1

Filed 9/30/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LATANYA A. STAMPS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A142424

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 51315373)

Appellant Latanya A. Stamps was convicted of multiple drug possession offenses 

after drugs in both pill and crystalline form were discovered in her car, purse or clothing

on four different dates in October through December 2012. She appeals, arguing the 

court improperly admitted the testimony of an expert criminalist who identified the drugs 

in pill form as controlled substances solely by comparing their appearance to pills

pictured on a Web site called “Ident-A-Drug.” Stamps attacks her convictions for 

possession of oxycodone and dihydrocodeinone on grounds that (1) the expert’s 

testimony was based on unreliable and inadmissible hearsay from the Web site and did 

not involve the use of the witness’s expertise; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to 

convict on the counts involving those drugs because the expert relied exclusively on the 

Web site in rendering her opinion. Because we agree that the expert testimony was 

improperly admitted, and because the testimony was central to Stamps’s pill-based 

convictions, we reverse Stamps’s convictions on counts one, five, seven and eight.

1 We 

 

1

Stamps’s briefs identify the challenged counts as one, three, seven and eight, but 

it appears the correct counts are one, five, seven and eight. 
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conclude, however, that a retrial on those counts is not barred by double jeopardy 

principles.

I. BACKGROUND

On four occasions in October through December 2012, Stamps was pulled over by 

the Pittsburg police because her car did not display a license plate. On each occasion she 

and her car were searched, and on each occasion drugs were discovered. On October 30, 

2012, the police discovered two yellow oval tablets with a capital “V” on one side and a 

white oval tablet with the word “Watson” on its side. The next night, the police again 

stopped Stamps’s car, conducted a search, and discovered a methamphetamine pipe and 

1.19 grams of a white crystalline substance believed to be methamphetamine. Yet again, 

on November 1, 2012, they found a bindle of white crystalline substance believed to be

methamphetamine, weighing .25 gram, six white oblong pills, one with the words 

“Watson” and “853” printed on it, and .28 gram of some white chunky substance 

believed to be cocaine base. On December 16, they found .03 gram of suspected 

methamphetamine in a plastic baggie in Stamps’s bra and two pills in her car. One of the 

pills was yellow with “853” written on it, and the other was a white tablet bearing the 

words “Watson 932.”

Stamps was charged with eight counts of drug possession: three counts of 

possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), one count of 

possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code,§§ 11350, subd. (a), 11379, subd. (a)), one 

count of possession of oxycodone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), and three 

counts of possession of dihydrocodeinone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). At 

trial, the People proved the chemical composition of the crystalline and chunky

substances through the testimony of criminalist Shana Meldrum, an employee of the 

Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Crime Lab. Meldrum performed a detailed chemical 

analysis on the suspected methamphetamine and cocaine, and her tests confirmed the 

drugs were as suspected. With respect to the drugs in pill form, however, Meldrum 

identified the pills as oxycodone and dihydrocodeinone based solely on a visual 

comparison of the seized pills to those displayed on the Ident-A-Drug Web site. Based 
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on the shape and color of the pills, their markings and their condition, Meldrum 

concluded they contained the alleged substances. This visual comparison was considered 

a “presumptive test” of each pill’s chemical composition. Meldrum did no confirming 

chemical analysis of the pills. In addition to the expert’s testimony, Stamps had given 

statements to the police on the dates of her arrests indicating the pills found on October 

30, 2012, were Norco and Phexoreal, and the pills found on November 1, 2012 were 

“Norcos.” 

The jury found Stamps guilty on all eight counts, and she was placed on probation 

for two years. On appeal she challenges her convictions only on the four counts 

stemming from her possession of the various pills described above.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Admissibility of the Ident-A-Drug Evidence

Stamps contends Meldrum should not have been allowed to testify to the contents 

of the Ident-A-Drug Web site because the testimony brought before the jury inadmissible 

and unreliable hearsay which the jurors may have used as direct evidence of the charged 

offenses. She further argues the expert’s testimony should have been excluded because 

matching the pills to a photograph on a Web site did not involve the use of the witness’s 

expertise.2(See State v. Ward (N.C. 2010) 694 S.E.2d 738, 746, fn. 5 (Ward).) On the 

 

