alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Official Journal L 91/2020

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 91 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6325 March 2020 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 91

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6325 March 2020

---

| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | DECISIONS |
| | * | Decision (EU) 2020/440 of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2020 on a temporary pandemic emergency purchase programme (ECB/2020/17) | 1 |
| | * | Decision (EU) 2020/441 of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2020 amending Decision (EU) 2016/948 of the European Central Bank on the implementation of the corporate sector purchase programme (ECB/2020/18) | 5 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

DECISIONS

*

Decision (EU) 2020/440 of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2020 on a temporary pandemic emergency purchase programme (ECB/2020/17)

1

*

Decision (EU) 2020/441 of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2020 amending Decision (EU) 2016/948 of the European Central Bank on the implementation of the corporate sector purchase programme (ECB/2020/18)

5

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-22-00075-CR

Enoch David Castillo-Quiroz, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

NO. CR2019-329, THE HONORABLE DIB WALDRIP, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R A N D M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

PER CURIAM

Appellant’s brief was originally due May 4, 2022. After this Court granted 

multiple motions requesting an extension of time to file his brief, appellant’s brief was due 

October 4, 2022. In granting the most recent extension, this Court advised counsel that no 

further extensions would be granted and that his failure to file a brief would result in the referral 

of the case to the trial court for a hearing under Rule 38.8(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure. To date, the brief has not been tendered for filing and is overdue.

The appeal is abated and remanded to the trial court. The trial court shall conduct 

a hearing to determine whether appellant desires to prosecute this appeal and, if so, whether 

counsel has abandoned this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(b)(2), (3). The court shall make 

appropriate written findings and recommendations. See id. R. 38.8(b)(2), (3). If necessary, the 
2

court shall appoint substitute counsel who will effectively represent appellant in this appeal. 

Following the hearing, which shall be transcribed, the trial court shall order the appropriate 

supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s records—including all findings and orders—to be prepared 

and forwarded to this Court no later than December 9, 2022. See id. R. 38.8(b)(3).

It is so ordered November 9, 2022.

Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Kelly

Abated and Remanded

Filed: November 9, 2022

Do Not Publish
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In  connection  with the Quarterly Report of SpaceDev, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities
and  Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, James W. Benson,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec.1350,
as  adopted  pursuant  to  Sec.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:

     (1)  The  Report  fully  complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  May  16,  2005


                                                   By:       /s/ James W. Benson
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                               James  W.  Benson
                                                       Chief  Executive  Officer

A  signed  original  of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears  in  typed  form within the electronic version of this written statement
required  by  Section  906,  has  been  provided  to  SpaceDev, Inc. and will be
retained  by  SpaceDev,  Inc.  and  furnished  to  the  Securities  and Exchange
Commission  or  its  staff  upon  request.
#### Farah A. Thompkins, Appellant, v Belkis *V.*Ortiz, Respondent.

[943 NYS2d 474]—

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Robert E. Torres, J.), entered April 25, 2011, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reinstating plaintiff’s claims that she sustained a “permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member” and/or a “significant limitation of use of a body function or system,” and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Defendant established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this action where plaintiff suffered injuries to her left foot, ankle and knee as she was exiting a livery cab driven by defendant. Plaintiff alleged that defendant started driving away before she was completely out of the cab, resulting in the car rolling over her foot and the door banging her knee. Defendant submitted an affirmed report of a radiologist who reviewed an MRI of plaintiff’s left knee and opined that her condition was degenerative and that there was no evidence of acute or recent injury. Defendant also submitted the affirmed report of an orthopedic surgeon who found that plaintiff’s knee, ankle and foot demonstrated full ranges of motion *(see Grant v United Pavers Co., Inc.,*91 AD3d 499 [2012]).

In opposition, plaintiff raised triable issues of fact. She submitted, inter alia, the report of a radiologist who found that the MRIs showed a partial intrasubstance meniscal tear of the left knee. Plaintiff also submitted reports of her orthopedic surgeon who conducted arthroscopy on her left knee and found meniscal tears, and of an orthopedist who, upon recent examination, found plaintiff had limited ranges of motion in her left ankle and knee and an antalgic gait to the left. The orthopedist also opined that the injuries were permanent and would require further treatment *(see Mitchell v Calle,*90 AD3d 584 [2011]; *419
      *Torres v Villanueva,*90 AD3d 523 [2011]). The orthopedist adequately addressed the causation issue by opining that the injuries were caused by the accident *(see Perl v Meher,*18 NY3d 208, 219 [2011]; *Yuen v Arka Memory Cab Corp.,*80 AD3d 481 [2011]).

Dismissal of plaintiffs 90/180-day claim was proper. Plaintiff testified that as a result of the accident, she missed only one day of school *(see e.g. Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 958 [1992]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Acosta, Renwick and Richter, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR CHOICETEL COMMUNICATIONS, INC AND SUBSIDARIES AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                             602
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,217
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,890
<PP&E>                                           9,283
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,554
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  14,949
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,866
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            29
<OTHER-SE>                                       5,301
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    14,949
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 5,154
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,438
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,823
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 235
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (107)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (48)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (59)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (59)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.02)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Echo Therapeutics, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Harry G. Mitchell, CPA, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Harry G. Mitchell, CPA


Harry G. Mitchell, CPA


Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer





August 16, 2010
#### Ronald Kellman et al., Appellants, v Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation et al., Respondents.

-In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., arising out of alleged breaches of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 and 241, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaccaro, J.), dated May 1, 1985, which denied their motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants’ liability under Labor Law § 240.

