alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed February 15, 2023

. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D22

- 138 Lower Tribunal No. 21

- 7112

________________



### Yavor Efremov , Appellant,

vs. 

### Motorsport Network, LLC, etc. , Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami

- Dade County, William Thomas , Judge. Clarke Silverglate, P.A., and Craig Salner and Karen H. Curtis, for appellant. AXS Law Group, PLLC, and Jeffrey W. Gutchess , for appellee.

Before LOGUE, SCALES, and BOKOR , JJ. PER CURIAM. We find no error in the trial court’s determination that the contract terms
at issue warranted the granting of the Appellee’s motion for summary2 judgment. Shivdasani v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 306 So. 3d 1156, 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“Courts cannot disregard ... agreed

- upon, contractual provisions between parties. To do so would be to strik e the ... obligations from the contract by way of judicial fiat and the bargained

- for contractual terms would be rendered surplusage. ” ). In addition, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to amend its complaint. In the last weeks before the summary judgment hearing, Appellant sought to add counts maintaining that the contract provisions he had reli ed upon in the litigation up to that point in time did not reflect the parties’ intent and must be reformed on account of mutual or unilateral mistake. The trial court properly found that the amendment would be both untimely and futile. Vella v. Salaues , 2 90 So. 3d 946, 949 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). Accordingly, we affirm the well

- reasoned judgment of the trial court.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Prakash Agarwal, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of NeoMagic Corporation on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended July 31, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of NeoMagic Corporation.



Date: September 10, 2004



By:

/s/ Prakash AgarwalName:

Prakash AgarwalTitle:

Chief Executive Officer
#### Oswald Wilson, Respondent, v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., et al., Appellants. (And Another Action.)

— In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for injury to plaintiff’s reputation due to libel, defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jones, J.), dated January 26, 1984, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Order reversed, on the law, with costs, motion for summary judgment granted, and complaint dismissed.

Plaintiff commenced the instant action specifically alleging that a certain letter written to him by the individual defendant, an attorney in the legal department of the corporate defendant, contained libelous statements. However, a plaintiff suing in libel, who does not adequately plead or prove special damages, as in the instant case, must establish that the defamatory statements “ ‘ “tend * * * to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society” ’ ” *(Matherson v Marchello,*100 AD2d 233, 236, quoting from *Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston,*42 NY2d 369, 379, *cert denied*434 US 969, quoting further from *Sydney v Macfadden Newspaper Pub. Corp.,*242 NY 208, 211-212). The challenged letter herein is simply a business communication concerning plaintiff’s failure to pay an alleged debt; the statements complained of fall short of defamation as a matter of law *(cf. Moran v Hearst Corp.,*40 NY2d 1071, 1072; *James v Gannett Co.,*40 NY2d 415, *rearg denied*40 NY2d 990). Moreover, since the record is barren of any evidence tending to show that plaintiff’s reputation in the *808community has been diminished as a result of the letter, and in fact, plaintiff acknowledged at his pretrial deposition that the letter did not cause him to suffer any ridicule from third parties, the first cause of action seeking to recover damages for libel must be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s second cause of action seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress must also fail, since plaintiff does not present any evidence that defendants are guilty of conduct “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community’ ” *{Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp.,*58 NY2d 293, 303, quoting from Restatement [Second] of Torts § 46 [1] comment d). Moreover, it would be improper to allow plaintiff to evade the specific prerequisites for a libel action by presenting his cause of action in terms of the generalized tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress *{see, Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., supra,*p 303; *see also, Terwilliger v Wands,*17 NY 54; *Wilson v Goit,*17 NY 442). Mangano, J. P., Gibbons, Brown and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
----

            COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1921/2004

of 25 October 2004         

amending Regulation (EC) No 499/96 opening and providing for the administration of Community tariff quotas for certain fishery products and live horses originating in Iceland

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 133 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Whereas:

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Regulation (EC) No 499/96 is amended as follows:

Article 2

For 2004, the annual volume of the tariff quota with order number 09.0792 shall be reduced in proportion to the part of the quota period in whole weeks which has elapsed before the date given in the second paragraph of Article 3.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

It shall apply from 1 May 2004.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 25 October 2004.

For the Council

The President

R. VERDONK            

----

(1)OJ L 75, 23.3.1996, p. 8.

(2)OJ L 130, 29.4.2004, p. 1.

----

ANNEX

In the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 499/96 the following item is inserted:

----

(1)  Entry under this subheading is subject to the conditions laid down in the relevant Community provisions (see Articles 291 to 300 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 (OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 1)).

(1)  The benefit of the tariff quota shall not be granted for goods declared for release for free circulation during the period from 15 February to 15 June.’         

----
<PAGE>

Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002

I, Joseph J. Bianco, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Whitewing Environmental
Corp. ("Whitewing");

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
Whitewing as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. Whitewing's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for Whitewing and have:

         a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to Whitewing and its subsidiaries
(collectively, the "Company") is made known to us by others within the Company,
particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

         b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures, and presented in the annual report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this annual report (the "Evaluation Date") based on such
evaluation; and

         c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during Whitewing's most recent
fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, Whitewing's internal control over financial reporting.

5. Whitewing's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to Whitewing's
auditors and the audit committee of Whitewing's board of directors:

         a) all significant deficiencies (if any) in the design or operation of
internal controls which are reasonably likely to adversely affect Whitewing's
ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have
identified for Whitewing's auditors any material weaknesses in internal
controls; and

         b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
controls.


Date:  June 15, 2004               /s/  Joseph J. Bianco
                                   -------------------------------
                                   Name:  Joseph J. Bianco
                                   Title: President and Chief Executive Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Edwin Rodriquez, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hayes, J.), rendered May 20, 1983, convicting him of burglary in the second degree (two counts), petit larceny (two counts), criminal mischief in the fourth degree (two counts), attempted robbery in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, and possession of burglar’s tools, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to the police and physical evidence.

Judgment modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing each of the two consecutive sentences imposed on the defendant’s conviction of two counts of burglary in the second degree, from 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment to 3 to 9 years’ imprisonment. As so modified, judgment affirmed.

*827The defendant was properly convicted; his motion to suppress statements and physical evidence was properly denied, and the defendant’s allegations of error on the part of the prosecutor and the court are without merit. However, the sentence was excessive to the extent indicated herein. Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BLOUNT INTERNATIONAL, INC. FOR THE PERIOD ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000000
       
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1998
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.64
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.60
        

<PAGE>

</TABLE>
Exhibit 31.2**CERTIFICATIONS**     I, Brent W. Christensen, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Meade Instruments Corp.;     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;and  c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting     Date: January 16, 2007       By: /s/ Brent W. Christensen       Senior Vice President — Finance and CFO
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from  the
financial statements accompanying the filings of Form 10-QSB and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             Dec-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                Jan-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                  Jun-30-1999
<CASH>                                            390,573
<SECURITIES>                                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   5,297,082
<ALLOWANCES>                                      144,000
<INVENTORY>                                     3,571,044
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                9,232,553
<PP&E>                                          1,033,120
<DEPRECIATION>                                    460,806
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  9,885,200
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           5,784,467
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   18,651
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                        0
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<CHANGES>                                               0
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<EPS-BASIC>                                           .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         .01


</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William R. O’Neil, Appellant.

— Main, J. P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Monserrate, J.), rendered January 11, 1985, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of assault in the third degree and resisting arrest.

In a four-count indictment, defendant was charged with assault in the second degree, resisting arrest, assault in the third degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree. In satisfaction of all four counts, defendant pleaded guilty to the charges of assault in the third degree and resisting arrest. These charges stemmed from incidents wherein defendant punched his son in the mouth and, later, when the police arrived and attempted to apprehend defendant, he struck a police officer. The charge of assault in the third degree related to defendant’s striking his son; the resisting arrest charge stemmed from his striking the police officer. After defendant entered his guilty plea, County Court sentenced him to two consecutive nine-month terms of imprisonment.

On this appeal, defendant contends that County Court erred in sentencing him to consecutive rather than concurrent prison terms since the offenses in question "were committed as parts of a single incident or transaction” (Penal Law § 70.25 [3]). We disagree. Defendant’s act of punching his son, the basis of the charge of assault in the third degree, had been accomplished before defendant struck the police officer, giving rise to the resisting arrest charge. In no way can these two offenses, which were distinctly separate in time, be construed as having arisen from the same incident or transaction *(see, People v Almeida,*39 NY2d 823). Thus, contrary to defendant’s assertion, County Court was not proscribed by Penal Law § 70.25 (3) from imposing consecutive sentences.

We likewise find unpersuasive defendant’s argument that *854the sentences imposed were harsh and excessive. Under the circumstances, County Court was empowered to impose two sentences of one year each *(see,*Penal Law § 70.15 [1] [e] [iii]). Perceiving no abuse of discretion in the sentences actually imposed by the court, we affirm *(see, People v Fullwood,*107 AD2d 975, 976).

Judgment affirmed. Main, J. P., Weiss, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Levine, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Bianca P. Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Theodore A.P., Jr., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Theodore P., III. Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Theodore A.P., Jr., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.)

[943 NYS2d 200]

In two related child protective proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the father appeals from a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Freundlich, J.), dated May 4, 2011, which, after a hearing, found that he neglected the subject children.

Ordered that the fact-finding order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The Family Court’s determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see Matter of Creighton v Whitmore,*71 AD3d 1141 [2010]). Here, contrary to the father’s contention, the Family Court’s finding of neglect as to the child Bianca based on his use of alcohol while driving a car in which she was a passenger and failing to put her into a child seat or restraint, *1127is supported by a preponderance of the evidence *(see*Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [B]; § 1046 [b] [i]; *Matter of Raima W.,*59 AD3d 633, 634 [2009]; *Matter of Heather D.,*17 AD3d 1087 [2005]; *Matter of Pedro C. [Josephine B.],*1 AD3d 267, 268 [2003]). The evidence also supports a finding of neglect with respect to the child Theodore based on the father’s allowing Theodore to ride in a car driven by a friend when he knew or should have known that the friend was intoxicated *(see Matter of Nicholas M. [Santino T.],*89 AD3d 1087 [2011]; *Matter of Tylasia B. [Wayne B.],*72 AD3d 1074, 1075 [2010]). Balkin, J.P., Leventhal, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.