-5-
Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir. 1997). The court, in
deciding such a motion, may receive and consider affidavits from

both parties, see Nelson by Carson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717

F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1983), and will resolve all factual
conflicts in favor of the plaintiff, see Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v.
R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1984).

A federal district court sitting in diversity in Illinois has
jurisdiction over a non-consenting, non-resident defendant if an
Tllinois state court would have jurisdiction. See McIlwee v. ADM
Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 222, 223 (7th Cir. 1994). “Three distinct
obstacles to personal jurisdiction must generally be examined: (1)
_state statutory law, (2) state.constitutional law, and (3) federal
constitutional law.” RAR, 107 F.3d at 1276. As for state
statutory law, the Illinois long-arm statute provides that an
Illinois state court also may exercise jurisdiction “on any other
basis now or hereafter permitted” by the state and federal
constitutions. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c). Because § 2-209(c) authorizes
personal jurisdiction to the constitutional limit, the analysis
collapses into two constitutional inquiries-~one state and one
federal--and we need not consider whether defendants engaged in any
of the acts enumerated in the Illinois long-arm statute. See RAR,
107 F.3d at 1276. Typically, the courts look to the federal due

process clause to construe the Illinois due process clause. See


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CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, defendant Michael Szporer’s

motion to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction is

granted. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint; he may

file an amended complaint by November 26, 2002.

DATE: November 12, 2002

ENTER: C] lam f
John . G¥ady, United States District Judge

J



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compile news and send the e-mail newsletter, electricity, and
photocopying charges. Siec does not have any employees, nor does
it pay Szporer any salary or commission.

Generally, to become a member of Siec and receive the e-mail
newsletter, a prospective subscriber must contact Szporer and ask
to receive the newsletter. Most, if not all, of Siec’s subscribers
are referred by word of mouth. All that Szporer requires from the
prospective subscriber is his or her e-mail address; Szporer does
not ask the subscriber for any other information. Szporer states
that he has “no way of knowing what state the member is from,” but
he estimates that “about fifty people of the three thousand Siec
members are residents of Illinois.” (Szporer Affidavit, @ 15.)
After the prospective subscriber gives Szporer his or her e-mail
address, the individual is placed on Siec’s master e-mail list and
begins receiving the newsletter. The e-mail newsletter is provided
free of charge to anyone who requests it. Siec does not advertise,
and it does not solicit or target any Illinois residents.

Szporer now moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. In the alternative, he moves for a transfer
of venue to the District Court for the District of Columbia.

DISCUSSION

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the

plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that

jurisdiction over the defendant is proper. See RAR, Inc. v. Turner



-6-

McMurray v. ImproveNet, Inc., No. 00 C 7137, 2001 WL 561376, at *1

(N.D. Ill. May 22, 2001) (Grady, J.).

General jurisdiction is for suits neither arising out of nor
related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, and it is
permitted only where the defendant has “continuous and systematic”
contacts with the forum. RAR, 107 F.3d at 1277. Specific
jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to jurisdiction over a
defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum. See id. Even defendants not physically
present in the jurisdiction have sufficient “minimum contacts” if
they do some act by which they purposefully avail themselves of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, see Hanson
v. _Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-53 (1958), and if they “should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

Plaintiff argues that we may assert both general and specific
jurisdiction over Szporer. However, the complaint does not allege
any facts demonstrating that Szporer had continuous and systematic
contacts with Illinois, or that. he did any act such that he could
reasonably anticipate being sued in T[llinois. Moreover
plaintiff's response to defendant’s motion relies solely on the
facts set forth by defendant, which in any event are not sufficient
to carry plaintiff’s burden. Plaintiff contends that jurisdiction

is proper pursuant to the “effects test” set forth in Calder v.


a!

02-3017.021-JCcD November 12, 2002

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
EDWARD MAZUR,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 02 C 3017

MICHAEL SZPORER,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), or alternatively, to transfer
venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the reasons stated
below, the motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.

