Mestek also argues that Glanders cannot provide expert testimony
on wastewater treatment of the Downers Grove Sanitary District
Wastewater Treatment Plant (the “DGSD WWTP”) effluent line because he
is not a sanitation engineer. TPDs respond that Glanders’s opinion
applies his expert knowledge to the issue of the effluent line’s
viability as a contamination pathway, not to its physical design.
Based on Glanders’ considerable experience, the Court concludes that
Glanders is qualified to testify about wastewater treatment and the
effluent line’s viability as a contamination pathway. However,
Glanders is barred from testifying about the physical design of the
DGSD effluent line.

Next, Mestek alleges that Glanders’ testimony is inherently
unreliable because he ignores critical data, relies upon false
factual assumptions, and fails to substantiate his conclusions with
accepted scientific principals. The Court has reviewed the parties’
filings, and concludes that Glanders’ opinion is reliable. The Court
makes the following specific observations. As to the insufficient
facts allegation, the Court’s review of Glanders’ reports reveals
that he relied on ample scientific data -- 17 years of sampling data,
groundwater maps, mounding drawings, as well as his 25 years of
experience. Mestek contends that Glanders’ use of the Tiered
Approach to Corrective Action (“TACO”) standard was an inappropriate
scientific standard. However, TACO, the standard utilized by the

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (the “IEPA”), was a


reliability of St. John’s entire opinion in this matter.
Accordingly, TPDs motion to bar the testimony of St. John is granted.
D. James Mercer

Mestek offers James Mercer as a hydrogeology expert in support
of its theory that groundwater carried contaminants from Ellsworth to
the Mejdrech class area. Mercer asserts numerous bases for his
conclusion regarding the contamination, but focuses on the historical
groundwater flow patterns. He posits that municipal well pumping
exerted a westerly influence on the groundwater flow. There is no
dispute over Mercer’s qualifications as a hydrogeological expert, or
the relevance of his opinions.

TPDs contends that Mercer’s report and testimony must be barred
as unreliable for two reasons. First, TPDs contend that Mercer’s
opinion that contamination migrated from Ellsworth to Area D is
contrary to, and irreconcilable with, a “line” or collection of non-
detects groundwater wells located between these areas. TPDs liken
this situation to Ramsey v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 111 F.Supp.2d
1030, 1138 (N.D. Ind. 2000), where the court barred the testimony of
an expert because the “record containfed} no explanation as to how
any scientific principles support the contrary opinion in the face of
eight years of non-detect result in and around the [relevant] well.”

This case is distinguishable from Ramsey. Here, the non-detect
data was taken in 2001 (not multiple years of test data) after the

well pumping had ceased. As such, there is evidence in the record

- 10 -


Lue-Hing testified that the IEPA effluent testing standard is
once yearly, and he used the available 17 annual samples (taken from
federal and state sampling and reporting requirements). This
technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
Mestek also argues that 17 samples are not sufficient and not
representative of the time period before the samples. Lue-Hing
explains that he based his opinion on review of literature, his
extensive experience, and his own research. For this case, Lue-Hing
has demonstrated that the methods and data he used generally are
accepted in the relevant scientific community. Mestek’s objections
relate to Lue-Hing’s conclusions, not his methodology. But the
“soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert’s analysis and
the correctness of the expert’s conclusions based on that analysis
are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact.” Smith,
215 F.3d at 718. Accordingly, Mestek’s motion to bar the expert
testimony of Lue-Hing is denied.

Cc. Ronald St. John

Ronald St. John submitted multiple reports opining on a DGSD
sewer line contamination pathway that runs from Ellsworth Industrial
Park (“Ellsworth”) to the LeClercg and Mejdrech class areas. It is
undisputed that St. John is a qualified hydrogeology expert.

TPDs seek to bar St. John’s testimony because he is not a
wastewater engineer and he cannot testify about the presence of

contaminants in effluent. Specifically, TPDs argue that St. John


legitimate means to determine whether there was an exposure pathway
from the soil under the DGSD effluent line to groundwater. Mestek’s
remaining allegations of Glanders’ unreliability are similarly
without merit -- Glanders used available data, his 25 years of
experience with contamination sites, and maps in formulating his
opinions. The Court’s role is not “to decide whether an expert’s
opinion is correct . . . [and is] .. .- limited to determining
whether expert testimony is pertinent to an issue in the case and
whether the methodology underlying that testimony is sound.” Smith,
215 F.3d at 719. The Court concludes that Glanders’ opinion is
relevant and reliable, and accordingly, Mestek’s motion to bar
Glanders’ testimony is denied on these grounds.
B. Cecil Lue-Hing

It is undisputed that Cecil Lue-Hing, an environmental engineer
for 40 years, is qualified to render expert testimony in this case.
He is a Registered Professional Engineer and holds numerous advanced
degrees in engineering. The relevance of the testimony is also
undisputed. Mestek seeks to bar Lue-Hing’s testimony as unreliable.
Mestek contends Lue-Hing’s reliance on 17 annual effluent samples is
in conflict with a book he co-authored that advocates monthly
monitoring of contaminant levels in air emissions from wastewater
treatment plants. TPDs respond that the book is not applicable as it
dealt with monthly monitoring of influent in major municipalities,

not effluent of the water leaving plants.


the results of certain groundwater and effluent line samples taken by
his own company. Finally, St. John failed to consider other
documented sources of DGSD contamination.

