alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 26, 2020.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-18-00943-CR

BRANDIN M. GLISPY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 176th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1557607

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant appeals his conviction for sexual assault. Appellant’s appointed 

counsel filed a brief in which he concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous and 

without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and 

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See High v. 

State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 811–13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
2

A copy of counsel’s brief was delivered to appellant. Appellant was advised 

of the right to examine the appellate record and file a pro se response. See Stafford 

v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). As of this date, more than 

60 days have passed and no pro se response has been filed.

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree the 

appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find no reversible error in 

the record. We are not to address the merits of each claim raised in an Anders brief 

or a pro se response when we have determined there are no arguable grounds for 

review. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Wise and Zimmerer.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Order entered July 28 , 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas** No. 05 - 15 - 00548 - CR No. 05 - 15 - 00549 - CR DADRIANNE NICHOLE TU RNER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F11 - 70784 - H , F13 - 55178 - H 

### O RDER Before Justices Fillmore, Myers, and Evans Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to issue the mandates in these appeals INSTANTER

. /s/ ROBERT M. F ILLMORE JUSTICE
#### In the Matter of East Ramapo Central School Dis*647trict, Respondent, v East Ramapo Teachers Association et al., Appellants.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to stay arbitration, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Slifkin, J.), dated January 16, 1984, which granted petitioner’s application to stay arbitration.

Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, stay vacated, application denied, and the parties are directed to proceed to arbitration.

Petitioner seeks to stay arbitration of a grievance relating to an alleged violation of the transfer and promotion provisions of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner claims that arbitration is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel by virtue of this court’s decisions in *Matter of Schlosser v Board of Educ.*(62 AD2d 207, *affd*47 NY2d 811) and *Matter of Greenwald v Board of Educ.*(77 AD2d 600, *affd*57 NY2d 945). Appellants contend that their grievance, which arose out of petitioner’s denial in 1983 of voluntary transfer requests made by appellants Rosen and Schiff, is a matter unrelated to the prior litigation, which arose out of petitioner’s alleged improper termination of Rosen’s and SchifFs employment in 1976. Arbitration was stayed because Special Term found that appellants previously had a full and fair opportunity to test the identical issue.

Upon any challenge to the submission of a dispute to arbitration between an employer and employee in the public sector, it must be determined whether it is permissible to resolve such grievances by arbitration under the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law art 14), and whether the parties, in fact, provided for arbitration of such grievances *(see, Binghamton Civ. Serv. Forum v City of Binghamton,*44 NY2d 23, 28-29; *Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. [United Liverpool Faculty Assn.]*42 NY2d 509, 513). Although this threshold determination was not made by Special Term, it is evident from the record that arbitration of a grievance relating to the transfer and promotion of employees was both included under the broad grievance procedures of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and not prohibited under the Taylor Law or by public policy of the State.

The remaining issue, regarding the collateral estoppel effect of the prior litigation, is outside the scope of judicial inquiry and is within the exclusive province of the arbitrator *(see, Board of Educ. v Patchogue-Medford Congress,*48 NY2d 812; *Matter of Board of Educ. [Florida Teachers Assn.],*104 AD2d 411, *affd*64 NY2d 822).

*648Therefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the parties are directed to proceed to arbitration. Lazer, J. P., Bracken, Niehoff and Hooper, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 32.2****Certification of Periodic Report**     Pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. §1350, the undersigned officerof Renaissance Learning, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certifies that, to the undersigned’sknowledge: (1) the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30,2006 (the“Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), asapplicable, of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and  (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.Dated: November 6, 2006            /s/ Mary T. Minch         Name: Mary T. Minch    Title: Vice President-Finance, ChiefFinancial Officerand Secretary  THIS WRITTEN STATEMENT ACCOMPANIES THIS REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF2002 AND SHALL NOT BE DEEMED TO BE FILED BY THE COMPANY FOR PURPOSES OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACTOF 1934.
Exhibit 32.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Franklin Street
Properties Corp. (the "Company") for the period ended September 30, 2004 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned, George J. Carter, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
that:

            (1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

            (2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operation of the Company.


Date: November 8, 2004              /s/ George J. Carter
                                    -------------------------------------
                                    George J. Carter
                                    President and Chief Executive Officer
#### In re STRANG.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

October 2, 1907.)

In the matter of the judicial settlement of the accounts of John R. Strang, etc.

No opinion. Motion granted, allowing decision to be changed so as to give the Geneseo Gospel Society costs of the appeal payable out of the estate. See 105 N. Y. Supp. 566.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1



                               NUTRITION MEDICAL, INC.
                               STATEMENT OF COMPUTATION
                                OF NET LOSS PER SHARE



                                                    Years ended December 31,
                                                    ------------------------
                                                       1996          1995
                                                    ----------     ------
Primary and Fully Diluted:

   Average shares outstanding . . . . . . . . . . .  3,489,120     2,059,808

   SAB No. 83- for stock issued and
       options or warrants granted
       at exercise prices less than the
       initial public offering price
       during the 12 months preceding
       the initial public offering using
       the treasury method  . . . . . . . . . . . .    836,264     1,115,019

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     4,325,384     3,174,827
                                                     =========     =========


Net loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     $(759,012)    $(959,623)
                                                      ========      ========


Net loss per share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        $(.18)        $(.30)
                                                         ====          ====
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

VALENCIA HICKS for
RAYMONT HICKS, SSN: 333-82-2263,

Plaintiff,
v. No. 01 C 6620

JO ANNE BARNHART, Commissioner of
Social Security,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

After this Court issued its March 7, 2002 memorandum opinion
and order (“Opinion”), rejecting the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment but granting the alternative motion of Valencia
Hicks (“Hicks,” who has sued here on behalf of her son Raymont)
for a remand for further proceedings, Hicks moved for an award of
attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA,” 28
U.S.C. §2412). Hicks' motion has been opposed by the government
on the premise that its position was “substantially justified,” a
standard that a movant such as Hicks must overcome under 28
U.S.C. §2412(d) (1) (A). That issue has now been fully briefed and
is ready for decision.

No dispute exists as to the approach to be taken here:
Kolman v. Shalala, 39 F.3d 173, 177 (7% Cir. 1994) puts it in
aphoristic terms:

The test for substantial justification is whether the

agency had a rational ground for thinking it hada
rational ground for its action....

\t


In doing so Kolman drew on the “reasonable basis both in law and
fact” articulation in Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
(1988). As Pierce, id. at 569 explained:

Conceivably, the Government could take a position that

is not substantially justified, yet win; even more

likely, it could take a position that is substantially

justified, yet lose.

But it should be noted that in both Kolman and Pierce the
question was whether a legal position advanced by the government
was “substantially justified”--and to that end both cases looked
at how other courts had dealt with the same legal issue.
Remember that the government's position must pass the test of
reasonableness in the conjunctive--“both in law and fact”--and
here its failure was in the second prong of that requirement.

It is not simply that the administrative law judge was at
fault, both in “playing doctor” and in wholly failing to consider
the major evidence that pointed to a finding of disability on the

, part of Raymont, as the opinion explained at length. It is
rather that the government should have recognized the multiple
deficiencies in its case against Raymont, conducting itself so
that such errors could have been avoided and the case could have
been decided properly on its merits.

In that sense the necessity for remand was substantially

ascribable to the government's flawed position on the facts

(there was really no quarrel as to the law to be applied to those

facts). And that deficiency negates the existence of


“substantial justification” under EAJA. Hicks' motion for the
award of fees is therefore granted. This action is set for a

status hearing at 9 a.m. July 23, 2002 to see whether there is
any dispute as to the quantification of that award and, if so,

determine what further proceedings may be required.

to

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: July 9, 2002
EXHIBIT 32





CERTIFICATIONS





Pursuant to Section 906 of the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted), Frederick Duffner, President of PacificHealth Laboratories, Inc. (the "Company"), and Stephen P. Kuchen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:





1.           The Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2010, and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32 (the "Annual Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2.           The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the end of the period covered by the Annual Report.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to PacificHealth Laboratories, Inc. and will be retained by PacificHealth Laboratories, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





DATE: March 4, 2011





By:
/s/ Frederick DuffnerFrederick Duffner, CEO and President(Principal Executive Officer)





DATE: March 4, 2011





By:
/s/ Stephen P. KuchenStephen P. Kuchen, Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
Page 1 of 1

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

Charles P. Kocoras Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 01 C 9479 DATE 9/1/2005

CASE

TITLE

Cook Inc v. Boston Scientific Corp.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

The parties in this case are given to September 23, 2005 to remove all documents filed under seal with the

Clerk of Court. Parties are to contact the Clerk of Court with respect to instructions on how to retrieve said

documents. The Clerk of Court is given authority to destroy all under seal documents in his possession if

they are not retrieved by the close of business September 23, 2005.

Docketing to mail notices.

 Courtroom Deputy

Initials:

SCT

Case: 1:01-cv-09479 Document #: 129 Filed: 09/01/05 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:611
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D19-1611

_____________________________

ED COX JR.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Gadsden County.

Barbara K. Hobbs, Judge.

July 24, 2019

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED.

WOLF, ROBERTS, and JAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Ed Cox Jr., pro se, Appellant.
2

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
EXHIBIT 23

                        CONSENT OF KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP

<PAGE>


                         Consent of Independent Auditors
                         -------------------------------




The Board of Directors and Stockholders of
First Colorado Bancorp, Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration  statements on Form
S-8 of First Colorado Bancorp,  Inc. related to the First Colorado Bancorp, Inc.
1992 Stock Option Plan and First Colorado  Bancorp,  Inc. 1996 Stock Option Plan
of our report dated March 9, 1998,  relating to the  consolidated  statements of
financial  condition of First  Colorado  Bancorp,  Inc. and  subsidiaries  as of
December  31,  1997  and  1996,  and  the  related  consolidated  statements  of
operations,  stockholders'  equity,  and cash flows for each of the years in the
three-year  period ended December 31, 1997, which report appears in the December
31, 1997 annual report on Form 10-K of First Colorado Bancorp, Inc.

                                               /s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

                                               KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

Denver, Colorado
March 30, 1998
Case: 1:03-cr-00779 Document #: 412 Filed: 09/18/08 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:2333
Case: 1:03-cr-00779 Document #: 412 Filed: 09/18/08 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:2334
Case: 1:03-cr-00779 Document #: 412 Filed: 09/18/08 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:2335
Case: 1:03-cr-00779 Document #: 412 Filed: 09/18/08 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:2336
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-82,530-01

EX PARTE ALLYN LYONS, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. W11-57686-U(A) IN THE 291ST DISTRICT COURT

FROM DALLAS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of aggravated sexual

assault and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction.

Applicant contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. On March 6, 2014, the

trial judge entered a timely order designating issues. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might

entitle him to relief. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson, 993

S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In these circumstances, additional facts are needed. As
2

we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is the

appropriate forum for findings of fact. The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to

Applicant’s claim.

If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. 

If Applicant is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an

attorney to represent him at the hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. 

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether counsel’s

conduct was deficient and Applicant was prejudiced. The trial court shall also make any other

findings of fact and conclusions of law that it deems relevant and appropriate to the disposition of

Applicant’s claim for habeas corpus relief.

This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time shall

be obtained from this Court. 

Filed: January 14, 2015

Do not publish
EXHIBIT 2 

Case 1:02-cv-05893 Document 1657-3 Filed 09/03/2009 Page 1 of 6
Case 1:02-cv-05893 Document 1657-3 Filed 09/03/2009 Page 2 of 6
Case 1:02-cv-05893 Document 1657-3 Filed 09/03/2009 Page 3 of 6
Case 1:02-cv-05893 Document 1657-3 Filed 09/03/2009 Page 4 of 6
Case 1:02-cv-05893 Document 1657-3 Filed 09/03/2009 Page 5 of 6
Case 1:02-cv-05893 Document 1657-3 Filed 09/03/2009 Page 6 of 6
# C_2019399EN.01007701.xml

| 25.11.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 399/77 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.11.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 399/77

---

Action brought on 17 September 2019 — Welter’s v EUIPO (Shape of a handgrip with bristles)

(Case T-624/19)

(2019/C 399/95)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Welter’s Co. Ltd (Touliu, Taiwan) (represented by: T. Meinke, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Representation of tridimensional European Union mark (Shape of a handgrip with bristles) in white — Application for registration No 17 902 351

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 July 2019 in Case R 2428/2018-5

Form of order sought

The applicant disputes the legality of the decision at issue and claims that the Court should order EUIPO to enter the mark applied for in the register of EU trade marks also in respect of the following further goods in Class 21: brushes; material for brush-making; toothpicks; combs; toothbrushes; interdental brushes for cleaning the teeth.

Pleas in law

| — | Breach of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Breach of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles Fox, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rader, J.), rendered December 18, 1978, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence as a second felony offender.

Judgment affirmed.

When the defendant appeared for sentencing on October 6, 1978, he was served with a predicate felony statement concerning a 1973 conviction in Nassau County for criminal possession of a weapon. The defendant asserted that this conviction was unconstitutionally obtained because he had been denied the right to self-representation. The defendant asked to be furnished with the sentencing minutes for the 1973 matter and the court ordered that he be furnished with the minutes for both the plea and sentence. At the subsequent hearing held on December 18, 1978, it was discovered that neither the plea minutes nor the sentencing minutes made any mention of a request by the defendant to proceed *pro se.*The defendant then alleged that his request had been made at a *Wade*hearing held on November 9 or 10, 1973. The court did not grant a second adjournment to obtain these minutes.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a previous felony conviction, but not its constitutionality *(see,*CPL 400.21; *People v Harris,*61 NY2d 9). Once the fact of the prior conviction has been established, it is *819then incumbent upon the defendant to allege and prove the facts underlying the claim that the conviction was unconstitutionally obtained *(People v Harris, supra).*In the case at bar, the defendant failed to present any evidence to show that the 1973 conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. It was not improper to deny a second adjournment for the purpose of obtaining the minutes of the defendant’s 1973 *Wade*hearing since he made no effort during a period which exceeded two months to obtain any evidence to support his claim of unconstitutionality. Because the defendant failed to sustain his burden of proving that the 1973 conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, he was correctly adjudicated a second felony offender. Gibbons, J. P., Brown, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.