2 Nor did Meldrum testify that any special expertise was required to use the IdentA-Drug Web site. She testified she “entered the markings on the pill into the website and 

obtained a match result to the markings, to the shape and to the color of the pills, and 

presumptively identified those” as oxycodone and dihydrocodeinone. Her testimony did 

not reveal any special expertise required to interpret the results provided by Ident-A-Drug 

beyond ordinary visual acuity, and she added nothing of her expertise to the Ident-ADrug information so as to make it an integral part of some larger opinion. By admitting 

Meldrum’s testimony that the contents of the Ident-A-Drug Web site “match[ed]” the pill 

found in Stamps’s possession, the court allowed her to place case-specific non-expert 

opinion before the jury, with the near certainty that the jury would rely on the underlying 

hearsay as direct proof of the chemical composition of the pills. The conclusion is 

unavoidable that Meldrum was a “mere conduit” for the Ident-A-Drug hearsay. (I-CA 

Enterprises, Inc. v. Palram Americas, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 257, 286; see People 

v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 92.)
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admissibility question, we review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling admitting the 

expert’s testimony for abuse of discretion. (People v. Dean (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 186, 

193 (Dean); People v. Robbie (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1083.) On any question of 

law, however, such as the meaning to be ascribed to the language in an appellate court’s 

opinion, we exercise independent review. (See, e.g., Even Zohar Construction & 

Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 837 [statutory 

interpretation]; Ducoing Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 

306, 313 [language in a court disposition].)

1. The Issue Was Not Forfeited

Preliminarily, we reject the People’s contention that Stamps’s argument was 

forfeited by failure to object in the trial court on the specific ground that too much detail 

was provided by the expert about the Web site or that reliability of the Web site had not 

been established. Stamps’s counsel did object repeatedly on grounds of hearsay and lack 

of foundation, which adequately alerted the court to the basis of objection and were 

sufficient to preserve the issue for review. (See People v. Carillo (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 

94, 101 [issue is whether the objection “ ‘fairly apprises the trial court of the issue it is 

being called upon to decide’ ”].)

2. Expert Reliance on Hearsay Under California Law

Until very recently, the law governing expert witnesses’ reliance on hearsay—and 

the latitude given them to testify about such hearsay—seemed fairly well settled. For 

instance, in People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605 (Gardeley), our Supreme Court 

held a gang expert could testify to out-of-court statements he had heard from fellow 

officers and gang members, including a co-participant in the crimes with which the 

defendants were charged, relating to the gang’s activities (id. at pp. 611–613, 619), and 

upon that basis could opine that the crime with which defendants were charged was a 

“ ‘classic’ example of gang-related activity” (id. at p. 619). The court relied upon the 

following rule: “because Evidence Code section 802 allows an expert witness to ‘state on 

direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter . . . upon which it is based,’

an expert witness whose opinion is based on such inadmissible matter can, when 
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testifying, describe the material that forms the basis of the opinion.” (Id. at p. 618.) In 

such a case, so the theory goes, the gang members’ statements are not admitted for their 

truth, but only as basis evidence for the expert’s opinion. (People v. Thomas (2005) 130 

Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209–1210.) This was not a new development in Gardeley; California 

had long followed this not-admitted-for-its-truth rule. (E.g., People v. Montiel (1993) 5 

Cal.4th 877, 918; Dean, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 196–197; Board of Trustees of 

Placerville Union School Dist. v. Porini (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 784, 792–794 & fns. 4 & 

6.)

But even in holding such hearsay admissible, Gardeley and similar cases placed 

some limits on its admissibility by cautioning that “any material that forms the basis of an 

expert’s opinion testimony must be reliable. [Citation.] For ‘the law does not accord to

the expert’s opinion the same degree of credence or integrity as it does the data 

underlying the opinion. Like a house built on sand, the expert’s opinion is no better than 

the facts on which it is based.’ ” (Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Gardeley

further reminded the trial courts of their power to limit “ ‘the form in which the expert is 

questioned to prevent the jury from learning of incompetent hearsay.’ ” (Id. at p. 619.)

Thus, trial courts were left with broad discretion to determine whether particular facts to 

which an expert was prepared to testify were sufficiently “reliable” to come before the 

jury. Concurrently, trial courts were and are charged with an important gatekeeping 

“duty” to exclude expert testimony when necessary to prevent unreliable evidence and 

insupportable reasoning from coming before the jury. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. 