The Court agrees that St. John’s testimony is unreliable. In
pertinent part, St. John opines that the contaminants TCE, PCE, and
TCA traveled in relatively equal proportions from Defendants’
facilities to the DGSD WWTP, passed through the DGSD WWTP into the
effluent line, leaked out of the effluent line, migrated downward
through the soil to contaminate the soil and groundwater beneath the
effluent line, and the contaminated groundwater then carried the TCE,
PCE, and TCA to the LeClercq and Mejdrech class areas. The 17
effluent samples that St. John ignored reflect non-detects for TCE,
PCE, and TCA - this data clearly is material and would be relevant to
St. John’s conclusions. Mestek concedes that St. John did not
include these 17 samples in his hydrogeological analysis. St. John
testified that he was aware of the DGSD effluent data when he
prepared his reports.

The Court concludes that St. John’s failure to discuss the
import of, or even mention, these material facts in his reports
amounts to “cherry-pick[ing] the facts he considered to render his
opinion, and such selective use of facts fail[s] to satisfy the
scientific method and Daubert.” Holden Metal & Aluminum Works v.
Wismarg Corp., No. 00 C 0191, 2003 WL 1797844, at *2 (N.D. Ill.

Apr. 2, 2003). This disregard of relevant data undermines the


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TERESA LeCLERCQ, AL LeCLERCQ,
individually, and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,
v.

THE LOCKFORMER COMPANY, a
division of MET-COIL SYSTEMS
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation, MESTEK, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation, and
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Delaware corporation,

Defendants.

MESTEK, INC., as assignee of
MET-COIL SYSTEMS, LLC, f/k/a
Met-Coil Systems Corporation,

Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.

ARROW GEAR COMPANY, AMES SUPPLY
cO., BISON GEAR; DYNAGEAR, INC.,
FLEXIBLE STEEL LACING CO.,
MAGNETROL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
MOLEX INCORPORATED, MOREY
CORPORATION, REXNORD CORPORA-
TION, TRICON INDUSTRIES, and
LINDY MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

Third-Party Defendants,
v.

DOWNERS GROVE SANITARY DISTRICT,
et al.,

Fourth-Party Defendants.

FILED

APR 2 § 2005

JUDGE HARRY D. LEINENWEBER
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case No. 00 C 7164

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber


necessary or standard in the industry for this method. Mercer
testified that “based on . . . all the data . . . including the
historical pumping, the historical flow direction, potentiometric
surface map data -- that I believe that the Mejdrech class area does
support - and looking at the chemical rations, does support a pathway
from Ellsworth to Mejdrech.” (Id. at 121-22). For the foregoing
reasons, the Court concludes that Mercer’s testimony is relevant and
reliable, and accordingly, TPDs motion to bar such testimony is
denied.
II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court rules as follows:

1. Mestek’s Motion to Bar Glanders’ Expert Testimony is
GRANTED only with respect to the topics of computer monitoring of
groundwater flow and physical design of the DGSD effluent line, and

is DENIED in all other respects.

2. Mestek’s Motion to Bar Lue-Hing’s Expert Testimony is
DENIED.

3. TPDs Motion to Bar St. John’s testimony is GRANTED.

4. TPDs Motion to Bar Mercer’s Expert Testimony is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Al Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
-—— United States District Court
Dated: Ye AL. LOS

-12-


that such data does not conflict with Mercer’s opinion regarding the
historical groundwater flow pattern (as opposed to the contemporary
groundwater flow pattern). At his deposition, Mercer rejected that
the well data was a “line” of “clean” wells because the data measured
residential drinking water wells, not groundwater monitoring wells.
(Mercer Tr. 99-102). Mercer further explained that such results
“represent[] that the contamination, if it exists there, was not
detected because the concentrations were so low they couldn’t be
quantified. . ..” Id. at 121. Additionally, Mercer stated that he
did not think such data detracted from his opinion. (Mercer Tr. at
163-64). Mercer reviewed historical groundwater maps published by
the Illinois Water Survey, municipal wells’ historical pumping data,
prior studies of the regional bedrock aquifer, and used a computer
model for hypothesis testing. The Court concludes that Mercer’s
testimony is reliable.

Second, TPDs contend that Mercer's analysis of contaminant
combination from the water quality in Area D and the Mejdrech class
area is inherently unreliable because Mercer did not provide
statistical analysis or “run the numbers.” The Court can quickly
dispose of this argument. Mercer testified that analyzing
contaminant combinations is a method widely accepted by
hydrogeologists and that he personally published a peer-review
article regarding this method. Further, TPDs have not provided any

authority or evidence to suggest that “running the numbers” is


cannot provide testimony on whether the DGSD WWTP would effectively
remove and treat contaminants before they reached the plant’s
effluent line. Mestek responds that St. John’s opinion is based on
his perspective as a hydrogeologist. Mestek admits that St. John is
not qualified to “offer any opinion about the wastewater treatment
processes . . . the design or operation of the DGSD WWTP . . . [or

the fraction of COCs removed by DGSD WWTP treatment processes,” and
asserts that he offers no such opinions. (Resp. Br. at 20).

The Court’s review of St. John’s reports reveals that he relied
on his experience and knowledge of the Lockformer site, IEPA reports,
water and soil samples taken by his company, and maps. The Court
concludes that St. John is qualified to provide expert testimony on
hydrogeologic issues relating to the sewer line contamination theory.
However, based on his admitted lack of qualifications in certain
specialized areas, he is barred from providing an opinion on the
physical design/operation of the DGSD sewer line, the wastewater
treatment processes, and the removal of contaminants ratios from the
line.

TPDs also contend that St. John’s testimony must be barred in
its entirety as unreliable because it ignores obvious and uncontested
material facts. Specifically, St. John failed to acknowledge and
account for 17 annual effluent samples reflecting non-detect for the
contaminants TCE, PCE, and TCA in the DGSD effluent. Further, TPDs

contend that St. John failed to address meaningfully in his reports


from chlorinated solvents. Based upon his practical experience and
education, the Court concludes that Glanders is qualified as a
hydrogeology expert.

Mestek next challenges Glanders’ qualifications to provide an
opinion on computer modeling. Glanders admitted that he had no
personal experience with computer modeling of groundwater flow,
stating:

Q. Have you ever used the WinFlow software
yourself personally?

A. No.

Q. . . .{H]ave you reviewed any [non-user
manual] . . . literature regarding the
WinFlow software?

A. Not that I can recall.

(Glanders Tr. 27-28).

Q. . . . Do you have any experience with
other modeling software, referring
specifically to software to model
groundwater flow?

A. No direct experience.

Q. Do you have any familiarity with models -
groundwater flow models designed to model
fractured flow?

A. No.

(Id. at 173-74).

Accordingly, Glanders is not qualified to provide expert testimony on

computer monitoring of groundwater flow and such testimony is barred.


expert’s opinion is derived from experience or training these
guidelines are applicable. See Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750,
758 (7th Cir. 1999).

A. Geoffrey Glanders

TPDs submit Geoffrey Glanders as a hydrogeology expert. Mestek
moves to strike Glanders’ testimony in its entirety because: (1) he
is unqualified as a hydrogeology expert generally; (2) he is
unqualified to testify about specific topics in his reports; and (3
his opinions are unreliable because he does not provide scientific
support. It is undisputed that Glanders’ testimony is relevant to an
issue in the case.

Mestek argues that Glanders’ lacks hydrogeology qualifications
because he is not an accredited Professional Hydrogeologist; he never
took college hydrogeology classes; and never published in a peer-
reviewed journal. TPDs respond that Glanders is a qualified
hydrogeology expert based upon his education, knowledge, skiil, and
experience. The Court must “consider a proposed expert’s full range
of practical experience as well as academic or technical training
when determining whether that expert is qualified to render an
opinion in a given area.” Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718
(7th Cir. 2000). Glanders is a Registered Professional Geologist
with a Bachelor of Science in Geology. He has 25 years of project
management experience at contamination sites and has been the project

manager at 30 to 50 sites with groundwater contamination resulting


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are the parties’ dueling motions to bar expert
testimony. Third-Party Plaintiff Mestek (“Mestek”) seeks to exclude
the expert testimony of Geoffrey Glanders and Cecil Lue-Hing. Third-
Party Defendants and Hybrid Defendants (collectively, the “TPDs”)
seek to exclude the expert testimony of Ronald St. John and James
Mercer.

I. DISCUSSION

Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993), courts must act as gatekeepers to ensure
that expert testimony satisfies the admissibility requirements of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Expert testimony based on scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge must be relevant and
reliable. See id. The testimony must be “based upon sufficient
facts or data,” “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and
the witness must have “applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.” FED. R. Evip. 702. Certain guidelines aid the
court in its gatekeeping function, including whether the expert’s
“theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested,” whether it
“has been subjected to peer review and publication,” whether there is
a high “known or potential rate of error,” whether there are
“standards controlling the technique’s operation,” and whether the
theory or technique enjoys “general acceptance” within a “relevant

scientific community.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. Even when the