20 No. 03-3844

an employee is able to establish that he has been unlaw-
fully deprived of a property right in promised or con-
tracted for wages, the courts have been amenable to
classifying the loss of those wages as injury to “business
or property.” See, e.g., Williams v. Mohawk, Industries,
Inc., 411 F.8d 1252, 1260 (7th Cir. 2005). However, Evans
does not claim that he was engaged in a lawful business
enterprise or activity which was interfered with by the
City or the officers who allegedly harassed him. Cf.
Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1020-21 (7th Cir.
1992). In addition, he does not claim that he was dis-
charged from his employment as the result of his refusal
to participate in a racketeering scheme. Cf. Shearin v. ELF.
Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162-63 (3d Cir. 1989).
Indeed, Evans only claims that he was effectively pre-
vented from “seek[ing] temporary day labor work.” Person-
al injuries such as these are most decidedly not the type of
injury that the RICO laws were designed to address.”

*8 The RICO laws were developed as “an aggressive initiative to
supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fighting
crime.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498. The United States Congress
envisioned a set of lawa that would facilitate the “irradication of
organized crime in the United States, by strengthening the
legal toola in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing
new penal prohibitions and by providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime.” 116 Cong. Rec. 35216 (1970) (re-
marks of Rep. Donohue), It is unlikely that the legislature would
have had the foresight to see the law being utilized in an action
against a municipality or its police officers; however, the law
was “aimed at keeping organized crime out of legitimate busi-
nesees” as well as illegitimate criminal enterprises, Id. at 35200;
see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981)
(holding that the civil RICO statute applies to criminal ae well as
legitimate enterprises).

(continued...)


14 No. 03-3844

harass by Chicago Police Officers, he was wrongly “tar-
geted for prosecution” and unjustifiably imprisoned. As a
result, he argues that he wag damaged in his “business
or property” by being falsely imprisoned-—even though he
pled guilty to and was convicted of some of the
charges—because he lost potential income during that
period of time.!® Also, Evans claims that because he
was wrongfully targeted for prosecution and ilegally
imprisoned, he was forced to incur attorneys fees to de-
fend himself in the resulting criminal actions constitut-
ing an injury to his “business or property.” We disagree.

Although the RICO statute is to be construed broadly,
and we are charged with liberally construing the law to
“effectuate its remedial purpose,” Sedima S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co,, 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985), not every injury is
cognizable under § 1964, See Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 768
(7th Cir. 1992). Indeed, in Sedima, the Supreme Court
quoted with approval this Court’s admonition that “[a]
defendant who violates section 1962 ia not liable for treble
damages to everyone he might have injured by other
conduct, nor is the defendant liable to those who have
not been injured.” Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 496-97
(quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust
Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (1984)). Building on this
concept, this court has determined that “[t]he terms
‘business or property’ are, of course, words of limitation
which preclude recovery for personal injuries and the
pecuniary losses incurred therefrom.” Doe v, Roe, 958 F.2d
at 767. See Schiffles v. Kemper Financial Servs., Inc., 978
F.2d 344, 358 (7th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds
by Beck, 529 U.S, at 495-507 (citing Berg v. First State Ins.
Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp,, 442 U.S. 380, 339 (1979) (analyzing an

19 Ae discussed infra, Evans had been unemployed for three years
prior to his imprisonment.


24 No. 03-3844

Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Doe v. Roe, and
in doing so reiterate this court’s understanding that
personal injuries, and the pecuniary losses flowing from
those injuries, are insufficient to establish standing under
the civil RICO, § 1964(c)."* We also hold that foregone

5 (. continued)

Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204,
208 (1946) (holding that federal courts are justified disregard-
ing state law if the Congressional purposes underlying federal
law would be undermined).

* We are cognizant of the fact that our decision today is at odds
with that of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Diaz v, Gates, 420 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
The Diaz majority, however, blurs the distinction between
whether an alleged injury satisfies the statutory definition of
“business or property” and whether a “business or property”
injury wae proximately caused by a predicate RICO act. This is
evinced by the court's statement that; “Diaz suffered two types of
injuries; (1) the personal injury of false imprisonment and (2) the
Property injury of interference with current or prospective
contractual relations. Treating the two as separate, and denying
recovery for the firet but letting the suit go forward on the
second, is both analytically cleaner and truer to the language of
the statute.” Id. at 902. This analysis ie equal parts mis-
characterization of the RICO statute and red herring. For one
thing, in the Diaz case, falae imprisonment would not be a
“personal injury,” as the Ninth Circuit characterized it: instead,
it would be a cause of action in tort, which would give rise to a
personal injury such as loss of employment, loss of consortium,
etc. See, e.g., Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. International Ins. Co., 994
F.2d 1280, 1286 (7th Cir. 1993). Also, simply because a personal
injury—in Diaz’s case “interference with current or prospective
contractual relations”—entails some pecuniary consequence, does
not mean that RICO etanding has been established, for it is part
and parcel of the underlying personal injury, i.e., it flows from it.
See id. And as the Supreme Court has made clear, the phrase

(continued...)



No. 03-3844 5

concerning the incident. In addition, Perkina’ family filed
a wrongful death lawsuit against the City of Chicago and
the CPD in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. The Perkins family hoped
that if the case ever went to trial Evans’ would testify as
to what he witnessed on March 22nd in order to bolster
their case against the city.°

A. Evans’ Alleged Harassment

Evans claims that shortly after his appearance on
television, he was subjected to a campaign of harassment
and terrorization by a number of Chicago Police Officers.
Specifically, Evans claims that Officers Joseph McCarthy,
Robert Hofer, Robert Bullington, Michael Kozenko, James
Hladick, Richard Coyle, Mark Smith and Tony Green’
committed various illegal and unwarranted offensea
against him, e.g., allegedly arresting him without probable
cause, threatening him and continually confronting him
on the street and at his home in an effort to harasa and

5 The complaint also alleged a number of constitutional and
civil rights deprivations on Perkins’ behalf relating to the
events of the night surrounding her death.

® As it turns out, the Perkine’ family's suit against the city
never reached trial, as it was settled on March 24, 1999, with
Perkins’ family receiving $500,000 in damages.

7 Evans had contact with many of these officers prior to Perkins’
death. For example, in February of 1997, Officers McCarthy
and Hoefer (who regularly patroled the area surrounding
Evans’ home at 3388 West Van Buren) had stopped him and
questioned him. No arrest was made at that time. Additionally,
just two weeks before Perkins death, Officera McCarthy and
Bullington encountered Evans while they were arresting Perkins
for possession of narcotics. Perkins was taken into custody, but
Evans was questioned and released.



