infliction of emotional distress draw in material part on some
egregious defamatory statements that he ascribes to EBN, those

|i aims are not preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act (see,
é.g., Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177.111.2d 511, 516, 687 N.E.2d 21,
23-24 (1997)). Nox, because those defamatory statements were
yttered post-termination, are they blocked by the Illinois

i

Workers’ Compensation Act. Finally, the pattern of EBN's claimed
activity that includes those statements satisfies the “extreme
and outrageous” standard established by Illinois caselaw.

|
Count VI will also stand.

i Conclusion

For the reasons stated here, EBN's Rule 12(b) (6) motion is
i
granted only as to Complaint Count V and is denied as to
fomplaint Counts III, IV and VI. EBN is ordered to answer those

remaining counts on or before July 8, 2002.

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: dune 25, 2002
|
|


Miguie Order Fin (06/97)
|

United States District Court, Northern District of Dlinois

Name of Assigned Judge Milton I. Shadur Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge * than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 9393 DATE 6/25/2002
CASE Eric R. Ralford vs. E.B.N. enterprises, Inc.
TITLE
T [In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
ion bei d,
MOTION: of the motion being presented]
i
DOCKET ENTRY:
qg oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) lo Brief in support of motion due
GB) oO Answer brief to motion due___._ Reply to answer brief due.
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on _ set for at
(5) oO Status hearing{held/continued to] {set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) ia Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
ga” $!0 Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) ' o {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
Oo (oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) (OGeneral Rule21 OO FRCP41(a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).
do) of {Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated here, EBN’s
Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted only as to Complaint Count V and is denied as to Complaint Counts II,
TV and VI. EBN is ordered to answer those remaining counts on or before July8, 2002. (28-1)
(11) ' | (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court. Document,
. Number
‘No notices required. i .
swumber of notices. ws
oY | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone, ‘SUN | 2.6 2002
Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form, dynos Lolulsia sn a D«,
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. PREM)
snsro02
courtroom €S:6 Rd S2NA 20 date muiled notice
* ‘nti ar aaa ss
UO Tymtrdmetedeivdrtn
central Clerk’s Office ailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ERIC R. RALFORD,

)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
' Vv. ) No. oO1C oa |)
| OCKETED
E.B.N. ENTERPRISES, INC., ) J
) UN 26 2002
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
E.B.N. Enterprises, Inc. (“EBN”) has filed a Fed. R. Civ. P.

(*Rule”) 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss four counts of the Verified
Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) filed against it by Eric Ralford
(“Ralford”). In turn, Ralford's appointed counsel have filed a
tesponsive memorandum addressing EBN's contentions at some
length. No extended discussion is needed to establish that only
one of EBN's four attacks succeeds.

Count IIT

Rule 12(b) (6) does not set a particularly high hurdle for a

|
plaintiff's pleading--see the standard reconfirmed in Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In this instance
Ralford's allegation in Complaint 922 sufficiently supports the
element of age-based employment discrimination challenged by EBN,
at least at this threshold stage. Count III will not be
dismissed.

Count IV

If our Court of Appeals were to convert its dictum i


Gonzalez v. Ingersoll] Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1034-35

(7 Cir. 1998) to an actual holding to the same effect at some
future time, it would stand alone among Courts of Appeals in
holding that an at-will employee may not sue under 42 U.S.C.
41981 (“Section 1981”). Like other judges in this District, this

Court will not assume such a result. Instead it leaves Count IV

in place--a determination that may always be reexamined if the
legal climate were to change before the final disposition of this

action.

i
| Count V

j Because Ralford's defamation claim sounds in state law and
|

not federal law, he cannot rely on the pendency of his EEOC

charge to toll the one-year statute of limitations on his

defamat ion-based claim (see, e.g., Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile

Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7% Cir. 1992)). Though

|
Ralford seeks to avoid dismissal on the Macawber-like premise

that “something may turn up” in discovery that would evidence a
i :

republication by EBN of the assertedly defamatory comments that

would render his claim timely, that speculative argument cannot

save the day.’ Count V is dismissed.

Count VE

j Because Ralford's claims of intentional and negligent

1 This is of course an interlocutory order, so that if such
an eventuality were to occur Ralford could move to reinstate

Count Vv.
!