dismissed for failure to state a claim if it is beyond doubt that there is no set of facts under which
plaintiff could obtain relief. Id.

ANALYSIS
I. Section 1983 and Federal False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims

With regard to Long’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal false arrest and false imprisonment
claims, the central issue is whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Long. If Defendants
can demonstrate the existence of probable cause, these claims would be barred. Simmons v.
Pryor, 26 F.3d 650, 654 (7" Cir. 1993) (stating that probable cause is an absolute bar to
defendant’s § 1983 liability for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution);
Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 582 (7" Cir. 1989) (same).

Probable cause is “a commonsense determination, measured under a reasonableness
standard,” Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510, 519 (7" Cir. 1998), and is present if, at the time of
arrest, “the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officer’s] knowledge and of which she
has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a prudent person in believing that the
suspect had committed or was committing an offense,” Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7" Cir.
1999). The existence of probable cause turns on the information known to the officers at the
moment the arrest is made, not on subsequently received information. See Hebron v. Touhy, 18
F.3d 421, 423 (7" Cir. 1994). The concept of probable cause “seeks to accommodate the
interests of effective law enforcement, on the one hand, versus the privacy and liberty interests
possessed by citizens who follow the law. The police, in determining whether probable cause
exists, must assess probabilities in specific factual scenarios, and such assessment is not

conducive to precise legal rules.” Ilinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).


Chicago Police Department and several of its officers arose from his arrest for murder. The
plaintiff's state claim for false arrest accrued on August 25, 1989, and his state claims for
malicious prosecution and false imprisonment accrued on December 13, 1990. Because the
plaintiff did not file his original complaint until August 19, 1992, i.e, more than one year later,
the Cooper Court declined to reinstate these previously dismissed state law claims as they were
time-barred under the Tort Immunity Act. Jd. at *5. See also Bodin v. McGannon, No. 98 C
5392, 1999 WL 528492, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 1999) (dismissing state law claim of false
imprisonment against Village of Lake Zurich and two of its police officers, which was filed more
than one year after the claim accrued, because it was time-barred under the Tort Immunity Act);
Harrell v. Sheahan, 937 F. Supp. 754, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (summary judgment granted in favor
of defendant on prisoner’s state law claim of false imprisonment against county sheriff, which
accrued more than a year before it was filed because it was time-barred under the Tort Immunity
Act).

Furthermore, the more specific statute of limitations contained in the Tort Immunity Act
prevails in this case. See Draghi v. County of Cook, 985 F. Supp. 747, 750 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(emphasis in original) (“the specific Illinois statute that governs a particular category of tort
claims (those brought against local government entities and their employees) necessarily prevails
over the generic two-year limitations period (735 ILCS 5/1 3-202) where a state Jaw tort claim is
involved”). Long filed this lawsuit on April 30, 2001, nearly two years after his May 3, 1999
arrest and the June 21, 1999 dismissal of the disorderly conduct charge against him. Thus, we
find that Long’s state law claims of false arrest and false imprisonment are time-barred, and we

dismiss Count III of the complaint.


1989) (“Probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, but need not be based on evidence
sufficient to support a conviction, nor even a showing that the officer’s belief is more likely true
than false.”); United States v. Gilbert, 45 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7" Cir, 1995) (quotations omitted)
(“Probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
actual showing of such activity.”).

Finally, Long argues that the Vernon Hills disorderly conduct statute under which he was
arrested was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment and, thus, Defendants did
not have probable cause to arrest him. We disagree. In Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31
(1979), the Supreme Court concluded that the fact that the Detroit ordinance in question was
determined to be invalid after the arrest had taken place did not undermine the validity of the
arrest. The Court explained:

Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are

declared unconstitutional. The enactment of a law forecloses

speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality

— with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly

unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be

bound to see its flaws. Society would be ill-served it if police

officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and

which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.
Id. at 38. Furthermore, the Court stated: “police action based on a presumptively valid law [is]
subject to a valid defense of good faith. ... A policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable

cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.” Id. (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 USS. 547, 555

(1967)). For these reasons, we find that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Long?

3 We note that, in their motion to dismiss, although Defendants did not raise the defense
of qualified immunity, they would have been entitled to that defense. “[Qlualified immunity

6


In this case, Long argues that Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest him. First,
he points out that he was arrested without a warrant. (R. 1, Pl.’s Compl. § 17.) However, a
warrant is not constitutionally mandated for an arrest made in a public place. United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-22 (1976); United States v, Fernandez-Guzman, 577 F.2d 1093, 1097
(7* Cir. 1978). Furthermore, an officer may arrest a suspect without a warrant for an offense
which did not occur in the officer's presence. United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 685 (7th
Cir. 2000). In addition, we note that the Supreme Court has “consistently accorded law
enforcement officials greater latitude in exercising their duties in public places.” Florida v.
White, 526 U.S. 559, 565 (1999).

Long also contends that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him because the arrest
was based only on a “general suspect description” and not on a positive identification. (R. 3,
P1.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss {| E-F.) Furthermore, Long claims that probable cause was
lacking because the alleged victim: (1) never viewed him ina lineup, R. 1, PI.’s Compl. { 19);
(2) never positively identified him, (id.); and (3) never signed a complaint against him, (éd.). The
Seventh Circuit, however, has “consistently held that ‘once police officers have discovered
sufficient facts to establish probable cause, they have no constitutional obligation to conduct any
further investigation in the hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence.’”” Eversole v.
Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 718 (7" Cir. 1995) (quoting Garcia v. Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 970 (7" Cir.
1994)). In this case, Long admits that Defendants had determined and explained to him, before
his arrest, that he fit the general description given by the alleged victim of her perpetrator. (R. 1,
Compl. { 13.) Thus, we find that Defendants did have probable cause to arrest Long, and no

further investigation was constitutionally required. Hughes v. Meyer, 880 F.2d 967, 969 (7" Cir.


public entities, although not expressly identified in [§ 1-206], are within the definition of ‘local
public entity” within the dictates of the Tort Immunity Act).

Long, however, asserts that a two-year statute of limitations should apply. We disagree.
Long argues that because actions brought under § 1983 apply the corresponding state statute of
limitations, the two-year Illinois general personal injury limitations period, 735 ILCS 5/ 13-202,
applies to his state law claims.‘ (R. 3, Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 4 J.) This Circuit
has recognized that 735 ILCS 5/13-202 applies to federal civil rights claims arising in Illinois.
Ashafa v. City of ' Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998). However, although the two-year
statute of limitations under 735 ILCS 5/13-202 applies to federal claims under section 1983, “a
federal court applies to state-law claims the same limitations period a state court would apply.”
Ellis v. City of Chicago, No. 2000 C 2457, 2000 WL 1774084, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2000)
(emphasis added). Therefore, while a two-year statute of limitations applies to Long’s federal
claims, a one-year statute of limitations applies to his state law claims against Defendants.

The relevant caselaw in this Circuit supports the application of the Tort Immunity Act’s
one-year statute of limitations in 745 ILCS 10/8-101 to state law claims against police officers.
In Pierce, 2000 WL 1847778, at *2, the plaintiff alleged that Chicago police officers arrested and
incarcerated him for drug and firearm violations without probable cause. Applying the Tort
Immunity Act, the court dismissed Pierce’s state law claims of false arrest and false
imprisonment because they were brought more than one year after the claims accrued and, thus,

were time-barred. Id In Cooper, 1995 WL 399009, at *4, the plaintiff's claims against the

* 735 ILCS 5/13-202 provides in pertinent part: “Actions for damages for an injury to the
person, or for false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution . . . shall be commenced within
2 years next after the cause of action accrued... .”

8


© Minute Order Form (06/97)

ho

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Ruben Castillo than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 3080 DATE 8/6/2001
CASE Kevin Jay Long vs. Todd Williams, et al.
TITLE
[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

(63) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) o Answer brief to motion due_ . Reply to answer brief due.

(4) im Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at_

(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

QFRCP4¢m) General Rule2} OFRCP41(a\(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) i | [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendant’s motion to strike [4-1]
and to dismiss plaintiffs complaint [4-2] is granted. Judgment is entered in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiff. This case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

ai) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.}

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

x | Docketing to mail notices.

x Mail AO 450 form.

docketing beputy Ynitials

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
RO deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office

mailing deputy initials



CONCLUSION
The Court fully understands why Mr. Long has litigated this lawsuit. ; Mr. Long sincerely
believes that he was mistreated at the hands of the defendants. Yet, Mr. Long must understand
that the law protects mistakes made by police officers who are given the difficult assignment of
protecting our society, as outlined herein. For all of the reasons contained in this opinion, we
must grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss. (R. 4-1.) The Clerk of the Court is instructed to

enter final judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, against Mr. Long.

ENTERED:

Judge Ruben Castillo
United States District Court

Dated: August 6, 2001

10


Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I and II of the complaint.
IL. State False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims

Under the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
(Tort Immunity Act”), 745 ILCS 10/1-101 ef seq., the applicable statute of limitations for the
state law claims of false arrest and false imprisonment against a local entity or its employees is
one year. 745 ILCS 10/8-101 (“No civil action may be commenced in any court against a local
entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date
that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.”). See Jordan v. Van Dyke, No. 99 C
5357, 2000 WL 126784, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2000) (“Illinois law truncates to one year the
limitations period for civil suits against municipal actors”); DiBenedetto v. City of Chicago, 873
F. Supp. 106, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying one-year statute of limitations to dismiss common
law claims of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment against city filed one year and one
day after they accrued). Given the plain meaning of the statute and that “local public entity” as
defined in the Tort Immunity Act includes a “township, municipality . . . and all other local
governmental bodies,” 745 ILCS 10/1-206, Defendants clearly fall under the domain of the Tort
Immunity Act. Pierce v, Pawelski, No. 98 C 3337, 2000 WL 1847778, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14,
2000) (applying Tort Immunity Act to civil action brought against police officers); Cooper v.
Butler, No. 92 C 5604, 1995 WL 399009, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1995) (same). See Luciano

v. Waubonsee Cmty. Coll., 614 N.E. 2d 904, 908 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (explaining “that various

protects arresting police officers from suit if a reasonable officer would have believed the arrest
to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information that the arresting officers
possessed, This standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Marks v. Carmody, 234 F.3d
1006, 1009 (7" Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).


appear?

Long filed this lawsuit on April 30, 2001, alleging that Defendants violated his civil
tights because they arrested him without a warrant and without probable cause. Currently
pending before this Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, we
grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Motion to Dismiss

The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not the
merits of the suit. Autry v. Northwest Premium Servs., Inc., 144 F.3d 1037, 1039 (7" Cir. 1998).
The Court views all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, as well as any reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Dimmig v. Wahl,
983 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1993). The Court will only grant a motion to dismiss if it is clear that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts warranting relief. Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318,
322 (7th Cir. 1996). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a pleading must only contain enough to
allow the court and the defendant to understand the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint.”
McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 323-24 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

Il. Pro Se Plaintiff
Pro se complaints are to be liberally construed and are not held to the stringent standards

expected of pleadings drafted by lawyers. Id. A pro se civil rights complaint may only be

? On May 7, 1999, Officer Williams secured a warrant for Long’s arrest for the disorderly
conduct incident that allegedly occurred on November 7, 1998. That case was dismissed on
March 22, 2000 because the complainants refused to appear. Long’s complaints in the instant
case are not based on facts associated with the November 7 incident.


parking lot in Vernon Hills for having an expired registration sticker. Officer Williams and
Sergeant Wagner were present in their vehicles for backup assistance. Defendants informed
Long that he fit the general description given by a woman with whom he had allegedly conducted
a sexual conversation earlier that day, and they questioned him regarding the incident. Long
denied having had the conversation. However, he cooperated fully with Defendants during the
stop. After receiving Long’s consent, Officer Zimmerman searched his vehicle but recovered no
contraband. Officer Williams next questioned Long about an earlier incident also involving a
sexual conversation with other women that allegedly occurred on November 7, 1998. Long again
denied having any knowledge of that incident. At that point, the officers arrested Long for
disorderly conduct pursuant to the Village of Vernon Hills code. (R. 1, Pl.’s Compl. 25
(“pursuant to Chapter 14, Article V, Section 14-211, Subsection (1) of Village of Vernon Hills
Code, to commit the offense of Disorderly Conduct one must ‘[do] any act in such [an]
unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace””).)
Sergeant Wagner took Long to the Vernon Hills Police Department for processing. At the Police
Department, Officer Zimmerman took a photograph of Long in order to show it to the women
involved in the November 7 incident. Long was then charged with disorderly conduct. He was
in custody for approximately two hours before being released.

On May 13, 1999, Long’s name and address as well as the details of his May 3, 1999
arrest appeared in the Pioneer Press suburban newspapers and on the internet. On June 21, 1999,

the charge regarding the May 3 incident was dismissed because the woman in question refused to


os

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
KEVIN JAY LONG, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) _No.01 C3080
vy. )
) Judge Ruben Castillo
)
POLICE OFFICER TODD WILLIAMS )
(Star 12), POLICE OFFICER PATRICK )
ZIMMERMAN (Star 28) and )
SERGEANT WILLIAM WAGNER __) DOCKETED
Star 81
Gears), } quG ~ 7 2001
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.

Kevin Jay Long filed this pro se lawsuit against Officers Todd Williams, Patrick
Zimmerman and Sergeant William Wagner of the Vernon Hills Police Department (collectively
“Defendants”), alleging: (1) a violation of his civil rights, 42USC. § 1983; (2) federal false
arrest/ false imprisonment; and (3) state false arrest/ false imprisonment. Defendants have filed a
motion to dismiss, (R. 4-1), which we grant for the reasons stated below.!

RELEVANT FACTS

On May 3, 1999, Officer Zimmerman stopped Long’s vehicle in the Rivertree Plaza

" Defendants’ motion cites both Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, indicating that they seek judgment on the pleadings or dismissal of the case for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Because Defendants have not yet filed an
answer to the complaint, the 12(c) motion is premature. We shall adopt the common practice of
treating the premature Rule 12(c) motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Seber v. Unger, 881 F.
Supp. 323, 325 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1995). This technical procedural point will not affect the outcome
of this opinion because the standard for consideration is the same for Rule 12(c) and Rule
12(b)(6) motions. GATX Leasing Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1112, 1114 (7th
Cir. 1995); Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1989).