Finally, plaintiff claims that Womack also charged plaintiff as absent without leave when
plaintiff took her scheduled vacation. Plaintiff claims in conclusory fashion that Womack “did
not do this to anyone else,” but fails to provide details as to the identitics of these employees, and
whether they had previously filed complaints.

Third, plaintiff states that supervisor Christensen also disapproved plaintiff’s leave
requests to cover (ime when she arrived al work late. She points to Christensen’s deposition
testimony in which he testificd that he could not recall the names of any other cmployces on Tour
3 for whom he had disapproved a request to use leave when they were late, but offers no
evidence that Christensen treated employees who had not filed complaints differently. Because
plaintiff does not show that any of these supervisors treated other similarly situated employees
who had not filed complaints differently in the way they handled Icave requests, plaintiff's claim
of retaliation based on the denials of her leave requests fails.

Finally, as lo plaintiff's claim that other employees were not allowed to talk to her,
plaintiff offers evidence that Brooks reprimanded employce ‘Tia Holmes for speaking with
plaintiff in Apri] 1998. Lowever, plaintiff's statement thal Holmes subsequently began speaking
with another employee without receiving a reprimand is not supported by admissible evidence.
In addition, there is no evidence indicating whether Holmes or the employee with whom she
spoke had previously filed any complaints, Plaintiff’s statement of facts lists Regina Walker,
Melancy Jackson, Laura teddoui, Tia Holmes, Nora Salas, Jossie Seals, and Joel Webb as being
allowed to talk to each other without being threatened with discipline by Brooks, but again offers
no admissible evidence in support of this claim, and does not indicate whether thesc employees

had previously filed complaints. PJaintiff states, in conclusory fashion, thal “Brooks did not

13


counselor, alleging discrimination based on her hearing impairment. Later in 1998, plaintiff fled
EEO complaints of discrimination based on her hearing impairment.

On April 7, 1998, Brooks told plaintiff at various times during the day that her time card
was missing, that the time card indicated that plaintiff had punched out for the day, and told her
that plaintiff was not showing up on the Operations Screen; Brooks later produced plaintiff's
time card. Also in Apri! 1998, Brooks instructed onc of plaintif{’s co-workers not to talk to
plaintiff, instructed plamtiff not to talk to the other employees, directed plaintiff to load mail
while her machine was stopped (which plaintiff characterizes as an extra duty), instructed her not
to sit at her console while the machine was broken down, refused to allow plaintiff to stop keying
when her hands were sore and swollen from an extended period of keying, and assigned plaintiff
to key for entire shifts. According to plaintiff, in April 1998 Brooks followed her as she pushed
tubs of mail from one end of the flat sorter machine to the other.

Plaintiff also claims that Brooks threatened her with discipline when plaintiff took notes
each time the machine broke down. On two occasions, Brooks left plaintifi’s name highlighted
on the computer in the middle of the unit. Brooks also “made clock rings” with plainti{'s time
card?

On April 18, 1998, plaintiff reccived a “five-day absence notice.” Plaintiff submitted
medical documentation to explain her absence. In May 1998, supervisor Anton Zoch issucd
plaintiff a “Letter of Removal.” Zoch told plaintiff that he was not allowed to call plaintiff about
her documentation, and referred her to supervisor Melvin Anderson. Anderson told plaintiff that

her request for leave was denied because he could not read her medical documentation. Zoch

3 Plaintiff does not explain what this means.

4



facts, along with supporting references to the record. This requirement significantly benefits the

court, whose role in ruling on 4 motion for summary judgment “is not to sift through the

evidence.” See Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7" Cir. 1994), Further,
this requircment serves the purpose of “alert|ing] the court to precisely what factual questions are
in dispute and point[ing] the court to the specific evidence im the record that supports a party’s
position on each of the questions.” Id, at 923. The factual statements and references to the
record “arc, in short, roadmaps, and without them the court should not have to proceed further,
regardless of how readily it might be able to distill the relevant information from the record on its
own.” Id.

