odious and inappropriate. It is less clear, however, whether Mr.
Nebolsky’s sexually discriminatory behavior so poisoned the
atmosphere at the plant as to create a hostile working environment
under Title VII. Most of the unpleasant interactions the plaintiffs
complain of, including Nebolsky yelling at his subordinates,
standing too close to them, whispering into their ears, cursing,
etc., characterized his unprofessional interactions with male and
female employees alike. The plaintiffs admit Mr. Nebolsky “got in
the face” of male employees, engaged in shouting matches with them,
and bumped into them, and that male employees lodged complaints
about Mr. Nebolsky with their union stewards. Most of the
plaintiffs’ allegations involve such non-gender-specific forms of
harassment.

The gender-specific incidents cited by the plaintiffs include
a number of occasions when Mr. Nebolsky stood so close to female
employees that his shoulder touched their breasts (Ms. Brandon, Ms.
Brown, Ms. King, Ms. Wallace), a few occasions when he placed a
hand on a female employee’s shoulder and slid it down toward her
breasts (Ms. Wallace, Ms. King), and isolated occasions when he
snatched a telephone out of a female employee’s hand, thereby
making contact with her breast (Ms. Brandon), pulled at a female
employee’s shirt to reveal a necklace underneath (Ms. King),
grabbed the. shoulders of a female employee (Ms. King), and pulled

a stool out from under a female employee, making contact with her


for retaliation cannot lie. Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating
Co.,307 F.3d 353, 550 (7th Cir. 2002). None of the plaintiffs’ EEOC
charges hint at race discrimination, and Ms. King’s contains no
suggestion of retaliation. The motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED as to these theories of recovery.

To maintain an actionable claim that Mr. Nebolsky’s conduct
created a hostile work environment at Nestle and thus constituted

sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that they were harassed because of their sex. Hilt-
Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 462. (7th Cir. 2002). Title
VII does not provide a cause of action where a supervisor is
abusive to male and female employees alike. Hardin v. S.C. Johnson
& Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 346 (7th Cir. 1999). In addition, this
harassment must be severe or pervasive, both objectively and
subjectively offensive, so that a reasonable person would find it
hostile or abusive. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 463. In determining
whether contested behavior creates an objectively hostile work
environment, a court may consider factors including the frequency
of the complained-of conduct, its severity, whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s ability to work. Id.

The evidence submitted by both sides makes it abundantly clear
that Mr. Nebolsky was an unpleasant supervisor with poor management

skills and that his subordinates found his behavior toward them


ae

buttocks (Ms. King). While these interactions obviously, and
rightly, caused the plaintiffs distress, they do not cumulatively
constitute an objectively hostile work environment under Hilt-
Dyson. Compare Ferguson v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 155 F. Supp. 2d
913, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (Bucklo, J.) (denying summary judgment to
employer where a supervisor propositioned an employee, attempted to
“feel her up,” or rubbed his body against her every day over an
extended period of time); Grant v. Murphy & Miller Inc., 149 F.
Supp. 2d 957, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (Shadur, J.) (harassment is
pervasive where plaintiff was hit on two to three times a week over
the course of eight months).

Thus, while the plaintiffs (and their male co-workers)
apparently suffered severe and pervasive harassment at Mr.
Nebolsky’s hands, they suffered only sporadic and moderate sexual
harassment which did not rise to the level actionable under Title

VII. Therefore, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED.
“Lie Buhl
Elaine £. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: May t 1 2004



irate Order Form (0697)

\S AQ United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Elaine E. Bucklo than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 9362 DATE 5/17/2004
CASE Brandon, et al. Vs. Nestle USA, Inc.
TITLE
[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Aaswer brief to motion due, . Reply to answer brief due :
(4) o Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) a Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(() a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
() Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) QO (Bench/Jury trial) [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) [Other docket entry] Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to all claims is granted. Enter
Memorandum Opinion and Order. Any pending motion in this case is terminated as moot.
(il) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
‘No notices required.
a | Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices.
JS | Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. .
65:4 id 2) Ahan
courtroom
MPI deputy's .
intials i pa received in
‘ntl ime rectivi
central Cletk’s Office



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DOCKETED

DOREEN BRANDON, PATRICIA A. MAY 18 2004

BROWN, JOYCE KING, AND MARIAH
WALLACE,

Plaintiffs,
v. No. 02 C 9362

NESTLE USA, INC.,

Defendants.
JUM_OPINION ER

Plaintiffs Doreen Brandon, Patricia A. Brown, Joyce King, and
Mariah Wallace are female African-American hourly employees at
defendant Nestle USA, Inc.’s (“Nestle”) Franklin Park, Illinois
manufacturing facility. A white male named Michael Nebolsky began
working as a supervisor at the facility on May 25, 2001. Between
that date and his August 29, 2002 termination, Mr. Nebolsky
allegedly harassed the plaintiffs because of their race and sex. In
August 2002, each of the plaintiffs filed a charge with the
Itlinois Department of Human Rights and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and each has received a right-to-
sue letter. On December 23, 2002, the four plaintiffs jointly filed
the instant complaint against Nestle, alleging violations of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §-2000e et seq..
Nestle now moves for summary judgment. I Grant the motion as to all

claims.


On a motion for summary judgment, I evaluate the admissible
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in
order to determine whether the evidence presents a genuine issue of
material fact. Bennett v. Roberts, 295 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir.
2002). There are two methods by which a plaintiff may prove
intentional discrimination by an employer under Title VII. She may
rely on direct evidence, or in the alternative, she may rely on the
burden-shifting method of proof established by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

As a preliminary matter, Nestle argues that it is entitled to
summary judgment to the extent that the plaintiffs’ claims are
outside the scope of their EEOC charges. While a Title VII
plaintiff “need not allege in an EEOC charge each and every fact
that combines to form the basis of each claim in her complaint,”
she can only pursue a claim of discrimination or retaliation if it
is “like or reasonably related to” the allegations of the charge
and grows out of those allegations. Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co.,
31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994). Here, none of the plaintiffs
alleged race discrimination in their EEOC charges. “An allegation
of race discrimination is not ‘like or reasonably related to’ an
allegation of sex discrimination.” Crawford v. Bank of Am., 986 F.
Supp. 506, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (Aspen, J.). Similarly, where the
plaintiff’s EEOC charge does not allege retaliation or even that

the plaintiff engaged in some kind of protected activity, a claim