Co., 258 F.8d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, plaintiffs’ complaint enumerates
13 separate instances of mail and wire fraud and not one of them contains all of the
factual specificity required by Rule 9(b). Most are infirm because they do not explain
how defendants’ fraud was communicated to plaintiffs, and some are inadequate
because they do not specify when the alleged misrepresentation occurred. However,
even if plaintiffs were to cure the pleading deficiencies, their RICO claims cannot be
salvaged because it is clear from the facts in the complaint that plaintiffs’ alleged
injury — monetary losses in excess of $3,000,000 due to the lost School Bus Contracts —
was not proximately caused by defendants’ alleged racketeering activity.

To recover under RICO a plaintiff must show some direct relation between the
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. See Associated Gen. Contractors of
Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 582-33 (1983);
Boim v. Quranic Literary Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Gir. 2002). “Thus, a plaintiff
who complain[s] of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third
person by the defendant's acts [i]s generally said to stand at too remote a distance to
recover.” Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69. For plaintiffs in this case to satisfy RICO’s
requirement of proximate causation, they must allege a relation between their injury
and the defendants’ violation that is neither indirect nor remote. Loeb Indus., 306 F.3d
at 496. Plaintiffs allegations fall well short of establishing this necessary relationship.

From the face of the complaint, it is evident that plaintiffs view their injury as

the logs of the School Bus Contracts due to defendants’ theft of. Alpha’s proprietary bid

-13-



laws, civil conspiracy, violation of Illinois trade secret laws, tortious interference with
business opportunity, breach of fiduciary duty, racketeering, and fraudulent transfer
of assets. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims against them. Because federal
jurisdiction in this case depends on the existence of a claim under either the Sherman
Act or RICO, the court’s opinion will address these claims first.

II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review

In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court must accept
as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 701 (7th
Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs here assert that federal jurisdiction exists because defendants
violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and RICO, 18 U.S.C, § 1962. See 28 U.S.C. §
1337. Defendants, however, contend that this court is without jurisdiction because
plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under cither federal statute.

Plaintiffs’ federal claims are subject to two different standards of pleading under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For plaintiffs’ antitrust claim to survive, it must
provide a short and plain statement which demonstrates that plaintiffs suffered an
injury caused by defendants’ restraint of interstate commerce. Midwest Gas Servs. v.
Indiana Gas Co., 317 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2008); Fep. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Importantly,
plaintiffs’ injury must be an “antitrust injury — which is to say, injury by reason of
those things that make the practice unlawful, such as reduced output and higher

prices,” as opposed to mere economic loss, Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 350 F.3d

-4-



illegal activities. See 42nd Parallel North, 286 F.3d at 405 (‘[a]ntitrust laws protect
competition, not competitors”).

But the court cannot draw this inference against plaintiffs in ruling on a motion
todismiss. Plaintiffs allege repeatedly that “Wagner, Meister, Chicago Bear Bones and
Southwest Leasing together with Hackel and Southwest” conspired to restrain trade.
Since the court must take this and other facts in the complaint as true, and since
plaintiffs need not allege the market power of potential conspirators to state a claim
under § 1, the court must assume that the individual and leasing company defendants
were in fact capable of conspiring with Southwest and Hackel to commit the alleged
antitrust violation.

Though the court finds that plaintiffs have pleaded an interstate commerce
nexus and a conspiracy, their antitrust claim still must fail because plaintiffs have not
alleged an antitrust injury. An antitrust injury is an injury caused by the kind of
conduct that the antitrust laws seek to prevent, Brunswick Corp. v. Peublo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S, 477, 489 (1977). The antitrust injury doctrine was created as a way
to sereen out complaints by competitors and others who were hurt not by
anticompetitive practices, but by productive efficiencies, higher output, and lower
prices — the very things antitrust laws are designed to encourage. Gypsum, 350 F.3d
at 627. Thus, a plaintiff competitor who seeks a kind of relief that would injure
customers, such as less competition or higher prices for his product, does not suffer
antitrust injury. Id. Similarly, a defendant competitor who undertakes to squceze out

his market competitors by underbidding them or increasing output or discounting

-9-



782 (7th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs in this case have done exactly that.

A successful claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof that (1) a
contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons (2) to restrain
interstate commerce in the relevant market (3) caused an injury of the sort Congress
intended to prevent by enacting the antitrust laws. See Denny's Marina Inc. v. Renfro
Prods., Ine., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir. 1993); Hammes, 33 F.3d at 782. Defendants
here argue that plaintiffs fail to establish a § 1 violation in all respects, including
(1) failure to plead a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce, (2) failure to show a
conspiracy among market competitors, and (8) failure to allege an antitrust injury.

Though not artfully pleaded, plaintiffs’ allegations of a nexus with interstate
commerce are sufficient to withstand defendants’ motions to dismiss. An antitrust
claim requires an improper purpose, an anticompetitive effect, and an effect on
interstate commerce, See BCB Anesthesia Care, Ltd. v. Werries, 36 F.3d 664, 666 (7th
Cir. 1994). The interstate commerce requirement is jurisdictional in antitrust suits,
United Phosphorus, Lid. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2003), and the
court must assure itself from allegations in the complaint that it is not about to hear
a case that it is not supposed to have the power to hear. Hammes, 33 F.3d at 778. In
diversity suits, for example, the complaint must allege the citizenship of the parties
and the amount in controversy, not just that the claim is within the diversity
jurisdiction. Jd. “But when the jurisdictional prerequisite is effect on interstate

commerce, the pleading of a conclusion should be good enough, since the number of



628, 626-27 (7th Cir. 2008); Loeb Indus. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir.
2001). For plaintiffs’ RICO claims alleging predicate acts of mail and wire fraud to
survive, they must describe with particularity “the identity of the person who made the
[mis]representation, the time, place, and content of the misrepresentation, and the
method by which the misrepresentation was communicated to the plaintiff.” Slaney v.
International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580, 599 (7th Cir. 2001); Feb. R. Civ.
P, 9(b). A successful RICO claim also requires a plaintiff to show that his injury was
proximately caused by defendants’ racketeering activity. Holmes v. Securities Investor
Prot. Corp., 503 U.S, 258, 268-69 (1992). Since plaintiffs fail to state a claim under
either federal law and they assert no other basis for federal jurisdiction, this case must
be dismissed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
B. Sherman Act Antitrust Claim

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which defendants’ act of underbidding Alpha for
the School Bus Contracts by using Alpha’s confidential information is alleged to
violate, forbids conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with
foreign nations. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 654
(7th Cir. 2002). Though all an antitrust claim need allege to survive a motion to
dismiss is that a plaintiff suffered an injury due to a defendant’s unlawful restraint of
interstate commerce, Midwest Gas, 317 F.3d at 711, it is quite possible for a plaintiff
to plead himself out of court by alleging facts that could not under any circumstances

constitute an antitrust violation, Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.8d 774,

-5-


between Southwest and the leasing defendants to restrain trade.

An antitrust conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more persons to
restrain trade in a given market. Denny’s Marina, 8 F.3d at 1220. Usually, as in a per
se violation of § 1, the conspirators are direct competitors in the market. Somctimes,
however, as in the case of a clothing manufacturer attempting to eliminate competition
among retailers of its products, a single individual may attempt, by conspiring with
market competitors, to control a market from the outside. See, e.g., 42nd Parallel
North v. E Street Denim Co., 286 F.3d 401 (7th Cir. 2002), In the latter case, the non-
market conspirator must have some kind of “market power,” or ability to raise prices
above a competitive level without losing its business, to be found capable of restraining
trade in the relevant market. Id. at 404-5.

