inadmissible for other evidentiary reasons as well. Therefore, we grant Defendants’

motion to strike the affidavits as improper.

IL Denial of Access to the Courts Claim

Dugan argues that he was denied access to the law library. A plaintiff must
show that he suffered an injury from the denial of access to the court in order to
maintain a Section 1983 claim for denial of access. Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d
589, 591 (7" Cir. 1998). For a denial of access to the courts claim “a prisoner must
show that unjustified acts or conditions ‘hindered his efforts to pursue a legal
claim.’” Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 591 (7" Cir. 1998)(quoting in part Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)). Dugan claims that his box of legal papers was
in the library and that he was not able to go to the law library during November of
2001, causing his appeal in case 99 C 4382 to be dismissed. This claim is not borne
out by the undisputed evidence. According to the public record docket in that case,
which was dismissed by Judge Zagel on June 7, 2001, Dugan’s appeal was dismissed
for failure to pay the filing fee. On October 26, 2001, an order issued indicating that
Dugan was required to pay the filing fee by November 7, 2001. Dugan failed to do
so which resulted in the final dismissal of the appeal on November 28, 2001. He has
failed to show that he was prevented from pursuing a meritorious claim, as his claim
had already been dismissed. The evidence thus is undisputed that his appeal was

dismissed due to his failure to pay his fling fee rather than his inability to present


Several of the Defendants argue that Dugan has failed to present evidence to
show that they had personal involvement in the alleged misconduct. The Seventh
Circuit has made it clear that “[t}he doctrine ofrespondeat superior does not apply
to § 1983 actions. ...” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7 Cir. 2001).
Thus, an individual cannot be held liable under Section 1983 in his individual
capacity unless he “participated directly in the constitutional violation.”
Hildebrandt v, Illinois Dept. of Natural Resources 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7 Cir.
2003)(stating that “Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability
and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual
defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”). For a supervisor
to be held liable under Section 1983 for acting in his supervisory role, a plaintiff
must show that the supervisor directed the constitutional deprivation or that it
occurred with his “knowledge and consent.” /d. (indicating that a plaintiff must
show that the supervisor knew “about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it,
condone it, or turn a blind eye.”). Dugan has failed to point to any evidence that
indicates that Defendants Stephen Mote, Jerome Springborn, John Thomas, Donald
Snyder, or George Adamson had any personal involvement in the alleged
misconduct either directly or indirectly. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on all claims brought against the above mentioned Defendants.


Dugan was in a prison, not a health club. He had no right to dictate access to his
preferred workout facilities. It is not genuinely disputed that the prison must
accommodate more than 2,900 inmates and thus it clearly was not practicable to tie
up the South Yard for a select few PC inmates or to tie up prison staff to escort the
PC inmates to the opposite side of the prison. Dugan has not shown that he suffered
any injury due to being unable to exercise in his preferred place and fashion. Also,
the evidence is clear that the lockdowns that limited recreational activities at times
were based on legitimate security concerns. Therefore, we grant Defendants’
motion for summary judgment on the claim based upon the denial of access to

recreational activities.

IV. Denial of Access to Religious Activities

Dugan claims that his religious activities were restricted as a result of being
placed in PC. An inmate must be allowed “to practice his religion as long as doing
so does not unduly burden the institution.” Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th
Cir. 1990). A prison regulation that affects an inmate's First Amendment rights “is
valid only ‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Alston v.
DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7* Cir. 1994)(Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987)). In order for a prisoner to succeed on his claim that a prison has violated his
First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion, the prisoner must establish:

“(1) that he espouses a bona fide religion, (2) that his beliefs are sincerely held, and


adequate legal arguments. Neither has Dugan pointed to evidence that shows that
his efforts were hindered in regards to the pursuit of any other legal claims. Also,
the prison had to institute a general lockdown for the entire prison population for
legitimate security reasons which prevented inmates from using the prison library at
times. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the denial

of access to the court claim.

Ill. Denial of Access to Recreation

Dugan claims that his recreational activities were restricted as a result of
being placed in PC. As the Seventh Circuit recognized in Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81
F.3d 1422 (7th Cir.1996), the "[l]ack of exercise may rise to a constitutional
violation in extreme and prolonged situations where movement is denied to the point
that the inmate's health is threatened.” Id. at 1432. In Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F. 3d
754 (7" Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit discussed the conditions of confinement
related to the sufficiency of exercise in prison. Jd. at 762-64. The court held that
there is no Eighth Amendment violation where a prisoner had room in his cell to do
push-ups, sit-ups, jogging in place and step-ups. Id.

In the instant action, Dugan had much more than that. He had periodic yard
access and gym access, even when in X house. Dugan complains that he could not
go to the weight room, (P. Dep. pp. 73-74), and complains that PC inmates were not

allowed to use the South Yard for exercise like the general population. However,


where they will have contact with the general population. Both positions were filled
by PC inmates. In regards to the classes the evidence is also clear that it was not
practical for the prison to offer classes to only a select few inmates at a time and in
particular to an inmate who would likely be unable to complete the classes because
of a imminent transfer.

