requirements as set forth in section 5/122-1(c) and, therefore, could not toll the one-year statute of
limitations under § 2244(d)(2)'. Brooks, 301 F.3d at 841.

As set outin this Court’s earlier Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 12, 2002,
the petition for collateral review was within the time required under Ilinois law. Therefore,

Respondent’s Motion to Reconsider is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Jerry Sternes’ Motion to Reconsider is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: Wostehae 200 ;
john W. Darrah, Judge

ted States District Court

"Section 2244(d)(1) provides that:
A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review[.]

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(2).

*(Tllinois’s] timeliness rule is quantitative (six months from the end of the direct appeal
or three years from the conviction, whichever is sooner) . . . .” Brooks, 301 F.3d at 841.

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igote Order Farm (06/97)
ee

°

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

opinion and order.

vere Magltate Tudee John W. Darrah “than Anlgned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C700 DATE 12/5/2002
CASE James Koch vs. Warden Jerry Sternes
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) o Filed motion of ( use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) oO Answer brief to motiondue___. Reply to answer brief due.
(4) Q Ruling/Hearingon__setfor_——_at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—ssetfor___——sat__—s
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on___at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(aX(1) ( FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) [Other docket entry} Jerry Sternes motion for reconsideration is denied. Enter memorandum

(1) @f (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
a | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form. .
“sh
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. yundd anwssi0
courtroom - 7302
SLB deputy’s es | Wa 5
initials Sa rae} ta
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
ex rel. JAMES KOCH, )
) Case No. 02 C 700
Petitioner, )
) Honorable John W. Darrah
v. )
Otter
WARDEN JERRY STERNES, ) 28 4 (7))
) 6 20g
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Respondent, Jerry Sternes (“Respondent”), Warden of the Dixon Correctional Center in
Dixon, Illinois, where Petitioner, James Koch (“Petitioner”), is in custody, filed a Motion to
Reconsider, arguing that this Court’s interpretation of Carey v. Saffold, - - U.S. - -, 122 S. Ct.
2134 (2002), is at odds with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of
Saffold in Brooks v. Walls, 301 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2002). For the reasons that follow,
Respondent’s Motion to Reconsider is denied.

LEGAL STANDARD

Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or
fact or presenting newly discovered evidence or an intervening change in the law. Cosgrove v.
Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1998). Reconsideration is appropriate when “the Court has
patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to
the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.” Spearman

Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (quoting

Ou



Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)). A motion
for reconsideration cannot be used to introduce new legal theories for the first time, to raise legal
arguments that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion, or to present
evidence that could have been adduced during the pendency of the original motion. Publishers Res.,
Inc, v. Walker-Davis Publ’ns, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985); Jn re Oil Spill by the “Amoco
Cadiz” off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 794. Supp. 261, 267 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Movants
should not use a motion for reconsideration to rehash arguments previously rejected by the court.
Sikora v. AFD Indus., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Til. 1998).
ANALYSIS

Respondent requests this Court to reconsider its decision of September 12, 2002. Ina
Memorandum Opinion and Order, this Court denied Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and held that
a petition for post-conviction relief tolled the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and
Saffold. Respondent filed this Motion to Reconsider based on the subsequent ruling in Brooks v.
Walls, 301 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 2002). Respondent argues that, in Brooks, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit interpreted Saffold as counting the time after a direct appeal is final but before
a petition for post-conviction relief has been filed against the one-year statute of limitations.

Contrary to Respondent’s interpretation, the Seventh Circuit in Brooks, citing Saffold, held
that “to be ‘properly filed’ an application for collateral review in state court must satisfy the state’s
timeliness requirements.” Brooks, 301 F.3d at 841. In addition, the Seventh Circuit in Brooks did
not disagree with Saffold’s interpretation of “pending” as used in § 2244(d)(2) as it applies to
collateral review in Illinois. In Brooks, the Seventh Circuit held that Brooks’ petition for post-

conviction relief was not “properly filed” because it did not comply with Ilinois’s timeliness

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