Ellis correctly contends that she has a property interest in her continued employment as a
correctional officer, but she fails to show denial of due process. In support of her claim, Ellis
points to 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-7008, which requires a probationary period of twelve months,
during which a correctional officer may be discharged at will. Since Ellis began working as a
correctional officer on September 1, 1987, she surpassed the probationary period and can only be
terminated for just cause, in accordance with 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-7012. Carroll y. County of

Cook, 90-760, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6275, at **6-7 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 1995). Accordingly, this

Court recognizes a correctional officer’s property interest in her continued employment.
However, Ellis’s backpay was not deprived through a denial of due process.

Originally, Ellis claimed that the “Merit Board does not have the power to resolve the
dispute between the parties about the amount of back salary to which the plaintiff is entitled.
Nor does the Merit Board have the power to order the Sheriff to restore plaintiff to her original
seniority date.” (Complaint {11). This contention is incorrect and Ellis apparently concedes this
in her own interpretation of Burton v. Sheahan, 98-5614, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25789 (N.D.

Ill. May 16, 2001). She noted that the Burton Court determined that the Merit Board must have

the authority to award backpay if it finds the plaintiff has been suspended without cause for some
period of time. (Plt.’s Mem. Supp. Sum. J. at 4.) That highly instructive case involved a
correctional officer, Burton, who delayed his Merit Board hearing for four months and was

eventually suspended. Burton, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS. at *3. Similar to Ellis, Burton claimed

that the Sheriff’s refusal to pay backpay for Burton’s delays effectively denied him salary
without a procedure to raise a backpay claim. Id, at *14. The Court concluded that
administrative review of the Merit Board’s decision was a viable option, showing that a

procedure is in place for Burton and Ellis to raise a claim of deprivation of backpay. Id. at *19.


situated people differently. Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 585 (7" Cir. 2003). It is further
agreed that in cases where no suspect classification is involved, the classification must rationally

advance a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S.

221, 235 (1981).
Ellis fruitlessly argues that exonerated officers and suspended officers are similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for treating them differently. The only comparison
presented by Ellis to show that exonerated officers and suspended officers are similarly situated
is that both groups are permitted to return to work. This singular argument, however, is not
convincing. There is a distinct difference between these groups, which is that one group was
determined to have violated the Sheriff’s General Orders. In such circumstances, it is reasonable
and rational that the Sheriff follow a policy that does not permit payment to suspended officers
for inducing delays in their Merit Board hearings. By denying such payment, the policy ensures
that officers will not intentionally delay their hearings, thus earning salary without performing
their duties as officers. Without such a policy, officers may be inclined to delay their hearings
for months or even years resulting in the equivalent of a paid vacation. Furthermore, ina
discussion of government interest pertaining to denial of due process, the Seventh Circuit
recognized the government’s interest in providing public safety. Hudson v. City of Chicago, 03-
2690, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 13809 at *18 (7" Cir. February 23, 2004). The Sheriff has a
distinct interest in resolving Merit Board hearings swiftly so that officers can return to work or
replacements can be found and provide the appropriate level of public safety. Accordingly, this
Court determines that officers exonerated by the Merit Board and those suspended by the Merit
Board are not similarly situated. Furthermore, the differing classification of these groups
rationally advances the reasonable and identifiable interest in reducing unnecessary expenses and

providing for the public safety.


IL. Denial of Due Process

Ellis alleges in her Complaint that the Sheriff’s refusal to pay back salary and return her
to her original seniority date is a deprivation of her property without due process of law. When a
correctional officer is suspended without pay, the Sheriff administers backpay in accordance
with policies outlined in Washington v. O’Grady, 92-4432, (1 Dist., nd Div., June 30, 1994.).
Depending on the circumstances, the Sheriff follows the appropriate standards. In cases where a
correctional officer was totally vindicated, the Sheriff pays that person full backpay for the entire
time of their suspension. This amount includes any and all the time the proceedings were
delayed regardless of whom it was attributable to. In cases where a correctional officer is
suspended but not terminated, the Sheriff deducts the suspension and the time of delays in the
proceedings which can be attributed to the correctional officer. Finally, where the correctional
officer is found guilty and terminated, the Sheriff provides no backpay. Ellis falls within the
second category, however, she argues that she should receive payment and seniority credit for
her suspension time, including the delays that she caused during her Merit Board hearing.

The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. To present a viable due process violation,
Ellis must show that she has a cognizable property interest and that property interest was
deprived; through a denial of due process. Hudson v. City of Chicago, 03-2690, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13809 at *11 (7" Cir. February 23, 2004), A constitutionally protected property interest
is created by a statute or ordinance when it goes beyond mere procedural guarantees by
providing some substantive criteria that limits the state’s discretion, such as requiring that
employees only be fired for cause. Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424, 1426 (7" Cir. 1989).
Furthermore, due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).


Ellis’s procedural due process claim also fails because other adequate processes are
available to her. Ellis argues that § 1983 does not require her to exhaust all remedies. The
Seventh Circuit has held that this is irrelevant because no due process violation occurs when

adequate state remedies exist. Veterans Legal Defense Fund v. Schwartz, 330 F.3d 937, 941 (Ch

Cir, 2003); Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 543 (7" Cir. 1982). Although Ellis is not required
to exhaust all possible procedures before bringing a § 1983 claim, she is prevented from raising a
procedural due process claim while adequate procedural remedies exist and she simply did not
avail herself of those remedies. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990). In this

instance, just as in Burton, Ellis could have filed a mandamus action, which Illinois courts have

recognized as a proper remedy to compel a public official to perform his duty to pay a salary to

an employee who is lawfully entitled to it. Burton 98-5614, 2001 U.S Dist. Lexis 25789 at *21

(citing People ex rel. Hilger v. Myers, 252 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Ill. App. 1° Dist. 1969)); Chrisweil
v. Rosewell, 388 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1979). Another available option to Ellis
was a state-court action under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, § 820 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 115/1 (2004), which was created with the purpose of assisting employees who seek redress
from employers for wrongfully withholding benefits. Miller v. J.M. Jones Co., 555 N.E.2d 820,
821 (Ill. App. 4" Dist. 1990); Glass v. Kemper Corp., 928 F. Supp. 928, 930 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Although these options were available to Ellis, she did not avail herself of them and therefore her
claim of denial of procedural due process fails.

Ellis further contends that her suspension without pay pending her termination hearing
resulted in a denial of due process because employees who receive discipline less than
termination are to receive full backpay for their deprivation. Generally, a discussion of pre-
termination procedures must include a balance of: 1) the private interest that will be affected by

the official action; 2) the government’s interest, including the function involved and any fiscal


CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Sheahan’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and

Ellis’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

ENTER:

cp Ha Maree

ige M. Marovich
nifed States District Judge

DATED: Q+ od]. 200 £
?


Minute Order Form (06/97)

— United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
eager fa\esnee | George M, Marovich | Storie owe
ceash NUMBER 01 C759 DATE 10/21/2004
(ase Ellis vs. Sheahan, et al.
TITLE
SI [la the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) i) Brief in support of motion due
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___-
(4) Q Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for}on__setfor____at
(6) im Pretrial conference{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——setfor__—at_
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for]on at
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto____at
(9) i) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

QFRCP4(m) CO Local Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a)(1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) MM — [Other docket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Sheahan’s motion for
summary judgment is granted and Ellis’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

(il) ff {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

Document
Number

0)

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

umber of notices
Notices mailed by judge's staff. y 22
Notified counsel by telephone. date 2008

AS | Docketing to mail notices.

~¥ | Mail AO 450 form.

docketing deputy initials

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
JD deputy’s
initials

“com” « Dateltindreceived in
central Clerk's Office

mailing deputy initials



and administrative burden that would be created by additional or substitute procedural
requirements; and 3) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 at 335,
In this instance, Ellis assumes this balance will tip in her favor and she skips directly to assessing
appropriate remedies.

