conning her, she immediately fired them both.

The judge was underwhelmed by this defense. He said
Hoogenboom's "preposterous effort to rationalize” her
conduct and "prevail on the balance of her own perjury”
could hardly “avoid the crushing impact...[of] the
overwhelming evidence that the government provided with
respect to her guilt.”

* * *

Hoogenboom next contends that the government failed to
show that she possessed the requisite mens rea to
support her convictions on all crimes except
obstruction of justice. She argues that since the
prosecution's only evidence of her intent came from the
testimony of the Shaktahs, and this directly conflicted
with her own more believable testimony, the prosecution
failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Again, preposterous. The district court called the
evidence against Hoogenboom "crushing” and “over-
whelming.” Indeed, the court noted that even without
the Shaktahs' testimony Hoogenboom was proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Plus, the judge expressly
found that Hoogenboom's testimony was perjured.
Viewing the case in any light--let alone that most
favorable to the government--there was ample evidence
to support the finding that Hoogenboom intended to
commit her crimes.

This Court has managed to wade through every page of

Hoogenboom’s extraordinarily bulky submission.? What she has

3 That adjective and the accompanying adverb really do not

do adequate justice to the volume of what she has tendered. This
opinion has had to refer to the 1-1/2 inches of thickness because
Hoogenboom has not numbered her pages (some don’t even have
enough bottom margin to permit such an insertion). All of her
typewritten pages are so closely single spaced, with minimal
margins at the sides, top and bottom that a random court
discloses over 550 words on a sample page! If Hoogenboom had
instead complied with court rules in those respects, it seems
likely that the thickness of her filing would have just about
doubled.


either living in a dream world or seeks to have this Court enter
one. Even apart from the fact that our Court of Appeals has
upheld this Court’s determinations as to eredibility and the
overwhelming weight of the evidence, no collateral attack on that
score can succeed.

In summary, “it plainly appears from the face of the motion
and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case
that the movant is not entitled to relief in the district court”
(Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for
the United States District Courts). That being the case, no
answer from the United States Attorney is required and the motion

is dismissed summarily (id.).°

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: April 27, 2001

6 What has been said here moots Hoogenboom’s contempora-
neously filed Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and it is denied
on that ground. And as indicated earlier, her Application To
Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees operates on the mistaken
premise that a Section 2255 motion involves a fee, so it too is
denied on mootness grounds.


interesting phenomenon on the part of someone with a master’s
degree in psychology, followed by a Ph.D at the Forest Institute
of Professional Psychology®) to blaming her lawyer--an essential
component of her Section 2255 attack, which must of course claim
the deprivation of constitutional rights. But here too
Hoogenboom comes up empty. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984) continues to define the constitutional standard for
the quality of a defense counsel’s representation, demanding a
dual showing that counsel’s performance was seriously deficient
and also (id. at 694):

The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Strickland went on to say (id. at 697):

Although we have discussed the performance component of
an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice
component, there is no reason for a court deciding

an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry
in the same order or even to address both components of
the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one. In particular, a court need not
determine whether counsel's performance was deficient
before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The
object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade
counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an

5 It is extraordinarily difficult to believe that, in some
sort of self-hypnotic fashion, Hoogenboom truly believes the
distorted picture that she still seeks to paint. It seems far
more likely that her current arguments reflect an attempted fraud
on the justice system, a kind of extension of her original
fraudulent scheme.


tendered has made it extraordinarily plain (though she obviously
will never admit it) that she remains in total denial. Just as
she did during the trial and on direct appeal, in substantial
part Hoogenboom continues to attempt to lay the blame for her
extensive fraudulent activity at the door of her co-defendants
Hanan and Thaer Shaktah, portraying herself as an honest provider
of Medicare services who was victimized by the Shaktahs’
fraudulent activities. That of course necessitates Hoogenboom’s
glossing over the detailed and damning direct evidence of her
culpability, as well as overturning the credibility
determinations that this Court made at trial.

In brief, Hoogenboom’s first of five asserted grounds for
Section 2255 relief--this time blaming the government prosecutors
for misconduct (more of her pattern of attempting to ascribe
fault to everyone but herself)--fails abysmally. In that respect
her assertion of nondisclosure of some snippets of evidence that
she says were favorable to her defense* is unpersuasive, for
those items could not--either individually or in combination--
have created any reasonable doubt as to her richly demonstrated
guilt.

But Hoogenboom has now extended her pattern of denial (an

4 Even that assertion is puzzling, for in the very next

paragraph of her filing (Petition §12(B), setting out her claimed
second ground) she says that her trial lawyer had copies of the
documents that she claims the prosecutors failed to disclose.

5


Protection under the Law”:

All three co-defendants were covered for up to 3 million

dollars in professional liability insurance for less than a

$400.00 [sic!] civil matter. Medicare breached their

contract by not following their own procedures or guidelines
when there is a billing discrepency. Plus, Forest Hospital,

which was located less than a mile from Dr. Hoogenboom’ s
Glenview office was scamming Medicare for years out of
millions of dollars, but the Government allowed them to
settle at a civil level for four million dollars. All of
her co-defendants were together insured up to 10 million
dollars and could have easily settled at the civil level
with no one going to prison.

In Hoogenboom’s view of the universe, it appears that
criminal fraud is excusable if the victim might possibly be
restored financially by resorting to the criminal’s insurance
coverage. Quite apart from the open question whether a

professional liability insurer would in fact have to make good

for its insured’s criminal wrongdoing, that view has no support

in law. Nor is Hoogenboom entitled to complain about some other

asserted wrongdoer’s nonprosecution as a predicate for giving her

a pass for her own blatant and large-scale fraud.
Finally, Hoogenboom advances a general assertion that
she was deprived of due process on this ground:

The information the Government used to sentence
the Petitioner was false and misleading. All the
witnesses committed perjury and could have easily
been impeached if her ineffective attorney
presented any of the 1000's of documents stated in
her 2255 Memorandum. She has been in prison for
over two years for a crime she did not have any
knowledge of or intentions to commit.

As with Hoogenboom’s other challenges to the evidence, she is


Minute Orde Formgosio7) *

C / United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
peek iese | —__ Mitton. Shad Sting ads One
WE NUMBER 01 C 3017 DATE 4/27/2001
: CASE USA vs. Carol Hoogenboom
L TITLE

[In the Following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.}

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due, . Reply to answer brief due.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on_____setfor__att

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__at___.
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on__at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) General Rule 21 CFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. In summary “it plainly appears from
the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is
not entitled to relief in the district court” (Rule 4(b) of the Rules governing Section 2255 Proceedings for
the United States District Courts). That being the case no answer from the United States Attorney is
required and the motion is dismissed summarily. Hoogenboom’s motion for appointment of counsel and
application to proceed without prepayment are denied as moot.

ab ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
es req number of notices

J | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

> ais
Notified counsel by telephone. An

Docketing to mail notices. 7
Mail AO 450 form. 4

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

472712001

date mailed notic
courtroom mallet notes

SN deputy’s
initials

“i sn

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office maiting deputy initials



ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of suffi-

cient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that

course should be followed.

That teaching is dispositive here. However dubious
Hoogenboom’s claims as to her experienced trial lawyer's
shortcomings may be, there is no need to examine them on the
merits--for again she is flat-out wrong in contending that any of
the matters to which she refers (once more either singly or in
combination) have undermined confidence in this Court’s
conclusive findings of her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on
each of the counts at issue during trial.

Next, Hoogenboom’s asserted third ground advances a mistaken
view of double jeopardy. This Court properly imposed a joint and
several restitution obligation on Hoogenboom and her co-
defendants the Shaktahs--and the amount of that obligation (some
$480,000) conformed precisely to the proof at trial. Moreover,
any claim of error in that respect (and there was none) could
have been advanced on Hoogenboom’s direct appeal, and it is of
course well established that a Section 2255 motion cannot be
employed as a substitute for appeal.

