DISCUSSION

Defendants first focus on Clark’s compliance with the administrative exhaustion
requirement of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). The PLRA provides that

[nJo action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined

in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Defendants contend that Clark did not follow the procedures established within
the Illinois Administrative Code and therefore did not exhaust his administrative
remedies. 20 Ill. Adm. Code §§ 504.800-504.870. In support of this argument,
Defendants offer evidence in the form of an affidavit of Jackie Miller, an IDOC
official. As detailed above, 12(b)(6) motions are to be decided based on the contents
of the complaint itself. Clark’s complaint alleges, with some degree of detail, his
efforts to resolve his issues at the administrative level, including an unequivocal
allegation that he pursued appeal. Whether these allegations are ultimately borne out
by evidentiary support is a question for another day. At this stage of the proceedings,

Clark has done what is required to satisfy an initial examination of compliance with the

PLRA exhaustion requirement.


relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for impingement of his First Amendment right to practice
his religion.? Defendants now move to dismiss his suit in accordance with Rule
12(b)(6), insisting that Clark has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is used to test the legal sufficiency of a
complaint. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In ruling
on a motion to dismiss, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff, construe allegations of a complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Bontkowski

v. First Natl. Bank of Cicero, 998 F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993); Perkins v. Silverstein,

939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991). The allegations of a complaint “should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no Set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). With these principles in mind, we turn

to the motion at hand.

? Clark amended his complaint in January 2004; it is that pleading that we
consider.

3.


Defendants move on from their PLRA argument to the substantive allegations
of the § 1983 claim. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that only two things: 1) a deprivation of a federal right 2) by a person acting under
color of state law. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980).
Here, Clark has alleged that he was deprived of his federal right to practice his
Rastafarian beliefs by persons acting under color of Illinois law. Defendants even
concede that the cutting of his hair imposed a substantial burden on his free exercise
of his religious beliefs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). Thus, Defendants establish that
Clark has stated a viable claim, but they attempt to prevail on their motion by setting
forth affirmative matters in support of a judgment in their favor and offering
inapplicable case law. The former cannot be properly assessed in the absence ofa fully
developed factual record, which is clearly not present during the examination of the
sufficiency of an initial pleading.

As for the latter, the first case Defendants cite, Reed v. Faulkner, was not
decided in the context of a motion to dismiss but after a full trial on the merits. 842
F.2d 960, 962 (7th Cir. 1988). Moreover, the court in Reed did not definitively state
that no prison hair regulation could run afoul of the First Amendment, as would be
required to underpin a 12(b)(6) dismissal. The second case, Moore-Bey v. Cohn, is an

unpublished opinion, as indicated by its inclusion in the Federal Appendix. 69 Fed.

5.


‘Minuhe Order Form (0697)

* United States District Court, Northern District of Minois
NameatAnee tee | Charles P. Kocoras | Stine nef One
CASE NUMBER 03 C 3852 DATE 7118/2004
CASE Clark vs. Briley et al
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly thens
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) Qa Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due__.
(3) QO Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due___.
(4) Q Ruling/Hearing on setfor__ se at_
(5) | | Status hearing set for 8/11/2004 at 9:30 A.M..
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to) {set for/re-set for]on___—_ssetfor_ at
(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at
(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at
(9) a This case is dismissed {with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

OOFRCP4(m) Ci) Local Rule 41.1 O)FRCP4i(a)(1) ) FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) I [Otherdocket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: Defendants’ motion (Doc 27-1)
dismiss is denied. Defendants are given to July 26, 2004 to answer the amended complaint.

(i) (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
i No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff,
(”] Notified counsel by telephone.
% | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form,

LEACI LIMES “SN

|}. Copy to jude/mbgistrate judge. W313
courtroom Zh Wd 8- TNE H002
scr depuy's
initials TUbaeria a ain
central Clerk's Office



Appx. 784, 788 (7th Cir. 2002). Seventh Circuit Rule 53 establishes that unpublished
orders and opinions may not be cited as precedent in any document filed in any court
within the Seventh Circuit, which clearly applies to this court and to Defendants’
memoranda. Accordingly, Moore-Bey has no precedential value that could assist
Defendants and should not have been included in their brief in the first instance.
Clearly, this presentation will not carry the day.

We concluded Clark has presented a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

CQ. One f beer

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
United States District Court

pared, 1) F104


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMIE JAMES CLARK, #B-42333,

Plaintiff
DOCKET

vs. 03 C 3852 JUL 097

)

)

)

)

KENNETH R. BRILEY, Warden; ROBERT )
CATCHINGS, Acting Warden; TRACY )
ENGLESON; ROBERT GRIFFIN; ALEX JONES; )
JOSEPH R. QUIJANO, Major; JAMES )
TSOULOS, Chaplain Il; MARILYN R. COUTEE, )
Adjustment Committee Chairperson, Lieutenant; )
GEORGE RYAN, Governor; DONALD N. )
SNYDER, Director; D, HUNTER, Superintendent; )
WARDEN, Major; TAMMIE HOWARD, )
Correctional Staff Member and on Adjustment )
Committee; S. BACKSTROM, Correctional Staff )
Member/Hearing Investigator; and JOE DOE, )
3 Gallery F Wing Counselor; )
)

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:
This matter comes before the court on the motion of Defendants Kenneth Briley,
Marilyn Coutee, Joseph Quijano, Robert Griffin, Darrin Hunter, James Tsoulos, Alex

Jones, Robert Catchings, and Tracey Engelson to dismiss the amended complaint


pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is
denied.
BACKGROUND

Defendants are employed by the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)
in various capacities.’ Plaintiff James Clark was an inmate at Stateville Correctional
Facility. He claims to be a practicing Rastafarian. As part of his beliefs, he maintains
uncut hair in dreadlocks. In October 2002, Clark was advised that he would have to
cut his hair in accordance with an IDOC policy allowing an “individual grooming
requirement” to be applied to inmates whose hairstyles met certain criteria. Clark
agreed to allow guards to employ various means of searching his hair for contraband
but repeatedly refused to comply with the mandate to cut it, citing his religious beliefs.
After several refusals, Clark was shackled and forcibly required to submit to the
haircut. In addition, Clark was disciplined in various ways as a result of his refusal to
cut his hair.

The complaint alleges that Clark filed several grievances protesting his
treatment, but none produced any response. Clark also alleges that he filed an appeal

and completed the grievance procedure. He filed the instant suit in June 2003, seeking

‘ Because this matter comes to us under the aegis of Rule 12(b)(6), we accept
as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint.

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