293 (1947) and such later cases as Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S.
449, 459 (1974), both addressing that issue in the related
context of a contempt citation). So the question is not whether
Morrow should have complied, but rather whether he did comply,
with the Order and its accompanying oral directive permitting a
modest addition to League’s website.

There is another respect in which Morrow’s counsel misses
the point entirely. In an effort to demonstrate Morrow's
asserted good faith, Response 942 and 3 advert to Morrow's pre-
June 4 conduct in having prepared an earlier League statement,
the unsatisfactory nature of which then triggered the June 4
hearing. But that is really beside the mark, for it is what
Morrow did and failed to do when the path had been clearly marked
out for him at the June 4 hearing that has generated both the
request for Section 1927 sanctions and the quantification of the
amount requested by Johnny’s IceHouse. Indeed, Johnny’s
IceHouse’s Motion Ex. 2, which is a highlighted printout of the
law firm’s time records and other charges, does not begin with
any items for which it seeks recovery until the time and expense
entries for June 11.

As a last observation before this opinion turns to the
substantive merits, Johnny’s IceHouse’s Reply is accurate in
stating in its Introduction (Reply at 1) what Morrow has and has

not placed in issue. Here is that brief summary of the issue


wilful disobedience on Morrow’s part. It has been plain for at
least 15 years that the applicable standard in determining
Section 1927 liability is not that of subjective bad faith, but
is instead one of objective content, such as “acting recklessly
or with indifference to the law” (In _re TCT Ltd., 769 F.2d 441,
445 (7 Cir. 1985))--and that analysis has been reconfirmed many

times since then, as in Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966 F.2d 1181,

1185 (7 Cir. 1992):

Under the current state of the law, something more than

ordinary negligence must exist in order to justify the

order of sanctions. Nonetheless, the fact that

ordinary negligence fails to meet the bad faith test

does not mean that extraordinary or extreme negligence

also fails. To the contrary, we have held that the bad

faith standard has an objective component, and

extremely negligent conduct, like reckless and

indifferent conduct, satisfies this standard.

In short, the thrust of the Section 1927 caselaw in
situations such as this mirrors the Rule 11 principle colorfully
expressed in such cases as Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154
(7 Cir. 1986):

An empty head but a pure heart is no defense.
That characterization (perhaps understandably, given its imagery)

has received substantial judicial repetition and approbation,

including for example in Burda v. M. Ecker Co., 2 F.3d 769, 775

(7 Cir. 1993)--a decision singled out here only because it
confirmed the imposition of sanctions under both Rule 11 and

Section 1927.


qa

TRO, the Court stated that a disclaimer should be made

by party defendant Amateur Hockey Association of

Illinois (“AHAI”) and MWEHL regarding the relationship

between those organizations.

That sequential characterization is just wrong (even though
Morrow would no doubt be liable for sanctions even if it were
accurate). What happened instead was that this Court imposed the
Order’s requirements for action to be taken by League as a
precondition to this Court’s not granting the entry of
preliminary injunctive relief (a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) sought by Johnny’s IceHouse in its Second Emergency
Motion for a TRO). That eschewal of the entry of a TRO rested on
the premise that an appropriate form of disclaimer by League that
would expressly negate a tie-in between League and AHAI could
operate to take League out of the category of nonparties that are
also made subject to the constraints of a TRO by the terms of
Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 65(d).

It may be noted parenthetically that Morrow raises no
question as to the propriety of the Order and its applicability
to the League--indeed, Morrow had voiced no objection to the
terms of the disclaimer or to the manner in which League was
directed to implement it. But it would not have mattered even
had he done so. It has long been established that a court order
must be complied with so long as it is outstanding, even where it
may later be challenged as invalid (see, e.g., the seminal

decision in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,


involved, as well as those nonissues:

Morrow’s sole response to plaintiffs’ motion for

sanctions is that he fully complied with the Court's

June 4 Order. He does not dispute the reasonableness

of plaintiffs’ fees and costs. He does not challenge

the number of attorney hours, the hourly rates applied

or the reasonableness of each item of expense. He also

does not deny that he is an attorney and thereby

subject to sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §1927.

At last, then, this Court addresses the issue of Morrow’s
compliance or noncompliance with this Court’s Order, the course
of conduct that in Section 1927 terms “multiplie[d] the
proceedings in [this] case unreasonably and vexatiously.” In
that respect Response {7 again distorts the record as to the
Order by saying “the order was silent as to the specific sequence
of where the Court language would be laid out.” Exactly the
opposite is true: Instead the Order, in express terms that
Morrow's lawyer ignores entirely, specifically ordered League to
delete the complex and confusing (to any layperson) language that
previously had on its website and to substitute in its place the
accompanying Court-ordered language.

Under the Order’s directive the Court-ordered language would
either exist on the website alone or, if League so elected as
discussed in the next paragraph of this opinion, it might be
followed by a brief supplemental statement (not of the type that
the Order had said must be deleted). Yet Morrow inexplicably

retained the language that had created the problem to begin with,

while inserting the Court-ordered language after that confusing

5


/

In sum, nothing contained in Morrow’s Response either
justifies or excuses his repeated violations of an unambiguous
court order. It is equally clear that, in the objective sense
taught by Section 1927 and Seventh Circuit caselaw, those
violations indeed “multiplie[d] the proceedings in [this] case
unreasonably and vexatiously” and forced Johnny’s IceHouse’s
counsel to expend the time and expenses for which they now seek
to hold Morrow responsible. No reason exists why innocent victim
Johnny’s IceHouse, rather than wrongdoer Morrow, should bear the
cost of that incremental and otherwise unnecéssary activity.
This Court therefore orders Morrow to pay the requested sum of
$8,918.09 to the firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt so that the latter

may in turn credit that amount to its clients.

Cth, OS cata

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: July 20, 2001


Minutgeder Form (0857)
ns

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Milton I. Shadur than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 00 C 7363 DATE 7/20/2001
CASE Johnny’s IceHouse vs. Amateur Hockey Assn.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, eg. plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
DOCKET ENTRY:
(e) aq Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due. :
(4) 0 Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at _.
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) ao Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) 1 General Rule 21 oOo FRCP41(a)(1) 2 FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) 4 [Other docket entry] _ Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Plaintiffs motion for sanctions is
granted. This Court therefore orders Morrow to pay the requested sum of. $8,918.09 to the firm of Mayer,
Brown and Platt so that the letter may in turn credit that amount to its clients. (91-1, 94-1) Respondent’s
motion for sanctions is treated as a response to Plaintiffs motion and is disposed of by this memorandum
opinion and order. (96-1)
al) {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
‘No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. umber ntees
Notices maited by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form. &
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom date mailed notice
deputy’s
initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office sailing deputy initials



statement. That action perpetuated the problem that had
compelled Johnny’s IceHouse to seek a TRO in the first place, and
that noncompliance on Morrow’s part must be viewed as a direct
flouting of the plain language of the written court Order.

It is true but quite irrelevant that during the in-court
proceedings on June 4, this Court had responded to the concerns
raised by Morrow that a website statement that limited itself to
speaking of the Illinois teams that were League members, while
being silent as to the teams that were organized in other states
and that were also League members, might itself be the source of
confusion. That led this Court to say during the June 4 hearing
that if League so wished it could follow the Court-directed
language with a brief statement that League’s posture vis-a-vis
other states was of the same nature as (or, in the case of
Michigan, was somewhat different from) the described relationship
as to Illinois. But that permitted insertion in no way altered
the express priority that this Court specified in the Order, and
it certainly did not by any stretch of the imagination authorize
what Morrow had done instead.

What has just been said was really compounded by Morrow’s
repeated failure to comply again and again, despite several trips
back to the courthouse, with what had been so plainly directed
the first time around. And it does not matter for Section 1927

purposes whether or not that noncompliance reflected subjectively


yo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT pOcKeTED
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS _
EASTERN DIVISION JUL 2 3 2008

JOHNNY’S ICEHOUSE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,
AMATEUR HOCKEY ASSOCIATION OF
ILLINOIS, et al.,

)
)
)
)
Vv. ) No. 00 C 7363
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

At issue here is an offshoot of the litigation in which the
principal (although by no means the only) adversaries are
Johnny’s IceHouse, Inc. (“Johnny's IceHouse”) and Amateur Hockey
Association of Illinois, Inc. (“AHAI”). Johnny's IceHouse has
moved under 28 U.S.C. §1927 (“Section 1927”) for sanctions
against Stephen Morrow (“Morrow”) (in fact all plaintiffs have
done so, but “Johnny's IceHouse” will be used here for
convenience). That motion stems from the agreement by Morrow, a
lawyer acting for nonparty Midwest Elite Hockey League (“League,”
of which he is Vice-President), that League would be bound by and
would comply with this Court’s June 4, 2001 memorandum order
(“order,” a copy of which ig attached), with the difficulty
arising from Morrow's indefensible and repeated violations of the
Order--violations that in turn forced the Johnny's IceHouse
lawyers to expend their time (and hence their clients’ money) in
several efforts to require Morrow (and League) to do what he (on

its behalf) had committed to do in the first instance.

\0


Although Morrow had acted alone on League’s behalf
throughout the course of events giving rise to the current
motion, now that his own conduct has been placed in issue for
Section 1927 purposes? he has retained outside counsel, who has
filed a Response to Motion for Sanctions (*Response”) on his
behalf. With counsel for Johnny’s IceHouse now having filed
their Reply in Support of Their Motion (“Reply”), the matter is
ripe for disposition.

Before Morrow's recent retention of counsel, he had shown
himself (despite his training as a lawyer) to be either unwilling
to follow, or incapable of following, the express and unambiguous
directions that were contained in the written court Order and
this Court’s contemporaneous oral directive. Now his retained
counsel has not improved matters materially, for the Response has
in part repeated the level of mischaracterization or
misunderstanding that Morrow himself has exhibited.

First, Morrow’s counsel provides an inaccurate matrix for
the situation that ultimately led to the sanctions motion by
stating in Response {1:

Mr. Morrow’s involvement in this matter came after the

Plaintiffs filed a TRO concerning the establishment of

a girls division within the MWEHL. The court denied
the plaintiffs TRO. Subsequent to the denial of the

1 Unlike other types of court-imposed sanctions, any

sanctions based on Section 1927 run only against lawyers who have
violated the statutory standards, not against the clients of
those lawyers.