J-S07008-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSEPH ROY MARTIN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 598 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 20, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0001594-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED: JULY 24, 2024

Joseph Roy Martin appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of York County, after a jury convicted him of one 

count each of person not to possess firearms,1firearms not to be carried 

without a license,2 driving while operating privilege suspended,3failure to 

display registration plate,4 and unauthorized transfer or use of registration.5 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).

2 Id. at § 6106(a)(1).

3 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a).

4 Id. at § 1332.

5 Id. at § 1372(3).
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In this appeal, Martin challenges the court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to 

suppress evidence. After careful consideration, we affirm.

Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Joshua Koach testified that, on 

January 14, 2021, at about 2:30 a.m., while he and his partner were on patrol 

in a marked vehicle in full uniform, around Red Lion Borough, he observed a 

vehicle that had no registration plate or light illuminating the plate area of the 

vehicle. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 4-5; see also Defense 

Exhibit 1, at 0:40. Trooper Koach followed Martin, who was the driver and 

sole occupant of the vehicle, and observed a temporary registration 

improperly displayed in the wrong corner of the vehicle’s rear window. See

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 5; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 1:50-

1:55. Trooper Koach activated his police vehicle lights in a safe area of 

Pennsylvania Route 74, but Martin was slow to respond; Martin continued to 

drive while making furtive movements in the passenger compartment of the 

vehicle, and completed two turns before stopping the vehicle perpendicular 

to, and over, several parking spaces in a business parking lot. See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 5-6; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 0:46-

1:26.

Upon approach, Trooper Koach saw that Martin had lit a cigarette and 

appeared very nervous. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 6. Martin 

was unable to produce a valid registration for the vehicle, proof of insurance, 

or a valid driver’s license. Id. at 6, 10, 17. Martin informed Trooper Koach 

that he had purchased the vehicle for $1900.00 cash just hours before in 
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Philadelphia on Facebook Marketplace and was returning home to 

Chambersburg with the vehicle. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 

6-7; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 1:57-2:05, 2:51-3:07, 4:23-4:34, 14:45. 

Trooper Koach found the route chosen by Martin to be odd given Martin’s 

stated starting point and destination, as well as considering the location where 

Trooper Koach pulled Martin over. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22,

at 18; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 10:15. Trooper Koach testified that, in 

his experience, Philadelphia is a hub for criminal activity involving narcotics 

and guns. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 6. Trooper Koach also 

found Martin’s explanation of the late-night vehicle purchase and travel route 

to be suspicious, and he was concerned the vehicle may have been stolen, 

either by Martin or the seller. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 6-

8; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 11:19.

Trooper Koach permitted Martin to call the seller of the vehicle via phone 

to substantiate his explanation of the vehicle’s late-night sale. See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 7; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 4:23-

9:02. The name of the individual that Martin contacted6 did not match the 

seller’s name on the vehicle title.7 See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22; 

____________________________________________

6 An individual who identified himself as Samuel Marks answered the phone, 

but the seller’s profile name on Facebook was Bob Dent. See Defense Exhibit 

1, at 3:00-3:45, 5:02, 17:17.

7 John Joseph McCoullough’s name appeared as the owner of the vehicle. See

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 26; see Defense Exhibit 1, at 5:17, 

6:20, 6:51-7:06.
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see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 5:02. Further, the individual on the phone 

stated that he and Martin effectuated the sale with the assistance of a notary. 

See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 7, 18-19; see also Defense 

Exhibit 1, at 7:48-8:10. However, Trooper Koach observed that there was no 

notarization on the title document establishing a proper sale to Martin. See

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 7, 18-19; see also Defense Exhibit 1, 

at 5:49, 8:10, 9:58-10:04.

Thereafter, Trooper Koach and his partner returned to their police 

vehicle while Martin remained inside his own vehicle and continued talking to 

the alleged seller on the phone. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 

25; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 9:02. Trooper Koach ran a search of the 

improperly displayed temporary registration, but the information and records 

he discovered from the search did not match the make and model of the 

vehicle Martin drove. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 8; see also 

Defense Exhibit 1, at 9:17. Further, the temporary registration was expired. 

See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 17; see also Defense Exhibit 1, 

at 9:37. Trooper Koach also ran a search of Martin’s name, which revealed 

that Martin had a suspended driver’s license, that he had prior criminal 

charges related to delivery of drugs, and that he was a person designated not 

to possess a firearm. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 9, 11; see 

also Defense Exhibit 1, at 9:17, 10:29. When Trooper Koach requested Martin 

alight from the vehicle, Martin responded with something to the effect of, “I’m 

going to jail, aren’t I?” See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 9-10; see 
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also Defense Exhibit 1, at 13:24. Trooper Koach found this statement to be 

nonresponsive, which further raised his suspicion that criminal activity may 

be afoot. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 10.

Trooper Koach escorted Martin to stand next to the police vehicle and 

Martin leaned with his back against the front bumper. See N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 7/14/22, at 15; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 13:23. Martin 

continued to appear very nervous. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22,

at 15; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 21:42, 22:52. Martin explained that he 

was driving on local roads because the vehicle could not drive above 45 miles 

per hour, a defect he believed he could fix quickly and inexpensively once 

home. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 18; see also Defense 

Exhibit 1, at 14:02, 14:49. Trooper Koach asked Martin if there was anything 

dangerous or illegal in the vehicle and asked if he could search it. See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 10; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 13:30, 

16:37. Martin explained that he had just purchased the vehicle, so he was 

unsure what might be in it and did not want to get in trouble regarding the 

vehicle’s contents leftover from the prior owner. See N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 7/14/22, at 10, 16; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 13:32, 16:38. 

Trooper Koach found this response to also be indicative of potential criminal 

activity. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 15-16.

Martin informed Trooper Koach that, although the seller of the vehicle 

seemed like a “decent dude,” who was unlikely to have left anything illegal in 

the vehicle, Martin still did not want to become responsible for anything the 
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prior owner might have left inside it, especially given that the paperwork 

relating to the sale was not in proper order. See Defense Exhibit 1, at 16:42-

17:11, 17:23. In response to police questions, Martin stated that, at the time 

of the vehicle’s sale, he had seen inside the trunk while the seller replaced the 

battery connection and there was nothing in there. See Defense Exhibit 1, at 

17:45-17:53. Thereafter, Martin explained that he did not conduct a full-scale 

search of the vehicle prior to taking possession and ownership, which he 

regretted, and he was concerned about the possibility of getting in legal 

trouble for anything that might be discovered by a police search. See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 16; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 18:00. 

While continuing to lean against the front of the police vehicle, Martin noted 

that his fiancée had warned him about purchasing a car from Philadelphia 

because people from there sell things they aren’t supposed to sell. See 

Defense Exhibit 1, at 18:27.

Upon further questioning, Martin agreed with the troopers that, even if 

the previous owner had possessed illegal items in the vehicle at a prior time, 

it would be unlikely that those illegal items remained in the vehicle at the time 

of its sale. See Defense Exhibit 1, at 18:01-18:25. Also, during this 

interaction, Martin informed the troopers several times that he was concerned 

about the possibility of going to jail. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22,

at 10, 16; see also Defense Exhibit 1, at 10:36, 18:00, 19:00, 20:25, 20:45-

55, 21:48, 22:08-22:48. The troopers responded by informing Martin that 
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they were unconcerned with discovering small amounts of drugs8 and that he 

would not go to jail for the traffic violations or for driving with a suspended 

license. See Defense Exhibit 1, at 22:58.

After several questions from the troopers regarding the circumstances 

of the sale of the vehicle, the potential contents of the vehicle, why Martin felt 

he was going to go to jail, why Martin was reluctant to permit a search of the 

vehicle in light of what he had seen and believed about the vehicle and its 

previous owner, and the likelihood of illegal items being left in the vehicle, 

Martin eventually stated that he was aware a firearm was located under the 

front driver’s seat. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 10; see also

Defense Exhibit 1, at 23:12. Trooper Koach immediately found the firearm, 

took Martin into custody for possession of a firearm, and provided for the 

vehicle’s towing to state police barracks.

The Commonwealth charged Martin with the above-mentioned offenses 

that same day, January 14, 2021. On July 14, 2022, the court conducted a 

suppression hearing on Martin’s motion in limine wherein Martin sought to 

preclude admission into evidence of Martin’s statements about the firearm, as 

well as the firearm itself, arguing all the evidence is fruit of the poisonous 

____________________________________________

8 Trooper Koach told Martin he was not concerned about a “dime bag” or 

“shake.” See Defense Exhibit 1, at 20:29, 21:51.
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tree.9 That same day, the court denied Martin’s motion to suppress the 

evidence. 

On January 30, 2023, a jury convicted Martin of the above-mentioned 

firearms offenses and the court, thereafter, convicted Martin of the traffic 

offenses. On March 20, 2023, the court sentenced Martin to an aggregate 

term of 5 years and 30 days to 101⁄2 years’ incarceration and ordered Martin 

to pay costs and a fine.

Martin filed a timely notice of appeal. Martin and the trial court have 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Martin raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied [] Martin’s motion 

to suppress evidence where the traffic stop was illegally 

extended beyond the time necessary to address the issue of 

his vehicle’s registration and the totality of the circumstances 

did not establish reasonable suspicion necessary to warrant 

extension of the stop?

2. [Whether] the trial court erred when it denied [] Martin’s 

motion to suppress evidence where Martin’s statements about 

the firearm located under the seat of the vehicle were obtained 

in violation of his rights under Miranda?

[10]

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

____________________________________________

9 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); see also 

Commonwealth v. Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278, 287 (Pa. 2017) (holding 

evidence derived from illegal automobile search constitutes fruit of poisonous 

tree as result of illegal seizure).

10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Our standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress is wellsettled:

[The appellate] standard of review in addressing a challenge to a 

trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the factual findings are supported by the 

record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts 

are correct. We are bound by the suppression court’s factual 

findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard 

of review on questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the 

defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may 

consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of 

the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our 

scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the 

suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (citations 

omitted). We may affirm the suppression court’s decision if there is any basis

in the record to support it, even if we rely on different grounds to reach the 

same result. See Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 301 (Pa. 

Super. 2013).

First, Martin argues that, here, just as in Rodriguez v. United States, 

575 U.S. 348 (2015), the police impermissibly extended the traffic stop 

beyond the amount of time necessary to address the vehicle’s registration and 

ownership questions. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12-13. Martin claims that the 

police improperly and measurably extended the vehicle stop when, during 

their investigation, they no longer were interested in whether the vehicle was 

stolen, and instead, became interested in potential contraband inside the 

vehicle. See id., at 13-14. Specifically, after about 21 minutes of interaction, 

Trooper Koach stated to Martin, “[t]he car’s not stolen so you don’t have to 
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worry about that, and I already told you I’m not worried about traffic tickets 

for suspended licenses.” Defense Exhibit 1, at 21:20. Martin argues that, 

based on this statement, the police did not possess sufficient facts to justify 

prolonging the stop, because, up to that point, “[a]ll they knew was that 

Martin was nervous, [] afraid of being arrested, and took a circuitous way 

home due to car troubles.” Appellant’s Brief, at 14. Martin claims that it is 

not unusual to be nervous in front of police while being stopped, he was 

justifiably afraid of being arrested for driving with a suspended driver’s license, 

and it was safer for him to take back roads given the condition of the vehicle. 

See id.

Second, Martin argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress 

the evidence because the police obtained Martin’s statements in violation of 

Miranda. Martin claims that the police subjected him to a custodial 

interrogation when they elicited his incriminating statements. Martin notes 

that Miranda warnings are required, not only for express questioning, but 

also for any police words or actions that police should know are reasonably 

likely to elicit incriminating responses. See Appellant’s Brief, at 16. Martin 

alleges that he was functionally arrested because: (1) he was removed from 

the vehicle, and was made to lean on the police vehicle’s front bumper, while 

two officers stood between Martin and the vehicle he was driving—which was 

his mode of transportation—thereby blocking his access to it; (2) he was far 

from his destination in Chambersburg; (3) there was no evidence Martin 

believed he was free to leave, where he was questioned about the contents of 
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the vehicle he was just driving; and (4) police questioning made it clear that 

they believed Martin possessed contraband in the vehicle. Id. at 17-18. 

Martin argues that because the police did not give him his Miranda warnings, 

the statements about the firearm, and the firearm itself, should be suppressed 

as fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. at 18-19. We disagree and find Martin is 

not entitled to any relief on either of his claims.

This Court has previously explained that the United States and 

Pennsylvania constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable police searches 

and seizures:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,[11]

made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution[,12] protect a person from unlawful searches and 

____________________________________________

11 The Fourth Amendment states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 

be seized.

U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. 

12 The Pennsylvania Constitution states:

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 

possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no 

warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall 

issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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seizures. Our Supreme Court has long held that[,] although the 

Pennsylvania Constitution provides broader protection from 

unreasonable searches and seizures than the United States 

Constitution, the Terry doctrine, announced in the seminal case 

of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [] (1968), sets forth the 

reasonableness standard for Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution.

Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation, 

footnote, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Pennsylvania law permits police to stop a vehicle if they observe a traffic 

code violation, which creates the necessary probable cause to stop the vehicle, 

even if the traffic violation is a minor offense. See Commonwealth v. 

Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017). Further,

[d]uring a traffic stop, the officer may ask the detainee a 

moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try 

to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s 

suspicions. If there is a legitimate stop for a traffic violation[,] 

additional suspicion may arise before the initial stop’s purpose has 

been fulfilled; then, detention may be permissible to investigate 

the new suspicions.

Id. at 1020 (citations, quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted).

[T]o extend a traffic stop beyond the purposes of enforcing a 

traffic violation, there must be reasonable suspicion that a 

defendant may have been engaged in criminal activity 

independent of the traffic violation. This Court has described the 

reasonable suspicion standard as follows:

To establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer 

must articulate specific observations which, in conjunction 

with reasonable inferences derived from those observations, 

____________________________________________

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by 

the affiant.

PA CONST. Art. I, § 8.
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led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, 

that criminal activity was afoot and that the person he 

stopped was involved in that activity. The question of 

whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time an officer 

conduct[ed] the stop must be answered by examining the 

totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 

officer who initiated the stop had a particularized and 

objective basis for suspecting the individual stopped. 

Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court 

must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts 

available to the officer at the moment of the stop warrant a 

man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken 

was appropriate.

Commonwealth v. Benitez, 218 A.3d 460, 471 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations, 

quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Further, “even a combination of 

innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the 

police officer.” Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). 

The United States Supreme Court has identified several lines of inquiry, 

in addition to “mission-related” questions, that police may lawfully ask, which 

may extend a traffic stop in time:

[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 

context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to address the 

traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related 

safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose 

of the stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 

th[at] purpose.” Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks 

tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—

completed.

[. . . . A] traffic stop “can become [unlawful] if it is prolonged 

beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” 

of issuing a warning ticket. . . . An officer, in other words, may 

conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic 

stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, 
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absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify 

detaining an individual.

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s 

mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” 

Typically, such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, 

determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the 

driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of 

insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement 

of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are 

operated safely and responsibly.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-55 (2015) (citations 

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142, 149-50 (Pa. 

Super. 2021) (permitting mission-related inquiries addressed to traffic 

violations which originally prompted vehicle stop and inquiries to ensure safe 

and responsible operation of vehicles on highways, including checking driver’s 

license, outstanding driver warrants, and vehicle’s registration and proof of 

insurance). 

During a vehicle stop, the police are permitted to check the vehicle 

registration, the driver’s license, and any other information required to enforce 

the motor vehicle code. See Commonwealth v. Mack, 953 A.2d 587, 589 

(Pa. Super. 2008). Also, the officer “may ask the detainee a moderate number 

of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information 

confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 

224 A.3d 1104, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also Harris, supra. Moreover, 

police may request a driver to alight from a lawfully stopped car, as a matter 

of right, without reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-111 (1977); Commonwealth 
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v. Brown, 654 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Pa. Super. 1995). Also, in furtherance of 

officer safety, Pennsylvania law permits police to ask drivers whether they 

have a weapon or anything else of a concerning nature as a matter of course 

during a traffic stop. See Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787, 793 (Pa. 

Super. 2023). Importantly, under certain circumstances, police officers, for 

their safety, may handcuff individuals during an investigative detention

without elevating the interaction into a custodial detention. See Wright, 224 

A.3d at 1109. The determination of the moment “when tasks tied to the traffic 

stop are completed or reasonably should have been completed, is fact 

specific.” Ross, 297 A.3d at 798. 

Further, Miranda warnings are only necessary if the detainee is 

subjected to custodial interrogation. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 

A.2d 495, 500-01 (Pa. Super. 2008). Custodial interrogation is questioning 

by police “after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived 

of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). “Police detentions only become custodial when, under the 

totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or duration of the detention 

become so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of formal arrest.” 

Id. at 501 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“[T]he test for custodial interrogation does not depend upon the 

subjective intent of the law enforcement officer interrogator. Rather, the test 

focuses on whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believes his 
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freedom of action is being restricted.” Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 907 

A.2d 3, 24 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). 

The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality of the 

circumstances, whether a detention has become so coercive as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the basis 

for the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect was 

transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether 

restraints were used; whether the law enforcement officer 

showed, threatened[,] or used force; and the investigative 

methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions. The fact that 

a police investigation has focused on a particular individual does 

not automatically trigger “custody,” thus requiring Miranda

warnings.

Commonwealth v. Witmayer, 144 A.3d 939, 948 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted).

Ordinary traffic stops are typically brief and occur in public view so as

not to be custodial for Miranda purposes. See Commonwealth v. Mannion, 

725 A.2d 196, 202 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc). Indeed, generally, a vehicle 

stop is an investigative detention. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Spence, 

290 A.3d 301, 314 (Pa. Super. 2023)

Here, as to Martin’s first issue, upon our review, we conclude that the 

police did not improperly extend Martin’s detention; there was sufficient 

reasonable suspicion to inquire further into a potentially stolen vehicle and/or 

concealment of contraband. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the 

following factors raised Trooper Koach’s suspicions that such criminal activity 

was afoot: (1) Martin was driving with a suspended driver’s license; (2) Martin 

failed to provide valid proof of insurance for the vehicle; (3) Martin failed to 
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provide valid registration for the vehicle; (4) Martin improperly used an 

expired temporary vehicle registration issued to another vehicle; (5) Martin 

improperly displayed the expired temporary vehicle registration by placing it 

in the wrong corner of the rear window; (6) Martin failed to establish his 

ownership of the vehicle (or permission to drive it) via the vehicle’s title 

documentation and phone call to the alleged seller; (7) the title documentation 

was not notarized, despite Martin’s and the alleged seller’s claims that a notary 

provided assistance with the sale;13 (8) Martin displayed excessive 

nervousness throughout the interaction; (9) Martin provided non-responsive 

answers to police, including several statements regarding his belief that the 

officers were going to take him to jail; (10) Martin stated, inconsistently, that 

the vehicle possibly contained contraband from the previous owner, despite 

also stating that he had seen there was nothing in the trunk or backseat, and 

despite acknowledging the likelihood was small that the prior owner left 

contraband in the vehicle; (11) Trooper Koach testified that, in his training 

and experience, Martin’s initial place of departure, Philadelphia, is a hub for 

illegal narcotics and firearms; (12) Martin’s prior criminal history involved 

delivery of drugs; (13) Martin’s status as a person not to possess a firearm; 

____________________________________________

13 During his testimony, Trooper Koach likened his understanding of the 

seller’s story regarding going to a notary and failing to have the document 

notarized, with “going to the grocery store and not buying groceries.” N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 18-19.
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(14) the time of day (approximately 3 a.m.);14 (15) Martin’s use of local roads 

and/or a strange route, using Pennsylvania Route 74, to arrive at his 

destination in Chambersburg from his origin of Philadelphia; (16) Martin’s slow 

response when pulling over; (17) Martin’s furtive movements in the vehicle; 

and (18) Trooper Koach testified that, in his training and experience 

investigating stolen vehicles, although this vehicle was not reported stolen at 

the time of his interaction with Martin, there was a possibility that a stolen 

vehicle report had not yet been made.15 See also Rogers, 849 A.2d at 1189-

90 (police had sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend focus of investigatory 

detention and pursue suspicions of contraband in vehicle because appellant 

unusually nervous, appellant stated previous vehicle owner might have left 

contraband in vehicle and had not yet searched vehicle, paperwork for vehicle 

out of order and fraudulent, appellant’s answers regarding origin were vague,

back seat of vehicle contained products police knew, via experience, 

commonly used in packaging illegal narcotics, and appellant had prior drug 

conviction). All these factors sufficiently support a finding of reasonable 

suspicion that Martin was engaged in criminal activity, potentially in 

connection with concealing contraband or a stolen vehicle, offenses 

____________________________________________

14 Trooper Koach testified that he was suspicious about the validity of the 

vehicle’s sale to Martin at such a late hour because, in his experience, most 

vehicle sales do not occur in the late hours of the night, and most notaries are 

not available at that time, which also contributed to the possibility that the 

vehicle was stolen. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 6-8, 19.

15 Ultimately, the vehicle was never reported stolen and Martin was able to 

properly establish his ownership.
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independent of the traffic violations, and were sufficient to support an 

extension of the stop. See Benitez, supra.

Further, upon our review, we conclude that the police diligently pursued 

their suspicions during the twenty-three minutes they interacted with Martin 

prior to Martin’s incriminating statements. See Ross, 297 A.3d at 797-98 

(noting asking additional question or two about firearm is less intrusive than 

order to exit vehicle, which was constitutionally sound). Indeed, here, the 

police questions were intended to confirm or dispel suspicions quickly as they 

attempted to understand why Martin would be concerned that he may be going 

to jail or that there might be contraband in the vehicle. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32, 43-44 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“[T]he 

court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. A creative judge 

engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine 

some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been 

accomplished.”) (citation and ellipsis omitted); id. at 44 (troopers acted 

reasonably and diligently in pursuing suspicions during one-hour-plus 

detention, which did not become custodial). See also Commonwealth v. 

Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043, 1049 (Pa. 1995) (appellant’s detention investigative, 

and not custodial, where it lasted for approximately ten to fifteen minutes and

officers diligently pursued attempts to confirm or dispel suspicions).

To the extent that Martin argues that Trooper Koach’s concerns 

regarding ownership of the vehicle were dispelled, as evidenced by Trooper 

Koach’s statement to Martin that, “[t]he car’s not stolen so you don’t have to 
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worry about that[,]” Defense Exhibit 1, at 21:20, we find this claim is 

meritless. We note that the ownership of the vehicle was still not resolved or 

determined at the time Martin told the police about the firearm. See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 7/14/22, at 19. Indeed, the title documentation did not 

mention Martin, was unnotarized, and the phone call to the alleged seller did 

not resolve the issue. Further, Trooper Koach testified at the suppression 

hearing that, in his training and experience investigating stolen vehicles, 

although this vehicle was not reported stolen at the time of his interaction 

with Martin, there was a possibility that a stolen vehicle report had not yet 

been made given it was the middle of the night; Trooper Koach stated, in his 

experience, there was a possibility the true owner of the vehicle might still 

have been asleep and would discover the vehicle was stolen the following 

morning. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Moser, 757 A.2d 377, 379 (Pa. 

Super. 2000) (since no occupant was able to show ownership or permission 

to drive vehicle, police were justified in checking beyond traffic violation to be 

sure vehicle was not stolen). Accordingly, we conclude—in addition to 

establishing grounds related to concealing contraband—that Trooper Koach 

articulated sufficient facts—in light of his training and experience—to establish 

that Martin was potentially engaged in concealing the theft of the vehicle, 

which was sufficient to support an extension of the investigative detention. 

See Benitez, 218 A.3d at 471. Consequently, we find that Martin is not 

entitled to relief on his first issue.
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Next, we conclude that Martin’s claim that the police should have 

provided him with his Miranda warnings because he was subjected to a 

custodial interrogation is meritless. See Freeman, supra; see also Ellis, 

supra. We find that Martin’s interaction with the police never escalated 

beyond an investigative detention. See Commonwealth v. Kondash, 808 

A.2d 943, 948 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“the dictates of Miranda do not attach 

during an investigatory detention”).

Although the troopers requested Martin alight from his vehicle and walk 

a few yards to stand by the police vehicle, it was for the purpose of separating 

Martin from the vehicle, for safety reasons, while the officers continued to try 

to resolve the question of ownership of the vehicle. See Brown, supra; see 

also Commonwealth v. Rosas, 875 A.2d 341, 348 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“It is 

well-established that when an officer detains a vehicle for violation of a traffic 

law, it is inherently reasonable that he or she be concerned with safety and, 

as a result, may order the occupants of the vehicle to alight from the car.”) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, as we noted above, the 

police diligently pursued their suspicions for the twenty-three minutes Martin 

was stopped. Moreover, although the two troopers stood between Martin and 

the vehicle during this portion of the interaction, the police never used 

restraints on Martin and spoke to him in a calm, conversational manner. The 

police continued to ask Martin questions in an attempt to understand why 

Martin was concerned that there might be contraband in the vehicle, or to 

follow up on apparent contradictions and other open questions related to 
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Martin’s answers and the circumstances of the purchase of the vehicle. We 

discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that these facts did 

not amount to a custodial interrogation. Cf. Wright, 224 A.3d at 1109 (for 

their safety, police officers may handcuff individuals during an investigative 

detention); Rosas, 875 A.2d at 348 (same).

Further, although Martin asked if, or stated that, he would be taken to 

jail multiple times, each time, police either deescalated the interaction or 

verbally attempted to assuage Martin’s concern. After the first time Martin 

made such a statement, both troopers returned to their own police vehicle to 

run the database searches, leaving Martin inside his own vehicle, handing 

Martin his own phone back to him, and telling Martin to resolve the vehicle 

ownership issue with the individual on the other end of the phone 

conversation. See Defense Exhibit 1, at 9:02, 10:36; id. at 9:02-13:23 

(Martin left in vehicle alone for several minutes while police returned to own 

vehicle and Martin permitted to smoke cigarette and kept phone). 

Martin made a similar statement along the lines of, “you’re taking me to 

jail, huh?” as he alighted from the vehicle. See Defense Exhibit 1, at 13:24. 

In response, Trooper Koach responded in the negative and informed Martin 

he simply wished to talk a little more.16 See also Defense Exhibit 1, at 13:27. 

As Martin continued to raise the issue of possibly going to jail, the police 

____________________________________________

16 We note that a police officer’s statement that an individual is not under 

arrest is not dispositive of whether an arrest was effectuated. See 

Commonwealth v. Conde, 822 A.2d 45, 53 (Pa. Super. 2003).
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continued to explain they were not concerned with finding small amounts of 

drugs and were requesting a vehicle search because Martin’s statements and 

circumstances at that hour were suspicious. Even though Martin exhibited 

nervousness and raised concerns regarding going to jail, we cannot discern 

from these facts that Martin could reasonably believe that the investigative 

detention was elevated to a custodial interrogation at the time he disclosed 

the existence of the firearm where he was informed several times he was not 

going to jail. Accordingly, we find that Martin is not entitled to relief on his 

second issue.17

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/24/2024

____________________________________________

17 Based on our decision herein, we need not reach the court’s finding, and 

the parties’ arguments, related to the doctrine of inevitable discovery.