discrimination cases because the outcome may depend on determinations of credibility and intent.
Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).
II. Starks’ Sex and Race Discrimination Claims

Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an
employee in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment based on the employee’s sex or race.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). In order to prove a case of discrimination under Title VII, Starks must offer
either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir.
1998). Starks does not offer any direct evidence that IDHS suspended or reassigned him because of
his sex or race. Instead, he relies on the burden-shifting method set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to establish his claims of sex and race discrimination.
A. Prima Facie Case

In order to establish a prima facie case of sex or race discrimination, Starks must show: (1)
he belongs to a protected class; (2) he met his employer’s legitimate performance expectations; (3)
he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the employer treated similarly situated employees
outside the class more favorably. Bragg v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 164 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir.
1998). If Starks establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to
IDHS to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If IDHS sets forth a legitimate justification, the burden then
shifts back to Starks to prove that IDHS’ reason is a mere pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.

IDHS argues that Starks cannot establish the fourth element of a prima facie case. In

response, Starks compares himself to Berger. As an initial matter, Berger, who is male, is not outside


CONCLUSION
Starks has not presented any evidence that IDHS’ decision rested upon a legally forbidden
ground. Without any evidence that IDHS’ decision to suspend and reassign Starks was based on his

race or sex, IDHS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

ENTER:

. Conlon
July 17, 2002 United States District Judge


Nevertheless, Starks claims a jury could find discrimination is “really at the base of Plaintiff’ s
reassignment and the granting of his position to a female worker.” Response at 10. Although Starks’
casual reference to the two African-American women who replaced him after his suspension and
reassignment does not create an inference of race discrimination, it may support his sex
discrimination claim. See Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)(“That
one's replacement is of another race, sex, or age may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but
it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition”). Assuming evidence of Starks’ replacement is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the burden then shifts to IDES to
articulate a non-discriminatory reason for Starks’ suspension and reassignment.

B. Reasons

IDHS’ burden of production is “‘quite light’ and the mere articulation of the reason . . . puts
the onus back on the plaintiff to prove pretext.” Flores v. Preferred Technical Group, 182 F.3d 512,
515 (7th Cir. 1999), quoting Pilditch v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 3 F.3d 1113, 1117 (7th
Cir. 1993). IDHS claims Starks was suspended for engaging in a business transaction with a client.
IDHS also advances several reasons for Starks’ reassignment. First, Berger thought it would be
awkward for Soto and Starks to work together again given Soto’s sexual harassment allegations
against Starks. Second, Berger questioned Starks’ judgment because he engaged in a financial
transaction with a subordinate. Third, Berger discovered during Starks’ suspension that his division
was not managed properly. The burden then shifts back to Starks to show that IDHS’ reasons for his

suspension and reassignment are pretextual.


Starks’ protected class for purposes of his sex discrimination claim. In any event, Starks fails to
demonstrate he is similarly situated to Berger in all material respects.

In order to establish that Berger is similarly situated, Starks must prove that he and Berger
“dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar
conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct
or the employer's treatment of them.” Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,219 F.3d 612, 617-18 (7th Cir.
2000). Starks fails to offer any evidence he shared the same supervisor with Berger. Indeed, Berger
was the supervisor primarily responsible for Starks’ suspension and reassignment. In contrast, Starks
claims Robert Wright determined Berger’s fate three years earlier. Consequently, Berger is not
similarly situated to Starks. See /d. at 618 (“Different employment decisions, concerning different
employees, made by different supervisors, are seldom sufficiently comparable to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination for the simple reason that different supervisors may exercise their
discretion differently”).

Without identifying any specific individual, Starks next argues that “[s]imilarly situated
employees who [lent money to co-workers] were not disciplined.” Response at 7. In his answers to
interrogatories, Starks claimed Karen Jones-Jackson (race unknown) told him that she loaned co-
workers $5.00 to $10.00 during 1996 and 1997. Even if Jones-Jackson’s statement were not
inadmissible hearsay, Starks fails to demonstrate that IDHS did not take corrective action against
Jones-Jackson. Indeed, Starks, as Jones-Jackson’s supervisor, was responsible for not taking
appropriate disciplinary action. Absent evidence that similarly situated non-A frican-American and/or
female employees were treated more favorably, Starks cannot establish a prima facie case of sex or

race discrimination.


DePaul University, 123 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 1997)(use of different terminology to describe
different elements of overall conduct does not create an inference of pretext). According to Kotter,
Starks was reassigned to work at another location due to Soto’s sexual harassment complaint against
Starks as well as Starks’ financial transaction with Soto. Motion, Ex. D at 19. Contrary to Starks’
position, Kotter’s reasons are identical to the first two reasons offered by Berger for Starks’
reassignment. Berger’s reliance on Starks’ performance as an additional reason for reassignment does
not impact the legitimacy of the two reasons articulated by both Berger and Kotter. See Logan v.
Kautex Textron North America, 259 F.3d 635, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2001)(summary judgment proper
where reasonable jury could find employee terminated for one of several reasons given for discharge).
Starks has not offered any evidence contesting the validity of his reassignment based on his
relationship with Soto. Nor has he offered any evidence that non-African-American or female
employees were treated differently after loaning money to a subordinate who later accused them of
sexual harassment. See Johnson y. West, 218 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2000)(pretext may be shown
by evidence that other similarly situated employees outside protected class committed similar
infractions but were not similarly disciplined). Therefore, Starks has ultimately failed to carry his

burden of establishing pretext.


Minute Order Form (06/97)

-_

L

United States District Court, Northern District of Hlinois

Sy

Name of Assigned Judge ‘uzann Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge 8 e B. Conlon than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01C 6836 DATE 7/17/2002
CASE WAYMON T. STARKS vs. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented, ]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) Qa Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due,
(4) go Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Q [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) [General Rule21 OFRCP41(a)(1) [1 FRCP41(a)(2).
do) i {Other docket entry] Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [10-1] is granted. ENTER
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.
ad [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. number of notices
v | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counse! by telephone, ML 19 002
Docketing to mail notices. 5
Y_ | Mail AO 450 form. ba
C judge/magistrate judge. ajg 13
‘opy to judge/magistrate judge. yu 199 j : sanrn0on
date mailed notice
courtroom ane
cB deputy’s 60 ail Wi eal AM 20 pw
initials Sau -
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Begala s rein pty its



Cc Pretext

When an employer offers multiple reasons for its employment decision, the employee must
show that all of the proffered reasons are pretextual. Ghosh v. Indiana Dep’t of Environmental
Mgmt., 192 F.3d 1087, 1091-92 (7th Cir. 1999). Starks may establish pretext either directly, by
showing IDHS’ decisions to suspend and reassign him were more likely than not motivated by
discriminatory reasons, or indirectly, by showing that IDHS’ reasons are unworthy of belief. Worth
v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 265 (7th Cir. 2001). “The indirect method requires some showing that (1) the
defendant’s explanation has no basis in fact or (2) the explanation was not the real reason, or (3) the
reason stated was insufficient to warrant the termination.” Jd. Starks has not presented any direct
evidence of pretext. Therefore, Starks must show that IDHS lied about its reasons for suspending and
reassigning him.

Starks disputes the legitimacy of his suspension by claiming he did not know Soto was an
IDHS client. However, “[slelf-serving statements do not shed any light on whether the employer
honestly based its employment decision on performance-related considerations, which is the focus
of our inquiry in these cases.” Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 363 (7th Cir. 1998),
quoting Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1460 (7th Cir. 1994). Starks admitted IDHS
maintained a rule against engaging in business transactions with clients. Response at J 18. Starks
has not presented any evidence that questions IDHS’ sincerity in suspending him for violating this
rule.

Starks also disputes the legitimacy of his reassignment by comparing the reasons given by
Berger with the reasons given by Kotter. Although shifting reasons for an employment decision can

raise an issue of fact regarding pretext, the reasons must actually be different. See O’Connor v.


a different office with different responsibilities. In his new position, Starks no longer supervised
other employees. Starks’ previous job duties were transferred to Marva Arnold, an African-American
female.

During his employment with IDHS, Berger was indicted for mail fraud. IDHS suspended
Berger without pay for 14 months pending resolution of the case. Berger was acquitted after a six
week trial. Prior to his suspension, Berger directly supervised 10 managers and indirectly supervised
more than 2,000 employees. After his suspension, Berger directly supervised two managers,
indirectly supervised 12 to 15 employees and earned several hundred dollars a month less than he had
prior to his suspension.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once a moving party has met its
burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there
is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir.
1999). The court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th
Cir. 2000). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The summary judgment standard is applied with special scrutiny to employment


hired Sheila Soto to fill a clerical position. At the time she was hired, Soto received public aid from
an IDHS program. In approximately September 1999, Soto became Starks’ secretary.

On September 14, 2000, Soto complained to IDHS’ Equal Employment Opportunity Office
that Starks sexually harassed her. Shortly thereafter, Soto was transferred to another location. On
September 21, 2000, IDHS’ Office of Inspector General, Bureau of Internal Affairs (“OIG”), began
investigating Soto’s complaint. During the investigation, Starks was placed on paid administrative
leave.

On November 13, 2000, OIG issued a report, concluding that Soto’s sexual harassment
complaint could not be substantiated. However, OIG learned during the investigation that Starks
loaned $516.00 to Soto, which was documented by a signed written agreement. OIG determined that
Starks’ loan to Soto violated an IDHS rule prohibiting employees from engaging in business
transactions with clients. Starks denies knowledge of Soto’s client status at the time of the loan.

OIG forwarded the report to Ken Kotter, a Caucasian male, who was responsible for
personnel. Kotter reviewed the report with Jim Berger, a Caucasian male, who was deputy director
of Stark’s division. Berger and Kotter recommended that Starks be suspended for 15 days for
engaging in a business transaction with an IDHS client. After proceeding through several levels of
review, Starks’ suspension was approved. Starks served his suspension from January 8 through
January 22,2001. During his administrative leave and suspension, Starks’ duties were performed by
Denise Powell, an African-American female.

In the interim, Soto’s attorney requested that Soto be returned to her previous position. Soto’s
attorney threatened litigation if her request was not granted. On January 15, 2001, IDHS reinstated

Soto to her previous position. When Starks returned from his suspension, Berger assigned Starks to


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

WAYMON T. STARKS,
Plaintiff, No. 01 C 6836
v. Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES,

wwe SSS DY

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Waymon T. Starks (“Starks”) sues the Illinois Department of Human Services (“IDHS”) for
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 20006¢ er seq.
Specifically, Starks claims IDHS suspended him for 15 days and then reassigned him to an inferior
position based on his sex and race and in retaliation for opposing discrimination. IDHS moves for
summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Starks concedes summary
judgment on his retaliation claim is proper.

BACKGROUND
I. Facts

All facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Starks, who is an African-American male,
began working for IDHS’ predecessor agency in 1962. During the relevant time period, Starks was
responsible for managing the Bureau of Food Stamp Employment and Training. Starks directly

supervised five to six managers and indirectly supervised 90 employees. In February 1999, Starks

DOCKETED

JUL 1 9 2002

J