as a result of Defendant’s unlawful employment practices. Absent more than Bouchelion’s
hypothetical interest in the Chicago area, this Court finds that he is unsuccessful in alleging any
specific facts that would arguably suggest proper venue in this District.

Additionally, venue is proper within the judicial district in which Defendant has its
principal office. In this case, Defendant’s principal office is located in Dayton, Ohio; therefore,
venue would be proper in the Southern District of Ohio.

Now that it has been established that this District is not the proper venue for the present
case, this Court can either dismiss the action, or “if it be in the interest of justice,” transfer it to a
proper district. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). “In instances where a complaint is timely filed and later
dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not ‘toll’ or suspend the 90-day limitations
period.” Sabay y. Reno, 1996 WL 167332 at *3 (quoting Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d
1023, 1027 (2nd Cir. 1993)). More than 90 days have passed since the issuance of Bouchelion’s
EEOC Right to Sue Letter, thus, the interests of justice are best served by transferring Plaintiff’s
Title VII claims.’

Finally, this Court will take a moment to discuss the quality of Plaintiffs’ submissions.
Numerous citation and typographical mistakes exist throughout the Complaint. Should Plaintiff
continue filing matters before this Court in the future, Plaintiff must take greater care in
preparation of the his materials. Although Rule 8 binds this Court, this Court will not make

Plaintiff’s case for him.

3 Under Title VII, an action must be brought within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC’s Right to Sue Letter. 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC issued Bouchelion’s Right to Sue Letter on January 1, 2001. The 90-day statutory period
ended March 31, 2001.


vy. Nat'l Football League, No. 97 C 3741, 1997 WL 619839, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1997)
(citing Hayes v. RCA Serv. Co., 546 F. Supp. 661, 664 (D.D.C. 1982)), Defendant claims that
Bouchelion can in no way assert that Reynolds’ decisions concerning the alleged discrimination
occurred in Illinois. Because Bouchelion never worked in Illinois, Defendant argues that he
cannot satisfy the first element of §5(f)(3). Bouchelion has failed to sufficiently counter
Defendant’s argument. Therefore, this Court finds that the first element of § 5(f)(3) has not been
satisfied.

Secondly, venue may be proper in the district in which Bouchelion’s relevant
employment records are kept. Defendant has offered proof of the fact that under the second
element, this case is not proper in Northern District of Illinois. John Eve’s affidavit clearly
indicates that all relevant employment records concerning Bouchelion are maintained and
administered in Dayton, Ohio and that none of Bouchelion’s records are maintained or
administered in Illinois.2 Bouchelion does not claim, nor can he claim, that his relevant
employment records are maintained or administered in Illinois. Therefore, Bouchelion has failed
to satisfy the second element of Title VII’s venue provision.

Third, this Court may find that venue is proper where Bouchelion would have worked but
for Defendant’s unlawful employment practices. Bouchelion’s only relevant argument to
support this proposition is that “the had expressed interest in positions for the computer division.
The computer division is located in Chicago to some extent.” (P1.’s Am. Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss or to Trans. Ven. J 7.) However, this argument is weak at best. Bouchelion has failed

to produce evidence that he applied for positions in Chicago and was rejected for those positions

2 John Eve is the Director of Human Resources for Defendant Reynolds & Reynolds Company.

3


CONCLUSION

In the present case, none of the factors listed in the venue provision of Title VII are
present. The allegations contained in Counts III and IV of Plaintiffs’ complaint state that all the
events involving Bouchelion’s employment occurred in Maryland. There is no indication that
any employment records relevant to this action are located in this district. Finally, Bouchelion
has failed to allege that but for the alleged discriminatory conduct he would be working in
Illinois. Thus, it is the order of this Court that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. #9-1) is
DENIED and Defendant’s Motion to Transfer (doc. #9-2) is GRANTED. Therefore, Counts II
and IV of Plaintiff's complaint are transferred to the Southern District of Ohio for further
proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 25, 2001

WILLIAM J. BLER, DISTRICT JUDGE


‘Minute Order Form (06/97)

“Go / United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
vere Magistrate ude Judge Hibbler “Than Asigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 010770 DATE 7/9/2001
CASE Gwin & Bouchelion vs. Reynolds & Reynolds
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts IH and IV or Alternatively to Transfer Venue
DOCKET ENTRY:
a a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) i) Brief in support of motion due
TM.G) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue____.
(4) o Ruling/Hearingon____—ssetfor______at
(5) o Status hearing [held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor_____at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference [held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__——at__—
(7) oO Trial [set for/re-set for] on__ at
(8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to____at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs [by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) OGeneralRule21 OFRCP41(a)(1) CI FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) MM (Otherdocketentry) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts II and IV of the Complaint (doc. #9-1)
is DENIED. Defendant’s Alternative Motion to Transfer Venue over Counts III and IV (Plaintiff
Bouchelion’s claims) to the Southern District of Ohio (doc. #9-2) is GRANTED. Based upon Plaintiff
Gwin’s oral motion and this Court’s findings, Counts I & II of the Complaint are transferred to the

Southern District of Ohio as well.

(1) [For further detail see order attached to one origi inute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
a umber of notices

lyu_ 10 200

Notices mailed by judge's staff,

Notified counsel by telephone.

vu | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

dotted Ny

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

1 JUL -9 Pil be 54

courtroom
JHC deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in

central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
ALPHONSO GWIN, JR., and )
KEITH S. BOUCHELION, )
Plaintiffs, )
) CAUSE NO. 010770
v. )
) JUDGE WILLIAM J. HIBBLER
REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS CO. )

Defendant. D OCKE TED

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION JUL - 18200
Plaintiff Bouchelion has brought an action seeking damages for employment
discrimination. This Court now has before it Defendant Reynolds’ Motion to Dismiss Counts III
and IV pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. 1406(a). Alternatively, Reynolds
seeks a Motion for Transfer of Venue of Counts III and IV pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000¢-
5(£)(3). For the reasons noted below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on improper venue
(doc. #9-1) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Transfer of Venue (doc. #9-2) is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Reynolds is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in
Dayton, Ohio. Plaintiff Bouchelion is a resident of the State of Maryland and for purposes of
this claim has never worked for Reynolds in the State of Illinois or worked out of any branch

office located in the State of Illinois.

0


PROPER VENUE UNDER TITLE VII

Bouchelion’s employment discrimination claim arises pursuant to Title VII.’ 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. Title VII has its own venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Section 5(f)(3)
is not simply a supplement to 28 U.S.C. § 1391; it is the exclusive venue provision for all Title
VII discrimination actions. Cooley v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. 95 C 5025, 1995 WL 683494, at
*] (NLD. Ill. Nov. 15, 1995) (citing Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, 950 F.2d 586,
587-588 (9th Cir. 1991)); McCarthy v. KFC Corp., No. 84 C 994, 1984 WL 1048, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. July 20, 1984). Since Defendant has challenged venue, Plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that venue is proper. First Health Group, Corp. v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., No. 99 C
2926, 2000 WL 139474, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2000). Under Section 5(f)(3), venue is proper:

[1] in any judicial district in the state in which the unlawful employment practice

is alleged to have been committed, [2] in the judicial district in which the

employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or

[3] in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but

for the alleged unlawful employment practice, [4] but if the respondent is not

found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial

district in which the respondent has its principal office.
A plaintiff need satisfy only one of the Title VII venue provisions for the court to exercise
jurisdiction. McDonald v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 308 F. Supp. 664, 669-70 (N.D.
Tl1.1970).

ANALYSIS

First, to determine where the alleged practice occurred, this Court must look to the

location of where the decisions and actions regarding the employment practices took place. Cox

1 This Court is using the specific venue requirements for the Title VII claims contained in Bouchelion’s Count IIE. This
Court will not consider the specific venue requirements under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),
29U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Bouchelion has not set forth a cause of action under the ADEA, and in fact he asks for judgment
under 28 U.S.C. § 621 which this Court finds to be an error.

2