Filed 3/27/23 Quillen v. Car City CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MICHAEL QUILLEN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CAR CITY, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B318046

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 17STLC03903)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Stephen M. Moloney, Judge. Affirmed in 

part and reversed in part.

Arno H. Keshishian for Defendants and Appellants.

Law Offices of Michael Geller and Michael S. Geller for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Defendant and appellant Car City, Inc. (Car City) 

appeals from the judgment in a lawsuit brought by plaintiff and 

respondent Michael Quillen, alleging Car City committed fraud, 

violated the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 

et seq.) (the CLRA) and violated the Unfair Competition Law 

(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) (the UCL) when it sold Quillen a 

used vehicle. The trial court ruled in Car City’s favor on the 

fraud claim, but in Quillen’s favor on the CLRA and UCL claims, 

and ordered Car City to pay Quillen attorney fees and costs 

according to proof.

We agree with Car City that substantial evidence does not 

support the judgment on the CLRA claim, because the record 

contains no evidence supporting that the Car City employee 

statements on which Quillen based that claim were actually false 

or misleading. Because the UCL claim is derivative of the CLRA 

claim, the UCL claim is likewise unsupported by the record.1

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment to the extent it adjudicates 

these two causes of action in Quillen’s favor and orders Car City 

to pay Quillen fees and costs. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. The Complaint

Quillen sued Car City and others2 in October 2017, alleging 

causes of action against Car City for fraud and violations of the 

1 Because our conclusion on this issue requires reversal, 

we need not address Quillen’s arguments regarding the court’s 

purported reliance on excluded, inadmissible evidence. 

2 The complaint also named American Contractors 

Indemnity Company and Chase Bank as defendants, neither of 

which is a party to this appeal. 
3

CLRA and UCL. All three causes of action were based on the 

same alleged conduct in connection with Quillen’s purchase 

of a used vehicle (the vehicle) from Car City. Specifically, the 

complaint alleged that, before Quillen purchased the vehicle, 

Car City employees assured Quillen it had not been in an 

accident and was in excellent condition, but that two years later,

Quillen learned the vehicle’s frame was severely damaged, which 

made the vehicle unsafe to drive.

B. Trial Testimony and Exhibits

The record on appeal does not include a reporter’s 

transcript. We therefore base our summary of the evidence 

presented at trial primarily on the detailed description of this 

evidence contained in the trial court’s “final statement of 

decision.”

3 (Capitalization omitted.)

1. Quillen testimony and key documents 

at trial

Quillen testified that he purchased the vehicle in December 

2015. He test drove the vehicle before purchasing it and did not 

detect any issues during the test drive. He further testified 

that Alex Oganesyan was the Car City employee with whom he 

discussed the vehicle before purchasing it, and that Oganesyan 

initially told Quillen the vehicle had not been in an accident 

and indicated “ ‘it was [in] great shape.’ ” Oganesyan then 

provided Quillen with a CARFAX report that indicated: 

(1) “No accident/damages reported to CARFAX”; (2) “No total 

3 It is not clear from the record whether all of the 

documents referenced in the statement of decision were admitted 

into evidence, something we address further in discussing Car 

City’s arguments on appeal. 
4

loss reported to CARFAX”; and (3) “No structural damage 

reported to CARFAX.” According to Quillen’s testimony, 

Oganesyan later told Quillen: “ ‘I must come clean since the 

vehicle was in a bad accident in the past and incurred frame 

damage.’ ” Oganesyan then provided Quillen with an AutoCheck 

report that notes “ ‘frame/unibody damage’ but also indicates no 

accidents involving the vehicle. The frame damage was reported 

by an auto auction in September of 2013. According to the 

AutoCheck report[,] ‘a wholesale auto auction has reported that 

the vehicle has frame damage which can weaken the structure 

of the vehicle.’ ”

Quillen testified that he asked to get a third-party 

inspection of the vehicle, in response to which Oganesyan 

became upset and would not let the vehicle leave the lot. 

Quillen nevertheless purchased the vehicle, in part because

the certificate of title did not indicate “salvage title,” as it would,

had the vehicle been salvaged.

