SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2470-17T1

CARLO J. COPPA, SR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VIVIAN DEMAS, ESQ.,

Defendant-Respondent.

____________________________

Submitted February 27, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-4085-14.

Carlo J. Coppa, Sr., appellant pro se.

Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, 

attorneys for respondent (Howard B. Mankoff and 

Walter F. Kawalec, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, Carlo J. Coppa, Sr., a former attorney and former client of 

defendant Vivian Demas, Esq., appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

August 23, 2019
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legal malpractice complaint. The trial court dismissed his complaint on 

summary judgment because he did not have an expert report. The court denied 

his motion to extend the deadline for expert reports and to extend the time to 

complete discovery. Thereafter, the court denied his motion for reconsideration. 

Plaintiff appeals. To succeed, he must show the court abused its discretion when 

it denied his motions to extend discovery and for reconsideration. He has not 

made the required showing. Hence we affirm.

This action's procedural history is not complicated. Plaintiff filed a legal 

malpractice complaint in which he alleged he had retained defendant to pursue 

a medical malpractice claim and she mishandled it. He filed the legal 

malpractice complaint on November 6, 2014. After the complaint was dismissed 

and reinstated for reasons not relevant to this appeal, the trial court dismissed 

the complaint without prejudice on February 3, 2017, due to plaintiff's failure to 

serve discovery responses. The court reinstated the complaint when plaintiff 

served them.

In plaintiff's discovery responses, he said he would provide expert reports. 

When he did not provide them, defendant filed a motion to compel the reports. 

The trial court granted the motion and issued a September 8, 2017 order that 

required plaintiff to serve expert reports within twenty days. Plaintiff missed 
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the deadline. Defense counsel granted plaintiff a short extension to serve expert 

reports. Plaintiff did not serve expert reports, so defendant filed a motion for 

summary judgment on October 5, 2017. Defendant filed a cross-motion to 

extend his deadline for serving an expert report and to extend the discovery end 

date forty-five days. On November 3, 2017, the court filed two orders that 

granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiff's cross-motion. 

In granting defendant's summary judgment motion, the court noted there 

were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. The court also noted 

plaintiff's cause of action was one for professional negligence and he needed an 

expert to prove his case. Because plaintiff had served no expert report, and 

because the time for serving expert reports had expired, the court granted the 

motion. 

In his cross-motion to extend the deadlines for serving experts and 

discovery, plaintiff filed a certification and averred he had missed the deadline 

for serving expert reports "[d]ue to various issues[.]" He did not elaborate. He 

further averred he had named an expert, and the expert would serve his report 

the week of October 30, 2017. In a November 2, 2017 letter the expert sent to 

plaintiff, the expert said he planned to have the report "ready sometime next 

week." 
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Denying the cross-motion, the court explained in a notation on the 

November 3, 2017 order:

The application is denied. The movant has continually 

failed to meet his discovery obligation. In his proposed 

form of order, he sets forth an overdue date that 

contravenes a prior court order and in subsequent 

correspondence makes it clear he is violating his own 

order because he intends to serve the report the week of 

11/6/17. At some point orders have to mean something 

and dates are not merely suggestions but actual 

deadlines.

Plaintiff subsequently served an expert report and filed a motion under 

Rule 4:50-1(f) to vacate the November 3, 2017 orders. On January 9, 2018, the 

court denied the motion. In a handwritten note on the memorializing order, the 

court wrote: "Application is denied. Movant has essentially reargued the same 

set of facts this court took into account in denying the original motion. That is 

not the standard on a motion for reconsideration. Movant has failed to show 

original denial was based on palpably incorrect reasoning." This appeal 

followed.

On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by not vacating the 

November 3, 2017 orders under Rule 4:50-1(f). He notes his expert's schedule 

was beyond his control and emphasizes that cases should be tried on their merits. 

Defendant responds that the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate the 
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November orders was not reversible error. She asserts there were no truly 

exceptional circumstances present to justify the relief plaintiff sought, and no 

injustice resulted from the denial of plaintiff's motion for relief from the 

November orders.

Our scope of review of the issues plaintiff raises is narrow. We generally 

review trial court decisions about whether to extend discovery deadlines, and 

what sanctions to impose for violation of discovery orders, for abuse of 

discretion. Abtrax Pharms., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 517 (1995); 

Quail v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc., 455 N.J. Super. 118, 133 (App. Div. 

2018); Leitner v. Toms River Reg'l Schs., 392 N.J. Super. 80, 87 (App. Div. 

2007). "This deferential approach 'cautions appellate courts not to interfere 

unless an injustice appears to have been done.'" Quail, 455 N.J. Super. at 133 

(quoting Abtrax, 139 N.J. at 517).

We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in this case. Plaintiff had 

not provided an expert report with interrogatory answers. The answers 

themselves had been a long time coming, plaintiff's complaint having been 

dismissed for failure to timely serve them. Defendant had to move to compel a 

deadline for plaintiff to serve expert reports so that defendant would have time 

to evaluate the reports and retain her own expert, if necessary, before the 
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discovery end date. In view of plaintiff's repeated disregard of the deadlines 

and the discovery rules, as well as the trial court's discovery order, we find no 

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court either in declining to delay the 

summary judgment motion or in refusing to further extend the court-ordered 

deadline for plaintiff to submit expert reports.

Plaintiff also argues the court erred by denying his motion for relief from 

judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(f). The appellate record is not entirely clear 

whether plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 or a 

motion for relief from judgment under Rule 4:50-1(f). Regardless, the result is 

the same. 

Our scope of review of a trial court's denial of a motion for reconsideration 

is governed by an abuse of discretion standard. Davis v. Devereux Found., 414 

N.J. Super. 1, 17 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Marinelli v. Mitts & Merrill, 303 N.J. 

Super 61, 77 (App. Div. 1997)). Reconsideration is reserved for "cases which 

fall into that narrow corridor" where the prior decision was "based upon a 

palpably incorrect or irrational basis," or the court failed to consider or 

appreciate "probative, competent evidence," or where a "litigant wishes to bring 

new or additional information to the [c]ourt's attention which it could not have 
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provided on the first application." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 

(Ch. Div. 1990). 

Similarly, a trial court's denial of relief from a judgment under Rule 4:50-

1(f) "will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion." In 

re Guardianship J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 473 (2002) (quoting Hous. Auth. v. Little, 

135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994)). Generally, relief under subsection (f) of Rule 4:50-

1 is available only when "truly exceptional circumstances are present." Ibid. 

(quoting Hous. Auth., 135 N.J. at 286).

Plaintiff sought relief from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to 

defendant and the court's denial of plaintiff's application to extend deadlines for 

serving expert reports and completing discovery. The court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2, because plaintiff did 

not demonstrate the court based its decision upon a palpably incorrect or 

irrational basis or failed to consider or appreciate probative, competent 

evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration 

under Rule 4:50-1(f), because plaintiff did not establish truly exceptional 

circumstances. Rather, the case presented a not uncommon instance of a litigant 

missing multiple discovery deadlines. The trial court acted well within its 

discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for relief from the summary judgment. 
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Affirmed.