alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ATTORNEY 10295

STATE OF ILLINOIS )

)SS Fi, .

COUNTY OF COOK )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Jun
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 26 2003

EASTERN DIVISION o noaeMaey w

; «Ug, Ds DCR S ing a
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems ore

No. 03 C 3872
Judge Plunke +

Hagistrate Judge Keys

Plaintiff,

ve

Claude Lee Benson, Luradine Benson
County of Cook, et al,

www we wee rw ew

Defendants

NOTICE OF FILING
Tire wat
TO: Fisher & Fisher tara pa ;
120 N. La Salle Street JUN 3 0°2003

Suite 2520
Chicago, IL. 60602

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 26" day of June 2003, I caused to be filed with the United States
District Court For The Northern District Of Illinois Eastern Division attached ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

FOR FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE.

RICHARD A. DEVINE

State's Attorney of Co: 4

Chieago, Illinois 60602
(312) 603-6325

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, John Egan, Assistant State's Attorney, hereby certify I mailed a copy of the attached ANSWER TO
COMPLAINT FOR FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE to those persons at the addresses, by depositing the
same in the U. S. mail at 500 Richard Daley Center, Chicaga, Ilinois 02, posta;
June_Z @ , 2003. .

t~

Jon Eefan | / / y



ATTORNEY 10295

STATE OF ILLINOIS )
) SS

COUNTY OF COOK ) Fyy Ep

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUN 26
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 2003

EASTERN DIVISION cr MlChae yy
“Kh Og. DisypeBSing
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems ) mei C3tnp
: ) .
Plaintiff, ) No. 03 C 3872
v. )
)
Claude Lee Benson, Luradine Benson, )
County of Cook, et al, )
Defendants
pe th J
Dubacie

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT TO FORECLOSE MORTGAGE JUN 3 0 2003

As its Answer to Plaintiff's complaint to foreclose mortgage, the County of Cook states:

1. The County of Cook admits the allegations of paragraphs 1 and 2.
2. As to paragraph 4L, the County of Cook has an interest in the mortgaged real estate by virtue

of a memorandum of judgment entered October 26, 2001 in favor of the County of Cook and

recorded November 08, 2001 as document number 0011054190. The memorandum of judgment

arose out of a lawsuit filed by the County of Cook against Claude Lee Benson and Luradine

Benson in the case number 00 M1 605767.

3. The County of Cook states that it’s interest in or lien on the mortgaged real estate is subject
only to that of the plaintiff, and superior to that of all other defendants herein.

4. The County of Cook makes no answer as to the remaining allegations of the complaint to

foreclose mortgage, as they are not directed to this defendant.

4


Wherefore, the County of Cook respectfully requests:

1, That the Honorable Court adjudicate equities of the parties and find that the County of Cook
has valid and subsisting interests or liens on the mortgaged real estate subordinate only to that
of the plaintiff, and superior to that of all other defendants herein.

2. That the County of Cook further requests inclusion of its interest or liens in any judgment of

foreclosure entered herein.

Respectfully Submitted,

Richard A. Devine
State's Attorney of Cook LE

ues ff

‘ago, Illinois 60602
(312) 603-6325
[No. 10298.

Department One.

July 29, 1912.]

#### Alma M. Rots *et al., Appellants,*v. J. H. Monoghan *et al., Respondents.*
      *1*

Appeal—Review—Evidence—Sueeiciehcy. A verdict will not be disturbed wben still sustained by tbe preponderance of tbe evidence after appellant’s propositions of law are resolved in bis favor.

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Myers, J., entered September 15, 1911, upon findings in-favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for damages.

Affirmed.

*Vince H. Faben,*for appellants.

*John B. Van Dyke*and *Josiah Thomas,*for respondents.

Reported in 125 Pac. 158.

Chadwick, J.

This action was begun against the defendants to recover damages to a certain building held by them Under a lease from plaintiffs, and for the loss of a part of a certain lot of furniture stored in the building, and for damages to the remainder thereof. It is alleged that the furniture was stored in a reserved part of the building, and that defendants “broke and entered . . . and destroyed and injured” it. The answer was in the main a general denial. A further defense that defendants ceased to be tenants after the first year and surrendered the term, and that the property was held thereafter by a corporation under a tenancy from month to month by and with the consent of plaintiffs’ agent, was interposed. It was also alleged the building was out of repair at the time defendants took possession, that certain alterations were made necessary on account of the character of their business, and that they were made at defendants’ expense after plaintiffs had consented thereto. There is testimony tending to show that the building was in as good con*408dition when defendants and their alleged successor moved out as it was when they took possession. Also that the furniture and household goods were in the building at the time. There was no direct evidence tending to show that defendants had personally appropriated any of the personal property. The case was tried before the court without a jury, and a judgment entered in favor of defendants.

Several questions—the authority of plaintiffs’ agent, defendants’ surrender of the lease, and the admission of improper evidence—are discussed at some length in the briefs. But a careful reading of the record convinces us that, although the propositions of law which are advanced by appellants be resolved in their favor, there is still evidence to sustain the findings and judgment of the trial court. Therefore, treating the defendants as tenants for the full term, we hold with the trial judge that appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondents are legally liable for the injury and destruction of appellants’ property.

Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.

Gose, Parker, Crow, and Mount, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John George, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Samenga, J.), rendered December 16, 1982, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (three counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

Defendant argues that his conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree should be reversed because the People did not properly establish that the cocaine sold weighed the requisite two or more ounces *{see,*Penal Law § 220.43 [1]). However, a “sale” for purposes of this offense includes not only an actual exchange, but also an “offer” to sell *{see,*Penal Law § 220.00 [1]). Defendant’s accomplice offered to sell more than two ounces of the cocaine, stating as he handed the package to an undercover officer, “the weight was a little bit over” the two ounces that were to be sold. Defendant’s guilt of first degree sale has therefore been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

*768We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mangano, J. P., Gibbons, Niehoff and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 8, 2016

p0229 

# Order

Clerk March 8, 2016

148677(79)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 148677

COA: 309320

Menominee CC: 11

- 003373

- FH

PAUL ANDREW HERRON,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s October 28,

2015 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it doe s not appear that the order was

entered erroneously.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

SALVADOR RUIZ

- CORTEZ,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 19

- 30000

D.C. No. 1 :17

- cr

- 02029

- SMJ

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Salvador Mendoza, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 19, 2019 **

Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Salvador Ruiz

- Cortez appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges the 135

- month sentence imposed following his guilty

- plea conviction

for distribution of methamphetamine , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

Pursuant to Anders v . California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Ruiz

- Cortez ’s counsel has

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 23 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 19

- 30000

filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to

withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided Ruiz

- Cortez the opportunity to

file a pro se supplemental brief . No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief

has been filed.

Ruiz

- Cortez waived his right to appeal his sentence. Our independent

review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), discloses

no arguable issue as to the valid ity of the waiver. See United States v. Watson , 582

F.3d 974, 986

- 88 (9th Cir. 2009). We accordingly dismiss the appeal. See id. at

988.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.40



             COMPENSATION FOR DATAWORKS CORPORATION EXECUTIVE GROUP
                   UNDER THE 1996 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN
          PER BOARD COMPENSATION COMMITTEE APPROVAL ON JANUARY 27, 1998


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICER                    1998 BASE SALARY*           1997 BONUS              1998 TARGET BONUS**
<S>                                        <C>                         <C>                     <C>
Stuart W. Clifton                               $325,000                $192,500                      100%
Robert C. Vernon                                $250,000                 $36,400                       50%
Mark Hellinger                                  $220,000                 $31,900                       50%
Norman R. Farquhar                              $210,000                 $80,000                       50%
Robert W. Brandel                               $200,000                 $80,000                       50%
</TABLE>


* Effective January 1, 1998.
** As a percentage of base salary.



                                       1.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.1



                         INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements of
Internet America, Inc., on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-70461, 333-72109, 333-72111,
333-77153, 333-80277, 355-80285, and 333-92295) of our report dated September
13, 2000, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Internet America,
Inc., for the year ended June 30, 2000.


/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP


Dallas, Texas
September 22, 2000
No. 76-5243.

#### Westberry *v.*Oliver, Warden, et al.

C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
Exhibit 10.52

AMENDMENT NUMBER ONE TO THE
MEDPARTNERS, INC. EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLAN

Pursuant
to the powers of amendment reserved under Article Nine of the MedPartners, Inc. Employee Stock Purchase Plan (the "Plan"), as restated effective November 11, 1998, the
Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of Care mark Rx, Inc. hereby amends the Plan as follows:

1.

Section 2.7
of the Plan shall be amended by replacing the phrase "MedPartners, Inc." with the phrase "Caremark Rx, Inc.".

2.

Section 2.19
of the Plan shall be amended by replacing the definition of "Plan" with the following:



3.

The
Plan shall be further amended by replacing, in every instance where the former Plan name is referenced, such former Plan name in its entirety with the new Plan name as indicated
above.

The
effective date of this Amendment Number One shall be March 14,2000.

|        |  |                    |  | CAREMARK RX, INC.
|------- |  | ------------------ |  | -----------------
|        |  |                    |  | /s/KIRK MCCONNELL
|ATTEST: |  | /s/AMY L. HOLLIMAN |  | Date:            

---
#### Raymond Tramanto et al., Plaintiffs, v Richmond Manufacturing Company et al., Defendants. C. P. Ward, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v J. A. Abraham Enterprises, Inc., Third-Party Defendant, and D. A. Le Pine, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

— Order, insofar as appealed from, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and motion denied. Memorandum: The court erred in granting summary judgment to the third-party plaintiff. It is undisputed that an employee of third-party defendant signed a document when he picked up a piece of equipment, but whether his signature bound his employer to an indemnification provision on the reverse side of the document depends upon whether he had actual or apparent authority to enter into such a contract *(see, Lake Steel Equip. Rental v Elia Bldg. Co.,*72 AD2d 948), which is a question of fact. We pass on no other issues. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Rosenbloom, J. — summary judgment.) Present —Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Boomer, Green and Pine, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dewayne Davis, Appellant.

—Motion by appellant for reargument on appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings Court, rendered March 5, 1982, which was affirmed by order of this court dated October 29, 1984 *(People v Davis,*104 AD2d 1046).

Motion granted, and, upon the submission of a reply brief by appellant’s counsel, John F. Clennan, pursuant to this court’s order dated April 15, 1985, and consideration of the points raised therein, including the propriety of the sentences imposed, the original determination is adhered to. Brown, J. P., Niehoff, Rubin and Fiber, JJ., concur.
----

            COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION         

of 18 January 2006         

concerning a coordinated Community monitoring programme for 2006 to ensure compliance with maximum levels of pesticide residues in and on cereals and certain other products of plant origin and national monitoring programmes for 2007

(notified under document number C(2006) 11)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2006/26/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 211 thereof,

Having regard to Council Directive 86/362/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the fixing of maximum levels for pesticide residues in and on cereals (1) and in particular Article 7(2)(b) thereof,

Having regard to Council Directive 90/642/EEC of 27 November 1990 on the fixing of maximum levels for pesticide residues in and on certain products of plant origin, including fruit and vegetables (2), and in particular Article 4(2)(b) thereof,

Whereas:

HEREBY RECOMMENDS:

Done at Brussels, 18 January 2006.

For the Commission

Markos KYPRIANOU            

Member of the Commission

----

(1)OJ L 221, 7.8.1986, p. 37. Directive as last amended by Commission Directive 2005/76/EC (OJ L 293, 9.11.2005, p. 14).

(2)OJ L 350, 14.12.1990, p. 71. Directive as last amended by Directive 2005/76/EC.

(3)  Codex Alimentarius, Pesticide Residues in Foodstuffs, Rome 1994, ISBN 92-5-203271-1; Vol. 2, p. 372.

(4)  Document number SANCO/10476/2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/plant/protection/resources/qualcontrol_en.pdf

(5)OJ L 187, 16.7.2002, p. 30.

(6)OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1, corrected by OJ L 191, 28.5.2004, p. 1.

(7)OJ L 175, 4.7.1991, p. 35. Directive as last amended by Directive 2003/14/EC (OJ L 41, 14.2.2003, p. 37).

(8)OJ L 49, 28.2.1996, p. 17. Directive as last amended by Directive 2003/13/EC (OJ L 41, 14.2.2003, p. 33).

(9)  For grapes the unit (i.e. standard bunch) is considered to have a size of about 500 g.

----

ANNEX I

PESTICIDE/PRODUCT COMBINATIONS TO BE MONITORED

----

(*1)  Indicative for 2007 and 2008, subject to programmes which will be recommended for these years.

(*2)  Chlormequat should be analysed in cereals, carrots, fruiting vegetables and pears.

(1)  For orange juice Member States should specify the source (concentrates or fresh fruits).

----

ANNEX II

Number of samples of each product to be taken and analysed by each Member State.

----

(*1)  Minimum number of samples for each single residue method applied.

(*2)  Minimum number of samples for each multi-residue method applied.

----
# C_2019363EN.01002502.xml

| 28.10.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 363/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 363/25

---

Action brought on 30 August 2019 – Chypre v EUIPO – Fontana Food (GRILLOUMI BURGER)

(Case T-593/19)

(2019/C 363/34)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Republic of Cyprus (represented by: S. Malynicz, QC, S. Baran, Barrister, V. Marsland, Solicitor)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Fontana Food AB (Tyresö, Sweden)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark GRILLOUMI BURGER – Application for registration No 15 963 283

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 19 June 2019 in Case R 1297/2018-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to bear its own costs and pay those of the Applicant for Annulment. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to bear its own costs and pay those of the Applicant for Annulment.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### WOOD v. THIRD AVE. R. CO.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.

December 2, 1895.)

Negligence— Construction of Street-Car Track.

In an action against a street-railroad company for personal injuries, it appeared that defendant laid manhole covers between its tracks, with a circular hole in the center of such covers, 1% inches in diameter, open and unguarded; that, when plaintiff was crossing the street, one of the crutches with which he walked went into the hole, and he was thrown and injured. *Held,*that the fact that after the manhole was constructed a great number of people had crossed at that place without accident was not conclusive evidence that the construction was a safe one, but was simply a matter proper to be considered by the jury. 34 N. Y. Supp. 698, reversed.

Appeal from special term, Kings county.

Action by Thomas P. Wood against the Third Avenue Railroad Company for personal injuries. From an order granting a new trial after a verdict was rendered in favor of plaintiff for $2,000 (34 N. Y. Supp. 698), plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Argued before BROWN, P. J., and DYKMAN and PRATT, JJ.

Thomas B. Pearsall, for plaintiff.

Hoadly, Lauterbach & Johnson, for defendant.

PRATT, J.

The defendant, which operates a cable railroad, laid manhole covers in the public street opposite the New York entrance of the Brooklyn bridge, with a circular hole in the center of such covers If- inch in diameter. The hole was open and unguarded. The plaintiff crossing the street, one of the crutches with which he walked went into the hole, and plaintiff was thrown and injured. The jury found the construction, negligent, and gave plaintiff a verdict, which was set aside. Plaintiff appeals.

The defendant showed that since the manhole had been so constructed a great number of people had crossed at that place without accident, and claimed that to be conclusive evidence that the construction was a safe one. That view prevailed. We think that, *254while the safe passage of so- many people was a matter proper for the consideration of the jury, the court went too far in holding that, as a matter of law, it entitled defendant to a judgment in its favor. The hole in the iron cover was large enough to admit the heel of a shoe, and, obviously, it was only a question of time when an accident would occur. It is not rare to see .people with crutches, and they have a right to use the streets. The manhole covers are between the tracks, and if a lady with a high heeled shoe should step upon the hole, it would be a happy accident if she escaped with her life. It is not possible that the good fortune of defendant in escaping accidents for a season can give it a vested right to maintain such a dangerous obstruction in the public street. This is the more obvious when we learn that the only benefit the defendant derives from the hole is that the cover can be lifted about 18 seconds sooner than it can be if built with a notch in the side. That advantage is too trivial to be considered in opposition to the safety of the public.

Order appealed from reversed, and judgment ordered on the verdict, with costs. All concur.
Case: 1:01-cv-02963 Document #: 220 Filed: 07/29/04 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:2968
#### In the Matter of William Easton, an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee of the Seventh Judicial District, Petitioner.

[945 NYS2d 922]

Order of suspension entered pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1022.23 (b). Present — Smith, J.P., Fahey, Carni and Sconiers, JJ. (Filed May 22, 2012.)
Order entered May 29, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00378-CV

TODD PRUETT, Appellant

V.

MARK STOLZ, ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-07463

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s May 24, 2013 motion for an extension of time to file a 

brief. By order dated May 23, 2013, the Court ordered Stephanie Moses, Official Court Reporter 

of the 193rd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, to file, within thirty days, either the 

reporter’s record or written verification that appellant has not requested the reporter’s record. 

Appellant’s brief will be due thirty days after either the reporter’s record is filed or 

written verification from the court reporter of no request. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(c) & 38.6(a). 

Accordingly, we DENY as moot appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file a brief. 

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE