harm that the nonmoving party will suffer if preliminary injunctive relief is granted, and that
preliminary injunctive relief will not harm the public interest if granted. Kiel v. City of Kenosha,
236 F.3d 814, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2000). As a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy, the moving party must make a clear showing as to all of the preceding requirements.
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting 11A Charles Allan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, at 129-30 (2d ed. 1995)).

Initially, we note that Thompson's requests for preliminary injunctive relief as to Count I
and Count II are moot due to Judge Suzanne Conlon's October 2, 2001 ruling. See Thompson v.
Il. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, No. 01 C 6057, at 4, 6 (N.D. Ill. dated Oct. 2, 2001) (granting
Sherman's Motion to Dismiss Count I and Count II). Hence, we need only decide if preliminary
injunctive relief is warranted as to Count III.

Count III sets forth three separate claims under § 1983: one for violation of substantive
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, another for violation of procedural due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and a third for violation of equal protection
under the law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. To establish a substantive due process
claim, a plaintiff must establish, at a minimum, that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a
constitutionally protected "life, liberty, or property interest." Bevell v. Breashears, No. 98 C 690,
1999 WL 102773, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1999) (quoting Zorzi v. County of Putnam, 30 F.3d
885, 894 (7th Cir. 1994)). To establish a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant deprived the plaintiff of constitutionally protected property without due process of
law. Lewandowski v. Two Rivers Pub. Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 1486, 1493 (E.D. Wis. 1989). To

establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was a member of a

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Written objections to any finding of fact, conclusion of law, or the recommendation for
disposition of this matter must be filed with the Honorable Suzanne B. Conlon within ten (10)
days after service of this Report and Recommendation. See FED. R. Clv. P. 72(b). Failure to
object will constitute a waiver of objections on appeal.

Copies have been mailed to:

LAUREL G. BELLOWS, Esq.
LESLIE P. POOLE, Esq.
Bellows and Bellows, P.C.

79 West Montoe Street

Suite 800

Chicago, IL 60603

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Mark E. Thompson

THADDEUS S. GAUZA, Esq.
Law Offices of Thaddeus Gauza
140 South Dearborn Street
Suite 1610

Chicago, IL 60603

Attorney for Defendants, Bob Dudycz
and Walter Dudycz

JEFFREY D. COLMAN, Esq.
DAVID JIMENEZ-EKMAN, Esq.
GREGORY M. BOYLE, Esq.
ERIN R. SCHRANTZ, Esq.
Jenner & Block, L.L.C.

One IBM Plaza

Chicago, IL 60611

Attorneys for Defendants, Illinois
Department of Professional Regulations
Leonard A. Sherman

SAMUEL J. RUFFOLO, Esq.
Baum, Ruffolo & Marzal, Ltd.
Three First National Plaza

70 West Washington Street
Suite 400

Chicago, IL 60602

Attorney for Defendant, William A. Darr


On August 7, 2001, Thompson filed a complaint in federal court against the Illinois
Department of Professional Regulation, Sherman, Walter Dudycz, Bob Dudycz, and Darr
asserting two causes of action: one under § 1983 for violation of First Amendment rights, the
other under Illinois law for breach of contract. In addition to compensatory damages, Thompson
sought immediate injunctive relief—a judicial order requiring Sherman to transfer Thompson
back to the Chief Administrative Law Judge position in Chicago. During the month of August,
the parties fully briefed the injunctive relief issue.

On September 14, 2001, Sherman transferred Thompson from the Chief of Enforcement
Administration position in Springfield to a Deputy General Counsel position in Chicago, with a
promise to keep Thompson in Chicago during the pendency of this litigation. On September 20,
2001, Thompson filed an amended complaint, dismissing the Illinois Department of Professional
Regulation as a party and adding § 1983 claims for violation of procedural and substantive due
process rights and equal protection under the law. As in the original complaint, Thompson
sought temporary reinstatement to the Chief Administrative Law Judge position in Chicago by
order of the court. We now provide a recommendation on whether a preliminary injunction

should be issued.

IL.
To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must show that he has a
reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his claim, that he has no adequate remedy at
law, that he will suffer irreparable harm if preliminary injunctive relief is denied, that the

irreparable harm he will suffer in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief is greater than the

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protected class, that he was treated differently than other similarly situated people outside of his
protected class, that he suffered an adverse employment action, and that the defendant acted with
discriminatory intent. McPhaul v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Madison County, 226 F.3d 558, 564 (7th
Cir. 2000).