No. 03-3844 21

Thus, our holding is limited to plaintiffs auch as Evans,
whose claims of injury are framed in terma of Pecuniary

See

23 (..continued)

Also, as the Supreme Court recognized in Sedima, “RICO is
to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress’ self.
consciously expansive language and overall approach, but algo of
its expresa admonition that RICO is to ‘be liberally construed to
offectuate its remedial purposes.’” Sedima, 473 U.S, at 497.98
(quoting Pub, 1h. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat, 947.) Gnternal quot-
ations and citations omitted). However, it would be contrary to
the intent of Congress for this court to construe the statute 50
broadly that we completely read the “restrictive significance,” see
Reiter, 442 US. at 339, of the “busi
requirement out of 18 U.S.C. § 191 a
Provision incorporated into § 1964(c) was adopted directly and
expressly from § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. See supra
PD. 18-19 n.19,

116 Cong. Rec. 35227 (@emarks of Rep. Steiger). The
denouement—whether 00d or bad—of increased “clarity” in this
instance was the adaptation of the Clayton Act’s standing
requirement that a Prospective plaintiff be injured in his
“businesa or property” and the “restrictive significance” that
those words retain. See Reiter, 44 U.S. 339, Although Congress
may have been concerned with “a private litigant [who] would
have to contend with a body of Precedent... setting strict


No. 03-3844 27

therefore represent non-compensable pecuniary losses
related to personal injuries, See Swick v, Liautaud, 169
Tll.2d at 512 (describing the elements of a tort claim for
malicious prosecution), As auch, they are also insufficient
to supply him with standing under RICO.

However, even if we were to assume arguendo that
Evans had established a “business or property” injury
within the meaning of § 1964(c) of the RICO statute, he
has failed to prove that his payment of attorney's fees was
proximately caused by the alleged racketeering activity
undertaken by the city.

The Supreme Court, in Holmes v, Sec. Investor Prot.
Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992), analogized § 1964(c) to
§ 4 of the Clayton Act, and concluded that a defendant's
RICO violation, in addition to being the “but for” cause of
a plaintiff's injuries, must aleo be the “proximate” cause.
In doing so, the Court outlined a number of reasons why a
direct relationship between an injury and an alleged RICO
violation is so important, stating that “[allthough . . .
directness of relationship is not the sole requirement of
Clayton Act causation, it has been one of its central ele-
ments.” Id. at 269 (citing Associated General Contractors
of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540 (1988).

In line with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Holmes
and previous decision such as Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985), which states that “[alny
recoverable damages occurring by reason of a violation of
§1962(c) will flow from the commiasion of predicate acts,”
a number of appellate courte have held that a showing of
RICO injury requires proof of a “concrete financial loss”
and does not encompass mere “injury to a valuable intangi-
ble property interest.” See, e.g., Anderson v. Kutak, Rock &
Campbell, 51 F.3d 518, 523 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Steele
v. Hospital Corp, of Am., 36 F.3d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1994)).
Indeed, every court that has addressed thie issue has


No. 03-3844 23

knowledge of the expectancy, (3) an intentional and
unjustified interference by the defendant that induced
or caused a breach or termination of the expectancy, and
(4) damage to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s
interference.” Anderson v, Vanden Dorpel, 172 Tl.2a 399,
406-07 (Ill. 1996) (citing Felihauer v. City of Geneva, 142
Mll.2a 495, 511 (1991)). Evans has proffered no evidence,
much less case law that could or would lead us to conclude
that, by lawfully prosecuting and imprisoning him, the
City or the Officers, in any way, interfered with his “‘legi-
timate expectation of continued employment,” nor has he
alleged that he had a “reasonable expectancy of entering
into a valid business relationship.” There is no question
that the State of Illinois has the right, and indeed the
obligation, to arrest and incarcerate individuals that
violate the State’s drug laws, as Evans did by possessing
a controlled substance, The fact that thie precluded him
from seeking employment was merely a derivative of his
criminal behavior, and does not constitute the deprivation
of a property right.”* Therefore, looking to state law to
define “property” in this context does not help Evans’
claim, for he ig still unable to establish that he was injured
in his “business or property” based on the fact that he
was denied the opportunity to seck work while incarcer-
ated.®

* Indeed, aside from concluzory allegations of police misconduct,
Evans doos not offer any evidence that he was either faleely
imprisoned or maliciously prosecuted. Also, it is undisputed that
the convictions the State gained against Evans in Cook County
Circuit Court are valid and have not been overturned. See supra
p. 7-9. As euch, Evans’ claim that he was somehow denied a
property intereat by being incarcerated borders on the ridiculous,

** Tt should be noted, however, that we need not adopt a state
law definition of “business or property” which is eo broad that
it contravenes Congress’ intent in enacting the RICO law. See

. (continued...)


18 No. 03-3844

result in a personal injury. See Swick v. Liauiaud, 169
Ill. 2d 504, 512 Cll. 1996) (malicious prosecution); Cruthis
v, Firstar Bank, N.A., 354 Tl. App.3d 1122, 1136 (IIL. App.
Ct. 2004) (false imprisonment). These torts often reault
in personal injuries, such as those enumerated above,
including the inability to puraue or obtain gainful employ-
ment. Evans’ claim of loss of employment income is
nothing more than an indirect, or secondary effect, of the
personal injuries that he allegedly suffered, the inability
to seek or obtain employment, and therefore such a claim
does not constitute a cognizable injury to “businesa or
property” within the meaning of § 1964(c). Doe, 958 F.2d
at 770 (holding that “Doe’s loss of earnings . . . are plainly
derivatives of her emotional distress—and therefore re-
flect personal injuries which are not compensable under
RICO”) (citing Rylewicz, 888 F.2d at 1180).

To illustrate the point that personal injuries and inciden-
tal monetary losses flowing from them do not confer
§ 1964(c) standing further, it is helpful to employ an
analogous situation. In the oft-cited case, Grogan v. Platt,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had failed
to establish RICO standing by pleading economic lose
and loss of employment income related to the wrongful
doath of their loved ones. See Grogan, 835 F.2d at 846-47.
The Grogan court concluded that “pecuniary losses are 80
fundamentally a part of personal injuries that they
should be considered something other than injury to
‘business or property.” Id. at 847. Like the plaintiffs in
Grogan, Evana has failed to allege anything more than
pecuniary losses antecedent to a personal injury. The fact
that Grogan was premised on a tort claim of wrongful
death and Evans’ case is premised on false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution is of no import. The real ques-
tion is whether Congress intended RICO laws to compen-
sate plaintiffs for pecuniary losses, such as loss of income,
stemming from what ie essentially a personal injury like


10 No. 03-3844

the other charge. Evans agreed, and on March 12, 2000
pled guilty to the June 8, 1997 charge. Thereafter, the
State, pursuant to the agreement, moved to nolle prosequi
the May 12, 1997 charge.” The Circuit Judge sentenced
vane to four years on the June 8, 1997 charge, with credit
for 838 days time served, the period of time he spent in
Cook County Jail awaiting trial.