Since plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the court could overlook her failure to describe her
disability in her statement of facts. However, plaintiff's presentment of her medical records has a
more significant flaw: plaintiff fails to authenticate or offer a foundation for these records.
Documents and exhibits presented as supporting material on summary judgment must be
properly authenticated and admissible. Scc Woods y. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7"

Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 8. Ct. 354 (2001). Plainti({ has presented no affidavits to establish

the authenticity of, and foundation for, her medical records. ‘[herefore, the court must disregard
these records.*

Thus, plaintiff has offered no evidence showing that she has a hearing impairment that

5 The court notes that even if these records were properly in evidence, they would appear
to be inconclusive on the issue of whether plaintiff's hearing impairment was substantially
limiting. The records, covering a period from approximately 1988 to 1997, indicate that plaintiff
had hearing problems in one or both ears, for which she wore a hearing aid, The records do not
show whether these hearing problems substantially limited one or more of plaintiff’s major lite
activities.

9



requests, then later rescinded her approval. Defendant denies that Womack had ever granted
plaintiff's request. According to defendant, plaintiff's first request was denied because plaintiff
was needed at work, and her second request was denied because plaintiff had insufficicnt leave.
Womack told plaintiff that she could not allow an employee leave without pay, and that she
always checked to make sure an employee had sufficient leave available. Plaintiff left work
without approval, and received a seven-day suspension.

According to plaintiff, she was required to work overtime, despite a medical restriction,*
on at least two occasions. One such occasion was October 10, 1998. Defendant denies that
plaintiff was required to work in excess of her scheduled number of hours al that time, noting
that when plaintiff was required to work on her regular day off, she was given a different day off
in return, Anderson also revised the holiday schedule to require plaintiff to work on January 16,
1999,

Supervisor Daniel Christensen lectured all the employees, including plaintiff, about
taking breaks at cither 9:00 or 11:10, but not both times. Christensen designated plaintiff as
“absent without leave” when she reported late to work, and denied her leave requests to cover
that ime. Christensen was aware that plaintiff had made EEO complaints against other
supervisors.

On March 22, 1999, Christensen required plaintiff to work in the express mail unit.
While plaintiff was there, Brooks came to plaintiff's work area, stood within one foot of her, and
stared at her.

In July 1999, supervisor Womack marked plaintiff as absent without leave when plaintiff

4 This medical restriction appears to be unrelated to plaintiff's hearing impairment.

6



had accepted similarly legible documents from plaintiff in the past. According to defendant,
plaintiff's request for leave was eventually granted, afler plaintiff provided adequate medical
support, Plaintiff claims that her pay was reduced from a level six to a level five, and her job
slatus was Jowered when she was unable to work in April 1998, She does not explain what these
reductions in pay and status entailed,

On April 23, 1998, Brooks required plaintiff to punch out carly for not following
instructions, and had her escorted out of the facility by the postal police. According to plaintiff,
Brooks had not given her suffictent time to complete the assignment as instructed. After
punching out on April 23, 1998, plaintiff did not report for work again until June 1998, even
though her Icave requests for that period were denicd.

From 1998 to March 2000, Anderson denicd some of plaintifi’s requests for injury
compensation lcave, family medical leave, and sick leave, designating these absences as “absent
without Jeave.” Plaintiff does not elaborale as to how many times this happened, or the
circumstances of the denials.

Jn June 1998, plant manager Gerald Kubick, Anderson, Brooks, Zoch, and steward James
Dixon met with plaintiff. At that meeting, the participants discussed letters plaintiff and her
mother had written, medical documentation plaintiff had submitted relating to stress and
depression, and plaintiff's EEO and postal police complaints, The managers also made jokes,
refused to grant plaintiff leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, advised plaintiff to trust
Brooks, and instructed plaintiff nol to write more letters.

On September 22 or 23, 1998, plaintiff submitted two requests for leave to go home early

due to illness. According to plaintiff, supervisor Martha Womack initially verbally granted the



57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7" Cir, 1995). An employee is considered disabled under the Act if she has
“(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) if [she] is regarded as having such an
impairment.” Id, “Major life activities” arc functions “such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, spcaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Id. Not
every impairment that affects a major life activity is a substantially limiting impairment: the
impairment must be significant. Id. The question of whether an employee is disabled under the
Act “is an individualized one, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id.

Defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence of a disability
to entitle her to relief under the Act. The court agrees. Plaintiff bases her discrimination claim
under the Rehabilitation Act on a hearing impairment, but offers no admissible evidence that
shows the extent to which that impairment affects a major life activity. Plaintiff only briefly
mentions her hearing impairment in a single paragraph of her Statement of Matenial Facts:

On March 10, 1998 Darlene Brooks, (hereinafter, “SDO Brooks”) became

Plaintiff's supervisor at which time the Plaintiff notified Ms. Brooks of her

disability...Brooks does not deny (although she cannot recall) that Plaintiff

informed her that she had a hearing impairment...Alter Plaintiff infonned Brooks

of her hearing impairment, Brooks gave Plaintiff a look that implied that Brooks

did not like anyone that was not “normal.”

Tn het brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues that she has
shown she is disabled through medical records containcd in exhibit 36 to her statement of
material facts.

The medical records contained in exhibit 36 are not cited in plaintiff's statement of

material facts. This omission contravenes Local Rule 56.1's requirement that partics supply the



) + , United States District Court, Northern District of [Minois

Name of Assigned Judge George W. Lindberg Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge > than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 4029 DATE 10/2/2002
CASE Denyce K, Atkins vs. John E. Potter
TITLE

[nthe following hox (a) indicate the party (iting the motion, c.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd pany plaintiff; and (b) state briefly the nature

opinion and order.

(11) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

MOTION: of the monion being presented

DOCKET ENTRY;

() O Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) QO Brief in support of motion due

Bg Oo Answer briefto motion due __, Reply to answer brief due

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on____ set for at

(3) a) Status hearing[held/continued to] [sct for/re-set for] on set for at

(6) ima} Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for‘ve-set for]on set for at

(7) o ‘Trial(set for/re-set forjon__— at

(8) oO [Beneh/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) ao ‘This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant lo]
OFRcP4(m) = C) Local Rule 41.1 OF RCp41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) [Other docket entry] Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Enter memorandum

Na notices required, advised in open court

Na notices required, .
‘tices require: uunbet of notices

Document
Number

Notices matted by judge's stat.

. OCT 0 4 2902
Notified counsel by telephone. das desked
wv | Dockcting to mail natices.
o& | Mail AO 450 form JMANF pee iy 39 ng deputy initials
2
Copy to judge/magisuate judge
, BOL tes dave mated ante
courtroum
SLB depuly's
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office soauling deputy sonal

5



Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff filed complaints alleging discrimination based
on her hearing impairment, or that those complaints constituted statutorily protected expression.
As this court determined in ils ruling on defendant’s first motion for summary judgment, some of
the actions about which plaintiff complains could constitute adverse employment actions. For
example, plaintifi’s 1998 scven-day suspension could constitute an adverse employment action.
See Biolchini v. General Elec. Co.,167 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7" Cir. 1999) (assuming that one-week
disciplinary suspension was a materially adverse employment action). Ln addition, repeatedly
denying requests for leave with pay, resulting in a loss of pay to the extent that an employee has
effectively been demoted, could constitute an adverse employment action. See Rabinovils v.
Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7" Cir. 1996). Finally, ordcring other cmployces not to talk to a co-
worker could constitute an adverse employment action, ifit rose to the level of shunning. See

McKenzie y. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 485 (7" Cir. 1996), However, as with plaintiff’s

retaliation claims based on complaints of race and gender discrimination, here plaintiff fails to
offer evidence that no other similarly situated cmployce who did not file a complaint of
discrimination was suspended, denied Icave requests, or shunned.

Plaintiff offers no proper evidence relating to other employces who left with or without
permission, (o show that she was treated differently than similarly situated employees with regard
to her 1998 suspension. Plaintiff's statement of facts notes only that “[p]lamtiff was treated
differcntly than other employees such as Toya Scott and Valerie Lewis (black, female non-
disabled), that left work and took Leave Without Pay.” This statement cites as support plaintiff's
declaration, in which plaintiff fails to offer a foundation that shows how this information was

within plaintifPs personal knowledge. Moreover, the statement fails to indicate whether Scott

ll



substantially limits one or more of her major life activities. Of course, her impairment need not
actually be substantially limiting, if her employer perceived it to be so. See Sanchez v.

