immediately ended Young’s assignment. On November 3, 2000, Young filed a second charge of
discrimination against Ameritech, claiming retaliation.
DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once a moving party has met its
burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798
(7th Cir. 1999). The court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d
969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 US. 242, 248 (1986). The summary judgment standard is applied with special scrutiny to
employment discrimination cases because the outcome may depend on determinations of credibility
and intent. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).
Il. Young’s Sex and Race Discrimination Claims

Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an
employee in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment based on the employee’s sex or race.
42 US.C. § 2000e-2(a). “The same standards governing liability under Title VII apply to § 1981
claims.” Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998). In order

to prove a case of discrimination, Young must offer either direct or indirect evidence. Pafford v.


decision to increase her responsibilities and pay. See Velasco v. Illinois Department of Human
Services, 246 F.3d 1010, 1018 (7th Cir. 2001)(temporal proximity does not create a question of fact
where the plaintiff's performance is called into question prior to filing of charge of discrimination).

Young also disputes the legitimacy of the complaints leading to her termination. Response
at 12-13. However, “[s]elf-serving statements do not shed any light on whether the employer
honestly based its employment decision on performance-related considerations, which is the focus
of our inquiry in these cases.” Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 363 (7th Cir. 1998),
quoting Dey, 28 F.3d at 1460 (7th Cir. 1994), Young has not presented evidence that the Ameritech
employees reporting her behavior harbored any discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Dey, 28 F.3d
at 1459. Therefore, Young has ultimately failed to carry her burden of establishing pretext.

CONCLUSION

Young has not presented any evidence that Ameritech’s decisions to reduce her pay and

terminate her assignment rested upon a legally forbidden ground. Ameritech is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law on all claims advanced by Young.

August 2, 2002 ENTER:

f

Si fe B. Conlon
United States District Judge


Prior to her reduction in pay, Young was performing supervisory duties. Although Young
claims Kunstman “never cut another ‘temporary’ employee’s pay,” Young fails to show the
unidentified temporary employees performed similar supervisory duties. See Sarsha v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. , 3 F.3d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 1993)(supervisors not similarly situated to subordinate
employees). Young likewise fails to show any temporary employee, including Scott, was involved
in two separate altercations within a two week period, but was not terminated. Absent evidence that
similarly situated non-African-American and/or male temporary employees were treated more
favorably, Young cannot establish a prima facie case of sex and/or race discrimination.

I. Young’s Retaliation Claim

Title VI prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who oppose unlawful
employment practices covered by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The same standards apply to
Young’s § 1981 claim. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1035. In order to prevail on a claim of retaliation,
Young must offer either direct or indirect evidence. Smart v. Ball State University, 89 F.3d 437, 439
(7th Cir. 1996). Young once again relies on the burden-shifting method set forth in McDonnell
Douglas to establish her retaliation claim. 5

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Young must show: (1) she engaged in
statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal
connection exists between the protected expression and the adverse action. Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d
249, 265 (7th Cir. 2001). Ameritech contends Young’s complaints prior to the filing of her charge
of discrimination are not protected by Title VII.

Prior to filing a charge of discrimination, Young complained about Scott’s behavior. In her

complaints, Young never suggested that Scott called her a “retard” or secretly placed a mailing label


Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir. 1998). Young does not offer any direct evidence that
Ameritech reduced her pay or terminated her employment based on her sex or race. Instead, she
relies on the burden-shifting method set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), to establish her sex and race discrimination claims.

In order to establish a prima facie case of sex or race discrimination, Young must show: (1)
she belongs to a protected class; (2) she met her employer’s legitimate performance expectations;
(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the employer treated similarly situated
employees outside the class more favorably. Bragg v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 164 F.3d 373,
376 (7th Cir. 1998). If Young establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of
production shifts to Ameritech to produce a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse
employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If Ameritech sets forth a legitimate
justification, the burden then shifts back to Young to prove that Ameritech’s reason is a mere pretext
for discrimination. Jd. at 804.

Ameritech claims Young cannot point to any similarly situated employee who was treated
more fayorably. In order to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case of discrimination,
Young must “show that there is someone [outside her protected class] who is directly comparable
to her in all material respects.” Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir.
2002). Specifically, Young must establish the employee: (1) held the same or similar employment
position; (2) had a similar employment history; and (3) engaged in similar misconduct giving rise
to the employment action. Mora v. Chicago Tribune, 57 F.Supp.2d 626, 635 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff'd

215 F.3d 1330 (7th Cir. 2000). Young fails to meet her burden.


Young may establish pretext either directly, by showing Ameritech’s decision to terminate
was more likely than not motivated by discriminatory reasons, or indirectly, by showing that
Ameritech’s reasons are unworthy of belief. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S, 248, 256 (1981); Worth, 276 F.3d at 265-66. “The indirect method requires some showing that
(1) the defendant’s explanation has no basis in fact or (2) the explanation was not the real reason,
or (3) the reason stated was insufficient to warrant the termination.” Worth, 276 F.3d at 266. Young
has not presented any direct evidence of pretext. Therefore, she must show that Ameritech lied about
its reasons for terminating her assignment.

Young first claims Ameritech’s reasons for her termination are suspect because Kunstman
denied knowing Young filed a charge of discrimination until after her termination. Response at 11-
12. Although Kunstman’s testimony may be called into question at trial, the court cannot resolve
issues of credibility on summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. Rather, the court
accepts Young’s version of events, including her claim that she told Kunstman about the charge
before her termination, as true. Jd.

Young next claims the timing of Ameritech’s actions supports an inference of pretext.
Specifically, Young claims her termination came just weeks after Ameritech gave her supervisory
responsibilities with a corresponding increase in pay. Response at 12. In contrast to the defendants
in the cases cited by Young, Ameritech was not aware of any performance deficiencies at the time
Young’s responsibilities and pay were increased. See Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446,
1461 (7th Cir. 1994); Melton v. Five Four Corp., No. 99 C 1274, 2000 WL 97568, at * 13 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 25, 2000). Indeed, Young was subsequently warned her behavior could lead to termination.

Under these circumstances, Ameritech’s decision to terminate Young is consistent with its previous


‘

Minute Order Form (06/97)

Tee

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Suzanne B. Conlon than “Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 2987 DATE 8/2/2002
CASE TAWANNA MARIE YOUNG vs. AMERITECH, INC.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented,]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(3) i) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) o Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(C3) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for} on set for at
(6) od Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
1”) oO Trial[set for/re-set for} on at
(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) (ClGeneral Rule21 CIFRCP41(a)(1) [1 FRCP41(a)(2).

do oi [Other docket entry]  Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [41-1] is granted. Defendant’s

motion to strike portions of plaintiffs affidavit in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary

judgment [ ,is moot. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.
(1) {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
qi! number of notices:

V_ | Notices maited by judge’s staff. iG 0 > 2000
Notified counsel by telephone, dare docketed
Docketing to mail notices, pnw

7_| Mail 40450 form, declating dpa na

isia‘S'n
a)

Vat

tuned Lon
:

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom nyth Hg 2- One 68
deputy’s

initials

CB pw

Datelipecceuedia ss =

central Clerk’s Office railing deputy initials



on her back because she is an African-American woman. Nor did she ever suggest Ameritech did
not adequately respond to her complaints because of her sex or race. Therefore, Young’s complaints
prior to the filing of her charge of discrimination do not rise to the level of protected expression for
purposes of Title VII. See Driver y. Arbor Management, Inc., No. 00 C 3933, 2001 WL 1183291,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2001)(“By definition, the complaints at issue are not statutorily protected
expression-for that purpose the expression must at least suggest to the employer (if not state
outright) that the employee reasonably believes that she is being treated in a discriminatory manner
because of her race or other protected classification”).

Although Ameritech concedes Young’s charge of discrimination constitutes protected
expression, Ameritech claims Young has not demonstrated a causal connection between the charge
and her termination. Contrary to Ameritech’s position, the close temporal proximity between
Young’s charge of discrimination on October 25, 2000 and the decision to terminate her assignment
on October 30, 2000 is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. McClendon v. Indiana
Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the burden of production shifts to
Ameritech to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Young’s termination.

Young does not dispute that Ameritech has presented a legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for her termination. Indeed, Ameritech’s burden of production is “quite light” and “the mere
articulation of the reason . . . puts the onus back on the plaintiff to prove pretext.” Flores v.
Preferred Technical Group, 182 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1999). Ameritech claims Young’s
assignment was terminated based on her inability to get along with Ameritech employees. The
burden then shifts back to Young to show that Ameritech’s reasons for her termination are

pretextual.


On October 12, 2000, Pell and Kunstman met with Bruce and DeSena to discuss Ameritech’s
temporary services arrangement with Parker Cromwell. The group also met with Young to discuss
her complaints against Scott. During the meeting, Young reiterated her belief that Ameritech’s
response was insufficient. Later that day, DeSena counseled Scott about his behavior. Beginning
October 16, 2000, Young’s pay was reduced to $10.00 per hour.

Shortly thereafter, two African-American female employees complained to Ameritech
supervisor Dina Desano that Young glared at them in the parking lot while extending both middle
fingers for over 30 seconds. After Desano reported the incident to Kunstman, they spoke with
Young about the complaint. Young denied the allegations. Nevertheless, Kunstman counseled
Young that the alleged behavior was unacceptable. Desano warned Young that if the conduct
occurred again, her assignment would be terminated.

On October 25, 2000, Young filed a charge of discrimination against Ameritech, alleging
race and sex discrimination. At the time, Kunstman was on vacation. According to Young, she
informed Kunstman of the charge when she returned from vacation on Monday, October 30, 2000.
Kunstman denies Young told her about the charge.

While Kunstman was on vacation, Ameritech manager Margaret Kielbasa observed Young
yelling at an Ameritech employee. Kielbasa reported Young’s conduct to Kunstman upon her return
from vacation. Kunstman then informed DeSena that she wished to terminate Young’s assignment
with Ameritech. DeSena confirmed Young’s assignment would end on Friday, November 3, 2000.

On November 2, 2000, Scott complained to Kunstman that Young was ignoring him. When

Kunstman confronted Young about her conduct, Young responded, “whatever.” Kunstman


account. Parker Cromwell senior staffing coordinator Maria DeSena was responsible for hiring and
placing temporary employees at Ameritech.

On August 25, 2000, Parker Cromwell assigned Young to work in the Center’s mailroom.
Young’s job duties included opening returned mail, batching mail for processing and typing
addresses on mail labels. The Center’s office manager Barbara Kunstman, who is a Caucasian
woman, supervised Young in her temporary assignment. Kunstman reported to Mark Pell, director
of the Center.

Kunstman found Young to be a “good worker” and “flexible.” Kunstman told Parker
Cromwell that Young “was doing a wonderful job” and her performance was “very good” and
“excellent.” Kunstman reported to Pell that Young was a “good employee.”

In late September 2000, Kunstman asked Young to oversee the work in the mailroom.
Effective October 2, 2000, Young’s pay was increased from $10.00 to $11.50 per hour. According
to Ameritech, Young was given the supervisory role and corresponding pay increase based on a
temporary increase in the volume of work in the mailroom. According to Young, Kunstman raised
her salary to reward her for her performance.

In early October 2000, Young told Kunstman that another Parker Cromwell temporary
employee Joseph Scott, who is a Caucasian male, called her a “retard” and surreptitiously placed a
mailing label on her back. Kunstman arranged a meeting with Young and Scott. During the
meeting, Kunstman reprimanded Scott for his inappropriate and childish behavior. At Kunstman’s
request, Scott apologized to Young. Young was not satisfied with Kunstman’s response. Young

asked Kunstman to reassign Scott. Scott was not reassigned.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
TAWANNA MARIE YOUNG, )
Plaintiff, ; No. 01 C 2987
v. } Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
AMERITECH, INC., } DOCKETED
Defendant. } AUG.0 5 2002

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Tawanna Marie Young (“Young”) sues Ameritech, Inc. (“Ameritech”) and Oja Enterprises,
Inc. (“Oja”)(collectively, “defendants”) for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII’), 42 U.S.C. § 2000¢ et seg. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981"). Specifically, Young
claims defendants reduced her pay and then terminated her employment based on her sex and race
and in retaliation for opposing discrimination. The court previously dismissed the complaint against
Oja with prejudice. Ameritech now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.

BACKGROUND

All facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Young, who is an African-American
woman, worked for Oja, a temporary service agency doing business as Parker Cromwell &
Associates (“Parker Cromwell”). In late July or early August 2000, Parker Cromwell began
providing temporary employees to work in Ameritech’s Long Distance Support Center (“the

Center”). Parker Cromwell general manager Suzanne Bruce was responsible for the Ameritech