IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 23, 2013

GREGORY A. HEDGES v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Morgan County

No. 2012-CR-104 E. Eugene Eblen, Judge

No. E2012-02557-CCA-R3-HC-FILED-OCTOBER 21, 2013

The petitioner, Gregory A. Hedges, filed in the Morgan County Criminal Court a habeas

corpus petition, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery with a deadly

weapon and aggravated kidnapping. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the

petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas

corpus court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT

WILLIAMS and JEFFREY S. BIVINS, JJ., joined.

Gregory A. Hedges, Wartburg, Tennessee, pro se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; John H. Bledsoe, Senior Counsel, for

the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

On September 24, 1985, the petitioner was convicted of first degree burglary, two

counts of aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of armed

robbery, and grand larceny, which offenses occurred on January 31, 1985. See State v.

Gregory Hedges, et al., No. 252, 1987 WL 9535, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Apr.

15, 1987). For his convictions, the petitioner received a total effective sentence of ninety-six

years. Id. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the appellant’s convictions and sentences.

Id.
Much aggrieved by his incarceration, the petitioner has doggedly pursued relief from

his convictions and sentences. He began his pursuit by filing a petition for post-conviction

relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, this court reversed the appellant’s

grand larceny conviction but affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court in all other

respects. See Gregory Hedges v. State, No. 03C01-9112-CR-00379, 1993 WL 73723, at *1

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Mar. 10, 1993). Thereafter, the petitioner pursued numerous

other, albeit unsuccessful, collateral attacksto his convictions. See Gregory Hedges v. David

Mills, Warden, No. W2005-01523-CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL 211819, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App.

at Jackson, Jan. 26, 2006) (habeas corpus); Timothy Bickers, et al. v. State, Nos.

E2002-02887-CCA-R3-PC, E2002-02888-CCA-R3-PC, E2002-02889-CCA-R3-PC, 2004

WL 34509, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Jan. 7, 2004) (post-conviction); Gregory

A. Hedges v. State, No. E2002-02610-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 22426831, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.

App. at Knoxville, Oct. 24, 2003) (error coram nobis); State v. Gregory A. Hedges, Nos.

E1999-01350-CCA-R3-CD, E1999-01323-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1478569, at *1 (Tenn.

Crim. App. at Knoxville, Oct. 6, 2000) (habeas corpus); Timothy Bickers, et al. v. State, No.

03C01-9706-CR-00218, 1998 WL 661528, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Sept. 25,

1998) (post-conviction).

The instant case is the petitioner’s third attempt to obtain habeas corpus relief from

his convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping, both of which were

classified as Class X felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-702(4), (5) (repealed 1989). On

September 11, 2012, the petitioner filed a lengthy habeas corpus petition, in which he raised

numerous grounds for relief. Specifically, he challenged the constitutionality of the Class

X statutes “facially and as applied to him” and alleges that his sentences for Class X felonies

were effectively overturned by the 1989 Sentencing Act. The petitioner contended that his

convictions and sentences were void and that he was entitled to release.

The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals,

again seeking relief from his convictions and sentences. Upon our consideration of the

petitioner’s issues, we conclude that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.

II. Analysis

The determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a question of law.

Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007). As such, we will review the trial

court’s findings de novo without a presumption of correctness. Id. Moreover, it is the

petitioner’s burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that the sentence

is void or that the confinement is illegal.” Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000).

Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees an accused the right to

-2-
seek habeas corpus relief. See Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). However,

“[s]uch relief is available only when it appears from the face of the judgment or the record

of the proceedings that a trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence a defendant or that

a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Wyatt, 24 S.W.3d

at 322; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101. In other words, habeas corpus relief may be

sought only when the judgment is void, not merely voidable. Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83. “A

void judgment ‘is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked

jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment or because the defendant’s sentence has

expired.’ We have recognized that a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute,

for example, is void and illegal.” Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000)

(quoting Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83).

On appeal, the petitioner raises nineteen issues,several with subparts, which challenge

the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition. The issues have been consolidated as

follows: First, the petitioner challenges the summary dismissal of his petition without

appointing counsel and conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, we note that a trial

1

court may summarily dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus without a hearing or the

appointment of counsel if the petitioner fails to show that he is entitled to relief. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 29-21-109; see also Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004).

Therefore, we turn to the remainder of the petitioner’s claims.

Second, the petitioner contends that when the Class X Felonies Act of 1979 was

repealed by the 1989 Sentencing Act, the state courts lost jurisdiction to try and/or punish

offenders for those offenses. He asserts that the State’s jurisdiction to enforce his sentences

for his Class X felonies “necessarily depends upon the life of these statutes” and that, upon

the repeal of the statutes, his sentences were void. In response, the State maintains that the

1989 Sentencing Act had no effect on the petitioner’s convictions or sentences because the

petitioner “was charged, prosecuted, and convicted prior to the enactment of the 1989 Act.”

