®

This Court finds that the four tax evasion counts, as well as the indictment, adequately

apprise Richardson of the events that comprise the tax evasion charges. As the Government
correctly notes, the indictment provides extensive detail about Richardson’s alleged involvement
with the WFA, and those details constitute the foundation of the tax evasion charges. Further,
cach count of the indictment sets forth the specific acts that comprise the Government's lax
evasion allcvations. For cxample, Count Thirty-Nine, Paragraph 10 of the indictment states:

10. From on or about January 1, 1997 through on or about October 19, 1998. in

the Northern District of tinois, Eastern Division, and elsewhere, Ronald J

Richardson, defendant herein, who during the calendar year was married. willfully

attempted lo evade and defeat income tax due and owing by him and his wile to

the United States for the 1997 calendar year by the following a
(a) on or about October 19, 1998, defendant Richardson prepared and
caused to be prepared, and filed and caused to be filed a false and
fraudulent United States Individual Income Tax Return, which was filed
with the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of himselfand his wile.
Wherein it was stated that the defendant and his wife did not have un
interesL in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a
foreign country and that their joint taxable income for that calendar year
was the sum of $638,178 and that the amount of tax due and owing
thereon was the sum of $253,690; whereas, the defendant then and there
well knew, he and his wife did have an interest in, and signature or other
aulborily over financial accounts in a foreign country; their joint laxable
income for that calendar year was substantially in excess of $038,178. and
he and his wife owed additional tax to the United States in an amount of al
least $84,000 beyond what he and his wife reported that they awed on their
lax return.

s, among others

Subsequently, Count Thirty-Nine, paragraph {0 provides further details of the actions allegedly
taken by Richardson in furtherance of his tax evasion scheme. Mor example, subsection (c) of

paragraph 10 states, “on or about February 24, 1997, defendant Richardson, acting in concert

with August C, Ghilarducci. wired and caused to be wired from the Northern District of Hlinots

to the Westpac Banking Corporation in Australia WFA proceeds in the approximate amount of


®

pereent of the fraudulently obtained deposits received from individuals and companies, and
subsequently, Richardson was identified by the Government as an unindicled co-conspirator in
the scheme,

The Government states that it will present evidenec that in these transactions, which

occurred from 1993 through 1997, Glavinovich actively sought to have Richardson repay the

principal Cilavinovich invested with Richardson. According to the Government, afler several

individuals were indicted and subsequently sentenced for their roles with MIG, Richardson
informed Gilavinovich that he would repay part of Glavinovich’s money, However, the
Government contends, Richardson has not repaid the money. Finally, on Augusl 3, 1996.
Glavinovich me! with Richardson, and Richardson told Glavinovich that Richardson would have
$50,000 available within twenty days. Subsequently. on August 20, 1996, Richardson received a
letter from Ghilarducei representing that Richardson was to be paid $92.093,75 for his services
related to COF and railroad bond transactions for WFA. The Government argues that
Richardson’s interactions with Glavinovich show that as Richardson and Ghilarducei were
setting up WFA and beginning to the conduct the business that is the subject of the indictment,
Richardson was receiving frequent correspondence from another investor about Richardson’s
alleged activities in a similar scheme, in that investor's attempt to recover his losses from the
first alleged scheme. The CGiovernment believes that any attempt by Richardson to repay

Glavinovich would have been with funds received from the WEA transactions.

BL Is This Evidence “Inextricably Jatertwined " With the Charged Offen:

The Government contends that the evidence that it seeks lo admit is directly related to,

and consequently, “inextrigably intertwined,” with the charged offense. The Seventh Circuit “has

-4-


defendants may be charged in one or more counts toycther or separately.

All defendants need not be charged in each count.

The Seventh Cireuit has noted that proper joinder “depends on the meaning of ‘saine series of

acts or transactions.”” United States wes v. Todosijevie, 161 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting

United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1353 (7th Cir, 1995)) (oting that, “{t]he usual

meaning is acts or transactions that are pursuant lo a common plan or commen scheme.” Id.) By
looking at the indicument, it is clear that the indictment centers around an ov erarching alleged
racketeering scheme, where every count of the indictment is closely linked to the alleged
racketeering activity, For example, paragraph $ of Count One of the indictment enumeraics the
respective roles of the Defendants in the alleged racketeering scheme. Paragraph 5(a) stales:
Defendant August C. Ghilarducei was the president and owner of WEA,
He oversaw and directed the operation of WFA, including, among other
things, determining the prices charged to WI'A clicnts, negotiating the

terms of WPA transactions and deciding how WEA proceeds would be
spht with defendant Richardson and other associates.

In addition, Paragraph 5 (b) state

Defendant Ronald J. Richardson was at different tines material to this
indictment cither an employee or an independent contractor of WEA,
Under the direction of, and in coordination with defendant Ghilarducei,
defendant Richardson, among other things, obtained clicnts for WFA,
prepared the paper work for many WFA transactions, and provided
prospective WIA clients with information and explanations concerning
WFA-related linancial transactions.

These paragraphs clearly show thal although Richardson and Ghilarducei had different roles in
the alleged rackcteering scheme. it was the same series of transactions that comprise the counts
in the indictment. Further, as Rule 8(b) states, it is not necessary for both Defendants to be

charged in every count in the indictment. Consequently. joinder is proper pursuant to Rule 8(b)

Ye


ee ®

Government notes that on August 3, 1996, Glavinovich met with Richardson, and Richardson

told Glavinovich that Richardson would have $50,000 available within 20 days. On August 20,
1996, Richardson received a letter (rom Ghilarducci, representing that Richardson was Lo be paid
$92,093.75 for his services related lo COF and railroad bond transactions for WFA, According
to the Government, it appears that Richardson may have intended to pay Glavinovich from
money reccived from WPA in 1996, As such, the Governnicnt contends, the Glavinovich
transaction js inextricably intertwined with the charged WIA transactions.

The Court finds that Richardson’s alleged transactions with Glavinovich are inextricably
related to the charges set forth in the indictment. Specifically, Glavinovich’s attempt in 1997 to
recoup moncy lost in an alleged racketeering scheme shows that the chronology of the
interactions between Richardson and Glavinovich are intertwined with the altegalions thal
comprise the indictment against Richardson. In addition, this evidence is instructive on whether
Richardson may have engaged in the alleged WFA transactions to pay back Glavinavich, 4
bondholder who contended that his investment was worthless. ‘This is particularly relevant given
certain allegations in the indiclment. Specilically, in paragraph 25 of Count One of the
indictment, the Government alleges that part of the scheme was that defendant Ghilarducei used
proceeds obtained from selling COF letters 10 repay some railroad bondholders who had
complained about the moncy lost on their allegedly worthless investment, Consequently,
Richardson’s transactions with Glavinovich are “inextricably related” with the allegations as set

forth in the indictment.

In addition, because the Court has determined that this evidence is inextricably related to

the charges set forth in the indictment, the Court must cnsure that the evidence satislics the

-6-


| ee ®

a well-established line of precedent which allows evidence of uncharged acts to be introduced if

the evidence is ‘intricately related” to the acts charged in the indictment.” United States v.

Spacni, 60 F.3d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1102

(7th Cir. 1995)). Pursuant to the “inextricably related” doctrine. “evidence of uncharged
criminal activity that is found to be ‘intricately related to the facts of the case’ is deemed relevant
and admissible. pravided that it satisfies the balancing test of Rule 403." United States v.

Gibson, 170 '.3d 673,680 (7th Cir, 1999) (citing United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1102-

03; United States v. Hargrove, 929 F.3d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1991). “Under the “inextricably
related” standard, the admissibility of evidence turns onTM;
| Whether the evidence is properly admitted to provide the jury with a “cormplcte
story of the crime [on] trial...’"whether its absence would create a “chronological
or concepttal void? in the story of the crime...or whether it is “so blended or
connected” that it incidentally involves, explains the circumstances or tends to
prove any clements of, the charged erime,
Gibson, 170 F.3d at 681 (internal citations omitted). Conscquently, evidence deemed
“inextricably related” must arise from the same transaction or transactions as (he charged crimes.
Id.

The Government contends that the proffered evidence, which concerns Richardson's
transactions with Glavinovich, is highly instructive to the jury’s understanding of the chronology
and circumstances surrounding the charged crimes. The Government notes that the Glavinovich
transactions look place between November 1992 and March 1993, However, the Government

contends, as late as October 1997, Glavinovich was corresponding with Richardson in an atlemplt

to recoup the principal he lost lo the scheme in which Richardson was involved. The


Il. Richardson’s Renewal for a Request for Severance

On May 5, 2004, Defendant Richardson moved for severance of the Defendants, or in the
alternative, severance of the counts in the indictment, Ata June 16, 2004 hearing, this Court
denied Richardson's motion. Richardson has renewed his motion for severance of the trial, as he
notes thal the Government has indicated that it intends to introduec a great deal of information
regarding uncharged conduct allegedly committed by co-Defendant Ghilarducci, Richardson
contends that this information will unfairly prejudice him, Murther, Richardson contends that a
jury instruction at the time of the introduction of such evidence stating that the evidence only
pertains to Ghilardueci will nor cure the prejudice, yet will highlight the evidence, thereby
increasing the prejudicial effvet upon both Delendants.

A fy Joinder Proper Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8b)?

Joinder of defendants is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b)
(hereinafter “Rule 8(b)”). Rule 8(b) provides that:
The indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they arc

alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same
seric¢s of acts or ansactions, constituting an offense or offenses, The

ee

not substantially outweighed by the danger of untair prejudice. United States vy. Hernar
F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1996). The evidence in this case passes the four part test. The
evidence of Richardson’s interactions with Glavinovich goes NOt CO propensity, but to intent to
defraud, the motive for allegedly conducting subsequent fraudulent transactions, his knowledge
of the outcome of these transactions, and his lack of mistake, In addition, Richardson's
transactions with Glavinovich are similar enough to the allegations in the indictment, as well
as close enough in time to be deemed us relevant. Further, the Government contends that it
will provide direct eyewitnesses testimony and bank records to support the transactions that
occurred between Richardson and Glavinovich. | inally, this evidence is highly probative, and
any purported prejudice is outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. Consequently ,
even if this evidence was not admissible pursuant to “inextricably related” doctrine, it would
be admissible pursuant to 404(b).

-&


Saute Lola gems

> District Court, Northern Dist nt Hlinois

United 'S

Name of Assigned Judge David H. Cour Sitting Judge if Otter
or Vagistrate Judge (han Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 CR L101 -2 DATE 10/12/2004 '
fv connec 4
CASE United States of America vs. August C, Ghilarducei and Ronald J. Richardson
TITLE ;
[In thy following bos fay enidicaty the party fling thy mgtign,eg., plinth, defendaris, ard party plant (f sand (ay Taate bray Hig ta

ef the mation being presented. |

MOTION:

Objections by Ronald J. Richardson to government’s rule 404(b) materials and renewal of request for
severance [Doc. No, 116]; Motion by Ronald J. Richardson for a bill of particulars regarding the counts of the
indictment charging defendant with tax evasion [Doc. No. 118|

P ENTRY:

OFRCPs my OLocal Rule di. OFROPS ay lh) OC FROPA ay?)

i Filed motion of | use listing in “Motion” box above.}
(2) a Bret in support of motion due |
(3) Gg Answer brief ta motion dug Reply to answer brief due
ay u Ruling/Hearing on sel for at
g oO Status hearing|held/continued to| [set for/re-ser tor] on sel for a, |
(6) n Pretrial comerence[held/continued to] [set for‘re-set for} on. set for at
(7) o ‘Trial|set for/re-set for] on al |
£8) u [Bench/Jury trial] [Heuring] hekl/continued to al |
oy a Tus case is disnussed [will without) prejudice ancl without costs] by/agieement pursuant to]
if
|

ao, JQther ducket entry} — Por the reasons set forth in the attached memorandum opinion and order.
Richardson's objections to the Gavernment’s Rule 404(b) materials [Dow. No. 116-1 |.which is taken os |
amotion to exclude these rule 404(b) materials, is DENIED, Richardson's renewed requesl for seversiice |
[Doc. No. 116-2) is DENIED. Richardson’s motion for a bill of particulars regarding the counts at tie |

indictment charying defendant with tax evasion [Doc. No. 118] is DENIED ot i
! a

Dud bar)

naa

i

i

i

1

|

(It) a [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order. ]

No natives required, actvased 1h open court Document
Nuinbee

No natives requitod

Notives inaled bby yudge’s statl

I
X | Noblicd counsel by tekephee. (copies of decision wete given to oct 14.2004 i
Dovkeung w me notees. to attorneys by Chambers)! i}"!° 277 = |
Mail AQ 4ou linn, g 1 We ae / 3 oOo i
Copy to dudgermag:sinaw judge i baa ghiez '
lite suitable Lanestacet ~~ vs
equntroum
shiley aly

mnibat's a

ma ae eo SNL Clarks Clic ty ie ely a :



the respective roles of each Defendant in the alleged rackctecring scheme. tn addition,

Richardson has failed ta show how a joint trial will prevent the jury from making a reHable
judgnicnt about guilt or innocence as to cach Defendant. lurthermore, Richardson has not made
a showing as to how a limiting instruction will highlight, rather than cure, any prejudice cither
Defendant may face because of a joint trial. Consequently, this Court has determined that neither
Delendants’ rights will be compromised during a joint trial, Consequently, Richardson's

renewed motion to sever is denied.

TH. Motion for Bill of Particulars Regarding Counts of the Indictment Charging
Defendant Richardson With Tax Evasion
When the Government obtained a third superceding indictment against Defendant

Richardson. it added four additional counts (Counts Thirty-Nine through Forty-two), allegir

evasion pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7201. These four counts concern Richardson's tax returms for
the tax years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. Richardson notes that each count slates that

Richardson wilfully attempted to evade taxes he owed for each year by taking “several specific

ac! In addition, Richardson notes that cach count then stales in paragraph (a) that the reported
taxable income and the tax duc and owing were a cerlain amount, but that Richardson had
additional income and owed additional taxes. Further, Richardson notes that the approximate

amount ol unreported additional income is unstated, and the identity of the specific items which

are unreported is not set forth. Richardson contends that given that these counts have been filed

shortly before trial, and (hat the counts pertain to lax years beg

inning over seven years ago, he is

in need of specific information to prepare Jor trial. The Defendant requests that the Court order

-ll-


| %

B. Should a Severance be Granted Pursuant io Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 142

Because joinder is proper pursuant to Rule 8(b), this Court’s authority to sever the
Defendants is governed entirely by Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 (hereinafter “Rule 14"). Rule 14 wives
this Court discretion to grant a severance of defendants “[i] fit appears that a defendant...is
prejudiced by joinder...for trial together.” United States v. Mohammad, $3 F.3d 1426, 1431 (7th
Cir. 1995) A defendant must establish thal a joint trial will result in actual prejudice. Id.

“Actual prejudice means that the defendant could not have a fair trial without severance, “not
merely that a separate trial would offer hiin a better chance at acquittal.” Id (internal citations
omitted),

When the joinder of defendants is proper pursuant lo Rule 8(b), “a joint ual is

‘presumptively appropriate.’” Mohammad, 53 F.3d at 1432 (citing United States v. Chapman,

954 F.2d 1352, 1359 (7th Cir, 1992)). This is because a joint trial “more efficiently considers the
roles of those indicted together and accused of a joint scheme.” Mohammad, 534 F.3d at 1432
(internal citations omitted). A request for severance should be granted, “only if there is a serious

risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants or prevent

the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Id. (citing

States, 506 WU.

534, 539 (1993)). Further, the Seventh Circuit has noted that the risk of
prejudice can be cured by measures such as proper limiting instructions to the jury. Mohammad,
53 F.3d at 1432.

Richardson has failed to present any evidence thal would cause the Court lo reconsider its
June 16, 2004 ruling, which held that a joint (ria will not prejudice either Defendants’ righls to a

fair tral. Rather, in the circumstances of this case, a joint trial will assist the jury in determining

-10-



) )

balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403. See Spacni, 60 F.3d at 316 (internal citations omilted). In

pertinent part, Fed. R. Evid. 403 states, “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice...” Evidence that Richardson
handled Glavinovich’s investment funds in a similar manner as alleged in the indictment is
highly probative evidence, especially if Richardson attempted to repay Glavinovich with funds

obtained from the alleged rackeleering schome as set forth in the indictment. This evidence is

highly relevant and probative, and hat probative value outweighs any purported prejudicial
impact this evidence may have on Richardson. Consequently, evidence of Glavinovich’s

interactions with Richardson is admitted us inextricably related to the allegations set forth.!

' Because the Court has determined that this evidence is admissible as “inextricably
related” to the allegations as set forth, it need not address whether the evidence is admissible
pursuant to Fed. R. Fvid. 404(b). (“Lvidence concerning the unfolding of events that led to
an indictment, or other circumstances surrounding the crime, is nol evidence of “other acts’
within the meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).”) United States v. Akinrinade, 61 13d 1279,
1286 (7th Cir, 1995 (citing United States v. Zanes, 33 F.3d 1454, 1469 (7th Cir, 1994),
Assuming, arguendo, however, that evidence of Rich. n’s interactions with Glavinovich
was not admissible pursuant to the “inextricably related” doctrine, the Court would still find
this evidence admissible pursuant to Fed. R, Evid. 404(b), Rule 404(b), in relevant part,
provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible to prove the character of a

person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
issible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
ion, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident...

One of the crimes that Richardson has been charged with is mail fraud, which is a specific
intent crime. See United States v. Feldman, 711 758, 765 (7th Cir, 1995), The Seventh
Circuit has noted that with specific iment crimes, intent is an, “essential and nec y element
to be proven, and thus necessarily becomes a matter in issue.” United States v. Harrod. 856
F.2d 996,1000 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). In addition, in order to be
admissible pursuant to Fed. R. Evid, 404(b), the evidence must past u four part test. The
evidence must: (1) be directed towards establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant’s
propensity to commit the crime charged; (2) show that the other act is similar enough and
close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue; (3) be sufficient to support a jury
finding that the defendant committed the similar act; and (4) have a probative value which is

7.


transaction was a. confirmed funds/Icased funds type of transaction. and was similar to the
lransactions thal are the subject of the indictment. The Government contends that the evidence
will show that in November 1992, Glavinovich entercd into an agreement brokered by
Richardson, and the structure of that agreement was virtually identical to the alleged fraudulent
transactions charged in the indictment,

Specifically, the Government contends that in Richardson’s transactions with

Glavinovich, Richardson informed Glavinovich that he represented an investment company by
the name of Myco Investment Group (“MIG”), The Government alleges that Richardson advised
Glavinovich that for a fee of $150,000, Richardson could arrange for Glavinovich to obtain the
rights to prima bank guarantees or letters of credit totaling 500 million dollars. Glavinovich
agreed to this transaction. The Government also asseris Lhal Richardson, using the bank
guarantees as collateral, advised Glavinovich that Richardson and his associates at MIG could
then buy and sell bank instruments in the form of a trading program. According to the
Government, Richardson advised Glavinovich that he had completed these types of transactions
in the past, with profits that could rise to the millions of dollars. It is based upon these
representations, the Government contends, that Glavinovich wired $175,000 to Richardson and
others affiliated with MIG. Ultimately, because of delays and problems, the transaction fell
through; however, Glavinovich’s moncy, which was being held in escrow, had already been

released by the escrow atlorney. According to the Government. Richardson convinced

Glavinovich to invest two more times: $71,000 in January 1993 and $35,000 in March 1993. All
three transactions ultimately fell through, and subsequently, several individuals faced federal

indictments for their roles with MIG. The Government believes that Richardson received 16



®

$150,000." In addition to Count Thirty-Nine, Counts Forty, Forty-One and Forty-Two set orth
specific acts constituting the tax evasion allegations. Count 39 sets forth eleven specific acts,
Count 40 sets forth four specific acts. Count 41 sets forth six specific acts. Finally, Count 42

sets forth four specific acts. Consequently, the Court finds that the indictment provides

Richardson with specific details about the acts constituting the alleged tax evasion, including the

specific amourts of income al issue, In addition, the Court finds that the Government’s

agreement to provide Richardson with the draft tax schedules and catculations for cach charged
lax year prior to trial further obviates any need for a bill of particulars. Consequently,

Richardson’s motion for a bill of particulars is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Richardson’s objections to the Government’s Rule 404(b)
materials, which is taken as a motion to exclude these 404(b) materials, is DENIED; Richardson's
renewed request for severance is DENIED; Richardson's motion for a bill of particulars regarding
the counts of the indictment charging defendant with tax evasion is DENIED.

Enter:

David]L Coar ~
United States District Judge

Dated: October 12, 2004

-14-


(3) monetary transactions in criminally derived property; (4) interstate transportation of property

taken by fraud; and (5) tax-related offenses. Id. at { 4.

Defendant Richardson has filed several pre-trial motions in an attempt to resolve certain
evidentiary disputes prior to the October 20, 2004 trial. Specifically, Richardson has filed: (1) an
objection Lo the Government’s Rule 404(b) materials; (3) a renewed request for severance of the
trial from his co-Defendant, August C. Ghilardueci; and (4) a motion for a bill of particulars
regarding the counts of the indictment charging Defendant with tax evasion. For the reasons set
forth below, Richardson’s objections to the Government’s Rule 404(b) materials, which is taken
as amouon lo exclude these 404(b) materials, is DENIED; Richardson’s renewed request for
severance is DENIED; and Richardson's motion for a bill of particulars regarding the counts of

the indictment charging defendant with tax cvasion is DENILD.

I. Defendant Richardson’s Objection to the Government’s Rule 404(b) Materials

In his motion, Defendant Richardson notes that the Government has indicated that it
intends to introduce testimony regarding Richardson's contact with a person named Dy, John
Glavinovich (“Glavinovich”) as uncharged misconduct pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence ("Rule 404(b)"). Richardson objects to the introduction of this uncharged
conduct, as Richardsan contends that it does not meet the requirements of Rule 404(b).
Consequently, Richardson argues, this testimony should be excluded from trial.

The Government states that on September 2, 2004, it provided Defendants with notice
that at trial, the Government intended to introduce evidence of Richardson’s financial

lransactions with Glavinovich in 1992 and 1993, ‘the Government believes that the Glavinovich


| = ®

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

No, 02 CR 1101
Vv.

AUGUST ©. GHELARDUCCI and RONALD

J, RECHARDSON

HONORABLE DAVID TH, COAR

weve veer ye eevee

Defendants.

DOCKETED

OCT 4 4 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

August C. Ghilarducei (*Ghilarducei”) and Ronald J. Richardson (“Richardson”)
(collectively, “Defendants”) have been variously charged in a [forty-two count third superseding
indictment (hereinafter, “the indictment”) with rackcteering, wire fraud, money laundering, lax
cvasion and making false statements on a lax return, The indictment alleges that Defendant
Ghilarducci was the president and owner of Westchester Financial Associates, Inc. (hereinafter,
“WFA”), an linois corporation halding itself oul as a financiat planning and consulting
business. ( See Indictment, Count One, 1). According to the indictment, Defendant Richardson
acted as a business broker, and obtaincd clients for WA. (Id. at] 2). The Government alleges
that at all times material to the indictment, Richardson did business under the name “Westchester
Financial Associates of Georgia.” Id. In addition, the Government alleges that the actual

purpose of the WF A enterprise was to engage in: (1) wire fraud; (2) money laundering;


®

the Government to file a bill of particulars, which specifics the exact figures for the omitted

income, and provides the Government's criminal tax computations for each of the tax years in

the indictment.

AL Standard for Issuing a Bill of Particulars

The Court’s power to order the Government to file a bill of particulars is governed by
Ped. R. Crim. P. 7(1) (hereinafter “Rule 7(f)"), whieh states:

The court may direc! the government to file a bill of paruculars. The
defendant may n1ove for a bill of particulars before or within 10 days alter
arraignment or at a later time ifthe court permits. The government may
amend a bill of particulars subject lo such conditions as justice requires.

A court may find that it is necessary to order a bill of particulars if the indictment fails to provide

sufficient notice of the charges in order to adequately allow the defendant to prepare for trial,
United States v. Vasquez-Ruiz, 136 F.Supp.2d 941, 942 (N.D. HL. 2001) (citing United States v.
Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 134 (7th Cir. 1981)). “The test is whether the indictment sels forth the
elements of the offense charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of the charges to enable
him to prepare for trial.” United States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir, 1978) (internal
citations omitted). An indictment satisfies this standard if it sets forth the clements of cach
offense charged, cites the statutes that are violated, and the time and place of the defendant’s
conduct that allegedly violated the statute, Id. However, “a defendant is not entitled to know all
the evidence the government intends to produce, but only the theory of the goverument’s case.”
Kendall, 655 F.2d at 135 (internal citations omitted). In deciding whether to grant a defendant’s
request tor u bill of particulars, a court can consider such factors as the: (1) complexity of the
charges; (2) clarity of the indictment, and (3) degree of discovery available to the defense absent
a bill of particulars. Vasquez-Ruiz, 136 F. Supp.2d at 943 (internal citations omitted).

-12-