This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A16-0109

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Arthur Senty-Haugen,

Appellant.

Filed December 19, 2016

Affirmed

Kirk, Judge

Carlton County District Court

File No. 09-CR-14-2335

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Thomas Pertler, Carlton County Attorney, Jesse D. Berglund, Assistant County Attorney, 

Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public 

Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith, 

Tracy M., Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KIRK, Judge

On his appeal from his bribery conviction, appellant argues that the district court 

erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search 
2

of the digital contents of his smartphone and (2) denying him credit for 22 days in jail. We 

affirm. 

FACTS

This case raises the issue of whether an involuntarily civilly committed person 

retains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a smartphone that was seized 

by staff members of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). 

The parties do not dispute the facts. Appellant Arthur Senty-Haugen is indefinitely 

civilly committed as a sexual psychopathic personality and sexually dangerous person 

(SDP/SPP) at MSOP. Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2006). On 

August 12, 2014, an MSOP staff member was performing random room checks and 

discovered appellant holding a device emitting a bright light, which the staff member 

believed to be a smartphone. Staff searched appellant’s room and found a phone charger. 

As staff transferred appellant to a high-security area to perform a body search, a Samsung 

Galaxy S5 smartphone slid out from his pant leg. Electronic communication devices, 

including cell phones, are considered contraband. MSOP Policy 301.030. The policy 

defines contraband as “items which are prohibited by Statute or Policy, or deemed a risk 

to the safety, security or therapeutic environment impacting the program or a [patient].” 

Id. A smartphone is only allowed for approved individuals inside the secure perimeter for 

business-related purposes. MSOP Policy 301.025. 

Kenneth Stewart, an MSOP investigator, testified at the contested omnibus hearing 

about MSOP’s investigation into the smuggling of the smartphone into the facility. Stewart 
3

explained that MSOP did not seek a warrant to search the phone because appellant’s 

possession of the phone merely violated MSOP’s security policies and was not a crime. 

MSOP staff and administrators did not know, and appellant refused to disclose, how he

had managed to obtain the smartphone. Stewart testified that the MSOP administrators 

were concerned about appellant’s ability to use the phone to circumvent the facility’s 

monitored telephone system and the potential of an ongoing security breach inside the 

facility. 

Forensic IT specialists at the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) 

lacked the necessary software to unlock the digital contents of the smartphone. MSOP 

administrators next solicited the assistance of a forensic investigator from the Santa 

Barbara Police Department in California. The investigator extracted the smartphone’s data 

and copied the data onto a disk, which MSOP officials reviewed. Data from the disk 

included text messages indicating that appellant had paid an MSOP staff member $3,000 

to smuggle the smartphone into the facility. MSOP officials questioned the staff member,

and he admitted that appellant paid him $3,000 to smuggle the smartphone into MSOP. 

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with felony bribery. Appellant 

moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the warrantless search of his 

smartphone. Relying on Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), he asserted that he 

retained a reasonable private interest in the digital contents of the smartphone and that no 

exigent circumstances existed allowing MSOP officials to search the phone without a 
4

warrant. He also asserted that the search was unreasonable because existing MSOP policy 

only allowed staff to seize the smartphone, but not to search its contents. 

After a contested omnibus hearing, the district court issued an order denying 

appellant’s motion. It implicitly found that appellant retained a legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the contents of his electronic devices under Riley and State v. Barajas, a recent 

decision from this court. 817 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Oct. 

16, 2012). In Riley, the Supreme Court held that a search warrant is generally required 

before law enforcement may search information stored on a cell phone. 134 S. Ct. at 2493. 

In Barajas, this court held that the digital contents of cell phones are subject to Fourth 

Amendment protections. 817 N.W.2d at 216-17. But the district court noted that, as an 

involuntarily civilly committed patient, appellant retained a diminished expectation of 

privacy after commitment to a custodial facility similar to a pretrial detainee. 

The district court applied the balancing test announced in the U.S. Supreme Court 

decision Bell v. Wolfish, which is used to determine the reasonableness of a search under 

the Fourth Amendment for pretrial detainees. 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). It 

concluded that the search of the digital contents of appellant’s phone was reasonable on 

the grounds that a phone in the possession of an involuntarily committed SDP/SPP could 

be used to circumvent MSOP’s monitoring policies, and it presented a grave security threat 

for both MSOP and the public. It cited MSOP’s strict regulations concerning the use of 

mobile devices by MSOP staff and administrators. See, e.g., MSOP Policy 301.030 

(prohibiting patients from possessing contraband including cell phones within and on the 
5

grounds of all MSOP facilities). It also cited MSOP Policy 301.010, which authorizes

MSOP to search personal effects for contraband by visual, canine, or electronic means. 

