LR 56.1(a)(3) [7] 2, 5); there is no evidence that Serrano was insubordinate to any of her supervisors;
and (3) unlike plaintiff, Serrano had no history of conflicts with her coworkers (id. J{ 6, 20).
O’Malley is also not comparable to plaintiff, though she was also a cashier, because there is no
evidence that she was insubordinate to any of her supervisors or that she had any difficulty getting
along with her coworkers. Because plaintiff has offered no evidence to suggest that defendant
treated a similarly situated, non-black cashier who was insubordinate to her supervisor more
favorably than plaintiff, she has not satisfied the fourth element of her prima facie case.

Having failed to make a prima facie case of race discrimination, plaintiffs Title VII claim

must be dismissed. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is, therefore, granted.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, there is no genuine issue of material fact on the Title VII
claim plaintiff asserts against defendant. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is, therefore,
granted. This is a final and appealable order.

ENTER:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

patep: 2 -/f- 23

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motion. To do so, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Von Zuckerstein v.
Argonne Nat’! Lab., 984 F.2d 1467, 1472 (7th Cir.1993). Once established, the prima facie case
creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. Id. The burden of production then shifts to
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the suspension. Id. If it does so,
the presumption of discrimination disappears and plaintiff must show that the proffered reason for
the suspension is merely a pretext. Id.

To establish a prima facie case on her race discrimination claim, plaintiff must show that she:
(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting defendant’s legitimate expectations; (3)
she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) defendant treated similarly situated employees

outside the protected class more favorably. Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP., 168 F.3d 1029, 1035

(7th Cir. 1999). There is no dispute that plaintiff is African American and was suspended without
pay for three days. Thus, the first and third elements are met.

There is, however, no evidence to support the second element. Plaintiff admits that she was
insubordinate to one of her supervisors, though she knew such conduct was prohibited. (See Def.’s
LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ff 4, 5, 12.) Thus, she was not meeting defendant’s legitimate expectations at
the time she was suspended.

There is also no evidence that defendant treated a similarly situated non-black cashier more
favorably than plaintiff, the fourth element of the prima facie case. Plaintiff compares her treatment
to that given to Lisa Serrano and Natalie O’Malley. Neither of those women, however, is situated
similarly to plaintiff. To be similarly situated, two employees must be “directly comparable .. . in

all material respects.” Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7" Cir. 2002).

Serrano is not comparable to plaintiff because: (1) she was plaintiff's supervisor not her peer (Def.’s

3.


Minus Order Forse (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

¢ of Assignet \dge Sitti judge it

PPsstamenet ae | Paul E, Plunket te eter

CASE NUMBER 01 C4895 IGG DATE 2/18/2003
CASE Terry Jenkins vs. Menards Hall Plaza
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(i) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) o Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due___.

(4) o Ruling/Hearingon___ssetfor___— at

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor___—_ at

(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set forlon___——sset for at_
(7) im} Trial[set for/re-set for] on___—_at

(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___—_saat

(9) oa This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

QFRCP4(m) O Local Rule 41.1 CFRCP41{a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).

ao [Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: there is no genuine
issue of material fact on the Title VII claim plaintiff asserts against defendant. Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is, therefore, granted. This is a final and appealable order.

ati [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

3,

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

LYNGD Loniteiaq:

NINDS

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice
courtroom

TBK deputy's
initials

miling deputy iitals



-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
TERRY JENKINS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 01 C 4985

) Paul E. Plunkett, Senior Judge
MENARDS HALL PLAZA, )
)
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Terry Jenkins has sued Menards Hall Plaza for its alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq, The case is before the Court on defendant’s Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56(c) motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth

below, the motion is granted.

Facts!

Plaintiff was hired by defendant as a part-time cashier on May 4, 1998. (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3)
Stmt. { 2.) When she was hired, plaintiff signed a form acknowledging receipt of the “Grow with
Menards Associate Information Booklet.” (Id. 44.) Among other things, the booklet says that acts
of insubordination may lead to a suspension. (Id.)

During her employment, plaintiff was supervised by Lisa Serrano, the head cashier, Rhonda

Root, the assistant office manager, and Dorian Broadwattrtthe office manager. (Id. § 5.)

els ree
Hrsg Powd

‘Plaintiff did not file a response to, defendant sik $6.1(a)(3) statement. She is, therefore,
deemed to have admitted all of the fact$'dsseited in it! See Local Rule 56.1(b).


On June 28, 1998, when plaintiff was using a cashier adding machine, her co-worker Natalie
O’Malley told plaintiff to “hurry up.” (Id. 99.) Plaintiff refused, at which point, she says, Serrano
told plaintiff to shut up. (Id. ff 10-11.) Plaintiff responded by telling Serrano to shut up. (Id. 12.)

Root, overheard plaintiffs comment to Serrano, but did not hear Serrano’s alleged comment
to plaintiff. (Id. {J 13-14.) Root immediately called plaintiff into the office, told her such conduct
towards her supervisor was inappropriate and suspended her for three days without pay. (Id. {{j 15,

17.) Plaintiff claims that her suspension was motivated by her race rather than her conduct.

The Legal Standard

To prevail on a summary judgment motion, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, [must] show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At this stage, we do not weigh evidence or determine the truth
of the matters asserted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). We view all

evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Michas v. Health Cost Controls

of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the

record as a whole establishes that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id.

Discussion
Plaintiff does not have any direct evidence of discrimination. (See Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot.
Summ. J. at 7-9.) Thus, she must comply with the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof

articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), if she is to defeat this

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