@ffice of the LZWmiep @eneral 

Sitate of tEexm 

DAN MORALES 

:,TTOHNCI CENEH,,L 

May 7, 1997 

The Honorable Richard J. Miller 

BelI County Attorney 

P.O. Box 1127 

Belton, Texas 76513 

Opinion No. DM-439 

Re: Whether a juvenile court’s authority under Family 

Code section 5 1.12X$) to “control the conditions and 

terms of detention and detention supervkion” supersedes tbe teams of a county contract with a’ private 

corporation regardiig the operation of the county 

juvenile detention facility (RQ-921) 

Dear Mr. Miller: 

On behalf of Bell County (the “couuty”), you ask about the relationship between Family Code, 

section 51.12(b) - wbicb gives tbejuvede cant of a county the authority to “control the conditions 

and terms of detention and detention supervision” - and a county contract authorizing a private 

corporation to operate the county juvenile detention kility. We conclude that section 5 1.12(b) is 

intended to authorize the juvenile court to control the conditions of the county juvenile facility and 

that any contract entered into by the county for the operation of a county juvenile facility is void to 

the extent it is inconsistent with section 5 1.12(b). 

Section 5 1.12 of the Family Code provides in pertinent part as follows: 

(b) The proper authoritiea in each county shall provide a suitable place of 

detention for children who are parties to proceed&s under this title, but the 

juvende cowl shall wnfrol the wna&ions and ferms of detention and 

ahntion supervision and shall petit visitation with the child at sll 

reasonable timea; 

(c) In each county, thejua& of thejuwmile CWM and the members of the 

juvenile boardshaIlpersv.mally inpecf he detention facilities and any public 

or private secure correctional kilities used for post-adjudication confinement 

that are located in the county and operated under the authority of the juvenile 

board at least annually and shall certia in writing to the authorities 

responsible for operating and giving tinancial support to the facilities and to 
The Honorable Richard J. Miller - Page 2 (DM-439) 

the Terra~ Juvenile Probation Commission that they are suitable or unsuitable 

for the detention of children in accordance with: 

(1) the requirements of Subsections (a), (fJ and (g); and 

(2) minimum professional standa& for the detention of children in preadjudication or post-adjudication secure continement promulgated by the 

Texas Juvenile Probation Commission or, at the election of the juvenile 

board, the current standards promulgated by the American Correctional 

Associatioa 

(d)Noc~dshallbeplacedina~tythathasnotbeenoertifiadunder 

Subsection (c) of this section as suitable for the detention of children. . . . 

In addition, we note that section 141.042(a)(4) of the Human Resources Code requires the Texas 

JwenileprobationCommissiontoadoptreasonablerulesthatprovide~ standards for juvenile 

detention facilities. 

The Bell Cow Juvenile Board (the “juvenile board”) is governed by section 152.0201 of 

the Human Resources Code and is composed of the county judge, the district judges of the county, 

the judge of County Court at Law No. 1 and the judge of County Court at Law No. 2. You Worm 

usthatthejwenileboardhssdesignatedthecountycourtatLawNo. lasthejuvenilewurtforthe 

county. SeeFamcode~51.oQ@)~eachcounty.thecounty’sjuvenileboardshalldesignateone 

or more district, uiminal district, domestic relations, juvenile, or county courts or county courts at 

law as the juvenile court _ . . .“). 

You refer to the contract at issue as a %anagement agreement.“* You state that the 

management agreement authorizes the private corporation to operate, maintain and manage the 

juvkle detention fkility according to standah of the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission, subject 

to the approval of the juvenile board. “The corporation is to develop its own written policies, 

procedures, and operation manuals concerning operation of the fhcility ‘and juvenile supervision for 
The Honorable Richard J. Miller - Page 3 (DM-439) 

which it is responsible’ under the agreement, which pohc& must comply with legal requirementsn 

The private corporation is responsiile for “day-to-day management of the facility, stafiing employee 

training, program services for juvenile detainees (with the advi[c]e and consent of the Juvenile 

Board), and providing seanity and supervision of the juveniles.” You also state that “[t]he only role 

spelled out in the Management Agreement for the designated Juvenile Court is one of inspection.” 