On September 15, 2015, appellant stipulated to the state’s case to obtain appellate 

review of the district court’s denial of appellant’s suppression motion. See Minn. R. Crim. 

P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court accepted appellant’s plea and sentenced him to a 

bottom-of-the-box sentence of 26 months, with credit for 383 days.

This appeal follows. 

D E C I S I O N

I. The district court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress 

evidence seized from a warrantless search of the digital contents of his 

smartphone. 

When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the 

district court’s factual findings for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences the 

district court draws from those facts, but we determine as a matter of law whether the 

district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence. State v. Diede, 795 

N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011). 

Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution prohibit 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. In 

determining whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated, “(1) the 

search must be of an area in which the person has an expectation of privacy and (2) the 

person’s expectation of privacy must be one that is recognized within society as 

reasonable.” Barajas, 817 N.W.2d at 213. Whether appellant can invoke the protections 
6

of the Fourth Amendment requires this court to first determine whether appellant exhibited 

an actual subjective expectation of privacy in the smartphone, and second, whether that 

expectation is reasonable. In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 2003) 

(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967)). 

Both parties agree that appellant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the 

digital contents of his smartphone. The issue before the court is the reasonableness of 

appellant’s expectation of privacy. “If there is no legitimate expectation of privacy, then 

there can be no Fourth Amendment violation.” United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066 

(8th Cir. 2002). As an involuntary civilly committed patient, appellant has the same Fourth 

Amendment protections as a pretrial detainee. Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 948 (8th 

Cir. 2009). Pretrial detainees retain a diminished expectation of privacy after commitment 

to a custodial facility. Bell, 441 U.S. at 522, 99 S. Ct. at 1865.

Appellant argues that under Riley, he retains a reasonable, but diminished,

expectation of privacy in the digital contents of his smartphone and that no MSOP policy 

authorized the warrantless search of the phone. The state argues that Riley does not apply 

because its holding is limited to warrantless searches by law enforcement of an arrestee’s 

phone under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. 

The parties’ arguments reflect a lack of certainty about the extent of privacy 

protections afforded to the electronic media devices of pretrial detainees under Riley. Any

constitutional guarantee, however, only protects against unreasonable intrusions or 

searches that “are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper 
7

manner.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966). “The 

test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or 

mechanical application.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S. Ct. at 1884. A district court must 

balance “the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the 

search entails” by considering “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which 

it was conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it was conducted.” 

Id. 

In Bell, the Supreme Court upheld the practice of prison authorities conducting 

visual body-cavity searches of pretrial detainees in a federally operated short-term 

custodial facility following contact visits. The Court assumed that the inmates had an 

expectation of privacy, but it justified the reasonableness of this highly invasive search

technique on the grounds that a detention facility was a place “fraught with unique security 

dangers” and prison officials had testified that the search technique was necessary to 

discover and deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other contraband into the 

detention facility. Id. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884. The Court noted that the search technique 

was a proven, effective deterrent against contraband entering the facility. Id. at 559, 99 

S. Ct. at 1885. 

Following Bell, we discern no error in the district court’s finding of MSOP’s 

concern that cell phones present a “grave security threat” in the context of sexually violent 

persons. See Serna, 567 F.3d at 953. The district court noted that this security threat 

includes the potential to conduct criminal activity by contacting past victims, grooming 
8

future victims, and securing child pornography. Id. The photographic capabilities of 

smartphones can undermine institutional security by transmitting images of personnel or 

buildings to persons outside of the facility. Id. We note that the phone’s ability to connect 

to the internet and its data-storage capabilities increase the gravity of these threats. These 

specific threats also undermine MSOP’s treatment goals. Id. Further, an individual’s 

privacy interests are lessened when the seized smartphone is contraband. See Illinois v. 

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005) (holding that governmental 

conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband does not implicate the Fourth 

Amendment).

We conclude that the scope, manner, and justification of the search of the phone is

consistent with MSOP’s policies. Under Bell, appellant’s expectation of privacy in the 

contents of his smartphone must be balanced against the state’s compelling interest in “both 

protecting the public from sexual violence and rehabilitating the mentally ill.” In re 

Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1999). Here, administrators at MSOP had specific 

evidence that appellant, an SDP/SPP, possessed a smartphone, which constituted a security 

breach. In light of the state’s compelling interest in appellant’s security and rehabilitation, 

it was reasonable for MSOP to search the digital contents of the phone to determine if a 

security breach had occurred or whether appellant was engaging in behavior that 

contravened his rehabilitation. 

