“psychotic breaks” she could not work competitively. On the other hand, when presented
with a hypothetical that included a claimant who did not suffer “psychotic breaks,” the VE
testified Claimant could work competitively and named many jobs in the national cconomy
Claimant could perform. ‘Vherefore, whether or not Goodson is disabled hinges on whether
or not Goodson suffers from “psychotic breaks.”

In this case, the ALJ dismissed Goodson’s claims and her doctors’ diagnosis of a
psychotic disorder without explaining his decision. This Court was unable to follow why the
ALJ accepted Goodson’s diagnosis ofa personality disorder while rejecting her diagnosis of
a psychotic disorder. The regulations provide that the Commissioner will consider the
“combined effect of all of your impairments” in determining whether a claimant is disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 416.923.

Claimant’s treating psychiatrist and examining psychologist diagnosed Claimant with
a psychotic disorder involving delusional thinking or hallucinations. A treating physician’s
opinion is generally given more weight because of his familiarity with the claimant's
conditions and circumstances. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. A treating physician’s opinion
regarding the nature and severity of a medical condition is entitled to controlling weight if
it is well supported by medical findings and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence
in the record. /d. Here, the treating psychiatrist diagnosed Claimant with psychotic disorder
and prescribed her with an anti-psychotic medication. Furthermore, as discussed supra, the

ALJ’s decision was not based on inconsistent findings of other psychiatrists. Rather,

19



decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 9-10).

Currently before the Court are Goodson’s and the Commissioner’s cross-motions for
summary judgment. Goodson contends the ALJ’s decision to deny her benefits was contrary
to law and was not supported by substantial evidence. Oral argument was held August 14,
2002. For the reasons stated herein, Goodson’s motion is granted and the Commissioncr’s
motion is denied.

Tl, LEGAL STANDARDS

Judicial review of a Commissioner’s final decision is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
which provides the “findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” Substantial evidence is “such
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In other words, the ALJ’s findings must
be supported by more than a mere scintilla of the evidence. Jd.

A reviewing court may not decide facts anew, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute its
own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Knight v. Chater, 55 ¥.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir.
1995), Rather, judicial review is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct
legal standards in reaching its decision and whether there is substantial evidence in the record
to support the findings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1075 (7th
Cir. 1992). The SSA gives a court the power to enter a judgment “affirming, modifying, or

reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding

13



Goodson stated her test scores in reading, writing, and arithmetic are very low. (R.
58). She can read basic mail and her sister helps her with the rest. (R. 58). She can write
a simple grocery list or message. (R. 58), She took the train to the hearing. (R. 59). When
she is not attending therapy appointments, she sleeps, watches television, occasionally walks
to the grocery store or drugstore, and attends church. (R. 59-60, 63). She may socialize with
her sister around the house. (R. 62). Before her father died, she socialized with other people
and visited her father. (R. 69). Since his death, her attacks and feeling like she is missing
something have increased. (R. 70).
C. | MEDICAL EVIDENCE

The medical evidence in this case consists of records from Goodson’s visits with her
treating psychiatrist, Dr. Bradley Gordon; examining psychologist, Dr. Mary Gardner; state
agency mental health professionals, psychiatrists Dr. Rachel Yudkowsky and Dr. Diane
Washington, and psychologists Dr. Robert Casas and Dr. Carl Hermsmeyer. No records were
submitted from her counsclor, Kitty Goldberg.

1 Dr. Bradley Gordon

Dr. Gordon is Claimant’s treating psychiatrist. He first cxamined Claimant on
February I 1, 1998, when Claimant reported she wanted to “stop using [drugs] and remain
clean and sober.” (R. 309). At that time, Dr. Gordon completed a psychiatric evaluation of
Goodson and opined she was circumstantial and tangential in her thinking, she was oricnted

times four, her mood was “settled,” her affect was appropriate to content, she had no


examining psychologist, Dr. Gardner, agreed with Dr. Gordon’s diagnosis of a psychotic
disorder. Lastly, the Vl testified at the hearing that a person suffering from “psychotic
breaks” could not perform compctitive work.

It was the ALJ’s responsibility to build a logical bridge from this evidence of
Claimant's pyschotic disorder to the ALJ’s finding of not disabled. Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176.
Because the ALJ failed to do so, his decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
Claimant is entitled to have this impairment considered in the disability evaluation process.
Prak y. Chater, 892 F.Supp. 1081, 1087 (N.D.TIl. 1995) (remanding for a new hearing
because the ALJ failed to assess the disabling severity of post traumatic stress disorder).

A claimant’s RFC is what she can still do in a work setting despite her limitations,
20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). In this case, the ALJ found Goodson had “the residual functional
capacity for simple four step work with no more than brief and superficial contact with co-
workers and supervisors and no contact with the public, and no work with sirict production
quotas.” R. 26. The VE testified if Claimant experienced “psychotic breaks,” she would be
precluded from competitive employment. In assessing Claimant’s RIC, it is again the
responsibility of the ALJ to consider all of Claimant’s impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a).
Once the ALJ reevaluates Claimant’s medical condition with regards to her psychotic
disorder, the ALJ must determine whether this RFC is appropriate for Claimant. Ifthe ALJ
finds Claimant does suffer from a psychotic disorder, then the ALJ must include this

diagnosis in his RFC assessment. Jd.

20



no jobs are available to Claimant. ‘The ALJ substituted his judgment for the medical

judgment of Goodson’s doctors and did not address the issue of her psychotic condition in

his RFC or explain why he has substituted his opinion for their medical judgment. For the

reasons set forth in this opinion, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is

denied, Goodson’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Commissioner’s

decision finding Claimant not disabled is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

SO ORDERED THIS 20th DAY OF AUGUST, 2002.

Copies mailed to:

Barry A. Schultz

Law Offices of Barry A, Schultz, P.C.
1609 Sherman Avenue, Suite 207
Evanston, TL 60201

(847) 864-0224

Henry Rose
Loyola Law School
One East Pearson St.

Chicago, IL 60611-2055
(312) 915-7840
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MORTON DENLOW
United States Magistrate Judge

Samuel D. Brooks

Assistant United States Allorney
219 South Dearborn Street, 5“ Floor
Chicago, IL 60604

(312) 353-5342

Curt P, Marceille

Assistant Regional Counsel

200 West Adams Street, 30" Floor
Chicago, IL 60606

(312) 353-9217

Attorneys for Defendant



Gardner. ‘The record is void of contradictory reports of other health professionals. The ALJ
found Dr, Hermsmeyer’s opinion that Claimant’s impairments met Section 12.05 (mentally
retarded) inconsistent with Dr. Casas’ report showing Claimant functions at least within the
low average range of general intellectual ability. Although Dr. Hermsmeyer’s assessment
of Claimant is inconsistent with her test results, this assessment does add credibility to the
diagnosis of Drs. Gordon and Gardner that Goodson does suffer from a severe mental
impairment. Moreover, Goodson’s IQ test performed by Dr. Casas was the only
contradictory medical evidence the ALJ relicd upon in reaching his decision. In his decision,
the ALJ is critical of Dr. Gardner’s opinion because she only examined Claimant once. R.
22. Tlowever, the ALJ is not equally critical of Dr. Casas, who also only examined Claimant
one time. R. 24. Rather, the ALJ looks to Dr. Casas’ assessment in determining Claimant’s
credibility noting Dr. Casas found Claimant was uncooperative and evasive. R. 24.
Moreover, while the ALJ recognized the 1Q test given by Dr. Casas, the ALJ failed to
recognize the Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-IIL test (“MCMIT-IIT”) given by Dr.
Gardner which produced a valid score and strongly indicated the presence of significant

psychopathology.’ R. 322. This contradiction in standards between Dr. Gardner and Dr.

“Ms, Goodson was able to complete the MCMI-II with reading assistance from the
examiner. She produced a valid score and her profile strongly indicates the presence of
significant psychopathology, Ms. Goodson has achieved an extremely high elevation on multiple
severe pathology scales. Her highest score was on the scale that measures delusional disorder.
This scale was designed to pick out paranoid individuals with a psychotic level of symptomatic
presentation. Ms. Goodson is acutely paranoid and may become periodically belligerent, voicing
irrational but interconnected delusions of a jealous, persecutory or grandiose nature. An
undercurrent of suspiciousness, vigilance and alertness to possible betrayal are typical features.”

17



had the mental capacity to perform simple tasks. (R. 172). Dr. Hermsmeyer reviewed the
record again in January 1998 and reached the same conclusion, that Goodson had the mental
capacity to perform simple tasks, (R. 299). He also opined Claimant met category 12.05,
mental retardation and autism. (R. 170, 288).

7. Kitty Goldberg

According to the ALJ, the record is void of documents from Kitty Goldberg,
Claimant’s counsclor who she sees twice a week. (R. 23).

D. VOCATIONAL EXPERT’S TESTIMONY

VE Hammersma testified after reading the exhibits and listening to the Claimant’s
testimony. (R. 70-76). The VE was asked a number of hypotheticals. The first involved a
claimant with no prior work expericnee who is 35 years old, completed the tenth grade and
started the eleventh grade, has a verbal IQ of 91, a performance IQ of 88, and a full scale 1Q
of 88, with some typc of personality disorder involving suspicion, a substance abuse disorder
inremission, borderline mental capacity, attended a regular school classroom but experienced
some learning disability, and took courses toward a GED, (R. 71).

Assuming this claimant was mentally limited, with no physical limitations, to simple
four-step work limited to brief and superficial contact with coworkers and supervisors, and
no public contact, the VE testified in the Chicago metropolitan arca, at the medium level,
18,000 kitchen helper jobs and 12,000 assembly positions exist. (R. 72). At the light or

sedentary level, 10,000 office cleaner jobs, 8,000 assembly positions, and 7,000 hand packing



needed to do unskilled work. (R. 340).

2. Dr. Mary Gardner

Dr, Gardner, a psychologist, examined and tested Claimant at the request of her
attomey in May, 1999 and diagnosed Claimant as suffering from psychopathology thal
included guardedness and hypervigilance, (R. 319-24). The exam indicated Goodson was
alert and oriented in all spheres, but was unable to pronounce simple words and could not
perform basic mathematical operations. (R. 321-22). Goodson completed the MCMI-II,
producing a valid score, strongly indicating the presence of significant psychopathology. (R.
322). Goodson is also acutcly paranoid and may become periodically belligerent. (R. 322).
The test also showed clinical evaluations on two of the three severe personality pathology
scales (Schizotypal and Paranvid), suggesting a dysfunctional personality disorder is likely.
(R. 322). Dr. Gardner diagnosed Goodson with Psychotic Disorder, NOS and Paranoid
Personality Disorder. (R. 323), She also opined Goodson would not be able to sustain
meaningful employment given the nature of her severe psychological problems and Goodson
would not be capable of managing her own funds if she were awarded benefits. (R. 324).

As part of her evaluation, Dr. Gardner completed a Psychiatric Review Technique
Form indicating Goodson met Listing 12.02 and equaled Listing 12.08 based upon her
diagnosis of categories 12.03 (schizophrenic, paranoid and other psychotic disorders) and

12.08 (personality disorders). (R. 325). In her Mental Residual Functional Capacity

assessment, Dr. Gardner noted marked limitations in Goodson’s ability to remember



homicidal or suicidal ideation, and her intellect, reasoning, attention and concentration,
insight, judgment and memory were all intact. (R. 310). Dr. Gordon assigned a Global
Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 60 indicative of moderate to mild symptoms. (R.
311). See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 32 (4" ed.
1994). Dr. Gordon also saw Claimant on March 11 and December 1, 1998. (R. 306).

Dr. Gordon saw Claimant in 1999 on January 22, February 3, 10, and 24, March 3,
and 17, April 14, 21, and 28. (R. 303-08). On February 3, 1999, Dr. Gordon prescribed
Serentil, an anti-psychotic medication for Goodson. (R. 307). On March 3, 1999, Dr.
Gordon diagnosed Goodson with a psychotic disorder, NOS, and opined her GAF on that
date was 45 with a GAF of 30 in the past. (R. 308). Dr. Gordon prepared a report on May
12, 1999 in which he indicated Claimant was under his “indirect care” for several months.
(R. 338). He detailed Goodson’s former drug use and diagnosed her with psychotic disorder,
NOS and a personality disorder, NOS, (R. 338-39). Atthis time, Dr. Gordon also completed
a “Medical Opinion Re: Ability to do Work-Related Activities” form. (R. 340-41), This
form indicated Claimant was seriously limited but not precluded from performing the mental
demands of unskilled work, and had poor or no useful ability in other areas. (R. 340-41),
Dr. Gordon opined Claimant had poor or no uscful ability to understand, remember or carry
out detailed instructions, interact appropriately with the general public, or maintain socially
appropriate behavior. (R. 341). He also rated her “fair” (ability to function is seriously

limited, but not precluded) in all categories associated with her mental abilities and aptitudes



Casas lends further support that the ALJ improperly substituted his judgment for the medical
judgment of Claimant’s doctors. The ALJ, properly, did not rely on the state agency health
professionals Goodson saw years prior to the hearing”

B. THE ALJ’S DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE

Goodson claims the ALJ did not consider all of her impairments, specifically cvidence
she suffers from a psychotic disorder, in assessing her RFC and whether or not she is
disabled. Goodson also contends the ALJ’s credibility determination failed to comport with
the requirements of Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p. Lastly, Goodson asserts the ALT
erred at step five in concluding she could perform work in the national economy.

In making a decision, the ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence. Dixon v.
Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). The ALJ is not required to address every
piece of cvidence or testimony, but must provide some glimpse into his reasoning. Jd.
Where an ATJ denies benefits, hc must build an accurate and logical bridge from the
evidence to his conclusion. Jd.

1 Psychotic Disorder

Whether or not Claimant suffers from a psychotic disorder requiring unscheduled

“psychotic breaks” is case determinative. The VIE testified if Claimant experienced

R, 322.

2 The Commissioner relies upon these state agency health professionals in its brief,
however, because the ALJ did not rely upon the opinions and because it is not this Court’s
position to re-weigh evidence, the Court does not give weight to those opinions.

18



4. Dr. Diane Washington

Dr. Washington, a psychiatrist, examined Claimant in January 1994 and diagnosed her
with chronic alcohol abuse and dependence, polysubstance dependence in remission for one
year and a half, and borderline intellectual functioning. (R. 167-69). At this time, Claimant
denied auditory or visual hallucinations. (R. 168).

5. Dr. Robert Casas

Dr. Casas, a psychologist, performed a psychological evaluation of Claimant in
January 1998 at the request of the agency. (R. 285-87). Dr. Casas administered the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised test (“IQ test”) on Goodson. (R. 285). Goodson’s verbal
score was 91, her performance score was 88, and her full scale score was 88. (R. 285). The
test indicated Goodson functions, at lcast, within the low average range of general
intellectual ability for her age group. (R. 286). Dr. Casas opined this should be considered
a minimal estimate of her general level of ability based on her attitude during testing. (R.
286-87). Dr. Casas also detected an odor of alcohol present on Claimant at this time. (R.
285, 287), Dr. Casas concluded Goodson likely functions in the average range of general
intellectual ability or higher. (R. 287).

6. Dr. Carl Hermsmeyer

In February 1994, Dr. Hermsmeyer reviewed the medical evidence and found
Claimant’s ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions moderately

limited, but was not otherwise significantly limited, (R. 170-71). He concluded Goodson



Minute Order Form (06997)

; Wo ~() United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

N: ‘Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Othe
° re Mayictrate Judge Morton Denlow than Atsigaed fudge
CASE NUMBER 01 C5999 DATE 8/20/2002
CASE Veronica Goodson vs. Jo Anne B. Barnhart
TITLE

|In the following box (a} indicate the purty filing the motion, ¢.g., pluintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
‘of the motion being presented.)

MOTION;

DOCKET ENTRY:

ql) oO Filed motion of ( use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Bricf in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due____. Reply to answer brief due___-

(4) 0 Ruling/Hearing ons set for at.

(5) im] Status hearing|held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—,s set ffor_)at_

(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [sct for/re-set for]on__._eset for, at

(7) o Trial[sct for/re-set for]on_____, at

(8) a] [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continyed to_ at.

(9) o This case is dismissed [with/vithout] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
DFRCP4(m) OlLocal Rule 41. OFRCP41(ay1) O FRCP41(a){2).

ao [Other docket entry} Enter Memorandum Opinion and order. ‘The Commissioner’s motion for

summary judgment [14-1] is denied, Goodson’s motion for summary judgment [13-1] is granted and the
Commissioner’s decision finding Claimant not disabled is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

al) {For further detail see order attached to the original minute urder.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document

Number

No notices required.

suuymher of notices

oY | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notitied counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to juudge/magistrate judge.

w2u2002

date mailed nuice
courtroom te

DK dleputy’s eo

initials
Date/time received in
ventral Clerk's Office. atluny cheputy initials



determined her disorder was in probable remission. (R. 21), Te also acknowledged the
record indicated a diagnosis of psychotic disorder and a personality disorder and described
her as having features of paranoia, periodically belligerent, suspicion, and/or mistrustfulness.
(R. 21). She currently takes the following medications: Serentil, Desipramine, and
Benzotropine MES. (R. 21). He found the record did not support a diagnosis of borderline
intellectual functioning and noted her I.Q. scores. (R. 21-22).

Atstep three, the AT.J concluded Goodson’s condition did not meet or equal the level
of severity required for any listed impairment, specifically Section 12.08 (personality
disorder). (R. 22). The ALJ rejected Dr. Gardner’s opinion that Claimant met Section 12.02
or equaled Section 12.08 because her only contact with Claimant was onc examination and
no other doctor concluded Claimant’s impairment met the listing level. (R. 22). The ALJ
evaluated the Claimant’s RFC as “simple four step work with no more than brief and
superficial contact with co-workers and supervisors and no contact with the public, and no
work with strict production quotas.” (R. 23).

Because the Claimant’s complaints are subjective, the ALJ assessed Claimant’s
credibility under Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p and 20 C.P.R. § 416.929, (R. 22).
He found her testimony not fully credible and supported his finding by discussing Goodson’s
doctor’s reports and findings. (R. 23-25). The ALJ opined Dr. Gordon’s psychiatric

evaluation of February 11, 1998 was inconsistent with his May 12, 1999 letter and Medical

Opinion Re: Ability to do Work-Related Activities form, (R. 23). Claimant’s treatment



jobs exist. (R. 73). If this claimant had a psychotic break, then she could not work
competitively. (R. 74). Also, taking everything on Dr. Gordon’s “Medical Opinion Re:
Ability to do Work-Related Activities” {orm of Claimant, combined with the RFC, no jobs
would be available to the Claimant. (R. 74-75).
E. THE ALJ’S DECISION

On July 12, 1999, ALJ Frisch determined Goodson was not entitled to SSL (R. 17-
36). In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ engaged in the five-slep analysis required by SSA
regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1520.

Atstep onc, the ALJ found Claimant had no substantial gainful work activity. (R. 21).
The ALJ then turned to stcp two and determined the Claimant was not subject to a severe
physical impairment but was subject to a severe mental impairment. (R, 21). Therefore, the
ALJ completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”), (R. 21, 28-36). On this
form, the ALJ checked that Claimant required an RFC assessment based upon category 12.08
Personality Disorder, but failed to check the box for category 12.03, Schizophrenic, Paranoid
and other Psychotic Disorders. (R. 28). He also checked the box “present” for 12.09
Substance Addiction Disorder but qualified it by writing “in possible remission.” (R. 34).
In his Rating of Impairment Severity, the ALJ based his findings for degree of limitation only
on listings 12.08 and 12.09 and neglected to include listing category 12.03. (R. 35). Lastly,
the ALJ did not assess the “Criteria of the Listings” for 12.03. (R. 36).

In his decision, the ALJ cvaluated Claimant’s history of substance abuse and

10



locations and work-like proccdures, the ability 1o understand and remember, or carry out
detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration, the ability to sustain an ordinary
routine, and the ability to complete a normal work day without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms. (R. 334). Dr. Gardner noted moderate limitations in the
ability to understand, remember, and carry out very short and simple instructions, the ability
to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within
customary tolerances, and the ability to work in coordination with or proximity to others
without being distracted by them. (R. 334). Lastly, Dr. Gardner found Goodson was not
significantly limited in her ability to make simple work-related decisions. (R. 334).

3. Dr. Rachel Yudkowsky

In June 1993, Dr. Yudkowsky, a psychiatrist, examined Claimant for the state agency
and completed a psychiatric cvaluation. (R. 163-66). Dr. Yudkowsky diagnosed Claimant
with alcohol and drug abuse in remission. (R. 165). She noted Claimant did “not seem to
have any other complicating psychiatric disorder” and found Goodson’s ability to do work-
related activities involving understanding, memory, sustained concentration, and persistence
not impaired at present with some exception. (R. 165).

Dr. Yudkowsky examined Claimant again in November 1997 and diagnosed 1)
developmental delay, probably borderline mental retardation, and 2) alcohol abuse, possibly

in remission. (R. 281). Dr. Yudkowsky opined Goodson probably could function in a

sheltered or low pressure and non-competitive working situation. (R. 282).



2. Credibility

Once the ALJ completes his assessment of Claimant’s mental impairments cither by
contacting Drs. Gordon and Gardner to clear up any inconsistency, by calling a medical
expert to testify, and/or by sending Goodson for an independent medical assessment, then the
ALJ should perform a new credibility determination of Claimant. At that point, the medical
evidence may confirm Claimant is suffering trom a psychotic disorder, Furthermore, the ALJ
may find her evasive behavior not unusual for someone suffering from such a disorder.

3. Work in the National Economy

According to the VE, if Claimant suffers from a psychotic disorder, no jobs exist in
the national economy that Goodson could perform. Therefore, once the record is clear on
whether or not Goodson suffers from a psychotic disorder, the ALJ can then engage in a step
five analysis.

IV. CONCLUSION
Claimant’s mental health doctors diagnose Claimant as suffering from a psychotic

disorder, NOS and personality disorder, NOS. Under these circumstances, the VE testified

3“The MCMI-II also indicates that while her initial presentation is evasive, it is clear that
she is highly guarded and attempts to ward off what she perceives as intrusive questions from
others. She is likely to be quarrelsome, fractious and abrasive, and has few acquaintances. She
ig unwatrantedly skeptical and mistrustful of the motives of others including relatives, friends
and associates. She tends to read hidden messages into benign matters and to magnify tangential
or mild difficulties into proof of duplicity and treachery. She displays a cold and humorless
demeanor and attempts to appear uncmotional and objective but is ofien edgy, envious and
jealous of others. Thus, it is clear that Ms. Goodson suffers from severe psychopathology.” R.
323,

21



psychotic disorder, NOS and a personality disorder, NOS. (R. 338-39, 323). With regards
to her mental condition, she testified Dr. Bradley Gordon prescribes medication for her
mental! impairment and when she stopped seeing him for about a year she was seeing other
counselors. (R. 64), Goodson sees this other counselor, Kitty Goldberg, twice a week and
attends group therapy every other week. (R. 67), Goodson also attends Alcoholics
Anonymous (“AA”) meetings. (R. 67).

Goodson takes medication because she sees and hears things that are not there and has
attacks. (R. 64-65). She feels a little better when she takes her medication. (R. 61).
However, she still sees and hears things despite being medicated. (R. 68). This bothers her
and makes her feel scared; she sometimes sleeps with the light on at night. (R. 68). During
her attacks, she expericnces cravings, mental headaches, shaking, and blurred vision. (R.
70). Goodson has been [ree from drugs and alcohol for a year and a half, yet she testified she
only sometimes knows where she is, where she lives, and what is going on around her. (R.
61, 64).

