### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Fe br ua ry 6, 200 6 S es sio n
JAME S TORRENCE , ET AL 

### . v. THE H IGGINS FA MILY LIMITE D

PARTNERSHI P, ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for P olk Coun ty No. 7101 Jer ri S. Bryant, Chancellor

No. E2005-1549-COA- R3-CV - F ILED APR IL 28, 2006

Jame s T or

re nc e a ndJ.T. L e mon s ( “ the plaint if fs ” ) w e re le sse e s of a fo ur -a c re tr a c t of la ndin P olk County . During the orig inal term of the le ase, their lessor transfe rre d acr eag e, which includes the four a c r e s u n d e r le a s e , to a f a mi ly p ar tn e r s h ip , T h e H ig g in s F a mi ly L im it e d Pa r tn e r s hip (“the Hig g ins Family ”). D uring an extended term of t he plainti ffs’ lease, the Hig g ins Family , without the consent or know ledg e of the plaintiffs, g rante d Hunter Properties I nc., an option to purc hase a 370-
acr e tra ct – which includes the four acr es – for $1,350,000. Upon subsequent written notice of the option to the pl aintiffs by the Higg ins Fa mily , the l essee s attempted to ex erc ise a rig ht of first re fusal set forth in their lea se. The right of first re fu s al provides that “[s]houl d the L andlord, during the lease term, or a ny

extended term, ele ct to sell all or any portion of the L ease d Property , the Tena nt shall have the rig ht of first re fusal to meet a ny bona fide offe r of sa le on th e s am e t erms and conditions of such offe r.” The plaintiffs a ssert that the rig ht of first re fusal extends to the entire 370-
acr e tra ct. The H igg ins Family ref used to sell the lessee s the property and this suit followed. The tr ia l c ou rt he ld that th e le sse e s ha d p ro pe rl y e xer c ise d th e ir

ri g ht o f f ir st r e fu sa l a ndwe re e nti tle d to pu rc ha se the pr op e rt y

fo r $ 1, 35 0, 00 0. Hu nte r P ro pe rt ie s f ile d a no tic e of app e a l a nda ll p art ie s r a ise iss ue s. We a ff

ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed; Case R em anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.

J ames T. Williams and Robert F. Parsle y , Chattanoog a, Te nnesse e, fo r t he appe llant, Hunter Properties, Inc.

Jame s F . L og a n, Jr., Cle ve la nd , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lle e s, Jame s T or re nc e a ndJ.T. L e mon s.-2-

H. Chri s T rew , Athens, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellees, The Hig g ins Family L imited Partnership, Ke nn e th D . H ig g ins , Jr. , a ndJane Hi g g ins El lio tt.

OP IN ION

I.

On Ma rc h 1 , 1 98 9, Jane Web b Hi g g ins le a se d to the plaint if fs a fo ur -a c re tr a c t of

pr op e rt y fo r a pe ri odof thr e e y e ars . T hepr e mis e s w e re de sc ri be d in the le a se a g re e me nt a s f oll ow s: That prope rty located at or near the intersec tion of U.S

. Hig hway #64 and Matlock Valley Road (B enton-Parksville Road) toge ther with the improvements located the reon w hich ar e now be ing use d by the Tena nt as a service station, deli, danc e pavilion , whitewate r ra fting business (in the old motel) and an overnig ht camping fac ility(Sug ar L oaf Campg round), whic h property consists of an ar ea that is to be marke d by

boundary stakes by

the L andlord a nd Tena nt, here inafter called the “L ease d Property ”.

The lea se conta ins the following pe rtinent provision:

Tena n t ’s Op tion to P urcha se – Right of First Refusa l. Should t he L a nd lor d, du ri ng the le a se te rm , or a ny e xten de d te rm , e le c t to se ll a ll
or any portion of the L ease d Property , the Tenant shall have the right of first refusal to meet any bona fide offer of sale on the same terms and conditions of such offer . Upon the Te nant’s failure to meet such b o n a f id e o f f e r , w ith in th irty ( 3 0 ) d a y s a f te r n o ti c e th e r e o f from the L a nd lor d, the L a nd lor d s ha ll b e fr e e to s e ll theL e a se d P rop ert yto such third per son in acc ordanc e with t he terms and conditions of such offe r. (Unde rlining in orig inal; e mphasis a dded). The lease term wa s ext ended on mor e than one occa sion, with the last ext ension being throug h Dec ember 31, 2003.

I n M arc h, 19 98 , th e plaint if fs ’ l e sso r, Jane Web b H ig g ins , transfe rredhe r i nte re st i n ap p r o x i m a t e l y 2 1 0 a c r e s o f r e a l e s t a t e

–w h i c h i n c l u d e d t h e l e a s e d p r o p e r t y –t o t h e H i g g i n s F a m i l y. The pa rtners of the Hig g ins Family

wer e Mrs. Hig g ins’ children, Kenne th D

. Hig g ins, J r., and Jane Hig g ins Elliot t. The childre n owned a n additional 160-ac re tra ct of land ad jace nt to the 210-ac re pa rc e l.

