The Ho norable Pasco M. Bowman became Chief Judge of the United State s 1 Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 18, 1998.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-3927

_____________ Kimberly C. Sutton, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Eastern * District of Missouri. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner * of Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

_____________ Submitted: March 10, 1998 Filed: October 13, 1998

_____________ Be fore BOWMAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD , 1 Circuit Judges.

_____________ PER CURIAM.The HONORABLE DAVID D. NOCE, United States Magistrate Judge for the 2 Eastern Dis trict of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition b y consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). At the hearing before the administr ative law judge, Sutton modified her alleged 3 onset date to August 19, 1993. In addition, Sutton more specifically alleged that she suffered from phlebitis and 4 thromb ophlebitis (primarily in her left leg); edema (in her left leg and left ankle) ; ob esity (Sutton is 5'4'' tall and weighs 260 pounds); hyperlipidemia; and menstrua l problems. To meet or equal a disabling impairment under section 9.09(D), the claiman t 5 must have "[w]eight equal to or greater than [258 pounds, for Sutton's height of 5'4'',]

. . . and . . . [c]hronic venous insufficiency with superficial varicosities in a lowe r extremity with pain on weight bearing and persistent edema." 2 0 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 § 9.09(D). -2- Kimberly C. Sutton appeals the district court's order, granting summary judgment 2 to th e Commissioner and affirming the Commissioner's decision to deny Sutto n disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. We affirm.
Sutton a pplied for social security disability and supplemental security incom e benefits, a lleging a disability onset date of February 21, 1994, based upon recurrin g 3 blood clots in her leg, impaired eyesight, and high blood pressure. Fo llowing a hearing, 4 the Commissioner's administrative law j udge (ALJ) denied Sutton's application, finding that, although Sutton suffers from obesity and a history of recurrent venous thrombosis that is accom panied by leg pain and edema, she fails to meet or equal any of th e disabling impairments on the Commissioner's Listing of Impairments, in particular 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, Listing 9.09(D) (1998). The ALJ further found that 5 Sutton's subjective complai nts of pain were not credible. Although the ALJ concluded that Sutton could not perform her past relevant work as a nurse's aide or certifie d medi cal aide, the ALJ decided that she still possessed the residual functional capacity to per form light exertion and sedentary jobs in the national economy. Th e Commissioner's Appeals Council denied Sutton's request for review,-3-

and Sut ton sought judicial review. The district court granted summary judgment i n favo r of the Commissioner, concluding that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supported the ALJ's decision. Sutton appeals.
We review the Commissioner's denial of benefits to determine whether substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the Commissioner's decision. See Kisling v. Chater , 105 F.3d 1255, 1257 (8th Cir. 1997). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponder ance, but enough that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate t o support the Commissioner's decisio n." See Briggs v. Callahan , 139 F.3d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1998). However, we must consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as well as evidence that supports it. See id. "We may not reverse th e Commissioner merely because substanti al evidence would have supported the opposite conclusion." Id. For reversal, Sutton argues that (1) neither the AL J nor the district court properly applieddisability listing 9.09(D) to her medical evidence which supports a finding o f disability based on her obesity and the listed impairment of chronic venou s insufficiency; and (2) the ALJ's decision that Sutton can work was not substantiall y supported by the record.
We have carefully reviewed the record and the parties' arguments on appeal

. Upon review of the record, we find no merit to Sutton's argument that the ALJ and the district cou rt failed to properly apply § 9.09(D) to her medical evidence. The AL J fo und that Sutton met the listing's weight requirement but concluded that, despite he r histor yof recurrent venous thrombosis, she did not suffer from chronic venou s insufficiency. As such, both the ALJ and the district court performed the prope r analysis under § 9.09(D), and we find that s ubstantial evidence supports the conclusion th atSutton does not meet the listing's requirement of chronic venous insufficiency

. Mo reover, substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ' s d e termination that Sutton's subjective complaints of pain are not credible and that she-4-

has the residual functional capacity to perform light exertion and sedentary jobs

. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons set forth in its thorough and well-reasoned memorandum opinion dated October 3, 1997.
The order of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.