further exacerbated by FFE'S failure (albeit nonjurisdictional)
to conform to the requirement of Section 1446(a) that all served
defendants must join in any removal,? this action is sua sponte
remanded to the Circuit Court as directed by Section 1447(c).
And as authorized by this District Court's LR 81.2(b), the Clerk

ef Court is directed to mail the certified copy of the remand

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

order forthwith.

Date: April 15, 2002

2 Alternatively, a notice that provides an explanation of a
defendant's excusable absence may do the job (see Roe).

3


United States District Court, Northern District of Hlinois i

jam signed Judge 7 Sitting Judge if Other
sige Magistrate Judge Milton I. Shadur than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 2585 DATE 4/15/2002
CASE Helmut Judt vs. Phillip Robertson, et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) QO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___.
(4) i] Ruling/Hearingon_ set for__—_aat :
(5) i} Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___——s set for__— sat

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor___—at__.

(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on ___—__sat

(8) (a) [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__—__at

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) (€) General Rule21 CIFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) =f (Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Order. Accordingly, because from the flawed nature of
the notice “it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction” (Section 1447(c)), and
because here that defect is further exacerbated by FFE’s failure to conform to the requirement of Section
1446(a) that all served defendants must join in any removal, this action is sua sponte remanded to the
Circuit Court. And as authorized by this District Court’s LR 81.2(b), the Clerk is directed to mail the
certified copy of the remand order forthwith.

al [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

Document
Number

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required,

umber of notices

16 20g9

date docketed

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

v | Docketing to mail notices.
VY | Mail A0 450 form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. yuna

fr eputy initials

‘courtroom Lon th
SN deputy’s Op: Kd
initials

Date/time received in
central-Clerk’s-Office’

mailing deputy initials



iad

a”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETEp

APR 1 6 2002

HELMUT JUDT,

Plaintiff,

)
}
v. No. 02 C 2585 DOCKrr-~
)
)
)

PHILLIP ROBERTSON, et al., APR 4 6;
* 9 duuy
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
FFE Transportation Services, Inc. (“FFE”) has filed what it
labels “Defendant's Notice for Removal” (“Notice”)! to bring this

action from the Circuit Court of Cook County to this federal
court. Because FFE's counsel have failed to establish the
requisite diversity of citizenship (the asserted basis for
removal) and because the Notice is otherwise defective, this
memorandum order is being issued sua sponte to remand this action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In that respect, although Notice 5 properly identifies both
of FFE's states of citizenship in accordance with Section
1332(¢) (1), Notice 94 and 6 speak only of the residences and not

the states of citizenship of plaintiff Helmut Judt and co-

1 As 28 U.S.C. §1446(a) and other portions of the removal
statutes reflect, the correct term is really “notice of removal.”
FFE's counsel's mistake in that respect is no doubt attributable
to the statutory change nearly 15 years ago from the old
“petition for removal” label to the current term--a surmise that
seems to be confirmed by the opening paragraph of the Notice, in
which FFE's counsel mistakenly “petition for this action...to be
removed....” Incidentally, all further references to Title 28
provisions will simply take the form “Section --.”


defendant Phillip Robertson (“Robertson”). As taught by Held v.
Held, 137 F.3d 998, 1000 (7 Cir. 1998), quoting Guaranty Nat'1

Title Co. v. J.BE.G. Assocs., 101 F.3d 57, 59 (7 Cir. 1996):

Of course, allegations of residence are insufficient to

establish diversity jurisdiction. It is well-settled

that “[w]hen the parties allege residence but not

citizenship, the court must dismiss the suit.”

In the instance of a removed action, of course, the appropriate
order is not such a dismissal, but rather the remand of the
action to the state court pursuant to Section 1447(c).

If what has been pointed out in the preceding paragraph were
the only problematic aspect of the Notice, this Court would be
disinclined to impose an additional $150 filing fee obligation on
FFE, because it would seem likely that the just-identified defect
may be curable (it is after all most common for an individual's
states of residence and citizenship to coincide, though that is
not always the case). In most cases, then, this Court tempers
the Held-Guaranty Nat'l directive by granting a limited-time
opportunity to file a curative submission. But in this instance
FFE has committed still another error: It impermissibly acted
alone, for the Notice has neither been joined in by Robertson nor
has any explanation been given for his absence (see Roe v.
Q'Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1994)).

Accordingly, because from the flawed nature of the Notice

“it appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction” (Section 1447(c)), and because here that defect is