Hoogenboom’s fourth and penultimate claim need only be
quoted to demonstrate its total unsoundness as a claim of
constitutional deprivation. Here (copied verbatim) is what she
views as demonstrating that “Her Conduct does not rise to the

Level of a Federal offense and Petitioner was not offered Equal


As this memorandum opinion and order goes on to explain,
Hoogenboom’s motion is subject to summary disposition at this
threshold stage, so that no photocopies of her voluminous filing
need to be made now. But if any future developments were to call
for the copying that Hoogenboom should have provided at the
outset, the requisite photocopies will indeed be charged to
Hoogenboom--and an order will be directed to her custodial
institution to pay that bill out of her trust fund account as
soon as funds there are adequate for that purpose.

Now on to Hoogenboom’s current effort to overturn her
conviction on constitutional grounds. As the Court of Appeals’
opinion reflected, this Court rather than a jury served as the
trier of fact (209 F.3d at 666), and it is really an
understatement to say (as this Court did in announcing its
finding at the end of the trial) that the evidence of her guilt
was truly overwhelming. Among other things, this Court heard
Hoogenboom'’s testimony and found her a totally incredible
witness. As the Court of Appeals accurately reported in part
(id. at 668, 670):

Hoogenboom told a markedly different story. She

testified that she performed all the work she billed up

until she hired Hanan, but that from then on she

assumed a purely supervisory role. She said that,

after initially supervising Hanan's activities quite

closely, she was fooled into believing that Hanan was

still treating the patients. She also said that Hanan
convinced her to hire Thaer and that Hanan was

responsible for supervising his work. Finally, she
reported that once she became aware that the two were

3


affirmance--the Court of Appeals’ mandate--on April 26, 2000.
Under those circumstances Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672,
674 (7° Cir. 1998) (per curiam) controls to confirm the
timeliness of the present Section 2255 motion:

Accordingly, we hold that federal prisoners who decide

not to seek certiorari with the Supreme Court will have

the period of limitations begin to run on the date this

court issues the mandate in their direct criminal

appeal. Any other reading of the statutes would render

the additional language in §2244 meaningless, a result

we must avoid.

One other matter should be addressed before this opinion
turns to the substance of Hoogenboom’s claims. Despite her
obligations to provide a copy of her documentation for service on
the United States (Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)) and to provide still
another copy for this Court’s use (this District Court’s LR
5.2(c)), Hoogenboom has tendered only a single set of the 1-1/2
inch thick submission that accompanies the motion itself (which,
as previously stated, takes the form of a filled-in Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus). Section 2255 motions, which are treated
as a continuation of the original case rather than as the
institution of a new lawsuit (although a civil case number is
assigned to each such motion purely for convenience), carry no
obligation for payment of a filing fee. But that does not
justify Hoogenboom’s conduct in thrusting on others the burden

and expense of photocopying the exhibits that accompany her

motion.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v- ) No. 97 CR 123-1
) (No. 01 C 3017) “Gp,
CAROL HOOGENBOOM, ) 4p Clio,
Pe “ED
Defendant. ) a
Oy

MEMQRANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Carol Hoogenboom (“Hoogenboom”) has just tendered a bulky
self-prepared motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255,+ seeking to overturn
her conviction on charges stemming from a massive Medicare fraud
for which she is now serving a 70-month prison term.? Even
though Hoogenboom’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct
appeal on April 4, 2000 (209 F.3d 665 (7 Cir. 2000)), her
Section 2255 motion has come in under the wire in terms of that
statute’s one-year period of limitation.

In that last respect, Hoogenboom’s current submission was
received on April 24, 2001 (more than a year after the April 4,
2000 date) --but the determinative factor is rather that this

District Court received the certified copy of the order of

1 All further references to Title 28's provisions will

simply take the form “Section--.”

2 Although nonlawyer Hoogenboom has mistakenly used the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus form provided by this District
Court’s Clerk's Office for true habeas claims, the content of her
submissions places them squarely within the scope of a Section
2255 motion. This Court will treat her current post-conviction
effort accordingly.