SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5508-15T4

IN THE MATTER OF 

BENJAMIN ACEVEDO.

_____________________

Submitted September 24, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Fasciale and Rose. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County.

Evan F. Nappen, attorney for appellant Benjamin 

Acevedo (Louis P. Nappen, on the brief).

Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Marc A. 

Festa, Senior Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on 

the brief).

PER CURIAM

Benjamin Acevedo appeals from a June 21, 2016 order granting the State's 

motion to revoke his Firearms Purchaser Identification Card (FPIC); denying his 

handgun purchase permit application; denying his handgun carry permit 

application; voiding and requiring him to surrender his FPIC; and ordering him 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 2, 2018
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to forfeit his firearms. We reverse, without prejudice, that part of the order 

requiring he forfeit his weapons. We otherwise affirm. 

In 2005, Acevedo was a constable for the City of Paterson and employed 

as a security guard. In December 2005, Acevedo provided security for a private 

party, where he possessed, without a permit, an unloaded handgun and a loaded 

magazine. The police arrested Acevedo and charged him with third-degree 

unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). He entered into the

pretrial intervention (PTI) program for one year, which he successfully 

completed. 

At the time of his arrest, the police seized his handgun and FPIC. The 

police returned Acevedo's FPIC after he completed PTI, and in 2010, he applied 

for permits to purchase handguns. The Paterson Police Department (PPD) 

granted the applications, and thereafter, he legally purchased handguns. 

In December 2012, Acevedo applied for a permit to carry a handgun, and 

in March 2013, he applied for a permit to purchase a handgun. In October 2013, 

the PPD denied both of his applications in the interest of "Public Health, Safety 

and Welfare." Acevedo appealed the denials to the Law Division. 
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In July 2014, the State filed a motion to revoke Acevedo's FPIC and forfeit 

his firearms. In 2016, after several days of an evidentiary hearing, the judge 

issued an oral decision, and subsequently entered the order under review. 

On appeal, Acevedo argues:

POINT I

THE [JUDGE'S] . . . DECISION REGARDING 

FORFEITURE OF APPELLANT'S ALREADY 

POSSESSED FIREARMS IS ULTRA VIRES AND 

NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW.

POINT II

THE [JUDGE] . . . ERRED BECAUSE APPELLANT 

IS NOT PRESENTLY A DANGER TO THE PUBLIC 

HEALTH, SAFETY OR WELFARE.

POINT III

THE [JUDGE] . . . ERRED REGARDING [HIS] 

RELIANCE UPON OSWORTH[1] SINCE THE 

PRESENT CASE IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM 

OSWORTH. 

POINT IV

ASSUMING APPELLANT SUFFERS FROM NO 

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(C)(5) DISQUALIFIER, 

REGARDING APPELLANT'S PERMIT TO CARRY 

APPLICATION: THE [ORDER] SHOULD BE 

REVERSED OR THE MATTER SHOULD BE 

REMANDED FOR A FINDING UNDER NEW 

JERSEY'S PRESENT (AS OF MARCH 6, 2017) 

REGULATORY "JUSTIFIABLE NEED" 

STANDARD OF "SERIOUS THREATS" OR 

 

1

 In re Osworth, 365 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 2003). 
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"SPECIAL DANGER TO HIS LIFE THAT CANNOT 

BE AVOIDED BY OTHER REASONABLE MEANS."

POINT V

THE [JUDGE] . . . ERRED BY DENYING A 

FUNDAMENTAL, INDIVIDUAL,

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT FOR A REASON THAT

DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A "LONGSTANDING 

PROHIBITION ON THE POSSESSION OF 

FIREARMS." (Not raised below).

POINT VI

THE [JUDGE] . . . ERRED BECAUSE [HE] FAILED 

TO CONSIDER THE MATTER UNDER 

HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY. (Not raised below).

POINT VII

THE [JUDGE'S] . . . DECISION APPL[]YING 

"INTEREST OF PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY OR 

WELFARE" CONSTITUTES AN 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST-BALANCING 

TEST. (Not raised below).