Ofall the named defendants in this case, only Southwest actually competes with
Alpha in the relevant market. The complaint does not specifically define the market,
but the court presumes from facts therein that it is the market for special education
student transportation services in the greater Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, area.
Though plaintiffs charge the individual defendants, Meister and Wagner, and the
leasing company defendants, Southwest Leasing and Bear Bones Leasing, with
conspiring to restrain trade, none of these defendants provides student transportation
services and none of them is alleged to have the kind of market power that would
enable them to control competition in the busing market. If this is true, only Alpha
and Southwest would be capable of the “bid-rigging” and “price-fixing” conduct

complained of here, and Alpha would have no cause of action to recover for its own

-8-



‘Minute Grace Horm 46/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Nyfime of A dye Sitting Judge if Oth
Persstcauens nie | Joan B, Gottscall ig ne her
7
CASE NUMBER 03 C 5009 DATE 6/15/2004
CASE Alpha School Bus Co. vs. Wagner, et al.
TITLE

(In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintift, and (b) state briefly the nature

f the motion being presented
MOTION: of the motion being presented. |

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

DOCKET ENTRY:

a) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) QO Brief in support of motion due

(3) Qo Answer brief to motion duc___. Reply to answer briefdue___-

(4) QO Ruling/Hearing on set for at.

(5) oO Status hearing[held/continved to] [set for/re-set for]on__ ___setfor_ at

(6) Q Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for}on___— setfor__— ss at__

) Qo Trial[set for/re-set for] on ss _at

(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at_

(9) oa This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
[1 FRCP4(m) =O] Local Rule 41.1 OLFRCP41(aX1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

| [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion and

order, defendant Mcister’s motion to dismiss [76-1] and defendants Wagner's, Hackcl’s,
Bear Boncs Leasing, Inc.'s, Southwest Transit, Inc.’s, and Southwest Leasing L.L.C.’s
motion to dismiss [89-1] are granted. Because plaintiffs fail to state a claim under federal
law and there is no other basis for this court’s jurisdiction, the court will not address the
merits of plaintiffs’ state law claims. Case dismisged for lack of jurisdiction.

(11) {For further detai) see order attached to the original

No notices required, advised itn open court

No notices required

Notices mailed by jndge’s stall

Notified counsel by telephone,

Docketing to mail nolices.

PX] ><

Mail AO 45¢ form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

RKB courtroom, bea ebb iad
deputy's %
initials

tate mailed notice,

Date/time received. in-

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confidential bid information, which Meister and Wagner compiled while still working
for Alpha, in preparing Southwest's bid for the School Bus Contracts. This conduct is
not price-fixing because there is no allegation that any two market competitors (and
there are only two actual market competitors named in this case, Alpha and
Southwest) conspired to submit noncompetitive bids or to sell their student
transportation services at a uniform price. See United States v. Brighton Bldg. &
Maint, Co., 598 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1979).

Nor is the complained-of conduct bid-rigging since there is no allegation that
Alpha or Southwest agreed in advance of submitting their bids that one of them would
offer a higher bid in order for the other to win the contracts. See Heffernan, 43 F.3d at
1146. Instead, the complaint repeatedly asserts that Southwest secretly underbid
Alpha and that, had Alpha known it was going to be underbid, it would have lowered
its own bid to win the contracts, Plaintiffs do not contend and no inference can be
drawn from these allegations that Southwest and Alpha had any kind of agreement in
place to rotate their bids on the School Bus Contracts.

Because the complaint does not allege a per se violation of § 1 and is otherwise
devoid of any allegation that defendants’ conduct restrained trade in a manner
prohibited by the antitrust laws, it fails to state an antitrust claim and is therefore
dismissed. See, e.g., BCB Anesthesia Care, 36 F.3d at 666 (“{o]nly unreasonable
restraints of trade are illegal” under § 1); 42nd Parallel North, 286 F.3d at 404

(upholding dismissal of § 1 claim due to lack of anticompetitive effect on the market).

