that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with,” 288 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th
Cir, 2002). Plaintiffs thus claim that we were in error when we dismissed the
conspiracy claims on the basis that Plaintiffs had not alleged an agreement between the
Union and the County to support the conspiracy claim. However, for a civil conspiracy
claim a plaintiff must still allege an agreement and merely failing to prevent the
unlawful conduct of one party or assisting an unlawful actor does not necessarily
constitute a conspiracy. Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 739-40 (7th Cir. 2002). In
Tierney, which was decided subsequent to Walker, the court provides further guidance
in regards to the pleading requirements for civil conspiracy. In Tierney one of the
defendants was a school swimming coach and also worked at a private swimming club.
Id. at 736. The coach allegedly improperly touched the plaintiffs’ daughter while
giving her a massage. /d. The plaintiffs complained to the school district and claimed
that there was retaliation against them for complaining. Jd. One alleged instance of
retaliation was a telephone call placed to plaintiffs in which an unknown male voice
swore at them. /d. The call was traced to a phone at the home of Debbie Olson who
was a teacher at the school district and whose husband was a swim club booster. Jd.
The court affirmed the dismissal of the conspiracy claim against the Olsons, noting that
a “conspiracy is an agreement... ..” The Court noted that, “even if the complaint

alleged that the unknown male caller had asked [Debbie Olson’s] permission to use the

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IV. Punitive Damages

Plaintiffs claim that, since they have properly alleged claims against Eugene
Moore and Christine Boardman in their individual capacities, punitive damages are
proper. As stated above, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged individual capacity
claims and Plaintiffs have provided no legal support to show that punitive damages
should be allowed.

V. Dismissal of Claims against Individual Defendants in their Official Capacity

Plaintiffs also complain that we dismissed the claims against Eugene Moore and
Christine Boardman in their official capacities because they are redundant. Plaintiffs
offer no legal authority to support their assertion and their only argument is based on
the inclusion of the word “generally” in the pertinent rule of law. We deny the motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of the claims against Eugene Moore and Christine
Boardman in their official capacities,

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we deny the motion for reconsideration in its entirety.

We also grant Plaintiffs leave to reply to Defendant’s certification answer brief.

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Dated: November 6, 2002



IL. Individual Capacity Claims

Plaintiffs also allege that we erred in dismissing the claims against the
defendants Eugene Moore and Christine Boardman in their individual capacities.
Plaintiffs claim that they have alleged sufficient personal involvement by the individual
defendants. First of all, the County raised this precise issue in their memorandum in
support of its motion to dismiss and thus we will not rehash old arguments already
before us concerning Eugene Moore. Plaintiffs allege nothing more in their complaint
than that Moore was the head of the Recorder’s Office and that grievances were
submitted to the personnel office of the Recorder’s Office. Therefore, we deny the
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the claim against Eugene More in his
individual capacity.

Plaintiffs refer to Paragraph 27 of their complaint and argue that, since the
complaint alleges that Boardman knew of the County’s alleged unlawful conduct, she
can be sued in her individual capacity. Paragraph 27(a) of Plaintiffs’ amended
complaint alleges that Christine Boardman “knew that Cook County and the
Recorder’s Office . . . were following the practice of unlawfully deeming employees
‘temporary employees’ and thereby denying them [their] rights. . ..” Plaintiffs cite
Antonelli v. Sheehan, 81 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1996) and Duncan v. Duncan v.

Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1981), for the proposition that conspiracy claims

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phone and told her he wanted the permission to make a harassing call to [the plaintiffs]
... and that she had granted him permission, that would not state a claim of conspiracy,
though it might make her an aider and abettor.” Jd at 739 (citations omitted). The
court then noted that since no agreement was alleged in the complaint, the plaintiffs
pled themselves out of court. Jd. at 740. Thus there must be alleged an agreement to
further the unlawful objective of the conspiracy.

In this case Plaintiffs allege only that the County actively schemed to deny
Plaintiffs their rights and that the County did so “with the unlawful implicit or explicit
consent of the union defendants .. ..” In Paragraph 27(a) of the amended complaint
Plaintiffs allege that the Union knew that the County was unlawfully denying
employees their rights “and did nothing about it.” As stated above, in Tierney the court
noted that, even if Debbie Olson knew of the purpose of the call and had not stopped
the caller, she was not a conspirator. Similarly in this case there are only allegations
that the Union knew of the unlawful conduct but failed to stop it. Thus, at most as in
Tierney, the Union allegedly aided and abetted the County. There is no allegation in
the complaint that there was an agreement to further the conspiracy and absent
speculation, we cannot reasonably infer such an agreement from the pleadings.
Therefore we deny the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the conspiracy

claims.



Plaintiffs also complain of our mentioning that the allegations of lost wages and
other benefits were not tied to the First Amendment claim, This matter is of no
consequence in terms of the ultimate outcome of this case and Plaintiffs will have
ample opportunity to show that such facts are directly related to their claims. However,
we do note that in their complaint Plaintiffs connect such losses of benefits to a
violation of “Illinois statutory law,” but never indicate what Illinois law is being
violated. Also, even if the lost wages and other benefits are somchow related to
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, the benefits which are predominantly at issue are
the job bumping and bidding privileges which allegedly enabled the County to make
political hirings.

