J-S18023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AARON JOHNSON 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1065 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 14, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003744-2010

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 20, 2023

Appellant Aaron Johnson appeals pro se from the Order denying his 

motion for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 

9541-46. He raises layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history in 

its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.1In 1994, Appellant received an aggregate

sentence of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration in connection with the shooting and 

robbery of Anthony Pellot. The shooting rendered Mr. Pellot a quadriplegic. 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Hon. Glenn B. Bronson presided over both Appellant’s trial and his PCRA 

proceedings.
J-S18023-23

- 2 -

On June 30, 2009, 15 years later, Mr. Pellot died as a result of 

complications from the injuries he sustained from the shooting. The 

Commonwealth charged Appellant with murder.

2

The court held numerous pretrial hearings. Relevant to this appeal, at 

a conference held on April 13, 2012, the trial court noted that it had received 

a letter from trial counsel “regarding [her] suspicion that the defendant might 

be incompetent[.]” N.T., 4/13/12, at 2. The court ordered “forthwith” a 

mental health evaluation for Appellant. Id. One week later, at a listing to 

address the status of Appellant’s mental health, the court learned that 

Appellant had refused to be evaluated. N.T., 4/20/12, at 2. The court then

asked trial counsel about the basis for her believing that defendant might be 

incompetent, and she responded that Appellant “refused to address any of the 

issues that were relevant to the case, was very upset [because] the court has 

not responded to motions that he had filed under the Maritime Act.” Id. at 4. 

She also noted that he did not want Ms. Coyne to represent him. Id. at 5;

PCRA Ct. Op., 6/28/22, at 7-8. The court ultimately found that counsel’s 

concerns about Appellant’s competency were “unfounded” because Appellant 

was merely espousing views held by so-called “sovereign citizens.” N.T., 

4/20/12, at 37-8. The court also observed that Appellant “seems articulate.

He seems to understand what I’m saying to him. He does not seem to not 

____________________________________________

2 Regina M. Coyne, Esq., represented Appellant at his murder trial and Lee 

Mandell, Esq., represented him on appeal.
J-S18023-23

- 3 -

understand the nature of the proceeding. He doesn’t seem to have any 

disconnect with reality.” Id. at 38.

A jury trial ensued.3 The Commonwealth read the victim’s testimony 

from the 1994 aggravated assault trial to the jury as well as the testimony 

from an eyewitness. Appellant’s co-defendant testified that he saw Appellant 

shoot the victim in the neck. Other witnesses testified to the circumstances 

leading up to and including the shooting. Subsequently, Appellant stipulated

that he fired the shot that struck the victim in the neck. See N.T. Trial, 

5/15/12, at 86. The Commonwealth’s medical expert testified that the 

gunshot wound was ultimately the direct cause of the victim’s eventual death. 

Appellant presented testimony from his own forensic pathology expert who 

opined that the gunshot wound was a factor in the victim’s death.

The jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder on May 18, 2012. 

The court immediately sentenced him to the mandatory term of life in prison. 

This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court denied allowance of appeal on August 28, 2014. See Commonwealth 

v. Johnson, 97 A.3d 799 (Pa. Super. 2014) (non-precedential

memorandum), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 76 (Pa. 2014).

Appellant pro se filed his PCRA petition on August 4, 2015. The court 

appointed counsel who filed an Amended PCRA Petition on August 17, 2016. 

____________________________________________

3 Prior to the start of trial, the court denied Appellant’s request to represent 

himself, concluding that because he would not swear or affirm to tell the truth, 

he forfeited his right to represent himself. See generally N.T., 5/14/12, at 

19-25. 
J-S18023-23

- 4 -

On August 24, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to represent himself. The court 

held a Grazier4 hearing, and concluded that Appellant’s waiver of counsel was 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court, thus, struck the counseled 

Amended PCRA petition, and allowed Appellant to proceed pro se.

After a November 2019 status conference,5 Appellant retained Matthew 

Weisman, Esq., who entered his appearance on December 3, 2019.

On June 4, 2021, counsel filed an Amended PCRA petition asserting a 

layered ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on (1) Appellant’s 

competency at trial and (2) his wearing of prison garb during trial. The 

Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss on September 9, 2021. Appellant 

filed a counseled response to the motion to dismiss.

On February 25, 2022, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of 

intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Despite being 

represented by counsel, on March 7, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se motion for 

leave to amend the Amended Petition and requested an evidentiary hearing. 

On April 8, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se response to the Rule 907 Notice in 

which he raised for the first time a double jeopardy claim asserting that the 

aggravated assault conviction barred the subsequent murder conviction. 

____________________________________________

4 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

5 Following the first Grazier hearing, the PCRA court continued the PCRA 

proceedings multiple times to allow Appellant to obtain the decedent’s medical 

records and investigate a potential claim of medical causation and trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness. Appellant ultimately abandoned his efforts.
J-S18023-23

- 5 -

On April 14, 2022, the court dismissed the PCRA petition, removed 

Attorney Weisman as counsel, and appointed Steven O’Hanlon, Esq., to 

represent Appellant in this PCRA appeal. 

Appellant filed a timely counseled notice of appeal and a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement. The court filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

Opinion. Appellant filed a motion in this Court seeking to proceed pro se. We 

remanded to the PCRA court for a Grazier hearing. After holding the hearing,

the PCRA court certified to this Court that Appellant’s waiver of appellate 

counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

In his pro se appellate brief, Appellant provides the following Statement 

of Questions Involved:

1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s timely filed 

PCRA without a hearing, knowing that his Six Amendment rights 

to effective assistance of counsel was violated?

2. Did the PCRA court err by not granting the Appellant an 

evidentiary hearing, “stating he did not proffer sufficient evidence 

to prove he was incompetent to stand trial on his claim of trial 

counsel’s failure to provide effective assistance of counsel by NOT 

requesting an inpatient competency evaluation.” Appellant 

counsel failed to raise the claim on direct appeal and PCRA counsel 

was ineffective for failing to develop the claim constituting layered 

ineffectiveness.

3. Did the PCRA court err by not granting the Appellant an 

evidentiary hearing stating, “He did not proffer sufficient evidence 

that he was denied his right NOT to appear in prison-uniform 

during trial on his claim of trial counsel’s failure to provide 

effective assistance of counsel.” Appellant counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise the claim on direct appeal and likewise PCRA 

counsel was ineffective for failing to proffer sufficient evidence to 

preserve the issues.
J-S18023-23

- 6 -

4. Did the trial court err by denying the defendant’s right to act 

as his own counsel when this right is implicit in the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Amend 

VI, and explicit in the Pa. Constitution art. I § 9?

Appellant’s Br. at 9-10 (verbatim, except unnecessary capitalization omitted).

A.

The following standards guide our review of the denial of a PCRA petition 

that is based on ineffectiveness of counsel. 

When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we 

consider the record “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the 

PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (citation omitted). We must determine whether the evidence of record 

supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of 

legal error. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016). 

With regard to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions, however, our standard of 

review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259 (Pa. 2011).

We review a PCRA court’s decision to deny a request for an evidentiary 

hearing for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 

601, 617 (Pa. 2015). Where a PCRA Petition raises “material disputes 

regarding the reasonableness of counsel’s actions, a hearing is required.” 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 501 n.26 (Pa. 2014); see also

Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2) (requiring a PCRA hearing “when the petition for postconviction relief . . . raises material issues of fact”). Although our Supreme 

Court has expressed a preference for an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s 
J-S18023-23

- 7 -

action or inaction, a petition must raise a “colorable” claim of ineffectiveness 

to obtain a hearing. Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 299 (Pa. 

2017). 

Finally, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Appellant must demonstrate that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 

(2) counsel’s performance lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) the 

ineffectiveness of counsel caused the appellant prejudice. Commonwealth 

v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012). To obtain relief, Appellant must 

present argument on all three elements of the ineffective assistance of counsel 

standard. Commonwealth v. Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 321-22 (Pa. 2007). 

Counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. 

Commonwealth v. Fetter, 770 A.2d 762, 770 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation

omitted).

B.

Under a heading purporting to correspond to Appellant’s first issue, 

Appellant asserts that trial counsel failed to conduct “any pre-trial 

investigation,” counsel was unprepared, Appellant was convicted based on 

perjured testimony of his co-defendant from the 1994 case, and trial counsel 

failed to challenge the mens rea element of the murder charge. Appellant’s 

Br. at 19-22. He also asserts that his expert witness at his murder trial was 

incompetent and that the court violated his double jeopardy rights by holding 

the murder trial. Id. at 23. He further asserts that the trial court harbored 
J-S18023-23

- 8 -

bias against him and the Commonwealth “acted wrongly with egregious 

deceitful, unethical practices to reach a guilty verdict.” Id. at 26-29. He 

concludes that a hearing is required because “the record is undeveloped, the 

evidence is fabricated and a fraud on the court has been perpetrated.” Id. at 

30. 

Pennsylvania has a bright-line rule that issues not preserved in a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement are waived for appellate review. 

Commonwealth v. Butler, 812 A.2d 631, 633-34 (Pa. 2002). Further, an 

appellant waives review of issues that could have been raised before trial, at 

trial, or on direct appeal but were not. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b); 

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 A.2d 232, 240-241 (Pa. 2001). Finally, 

issues not raised in a PCRA Petition are waived. Id. 

As noted above, Appellant raised two issues in his Rule 1925(b) 

Statement pertaining to counsel’s ineffectiveness which were based on a 

challenge to his competency to stand trial and the wearing of his prison garb

during trial. To the extent Appellant is now raising issues in his argument 

section that are unrelated to those raised in his Rule 1925(b) Statement, they 

are waived.6 

C.

____________________________________________

6 Likewise, Appellant did not raise his fourth issue in his PCRA petition, and it 

is also waived.
J-S18023-23

- 9 -

Under the heading pertaining to his second issue, Appellant presents a 

disjointed, meandering series of statements where he discusses the same 

unpreserved issues noted above, adds an allegation of police misconduct, and 

asserts direct appeal counsel “was deficient” for refusing to raise a claim of 

ineffectiveness of trial counsel on direct appeal. Appellant’s Br. at 30-32. In 

one of two instances where he mentions the word “competency,” Appellant 

complains that competency and his right to self-representation became

“intertwined.” Id. at 31. His brief, however, then lodges into an allegation 

that counsel provided ineffective assistance by not raising challenges to both 

the weight and sufficiency the trial evidence. Id. at 31. 

It is an appellant’s duty to present sufficiently developed arguments on 

issues that have been preserved for review. Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 

A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007). “The brief must support the claims with 

pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal 

authorities.” Id., citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b), (c). “[W]hen defects in a brief 

impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss 

the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived. Id. (citation omitted);

Pa.R.A.P. 2101. See also Commonwealth v. Hallock, 722 A.2d 180, 181 

(Pa. Super. 1998) (holding that “[w]hen issues are not properly raised and 

developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific 

issues for review, a court will not consider the merits thereof.”). “This Court 
J-S18023-23

- 10 -

will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an 

appellant.” Hardy, 918 A.2d at 771.

Appellant utterly fails present any cogent argument related to the issue 

as raised and fails to inform us of how the PCRA court erred in its observation 

that Appellant’s attempt at claiming incompetency was unsupported. Rather, 

he discusses unrelated, unpreserved issues and states (without a subject 

included in the sentence), that “by not reviewing the record relative to 

competency, it was reasonably probable that the outcome would have been 

different, even a favorable outcome absent of counsel’s failure to act.”

Appellant’s Br. at 33. Appellant’s defective brief and inadequate argument 

fatally hamper our review. His issue is, thus, waived.

7

____________________________________________

7 Moreover, a “defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial” and it is 

the defendant’s burden to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that he 

was incompetent to stand trial.” Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 

236 (Pa. 2007). This requires proof, as an initial matter, showing that if a 

medical professional had conducted a competency evaluation at the time of 

the trial, the medical professional would have concluded that the defendant 

was not competent. Id. Here, the PCRA court observed that Appellant 

proffered no expert evidence to establish that he was incompetent at the time 

of his trial. “Instead, [Appellant] relied entirely on [his] conduct and the 

assertions of trial counsel at the April 20, 2012 status listing described above, 

which, at most, support an argument that an evaluation should have been 

done; not that defendant would have been found to have been incompetent.” 

Tr. Ct. Op. at 10 (footnote omitted). As noted above, Appellant has failed to 

inform us how the PCRA court erred, barely mentions the word “competency,” 

and presents only conclusory statements regarding ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Although Appellant claims the record would be developed if the PCRA 

court had held a hearing, he does not address the court’s conclusion that he

did not present a colorable claim warranting a hearing.
J-S18023-23

- 11 -

D.

In his last issue, Appellant asserts that trial counsel and each successive

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim that he was 

deprived of his due process rights when he “was compelled to appear in prison 

garb” during his trial. Appellant’s Br., at 37-38. He summarily states, without 

citation to the record or relevant case law, that the “instruction to disregard 

does not cure the prejudice, nor alleviates the prejudice associated with 

appearing in such apparel.” Id. at 38.

In addressing this claim, the PCRA court acknowledged that Appellant 

wore prison garb during his trial and that due process prohibits a defendant 

from being compelled to wear prison garb during a jury trial. PCRA Ct. Op. at 

11 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976), and 

Commonwealth v Keeler, 264 A.2d 407, 409-410 (Pa. Super. 1970)). The 

court explained, however, that Appellant had refused to wear civilian clothes

and, thus, the court did not compel him to wear prison garb. The court noted:

The undersigned trial judge, who presided over defendant’s trial, 

has an invariable practice of only permitting a defendant to wear 

prison clothes during a jury if the defendant refuses to wear 

civilian clothes. Nevertheless, the [c]ourt afforded [Appellant] an 

opportunity to proffer evidence to the contrary, setting forth the 

following in the [c]ourt’s [Rule] 907 notice:

Defendant’s second claim, regarding his prison garb at 

trial, is denied on the ground that defendant has not 

proffered any evidence that he was denied the opportunity 

to wear civilian clothes at trial. It is the practice of the 

undersigned trial judge to conduct a jury trial with a 

defendant wearing prison garb only if the defendant has 
J-S18023-23

- 12 -

refused to wear civilian clothes. There is no contrary 

evidence in the record.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 11-12.8

Appellant does not dispute the trial court’s finding that he refused to 

wear civilian clothes. Instead, he argues, without citation to the record, that

“the trial court abused its discretion by forcing Appellant to appear before and 

be tried by a panel of jurors who saw him clothed in prison garb for the entire 

trial,” and each of his attorneys “missed the structural error.” Appellant’s Br. 

at 38-39. 

Since Appellant does not dispute the trial court’s observation that he 

refused to wear civilian clothing and does not indicate where the record 

indicates that the trial court “forced him” to appear in prison garb at his trial, 

Appellant has not demonstrated that the claim underlying this layered 

ineffective assistance of counsel has arguable merit. Accordingly, this issue 

warrants no relief.

E.

In sum, having found Appellant’s issues waived, we affirm the order 

denying PCRA relief.

Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

8

In a footnote, the trial court acknowledged that “the pretrial discussions

regarding defendant’s clothing were not transcribed.” PCRA Ct. Op. at 12 n.8. 
J-S18023-23

- 13 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/20/2023