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Filed 3/29/24 P. v. Young CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHARLES DAVIS YOUNG,

Defendant and Appellant.

A168187

(Contra Costa County Super. Ct.

No. 05001309251)

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Charles Davis Young was convicted by jury of residential burglary 

(Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)),2 assault with a deadly weapon (a cane) 

(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and false imprisonment (§ 237, subd. (a)), as well as an 

enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, 

subd. (a)). The trial court found prior conviction allegations to be true and 

sentenced Young to a prison term of 45 years to life. In an unpublished 

opinion otherwise affirming the convictions, we agreed with Young that the 

sentence on the assault conviction should have been stayed under section 

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it raises no 

substantial issue of fact or law. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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654, and remanded for resentencing. (People v. Young (Jan. 3, 2019, 

A144481) [nonpub. opn.] (Young I).)

In resentencing Young, the court imposed the upper term of six years 

for the first degree residential burglary conviction, and doubled it to twelve 

years based upon a prior strike (dated October 2, 2003 for § 192, subd. (a), 

manslaughter). (People v. Young (Mar. 10, 2021, A159701) [nonpub. opn.]

(Young II).)3 The court imposed another three years, consecutive, for the 

enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (a). (Young II, supra, 

A159701.) The sentences for the assault and false imprisonment convictions 

were stayed pursuant to section 654. (Young II, supra, A159701.) Two prior 

convictions (for a robbery and another first degree burglary) brought five 

years each, adding another ten years under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). 

(Young II, supra, A159701.) At the resentencing proceeding, Young’s counsel 

pointed out to the court that it now had discretion to strike those prior 

convictions, but the court declined to do so, while acknowledging it could. In 

an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the aggregate determinate sentence of 

25 years imposed in the resentencing proceedings. (Ibid.)

Young subsequently filed a petition for recall of his sentence and 

resentencing under former section 1171 (since renumbered to section 1172.7

(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 11)) and former section 1171.1 (since renumbered to

section 1172.75 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12)). These statutes invalidate, 

respectively, any sentencing enhancement imposed (1) under Health and 

Safety Code section 11370.2 for having suffered a prior conviction for 

specified drug offenses (section 1172.7), and (2) under section 667.5, 

3 Young’s appellate counsel requests that we take judicial notice of 

Young I and Young II under Evidence Code sections 452 and 459. We hereby 

grant these requests.
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subdivision (b), for having served a prior prison term (section 1172.75). The 

People filed an opposition. The court held a hearing on the petition at which 

Young was represented by counsel, and at the conclusion of the hearing 

denied relief. 

Young now appeals. Young’s appointed counsel on appeal filed a brief 

with this court pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, stating 

that upon a thorough review of the case record, counsel found no arguable 

issues. Young filed a supplemental brief, which is difficult to follow, but 

appears to reference (1) something about “Brady rights”, (2) “eleven enclosed

camera hearings” that were designed to “hide evidence” which would have 

shown the testimony of a “paid informant” to be perjurious, (3) a defense to 

Young’s burglary conviction based on his assertion that he lived in the house 

that was burgled, (4) the “withhold[ing]” of “[v]ital information” that would 

have shown a witness against him had once been in a mental hospital, and 

(4) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise any of these issues. 

We see no basis in the record to cast any doubt on the correctness of the 

trial’s denial of resentencing relief here. No resentencing enhancement 

invalidated by either section 1172.7 or section 1172.75 was imposed on Young 

at either his original sentencing or the resentencing that we ordered on 

remand following his first appeal. He is therefore ineligible for relief under 

the statutes that purportedly authorized his request for resentencing relief. 

Nor do any of issues raised in his supplemental brief bear on his eligibility for 

such relief. To the extent Young wishes to challenge his convictions or 

sentence on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, that argument is 

more appropriately brought, if at all, in a habeas petition.4

4 To be clear, we express no opinion on whether a habeas petition by 

Young would be either timely or successful. 
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DISPOSITION

The order denying Young’s resentencing petition under sections 1172.7

and 1172.75 is affirmed. 

STREETER, J. 

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.

GOLDMAN, J.