alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

DEC 21 1999

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JEAN DENNY, Class action for

Motorhome Owners in Sandia Heights,

Unit 3,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SANDIA HEIGHTS HOMEOWNERS

ASSOCIATION; COUNTY OF

BERNALILLO; COUNTY OF SANTA

FE; STATE OF NEW MEXICO;

SUSAN CARLOW, Covenant

Committee member; TED BACA,

Honorable, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-2253

(D.C. No. CIV-99-310-DJS)

(New Mexico)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
-2-

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Jean Denny brought this pro se civil rights action against the Sandia

Heights Homeowners Association, an individual member of that association,

Bernalillo and Santa Fe Counties, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals alleging

civil rights violations arising from a civil action brought against her in state court. 

In the state proceeding, the state district court found that Ms. Denny’s motor

home was in violation of restrictive covenants covering her subdivision and

permanently enjoined her from parking the motor home on her property. The

decision was affirmed by the state Court of Appeals. In this federal action, Ms.

Denny asserts that the state suit against her was illegal on several grounds, as well

as a denial of equal protection and due process.

Upon consent of the parties, the matter was heard by a magistrate judge,

who dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. See U.S. West Inc. v. Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999). 

We have carefully reviewed the record and the reasoning and authorities relied on

by the magistrate judge. We affirm substantially on the grounds set forth in the

memorandum opinion and order dismissing the action.

AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Stephanie K. Seymour

Chief Judge
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION**

 

The following statement is provided by the undersigned to accompany the foregoing Report on Form 10-K pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and shall not be deemed filed pursuant to any provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any other securities law.

 

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Report on Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Section 78) and that the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Broadway Financial Corporation as of and for the year ended December 31, 2019.

 

 
| Date:  | April 29,   2020 | By:                              | /s/   Brenda J. Battey |
|--------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|
|   |                  | Brenda   J. Battey               |
|   |                  | Chief   Financial Officer        |
|   |                  | Broadway   Financial Corporation |

 

----
<PAGE>
EXHIBIT 99.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

I, Robert C. Bateman, Chief Financial Officer of Applied Microsystems
Corporation (the "Registrant"), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

         (1) the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Registrant, to which this
         certification is attached as an exhibit (the "Report"), fully complies
         with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
         of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and

         (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Registrant.

Dated: March 28, 2003                                    /s/  Robert C. Bateman
                                                         -----------------------
                                                         Robert C. Bateman
                                                         Chief Financial Officer
#### William Jenkins, Respondent, v Fink Baking Corp., Appellant.

—In an action for job reinstatement, back pay and other damages arising out of a claimed wrongful discharge, and breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the defendant Fink Baking Corp. appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (LeVine, J.), dated December 5, 1984, as, upon reargument, adhered to its previous determination dated September 26, 1984, which denied the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint.

Order reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, order dated September 26, 1984 vacated, motion granted, and complaint dismissed.

The defendant employer correctly asserts that a prior arbitration award, which found simply that the plaintiff William Jenkins was discharged for just cause, was a "final and definite award on the subject matter submitted” *(cf.*CPLR 7511 [b] [1] [iii]), and, thus, pursuant to the principle of res judicata, bars relitigation of the propriety of the discharge *(see, Matter of Ranni [Ross],*58 NY2d 715). The award did not, however, preclude a relitigation in the Unemployment Insurance Administrative Law Judge Section of the New York State Department of Labor of the circumstances surrounding Jenkins’ dismissal, as a "just cause” discharge does not automatically preclude entitlement to unemployment compensation *(see, Matter of Hulse [Levine]*41 NY2d 813; *Matter of Guimarales [New York City Bd. of Educ.—Roberts]*109 AD2d 1042). The Administrative Law Judge could determine that the arbitration award was, under the circumstances, not entitled to collateral estoppel effect with respect to the plaintiffs claim for unemployment compensation *(see, Matter of Guimarales [New York City Bd. of Educ.—Roberts] supra).*Thus, contrary to Special Term’s reasoning, the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that Jenkins was not guilty of the misconduct that was the basis for his discharge went only to his eligibility for unemployment benefits and did not effect the validity of the arbitration award. Accordingly, Special Term should have granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the *714complaint. Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
#### Timothy T. Johnson, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Kyrell Johnson, an Infant, Appellant, v Genesee Management, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[945 NYS2d 917]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Thomas A. Stander, J.), entered March 23, 2011 in a personal injury action. The order granted the motions of defendants for summary judgment and dismissed the amended complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in the decision at Supreme Court. Present — Scudder, P.J., Smith, Fahey, Bindley and Martoche, JJ.
DOCUMENT NOT IMAGED DUE TO ONE OR MORE REASONS LISTED BELOW:

9 TOO VOLUMINOUS

9 TRANSCRIPT 

9 QUALITY NOT LEGIBLE

9 FONT TOO SMALL

9 PHOTOGRAPHS

9 OTHER _____________________________________________________

TO VIEW THE DOCUMENT YOU MUST OBTAIN THE CASE FILE AT THE

CLERK’S OFFICE. THE CLERK’S OFFICE IS OPEN FROM 8:30 AM. TO 4:30 PM.

MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY EXCEPT FOR LEGAL HOLIDAYS. TO OBTAIN A

COPY YOU CAN CALL THE CLERK’S OFFICE SERVICE CENTER AT

312-435-5699.

Case: 1:02-cv-03002 Document #: 53-2 Filed: 08/22/05 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:213
#### George J. Delaney, Respondent, v Maura T. Delaney, Appellant.

Resettled judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Silbowitz, J.), entered October 30, 1984, granting a divorce in favor of defendant wife and providing, *inter alia,*for the payment of maintenance of $200 per week to defendant, unanimously modified, on the law and on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, without costs or disbursements, to increase the maintenance award to $400 per week, to delete the provision terminating plaintiff’s responsibility to pay maintenance upon the youngest child’s reaching 21 years of age and, except as thus modified, affirmed. Appeal from judgment of divorce, same court and justice, entered December 1, 1983, dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as academic.

This is a case of a 23-year marriage gone sour. Whatever the reason for the breakup, it is clear that the wife, a licensed health teacher with the New York City Board of Education at the time of her marriage, subordinated her own career to bear and raise four children, the youngest of whom is now 16, and assisted the husband, now 49 years of age, with his successful career as a vicé-president of Con Edison, where he currently earns approximately $100,000 per year in addition to enjoying substantial perquisites. The wife, now 47 years of age, works at a local college as an administrator and fund raiser at an annual salary of $20,800. Her employment is terminable at will and her prospects for any significant increase in salary do not appear to be substantial. During the marriage the family enjoyed country club and yacht club memberships and the children were privately educated.

In our view, a maintenance award of $200 per week is unrealistically low, particularly in light of the husband’s present and anticipated income, the wife’s present and future earning capacity, and the parties’ preseparation standard of living. Furthermore, upon sale of the marital residence and division of the proceeds, as directed by the judgment herein, the wife will be confronted with the additional burden of finding suitable housing accommodations for herself while the husband has been awarded, as separate property, the cooperative apartment into which he moved at the time of the separation. In such circumstances we find that a maintenance award of $400 per week would be more in keeping with the husband’s ability to pay and the wife’s present and future needs. Since we can find no justification for terminating the husband’s responsibility for paying maintenance when the youngest child reaches 21 years *112of age, a time when the wife’s needs will be no less acute, we eliminate said provision. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Bloom and Ellerin, JJ.
U.S. flagAn official website of the United States government
                    Here's how you know **Official websites use .gov**
                            
                            A **.gov** website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
 **Secure .gov websites use HTTPS**
                            
                            A **lock** (                            
                              A locked padlock                                                      
                            
                            ) or **https://** means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.


Menu Agricultural Research Service
						
                    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
 Great Basin Rangelands Research: Reno, NV
 close



    Research

                    Research Projects
                                    Publications
                                    Collaborations
                                    News
                People

                    Staff Listing
                                    Careers


        


                    Newsletter
                        Volume 1
                                    Volume 2Search small
                    Search
            
            ARS Home
                                About ARS
                                Contact Us






rehab field photosheadline bar Research


Return to top


Connect with ARS Sign up


ARS Home
                            USDA.gov
                            Plain Writing
                            Policies & Links
                            Civil Rights Statements
                            FOIA
                            Accessibility Statement
                            Privacy Policy
                            Non-Discrimination Statement
                            Quality of Information
                            USA.gov
                            WhiteHouse.gov
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1035 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1035

To establish a moratorium on large fishing vessels in Atlantic herring 
                        and mackerel fisheries.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 17, 1997

Mr. Reed (for himself, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. Chafee, and Mr. Lautenberg) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
           Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To establish a moratorium on large fishing vessels in Atlantic herring 
                        and mackerel fisheries.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MORATORIUM.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801 et 
seq.), no large fishing vessel may engage in fishing for Atlantic 
herring or Atlantic mackerel within the United States exclusive 
economic zone until--
            (1) the National Marine Fisheries Service has completed a 
        new population survey concerning the abundance of the discrete 
        spawning stocks of Atlantic herring and Atlantic mackerel; and
            (2) the Secretary of Commerce has approved and implemented 
        fishery management plans developed by the appropriate regional 
        fishery management council for Atlantic herring and Atlantic 
        mackerel, that specifically allow large fishing vessels to 
        participate in those fisheries.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Fishery management plan.--The term ``fishery management 
        plan'' means a fishery management plan prepared under section 
        303 of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
        Act (16 U.S.C. 1853).
            (2) Large fishing vessel.--The term ``large fishing 
        vessel'' means a fishing vessel (as that term is defined in 
        section 3 of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
        Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1802)) of the United States that is 
        equal to or greater than 165 feet in length overall and has an 
        engine of more than 3,000 horsepower.
            (3) Regional fishery management council.--The term 
        ``regional fishery management council'' means a regional 
        fishery management council established under section 302 of the 
        Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 
        U.S.C. 1852).
            (4) United states exclusive economic zone.--The term 
        ``United States exclusive economic zone'' means the exclusive 
        economic zone established by Proclamation No. 5030, issued on 
        March 10, 1983.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2019337EN.01002101.xml

| 7.10.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 337/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 337/21

---

Action brought on 20 August 2019 — The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann v EUIPO (Gymnastic or sports equipment)

(Case T-579/19)

(2019/C 337/22)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann GbR (Munich, Germany) (represented by: J. Hellmann-Cordner, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Design at issue: Multiple application for registration of European Union designs (Gymnastic or sports equipment) — Registration No 5807179 0001-0012

Contested decision: Decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 June 2019 in Case R 573/2019-3

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | annul the defendant’s decision of 16 January 2019 in so far as priority was not given to European Union design No 5807179 0001-0012; uphold the claimed priority of 26 October 2017 and provide for a corrected notification of the European Union design indicating the priority; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the defendant’s decision of 16 January 2019 in so far as priority was not given to European Union design No 5807179 0001-0012; uphold the claimed priority of 26 October 2017 and provide for a corrected notification of the European Union design indicating the priority;

| — | reimburse it for the appeal fee; |
| --- | --- |

—

reimburse it for the appeal fee;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs; |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs;

| — | alternatively, conduct a hearing. |
| --- | --- |

—

alternatively, conduct a hearing.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 41(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 on Community designs |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 41(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 on Community designs

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001031003
<NAME>                        MERRILL LYNCH PREFERRED CAPITAL TRUST II
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   OTHER
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                        DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                           DEC-26-1998
<PERIOD-END>                             MAR-26-1999
<CASH>                                             0
<SECURITIES>                             309,278,400
<RECEIVABLES>                              6,185,568
<ALLOWANCES>                                       0
<INVENTORY>                                        0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         315,463,968
<PP&E>                                             0
<DEPRECIATION>                                     0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           315,463,968
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      6,185,568
<BONDS>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                              300,000,000
<COMMON>                                   9,278,400
<OTHER-SE>                                         0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             315,463,968
<SALES>                                            0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           6,185,568
<CGS>                                              0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            6,185,568
<INCOME-TAX>                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        6,185,568
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                               6,185,568
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      0
        


</TABLE>
Order entered August 8, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 12
- 01648
- CR CIRO CUEVAS, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Caus e No. F11
- 57751
- U



### O RDER In this case, appellant raises an issue related to the costs assessed against him. The record, however, does not contain a cost bill or other document with an itemized list of costs assessed in this case. Accordingly, we ORDER th e Dallas County District Clerk to file, within FIFTEEN DAYS of the date of this order, a supplemental clerk’s record containing a detailed itemization of the costs assessed in this case, including but not limited to, specific court costs, fees, and court

a ppointed attorney fees. In accordance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 103.001, the cost bill shall be signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer who is entitled to receive payment for the cost. We further ORDER that the suppl emental clerk’s record include adocument explaining any and all abbreviations used to designate a particular fee, cost, or court

appointed attorney fee.
We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to Gary Fitzsimmons, Dal las County District Clerk; Dallas County District Clerk’s Office, Criminal Records Division; and to counsel for all parties.

/s/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE