alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 10.3

                               AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO
                              EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

     This Amendment No. 2 (the "Amendment") to that certain Employment Agreement
(the "Agreement") between Notify Technology Corporation (the "Company") and
Gaylan Larson (the "Employee") dated as of August 1, 1997 and as amended on
February 23, 2000 is made as of June 29, 2001.

     In consideration of good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged, the Company and Employee agree as follows:

     1.  Section 4(a) of the Agreement shall be amended so that it reads in its
entirety as follows:

         "(a) Termination Following A Change of Control. If the Employee's
              -----------------------------------------
employment with the Company terminates at any time within twenty-four (24)
months after a Change of Control, then, subject to Section 5, the Employee shall
be entitled to receive severance benefits as follows:

              (i) Involuntary Termination. If the Employee's employment
                  -----------------------
terminates as a result of an Involuntary Termination (as defined in Section 8)
other than for Cause (as defined in Section 8), then the Employee shall be
entitled to receive a continuation of the Employee's Base Compensation for a
period equal to six (6) months.

              (ii) Voluntary Resignation; Termination for Cause. If the -
                   --------------------------------------------
Employee voluntarily terminates employment with the Company, other than as a
result of an Involuntary Termination, or if the Employee is terminated for
Cause, then the Employee shall not be entitled to receive severance or other
benefits.

         (iii) Disability; Death. If the Company terminates the Employee's
               -----------------
employment as a result of the Employee's Disability, or such Employee's
employment is terminated due to the death of the Employee, then the Employee
shall not be entitled to receive severance or other benefits except those (if
any) as may then be established under the Company's then existing severance and
benefits plans and policies at the time of such Disability or death."

       This Amendment has been executed effective as of the first date set forth
above.

NOTIFY TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION                     EMPLOYEE



/s/  Paul DePond                                  /s/  Gaylan Larson
-------------------------------------             ------------------------------
Paul DePond, Chief Executive Officer              Gaylan Larson
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 8 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                 In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

                                                       January 7, 1997.
    Resolved, That at 10:30 a.m. on Monday, January 20, 1997, the House shall 
proceed to the West Front of the Capitol for the purpose of attending the 
inaugural ceremonies of the President and Vice President of the United States; 
and that upon the conclusion of the ceremonies the House stands adjourned until 
noon on Tuesday, January 21, 1997.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
Case: 1:01-cv-00736 Document #: 156 Filed: 02/05/04 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:1492
Case: 1:01-cv-00736 Document #: 156 Filed: 02/05/04 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:1493
Case: 1:01-cv-00736 Document #: 156 Filed: 02/05/04 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:1494
Case: 1:01-cv-00736 Document #: 156 Filed: 02/05/04 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:1495
#### Calvin B. NELSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William SCISM, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-6214.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 28, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 2, 2011.

Calvin B. Nelson, Appellant Pro Se.

*19Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Calvin B. Nelson, a District of Columbia offender, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief without prejudice on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp.2011) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Nelson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in for-ma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Case: 1:02-cv-07921 Document #: 135 Filed: 11/16/04 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:884
Case: 1:02-cv-07921 Document #: 135 Filed: 11/16/04 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:885
Case: 1:02-cv-07921 Document #: 135 Filed: 11/16/04 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:886
Case: 1:02-cv-07921 Document #: 135 Filed: 11/16/04 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:887
Case: 1:02-cv-07921 Document #: 135 Filed: 11/16/04 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:888
Case: 1:02-cv-07921 Document #: 135 Filed: 11/16/04 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:889
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ronald Lee, Also Known as John Davis, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Rock-land County (Edelstein, J.) the first rendered April 1, 1982, convicting him of rape in the first degree (three counts), sodomy in the first degree, attempted sodomy in the first degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, and the second rendered April 5, 1982, convicting him of rape in the first degree and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, upon jury verdicts, and imposing sentences.

Judgments affirmed.

Defendant timely and unequivocally asserted his right to defend himself *pro se.*After an extensive inquiry, the court granted his request, and appointed counsel to sit through the trial and be available to defendant when the latter sought advice. Defendant was given the opportunity to reconsider on a number of occasions, each time insisting that he wanted to represent himself.

On this record, it cannot fairly be said that the trial court erred in allowing defendant to proceed *pro se (see, People v Whitted,*113 AD2d 454); in fact, a refusal to do so might have constituted reversible error *(see, People v McIntyre,*36 NY2d 10, 17; *People v Reason,*37 NY2d 351, 357; *People v Davis,*49 NY2d 114).

Defendant’s remaining contentions have been considered and found to be without merit. Gibbons, J. P., Thompson, Brown and Fiber, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

WILLIAM DEFORTE

v.

BOROUGH OF WORTHINGTON, et al

PETITION OF: UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

EVAN TOWNSEND

v.

BOROUGH OF WORTHINGTON, et al

PETITION OF: UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 83 WM 2018

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th d ay of July , 201 8

, the Petition for Ce rtification of Question

of State Law is GRANTED

. This Court shall consider the following issue:

Whether, under Pennsylvania law, (1) the Pennsylvania Borough Code

and the Police Tenure Act must be read in pari materia , such that every legally authorized police force in Pennsylvania fall under the governance of one of those two state statutes, and (2) if not, whether the same test

should be used to determine whether the Tenure Act's two

- officer maximum and the Borough Code's three

- officer minimum is satisfied.

T he Prothonotary is DIRECTED to establish a briefing schedule and list this case

for oral argument.
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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eddie Stokes, Appellant.

—Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Sullivan, J.), rendered May 18, 1983, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to 12 *V2*to 25 years’ imprisonment.

Judgment affirmed.

Subsequent to the *Sandoval*hearing in this matter, defendant decided not to testify during the course of the trial. However, his videotaped statement made to an Assistant District Attorney at the time of his arrest was introduced into evidence. The court, as part of its instructions to the jury, charged that "a defendant in a criminal case has an interest in the outcome. You may consider that fact when evaluating *694the video tape of defendant’s statement”. Defendant objects to that portion of the trial court’s charge.

A judge may properly instruct a jury to consider a defendant’s interest in assessing his credibility *(see, People v Ochs,*3 NY2d 54; *People v Demery,*60 AD2d 606). The videotaped statement was properly considered as if it were made by defendant actually testifying at trial *(see,*3A Wigmore, Evidence § 884 [Chadbourn revision]) and no comment was made with respect to defendant’s failure to testify in person *(cf. People v McLucas,*15 NY2d 167). The jury was properly provided with guidelines to evaluate the videotaped statement in terms of defendant’s obvious interest, and, therefore, such a jury charge was not error.

Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury as to lesser included offenses, namely, manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide. A lesser included offense must be charged when any reasonable view of the evidence would warrant a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense rather than of the greater offense *(see, People v Mills,*105 AD2d 759). Since there was no such view of the evidence in this case to warrant such a verdict, the court properly refused to submit to the jury the lesser included offenses requested *(see,*CPL 300.50 [1]; *People v Green,*56 NY2d 427, *rearg denied*57 NY2d 775; *People v Bell,*111 AD2d 926). Lazer, J. P., Bracken, Weinstein and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.1
**CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION**
I, Godfrey R. Sullivan, Chief Executive Officer of Hyperion SolutionsCorporation, certify that:
 1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Hyperion SolutionsCorporation (the “Registrant”);  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under whichsuch statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flowsof the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The Registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theRegistrant and have:
 a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the Registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this reportour conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theRegistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the Registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the Registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
 5. The Registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the Registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theRegistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
 a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses inthe design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theRegistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in theRegistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Dated: September 13, 2004   /s/ GODFREY R. SULLIVAN    Godfrey R. Sullivan  Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Radiologix, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-Q, as amended, for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Michael N. Murdock, Senior Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                                    
|--------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ MICHAEL N. MURDOCK                                              
|Michael N. Murdock Senior Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer

Dated: September 27, 2006

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Radiologix, Inc. and will be retained by Radiologix, Inc. and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### In the Matter of Tiffany B. Constance Bennett, Respondent; John B., Appellant.

