+a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s
determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423
(d) (2) (C). SSA regulations provide that the Commissioner must
consider “the combined effect of all of [the claimant’s]
impairments” when making a disability determination. 20 C.F.R. §
416.923; see also Goodson v. Barnhart, 217 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902
(N.D. Ill. 2002). However, when it is not possible to separate
the mental impairment documented in the evidence, from the drug
or alcohol abuse, then “a finding of ‘not material’ would be
appropriate.” Clark v. Apfel, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (D.c.
Ore. 2000) (quoting Social Security Administration Emergency
Teletype of DAA, August 30, 1996, Answer 29).

In Mr. Jarmon’s case, the ALJ determined that Mr. Jarmon’s
“primary problem” was his substance abuse disorder. Record at
19. The ALJ noted that, if he “considered the affects of the
claimant’s drug and alcohol abuse, [he] would find that [Mr.
Jarmon] was unable to perform even a simple, unskilled job on a
sustained basis and that jobs did not exist in significant
numbers, in the national economy that he could perform.” Record
at 21. He then applied Public Law 104-121, which prohibits
disability benefits when drug or alcohol abuse are a “material
contributing factor” to the impairments, and found that Mr.

Jarmon was not disabled. Record at 21. Fundamentally, however,

19


‘obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifint) OR any serious
impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g.,
no friends, unable to keep a job).” Id. (emphasis in original).
The record also contains an April 7, 2000 note from Dr.
Zaloudek, the same medical expert who testified before the ALJ,
stating that he “agree[s] with the PRTF and MRFC as signed by Dr.
Hermsmeyer on 9-9-99 and affirmed by Dr. Tomassetti on 2-9-00.”
Record at 328. According to those documents, Mr. Jarmon suffered
from both schizophrenic, paranoid or other psychotic disorder,
and substance addiction disorders. Record at 307. Drs.
Hermsmeyer and Tomassetti found that Mr. Jarmon’s disorders
functionally limited his activities of daily living, his social
functioning, and his concentration, persistence or pace. Id. at
314. Specifically, Drs. Hermsmeyer and Tomassetti found that Mr.
Jarmon was moderately limited in his ability to understand and
remember detailed instructions, and his ability to carry out
detailed instructions, but that he had the mental capacity to
perform simple tasks. Id. at 315-17. Although not specifically
mentioned by Dr. Zaloudek, the record also contains a residual
functional capacity assessment prepared on February 22, 2000 by
Dr. F. Paul LaFata, who concluded that Mr. Jarmon could lift 20
pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, that he could

stand, walk and sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and that

13


any finding of disability would have had to have stemmed, in a
material way, from the substance abuse. But on the record before
it, the Court cannot sustain that conclusion. On remand, the ALJ
must do a better job of explaining why he believes a person with
Mr. Jarmon’s impairments - his physical impairments and his non-
substance abuse mental impairments ~ is capable of performing a
significant number of jobs in the national economy. On the
record as developed, that conclusion is not self-evident.
Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the
ALJ’s findings at step five are not supported by substantial
evidence, and that the ALJ failed to build an accurate and
logical bridge between the record evidence and his conclusions
that Mr. Jarmon’s addictions were a material contributing factor
in his mental impairments, and that Mr. Jarmon was capable of
performing other jobs in the national economy. The Court,
therefore, grants Mr. Jarmon’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and
denies the Commissioner’s. The Court remands the case to the
Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this

Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Date: March 31, 2004 ENTER:

Qr2eron Fov<

ARLANDER KEYS
United States Magistrate Judge

23



“hearing; he testified that he last drank in May of 2000. Id. at
464-65. In response to questioning from his attorney, Mr. Jarmon
testified that he can walk a block or two before he runs out of
breath, and, even then, he has to walk slowly because of his
ulcers and varicose veins. Id. at 468-69. He testified that he
uses a cane, on the advice of his doctor. Id. at 471. He
testified that his depression make it difficult for him to
concentrate, sit or read for any significant period of time. Id.
at 471-72. He testified that he feels kind of confused, he hears
noises (babies crying, cats purring and meowing) that aren’t
really there, sometimes he thinks people are trying to harm him.
Id. at 474. He testified that he is forgetful, and that he has
difficulty sleeping. Id. at 475. In response to questions from
the medical expert, Mr. Jarmon testified that he had been
hospitalized several times for mental problems, and that one
time, at Hines, he was told that “the alcohol and drugs was part
of me being depressed so they took me to the alcohol and drug
unit.” Id. at 482.