We find that preliminary injunctive relief is unwarranted as to all three claims contained
in Count IIT because Thompson has failed to develop an argument and provide this Court with
supporting case law. See United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991)
("[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent
authority, are waived."); Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C 2021, 2001 WL 417991, at *11 n.6 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 23, 2001) (same). All of the memoranda before this Court were filed before Thompson's
Count HI came into existence. (See Pl.'s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 1 (referring only
to Thompson's two-count Verified Complaint).) The obligation to conduct research and
construct an argument falls on the moving party. Because this obligation has not been performed
by Thompson, we must deny Thompson the drastic relief he seeks.

In any event, argument or no argument, case law or no case law, preliminary injunctive
relief must be denied at least with respect to the due process claims in light of Judge Conlon's
October 2, 2001 ruling. By ruling that Thompson could be removed or demoted for purely
political reasons, Judge Conlon foreclosed any possibility of Thompson's establishing the
existence of a property interest in the Chief Administrative Law Judge position. The absence of
a property interest is fatal to any due process claim, procedural or substantive. Bevell, 1999 WL

102773, at *3-4; Lewandowski, 711 F. Supp. at 1492-93.


a

od

ey fat
“Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Ni f Assigned Jud Sitting Judge if Othe i
Mor Magistrate Saige Suzanne B. Conlon than Asigned Sudge Martin C. Ashman
CASE NUMBER 01 C 6057 DATE 10/12/2001
CASE Mark E. Thompson vs. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, et al.
TITLE

{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

@) im] Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___.

(4) a Ruling/Hearingon___set for at

(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set forlon______esetfor at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_sset for at_—

) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at.

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__—_at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CUFRCP4(m) (General Rule21 CIFRCP41(a)(1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).

ao ill {Other docket entry] Report and recommendation recommending that plaintiff Mark E.

Thompson’s request for a preliminary injunction [4-1] be denied is hereby entered of record. All matters
relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge.

dl) lf [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
5
No notices required. umber of notices
V | Notices mailed by judge’s staff. ocr 16
Notified counsel by telephone. date 2 00
Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form. a
SW
Uv | Copy to judgesnegisteatejudge.
‘courtroom rary 12 ri “4
Is deputy’s ui bers
initials
Date/time received in ;
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials



Til.

For the reasons stated, this Court recommends that Thompson's request for a preliminary

injunction be denied.

Deak, 0 Fn Leeee,

MARTIN C. ASHMAN
Dated: October 12, 2001. United States Magistrate Judge


bocweres”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OCT 16 2001
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARK E. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff, Case No. 01 C 6057
v. Judge Suzanne B. Conlon

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,
et al.,

Magistrate Judge
Martin C. Ashman

NO

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Mark Thompson filed suit against the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation,
Leonard Sherman, director of the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, Walter Dudycz,
Illinois state senator, Bob Dudyez, Maine Township supervisor and brother of Walter Dudycz,
and William Darr, committeeman of the Maine Township Regular Republican Organization,
alleging deprivation of First Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and breach of
contract under Illinois law. An amended complaint, filed over one month later, dismissed the
Illinois Department of Professional Regulation as a party and included additional § 1983 claims
alleging deprivation of certain Fourteenth Amendment rights. All of the claims emanated from

Sherman's employment decision to transfer Thompson from one position to another.

ie


Presently before this Court is Thompson's request for a preliminary injunction.' For the

following reasons, this Court recommends that Thompson's request be denied.”

L

Sherman appointed Thompson to a Deputy General Counsel position at the Illinois
Department of Professional Regulation in October 1999. On April 1, 2000, Sherman transferred
Thompson from the Deputy General Counsel position to a Chief Administrative Law Judge
position. All the while, Thompson was a member of the Republican party and lived near
Chicago, where he worked.

For the April 2001 Maine Township election, Thompson decided not to support
Republican candidate Bob Dudyez. Instead, Thompson supported the Democratic candidate
running against Bob Dudycz. This allegedly upset Walter Dudycz, Bob Dudycz, and Darr, and
caused them to contact Governor George Ryan for the purpose of retaliating against Thompson.
In May 2001, Sherman, purportedly at the direction of Governor Ryan, transferred Thompson
from the Chief Administrative Law Judge position to a Chief of Enforcement Administration
position. The transfer required Thompson to work in Springfield. Thompson viewed the transfer

as a demotion.

' Tn terms of procedure, or lack thereof, this Court will treat Thompson's Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction as a motion for a preliminary injunction. To
date, Thompson has not filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.

> This matter comes before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local
Rule 72.1 for a report and recommendation.

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