NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SUKHWINDER SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 23-1065

Agency No.

A208-203-444

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 13, 2024**

San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD, TALLMAN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Sukhwinder Singh petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals 

(“BIA”) affirmance of a decision by an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his 

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 17 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 23-1065

Against Torture (“CAT”), and ordering his deportation to India. Singh contends 

that the agency violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights because the

official Punjabi interpreter at Singh’s merits hearing provided inadequate 

interpretation services, preventing Singh from reasonably presenting his case. We 

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny Singh’s petition for 

review.

In cases where “the BIA agrees with and incorporates specific findings of 

the IJ while adding its own reasoning, we review both decisions.” Bhattarai v. 

Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). We review due process challenges to 

deportation proceedings de novo. Benedicto v. Garland, 12 F.4th 1049, 1058 (9th 

Cir. 2021). We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility 

determinations, “under the deferential substantial evidence standard.” Zhi v. 

Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). Under that standard, “we must 

uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary 

conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019); 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The deference we give to the agency’s credibility 

determinations pursuant to the REAL ID Act “makes sense because IJs are in the 

best position to assess demeanor and other credibility cues that we cannot readily 

access on review.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010).

1. “Due process requires that an applicant be given competent translation 
3 23-1065

services.” He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2003). “To prevail on a due 

process challenge to deportation proceedings, [a noncitizen] must show error and 

substantial prejudice.” Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2020) 

(quoting Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Singh urges that there were several potential mistranslations or 

misunderstandings in the transcript, including moments when: (1) Singh 

misunderstood his attorney’s question about whether he had lived in any Indian 

state other than Punjab; (2) the interpreter did not include the word “Khalistan” in 

her interpretation but the attorney asked additional questions and Singh explained 

the meaning of “Khalistan”; (3) the interpreter initially did not understand Singh’s 

response, but Singh’s attorney proceeded to ask additional questions so that Singh 

could clarify his answer; and (4) the interpreter could not translate a specific word 

about Singh’s wife’s reaction but explained the meaning of the word. 

However, Singh does not show that any English-Punjabi interpretation 

issues substantially prejudiced the proceedings or “prevented” him “from 

reasonably presenting his case.” Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

In each instance of potential mistranslation or miscommunication, the IJ was aware 

that there was an issue, and Singh was afforded opportunities to clarify his 

answers. Moreover, for Singh to establish a due process violation, the errors he 
4 23-1065

identifies must “substantial[ly] prejudice” the proceedings. Grigoryan, 959 F.3d at 

1240. The IJ based her adverse credibility determination on inconsistencies, 

otherwise consistent testimony, demeanor, and inherent implausibility. The 

inconsistencies that the IJ identified did not relate to the potential mistranslations 

that had been clarified; rather, they related to the medical treatment Singh received 

after being attacked, discrepancies between Singh’s testimony and the letters from 

hospitals he submitted as evidence, and Singh’s changing testimony about whether 

he was a member of the Mann political party. The IJ also noted that Singh’s 

testimony was otherwise consistent with the typed statement he submitted with his 

application, but that his recitation of those facts “lacked the ring of truth.” Finally, 

the IJ found Singh’s testimony inherently implausible because (1) Singh articulated 

a choice to leave his family behind; and (2) Singh’s explanation of his injuries did 

not align with the medical treatment he received. Because Singh neither showed

that the issues with interpretation prejudiced the IJ’s credibility determination, nor 

that the interpretation was inadequate and prevented him from reasonably 

presenting his case, we deny the petition for review of his asylum and withholding 

of removal claims.

2. Singh does not appear separately to petition for our review of the 

agency’s denial of his application for CAT relief, and it appears that he waived any 

CAT claim before the BIA. Even if Singh petitioned for review of the CAT 
5 23-1065

determination and his claim is not waived, there is not substantial evidence that 

would compel us to grant the petition as to Singh’s CAT claim. Relying on 

Singh’s testimony and documentary evidence, the IJ reasonably concluded that

Singh neither established that he suffered past harm rising to the level of torture; 

nor that he is more likely than not to be tortured upon return to India. We have not 

found substantial evidence in the record that would compel us to conclude that 

Singh is more likely than not to be tortured if removed to India. See Plancarte 

Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2022).

PETITION DENIED