[Cite as State v. Watson, 2021-Ohio-2218.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

TYLIN WATSON 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 28914 

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-2768 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 30th day of June, 2021. 

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MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by HEATHER N. KETTER, Atty. Reg. No. 0084470, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 

Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

JEFFREY T. GRAMZA, Atty. Reg. No. 0053392, 101 Southmoor Circle NW, Kettering, 

Ohio 45429 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

TUCKER, P.J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Tylin Watson appeals from his convictions for murder, 

aggravated robbery, tampering with evidence, and having weapons while under disability. 

In support of his appeal, Watson asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient and 

that the evidence weighed heavily against his conviction. 

{¶ 2} For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court's judgment 

was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 3} On May 28, 2018, Sorin Farcas died after being shot in the head during a 

drug transaction. Following an investigation, Watson was arrested and indicted on four 

counts of murder, three counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of felonious assault, 

one count of tampering with evidence, one count of kidnapping, and one count of having 

weapons under disability. All of the counts carried firearm specifications with the 

exception of having weapons while under disability. A jury trial was conducted on all the 

charges except having weapons while under disability, which was subsequently tried to 

the bench. 

{¶ 4} The State presented the testimony of Ronald Hughes, who was with Watson 

at the time of the shooting. According to Hughes, he was with his girlfriend M.H.1 during 

the early morning hours of May 28, 2018. Hughes testified he was driving in his white 

Toyota with M.H. while she was messaging someone from whom she wanted to buy 

marijuana. M.H. had asked Watson if he wanted to go with her to buy marijuana, so the 

1 Because M.H. was a juvenile at the time of the offense, we will refer to her by her initials. 
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pair stopped to pick him up. At the time, Watson was wearing a “hoodie.” Tr. p. 309. 

The trio went to a nearby park to meet the seller. Hughes testified that M.H. and Watson 

exited the car in order to make the purchase. However, they returned to the car without 

any marijuana. M.H. then messaged the seller again and was given another address at 

which meet. 

{¶ 5} M.H. used her phone’s GPS system to navigate to an address located on 

Charnwood Drive in Huber Heights. Hughes testified that he drove a few houses past 

the designated address before he stopped and parked his car on the side of the road; 

M.H. and Watson then exited the vehicle, but Watson told M.H. to stay with the car. 

Watson walked uphill toward the seller’s address, and M.H. got into the backseat of the 

car. Watson had been gone for a few minutes when Hughes heard a gunshot. Watson 

returned and got back into the car. Hughes observed Watson holding a revolver and a 

“large Ziploc bag * * * full of marijuana.” Tr. p. 312. According to Hughes, Watson had 

the hood on his sweatshirt pulled up over his head when he returned to the car. Watson’s 

gun was pointed toward Hughes when he ordered Hughes to drive away and to “keep his 

mouth shut.” Tr. p. 313. M.H. asked Watson what had occurred, and Watson said, “I 

popped him.” Id. Hughes testified that he understood Watson to mean that he had shot 

someone. Hughes eventually dropped Watson off in Dayton near a convenience store. 

Hughes admitted that he did not call the police afterward; indicated he did not do so 

because he believed he would endanger himself and his family if he spoke to the police. 

Hughes indicated that he stopped dating M.H. after the incident. 

{¶ 6} M.H. also testified on behalf of the State. Like Hughes, she testified that she 

had been trying to purchase marijuana during the early morning hours of May 28, 2018. 
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She testified that she posted her request on a social media outlet and received a response 

from Farcas. M.H. asked Watson, whom she had known for about one year, if he wanted 

to accompany her to the buy. When Watson responded affirmatively, Hughes and M.H. 

picked him up and traveled to a park to meet Farcas. Farcas did not show up at the park, 

but he texted M.H. and told her to meet him at his house in Huber Heights. He also 

texted her his address. M.H. then used her phone’s GPS system to locate the address. 

{¶ 7} M.H. testified that, during the drive, she showed Watson a picture of Farcas 

from one of Farcas’s social media apps. According to M.H., Watson said Farcas looked 

“lame” and that he could “just run off with his stuff,” which led M.H. to believe that Watson 

was going to take Farcas’s marijuana without paying. Tr. p. 517. She testified that 

Watson went up to Farcas’s home while she sat in the car with Hughes. Approximately 

six minutes later, M.H. heard a “loud pop” which sounded like a gunshot coming from the 

house. Tr. p. 520. She testified that Watson returned to the car approximately 30 

seconds after the gunshot and that he had the hood on his red sweatshirt pulled up. 

{¶ 8} According to M.H., when Watson entered the car, he told Hughes to “hurry 

up and drive,” and that he had shot Farcas in the head. Tr. p. 522. M.H. also observed 

Watson had a clear bag containing marijuana and an iPhone, which he turned off as soon 

as he entered the car. Watson gave M.H. 10 to 12 grams of the marijuana, which was 

approximately half of the contents of the bag. 

{¶ 9} M.H. admitted she was charged in juvenile court for her role in these events. 

Specifically, she was charged with offenses that, were she an adult, would have 

constituted aggravated robbery and involuntary manslaughter. The State sought to have 

M.H. bound over to the common pleas court to be tried as an adult, but the juvenile court 
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retained jurisdiction. Eventually, a plea agreement was reached, and M.H. was 

remanded to the Ohio Department of Youth Services. She remained in custody for 

approximately one year and was on parole at the time of Watson’s trial. 

{¶ 10} Michael Ballweg testified that he and Farcas met while working at the same 

restaurant and that he would purchase marijuana from Farcas. Ballweg was at work 

during the early morning hours of May 28. Ballweg did not own a car, so he texted 

Farcas to ask for a ride home from work. Farcas arrived at the restaurant at 

approximately 3:00 a.m. and informed Ballweg he would take him home but that he 

needed to first stop at his own residence in order to make a marijuana sale. The two 

drove to Farcas’s home on Charnwood Drive in Huber Heights, pulled into the driveway, 

and then went into the garage. 

{¶ 11} According to Ballweg, the garage contained a table, chairs, and a sofa. 

Ballweg testified that he and Farcas sat down with the garage door open and noticed a 

“really loud white car” drive past Farcas’s house. Tr. p. 399. Ballweg testified that, after 

he and Farcas had been seated for two to three minutes, a man ran into the garage. 

According to Ballweg, the man was wearing a “red hooded sweatshirt,” with the hood up. 

Tr. p. 419. Ballweg testified the sweatshirt was zipped and the hood was tied. 

{¶ 12} The man had a gray revolver, which he pointed at both Ballweg and Farcas. 

The man then demanded the marijuana which was sitting out on the table. According to 

Ballweg, Farcas handed the man the bag of marijuana. The man then demanded that 

Farcas hand over his cell phone. Farcas initially refused, but the man again demanded 

the phone, and Farcas handed it to him. Ballweg testified that the man also demanded 

Farcas provide him with the password for the phone, and Farcas complied. The man 
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then pointed the gun at Ballweg and asked him what Ballweg had in his possession. 

Ballweg reached into his pocket and pulled out a bill which was either a “ten or a fivedollar bill,” and handed it to the man. 

{¶ 13} At this point, Farcas rose from his chair and was moving toward the door. 

The man ordered Farcas to sit down. Farcas then said, “I’m not going to go out like that, 

you’re going to have to kill my ass.” Tr. p. 406. Farcas began to run toward the man, 

and the man shot him in the head. The man then ran out of the garage and got into the 

white car, which drove away. Ballweg called 911. 

{¶ 14} Ballweg was not able to identify Watson in a photospread lineup because 

the hoodie had covered a large portion of the shooter’s face. However, he described the 

shooter as an African-American with a goatee, a description which, at the time, fit Watson. 

{¶ 15} Brad Daugherty, a captain with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s 

Department, also testified for the State. According to Daugherty, he was investigating 

an unrelated homicide when he interviewed Kalesha Whitner, who was Watson’s 

girlfriend at the time of the Farcas shooting. During the interview, Whitner, without 

prompting, provided information regarding the Farcas shooting. Following the interview, 

Daughtery contacted the Huber Heights Police Department to determine whether the 

department was investigating a case involving the facts provided by Whitner. After 

learning that the details provided by Whitner matched the facts of the Farcas case, 

Daughtery introduced Whitner to detectives from Huber Heights. 

{¶ 16} Whitner testified that Watson contacted her around 4:00 a.m. on the 

morning of May 28, 2018 and asked her to pick him up. She testified Watson got into 

her car and told her he had killed someone. Watson explained that he and a girl had 
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gone to Huber Heights where he met two boys; one of the boys was “scared,” but the 

other was “acting tough.” Tr. p. 588. Watson stated that he killed the one who was 

acting tough. Watson told Whitner the boy he killed was white, a description fitting 

Farcas. Whitner noted Watson had a silver revolver and marijuana. The two later met 

some friends and smoked the marijuana. 

