Defendants’ argument that “release” is an administrative step incident to the arrest, and
that under County of Riverside they had up to forty-eight hours to affect the release, is without
merit, In essence, under defendants’ theory, they could complete every step that needs to be done
to determine that an arrestee is entitled to be released within the first hour of detention, and then
wait until the forty-eighth hour to “turn the key.” Even if the forty-eight hour period allowed by
County of Riverside applied (which it does not), it could not support such an absurd theory.

Finally, defendants argue that class treatment is inappropriate because under any theory
they are entitled to challenge the unreasonableness of the alleged delay by presenting evidence of
explanation. Plaintiffs, however, allege a city wide-policy of delay after all administrative steps
except release have been completed. Nothing about defendants’ defense precludes class
certification. Indeed, as noted in this court’s opinion certifying the class, County of Riverside

was a class action, Portis, 2003 WL 22078279 at *3. Individual affirmative defenses do not

preclude class treatment. See, ¢.g., Avid Blihovde v. St, Croix County, 219 F.R.D. 607, 621-22

(WD Wise. 2003).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to decertify the class is

denied.

ENTER: June 10, 2004 ae .

Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge

'The court takes the opportunity to note, as it did when defendants presented the instant
motion, that defense counsel appears to be needlessly protracting this litigation by filing
repetitive motions that are essentially motions to reconsider previous rulings by the court, and
which ignore plaintiffs’ theory of the case on which those rulings were based. As noted in its
September 8, 2003, opinion, defendants continue to demonstrate “either an error in
comprehending or unwillingness to accept the exact nature of plaintiff's claims.” Portis at *3.
The court will not tolerate such tactics in the future, and defense counsel is admonished to be
mindful of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.



were contemplated, Rather, police held the plaintiffs only while they completed their

processing.” Id. Thus, the Chortek court found County of Riverside relevant to its discussion

only because in that case the Court noted that even unreasonable delays within a presumptively
reasonable period may be constitutionally troublesome if the delay was occasioned by an
improper purpose, such as gathering additional evidence to justify an arrest, or a delay motivated
by ill will or for delay’s sake. Id.

The Chortek court then reaffirmed its earlier opinions in Moore v. Marketplace

Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2nd 1336 (7" Cir. 1985), and Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797

F.2nd 432 (7" Cir. 1986), which suggested that a delay of over four hours after a warrantless
arrest for a minor non-custodial offense would be presumptively unreasonable, calling for a

explanation by the defendant. In Chortek, a satislactory explanation was given, the facts of which

were uncontested by the plaintiffs. Thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate.
Id. at 747-48.

In the instant case, plaintiffs do not challenge the delay caused by the completion of the
administrative steps required as incident to the arrest, although in each case the delay was well
beyond the four hours which caused such concern for the Seventh Circuit in Moore and
Gramenos. Instead, plaintiffs challenge the time period between the time all those steps were

completed and the time of the actual release -- the proverbial “turning of the key.” At that time,

the only procedures left to perform arc the ministerial, non-discretionary approval of the charges
(that had already been approved by the watch commander) and the preparation of an I-bond.

‘These steps, according to plaintiffs, can be accomplished well within two hours.



«
= Minute Order Form (06/97)

United es District Court, Northern Distrittof Illinois

N: e of Assigned Jud; i dge if Oth
vor Magistrate uage | Obert W. Gettleman — | “yintStigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02°S:3139 DATE June 9, 2004
CASE Ronald Portis v City of Chicago, et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) ty] Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) o Hearing

(5) im} Status hearing

(6) fa! Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—setfor__—s—sat__.
(7) QO Trial{set for/re-set for]on_____at

(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__—__at.

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) O General Rule21 OFRCP41(a)(1) OFRCP41(a)(2).

(10) M@ {Other docket entry]
Memorandum opinion and order entered.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion to decertify the class is denied.

al) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document

Number

No notices required
umber of notices

X | Notices mailed by judge's staff.
JUN 1 0 2004

Notified counsel by telephone. ‘date docketed

Docketing to mail notices.

(cH

Mail AO 450 form. un ocksting deputy initials

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom Pret 6- NIE 4002 ate mailed notice

Gs deputy's
initials

Date/timereceived in
central Clerk's Offite TM, railing deputy nit



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
DOCKETED

RONALD PORTIS, MARDRIC E. LANCE, and
EMMETT LYNCH, individually and on behalf of JUN i 0 ae o¢
aclass,

Plaintiffs,

No. 02C3139
v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation,
SUPERINTENDENT TERRY G. HILLARD,
COMMANDER JOSEPH GRIFFIN,
COMMANDER JOHN RISLEY, COMMANDER

FRANCIS KEHOE, COMMANDER EVERT L.
JOHNSON, and CAPTAIN ROBERT JOHNSON,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

) Judge Robert W. Gettleman

)

)

)

)

)

)

)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs, Ronald Portis, Mardric E, Lance and Emmett Lynch have brought a class

action suit against Defendants City of Chicago, Terry Hillard, Joseph Griffin, John Risley,
Francis Kehoe, Evert L. Johnson and Robert Johnson, alleging that plaintiffs were unlawfully
detained for prolonged periods of time after completion of all administrative steps incident to
their arrests for non-custodial ordinance violations. After denying defendants’ motion to dismiss,
see Simack v. City of Chicago, 2003 WL 1924335 (N.D. Ill. 2003), the court certified a class
defined as “all persons who, during the class period, were arrested on ordinance violations which
carry no jail time in the City of Chicago and who were detained for more than two hours after all

administrative steps incident to the arrest, except non-discretionary ministerial acts, were

completed.” Portis v. City of Chicago, 2003 WL 22078279 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The court then

(OY


denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment, which were essentially motions to reconsider
the denial of the motion to dismiss.

Defendants have now moved to decertify the class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). This
is defendants’ fourth attempt to argue that the Supreme Court’s opinion in County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), dispels any claim in the instant case, or at least any class wide
claim. Defendants argue that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356
F.3d 740 (7" Cir. 2004), establishes that the holding in County of Riverside that a determination
of probable cause within forty-eight hours is presumptively reasonable applies to the instant case.
Defendants are simply wrong.

In Chortek, like the instant case, the fifteen plaintiffs were arrested for non-custodial

ordinance violations. Unlike the instant case, they were all arrested at the same time and place.
They were taken to a prisoner processing station where they were subjected to the standard
processing routine, which involved a scries of procedures related to booking, searches,
paperwork and release. It was undisputed that extensive paperwork was involved that “easily”
Tequired six to eight hours to complete. Id at 744. Six of the plaintiffs were detained over eight
hours, twelve over six hours, and all but one over four hours. In reviewing the plaintiffs’ claims
for unreasonable detention, the court noted that “County of Riverside is generally invoked to
evaluate cases involving extended detention because the forty-eight hour framework governs the
length of time which may elapse before a probable cause hearing.” Such a hearing, of course, is
required because a finding of probable cause is needed before any extended restraint of liberty

following arrest. Id. at 746. The Chortek court recognized, however, that in the case before it,

like the instant case, “neither extended detention of the plaintiffs nor probable cause hearings