Henderson, 188 F.3d 740, 744-45 (7" Cir. 1999) (citing Johnson v. American Chamber of

Commerce Publishers, 108 F.3d 818 (7" Cir. 1997)). “[T]he plaintiff must be regarded as having
a substantial impairment, not just any impairment.” Id. at 745. Although plaintiff offers
evidence that she placed Brooks on notice that she has a hearing impairment, she offers no
evidence that would show that Brooks perceived this mpairment to be substantially limiting.
Since plaintiff cannot show that she was actually disabled under the Rehabilitation Act, or that
she was perceived to be disabled, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's
discrimination claim brought under the Act.

B, Retaliation

Defendant also contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs retaliation
claim. To survive summary judgment where, as here, a plaintiff bas no direct evidence of
retaliation, the court looks to the McDormell Douglas analytical framework. Under that analysis,
a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating that (1) she
engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she was performing her job satisfactorily; (3) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) no other similarly situated employee who did not
file a complaint was subject to the adverse employment action. Sec Stone v. City of Indianapolis
Pub. Utils, Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7" Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 28, 2002)
(No. 02-16). If the plaintif makes this showing, the burden shifis to the defendant to state a
legitimate reason for the action. See id. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the

plaintiff to show that the defendant’s stated reason is pretextual. See id.

10



took her scheduled vacation. Later that month, Womack charged plaintiff with unscheduled
leave when plaintiff reported late to work. Womack had approved employee Ophelia Almon’s
same-day leave request, allowing Almon to leave early.

Supervisor Pamela Stmmons did not allow plaintiff to play a radio, but allowed other
cmployees to do so. According to plaintiff, Simmons confronted her and challenged her to a
fight; defendant denies that this cident occurred,

TI. Discussion

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [any] affidavits, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must draw alt reasonable inferences in favor of

the nonmoving parly. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000),

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no material issue exists for trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has properly
supported its motion, the nonmoving party must offer specific facts demonstrating that a material
dispute cxists, and must present more than a scintilla of evidence to support its position.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).

A. Discrimination
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits employers that receive federal financial assistance from
discriminating against qualified employees based on disability. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To

survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must meet the threshold burden

of establishing that she is disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp.,

4
7



defendant responds to plaintiff's facts that rest on these portions merely by denying that the facts
are supported by admissible evidence, those facts are deemed admitted. See LR56.1(a).
Defendant also notes that some of plaintiffs exhibits are her own unswom statements in
postal service forms: exhibits 5, 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 28, 30, 34, 38, 40, and 42. As this court stated
in its ruling on defendant's first motion for summary judgment, these forms are not sworn
affidavits, unsworn declarations that subject plaintiff to the penaltics of perjury, or otherwise
admissible evidence, and thus catmot be rclicd upon as support in her statement of material facts.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1746; Woods vy, City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 987-88

(7* Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 8. Ct. 354 (2001).

(1, Factual Background

Plaintiff began working for the Postal Service m 1985, and has been a clerk since 1988.
Between 1997 and 2000, plaintiff worked at the AMC O’Hare postal facility in Chicago, Illinois,
where she primarily worked on a flat sorter machine. On March 10, 1998, Darlene Brooks
became plaintiffs supervisor. According to plaintiff, al that time plaintiff informed Brooks that
she had a hearing impairment; Brooks does not recall plaintiff doing so.

Tn the months that followed, Brooks periodically sent plaintiff out of her unit of
assignment to work in other areas of the postal facility. In March 1998, Brooks threatened
plaintiff with discipline if plaintiff refused to work overtime. Although defendant disputes that
the following incidents occurred, according to plaintiff, in March 1998 Brooks also accused
plaintiff, in front of co-workers, of unnecessarily stopping the flat sorter machine; issued her a

warning letter for failing to follow instructions; and shouted instructions in her face.

On March 30, 1998, plaintiff requested an appointment with a Postal Service LEO



isolate any other employees.” However, plaintiff's only support for her claim that talking among
employees was not generally discouraged, is Brooks’ testimony that it would not violate a
regulation for keyers to talk to each other while a jam in the machine was being cleared, if they
had already fully loaded the machine with mail for when it started again. This is not evidence
that keyers in that situation would not nevertheless be discouraged from talking to cach other
while a jam was clearcd. Nor does plaintiff present cvidence as to whether employees were
allowed to talk when their machine was not jammed.

Plaintiff’s evidence of co-workers being discouraged from talking to plaintiff hardly rises
to the level of shunning, and plaintiff provides no evidence that other employces were treated
differently than she was. Therefore, if plaintiff's claim that defendant directed other cmployces
not to talk to her even amounted to an adverse action, her retaliation claim based on this
contention does not survive summary judgment.

Plaintiff has failed to offer cvidence that no other similarly situated employee who did not
file a complaint of discrimination was suspended, denied leave requests, or shunned. Since
plaintiff has failed to establish this element of the prima facie case, her retaliation claim docs not
survive summary judgment under this analysis, See Hilt-Dyson, 282 I'.3d at 465 (the inability to
prove even a single element of the prima facie case is fulal to a retaliation claim).

As she did in relation to her Title VL claims, plaintiff urges this court to consider the
entire course of conduct that she alleges when analyzing her retaliation claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, rather than merely the individual incidents that may constitute materially
adverse employment actions. ‘Io maintain an actionable claim under a theory that defendant's

conduct created a hostile work environment, and thus constituted retaliation in violation of the

14



incidents plaintilf alleges, cven considered collectively, are not sufficiently severe and pervasive
to be actionable, Accordingly, summary judgment is entered in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s
retaliation claim in Count II.

ORDERED: Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [32-1] is granted.

ENTER:

George W. Lindberg
Senior United States District Judge

DATED: OCT 02 2002

16



such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to Lestify to the matters stated therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Absent supporting

evidence, “[c]onclusory allegations by the party opposing [a summary judgment] motion cannot

defeat the motion.” Aberman v. J. Abouchar & Sons, Inc., 160 F.3d 1148, 1150 (7" Cir. 1998)
(quoting Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317, 320 (7" Cir. 1995)).

The statements in plaintiff's declaration regarding how supervisors treated cmployees
other than plaintiff lack foundations that show how this information was within plaintiff's
personal knowledge. l’or example, in onc paragraph of the declaration, plaintiff states that
“Brooks instructed employees Toya Neal-Scott and Tia Holmes to work overtime but they fuiled
to do so and did not receive any discipline,” In another paragraph, plaintiff states that “[a] part-
time sub-clerk, Regina Walker (black, female, non-disabicd) and other employees such as Toya
Neal-Scott (black, female, non-disabled), repeatedly refused SDO Brooks’ same instructions on
or about March 17, and March 24, 1998 but did not receive Letters of Wamings [sic] from SDO
Brooks.” The following paragraphs contain such deficient statements: 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14,
15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 48, 50, 53, 54,
55, and 56. Although the court is mindful that pro se pleadings should be given a liberal

construction, see Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7" Cir. 1998), these deficiencies arc

not mere technicalities that the court can overlook. Accordingly, the court will disregard
plaintiff’s statements of fact that cite as support the deficient portions of plaintiffs declaration.
Lowever, plaintiffs entire declaration docs not sulfer from these deficiencies. Some

portions of the declaration offer evidence that is within plamliff's personal knowledge. Where

> Some portions of plaintiff's declaration also contain hearsay.

