promoting supercross. Most of its argument is devoted to refuting the market significance of
these supposedly “essential” venucs. It recognizes counts 9 and 10 as attempting to allege a
market allocation scheme and argues that these claims are inadequate as well. As the court reads
the amended complaint, counts 5-8 and 11-14 are all based on a theory that Clear Channel
leveraged its power in various markets to ensure that JamSports could not gain access lo key
stadiums in several cities where supercross is established and popular, and that these efforts
forced JamSports out of the market for promoting supercross and allowed Clear Channel to
maintain its market dominance. We agree with JamSports, however, that counts 15 and 16 allege
monopolization generally, and we therefore address those claims separately.

1. Essential Facilities/Monopoly Leveraging

‘Yo state a claim for a § 2 Sherman Act violation under any theory, a plaintiff niust allege
(1) possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power. Elliot, 126 F.3d at 1004-05. Section 1 claims, by contrast, require
allegations of collective action: (1) a contract, combination or conspiracy and (2) a resultant
unreasonable restraint of trade in the relevant market. MCM, 62 F.3d at 972 n.7. At least some
of JamSports’ claims in counts 5-8 and 11-14 adequately allege eloments of each of these types
of claims.

With respect to its § 2 claims, JamSports alleges that Clear Channel has monopoly power
over the relevant market for promoting supercross, Cmplt. 4 112, 116, 120,136, 140, 144 (counts
5-7, 11-13). It further alleges that Clear Channel sought to maintain thal power by coercing
owners of essential facilities within the markct to refuse to do business with competitors,

including JamSports. Jd. $f] 105-111, 116, 120, 124, 140, 144 (counts 5-7, 11-13). In its §1

19



materials and distribution services used in the operation of its own stores. Queen City Pizza, 124
F.3d at 437. The Third Circuit rejected the proposed relevant market at the pleading stage
because the plaintiff acknowledged that although he was bound by contract to use Domino’s
supplies, the dough, tomato sauce, and paper cups used and approved by Domino’s were
commercially interchangeable with the dough, sauce and cups available from other suppliers. {d.
al 438. In Apani Southwest, the court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to limit the relevant market
for the sale of bottled water to twenty-seven Cily-owned facilities in Lubbock, Texas. 300 F.3d
at 628-633, Relying in part on the district court’s review of the pleadings, which revealed that
plaintiff regularly sold bottled water throughout Lubbock to customers other than the City, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the alleged market was artificially narrow and did not correspond to
commercial realities of the industry. /d. Similarly, in RoAlfing, Judge Aspen concluded that the
relevant market alleged--salc of pharmaccuticals to residents of Manor Care-network nursing
facilities—was legally inadequate because it improperly defined the market in terms of a single,
narrow class of customers. 172 F.R.D- al 345-346.

The market allegations now before (he court are nol so obviously contrived or narrow.
First, Clear Channel docs not own the sport of supercross. We are therefore not convinced that
JamSports is attempting to characterize Clear Channel as monopolist over its own product.
JamSports defines the market for supercross promotion in terms of a sanctioning body (AMA
Pro), an established fan base (national and regional), recognized stadiums, and commercial
sponsorships. Clear Channcl’s promotion efforts may have shaped the boundaries of the market
as JamSports describes it, but that does not mean that the market docs not exist or that it has been

contrived for this lawsuit. Sccond, we cannot say at this point in the litigation that the alleged

13



make these types of findings, and we decline to look beyond the pleadings to take notice of
alternatives to the stadiums that JamSports identifies,

Clear Channel also argues that JamSports was able to “assemble an AMA Supercross
schedule by entering into contracts with other venues and in other cities,” Cmp!t. J 62, and
argucs that this undermines the claim that any of the facilitics were necessary to promoting
supercross, We do not consider the fact that JamSports was able to assemble a schedule of
alternative venues as the equivalent of an admission that the stadiums it identifies were non-
essential. ‘To the contrary, JamSports alleges (hat its proposed altemative schedule failed, as it
was unable to obtain AMA Pro’s sanction without sccuring a deal to promote supercross races in
established forums.

We likewise reject Clear Channel’s contention that JamSports has not properly alleged
that booking events in the cities it identifies was necessary to produce a successful supercross
schedule. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of JamSports, we are obliged to accept at
this stage the claim that (he alleged cities and sladiums identified by JamSports are indispensable
hubs of fan support for supercross. The Promotion Agreement that JamSports negotiated with
AMA Pro dogs not state otherwise, see Pl’s Ex. J, Addend. A, §(a)(2) (supercross promotion
contract renewal contingent on scheduling supercross events in 10 of the largest 35 markets in
North America), and it is conceivable that without events in cities where the sport is most
popular, a series of supercross races would fail. Moreover, JamSports alleges that its cffort to
schedule a supercross scries in alternate citics failed to attract AMA sanctioning.

The only case that Clear Channel cites in support of dismissing an essential facilities

claim at the pleading stage differs from this casc in a few key respects. In Paddock Publications,

23



television partnership with Specdvision, a 24-hour cable network devoted to molor sports.
Cmplt. | 37; Pl’s Ex. E. Further, JamSports alleges that it began negotiating with marketing,
radio, merchandising, and sponsorship entities, incurring substantial expenses in the process.
Cmplt. 4 38. JamSports also claims to have committed extensive resources to ensure that its
infrastructure would be sufficient to support its partnership with AMA Pro, and it alleges that
AMA Pro staff moved into office space that JamSports created for them. Jd. 40.

The parties’ business relationship, however, did not develop as planned. On January 30,
2002, two days before the expiration of the agreed period of exclusive negotiations, AMA Pro
contacted JamSports and proposed cerlain modifications to the deal that the partics had outlined
up to that point. Zd. 42. According to JamSports, AMA Pro indicated that it would accept the
“form and content” of the promotion agreement once those final modifications were included.
Id. In response, JamSports prepared a revised draft of the agreement reflecting AMA Pro’s
requested changes and forwarded the draft to AMA Pro for ils review. fd. 43. But, JamSports
alleges, AMA Pro delayed concluding the transaction. By a scparate agreement dated February
1, 2002, the parties agrced to extend the period of exclusive negotiations until February 5, 2002.
id. 944. At the end of that period JamSports still had nol received word from AMA Pro
regarding the revised draft, On February 5, 2002, and again on February 8, 2002, JamSports sent
letters to AMA Pro “confirming its acceptance” of all of AMA Pro’s modifications and notifying
AMA Pro that it was “ready willing and able to sign the Promotion Agreement.” Jd. {| 45-46;
Pl’s Exs. H, 1. JamSports alleges that as of the time it accepted AMA Pro’s proposed
modifications, there were no outstanding issues between the partics with respect to the promotion

agreement. /d. 4] 47.



claims, JamSports alleges that Clear Channel entered into contracts, combinations or
conspiracics to exclude JamSports from the alleged essential facilities. /d. ff] 124-125, 148-149,

Clear Channel makes three arguments in support of its motion to dismiss these claims.
First, it argues that none of the stadiums (hat JamSports identifies is an essential facility with
respect to its geographic area. Second, it contends that none of these stadiums is csscntial to the
promotion of a nationwide series of supercross cvents. Third, Clear Channel insists that
JamSports has failed to allege that it was actually denied access to these facilities since it only
sought contracts to promote events between January and May. In consequence, il argues,
JamS$ports cannot claim that Clear Channel has acted to maintain monopoly power over
supercross, through collective action or otherwise.

We agree that for all practical purposcs, JamSports must allege a valid cssential facilities
claim in order to proceed with the claims alleged in counts 5-8 and 11-14. The “monopoly
leveraging” and “exclusive dealing” claims that JamSports asserts ultimately depend on a finding
that JamSports was forced out of the market for promoting supercross. That finding, in tum,
depends on a factual determination that the stadiums to which it was denied access were essential
to the nationwide promotion of the sport. Accordingly, though we acknowledge that there may
be differences between counts 5-8 and 11-14, we address Clear Channel’s argument that all of
these claims should be dismissed for failure to identify any truly essential facilities.

The Seventh Circuit has adopted a four element test for establishing an essential facilities
claim. To state a claim, the plaintiff must allege “*(1) control of the essential facility by a
monopolist; (2) the competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential

facility; (3) denial of the usc of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the

20



§1 of the Sherman Act. In support of this claim, JamSports alleges that there are separate
relevant markets for supercross sanctioning and supercross promotion and that Clear Channel
and AMA Fro have agreed to divide these markets and to refrain from competing with each other
within them. Cmplt. { 128-130. We agree with Clear Channel that this does noi state a
cognizable antitrust claim. Market allocation schemes involve horizontal agreements between
competitors in a market to refrain from competing with cach other for consumers within some
portion of that market, See, e.g., Blackburn v, Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995) (agreement
between former partners in personal injury practice not to advertise in each other’s clicnt
tertitorics). The allegations in counts 9 and 10 do not allege this kind of agreement. Rathcr,
JamSports describes a deal between two companies at two diffcrent levels of production to deal
exclusively with one another. Without more, this type of exclusive contract (the same type of
agreement that JamSports sought to obtain from AMA Pro) is permissible. See Paddock
Publications Inc., \03 F.3d at 44-45, The allegation that Clear Channel’s threatened entry into
the supercross sanctioning market caused AMA Pro to abandon its deal with JamSports has becn
captured in its other antitrust claims and does not support a separate claim of improper market
allocation.

IL, Tortious Interference with Contract (counts 3 and 4)

Clear Channel has also moved to dismiss JamSports’ tortious interference claims.
Because JamSports’ claims are based on two separate alleged contracts, we address them
separately.

1. The First Agrecment

In Count 3, JamSports alleges that Clear Channel induced AMA Pro to breach its

26



traditionally host supercross events during the January-May supercross season, that an
established fanbase has developed around events held in these stadiums, and that any success/ul
supercross serics must include events held in these stadiums. Cmplt. {{] 57, 59, 61. Tt alleges
that due to Clear Chanmel’s alleged cocrcive tactics, it was unable to schedule events during the
January-May supercross season in any of the essential stadiums it identifies. /d. ] 61. Further, it
alleges that though it was able to cobble together a schedule of supercross races in alternative
venues in key cities, and stadiums in other areas, it was unable to secure AMA Pro’s sanction to
produce AMA Supercross. Jd. #{[ 62, 65. These allegations adequately identify essential
facilities and JamSports’ exclusion from them.

We are not persuaded by Clear Channel’s arguments that JamSports has failed lo meet its
pleading burden. First, most of Clear Channel’s arguments address the evidentiary sufficiency of
JamSporls’ essential facilities claims. For example, Clear Channel contends that JamSports has
not set forth facts confirming that there were no reasonable alternatives to the stadiums alleged to
be essential. As we have discussed, however, an antitrust plaintiff is not required to bolster its
allegations with particularized facts, see MCM, 62 F.3d at 976, let alone to negate in its
complaint factual challenges that the defendant might raise. An cssential facilities claim, like
relevant market definition, requires factual development. Clear Charmel’s reliance on FJip Side
illustrates this point. There, the plaintiff was unable to establish that the Rosemont Horizon was
an essential facility for the promotion of arena-level concerts in the Chicago arca. /lip Side, 843
F.2d at 1034, But the decision turned on findings made at the summary judgment stage revealing
that several other stadiums in Chicago, including the Intemational Amphitheatre and the UIC

Pavilion, were adequate venues for arena-level concerts. /d. At the pleading stage, we cannol

22



molor sports that it identifies form a cognizable market. We decline to look behind JamSports’
allegations to disccrn whether the market that it proposes improperly excludes automobile racing
or improperly includes monster trucks. Those inquiries are a matter for later determination. See
MCM, 62 F.3d at 976 (citing Zastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481-82),

As we discussed in relation to the alleged market for promotion of supercross, however,
JamSports lacks standing to assert an antitrust claim based on Clear Channel’s conduct within
any relevant market limited to a subregion within the United States. Thus, JamSports may nol
base any of its claims solely on the theory that Clear Channel has monopolized the market for
promoting specialized stadium motor sports in specific “major metropolitan areas.” Cmplt. | 16.
B. Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2

Though JamSports asserts twelve separate claims under the Sherman Act, its allegations
reveal a few basic theories of relict. First, in counts 5-7, JamSports alleges that Clear Channel
leveraged its dominant market power in the “concert, motor sports, and/or media markets” to
coerce key stadiums in several metropolitan areas to refuse to sign supercross deals with
JamSports, and that this anticompetitive conduct forced JamSports out of its deal with AMA Pro
and out of the market for promoting supercross. Id. J] 105-123. Based on these allegations,
JamSports asserts claims of monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to
monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman Act.

Second, in count 8, JamSports alleges that Clear Channel entered into “exclusive dealing
contracts, combinations or conspiracies” with stadiums “for the purpose and with the effect of
unreasonably restraining competition in the relevant geographic submarkets for the promotion of

supercross.” Here, JamSports asserts a claim under §1 of the Sherman Act. /d. 4{{] 124-127,

17



affects every antitrust issue currently before the Court, we begin our analysis with JamSports’
relevant market allegations.
A. Relevant Market

In order to state a claim lor monopolization undcr § 2 of the Sherman Act, JamSports
needs to allege ‘““‘(1) the existence of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”” Elliot v. United
Center, 126 F.3d 1003, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). To state a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act JamSports must
allege: (1) a contract, combination or conspiracy and (2) a resultant unreasonable restraint of
trade in the relevant market. MCM, 62 F.3d at 972 n.7. Both types of claims require JamSports
to identify the relevant market in which Clear Channel is alleged to have engaged in
anticompetitive conduct. In its complaint, JamSports advances three possible definitions of the
relevant market in this case: (1) a national market for the promotion of supercross, (2) geographic
submarkets for the promotion of supercross in each of 11 metropolitan areas: Phoenix, Los
Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, Daytona, Miami, Indianapolis, Detroit, Minneapolis, St.
Louis, Las Vegas, Dallas, Houston, Salt Lake City, and (3) a national market for the promotion of
specialized motor sports events presented in stadiums and arenas.

Clear Channel contends that each of these alleged relevant markets is implausible and
lacks factual support. First, it insists that the idea of a market for promoting supercross is

contrived, arguing that JamSports, in an effort to claim Clear Channel is a monopolist, has

defined the market as consisting of the dirt-track stadium motorcycle racing series that Clear



the AMA Pro’s requested modifications. P!’s Exs. H, 1. It further alleges that AMA Pro’s board
of directors approved the agreement in the form it appears on the document attached to the
complaint. /d. 448. Accepting these allegations as true, JamSports has adequately alleged a
mecting of the minds.

Clear Channel’s most serious objection to count 4 is the argument that the alleged
contract is unenforceable under Illinois’ statute of frauds. Because the parties agree that Clear
Channel and AMA Pro contemplated an agreement that could not be performed within a year, the
Promotion Agreement falls within the statute. See 740 LLCS 80/1, Consequently, there must be
a writing or scries of writings that in combination reflect a final agreement, and one of these
writings must be signed by AMA Pro. See Bower v. Jones, 978 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1992),
Clear Channel’s argument does not support dismissal of count 4 for failure to state a claim.
JamSports has attached to the amended complaint a copy of the alleged agreement and letters
{rom its attorncys confirming its own approval of the deal, Pl’s Exs. H, |, J. JamSports also
alleges that AMA Pro’s board of directors approved the same agreement it has attached to the
complaint, it suggests in response to the motion to dismiss that discovery will lead to the
production of a document or documents signed by a representative of AMA Pro confirming its
approval of the deal. Though JamSports has not yet produced a document reflecting the approval
by AMA Pro’s board, it need not do so at the pleading stage. Drawing reasonable inferences in
JamSports’ favor, as we must at this stage, we conclude that JamSports’ pleadings sufficiently
allege the Promotion Agrcement’s cnforceability.

Ul. JamSports’ Motion To Strike

The court acknowledges JamSports’ motion to strike the last paragraph of Clear

29



of Clear Chamnel’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct, JamSports was unable to schedule
supercross events in 12 key metropolitan arenas: Edison Field (Anaheim), Texas Stadium
(Dallas), the Silverdome (Detroit), Ford Field (Detroit), Reliant Stadium (Houston), Sam Boyd
Stadium (Las Vegas), Pro Player Stadium (Miami), the Metrodome (Minneapolis), Bank One
Ballpark (Phoenix), Rice-Eccles Stadium (Salt T.ake City), Qualcomm Stadium (San Diego), and
America’s Center (St. Louis). /d. 461. JamSports alleges that many of these stadiums expressly
cited Clear Channel as their reason for rejecting JamSports’ promotion proposals, Jd,

JamSports maintains (hat its inability to secure these key venues contributed to its failure
to finalize a deal with AMA Pro to promote the AMA Supercross Series. Though JamSports was
able to put together a supercross event schedule by sccuring contracts with altcrnate arenas, and
stadiums in other cities, Clear Channel’s exclusive rights to promote supercross in the Series’
established venues proved decisive. JamSports alleges that Clear Channel uscd its dominance
over these stadiums to threaten AMA Pro with the prospect of a competing supercross
series—without AMA Pro’s sanction--and that AMA Pro rcnounced ils deal with JamSports to
prevent that possibility. Jd. 62-65.

The complaint further states that Clear Channcl leveraged its dominance over the concert,
specialty motor sports, and media markets, along with its exclusive deals with key stadiums, to
discourage the motorcycle manufacturers who routinely sponsor supercross teams from doing
business with JamSports. Moreover, JamSports alleges that Honda, Kawasaki, Suzuki, and other
motorcycle manufacturers have representatives on the board of directors of the American
Motorcyclist Association (AMA Pro’s not-for-profit parent company) and thal Clear Channel

was able to leverage its influence over (hese companies, through the AMA, to pressure AMA Pro



According to JamSports, on February 14, 2002, AMA Pro finally approved the promotion
agreement, /d. [ 48. But the two parties never signed a written contract. To the contrary, AMA
Pro eventually signed a deal with Clear Channel, granting it the right to promote the AMA
Supercross Scries for the 2003-2009 seasons, By JamSports’ account, AMA Pro had been
negotiating with Clear Channel all along, in breach of its obligation to negotiate exclusively and
in good faith with JamSports. JamSports alleges malfeasance on Clear Channel’s part as well.
JamSports contends that Clear Channel knew of JamSports’ exclusive negotiating rights, yet
made numerous improper contacts with AMA Pro, including written and oral proposals regarding
the 2003 Supercross season. 7d. | 52. As a result of this alleged interference, JamSports
maintains that it was deprived of the Supercross promotion rights that it believed il had been
promised.

