UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

NATALIE J. FERGUSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WESTERN CAROLINA REGIONAL SEWER

No. 96-1277

AUTHORITY,

Defendant-Appellee,

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

Amicus Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.

Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-94-3404-6-20AK)

Argued: October 28, 1996

Decided: December 30, 1996

Before WIDENER and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and BULLOCK,

Chief United States District Judge for the Middle District of

North Carolina, sitting by designation.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Julie Michaels Bondura, HARMON LAW FIRM, P.A.,

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Dori Kay Bernstein,
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. Thomas Allen Bright, HAYNSWORTH, BALDWIN, JOHNSON & GREAVES, P.A., Greenville,

South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Roy F. Harmon, III, HARMON LAW FIRM, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant.

C. Gregory Stewart, General Counsel, Gwendolyn Young Reams,

Associate General Counsel, Carolyn L. Wheeler, Assistant General

Counsel, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. Susan Eglin Sykes,

HAYNSWORTH, BALDWIN, JOHNSON & GREAVES, P.A.,

Greenville, South Carolina; Stephen H. Brown, HILL, WYATT,

BANNISTER & BROWN, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff appeals the district court's granting of her former employer's motion for summary judgment in her action alleging employment

discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The district court found that her

alleged impairments--hypothyroidism, irritable bowel syndrome, and

diverticulosis--did not, either alone or in combination, constitute a

disability under the ADA. Because we find that the undisputed facts

show that Plaintiff was terminated for legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons unrelated to her alleged disability we do not find it necessary

to consider Plaintiff's arguments concerning the proper definition of

the term "disability" under the ADA. See McMahan v. International

Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, 964 F.2d

1462, 1467 (4th Cir. 1992) ("We of course have the power to affirm

a judgment for any reason appearing on the record, notwithstanding

that the reason was not addressed below.") (citing Blum v. Bacon, 457

U.S. 132, 137 n.5 (1982)).

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I.

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant in October 1973, and at the time

of her termination performed the duties of clerk/typist/receptionist

under the supervision of administrative assistant Beverly Gunter.

Plaintiff suffers from hypothyroidism, irritable bowel syndrome, and

diverticulosis. In May 1992, soon after Plaintiff's hypothyroidism was

diagnosed, Defendant's executive director offered to let her work a

three-day week. Plaintiff declined the offer at that time. In

August 1992, Plaintiff was allowed, at her request, to work a threeday work week, the first of which ended on August 9, 1992. She

worked the first day of the next week and was out for the remainder

of the week. A doctor's note indicated that she was sick on

August 12, 13, and 14.

On August 19, 1992, Plaintiff met with Gunter and Ray Orvin,

Defendant's assistant director, for a performance evaluation. The

review was critical of Plaintiff's absenteeism, and her medical problems were discussed. Plaintiff became upset. Plaintiff was told that

she needed to be evaluated by a doctor to determine whether she was

physically able to work the 37-1/2 hour normal work week or should

take a leave of absence. Plaintiff did not want to take a leave of

absence. Shortly after the meeting Plaintiff left her job and went

home. According to Plaintiff, she was given permission to leave, but

this is disputed. Regardless, Gunter called Plaintiff approximately

three hours later and directed her to return to work. Plaintiff stated

that she was sick with a migraine headache and that Orvin had given

her permission to leave work. Orvin then spoke with Plaintiff and told

her that she did not have permission and that she must return to work

that day. Plaintiff refused, stating that she was too sick and had taken

medication. However, she did drive back later to pick up her husband

who was also employed by Defendant.

The next day Plaintiff saw her doctor, but did not go to work after

her doctor's appointment. She attempted to call Gunter to report that

she still had a headache and would not be at work, but was unable to

speak with her. That afternoon Orvin contacted Plaintiff and directed

her to come to the office to discuss her situation and her behavior the

previous day. Plaintiff refused, stating that she was not well enough

to drive to work, although she had driven to the doctor that morning.

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Plaintiff was terminated for abandoning her job during working hours

and for insubordination for her refusal to return to work. Plaintiff then

filed the instant lawsuit, alleging that Defendant wrongfully terminated her employment because of her disabilities and failed to provide

reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Following discovery, the district court granted Defendant's motion

for summary judgment, finding that "no reasonable jury could find

that Ferguson's impairments, either alone or in combination, constitute a disability under the ADA." Defendant contends that the district

court's decision can be upheld on any of three grounds: (1) that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) that if she was

disabled Defendant fulfilled its legal obligation to reasonably accommodate her; and (3) that she was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

II.

It is beyond dispute that an employee may be discharged for violating a workplace rule and for insubordination. See Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d

255, 259 (4th Cir. 1993) (employer may terminate employee because

of misconduct even though employee is handicapped). Even assuming

that Plaintiff initially believed she had permission to leave work on

August 19, she refused her supervisor's subsequent direction to return

to the office, contending that she was sick. Yet she admitted in her

deposition that she later drove to pick up her husband from work. Furthermore, Plaintiff was insubordinate again on August 20 when she

refused to heed Orvin's instruction to return to the office to discuss

her situation. Again, Plaintiff gave the excuse that she was too sick

to drive, but admitted that she had driven to the doctor that morning.

The record is clear that Defendant was sympathetic and accommodating to Plaintiff's condition, literally allowing her to work when

able. When Defendant finally sought to reach some understanding

with her which would allow her job to be covered she became insubordinate and disobeyed her supervisor's orders to return to work on

two separate days. Thus, even if Plaintiff is a person with a disability

within the meaning of the ADA, she was terminated for legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons.

AFFIRMED

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