Affirm and Opinion Filed July 31, 2015.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-00898-CR

JOHN ANTHONY MARGETIS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 9

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MB1251720

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Schenck

Opinion by Justice Lang

John Anthony Margetis, pro se, appeals the trial court’s judgment convicting him of 

indecent exposure. The jury found Margetis guilty and assessed his punishment at a fine in the 

amount of $1,500. Margetis raises four issues on appeal, arguing: (1) his right to an impartial 

jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated; (2) his dueprocess right under article 1, section 19 of the Texas Constitution was violated; (3) the trial court 

erred when it overruled his objection to a juror and request to cross-examine the juror; and (4) 

the trial court erred when it coerced an ill juror, who was on medication and stated she had a 

problem with the case, to remain on the jury.

I. AUTHORITIES AS TO BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS

Initially, we note that, although Margetis raises four issues on appeal, he cites no 

authority establishing any rule or standard against which we should judge the alleged errors. 
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Rule 38.1 requires that a brief contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, 

with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). The brief 

must include, among other things, appropriate citations to the applicable legal authorities and an 

explanation of how those authorities apply to the facts of the case at hand. See Walder v. State, 

85 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.). The briefing rules should be construed 

liberally and are “meant to acquaint the court with the issues in a case and to present argument 

that will enable the court to decide the case.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9. However, the failure to 

present argument or authorities in support of an assertion results in waiver of the issue. See State 

v. Gonzales, 855 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Delapaz v. State, 228 S.W.3d 183, 

197 n.20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. ref’d); see also Kiss v. State, 316 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2009, pet. ref’d). A pro se litigant must comply with the rules of evidence and 

procedure and is not to be granted any special treatment because he has asserted his pro se rights. 

Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (pro se litigant is held to same 

standards as licensed attorney and must comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure).

II. DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT’S BRIEFING

In his amended brief,1 Margetis argues as to issue one, the following, which we quote in 

its entirety:

I. The [trial court] erred by denying [] Margetis of his right to an 

impartial jury.

If [the trial court] would have followed the constitution, and law, then this trial 

would have resulted in a mistrial. A new jury panel would have been selected, 

which would have most likely acquitted [] Margetis of the alleged charge.

(Emphasis in orig.).

 

1

The Clerk of the Court sent Margetis a letter advising him that the first brief he filed in this case did not meet the requirements of Texas Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 38.1 and specifying the areas in which the brief was deficient. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9(a). In response, Margetis filed 

an amended brief, which we discuss in this opinion.
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As to issue two, Margetis states only the following in bold print: “II. The [trial court] 

erred by denying [] Margetis of due process by coercing a jury member, who stated in open 

court that she was not comfortable with this case at all, and who was ill and on medication 

to stay on the jury panel.” (Emphasis in orig.). Margetis provides no argument or authorities 

for this issue, but generally references, without explanation, nine pages of the reporter’s record.

As to issue three, Margetis argues in bold print:

III. The [trial court] erred when it was brought to the [trial court’s] 

attention that when the juror told the court reporter that she had a problem 

with the whole case, and that she was sick, and Margetis objected, and asked 

to cross examine her to see if she would be fair and impartial, the [trial] court 

denied the request.

(Emphasis in orig.). Then, in support of issue three, Margetis makes the following argument, 

which we quote in its entirety:

During voir dire by the prosecutor, it is clear that this juror through he own 

statements, stated that she could not be fair and impartial and that she’s confused. 

It appears that she was sick and could not concentrate. “The test for abuse of 

discretion requires us to determine whether the trial court acted in an arbitrary or 

unreasonable manner without references to any guiding rules or principles.” 

[Citation omitted.]

“The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding 

principles or acts arbitrarily or unreasonable.” [Citation omitted.]

By the [trial] court’s actions, it clearly abused its discretion and acted 

unreasonably.

This argument merely sets forth the abuse of discretion standard of review. Also, 

Margetis generally references, without explanation, the same nine pages of the reporter’s record 

as cited for issue two.

As to issue four, Margetis states only the following in bold print: “IV. The [trial court] 

erred by releasing the alternate jurors and coercing the ill juror to stay on the panel, who 

was on medication, who stated she had a problem with the case.” (Emphasis in orig.). 

Margetis provides no argument to support issue four.
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III. ANALYSIS

Margetis cites no authority as to the rules of law applicable to the alleged errors. Nor 

does he suggest the significance of the alleged errors to demonstrate why the trial court was in 

error and any such actions could have affected the outcome of his case. Further, Margetis cites 

only nine pages of the reporter’s record, but does not indicate how the content of those pages 

relates to the alleged errors. Margetis simply asserts all of the trial court’s decisions were abuses 

of discretion. We conclude Margetis has waived all four of his issues on appeal by failing to 

adequately brief them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Gonzales, 855 S.W.2d at 697; Delapaz, 228 

S.W.3d at 197 n.20.

Even if we were to consider the merits of Margetis’s four issues, we would reject his 

complaints because they are not supported by the record. The record shows that, after the jury 

was impaneled, the other venire members were released. When the jury returned from lunch, the 

trial court learned that a juror was unwell and questioned her. In response to the trial court’s 

questions, the juror stated that she had a sinus infection and was taking medication. However, 

when the trial court asked the juror if she could concentrate, watch, and listen, the juror 

responded, “I can try to do that, yes.” Also, the trial court offered to accommodate the juror by 

starting the proceedings at a later time the next day so that the juror could see her physician. 

When the trial court finished questioning the juror, Margetis, who appeared pro se in the trial 

court, stated:

I’d like the record to reflect that juror number three is sick, and she basically is 

being forced to sit on this panel.

And, secondly, the court reporter told us that somebody talked to her back in the 

jury room, and she said she doesn’t feel comfortable with this whole thing. So we 

have two things going on here. We have a juror that’s sick, and we have a juror 

that made the statement—I don’t know to whom, somebody back in the jury 

room, that she doesn’t feel comfortable.
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And I want a fair trial. That’s all I battle for. That’s all I’ve asked for. I want my 

due process. I want the scales equal. That’s what the justice system requires, and 

I think we need to bring her back in here and interrogate her. Somebody—[] your 

court reporter, made the statement that she had a problem with this whole thing.

So if she’s—I think she’s sick still. She’s got sinus [sic].

. . . .

Well, bottom line is, I don’t think we have a choice but to dismiss her. I mean, 

she’s sick, and she made a statement to somebody in the jury room that she’s not 

comfortable with any of this.

The State responded in the trial court that there were “no signs of coercion,” the juror 

stated she could “sit” and would let the trial court know if she was feeling too ill to listen to the 

evidence. The State argued that “how she feels about the subject matter really is irrelevant” and 

pointed out that the juror indicated, during voir dire, that she could be fair, listen to this type of 

case, and make a ruling based on the evidence. As a result, the State contended that there was no 

evidence before the trial court rendering the juror incapable of serving. Margetis responded that 

he “object[ed] to that.” Margetis claimed the juror had changed her mind and she was not going 

to be fair or impartial. The trial court noted that the juror did not say those things, but only that 

“she’s uncomfortable with the topic,” and did not say that she could not be fair or sit on the jury. 

Then, the trial court overruled Margetis’s objections.

In response, Margetis asked “Is there anyway [sic] we could question her further as to 

being impartial and partial?” The State objected on the basis that the trial court had fully 

inquired as to the juror’s ability to serve and further questioning would not be material or 

relevant. Margetis replied that there were clearly documented “ex parte communications” 

because the juror had spoken with someone in the jury room. The trial court overruled his 

objection, stating that the juror “did not discuss this with the [trial] court.” Once again, Margetis 

asked “Is there anyway [sic], Your Honor, that we just question her one more time?” and the trial 

court answered “No.”
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In all four issues, Margetis bases his contentions about trial court error on the premise 

that an ill juror, who apparently obtained medication, was not impartial because the juror stated 

that she “had a problem” with the case and was coerced to sit on the jury, and the alternate jurors 

were released. However, the record does not support Margetis’s contentions. There were no 

alternate jurors. The juror on which Margetis focuses, who allegedly could not be impartial,

stated she had a sinus infection and was taking medication. However, she also said that she 

could concentrate, watch, and listen to the trial. Further, the trial court offered to accommodate 

the juror and did accommodate the juror due to her sinus infection. 

Issues one through four are decided against Margetis.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

140898F.U05

/Douglas S. Lang/

DOUGLAS S. LANG

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

JOHN ANTHONY MARGETIS, Appellant

No. 05-14-00898-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court 

No. 9, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MB1251720.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices 

Bridges and Schenck participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 31st day of July, 2015.