single incident of his arrest and detention. He cannot premise a municipal claim on this isolated

incident. Board of County Comm’r of Bryan County. Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-06, 117

S.Ct. 1382, 1389 (1997).

c. McHenry County and the McHenry County Sheriff

A county is not vicariously liable for its sheriffs conduct. Moy v. County of Cook, 640
N.E.2d 926, 928-30 (Ill. 1994). Panfil still has not alleged any actionable conduct on McHenry
County’s part in his third proposed complaint. Rather, he alleges actions taken by McHenry
County Sheriff office members. Second Am. Compl. at 98-10. As Sheriff, Nygren is warden of
McHenry County Jail, responsible for all personnel and programs, including medical treatment.

Id.; Freeman v. Fairman, 916 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill. 1996); 55 ILCS 5/3-15003(c). He is not

under McHenry County’s control. Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7 Cir.1995);
Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7" Cir.1989). Panfil’s claim is in reality against
Sheriff Nygren, not McHenry County.

Further, although Panfil attempts to sue Sheriff Nygren in his individual capacity, the
proposed second amended complaint does not allege any personal involvement on his behalf.

Stone-El v. Sheahan, 914 F. Supp. 202, 204-05 (NLD. Ill. 1995); Los v. Wardell, 771 F. Supp.

266, 269 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The proposed amendment is fatally defective.

D. Valid warrant, probable cause, and indefinite detention

There is no unconstitutional deprivation of liberty and no cognizable claim under § 1983
if Panfil was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant or probable cause. Baker v. McCollan, 443
US. 137, 143-44 (1979). Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within Ciesla’s

knowledge at the time were sufficient to support a prudent person’s belief that an offense

4.


accused named in a warrant are not required to investigate each protestation of innocence.
Baker, 443 U.S. at 146; Almeida , 1998 WL 781109, at *4. But the morning after he was
transferred to McHenry County Jail, Panfil was brought before a magistrate. Second Am. Compl.
at 8-9. He pleaded not guilty, and was released three days later by a McHenry County judge’s
order and “after investigation into his claims of innocence by ... McHenry County Jail.” Id.
These allegations continue to undermine Panfil’s detention without due process of law claim.
WL —-§ 1988 [Count IT]

Count III requests attorneys’ fees. As discussed above, Panfil has adequate state remedies
to pursue his claims of wrongful arrest and detention against Ciesla, and thus his federal due
process rights are satisfied. Further, Panfil again fails to state a § 1983 claim against defendants.
Count III is therefore futile because it incorporates by reference the defective allegations of
Counts I, adding a request for attorneys’ fees.

IV. State claims of wrongful arrest and detention [Count IV]
Because Panfil's federal claims are defective, the court declines to retain jurisdiction over

his pendent state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).


remedies are available. Hood v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 312, 314 (7" Cir. 1991); Guenther v.

Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 882 (7 Cir. 1984); Weber v. Village of Hanover Park, 768 F. Supp.

630, 635 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Baltz v. Shelley, 661 F. Supp. 169, 181 (N.D. Ill. 1987). Panfil’s
§1983 due process allegations form the basis for his pendent state claims of wrongful arrest and
detention. Second Am. Compl. at f{]1-17, 20-22. Because he has not shown that state remedies
for his §1983 due process claims are inadequate, Panfil’s proposed second amended complaint is
deficient.

B. Municipal liability against the city, McHenry County, or
McHenry County Sheriff Nygren

To state a §1983 claim against the city, McHenry County, or McHenry County Sheriff,
Panfil must plead that his constitutional injury resulted from a municipal policy. Monell v. New

York City Dep’t of Soe. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). To do this, he must allege either that

these defendants had “a widespread practice” that, although not authorized by written law or
express municipal policy, was so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a “custom or usage”
with the force of law. McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7" Cir. 1995). Panfil now
alleges:

The fact that no police officer or other municipal employee was required to

identify the plaintiff, Daniel Panfil, using fingerprints or any other conclusive

form of identification, yet he was detained for a prolonged period of time,

supports his allegation that a widespread governmental or public practice or policy

of both the McHenry County Sheriff and the City of Chicago resulted in the

violation [of his rights].
Second Am. Compl. at §15. Defendants argue Panfil fails to plead a specific custom, policy or

practice on their part. Panfil has not even alleged the boilerplate for a municipal policy claim.

Instead, he alleges a policy should have been in place to verify his identity. Panfil alleges only the

3.


occurred. Edwards v. Cabrera, 58 F.3d 290, 291 (7" Cir.1995);see Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949,
953 (7" Cir.1999), An arrest is not unconstitutional if the information Ciesla relied upon later
proves erroneous; reasonable mistakes are permitted. McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183 (Cn
Cir.1984); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). Panfil was arrested on a valid
warrant. He cannot maintain his § 1983 claims unless Ciesla lacked probable cause to arrest him
despite the warrant. Myatt v. City of Chicago, 816 F. Supp. 1259, 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Panfil
again fails to plead a lack of probable cause.

Daniel Panfil was arrested on a warrant issued for his brother, Dale Panfil. But “aliases
and false identifications are not uncommon.” Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803
(1971);Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 ( th Cir, 1987). Although Panfil now alleges he
told Ciesla he was not the person named in the warrant; produced his driver’s license; and his
father, who was present, informed Ciesla he had the wrong person, defendants’ arrest and
detention of Panfil pursuant to the valid warrant remains reasonable. Second Am. Compl. at {{]3-
5. Daniel Panfil and his brother, Dale Panfil, have similar first names, the same last name, and
are the same gender and race. Panfil acknowledged in his responses to defendants’ motions to

dismiss that he matched the physical description in the warrant. Ciesla acted reasonably by

taking him in for further investigation. Brown, 823 F.2d at 169. Because Panfil was in a car, it
might have taken a long time to find him again if he were the person named in the warrant.
Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 699 (7" Cir.1987).

Further, law enforcement personnel do not have a constitutional duty to “investigate
independently every claim of innocence” or “perform an error-free investigation.” Baker, 443

U.S. at 146; Almeida v. Sheahan, No. 98 C 1550, 1998 WL 781109, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4,

5.


CONCLUSION

The motion to amend the complaint a third time is denied as futile.

ENTER:

a”, B. Conlon

United States District Judge

July 20, 2001


Mhnnte Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Iinois

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices

Mail AO 450 form,

Copy to judge/magisteate judge. e Penk BOCAETING

GI JUL 20 Pit G 12

courtroom
deputy’s

Name of Assigned Judge ann Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Su  B. Conlon than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 00 C 8011 DATE 7/20/2001
CASE PANFIL vs. CITY OF CHICAGO, ET. AL.,
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.8., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
D :
DOCKET ENTRY:
rap) im) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
Q) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) 0 Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(or) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Qa [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
OOFRCP4(¢m) 1 General Rule 21 Orrcp4i(ay) O FRCP4i(a)(2).
co) i [Other docket entry] Plaintiff Daniel Panfil’s request for leave to file a second amended complaint
[20-1] is denied. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.
dl) ff {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. somber of notices :
V_| Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

UL .2..3..2001

7072001

date mailed notice

pe

initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office

‘mailing deputy initials



1998). Hernandez v. City of Chicago, No. 99 C 6441, 2001 WL 128246 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2001),
does not change this. Hernandez states a police officer cannot ignore information he discovered
that reveals his mistake and then not promptly release the arrestee from custody. In Hernandez
the plaintiff, Emiliano Hernandez, was arrested for traffic violations. Jd. at *1. He was taken into
custody and processed under his name. Jd. Because of a warrant for Enrique Hernandez, who
had the same birthday and similar physical features to Emiliano, the officers held Emiliano, /d.
Emiliano alleged in his complaint he protested he was not Enrique and his family came to the
police station with copies of his passport, social security card, and resident alien card to prove
this. Id. at *4. His family brought more documentation that night. Jd. at *1. The court found the
officers should have known there was lack of probable cause for the hold. Jd. at *4. Panfil’s
allegations that he and his father protested his innocence, he produced his license, and nothing
else he produced showed he was his brother Dale, do not bring him within the purview of
Hernandez.

A §1983 claim may be brought for an extended detention on the basis of
misidentification. Johnson v. Chicago, 711 F. Supp. 1465, 1469-70 (N.D. IIL. 1989); Almeida,
1998 WL 781109, at *4-5. At the very least, a detention period exceeding three days and

repeated claims of innocence is required to sustain such a claim. Jd.; Baker, 443 U.S. at 144-45

(three days over holiday weekend insufficient). Panfil again alleges he protested innocence, but
the city held him at most two days before transferring him to McHenry County’s custody.
Second Am. Compl. at {2-7. This is insufficient to sustain his §1983 claims.

Panfil also alleges he protested innocence to McHenry County and Sheriff Nygren and

they held him over three days before releasing him. Jd. at {J 7-9. Officials in custody of the

-6-


POCKETED

JUL 23 2008

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
‘FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
PANFIL )
Plaintiff, } No.00 C 8011
v. } Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
CITY OF CHICAGO, ET. AL., }
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Daniel Panfil requests leave to file a second amended complaint against the City of Chicago
(“the city”), Gerald Ciesla, individually and in his representative capacity as a Chicago police officer,
Keith Nygren, individually and in his capacity as the Sheriff of McHenry County, and the County
of McHenry (collectively “defendants”). In Counts I-Il, Panfil sues defendants for civil rights
violations by depriving him of his liberty without due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count
lis against all defendants and Count Il is against Ciesla. In Count Ill, Panfil sues defendants for
recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Count IV, Panfil sues
defendants for pendent state claims of wrongful arrest and detention. With one exception, on May
23 and 25, 2001, this court dismissed Panfil’s constitutional claims in his amended complaint
without prejudice and declined to retain jurisdiction over his state law claims.!

The court dismissed Panfil’s claims against Ciesla because he had adequate state remedies

to pursue his claims of wrongful arrest and detention, satisfying his federal due process claims. With

| panfil’s claims under the Fifth Amendment were dismissed with prejudice.

“1+

X


regard to the city, McHenry County and the McHenry County Sheriff, Panfil failed to plead his
constitutional injury resulted from a municipal policy. McHenry County was also dismissed as a
defendant because Panfil did not allege any cognizable conduct on its part. Finally, Panfil did not
allege defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him; that the city detained him for a
period exceeding three days despite repeated protests of innocence; or that McHenry County and
Sheriff Nygren held him without due process oflaw. Defendants object to Panfil’s request for leave
to file a second amended complaint because he has failed to remedy the defects in his first amended
complaint.

DISCUSSION

I Motion for leave to file an amended complaint standard

A plaintiff may amend his complaint after a responsive pleading is served only by leave
of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Leave is freely given when “justice so requires.” Jd. But this rule is
not absolute. Glick v. Koenig, 766 F.2d 265, 268 (7" Cir.1985). Ifthe proposed amendment does
not cure the complaint’s deficiencies, there is no abuse of discretion if the amendment is denied.
Id. The liberal amendment policy does not require that “a court engage in futile gestures.” Shell

Oil Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur, Co., 158 F.R.D. 395, 403 (7® Cir, 1994); see Perrian v. O’Grady,

958 F.2d 192, 193 (7" Cir. 1992). Whether an amendment to the complaint should be allowed

rests in the sound discretion of the court. Jones v. Hamelman, 869 F.2d 1023, 1026 (7" Cir.

1989).
i. § 1983 [Count I-Il]
A. Ciesla

A due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest is not stated if adequate state law

-2-