BACKGROUND

Invoking diversity jurisdiction, plaintiff Edward Mazur filed
this suit against defendant Michael Szporer in April 2002, alleging
defamation and false-light invasion of privacy. Plaintiff's
allegations are summarized as follows. Plaintiff is an American
citizen, originally from Poland, who immigrated to the United
States in 1962. He is a businessman (with ownership interests in
a number of businesses) who lives in Glenview, Illinois, with his
wife and two of his three sons. He is, or has been, involved in

various social and community-based activities.


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Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), which instructs that the state in which

the victim of defamation lives has jurisdiction over the victim’s
defamation suit. But the Seventh Circuit has pointed out that,
“[i]n Calder as in all the other cases that have come to our
attention in which jurisdiction over a suit involving intellectual
property (when broadly defined to include reputation, so that it
includes Calder itself) was upheld, the defendant had done more
than brought about an injury to an interest located in a particular
state. The defendant had also ‘entered’ the state in some fashion,
as by the sale of the magazine containing the defamatory material.”

Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club

Ltd. Partnership, 34 F.3d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus,
plaintiff must show an injury in Illinois plus some additional act
directed toward Illinois. Plaintiff has alleged no facts in the
complaint and offered no evidence of his own of an additional act
by defendant such that defendant would reasonably anticipate being
required to defend himself in Illinois. (And the facts alleged by
defendant himself do not show such conduct.) Therefore, plaintiff
has not met his burden of showing that jurisdiction is proper over
Szporer.

Plaintiff is given leave to amend the complaint, if he can, to
allege a factual basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over

defendant.


-~2-

Plaintiff alleges that Szporer is editor of the “Siec,” “a
newsletter that is published and disseminated at least nationwide
over the internet.” (Complaint, {@ 3.) According to plaintiff
“fo]n March 2, 2002, and April 3, 2002, Defendant published
articles in the Siec that state that Mazur contracted for the
murder of a Polish Police officer, Marek Papala. The articles also
indicate that Mazur was involved with organized crime in Poland,
and that he exercised improper influence over Polish government
officials in Warsaw, including. the Prime Minister and the Justice
Minister of Poland.” (Id., G 11.) The complaint does not quote
from the allegedly defamatory articles, nor are they attached to
the complaint.! Count I of the complaint seeks injunctive relief
preventing defendant from publishing future defamatory statements
about plaintiff or his family. Count II is a claim for defamation
per se, and Count III is a claim for false-light invasion of
privacy.

Defendant sets forth the following facts in his affidavit in
support of his motion. Like plaintiff, defendant is originally
from Poland, and immigrated tothe United States as a child. He
lives in Washington, D.C. and.is an associate professor at the
University College of the University of Maryland. About ten years

ago, he founded “Siec,” a not-for-profit, “academic/ governmental/

¥ Plaintiff does attach one allegedly defamatory article, dated March 20,
2002 (not March 2, 2002), to his response.


-3-

community network of people who are interested in Poland and
Central Europe.” (Affidavit. of Michael Szporer, @ 5.) Siec
published a bulletin at the Library of Congress in Washington,
D.C., containing information about topics and events concerning
Poland and Central Europe. At the time of its inception, all of
Siec’s members were from the Washington, D.C. area.

The events calendar for Siec was originally sent to its
members via U.S. mail. As the mailing list began to grow, Szporer
decided that it would be easier and less expensive to notify
members about events by using e-mail. About seven years ago,
Szporer decided to send “other useful information,” including news
and commentaries, about Poland and Central Europe to Siec members
in the Washington, D.C. area. This information was sent via e-mail
in a newsletter format. Today, Siec has approximately 3,000
members who receive the e-mail newsletter, which is edited by
Szporer.

Szporer states that Siec. “is a community service with no
commercial or business purposes.” (Szporer Affidavit, 9 5.) Siec
is not incorporated, and it does not sell any product or service.
It has two sponsors, Western..Union and the Karol Marcinkowski
University of Medical Sciences in Poznan, Poland. The sponsors pay
Siec approximately $1,500.00 per year for its expenses, which -
include copyright charges for news report reproduction, maintenance

of the Siec member list, maintenance of the computer used to