After Mr. Jarmon, Dr. Zaloudek testified. He testified
that, in his opinion, Mr. Jarmon has a severe impairment that
includes drug and alcohol abuse and dependence, which is in early
remission, and that he also has a schizoaffective disorder, which

Dr. Zaloudek characterized as follows:


“the fact that Mr. Jarmon’s substance abuse was his “primary
problem” should not automatically have caused the ALJ to
disregard all of his other problems. See Goodson, 217 F. Supp.
2d at 902 (stating that ALJ must look to the combined affect of
all of a claimaint’s impairments). The Court does not read
Public Law 104-121 to say that, if there is a component of mental
illness separate and apart from the addiction disorders, the ALJ
is required to throw the claimant out on his head. Here, the ALJ
did not adequately address Mr. Jarmon’s history of psychological
problems; he merely dismissed them as being secondary to the
addiction disorders, and this is inappropriate, given the
evidence in the record suggesting that Mr. Jarmon’s psychological
impairments might have existed separate and apart from his
substance abuse. See Myers v. Chater, 1997 WL 116805, *13 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (remanding the case because the ALJ did not provide an
explanation for dismissing the claimant’s mental impairment
claim, which, according to the district court, meant that the ALJ
made an impermissible medical determination). Although the ALJ
is in the best position to decide the evidence, he must still
address the issues before him and adequately explain his
reasoning and determination. See Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d
863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the ALJ is not required to

examine every piece of evidence, but must still articulate a

20



‘ concerns, he recognized that Mr. Jarmon was given other mental
health diagnoses, including dysthymia and borderline personality
disorder, approximately one year later. Record at 18. Also,
although the ALJ dismissed Mr. Jarmon’s depression by noting the
numerous times that Mr. Jarmon was not experiencing suicidal or
homicidal ideations, the ALJ failed to mention the documentation
showing that Mr. Jarmon had, in fact, attempted suicide in the
past, including one time when he was stopped by the police, that
he had, in fact, engaged in self-mutilating behavior, and that he
had, in fact, had thoughts of hurting his girlfriend and her
child. The ALJ never questioned whether these manifestations of
Mr. Jarmon’s very real mental illness would have affected his
ability to hold down a job; instead, he noted the substance abuse
and ended the matter, without discussing how Mr. Jarmon’s other
mental impairments might come into play. Because of this hole in
the analysis, the Court is unable to meaningfully review the
ALJ's ultimate conclusion that Mr. Jarmon was not disabled. The
case must, therefore be remanded.

Having said all of this, it is important to note that, at
the end of the day, the ALJ may well be right about Mr. Jarmon’s
mental impairments; his substance abuse may very well turn out to
have been a material contributing factor in his schizoaffective

disorder and borderline personality disorder diagnoses, and that

22



“determines at any time that the claimant is not disabled, the
analysis ends. Goodson, 217 F. Supp.2d. at 900. The claimant
has the burden of establishing a disability at steps one through
four; however, if the analysis reaches step five, then the burden
shifts to the SSA, to show that there are other jobs in the
national economy that the claimant is capable of performing.

Additionally, an ALJ must “build an accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusions so that [the Court]
may afford the claimant meaningful review of the SSA’s ultimate
findings.” Blakes ex rel. Wolfe v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 569
(7th Cir. 2002). Therefore, not only must the record contain
evidence to support the ALJ’s finding, but the ALJ must also
rationally articulate the basis for his findings. Steele, 290
F.3d at 941. Without this connection, the district court must
remand the ALJ’s decision. Id.

In this case, the ALJ applied the five-step analysis
outlined above, and found initially, that Mr. Jarmon was not
engaged in substantial gainful work, as he had been unemployed
since March of 1999. Record at 19. At step two, the ALJ found
that Mr. Jarmon suffered from a “severe substance abuse disorder
and also suffers a severe physical impairment.” Id. At step
three, the ALJ determined that Mr. Jarmon’s physical and mental

impairments, whether combined or. alone, did not meet or equal any

17


“any affective or psychotic symptoms, and, in the end, he was
deemed “stable to obtain housing at the YMCA.” Record at 121-22.
It is unclear whether Mr. Jarmon ever actually received

housing at the YMCA. But the record shows that, on July 21,
1999, he was admitted to Skokie Meadows Nursing Center, a
facility that provided short-term and long-term care for
individuals with psychiatric disorders, substance abuse problems,
or both. Record at 263, 82. According to a “report of contact”
form in the record, Mr. Jarmon was admitted to Skokie Meadows for
short-term care “for sobriety”; the administrator who spoke to
the SSA representative reported that Mr. Jarmon had “no real
psychiatric diagnosis,” and that he “has some depression,
probably secondary to his substance abuse.” Record at 82.

The record shows that Mr. Jarmon returned to the NCVA on
April 17, 2000. According to the notes in the file, Mr. Jarmon
was incarcerated for three months, from about December of 1999 to
March of 2000, after he violated an order of protection issued
for his long-time, on-and-off girlfriend. Record at 378-80. He
went to NCVA shortly after his release to see whether he should
re-start coumadin to help with his blood clots, and was told that
that was not necessary. Id. at 380. He returned to West Side VA
Hospital the next month, after relapsing into substance abuse.

Id. at 379. In addition to the relapse, in May of 2000 Mr.


“was admitted to the North Chicago VA Hospital (NCVA) on October
5, 1998 for alcohol and substance abuse. He was referred to NCVA
by his probation officer, who was monitoring Mr. Jarmon in the
wake of a domestic violence incident, after he showed up to an
appointment under the influence of alcohol. Record at 246. The
records from NCVA show that, at the time he was admitted, Mr.
Jarmon reported that he had started drinking at age 14, that he
drank 1 to 2 pints of gin per day, plus a six-pack of beer; he
stated that he had had his last drink about two weeks prior to
his admission. Record at 252. He further reported that he had
started using cocaine in 1994, and that his habit was up to about
$300 per day; he reported that he had last used cocaine three
weeks before his admission. Id. As part of the admission
process, NCVA also conducted a psychiatric evaluation; the
evaluator concluded that Mr. Jarmon had no major depressive or
psychotic symptoms, and no suicidal or homicidal ideations.
Record at 251. The record shows that, by October 22, 1998, the
NCVA staff had diagnosed Mr. Jarmon with alcohol and cocaine
dependence, in early partial remission in a controlled
environment, and major depressive disorder, recurrent, with
psychotic features. Record at 235. According to the notes from
that date, Mr. Jarmon’s “major diagnosis is Borderline

Personality Disorder with sequelae of substance abuse and


a depression that can show up with a person being a

loner or a social isolated. And can have symptoms of

hallucinations or paranoia. It falls between the

condition of schizophrenia and major depression.

Sometimes the person has problems collecting their

thoughts and difficulties with concentration. And

they’ re put on usually a combination of medications

such as anti-depressants and anti-psychotic

medications.
Record at 483. Dr. Zaloudek testified that Mr. Jarmon’s mental
impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. Id. He
testified that, functionally, Mr. Jarmon’s depression would make
him agitated and cause him to suffer deficits of concentration;
he testified that Mr. Jarmon would have “marked difficulties”
completing a normal workday or a normal workweek because “he
wouldn’t be able to maintain contration without the interference
of psychological problems.” Id. at 484. Dr. Zaloudek testified
that, in his view, Mr. Jarmon would have “moderate restrictions
of daily activities and social functioning, but frequent
deficiencies of concentration, persistence of pace.” Id. at 485.
He testified that Mr. Jarmon experienced sleep difficulties,
psychomotor agitation and difficulties with concentration, which
“would be enough to satisfy the criteria of a major affective
disorder.” Id,
In addition to the testimony of Mr. Jarmon and Dr. Zaloudek,