Given this background, you ask the following series of questions: 

what is the specific authority of the designated Juvenile Court. . .? Jfthe 

quired policies oftbe private corporation are adopted by the Juvenile Board, 

is the Juvenile Court empowered by Section 51.12(b) to ,order di&re.nt 

acdvities or policies independent of those adopted by the Juvenile Board, so 

long as minimum standards are met? Does the Juvenile Court have the 

statutory authity to specifically dirt& all aspects of the day-today operation 

of the detention fhcility within tbe standards established by the Juvenile 

Probation Commission, regardless of any agreement between a private 

corporation and the Juvenile Board and Commissioners Court? How does 

[section 5 1.12(b)] w-exist with other statutes . _ _ kven that it seems] the 

legislature intended that the Juvenile Board play the primary role in opemting 

and supervismg detention thcilities? 

Your query requires us to construe the language in section 5 1.12(b) tbat gives the juvenile 

court of a county the authority to “control the conditions and terms of detention and detention 

ape&ion.” W&your query, you enclose a letter briefwritten on behalf of the county by a private 

attorney expressing the view that this language in section 5 1.12(b) merely authorizes the juvenile 

court to control the terms and wnditions of detention of the particular juveniles coming before the 

court, but that it givea the juvenile wurt no general supervisory authority over the juvenile detention 

tkdity~ mhe extent oftbe Juvenile &arrt’s authority is limited to those juveniles directly under the 

hut’s jurisdiction, and only then to the extent newssary to insure that the thcility to which these 

spedicjuvdes are enhuted is operated in accordance with law.” A letter Tom the Texas Juvenile 

Probation Commission, however, rejects this narrow interpretation of the language and insists that 

section 51.1’4b) givesjuvenile wurta control over the conditions and terms of detention and that to 

exercise this authority juvenile courts “must have some abiity to intluence operations of the facility.” 

We believe that the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission has the better of the two positions. 

The relevant language in section 5 1,12 was enacted in 1973 when the legislature adopted title 3 of 

the Family code.2 As the following wmmentary explains, when title 3 was adopted, juveniles were 

0th detained in county jails controlled by the wunly sheriff when understood in this contact, it 

is apparent that the intent of language at issue was to transfer supervisory authority for the detention 

=Sse AdofMay25.1913.63dLeg., RS.. ch 544. $1.1973 Tex. Ga. Law 1460.1465-66. 

p. 2450 
The Honorable Richard J. Miller - Page 4 W-439) 

ofjuveniles Sam the sherift; the official responsible for supervising and controlling wunty jails, to 

tbejuvenile court: 

Subsection(b), like prior Texas law, Tex Rev. Civ~Stat. Ann. art. 2338-1, 

3 17, places tbe responsiii on local authorities to provide the space needed 

for the detention of children. The proper authorities in each county clearly 

includes the wmmissioners court; however, if the detention facility is in the 

county jail the proper authorities would also include the shetiE. The juvenile 

court wntrol of “tbe conditions and terms of detention and detention 

supervision” is new to Texas law. The concept, however, is an old principle 

in juvenile proceedings: Thejuvenile~wurt judge is the ultimate authority for 

the entire juvenile process and he, not the sheriff, should control the 

wnditions of detention and detention supervision Subsection (b), therefore, 

supersedes the general rule of Tex. Rev. Civ. S&t. Ann art. 5 116 that “the 

ShaitTshall exe a supervision and wntrol over the jail,” to the extent that 

a county jail is used as a place of detention for children. . . . 

Robert 0. Dawson, Delinquent Chitien and Chik&en in Needof Supervision: Lk#man ‘s Comments to fide 3 of the Texas Family GM& 5 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 509,530-3 l(1974). 

In enacting the language at issue in 1973, the legislature clearly intended to vest juvenile 

courts with authority over wunty fkilities used to detain juveniles. It is now the case that juveniles 

across the state are housed in juvenile detention facilities rather thau wunty jails.’ As the same 

wmmentator wrote in 1990, “When Title 3 was enacted in 1973, many children in pretrial detention 

status were detained in wunty jails. Today, no children are detained in county jails but are instead 

.detalned in local or Regional detention tkilitiea. That makes some of the provisions of subsection (b) 

dating to county jails obsolete.” Dawson, supm note 3, at 1776. While the original impetus for this 

language in section 5 1.12(b) may no longer exist, we have no basis to conclude tbat the language has 

been impkdly repealed. 

