J-S33016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: F.W., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1502 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered May 16, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001245-2021

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2022

Appellant, F.W. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which adjudicated her minor 

child, A.B. (“Child”) dependent. We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows: 

The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) 

first became aware of this family on September 9, 2021, 

when DHS received a Child Protective Services (“CPS”) 

report alleging that [Child] had been sexually abused for 

several years by Mother’s paramour. The CPS report alleged 

that the most recent incident of sexual abuse occurred in 

June 2021. The report further alleged that Mother did not 

believe the allegations. 

On September 9, 2021, [Child] had a forensic interview with 

Philadelphia Children’s Alliance (“PCA”). In the interview, 

[Child] confirmed that Mother’s paramour sexually abused 

her from 2013 until 2020. [Child] stated that she informed 

Mother about the abuse on several occasions. When DHS 
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visited Mother’s home on September 10, 2021, Mother and 

her paramour denied the allegations in the CPS report. 

When DHS filed its dependency petition on December 23, 

2021, Mother continued to reside with her paramour. 

[Child] was initially placed with her father in Pottstown, PA, 

but DHS learned that Father later left [Child] at her paternal 

grandmother’s house. DHS implemented a safety plan in 

paternal grandmother’s home in which [Child] was not to 

return to the home where Mother and her paramour resided. 

The safety plan also stated that any communication 

between [Child] and Mother was to be monitored. 

On November 18, 2021, [Child’s] paternal grandmother 

informed DHS that she was unable to care for [Child] on a 

long-term basis. On December 6, 2021, DHS identified an 

appropriate placement for [Child]. On that date, DHS 

obtained an order of protective custody (“OPC”) for [Child] 

and placed her with the identified caregiver. At the 

December 8, 2021 shelter care hearing, the OPC was lifted 

and the temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to 

stand. [Child] was referred to Behavioral Health Services 

(“BHS”) for an evaluation. 

At the February 2, 2022 hearing, which was continued, [the 

trial c]ourt learned that [Child] was absent without leave

(“AWOL”). [The trial c]ourt deferred [Child’s] adjudication 

and ordered a private investigator (“PI”) to be hired. The 

court also ordered a missing person’s report to be filed and 

for the missing persons protocol to be followed. 

On May 16, 2022, [the trial c]ourt held an adjudicatory 

hearing for [Child]. At the beginning of the hearing, 

Mother’s counsel requested that [the c]ourt discharge 

[Child’s] case because of the child’s AWOL status. Prior to 

making a determination regarding Mother’s request, [the 

c]ourt heard testimony from the Community Umbrella 

Agency (“CUA”) case manager, Mr. Davon Dixon, regarding 

the Child’s AWOL [status]. Mr. Dixon testified that he was 

assigned to this case in December 2021. He stated that 

[Child] went AWOL on January 7, 2022. Mr. Dixon further 

testified that a police report was filed, the Center for Missing 

and Exploited Children was notified, and an on-grounds PI 

search was conducted. Mr. Dixon further stated that the PI 
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was unable to locate [Child]. Additionally, Mr. Dixon 

conducted unannounced visits at Mother’s home, but did not 

see the child there. Mr. Dixon testified that he spoke to 

Mother about the child’s whereabouts, but Mother stated 

she “has no idea where she could be.” On crossexamination by the child advocate, Mr. Dixon testified that 

[Child] has not attended school since January 2022. Mr. 

Dixon stated that he had been unable to communicate with 

[Child’s] previous kinship parents from whose home [Child] 

went AWOL. Mr. Dixon further testified that he has never 

met the child. 

Counsel for DHS also called DHS Investigator, Ms. Jocelyn 

Childs, to testify regarding [Child’s] AWOL [status]. Ms. 

Childs testified that the last time she saw [Child] was on 

January 7, 2022. On that date, she attempted to locate a 

new foster placement for [Child] after her kinship placement 

failed. Ms. Childs testified that [Child] packed, she assisted 

[Child] with putting her belongings in the car, but [Child] 

refused to get in the vehicle. A police report for [Child] was 

filed that same day. Ms. Childs further testified that at some 

point between January 7, 2022 and January 12, 2022, she 

received a phone call from [Child’s] previous kinship parent 

stating that [Child] still shared her iPhone location with her. 

The last location that the kinship parent reported for 

[Child’s] iPhone was at Mother’s home. Ms. Childs further 

testified that the kinship parent sent a screenshot of 

[Child’s] iPhone location to her, which she also shared with 

CUA and the assigned PI. 

