IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-60444

Summary Calendar

MARIA SALCIDO,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI; MARTHA SAUNDERS, 

Individually and Officially; REBECCA WOODRICK, Individually and 

Officially; CHARLES WEST, Individually and Officially,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 2:11-CV-173

Before WIENER, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Maria Salcido appeals the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of the University of Southern Mississippi; Dr. Martha 

Saunders, individually and officially; Dr. Rebecca Woodrick, individually and 

officially; and Dr. Charles West, individually and officially (collectively, “the 

Defendants”) on her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Defendants 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 13, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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discriminated against her on the basis of race, national origin, and ethnicity, 

and denied her specific constitutional rights. AFFIRMED. 

I. Background

Salcido, a foreign-born woman of Latin American origin, was a part-time 

graduate student in the marriage and family therapy (“MFT”) program at the 

University of Southern Mississippi (the “University”). To obtain a master’s 

degree, students in the MFT program must complete 500 clinical hours by 

providing therapy to clients at the university clinic or through an externship. 

Salcido was the only Latino-born student in the class of thirteen students, and 

she claims she was not given the same opportunities to accumulate the 

required clinical hours as her American-born, Caucasian peers.

Salcido also alleges that Drs. Hinton, Grames, and Adams1 at various 

times engaged in discriminatory actions and made discriminatory remarks to 

her. Salcido claims that Hinton told her he wanted her to work exclusively 

with Latino clients2 and refused to provide her with an externship when she 

requested one in the fall of 20083 so that she could gain the hours required to 

graduate by August 2009.4 Salcido also alleges that Adams repeatedly verbally 

1 Salcido did not name these professors as parties to the suit. Grames was the MFT 

program director. Adams was one of her professors, and Hinton assigned clinical hours and 

externships.

2 Salcido stated that Hinton told her she needed to be “in the right setting” for 

completing her clinical hours and that this statement was clearly meant to indicate that she 

could only have Latino clients. Hinton disputes that the statement indicated he wanted her

to exclusively treat Latinos; however, the Defendants do not deny that Hinton used that 

phrase when discussing Salcido’s options.

3 In his deposition, Hinton states that he could not provide Salcido with an externship 

because externship positions are typically made one year in advance, and she did not request 

one until a few months before she wanted to begin the externship. He also claims to have 

offered her an externship in the spring 2009 semester, but Salcido turned it down.

4 Because Salcido was a part-time student, graduating by August 2009 would have 

been at least one year sooner than expected.

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admonished her, which Salcido attributes to Adams’s belief that Salcido has a 

language barrier. Salcido also alleges that Adams learned of a critical 

evaluation written by Salcido that was supposed to remain confidential and 

afterwards retaliated against Salcido by treating her more harshly than other 

students. 

Salcido complained to multiple administrators, including West. She

later filed a formal complaint with the AA/EEO office as well as the Office of 

Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education (“OCR”). Woodrick met with 

Salcido to begin the appeals process; during that meeting, Salcido informed 

Woodrick that she had retained counsel. At that time, Woodrick forwarded the 

complaint to the University’s attorney. Woodrick also suspended her 

investigation pending the outcome of the OCR’s investigation. After the OCR 

inquiry found that the University had not violated Title VI with regard to her 

allegations, the AA/EEO investigation was closed with no further 

investigation. 

After the AA/EEO investigation was closed, the MFT department 

proposed a plan to help Salcido complete her degree requirements, despite 

having relocated to Wisconsin. She rejected the plan and wrote a letter to 

Saunders reiterating her complaints. One month later, she filed this suit, 

asserting various claims under §1983, including that the Defendants deprived 

her of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment 

Due Process Clause, and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.5

II. Discussion

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Ibarra 

v. United Parcel Serv., 695 F.3d 354, 355 (5th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment 

5 Salcido also asserted a state-law claim for breach of contract. That claim was later 

remanded to state court.

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is appropriate if the moving party shows there is “no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 56(a). Because the burden of production at trial would be on Salcido, 

the Defendants need only demonstrate an absence of evidentiary support in 

the record for her case. See Cuadra v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 

812 (5th Cir. 2010). This court may “affirm a grant of summary judgment on 

any grounds supported by the record and presented to the [district] court.” 

Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 2008).

a. Section 1983 Individual Capacity Claims

Salcido raised claims against Saunders, Woodrick, and West in their 

individual capacities. To make out a § 1983 claim against the Defendants in 

their individual capacities, Salcido must show that they were either personally 

involved in the constitutional violations alleged or that their wrongful actions 

were causally connected to the constitutional deprivation. Jones v. Lowndes 

Cnty., Miss., 678 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2012). Furthermore, supervisory 

officials are only liable under § 1983 if they affirmatively participate in the acts 

causing the constitutional violation or implement unconstitutional practices 

that result in a constitutional injury. Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386, 401 

(5th Cir. 2009). Supervisory officials are not subject to respondeat superior 

liability under § 1983. Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Prish Council-President Gov’t, 279 

F.3d 273, 286 (5th Cir. 2002). 

i. Procedural Due Process

Salcido argues that the Defendants deprived her of procedural due 

process by denying her clinical hours and externships and by not following the 

grievance procedures guaranteed by the University. To establish a procedural 

due process claim, the plaintiff must show that she was “denied life, liberty, or 

property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 

F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 2012). Property or liberty interests can be created by 

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the policies and procedures of state universities. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. 

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972). If a due process entitlement exists, the party 

is entitled to “notice and an opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time 

and in a meaningful manner.” Gibson v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins.—Div. of Workers’ 

Comp., 700 F.3d 227, 239 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

To create a due process entitlement, there must be no discretion in the 

official and a reasonable expectation that the individual will receive the 

protected property interest. See Hampton Co. Nat’l Sur. v. Tunica Cnty, Miss., 

543 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 2008). The MFT Handbook clearly states that the 

faculty has the discretion to determine who qualifies for externships, based on 

the student’s “clinical readiness,” which includes her “emotional maturity.” 

Therefore, the district court properly held that there was no property interest 

in clinical hours. Even if there were a property interest, there is no evidence 

in the record that any of the Defendants, including West, who supervised the 

department that housed the MFT program, were either directly involved in 

denying Salcido clinical hours or implemented policies that deprived Salcido of 

clinical hours.6 See Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 401. Therefore, the district court 

properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on Salcido’s 

claim of due process deprivation regarding access to additional clinical hours 

and externships.

Salcido further claims that she was deprived of a constitutionally 

protected property interest in the grievance procedures provided by various 

student handbooks. See Whiting v. Univ. of S. Miss., 451 F.3d 339, 346 (5th 

Cir. 2006) (state law procedural guarantees create a property interest). The 

6 Indeed, the record indicates that Hinton was responsible for assigning clinical hours 

and externships and that Hinton told Salcido he did not have an externship available for her 

when requested.

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MFT Student Handbook provides that a student with a grievance should make 

an appointment with the department chair, and the Student Handbook states 

that the department chair should “normally” be responsible for filing a 

grievance after resolving an issue. The Student and Faculty Handbook further 

provides a formal procedure for bringing complaints to the AA/EEO Office, 

which explains that the AA/EEO director will investigate claims and make a 

written notice of the decision. Finally, after the AA/EEO director makes her 

decision, the complaining student can appeal the determination directly to the 

President of the University within fifteen days.

The district court correctly found that West did not violate any 

procedural guarantee enumerated in the MFT Student Handbook: he met with 

Salcido, as required. While the Student Handbook does suggest that the 

department chair should normally file a grievance, it is discretionary and 

therefore does not create a procedural right. See Hampton Co., 543 F.3d at 

226; see also Whiting, 451 F.3d at 346 (stating that where a handbook states 

an official should “normally” communicate a result by a particular date, the 

word “normally” makes compliance with the deadline discretionary).

The grievance procedures outlined by the various student handbooks do 

not impose any duties on Saunders. As the University President, Saunders is 

only involved in formal complaints at the time of appeal. While Salcido did 

write a letter to Saunders, this letter was not written until after the events 

took place, and Salcido never appealed the AA/EEO’s determination. Salcido 

has not produced evidence that Saunders either participated in the alleged due 

process violations or implemented unconstitutional practices that denied 

Salcido of her due process rights; therefore, the district court properly granted 

summary judgment in favor of Saunders on this issue. See Wernecke, 591 F.3d 

at 401. 

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Neither party disputes that Woodrick did not strictly follow the 

procedures outlined in the Student and Faculty Handbook. Salcido filed her 

AA/EEO complaint on June 2, 2009, and because Woodrick suspended her 

investigation pending OCR’s determination, she did not issue her 

determination in the timeframe provided by the Student and Faculty 

Handbook, nor did she perform her own investigation.

Woodrick invoked qualified immunity. The burden is therefore on 

Salcido to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. McClendon v. City 

of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002). Woodrick is entitled to 

qualified immunity if her conduct was “objectively reasonable.” Kipps v. 

Caillier, 197 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1999). The reasonableness of a defendant’s 

actions must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable official in the same 

situation with the same knowledge. Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 762

(5th Cir. 2012) (holding that an officer’s actions are judged from the perspective 

of a reasonable officer confronted by the same facts and circumstances without 

regard to intent or motivation). 

Salcido does not provide evidence that it is unreasonable to suspend an 

investigation where there is a pending OCR hearing and the student has 

retained counsel. See id. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding 

that Woodrick was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Salcido’s 

procedural due process claim and granting summary judgment on this issue.

ii. Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process requires public officials exercising their 

professional judgment to do so in a nonarbitrary and noncapricious manner. 

Lews v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 630–31 (5th Cir. 

2011). Salcido claims that her substantive due process rights were violated 

when the Defendants failed to provide her with the opportunity to obtain 

sufficient clinical hours to obtain a master’s degree in the MFT program. Her 

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claims fail for two reasons: (1) none of the individual defendants made 

decisions in assigning her clinical hours, and (2) there is no constitutionally 

protected property interest in receiving the clinical assignments or 

externships. See Hampton Co., 543 F.3d at 226. Even assuming that Salcido 

had a property interest in the clinical hours, West, who is the only defendant 

associated with the MFT department, cannot be held purely vicariously liable

for the actions of his subordinates who denied Salcido her hours. Cozzo, 279 

F.3d at 286. There is no evidence that he was directly involved in denying her 

those hours or that he instituted any policies that would have led to those hours 

being denied. Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 401. Therefore, the district court properly 

granted summary judgment on this issue. 

iii. Equal Protection

Salcido makes two equal protection claims: that she was given fewer 

clinical hours than non-Hispanic Caucasian and American-born students and 

that the Defendants failed to remedy the unlawful discrimination. Salcido’s 

first equal protection claim fails because none of the named Defendants made 

decisions regarding clinical assignments and externships, and Salcido has not 

provided competent evidence that they encouraged discriminatory behavior or 

instituted policies that led to her receiving fewer clinical hours. See, Cozzo, 

279 F.3d at 286; Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 401. As to her second claim, Salcido 

has provided no evidence that any departures from the grievance procedures 

stemmed from discriminatory intent. See McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 

577 (5th Cir. 2012) (requiring plaintiffs to show that their treatment was 

“different from that received by similarly situated individuals” and that the 

treatment “stemmed from a discriminatory intent”). Nor has she shown that 

other similarly situated individuals who engaged the grievance procedures 

were treated more fairly. See id. The district court properly granted summary 

judgment on this claim.

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iv. First Amendment

Salcido further claims she faced retaliation for criticizing Adams in a

confidential evaluation. Salcido’s First Amendment claim suffers from the 

same flaw as her other claims: there is no evidence in the record showing that 

the individual Defendants participated in, approved, or implemented policies 

that caused her injuries. See Wernecke, 591 F.3d at 401. Furthermore, there 

is no evidence in the record that the named Defendants were responsible for 

revealing the evaluation. See id. Therefore, the district court properly granted 

summary judgment on this issue.

a. Section 1983 Claims Against the Defendants in their Official 

Capacities

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a “person” acting under the 

color of law deprives an individual of rights ensured by the “[c]onstitution and 

laws.” We have previously held that state universities are not “persons” under 

§ 1983, and therefore, the statute does not provide a cause of action. Stotter v. 

Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 508 F.3d 812, 821 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Lapides 

v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002). Therefore, the 

district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the University. 

Salcido also sued Saunders, Woodrick, and West in their official 

capacities. Because an official-capacity suit for damages is treated as a suit 

against the state entity, the district court properly granted summary judgment 

in favor of Saunders, Woodrick, and West for any damages related to the 

official capacity claims. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[A]n 

official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit 

against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real 

party in interest is the entity.” (internal citation omitted)). Although Salcido’s 

claim for prospective non-monetary relief against the individual Defendants in 

their official capacities is not barred by state sovereign immunity, see Nelson 

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v. Univ. of Tex. at Dall., 535 F.3d 318, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2008), she has not 

identified an unconstitutional policy against which an injunction or other nonmonetary relief could issue.7

AFFIRMED.

7 She also fails to state a cognizable claim for relief in this regard. Her brief vaguely 

alludes to the relief sought stating that she “has consistently asked . . . that USM be enjoined 

to provide her with a work environment free of discriminatory conduct and that, as an 

equitable remedy, she be provided the Degree she has earned by enduring the discriminatory 

hardships described herein.” She fails to cite any authority supporting such “relief.” Gann v. 

Fruehauf Corp., 52 F.3d 1320, 1328 (5th Cir. 1995)(failure to properly brief an issue waives 

that issue). She specifically fails to cite any authority that the court appropriately could 

compel the award of a degree for which a student, such as Salcido, admittedly has not yet 

qualified.

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