VY VY
and Olson was not sentenced beyond the statutory maximum.
Apprendi does not provide any basis for relief.

Olson also contends that Apprendi requires that the
relevant conduct considered for purposes of sentencing also be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Case law is to the contrary;
findings as to relevant conduct may be determined by the court by

a preponderance of the evidence. Jones, 245 F.3d at 651. See

also Polichemi II, 219 F.3d at 713. Polichemi II further holds

that, taking into consideration the acquittals on some counts,
the evidence was still sufficient to support the relevant conduct

findings. Id. at 713; see also United States v. Bailey, 227 F.3d

792, 800 (7th Cir. 2000). Since already raised in direct appeal,
defendant cannot reargue the issue in his present motion.
Olson's next contention is that, in determining the
appropriate total offense level for sentencing guideline
purposes, the consideration of relevant conduct involved double
counting. Olson contends it was double counting to add two
levels because the laundered funds were known to be proceeds of
specified unlawful activity (U.S.S.G. § 251.2(b) (1) (B)) and to
also add nine levels because the value of the laundered funds
exceeded $10,000,000 (id. § 2S51.2(b) (2) (incorporating
§ 251.1(b) (2) (J))). The two different enhancements, though,
take into account different factors. The first adjustment is
for having a higher level of scienter, one that is not required
to be guilty of the crime itself. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(c);

Polichemi II, 219 F.3d at 708; United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d



wi a

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you.
kok
[Sidebar]
[defense attorney] SPIELFOGEL: What about
the woman with the pension fund? No problem.
MR. KOHLER: She said obviously that she
takes it as a serious matter.
Tr. Vol. 2, 271-87.

Although Brining initially indicated concern about
impartiality, further questioning disclosed that she considered
pension benefits a serious matter and that she could be fair and
decide the case on the evidence before her. Brining's testimony
did not require that she be dismissed for cause. See
Polichemi I, 201 F.3d at 863.7

Since none of the grounds raised by Olson provide a basis
for overturning his conviction or sentence, they also could not
support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Olson's
motion will be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's motion to vacate
sentence is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of the government and against defendant denying
defendant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate sentence. If

defendant wishes to appeal this order, he must file a Notice of

Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

?Polichemi I upholds the court's refusal to strike for
cause venirepersons John Buck and David Maines. Although
Polichemi IL does not specifically readopt that holding, it also
does not discuss the issue. Implicitly, this holding was
reinstated when Polichemi II was issued.


Lo AY
with his acquittal on various counts. Defendant further contends
that the application of relevant conduct was improper in that it
involved double counting. Last, plaintiff contends that juror
Rosemary Brining should have been removed for cause. As to the
aforementioned errors, defendant further contends that his trial
counsel and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to raise these issues. However, because none of the
grounds raised would be a basis of relief even if they had been
raised at trial or on appeal, it is unnecessary to separately
consider whether counsel's representation was ineffective.

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. See also id. at 2355 (quoting Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)). Apprendi does not
apply to situations such as the present case where Olson was
sentenced to an unenhanced statutory maximum. United States v.
Jones, 245 F.3d 645, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2001). The statutory
maximum for a § 1957 violation is 120 months' imprisonment. 18
U.S.C. § 1957(b) (1). Defendant contends Apprendi applies because
his total sentence of incarceration is 121 months. Olson,
though, was convicted on three counts and did not receive a
sentence of 121 months on any individual count. The most he
received on any individual count was 120 months' incarceration.

The jury found all the necessary elements of a § 1957 violation


a 4

447, 452 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 879 (1995); U.S.S.G.
§ 281.2, comment. (backg'd.). The second adjustment is based on
the amount laundered. Thus, a person who laundered more than
$10,000,000 of criminally derived proceeds, but did not know the
nature of the underlying unlawful activity, is deemed to be less
culpable than a person such as Olson. There was no double
counting involved in the calculation of Olson's total offense

level. See United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1068 (8th

Cir. 1999). Cf. Hare, 49 F.3d at 452.

Last, Olson contends one of the jurors should have been
discharged for cause because, in voir dire, she stated her
husband was involved in protecting union pension rights and
therefore she could not be fair in this case, which included
allegations of fraud related to pension funds. The juror's
pertinent testimony was as follows:

[Defense Attorney] LOEB: You mentioned your
husband's involvement in the IBEW and
specifically the pension fund.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BRINING: Uh-huh.

MR. LOEB: Do you have discussions with him
concerning his role in the pension fund?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BRINING: Sure.

MR. LOEB: Are you aware that there may be
testimony in this case concerning the handling of
the Chicago Housing Authority pension fund?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BRINING: I heard that,
yes.

MR. LOEB: Is there anything about that fact
and your husband's involvement in IBEW pension
fund that would cause you to be unfair to one
side or the other in this case?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BRINING: Only because I
do see the importance of the pension fund. So my
answer is yes.

MR. LOEB: Okay.


LT VY

Circuit with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, 219 South Dearborn Street,
20th Floor, Chicago, Illinois 60604, within sixty (60) days of

the entry of the judgment in this case.

ENTER:

Witim T kt

UNITED STATES DISTRICT GUDGE

DATED: AUGUST 7 , 2001


Minute Qjder Form (95197)

fre

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

“onstage | WILTAMT. HART | Stes as

CASE NUMBER 01 C 2933 DATE AUGUST q > 2001
CASE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. OSCAR WILLIAM OLSON, JR.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.}

ql) @f

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qi) QO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) i) Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) Q Ruling/Hearing on set for at :

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for] on set for at

(7) ao Trial[set for/re-set for] on__at

(8) O [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at

(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) (J General Rule21 OOFRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Ml [Other docket entry] Defendant's motion to vacate sentence is denied. The Clerk of the

Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the government and against defendant
denying defendant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate sentence. If defendant wishes to
appeal this order, he must file a Notice of Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit with the Clerk of the Court, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, 219 S. Dearborn Street, 20th Floor, Chicago, IIlinois 60604, within sixty (60) days
of the entry of the judgment in this case.

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

VY | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Dockeling to mail notices.

¥_ | A0 450 form mailed by judge’s staff.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
cw deputy’
inicals

®

Gl AUG 10 PH & 25

rite : HE TING

Aug 4.3 2001

4

number of notices

date docket

AUG. 9, 2001

date mailed notice

MQM

Date/time reccived in
central Clerk's Office

swailing initials



V 4

{government attorney] KOHLER: Just a few
questions, your Honor.

Ms. Brining, I think you just mentioned that

you see the importance of a pension fund.
I am just curious about that one point.
Obviously because you see the importance, you
take this as a serious matter. But would you
make-if you were a juror, would you make any
judgment that you ultimately made as to guilt or
innocence based on the evidence that you hear
here in the court?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BRINING: I don't
understand what you are asking me.

MR. KOHLER: Does that just mean that you
recognize this is a serious matter?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BRINING: Yes.

MR. KOHLER: It doesn't necessarily
influence how you would make a decision in the
case? You would still make it based on the
evidence that you hear in the courtroom?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BRINING: Correct. I am
just saying that as far as I know, he has been
working on it a long time. He is trying to make
changes and everything under the pension fund at
his local. So I hear it all the time and I know
what he is doing. So I know the importance it is
to people, when they retire how important it is
for them to stay in the life-style they are
accustomed to.

MR. KOHLER: Thank you.

kk *

[Olson defense attorney} SULLIVAN: Lastly,
I think I have one follow-up.

Mrs. Brining.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BRINING: Yes.

MR. SULLIVAN: You and your husband
apparently have regular discussions about his
work at the pension fund.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BRINING: Yes.

MR. SULLIVAN: The Judge will instruct you
later on in the case that you will have to
refrain from discussing the case with anyone
until the case is over and certainly not to
discuss it with anyone at home when you get home
at night. Do you think you will be able to
follow that and keep what you learn about pension
fund questions here to yourself until the case is
over?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR BRINING: I will do my
best.


DOCKETED

wy VW AUG 13 2001

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v. No. 01 C 2933
(94 CR 555-3)

OSCAR WILLIAM OLSON, JR.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Following a jury trial with codefendants, defendant Oscar
Olson was acquitted on conspiracy and wire fraud counts, but
found guilty of three substantive counts of money laundering in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Initially, Olson was sentenced to
concurrent terms of 120 months on two of the counts and a
consecutive sentence of one month on the other count, as well as
two years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $10,000,000
in restitution. On direct appeal, the Seventh Circuit initially
vacated the convictions on the ground that one of the
venirepersons should have been removed for cause. Although
defendants instead used one of their peremptory challenges to
strike that venireperson, they used all their peremptory
challenges and stated that they were unable to peremptorily
strike another venireperson who was on the jury. See United
States v. Polichemi, 201 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2000)

("Polichemi I"). Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme


Ne YY

Court decided United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304
(2000), in which it held that there is no basis for reversing a
conviction if no disqualified person sat on the jury and the
defendant received his or her full allotment of peremptory
challenges. On reconsideration, the Seventh Circuit followed
Martinez-Salazar and upheld the convictions. See United
States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 121
S. Ct. 485 (2000) ("Polichemi II"). As to Olson's sentence,
though, the Seventh Circuit held that the restitution improperly
included losses caused by conduct for which Olson had been
acquitted. Id. at 714. That part of the sentence was vacated
and Olson's case was remanded for recalculation of the amount of
restitution. Id. at 715. On remand, it was determined that
$75,000 was the appropriate amount of restitution to impose and
an amended judgment and conviction order was entered. See United
States v. Olson, 2001 WL 301212 (N.D. Ill. March 27, 2001). The
amended judgment was entered on April 16, 2001. No appeal was
taken from the imposition of the new sentence.

On April 24, 2001, Olson, proceeding pro _se,* brought a
motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), defendant

first contends his sentence was in error because the issue of
relevant conduct was not submitted to the jury. He also contends

that the determination as to relevant conduct was inconsistent

tuntil the time of his conviction, defendant was a
practicing attorney.