{¶ 17} Whitner testified that she was eventually charged with aggravated robbery 

and murder in the unrelated case. She admitted that she had reached a plea agreement 

with the State which allowed her to plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter, theft of a 

firearm, and aggravated robbery. The plea agreement also required her to testify 

truthfully against her co-defendants in the unrelated case as well as against Watson in 

this matter. 

{¶ 18} The jury acquitted Watson on the charge of kidnapping. The jury convicted 

Watson of all the remaining counts and specifications before it. The count of having 

weapons under disability was tried to the court, and the court found Watson guilty. The 

trial court sentenced Watson to an aggregate prison term of 49 years to life. 

{¶ 19} Watson appeals. 

II. Analysis 

{¶ 20} The first and second assignments of error asserted by Watson are as 

follows: 

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT, AS 

A MATTER OF LAW, TO PROVE APPELLANT’S GUILT BEYOND A 

REASONABLE DOUBT. 
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THE VERDICTS OF GUILTY WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶ 21} In his two assignments of error, Watson asserts that the State did not 

introduce evidence sufficient to sustain the convictions and that the verdicts were against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. In support, Watson contends the State failed to 

establish identity. We note his entire argument hinges upon his claim that Hughes, M.H., 

and Whitner were not credible and that the jury thus erred in crediting their testimony. 

{¶ 22} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has 

presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to 

the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 

N.E.2d 541 (1997). When reviewing a challenge to sufficiency, we apply the test from 

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), which provides: 

An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence 

admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would 

convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Citation omitted). Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 23} In contrast, “[a] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability 

of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence 
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is more believable or persuasive.” (Citation omitted.) Wilson at ¶ 12. When engaged in 

a review of a manifest weight challenge, a “ ‘court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and 

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and 

a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised 

only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 

conviction.’ ” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 

N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). 

{¶ 24} “Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts, 

manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that 

a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a 

finding of sufficiency.” (Citations omitted.) State v. McCrary, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11. Accord State v. Winbush, 2017-Ohio-696, 85 N.E.3d 501 

(2d Dist.), ¶ 58; State v. Putman-Albright, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 26679, 2016-Ohio319, ¶ 19. As a result, “a determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of 

the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.” (Citations omitted.) State 

v. Braxton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-725, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 25} Importantly, “[b]ecause the factfinder * * * has the opportunity to see and 

hear the witnesses, the cautious exercise of the discretionary power of a court of appeals 

to find that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires that 

substantial deference be extended to the factfinder's determinations of credibility. The 

decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses is 
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within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.” 

State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997). 

{¶ 26} We first turn to the issue of sufficiency. The testimony provided by Hughes 

and M.H., if believed, established that Hughes, M.H., and Watson drove to Farcas’s 

residence in order to purchase marijuana after failing to make the transaction at the park. 

Both M.H. and Hughes testified that they parked a few houses past Farcas’s residence 

and that Watson left Hughes and M.H. in the car while he walked up the hill to the home. 

Hughes and M.H. both testified that Watson was wearing a hoodie at the time and that 

they heard a gunshot after Watson walked up to the house. Additionally, they both 

testified that Watson returned to the car with a bag of marijuana and admitted to killing 

the seller. M.H. testified that Watson also had an iPhone, which he immediately turned 

off. The evidence in the record established that Farcas’s iPhone was turned off at 3:16 

a.m. Hughes also testified that Watson was holding a revolver when he returned to the 

car, and both testified that Watson’s hoodie was pulled up when he returned to the car. 

{¶ 27} Ballweg testified that, when Farcas picked him up at work, Farcas told 

Ballweg he had to hurry home in order to meet a girl to whom he was selling marijuana. 

Ballweg and M.H. both testified that the transaction was set up over a social media app 

called “Snapchat.” Ballweg testified that a loud white car drove by Farcas’s open garage 

just prior to the man wearing a red hoodie entering the garage. This corresponded with 

Hughes’s testimony that the brakes on his white vehicle were loud and could be heard 

from a distance. Ballweg testified that the shooter entered the garage with a dirty gray 

revolver, immediately demanded that Farcas give him the marijuana, and then demanded 

Farcas’s iPhone. Ballweg observed the shooter kill Farcas and then return to the white 
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car. 

{¶ 28} Whitner also testified that Watson had a rusty silver revolver and told her 

he had killed a white boy during a marijuana transaction. She also testified that Watson 

had marijuana, which they later smoked. 

{¶ 29} Further, as noted by the State, the “bullet that killed Farcas was consistent 

with a .38 caliber bullet which is typically fired by a revolver and was consistent with 

having been fired from a revolver. Likewise, no casings were found on scene which 

would further indicate that Watson used a revolver to shoot Farcas.” 

{¶ 30} This evidence, although circumstantial as to Watson’s identity, was 

sufficient to establish that Watson shot and killed Farcas. In Ohio, it is well-established 

that “a defendant may be convicted solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence.” State 

v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 151, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988). “Circumstantial evidence is 

defined as ‘[t]estimony not based on actual personal knowledge or observation of the 

facts in controversy, but of other facts from which deductions are drawn, showing 

indirectly the facts sought to be proved. * * *’ ” Id., at 150, quoting Black's Law Dictionary

221 (5 Ed. 1979). 

{¶ 31} We next turn to the claim that Hughes, M.H., and Whitner lacked credibility. 

In support, Watson first notes that Hughes and M.H. were romantically involved and thus 

had a reason to protect each other. He further claims that their testimony was rendered 

incredible because there were discrepancies between their respective versions of events. 

For example, Watson notes that Hughes testified that he (Watson) returned to the car 

after the shooting and stated he had “popped” someone, while M.H. testified that he 

(Watson) returned to the car and “he basically said, he was like, I blasted him. He said 
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he shot him. He told me he shot him in the head.” Tr. p. 521. Watson further notes 

that neither Hughes nor M.H. called the police after the shooting, and they only spoke 

with the police after the police contacted them. Additionally, during their initial interviews, 

both denied involvement in the incident. 

{¶ 32} All of the issues cited above were pointed out to the jury during the course 

of the trial; thus, we may presume the jury accounted for these matters as part of its 

evaluation of the credibility of the State’s witnesses. State v. Lynch, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 27620, 2018-Ohio-1424, ¶ 17, citing State v. Spraggins, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 85686, 2005-Ohio-5977, ¶ 13-14. Further, Hughes and M.H. testified that 

their relationship ended almost immediately after the shooting, and they had not been 

romantically involved with each other for the nearly two-year period between the event 

and the trial. Thus, any claim that their romantic involvement affected their testimony 

could have reasonably been ignored by the jury. Also, the mere fact that two witnesses 

recalled different statements made by Watson during the course of the car ride following 

the shooting did not, in itself, render their testimony incredible. Indeed, one could infer 

that Watson described the shooting in different words throughout the course of the ride. 

Additionally, we cannot say that the fact that neither Hughes nor M.H. reported the crime 

and that they both initially denied involvement when questioned by the police rendered 

them unbelievable. Hughes testified he was afraid to report the incident because he 

feared retaliation, and M.H. testified she was afraid she would be in trouble if she admitted 

her involvement. 

{¶ 33} Watson next claims the testimony provided by Whitner and M.H. was 

inherently incredible because they both had reached plea agreements with the State 
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requiring them to testify against him. Again, the jury was made aware of the plea 

agreements, both of which were admitted into evidence. The jury was also aware that 

the agreements were reached well after M.H. and Whitner had been interviewed by the 

police.2 

{¶ 34} We cannot conclude that the jury clearly lost its way in choosing to believe 

the testimony of Hughes, M.H., and Whitner, as a trier of fact is free to believe all, some, 

or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it. Iler v. Wright, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 80555, 2002-Ohio-4279, ¶ 25. Furthermore, there is nothing in this 

record that would cause us to conclude that M.H. or Whitner was improperly induced to 

testify. 

{¶ 35} After reviewing the record before us, we conclude the State produced 

evidence sufficient to sustain the convictions and that the convictions were otherwise not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Watson’s assignments of error 

are overruled. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 36} Both of Watson’s assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2 Watson asserts that the State agreed to permit M.H.’s case to remain in juvenile court, 

rather than pursuing a transfer to adult court, in exchange for her testimony against 

Watson. However, the record demonstrates that the juvenile court, against the wishes 

of the State, decided to retain jurisdiction over the case, and, a plea agreement was 

reached thereafter. 
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WELBAUM, J. and EPLEY, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr. 

Heather N. Ketter 

Jeffrey T. Gramza 

Hon. Richard Skelton