An internal Car City document entitled “vehicle disclosure 

form” (capitalization omitted) includes a list of the following 

statements, each of which Quillen initialed: “a. The vehicle has 

prior accident damage that has been repaired; [¶] b. The vehicle 

has frame damage reported; [¶] c. I have seen the CarFax report; 

[¶] d. I have seen the AutoCheck report; [¶ ] e. I have seen the 

[National Motor Vehicle Title Information System] title report; 

[¶ ] f. I have test driven the vehicle; [¶ ] g. I have physically 

inspected the vehicle and I have no demands or expectations 

of the dealer; [¶] h. I have been informed that I have the right 

to an independent inspection of the vehicle. [¶] . . . [¶] k. I am 

purchasing the vehicle ‘as is’ no claim made by the dealer; and 

[¶] l. I am satisfied with the vehicle’s condition.” (Underscoring 
5

omitted.) Quillen also “initialed and signed this document

confirming the representations made [therein].”

Quillen testified that, in April 2017, when the vehicle 

had approximately 14,000 more miles on it than it had at the 

time he purchased it (approximately 83,000 miles as opposed 

to 69,315 miles), Quillen took the vehicle to Big O Tires because 

the vehicle was not driving straight. Quillen testified he was told 

that Big O Tires could not align the tires due to frame damage, 

causing Quillen to have the vehicle inspected at Central Valley 

Collision Inc., where he “was advised that it would cost in excess 

of $10,000 to repair the frame damage.”

Another estimate for repair from San Francisco Auto Body

and Frame Repair Quillen subsequently obtained indicates 

“VEHICLE NOT SAFE TO DRIVE WITH THE EXTENT OF

THE DAMAGES FOUND UNDERNEATH.”

2. Oganesyan testimony

Oganesyan testified that the vehicle at issue “was obtained 

by Car City . . . as a trade-in for a vehicle that was purchased 

from them.” According to Oganesyan, Car City enlists Steve’s 

Muffler Brakes and Shocks to inspect vehicles “to see if a vehicle 

is safe to be sold” and to place a value on a vehicle. He testified 

that a such an inspection report (the Steve’s Muffler inspection 

report) “g[ave] Car City the green light to sell the vehicle.” 

Oganesyan “testified that he did not know if the vehicle needed 

repairs. Instead, he relied on the safety inspection from Steve’s 

Muffler.”

Oganesyan did not remember every detail of his 

conversation with Quillen, but testified that he was relying 

on the Steve’s Muffler inspection report and AutoCheck report 

in that conversation. Consistent with Quillen’s testimony, 
6

Oganesyan testified that he showed Quillen documents indicating 

the vehicle had frame damage. The documents did not indicate

that the frame damage had been repaired. Inconsistent with 

Quillen’s testimony, however, Oganesyan testified that Car City 

permitted vehicles to be taken up to seven miles away from Car

City for independent inspection, and that “it is impossible not 

to give the ‘ok’ to take a vehicle off the [l]ot to be inspected.” He 

testified that “about 50 [percent] of Car City’s customers asked 

for and received an independent inspection report,” for which Car 

City pays.

3. Expert testimony

No expert testimony was presented at trial. Quillen

initially designated an expert to testify regarding the “safety 

and condition of the vehicle” and whether it had been “repaired 

in a reasonable and safe manner.” When Quillen sought to 

change experts on the eve of trial and without enlisting the 

proper procedures for doing so, the court did not permit the 

substitute witness to offer expert testimony.

C. Statement of Decision

The court issued a detailed written statement of decision. 

With respect to the fraud claim, the court found that Oganesyan 

had made a misrepresentation in December 2015 “that the 

[vehicle] was safe to drive.” The court based its finding that 

the vehicle was not, in fact, safe to drive in December 2015 on 

(1) statements by employees at Big O Tires in 2017, as relayed 

to the court through Quillen’s testimony, and (2) the estimate of 

repair documents obtained at some point in April 2017 or later 

that reflected the vehicle was not safe to drive.
7

The court further found, however, that Quillen had “offered 

no evidence that . . . Oganesyan knew that his statement was 

false, or that he made the statement with the intent to defraud.” 

To the contrary, the court found “Oganesyan was credible when 

he testified that he did not know that the car was not safe.” The 

court further found that the Steve’s Muffler inspection report 

was a “reasonable bas[is] for . . . Oganesyan to rely upon when 

he made the false statement that the vehicle was safe to drive[,]”

and that “it was reasonable that . . . Oganesyan did not know 

that the [vehicle] was not safe to drive because it was not an 

obvious and readily discovered defect.”

