alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 6185** 

GBEKE MICHAEL AWALA , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. IMMIGRATION JUDGE; ATTORNEY GENERAL , Respondents

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore
. William D. Quarles, Jr. , District Judge. ( 1:09

- cv - 03442

- WDQ )

Submitted : April 29, 2010 Decided: May 4, 2010
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Affirmed by un p ublished per curiam opinion
. Gbeke Michael Awala, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Gbeke Michael Awala , a federal prisoner, appeals the district court ’ s order dismissing without prejudice h is 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (2006) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Awala v. Immigration Judge , No. 1:09

- cv - 03442

- WDQ (D. Md. Jan. 7, 2010) . We dispense wit h oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
(15 Misc. Rep. 146.)

#### CULLEN v. GALLAGHER.

(Common Pleas of New York City and County,

General Term.

December 27, 1895.)

Evidence—Materiality—Question Already Answered.

Where a witness testified, in an action by his employer to recover the value of work, that he received stonecutters’ wages, and the union wages for stonecutters was in evidence, the question by defendant’s counsel, “How much was it?” is immaterial.

Appeal from Ninth district court.

Action by John Cullen against Patrick Gallagher. There was a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before BOOKSTAVER and BISCHOFF, JJ.

Hastings & Gleason, for appellant.

Daniel Daly, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This action was brought to recover the value of work done for the defendant at his request. There is no stipulation *469in the agreement as to the rate of compensation. It therefore became necessary for the plaintiff to show the value of the work, and he gave evidence tending to show the number of days his workmen were employed and the fair value of the work. On the cross-examination of one of his witnesses the defendant asked: “Q. What wages were you paid? A. Stonecutter’s wages. Q. How much was it?” This was objected to by the plaintiff, on the ground that it was immaterial, and the court sustained the objection, remarking, “I don’t think it is proper,” to which defendant excepted. As a general rule, the cost of an article or thing is not the criterion of its value. In most cases the question is its market value. Although it has been said, “whether the price paid for a chattel or the price at which it is sold be admissible in evidence depends upon the special circumstances of each case” (Beach v. Railway Co., 37 N. Y. 469), and accordingly many cases may be quoted where such cost was admitted in evidence, and it may be conceded in this case that the question should have been allowed, yet we think the defendant was not injured by the ruling of the court. The witness had, just before, testified that he received stonecutter’s wages, and it was in evidence; without contradiction, that the union wages for stonecutters were $4.50 per day; so that the question was substantially answered. The real question for the court to determine was the fair value of the plaintiff’s services. That was testified, by the plaintiff and a witness called on his behalf, to be worth from $5 to $6 a day, and no evidence was given by the defendant to contradict this; the principal question raised upon the trial being as to the number of days the men worked. On this there was some conflict, but we think there was quite enough to justify the court in finding as it did as to the number of days, for which compensation was allowed at the lowest rate testified to.

The judgment should therefore be affirmed, with costs.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

April 24, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

132960 & (61) Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 132960 

 COA: 263180

 Wayne CC: 05-001102-01

05-001104-01 

CETRIC DEONDRAE SMITH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 12, 2006 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to 

remand is DENIED. 

s0416 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

April 24, 2007 

 Clerk
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 23 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 23

                   To prohibit unauthorized earmarks.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

             January 25 (legislative day, January 5), 2011

    Mr. Inhofe (for himself and Mr. McCain) submitted the following 
     resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and 
                             Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
                   To prohibit unauthorized earmarks.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON UNAUTHORIZED EARMARKS.

    (a) In General.--It shall not be in order to consider a bill, joint 
resolution, conference report, or amendment that provides an earmark.
    (b) Supermajority.--
            (1) Waiver.--The provisions of subsection (a) may be waived 
        or suspended in the Senate only by the affirmative vote of 
        three-fourths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn.
            (2) Appeal.--Appeals in the Senate from the decisions of 
        the Chair relating to any provision of this section shall be 
        limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and 
        controlled by, the appellant and the manager of the measure. An 
        affirmative vote of three-fourths of the Members of the Senate, 
        duly chosen and sworn, shall be required to sustain an appeal 
        of the ruling of the Chair on a point of order raised under 
        this section.
    (c) Earmark Defined.--In this resolution, the term ``earmark'' 
means a provision or report language included primarily at the request 
of a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives providing or 
recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget authority, 
credit authority, or other spending authority for a contract, loan, 
loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to 
an entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality, or congressional 
district unless the provision or language--
            (1) is specifically authorized by an appropriate 
        congressional authorizing committee of jurisdiction;
            (2) meets funding eligibility criteria established by an 
        appropriate congressional authorizing committee of jurisdiction 
        by statute; or
            (3) is awarded through a statutory or administrative 
        formula-driven or competitive award process.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Harris, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Donnelly, J.), rendered October 16, 1979, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

The defendant, by pleading guilty, waived any challenge to the amendment to the indictment herein *(see, People v Lawrence,*99 AD2d 557; *People v Dowdell,*72 AD2d 622). Moreover, we find the defendant’s constitutional double jeopardy claim to be without merit *(see, People v Ercole,*4 NY2d 617, *rearg dismissed*5 NY2d 983, 1041). Bracken, J. P., Lawrence, Eiber and Kooper, JJ., concur.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

SUNSTAR, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

-againstALBERTO-CULVER COMPANY, INC. 

and BANK ONE CORPORATION f/k/a 

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, 

Defendants. 

Civil Action No. 01 C 0736 

Judge Guzman 

- and - 

ALBERTO-CULVER COMPANY, a Delaware 

corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

-againstSUNSTAR, INC., a Japanese corporation, SUNSTAR 

GROUP COMPANY, (f/k/a Alberto-Sunstar Co., Ltd) a 

Japanese corporation, KANEDA, KASAN, 

KABUSHIKI KAISHA, a Japanese corporation, and 

BANK ONE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee 

under Trust Agreement No. 22-81196, dated February 

27, 1980, a national banking association, 

Defendants. 

Civil Action No. 01 C 5825 

Judge Guzman 

SUNSTAR’S RULE 50(b) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Sunstar, Inc. and Kaneda, Kosan, Kabushiki Kaisha (collectively, “Sunstar”), pursuant to 

Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully renew that portion of “Sunstar’s 

Motion Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) for Judgment as a Matter of Law Dismissing Alberto’s 

Claim,” made on December 12, 2006, which asserted that: 

“Alberto’s claim for breach of contract in the nature of trademark infringement should be 

dismissed as a matter of law because no sufficient evidence has been presented of 

likelihood of confusion, a required element needed to establish trademark infringement, 

and because Alberto has failed to present any evidence that any actual or likely consumer 

confusion exceeds the amount of so-called ‘natural confusion’ in the situation by a 

‘significant amount,’ as required by controlling Seventh Circuit authority.” 

as more particularly discussed in that Rule 50(a) motion. 

NY2 - 462735.01 
SUNSTAR, INC. and 

KANEDA, KOSAN, KABUSHIKI KAISHA 

Respectfully submitted, 

Dated: January 3, 2007 By: s/ Timothy T. Patula 

One of Their Attorneys 

Timothy T. Patula 

Charles T. Riggs, Jr. 

PATULA & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 

116 South Michigan Avenue, 14th Floor 

Chicago, Illinois 60603 

(312) 201-8220 

OF COUNSEL: 

Robert A. Schwinger 

CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP 

30 Rockefeller Plaza 

New York, New York 10112 

(212) 408-5100 

William S. D’Amico 

CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP 

1200 New Hampshire Ave., N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

(202) 974-5600 

NY2 - 462735.01 2
EXHIBIT 32.1



CEO/CFO Certification Pursuant to § 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350)



The undersigned, as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation, respectively, certify that, to the best of their knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the
period ended June 30, 2003, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the periodic report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation and subsidiary at the dates and for the periods indicated.



The foregoing certification is made pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350) and shall not be relied
upon for any other purpose. The undersigned expressly disclaim any obligation to update the foregoing certification except as required by law.



|August 13, 2003 |  |  |  | /s/     ROBERT H. GILLIAM,
JR.
|--------------- |  |  |  | ------------------------------
|Date            |  |  |  |                               
|                |  |  |  |                               





|August 13, 2003 |  |  |  | /s/    BRYAN M. LEMLEY
|--------------- |  |  |  | ----------------------
|Date            |  |  |  |                       
|                |  |  |  |                       



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signatures that appear in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to
Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation and will be retained by Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



27
#### James Brown, Respondent, v Josephine F. Moore, Appellant. Motor Vehicle Accident Corporation, Intervenor-Respondent.

— In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, defendant Josephine F. Moore appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Goldstein, J.), dated July 11, 1984, which denied her motion to amend her answer to include the defense of collateral estoppel and to dismiss the action against her on that ground, and (2) as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the same court, dated September 7, 1984, as, upon reargument, adhered to the original determination.

Appeal from the order dated July 11, 1984 dismissed, without costs or disbursements. That order was superseded by the order dated September 7, 1984, made upon reargument.

Order dated September 7, 1984 reversed, insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, motion granted, and plaintiffs complaint against defendant Moore dismissed.

Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating defendant Moore’s involvement in the accident, as the record indicates that that issue has already been resolved in the latter’s favor in an arbitration proceeding. The mere fact that the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) is also a defendant here, having intervened in this action, does not affect defendant Moore’s right to have plaintiffs action against her dismissed on the ground of collateral estoppel *(see, e.g., Greenspan v Doldorf, 87*AD2d 884; *Matter of Wallace v MVAIC, 25*NY2d 384; *Schwartz v Public Administrator of County of Bronx,*24 NY2d 65, 71). Mollen, P. J., Mangano, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-7993

CHARLIE MATTHEWS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

VALERIE MURRAY; DR. COLIN OTTEY; WILLIAM BEEMAN; GREG FLURY; 

LISA SCHINDLER,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. 

(1:13-cv-00059-RDB)

Submitted: February 27, 2014 Decided: March 5, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charlie Matthews, Appellant Pro Se. Michelle Jacquelyn 

Marzullo, Richard P. Seitz, MARKS, O’NEILL, O’BRIEN, DOHERTY & 

KELLY, P.C., Towson, Maryland; Gina Marie Smith, MEYERS, RODBELL 

& ROSENBAUM, PA, Riverdale, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Charlie Matthews appeals the district court’s order 

denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. We 

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. Matthews v. Murray, No. 1:13-cv-00059-RDB (D. Md. Dec. 

4, 2013). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
34



Exhibit  99.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

Pursuant  to  Section  906 of the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 (18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted), Richard B. Slansky, Chief Financial Officer of
SpaceDev,  Inc.  (the  "Company"),  hereby  certifies  that,  to the best of his
knowledge:

The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30,
2003, and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 99.2 (the "Periodic
Report"), fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d)
of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934,  as  amended,  and the information
contained  in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of  the  Company.

IN  WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have set their hands hereto as of this 12th
day  of  November  2003.



By:  /s/  Richard  B.  Slansky
-----------------------------------
          Richard  B.  Slansky
          Chief  Financial  Officer
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

LINEAR HARDEN
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 13

- 2074

[ July 29, 2015 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Michael Usan , Judge; L.T. Case No. 12005415CF10A

.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Lesley N. Clark, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

M AY
, J.

The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for grand theft over $100,000 . He raises a single issue, with multiple subparts, of ineffective

assistance of counsel. “Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not cognizable on direct appeal.” Gould v. State , 137 So. 3d

524 , 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). “An exception exists ‘only in the rare case where both prongs of Strickland

— the error and the prejudice

— are manifest in the record .’” Id

. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Boyd v. State , 45 So. 3d 557, 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)). This exception is rarely applicable because “[s]uch claims ordinarily turn on issues of fact and both sides are entitled to present relevant evidence to the trial court

to resolve those issues.” Gordon v. State , 469 So. 2d 795, 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (Anstead, C. J., concurring specially).

This case does not fall within the exception. We therefore affirm without prejudice to the defendant raising his claim in a motion, pursuant

to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.

Affirmed without prejudice

.2

K LINGENSMITH

, J., and R OBY
, W ILLIAM L ., Associate Judge, concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion fo r rehearing.
#### Derek N. JARVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDEX OFFICE & PRINT SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-1214.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 25, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 2, 2011.

Derek N. Jarvis, Appellant Pro Se. David Samuel Panzer, Eric C. Rowe, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Derek N. Jarvis appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to reconsider and granting summary judgment against him in his civil action. On appeal, Jarvis contests the denial of his *72motion to reconsider the court’s earlier denial of his spoliation of evidence claim, and the denial of his claim of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Jarvis v. FedEx Office & Print Servs., Inc.,*No. 08-1694, 2011 WL 826796 (D.Md. Mar. 7, 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*