We agree with the State.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-117(b) specifically provides that “[u]nless

prohibited by the United States or Tennessee constitutions, any person sentenced on or after

November 1, 1989, for an offense committed between July 1, 1982, and November 1, 1989,

shall be sentenced under the provisions of this chapter.” (Emphasis added). This court has

observed that “the ‘act [does] not affect rights and duties that matured, penalties that were

The petitioner supplemented his cites to legal authority with quotes from William Shakespeare, 1

William Penn, Confucius, and Sigmund Freud. Specifically, regarding the habeas corpus court’s summary

dismissal of his petition, the petitioner, quoting Sigmund Freud, advises this court that “‘[t]he voice of the

intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing.’” 

-3-
incurred, or proceedings that were begun before its effective date.’” State ex rel. Stewart v.

McWherter, 857 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts,

ch. 591, § 115). In other words, because the petitioner was convicted and sentenced in 1985,

the 1989 Sentencing Act is not applicable to his convictions and sentence. Therefore, this

issue is without merit.

Further, the court also addressed the savings statute contained in Tennessee Code

Annotated section 39-11-112 and concluded that it did not require that defendants be

resentenced. This court has previously explained:

The criminal savings statute has never been interpreted to apply

to convictions and sentences which were already received when

a subsequent act or amendment provided for a lesser penalty. By

their terms, the . . . savings statutes relate to active prosecutions,

not past cases for which sentences are being served. Absent

clear language to the contrary, the changes in sentencing

wrought by the 1989 Sentencing Act or by any other act after the

petitioner’s sentences were imposed would not affect those

sentences because they were penalties already incurred.

Id. at 877. Again, the petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this basis.

Next, the petitioner raises several issues regarding the constitutionality of the Class

X Felonies Act. We note that the Class X Felonies Act, under which the petitioner was

sentenced, was not repealed until the enactment of the 1989 Sentencing Act. See Eddie

DePriest v. State, No. W2003-02561-CCA-R3-HC, 2004 WL 1872897, at *2 (Tenn. Crim.

App. at Jackson, Aug. 20, 2004). This court has repeatedly found that the Class X Felonies

Act was not unconstitutional. See State v. Alcorn, 741 S.W.2d 135, 138-39 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1987); State v. Taylor, 628 S.W.2d 42, 46-47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). The

petitioner’s sentences complied with the law that was in force at the time of his sentencing.

See State v. Carico, 968 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that the sentence for a Range

I, standard offender under the 1982 Act was twenty to forty years) (citing Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-35-109(a) (1982)). Therefore, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this basis.

Additionally, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the denial of bail to

persons convicted of a Class X felony. He has, however, failed to establish how this would

render his convictions or sentences void. Any challenges to the denial of bail would, at most,

render a judgment voidable, not void, and would thus not be a basis for habeas corpus relief.

See e.g., Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007); State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar,

381 S.W.2d 290, 291-92 (Tenn. 1964). Nevertheless, we note that this court has repeatedly

-4-
found that the statute denying bail to a Class X felon is not unconstitutional. See State v.

Arnold, 637 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Selph, 625 S.W.2d 285, 286

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).

Further, the petitioner makes multiple arguments that the robbery by use of a deadly

weapon and the aggravated kidnapping statutes were unconstitutional and void and that his

convictions for those offenses were also void. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that the

robbery by a deadly weapon statute, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-501 (repealed), was

unconstitutional because it provided for death as a punishment for violating the statute.

However, this contention was rejected in State v. Bowers, 673 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1984). This court has explained that “[w]hile case law did effectively eliminate the

unconstitutional punishment of death from Tennessee’s old robbery statute, the other

provisions of the statute remained constitutionally sound, including the remaining sentencing

penalties.” Carl P.E. Munsey v. State, No. 01C01-9209-CR-00299, 1993 WL 143544, at *1

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, May 6, 1993). Accordingly, the petitioner’s aggravated

robbery conviction and sentence are not void.

The petitioner also complains that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-301(e),

the aggravated kidnapping statute, does not fall within the caption of the Public Acts of 1981.

This court has previously examined a similar challenge and determined that the claim

“require[d] proof beyond the judgment of conviction” and was thus not a proper ground for

habeas corpus relief. Jermaine Hunter v. Howard Carlton, Warden, No.

E2007-00438-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 2792923, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Sept.

27, 2007).

Finally, the petitioner contendsthat Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-21-107(b),

2

which addressed the procedure for revoking a suspended sentence of a person charged with

a Class X felony and the denial of bail pending the appeal of such revocation, would violate

the prohibition against ex post facto laws if “applied to individuals convicted of crimes prior

to September 1, 1979, the effective date of the prohibition in the Class X Felonies Act.”

Initially, we note that the petitioner was sentenced after September 1, 1979. Moreover, this

claim, even if true, does not entitle the petitioner to habeas corpus relief.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-21-107 “wasrepealed by 1989 Tennessee Public Act chapter

2

591 section 7 and replaced by the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 with [Tennessee Code Annotated

section] 40-35-311.” State v. Shad Tankersley, No. W2005-02901-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1259212, at *4

n.1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Apr. 30, 2007).

-5-
III. Conclusion

In sum, we agree with the habeas corpus court’s determination that the petitioner

raised no claims entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of

the habeas corpus court.

_________________________________

NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE

-6-