POINT VIII

APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE DENIED HIS 

FUNDAMENTAL, INDIVIDUAL, 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KEEP ARMS FOR A 

REASON THAT IS VAGUE AND OVERBROAD. 

(Not raised below).

POINT IX

APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE DENIED HIS 

FUNDAMENTAL, INDIVIDUAL, 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT FOR A REASON THAT 

PROVIDES NO DUE PROCESS NOTICE. (Not raised 

below).
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POINT X

THE [JUDGE'S] . . . DECISION 

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY BARS APPELLANT 

FROM EXERCISING A FUNDAMENTAL, 

INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AD 

INFINITUM WITH NO FORM OF REDRESS.

The law governing this appeal is well settled. A municipal police chief 

has the discretion, "subject to standards which have been adjudged 

constitutionally adequate," to grant or deny an individual's application for a 

handgun permit or identification card. Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 43 (1972). 

The police chief's decision to deny an application is subject to de novo review 

by the Law Division, which "in this context contemplates introduction of 

relevant and material testimony and the application of an independent judgment 

to the testimony by the reviewing court." Id. at 45. The State bears the burden 

of establishing the existence of good cause for the denial "by a fair 

preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 46. 

Because "a judicial declaration that a defendant poses a threat to the public 

health, safety or welfare involves, by necessity, a fact-sensitive analysis," State 

v. Cordoma, 372 N.J. Super. 524, 535 (App. Div. 2004), "an appellate court 

should accept a trial [judge's] findings of fact that are supported by substantial 

credible evidence," In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 116 

(1997). Where the evidence is mostly testimonial and involves questions of 
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credibility, deference to a judge's findings of fact is particularly appropriate. Id.

at 117. We will not disturb a judge's findings of fact unless those findings would 

result in an injustice. Ibid. (citing Rova Farms Resort v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 

474, 483-84 (1974)). Nevertheless, a judge's "interpretation of the law and the 

legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any 

special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 

N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

We begin by addressing Acevedo's argument that the judge improperly 

ordered him to forfeit his already possessed firearms. He asserts that the State 

moved solely under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f), which governs the granting and 

revocation of FPICs, not the forfeiture of already possessed firearms, and that 

the judge only considered this statute in his oral decision. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f) in part states, "[a]ny [FPIC] may be revoked by the 

Superior Court of the county wherein the card was issued, after hearing upon 

notice, upon a finding that the holder thereof no longer qualifies for the issuance 

of the permit." The statute explicitly concerns FPICs and does not mention 

possession or forfeiture of firearms – N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 is entitled "Purchase of 

firearms."
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The judge relied solely on N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f) to explain the Superior 

Court's authority to revoke an FPIC, and in the same breath granted the State's 

motion for FPIC revocation and forfeiture of firearms. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f) 

provides no basis for the forfeiture of already possessed firearms. The judge 

improperly relied on N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f) to require Acevedo to forfeit his 

already possessed firearms. We reverse without prejudice, however, this 

requirement, and afford the parties the opportunity – if desired – to address anew 

whether forfeiture is warranted under the appropriate law and facts of this case. 

We do so especially because the record is incomplete for us to resolve the issue 

ourselves. 

As to Acevedo's argument that the judge improperly found him to be a 

danger to the public health, safety or welfare under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), we 

disagree. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) states, "[n]o handgun purchase permit or 

[FPIC] shall be issued . . . [t]o any person where the issuance would not be in 

the interest of the public health, safety or welfare." This FPIC disqualifier 

"provision is 'intended to relate to cases of individual unfitness, where, though 

not dealt with in the specific statutory enumerations, the issuance of the permit 

or identification card would nonetheless be contrary to the public interest.'" In 

re Osworth, 365 N.J. Super. at 79 (quoting Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 91 
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(1968)). "This broadly worded disqualification criterion eludes precise 

definition. We are satisfied, however, that it must be liberally construed . . . ." 

Cordoma, 372 N.J. Super. at 534.

We are satisfied that the judge's credibility findings and factual 

determination that issuance of a permit would not be in the interests of the public 

health, safety or welfare are amply supported by credible evidence. The judge 

engaged in a fact-sensitive analysis of all of the testimony and evidence 

presented. See id. at 535. 

The judge properly analyzed various events in determining Acevedo's 

fitness to carry a handgun and FPIC. He considered the underlying facts of 

Acevedo's 2005 arrest and subsequent PTI. Although Acevedo contends that he 

carried a firearm without a permit as a result of a custom that allowed constables 

to do so, the judge heard testimony to the contrary, and Acevedo failed to 

establish that he was working as a constable on the night of his arrest. In fact, 

Acevedo's testimony established that he was working as a security guard for a 

private party at the behest of a councilman. The judge acknowledged the lapse 

of time since the arrest, yet supported his decision with additional incidents 

between Acevedo and the police.
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One such incident occurred in October 2014, when Acevedo entered his 

child's school without permission to voice his concerns for how traffic was being 

directed at the school's closing time. The principal testified that Acevedo 

"presented very angry, combative, and screaming, . . . questioning if [she] was 

the principal," and he was "very aggressive in his approach," but she did not 

contact the police.

When Acevedo entered the school building without permission for the 

second time – to retrieve traffic cones from inside the building so that he could 

direct traffic – the principal testified that he appeared "very upset, very 

disgruntled," and acted "[v]ery similar to the first incident." This time, she had 

to call security. She explained that she felt threatened by Acevedo, was fearful 

for her own safety and that of her students, and that "his reaction to the fact that 

there were no crossing guards . . . escalated from zero to 100" – factors that 

prompted her to file a police report. The responding police officer also testified 

that the principal appeared to be afraid. 

On a separate occasion, Acevedo was attempting to direct traffic at the 

school, when a woman ran over his foot. The police were called, and upon 

arrival, Acevedo identified himself first as a county peace officer, and then 

corrected himself and stated that he was a Passaic County constable. The officer 
10 A-5508-15T4

testified that when the woman challenged Acevedo's authority to direct traffic, 

he told her that he was a constable and then stood behind her vehicle. The judge 

took particular note of this because Acevedo gave "the impression that he had 

more authority than he actually had, which leads me to the initial problem that

. . . Acevedo had back in 2005 . . . ." 

Lastly, the judge considered Acevedo's behavior at the PPD Headquarters, 

which occurred months after he applied for the carry permit and permit to 

purchase. Officer Katy Santana testified that she encountered Acevedo when he 

arrived at headquarters to see Detective Keith Rotsaert, and he became

"boisterous, loud, aggressive," "yelling he wanted to see [Detective Rotsaert]," 

and "cursed a little bit, just getting disruptive." She explained that she "would 

have probably arrested him had he not had to see [Detective Rotsaert] that day." 

Detective Rotsaert stated that on that afternoon, Acevedo called him sixteen 

times in twenty minutes. He testified that Acevedo asserted that he was "joking" 

with Officer Santana and that they were friends. And yet, Officer Santana

testified that she took Acevedo's actions seriously and did not know him. This 

behavior concerned the judge and evinced Acevedo's impatience. 

We reject Acevedo's contention that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) provides no 

statutory limit or due process form of redress, and that the judge provided no 
11 A-5508-15T4

relief to its effect. The judge did not specify a time period in which Acevedo 

will remain disqualified from obtaining an FPIC, and instead stated that the 

statute does not "specify a time period." Although the prosecutor advocated that 

the FPIC should be revoked into perpetuity, the judge did not make that 

determination.

Acevedo's constitutional arguments were not raised to the Law Division 

judge. We therefore decline to consider them. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 

20 (2009). Even considered, though, we find them meritless, noting our prior 

discussion in In re Winston, 438 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2014). See also

In re Forfeiture of Pers. Weapons & Firearms Identification Card belonging to 

F.M., 225 N.J. 487, 506-08 (2016); In re Dubov, 410 N.J. Super. 190, 196-97 

(App. Div. 2009). 

We conclude that Acevedo's remaining arguments are without sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed as to the revocation of the FPIC; reversed without prejudice as 

to the forfeiture of firearms. We do not retain jurisdiction.