Fm we note that although the above-quoted wmmentsry suggests that the sole purpose of 

the language mgardhgjuvenile court wntml of “the wnditions and terms of detention and detention 

supervision” was to give juvenile wurts authority over the conditions of the detention ofjuveniles 

in wunty jails, section 5 1.12(b) vests juvenile wurts with this authority witbout regard to whether 

a particular facility is operated by the sheriffor the wmmissioners wurt. This suggests legislative 

intent to vest juvenile wurts with authority over the conditions of detention in all county facilities 

used to detain juveniles. The legishtture last revisited section 5 1.12 in 1995, amending subsections 

(a) and (c), but did not see fit to amend subsection (b).’ 

kobal 0. Dawsoq Tide 3. Deli?quenf Chi,Wrn and CJd&n in Need ofSuprvis/on, 21 TEC. TWX L. l&V. 

1747,1776(19¶0). 

‘SeeAdoft&y27,1%‘5,74thLcg.,RS.,ch. 262.5 12.1995Te~.OenLaws2517.2523 
The Honorable Richard J. Miller - Page 5 (nu-439) 

We also note that the authority granted to the juvenile court in subsection (b) is not 

inwnsistent with the reqrirement in subsection (c) that %e judge of the juvenile wurt and the 

members of the juvenile board shall personslly inspect the detention facilities” and certify their 

suitability for the detention of children The duty of the juvenile wurt and the juvenile board annually 

to inspect and certify to a ikcility’s wmpliice with statutory requirements and minimum standards 

selected by the juvenile board does not preclude the juvenile court t?om exercising authority over 

. . co&rons and terms of juvenile detention 365 days of the year. Furthermore, the express inclusion 

ofthejudge ofjuvenile court in inspection in subsection (c). which dates from 1975: indicates that 

the h&datum intended to ensure tbat the juvenile wurt judge participate in the iwpection of juvenile 

detention fhcilities even if the judge is not a member of the juvenile board.6 In the many times the 

legislature has amended subsection (c) since 1975, it has lefi this express and separate reference to 

the juvenile court unsltered.7~ 

Finany, we note that since 1973 the role ofjuvwile bosrds in the administration of the wuntyleveljuvwilejustiw system has been signitlcantly expanded across the state.* In additioq today, as 

a general rule, the juvenile wurt judge must be a member of the juvenile board.9 It may bethe case 

tbat the legislature has failed to amend subsection (b) to delete the juvenile wurt’s separate statutory 

authority to control the county juvenile detention facility because it views this authority as fully 

wnsistent with the juvenile wurt*s role as a member of the juvenile board. While the separate 

statutory grants of authority with respect to juvenile detention facilities in Family Code section 5 1.12, 
The Honorable Richard J. Miller - Page 6 (DM-439) 

sabedions @) and (c) (and other statutes’? may be “unwieldy and unmanageable” in Fkll County, 

it is for the legislature, not this office, to assess whether the authority granted to juvenile courts in 

subsection (b) is outdated or universally unworkable and to amend the statute if necessary 

In sum, section 51.12(b) v&s the juvenile court with authority over the wunty juvenile 

detention Mlity sepamte and apart 6omtbe authority oftbejuvenile board and wmmissioners wurt. 

A county is not authorized to enter into a contract that conflicts with state law. A wunty contract 

with a p&ate wrpomtion regarding the operation of a juvenile detention kility is void to the extent 

itwntlictswithsection 51.12(b).” 

SUMMARY 

Family code se&on 51.124b) vests a wunty juvenile wurt with authority 

ova uxmtyjuvde detention facilities separate and apart 6om the authority 

of the juvenile board and wmnuss~ - ‘oners wurt. A county contract with a 

private corporation regarding the operation of a juvenile detention facility is 

void to the extent it wntlicts with section 5 1.12@). 

DAN MORALES 

Attorney General of Texas 

JORGE VEGA 

First As&ant Attorney General 

SARAH J. SHIRLEY 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Mary R Grouter 

Assktant Attorney General 

p. 2453