C. Evans’ Civil Case

On November 16, 2000, Evans filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Tilinois against the City of Chicago and eight Chicago
Police Officers.’” In his second amended complaint,"* which
ig pertinent here, Evans claims that he is entitled to

%* The agreement between Evans and the State's Attorney’s office
to nolle prosequi the May 12, 1997 charge in return for a guilty
plea on the June 8, 1997 charge is reflected both in the affi-
davit of Brian Klauss, the Assistant State’s Attorney who pros-
ecuted the cage, and in the transcript of the sentencing proceed-
ings. At sentencing, Judge Haberkorn expressly acknowledges
that Evans is pleading guilty to the June 8, 1997 charge “pursu-
ant to agreement.” In addition, the court thoroughly questioned
Evans as to his understanding of what his guilty plea meant
and as to his intention to enter such a plea voluntarily.

Also, Klauss states in an affidavit that the only reason he
moved to nolle prosequi the May 12, 1997 charge was because
ofthe agreement. Indeed, he states that, at the time, he “believed
that if the matter had gone to trial, it would [have] result{ed]
jn a conviction, pased in large part on the fact that Judge
Haberkorn had convicted [co-defendant] Doris Jones of the May
12 charges and had expreseed her belief that these same arrest-
ing officers were credible in their testimony on the same facts.”

17 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
8 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.


No, 03-3844 33

1991)). Indeed, the in Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, the Llinois
Supreme Court made clear that “the statute of limita-
tions ie only held in abeyance until the date of the last
injury suffered or when the tortious acts cease.” Id. at 284,

Applying this common-sense rule to the facts concern-
ing Evans’ allegations of continuing torts and First
Amendment violations, we are convinced that the district
court correctly granted summary judgment in the defen-
dants’ favor, It ia undisputed that the last, confirmed
interaction between Evans and the police officers named
in the complaint” took place sometime in December of
1997, Thus, the last injury Evans suffered, and indeed the
last poasible date of a tortious act against Evans, was in
December of 1997, well beyond both the two-year statute
of limitations for § 1983 claims and the one-year statute
of limitations for tort claims against governmental entities
or employees. In order to subvert this result, Evans
introduced an affidavit statement claiming that in March
of 2000, after he had been released from prison, two
unidentified persons told a friend of Evans’ that officers
would be “coming around looking for him.” However, this
quite obvious attempt by Evans to manipulate the doc-
trine of continuing violations is woefully insufficient to
survive summary judgment. As stated above, the self-
serving affidavit statement of a plaintiff is ipso facto,
insufficient to create an issue of material fact. See, €.g.,
Cichon, 401 F.3d at 810-813; Laborers’ Pension Fund, 377
F.3d at 739; Buie, 366 F.3d at 504.

Thus, because the statute of limitations began running
in late December 1997 and Evans didn’t file suit until
three years later, in November of 2000, both Evans’ § 1983
claim and his state law intentional infliction of emotional

*° Aside from court appearances at which the officers appeared.



30 No. 03-3844

factors”).””

Because Evans has failed to create an issue of material
fact, and because his RICO claim fails as a matter of law,
we conclude the district court did not err when it granted
summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Evans
lacks RICO standing.

?7Tn addition, even if were able to parse the record and the
affidavits in order to determine which charges were incurred
with respect to certain criminal charges, Evans has not estab-
lished that the attorney's fees he incurred were caused by a
predicate act within the meaning of the RICO statute. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1964(c), 1962; see also Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494,
500-07 (2000) (holding that in order for a RICO plaintiff to have
standing he must establish that his injuries were caused by a
predicate act within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1962). In order
to establich standing, Evans must point to an illegal act enumer-
ated in 18 U.S.C. § 1962, that was the proximate cause of his
alleged injuries, which he has failed to do. See id. There is no
indication in the record whatacever that Evans was mistakenly
or incorrectly arrested or charged with the offenses that were
Jater abandoned, i.e., violation of parole and possession of a
controlled substance on May 12, 1997. Ae mentioned above, the
May 12 charge was abandoned as part of a pre-arranged plea
agreement with Evans and hie couneel. See supra p. 11-12. Also,
although the violation of probation charge was abandoned, even
viewing the record in the light most favorable to Evans, as we
must at this stage, there is nothing to suggest that Evane had not
violated his parole and wae correctly charged with this offense.
As the state’s attorney trying Evans’ casee stated in affidavit
testimony, he moved to have the violation of probation charge
resolved as “probation terminated unsatisfactory” because Evans
had aerved the maximum amount of time for his 1996 conviction
while awaiting trial and the prosecutor believed the charge to be
“moot.” See supra p. 11.



No. 03-8844 7

stance, in violation of 720 ILCS 570/402." On each occa-
gion, Evans claims he was arreated without cause and that
he was mistreated by police officers. For instance, Evans
claims that when he was arrested on May 12, 1997,
officers proceeded to kick, punch and otherwise abuse
him after chasing him into his house.” In addition,
Evans claima that after being arrested and transported to
the 11th District Police Station, officers resumed beat-
ing him in the parking lot before taking him inside the
station house and forcing him to strip naked in front of
a female detainee. After being allowed to dress, Evans
alleges that the officers “paraded” him through the police
station, announcing to other officers that he was “the one
that wag on T.V.” and informing them that they should
“lock his ass up” whenever they encountered him.”*

10 Bvang was also arrested on September 5, 1997, by Officor
Hofer on an outstanding warrant and on September 21, 1997, by
Officers McCarthy and Bullington for disorderly conduct. ,

1. Tt should be noted, however, in a hearing concerning Evane’
May 12, 1997 arrest, a Cook County Circuit Court judge specifi-
cally found that there was indeed probable cause to arrest Evans.