Also, to the extent that Dugan asserts due process claims based on his denial
of access to a prison job or classes, Dugan fails to point to sufficient evidence to
support the claims. The limitations of procedural due process “allow[] the
government to deprive a citizen of ‘life, liberty, or property’ only in accordance with
certain procedural protections.” Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 377 F.3d 757, 768
(7 Cir. 2004). In order to succeed on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff
must establish that there is: “(1) a cognizable property interest; (2) a deprivation of
that property interest; and (3) a denial of due process.” Hudson v. City of Chicago,
374 F.3d 554, 559 (7" Cir. 2004)(quoting Buttitta v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1198,
1201 (7th Cir. 1993)). Dugan fails to point to evidence that would show that he had
a liberty or property interest in obtaining a prison job or attending prison
rehabilitation or educational classes. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on the claims based upon the denial of a prison job and the

denial of access to educational and rehabilitative classes.

IV. Lack of Personal Involvement



> Minute Ont ogt0o9)

AT

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge . i Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 03 C 4366 DATE 1/11/2005
CASE Brian Dugan vs. Briley, et al.
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
ql) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) 0 Brief in support of motion due
GB) im] Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) o Status hearing(held/continued to] {set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) im} {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
QFRCP4(m) DO Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

do) (Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion, defendants’

motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. All pending dates and motions are hereby

stricken as moot. Terminating case. Enter Memorandum Opinion.
(1) {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court,

No notices required, number of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

san 12 2005

‘Notified counsel by telephone. Gale docketed

J | Docketing to mail notices,

docketing ral als

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed noice
courtroom ceed ne

deputy’s
initials

MW

Date/timesreceived in

central Clerk's Office mailing deputy initials

GS


CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment in its entirety on all claims.

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan 3 j a

United States District Court Judge

Dated: January 11, 2005

11


V. Equal Protection Claim

Defendants also seek summary judgment on the equal protection claim. The
Equal Protection Clause provides “to all Americans the right to be free from
invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental
activity.” Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F. 3d 446, 453 (7" Cir. 1996) (quoting Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)). Under the traditional equal protection analysis,
if the alleged class is not a suspect class, the court “will address [the plaintiffs]
equal protection claim under the familiar rational basis test, . . [and rule for the
defendant] if ‘there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.’” Zambrano v. Reinert, 291 F.3d 964, 970 (7"
Cir. 2002)(quoting in part FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993)).

Dugan claims that the class of PC inmates were discriminated against and
treated differently than the general population. However, as explained above Dugan
has failed to point to evidence that would indicate that there were any significant
differences in the treatment of PC inmates. The undisputed evidence clearly shows
that all the measures taken in regards to PC inmates were taken for valid security
reasons in order to promote the welfare and protection of the inmates. Therefore, we

grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the equal protection claims.

10


(3) that the activity he wishes to perform is essential to the practice of his religion.”
Saunders-El v. Tsoulos, 1 F.Supp.2d 845, 847 (N.D. Ill. 1998).

In the instant action, Dugan now claims in his affidavit that he is both a
Christian and a Catholic. However, in April of 2000 he submitted a written request
to the prison chaplain to change his faith from Catholic to Agnostic and the request
was approved on April 6, 2000. Also, even if Dugan had shown that he was a
practicing Catholic, Defendants submit undisputed evidence that indicates that in PC
the prison still provided some services by having chaplains and volunteer clergy go
to the living unit. Dugan has failed to point to sufficient evidence to dispute these
material facts. In addition, the evidence is undisputed that religious activities for all
inmates were inhibited at times during general lockdowns that were instituted for
legitimate security reasons. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the denial of access to religious activities claim.

IV. Denial of Access to Prison Job and Classes

Dugan also claims that he was denied the opportunity to participate in a prison
job and to attend educational or rehabilitative classes. However, the evidence
clearly shows that after the move to X-House, due to the small number of PC
inmates that were temporarily held in the X-House, there was no practical way for
the prison to provide the services to those inmates. The evidence is clear that only

two jobs were available to PC inmates because PC inmates cannot work in shifts


Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc. 216 F.3d 596,
599 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must consider the record as a whole, in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences that favor the
non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport Co, 212
F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

L. Affidavits of Inmates

Dugan attempts to support his position with his own affidavit and affidavits of
several other inmates. Defendants have moved to strike the affidavits. We agree
that in regards to some of the affidavits, they are not properly notarized and are not
properly executed. Also, the affidavits include broad generalizations that are too
vague to be of assistance to the trier of fact. The affidavits fail to point to specific
complaints or dates and the trier of fact would therefore be required to speculate
based upon the generalized comments included within the affidavits. Also, certain

statements included in the affidavits would be misleading, unduly prejudicial, and


have a job at the prison, was denied access to the same religious services, and the
same recreational activities, and was denied access to other programs offered by

Stateville. Dugan has brought this action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983

(“Section 1983").

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment the moving party must
identify “those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This initial
burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by
pointing out “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at
325. Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest
on the allegations in the pleadings, but, “by affidavits or as otherwise provided for in
[Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A “genuine issue” in the context of a motion for

summary judgment is not simply a “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
BRIAN DUGAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 03 C 4366
)
KENNETH BRILEY, et al. ) _
eras ‘ POrKETED
Defendants. y JAN 12 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons stated below, we grant the motion for summary judgment in its

entirety.

BACKGROUND
Dugan is currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center, but was
formerly incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”). Dugan claims
that Defendants, various officials at Stateville, violated his constitutional rights by
denying him access to the same programs that were available to the general prison
population while Dugan was confined in protective custody (“PC”) at Stateville.

Dugan claims that he was denied access to the prison law library, was not allowed to

1

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