-ll1-


prices does not cause an antitrust injury, unless his activities are undertaken in
concert with another competitor and involve anticompetitive conduct like fixing prices,
shorting supply, or tying.

In the instant case, defendants’ acts of pilfering Alpha’s proprietary information
in order to undercut Alpha’s bid and win the School Bus Contracts is not the kind of
wrongful conduct that the antitrust laws forbid. Though plaintiffs label defendants’
activities as “price-fixing” and “bid-rigging,” two practices that are considered per se
violations of § 1, the conduct alleged in the complaint belies such description. Price-
fixing, in general terms, occurs when competitors in a given market get together and
agree to sell at a uniform price. Kahn v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir,
1996) rev'd on other grounds, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); United States v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d
1144, 1149 (7th Cir, 1994). Bid-rigging has a more specialized meaning in antitrust
Jaw and is analogous to bid rotation. Heffernan, 43 F.3d at 1150. Bid rigging or bid
rotation occurs when two or more competitors agree which of them should be the low
bidder for a particular job, and the others submit higher bids to make sure the
designated bidder wins. Id. at 1146.

What happened in this case, at least as far as the complaint describes, amounts
neither to price-fixing nor bid-rigging. See BCB Anesthesia Care, 36 F.3d at 667
(“pinning a label on conduct, such as ‘tying’ or ‘boycott,’ is not enough if the conduct
does not necessarily have the pernicious effect the label suggests”). Plaintiffs allege

that Meister and Wagner secretly conspired with Hackel and Southwest to use Alpha’s

~10-


cases that fail at that threshold has become minuscule.” Jd. Here, plaintiffs claim that
“Student transportation services [including the School Bus contracts at issue]... and
the competitive bidding process to let those contracts, affect interstate commerce.”
Given the low threshold for satisfying the interstate commerce nexus in antitrust suits,
see Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 333 (1991), and liberal federal
pleading standards, plaintiffs’ allegations in this case are sufficient to establish this
court’s jurisdiction.

Defendants also arguc that plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claim must be dismissed for
failure to allege a conspiracy. Plaintiffs contend that defendants Wagner, Mcister,
Southwest Leasing, and Bear Bones Leasing conspired with Hackel and Southwest to
restrain trade. The complaint also asserts that Wagner and Meister were employed
by Alpha at the time of the alleged conspiracy. It appears from the complaint, and
plaintiffs’ brief confirms, that Wagner and Meister acted solely to benefit Southwest,
Hackel, and the leasing defendants. Thus, defendants argue, Wagner and Meister are
either agents acting on behalf Southwest and therefore cannot conspire with their
principal, or are employees of Alpha and therefore Alpha cannot recover for damages
incurred through its own conspiracy with Southwest. Plaintiffs’ response to
defendants’ argument is confounding, as it argues simultaneously that Wagner and
Meister are not agents of Southwest because they are Alpha employecs and that Alpha
is not responsible for their actions because Wagner and Meister were acting on behalf
of Southwest. The court need not decipher this illogic, however, because as explained
below, there is a possibility, however slight, that the complaint alleges a conspiracy

-T-



provided busing services to all three districts), and both helped prepare Alpha’s bid for
the School Bus Contracts for 2003-2006,

In addition to incumbent contract holder Alpha, a number of other
transportation companies also bid for the 2003-2006 School Bus Contracts; the winner
was Southwest. Southwest is an Illinois corporation, owned and controlled by Barbara
Hackel, that provides busing services in competition with Alpha. Southwest Leasing,
an Illinois limited liability company, and Bear Bones Leasing, a de jure or de facto
Illinois corporation, are owned and controlled by Wagner and operate to lease buses to
Southwest. Plaintiffs allege that Hackel, Wagner, and Meister contracted to form
Southwest and the leasing companies, and that together they conspired to underbid
Alpha for the Schoo] Bus Contracts and eliminate Alpha as a competitor in the special
education student transportation business.

According to the complaint, Wagner and Meister were still employed by Alpha
when they stole Alpha’s confidential bid information and gave it to Hackel and
Southwest, who then used it to prepare Southwest's bid for the School Bus Contracts.
As a result of Wagnor's, Meister’s, Hackel’s and Southwest's allegedly unlawful
conduct, Southwest submitted a lower bid to the School Districts and won the 2003-
2006 contracts. Soon after the contracts were awarded to Southwest, Wagner and
Meister notified Alpha of their intent to retire and began working for Southwest and
the leasing company defendants.

In summer of 2003 Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court, arguing that defendants’
conduct amounted to forbidden restraint of trade under the federal and state antitrust

-3-


information and “bid-rigging.” Plaintiffs portray defendants’ alleged racketeering
activity, however, as fraudulent usc of the mail and wires to incorporate, secure loans,
solicit investment income, recruit employees, and obtain insurance. In most of these
allegations, plaintiffs assert that because of defendants’ deception of others — including
banks, investors, insurance companies, and accounting firms — defendants were able
to create their racketeering enterprise. This is too remote a connection for plaintiffs
to recover under RICO. If this court were to find otherwise, any individual who reads
in the newspaper that a racketeering enterprise was created by falsely incorporating
and swindling investors could recover under RICO whether or not the enterprise’s
illegal activities caused any direct harm to that individual. This kind of ephemeral
injury is not the sort that RICO is designed to prevent.

Two other of plaintiffs’ allegations come closer to making a direct connection

between plaintiffs’ injury and defendants’ “racketeering” actions. Specifically,
plaintiffs allege that “In or about January 2003 the defendants used emails sent
through the interstate wires to solicit bid bonds and performance bonds for bids for the
school district contracts” and that “defendants used the wires and mails to submit
rigged bids” to the School Districts. The first of these does not help plaintiffs’ case
because it contains no allegation of fraud with respect to the solicitation of bid bonds
or performance bonds. The accusation does not suggest that defendants were not
entitled to obtain the bonds, and the complaint does not contain anything that would

permit the court to so infer.

As for the second allegation, that defendants submitted a rigged bid, the court

-14-



Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.’ For the
reasons that follow, defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted.
I. Background

Alpha is a school bus contractor located in Crestwood, Illinois, and is a wholly
owned subsidiary, along with twelve other subsidiaries licensed as interstate carriers
of passengers, of Cook-Illinois. Alpha provides student transportation services for a
number of school districts in the greater Chicago and Cook County, Tlinois, area. At
issuc in this case are the 2003-2006 contracts for busing services for the Chicago Board.
of Education non-public routes, Southwest Cook County Cooperative Association for
Special Education, and Oak Lawn School District 218 (collectively, the “School Bus
Contracts”). In the spring of 2003, when Alpha prepared and submitted its bids to the
Chicago Board of Education, Southwest Cook County Cooperative Association for
Special Education, and Oak Lawn Board of Education (collectively, the “School
Districts”), Michael Wagner and Leroy Meister were employed by Alpha as General
Manager and Director of Operations, respectively. According to Alpha, both men had
access to confidential Alpha business information, including details of Alpha’s past and

present contracts with the School Districts (for many years prior to 2003, Alpha

1 The remaining named defendants in this case, Sunrise Southwest, L.L.C.,
and Sunrise Transportation, Inc., filed a motion to dismiss the state law claims
against them for failure to state a claim. However, since they were not named in
plaintiffs’ Sherman Act or RICO claims, they did not join the other defendants in
moving to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, unless otherwise
specified, all references to “defendants” in this case refer only to Southwest,
Southwest Leasing, Bear Bones Leasing, Hackel, Wagner, and Meister.

-2-



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Alpha School Bus Company, Inc., and )
Cook-I1linois Corp., )
)

Plaintiffs, )

) Case No. 03 C 5009
Vv. )

) Honorable Joan B. Gottschall
Michael W. Wagner, Barbara Ann )
Hackel, Leroy Meister, Southwest )
Transit, Inc., Chicago Bear Bones )
Leasing, Inc., and Southwest Transit )
Leasing, LLC, Sunrise Southwest, )
L.L.C,, Sunrise Transportation, Inc., )

)
)

a,
iy ey

Defendants. >
yy, "4

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court are defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ Alpha School Bus
Co.’s (“Alpha”) and Cook-Ilinois Corp.’s (“Cook-Iinois”) Third Amended Complaint for
failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Addressing the
jurisdictional arguments first, Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 687 (“subject matter
jurisdiction is the first question . . . in all suits filed in federal court”), defendants
Southwest Transit, Inc. (“Southwest”), Southwest Leasing, L.L.C. (“Southwest
Leasing”), Chicago Bear Bones Leasing, Inc. (“Bear Bones Leasing”), Barbara Ann
Hackel, Michael Wagner, and Leroy Meister contend that this court lacks jurisdiction

because plaintiffs fail to establish a violation of federal law in their allegations that

defendants violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seg., and the Racketeer



C. RICO Mail and Wire Fraud Claims

Plaintiffs also charge defendants with conspiring to and committing numerous
acts of mail and wire fraud in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(d). Plaintiffs
allege that defendants are associated in fact and constitute an enterprise within the
meaning of § 1961(d) and that defendants’ mail and wire fraud constitute a pattern of
rackcteering activity, the purpose of which was to “rig-bids” on the School Bus
Contracts and acquire the contracts and Alpha’s property “by fraudulent, deceptive and
illegal means.” To state a cause of action under RICO a plaintiff must allege with
particularity (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (8) through a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity, Slaney, 244 F.3d at 597, and that plaintiffs’ injury occurred “by reason of”
defendants’ racketeering activity, Holmes v. Securities Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S.
258, 268-69 (1992). Defendants in this case argue that plaintiffs’ RICO claims fail as
a matter of law because (1) plaintiffs fail to plead the predicate mail and wire fraud
claims with the specificity required by FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), (2) the racketeering
allegations do not establish a “pattern,” and (3) plaintiffs’ injury did not occur by
reason of defendants’ alleged racketeering activity.

As an initial matter, plaintiffs’ RICO claims do not satisfy Rule 9(b)'s
particularity requirements. Federal rules require mail and wire fraud, the predicate
acts underlying plaintiffs’ RICO claims in this case, to be pleaded with particularity.
FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b); Slaney, 244 F.3d at 597. This means that plaintiffs must allege the
time, place, and content of the misrepresentations as well as the method by which they

were communicated to plaintiffs. Slaney, 244 F.3d at 597; Pizzo v. Bekin Van Lines

~12-



has already explained that defendants did not as a matter of law engage in “bid-
rigging” as that term is meant in antitrust law. Moreover, even if defendants used the
mail or wires to submit their bid to the School Districts, and even if the bid was
fraudulent, one act of fraud does not establish a “pattern” of racketeering sufficient to
state a claim under RICO, especially where there is no evidence that defendants
intended to repeat the criminal activity in the future. See Pizzo, 258 F.3d at 633
(finding that two disputes of fraud five months apart with no other evidence of ongoing
criminal activity were not sufficient to establish a pattern of fraudulent activity
required under RICO). Plaintiffs’ RICO claims are therefore dismissed for failure to
state a claim.
TIL. Conclusion

Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts that would entitle them to relief under
either § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 1962 of RICO, so defendants’ motions to dismiss are
granted, As plaintiffs’ remaining claims all seek recovery for violations of state law
and no other basis for federal jurisdiction exists, the court will not address the merits
of plaintiffs’ state law claims. Case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

ENTER:
YAN BY/GOTTSCHALL
nited/States District Judge

-15-

DATED: June 15, 2004