In our opinion we requested further briefing on the issue of class certification
because the argument made by Plaintiffs was tied to several of the claims that we
dismissed, We thought it a more efficient approach to address the class certification
issue after the dust had settled from our other rulings, and that such an approach would
help to refine and clarity the arguments on the certification issue. We granted
Defendants leave to respond to the class certification request. Plaintiffs have cited no
authority to support their assertion that our ruling was erroneous. In fairness we will

give Plaintiffs an opportunity to reply by brief to the arguments made in Defendant’s

answer on the certification issue.



Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Tllinois

Name ofanianet wage | Charles P. Kocoras | Siting dae Ome

CASE NUMBER 02 C 3279 DATE 11/6/2002
CASE Webb et al vs. Local 73 et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) QO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer briefto motionduc___.. Reply to answer brief due___.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon ss setfor__— at.

(5) a Status hearing set for 11/19/2002 at 9:30 A.M..

(6) QO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-sct for]on__——sset for _at__
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for}on_ at.

(8) oOo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued tot

(9) O This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4m) O Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Wl (Other docket entry] Ruling held. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: We deny the motion
(Docs 26-1 & 26-2) for reconsideration in its entirety. We also grant Plaintiffs leave to reply to
Defendant’s certification answer brief.

(il) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No niotices required, advised in open court,

‘No notices required. umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff, now 0% 2002

Nolified counsel by telephone. ns docketed

dato mailed notice

vw | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form, 'LuNOd LOM LSta “SA
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against high officials should not be dismissed on the basis that there is no allegation
of personal involvement by the official, However, both of those cases involved pro se
plaintiffs and the courts noted that the pleadings would be held to a less stringent
standard. Also, in Antonelli the court held that allegations of systemic violations in the
corrections department against the Sheriff individually should not be dismissed. 81
F.3d at 1429. The court reasoned that since the Sheriff was in charge of the prison
where the violations allegedly occurred he should be aware of at least systemic
violations. fd.

In the case before us, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges systemic violations
in the Recorder’s Office and that Christine Boardman had knowledge of those
violations in the Recorder’s Office. However, unlike the Sheriff in Antonelli,
Boardman is not in charge of the department where the alleged systemic violations
occurred and therefore, we cannot simply infer her involvement as Plaintiffs suggest.
Plaintiffs might argue that we could presume that Boardman had knowledge of the
systemic decisions made by the Union, but, as said before, Plaintiffs have failed to
sufficiently allege any claim against the Union. Therefore, we deny the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the individual claims against Christine Boardman.

Il. Facts Tied to First Amendment Claim and Additional Certification Briefing


LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 59(e) permits parties to file, within ten days of the entry of a judgment, a
motion to alter or amend the judgment. Motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)
are designed to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence. Publishers Res., Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publ'ns, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th
Cir.1985). Such motions do not give a party the opportunity to rehash old arguments
or to present new arguments "that could and should have been presented to the district
court prior to the judgment." Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996)
(citing LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Rather, a Rule 59(e) motion “must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or
fact or must present newly discovered evidence" in order to be successful. LB Credit
Corp., 49 F.3d at 1267 (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260,
1268 (7th Cir. 1986)). The decision of whether to grant or deny a Rule 59(e) motion
"is entrusted to the sound judgment of the district court." Jn re Prince, 85 F.3d 314,
324 (7th Cir. 1996).

DISCUSSION

J. Conspiracy Claim

Plaintiffs argue that, according to Walker v. Thompson, all that must be alleged

for a civil conspiracy claim is “the parties, general purpose, and approximate date, so



County of Cook as joint employers, Webb and Collins claim that the County
unlawfully designated them as “temporary employees” in order to deprive them of their
right to apply for open permanent positions and to “bump” employees with lower
seniority from open positions. The “temporary employee” status was allegedly part of
a scheme to allow the County to fill open permanent positions with politically
motivated hirings. Plaintiffs also allege that the Union conspired with the County by
refusing to uphold Plaintiffs’ rights under the collective bargaining agreement which
prohibited the unlawful designation of “temporary employees.”

On September 12, 2002 we granted the Union’s motion to dismiss Counts T, II,
TH, and TV and the County’s motion to dismiss Counts IT, IIL, and Count TV to the
extent that Plaintiffs seek equitable relief and punitive damages, We also granted the
Union’s motion to dismiss all claims against Christine Boardman in her individual
capacity and the County’s motion to dismiss al] claims against Eugene Moore in his
individual capacity. We stated that we shall treat the claims against Christine
Boardman and Eugene Moore in their official capacity as redundant claims against the
County and Union and that the County is granted leave to file additional briefing

concerning Plaintiffs’ claim for non-equitable relief and the class certification issue.


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
roe a
CYNTHIA WEBB and SHARON COLLINS,
individually and on behalf’ of others similarly situated, Be
UY OF ee:
Plaintiffs,
vs. 02 C 3279

LOCAL 73, SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL, AFL-CIO; CHRISTINE
BOARDMAN, personally and in her official capacity as
President of Local 73; EUGENE MOORE, personally
and in his official capacity as Recorder of Deeds of
Cook County; and THE COUNTY OF COOK, a body
politic and corporate,

Defendants.

we SSS eS SS eS SS SS SS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on a motion for reconsideration brought by
Plaintiffs Cynthia Webb and Sharon Collins. For the reasons set forth below, we deny
the motion for reconsideration in its entirety.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Cynthia Webb (“Webb”) and Sharon Collins (“Collins”) were hired

by the Office of the Cook County Recorder of Deeds (“Recorder’s Office”) and the

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