distress. In case 98 C 3275, Sanders sued the Railroad alleging intentional infliction of
emotional distress, along with a slue of other allegations. Presently, Sanders asserts that
the Railroad and Mr. LaFave, the Railroad's attorney, have been harassing her relentlessly
which has caused physical and emotional harm. Sanders’ claims are again an attempt to
re-litigate claims that were previously determined by another court. Sanders alleges that
“Union Pacific, through its agent, Daniel LaFave” has caused her undue hardship,
emotional distress, and harassment by its investigation into her disability either through
correspondentce or visual observation. See Plt.'s Compl. {] 9 -21. Sanders made similar
statements in her previous action, 98 C 3275. The District Court previously determined
that Sanders’ had no basis for bringing claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See Sanders, No 98 C 3275, 2001 WL 1230549 (N.D.IIl_ 2001). Furthermore, to the
extent that Sanders did not assert any such claim for intentional infliction for emotional
distress in her previous complaint, she had the opportunity to do so. Therefore, Sanders’
claims intentional infliction of emotional distress are also excluded on the basis of Res
Judicata. “Sanders may be unhappy that Union Pacific monitors its employees for abuse
of its medical leave policies, but ‘not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an
actionable adverse action.”” Sanders, No 98 C 3275, 2001 WL 1230549, *3 (N.D.IIl. 2001)
(quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)).

In summary, Sanders’ claims are merely a recantation of her previous assertions
and are therefore barred. The mere naming of an additional party, Daniel LaFave, the
Railroad's attorney does not revive or alter Sanders’ claims. Therefore, Sanders’ complaint

is dismissed with prejudice based on the doctrine of res judicata.


Southwest Areas Pen.Fund v. Hunt Truck Lines, Inc., 296 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2002).
Res judicata is limited to cases where the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
her claim in the previous proceeding. See Licari, 298 F.3d at 666-67. “[R]es judicata [also]
applies when the precluded claims ‘could and should have been brought in the earlier
litigation.” In re Kroner, 953 F.2d 319-320 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Howell Hydrocarbons v.
Adams, 897 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir, 1990); Barnett y. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 978 n.7 (7th Cir.

1990)(quoting D-1 Enters., Inc. v. Commercial State Bank, 864 F.2d 36, 38 (5th Cir.

1989))).

Previously, a final and appealable judgment was rendered upon Sanders’ claims in
the state court. On June 20, 2002, after five years of litigation, Sanders’ 97 L 9830
complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Sanders was provided a full and fair opportunity
to litigate her claims in that proceeding. A brief review of Plaintiffs Complaint shows that
she is merely making a veiled attempt to re-plead, and reargue facts that were previously
decided in the state court, 97 L 9830. The first eight (8) paragraphs of Sanders complaint
are almost verbatim from the previous litigation and are therefore dismissed based on Res
Judicata. Compare Defs’ Reply to Plt.’s Resp. with Defs.’Mation to Dismiss Ex, E and G.

Additionally, a final and appealable judgment was rendered in the Federal court.
On September 28, 2001, the Honorable District Court Judge Leinenweber granted
Defendant Union Pacific Railroad’s Motion for Summary Judgment in case 98 C 3275,

finding Sanders claims to be without merit or factual basis. See Sanders v. Union Pacific

Railroad, No 98 C 3275, 2001 WL 1230649 (N.D.I. 2001). A comparison between the
98 C 3275 complaint and the instant complaint, paragraphs 9 through 21, depicts another
attempt to bring a cause of action against Union Pacific for intentional infliction of emotional

3


Additionally, the court finds that Sanders’ failure to pay the awarded fees and costs
of previous litigation, ie. 98 C 3275, is inexcusable. Sanders contends that she is not
tequired to abide by the District Court's order to pay fees and costs for two reasons. First,
Sanders contends that the court improvidently entered the order based on false statements
made by the defendant relating to a settlement award. The District Court’s order does not
make any reference to a settlement, or condition the payment of fees and costs on
settlement of an unrelated case. Furthermore, Sanders never challenged the District
Court's order awarding fees and costs before the presiding judge. Sanders will not be
heard to argue over two and haif years later, before a different judge, that the award was
unjustified.

Second, Sanders asserts that she should not have to pay the court ordered fees
and costs because she was allowed to proceed in that action, in forma pauperis.
“[A]uthorization to proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915 does no more than excuse
prepayment costs. It does not authorize any person to continue in a course of vexatious
litigation without regard to the losses imposed on others (including the judicial system). By
postponing the reckoning of costs to the end of the case, § 1915 gives an impoverished
litigant one free bite at the apple, not more.” Sato v. Plunkett, 154 F.R.D at 193 (internal
quotation omitted). Therefore, the court finds Sanders’ second basis for noncompliance
with the District Court's order to pay attorney fees and costs is without merit.

