Case Number 01-14-00979-CV 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

at Houston, Texas 

__________________________________________________________________ 

In re Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club, 

Relator. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

RELATOR’S REPLY TO REAL PARTY IN INTEREST’S 

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

__________________________________________________________________ 

From Cause Number 13-DCV-203651 Pending in the 

240th Judicial District Court of Fort Bend County 

__________________________________________________________________ 

WALTERS, BALIDO & CRAIN, L.L.P. 

Gregory R. Ave 

State Bar No. 01448900 

greg.ave@wbclawfirm.com 

David H. Bradley 

State Bar Number 00783704 

Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500 

10440 North Central Expressway 

Dallas, Texas 75231 

Telephone (214) 749-4805 

Facsimile (214) 670-1670 

bradleyedocsnotifications@wbclawfirm.com

January 15, 2015 ATTORNEYS FOR RELATOR 

ACCEPTED

01-14-00979-cv

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

1/15/2015 2:27:48 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 1/15/2015 2:27:48 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
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TO THE HONORABLE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS: 

 Relator Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (“Auto 

Club”) files its reply to the response filed by Real Parties in Interest John 

Amponsah and Melanie Amponsah (the “Amponsahs”) to Auto Club’s 

petition for writ of mandamus, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 52.5, and would show the Court as follows: 

 In their response to Auto Club’s mandamus petition, the Amponsahs 

argue the only way the trial court could properly assess whether the 

expert1 applied acceptable methods and properly analyzed the cause of the 

foundation damage in question is by comparing his evaluation with others 

reports he has provided Auto Club. [Response at p. 6.] This position was 

explicitly rejected by the supreme court in In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 13-

0761, 2014 WL 5785871, at *2 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2014) (orig. proceeding). 

As discussed in Auto Club’s petition, when faced with this exact 

same argument by the real party in interest in Nat’l Lloyds, the supreme 

court declared: “[W]e fail to see how National Lloyds’ overpayment, 

underpayment, or proper payment of the claims of unrelated third parties 

 

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 The designated expert witness at issue in this matter is Auto Club’s retained expert Derrick S. 

Hancock (“Hancock”). 
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is probative of its conduct with respect to [real party in interest’s] 

undervaluation claims at issue in this case.” Id. Here, the Amponsahs do 

not and cannot demonstrate how reviewing Hancock’s prior reports could 

in anyway shed light on whether he employed proper methods in 

evaluating the Amponsah’s foundation damage. See Transcon. Ins. Co. v. 

Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 215 n.2 (Tex. 2010) (outlining the factors for 

determining the reliability of expert testimony). Nonetheless, the 

Amponsahs insist they are permitted to employ this same approach 

expressly rejected in Nat’l Lloyds to contest the validity of Hancock’s 

methods.2 [Response at p. 7.] 

 In conclusory fashion, the Amponsahs also argue that it was within 

the trial court’s discretion to order production of thirteen years’ worth of 

Hancock’s reports simply because the trial court has broad discretion to 

define the scope of discovery and it must have found the reports are 

relevant to whether Auto Club breached its contract. [Response at pp. 6-7.] 

 

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 Perhaps even more astonishing is the Amponsahs contention that the Texas Supreme Court’s 

opinion in Nat’l Lloyds is not “authoritative.” [Response at p. 7.] As an opinion of Texas’s 

highest court and being directly on point with the issue before this Court, Nat’l Lloyds is not only 

“authoritative,” but it mandatory authority. It strains one’s imagination to think the Amponsahs 

were unaware of Nat’l Lloyds’s controlling and authoritative position. 
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Notwithstanding the Amponsahs’ suggestion to the contrary, the 

supreme court has repeatedly held that a trial court does not have 

unlimited discretion to define the scope of discovery, but must reasonably 

tailor discovery to “include only relevant matters.” In re CSX Corp., 124 

S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003). The Amponsahs have not and cannot offer any 

explanation as to how Hancock’s prior reports have any bearing 

whatsoever on whether Auto Club improperly denied their claim. See Nat’l 

Lloyds, supra, 2014 WL 5785871, at *2. Consequently, the trial court abused 

its discretion by ordering production of the reports at issue. 

 Because the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Auto Club to 

produce documents that have no bearing on the sole claim at issue in this 

case and exceed the permissible boundaries of discovery for evidence of 

witness bias, Auto Club respectfully requests the Court grant its petition 

for writ of mandamus in all respects and order Respondent District Court 

Judge Thomas R. Culver, III to vacate his Order and deny Plaintiffs’ motion 

to compel production of Derrick S. Hancock’s reports for the years 2000 

through 2012, and for such other and further relief to which Auto Club 

shows itself entitled.

 
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Respectfully submitted, 

WALTERS, BALIDO & CRAIN, L.L.P. 

By: /s/Gregory R. Ave 

Gregory R. Ave 

State Bar No. 01448900 

greg.ave@wbclawfirm.com 

David H. Bradley 

State Bar Number 00783704 

bradleyedocsnotifications@wbcla

wfirm.com

Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500 

10440 North Central Expressway 

Dallas, Texas 75231 

Telephone (214) 749-4805 

Facsimile (214) 670-1670 

ATTORNEYS FOR RELATOR 

INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE OF 

THE AUTOMOBILE CLUB 

 
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

 Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), the 

undersigned certifies that this instrument complies with the type-volume 

limitations of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(C). 

 Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.10(a), the 

undersigned counsel hereby certifies that he has made a diligent effort to 

notify all parties by expedited means of this request for temporary relief. 

 Exclusive of the exempt portions identified by Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1), this reply contains 633 words, including 

footnotes, headings, and quotations. In providing this word-count, the 

undersigned is relying on the word count generated by the computer 

program used to prepare the reply. 

 This petition has been prepared in proportionally spaced type-face 

using Word (version 2010) computer program in Book Antiqua 14 point 

text and Times New Roman 12 point footnotes. 

 /s/ Gregory R. Ave 

Gregory R. Ave 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 On January 15, 2015, a true and correct copy of this instrument was 

forwarded to the following persons in the manner indicated below: 

The Honorable Thomas R. Culver, III (Via Hand Delivery) 

Presiding Judge of the 240th Judicial District 

 Court of Fort Bend County, Texas 

301 Jackson 

Richmond, Texas 77469 

RESPONDENT 

James E. Rensimer, Esquire (Via E-Serve) 

Everett Day, Esquire 

9525 Katy Freeway, Suite 128 

Houston, Texas 77024 

JR@RensimerLaw.com 

ATTORNEY FOR REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST 

JOHN AMPONSAH AND MELANIE AMPONSAH

/s/ Gregory R. Ave 

Gregory R. Ave