September 3, 2019 judgment of the E rie County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Father is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pur suant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.44. In re B.S. C .A. No. E-19-052

Thomas J. Osowik, J. _______________________

________ JUDGE Christine E. Mayle, J.

_______________________________ Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR.

_______________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.