Sanders continuous, onslaught against Union Pacific Railroad and its agents must
come to an end. Although the court refrains from issuing sanctions at this time, Sanders
should note that her status as a pro se litigant does not give her “an unfettered licence to
wage an endless campaign of harassment ... or to abuse the judicial process.” Chapman

5


Minute Order Fone (06/67)

YO 4% a \p
Name of Assigned Judge sR. Norgl Sitting Fudge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Charles R. Norgle than Assigned Judge

United States District Court, Northern District of Iinois

CASE NUMBER 03 C 7049 DATE 5/7/2004
CASE Sanders vs, Union Pacific Railroad ct al
| TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing dhe motion, c.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintifY, and (b) stale briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
DOCKET ENTRY;
qd) Qa Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
Q) im) Brief in support of motion due
@) im Answer brief to motion due____. Reply to answer brief due___.
(4) im Ruling/Hearing onset for__ at.
(6) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on_—ssetfor_— at
(6) o Pretrial conference{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for}on_—setfor at
(7) im} Trial[set for/re-set for] on at _
(8) 5 (Bench/Jury tria!] [Hearing] held/continuedto____at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OLFRCP4(m) O Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP4i(a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) if [Other docket entry] Before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss is granted, terminating this case. It is so ordered,
Maite — r

al) gf [for further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required,

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. die docketed

& | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AQ 450 form.

dockedng detuty inlthals

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in 7 7
central Clerk's Office ‘ imniling deputy initials



lily. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 01 C 9697, 2002 WL 818300, * 13 (N.D.1IIl 2002) (quoting
Pfeifer v. Valukas, 117 F.R.D. 420, 423 (N.D.IlI. 1987)). If Sanders continues to bring merit
less claims, or claims barred by the doctrine of res judicata against Union Pacific and its
agents, the court will strongly consider imposing heavy sanctions to discourage this
vexatious course of litigation.
CONCLUSION
For the abovementioned reasons, Plaintiff, Mamie Sanders’ Complaintis dismissed

with prejudice. It is so ordered.

ENTER: Llc hh forg lo

CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, piste sudge

DATED:

of
S-7-05



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT yo”

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS pu
EASTERN DIVISION w

MAMIE SANDERS

Plaintiff,
lo. 03 C 7049

Ni
HONORABLE CHARLES R. NORGLE

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY and DANIEL LAFAVE,

Defendants.

we SS

OPINION AND ORDER

Charles R. Norgle, District Judge.

Before the Courtis Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendants
assert that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed based on res judicata and her failure
to satisfy a previous court order in case 98 C 3275, which ordered Plaintiff to pay attorney
fees and costs. For the following reasons Defendants’ motion is granted.

Pro Se Plaintiff, Mamie Sanders, initially worked for Chicago and North Western
Transportation Company, which was later purchased by Union Pacific Railroad Company,
the Defendant (“Railroad”). While employed with the Railroad, Plaintiff filed a claim for
disability benefits. Plaintiff asserted that she had carpal tunnel syndrome and various other
stress related ailments. Plaintiff was awarded and is still receiving disability benefits.

Sanders is not your ordinary pro se litigant. Sanders has filed no less than fifteen
(15) causes of actions in various courts in the past seventeen years. Sanders has filed six

actions in state court, 87 L 06527, 89 L 13557, 97 L 9830, 98 L 012849, 02 L 000938, 04



L 000778; six cases in bankruptcy court, 90 B 22520, 96 B 02727, 97 B 16994, 97 B
01774, 98 B 35499, 99 B 14205; and three actions in federal court, 95 C 7092, 98 C 3275,
03 C 7049; not to mention the various appeals she has filed after losing those cases.
Sanders has proven herself to be a proficient, vexatious litigator. Almost every action she
has filed has been against the Railroad or the attorneys who previously represented her
in suing the Railroad. In this action, Sanders is attempting to again sue Union Pacific
Railroad Company and additionally its attorney, Daniel LaFave. “[A]t some point, our
solicitous treatment of pro se litigants must be trumped by our concern with the rights of
Defendants to be free of scandalous, repetitive, and baseless claims that undoubtedly
drain their financial and emotional resources.” Sato v. Plunkett, 154 FRD 189, 192 (N.D.III.
1994) (quoting Sato v. Kwasny, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 15693 at *10 (Nov. 5, 1993)).

In this instance, Sanders is merely attempting to re-litigate claims that have been
previously ruled upon in cases 97 L 9830 and 98 C 3275. Sanders’ continuous, litigious
assault on Defendants, with utter disregard to previous rulings made by the court, must
come to an end. Sanders continues to assert the same untenable claims against
Defendant. Sanders contends that she is not merely asserting the same claims, but that
she has new found evidence that should allow her claims to proceed. Additionally,
Sanders now claims that Union Pacific’s attorney Daniel LaFave also violated her rights.

The couching of an old claim as something new or newly discovered, will not serve
to obfuscate the basic legal principle of res judicata, “Res judicata applies where: (1) a
final judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there
is an identity of causes of action; and (3) there is an identity of the parties or their privies.”

Licari v. City of Chicago, 298 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2002): Central States, Southeast and
2