Thus Haywood’s false arrest claim can proceed. The Court is, however, constrained to
point out that on the scenario that Haywood posits, his false arrest claim is premised on what is
common parlance would be characterized as the narrowest of “technicalities.” The fact is that he
was not legally authorized to carry his weapon; he was in fact committing the offense with which
he was charged (even if, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the Cook County State’s
Attorney elected not to pursue the charge); and the statement he claims to have made which
brought the statutory exemption into play was false, even if unknowingly so. Even if Haywood’s
version of the events is correct, a simple and entirely proper tequest by the officers — “Let’s see
your permit” — would have eliminated any basis upon which to challenge the arrest. The Court
questions whether a jury would award Haywood more than nominal damages even if it accepted
his version of the events. The Court urges the parties to seriously consider settlement of this

action.

MATTHEW F. KE) LLY
United States Districf Judge
Date: November 15, 2002



y

Haywood now points out that he was not required to allege these facts in his complaint,
and he claims that he indeed told the officers that he had the necessary paperwork with him, thus
bringing the exemption into play, but they ignored him, did not ask to see it, and arrested him
despite his claim. Of course, if the officers had asked for the paperwork, Haywood would not
have been able to produce it (evidently his tan card had expired), but they did not ask, and
Haywood correctly argues that their later discovery that he had no valid tan card cannot support
the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrest. See, e.g., Smith v. Ball State University,
295 F.3d 763, 769-70 (7th Cir. 2002).

The Court is persuaded by Haywood’s argument that he has not conceded probable cause
to arrest; he is entitled to proceed on his false arrest claim. Though an officer who has probable
cause to arrest need not continue to investigate to uncover exculpatory evidence, see, e.g.,
Forman v. Richmond Police Department, 104 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir. 1997), the determination of
probable cause involves an examination of all the circumstances known to the officer at the time
of the arrest, see generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925), including
exculpatory information. Thus, as the Sixth Circuit has held, probable cause is lacking if an
officer has knowledge of matters tending to establish that the arrestee is entitled, as a result of a
statutory exemption, to carry a weapon. See Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012
(6th Cir. 1999); Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 571 (6th Cir. 1999). Put another way,
Haywood can maintain a claim that because he claimed a statutory exemption when confronted
by the officers, probable cause was lacking absent information tending to undercut that
exemption. The facts underlying Haywood’s claim are disputed, but we cannot resolve the

dispute on a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings.



>
Minute Order Form (06/97)
+

: United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

veer MagheeteJugge | Matthew F. Kennelly “oan igned Judge

CASE NUMBER 01 C 3872 DATE 11/15/02
CASE Haywood vs, City of Chicago
TITLE

[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(e0) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im] Brief in support of motion due

(3) ia} Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due__.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon__setfor__—_at

(5) Qo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—_—ssetfor__—__att

(6) QO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_—setfor__—aat__—.
”TM O Trial{set for/re-set for]on__—__at

(8) Q [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to____at

(9) a) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

COFRCP4(m) Local Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a\X1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

(ao [Other docket entry] For the reasons set forth on the attached order, Haywood’s false arrest claim
can proceed, The Court urges the parties to seriously consider settlement of this action.

(al) Wf (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.)

No notices required, advised in open court.

‘Document.
Number

4

No notices required, number of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff. INOV 2 6 2002

Notified counsel by telephone. dane docketed

w | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form.

docketing depory initials

—e——ee gqyisia’s'n
mu 0 date mailed notice
courtroom
°* ea" gn wa $2 NONZO
ggeaccti sal —



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION D OCKE TED

No V 26
DAVID HAYWOOD, 2002

Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 01 C 3872
CITY OF CHICAGO, OFFICER

MICHAEL MAROZAS, Star No. 11354, and
OFFICER EDWARD MARAS, Star No. 4586,

wee ve were ewe

Defendants.

MEM ORDE)

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

The Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of September 25, 2002 directed plaintiff
David Haywood to show cause why judgment on the pleadings should not be granted as to all of
his claims except his unlawful search claim. Haywood v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C 3872, 2002
WL 31118325, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2002). Both sides have now addressed the issues
raised by the Court. Haywood has persuaded the Court that it may have jumped the gun and that
his claim can proceed, at least for now. Familiarity with the September 25 ruling is assumed.

As Haywood points out, he has made two separate §1983 claims arising from his arrest
and detention: a false arrest claim and a claim for unlawful detention following the Gerstein
hearing. He argues that even if the officers had probable cause to arrest, as the Court suggested
in its September 25 ruling, that does not warrant detention beyond the Gerstein hearing. The
Court agrees. Haywood’s claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to Officer

Maras’s allegedly false statements on the complaint used at the Gerstein hearing to justify



Haywood’s further detention — a claim that we concluded stated a claim upon which relief could
be granted! — is, in fact, separate and distinct from his false arrest claim. Defendants essentially
concede this in their response to Haywood’s memorandum and note that they intend to move for
summary judgment on the Gerstein-related Fourth Amendment claim.

With regard to his false arrest claim, Haywood argues that he did not, contrary to the
Court’s suggestion, concede probable cause in his second amended complaint. To understand
this argument some context is required. In the Court’s September 25 ruling, we noted that
Illinois law makes the carrying of a firearm an offense; the prosecution is not required to negate
unraised affirmative defenses to obtain a conviction or even in stating a criminal charge for that
offense. Haywood, 2002 WL 311 18325, at *7. An exemption exists for a licensed security
guard whose duties involve carrying a weapon and who is commuting to work, so long as the
guard is carrying documentation demonstrating his completion of an approved course in firearms
handling — a so-called “tan card.” Jd. In his second amended complaint, Haywood conceded that
he did not have a valid tan card at the time of his arrest, though he alleged that the officers did
not know this and did not ask. 2d Am. Cplt. 412. The Court noted that an officer who is aware
of information that tends to establish an affirmative defense cannot ignore it, meaning that such
information may negate probable cause. Id. at *7 (citing Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872-
74 (6th Cir. 2002)). But, we stated, “Haywood does not claim to have shown the officers a ‘tan

card’ or even to have told them that he had one.” Jd. at 13.

‘ The Court did not, as Haywood suggests, find that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated in connection with the Gerstein hearing. Nor could we have done so in the context of a
motion to dismiss made by the defendants. Rather, we held that Haywood had alleged enough to
permit that claim to proceed.