Order reversed, on the law, with costs, partial summary judgment granted to plaintiff Ronald Kellman on the second cause of action asserted in the verified complaint and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings.

An examination of the affirmation submitted on behalf of the defendants in opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment indicates that the defendants have failed to meet their obligation to tender evidentiary proof in admissible form which would raise a triable issue of fact. Firstly, the affirmation was made by an attorney without personal knowledge of the facts, and as such is without evidentiary value *(see, Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557). Secondly, both the affirmation and its attachments *652fail to provide any evidence controverting or denying plaintiffs’ version of the facts, apart from conclusory allegations that plaintiff Ronald Heilman’s story is incredible and that plaintiffs have failed to establish a claim under Labor Law § 240. Such conclusory allegations are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment *(see, Capelin Assoc. v Globe Mfg. Corp.,*34 NY2d 338). On the other hand, plaintiffs’ motion meets the requirements of CPLR 3212 (b) and asserts, in admissible form, all the facts necessary to make out a claim under Labor Law § 240 (1).

Defendants claim that they could have tendered evidence in admissible form if discovery were allowed to continue and if they could depose a witness who allegedly made a previous statement contradicting the injured plaintiff’s version of how the accident occurred. However, the alleged statement upon which defendants intend to rely would only permit a finder of fact to conclude that the injured plaintiff’s own negligence may have contributed to the happening of the accident. A violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes absolute liability, and comparative negligence is not a defense to such a claim *(Bland v Manocherian,*66 NY2d 452; *Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts,*65 NY2d 513). Since a deposition of the witness in question would not disclose any facts essential to defendants’ opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants’ liability under Labor Law § 240 (1), that motion should have been granted. Lazer, J. P., Mangano, Brown and Hooper, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from financial
statements included in the Company's quarterly report on form 10-q for the six
months ended June 30, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statement.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                           3,352
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,606
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,594
<INVENTORY>                                      6,395
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                10,063
<PP&E>                                         175,880
<DEPRECIATION>                                (52,075)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 174,063
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           21,140
<BONDS>                                        131,465
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           32,784
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                    (48,250)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   174,063
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                30,264
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   40,644
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,517
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (19,133)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        27
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (19,160)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                      (1,807)
<NET-INCOME>                                  (20,967)
<EPS-BASIC>                                 (1,106.55)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gregory MOORE, Jason Mitchell, Jeffrey Martinez, Alvin Martinez, Nathaniel Slater, Anthony Bowen also known as Tony Felder, Nelson Martinez, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 07-1589-cr(lead), 07-2247-cr(Con), 07-2787-cr(Con), 07-2930-cr(Con), 07-2931-cr(Con), 07-3584-cr(Con).

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Jan. 9, 2009.

*629Lawrence D. Gerzog, Esq. New York, NY, for Appellant Gregory Moore.

David V. Harbach, Assistant United States Attorney for Michael J. Garcia, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.

PRESENT: Hon. CHESTER J. STRAUB and Hon. PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges, Hon. STEFAN R. UNDERHILL,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Stefan R. Underhill, United States District Judge for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal of Gregory Moore on the ground that he had entered into an agreement to waive his appellate rights and then appealed his sentence. It is well-settled in this Court that “a defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal a sentence within an agreed upon guideline range is enforceable.” *United States v. Djelevic,*161 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir.1998). This Court has also held that, “[i]n no circumstance ... may a defendant, who has secured the benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal a certain sentence, then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement.” *United States v. Salcido-Contreras,*990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1993); *see also United States v. Morgan,*406 F.3d 135, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2005).

Moore pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement with the Government in which he stipulated that he would not appeal a sentence within or below the Guidelines range. Moore received a Guidelines range sentence. The record indicates that Moore’s waiver was valid because he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal.**

Moreover, as applicable to Moore’s appeal we have previously held that a defendant who has waived his right to appeal and then attempted to challenge his sentence based on the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in *Kimbrough v. United States,*— U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), may not do so. *See United States v. Lee,*523 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that a defendant’s “inability to foresee that subsequently decided cases would create new appeal issues does not supply a basis for failing to enforce an appeal waiver” and concluding that “neither *Kimbrough*nor any other legal ‘developments’ constitute grounds for finding [the defendant’s] appeal waiver unenforceable.”) (internal quotations omitted).

For the foregoing reasons, the Government’s motion to dismiss Moore’s appeal is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

**

 THE COURT: [B]ecause of your agreement with the government, if I do sentence you to 115 months or less, you have agreed with the government not to appeal or collaterally attack your sentence. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Moore Plea proceeding Tr. 11:6-11, Nov. 8, 2006.
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Pacific Shellfish Research Unit scientists are currently investigating Pacific oyster culture in US West Coast estuaries.
 Pacific oysters were introduced from Japan in the early 1900’s and are now widely farmed in estuaries along the US West coast.
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#### Kevin D. ALLEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Patricia R. STANSBERRY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 10-7586.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 28, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 10, 2011.

Kevin D. Allen, Appellant pro se. Debra J. Prillaman, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appel-lee.

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Kevin D. Allen, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp.2010) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Allen v. Stansberry,*No. 1:09-cv-00631-GBL-JFA, 2010 WL 3671392 (E.D. Va. filed Sept. 14, 2010 *&*entered Sept. 15, 2010). With regard to claims raised by Allen for the first time on appeal, we find that Allen has *794waived consideration. *See First Virginia Banks, Inc. v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc.,*206 F.3d 404, 407 n. 1 (4th Cir.2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*