1 Bvane claims that he “possessed no contraband” and that
“[t]he defendant officers produced the controlled substances at
the 11th District, falsely claiming it had come from Ronnie
Evans,” However, the police report tells a far different story.
According to the police report officere had been conducting
surveillance in the area of the 3300 block of West Van Buren
on that date and had witnessed six different eubjects pur-
chase drugs from three different individuals, Jater identified as
Evans, Doris Jones and Anthony Gray. The report also states
that when Evane was approached by officers after distributing
what appeated to be contraband, he immediately ran into
his house. However, before he reached the door he dropped a
baggie containing 20 individual doses of erack cocaine.

18 Byans was released on a bond a day or two later and placed on
house arrest pending an appearance on the charge. Four days
(continued...)



6 No. 03-3844

intimidate him. The alleged harassment began in early
April 1997—approximately one-and-a-half weeks after the
news broadcaat—and continued until late December of
1997. According to Evans, the reasoning behind this
supposed persecution was to keep him quiet and to dis-
courage him from teatifying—either in front of the OPS or
in federal court in conjunction with Perkins’ pending
lawsuit—concerning the incident that he witnessed on the
evening of March 22, 1997. On the other hand, the officers
claim that Evans was a known drug dealer and they were
just doing their job by checking up on him and stopping
him, when necessary, to ascertain whether he was in
possession of, or dealing, illegal drugs.

Indeed, during thie time period Evans was arrested on
three separate occasions—May 12, 1997, June 8, 1997’ and
July 14, 1997—for felony possession of a controlled sub-

4 On a number of occasions, Evans describes being accosted on
the street and/or near his home by two or more officers. For
example, about three weeks after Perkins’ death, Evans claims
that Officers McCarthy, Bullington, Coyle and Kozenko ap-
proached the vacant lot next to Evans’ house and proceeded to,
without cause, ask him to take off all of his clothes so that they
could search him. Evans goes on to assert that officers performed
a cavity search on him and then proceeded to laugh at him
when he refused to answer any of the questions posed to him.
Evans states he was humiliated and angry, noting that he
refused to answer any of their questions. According to Evans,
incidents such aa thie continued throughout the summer and
fall. What's more, Evans claims that during the same time
frame he was simply minding his own business, but that police
officers made a point of continually attempting to intimidate
and harass him.

® In addition, the day following this arrest, June 10, 1997, the
Cook County State’s Attorney's office filed a violation of proba-
tion charge against Evans, relating back to a 1996 conviction
he had sustained, also for possession of a controlled substance.


No. 03-3844 19

the inability to work or seek employment. We are of the
opinion that Congress did not intend to do 80. See infra
p. 24 n.21. This is particularly true Given the “restrictive
significance” of the RICO standing requirement, which
was adopted directly from the Clayton Act. See Reiter,
442 U.S. at 339; see also infra, p. 20 n.23. Indeed, we
are inclined to agree with the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia's statement in Mor-
rison v, Syntex Labs. that “fhlad Congress intended to
create a federal treble damages remedy for cases involving
bodily injury, injury to reputation, mental or emotional
anguish, or the like, all of which will cause some financial
loss, it could have enacted a statute referring to injury
generally, without any restrictive language.” 101 F_.R.D.
743, 744 (D.D.C. 1984), cited with approval in Grogan, 835
F.3d at 847 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original),

In Doe v, Roe, this court held that the loss of income
reaulting from the personal injury of emotional distress
was not sufficient to establish standing under § 1964(c).
958 F.2d at 765-67. In doing so, we noted that “Imjost
personal injuries—loss of. earnings, loss of consortium, logs
of guidance, mental anguish, and pain and suffering, to
name a few—will entail some pecuniary consequences.” Id.
at 770. However, we concluded that although “the eco-
nomic aspects of such injuries could, as a theoretical
matter, be viewed as injuries to ‘business or property,’ ...
engaging in such metaphysical speculation is a task
best left to philosophers, not the federal judiciary.” Id.
Likewise, although the economic aspects of Evang’ alleged
loss of employment income injury could conceivably be
regarded as affecting “business or property,” Congress
specifically foreclosed this possibility by adopting the
civil RICO standing requirement and its “restrictive
significance” from the Clayton Act. See Reiter, 442 U.S. at
339, see also infra p. 20 n,23.

This is not to say that a plaintiff may never recover
under RICO for logs of an employment opportunity. Where


No. 03-3844 9

Subsequently, on January 14, 2000," the State of Illinois
voluntarily withdrew one of the charges pending against
Evans, a violation of probation charge that the State had
filed on June 10, 1997, relating back to a 1996 conviction
Evans had incurred for possession of a controlled sub-
stance. See supra p. 6 n.9. The State’s Attorney's office
felt that because Evans had served the maximum amount
of jail time on his 1996 possession of a controlled. sub-
stance conviction while awaiting trial, the violation of
probation charge was, in effect, moot. Shortly thereafter
the State moved the Circuit Court to order that the
probation charge had been resolved as “PTU” or “probation
terminated unsatisfactory.” The Circuit Court granted the
motion, issuing an order reflecting that Evans had indeed
violated his probation, but not reaching the merits of the
charge.

On February 25, 2000, Evans’ motions to suppress
concerning his July 14, 1997 arrest were argued and
denied. That afternoon, a short bench trial was held on the
duly 14, 1997 charge, and Evans was found guilty of
possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to
one year of probation, probation terminated instanter.
With the July 14, 1997 possession of a controlled substance
charge resolved, the State then entered into talks with
Evans in an attempt to deal with the two remaining
pending charges against him, the May 12, 1997 and June
8, 1997 possession of a controlled substance charges. The
State’s Attorney approached Evans with a plea bargain,
whereby Evans could plead guilty to one of the charges
and the State would seek the minimum punishment for
that crime, four years in prison, and move to nolle prosequi

% The cause of a delay of approximately 10 months is unclear
from the record, but it may be due to Evans’ change of counsel
during that period of time.


