IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ro bert Dubose, Administrator of : CASES CONSOLIDATED

the Estate of Elise Dubose, Deceased :

:

v. : No. 315 C.D. 2019

:

Willowcrest Nursing Home and Albert :

Einstein Healthcare Network :

:

Robert Dubose, Administrator of :

the Estate of Elise Dubose, Deceased :

:

v. :

:

Mark Quinlan, Donna Brown, RNC, BSN, :

Albert Einstein Medical Center D/B/A :

Willowcrest, Willowcrest, and Jefferson :

Health System :

:

Appeal of: Rhonda Hill Wilson and the :

Law Office of Rhonda Hill Wilson, P.C. :

Robert Dubose, Administrator of the : No. 51 7 C.D. 2019

Estate of Elise Dubose, Deceased : Argued: November 14, 2022

:

v. :

:

Willowcrest Nursing Home and Albert :

Einstein Healthcare Network :

:

Robert Dubose, Administrator of the :

Estate of Elise Dubose, Deceased :

:

v. :

:

Mark Quinlan, Donna Brown, RNC, BSN, :

Albert Einstein Medical Center d/b/a :

Willowcrest, Willowcrest, and Jefferson :

Health System :Appeal of: Rhonda Hill Wilson, Esquire :

and the Law Office of Rhonda Hill :

Wilson, P.C. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK , Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER , Judge (P

. )

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE , Ju dge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: February 3, 2023

Appellant s

, Rhonda Hill Wilson , Esq uire, and the Law Office of Rhonda

Hill Wilson, P.C. ( collectively, Counsel)

, appeal the December 13, 2018 orders of

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County ( the trial court) granting the

Medical Care A vailability and Reduction of Error Fund’s (MCARE) 1 motion for

setoff and dismissing as moot Counsel’s motion to dismiss MCARE’s motion for

setoff. 2 For the follow ing reasons , we dismiss the appeal

.

1 The MCARE fund is “a statutory excess carrier that provides excess medical malpractice

insurance coverage to the extent a health care provider’s liability exceeds its basic coverage in

effect at the time of an occurrence. ” Fletcher v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n , 985 A. 2d

678, 680 n.2 (Pa. 2009).

2 The trial court issued two separate orders on December 13, 2018 , one order granting MCARE’s

motion for setoff and the second order denying Counsel’s motion to dismiss . Counsel appealed

both orders, which were assigned separate docket numbers. On May 30, 2019, this Court

granted Counsel’s request to consolidate these matters. See Order, dated May 3 0 , 2019.

Therefore, we address both orders in this opinion

.2 BACKGROUND

Counsel represent ed Robert Dubose (Dubose)

, 3 executor of the estate of

decedent Elise Dubose (Estate)

, who filed a Wrongful Death and Survival Action

on behalf of the Estate against Willowcrest Nursing Home

, Albert Einstein

Healthcare Network , Mark Quinlan, Donna Brown, Albert Einstein Medical Center

d/b/a Willowcrest, and Jefferson Health System ( collectively, Willowcrest)

(Wrongful Death Action)

. 4 The Wrongful Death Action proceeded to jury trial in

March 2013

. Reproduced Record ( R.R. ) at 122a. T he jury returned a verdict for

the Estate, awarding compensatory and punitive damages

. R.R. at 122a , 198a

.

On April 27, 2018, the trial court ordered all payments for damages to be

f orward ed to Counsel and ordered Counsel to distribute the proceeds (Distribution

Order) in the manner outlined in the Distribution Order . R.R. at 148a. Relevant to

this appeal, t he trial court ordered the punitive damages award to b e paid as

follows: $460,775.97 to the Estate and $153,591.99 to MCARE as required under

Section 715(d) of the MCARE Act

. 5

, 6 R.R. at 150a.

3 Dubose passed away in July 2019, while this appea l was pending.

4 Neither Willowcrest nor the Estate participated in this appeal.

5 Act of March 20, 2002, P.L. 154, as amended , 40 P.S. § 1303.715(d).

6 Section 505 of the MCARE Act provides:

Upon the entry of a verdict including an award of puniti ve damages, the punitive

damages portion of the award shall be allocated as follows: (1) 75% shall be paid

to the prevailing party; and (2) 25% shall be paid to the Medical Care Availability

and Reduction of Error Fund.

40 P.S. § 1303.505(a)

.3

On June 5, 2018, Counsel filed an affidavit of compliance (Affidavit)

indicating she complied with the trial court’s Distribution Order. R.R. at 151a. In

her Affidavit, Counsel listed the payments made , but did not include the required

payment to MCARE

. Id

.

MCARE, owing the Estate a payment of $570,361 .00 from the jury’s award,

filed a motion for setoff requesting the trial court permit MCARE to setoff “the

$153,591.99 properly owed to [MCARE] so that the [Estate] will receive

$416,769.01 on or about December 31, 2018, in full and complete satisfaction of

the amount owed by [MCARE].” R.R. at 157a. In response, Counsel filed a

motion to dismiss MC ARE’s motion for setoff. 7

The trial court held a hearing on October 30, 2018. R.R. at 264a

- 74a.

Regarding party representation at the hearing, the trial court asked Counsel

whether the Estate was represented and she responded, “not to my knowledge[ ,]”

and explained the parties had “severed [their] relationship[.]” Id . at 267a. The trial

court specifically asked Dubose, who appeared on behalf of the Estate , if he “had a

lawyer representing the Estate[,]” to which Dubose indicated he did not. Id . at

270a. The Estate proceeded pro se during the hearing. 8 Id

.

7 It is eviden t Counsel filed this motion on her own behalf as she titled her motion “RHONDA

HILL WILSON, ESQUIRE’S MOTION TO DISMISS MCARE’S MOTION FOR SET

- OFF ”

and stated “I, Rhonda Hill Wilson, Esquire, Respondent to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Insurance D epartment, MCare Fund Motion for Set

- off hereby submits this Motion to Dismiss as

follows [.]” R.R. at 241a.

8 Throughout the hearing, the parties reference d ongoing issues between Counsel and the Estate.

At one point, the Estate accuse d Counsel of fail ing to properly disperse money owed to the

Estate. R.R. at 269a

- 70a. Those matters are not before us, and we do not address those

allegations.4

At the hearing, MCARE addressed the merits of the issue assert ing it was

statutorily entitled to 25% of the punitive damages award, Counsel was obligated

to make the payment to MCARE, and Counsel failed to do so. R.R. at 265a. Thus,

MCARE sought a setoff in the interest of judicial economy. Id . Explaining

MCARE still owed $570,361 .00 to the Estate , MCARE asserted the “simplest

solution [was] to set off the amount that we owe by w hat we are owed, which

would have us paying $416,769.01. ” Id

.

During the hearing, Counsel indicated the settlement check was made out to

the Estate and Counsel. Id

. at 268a. Counsel indicated her failure to pay MCARE

was “unintentional[

, ]” and asserted “ it was an error . It was inadvertent. [She] did

not mean to do it.” R.R. at 266a. She also asserted the $153,000 .00 was owed “by

the [Estate], not by [her] office” and it was the Estate’s duty to pay MCARE. Id . at

267a

- 68a

. During the hearing, Counsel made an oral motion to have the Estate

disgorge the money

, to which t he trial court responded by indicat ing she needed to

make that request in a formal motion. Id . at 268a.

On December 13, 2018 , the trial court granted MCARE’s motion for seto ff.

The trial court noted that because MCARE was not paid the punitive damages

ordered by the trial court and MCARE still owes the Estate $5 7 0,361.00, the trial

court approved MCARE setting off its payment by the punitive da mages award.

Additionally , the trial court issued a second order dismiss ing , as moot, Counsel’s

motion to dismiss. Counsel filed this appeal. 9

9 Counsel initially appealed to our Commonwealth’s Superior Court. MCARE moved to

transfer the case to this C ourt , which the Superior Court granted. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5103(a) (if an

appeal is filed in a court of the Commonwealth that lacks jurisdiction, the court should not quash

the appeal “but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth,

where the appeal . . . shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee tribunal on the date

when the appeal . . . was first filed” in the court without jurisdiction).

