CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we deny the motion to dismiss the petition for

writ of habeas corpus. The merits of the petition remain to be adjudicated.

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Dated: _ october 29, 2002



The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Mr. Lewis correctly points out that the “in
custody” requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only applies “at the time the petition was
filed.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Thus, the fact that Mr. Lewis is no
longer in prison or on probation is immaterial to the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Notwithstanding the statute’s purported conferral of jurisdiction, Mr. Lewis’s
petition must still present a case or controversy as required by Section 2 of Article III
of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. Even though a petitioner’s sentence
(prison, parole, or probation) has expired, ongoing "collateral consequences" of his
conviction may be adequate to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement.
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7-8. Typically, we will presume the existence of ongoing
collateral consequences. Jd. at 7-13. Even absent this presumption, we find that Mr.
Lewis alleges sufficient actual and ongoing consequences of his conviction.
Specifically, he complains of having to comply, through affirmative acts, with the Sex

Offender Registration Act and of having his status as a former sex offender

continuously and widely disseminated to the public.


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Charles P. Kocoras Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 4472 DATE 10/29/2002
CASE Lewis vs, People of the State of Illinois
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.}

(1)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motiondue

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) a Ruling/Hearingon___setfor__— ss at__.

(5) a Status hearing set for 11/13/2002 at 9:30 A.M..

(6) Qo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for]on____setfor ss at__

(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on__— at

(8) QO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at

(9) Q This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
DERCP4(m) (Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a\(1) OC ERCP41(a)(2).

ao) «of [Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: We deny the motion (Doc 9-1) to

dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The merits of the petition remain to be adjudicated.

| [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff. DCT 30 2002

Notified counsel by telephone.

date docketed

Docketing to mail notices. ew
Mail AO 450 form. a “ouesn

docketing deputy initials
Copy to judge/pagistate judge

date mailed novice
courtroom

scT deputy’s
initials

——
Date/tinié received in
central Clerk's Office malting deputy iniits



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
DOCKETEN
STEPHEN EDWARD LEWIS, ) OCT 3 0 2002
Plaintiff,
vs. 02 C 4472
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on the People of the State of Illinois’ (the
“State”) motion to dismiss Stephen Lewis’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. For the
reasons set forth below we deny the motion.

BACKGROUND

Because this is a motion to dismiss, we accept all well pleaded facts and
allegations in the petition as true and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to Mr. Lewis. See Bontkowski v. First Nat’l Bank of Cicero, 998 F.2d 459,
461 (7th Cir. 1993). On June 26, 2000, Mr. Lewis pled guilty in Cook County Court
to sexual exploitation of a child, a Class A misdemeanor in Illinois. The acts

constituting the offense occurred on October 14, 1995. In exchange for his plea and

\s



his agreement to register as a sex offender, the State dropped two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual abuse. Mr. Lewis, after spending over four years in prison, was
required to serve two years of probation and register as a sex offender for ten years
pursuant to Illinois’s Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seg. While
still on probation, he filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 24,
2002. He is no longer on probation. The State moves to dismiss the petition on
mootness grounds because Mr. Lewis is no longer serving a sentence. Mr. Lewis
avers, and the State concedes, that he has properly exhausted his state remedies prior
to bringing this petition.
LEGAL STANDARD

Jurisdiction is the "power to decide" and must be conferred upon a federal court.
In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., 794 F.2d 1182, 1188 (7th Cir. 1986).
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move
to dismiss claims over which the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. With
these legal principles in mind, the court turns to the instant motion.

DISCUSSION

The State moves to dismiss the petition on the grounds that Mr. Lewis is no

longer in custody. Mr. Lewis invokes the jurisdiction of this court under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a), which provides: