forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of
fact to find in her favor on a material question, then the court
must enter summary judgment against her.” Waldridge v. American
Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in
original). As Defendants have not come forward with
contradictory evidence, the Court accepts as undisputed Allied’s
properly supported statements of material fact contained in its

Local Rule 56.1(a) (3) Statement of Uncontested Material Facts.

The Court’s task now becomes to determine whether “given the
undisputed facts, summary judgment is proper as a matter of
law.” Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Assocs., Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 568
(7th Cir. 1992).
Allied’s Motion for Summary Judgment

As an interstate motor carrier of household goods, Allied
is subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act of 1996, 49 U.S.C. § 13101 et seq.
(the “Act”). Under the Act, a motor carrier like Allied is
required to publish its rates for interstate transportation of
household goods in a tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and is required to charge and collect rates for
transportation in strict accordance with the filed tariff. 49
U.S.C. § 13702(a) (2). The filed rate cannot be varied by a

separate agreement of the parties, nor can payment of the rate



together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fep. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The court must “review the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that
Party’s favor.” Vanasco v. National-Louis Univ., 137 F.3d 962,
964 (7th Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, the party who bears the
burden of proof on an issue may not rest on the pleadings, but
must affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of
material .fact that requires trial. Warsco v. Preferred
Technical Group, 258 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 2001).

Defendants’ Failure to
Respond to Motion for Summary Judgment

Because Defendants are not represented by counsel in
connection with the instant summary judgment motion, Allied has
complied with the requirements of Local Rule 56.2 and provided
Defendants with a “Notice To Pro Se Litigants Opposing Summary
Judgment,” explaining in sufficient terms the purpose of a
summary judgment motion, Defendants’ obligations to respond and
the consequences for failing to do so. See N.D. Ill. Local
R. 56.2; Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992).
Despite receiving this notice, Defendants did not file a
response to Allied’s summary judgment motion, Under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), “if the non-movant does not come

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charged in accordance with the filed tariff be avoided by reason
of equitable defenses. See 49 U.S.C. § 13702(c); Maislin v.
Primary Steel, 497 U.S. 116, 127 (1990).

The Bill of Lading for Defendants’ property, which
incorporates by reference the applicable tariff rates, was
signed by Elizabeth Kaye as shipper, and was again signed by
Elizabeth Kaye as consignee acknowledging delivery of
Defendants’ property in Marina Del Ray, California. Section 3
of the Bill of Lading sets forth expressly the joint and several
liability of the shipper and consignee for payment of applicable
tariff charges, and also states that the extension of credit to
a shipper or consignee for such charges will not discharge the
obligation of that party to pay the tariff charges in the event
the third party fails to pay such charges.

Here, the documents Defendants signed as shipper and
consignee clearly set forth their liability for applicable
tariff charges. Defendants may not avoid their liability to
Allied for the tariff charges based on the fact that Jay Time
may have made an independent agreement with Defendants to cover
the costs of the move. See United Van Lines, Inc. v. Zak, 861
F.Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Ill. 1994). Jay Time’s possible liability
to Defendants for the charges under an independent agreement is

a wholly separate issue, and does not in any way preclude



Minute Order Form (06/97)

Vee

fe of Assigned Judge H Lei Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge arry D. Leinenweber than Assigned Judge

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

CASE NUMBER 02 C 3685 DATE 12/18/2002
CASE Allied Van Lines Inc. vs. Jay Time Inc., et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, .g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff. and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(63) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Qa Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue____

(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon___setfor__at

(5) im Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor at

(6) im) Pretrial conference[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for]on____ set for at.
(7) Q Trial[set for/re-set for]on___—__at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___—_at.

(9) im This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

QFRCP4(m) OC Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(aX1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) «=f [Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Allied’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Judgment is entered in favor of Allied and against Defendants in the
principal amount of $10,435.83, plus pre-judgment interest in the amount of $656.84.

(11) @ (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's staff. EC
Notified counsel by telephone. )

wv | Docketing to mail notices.

7 | Mail AO 450 form LYNO3 L5INISIO“S'n
y J

Copy to judge/magistrate judge

courtroom 9274 Hd 81 33020 Merits notice
WAP deputy's
initials =
Datwhmbledeinden [TJ
central Clerk's Office mailing deputy initials



summary judgment in Allied’s favor when Defendants failed to
controvert Allied’s evidence that they signed the documents
rendering them liable as shippers and consignees for the charges
at issue. Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Allied’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Judgment is entered in favor of

Allied and against Defendants in the principal amount of

$10,435.83, plus pre-judgment interest in the amount of $656.84.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court

Date: 02>



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT court f= | L E D
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DEC 1 8 202
JUDGE HARRY D. LEINENWEBER
ALLIED VAN LINES, INC., US. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Plaintiff,
Case No. 02 C 3685
v.
JAY TIME, INC., d/b/a Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

CALIFORNIA HEALTH PRODUCTS,

SANFORD KAYE, and ELIZABETH
KAYE,

Defendants. AN)
porters,

i pee 43
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Allied Van Lines, Inc.’s
(“Allied”) Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants
Sanford and Elizabeth Kaye (the “Defendants”) pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

BACKGROUND

The material facts are undisputed. Allied is an interstate
motor carrier of household goods and furnishings. On or about
August 16, 2001, Defendant Jay Time, Inc. (“Jay Time”) sent a
letter to Allied’s agent, Jackson Moving Services, Inc.,
authorizing the relocation of Defendants’ household furnishings
and property from Oak Brook, Illinois to Marina Del Rey,
California. On or about August 24, 2001, Defendants entered

into a Bill of Lading contract with Allied for the interstate



shipment of their personal property and household goods. The
Bill of Lading designated Allied as the carrier and Defendants
as the shipper. On or about September 5, 2001, Allied delivered
Defendants’ property to the designated address in Marina Del
Rey, California. At that time, Defendants executed the Bill of
Lading as consignee, acknowledging delivery of the goods and
Allied’s performance of its duties under the contract.

Allied’s total tariff charges for the shipment of
Defendants’ property amounted to $10,435.83. To date, this sum
remains unpaid by either Jay Time or Defendants, and Allied
filed the instant action to collect the outstanding tariff
charges. Jay Time never answered the complaint and default
judgment was entered in favor of Allied and against Jay Time on
November 13, 2002. Although Defendants have not responded to
Allied’s motion for summary judgment, they contend in their
answer that Jay Time agreed to cover all charges related to the
move and that they never intended to become liable for the
charges incurred by signing the Bill of Lading as shipper and
consignee.

DISCUSSION
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

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