In a neglect proceeding pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act, the appeals are from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Collins, J.), entered February 23,1983, which, after a hearing, adjudicated appellant to be a neglectful parent, and from a dispositional order of the same court, entered May 4,1983, which placed the subject infant with the petitioner Nassau County Department of Social Services for a period of 18 months.

Appeal from the order entered February 23, 1983 dismissed, without costs or disbursements *(see,*Family Ct Act § 1112). That order is brought up for review on the appeal from the dispositional order entered May 4, 1983.

Order entered May 4, 1983 affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The issue of whether article 10 of the Family Court Act is unconstitutional because it allows a finding of neglect to be predicated on a standard of fair preponderance of the evidence was not raised at nisi prius and thus may not be considered on appeal *(see, e.g., Melahn v Hearn,*60 NY2d 944, 945; *Matherson v Marchello,*100 AD2d 233, 241, n 4). Moreover, the requisite statutory notification has not been given to the Attorney-General (CPLR 1012 [b]; Executive Law § 71), which constitutes an independent bar to appellate review *(Matherson v Marchello, supra,*at 241, n 4). In any event, this proceeding involved a finding of temporary neglect and the placement is of a limited duration. Consequently, *Santosky v Kramer*(455 US 745) is plainly distinguishable *(Matter of Linda C.,*86 AD2d 356).

We perceive no reason to disturb the determination on the merits. Titone, J. P., Mangano, Weinstein and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

EUNICE LITTLE, 

Petitioner

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 

Respondent

______________________

2024-1275

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-0842-22-0304-I-1.

______________________

O R D E R

The petitioner having failed to pay the docketing fee 

required by Federal Circuit Rule 52 (a) (1) and to file the

required Statement Concerning Discrimination, it is 

ORDERED that the petition for review be, and the 

same hereby is, DISMISSED, for failure to prosecute in 

accordance with the rules. 

FOR THE COURT

March 13, 2024

Date

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: March 13, 2024

Case: 24-1275 Document: 5 Page: 1 Filed: 03/13/2024
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

BEVERLY FERRARO,

Respondent

v.

PATTERSON-ERIE CORPORATION D/B/A 

BURGER KING AND BURGER KING 

CORPORATION,

Petitioner

:

:

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:

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No. 170 WAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 4th day of January, 2023, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

GRANTED. The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

Whether the Superior Court’s conclusion that [Respondent] was excused 

from compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure to serve [Petitioner] 

timely and via the Sheriff before the statute of limitations expired was in 

conflict with this Honorable Court’s holdings on the same legal question and 

other holdings of the intermediate appellate courts?
# C_2022207EN.01000701.xml

| 23.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 207/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 207/7

---

Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 10 January 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg — Germany) — EL, CP v Ryanair DAC

(Case C-287/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Air transport - Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 - Article 5(3) - Common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of cancellation or long delay of flights - Exemption from the obligation to pay compensation - Concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ - Strike by cabin crew and pilots - Circumstances that are ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to the operating air carrier’s activity - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Articles 12 and 28 - Articles 12 and 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - No infringement of the workers’ freedom of assembly and association and the air carrier’s right of negotiation)

(2022/C 207/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: EL, CP

Defendant: Ryanair DAC

Operative part of the order

Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, must be interpreted as meaning that strike action which is entered into upon a call by a trade union of the cabin crew and pilots of an operating air carrier and which is intended to assert the demands of those workers does not come within the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of that provision, any prior negotiations with the workers’ representatives being irrelevant in that regard.

---

(1)  OJ C 279, 24.8.2020.

---
Order entered November 7, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00827-CR

No. 05-16-00828-CR

JOHN HARRY CLOUD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F93-61603-I & F93-61604-I

ORDER

On November 1, 2016, the Court received written notification from Mildred Frank that 

her brother, John Harry Cloud, died on October 27, 2016. Appellant was proceeding pro se in 

these appeals.

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.1(a)(2), we PERMANENTLY 

ABATE these appeals.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE