IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

GERI A. KEEFE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Blanche M. Manning

 v. )

) Case No. 02 C 5156

MEGA ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the court is defendants Mega Enterprises, Inc., Mega Home Improvement, Trust

Management Group, Steve Hogel, and Joseph Hogel’s motion for summary judgment as to

plaintiff’s claims for sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII, 42

U.S.C. § 2000(e). For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motion is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Local Rules

Under Local Rule 56.1, the party moving for summary judgment must submit a statement

of material facts, written in short numbered paragraphs with citations to admissible evidence.

Loc. R. 56.1(a); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2003). The opposing party must

respond to each paragraph by either admitting or denying the allegations, and specifically citing

to supporting materials showing the existence of a genuine factual dispute. Loc. R.

56.1(b)(3)(A). In her response to defendant’s Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement, plaintiff objects to at

least one of the facts on “relevance” grounds, which is inappropriate. Further, in their response

to plaintiff’s statement of additional facts, defendants have failed to properly deny any of

Keefe’s assertions of fact under Rule 56.1(b)(3), and either do not respond to the asserted facts
2

or only dispute the “relevance” of certain facts without admitting or denying the contents. 

Failure to comply with the local rules governing the form of summary judgment motions is not a

“harmless technicality.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 1994). 

When a party does not properly contest the opposing party’s statement of facts, these facts are

considered by the court to have been admitted to the extent that they are supported by the record. 

Rule 56.1(b)(3); Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1312 (7th Cir. 1995); Tobey v.

Extel/JWP, Inc., 985 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1993). With this caveat, the following facts are

undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

B. Facts

Mega Enterprises, Inc. is an Illinois corporation owned equally by Joe and Steve Hogel. 

Mega Enterprises, Inc. does business under the trade name Mega Home Improvement ("Mega"). 

Trust Management Group (“TMG”) is defendants' commercial real estate arm. Plaintiff Geri

Keefe began working for Mega in April of 1997 in a clerical position in Mega's Algonquin

office. Over the course of Keefe's employment, her direct supervisor was Joe Hogel; however,

Keefe called Steve Hogel for guidance in Joe's absence. 

In September or October of 1999, Keefe began working with Joe Hogel at Rush Creek,

which is a piece of land in Harvard, Illinois and is TMG's site office. Defendants acquired this

parcel of land in order to develop it into a retail shopping area. Keefe is the only employee TMG

has ever had (other than one other short-term employee) and she was placed at the Rush Creek

site to make calls seeking tenants for Rush Creek. Keefe worked alone at Rush Creek. 

Geri Keefe's & Joe Hogel's Relationship

In 1997, Keefe and Joe Hogel began a consensual sexual relationship. In May 2001, Joe
3

Hogel’s wife, Judy Hogel first learned of Keefe's and Joe's physical relationship. That same

month, Joe Hogel ended the relationship with Keefe. Keefe admits that she was sad when the

relationship ended. Even after their relationship officially ended, Joe Hogel and Keefe engaged

in physically intimate activities. For example, Joe would come out to the TMG office in

Harvard, Illinois and kiss Keefe on the lips. Keefe responded by saying, "Joe[,] this is not a

good idea." After May 2001, Joe Hogel would ask Keefe to do things in the office of a sexual

nature, including indicating that he wanted her to perform oral sex. In September 2001, Joe

Hogel approached Keefe after a Chicago convention, asked her to kiss him, and told her he

missed her. He drove her home and made sexual advances toward Keefe in the car, including

“feeling her up” and touching her breasts and vagina. 

According to Joe Hogel, after he terminated his relationship with Keefe, she "showed up"

at his house in June 2001 and told him she wanted to spend the night, and he said, "[n]o, get out

of my house." He claims that Keefe kept calling his house, and he took the phone off the hook. 

Hogel testified that the day after he took the phone off the hook, he told Keefe that "the lines on

the relationship just got all smudged up;" he "wanted the personal thing to stop;" and he "wanted

to work in business and business only." 

Working Conditions After Geri Keefe's and Joe Hogel's Relationship Ended

On June 22, 2001, Joe Hogel wrote a letter to Keefe, saying, "[d]o your job better than

ever b4;" "[d]o not become a hassle, interruption, or make Joe H. unhappy"; and "[m]ake Joe H.

uncontrolably [sic] happy. This is [sic] your 3 objectives.” Joe Hogel has testified that he is

uncertain about whether he actually discussed his increased expectations with Keefe prior to

writing this letter. He testified that his slogan is that "employees are volunteers." Joe Hogel
4

wrote to Keefe that he would continue to employ her based on an "only up relationship" and to

him, it was clear what he meant by an "only up relationship." 

Keefe admits that after her relationship ended with Joe, her work duties did not change

and she did not work any extra on weekends or take any more work-related phone calls on

weekends than she had before the end of the relationship. 

Keefe believes that Joe Hogel retaliated against her after their relationship ended,

including the way in which Joe spoke to her. For example, in the summer of 2001, Joe Hogel

became angry with her and told her he would rip off her head, tear out her tongue, and shit down

her throat. He once returned a note, by fax, stating, "if you go over the amount I've okayed, then

you're going to have to pay for it out of your pocket," without responding to the questions Keefe

had faxed him. Keefe testified that Joe Hogel would have little verbal contact with her once the

relationship ended. 

On November 6, 2001, Keefe wrote and faxed a letter to Joe Hogel complaining about a

police officer who visited her every day while she was alone at her worksite, which made her

uncomfortable. Keefe had complained about this police officer to Joe Hogel in the past. He

regarded the letter as "another interruption, another cry for attention," and he "did not pay

attention to [it]." 

Keefe's Termination

On November, 7, 2001, Joe Hogel fired Keefe. Hogel did not give her a specific reason

as to why she was fired that day. Defendants provided her with two weeks of severance pay,

continued paying her health insurance through January 2002, and, at Keefe's request, Joe Hogel

wrote her a letter of reference. 
5

Keefe's Bonus

Keefe claims that Joe Hogel told her that if any outlots at Rush Creek were sold, she

would receive a 3% commission once the sale occurred. Joe Hogel denies that he had any such

agreement to pay Keefe a commission or bonus for the sale of land. Defendants sold a piece of

Rush Creek to Blockbuster Video for $150,000 in 2000. Keefe did not receive three percent of

the sale, and she complained to Joe Hogel about it at the time of the sale as well as at the time of

her termination. 

Rush Creek 

Overall, the Rush Creek project generated little revenue. The only lot sold during the

time the Harvard office was open is the one that was sold to Blockbuster Video in late 2000 for

which Keefe claims she is entitled to a 3% commission. According to Defendants, the negative

economic impact of the close of the local Motorola facility and the September 11, 2001 attack

led to their decision to close the Harvard office. In November 2001, Defendants terminated Jim

Hogel, the owners' brother, and reduced their staff by not replacing employees who resigned. 

Around the same time, Defendants decided to close their "telemarketing room."

Charges of Discrimination

 On April 17, 2002, Keefe filed a charge of discrimination against Mega and TMG. In the

text of this charge, Keefe stated that she had at one time been involved in a consensual

relationship with Joe Hogel, her employer. She did not, however, mention Steve Hogel in the

charge. In Keefe's original EEOC charge, she claims, "I believe that I have been discriminated

against in that I was sexually harassed, and retaliated against in that I was discharged by

Respondent." Keefe filed her first complaint on July 19, 2002. 
6

In her second EEOC charge, filed on August 30, 2002, Keefe claims, "I believe that I

have been discriminated against in that I was treated differently because of my gender, I was

sexually harassed, and retaliated against in that I was discharged by Respondents." On

September 6, 2002, Keefe filed a third charge in which she added Joe Hogel as an individual

who allegedly discriminated against her. 

Steve Hogel's and Geri Keefe's Conversations and Encounters

Steve Hogel did not know about Geri Keefe's and Joe Hogel's relationship until after she

was terminated and this lawsuit was filed. When Steve learned about the lawsuit, he called

Keefe to talk with her. On October 4, 2002, Steve Hogel asked Keefe if he could come to her

house because they "really needed to talk." Steve explained to Keefe that he wanted to talk to her

in person because he could not find out what happened and how the lawsuit arose over the

phone. Steve went to Keefe's house to talk to her about her charge and complaint. 

Their conversation lasted about an hour. According to Keefe, Steve Hogel told her that

he was sad about the lawsuit and that he hoped she would change her mind. Keefe told Steve

Hogel that she “didn’t mean for it to be against [him]” and he responded that it was because he

worked with Joe at Mega. Plaintiff testified that Steve’s tone later became angry and that Steve

told Keefe that if she did not drop her lawsuit, Joe could slap her with a lawsuit and she would

be left with nothing. According to Keefe, after this meeting she called her attorney to tell him to

drop the lawsuit because she was afraid of Steve. 

Joe and Steve Hogel subsequently discussed what they would do next and how they

would make sure Keefe had, in fact, dropped the lawsuit. Steve said that while he was at Keefe's

house, she contacted her lawyer, said that she would email Joe based on the conversation, and
1

Given that the court is considering this motion for summary judgment, Keefe ultimately

did not drop the lawsuit. 

7

said that she would send a letter saying she was dropping everything. Joe Hogel testified that he

never spoke with Steve about contacting Keefe prior to Steve's doing so. 

On the same day that Steve came to her house, Keefe typed a letter to her attorney dated

October 7, 2002. After Steve met with Keefe, he called to ask her if she had, in fact, sent the

letter to her attorneys directing them to dismiss the lawsuit. Keefe sent the letter to her attorney

three days later. On October 8, 2002, Keefe sent an email to Joe and Judy Hogel apologizing for

filing the lawsuit and attached a letter that she sent to her attorney asking him to drop the case.1

Thereafter, Steve Hogel went to a restaurant where Keefe worked. Keefe confronted

Steve, who said, "wow, this whole thing is back up again." Keefe and Steve set up a time to

meet at another restaurant. According to Steve, at this time Keefe was "a little bit more bitter." 

At their meeting, Steve told Keefe, "you know what, I would make this go away for $2,000,

okay?" Keefe never made any attempts to contact Steve or left any messages for him, from the

time he went to her house until the last conversation they had. On November 6, 2003, Keefe

filed her second amended complaint, adding Steve Hogel as a defendant. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of

any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The

party opposing the summary judgment motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials

of the adverse party’s pleading; rather, it must respond with “specific facts showing that there is
2

Although this court initially denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a surreply, the

court reconsiders the denial and grants plaintiff’s motion to file a surreply.

8

a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). This court must evaluate the evidence supporting

the summary judgment motion in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). With these standards in mind, the court turns

to defendants’ motion for summary judgment to determine whether they are entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d 1104, 1112 (7th Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the court notes that to the extent Keefe is attempting to hold Joe and

Steve Hogel liable under Title VII in their individual capacities, she cannot do this. Gastineau v.

Fleet Mortgage Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, the Title VII claims against Joe

and Steve Hogel are dismissed. 

A. Sex Discrimination (Count I)

The court notes that neither the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) nor the briefing

on the motion for summary judgment are models of clarity. The Plaintiff’s SAC alleges

“discriminatory conduct” (Count I ) and retaliation (Count II). In their motion for summary

judgment, defendants offer arguments against claims of sexual harassment, different treatment,

retaliation and plaintiff’s entitlement to a bonus. Plaintiff sought to file a surreply2

 stating that 

[m]erely because the Defendant characterizes the Plaintiff’s complaint as

including more, or different, claims than what Plaintiff has actually

brought, does not make it so. The Plaintiff did not bring separate claims

for sexual harassment, different treatment, retaliation and bonus. Those

claims are all part of her discrimination claim and should be treated as

such.

Generally speaking, a plaintiff cannot bring claims in a lawsuit that were not included in
9

her EEOC charge. Cheek v. W. and S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir.1994) (citing

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)). Plaintiff’s last EEOC charge filed

on September 6, 2002 states that “I believe that I have been discriminated against in that I was

treated differently because of my gender, I was sexually harassed, and retaliated against in that I

was discharged by Respondents in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended.”

Based on this EEOC charge, the court will address plaintiff’s claim for sex discrimination

(including a claim that she was denied a bonus because of her gender), sexual harassment, and,

in Count II, her claim of retaliation. 

Termination

Keefe alleges that she was terminated by defendants because of her refusal to continue a

personal relationship with Joe Hogel. Under Title VII it is unlawful for any employer to "fail or

refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. An

employee alleging sex discrimination may proceed by presenting direct evidence of

discriminatory intent or by using the indirect (i.e., McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting) method. 

See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 

“To prove discrimination via direct evidence ‘essentially requires an admission by the

decision-maker that his actions were based on the prohibited animus.’” Jordan v. City of Gary,

No. 03-3772, 2005 WL 182412, at *4 (7th Cir. Jan. 28, 2005) (citation omitted). Because such

direct evidence is often difficult to come by, “a plaintiff may also ‘prevail under the direct
3

While Keefe was apparently the only employee TMG ever had (other than another short

term employee who was there for just a few months), defendant Mega Enterprises, Inc. (TMG

was Mega Enterprises, Inc.’s commercial real estate arm) had other employees. 

10

method of proof by constructing a ‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that ‘allows a

jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decision-maker.”’ Id. (citations omitted). 

Under the indirect method, Keefe must establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination

by demonstrating that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing her job

satisfactorily; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) at least one similarly

situated employee, not in her protected class, was treated more favorably. Wyninger v. New

Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 978 (7th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff proves her prima facie

case, then “it is incumbent upon the defendants . . . to counter with a legitimate,

nondisciminatory and nonpretextual reason for the employment action.” Jordan, No. 03-3773, at

*5. As in any Title VII action, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff to show

that the employer intentionally discriminated against her. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993).

Keefe makes no argument that direct evidence of discrimination exists. Accordingly, the

court will analyze the claim for sex discrimination under the McDonnell-Douglas test. Keefe

fails to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Although Keefe

alleged in her SAC that she was “treated differently than other employees of the firm . . . on the

basis of [her] gender,” she does not provide this court with any evidence of a similarly situated

employee who was treated more favorably than she.3

 

To establish that another employee is similarly situated, Keefe must show that there is

someone who is directly comparable to her in all material respects. See Patterson v. Avery
11

Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). To determine whether employees are

directly comparable, the court looks to relevant factors, including whether the employee: (1)

held the same or similar job; (2) was subject to the same standards; (3) was supervised by the

same person; and (4) had comparable experience, education, and other qualifications. See Ajayi

v. Aramark Bus. Serv., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Keefe has not provided any information of evidentiary quality, i.e., depositions, answers

to interrogatories, admissions on file, or affidavits, that fulfill these criteria. See Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 322. As such, Keefe has not established that one of her co-workers was similarly

situated in the first instance, let alone that a similarly-situated employee was treated more

favorably than she. Because Keefe has failed to establish a prima facie case of sex

discrimination, the court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this aspect of

Count I of the Complaint. 

Sexual Harassment

Plaintiffs can establish a violation of Title VII by proving that "discrimination based on

sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.

57, 66 (1986). For sexual harassment to be actionable, however, it must be "so severe or

pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment." 

Hottenroth v. Village of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1034 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Faragher v. City

of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)). “The workplace that is actionable is one that is

hellish.” Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2003). 

In evaluating whether a work environment is hostile based on sexual harassment, a

plaintiff must establish that: (1) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (2) the
12

harassment was based on her sex; (3) the sexual harassment unreasonably interfered with her

work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment that

affected the psychological well-being of the plaintiff; and (4) there is a basis for employer

liability. See McPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 437-38 (7th Cir. 2004).

Defendants argue that Keefe cannot succeed on her claim of sexual harassment because

Keefe has not alleged that Hogel’s conduct “altered her ability to do her job,” pointing to the fact

that Keefe alleged in her complaint that her job performance “continued at substantially the same

level or better” subsequent to the termination of the relationship between Joe Hogel and Keefe. 

In her response to defendants motion for summary judgment, Keefe, however, makes no

argument in response to defendants’ assertion that they should be granted judgment on the sexual

harassment claim as a matter of law. “Employment discrimination cases are extremely factintensive” and the court is not “‘obliged to scour the record looking for factual disputes.’” Greer

v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

Instead, plaintiff “must present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal” if she wishes to

successfully oppose defendants’ motion. Salvadori v. Franklin Sch. Dist., 293 F.3d 989, 996 (7th

Cir. 2002). Here, plaintiff has made no effort to rebut defendants’ argument as to the sexual

harassment claim or point to any evidence relating to the defendants’ argument. 

However, upon consideration of the material facts as submitted by the parties, as well as

certain other parts of the record, the court concludes that defendants are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law as to Keefe’s claim of sexual harassment. Keefe has set forth sufficient evidence

establishing the first (that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment) and fourth (that

there is a basis for employer liability) elements of a hostile work environment claim. 
13

Specifically, Keefe testified that during her employment with TMG but after Joe Hogel had

ended their consensual physical relationship, Hogel made it “apparent” that he wanted a sexual

relationship with her and that it “made her very uncomfortable” and that she “didn’t want to do

anything.” For example, Keefe testified that Hogel kissed plaintiff on the lips to which plaintiff

responded by saying that “it was not a good idea. We are gonna get caught. This is not–we can’t

do this.” He also would visit her at her office and indicate that he wanted her to perform oral sex

by sitting back in his chair, separating his legs, putting his hand on his crotch and saying “come

on over here.” 

Keefe also testified that while she attended a convention at a hotel in Chicago, Hogel had

approached her at the convention and they went to a bar. At the bar, Hogel “asked me to kiss

him, [said] that he missed me, and then he offered to drive me home, and then I got in the car

with him and we drove home.” Keefe further testified that on the way, Hogel “made advances”

towards Keefe, “felt her up” and touched her breasts and vagina. Keefe testified that in response

to Hogel’s advances, she again stated that “this is not a good idea” and “we cannot do this.” 

Keefe further testified that on the drive home from the hotel, “[Joe Hogel’s] wife had

made a phone call on the phone, and he said, ‘Yes, I’m on my way home.’ And when he hung up

the phone, I said, ‘you can’t do this. We can’t have this relationship.’” Hogel’s remarks and

conduct were sexual in nature. In addition, under the fourth element, Mega is strictly liable for

Hogel’s conduct because he was a supervisory employee. See McPherson, 379 F.3d at 438.

Thus, the court is left with the questions of whether the behavior by Hogel was based on

Keefe’s gender under the second prong and whether Keefe has established that a hostile work

environment existed under the third prong. Because Keefe’s claim fails under the third prong, it
14

need not address the second prong. 

As to the third prong, a plaintiff can establish that a hostile work environment existed if

the conduct she was subjected to was so severe or pervasive that it altered her employment

conditions and created an abusive working environment. See id. (citations and quotations

omitted). To qualify as hostile, the work environment must be objectively and subjectively

offensive, that is, it must be a work environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or

abusive, and one that the victim in fact perceived to be hostile or abusive. See id. (quotations

and citations omitted). 

Keefe has not put forth any evidence that she perceived the work environment to be

hostile or abusive as a result of the sexual harassment. Indeed, the deposition testimony by

Keefe indicates that the main reason she was stating that “we cannot do this” was due to her

concern that she and Hogel would be caught and that their physical relationship could hurt his

wife, Judy, not because she found the conduct hostile or threatening. Specifically, in her

deposition testimony, Keefe stated that she was not surprised that Joe Hogel ended their physical

relationship because she was friends with his wife, Judy, and their two sons. Keefe dep. at 149

(“I, myself, being friends with Judy and Joe knew that it eventually had to end. . . Q: So were

you feeling bad that you were also having an affair with her husband and their father? A: Yes. Q:

So you weren’t surprised. Were you sad that the relationship was ending? A: Yes.”). 

The record supports the conclusion that Judy Hogel and Keefe were quite friendly. For

example, Judy Hogel had offered to let Keefe stay in the Hogels’ home in or around 1998 and

Keefe and her daughter lived with the Hogels for three months rent-free. The Hogels also lent

Keefe money through Mega so that she could pay bills, and Judy Hogel also purchased
15

groceries, school supplies and groceries for Keefe and her daughter. In addition, Keefe and her

daughter accompanied the Hogels on some family vacations and the Hogels also hosted a

birthday party for Keefe’s daughter one year. The court cites to this evidence only to show the

extent of the friendship between Judy Hogel and Keefe in support of its conclusion that Keefe

indicated that she did not want to continue the relationship with Joe Hogel because of her

friendship with Judy, and not because she found Hogel’s conduct to be threatening. Indeed, the

record is devoid of any evidence that Joe Hogel’s sexual advances subsequent to the termination

of their physical relationship altered Keefe’s working conditions and created a hostile or abusive

working environment. Because Keefe has not provided sufficient evidence to fulfill the elements

of a hostile work environment claim based on sexual harassment, the court grants defendant’s

motion for summary judgment as to the sexual harassment aspect of Count I. 

Bonus Claim

Defendants argue that Keefe’s discrimination claim based on a bonus that she contends

was due her from the sale of a Rush Creek lot in 2000 is time-barred and that they are, therefore,

entitled to summary judgment on the issue. Once again, plaintiff has completely failed to

address this argument in her response brief, and has offered no evidence in rebuttal. The court

concludes that plaintiff’s claim of discrimination based on the failure to pay a bonus is timebarred. 

A plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or appropriate state

agency within 300 days after the “alleged unlawful employment practice.” Sharp v. United

Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 2001). The 300-day limit begins to run “when the

defendant has taken the action that injures the plaintiff and when the plaintiff knows she has
16

been injured ... ‘not when [she] determines that the injury was unlawful.’” Id. (quoting Thelen

v. Marc’s Big Boy Corp., 64 F.3d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1995)). 

Keefe claims that defendants’ unlawful employment practice is their failure to give her

the 3% bonus that she alleges became due to her upon the sale of the Blockbuster lot in late

2000. Joe Hogel allegedly took the action that “injured” Keefe when he failed to pay her at the

time the bonus was due. At that time, Keefe was aware that she had been injured; therefore, the

300-day period began the day the bonus became due in late 2000. Keefe did not, however, file

her first charge until April 17, 2002, well over 300 days after the injury occurred. Therefore,

Keefe’s bonus claim is time-barred and defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this

issue.

B. Retaliation (Count II)

Although Plaintiff states in her EEOC charge that she was retaliated against by being

terminated by Joe Hogel because their relationship ended, in the SAC, Keefe alleges that “[t]he

conduct of Steve Hogel as described above was in retaliation for the filing of this suit and for the

filing of plaintiff’s Charges of Discrimination . . . [] and in retaliation for plaintiff’s conduct in

opposing a practice that is unlawful; and/or because plaintiff has made a charge . . . under Title

VII.” SAC at ¶36 (emphasis added). Under either scenario, her claims of retaliation fail. 

As to the claim of retaliation against Steve Hogel, defendants contend that the claim of

retaliation against Steve Hogel should be dismissed because Keefe failed to include her claim of

retaliation against Steve Hogel in her EEOC charge and within 300 days after the events

occurred, as required by statute. The court does not agree. In addition to allegations in the

administrative charge, Title VII cases can include claims that are “like or reasonably related to
17

the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.” Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut.

Hosp. Ins., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976). These permissible related claims specifically

include retaliation for the filing of a charge. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th

Cir. 1989), superseded on other grounds by statute, Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., 966 F.2d 1104,

1111 (7th Cir. 1992). The practical reason behind treating retaliation claims in this manner is that

plaintiffs who have been retaliated against for filing an administrative charge will be reluctant to

file a second charge complaining about the retaliation. Id. In short, a separate administrative

charge is not a prerequisite to a retaliation claim for filing the first charge. Id.; Steffen v.

Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 545 n.2 (7th Cir. 1988). The alleged incidents that Keefe

argues constituted retaliation by Steve Hogel occurred in October of 2002, but Keefe’s three

EEOC charges were filed between April 17 and September 6, 2002. Thus, because the alleged

retaliation by Steve Hogel occurred after the filing of Keefe’s EEOC charges, her failure to file a

separate administrative charge for the retaliation claim against Steve Hogel is not fatal to her

claim.

In any event, Keefe’s retaliation claim against Steve Hogel claims fails on the merits. 

Former employees are protected under the retaliation section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). Keefe’s claim of post-termination

retaliation by Steve Hogel will only survive a motion for summary judgment, however, if the

alleged post-termination acts of retaliation have a nexus to her employment or impinge on her

future employment prospects. Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 888, 892-94 (7th Cir.

1996) (stating that the following actions could be actionable as post-termination retaliation:

plaintiff's claim that former employer did not rehire him because of his pending action for
18

discrimination; former employer's disclosure of the plaintiff's pending action to a placement

firm, which no longer submitted plaintiff's resume to potential employers; and the former

employer's disclosure of false information about the plaintiff to new employer). 

Here, Keefe claims that the nexus between Steve Hogel's retaliation and her future

employment is that he attempted to intimidate her into dropping her Title VII claim, which, if

she were successful, could allow her to obtain reinstatement as a remedy. But Keefe did not

drop her lawsuit and she does not seek reinstatement as a remedy. Unlike the plaintiff in

Veprinksy, Keefe has not demonstrated any interest in working for defendants again. 

Furthermore, Keefe has not put forth any evidence that Steve Hogel's actions have impeded her

future employment opportunities. Accordingly, because Keefe has not shown that there is a

nexus between Steve Hogel's action and her employment or future employment prospects,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Keefe's post-termination retaliation claim is

granted. 

As to the claim of retaliation against Joe Hogel, there are two ways in which a plaintiff

may pursue a retaliation claim. Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644

(7th Cir. 2002). Under the first method, the plaintiff must present direct evidence of a statutorily

protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the two. See

Haywood v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2003). Under the indirect method, an 

employee may establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that: (1) she engaged in

statutorily protected activity; (2) she performed her job satisfactorily; (3) despite her satisfactory

job performance, she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less

favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected activity. 
19

See Haywood, 323 F.3d at 531

Keefe has not presented any direct evidence that the adverse employment action of which

she complains (her termination) was causally connected to the statutorily protected activity in

which she was engaged (refusing to continue her relationship with Joe Hogel). Under the

indirect method, Keefe’s claim also fails because she failed to present any evidence of the fourth

prong of the prima facie test–that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated

employees who did not engage in statutorily protected activity. Accordingly, Keefe has failed to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, and thus the court grants defendants’ motion for

summary judgment as to Count II. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to Counts I and II. Judgment is entered against the plaintiff. 

ENTER:

/s/ Blanche M. Manning 

Blanche M. Manning

United States District Court Judge

DATE: March 23, 2005