substantive dve process grounds, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the decision was arbitrary
and irrational, and (2) that the decision-makers either committed another substantive
constitutional violation or that state remedies are inadequate.” Srasburger v. Board of
Education, 143 F. 3d 351, 357 (7th Cir.1998). Moreover, “a claim based on substantive due
process must. be based on the deprivation of an underlying protected life, liberty, or property
interest.” Zorai v. County of Putnam, 30 F.3d 885, 894 (7th Cir. 1994).

Therefore, “tine absence of any claim by the plaintiff that an interest in . . . property
has been impaired is a fatal defect in the plaintiff’s [substantive] due process argument.” Id.
Only once a plaintiff can show he or she has a protected life, liberty, or property interest, may
he or she then maintain a substantive due process cause of action for an allegedly arbitrary
action. See De7Tomasce v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211, 214 (7th Cir. 1992).

Ontheother hand, to state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, the
second element ofa § 1983 claim - the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right -
breaks down inte three components: (1) the claimed interest must be a protected property or
liberty interest. (2) the alleged loss must constitute a deprivation; and (3) the deprivation must
be without due process of law. Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 555 (7th Cir.1989).

Accord rgtothe complaint, Mr. Trujillo and Mr. Perez allegedly deprived Mr. Bryant
of his due process fights. The only allegation in the complaint directed at Mr. Trujillo and
Mr. Perez States that they met with Mr. Bryant and refused to allow him to bring an attorney
to that meefing, (tis unclear what transpired at the meeting, or what it was meant to address.
While the court has construed the allegation about the meeting generously, Mr. Bryant must
allege facts supporting an inference that he had a constitutionally protected property or liberty

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person with final policymaking authority causes a constitutional injury. See 42 U.S.C. §
1983; see also McTigue,v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995).

The Seventh Circuit does not impose a heightened pleading standard in § 1983
municipal liability cases. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319 (2000). Instead,
invoking the seminal case of Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit, $07 U.S. 163, 164 (1993), in which the Supreme Court emphasized that
courts should not dismiss § 1983 complaints for lack of factual specificity, the Seventh Circuit
has held that a “smattering of phrases like ‘highest policymaking officers’ and ‘widespread
custom’” threvghout a complaint should be enough to get a § 1983 plaintiff over the pleading
bar on a municipal liability claim. Jd. at 324. Thus, while a complaint need not plead facts
which establish the legal conclusions set forth in the complaint, it must contain enough factual
specificity to enable the court and the defendants to understand the gravamen of the complaint.
Id. at 324-35.

Here, Mr. Bryant alleges that “[t]he Chicago Board of Education and its agents being
informed of the Defendant’s [Ms. Redd’s] action, failed to intervene on behalf of the
Plaintiff.” This atlegation does not satisfy the Seventh Circuit’s relatively undemanding
standard because it fails to explain, in even a cursory fashion, how the Board could potentially
be liable under $ 1993. Hence, the § 1983 claims against the Board are dismissed without
prejudice.

The court next turns to the § 1983 claims against Mr. Trujillo and Mr. Perez. Mr.
Bryant claims that Mr. Trujillo and Mr. Perez deprived him of his substantive and procedural
due process rights, In order to properly challenge the substance of a government decision on

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interest Connected to the meeting. Without a property or liberty interest, his substantive and
procedural due process claims against Mr. Trujillo and Mr. Perez must fail.
Conclusion
For thé above reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss [11-1] is granted. The § 1983
claims againgt the Board and the substantive and procedural due process claims against Mr.
Trujillo and Mr. Perez are dismissed without prejudice. Mr. Bryant may file an amended

complaint, congistent with Rule 11, by May 13, 2002.

pate: 4-9-0 Canela M Mrring

Blanche M. Manning
U.S. District Judge

5-


"Fiinate Order Farin (06/97)" c~ rN

United States District Court, Northern District of Dlinois

vie Magia Judge Blanche M. Manning “than Asigned Sage
CASE NUMBER 01 C 7895 DATE April 19, 2002
CASE Bryant v. Chicago Board of Education
TITLE
[In the 1-Howing box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the
MOTION: Nature «+ tlic motion being presented.}
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) im Brief in support of motion due
(3) Qo Answer bric!!> motion due____.-: Reply to answer brief due
(4) o Ruling/Heariny on ___sset for ___ at
(5) go Status hearing|':-Id/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—s set for at
(6) oO Pretrial conference!held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor_ at.
(1) gd Trial[sct for/re-set for]on___at
(8) Go [Bench/ury trial] {Hearing] held/continued to____sat
(9) Qa This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OO FRCP4@m) General Rule 21. OO FRCP41(a)(1) © FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) MTM (Other docket entry} The defendants’ motion to dismiss [11-1] is granted. The § 1983 claims
against the Board and the substantive and procedural due process claims against Mr. Trujillo and Mr.
Perez are dismissed without prejudice. Mr. Bryant may file an amended complaint, consistent with Rule
11, by May 13, 2002. Enfer Memorandum and Order.

(11) Lf [For further detail sce order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in per court.

No notices required. number of notices

¥ | Notices mailed by judye’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistr:te judge.

courtroom
RTS deputy’
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office

mailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

EARNEST BRYANT and KATRENA )

BRYANT, )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) 01 C 7895

)

CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION, )

et al., )
Defendants, ) DOCKETED

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER APR 2 5 2002

Plaintiff Earnest Bryant is a former business manager at Morton Career Academy, a
Chicago Public School. Plaintiff Katrena Bryant is his spouse. The defendants are the
Chicago Board of Education, Vivian Reed (Morton’s principal), Eardie Bassett (Morton’s local
school council chairperson), Morton’s local school council, Domingo Trujillo (the regional
education officer for Region 2 of the Chicago Public Schools) and Jorge Perez (Region 2's
business manager). The Board, Mr. Trujillo, and Mr. Perez assert that they should be
dismissed because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over them. They also assert that
Mr. Bryant’s $ 1983 claims against them fail as a matter of law. For the following reasons,
subject matter Jurisdiction is proper but the motion to dismiss is nevertheless granted.

Background

The following facts are drawn from the plaintiffs’ pro se complaint, which the court
has consfrued generously and will accept as true for the purposes of the defendants’ motion to
dismiss. Mr. Bryant claims that Ms. Redd, among other things, directed unwelcome sexual
advances and remarks towards him and forged his name on school checks. Ms. Redd and Mr.

Bassett conspired to eliminate Mr. Bryant’s position to retaliate against him after he


complained about Ms. Redd’s behavior. Mr. Bryant told the Board about the retaliation, but
the Board refused to help protect him. Mr. Bryant asked to meet with Mr. Trujillo and Mr.
Perez and his lawyer. Mr. Bryant subsequently met with Mr. Trujillo and Mr. Perez, but not
a lawyer. It isunelear what transpired during the meeting.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The defendants correctly note that the plaintiffs failed to specify the basis of the court’s
jurisdiction, atthovgh Rule 8(a) required them to do so. Nevertheless, the basis of the court’s
jurisdiction - federal question ~ is clear given that Mr. Bryant claims that the defendants
violated 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and his federal due process rights. Thus, the motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.

Discussion

The Board is a municipality for purposes of § 1983 as government entities are
“persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and thus can be “sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief [provided] the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adepted and promulgated by that body's officers.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of
the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Looper Maintenance Serv. Corp. v. City of
Indianapolis, 197 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir.1999).

There are three ways in which a municipality’s policy can violate § 1983: (1) if it has
an express pplicy that, when enforced, causes constitutional deprivation; (2) if there is a
widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy,
is so permanent and well settled as to constitute custom or usage with the force of law; (3) if a

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