“squibb Co., 85 F. 3d 270, 272-74 (7th Cir. 1996). The question of
whether a change in working conditions is materially adverse is one
of fact, and can be resolved on summary judgment only “if the
question is not fairly contestable,” Id. at 273-74. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, I
hold that Ms. Hobson has met her burden as to the third element of
the McDonnell test.

However, Ms. Hobson’s successful prima facie case does not
save her claim. The burden now shifts to the defendant, who has
amply demonstrated a nondiscriminatory reason for transferring Ms.
Hobson, namely the conflict of interest that necessarily occurs
when one spouse directly supervises another at work. Ms. Hobson
simply has not offered any evidence by which a reasonable fact-
finder could conclude that the defendant’s explanation for her
transfer is pretext. Her own union representative, who was
authorized to speak for her, acknowledged “the need for Ms. Hobson
to report to someone other than” her husband. Ms. Hobson’s argument
that her husband did not in fact show her any favoritism is not
relevant; it is entirely proper for an employer to avoid the
appearance of favoritism by preventing spouses from reporting
directly to one another. Equally inapposite is Ms. Hobson’s
argument that she was treated unfairly because at the time of her
transfer, the Post Office handled cases of conflict of interest as

they came to a manager’s attention, usually by word of mouth,


job under a supervisor whose specialty is marketing, that her
workspace was moved 300 feet down the hall, making it harder for
her to access and seek help from her colleagues in the operations
department, and that the switch has made it more difficult for her
to do her work. The defendant counters that Ms. Hobson is
performing the same work, for the same pay, with the same title, in
the same building, and that such a transfer is not adverse as a
matter of law.

Cases in this circuit make this question a close call. On the
one hand, “fa]dverse employment action has been defined quite
broadly in this circuit.” Smart v, Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437,
441 (7th Cir. 1996). Transfer to a department where the supervisors
did not understand the plaintiff’s job, in combination with a
change of duties from consulting to referencing and various
indignities such as the withdrawal of the plaintiff’s office,
telephone, and business cards, was found to be an adverse
employment action in Collins v. State of Illinois, 830 F.2d 692,
704 (7th Cir. 1994). Yet the Seventh Circuit has also made clear
that “not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an
actionable adverse action.” Smart, 89 F. 3d at 441. For example,
a salesman’s transfer to new territory, which resulted in a
decrease in his commission earnings, and his employer’s insistence
that he enroll in a disciplinary sales coaching program, did not

constitute an adverse employment action. Williams v. Bristol-Meyers


‘rather than via across-the-board inquiry into its supervisors’
private lives. Evidence that the Post Office only separated spouses
when it received information about their relationships is not
evidence that an individual choice to separate spouses was racially
motivated. Ms. Hobson has not produced any evidence suggesting that
the Post Office failed to act in any cases after it was made aware
of same-race spouses in supervisory relationships ~- only that it
failed to act when it was unaware that such relationships were
taking place.

Ms. Hobson complains that her transfer was instituted in
retaliation for her husband’s complaint of racial discrimination.
Ms. Hobson’s husband filed an EEO action and a union grievance when
he was transferred to solve the conflict of interest created by the
reporting relationship between Ms. Hobson and her husband. When
that grievance was settled through her husband’s return to his old
position, Ms. Hobson was transferred. The McDonnell burden-shifting
analysis described above is applied in cases of alleged retaliation
as well as cases of alleged racial discrimination. Parkins v. Civil
Constructors of Illinois, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1038-39 (7th Cir.
1998). Ms. Hobson will be unable to show that her employer’s
explanation for the transfer is mere pretext. Her employer's
initial attempt to remove Ms. Hobson and her husband from a direct
reporting relationship took place before either of them filed a

claim of discrimination. There is no evidence that its second


Minute Order Form (06/97)

q¥@ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
ange Magistene Judge Elaine E. Bucklo “Than Arsipned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 24 DATE 5/28/2003
CASE Hobson vs. Potter
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the parly iting the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}

(2) QO Brief in support of motion due

(3) 0 Answer brief to motion due___- Reply to answer brief due____.

(4) im) Ruling/Hearingon___set for att

(5) QO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on__set for ___—_at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___——sset for aat_

(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for]on__—at__

(8) D [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) ClLocat Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)2).

ao) «ot [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order granting defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. Judgment is therefore entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. Any pending
motion in this case is terminated as moot.

di) @f [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

Document
Number

No notices required, advised in open court.

[0 notic« i
No notices required. number of notices

oY | Notices mailed by judge’s staff. MAY y) 9 200

Notified counsel by telephone. data dgcketed

Docketing to mail notices.

oY | Mail AO 450 form.

docrenbellly inns

5/28/2003

3m

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice

courtroom py —
MPI deputy’s CGAY Bo 2. fae sa
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office nailing €epoty iniils



attempt to separate the two, by transferring Ms. Hobson, was done
to punish Ms. Hobson.

The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

ENTERS, IRDER :
Kone L Basbe.

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: May Q¥ 2003


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MAY 2S 2003

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

VANESSA L. HOBSON,
Plaintiff,

Vv.
No. 02 C 24
JOHN E, POTTER, in his official
capacity as Postmaster General
of the United States,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Vanessa L. Hobson, an African-American woman, was
transferred from the operations department of the United States
Postal Service facility where she works to the marketing department
of the same facility after her manager received an anonymous phone
call informing him that she was married to her immediate
supervisor, who is white. Ms. Hobson sues John Potter, the
Postmaster General, for retaliation and discrimination under Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg. The defendant now moves for summary
judgment. I grant the motion.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when,
viewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, the case presents no genuine issue of material
fact. Popovits v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 185 F.3d 726, 731 (7th
Cir. 1999). Because Ms. Hobson presents no direct evidence of

racial hostility to support her discrimination claim, I will

x


. a

analyze it under the burden-shifting method established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under
this method, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination. Once she has done so, the employer
must produce a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.
If it does, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to allow
a trier of fact to find that the employer’s explanation is
pretextual. Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2002). In
order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the
plaintiff must prove (1) that she was a member of a protected
class; (2) that she was performing her job satisfactorily; (3) that
she experienced an adverse employment action, and (4) that
similarly situated individuals who were not members of the
protected class were treated more favorably. Id.

Elements (1) and (2) are not in dispute. Both parties agree
that Ms. Hobson is African-American and that she performed her job
satisfactorily. Element (4) has likewise been met; the Manager of
Human Resources for the Postal Service district where Ms. Hobson
was employed acknowledged in his deposition that at the time of Ms.
Hobson’s transfer, there were “some” other, non-interracial
conjugal couples in direct supervisory relationships. (Simmons Dep.
at 80). However, the parties disagree strongly as to whether Ms.
Hobson’s transfer was an adverse employment action. Ms. Hobson

contends that she is now forced to perform an operations-related