is unwarranted. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S.Ct. 386, 392
(1994) (“by appeal . . . parties may seek relief from the legal consequences of judicial judgments.
{A] party who steps off the statutory path to employ the secondary remedy of vacatur as a refined
form of collateral attack on the judgment .. . disturb[s] the orderly operation of the federal judicial
system”). Nor is it relevant that the Federal Circuit remanded this action. Chamberlain’s
unopposed motion for remand was granted “for the purpose of allowing the district court fo
consider the parties’ motion to vacate its judgment.” Fed. Cir. Order, 09/04/03, Doc. No. 221
(emphasis added).

Chamberlain argues that Microchip’s potential use of offensive collateral estoppel warrants
vacatur. This argument is meritless. The preclusive effect of litigation strongly militates against
vacating a judgment. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302; Pivot Point, 2002 WL 1484488 at *1.
Chamberlain may challenge the preclusive effect of this court’s construction of ‘364 patent in the
Arizona litigation before the Arizona court. However, this court may not wrest this determination
from the Arizona court. Pivot Point Int’l, Inc.,2002 WL 1484488 at *1. The summary judgment
order may not be expunged merely to facilitate the parties’ private agreement. Memorial Hosp. , 862

F.2d at 1300. Accordingly, Chamberlain’s motion to vacate is denied.

May 27, 2004 ENTER:

Quanw B Cube

Suzanne. Conlon
United States District Judge



enough affected to entitle the amicus to intervene and become a party in the present case”).
Moreover, Microchip’s amicus brief identifies relevant authority that Chamberlain neglected to
mention, let alone analyze, in its motion to vacate.

Vacatur upon settlement is disfavored in this Circuit. In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa City,
Inc., 862 F.2d 1299 (7" Cir. 1988); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 93 C 6333, 96 C 5571, 2002 WL
31369410 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., et al., No. 90 C 6933,
2002 WL 1484488 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Allen-Bradley Co. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316 (E.D.
Wis. 2001); Krolikowski v. Volanti, No. 95 C 1254, 1996 WL 451307 (N.D.IIL. 1996). A motion
to vacate a grant of summary judgment is not treated differently than judgment after trial or a
Markman hearing. Aqua Marine Supply v. Aim Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (vacatur of district court’s grant of summary judgment on patent infringement claims
denied); Home Indemnity Co. v. Farm House Foods Corp., 770 F.Supp. 1348, 1350 (E.D. Wis.
1991) Goint motion to vacate partial summary judgment denied). Vacatur is appropriate only under
exceptional circumstances, Agua Marine, 247 at 1221; Nilssen, 2002 WL 31369410 at * 4. The
purportedly exceptional circumstances identified by Chamberlain are nothing more than common
circumstances occasioned by a settlement.

Chamberlain argues it should not be saddled with this court’s reversible error in construing
the ‘364 patent. Pl’s Opp. Mem. at 11. However, in lieu of settlement, Chamberlain could have
pursued appellate review of this court’s summary judgment order. Chamberlain chose instead to

voluntarily abandon its appeal rights in favor of settlement.' Under these circumstances, vacatur

‘Chamberlain could have pursued its Rule 59(e) motion to vacate construction of the ‘364
patent. Pl. Mot. Vacate, 8/14/02, Doc. No. 198. Instead, Chamberlain filed a notice of appeal
prior to this court’s decision, thereby abandoning its motion to pursue appellate review. Pl.
Notice, 8/30/02, Doc. No. 209.



Minute Order Form (06/97)

r

United States District Court, Northern District of Hlinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Suzanne B. Conlon

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 01 C 6157 DATE 5/27/2004
CASE THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC. vs. INTERLOGIX, INC.
TITLE
[In the followingbox (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) iva} Brief in support of motion due
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer briefdue___—.
(4) Q Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) a {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 COFRCP41(a)(1) i FRCP41(a\X2).

do) olf [Other docket entry} | Microchip Technology Inc.’s motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief

[226-1] is granted. Plaintiff's unopposed motion to vacate the court’s decision of 7/31/02 [224-1] is

denied. Plaintiff's motion to enter a stipulated notice of dismissal [223-1] is moot. Final judgment

[192-1] stands. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.
dal) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
ot quires number of notices

~ | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

AY'2 8 2004

date docketed,

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form,

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
cB deputy's
initials

Date/time received in

central Clerk's Office. mailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC., )
Plaintiff, No. 01 ¢ 6157
v. ) Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
INTERLOGIX, INC.,
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Chamberlain Group, Inc. (“Chamberlain”) sued Interlogix, Inc. (“Interlogix”) for patent
infringement. Interlogix’s motion for summary judgment on non-infringement of Patent No. Re.
35,364 (“the ‘364 patent”) was granted. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Interlogix, Inc., 2002 WL
1777280 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2002). After the parties completed appellate briefing, a settlement was
reached. Chamberlain now moves to vacate the summary judgment order construing Claim 5 of
the ‘364 patent as limited to a garage door opener. Pl. Mem. at 2. Interlogix does not oppose the
motion. Non-party Microchip Technology, Inc. (“Microchip”) moves for leave to file an amicus
brief in order to oppose vacating the order construing the ‘364 patent to apply only to a garage door
opener. Microchip is currently litigating the validity of the ‘364 patent against Chamberlain in a
declaratory judgment action in another federal district court. Microchip Technology Inc. v. The
Chamberlain Group, Inc., No. Civ. 01 1423 PHX SRB (D. Ariz.). Microchip seeks to use this

court’s finding that Claim 5 of the ‘364 patent is limited to a garage door opener under the doctrine

:

of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel.


As an initial matter, Microchip’s motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief should be
granted. Permitting an amicus curiae brief is discretionary. National Organization for Women,
Ine. v. Scheidler, et al., 223 F.3d 615, 616 (7" Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit has cautioned
against amicus briefs that do not “assist the judge . . . by presenting ideas, arguments, theories,
insights, facts, or data that are not to be found in the parties’ briefs.” Voices for Choices, et al. v.
Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545 (7" Cir. 2003). An amicus brief should only be
permitted in “a case in which a party is inadequately represented; or in which the would-be amicus
has a direct interest in another case that may be materially affected by a decision in this case; or in
which the amicus has a unique perspective or specific information that can assist the court beyond
what the parties can provide.” Id. See also National Organization for Women, Inc., 223 F.3d at
617; Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7" Cir. 1997).

Given this standard, Microchip’s amicus brief must be considered. Chamberlain’s own
motion identifies Microchip as a directly interested party that may be materially affected by this
court’s decision. Pl. Mot. at 2 (“Chamberlain has filed this motion to vacate because a third party
in a declaratory judgment action requested another district court to grant summary judgment of no
infringement of the ‘364 patent by adopting this Court’s claim construction under the doctrine of
issue preclusion or collateral estoppel”). Chamberlain’s attack on Microchip’s standing to bring
a declaratory judgment action is belied by Chamberlain’s lack of success in moving to dismiss the
action. Pl. Resp. Ex. 1 at 25 (“th{e Arizona] Court has denied Chamberlain’s motions to dismiss”).
Contrary to Chamberlain’s position, Microchip’s interest need not be sufficient to intervene
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063 (“an amicus brief should normally be

allowed when .. . the amicus has an interest in some other case that may be affected . . . though not