University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 753 (Sargon);

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see People v. 

Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 156.) Because appellate review is for abuse of 

 

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Specifically, Sargon requires trial courts to probe expert testimony under 

Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802 and exclude any portion of it “that 

is (1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on 

reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative. Other 

provisions of law, including decisional law, may also provide reasons for excluding 

expert opinion testimony.” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 771–772.)
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discretion, this broad discretion went largely uncorrected except in cases of manifest 

abuse.

Recently, however, the not-admitted-for-its-truth rationale was jettisoned 

altogether—at least with respect to “case-specific hearsay”—when a unanimous Supreme 

Court announced: “this paradigm is no longer tenable because an expert’s testimony 

regarding the basis for an opinion must be considered for its truth by the jury.” (People v. 

Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 679 (Sanchez).) In so holding, Sanchez followed the 

reasoning of a number of jurists who have criticized the logic of the not-for-its-truth 

rationale, including a majority of justices of the United States Supreme Court. (Id. at 

pp. 680–686; see also, Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2256, 

2258 & fn. 3 (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.); id. at pp. 2264–2269 (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.); 

People v. Hill (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1127–1129; People v. Mercado (2013) 216 

Cal.App.4th 67, 89.) In vigorously rejecting the not-for-its-truth rationale, the Supreme 

Court also dealt a death blow to the notion that juries can make any sense of the 

distinction traditionally espoused in cases such as Gardeley.

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The court expressly ruled 

that a limiting instruction intended to restrict jurors’ consideration of such evidence to the 

purpose of serving as the basis for the expert’s opinion was ineffective in eradicating the 

evidentiary error or rendering it harmless. (Sanchez, supra, at p. 686, fn. 13.) The

paradigm shift occasioned by Sanchez no doubt affects the outcome of the present appeal. 

Indeed, as we shall discuss, we find Sanchez dispositive.

Sanchez dealt with a gang expert’s testimony subject to a challenge under 

Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), but in the course of analyzing 

the Confrontation Clause issue the Supreme Court found occasion to revisit, and 

essentially to revamp, state law hearsay rules relating to expert testimony generally. 

(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 674–686.) It is this non-Crawford aspect of Sanchez

 

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Sanchez specifically disapproved several of the Supreme Court’s earlier cases to 

the extent they conflicted with its holding, including Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th 605, 

and Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th 877. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686, fn. 13.)
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that comes into play here.5 Insofar as pertinent to this case, the significance of Sanchez 

was not left open to doubt. The court specifically “adopt[ed] the following rule: When 

any expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court statements, and treats the content 

of those statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, the statements 

are hearsay. It cannot logically be maintained that the statements are not being admitted 

for their truth.” (Id. at p. 686.) Because we conclude the Ident-A-Drug evidence was 

admitted for its truth under the foregoing test, while not coming within any hearsay 

exception, we also conclude it was improperly admitted.

Incorporated within the Sanchez rule is what appears to be a new litmus test for 

admissibility of expert testimony incorporating hearsay as the basis for the expert’s

opinion: it depends on whether the matter the prosecution seeks to elicit is “case-specific 

hearsay” or, instead, part of the “general background information” acquired by the expert 

through out-of-court statements as part of the development of his or her expertise. 

(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 678.) Though most jurists may find this a novel 

approach, the Supreme Court took pains to explain that the rule announced in Sanchez in 

fact “restores the traditional distinction between an expert’s testimony regarding 

background information and case-specific facts” that had existed at common law and in 

the early California cases. (Id. at p. 685.) Sanchez itself acknowledged that the line 

between “case-specific facts” and “general background information” had “become 

blurred” due to decades of statutory and case law that paid no heed to such a distinction. 

(Id. at p. 678.)

After Sanchez, reliability is no longer the sole touchstone of admissibility where 

expert testimony to hearsay is at issue. Admissibility—at least where “case-specific 

hearsay” is concerned—is now more cut-and-dried: If it is a case-specific fact and the 

witness has no personal knowledge of it, if no hearsay exception applies, and if the expert 

treats the fact as true, the expert simply may not testify about it. (Sanchez, supra, 63 

Cal.4th at pp. 684–686.) The underlying fact also may not be included in a hypothetical 

 

5

The Crawford line of cases has no direct application here because the challenged 

hearsay was not testimonial. (See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 50–53.)
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question posed to the expert unless it has been proven by independent admissible 

evidence. (Id. at pp. 684, 686.) If the hearsay relied upon by the expert is not casespecific, as we read Sanchez, the evidence still is admitted for its truth (id. at pp. 685–

686), and is therefore hearsay, but we tolerate its admission due to the latitude we accord 

experts, as a matter of practicality, in explaining the basis for their opinions (id. at 

p. 676). Where general background hearsay is concerned, the expert may testify about it

so long as it is reliable and of a type generally relied upon by experts in the field, again 

subject to the court’s gatekeeping duty under Sargon, supra. (Sanchez, supra, at 

pp. 676–679, 685; Evid. Code, §§ 801, 802.)

3. The Ident-A-Drug Testimony Was Inadmissible Because It Was CaseSpecific

Stamps argues, and the People do not contest, that the content of the Ident-A-Drug 

Web site would not be independently admissible to prove its truth because it was 

hearsay.6 (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a); People v. Franzen (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 

1193, 1203–1215 [police use of Web site containing cell phone data did not make 

information retrieved from the Web site admissible over a hearsay objection]; People v. 

Hard (Colo. Ct. App. 2014) 342 P.3d 572, 575–579 [information found on “Drugs.com”

was not sufficiently reliable to be admissible as hearsay exception when trooper 

identified hydrocodone pills only by visual comparison].) Indeed, the cases reflect a 

common judicial skepticism of evidence found on the Internet: “While some look to the 

Internet as an innovative vehicle for communication,” the courts continue to view it 

“warily and wearily” as a catalyst for “rumor, innuendo, and misinformation.” (St. Clair 

v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc. (S.D. Tex. 1999) 76 F.Supp.2d 773, 774.) The 

Internet “provides no way of verifying the authenticity” of its contents and “is inherently 

 

6 Based on Meldrum’s testimony, it appears the Web site provided photographs of 

pills, together with sufficient text to communicate that the photograph depicted a 

specified pharmaceutical. This combined content would constitute an out-of-court 

“statement” of a “person” (the person who entered the information on the Web site) so as 

to bring it within the definition of hearsay. (Evid. Code, §§ 225, 1200, subd. (a).)
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untrustworthy. Anyone can put anything on the Internet. No web-site is monitored for 

accuracy and nothing contained therein is under oath or even subject to independent 

verification absent underlying documentation.” (Id. at pp. 774–775.) Moreover, 

“hackers can adulterate the content on any web-site from any location at any time. For 

these reasons, any evidence procured off the Internet is adequate for almost nothing, even 

under the most liberal interpretation of the hearsay exception rules . . . .” (Id. at p. 775; 

see generally, Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2010) 717 F.Supp.2d 965, 

976, fn. 19 [discussing why Wikipedia content generally is considered inadmissible 

hearsay]; Southco, Inc. v. Fivetech Tech., Inc. (E.D. Pa. 2013) 982 F.Supp.2d 507, 515

[Web sites are “typically inadmissible as hearsay,” and “even website evidence 

admissible under a hearsay exception requires authentication”]; Hernandez v. Smith (E.D. 

Cal. 2015) 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90740, p. *12 [striking “printouts of Internet websites 

as inadmissible hearsay and as unauthenticated”].) 

The Attorney General has proposed no hearsay exception that would render the 

Ident-A-Drug Web site contents admissible. Because the Ident-A-Drug content was itself 

inadmissible hearsay, and because that content was case-specific, Meldrum’s testimony 

about the Web site was inadmissible under the new paradigm. Sanchez defined “casespecific” facts as those “relating to the particular events and participants alleged to have 

been involved in the case being tried.” (63 Cal.4th at p. 676.) We think it undeniable

that the chemical composition of the pills Stamps possessed must be considered casespecific. Indeed, the Ident-A-Drug hearsay was admitted as proof of the very gravamen 

of the crime with which she was charged. There is no credible argument that the 

testimony concerned “general background” supporting Meldrum’s opinion. That being 

true, our hearsay analysis is at an end. We need not address the out-of-state cases and 

other authorities cited by the parties, nor need we get bogged down in considering the 

reliability of the Ident-A-Drug Web site.
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4. Harmless Error Analysis

We review the erroneous admission of expert testimony under the state standard of 

prejudice. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; Dean, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 202 [Watson standard applies].) Under that standard the error was not harmless.

First, Sanchez specifically held a limiting instruction was not effective in 

preventing the jury from considering the hearsay as direct evidence of the facts asserted. 

(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 684.) And cycling hearsay through the mouth of an 

expert does not reduce the weight the jury places on it, but rather tends to amplify its 

effect. We cannot dismiss the evidence in this case as carrying little weight with the jury 

or being duplicative of other evidence.

Because the Ident-A-Drug testimony was the only evidence that the pills actually 

contained the controlled substances alleged in the information, the convictions on counts 

one, five, seven and eight must be reversed. In this case, unlike some others, there was 

no chemical analysis to supplement the expert’s testimony based on visual similarities 

she noted on Ident-A-Drug (cf. State v. Stank (Wis. App. 2005) 708 N.W.2d 43, 54–55),

and no identification of the drug on sight based on experience, as with a pharmacist 

witness (cf. Sterling v. State (Tex. App. 1990) 791 S.W.2d 274, 277). Nor was there any 

testimony to the uniqueness of the trade dress of pharmaceuticals. (Cf. Jones v. 

Commonwealth (Ky. 2011) 331 S.W.3d 249, 255.) Meldrum’s testimony also took no 

account of the possibility that the pills were counterfeit. (See Ward, supra, 694 S.E.2d at 

p. 745.)

There were, of course, admissions by Stamps that some of the pills were Norco 

and Phexoreal, but there was no testimony that these brand names are equivalent to

oxycodone and dihydrocodeinone. And though this evidence may prove Stamps believed

she was in possession of controlled substances, Meldrum’s testimony was the only 

evidence that the pills actually contained dihydrocodeinone and oxycodone, as charged. 

We conclude it is reasonably probable the jury would have acquitted Stamps of the 

charges based on pill possession in the absence of the Ident-A-Drug testimony.
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The evidence in question, consisting solely of Meldrum’s unfiltered and 

unvarnished recapitulation of what she saw on the Ident-A-Drug Web site, was casespecific, did not come within any hearsay exception, was not personally known to the 

witness as a fact, was treated as true by Meldrum, and was inadmissible under Sanchez. 

Because it was central to conviction on the counts involving pills, we must reverse as to 

those counts.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Although reversal is required based on inadmissibility of the evidence alone, we 

consider Stamps’s insufficiency of the evidence argument as well, in order to determine 

whether retrial is barred by double jeopardy principles, as announced in Burks v. United 

States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 16–17 (Burks). (See People v. Smith (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 

1233, 1235, fn. 1.) Though we agree with Stamps that without the Ident-A-Drug 

testimony there was insufficient evidence to convict Stamps on the pill-based counts, we

do not find the evidence as introduced by the prosecution was, apart from the evidentiary 

error, insufficient to support those convictions. The evidence was not, as presented, “so 

lacking that the trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal.” (Lockhart v. 

Nelson (1988) 488 U.S. 33, 39.) Acceptance by the jurors of the veracity of the Ident-ADrug results was not so misguided as to render the guilty verdicts among those that no 

“rational factfinder” could render. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 313.) And 

in addition to Meldrum’s testimony there were admissions by Stamps regarding the 

forbidden nature of the pills she possessed. The prosecution did not fail altogether “to 

muster” sufficient evidence to support the charges (Burks, supra, at p. 11); rather, our 

analysis discloses only that “evidence was erroneously admitted against” Stamps, which 

was an “error in the proceedings leading to conviction” such that a retrial is not barred. 

(Lockhart v. Nelson, supra, 488 U.S. at pp. 38, 40; see People v. Bryant (1992) 10 

Cal.App.4th 1584, 1596–1598; People v. Reynolds (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 382, 390.)
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III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed as to counts one, five, seven and eight. In all other 

respects it is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the superior court for further 

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
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_________________________

Streeter, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Reardon, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Rivera, J.

A142424/People v. Stamps
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People v. Stamps (A142424)

Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. John C. Cope

Counsel: 

Alfons Wagner, J. Bradley O’Connell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant. 

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Ann P. Wathen, Deputy Attorney General for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.