The court found that Quillen “was not credible in 

his account of the business transaction with . . . Oganesyan” 

and specifically did not find credible Quillen’s testimony 

that Oganesyan had refused to permit Quillen to obtain an 

independent inspection.

As to the CLRA claim, the court ruled in Quillen’s favor. 

As it had in the context of the fraud claim, the court found 

Oganesyan had misrepresented that the vehicle was safe to drive,

which constituted a “deceptive act[ ] or practice[ ] in the sale of 

consumer goods” as required for a CLRA violation.

The court acknowledged that Oganesyan had disclosed to 

Quillen that the vehicle had frame damage, but concluded that 

“this true statement was made in circumstances that minimized 

the concern about . . . the vehicle’s safety to drive,” noting that 

Oganesyan had “offered misleading information about the vehicle 

with the CARFAX report showing no accident or frame damage” 
8

and initially telling Quillen “the vehicle was not in an accident 

and was in excellent condition.”4

Finally, as to the UCL cause of action, the court concluded 

that the CLRA violation Quillen had established constituted an

“unlawful . . . business practice[ ]” supporting the UCL claim. On 

this basis, it ruled in Quillen’s favor on the UCL claim as well. 

Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of Quillen 

and against Car City in the amount of $48,763.74, and awarded 

attorney fees to be established upon noticed motion, and costs 

pursuant to a proper memorandum of costs.5

Car City timely appealed the judgment.

DISCUSSION

Car City first argues that, in reaching its decision in 

Quillen’s favor on the CLRA and UCL claims, the court relied 

on two pieces of evidence that had been excluded as inadmissible 

hearsay: Quillen’s testimony regarding what Big O Tire 

employees told him in April 2017, and an estimate for repair 

reflecting the damage to the vehicle around that same time. 

Quillen counters that Car City cannot make this argument, 

because the record does not establish the trial court actually 

excluded this evidence. We need not decide whether Car City 

can establish that the trial court excluded the challenged

evidence and/or that the court erred in relying on it, however. 

4 As noted in the factual summary, Quillen testified 

that Oganesyan ultimately did disclose the car had been in 

an accident before Quillen purchased the vehicle. 

5 The court also ruled in Quillen’s favor on the cause 

of action against Chase Bank Finance, and awarded no relief 

against American Contractors Indemnity Company.
9

Even assuming the court properly relied on it, the record still 

does not contain substantial evidence to support all elements 

of the CLRA and UCL claims, as we explain further below. 

A. CLRA Claim

“The CLRA proscribes particular ‘unfair methods 

of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ 

in transactions for the sale or lease of goods or services to 

consumers. (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a); see Daugherty v. 

American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 

833.)” (Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 

249, 255 (Collins).) Deception is a necessary component of 

the conduct proscribed by the CLRA. (See Durell v. Sharp 

Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1367 [“ ‘plaintiffs in 

a CLRA action [must] show not only that a defendant’s conduct 

was deceptive’ ”]; see Civ. Code, § 1760 [CLRA’s “underlying 

purposes . . . are to protect consumers against unfair and 

deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and 

economical procedures to secure such protection”].) Although 

there is no statutory or case law definition of a “deceptive

practice” for these purposes, the statute lists numerous 

examples, including “[r]epresenting that goods . . . have . . . 

characteristics . . . [which] they do not have.” (Civ. Code, 

§ 1770, subd. (a)(5).) Courts have also deemed “the concealment 

or suppression of material facts” to be deceptive, based on 

principles of fraud. (See Collins, supra, at p. 255.) It follows 

that, under the CLRA, even if a representation is true, it 

may still be deceptive because “ ‘[a] perfectly true statement 

couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive 

the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant 

information, is actionable.’ [Citation.]” (Consumer Advocates v. 
10

Echostar Satellite Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1362; see

also Jones v. Credit Auto Center, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 

Supp. 1, 11.) 

The deceptive practice on which Quillen based his CLRA 

claim were Oganesyan’s statements that the vehicle was safe 

to drive and in good condition, which the court found were false, 

and Oganesyan’s informing Quillen about the frame damage in 

a manner the court found was misleading because it “minimized” 

the effect of the damage on the car’s safety. But in order for 

these statements to be false and misleading, it must be true 

that, in December 2015 when Oganesyan made them, the vehicle 

was not safe to drive as Oganesyan claimed and/or that the

frame damage was more extensive than Oganesyan led Quillen 

to believe. But no evidence in the record—not even the evidence 

Car City argues was excluded—supports either finding. Indeed, 

the only evidence in the record regarding the vehicle’s condition 

around December 2015 are the CARFAX report, AutoCheck 

report, and Steve’s Muffler inspection report, all of which indicate 

the vehicle was safe to drive. The estimates of repairs in the 

record and the hearsay testimony regarding what Big O Tires 

employees told Quillen speak to the condition of the vehicle in 

April 2017 or later. This is not substantial evidence establishing 

the condition of the vehicle two years and 14,000 miles earlier. 

Without substantial evidence that the vehicle was in any way 

unsafe to drive at the time Oganesyan made the challenged 

statements, the record does not support that Oganesyan’s 

statements to the contrary were false or misleading. (See 

Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(5) [deceptive business practice to 

“[r]epresent[ ] that goods . . . have . . . characteristics . . . [which]

they do not have,” italics added].) Nor can Oganesyan be found 
11

to have concealed or suppressed a fact if there is no evidence 

in the record supporting that fact. (See Collins, supra, 202

Cal.App.4th at p. 255 [conduct proscribed by CLRA includes

concealment of material fact “because fraud or deceit 

encompasses the suppression of a fact by one who is bound 

to disclose it, or the suppression of a fact that is contrary to

a representation that was made,” italics added]; Gutierrez v. 

Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 

1258 [“an omission is actionable under the CLRA if the omitted 

fact is (1) ‘contrary to a [material] representation actually made 

by the defendant’ or (2) is ‘a fact the defendant was obliged to 

disclose,’ ” italics added].)

Substantial evidence thus does not support a deceptive 

practice prohibited by the CLRA, and does not support the court’s 

ruling in Quillen’s favor on the CLRA claim.

6

B. UCL Claim

A UCL claim requires an “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent 

business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) The 

court ruled in Quillen’s favor on the UCL claim on the basis that 

Quillen had established Car City violated the CLRA, and thus 

had engaged in an “ ‘unlawful’ . . . business practice” that harmed 

Quillen. (See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles 

Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180; see ibid. [“[b]y 

proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200

6 Because we conclude substantial evidence does not 

support the judgment as to the CLRA claim on this basis, we 

need not address the parties’ arguments about whether the 

CLRA contains a scienter requirement necessitating proof the 

defendant knew a statement was false in order to establish a 

deceptive business practice based on a misrepresentation.
12

[the UCL] “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them 

as unlawful practices’ that the unfair competition law makes 

independently actionable”].) Because substantial evidence 

does not support the CLRA claim, it likewise does not support 

an “unlawful . . . business act or practice” under the UCL. 

(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) Nor can we uphold the judgment 

on the UCL claim on the basis that Oganesyan’s statements 

reflect a fraudulent business practice, as this would be 

inconsistent with the court’s unchallenged finding that Car 

City did not make a fraudulent statement. Finally, substantial 

evidence does not support that Oganesyan’s statements were 

“unfair” for the same reasons substantial evidence does not 

support that these statements were deceptive: The record does 

not reflect that there was anything about the state of the vehicle 

in December 2015 that Oganesyan misrepresented or failed to 

disclose to Quillen.

Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed to the extent 

it adjudicates the CLRA and UCL causes of action in Quillen’s 

favor.

C. Attorney Fees and Costs

Following our partial reversal, Quillen is no longer the 

prevailing party as against Car City on any cause of action, and 

the award of attorney fees and costs against Car City must be 

reversed as well. (See Merced County Taxpayers’ Assn. v. 

Cardella (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 [“[a]n order awarding 

costs falls with a reversal of the judgment on which it is based”].) 
13

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed as to the CLRA and UCL causes 

of action against Car City, and to the extent it entitles Quillen 

to collect attorney fees and costs from Car City. In all other 

respects, we affirm.

Appellant Car City is awarded its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WEINGART, J.