Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1704-JT-671 | Septemeber 26, 2017 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Victoria L. Bailey

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Aaron T. Craft

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re Termination of the ParentChild Relationship of: J.T., 

Dt.W., and Dc.W. (Minor 

Children), 

and

T.D. (Mother), 

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner, 

and 

September 26, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1704-JT-671

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court 

The Honorable A. Marilyn 

Moores, Judge

The Honorable Larry E. Bradley, 

Magistrate 

Trial Court Cause Nos.

49D09-1511-JT-672

49D09-1511-JT-673

49D09-1511-JT-674
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1704-JT-671 | Septemeber 26, 2017 Page 2 of 13

Child Advocates, Inc., 

Appellee-Guardian ad Litem. 

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary 

[1] Appellant-Respondent T.D. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to Dc.W. and Dt.W. She raises the following 

restated issue on appeal: whether the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) 

presented sufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights to 

Dt.W. and Dc.W. Specifically, Mother contends that the juvenile court 

erroneously found that termination was in Dc.W.’s and Dt.W’s best interests. 

Concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support the termination order, we 

affirm. 

Discussion and Decision 

[2] Mother is the biological parent of Dc.W., who was born November 4, 2011, 

Dt.W., who was born June 22, 2010, and J.T., who was born on July 28, 2006.1 

On January 17, 2012, DCS filed a verified petition alleging Dc.W., then a two-

 

1 Mother does not appeal the termination of her parental rights with respect to J.T. The children have 

different biological fathers. The parental rights of the fathers were also terminated, but they do not 

participate in this appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1704-JT-671 | Septemeber 26, 2017 Page 3 of 13

month-old child with special needs, to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) 

due to medical neglect. An initial hearing was held that day, and Dc.W. was 

initially permitted to remain in the home. 

[3] On January 26, 2012, the juvenile court issued an order removing Dc.W. from 

the home and placing him into foster care. That same day, DCS filed a verified 

petition alleging that J.T. and Dt.W., Dc.W.’s older brothers, were CHINS. 

The juvenile court held an initial hearing that day and ordered that Dt.W. and 

J.T. also be placed in foster care. 

[4] On February 21, 2012, the juvenile court found that the children were CHINS 

based on Mother’s admission. A dispositional hearing for Mother was held the 

same day. Dc.W.’s father agreed with Mother’s admission but asked that the 

disposition be set a few weeks later after he established paternity. His 

dispositional hearing was held on March 5, 2012. 

[5] On May 1, 2012, the juvenile court held a periodic review hearing—Dc.W.’s 

father did not attend because he was in jail for physically assaulting Mother. 

On November 13, 2012, the court held the first permanency hearing. DCS 

recommended that the permanency plan remain reunification in view of the 

parents’ progress up to that point, and the juvenile court agreed. 

[6] On February 19, 2013, a periodic review hearing was held. Mother did attend 

the hearing, but she was not actively engaging in services or visiting the children 

at that time because she had moved to Michigan in November of 2012 with 

Dc.W.’s father. 
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[7] A second permanency hearing was held on May 28, 2013. DCS recommended 

that the permanency hearing plan be changed to adoption and the guardian ad 

litem (“GAL”) agreed. At that point, the parents had not completed services, 

Mother had not seen the children since her November 2012 move to Michigan, 

and the children were doing very well in their foster care placement. DCS 

initiated termination proceedings with respect to all three children in June 

2013.2 

[8] By the time of the September 10, 2013, periodic review hearing, Mother and 

Dc.W.’s father had returned to Indianapolis and were engaging in services. In 

January of 2014, DCS dismissed the original termination proceedings due to 

Mother’s and Dc.W.’s father’s cooperation and compliance with services. 

[9] On April 8, 2014, the juvenile court held another permanency hearing. The 

permanency plan was changed back to reunification, over the GAL’s objection. 

On September 16, 2014, the juvenile court issued a no-contact order barring 

contact between Mother and Dc.W.’s father and between Dc.W.’s father and 

the children, because he had attacked Mother.3 

[10] On April 17, 2015, the GAL filed a motion to suspend Mother’s unsupervised 

visitation with the children after Mother was seen with Dc.W.’s father in 

 

2 Mother has at least one other biological child who is not a part of this particular case. 

3 There is also evidence in the record that Dc.W.’s father abused J.T. causing him to suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder, reactive attachment disorder, and other severe behavioral issues. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1704-JT-671 | Septemeber 26, 2017 Page 5 of 13

violation of the no-contact order. DCS objected to the motion because it 

wanted to give Mother another chance due to all the progress she had made on 

other fronts. On April 28, 2015, the juvenile court denied the GAL’s motion. 

[11] On September 1, 2015, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing. Mother 

and Dc.W.’s father came to the hearing together despite the no-contact order. 

Several days before the hearing, Dc.W.’s father violated the no-contact order 

when he was present in Mother’s home during an unsupervised visit intended to 

be between Mother and the children. The juvenile court ordered that Mother’s 

visits be fully supervised due to concerns about Mother not being able to keep 

the children safe. 

[12] During an October 6, 2015, permanency hearing, the juvenile court changed the 

permanency plan from reunification back to adoption. The juvenile court noted 

that the matter had been open since January 2012 and Mother had not 

successfully completed services. While Mother had participated in some 

services, she had not demonstrated a willingness or an ability to protect her 

children from their abuser, allowing Dc.W.’s father to have contact in violation 

of the no-contact order. 

[13] On November 5, 2015, DCS filed a petition for involuntary termination of 

parental rights with respect to Mother and all three children, Dc.W. and his 

father, and Dt.W. and his biological father.4 A four-day trial was held on 

 

4 The parent-child relationship between J.T. Sr., and J.T. had been severed on October 24, 2013. 
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August 22 and 23, 2016, and February 21 and 22, 2017. Mother attended the 

first day of trial via telephone and the second day of trial in person. Mother, 

however, did not attend the last two days of trial. Dc.W.’s father attended only 

part of the first day of trial via telephone. 

[14] On March 9, 2017, the juvenile court issued an order terminating the parentchild relationships between Mother and all three children, Dc.W. and his 

father, and Dt.W. and his father. In doing so, the juvenile court made the 

following pertinent specific findings: 

44. The three children have been placed with the same foster 

parents since January of 2012, and this placement is preadoptive.

45. [Dt.W. and Dc.W.] were seeing a behavior specialist from 

April of 2016, due to difficulties with severe temper outbursts and 

tantrums.

46. [Dt.W] is cognitively struggling in school and is speech 

delayed. He has an Individualized Educational Program set up 

for him at school and he has an academic aide. He is on three 

medications.

47. [Dc.W.] was a failure to thrive baby but his foster parents 

caught his weight up in a month. He sees six doctors and has two 

medications presented for his behavior issues. [5]

 

5 Dc.W. weighed four to five pounds when he was removed from the home at two-months old. He was also 

very sick. The foster parents had to take him to approximately twelve doctors during the first three months 

that he was in their home to help get him to a normal weight and improve his health. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1704-JT-671 | Septemeber 26, 2017 Page 7 of 13

****

58. The children’s caregivers work with providers and they 

follow the same behavior program from school to provide 

structure, stability, and predictability.

59. The foster parents are advocates toward meeting the 

children’s intense special needs.

60. The children have been observed as being very bonded to 

their preadoptive foster parents. [J.T.] has been placed with the 

family one-half of his life, and [Dt.W.] and [Dc.W.] for most of 

their lives.

61. Continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to 

the children’s well-being. It would stand as a barrier to having the 

children adopted, after five years of being wards, into the home

where they have bonded and are having all their needs met. If 

placed back with their mother, it is not known if she would be 

able to provide for the children’s basic or special needs on a 

twenty-four seven basis, or provide the stability the children must 

have.

62. Without continued structure and stability, the children’s 

behaviors could regress.

63. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the removal and continued placement of the children 

outside the home will not be remedied by their mother. Although 

[Mother] made good progress in services until the end of 2015, it 

is clear that she was not willing to give up her relationship with 

[Dc.W.’s father] and provide a safe environment, emotionally 

and physically, in which to appropriately parent.
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****

66. Family Case Manager Phyllis Clemons has been on the 

CHINS case for four years. She recommends adoption given the 

five-year length of the CHINS case, and the children thriving, 

and being bonded, in their placement which is nurturing and 

loving.

67. Mark Bass has been the children’s Guardian ad Litem since 

the CHINS opened. He agrees with the plan of adoption as being 

in the children’s best interests given the children’s bond and 

having their special needs met.

68. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best 

interests of the children. Termination would allow them to be 

adopted into a stable and permanent home in which they have 

resided for much of their lives, and where their basic and special 

needs will continue to be safely met. 

69. There exists a satisfactory plan for the future care and 

treatment of the children, that being adoption

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 59-60. 

Discussion and Decision 

[15] This court has long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases 

concerning the termination of parental rights. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2001). When reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we 

will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most 

favorable to the judgment. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1704-JT-671 | Septemeber 26, 2017 Page 9 of 13

2004), trans. denied. Thus, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the 

credibility of the witnesses. Id. We will only set aside the court judgment 

terminating a parent-child relationship if it is clearly erroneous. In re B.J., 879 

N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

[16] The traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise her children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). 