After hearing the testimony presented, [the trial c]ourt 

denied Mother’s request to discharge [Child’s] case and 

proceeded with the adjudicatory hearing. Counsel for DHS 

called Ms. Jocelyn Childs to testify again. Ms. Childs testified 

that she was the assigned DHS investigator for the CPS 

report involving this family. She testified that on September 

9, 2021, DHS received a CPS report alleging that [Child] was 

sexually abused by Mother’s paramour. The allegations in 

the CPS report were that Mother’s paramour sexually 

assaulted [Child] by placing his penis in her mouth and 

vagina. [Child] was the victim child named in the CPS report 

and Mother’s paramour was the alleged perpetrator. 

Prior to Ms. Childs receiving this investigation, [Child] was 
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interviewed by [PCA] about the allegations in the CPS 

report. During the PCA interview, Ms. Childs testified that 

[Child] disclosed that she had been sexually abused by 

Mother’s paramour. 

During her investigation, Ms. Childs spoke with Mother, 

Mother’s paramour, the child, and Father. When Ms. Childs 

received the investigation, she conducted an unannounced 

visit at Mother’s home to determine if Mother’s paramour 

was there. She testified that Mother’s paramour answered 

the door and identified himself. When Ms. Childs spoke to 

Mother, she informed her of the allegations in the CPS 

report. Ms. Childs testified that Mother stated that she did 

not know why the child would make up or lie about the 

allegations. Mother stated to Ms. Childs that she believed 

[Child] made the disclosure to avoid getting into trouble for 

previously running away from home. Mother’s paramour 

denied the allegations in the CPS report. When Ms. Childs 

concluded her investigation, Mother’s paramour continued 

to reside in the home with Mother. 

When Ms. Childs interviewed [Child], [Child] made a 

disclosure about being sexually assaulted by Mother’s 

paramour. However, [Child] then attempted to recant the 

disclosures she made in the PCA interview and minimize the 

allegations. Ms. Childs stated that [Child] recanted the part 

of the PCA interview in which she disclosed that Mother’s 

paramour sexually assaulted her. [Child] stated to Ms. 

Childs that Mother’s paramour attempted to sexually assault 

her, but then [Child’s] brother walked into the room, and 

Mother’s paramour did not actually assault her. Ms. Childs 

went to the paternal grandmother’s home to interview 

[Child]. Before Ms. Childs mentioned the sexual assault 

allegations, [Child] immediately stated, “Everything I said 

before didn’t happen.” When Ms. Childs asked for 

clarification regarding [Child’s] statement, she stated that 

Mother’s paramour did not have sex with her, but rather 

“just tried to.” 

When the DHS investigation concluded, the CPS report was 

indicated for sexual abuse. Ms. Childs testified that the CPS

report was indicated because [Child] made an initial full 

disclosure at an emergency forensic interview with PCA. Ms. 

Childs stated that she maintains the DHS file and had an 
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opportunity to review the file. [Child] also made a full 

disclosure when she was interviewed alone by the DHS 

hotline social worker. This disclosure was consistent with the 

allegations in the CPS report. In the disclosure to the hotline 

social worker, [Child] stated Mother’s paramour sexually

abused her on more than one occasion. Additionally, [Child]

disclosed to the hotline social worker that she and her 

brother told Mother about the sexual abuse, but that Mother 

did not believe her. 

Ms. Childs testified that she did not believe [Child’s] 

recantation of the sexual abuse was credible. On crossexamination by the child advocate, Ms. Childs stated that 

[Child’s] kinship parent was concerned that [Child] was 

having inappropriate and unsupervised phone contact with 

Mother. There were also concerns regarding Mother 

allegedly attempting to provide [Child] with money, gifts, 

and promises to go shopping if she recanted. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 1-6) (internal record citations and some 

capitalization omitted). 

By order entered May 16, 2022, the court adjudicated Child dependent 

and transferred legal custody to DHS. The court also indicated that Child’s 

placement goal was to return to Mother. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal 

on June 13, 2022. The notice of appeal included a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. 

Mother now raises four issues for our review: 

Did the trial court violate Mother’s due process rights under 

state and federal law by admitting hearsay statements that 

were not subject to cross-examination? 

Did the trial court err in law or abuse its discretion when it 

admitted the hearsay testimony for the truth of the matter? 

Did the trial court err in law or abuse its discretion and 

lacked personal jurisdiction when it adjudicated a child that 
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was AWOL and not present and the child was not served to 

be present at the hearing? 