In Bell, the Supreme Court refused to adopt a less-invasive-means test for 

identifying contraband. 441 U.S. at 559 n.40, 99 S. Ct. at 1885 n.40. Post Bell, the Serna
9

Court noted that to do otherwise would “effectively deprive institutional administrators of 

the deference noted in Bell.” 567 F.3d at 955. Here, MSOP officials had to unlock the 

digital contents of the phone because there was no other way to determine the origination 

of the phone or if there were ongoing threats to the safety of the facility or appellant’s 

rehabilitation. 

Appellant argues that MSOP policies only authorized staff to seize the phone and 

hold it according to its evidence handling policy, which it failed to admit into the record. 

See MSOP Policy 103.030 (stating that “contraband secured during any search will be 

handled according to MSOP Security Policy 107.055, ‘Evidence Handling’”). He also 

asserts that any threat posed by the phone ceased upon its seizure by MSOP.

We find appellant’s argument to be unpersuasive. The Bell Court deferred to the 

judgment of detention-center officials in handling security threats within the facility. “The 

problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible 

[to] easy solutions,” and “in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate 

that officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should 

ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S. Ct. at 

1879. Here, the district court did not err in finding that MSOP had numerous policies 

regulating contraband and the use of mobile devices in the facility. It was not unreasonable 

for MSOP administrators to search appellant’s contraband phone to determine whether 

there were ongoing threats to the facility’s security or appellant’s rehabilitation. 
10

We conclude that MSOP officials acted reasonably in sending the smartphone to 

forensic investigators after ascertaining that DHS lacked the appropriate software to unlock 

the phone’s contents. 

II. The district court did not err by denying appellant 22 days of jail credit.

A criminal defendant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to credit for time 

spent in custody during criminal proceedings. State v. Garcia, 683 N.W.2d 294, 297 

(Minn. 2004). When pronouncing an individual’s sentence, the district court must “[s]tate 

the number of days spent in custody in connection with the offense or behavioral incident 

being sentenced.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B). “[A] criminal defendant at 

sentencing shall get credit for time spent in jail in connection with the criminal charges.” 

State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted). Jail credit is 

applied by subtracting the credit from the specified minimum term of imprisonment of the 

imposed sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 3.C.2.a (2014).

A district court’s decision whether to award credit is a mixed question of fact and 

law. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 379. The court must determine the circumstances of the 

custody the defendant seeks credit for, and then apply the rules to those circumstances. Id. 

The sentencing court does not have discretion in awarding jail credit. State v. Clarkin, 817 

N.W.2d 678, 689 (Minn. 2012).

Appellant argues that he is entitled to 22 days of jail credit from September 12, 2014

through October 3, 2014 because the state had probable cause that he had committed felony 

bribery on September 12, but delayed charging until October 3. The state disputes 
11

appellant’s characterization of the record, arguing that appellant should only get custody 

credit beginning on December 12. In support of its argument, the state submitted a copy 

of a booking printout from the Moose Lake Police Department reflecting that appellant was 

not in jail from September 12 through October 3. But this document was not filed with the 

district court. On appeal, this court cannot consider this document in its determination. 

See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (stating that the record on appeal consists of documents 

filed in the district court, the exhibits, and the transcripts).

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor conceded that appellant was entitled to jail 

credit beginning on October 3. He stated on the record, “I’ll go with the October 3rd date 

for credit.” The prosecutor further explained that he did not decide to charge appellant 

until October 3 because, on that day, he spoke with MSOP officials concerning the bribery 

statute, and he became convinced that he could bring charges. He also stated that the 

complaint was not completed until December 12 because upon further review, he found 

some holes in the case and requested further information from MSOP. The presentence 

investigation (PSI) worksheet shows that appellant was jailed for the offense from 

December 14, 2014 through October 21, 2015. 

The district court gave appellant credit back to October 3, 2014. Clarkin outlines 

when a district court can award a defendant jail credit. 817 N.W.2d at 687. 

We conclude that an award of jail credit is appropriate for time 

spent in custody after the date when (1) the State has completed 

its investigation in a manner that does not suggest manipulation 

by the State, and (2) the State has probable cause and sufficient 

evidence to prosecute its case against the defendant with a 
12

reasonable likelihood of actually convicting the defendant of 

the offense for which he is charged.

Id. at 689. 

We discern no error in the district court’s calculation of appellant’s jail credit. With 

respect to the first prong of the Clarkin test, the record supports the district court’s implicit 

finding that the state completed its investigation on October 3. The prosecutor affirmed 

that he had substantially completed his investigation on October 3 and that he was willing 

to give appellant jail credit beginning on that date. Under the second prong of the Clarkin

test, the record supports the district court’s implicit finding that the prosecutor had probable 

cause to charge on October 3 as he had “probable cause and sufficient evidence” to 

successfully prosecute the charge against appellant. Id.

Affirmed.