Although her assumption may be premature, her argument on the basis of remedies is
also insufficient. Ellis cites two cases that declare public employees will receive full backpay
and be restored to their respective ranks if they are permitted to return to work. Amett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 146 (1974); Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 634, F.2d 1055, 1058 7 Cir.
1980). These cases, however, are distinguishable from the current case because neither of them
concerns variations on backpay due to delays in a hearing caused by the plaintiff. As Sheahan is
willing to pay certain amounts of backpay and reinstate certain periods of seniority, the delays
are the key element to this case and Ellis ignores this in her brief. As such, this Court does not
believe that Ellis’s argument is relevant to the current issue and thus fails. The other arguments
Ellis sets forth to show a due process violation are similarly untenable, therefore, her claim is
unsuccessful.!

Il. Equal Protection

Ellis contends that the Sheriff's policy affords different treatment to similarly situated

persons. Both parties agree that the Equal Protection Clause requires the existence of a reason

that is rationally related to a legitimate goal of government when the government treats similarly

| Although Sheahan’s defense of qualified immunity is moot because of the deficiency of Ellis’s
claim, this Court takes the opportunity to remind Sheahan that no such defense can be raised
when he is being sued in his official capacity as Sheriff. A fact already known to Sheahan.
Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d 525, 527, (7" Cir. 1994); Ruffino v. Sheahan, 218 F.3d 697, 700
(7" Cir. 1999).


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GLORIA ELLIS,
Plaintiff, 7
Case No. 01 C 759

v.
Judge George M. Marovich

DOCKETED
OCT 2 2 2004

MICHAEL SHEAHAN, SHERIFF OF
COOK COUNTY,

eS SS SSS

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.

Bee.
Plaintiff Gloria Ellis (“Ellis”) filed a one-count Complaint against The Sheriff of Cook

County, Michael Sheahan (the “Sheriff’), on February 2, 2001. Ellis alleges a violation of 42
U.S.C. §1983 on the basis that Sheahan deprived her of salary and seniority credit without due
process. In response, Ellis filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on September 16, 2003.
For the reasons set forth below, Sheahan’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Ellis’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
BACKGROUND

Ellis began working as a correctional officer with Sheahan on September 1, 1987. She
completed her probationary period exactly one year later. On July 24, 1998, Sheahan suspended
Ellis without pay pending a termination hearing before the Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board
(“Merit Board”), The Merit Board first heard Ellis’s case on August 12, 1998, to determine
whether Ellis violated several sections of General Orders 4.1, including: Section III A-2
(negligence resulting in injury to a staff member or inmate); Section III A-18 (making a false
official report), Section III A-3 (desertion of post); Section III B-6 (failure to perform assigned

tasks); and Section III A-17 (Engaging in conduct unbecoming an officer). These allegations


stemmed from incidents occurring on May 9, 1998, when Ellis was assigned to guard an inmate
at the Cook County Hospital who slipped out of her shackles and jumped out of a window to her
death.

Although the case first came before the Merit Board on August 12, 1998, it was delayed
until May 27, 1999, in response to at least five motions by Ellis requesting postponement. The
case was further continued by agreement to July 7, 1999, and then delayed again by Ellis’s
motions to September 23, 1999. The case was then continued by the court twice and later
continued by agreement of the parties until January 9, 2000. Eventually, on April 17, 2000, Ellis
was suspended for sixty days for violating three sections of General Orders 4.1. The suspension
commenced on July 28, 1998, thus permitting Ellis’s ongoing suspension to serve as completion
of her sixty day punishment.

DISCUSSION
L Standard of Review.

Summary judgment should be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When making such a determination, the Court must construe the
evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate, however,
when the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Courtney v. Biosound, 42

F.3d 414, 418 (7th Cir. 1994).