Did the trial court err in law or abuse its discretion when it 

adjudicated that child without clear and convincing 

evidence? 

(Mother’s Brief at 5). 

In her first two issues, Mother contends that DHS submitted improper 

hearsay evidence to support its contention that Mother’s paramour sexually 

abused Child. Specifically, Mother claims that Ms. Childs “had no personal 

knowledge [of the abuse] and all her statements testified to in court were 

from other individuals and reports.” (Id. at 9). Mother also complains that 

“Child was not present to be cross-examined as to the statements she made,”

and “DHS had the burden to call the child, the father, PCA interviewer, and 

the hotline worker who had personal knowledge about [the] case.” (Id. at 9-

10) 

Mother recognizes that there are exceptions to the general prohibition 

against hearsay evidence, and she acknowledges that the trial court relied on 

the “business records” exception set forth in Pa.R.E. 803(6). Mother insists, 

however, that the exception requires a witness with personal knowledge of 

the business records to authenticate the documents. Mother maintains that 

Ms. Childs lacked such personal knowledge because she “did not create these 

records during her normal course of business.” (Id. at 11). Under these 

circumstances, Mother concludes that the trial court erred by admitting 

impermissible hearsay evidence that could not satisfy the “clear and 
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convincing” standard required to support Child’s adjudication. We disagree. 

“The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and 

such decisions will be reversed only if the trial court has abused its discretion.” 

Interest of I.R.-R., 208 A.3d 514, 519 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting In re 

Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 675 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “The Rules of 

Juvenile Court Procedure provide that in adjudications, each party shall have 

an opportunity to present evidence subject to the rules of evidence.” Id.

(citing Pa.R.J.C.P. 1406(C), cmt.)

“‘[H]earsay is defined as an out-of-court statement, which is offered in 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Adams v. Rising Sun 

Medical Center, 257 A.3d 26, 35 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, ___ Pa. 

___, 263 A.3d 246 (2021). “Generally, hearsay is inadmissible because it is 

deemed untrustworthy since it was not given under oath and subject to crossexamination.” Id. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provide 

an exception to the general rule prohibiting hearsay for certain types of 

business records:

Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay—

Regardless of Whether the Declarant is Available as a 

Witness

* * *

(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A 

record (which includes a memorandum, report, or data 

compilation in any form) of an act, event or condition if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or 

from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;
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(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly 

conducted activity of a “business”, which term includes 

business, institution, association, profession, occupation, 

and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 

profit;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that 

activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of 

the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a 

certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with 

a statute permitting certification; and

(E) the opponent does not show that the source of 

information or other circumstances indicate a lack of 

trustworthiness. 

Pa.R.E. 803(6). “In regard to the business records exception, the 

circumstantial trustworthiness arises from the regularity with which business 

records are kept and the reliance that businesses place on the accuracy of 

those records.” Bayview Loan Servicing LLC v. Wicker, 651 Pa. 545, 560, 

206 A.3d 474, 483 (2019). 

This exception has been incorporated into Pennsylvania law through the 

Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act (“the Act”), which states:

A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as 

relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other 

qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its 

preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of 

business at or near the time of the act, condition or event, 

and if, in the opinion of the tribunal, the sources of 

information, method and time of preparation were such as 

to justify its admission. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(b). “The Act and the Rule substantially overlap in that 
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both generally require that a custodian or other qualified witness testify that 

the record was made ‘at or near the time’ of the event recorded and that the 

record was kept in the regular course of business.” Bayview Loan Servicing, 

supra at 560, 206 A.3d at 483 (internal footnote omitted). 

Regarding the requirement of testimony from a custodian or qualified 

witness, our Supreme Court has recognized: 

Quite often different individuals have personal knowledge of 

the various phases of a transaction so that no one individual 

has knowledge of the entire transaction. In addition, the 

frequent turnover of personnel often makes it impossible to 

identify the employee—if it were only one—who took part in 

the transaction. Under these circumstances, to require the 

entrant to have personal knowledge of the event recorded, 

and to require proof of the identity of the recorder, would 

exclude almost all evidence concerning the activities of large 

business organizations—a result diametrically opposed to 

the purpose and spirit of the Business Records as Evidence 

Act. 

Id. at 561, 206 A.3d at 483-84 (quoting Fauceglia v. Harry, 409 Pa. 155, 

158-59, 185 A.2d 598, 600 (1962)). “While a qualified witness need not have 

personal knowledge, the individual must be able to ‘provide sufficient 

information relating to the preparation and maintenance of the records to 

justify a presumption of trustworthiness....’” Carlini v. Glenn O. Hawbaker, 

Inc., 219 A.3d 629, 641 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting Keystone Dedicated 

Logistics, LLC v. JGB Enterprises, Inc., 77 A.3d 1, 13 (Pa.Super. 2013)). 

Thus, “the import of the Act is to require that the basic integrity of the recordkeeping is established,” and “as long as someone in the organization has 

personally observed the event recorded, the evidence should be admitted.” 
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Bayview Loan Servicing, supra at 562, 206 A.3d at 484 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Instantly, DHS presented testimony from Ms. Childs, the social worker 

who investigated Child’s circumstances. Ms. Childs explained that DHS 

received a CPS report alleging that Mother’s paramour, A.O., sexually abused 

Child. (See N.T. Hearing, 5/16/22, at 18-19; DHS’s Exhibit 2, CPS Report, 

dated 9/9/21). Initially, a DHS hotline worker contacted Child “and 

implemented a safety plan.” (N.T. Hearing at 20). Thereafter, Ms. Childs 

contacted Mother and A.O. at the family home. Mother told Ms. Childs that 

she did not believe Child’s allegations against A.O., and Mother felt that Child 

fabricated the allegations “to avoid getting into trouble because she had 

recently ran away and gotten into trouble for it.” (Id. at 21). 

Ms. Childs began to testify about Child’s forensic interview at PCA, and

Mother’s counsel objected. The thrust of this objection was that DHS was not 

presenting the PCA employee who was “the actual interviewer.” (Id.) The 

court overruled the objection and permitted Ms. Childs to continue. DHS’s 

attorney then asked Ms. Childs about her subsequent interview of Child. 

Again, Mother’s counsel objected and argued that “[t]he child’s not here and 

it's hearsay, anything that she has said to the child is hearsay.” (Id. at 21-

22). The court also overruled this objection, and Ms. Childs continued to 

testify about her interview of Child. 

After this line of questioning, DHS entered its investigation report into 
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evidence. (Id. at 25; DHS’s Exhibit 3, Form CY48, dated 10/8/21). Mother’s 

counsel objected to this report because “the actual investigator is not 

present.” (N.T. Hearing at 25). The court quickly corrected counsel, informing 

her that Ms. Childs was the investigator. (Id. at 26). The court also overruled 

the objection. Ms. Childs concluded her testimony by stating that she 

maintained the DHS case file while conducting the investigation, and she had 

an opportunity to review the file. As part of that review, she studied the notes 

from Child’s prior interviews. 

In defense of its evidentiary rulings, the court noted: 

DHS properly laid the foundation for the admissibility of Ms. 

Childs’s testimony regarding [Child’s] PCA interview as well 

as the statements [Child] made to Ms. Childs during her 

investigation. Ms. Childs testified that she was the DHS 

investigator assigned to conduct the DHS investigation of 

the allegations in the CPS report. Ms. Childs interviewed the 

child as a normal part of her DHS investigation. Ms. Childs 

further testified that she maintains the DHS file for this case 

and had the opportunity to review the file. The statements 

that [Child] made to Ms. Childs were given during the 

normal course of Ms. Childs’s investigation, thus [the trial 

c]ourt found the statements relevant and admissible under 

Pa.R.E. 803(6). The CPS report which Ms. Childs was 

assigned to investigate was filed based on the disclosure of 

sexual abuse that [Child] made during her PCA interview. 

These statements formed the basis of the DHS investigation 

and are relevant and admissible in the Adjudicatory Hearing. 

Additionally, in a disposition hearing, all evidence that is 

helpful in determining the questions presented may be 

considered by the court to the extent of its probative value. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(d). 

(Trial Court Opinion at 17). Here, we agree that Ms. Childs provided sufficient 

information relating to the preparation and maintenance of the reports to 
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justify a presumption of trustworthiness. See Carlini, supra. 

Moreover, we disagree with Mother’s argument that Ms. Childs lacked 

personal knowledge to justify the admission of the records under Rule 803(6). 

Contrary to Mother’s assertions, the DHS employee who oversees the 

investigation into child abuse allegations is uniquely suited to comment on the 

preparation and maintenance of the reports in the investigation file. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(b). On this record, we conclude that the court did not abuse 

its discretion with its evidentiary rulings. See Interest of I.R.-R., supra. 

Accordingly, Mother is not entitled to relief on her first two issues. 

In her third issue, Mother argues that dependency courts “must have 

personal jurisdiction by serving the parties with a summons.” (Mother’s Brief 

at 12). In light of DHS’s inability to locate Child, Mother maintains that the 

court lacked personal jurisdiction in this case. Mother also insists that she did 

not waive this issue where her “counsel objected to the hearing going forward 

and requested that the petition be discharged because the child had been 

AWOL ... and she was [unavailable] to cross-examine.” (Id.) Mother 

concludes that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction when it adjudicated 

Child dependent. Mother’s issue is waived. 

“Personal jurisdiction is [a] court’s power to bring a person into its 

adjudicative process[.] Moreover, personal jurisdiction is readily waivable.” 

Grimm v. Grimm, 149 A.3d 77, 83 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, 641 Pa. 

592, 169 A.3d 25 (2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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Under the Juvenile Act, attendance at and participation in 

dependency proceedings are restricted. Dependency 

hearings are closed to the general public. Only a “party” 

has the right to participate, to be heard on his or her own 

behalf, to introduce evidence, and/or to cross-examine 

witnesses. Although the Juvenile Act does not define 

“party,” case law from this Court has conferred the status 

of party to a dependency proceeding on three classes of 

persons: (1) the parents of the juvenile whose dependency 

status is at issue; (2) the legal custodian of the juvenile 

whose dependency status is at issue, or (3) the person 

whose care and control of the juvenile is in question. These 

categories logically stem from the fact that upon an 

adjudication of dependency, the court has the authority to 

remove a child from the custody of his or her parents or 

legal custodian. Due process requires that the child’s legal 

caregiver, be it a parent or other custodian, be granted 

party status in order to be able to participate and present 

argument in the dependency proceedings. 

In re L.C., II, 900 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal citations 

omitted). 

After a dependency petition is filed, the court “shall direct the issuance 

of a summons to the parents, guardian, or other custodian, a guardian ad 

litem, and any other persons as appear to the court to be proper or necessary 

parties to the proceeding, requiring them to appear before the court....” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6335(a). “The summons shall also be directed to the child if [she]

is 14 or more years of age....” Id. Nevertheless, our Rules of Juvenile Court 

Procedure recognize certain situations when a child need not be present: 

Rule 1128. Presence at Proceedings

A. General Rule. All parties, including the child, shall 

be present at any proceeding unless the exceptions of 

paragraph (B) apply. 
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B. Exceptions. 

(1) Absence from Proceedings. The court may proceed 

in the absence of a party upon good cause shown except 

that in no case shall a hearing occur in the absence of a 

child’s attorney. If a child has a guardian ad litem and legal 

counsel, both attorneys shall be present. 

(2) Exclusion from Proceedings. A party may be 

excluded from a proceeding only for good cause shown. If 

a party is so excluded, counsel for the party shall be 

permitted to be present. 

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1128(A), (B). 

Instantly, at the start of the adjudication hearing, Mother’s counsel 

made the following statement: 

Your Honor, this case has been open since December and 

the child is still AWOL. My client has cooperated with the 

investigation. They still have not been able to identify where 

the child is located, and I’m requesting that the case be 

discharged. 

(N.T. Hearing at 7). 

Although Mother now argues that counsel’s generic request for 

discharge preserved her specific claim related to personal jurisdiction, the 

court disagreed:

At [Child’s] adjudicatory hearing, Mother’s counsel did not 

raise any objection regarding the child not being served or 

given notice of the adjudicatory hearing. Additionally, 

Mother’s counsel did not raise any objection at the 

adjudicatory hearing regarding [the trial c]ourt’s personal 

jurisdiction over [Child] given her AWOL status. Mother’s 

counsel appeared before [the trial c]ourt in this matter on 

numerous occasions and failed to raise objections to the 

child’s lack of notice and service or [the c]ourt’s personal 

jurisdiction over the child. 
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(Trial Court Opinion at 11) (some capitalization omitted). 

Based upon our review of the record, the court correctly determined that 

Mother did not preserve her claim regarding personal jurisdiction. See PCS 

Chadaga v. Torres, 252 A.3d 1154 (Pa.Super. 2021) (reiterating that party 

must make specific objection to alleged error before trial court in timely 

fashion and at appropriate stage of proceedings to preserve claim of error for 

appellate review; failure to raise such objection results in waiver of underlying 

issue on appeal). Even if Mother had not waived her claim, the court properly

concluded that it could proceed without Child based upon the demonstration 

of “good cause.”1 See Pa.R.J.C.P. 1128(B)(1). Accordingly, Mother is not 

entitled to relief on her third issue. 

In her fourth issue, Mother contends that the court’s ruling was “based 

on inadmissible hearsay” evidence because Child was not available to testify. 

(Mother’s Brief at 13). Mother insists that she provided for all of Child’s needs

and, aside from the abuse allegations, “there were no other dependency issues 

in the home.” (Id. at 15). Mother posits that Child may have “mental health 

and/or behavioral issues that may not be identified,” and that these are the 

real cause of the family’s problems. (Id.) Absent more, Mother concludes 

that DHS did not provide clear and convincing evidence to support the 

adjudication. We disagree. 

____________________________________________

1 We note that Child’s attorney/guardian ad litem attended the hearing. (See

N.T. Hearing at 6). 
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The applicable scope and standard of review for dependency cases is as 

follows:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept 

the [trial] court’s inferences or conclusions of law. 

Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion. 

In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 

9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)). 

We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge 

because [the court] is in the position to observe and rule 

upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who 

appear before [the court]. Relying upon [the court’s] unique 

posture, we will not overrule [its] findings if they are 

supported by competent evidence. 

In re A.H., 763 A.2d 873, 875 (Pa.Super. 2000). 

The Juvenile Act defines a dependent child, in pertinent part, as follows: 

§ 6302. Definitions 

* * *

“Dependent child.” A child who: 

(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, 

education as required by law, or other care or control 

necessary for his [or her] physical, mental, or emotional 

health, or morals. A determination that there is a lack of 

proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence 

of conduct by the parent, guardian or other custodian that 

places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, 

including evidence of the parent’s, guardian’s or other 

custodian’s use of alcohol or a controlled substance that 

places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.] 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. 
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A court may adjudicate a child as dependent if the child meets the 

statutory definition of a dependent child by clear and convincing evidence. In 

re E.B., 898 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2006). Additionally, “a finding of 

dependency can be made based on prognostic evidence and such evidence is 

sufficient to meet the strict burden of proof necessary to declare a child 

dependent.” In re R.W.J., 826 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa.Super. 2003). “The court 

must make a comprehensive inquiry into whether proper parental care is 

immediately available or what type of care [the parent] could provide in the 

future.” Id. 

If the court finds that the child is dependent, then the court 

may make an appropriate disposition of the child to protect 

the child’s physical, mental and moral welfare, including 

allowing the child to remain with the parents subject to 

supervision, transferring temporary legal custody to a 

relative or a private or public agency, or transferring 

custody to the juvenile court of another state. 

In re E.B., supra at 1112. 

Upon a finding of dependency, the court must focus on the child’s best 

interests and order a disposition best suited to the child’s safety and wellbeing. In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 

782, 959 A.2d 320 (2008). The court may not separate the child from the 

parent unless it finds that the separation is clearly necessary. In re G.T., 845 

A.2d 870 (Pa.Super. 2004). Such necessity is implicated where the child’s 

welfare, safety, or health demands he or she be taken from his or her parent’s 

custody. Id.; In re R.W.J., supra. 
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Instantly, the trial court concluded that DHS satisfied its burden and 

demonstrated that Child was without proper parental care and control. (See

Trial Court Opinion at 9). After summarizing DHS’s evidence, the court noted: 

The allegations in the indicated CPS report as well as 

Mother’s position regarding the sexual abuse [Child] 

suffered greatly concern [the trial c]ourt. The evidence 

reflects Mother lacks the ability to provide adequate care 

and supervision for [Child] due to the sexual abuse [Child] 

suffered while in her care. The record reflects that [Child] 

and her brother informed Mother on numerous occasions 

that [Child] was sexually abused by Mother’s paramour, but 

that she did not believe them. Mother’s refusal to 

believe [Child’s] disclosure of sexual abuse as well as 

Mother continuing to allow her paramour to reside in 

the home with [Child] placed [Child’s] safety and 

wellbeing at risk. 

(Id. at 10) (emphasis added). We agree with the court’s analysis. 

We also emphasize that the crux of Mother’s appellate issue concerns 

the quality of the evidence supporting Child’s sexual abuse allegations. The 

court, however, did not base its ruling on the allegations alone. Significantly, 

the court recognized that Mother’s response to the allegations placed Child at 

risk. Thus, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in adjudicating 

Child dependent. See In re A.B., supra. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 
J-S33016-22

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/8/2022