Claimant receives General Assistance and food stamps to purchase food and
medications. (R. 60), Goodson rents a room from her mother and sister. (R. 55-56). She
makes her own simple meals, does her own laundry, and sometimes cleans her room. (R.
56). She has four children, all of whom were adopted by her father. (R. 56), Her father died

in July 1998 and his wife cares for the children. (R. 56, 58), Goodson has telephone contact

with the children, (R. 57).



the cause for a hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

In order to be entitled to DIB under Title II of the SSA the claimant must establish a
“disability” as defined by the Social Security Act. The same is true to qualify for SSI under
‘Title XVI of the SSA. Zurawski v, Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 1997). To establish
a “disability” the claimant must show he is suffering from a medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or, which has lasted or can be
expected to last for at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382e(a)(3)(A).
Additionally, an individual shall be considered disabled “only if his physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(2)(A), 1382¢(a)(3)(B).

The Social Security Regulations provide a five-step process to determine whether a
claimant has established a “disability.” 20 C.T-R. § 404.1520. The process is sequential; if
the ALJ finds that the claimant is not disabled at any step in the process, the analysis ends.
Jd. The ALJ must inquire: 1) whether the claimant is still working; 2) whether the claimant
has a severe impairment; 3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed
impairment; 4) if the claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment, whether he can
perform past relevant work; and 5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work

in the national economy. Jd.



or opinion that contradicts Drs. Gordon’s and Gardner’s opinions. In effect, the ALJ
substituted his judgment for that of the doctors. However, an ALJ must not substitute his
own judgment for a doctor’s opinion without relying on other medical evidence or authority
in the record. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870.

This Court acknowledges the ALJ’s possible skepticism over both doctors presenting
their opinions within days of the hearing; however, both doctors are professionals and
without contrary evidence, the ALJ should not substitute his judgment for theirs. In
particular, Dr. Gordon treated Claimant “indirectly” for over one year and saw her
approximately ten times in the five months before the May 1999 hearing. It was the
responsibility of the ALJ to contact the doctors if he found any inconsistencies, have a
medical expert testify at the hearing, or send Claimant to another psychiatrist to satisfy
himself of Claimant’s condition. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(e)(f). Furthermore, in discussing
another type of mental illness, depression, the Seventh Circuit has stated:

Severe depression is not the blues. It is a mental illness; and

health professionals, in particular psychiatrists, not lawyers or

judges, arc the experts on it. [Wilder] is entitled to a decision

based on the record rather than on a hunch. The salient fact of

record is the testimony of the psychiatrist, a disinterested as well

as expert witness, Everything else is rank conjecture.
Wilder, 64 F.3d at 337, 338. Neither the ALJ nor this Court should engage in conjecture
regarding whether Claimant suffers from a mental illness. This must be Icft to health

professionals.

The ALJ indulged his lay view of psychotic disorder for that of Drs. Gordon and

16



application on January 21, 1993; this application was denied by an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (R. 20). Claimant subsequently requested a review by the Appeals Council which
was denied. (R. 20). Goodson filed her second application on August 20, 1996, (R. 20).
This application was denied initially and Goodson did not appeal. (R. 20). Goodson filed
the application which is the subject of this action on August 15, 1997. (R. 20). Her
application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 20). She requested a hearing
and testified at the hearing where she was represented by counsel. (R. 50). Vocational
Expert, Richard J. Hammersma (“VE”), also testified. (R. 50). ALJ Charles J. Frisch
rendered an unfavorable decision. (R. 17-27). Goodson’s request for review with the
Appeals Council was denied. (R. 9).
B. GOODSON’S HEARING TESTIMONY

On May 14, 1999, Goodson testified before ALJ Frisch at a Social Sccurity
Administration (“SSA”) Tlearing. Goodson was born on October 13, 1963. (R. 197). She
completed the tenth grade and began the eleventh grade, but did not finish. (R. 58).
Claimant took courses towards her GED; however, she never received her GED. (R. 71).
Goodson has not tried to work since she was involved in a training program at McDonald’s
in Junior High School. (R. 61). She has no previous work experience. (R. 61). She currently
is not attending school. (R. 61). When asked if there was any physical reason why she could

not work, Goodson stated her feet hurt from time to time. (R. 59).

Goodson’s treating psychiatrist and examining psychologist have diagnosed her with



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETED

aug 2 2 2002
VERONICA GOODSON,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 01 C 5999

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

)
)
)
)
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow
)
)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Veronica Goodson (“Claimant” or “Goodson”) seeks judicial review of the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), Jo Anne B.
Barnhari, denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SST”) under the Social
Security Act, Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d), 1383. Goodson claims the
Commissioner’s decision to deny her benefits should be reversed and remanded because the
Commissioner did not consider her psychotic disorder. Both parties now move for summary
judgment. For the reasons stated herein, this Court denies the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment, grants Claimant’s motion for summary judgment, and remands the case
to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

1. RELEVANT FACTS

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Goodson has filed three applications for SSI benefits. (R. 20). She filed her first



record of February 11, 1998 indicated Claimant's intellect, reasoning, attention and
concentration, insight, judgment, and memory were all intact, (R. 23). ‘The ALJ also cited
to progress notes opining Claimant’s memory was good, her situation was changing for the
better, her mood was busy and focused with appropriate affect, she was stable. (R. 23). The
ALJ noted the record was void of supporting documentation from Claimant’s therapist, Killy
Goldberg who, according to Claimant, has been seeing her twice a week. (R. 23). The ALJ
opined Claimant's daily activitics are only slightly limited by her mental impairments, she
experiences moderate difticullies maintaining social functioning although her problems are
moderate, and she often experiences deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace. (R.
24).

Because Claimant has no past relevant work history, she met step four. (R. 25).
‘Therefore, after the burden shifted to the Commissioner at step five, the ATJ looked to the
testimony of the VE to determine whether a significant number of jobs remain in the
economy which Goodson can perform, (R, 25). Relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ
concluded Claimant retained the RFC to perform a significant number of jobs existing in the
national economy, specifically, kitchen helper (18,000 jobs), assembly person (12,000 jobs
at medium level and 8,000 jobs at light level), office cleaner (10,000 jobs), and hand
packager (7,000 jobs). (R. 25-26).

Following the ALJ’s decision, Goodson requested review by the Appeals Council.

On June 14, 2001, the Appeals Council denied Goodson’s request for review, thus the AT.J’s

12



il. ANALYSIS
‘The issues presented are 1) whether the ALJ substituted his judgment for the medical
judgment of Goodson’s doctors, and 2) whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence.

A. THE ALJ IMPROPERLY SUBSTITUTED HIS JUDGMENT FOR THE
MEDICAL JUDGMENT OF CLAIMANT’S DOCTORS

Goodson contends the ALJ substituted his judgment for the medical judgment of her
doctors, specifically Drs. Gordon and Gardner. ‘Lhe Seventh Circuit does not permit ALJs
to substitute their judgment for that of medical professionals. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863,
870 (7th Cir. 2000); Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996); Wilder v. Chater, 64
F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1995). Specifically, ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play
doctor and make their own independent medical findings. Rohan, 98 F.3d at 970.

Drs. Gordon and Gardner diagnosed Claimant as suffering from psychotic disorder,
NOS and personality disorder, NOS. Dr. Gordon first diagnosed this disorder on February
3, 1999 and prescribed Serentil, an anti-psychotic medication. RK. 307. Although the ALJ
acknowledged in his opinion that the record contained evidence of a diagnosis of both a
psychotic disorder and a personality disorder, the ALJ chose to focus only on Goodson’s
personality disorder and did not include her psychotic disorder in his findings. R. 26.
Furthermore, in the Psychiatric Review Technique orm, evidence of a psychotic disorder
is excluded from the ALJ’s consideration of Claimant’s mental impairments. R. 28-36. In

giving little or no weight to her psychotic disorder, the ALJ did not cite to any medical report

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