the ALJ considered Mr. Jarmon’s extensive record of medical

treatments and assessments. According to that record, Mr. Jarmon


“listed impairments. Id. At step four, the ALJ found that Mr.
Jarmon was unable to perform his past relevant work. Id. at 21.
He determined, however, that Mr. Jarmon “retains the residual
functional capacity for light work activities, with standing and
walking of 6 hour [sic] in a workday and lifting 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently.” Record at 20. At step
five, the ALJ found that, given his physical and mental
limitations, his age and his education, Mr. Jarmon had the
residual function capacity to perform the full range of light
work. Id. at 22.

After analyzing Mr. Jarmon’s case under the five step
analysis required by the regulations, the ALJ noted that, if Mr.
Jarmon’s substance abuse was considered, then he would have found
Mr. Jarmon to be disabled. The ALJ concluded, however, that
under 42 U.S.C. 423 (d)(2)(C), which prohibits a finding of
disability when a claimant’s substance abuse is a material
contributing factor, Mr. Jarmon was not disabled.

By way of background, in 1996, Congress enacted Public Law
104-121, the “Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996.”
Section 105, entitled “Denial of Disability Benefits to Drug
Addicts and Alcoholics,” provided that claimants “shall not be
considered to be disabled for purposes of this title if

alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this subparagraph) be

18



"30 days”; that he experienced “serious depression, serious
anxiety or tension, trouble understanding, concentrating or
remembering and trouble controlling violent behavior”; and that
he had “serious thoughts of suicide in the past 30 days.” Record
at 182. According to the evaluator, Mr. Jarmon’s representations
on April 12 were “not significantly distorted by
misrepresentation.” Id. Just a week later, however, the
attending psychiatrist’s notes show that Mr. Jarmon was “stable,”
with no symptoms of depression or anxiety, and that he denied
having any suicidal or homicidal ideations. Record at 181. A
note from May 13, 1999 confirms that Mr. Jarmon was “doing well,
his sleeping pattern has stabilized; his depressive [symptoms]
lifted.” Record at 170. On June 7, 1999, NCVA discharged Mr.
Jarmon from its program, when he failed to return to the facility
after being granted a weekend pass. Record at 164.

The record shows that Mr. Jarmon returned to the NCVA on
June 17, 1999, stayed for a few days, and was then discharged on
June 22, 1999 when he, once again, failed to return to the
facility. Record at 162. On June 30, 1999, Mr. Jarmon turned up
at the West Side VA Hospital, seeking a psychiatric clearance so
that he could obtain a room in the YMCA. He was evaluated in the
psychiatry assessment clinic, he reported that he had been sober

for the past nine months, he denied any drug or alcohol use and


Minut Order Form (06/97)

$P

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Naiiie of Assigned Jud; Sitting Judge If Oth
vor Magistrate Jude Arlander Keys than Asigaed Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 3702 DATE 3/31/2004
CASE Robert Jarmon vs. JoAnn Barnhart
TITLE
. [la the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

2 a Brief in support of motion due ‘

@) a Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due. .

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) oO Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at

© oa Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .

(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial} [Hearing] held/continued to at

9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) (CLocal Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(aX1) OFRCP4I{aX2).

(10.) =f [Other docket entry] Memorandum Opinion and Order entered. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment [#13] is granted; Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [#23] is denied. The case
is hereby remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

(11) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.
a | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices.
a | Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
yurtroo1 o Lente
ree com gz sini 1 usa tll
initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office

4

ee eed



“evidence before the ALJ also included reports from an internist
and a psychiatrist who evaluated Mr. Jarmon at the behest of the
SSA in August 1999. The internist, Dr. Peter Biale, diagnosed
Mr. Jarmon with “bilateral mild varicosities in the right leg”
and “ulcers in the medial aspect of the leg,” as well as
recurrent blood clots, hypertension and depression. Record at
266. The psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Wagner, noted that Mr. Jarmon
“was given a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, depressed
type and dementia not otherwise specified,” and that he “also has
a history of alcohol and polysubstance abuse.” Record at 269.
Based upon the mental status examination he performed on Mr.
Jarmon, Dr. Wagner concluded that “it might be reasonably
expected that this claimant might have difficulty with
effectively managing simple funds in their best interest.” Id.