(Footnote continued on next page...)5

On appeal, Counsel makes several arguments asserting the trial court’s

errors. However, we need not outline those issue s because we do not reach the

merits of those arguments , instead concluding that Counsel lacks standing to bring

this appeal.

Trial Court’s Opinion

In its Opinion Sur Appeal (Opinion)

, 10 the trial court asserts this Court

should quash or dismiss Counsel’s appeal because it is an “improper attempt to

pursue a claim by [Counsel] in her own name, when in fact, she has never become

a party in interest, has interests adverse to her client, . . . and has breached her duty

of loyalty to her client. ” Trial Ct. Op. at 10. The trial court notes Counsel is

“pursuing her own interest in receiving her fees, while simultaneously suggesting

outright to MCARE that they pursue an action against her clien t for the funds

owed.” Id . at 10

- 11. The trial court contends that because Counsel’s actions are

“in clear breach of her fiduciary duties to [the Estate], . . . this Appeal must be

quashed.” Id . at 11.

(continued...)

10 An Opinion Sur Appeal may be filed by a judge pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 1925 (a)(1) , which states:

(a) Opinion in support of order.

(1) General rule

. Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, upon

receipt of the notice of appeal, the judge who entered the order

giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do

not already appear of record, shall forthwith file of record at least a

brief opinion of the reasons for t he order, or for the rulings or other

errors complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the

record where such reasons may be found.

Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a)(1).6 DISCUSSION

At the outset, we must determine whether Counsel’s appeal is properly

before this Court. We begin by considering the trial court’s assertion i n its

Opinion th at Counsel lacks standing to bring this appeal. Counsel argues that “any

attorney/client relatio nship with [the Estate] ended with the positive disposition of

the tort action and distribution of the jury verdict proceeds.” Counsel’s Br. at 19.

In fact

, Counsel “states emphatically that [Counsel] did not represent [the Estate] at

relevant times here to and therefore did not act outside of the requirements of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct .” Id

.

The doctrine of standing is a judicially create d principle designed to weed

out litigants who have no direct interest in a judicial matter. Office of the

Governor v. Donahue , 98 A.2d 1223, 1229 (Pa. 2014). The “core concept of the

doctrine of standing is that a person who is not adversely affected in any way by

the matter he seeks to challenge

. . . has no right to obtain a judicial resolution of

his challenge.” In re T.J. , 739 A.2d 478, 481 (Pa. 1999)

. In Pennsylvania, standing

is not a jurisdictional issue because an issue related to standing is wa ivable. In Re

Est

. of Brown , 30 A.3d 1200, 1204 (Pa. Super. 2011).

According to our Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, o nly an

“ aggrieved party ” has the right to file an appeal. Pa. R.A.P. 501. A “party”

includ es a “person who commences or against whom relief is sough t in a matter,”

and specifically includes “counsel for such person who is represented by counsel.”

42 Pa. C.S. § 102

. A party is “aggrieved” when he or she has a “substantial, direct,

and immediate ” interest in th e subject matter of the appeal. William Penn Parking

Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh , 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975).7

Next, we consider Pennsylvania case law addressing standing of attorneys to

file appeals in their clients’ cases. Our Superior Court addr essed similar issues in

Green by Green v. SEPTA , 551 A.2d 578 (Pa. Super. 1998), and In re Estate of

Geniviva , 675 A.2d 306 (Pa. Super. 1996) . While these decisions of the Superior

Court “are not binding on this Court, [ ] they offer persuasive precedent [as] they

address analogous issues.” Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. , 180 A.3d

545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

In Green by Green v. SEPTA

, 551 A.2d at 578, our Superior Court addressed

an issue involving a minor plaintiff and her mother who were represented by an

attorney in a personal injury action , which resulted in a settlement

. The trial court

ordered a reduction in the amount of attorney fees payable from the settlement

proceeds and increas ed the amount distributable to the minor plaintiff. Id

. The

attorney represented the minor plaintiff and her mother on appeal and argued the

trial court abused its discretion by reducing the amount of attorney fees. Id . The

Superior Court held that bec ause the mother and daughter were the prevailing

parties, they were not “aggrieved” by the trial court’s order that increased the

amount distributable to the minor plaintiff

. Id

. Thus, b ecause they were not

aggrieved, they did not have standing to appeal. Id

. Further, t he Court pointed out

the individual aggrieved by the trial court’s order was the attorney whose fees were

reduced by the trial court. Id

. The Court indicated for the attorney to obtain

review of the order, it was necessary for the attorney to file an appeal in his own

name. Id . The Court noted it would “not permit counsel to use an appeal by his

clients as a m e ans for advancing his own interest at the expense of his client whose

interests are not separately represented. ” Id . at 580

.8

In In re Estate of Geniviva

, 675 A.2d at 306, the Superior Court considered

whether an estate’s former attorney had standing to appeal an order sanctioning the

estate’s executor for mismanagement. The Superior Court considered whether the

attorney was an “ aggrieved party ” with the right to bring an appeal

. Id . The Court

concluded because the attorney was no longer representing the estate, the attorney

was not a party to the action and, therefore , he lacked standing to bring an appeal.

Id

. Additionally, the Court noted even if the attorney w as a party to the case, he

was not an aggrieved party because the order did not direct him to take any action

whatsoever with respect to the estate

. Id

.

We turn to the facts of the case before us

. Counsel asserts she has the right

to bring this action because she no longer represents the Estate, while the trial court

asserts Counsel does not have the right to bring the action because she remains the

attor ney of record for the Estate. However, w e need not resolve whether Counsel

remains the Estate’s attorney because regardless, Counsel lacks standing.

Counsel is not an aggrieved party to this case. The only way Counsel could

be a party to this case is i f she is the Estate’s attorney. Taking her at her word that

she is not the Estate’s attorney, Counsel is not a party. Even if she remained the

Estate’s attorney, Counsel would still lack standing to represent her own interests.

Her standing would be in her capacity as agent for the Estate’s interests, not her

own personal interests. If she represents the Estate, Counsel’s only vehicle to

appeal is on the Estate’s behalf, but the Estate is not aggrieved. Therefore, whether

Counsel is or is not the Estate’s attorney is of no consequence. E ither way,

Counsel lacks standing.

While Counsel may be aggrieved, she is not an aggrieve d party in this

action. Rather, she has been aggrieved by her firm’s own actions of providing a9

distribution check to her client for an amount higher than she ought to have

distributed . Any recourse would be between her firm and the Estate, separate and

apart from this suit.

Because counsel lacks standing, we do not reach the remaining issues.

Accordingly, Counsel’s appeal is dismissed.

______________________________ STACY WALLACE , Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.

Judge Dumas did not participate in the decision of this case.IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Dubose, Administrator of : CASES CONSOLIDATED

the Estate of Elise Dubose, Deceased :

:

v. : No. 315 C.D. 2019

:

Willowcrest Nursing Home and Albert :

Einstein Healthcare Network :

:

Robert Dubose, Administrator of :

the Estate of Elise Dubose, Deceased :

:

v. :

:

Mark Quinlan, Donna Brown, RNC, BSN, :

Albert Einstein Medical Center D/B/A :

Willowcrest, Willowcrest, and Jefferson :

Health System :

:

Appeal of: Rhonda Hill Wilson and the :

Law Office of Rhonda Hill Wilson, P.C. :

Robert Dubose, Administrator of the : No. 517 C.D. 2019

Estate of Elise Dubose, Deceased :

v. :

Willowcrest Nursing Home and Albert :

Einstein Healthcare Network :

:

Robert Dubose, Administrator of the :

Estate of Elise Dubose, Deceased :

v. :

Mark Quinlan, Donna Brown, RNC, BSN, :

Albert Einstein Medical Center d/b/a :

Willowcrest, Willowcrest, and Jefferson :

Health System :

:

Appea l of: Rhonda Hill Wilson, Esquire :

and the Law Office of Rhonda Hill :

W ilson, P.C. :O R D E R

AND NOW , this 3 rd day of February 202 3

, the appeal of Rhonda Hill

Wilson , Esquire, and the Law Office of Rhonda Hill Wilson, P.C. is dismissed.

______________________________ STACY WALLACE , Judge