I n 2002, the Hig g ins Fa mily decide d to marke t the combined 370- acr e par cel of property for
sa le . O n A pril 8 , 2 00 3, the Hi g g ins F a mil y , d uring the te rm of the la st exte ns ion of

the plaint if

fs ’ lease , enter ed into an option ag ree ment (“the option ag ree ment”) w ith Hunter P roperties, g ranting-3-

it the op tio n to pu rc ha se the 37 0- a c re tr a c t f or $1 ,3 50 ,0 00 . T he plain tif fs we re no t pa

rt ie s to thi s option and wer e not awar e that the Hig g ins Family intended to g rant it. The option ag ree ment states that the option will rema in in eff ect f or four months at no charg e to Hunter Properties. The option ag ree ment further

provides that Hunter

Properties is g rante d the rig ht to ex tend the option for two additional four- month periods, upon pay ment of $10,000 for eac h extension.
On April 16, 2003, the Hig g ins Family provided the plaintiffs with a written “Notice of Bona F ide Of fe r o f P ur c ha se ,” wh ic h s ta te s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
Pursuant to numerica l twenty (20) of the orig inal lease ag ree ment by
an d b et wee n J ANE WEBB HI GGINS as “landlord” and JAMES TORRENCE AND J.T. L EMONS, as “te nant” dated Marc h 1, 1989, and the extensions of t he term of t hat l ease enter ed int o there afte r, the lan dlo rdhe re by

g ive s n o ti c e to th e te n a n t o f a b o n a fi de o

ff e r of pu rc ha se of t

he prop e rty pre se ntl

y le as e d b y te na nt. The propert y p resently

under le ase to tena nt is onlya portion of the property upon which the of

fer to purcha se has bee n rec eived, but the of fe r i n f a c t, e nc omp a sse s a ll o f the pr op e rt y pr e se ntl y

leased to te na nt.

The owne rs of a ll the p ro p er ty have e lected to a cce pt the bona fide of fer andse ll a ll o f this pr op e rt y , in c lud ing the po rt ion pr e se ntl y le a se d to the te na nt.

Un de r n ume ri c a l pa

ra g ra ph tw e nty

(2 0) of the orig ina l lease mentioned above , the landlord here by g ives notice to the tenant of the
rec eipt of the bona fide offe r and the elec tion of the l an d l o rd and
owner s to acc ept such off er.
The off er is in fe e simpl e fo r certain parc els or tra cts of land, containing 370 acr es more or less, situated in Polk County , (B enton), Te nn e sse e . T he c on sid e ratio n f or the op tio n is tha t the pu rc ha se r i s g rante d four ( 4) months at no cost within whic h to e x erc ise the option to p ur c ha se , th e n if the op tio n ha s no t be e n e xer c ise d wi thi n the fi rs t four month period of time, the purcha ser s h al l p ay Ten Thousa nd dollar s ( $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 ) f

o r a n a d d it io n a l f

o u r mo n tho p ti o n a n d if

n ot exercised within that period of time, the purcha ser sh all pay an additional Ten Thousa nd dollars ($10,000) f or an a dditional four
mon th o pti on . I f the op tio n to pu rc ha se is i n fa c t e xer c ise d a ny su ms p aid mentioned her ein ar e applied a s a cr edit toward the entire purcha se price at the c losing. I f the purc haser exercises the option, the tot a l pric e to the pa id i s O ne Millio n T hr e e Hu nd re d F if ty-4- Thousand dollars ( $1,350,000) pay able at the closing . There are a dd iti on a l te rm s se t f

orth i n th e of

fe r t o p ur c ha se re g ard ing no tic e s, d e f au l t , o w n e r ’ s w arr a n t i e s , a s s i g n m e n t , d a m a g e t o p r o p e r t y, s u r v e y, availability

of utiliti es, closing , rec ording of o p t ion, parties bound,
c on de mnatio n, ins pe c tio n a ndtit le , w hic h th e la nd lor d w i l l s h are wi th the tenant if r equeste d.

Pur su a nt t o n ume ri c a l pa ra g ra ph tw e nty

(20) of the orig ina l le a se m en t i oned above , this shall be dee med notice to tenant of tenant’s right of first refusal to mee t all terms of the bona fide offer mentioned herein withi n thirty ( 30) days of this no tice . I f tena nt does not exercise its rig ht of first re fusal, the landlor d is free to sell the leased pr op e rt y to the thi rdpe rs on ha vin g se t f orth the bo na fid e of

fe r t o purcha se in ac corda nce w ith the terms and conditions of such of fer

. (Capitalization in original; emphasis adde d).
On May 13, 2003, within 30 day s of the rec eipt of the notice, the plaintiffs sent a letter (“the L e tte r” ) t o th e Hi g g ins F a mil y ind ic a tin g that th e y

we re e xer c isi ng the ir

ri g ht o f f ir st r e fu sa l:

Re : No tic e of

Exe rcise of

Rig ht o f F ir st R e fu sa l un de r L e a se Dated Marc h 1, 1989 (the “L ease ”) by and betwe en T he Hi g g ins F a mil y