Antitrust Allegations

At the same time that the parties were battling over the contract to promote the AMA
Supercross Series, JamSports alleges, Clear Channel was using anticompetilive tactics to exclude
JamSports from entering the supercross promotion market altogether. According to JamSports,
presenting a successful supercross series requitcs a promoter to secure key stadiums in certain
metropolitan arcas where the sport has an cstablished fan base. Jd. 457. With this in mind,
JamSports alleges, Clear Channel set out to prevent potential competitors, including JamSports,
from obtaining access to these essential facilities. Jd. Specifically, JamSports alleges that Clear
Channel was able to use its power in other markets- the markels for promoting concerts and
specialty motor sports events, along with radio, television and outdoor advertising markcts—as

leverage to coerce stadiums into exclusive deals for promoting supercross. Jd. 60. Asa result



Third, in counts 9 and 10, JamSports alleges a market allocation scheme based on Clear
Channel and AMA Pro’s alleged agreement not to compete with one another in “the respective
markets for supercross sanctioning and supercross promotion.” This alleged scheme forms the
basis for two claimed violations of § 1 of the Act: an alleged per se violation, and an alleged
“rule of reason” violation.

Fourth, counts 11-13 echo the allegations made in counts 5-7 that Clear Channel forced
JamSports out of the supercross promotion market by foreclosing access to stadiums essential to
producing the sport, Jd. 4] 136-147. In these counts, however, JamSports focuses on the
stadiums as “essential facilities” rather than on Clear Channel’s monopoly leveraging tactics. As
in counts 5-7, it asserts claims for monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to
monopolize. In count 14, JamSports alleges an “cssential facilities” claim under § 1 of the Act,
stating that Clear Channel “cntered into contracts, combinations, or conspiracies with stadiums to
foreclose competitors from gaining access” with the purpose and effect of restraining commerce.
Id. ¥¥} 148-150,

Finally, count 15 is a general monopolization claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act,
alleging that Clear Channel has significant power in the relevant market for supercross promotion
in the U.S., and that it has used anticompetitive means to maintain its dominance. Count 16 is
identical to Count 15, except that it alleges Clear Channel’s monopoly presence in the alternative
market for specialty motor sports. fd. [ 158.

Clear Channel contends that counts 5-8 and 11-16 are all “essential facilities” claims
under either §1 or §2 of the Act in that they depend on a determination that certain stadiums to

which JamSports was denicd access were indispensable to its bid to cnter the market for

18



support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957), MCM Partners, lac. y, Andrews-Bartlett & Associates, Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 972 (7th Cir,
1995). We first address the sufficiency of JamSports’ antitrust allegations.

1 Antitrust Claims (counts 5-16)

JamSports asserts 12 separate claims under the Sherman Act: four counts of
monopolization (counts 5, 11, 15, and 16), two counts of attempted monopolization (counts 6
and 12), and two counts of conspiracy to monopolize (counts 7 and 13) under 15 U.S.C. § 2,
along with four counts based on §1 of the Act (counts 8, 9, 10, and 14). Most of these claims are
based on a few overlapping antitrust theories; leveraging of monopoly power (counts 5-7),
exclusion from essential facilities (counts 11-14), exclusive dealing (count 8), and market
allocation (counts 9-10).? Clear Channel disputes some of the labels that JamSports has applied
to describe and distinguish its antitrust claims. The parties agree that counts 9 and 10 allege a
market allocation scheme in violation of § 1, But Clear Channel characterizes each of the claims
alleged in counts 5-8 and 11-16 as “essential facilitics” claims, and argues that JamSporls has
failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that any of stadiums that Clear Channel allegedly
dominates are essential lo promoting supercross. With respect to all of JamSports’ antitrust
claims, Clear Channel argues that JamSports has failed to allege a legally sufficient relevant
product market. It contends that the alleged “market for the promotion of supercross” is
implausibly narrow, and that JamSports’ proposed alternative, the “market for the promotion of

specially molor sports presented in stadiums and arenas” is artificial and incoherent. Because it

> JamSports characterizes counts 15 and 16 as “general monopolization” claims under § 2 of the Sherman

Act,



Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996), the court dismissed the Daily Herald’s
§1 antitrust claim against the owners of the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun-Times, who
were alleged to have pushed the Herald out of the market for premium syndicated news features
by signing exclusive deals with two major supplemental news services. The court emphasized
the Daily Herald's admissions that there were (hree major competing supplemental news services
in the market and that it had access to onc of them. Here, by contrast, JamSports does not admit
the feasibility of altematives; in fact it alleges that its attempt pursue a supercross scrics in
alternative venues failed. Further, the plaintiff's theory m Paddock depended on a finding that
the defendants’ exclusive contracts within a competitive market squeezed out smaller
competition. Jd. al 45-46. By contrast, JamSports has alleged that Clear Channel leveraged its
power in certain markets to forestall competition in another market and that JamSports’
exclusion from essential facilities was the product of coercion.

Alongside its contention that none of the alleged stadiums are esscntial to promoting
supercross, Clear Channel argues that JamSports has failed to allege that it was actually denied
access to these venues. ‘This argument is based on the fact (hat JamSports alleges only that it was
excluded {rom deals to present supercross events from January through May. Cmplt. {ff] 60-61.
But JamSports specifically alleges that the supercross season runs from January through May and
that AMA Pro sanctions racing during that time. /d. Morcover, we can conccive of reasons why
dirt track motoreycle racing would be possible in these stadiums, many of which are also venues
for professional football and baseball, only during the winter and early spring. JamSports’
allegation that it was denied access to essential stadiums during these months is adequate.

We conclude that JamSports has stated valid antitrust claims under §§1 and 2 of the

24



Minute Order Porm (08/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

Name of Assigned Judge Matthew Kennelly Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 2298 DATE 4/15/2003
CASE Jamsports and Entertainment vs. Paradama Production, ct al
TITLE

uf the motion being presented.

[In the following box (a) indicale the party filing the motion, c.g., plaintitT, defendant, 31d party plaintiff, and (bh) state briefly the nature

arc ordered to answer all remaining claims on or before April 29, 2003.

ql) {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order. |

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

() oO Filed motion of | use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Q Bricf in support of motion due

Q) 0 Answet brief to motion duc _____. Reply to answer brief due

(4) o Ruling/Hearingon set for_ at

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] onset for_ at

(6) oO Pretrial conference|held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on set for at.

(7) im Trial{set for/re-set for}on at

(8) u [Bench/Jury trial] [1learing} held/continucd to at

(9) 0 This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without cosis[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41,1 OPRCP4a)(1) [1 FRCP41{a)(2)

(10) =f (Other docket entry} For the reasons set forth on the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order,

the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss [docket item 21-]] as to Counts 9 and 10 of the amended
complaint, The motion is otherwise denied. JamSports’ motion to strike [31-1] is denied. Defendants

No notices required, advised in open court

No notices required, dur gf uals

Document
Number

Notices muiled by judge's staff

AFR 21
Notified counsel hy telephone AR 2 ns
a | Docketing to msil notices
Mail AO 450 torn, Ad ile

Copy lo judgo/magistrate judge.

FAN

, ¥ ran
fim ney ate maid tie
courtroam se OT Ys ey
bs deputy’s 7 tu
initials

fame ss
OE pate ives in

central Clerk's Office railing deputy wtinls

+



of the competitive market for commodities depends on how different from one another are the
offered commodities in character or use, how far buyers will go to substitute one commodity for
another”), The boundaries of a market or submarket are determined “by cxamining such
practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket [or market] as a separate
economic entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilitics,
distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.” Brown
Shoe, 370 U.S, at 325,

Market definition, however, involves a deeply fact-intensive inquiry, see Todd v. Exxon
Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199-200 (9th Cir. 2001); Found. for Interior Design Educ. Research v.
Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Market definition is a
highly fact-based analysis that generally requires discovery.”) (citing Zastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S, 451, 482 (1992)), and for this reason a court must be
hesitant to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to plead a relevant market. Todd, 275 F.3d at
199-200; Queen City Pizza, {ne., 124 F.3d at 436, On this point, the Seventh Circuit has
emphasized that “an antitrust plaintiff need not ‘include the particulars of his claim’ to survive a
motion to dismiss.” MCM, 62 I'.3d at 976 (quoting /Zammes vy. AAMCO Transmissions, Ine., 33
F.3d 774, 782 (7th Cir. 1994), and reversing dismissal of antitrust claim for failure to plead
specific facts justifying the alleged relevant market). Though JamSports must eventually
convince a tier of fact that a market for the promotion of supercross or “specially motor sports in
stadiums” actually exists, at the pleading stage, we need only find it conceivable that JamSports
could prove a sct of facts supporting the relevant market definitions that it has alleged. /d. at

977.

11



Channel has produced since 1997. On this score, Clear Channel compares JamSports’ market
allegations with those rejected in a series of cases in which antitrust plaintiffs sought to lint the
relevant market to a single product, brand, or narrow class of customers. See, eg., Hiliot, 126
F.3d at1005 (7th Cir. 1997); Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 300 F.3d 620,
628 (5th Cir. 2002); Queen City Pizza, Ine. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3rd Cir.
1997); Rohifing v. Manor Care Inc., 172 F.R.1T. 330 (N_D. Tl. 1997). Clear Channcl also argues
that a market limited to supercross promotion cannot be justified by reference to principles of
“reasonable interchangeability” and “cross clasticity of demand.” See United States v. Ef.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Brown Shoe Co, v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962). Tl insists that JamSports is required to identify cconomically meaningful distinctions
betwecn supercross and possible market substitutes such as outdoor motorcycle racing, or motor
sports generally, and that it has failed to do so. Clear Channel raises these same arguments
concerning JamSports’ geographic submarket allegations and adds the further objection that the
concept of a relevant metropolitan sub-market for supercross cannot be reconciled with
JamSports’ description of supercross as a nationwide series of races. Finally, Clear Channel
argues that JamSports’ alleged alternative market, promotion of “specialty motor sports in
stadiums and arenas,” is implausible as a matter of law. It contends that a market for specially
motor sports in stadiums, which JamSports defincs to include both supercross and monster truck
events but not outdoor automobile racing is simply illogical and should be rejected on its face.

‘There is no question that JamSports is required to allege a plausible relevant market. As
Clear Channel notes, markets are defined by reference to cross elasticity of demand and

reasonable interchangcability with other products. See DuPont, 351 U.S. at 393 (“Determination

10



Channel’s reply brief. Because nothing contained in that paragraph is cssential to our resolution
of Clear Channel’s motion to dismiss, the motion to strike is denied as moot,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss [docket
item 21-1] as to Counts 9 and 10 of the amended complaint. ‘The motion is otherwise denied.
JamSports’ motion to strike [31-1] is denied. Defendants are ordered to answer all remaining

claims on or before Apmil 29, 2003.

MATTHEW F. KENNELUY
United States District Jud,
Date: April 15, 2003

30



out of its deal with JamSports. Jd.

Finally, JamSports characterizes Clear Channel’s final deal with AMA Pro as an
anticompetitive pact, designed with the intent to exclude any other promoter or any other
sanctioning body from producing a supercross series capable of competing with AMA
Supercross. It alleges that, facing the possibility of JamSports’ entry into the market and the
prospect of JamSports’ gaining AMA Pro’s sanction, Clear Channel leveraged all of its influence
to obtain a deal with AMA Pro that guaranteed cach party’s continuing monopoly power over
supercross. Id. 4 66-70.

Based on its factual allegations, JamSports asserts two counts of tortious interference
with contract against Clear Channcl (counts 3 and 4), In addition, JamSports asserts twelve
separate violations of the Sherman Act (counts 5-16). Clear Channel moves to dismiss cach of
these claims.’ JamSports’ breach of contract claims (counts 1 and 2) are not at issuc in Clear
Channel’s motion.

Analysis

Tn considering Clear Channel’s motion to dismiss, we accept as true the amended
complaint’s well pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences {rom those
allegations in favor of JamSports. Thompson, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir, 2002). We will

dismiss a claim only if it appears beyond doubt that JamSports can prove no set of facts in

> Clear Channel Communications Lnc., and its subsidiary, SFX Entertainment, Inc. seek to be dismissed as
improper defendants in this suit. They contend that JamSports’ complaint refers only to conduct allegedly
undertaken by another of Clear Channel's subsidiaries, SIX Motor Sports, Inc. We agree with JamSports, however,
that its allegations properly apply to each of these named defendants. JamSports has alleged that Clear Channel and

its subsidiaries hold themselves out as an integrated enterprise, and that they have leveraged their collective power in
various media and entertainment markets to gain anticompetitive advantages in violation of the Sherman Act, Cmplt
at 16, 0.2,



facility.” Flip Side Productions, Inc. v. Jam Productions, Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir, 1988)
(quoting MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir,
1982)). The fourth factor is inapposite here. Tn the paradigmatic case, the alleged monopolist
actually owns the facility alleged to be essential, and some cost-benefit analysis must be made to
determine whether il is economically feasible for the monopolist to provide competitors with
access. See, ¢.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 381-82 (1973) (feasibility
of regulated electric utility selling or transmitting power to competing municipal distributors);
MCI, 843 F.3d at 1133 (feasibility of AT&T providing access to local distribution facilities
essential to MCT’s market participation). Llere, however, JamSports contends that Clear Channel
coerced third parties to refuse JamSports access to their allegedly essential facilities, We must
therefore decide whether JamSports has properly alleged that (1) Clear Channel controlled the
stadiums that JamSports identifies, (2) the stadiums were essential to promoting supercross, (3)
JamSports was denied access to the stadiums. Clear Channel does not dispute the sufficiency of
the allegations that it controlled the stadiums in question. Rather, it contends that JamSports
docs not properly allege that the stadiums were essential or that il was actually denied access to
the stadiums.

To be essential, ‘““‘a facility need not be indispensable; it is sufficient if duplication of the
facility would be economically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap on
potential market entrants.” Fishman, 807 F.2d al 539 (quoting Hecht, 570 F.2d al 922).
JamSports alleges that specific stadiums in eleven distinct metropolitan areas are essential
facilities for the promotion of a national scrics of supercross races. Tt contends that these

stadiums, for example, Edison Field in Anahcim, CA and the Metrodome in Minneapolis, MN,

21



agreement with JamSports to negotiate exclusively and in good faith toward a contract to
promote AMA Supercross. To state a claim for tortious interference with contract, JamSports
must allcge: (1) the existence of a contract between JamSports and AMA Pro; (2) Clear
Channel’s awareness of the contract; (3) Clear Channel’s intentional inducement of a breach; and
(4) damages. J/P/ Health Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Llospital, Inc., 131 IL.2d 145, 156, 545
N.F.2d 672, 676 (1989). Clear Channel acknowledges that JamSports has alleged that it had a
binding contract to negotiate exclusively and in good faith towards a promotion deal. Though
Clear Channel denies that it knew of the contract at time of ils alleged interference, that element
is adequately pleaded. See Cmplt. 495. Clear Channel contends, however, that its alleged
interfcrence~among other things, contacts and oral and written proposals made to AMA Pro
notwithstanding the agreement—cannot be considered inducement to breach. Clear Channel
refers to a portion of the First Agreement, atlached to the complaint, that imposes a duty to
disclose any third party offers made to either JamSports or AMA Pro during their ageced period
of exclusive negotiations. See Pl’s Ex. A (First Agrcement § 13), Because the partics
contemplated the possibility of unsolicited third party ofters, Clear Channel argues, any
competing proposals it communicated to AMA Pro cannot be considered tortious. We agree
with JamSports that this argument does not warrant dismissal of JamSports’ claim. The notice
requirement to which Clear Channel refers does not undermine the unambiguous language of the
First Agreement providing for exclusive negotiations. Accepting as true JamSports’ allegations
that Clear Channel knew of the exclusive arrangement yet made its own pass at AMA Pro, the
allegations of Clear Channel’s contacts with AMA Pro are sufficient to state a claim of

intentional inducement to breach.

27



exclusive rights to produce and promote AMA Supercross in North America, (2) financial terms
granting AMA Pro the greater of 8% of gross gate receipts or 30% of the net income from cach
Supercross event, and (3) an agreement to share revenues gencrated by event sponsorship,
product merchandising, and media and marketing deals. /d. {| 23-25. The First Agreement also
provided that JamSports would advance to AMA Pro a non-refundable amount of $3 million as
general working capital to support the creation of a successful media and televison serics. /d. |
26, Pl’s Ex. A (First Agreement) at 3. But none of these terms were immediately binding.
Rather, JamSports and AMA Pro agrecd to a ninety day period of exclusive negotiauions during
which the parties were obligated to use their best efforts to negotiate the remaining terms of the
deal in good faith. Cmoplt. {J 30-31, 33; Pl’s Ex. A at 6. They also promised to protect the
confidentiality of their business relationship, and to that end the First Agreement conluined a
binding obligation prohibiting either party from disclosing the terms of their proposed deal. /d.;
Cmplt. 4 32

On November 5, 2001, AMA Pro sent a Ictter to several motor sports venues announcing
ils partnership with JamSports and advising the venues that JamSports had exclusive
authorization to negotiate with the venues on AMA Pro’s behalf. Cmplt. 4 34; Pl’s Ex. B. On
November 6, AMA Pro issued a press release announcing that it selected JamSports as its new
promotion partner for the AMA Supercross series. Cmplt. 435; Pl’s Ex. C. In tum, JamSports
began taking steps to promole AMA Supercross and to prepare for the 2003 season. [n reliance
upon AMA Pro’s representations and its agreement to negotiate exclusively and in good faith
with JamSports, JamSports carried out negotiations with the Indianapolis Motor Speedway for

television coverage of AMA Supercross events, and on December 7, 2001 it armounced a



market for supercross is an obviously impermissible subset of a larger market for motorcycle
racing or live motor sports events generally at Icast not in the way thal a market for
pharmaceutical sales to “Manor Care-network nursing home patients” is clearly part of a larger
market for pharmaccutical sales to nursing home patients. JamSports has not tethered its market
allegations to a narrow class of customers. ‘To the contrary, it has characterized Supercross as a
recognized sport with a sizcable following.

JamSports’ pleadings and exhibits do appear to reveal a consumer connection between
the market for supercross as alleged and the market for other motor sports. See Pl’s Exs. D
(Indianapolis Motor Speedway press release), E (Speed Channel press release), J (Promotion
Agreement, § 18(b)). But we do not share Clear Channcl’s view that an independent market for
championship level dirt track motorcycle racing in stadiums is inherently implausible. As we
have discussed, we cannot determine at the pleading stage that among motor sports fans or
commercial sponsors, supercross racing is reasonably interchangeable with other types of
motorcycle racing or motor sports events. JamSports has not “pleaded itself out of court” by
acknowledging that the Speed Channel cable network appeals to fans of both supercross and
“AMA Superbikes,” Pl’s Ex. E., or by disclosing that its proposed agreement with AMA Pro
included a clause prohibiting JamSports from competing with it in the arca of “motorcycle sports
events.” Pl’s Ex. J (Promotion Agrecment, 418(b)). These documents suggest some cross-
elasticity of demand between supercross and possible market substitutes, but they do need lead
inexorably to the conclusion that no supercross market exists.

Clear Channel also argues that JamSports’ alternative relevant market allegations

undermine its claim that a market for supercross cxists. As facts in the case develop, it

14



Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir, 1995) (quoting Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S, 477, 489 (1977)), ‘Though a plaintiff can allege an antitrust injury based on the
unlawful efforts of its competitor to exclude it from a valid market to which it sought access, see
Fishman, 807 F.2d at 531-535, JamSports never sought to compete in the alleged geographical
submarkcts, Instead, it sought contracts with key stadiums in various citics as a means of
entering a national market, See Cmplt. {{] 57, 61-62. JamSports is cntitled to allege that Clear
Channel’s efforts to exclude it from reaching the supercross fan base in the eleven identified
geographical submarkets constituted illegal anticompetitive conduct. But the relevant market for
such a claim is the national market for the promotion of supercross.

3. Market for promotion and production of “specialized motor sports events
presented in stadiums and arenas.”

JamSports has alleged an alternative market for the promotion of “specialized” stadium
motor sports events, which it characterizes as including “supercross, arena cross, monster truck
events, freestyle motocross events and drag racing.” Cmplt. 416. Clear Channel argues that this
market is implausible as well, leveling many of the same objections it has raised in opposition to
the alleged market for the promotion of supercross. It contends that JamSports has simply drawn
a line around Clear Channel’s motor sports promotion business in order to characterize it as a
monopolist. Further, it argues that the grouping together of stadium motorcycle racing, drag
racing and monster truck events is arbitrary and without factual support. But here, as in ils
arguments for rejecting JamSports’ primary market allegations, Clear Channel exaggerates the
pleading requirements for antitrust plaintiffs. JamSports is entitled to state its market allegations

generally, see MCM, 62 F.3d at 976-977, and we do not find it inconceivable that the stadium



JamSports has also sued Clear Channel for violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. It
alleges that Clear Channel enjoys monopoly control over the supercross promotion market and
has leveraged its power in the concert promotion and media markets to exclude potential
supercross promotion competitors like JamSports from securing deals with stadiums and
sponsors essential lo promoting the sport. The case is now before the court on the Clear Channel
defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Factual Background

‘The facts alleged in JamSports’ amended complaint, which we regard as true for purposes
of this motion, Thompson y, Illinois Dep't of Prof’! Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.
2002), are as follows. AMA Pro holds itself out as the owner and sanctioning body for the AMA
Supercross Serics, Cmplt. 18. AMA Supercross is a valuable franchise, generating
approximately $40 million in annual revenues, including gate receipts, ancillary revenues,
sponsorships and television rights. /d. 919. From 1997 through 2002, Clear Channel (and
companies that it subscquently acquired) promoted the series, but its contract with AMA Pro was
sel 0 expire at the conclusion of the 2002 racing season. /d. In the summer of 2001, AMA Pro
began soliciting bids from other promoters, including JamSports, for the purpose of entering into
an agreement to promote AMA Supercross for the 2003 season and beyond. /d. 4120.

Contract Negotiations

On November 2, 2001, AMA Pro and JamSports entered into an agreement under which

JamSports agreed to produce and promote AMA Supercross for the 2003-2009 seasons. fd. 721.

‘This “First Agreement,” essentially a letter of intent, laid out several terms and conditions for a

later transaction that parties agreed to undertake, including: (1) a provision granting JamSports



Sherman Act on theories of monopoly leveraging,’ exclusive dealing and foreclosure of access to
essential facilities. As we discusscd in our relevant market analysis, however, JamSports lacks
standing to allege Sherman Act violations limiled to any of the alleged geographic submarkets.
To the extent that counts 5, 7, 11, 13 or 14 purport to state such a claim, those claims are
dismissed

2. General Monopolization

JamSports’ antitrust claims do not al] depend on its exclusion ftom allegedly esscntial
stadiums. In Count 15, JamSports alleges that Clear Channel “has significant market power in
the relevant market for supercross promotion in the U.S,” and that it has maintained its
dominance in that market though “unfair and anticompetitive means.” The allegations in count
16 are identical, except that they refer to Clear Channel’s conduct in the alternative relevant
market for promotion of specialty motor sports. These counts incorporate all of the factual
allegations in the complaint, including Clear Channcl’s alleged efforts to cocrce AMA Pro and
major motorcycle manufacturers into refusing to deal wilh JamSports. We agree with JamSports
that these counts state claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act separate from its essential facilities
claims; Clear Channel makes no argument to the contrary.

3. Market Allocation

In Counts 9 and 10, JamSports characterizes AMA Pro’s supercross sanctioning contract

with Clear Channel for the 2003-2009 scasons as a “market allocation agreement” in violation of

4 We note that Clear Channcl includes a paragraph in its reply challenging JamSports monopoly leveraging
theory, It suggests that JamSports “leveraging market” allegations are vague and inadequately pleaded. Because it
has failed to provide authority to support this position, and because it initially bricfed the relevant market issue
without any reference two the sufliciency of JamSports’ monopoly leveraging allegations, we decline to address this
issue.

25


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
JAMSPORTS AND )
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 02 C 2298
)
PARADAMA PRODUCTIONS, INC. »)
d/b/a AMA PRO RACING, CLEAR CHANNEL )
COMMUNICATIONS INC., SFX )
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. d/b/a )
CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS )
INC., SFX MOTOR SPORTS, INC, d/b/a )
CLEAR CHANNEL ENTERTAINMENT - )
MOTOR SPORTS, ,) KETED
) C
Defendants. ) BO

APR 2 1 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW PF, KENNELLY, District Judge:
This case is about “supercross”: championship-level, dirt track stadium motorcycle
racing. JamSports and Entertainment LLC, a sporting events promoter, has sued AMA Pro
Racing, a motorcycle sports sanctioning body, for allegedly reneging on a deal that would have

given JamSports the right to produce and promote the “AMA Supercross Series”! for the 2003-

2009 racing seasons. JamSports has also sued Clear Channel Communications Inc. and two of
ils subsidiaries (which we will refer to collectively as “Clear Channel”) for tortious interference
with contract, alleging that they carried on illicit negotiations with AMA Pro and eventually

wrested away from JamSports the Supercross promotion rights it claims to have acquired.

' “The AMA Supercross Series consists of a series of dirt track motorcycle races held in large indoor and

outdoor stadiums throughout the U.S, each year from January until May. Cmplt. §18.



Clear Channel also insists that JamSports’ damages allegations are insufficient. Tl argues
that its alleged interference with a letter of intent could not have proximately caused the 20 ~
million dollars in damages that JamSports claims to have suffered as a result of losing its deal
with AMA Pro. This argument is misplaced on a motion to dismiss. Under the law, JamSports
is entitled to the forsecable and consequential damages of the breach, which may include the loss
of the benefil of the contract. See Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp., 96
F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir, 1996) (in case of bad faith, damages for breach of an agreement to
negotiate may be the same as the damages for the breach of a final contract). Wc cannot say at
this stage that its damage claim is deficicnt as a matter of law.

2. Promotion Agreement

In count 4, JamSports alleges that Clear Channel tortiously interfered with the Promotion
Agreement allegedly accepted and approved by AMA Pro’s Board of Directors. Clear Channel
moves to dismiss this claim on the grounds that the Promotion Agreement was never a binding
contract, Tt points to JamSports’ complaint which acknowledges that a contract was never
signed, Cmplt. 4 49, and refers the Court to the Promotion Agreement itself, Pl’s Ex. J, which it
characterizes as an unfinished, red-lined draft. Though we agree with Clear Channel that the
alleged contract attached to JamSports’ complaint appears unfinished, JamSports has sufficiently
alleged the cxistence of a final and binding deal. It alleges that it corresponded with AMA Pro
regarding the final terms of the Promotion Agreement, that AMA Pro agreed to accept the deal
subject to cerlain modifications, that JamSports edited the proposal to reflect those
modifications, and that it mailed a final deal to AMA Pro for its signature. Cmplt. ‘[§42-44.

JamSports attaches to the complaint two letters from its attorneys in which it purports to accept

28



1, National market for promoting supercross

JamSports’ principal allegation is that there is a national market for promoting
supercross. It asserts that the sport has an established fan base, with seasonal events held in
several metropolitan areas each year. Cmplt. § 18, Tt claims that the supercross series currently
sanctioned by AMA Pro and promoted by Clear Channel generates around $40 million in annual
revenues. /d. It alleges that the sport is televised and attracts sponsorship deals with motorcycle
manufacturers. /d. at {] 18, 64. Taking these allegations as true, and drawing reasonable
inferences in JamSports favor, a fact finder reasonably could find that there exists an
economically significant relevant market for the national promotion of supercross. As JamSports
has defined it, supercross is a sport with a recognized season, championship competition, and
specialized sponsors. Though the question may well arise as to whether the consumer demand
for supercross is interchangeable with the demand for other types of motor sports, that is a factual
issue that cannot be determined at this stage of the litigation. JamSports is not required to
anticipate and refute in its complaint all possible market substitutes.

Moreover, we are not persuaded that the alleged market identified by JamSports bears
resemblance to those rejected as implausible in the “single brand or product” cases cited in Clear
Channel’s brief. In those cases, proposed relevant markets were rejected out of hand because
they were alleged to encompass tiny geographic areas, a narrow class of customers, or the
defendant's own product. In Fi/iot, for example, the Seventh Circuit rejected a group of peanut
vendors’ allegations that the United Center had monopolized the sale of food inside the arena.
Elliot, 126 F.3d at 1003-04. In Queen City Pizza, the plaintiff, a Domino’s Pizza franchisee,

alleged that Domino’s Pizza, Inc. had monopolized the market for the ingredients, supplies,

12



presumably will become clear whether the demand for supercross is reasonably interchangeable
with the demand [or “specialized motor sports events in stadiums.” But JamSports is entitled to
plead in the alternative, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(2), and for now it may allege, albeit perhaps
inconsistently, that there are economically significant markets for both supercross and specialized
stadium motor sports events generally.

2. Geographic submarkets for promoting supercross

We reject Clear Channel's suggestion that the concept of a geographic submarket for
supercross is in tension with JamSports’ allegations that the sport is produced as a nalionwide
series of races. Again, the federal rules permit a plaintiff to plead in the alternative. /d. In any
event, courts have recognized geographic submarkets for professional football and basketball in
specific metropolitan areas even though the games presented in those submarkets formed part of
a larger league enterprise. Sve, e.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986)
(relevant market for presentation of live professional basketball in Chicago metropolitan area);
Hecht v. Pro Football, Ine., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (relevant market for professional
football in Washington, D.C.), In the same way, a market for promoting the supercross series
event in Anaheim, for cxample, is a plausible market for competition among promoters within a
larger relevant market for the promotion of supercross nationwide.

The problem for JamSports, however, is that it docs not allege that it attempted to enter
any of the submarkets it identifies, apart (rom its overall effort to promote a nationwide
supercross series. This is more an issue of standing than relevant market sufficiency. In order to
maintain a private antitrust action, a plaintiff must allege an antitrust injury: an injury “of the

type of loss that the claimed violations ... would be likely to cause.” Serfecz v. Jewel Food

15