was incurred in litigating plaintiff's motion for rule to show cause. While this court is recognizant
of its August 19, 2002 ruling that defendant was in contempt of court for failing to comply with its
obligations under this court’s April 19 final judgment, this court nonetheless finds that almost thirty
hours and $6,129.50 in fees incurred by plaintiff in trying to enforce the judgment is excessive and
unreasonable given the uncomplicated and straightforward nature of the main issue in plaintiff's rule
to show cause motion. Accordingly, this court reduces this fee by sixty-six percent, and allows
plaintiff to recover $2,084.03 for work performed in enforcing judgment.

As to the remaining $14,074.75 in fees plaintiff requests for preparation of the fee petition,
this court finds the amount of work devoted by plaintiff's counsel to the fee petition to be

unreasonable. See generally Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 553-54 (7th Cir.

1999) (awarding only fees and costs “reasonably expended” in preparation of fee request). The
$14,074.75 in fees spent in pursuing fees represents almost thirty percent of the $47,147.74 fee

amount determined by this court to be reasonable for the litigation of this case. See id. (finding the

“amount of time and effort devoted by counsel to the pursuit of fees to be excessive and, this
“reinforc[ed] our impression that lawyers litigate fee issues with greater energy and enthusiasm than
they litigate any other type ofissue.”) Accordingly, this court reduces the fees incurred in preparing
and defending the fee petition by sixty-six percent, leaving $4,785.42. In sum, this court allows a
total of $6,869.45 for work done in enforcing judgment and in connection with the fee petition.
CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs fee petition is granted in part in the total amount

of $54,017.19, which equals the total amount requested, $116,436.72, minus $19,913.00 in fees

stricken for work on procedurally defective motions, $19,843.50 stricken for duplicative and

13


prevailed in this case, plaintiff did not achieve any of the substantive relief plaintiff requested in his
complaint and that therefore plaintiff is not a “prevailing party” under the ESA and is not entitled
to reasonable attorneys fees and costs.

Defendant correctly contends that in determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees,
“reasonableness implies commensurability with results obtained.” Bristow v. Drake St. Inc., 41 F.3d
345,352 (7th Cir. 1994). Indeed, where damages are the primary goal of a lawsuit, a comparison
between the damages sought and those awarded is highly relevant to the reasonableness of the fee
petition. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574, 106 S.Ct. 2686 (1986); Johnson _v.
Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999). In this case, defendant argues that plaintiff did not
substantively prevail because in his complaint, plaintiff sought cash for the value of the repurchased
securities and instead of awarding plaintiff the cash, this court ordered defendant to give plaintiff
certain promissory notes pursuant to the ESA for the value of the securities payable on August 30,
2003, plus certain applicable interest, some of which was payable immediately. This court does not
find that “plaintiffs victory is de minimis so that the only reasonable attorney’s fee is either no fee
or a substantially reduced fee.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 117, 113 S.Ct. 566 (1992); Maul v.
Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 147 (7th Cir. 1994).

Additionally, defendant argues that defendant had repeatedly offered to provide plaintiff with
the substitute securities that plaintiff ultimately won in litigation, but that plaintiff had rejected this
settlement. Defendant, however, presents no evidence of these “repeated offers” to provide plaintiff
with substitute notes. Based on the record before this court, it appears defendant did not offer to
provide plaintiff with promissory notes pursuant to the ESA until April 11, 2002, in its reply

memorandum in support of defendant’s summary judgment motion for damages. This court finds


Monahan performed a substantial amount of work on several motions for summary judgment that
were ultimately stricken by this court for procedural deficiencies. From May 14, 2001 through
August 28, 2001, Smith, Gambrell also billed a significant number of hours for work spent on those
same motions for summary judgment. As another example, from December 5, 2001 through January
16, 2002, Alholm, Monahan billed approximately twenty-five hours for work completed on the
motion for summary judgment on damages. From November 9, 2001 through January 23, 2001,
Smith, Gambrell billed approximately fourteen hours for work on that same motion for summary
judgment and for numerous telephone conversations with Alholm, Monahan about this motion.
Both Alholm, Monahan and Smith, Gambrell worked on the motion to disqualify and the motion for
protective order, and when Fox, Hefter took over as local counsel, both Fox, Hefter and Smith,
Gambrell billed time spend on preparing the motion for summary judgment filed in February, 2002.
The above findings represent a few examples of many instances where both the Smith,
Gambrell and local counsel performed work on the same substantive issue; it is overly cumbersome
for this court to list each and every instance when this occurred in this case. This court finds
generally that plaintiff's practice of using two law firms to perform substantive work on one motion

constituted unnecessary and unreasonable overstaffing. See Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888

F.2d 1151, 1160 (7th Cir.1989) ("While we have refused to lay down a flat rule of one lawyer per
case, the tendency of law firms to overstaff a case should cause the trial court to scrutinize a fees
petition carefully for duplicative time.") (citations omitted). Therefore, in addition to the charges
already stricken in the previous section for work done on procedurally defective motions, this court
strikes the following hours and charges by the multiple law firms plaintiff utilized due to what this

court finds to be redundant, excessive and duplicate work performed:


court will not, as defendant requests, disallow all fees and costs requested for Alholm, Monahan
services. Instead, this court will accordingly look to the materials plaintiff submitted to make a
determination as to the reasonableness of the individual fees and costs.
V. Defective Motions

Through the course of this litigation, over half of the motions filed by plaintiffs counsel in
this case were stricken for violations of various procedural rules. (See Docket Entries Nos. 19, 23,
25, 40, 44, and 63.) Five of the six motions stricken were motions for summary judgment due to
plaintiffs counsel’s repeated failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1. Defendant argues that any
attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with these motions are unreasonable. This court
agrees. This court strikes the following fees and costs associated with these six procedurally
defective motions filed by plaintiffs counsel:

Alholm, Monahan, Keefe and Klauke, LLC

Attorney Hours Rate Total
Anne M. Oldenburg 1.0 $175.00 $175.00
Linda J. Hay 10.1 $175.00 $ 1,767.50
Brian C. Thomas 37.5 $175.00 $6,562.50
Smith, Gambrell and Russell, LLP - 2001

Attorney Hours Rate Total
Tracie Johnson 52.1 $180.00 $9,378.00
Matthews Coles 2.9 $300.00 $870.00
Smith, Gambrell and Russell, LLP - 2002

Attorney Hours Rate Total
Tracie Johnson 2.3 $200.00 $460.00
Matthews Coles 2 $350.00 $700.00
TOTAL HOURS: 107.9

TOTAL FEES STRICKEN FOR DEFECTIVE MOTIONS: $19,913.00


that plaintiff received more than a “technical victory” or “moral satisfaction” and accordingly, rejects
defendant’s argument that plaintiff is not the “prevailing party” for purposes of § 15(g) of the ESA.

Il. Venue

Defendant also objects to any fees and expenses incurred because plaintiff originally filed
this lawsuit in Georgia state court. Defendant argues that filing in Georgia state court was
unreasonable because § 15(f) of the ESA vests courts in Cook County with exclusive jurisdiction
over enforcement of the ESA. Section 15(f) of the ESA states, in relevant part, that plaintiff
“Grrevocably consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of any local state or federal court
within the County of Cook in the State of Illinois for enforcement by the [defendant] of this
Agreement.” By this forum selection clause, plaintiff waived any objection he may have had to
venue in defending any enforcement claims by the defendant. This case, however, was brought by
the plaintiff, not the defendant, in an effort to enforce plaintiff's claim under the ESA. Accordingly,
this court finds that plaintiff did not unreasonably choose Georgia as the forum to litigate his claims.
Therefore, this court will not strike any fees or costs associated with defendant’s transfer of the case
out of the Georgia state court to this court.

IV. Alholm, Monahan, Keefe, Klauke, LLC

Defendant makes the general argument that this court should not reward any of the fees and
costs requested for work done by Alholm, Monahan, Keefe, Klauke (“Alholm, Monahan”) because
plaintiff has not affirmatively stated that the Alholm, Monahan fees were reasonable and plaintiff
bears the burden on this issue. Plaintiff does, however, submit with his fee petition a detailed
statement of the firm’s fees and expenses incurred in working on this case, as well as the affidavit

of Linda Hay, a partner at Alholm, Monahan, attesting to the reasonableness of those fees. This


2002, Fox, Hefter, Swibel, Levin and Carroll (“Fox, Hefter”), also based in Chicago, replaced
Alholm, Monahan as local counsel. Throughout the litigation, Smith, Gambrell, as plaintiff's
counsel in Atlanta, continued to perform substantive work but never appeared before this court.
Defendant has objected to all the attorneys fees and costs incurred by all three of the law firms for
the entire duration of the case. Defendant contends generally that none of the fees and costs incurred
by Smith, Gambrell should be allowed because having both Atlanta and Chicago counsel performing
substantive work created unreasonable duplication and excessive inter-firm consultations. Defendant
objects to all fees and expenses Smith, Gambrell incurred in conferring with other attorneys or vice-
versa, and all fees incurred during the transitional period between law firms. Further, defendant
maintains that the Smith, Gambrell fees and costs are unreasonable as a whole because Smith,
Gambrell counsel never physically appeared before this court.

This court does not find that plaintiff's use of two law firms at any given time during the
case, one as the main firm and one as local counsel, was per se unreasonable, as defendant argues,
given the fact that plaintiff was a resident of Georgia and the case was litigated in Illinois. The fact
that the Smith, Gambrell attorneys never formally appeared before this court does not preclude
Smith, Gambrell from seeking fees for services rendered. Also, this court does not find that simply
because both Smith, Gambrell, and local counsel performed substantive work for the case, that the
separate efforts of counsel were per se duplicative.

However, upon an exhaustive review of the fee petition and the chart submitted by defendant
(Def.’s Resp. to Fee Petition, Ex. A) detailing defendant’s objections, this court finds that plaintiff's
use of multiple law firms resulted in significant overstaffing, duplication of work, and excessive

inter-firm communication. For example, from May 21, 2001 through August 28, 2001, Alholm,


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge James F. Holderman Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge . than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01C 1519 DATE 8/30/2002
CASE WENGRYN vs. CONNOR SPORTS FLOORING
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im] Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.

(4) o Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) i) Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-sct for] on set for at

(6) ia Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :

(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) O [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) im} This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

CUFRCP4(m) CO Local Rule 41.1. OOFRCP41(a)(1) [1 FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) MH [Other docket entry} Pursuant to Memorandum Opinion and Order entered this day, plaintiff's fee petition
is granted in part in the total amount of $54,017.19, which equals the total amount requested, $116,436.72 minus
$19,913.00 in fees stricken for work on procedurally defective motions, $19, 843.50 stricken for duplicative and
excessive work due to plaintiffs use of multiple law firms, $6,309.00 stricken for fees due to plaintiff's change
in local counsel, and $13,334.80 stricken as unreasonable and excessive fees incurred in enforcing judgment and
pursuing the fee petition. Defendant is ordered to pay $54,017.19 to plaintiffno later than September 16, 2002.

di) [For further detail sce order on the reverse side of the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document
N Number
(0 notices required. umber of notices
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Notified counsel by telephone. date dockered
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Smith, Gambrell and Russel], LLP - 2002

Attorney Hours Rate Total
Tracie Johnson 1.4 $200.00 $280.00
Matthews Coles 0.7 $350.00 $245.00
TOTAL HOURS: 23.8

TOTAL FEES STRICKEN FOR TRANSITIONAL WORK: $ 6,309.00

VIL. Simonini Deposition

Defendant also specifically objects to the time Alholm, Monahan, and Smith, Gambrell billed
to prepare for the deposition of Mr. Joseph Simonini, the Chief Financial Officer of defendant
corporation, in November and December 2001. Defendant argues that this deposition was not
reasonably necessary at the time it was taken because prior to the deposition of Mr. Simonini,
plaintiff's counsel had already finalized a motion for summary judgment on damages and the motion
was filed while the deposition was proceeding. However, plaintiff maintains that the deposition was
taken at a time when defendant was defending the case on the basis that its financial condition did
not permit it to comply with the terms of the ESA. Therefore, plaintiff argues, the deposition of
defendant’s chief financial officer at that time, even after the motion was filed, was a reasonable
course of action. This court agrees with plaintiff and finds that plaintiff did not act unreasonably in
taking Mr. Simonini’s deposition after filing a motion for summary judgment on damages given the
likelihood that defendant would oppose plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff was not required to wait until
this court ruled on the summary judgment motion to decide whether this discovery was needed.
Accordingly, this court will not strike the fees and costs incurred in taking Mr. Simonini’s
deposition.

VIII. Costs

1


Alholm, Monahan, Keefe and Klauke. LLC

Attorney Hours Rate Total
Anne M. Oldenburg 1.5 $175.00 $262.50
Linda J. Hay 13 $175.00 $2275.00
Brian C. Thomas 14 $175.00 $2450.00
Fox, Hefter, Swibel. Levin and Carroll

Attorney Hours Rate Total
Daniel Hefter 23.6 $295.00 $6962.00
Smith, Gambrell and Russell, LLP - 2001

Attorney Hours Rate Total
Tracie Johnson 30.3 $180.00 $5,454.00
Matthews Coles 1.3 $300.00 $390.00
Smith, Gambrell and Russell, LLP - 2002

Attorney Hours Rate Total
Tracie Johnson 6.4 $200.00 $1280.00
Matthews Coles 2.2 $350.00 $770.00
TOTAL HOURS: 92.3

TOTAL FEES STRICKEN FOR DUPLICATIVE WORK: $19,843.50

Additionally, this court finds that it is unreasonable to award plaintiff the fees charged due

to plaintiff’s decision to change local counsel in February, 2002. The change in local counsel

resulted in over twenty hours of time spent informing new local counsel Fox, Hefter about the case.

Accordingly, this court strikes the following fees incurred during the transitional period when Fox,

Hefter replaced Alholm, Monahan as plaintiffs local counsel:

Alholm, Monahan, Keefe and Klauke, LLC

Attorney Hours Rate Total
Brian C. Thomas 1.6 $175.00 $280.00
Fox, Hefter, Swibel, Levin and Carroll

Attorney Hours Rate Total
Daniel Hefter 16.4 $295.00 $4838.00
Todd Fox 3.7 $180.00 $666.00

10


Next, defendant contends that the fees and costs expended in connection with plaintiff's
motion to disqualify defendant’s counsel and plaintiff's motion to extend discovery were also
unreasonable and must be stricken. Defendant argues that these motions were without legal or
evidentiary basis, and without merit. This court finds, however, that the filing of these two motions
was a part of plaintiff's litigation strategy and there is no evidence that plaintiff did not file these
motions in good faith. Accordingly, this court will not strike the fees and costs incurred in filing
these two motions.

Defendant also objects to time plaintiff’ s counsel spent in preparing material that was never
filed or served. For example, defendant objects to the fees for time spent on several matters related
including interrogatories and depositions, and several other motions that plaintiff never filed,
including a motion to clarify, a motion for status, a request for admission, a motion for final
judgment, a motion to strike, and a pro hac vice application. This court does not find the amount
of time plaintiff's counsel spend on these matters as part of plaintiff's counsels’ litigation strategy
to be unreasonable, despite the fact that these papers were never filed. This court does not believe
it was imprudent or unreasonable for plaintiffs counsel to prepare thoroughly, especially in light of
the contentious nature of this litigation.

VI. Multiple Law Firms

Plaintiff, who is a resident of Georgia, has been represented by three separate law firms. The
law firm of Smith, Gambrell, & Russell, LLP “Smith, Gambrel!”), located in Atlanta, Georgia, has
been plaintiffs counsel since the inception of this case. When the case was transferred to this court,
plaintiff retained Alholm, Monahan, based in Chicago, as local counsel. Alholm Monahan

represented plaintiffas local counsel from March 2001 through February 2002. Finally, in February,


plaintiff's petition opposing plaintiffs fee petition in its entirety.
ANALYSIS

I. General Standard Governing Fee Awards

Provisions in contracts for awards of attorney’s fees are an exception to the general rule that
the unsuccessful litigant in a civil action is not responsible for the payment of the opponent's fees.
Kaiser v. MEPC American Properties, Inc., 518 N.E.2d 424, 427, 164 Ill.App.3d 978, 983 (Ill-App.
1 Dist.,1987). “Determination of a fee award is left to the discretion of the district court in light of
its ‘superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review

of what essentially are factual matters.”” Eddleman v. Switchcraft, Inc., 965 F.2d 422, 424 (7th Cir.

1992) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983)). District
courts possess “wide latitude in . . . evaluating the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees requested.”
Johnson vy. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999). In determining the amount of attorneys’
fees to award to the counsel for the prevailing party, the burden is on the party seeking the award to
substantiate the hours worked and the rate claimed, and present sufficient evidence from which the
trial court can render a decision as to their reasonableness. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433,

103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983); Kaiser, 518 N.E.2d at 427, 164 Ill. App.3d 978.

Il. Plaintiff as Prevailing Party

Section 15(g) of the ESA provides that in the event of a dispute under the ESA, the prevailing
party’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs shall be promptly reimbursed by the opposing party in
the dispute. As part of this court’s judgment order as to damages, this court ordered defendant,
pursuant to this section, to pay plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with the

prosecution of plaintiff’s claim under the ESA. Defendant argues that although plaintiff technically


excessive work due to plaintiffs use of multiple law firms, $6,309.00 stricken for fees due to
plaintiff's change in local counsel, and $13,334.80 stricken as unreasonable and excessive fees
incurred in enforcing judgment and pursuing the fee petition. Accordingly, defendant is ordered to

pay $54,017.19 to plaintiff no later than September 16, 2002.

ENTER:

Qa, 2 faa

JAMES F. HOLDERMAN
United States District Judge

DATE: August 30, 2002

14


reasons, plaintiff's fee petition is granted in the amount of $54,017.19.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was employed by defendant until September 16, 1999, when his employment was
terminated. Pursuant to the Executive Securities Agreement (“ESA”), plaintiff holds two forms of
securities in defendant’s parent company and on September 16, 1999, defendant exercised its right
under the ESA to repurchase plaintiffs securities. The values of the securities were determined by
an independent appraiser and binding on the parties pursuant to the parties subsequent settlement and
release agreement. Based on § 5(1)(a)(ii) of the ESA, defendant was required to close the
transaction for the purchase of plaintiff’s securities on August 31, 2000, but defendant failed to do
so. Plaintiff therefore sued to enforce defendant’s obligation to purchase the securities under the
ESA.

On October 17, 2001, this court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to
defendant’s liability under the ESA, finding that defendant had breached the ESA. The parties,
unable to decide on the damages owed under the ESA, returned to this court on February 28, 2002
with cross-motions for summary judgment as to damages. On April 19, 2002, this court entered an
order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and granting plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment in part, and this court ordered defendant to provide plaintiff with promissory
notes and interest payments as detailed in the April 19 judgment. On June 13, 2002, because
defendant had failed to comply with the April 19 final judgment, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion
for rule to show cause, which this court granted on August 19, 2002. On June 20, 2002, plaintiff
filed a petition for fees and costs. Following in line with both parties’ conduct in contentiously

litigating each and every aspect of this breach of contract case, defendant has filed its response to


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID WENGRYN, }
Plaintiff, } SEP 03 pong
v. } No. 01 C 1519
CONNOR SPORTS FLOORING }
CORPORATION, )
Defendant. }
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES F. HOLDERMAN, District Judge:

On October 17, 2001, this court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff David
Wengryn and against defendant Connor Sports Flooring Corporation as to defendant’s liability for
breach of the Executive Securities Agreement (“ESA”). On April 19, 2002, this court granted
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in part, as to damages, and ordered defendant to forthwith
provide plaintiff the damages specified in the final judgment as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees
and costs associated with the prosecution of plaintiff's case under the ESA. On June 20, 2002,
plaintiff filed a fee petition seeking $96,232.47 in fees and costs. On July 26, 2002, defendant filed
its objections to plaintiff's fee petition in its entirety. Plaintiff also seeks, as detailed in plaintiff's
reply in support of his fee petition, an additional $20,204.25 in fees and costs incurred in defending
his fee petition and in attempting to compel compliance with this court’s April 19 judgment order.

Therefore, plaintiff seeks a total amount of $116,436.72 in fees and costs. For all the following

6


As to the fees and related nontaxable expenses incurred by plaintiffs counsel, plaintiff seeks
$531.94 for Smith, Gambrell expenses and $3,615.90 for Fox, Hefter expenses. Plaintiff has not
submitted any material regarding nontaxable expenses incurred by Alholm, Monahan. Defendant
failed to present this court with any objections to plaintiff's request for these expenses and costs.
This court finds that the amount and nature of the expenses listed for reimbursement meet the
minimum level of detail that paying clients would probably find sufficient and reasonable to pay,
except for the computer assisted research amounts, which total $149.05 for Smith, Gambrell, and
$2870.18 for Fox, Hefter. Computer research charges are considered a form of attorneys! fees.

Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 231 F.3d 399, 409 (7th Cir. 2000); Haroco, Inc. v. American

Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 38 F.3d 1429, 1440-41 (7th Cir.1994). The idea is that
computer-assisted legal research essentially raises an attorney's average hourly rate as it reduces (at

least in theory) the number of hours that must be billed. Montgomery, 231 F.3d at 409; Haroco, 38

F.3d at 1440-41. As a form of attorneys’ fees, the charges associated with such research are not
separately recoverable expenses. Montgomery, 231 F.3d at 409. Accordingly, this court strikes a
total of $3,019.23 in expenses for Smith, Gambrell’s and Fox, Hefter’s computer-assisted legal
research expenses, but allows plaintiff to recover the remaining $1,128.61 in expenses and costs.
IX. Motion for Rule to Show Cause and Fee Petition

In plaintiff’ s reply in support of his fee petition, plaintiff argues that he has been compelled
to incur an extra $20,204.25 in attorneys’ fees since this court’s April 19, 2002 judgment in
attempting to compel compliance with the April 19 judgment through a motion for rule to show
cause, and in an effort to overcome defendant’ s objection plaintiff's entire fee petition. Upon review

of the records plaintiff submitted, this court finds that $6,129.50 of the total $20,204.25 requested

12