L imi te d Pa

rt ne rs hip (s uc c e sso r- in- int e re st t o the intere sts of J ane Webb Hig g ins, d ec ea s ed) ( “L andlord” ) and J.T. L emons and James Torre nce ( collective ly , the “Te nant”)

D e ar K e n n y [H ig g in s ], The undersig ned, as Tena nt under the above- ref ere nced L ease , does here by provide its notice that it is ex erc ising its Right of First Refusal under Par ag raph 20 of

the L ease in acc ord with L andlord’s Notice of Bona Fide Offe r Of Purchase dated April 16, 2003 (the “L andlord’s Of fe r N oti c e ” ) w ith re sp e c t to 37 0 + a c re s lo c ate d in B e nto n, Pol k County , Tenne ssee (t he “Prope rty ”) w hich Property includes the lease d premises of approximately 4 + ac res a nd approximately 366 +
acr es of a dditional land.

The Te nant does he reby

reque st all in fo rm at ion with respec t to the offe r (the “ Offe r”) that is set forth in the L andlord’s O ffe r Notice , inc lud ing bu t no t lim ite d to i nf orma tio n r e g ard ing the op tio n th a t is par t o f th e O f

f e r

. Pu r s u a n t to th e te r ms o f th e O f f e r s e t f orth in the L a nd lor d’ s O ff

e r N oti c e , the Ten a nt i s p re pa re d to a ndde sir e s to-5- enter into ag ree ments with the L andlord on the te rms of t he Of fer set forth in the L andlord’s O ffe r Notice

. Please ex ecute a copy of t his letter where indicated below sig nify ing L a nd lor d’ s a c kn ow le dg me nt o f the e xerc is e of the Rig ht o f F ir st Re fu sa l by

the Te na nt andL a nd lor d’ s a c kn ow le dg me nt o f the ri g hts of the Te nant to pur chase the Property acc ording to the terms of the Offe r set forth i n the L andlord’s O ffe r [N] otice upon execution of
app ro pria te do c ume ntatio n. Th a nk y ou fo r y ou r atte nti on to this matter.

S i n c e r e l y,

Tena nt

/s/ J .T. L emons
/s/ J ames Tor

renc e As a pa rt of the tra ns m ittal to the Higg ins family , the plaintiffs included a separ ate unsig ned do c ume nt ( “ the a c kn ow le dg me nt d oc ume nt” ), so lic iti ng the a c kn ow le dg me nt of the Hi g g ins F a mil y a s f oll ow s:
The unde rsig ned, as L andlord unde r t he L ease , does hereby ratify and
a ff ir m th e te rm s of the L e a se , ac kn ow le dg e s tha t the L e a se is i n f ull forc e and e ffe ct, ac k n o wl ed ges the L ease shall remain in full for ce and eff ect ( provided Te nant continues the pay ments of re nt and perf ormanc e of Te nant’s oblig ations under the L ease ) for the period that th e Of

fe r s e t f orth i n th e L and lor d’ s O ff e r N oti c e sh a ll r e ma in
ou tst a nd ing a nda c kn ow le dg e s th e ri g hts of the Te na nt to p ur c ha se the Pr op e rt y un de r a nd a c c or din g to the te rm s of the Of fe r se t f orth i n the L andlord’s O ffe r Notice. The undersig ned, as L andlord under the L e a se , d oe s h e re by

a c kn ow le dg e that th e ri g hts of the Te na nt t o purcha se the Property

shall have priority over any other purc haser and shall conti n u e for the time parame ters set forth in the Offe r. The
un de rs ig ne d f

urthe r a g re e s th a t th e Te na nt m a y re c or d a c op y of thi s le tte r ( or a sim ila r d ocu ment

in r e c or da

ble fo rm ) i n th e app ro pria te deed r ecor ding of

fice s to evidence Tena nt’s rig hts to pur chase the Property and the unde rsig ned ag ree s to promptly(within three ( 3) day s of Tenant’s reque st) execute a r ecor dable doc ument to such eff ect if r equeste d to do so by the Tenant. Ex ecute d this ___ day of May , 2003.-6-

The f o ll o w in g d a y , o n M a y 1 4 , 2 0 0 3 , a n a tt o r n e y f o r th e p lain ti f

f s f a xe d to the Hig g ins Fa milya conf

irmation that the plaintiffs wer e exercising their rig ht of first ref usal. Two we eks later , c ou ns e l f or the Hi g g ins F a mil y

se nt a le tte r t o th e plaint if

fs , inf ormin g the m that the Hi g g ins F a mil y would not acc ept the plaintiffs’ “ offe r,” c ontending that the pl aintiffs “did not exercise the rig ht of first ref usal in a proper and timely manner ” in that it added “ a material and substantial cha ng e to the offe r re ceive d from Hunter Properties,” i.e. , it

“ inc lud e d a n ex ten sion o f the te rm of the L e a se bey ond its curre nt expi ration of De cembe r 31, 2003,” and, acc ording ly , the “of fer ” wa s not “on the same terms and conditions of t he offer of Hunter Prope rties.” The letter then pr ocee ded to inform the plaint if

fs that th e Hi g g ins F a mil y int e nd e d to se ll the e nti re 37 0- a c re tr a c t to Hu nte r P ro pe rt ie s. T h e f o l l o w i n g w e e k , t h e p l a i n t i f f s ’ t h e n

- a t t o r n e y s e n ta

l e t t e r t o t h e a t t o r n e y f

o r t h e H i g g i n s F a m i l y, informing him that the plaintiffs “ar e dead serious about purc hasing the Hig g ins Family property .”
The Hig g ins Family

extended the t erm of Hunter Properties’ option on Aug ust 7, 2003, and ag ain on Dec ember

8, 2003, when, on both occ asions, Hunter Prope rties paid it $10,000.

On Marc h 5, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a co m p l ai n t in the trial court a g ainst the Hig g ins Fa milyand Hunter

Properties, see king a determination as t o the respective rights of the parties to the 3 7 0 ac re s at issue and, a lternatively , “to re cover damag es ag ainst . . . Hunter Prope rties . . . for procuring a

brea ch of c ontrac t and/or [to recove r dama g es aga i n s t t he Hig g ins Family ] for brea ch of contra ct.” I n addition, the plaintiffs deposited $20,000 with the cler k of court, and asserted that they wer e doing so to indicate “the ir willingne ss and desire to cl o s e the purc hase of the subject property at the stated pur chase price ” of $1,350,000.

After filing a nswers a nd counter claims, Hunter Prope rties and the H igg ins Family eac h filed a motion for partial summary judgme nt, claiming that t h e p l ai n t i ffs had “no rig ht to purchase the pr op e rt y a t is su e ,” du e to the plaint if fs ’ a lle g e d f

a ilu re to p ro pe rl y

e xer c ise the ir

ri g ht o f f ir st r e fu sa l. The plaintiffs then f

iled their own motion for partial summary judgme nt, contending that they wer e, in f a c t, e nti tle d to pu rc ha se the 37 0 a c re s.
On Fe bruary

15, 2005, the trial court en t ered an orde r g ranting the plaintiff’s motion for pa rt ia l su mma

ry jud g me nt, statin g , in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

T h e m at t eri s b ef

o re t h e C o u rt es s en t i al l y

o n s t i p u l at ed fa ct s

. T h o u gh the parties may

have dif fer ence s on certain fac tual issues, the parties
announce d in open Court that it is the opinion of ea ch party that the materia l and nec essary

fac ts for dispositi on of the Motions for Partial Summary J udg ment are undisputed. Specifica lly the par ties stipulated and ac knowl edge the authenticity of the following do c ume nts

. 1. Th e L e a s e o f

t h e p l a i n t i f

f s w h i c h c o n t a i n e d a

R i g h to f F i r st Refusal is as set f

orth in Parag raph 20 of

said L ease

. . . .-7- 2. A St a n d ar d O p ti o n A g r e e me n t w h ic h w a s e n te r e d in to betwee n [t he Hig g ins Family ] and [ Hunter Prope rties] on April 8, 2003, . .

. . 3. The Noti ce o f Bona Fide Offe r of pur chase from [the Hig g ins Fa mily ] t o the plaintiffs which w as mailed on April 16, 2003, . . . .

4. T h e letter dated May

2003 bearing the signature of the plaintiffs which wa s returne d to [t he Higg ins Fa mily ] in a ti mely manner

. . . . There was acc ompany ing the two signe d pag es an a cknowledg ment of re ceipt form . . . . 5. Counsel for the plaintiffs r eturne d via telef ax

. . . a fa x letter dated May 14, 2003 . . . .

6. The next written communication betwee n the parties is the letter of counse l for [the Hig g ins Family ] which is dated May 30, 2003, . .

. .
7. Pla int if

fs ’ c ou ns e l’ s le tte r of June 5, 20 03 c on sti tut e d th e re sp on se of [the plaintiffs] . . . .

* * *

The Court further a nnounced that the contra ct bein g t he L ease s and th e l et t er s involved in this m atter a re unambiguous. The Court fu rthe r ann ou nc e d th a t th e fi rs t tw o pa g e s of [the plaint if

fs ’ l e tte r t o the Hig g ins F amily dated May 13, 2003] wa s a sig ned ac cepta nce by the plaintiffs, and [the attac hed ac knowledg ment document] was not a condition pre cede nt to acc eptanc e of the Right of F irst Refusal and [that do c ume nt], a t th e mos t, m a y ha ve been an of

fe r o n a se pa rate pa rt or se pa rate iss ue that e xiste d b e tw e e n th e pa rt ies bu t w a s n ot a condition prec edent. The contra ct with the lease and the Rig ht of F ir st Re fu sa l wh ic h wa s a c c e pte d un c on dit ion a lly by the plaint if fs in this case is enf

orce able a nd their Motion for Partial Summary Judg me nt i s g rante d. Th e plaint if fs sh a ll b e e nti tle d to pur c ha se thi s p r o p e r ty a t th e p r ic e n e g o ti a te d b y [H u n te r Pr o p e r ti e s ].

On J une 10, 2005, the tria l court ente red a n order , pursuant t o T enn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, s tating that the prim ary issue in the case centere d on the pl aintiffs’ right to purcha se t he subj ect property and that the re wa s “ no jus t r e a so n f or de la y of e ntry of fi na l ju dg me nt o n th is i ssu e .” F ro m th is j ud g me nt, Hunter Prope rties filed a

notice of a

ppeal.-8- II.

I n d e c idi ng wh e the r a

g rant of su mma

ry jud g me nt is app ro pria te , c ou rt s are to de te rm ine “ if t h e pleadings, de positions, answers to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the
a ff ida vit s, if a ny , s ho w that th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to a ny ma te ri a l fa c t and that the mov ing pa rt y is entitled to a judgmen t as a matter of la w.” Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56.04. I n this case, the pa rties
announce d to the trial court that “the mate rial and ne cessa ry fac ts for disposition of the Motions for Partial Summary

J udg ment are undisputed.”

Sin c e a mot ion fo r sum mary

jud g me nt p re se nts a

pu re qu e sti on of

la w, ou r r e vie w i s de novo on the re cord of

the proc eeding s below with no presumption of cor rec tness as to the trial court’s judgme nt. Gonzales v. Alm an Con str. Co. , 857 S.W .2d 42, 44-45 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1993).

III

. The plaintiffs, by

way of a motion to dismis s this appeal, cha lleng e the r i g ht of Hunter Properties to ra ise issues reg arding the propriety of t he trial court’s action. The plainti ffs point out that the tri al co u rt ’s order require d the Hig g ins Family to convey

the subject prope rty

to the plaintiffs; thus, accor ding to the pla intiffs, the Hi ggi n s Fa milyis an “indispensable party ” to an appea l challeng ing the propriety of that dec ision. Bec ause, s o t h e arg ument g oes, the Hig g ins F a mil y , a n “ ind isp e ns able pa rt y ,” didno t f

ile a no tic e of app e a l, Hun ter P rop e rt ie s c a nn ot r a ise issues that directly

bear upon the rig hts of an indispensable pa rty . I n es s en ce , t h e p laintiffs are contending that, befor e Hunter Properties could raise these i ssues, the Higg ins Fa mily had to pursue an appe al by

way of a se parate notice of

appea l.
The plaintiffs’ arg ument is bottomed on a false premise – that an ag g rieve d party , here the Hi g g ins Fam il y , mus t f

ile a no tic e of app e a l be fo re iss ue s p e rt a ini ng to i t c a n b e raise d. Th is i s simply no t tr ue . U nd e r T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (e ), “ [a]n app e a l a s o f rig ht to the

. . . Co urt of Ap pe a ls

. . . s ha ll b e take n b y

tim e ly fi lin g a no tic e of app e a l with the c le rk of the tr ia l cou rt

. . . . ” Th e tim e ly f i l i n g o f a n o t i c e o f ap p e a l , b y any party

involved in the trial court l i t i gat i on, vests the Court of Appea ls with jurisdi ction to hear and resolve a ll issues thereaf ter raised, not only

the issues raise d by t h e p ar t y filing the notice of a ppeal but also the issues r aised by any other pa rty ag g rieve d by
some ac tion of the trial court. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(a). In Dunlap v. Dun lap , 996 S.W .2d 803 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 8 ), we s t at ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:
As a g ener al rule, a p ar ty to a n a pp e al may p r e s e n t a n y q u e s ti o n of law for this court’s re view. Rule 13(a ) g overns this court’ s scope of
re vie w a ndpr ov ide s tha t, “ [e]xc e pt a s o the rw ise pr ov ide d in Rul e 3(e) [addressing waiver

of ce rtain issues in jury trials], any question of law ma y

be broug ht up for rev i ew an d relief by any party .” T.R.A.P

. 1 3 (a ). I n its comment on rule 13(a ), the a dvisory commission ex plained that-9- this subdivi sion rejec ts use of the notice of appe al as
a re view-limiting de vice. In fe d er al practice the
n o tice of a

ppeal ha s limi ted re view in two principa l way s. Some courts have lim i t ed t he questions an appellant may

urg e on re view to t h o s e af fec ting the port i o n of the judg ment specifie d in the notice of appeal

. Howeve r, since the principal utilityof the notice of a

ppeal is simply

to indicate a pa

rty ’s int e ntion to take a n a

pp e a l, this lim itatio n s e e ms undesirable . The fe dera l courts have also limit ed the issues an appellee may raise on a ppeal in the a

bsence of the a ppellee’ s own n o t i ce of

appea l. Here ag ain, since ne ither the iss ues pre sented for revie w nor the
arg ume nts in s up po rt

of tho se iss ue s a

re se t f orth i n the notice of appea l, there seems to be no g ood rea son for so limiting the que stions an appellee may urg e on revie w. The r esult of eliminating any require ment that an appe llee fil e t h e appe llee’s own notice of
ap p e a l i s th a t o n ce anyparty files a notice of appeal the ap pe lla te c ou rt ma

y c on sid e r the c as e as a wh ole

. Id . at 810-11(emphasis added; bracke ting in original). See also Edw ar ds v . Hu nt , 635 S.W .2d 696, 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) ( stating that “[i] t was t he int ention of R ule 13 TRAP that only one notice of app e a l be fi le d” ); Scott v. Noland Co. , No. 03A01-9502-CV- 00072, 1995 WL 440375, at *1 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed J uly 26, 1995) (holding that “[a] party who does not file a

notice of a

ppeal
c a n s til l r a ise iss ue s in its brie f” ); Glidden v. Glidden , No. 86-320-I I , 1987 WL 9452, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. M.S., fil ed April 16, 1987) (holding that “once an appeal has been taken from a fina l order pursuant to [Tenn. R. App. P.] 3, any question of law or

fac t involved in the case as a w hole may be considere d by

the appe llate court”).
The Spec ial Workers’ Compensation Panel of the Supr e me

Co urt was f

ace d with a somewha t simil ar situation in Hugh es v. Mem phis Light, Gas & Water , in which the def endant utility

appea led the judg ment of t he trial c ourt, afte r which the Second I njury Fund, a nother pa

rty to the case , raised
a n is s u e o n ap peal. Id. , No. W2000-01056-WC-R3-CV, 2001 W L 468581, at *1 (Te nn. Sp. Workers’ Comp. Panel, filed May 3, 2001). The plaintiff arg ued that the Sec ond I njury Fund did not have standing to pa

rticipate in the appea l be cause it did not f ile a notice of appea l. Id. , at *3. The pa ne l r e je c te d th a t arg ume nt, no tin g that T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( a ) d oe s n ot r e qu ir e se pa rate app e a ls. Th e pa ne l he ld that “ [a]n y qu e sti on of

la w m a y be br ou g ht u p f

or re vie w b y

a ny pa rt y on c e a pa rt y has appe aled.” Id.

The notice of appea l f

iled by Hunter Properties broug ht with it, not only Hunter Prope rties and the plaintiffs, but the Higg ins Fa mily as well. All wer e properly befor e the tria l court and, by-10-

virtue of Hunte r Properties’ notice of appea l, a ll a re now proper ly befor e us. All parties ar e allowe d to r a ise su c h is su e s a s th e y se e fi t.

I V.

A.
Hunter Prope rties contends – a nd the Hig g ins F amily supports its contention – that the trial court e rre d in gr anting the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgme nt and in holding that the plaintiffs wer e entitled to purc hase the whole 370-a cre t ra ct o f land. Hunte r Properties raises the fo llo wi ng thr e e iss ue s:

1. Di d th e tria l c ou rt

e rr in d e te rm ini ng that th e plaint if fs pr op e rl y e xer c ise d th e ir

ri g ht o f f ir st r e fu sa l?

2. Ev e n if the plaint if

fs pr op e rl y

e xer c ise d th e ir

ri g ht o f f ir st r e fu sa l, sh ou ld the y

be pr e ve nte d fr om pu rc ha sin g the su bje c t pr op e rt y du e to the ir failu re to s a tis fy

the te rm s o f the op tio n a g re e me nt?

3. Are the plaintiffs entitled to purcha se the entire 370-ac re pa rce l of la nd , a s o pp os e d to the fo ur -a c re pa rc e l that ha d be e n le a se d to the m?

We will address ea ch issue in turn.

B.
Hunter Prope rties ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in holding that the plaintiffs wer e entitled to p ur c ha se the su bje c t pr op e rt y be c a us e , a c c or din g to H un te r P ro pe rties, th e pla int if fs faile d to proper ly exercise their rig ht of first ref usal. Hunter Prope rties points out that the right of first ref usal contained in the lease ag ree ment require s the plaintiffs “to mee t any bona fide offe r of sa le on the same terms and conditions of such off er.” When the plaintiffs exercised the ir rig ht of first re fusal in the L etter, the plaintiffs included with the L etter the acknowl ed gm en t d ocument see king the
a c kn ow le dg me nt of the Hi g g ins F a mil y to va ri ou s thi ng s, inc lud ing the Hi g g ins F a mil y ’s a sse nt t o the proposition that “the L ease shall rema in in full forc e and e ffe ct . . . for the period that the O ffe r se t fo rth in the L a nd lor d’ s Of fe r No tic e sh a ll re ma in o uts ta nd ing .” Ac c or din g to H un te r P ro pe rt ie s, the addition of the acknowledg ment document had the effec t of vary ing the terms and c onditions of Hu nte r P ro pe rt ie s’ of

fe r, the re by

inv a lid a tin g the plaint if

fs ’ a tte mpt e d e xer c ise of

the ri g ht o f f

ir st
re fu sa l.
A rig ht o f fi rst ref usal “limits the right of the owner to dispose free ly

of his property

by compelling him to offe r i t first to the party who has the first rig ht to buy .” Koe lla v . M c Har gue , 976 S

. W

. 2 d 6 5 8 , 6 6 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( q u o t i n g J o hn s o n v . He rren , N o

. 8 8

- 1 6 0

- I I , 1 9 8 8 WL 11 92 78 , at *4 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. E. S., fi le d No v. 10 , 19 88 ))

. “ [T]he pa rt y e xer c isi ng the ri g ht o f f ir st-11-

ref usal must strictlymatch the terms of the third party ’s offe r,

. . . .” In re Ne w Era Re so rts , 238 B.R. 381, 385 (B ankr. E.D . Tenn. 1999):

An ac cepta nce that fails to mirror an of fer is no acc eptanc e at all, but is a reje ction of the off

er a nd a counte r-of

fer . The pr o p ertyowner may acc ept the counte r-of

fer , but is n o longe r bound by the rig ht of first ref usal bec ause that rig ht lapses when the holder f ails to acc ept the offe r.
Id. at 386 (interna l citations omit ted).

Hunter Properties contends that the plaintiffs violated the “ mirror imag e rule ” by including terms in their attempted a cce ptance of the Hig g ins Family ’s offe r that did not match the terms of the offe r made by

Hunter Prope rties. We disag ree

. Th e a c kn ow le dg me nt d oc ume nt is on a se pa rate pie c e of

pa pe r. I t do e s n ot s ta te that it s te rm s are a part of the terms of the plaintiffs’ ex erc ise of t heir rig ht of first re fusal. B y the same toke n, the L etter doe s not state that the plaintiffs’ acc eptanc e of the offe r of the H igg ins Family is conditioned upon the Hig g ins Family

ag ree ing to the r equests set forth in the acknow ledg ment document. I n a straig htforwa

rd manne r, the L etter r ecites that the plaintiffs

a s T e na nt un de r the abo ve -r e fe re nc e d L e a se , d oe s h e re by pr ov ide its notice that it is ex erc ising its Right of F irst Refusal under Parag raph 20 of the L ease in a ccor d with L andlord’s N otice of B ona F ide Off er Of Purchase dated April 16, 2003 (the “L andlord’s Offe r Noti ce” )
w i t h r e s p e c tt o 3 7 0 + a c r e s l o c a t e d i n B e n t o n , P o l k C o u n t y, Tenne ssee ( the “Prope rt y ”) w hich Property includes the lea sed premises of approximately 4 + ac res a nd approximately 366 + ac res of additional land.

As ca n be see n, the L etter does not state, ex pressly or by implication, that if the Hig g ins Family does
no t agree to the re qu e ste d e xten sio n o f the le a se , th e plaint if fs ’ a c c e ptanc e , a s se t f

orth a bo ve , is withdrawn, or

null and void, or other than f ully and complete ly

valid and enf

orce able.

Whil e it is obvious that the plaintiffs wanted the Hig g ins Family to sign the a cknowledg ment do c ume nt in ord er to ha ve writt e n p ro of of va ri ou s th ing s –

inc lud ing that th e plaint if fs c ou ld continue to occ upy

the four a cre s bey ond the period of the then-e x isting lea se extension – we find nothing in the plaintiffs’ corr espondenc e of May 13, 2003, that constitutes the additi on of a ne w term or provision to the offe r of the Higg ins Fa mily to sell the 370 acr es on the t erms of the offe r made to the Hi g g ins F a mil y

by Hu nte r P ro pe rt ie s.
We h oldthat th e plaint if

fs pr op e rl y

e xer c ise d th e ir ri ght of fir st r e fu sa l by ind ic a tin g the ir willingness to match the terms of the of fer of Hunter

Properties to buy the 370 acr es. I n short, the-12-

plaint if fs did “strictly match the terms” of the option a g ree ment when they exercised their

rig ht of first ref usal. Id. at 385. Acc ording ly , we find no err or in the trial court’s decision holding that the plaint if fs pr op e rl y

e xer c ise d th e ir

ri g ht o f f ir st r e fu sa l.

C.

Hu nte r P ro pe rt ie s c on te nd s th a t, e ve n if the plaint if

fs pr op e rl y

e xer c ise d th e ri g ht o f f

ir st
re fu sa l, the y

sh ou ld n ot b e pe rm itt e d to pu rc ha se the su bje c t pro pert y be c a us e of

the ir failu re to satisfy the terms of the option . The option g ave H unter Properties two opportunities to ext end the op tio n pe ri od , pro vid e d it ma de a tim e ly pa y me nt o f $ 10 ,0 00 fo r e a c h e xten sio n. Th e plaint if fs did not make a $10,000 pay ment to the Hig g ins Family by either Aug ust 8, 2003, or Dec ember 8, 2003 (the de a dli ne s f

or e xten din g e a c h of the op tio n pe ri od s)

. Th e re fo re , a c c or din g to Hu nte r P ro pe rt ie s, this failure by

the plaintiffs to meet the requireme nts of the option vitiates their rig ht to purchase the p r o p e r t y.
Th e po sit ion of

Hu nte r P ro pe rt ie s mis se s the mark

. Th e ri g ht of fi rs t re fu sa l in the le a se is tr ig g e re d by a

th ir d p art y ’s offer

to buy the prope rty . When Hunter Properties indicated to the Hi g g ins F a mi lythat it

wa s in te re ste d in pu rc ha sin g the 37 0- a c re tr a c t, the Hi g g ins F a mil y , in
v i o l a t i o n o f

t h e p l a i n t i f

f s ’ r i g h t o f f

i r s t r e f u s a l , g r a n t e d H u n t e r P r o p e r t i e s a n u n q u a l i f i e d o p t i o n

. In
no tif y ing the plaintif

fs of the re la ti on ship i t ha d d e ve lop e d w ith Hu nte r P ro pe rt ie s w ith re sp e c t to t h e property , the Hig g ins Family treated the option to purcha se as if it we re a n offer to purcha se. This is clear f

rom the Hig g ins Family ’s “Notice of B ona F ide Of fe r of Purcha se.” ( Emphasis added)

. Under the rig ht of first re fusal, the plaintiffs ha d to match the “of fer ” part of the dea l betwee n the Hig g ins Family

and Hunter

Properties. This the plaintiffs did. The plaintiffs did not have to mee t the option part of the deal. They actua lly did more than simplyassent to enter into an option to buy the pr op e rt y ; th e y

ma de a n ou tr ig ht a c c e ptanc e of the “ of fe r. ” Whil e the plaint if

fs , in e xer c isi ng the ir ri g ht o f f ir st r e fu sal , askedfo r i nf

orma tio n r e g ard ing the op tio n g rante d to Hu nte r P ro pe rt ie s, thi s reque st for information do es not chang e the f act that the pla intiffs ag ree d to buy the prope rty

for $1 ,3 50 ,0 00 . T he Hi g g ins F a mil y , in no tif y ing the plaint if

fs of its de a lin g s w ith Hu nte r P ro pe rt ie s, chose to by

pass the option part of the deal and trea t it as if it we re a n outrig ht offer to purcha se. The Hig g ins Family

said, in eff

ect, “ we ha ve an of

fer for the pr operty

and her e is the o ffe r. Will y ou match it? ” The plaintiffs clea rly responde d “y es.”

T h e H i g g i n s F a m i l y ult im ate ly offe red to sell the pr operty to the plaintiffs as i t was re quired to d o b y the te rm s o f the le a se

. Th e plaint if fs ’ a c c e ptanc e of that of

fe r c re a te d a

bin din g c on tr a c t. The option – a g rant to H unter Properties that the Hig g ins Family was without authority

to make – is a “re d herring.” I t is sim ply not material to t he is sue of whether the plaintiffs matche d the “of fer ” part of H unter Properties’ option.

D. Finally , Hunter Properties arg ues t hat, even if the pl aintiffs properly exercised their

rig ht of first ref usal, they wer e only

entitled to purcha se the four acr es which were the subject of the lease ,-13-

rathe r tha n th e e nti re 37 0- a c re tr a c t of la nd . O ur

re vie w o f the re c or d re ve a ls a fa ta l de fi c ie nc y wi th
re sp e c t to thi s is su e ; it was never ra is ed bel ow b y Hu nte r P ro

pe rti e s o r th e Hi gg ins Fa mi ly . It is
we ll- se ttl e d th a t is su e s n ot r a ise d at th e tr ia l c ou rt le ve l may no t be raise d fo r the fi rs t tim e on app e a l. Sim pson v. Fron tier Cm ty. Credit Union , 810 S.W .2d 147, 153 (Tenn. 1991)

. Howeve r, eve n had this iss ue bee n raised, w e doubt that it would have had merit. We note that the “Notice of B ona F ide Offe r of Purc hase” that the Hig g ins Family sent to the plaintiffs – af ter de tailing th e terms of the

“ of fe r o f p ur c ha se ” by Hu nte r Pr op e rt ie s – re c ite s that the plaint if f’ s ri g ht of fi rs t re fu sa l e xten ds to “all terms of the bona fide offer mentioned [i n the Noti ce].” Since the “of fer of purc hase” perta ins to all of the 370 acr es, and not just the premises lease d to the pl aintiffs, we do not understand how it c a n b e se ri ou sly

arg ue d th a t the te na nt’ s rig ht of fi rs t r e fu sa l on ly e xten de d to the le a se d p re mis e s. I t is clear to us that the H igg ins Family – in drafting the Notice to the pla intiffs – interpre ted the

“ ri g ht o f f ir st r e fu sa l” la ng ua g e in the le a se to e nc omp a ss the e nti re 37 0 a c re s.

V. The ju d gm en t o f the trial c ourt is affirmed. This case is remande d to the trial court f or e nf or c e me nt o f that c ou rt ’s jud g me nt a ndfo r the c oll e c tio n o f c os ts a sse sse d b e low , a ll p ur su a nt t o applicable law. Costs on appea l ar e t ax ed h alf to Hunter Properties, Inc., and ha lf to the Hig g ins Fa milyL imited Partnership.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE