No. 03 C 1018 Page 3

As defendant acknowledges in its own motion, an outright award of benefits is proper
when the decision is “so clear cut that it would be unreasonable for the plan administrator to
deny the application for benefits on any ground.” Gallo vy. Amoco Corp., 102 F.3d 918, 923 (7""
Cir. 1996)(citing Weaver y. Phoenix Home Life Mutual Ins, Co., 990 F.2d 154, 159 (4 Cir,
1993)). This record provides a clear-cut case, thus remand is unnecessary. After arbitrarily
denying plaintiff's claim, defendant is not entitled to deyelop a new record to evaluate
plaintiff’s initial eligibility while plaintiff waits without benefits. Defendant may certainly
conduct new tests and exams to determine whether plaintiff should continue to receive
benefits, but the present record establishes his initial eligibility.

Defendant also argues that the court misapplied the summary judgment standard by
granting plaintiff's motion merely because it found that the plan administrator’s decision was
arbitrary and capricious. Defendant reminds the court that it must consider the merits of each
cross-motion separately. As explained above, we reviewed the evidence that supported
denying defendant’s motion and the evidence that supported granting summary judgment for
plaintiff. We did not find for plaintiff merely because the plan administrator’s decision
was arbitrary and capricious, but because the record supports only one reasonable outcome
—an award of disability benefits to plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to reconsider is denied.

Anes B. Moron

wa) JAMES B. MORAN
Sehior Judge, U. 8, District Court

Ha 7, 2004,



’ MinesMlurder Porm (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge James B. Moran Sitting Judge If Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 1018 DATE 5/4/2004
CASE FRANK DI PIETRO vs. THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented}

MOTION:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DOCKET ENTRY:
() Qa Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.)
(2) Oo Bricf in support of motion duc
(3) Oo Answer briefto motiondue____.. Reply to answer briefdue__
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on setfor_ at.
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on_— set for at
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-setfor]on_——ssetfor_— att.
{7) QO Trial[set for/re-sct for]on at
(8) oO (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/eontinued to at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCPA(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) CFRCP41(a)(2).

do) «=f [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. Defendant's motion to reconsider
is denied.

(11) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

umber of notices
Notices mailed by judge's staff. MAY 2A
Notified counsel by telephone, Oo ri

a | Docketing to mail notices, t

Mail AO 450 form, . docket ty initial
Copy to judge/magisteate judge.

date muited notice

courtroom
LG deputy's
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Mice, ‘mailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
FRANK DI PIETRO, )
Plaintiff, }
vs. } No. 03 C 1018 LE a 2004
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE }
COMPANY OF AMERICA, )
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Frank DiPietro brought this ERISA action against defendant Prudential
Insurance Company of America, challenging its denial of disability benefits under his
employee benefits plan. On March 25, 2004, this court issued a memorandum opinion and
order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross-
motion for summary judgment, Defendant now brings a motion for reconsideration pursuant
to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, The motion is denied.

A party can bring a motion for reconsideration to correct errors of law or fact, or
present newly discovered evidence. See Bordelon y. Chicago School Reform Board of

Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7" Cir. 2000)(citing LB Credit Corp. vy, Resolution Trust Corp.,

49 F.3d 1263 (7" Cir. 1995)). Defendant argues that the court committed two legal errors in
reaching its decision. First, that after finding the plan administrator’s denial of benefits to be
“arbitrary and capricious” the court awarded benefits to plaintiff instead of remanding the
claim to the plan administrator. Second, that the court misapplied the summary judgment

standard in finding for plaintiff. We disagree.

Defendant argues that when reviewing a plan administrator’s initial denial of a

17



No. 03 C 1018 Page 2

claimant’s benefits, it is not the district court’s place to determine the claimant’s eligibility,
It maintains that after finding the plan administrator’s decision to be arbitrary and capricious,
the court must return the plaintiff to the same position he was in before the arbitrary decision
and remand the case to the plan administrator to determine whether or not the plaintiff is

disabled. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit states in Hackett v. Xerox Corporation Long-Term

Disability Income Plan, 315 F.3d 771, 776 (7" Cir. 2003): “In a case where the plan
administrator did not afford adequate procedures in its initial denial of benefits, the
appropriate remedy respecting the status quo and correcting tor the defective procedures is
to provide the claimant with the procedures that she sought in the first place.” However, we
did not simply find that the process was inadequate.

In the opinion granting summary judgment for plaintiff, we discussed the defendant’s
three proffered reasons for denying plaintiff’s claim: lack of evidence to support his claim;,
failure to work to the greatest extent possible; and failure to follow treatment
recommendations, While discussing defendant’s first argument, we highlighted the
deficiencies in its decision — improper assumptions, discrediting of evidence without
justification, and selective review of the evidence. We also recited the evidence on record that
supported plaintiff’s claim of disability, including the medical opinion of Dr. Sliwa, a post-
polio specialist; the recommendations of Maureen Ziegler, an occupational therapist; the
report of Thomas Grzesik, a rehabilitation consultant; the Social Security Administration’s
finding of disability; plaintiff’s statements; and the letters of his friends and co-workers, In
our opinion we noted the dearth of evidence to support the determination that plaintiff was
not disabled. Finally, we concluded not just that the plan administrator's opinion contained

procedural deficiencies but that, given this record, it was unreasonable not to find plaintiff

disabled. As we stated, “The record is clear that plaintiff is entitled to disability benefits.”