Furthermore, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the 

most valued relationships of our culture.” Id. However, parental rights are not 

absolute and the law allows for the termination of such rights when a parent is 

unable or unwilling to meet her responsibilities as a parent. In re T.F., 743 

N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans denied. The purpose of terminating 

parental rights is to protect the child, not to punish the parent. Id. The juvenile

court may terminate the parental rights if the child’s emotional and physical 

development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child 

has suffered from irreversible harm. Id.

[17] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS is 

required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: 

(A) one (1) of the following exists:

(i) the child has been removed from the parent for at least 

six (6) months under a dispositional decree;

(ii) a court has entered a finding under IC 31–34–21–5.6 

that reasonable efforts for family preservation or 

reunification are not required, including a description of 
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the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner 

in which the finding was made; or

(iii) the child has been removed from the parent and has 

been under the supervision of a county office of family and 

children or probation department for at least fifteen (15) 

months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, 

beginning with the date the child is removed from the 

home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in 

need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS’s burden of proof for establishing these

allegations in a termination case is one of “clear and convincing evidence.” In 

re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009). 

[18] Mother argues that the juvenile court’s order terminating the parental rights as 

to Dc.W. and Dt.W. was clearly erroneous. Specifically, Mother argues that 

the findings of facts do not support its conclusion that termination is in the 

children’s best interests. 
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[19] Mother argues that the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination is in 

Dc.W.’s and Dt.W.’s best interests is “mere speculation.” Appellant’s Br. p. 

14. When reviewing such claims, we are mindful of the fact that the juvenile 

court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the 

totality of the circumstances. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 

798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, this court must 

subordinate the interest of the parent of the child involved. Id. Children’s need 

for permanency is a “central consideration in determining the [children’s] best 

interests.” K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn Cty. Office, 989 N.E.2d 

1225, 1235 (Ind. 2013). Further, the Indiana Supreme Court has acknowledged 

that “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward 

preservation or reunification—and courts ‘need not wait until the child is 

irreversibly harmed such that the child’s physical, mental and social 

development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child 

relationship.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 648 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 

N.E.2d at 1235). 

[20] In addressing whether termination was in Dt.W’s and Dc.W.’s best interests, 

we note that the DCS Family Case Manager and the GAL testified that 

termination was in their best interests. Such testimony is sufficient to support 

the juvenile court’s conclusion in this regard. See In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 

170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). However, additional evidence further supports the 

juvenile court’s conclusion. Dc.W. and Dt.W. have been in foster care for 

more than five and a half years. Mother has failed to maintain a consistent and 
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positive relationship with Dc.W. and Dt.W. throughout the CHINS case. She 

has not visited them since December of 2015. There was also a period from 

November 2012 to May 2013 where she moved to Michigan. Furthermore, the 

record shows that Mother consistently put her relationship with Dc.W.’s father 

ahead of the health and safety of her own children.

[21] The service providers further testified that the children would be seriously 

endangered in Mother’s care despite all of their efforts to help Mother with

reunification. The record shows that Mother’s relationship with Dc.W.’s father 

was often a priority over the needs and safety of her children. These findings 

indicate Mother is uninterested or unwilling to put her children’s needs and 

safety first. 

[22] Moreover, establishing permanency for Dc.W. and Dt.W. was repeatedly 

expressed as a reason for termination given their special needs. Dc.W. and 

Dt.W. both have severe behavioral issues and have been seeing a behavior 

specialist since April 2016. Dc.W. has a “terrible temper” and will head-butt 

and pinch to the point that he cannot be controlled. Tr. Vol. III p. 101. When 

they started seeing the behavior specialist, Dc.W. and Dt.W. would not listen 

and would throw severe temper tantrums. Dt.W. was struggling with the same 

aggressive behaviors at school, striking teachers and peers when he got angry. 

Their development is delayed and they behavior is consistent with that of a 

younger child. The foster parents and specialist worked together at home and 

at school to provide the children with structure, consistency, and predictability. 

Dt.W. and Dc.W. have shown considerable improvement due to those efforts. 
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However, the behavior specialist testified that if the stability, consistency, 

security, and predictability is taken away, it is likely that they behaviors will 

regress and the aggression and defiance will return. The record contains clear 

and convincing evidence that Mother is not capable of providing Dt.W. and 

Dc.W. with the care they need to have a safe and stable life. 

[23] The totality of the evidence demonstrates that the juvenile court’s conclusion 

that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Dc.W.’s and Dt.W.’s best 

interests is not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2001) (holding that the record contained sufficient evidence that 

termination of the parents’ rights was in the best interests of the children). 

Consequently, we find sufficient evidence in the record to support the juvenile 

court’s conclusion that DCS proved the statutory elements by clear and 

convincing evidence. Mother is essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence as 

it pertains to the children’s best interests, which we will not do. In re N.G., 51 

N.E.3d 1167, 1170 (Ind. 2016). 

[24] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to Dc.W. and Dt.W. 

May, J., and Barnes, J., concur.