Additionally, on January 28, 2000, Mr. Jarmon underwent a
round of consultative examinations and evaluations for the SSA.
First, he was examined by Dr. Claude Hamilton, who “spent
approximately 50 minutes with the claimant in evaluating medical
records, forms, and in formulating and dictating this report.”
Record at 296. Dr. Hamilton noted Mr. Jarmon’s history of drug
and alcohol abuse, psychiatric illness, blood clots and
hypertension. Record at 300. He determined that Mr. Jarmon

continued to use drugs, but was otherwise stable; he made no

11


-Jarmon also suffered two episodes where he was temporarily
blinded and felt numb on his left side. Record at 377. He was
admitted to West Side VA Hospital on May 17, 2000, and, after a
psychiatry assessment, was re-started on anti-depressants.
Record at 374, 378. Mr. Jarmon was discharged from the hospital
on May 22, 2000. Id. at 364.

On June 8, 2000, Mr. Jarmon returned to NCVA for substance
abuse treatment. Record at 421. He was admitted that day, and
diagnosed with alcohol and cocaine dependence, dysthymic
disorder, borderline personality disorder, deep venous
thrombosis, and varicosities of the lower extremeties. Id.
Progress notes from June 23, 2000 indicate that Mr. Jarmon
resumed taking antidepressants because of his continued sleep
disturbances and anxiety symptoms; he denied having any suicidal
or homicidal ideations. Id. at 405. Notes from July 13, 2000
indicate that, by that date, Mr. Jarmon had completed the
substance abuse treatment program and was stable for discharge;
he had no symptoms of major depression, mania or psychosis and
was experiencing no suicidal or homicidal ideations. Record at
389. The notes show that the plan upon discharge was for Mr.
Jarmon to receive follow up care at the West Side VA Hospital.
Id

In addition to the treatment records, the documentary

10


“depression. He reports history of chaotic, violent relationships
and self harming behavior.” Id. The notes conclude that, given
this diagnosis, “Mr. Jarmon’s prognosis for recovery is very
poor.” Id. While at NCVA, Mr. Jarmon started taking anti-
depressants, and, over time, some of the negative symptoms he had
experienced lessened or stopped altogether; the record shows that
Mr. Jarmon started sleeping better, he stopped engaging in self
harming behaviors, stopped biting his nails, stopped pulling out
his lashes and hair; he became calmer and less anxious. See,
e.g., Record at 194, 196, 213.

The record shows that, in the middle of his stay at NCVA,
Mr. Jarmon was admitted to the West Side VA Hospital for
treatment of his “veinous thrombosis” and blood clots. Record at
102-125. For the latter, Mr. Jarmon underwent two venograms with
urikinase treatment, but when the clots persisted, the doctors
prescribed a long-term course of anticoagulants (coumadin) and
discharged him on March 31, 1999; he was instructed to report
directly to the halfway house at NCVA. Id. at 115.

The record shows that, upon returning to NCVA, Mr. Jarmon
reported feeling more anxious and his sleep problems appeared to
re-emerge. See, e.g., record at 190, 191. The notes from April
12, 1999 show that Mr. Jarmon reported experiencing

“psychological or emotional problems on 30 days during the past


“legitimate reason for his decision). With one exception, the
reports documenting Mr. Jarmon’s mental impairments treat the
borderline personality disorder and the schizoaffective disorder
as a separate diagnosis from the substance abuse disorders. This
at least suggests that the non-substance abuse afflictions were,
to a variety of health professionals, note-worthy in their own
right.

