that forms the gravamen of Schultz' federal Family and Medical
Leave Act claim.?

Accordingly defendants' motion for summary judgment must be
and is denied because of the existence of genuine issues of
material fact. Count III, like Schultz' other claims, will be

the subject of disposition at trial.

Te kee O) Giada —

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: May 24, 2002

* In that respect defendants' Mem. 6-8 points to a portion

of Schultz! deposition (Dep. 114-18) as purportedly limiting the
nature and scope of Schultz' Count III claim. But that
contention is unduly crabbed, although defendants will of course
have the opportunity at trial to seek to elicit the relied-on
portions of the deposition for possible impeachment. In brief,
as demanding as the Illinois caselaw may be in this area, when
Schultz' submissions are taken as true (as they must be for
summary judgment purposes), they call for resolution by a
factfinder--a jury--and not by the court as a matter of law.

3


ll

-

* smuaute Urder Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Iinois

Name of Assigned Jud; ; Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Milton I, Shadur than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 702 DATE 5/24/2002
CASE Chris Schultz vs. Advocate Health
TITLE

{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the

of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

a) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due.

(3) gq Answer brief to motion due____. Reply to answer briefdue__.

(4) o Ruling/Hearing on____setfor__—_at

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] {set for/re-set for} on___setfor at

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for]on____setfor___—sat__

(7) im] Trial{set for/re-set for]on ___—_at

(8) Qo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to

(9) im} This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4¢m) (General Rule21} CFRCP41(a)\(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) ME [Otherdocketentry] Enter Memorandum Order. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 1

ay

be and is denied because of the existence of genuine issues of material fact. (15-1) Count III, like Sch

other claims, will be the subject of disposition at trial.

| (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. “ Documen

No notices required.
umber of voices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom:
SN deputy’s
initials

Datertime received-in « \\~
central Clerk’s Office railing deputy initials



1
1
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHRIS SCHULTZ, )
Plaintiff, }
v. No. 01 C 702 Lop
SCRE RE MD mone tar 4 ety
)
)

<lup

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
After the completion of discovery in this multicount action
by Chris Schultz (“Schultz”) against. Advocate Health and
Hospitals Corporation (“Advocate”) and two of its employees, on
April 26, 2002 this Court entered its final pretrial order
looking toward trial of the action. At the same time defendants
have moved for summary judgment on one of the claims advanced by
Schultz: Count III's common law claim (which is on this federal
court's plate under the auspices of the supplemental jurisdiction
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1367(a)) that asserts the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. With Schultz now having
responded to that motion, it is ripe for decision.’
There is no dispute as to the demanding requirements that

Illinois caselaw has established for the intentional-infliction-

1 No useful purpose would be served by calling for a reply
from defendants. Once material facts have been scrambled into
omelette form by bona fide disputes as is the case here, they
can't be placed back into a Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule”) 56 eggshell
via the summary judgment movants' quarrel with the factual
version proffered by the target of the Rule 56 motion.


of-emotional-distress tort. Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 490
(7 Cir. 2001) (most citations as well as internal quotation
marks omitted) sets out an admirable statement of the operative
principles:

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress has been recognized in Illinois since 1961,
when the Illinois Supreme Court explained that persons
could be liable under the tort only for acts truly
“outrageous,” that is, an "unwarranted intrusion...
calculated to cause severe emotional distress to a
person of ordinary sensibilities.” More recently, in
McGrath v. Fahey, 126 I11.2d 78, 127 Ill. Dec. 724, 533
N.E.2d 806, 809 (1988), the Illinois Supreme Court set
forth three requirements necessary to demonstrate the
intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) the
conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous;
(2) the actor must either intend that his conduct
inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there
is at least a high probability that his conduct will
cause severe emotional distress and (3) the conduct
must in fact cause severe emotional distress. This
tort does not require a contemporaneous physical impact
or injury. It is clear, however, that the tort does
not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.
Instead, the conduct must go beyond all bounds of
decency and be considered intolerable in a civilized
community. Thus, to serve as a basis for recovery, the
defendant's conduct must be such that the recitation of
the facts to an average member of the community would
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him
to exclaim[:] “Outrageous!” Whether conduct is extreme
and outrageous is judged on an objective standard,
based on the facts of the particular case.

For present purposes it is unnecessary to dwell on the
matter at any length. Suffice it to say that Schultz' counsel
have tendered additional facts that provide a far less sterile
version of events than defendants'--particularly in terms of the

background that preceded the direct adverse employment decision

2