2



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
DENYCE K. ATKINS, ) _
) ae si
Plaintiff, ) :
~~ 9)
. 01 € 4029 Doeerren
) Judge George W. Lindberg OCT 4 2092
JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General, ) ©
United States Postal Service, )
) 3.
Defendant. )

wind
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is dcfendant’s sccond motion for summary judgment. This motion seeks
judgment on Counts [ and JI of plaintiffs amended complaint,! which allege discrimination,
harassment, and retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the
reasons stated below, the motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts

As a preliminary matter, the couri must consider defendant’s argument that much of
plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts is not supported with admissible evidence. Defendant
takes issue with plaintiff's declaration (plaintiff's exhibit 25), which defendant contends should
not be used to support plaintiff's claim that she was treated differently than her fellow
employees. The court agrees that portions of plaintiff's declaration do not comply with the rules
governing summary judgment motions.

“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

' On July 31, 2002, this court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to
the remaining counts of plaintiff's amended complaint. The courl granted defendant leave to file

asecond motion for summary judgment on August 6, 2002.



and Lewis had previously filed complaints or the circumstances under which they left work.
Since plaintiff has failed to show that defendant treated plaintiff differently than other similarly
situated employces in suspending her, her retaliation claim fails, to the extent that it is based on
plaintiff's suspension.

Nor does plaintiff show that similarly situated employees were treated differently in
response to their leave requests. Plaintiff claims that three supervisors® unfairly denied her leave
requests. First, plaintiff contends that supervisor Anderson disapproved leave requests submitted
by plaintiff between 1998 and March 2000, but that he approved leave requests of employee
Belinda Carroll-Nelson, Plaintiff cites her own declaration in support of this statement, but fails
to indicate her basis of knowledge regarding Carroll-Nelson’s requests, or whether Carroll-
Nelson had previously made complaints.

Plaintiff also claims that supervisor Womack unfairly denied plaintiff's leave requests.
Plaintiff states that Womack refused to allow her to use leave to make up time when she was
tardy, while Womack approved employee Ophelia Almon’s same-day request to leave work
early. Plaintiff states, without support, that Almon had not filed an EEO claim. Even if there
were admissible evidence showing that Almon had not filed. any complaints, however, Almon
nevertheless is not a similarly situated employee. Asking permission to leave early is quite a
different situation from asking to cover a tardy arrival alter the fact. Although plaintiff claims
that Womack also approved scheduled leave for employee Belinda Carroll-Nelson after Carroll-

Nelson arrived late for work, plaintiff offers no admissible evidence in support of this claim.

® Plaintiff alleges that a fourth supervisor, Zoch, also denied plaintiff's leave requests in
January 1999, but Zoch apparently later approved the requests.

12



Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff must demonstrate harassment “that is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of [her] cmployment.” See Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 804 (7"
Cir. 1999). The working environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive. Id. al
805. Factors relevant to the inquiry of whether conduct creates an objectively hostile work
environment include the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it was
physically threatening or humiliating; or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an cmployee’s work performance.” Id. at 804.

Plaintiff argues that when considered collectively, the various supervisors’ actions she
alleges amount to severe and pervasive harassment. These actions include removing plaintiff
from her unit of assignment to work in other areas; accusing plainti{f of shutting off a machine;
issuing her a warning letter for failing to obey instructions, directing her to perform minor extra
duties; reprimanding her for idleness; kecping her at the same assignment for an entire shift;
following her; shouting at her; requiring her to leave work carly; lecturing her (and other
employees) about taking too many breaks; requiring her to work two of her regular days off,’ for
which she apparently was paid and which apparently did not result in a change of
responsibilities; and refusing to let her play a radio at work. As this court concluded in its ruling

on defendant’s first motion for summary judgment, relating to plaintiff's Title VII claims, the

7 Although plaintiff claims that supervisors Melvin Anderson and Christine Allen
“continuously required Plaintiff to work overtime, regardless of medical restrictions,” that
Anderson required plaintiff to work overtime and holidays “on many occasions,” and that
Anderson required plaintiff to work overtime “throughout 1998, 1999, and 2000,” plaintiff offers
no specific evidence to support claims other than that she was required to work overtime on
October 10, 1998 and January 16, 1999, According to defendant, plaintiff was given different
days off at those times, resulting in no gain in weekly hours, although defendant offers proper
evidence on this point only as to plaintiff's October 10, 1998 claim.

15