It is true, as the ALJ noted, that Mr. Jarmon was told by
his doctors that alcohol and drug use were part of his
depression. Record at 18. But that is not necessarily the same
thing as saying that the addictions were a material contributing
factor in his mental impairments. Without some explanation, the
ALJ’s conclusion seems dismissive. And the ALJ's dismissiveness
with regard to the psychological evidence is reflected in the way
he viewed the record. For example, the ALJ’s decision states
that “[s]ignificantly, the only mental diagnosis given was
rehabilitation for alcohol and cocaine dependence,” and he cites
one of the medical assessments to support that finding. Record
at 18 (emphasis added). But the report he cites actually states
that Mr. Jarmon’s primary diagnosis is Borderline Personality
Disorder, and that, due to this problem, Mr. Jarmon’ s “prognosis
for recovery is very poor.” Record at 235. Further, although

the ALJ concluded that there were no other mental health

21



“December 1999, he received $794 per month for service-connected
disability. Id. at 451-52. He also testified that he was not
working, that he last worked in March of 1999, when he developed
blood clots in his legs and had to quit his job. Id. at 452. He
alleges that his disability onset date was March 1, 1999. Id. at
460. Mr. Jarmon testified that, prior to his park maintenance
job with the North Chicago Park District, he worked as a cook and
as a painter. Id. at 453-58.

With respect to his impairments, Mr. Jarmon testified that
he suffered frostbite to his legs in 1982, and then developed
varicose veins in both legs, but more predominantly in his right
leg, and ulcers in his right ankle. Id. at 460. He testified
that, in addition to his leg problems, he also suffers from
depression; he testified that he had been receiving treatment for
his depression since about March of 1999, and that he was
currently taking anti-depressants. Id. at 461-62.

With respect to his daily activities, he testified that he
doesn’t really do much during the day, he just pretty much sits
around at the shelter, and spends his time alone; he participates
in weekly counseling sessions, he watches television and reads
the paper, sometimes he takes a walk or goes to the park. Id. at
463, 466-68. He testified that he had abused drugs and alcohol

in the past, but that he was not using either at the time of the


“his ability to push and pull was unlimited. Record at 320. Dr.
LaFata’s RFC also indicates that Mr. Jarmon could occasionally
climb, and frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl.
Id. at 321.

The ALJ issued his decision on September 29, 2000, finding
that Mr. Jarmon retained the residual functional capacity to
perform the full range of light work and was, therefore, not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Record
at 22. The ALJ specifically noted that, if he had considered Mr.
Jarmon’s substance abuse disorder, he would have found Mr. Jarmon
to be disabled because his addictions prevented him from
performing even a simple, unskilled job on a sustained basis.

Id. But, the ALJ concluded, because Mr. Jarmon’s addictions were
contributing factors material to the finding of disability,
Public Law 104-121 precluded him from finding Mr. Jarmon to be
disabled. Id. at 21-22. On this last point, the ALJ found,
after “combing through the medical evidence,” that Mr. Jarmon’s
addictions were material to the residual functional capacity
determination; specifically, the ALJ determined that, “[a}lthough
the claimant has been diagnosed with a schizoaffective disorder,
the evidence shows that the claimant’s primary problem appears to
be with substance abuse.” Id. at 19. Additionally, in assessing

Mr. Jarmon’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ chose not to

14


‘Commissioner’s decision may not re-weigh the evidence, re-try the
case, or substitute its own judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir.
1995). Review is limited to examining whether the ALJ applied
the proper legal standard and whether there is substantial
evidence to support the ALJ's findings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see
also Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F. 2d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir. 1992).
The Social Security regulations provide a five-step analysis
to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) the ALJ first
asks whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) if the
claimant is unemployed, then the ALJ asks whether the claimant's
impairment is severe; (3) if the impairment is severe, the ALJ
determines whether the impairment meets or equals one of the
listed impairments specified in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1; (4) if the impairment meets one on the listing, then
the claimant is disabled; if it does not, then the ALJ must
determine whether the claimant is able to perform his past
relevant work; (5) if the claimant is unable to perform his past
relevant work, the ALJ must determine whether there is any work
in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)-(£); Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 376, 378 (7th Cir.
1999); Goodson v. Barnhart, 217 F.Supp.2d 892, 900 (N.D. Ill.

2002). When applying this sequential process, if the ALJ

16



"has worked as a beautician, a cook, and a painter. Record at 57.
He last worked as a park maintenance worker; he was on the job
for approximately two months when he had to quit because of his
impairments. Record at 452.

Mr. Jarmon applied for SSI and DIB on June 25, 1999,
claiming on his application that, as of March 1, 1999, he was
unable to work because of varicose veins in his lower
extremities, blood clots, substance abuse and mental problems.
Record at 56-60. The SSA denied his claim initially and on
reconsideration. Mr. Jarmon requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge, and the case was assigned to Judge
Alfred Burton, who held a hearing on August 14, 2000.

At the hearing, the ALJ heard from Mr. Jarmon, who testified
first, and from Dr. Richard Zaloudek, a medical expert. Mr.
Jarmon, who was represented by counsel, testified that he was
currently living in a shelter, that he was single, had never been
married and had no children. Record at 448. He testified that
he received a GED in 1982, and that he had associates degrees in
both cosmetology and security. Id. at 449. Mr. Jarmon testified
that he served in the United States Army from January 7, 1980 to
January 7, 1983, when he was honorably discharged. Id. at 450.
He testified that he had been receiving disability payments in

connection with his service in the Army since 1983; as of


“~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT JARMON,

- 4 10h

Plaintiff, No. 02 c 37da‘

vs. Magistrate Judge
Arlander Keys
JO ANN B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

RAND’ OPINION ORDER

Robert Jarmon applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
and Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) on June 25, 1999,
claiming that he suffers from both physical and mental
impairments that prevent him from working. The Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) denied Mr. Jarmon’s application, and,
after exhausting his appeal rights before the SSA, Mr. Jarmon
filed an action in the United States District Court seeking
review of the agency’s decision. The case is before the Court on
the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

Robert Jarmon, now forty-one years old, is an Army veteran
with the equivalent of a high school education and two
associate’s degrees, one for cosmetology and the other for

network security. Record at 17, 450. In the past, Mr. Jarmon

av


-findings concerning Mr. Jarmon’s psychiatric illness, leaving
that assessment to the consulting psychiatrist. Id. at 300. Dr.
Maria Mynatt performed the consultative psychiatric evaluation;
she reviewed the earlier reports prepared by Dr. Wagner and Dr.
Biale, and she spent about 40 minutes with Mr. Jarmon. Record at
303. According to Dr. Mynatt’s report, Mr. Jarmon was feeling
depressed at the time of the evaluation; he reported that his
sleep was poor, his appetite was low, he was having suicidal
thoughts and occasional homicidal thoughts, as well as auditory
hallucinations; he stated that his memory was terrible, that he
had difficulty concentrating, making decisions and staying on
task. Id. at 303-04. In the summary section of her report, Dr.
Mynatt focused on both Mr. Jarmon’s substance abuse problems, and
his depression and concluded that his “[{p]rognosis remains
guarded.” Id. at 306. Under the diagnosis section, she noted
polysubstance dependence, schizoaffective disorder (currently
depressed), thrombophlebitis, recurrent blood clots, ulcers, and
hypertension. Id. She noted that he had a “[c]urrent GAF of
about 45,” id., meaning that she put him at a 45 on the Global
Assessment of Functioning Scale, a “hypothetical continuum of
mental health-illness.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth ed. (DSM-IV), p. 32. A score of 45

indicates “[slerious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe

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‘credit Dr. Zaloudek’s testimony from the hearing that Mr. Jarmon
was incapable of performing even a simple, unskilled job on a
sustained basis. Id.

The ALJ’s decision became the final agency decision when the
Appeals Council denied review on April 3, 2002. See 20 C.F.R.
§416.1481. Myr. Jarmon then filed this lawsuit, seeking review of
the agency’s decision and an award of benefits. The parties
consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, and the case was
reassigned to this Court on July 30, 2003. Thereafter, both
parties moved for summary judgment.

Discus

A district court must affirm the ALJ’s finding if it is
supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d. 936, 940 (7th Cir.
2002). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence and consists of “such evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The ALJ need not weigh every
piece of evidence; however, when the SSA Commissioner’s “decision
lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to
prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded.” Steele,

290 F.3d at 940. Generally, a court that is reviewing the

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