No. 03-3844 25

earnings stemming from the lost opportunity to seek or
gain employment are, as a matter of law, insufficient to
satisfy § 1964(c)’s injury to “business or property” require-
ment where they constitute nothing more than pecuni-
ary losses flowing from what is, at base, a personal injury.
See Doe, 958 F.2d at 770. Thus, because Evans’ claims of

36 (continued)

“‘business or property’... exclude[s] personal injuries suffered,”
Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339. Diaz’s loss of employment and the related
monetary losses he suffered merely represent pecuniary losses
derivative of a underlying, non-compensable personal injury,
and as such those losses cannot constitute an independent
grounds for RICO standing. See id.; Roe, 958 F.2d at 770,

In addition, the Ninth Circuit's decision seems to weigh
significantly on that court's understanding of what constitutes
a “property interest” pursuant to California law. For example,
court concluded that the loss of incomo stemming from the
inability to pursue employment did constitute a cognizable in-
jury sufficient to establish standing under RICO, concluding
that Diaz had “alleged both [a] property interest and [a] finan-
cial loss,” under California law. Diaz, 420 F.3d at 900. The court
stated that the “harms [Diaz] alleged] amount[ed] to intentional
interference with contract and interference with prospective
business relations, both of which are established torts under
California law.” Zd. (emphasis added), In doing so the court
stated that the distinction between current and prospective
employment was “untenable” due to the fact that “California
law protects the legal entitlement to both current and prospec-
tive contractual relations.” Id. However, ae discussed above,
Ilinois law does no such thing. In fact, Illinois law explicitly
protects only the “legitimate expectation of continued employ-
ment,” See Fumarolo, 142 IlL.2d at 107, or a “reasonable expec-
tancy of entering into a valid business relationship,” Anderson,
172 Jll.2d at 406-07, none of which apply to Evans. Therefore,
because the Diaz decision is neither controlling law nor persua-
sive in its rationale, we need not alter our opinion today in light
of that decision.



CERTIFIED COPY

In the

Gnited States Court af
For the Seventh Citeutt
FEB O 1 2006

No. 03-3844
MICHAEL W. DOBBINS
RONNIE EVANS, CLERK, U,S. DISTRICT couarT
\gintiff- Appellant,

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 00 C 7222—Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 10, 2004—DECIDED JANUARY 6, 2006

Before COFFEY, RIPPLE and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

CoFFeyY, Circuit Judge. On the evening of March 22,
1997, Frankie Ann Perkins, age 37, died following an
altercation with two Chicago Police Officers who were
allegedly attempting to restrain her while taking her into
custody. Ronnie Evans, who resided next door to the
vacant lot on Chicago's west side where Perkins died,
claims to have witnessed the entire event. In a television
news interview taped the next day, Evans announced hie
version of the events surrounding Perkins’ death and in
doing so publicly accuaed the two officers involved of
murdering Perkins. In the months that followed, Evans
claims he was systematically harassed, intimidated and
retaliated against by a number of Chicago Police Officers



12 No. 03-3844

IL. ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the City and the individual officers
de novo, See Stark v. PPM America, Inc., 354 F.3d 666,
670 (7th Cir. 2004), and view the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, here Evans. See Dunn
v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 2001).
Summary judgment is proper only “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there ie no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact presents a “genuine
issue” if it is “one on which a reasonable factfinder could
find for the nonmoving party.” Hottenroth v. Village of
Slinger, 388 F.3d 1016, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Patel
v, Alistate Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 365, 370 (7th Cir, 1997)). An
issue of fact is “material” if it is outcome determinative. Id.
However, “bare allegations not supported by specific facts
are not sufficient in opposing a motion for summary
judgment.” Id. (quoting Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dept. of Natural
Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1036 (7th Cir. 2003)).

A. Issues

On appeal, Evans challenges only the district court’s
grant of summary judgment as to his RICO, First Amend-
ment, § 1983 claims and his state law tort claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In doing 80,
Evans argues that the loss of income and attorneys fees
that he incurred was the direct and proximate result of
the defendant-appellees RICO violations, thus providing
him with standing to sue pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
Evans also argues that his Firat Amendment civil rights
claims and his state law tort claims are not barred by the
applicable statutes of limitation because he was the victim



No. 03-3844 11

damages, due to the fact that inter alia: the named offi-
cers violated the RICO, 42 U.S.C. § 1961, ef seg.; the
officers and the City violated his First Amendment right to
free speech, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the officers and the City
violated Illinois law by maliciously prosecuting him; and
that the officers and the City also violated [llinois law by
intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon him. See
Evans v, City of Chicago, No. 00-C-7222, 2003 WL
22232968 (N.D. ILL. Sept. 26, 2003).

Following discovery, the defendanta moved for sum-
mary judgment and, on September 26, 2003, the district
court granted the defendant's motion in its entirety.
Specifically, the trial judge concluded that Evans could not
prevail on his malicious prosecution claim because he could
not establish that the circumstances surrounding the nolle
prosequi of the May 12, 1997 charge and the withdrawal] of
the violation of probation charge were “consistent with his
innocence.” Id. at *18-20. In addition, as to Evans’ First
Amendment civil rights claims and his state law inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims, the court
found that because the alleged illegal acts took place in
1997, and that suit was not filed until 2000, they were
both well beyond the two-year statute of limitations for
First Amendment civil rights claims in the State of Ilinois,
see Kelly v. City of Chicago, 4 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1993),
and the applicable one-year statute of limitations for tort
claims against governmental employees in Illinois, see 745
{LCS 10/8-101. Id. at *15-17, *22-23. Finally, the district
judge concluded that Evans’ RICO claims must also fail as
a matter of law, due to the fact that he lacked standing to
bring that claim because he had failed to establish that he
had been injured in his “business or property by reason of
a violation of Section 1962” within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c). Id. at *10-14. Judgment was entered in
favor of the City of Chicago and the officers, and Evans
timely appealed.


32 No. 08-3844

when the plaintiff suffers injury.” Golla v. General
Motors Corp., 167 Il1.2d 358, 360 (Ill. 1995) (citing West
American Ins. Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., 69 TIL2d
126, 180 (Ill. 1977), and Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors
Adjustment Co., 166 Il1.2d 72 (Ill. 1995)). In addition, as
the district court correctly found, nothing in either federal
law or Itlinois law tolis or delays the running of an ap-
plicable statute of limitations on a § 1983 claim until
criminal proceedings are concluded. See Pitis v. City of
Kankakee, 267 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that
“InJormally, the statute begins to run from the date of an
injury” on a § 1983 claims); Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641,
645 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Day v. Morgenthau, 909 F.2d
75, 79 (2d Cir, 1990). Thus, both Evans’ § 1983 claims and
his intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are
barred, unless the “doctrine of continuing violation”
applies. See Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir.
2001).

The doctrine of continuing violation, as the Illinois
Supreme Court has held, “does not involve tolling the

statute of limitations because of delayed or continuing
injuries, but instead involves viewing the defendant’s
conduct as a continuous whole for prescriptive purposes.”
Feltmeier v. Felimeier, 207 I11.2d 268, 279 (Ill, 2008) (citing
Pavlik v. Kornhaber, 326 IlApp.3d 731, 745 (I. App. Ct.

28 Because Evans has not alleged that he did not discover the
existence of an injury until after the injury actually took place,
the Illinois default rule on this subject controls. See Golla, 167
IlL.2d at 360 (“To alleviate the hareh consequences that would
flow from the literal application of the limitatione period, the
judiciary created the ‘discovery rule.’ The effect of the discovery
rule . ..is to postpone the commencement of the relevant statute
of limitations until the injured plaintiff knows or reasonably
should know that he has been injured and that his injury was
wrongfully caused.” (internal citations omitted)).



No. 08-3844 31

2. First Amendment and Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress Claims

Evans also claims that the district court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment to the defendants on his First
Amendment civil rights and state law intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claims. Evans argues his First
Amendment, § 1983 claim and his intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims should not be considered time
barred “because (1) suit was filed within one year of the
termination of the criminal prosecutions . . . and (2) both
claims involve a continuing tort, where a repeated course
of tortious conduct continued even after the filing of the
suit.” Evans is mistaken,

The statute of limitations applicable to claime under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in Illinois is the same two-year provision
which governs personal injury actions in the state, 735
ILCS 6/13-202. Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d 867, 869-70
(7th Cir. 2005) (citing Hileman v. Maze, 367 F.3d 694, 696
(7th Cir, 2004)). The limitations period for tort claims,
such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, against

governmental entities and their employees, however, is
only one year pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/8-101. See id. It is
undisputed that the vast majority of events giving rise to
Evana’ complaint took place in 1997. It is also undisputed
that Evans did not file hie suit until 2001. Therefore,
unless he is able to identify some legal rationale for ua to
extend the statute of limitations or conclude that acts
giving rise to his claim continued for a substantial amount
of time following the incidents in 1997, his claim must fail,

Evans’ initial argument is that the cause of action did
not accrue until the termination of the state criminal
proceedings against him in 2000. What Evans fails to take
into consideration is that the default rule, under Llinois
law, is that “a cause of action for personal injuries accrues



8 No. 03-3844

Throughout the summer and fall of 1997, Evans saw fit
to fail to appear in Cook County Court on numerous
occasions relating to the drug charges brought against
him during the summer, ie., his May 12, 1997, June 8,
1997 and July 14, 1997 arrests, and by December of 1997,
Evans had five warrants pending for his arrest. At some
point in early December 1997, in order to avoid apprehen-
sion, Evans decided to turn himself into J: udge Haberkorn,
the Cook County Circuit Court Judge handling all of his
criminal casea, J udge Haberkorn ordered a deputy to
immediately transport him to the Cook County Jail at
26th and California, where he remained until March 17,
2000, approximately 28 montha in all.

B. Criminal Court Proceedings Against Evans

In October of 1998, Evans’ attorney filed two motions to
suppress evidence, both concerning his July 14, 1997,
arreat."! The circuit court judge heard teatimony on the
motions on three dates between October 1998 and Febru-
ary 1999, but did not rule on them immediately.

8 (. continued)

after hie arrest, on May 16, 1997, Evans made a statement to
OPS concerning his arrest on May 12th and told the investigatore
that arresting officers, in his words, had “used exceasive force
and had arrested him without probable cause.” In the following
weeks Evans alleged that he was approached on two other
occasions by CPD officers who proceeded. to threaten and at-
tempt to intimidate him.

TM Prior to April 2, 1998 Evans was represented in his various
criminal proceedings by two attorneys from the Office of the
Cook County Public Defenders. Thereafter, he was represented
by a private attorney.


22 No. 08-3844

losses incurred as a result of what can only properly be
classified as a personal injury—such as the inability to
seek or obtain employment opportunities arising out of
false imprisonment or malicious prosecution tort claims.
See Grogan, 835 F.2d at 847.

Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Illinois law
also does not recognize the right to seek out employment
opportunities as a cognizable property right. Often, courts
will look to state law to determine the meaning of a
“property” right pursuant to federal statutes such as
RICO. See Doe, 958 F.2d at 768 (“While federal law
governs most issues under RICO, whether a particular
interest amounts to property is quintessentially a ques-
tion of atate law.”). Thia hae indeed proved to be an
acceptable and appropriate method for determining the
meaning that should be given to property interests. See
Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.8d 354, 357 (7th Cir, 1997)
(stating that “[plroperty interests ‘are not created by the
constitution’ . . . [r]ather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state
law ....”) Pertinent here ie the fact that the Ilinois
Supreme Court has specifically held that a person has a
property interest in employment only where that person
has a legitimate expectation of continued employment. See
Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Ed., 142 1.2d 54, 107 du.
1990) (holding that “a property interest in employment
as a tenured teacher can be created where there is a
legitimate expectation of continued employment”). In
addition, under Illinois law, to state a claim for “interfer-
ence with prospective economic advantage” which is es-
sentially what Evans claims the City and the officers did
by allegedly falsely imprisoning him thereby denying him
the opportunity to seek or obtain gainful employment, “a
plaintiff must allege (1) a reasonable expectancy of enter-
ing into a valid business relationship, (2) the defendant's



28 No. 03-3844

held that injuries proffered by plaintiffs in order to confer
RICO standing must be “concrete and actual,” as opposed
to speculative and amorphous. See, e.g., Regions Bank v.
IR. Oil Co., LLC, 387 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2004); Steele,
36 F.3d 69, 70; Anderson v. Lincoln Insurance Agency, Inc.,
2003 WL 291928, at *8 (N.D.IIL. Feb. 10, 2003); Pelfresne
v. Village of Rosemont, 22 F.Supp.2d 756, 765 (N.D.IL.
1998). Recently, this court adopted a similar standard,
holding that “a cause of action does not accrue under RICO
until the amount of damages becomes clear and definite.”
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 322 F.8d 130, 135 (2d Cir.
2003).

Evans claims that, due to the alleged racketeering
activities of the named police officer defendants, he was
forced to incur additional attorney's fees to defend against
charges on which he was later vindicated. In addition,
Evans claims that he incurred fees for “many court
sessions where witness after witnees was put on to testify
about harassing incidents involving the defendants.”
However, even when viewed in the light most favorable to
Evans, the evidence concerning the attorney's fees ia far
too speculative to confer RICO standing.

The problem is that Evane was convicted of two of those
charges, ie., the June 8, 1997 possession of a controlled
substance charge and the June 14, 1997 possession of a
controlled substance charge, while the other two charges
{the violation of parole charge and the May 12, 1997
possession of a controlled substance charge) were aban-
doned. Even if we were to assume that Evans “prevailed”
on the charges that were abandoned, the question remains:
What portion, if any, of the attorney's fees that Evans
incurred is attributable to the charges that were aban-
doned?

The attorneys that represented Evans tell us, via
affidavit teatimony, that they would have charged Evans


4 No. 03-3844

medics did arrive to attend to Perkins, the officers alleg-
edly told them that the area was a crime ecene; meaning
that they should not attempt to revive the woman.®
Perkins wae later examined by the paramedics and

determined to be dead.*

The next morning, representatives of ABC Channel 7
visited the neighborhood in order to conduct interviews
concerning Perkins’ alleged death at the hands of Chicago
Police Officers. Evans agreed to, and did, appear on the
news that evening. While relating his view of what hap-
pened the previous night, Evans publicly accused, the
two officers involved of murdering hia cousin in cold blood.

After the report aired, the CPD’s Office of Professional
Standards (“OPS”) formally launched an investigation into
the incident. In an interview conducted on September 2,
1997, Evans related to OPS officers his version of the
events that took place on the evening of March 22, 1997,
including his opinion that Officera McCarthy and Hofer
participated in the choking death of Perkins. Evans along
with Perkins’ family also Jodged complaints with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois as well as the
offices of Congressmen Danny Davis and Bobby Rush

2 Israel Garcia, one of the paramedics who arrived on the acene,
testified that he and bis partner thoroughly examined Perkins
and even hooked her up to an EEG machine, but there were no
signe of life. In Garcia’s words, she had “flat-lined.” Further,
Garcia testified that, because Perkins showed no signs of life
and because the police had designated the area a crime scene,
the paramedics did not attempt to resuscitate her.

4 ‘The record is unclear as to when Perkine was examined, how
she was transported and where she was conveyed to after she
was taken from the acene. However, it is clear that she died
following the altercation with police.



Me

No. 03-3844 at)

identical phrase in the Clayton Act); Rylewicz v. Beaton
Servs., 888 F.2d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir. 1989).

This seems quite proper when one considers that per-
sonal injuries lie outside the “business or property”
standing provision of the Clayton Act, see 15 U.S.C, § 15,
which is identical to the standing requirement contained
in the civil RICO statute.”® Indeed, in Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., the Supreme Court directly addressed the question
of whether the Clayton Act’s standing provision, which like
civil RICO requires injury to “business or property,”
encompassed personal injuries. See Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339.
The Court stated that although actual monetary losses
would, under most circumstances, be sufficient to confer

2° The Clayton Act provides that “any person who shall be in-
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (emphasis added). As the
Supreme Court acknowledged: “Even a cursory comparison of
the two statutes reveala that the civil action provision of RICO
was patterned after the Clayton Act.” Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987); compare
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). During Congressional
debates over the civil RICO statute, the American Bar Associa-
tion recommended that the bill be amended “to include a
provision authorizing private damage suite based upon the
concept of Section 4 of the Clayton Act.” 116 Cong. Rec. 25190-
25191 (1970), The reason for this is that prior to the introduction
of the “business or property” standing requirement, the civil
RICO bill did “not do the whole job .. . {i]t [made] the mistake
of merely authorizing such suits, without resolving the many
and varied procedural questions which [would] arise in its
application, and without granting to the courts the full extent of
remedial authority contained in comparable antitrust lawe.” 116
Cong. Rec, 35227 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Steiger). Accordingly,
the Clayton Act’s standing requirement was introduced by
amendment into the bill in order to enhance the “clarity and
contours of the title’s procedural provisions.” Id.


No. 03-3844 17

period of time while he was lawfully and properly incar-
cerated because he was unable to seek or obtain gainful
employment. The crux of Evans’ argument is that, due
to the fact that he was allegedly maliciously prosecuted
and falsely imprisoned, he thus lost the ability to puraue
gainful employment and also lost potential income from
that employment. As such, his claim must fail.”

The losa of income as a result of being unable to pur-
sue employment opportunities while allegedly falsely
imprisonedTM-—similar to monetary losees flowing from the
lose of consortium, loss of security and peace, wrongful
death and similar claims sounding in tort—are quint-
easentially pecuniary losses derivative of personal injuries
arising under tort law. See, e.g., Doe, 958 F.2d at 770.
Under Ilinois law, which in this instance defines the
scope of tort law, both malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment constitute traditional tort claims which

"1 We note that, while this case is before this court on sum-
mary judgment and all facts must be taken in the light most,
favorable to Evans, the record suggests that Evans was lawfully
incarcerated at all times pertinent to this suit.

*2 Because Evans’ complaint was dismissed on summary judg-
ment, we view tho evidence in the light most favorable to him.
See Hottenroth, 388 F.3d at 1026. However, it is worth noting
that Evans’ claim that he was falsely imprisoned borders on
the absurd. There is no dispute that Evans wae found guilty
to one charge of posseasion of a controlled substance and pled
no contest to another. Therefore, even if we were to find that
loss of potential employment income provided standing pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), Evans’ claim would fail the “but for”
causation test enumerated by the Supreme Court in Holmes v.
Sec, Investor Prot. Corp., 603 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). Thia is due
to the fact that Evans would be unable to establish that “but
for” the acts of the officers he would have been able to gain
employment, because he was lawfully imprisoned at the time
he alleges he suffered those injuries.


No. 03-8844 3

the applicable statutes of limitations, 735 ILCS 5/13-202
and 745 ILCS 10/8-101. Affirmed.

I, BACKGROUND

At approximately 9:00 p.m. on the evening of March 22,
1997, Ronnie Evans and his cousin, Anthony Gray, were
alerted by what they described as flashing colored lights
that seemed to be coming from the vicinity of the vacant
Jot next door to Evans’ residence at 3340 West Van Buren
atreet in Chicago, Illinois. Evans claims that, after noticing
the flashing lights, he and Gray went to a window on the
aecond floor of the house to determine what the commotion
was. Once at the window, Evans witnessed two persons,
whom he later identified as Officers Hofer and McCarthy,
struggling with a woman, whom he later recognized as his
cousin, Frankie Perkins. One of the officers allegedly had
his hands around Perkins’ neck while the other was
struggling to hold her arms behind her back. At some
point, the two officers and Perkins fell to the ground and
one officer let go of her, while the other officer—who
allegedly had his hands around Perkins’ neck—fell directly
onto Perkins’ chest and continued to strangle her. Evans,
at that point, presumed that Perkins had passed out or
died, because as the officers rolled her over to handcuff
her, Perkins was motionless. After Perkins was cuffed,
officers allegedly proceeded to drag her unconscious body
over to the squad car and unceremoniously lifted and
shoved her lifeless body into the back seat of the vehicle.
Upon witnessing this, Evans claims he charged out of the
house, screaming at the officers “I seen [sic] what you guys
did... [m]an, you are bogus.” While Perkins lay in the
back seat of the squad car, Evans overheard the officers
radio for ambulance assistance and atated that they
failed to perform CPR nor did they make any other
attempt to revive Perkins. What's more, when the para-


26 No. 03-3844

logs of earnings due to the inability to geek out or obtain
employment constitute pecuniary losses stemming from
personal injury, he lacks standing under RICO to ad-
vance this portion of his claim and the district court did
not err in granting the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.

ii. Attorney’s fees

Evans also claims that he suffered monetary losses
sufficient to establish standing under § 1964(c), in the form
of attorney’s fees, when he was forced to defend himself
against the charges levied by the Illinois State’s Attorney.
Specifically, Evans argues that the fees he incurred to
defend against the withdrawn violation of probation charge
and the May 12, 1997 possession of a controlled substance
charge constitute a cognizable RICO injury. We disagree.

As discussed at length above, personal injuries and the
pecuniary losses stemming therefrom do not establish
standing under the civil RICO statute. See Roe, 958 F.2d
at 770. Like pecuniary losses stemming from the inability
to seek or gain employment due to a plaintiff’s alleged
false imprisonment, pecuniary losses which emanate from
a personal injury such as the acquisition of attorney fees
due to alleged malicious prosecution or false imprisonment
do not provide a plaintiff with standing under the civil
RICO statute. In Doe v. Roe, we addressed precisely this
issue and held that monies expended in retaining a “new
attorney [were] plainly derivatives of her emotional
distress—and therefore reflect personal injuries which
are not compensable under RICO.” Id. The fees that
Evans allegedly paid his attorney with regard to the
withdrawn violation of probation charge and the May 12,
1997 possession of a controlled substance charge which
was nolled, are clearly derivative of his alleged false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims and


2 No. 03-3844

who acted in a concerted effort to intimidate and coerce
him into changing his story as to the circumstances
surrounding Perkins’ death.

On November 16, 2000, Evans filed a five count com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois against the City of Chicago (“City”)
and eight individual Chicago Police officers.‘ Evane’ initial
complaint, along with a firet amended complaint, were
dismissed in part, and a second amended complaint was
thereafter filed? alleging inter alia that: the named offi-
cers violated the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), 42 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq.; the
officers and the City violated his Firet Amendment right
to free speech, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the officers and the City
violated Illinois law by maliciously prosecuting him; and
that the officers and the City also violated Illinois law by
intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon him. See
Evans v. City of Chicago, No. 00-C-7222, 2003 WL
22232963 (N.D. Il. Sept. 26, 2003). Following discovery,
the City filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
district court granted, finding that Evans’ RICO claim
failed as a matter of law because he lacked standing and
hia § 1983 and Illinois common law claima were barred by

1 The Chicago Police Officers named in the complaint are:
Joseph McCarthy, Robert Hofer, R. Bullington, Michael Kozenko,
J. Hladick, Richard Coyle, Mark Smith and Tony Green.

2 The first two complainta Evans filed were dismissed without
prejudice, leaving us to consider only his second amended
complaint. A more complete procedural history can be found
at Evans v. City of Chicago, No. 00 C 7222, 2001 WL 1028401
(N.D-Ill. Sept. 6, 2001), Evans v. City of Chicago, No. 00 C 7222
(ND. Ill. Nov. 28, 2001), Evans v. City of Chicago, No. 00 C 7222
(N.D.ID, Jan. 18, 2002), Zuans v. City of Chicago, No. 00 C 7222,
2003 WL 22232963 (N.D.IIL. Sept. 26, 2003).


84 No, 03-3844

distress claim were properly dismissed as being beyond
the respective two and one year statutes of limitation.

III. CONCLUSION

The decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:
Teste:

Herk of the United States Coupt of
: /Appeals for the Seventh Cirtuit
/

a

USCA-02-C-0072-—1-6-06



No. 03-3844 29

the same amount of money—$20,000 or $10,000 a piece—
regardless of the number of charges pending against him
at the time. In addition, they themselves state that they
did not apportion their time amongst the criminal charges,
Le., they only kept an aggregate total of the hours worked
and did not bill based on which charge they were address-
ing at any given time. Whether billing in such a manner
constitutes a good business decision or not, we, along with
the attorneys that represented Evans, are unable to
discern what, if any, percentage of that $20,000 would
constitute damages even if Evans were to prevail on his
RICO claim. He does state in an affidavit that “{hlad there
been less than four cases, I would have incurred less than
a $10,000 debt to attorney Alexander.” However, Evans
offers no other support for this statement and, as this
court has repeatedly held, the self-serving affidavit of a
Plaintiff is ipso facto, insufficient to create an issue of
material fact. See, e.g., Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co.,
401 F.3d 803, 810-813 (7th Cir, 2005); Laborers’ Pension
Fund v. RES Environmental Serus., Inc., 377 F.3d 735, 739
(7th Cir. 2004); see also Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366
F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (“self-serving statements
contained in an affidavit will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment when those statements are ‘without
factual support in the record’ ”) (quoting Slowiak v. Land
Oakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1998)). Indeed,
speculative damage claims like Evans’ are precisely the
type of situation the Supreme Court was trying to avoid in
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., when the
court instituted a proximate cause requirement in order to
establish standing in civil RICO cases. 503 U.S. 258, 269
(“the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes
to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's damages attribut-
able to the violation, as dietinct from other, independent,


No. 03-3844 . 13

of a continuing tort, see, e.g, Hyon Waste Management
Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 214 Tll.App.3d 757, 762-
763 (I. App. Ct. 1991), which did not cease until the
year 2000, when his civil case was filed.

1. RICO Standing

The civil RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), provides
that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may
aue...in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.”
§ 1964(c). The phrase “injured in business or property” has
been interpreted as a standing requirement—rather than
an element of the cause of action—which must be satis-
fied in order to prevail on a RICO claim. See Gagan v.
American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.8d 951, 958-59 (7th Cir.
1996). The causation component of § 1964(c)—whether
an alleged RICO injury was caused “by reason of” a
violation of the atatute—has also been considered a
component of standing. See, e.g., Beck v, Prupis, 529 U.S.
494 (2000); Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 318 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir.
2008). As such, the issue “represents a jurisdictional
requirement which remains open to review at all stages
of the litigation.” Jd. (quoting National Organization
for Women, Ine. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994)).

a. Injury to Business or Property

In order for Evans to secure standing to aue under RICO,
he must first present the court with evidence that he
incurred an injury to his “business or property” within the
meaning of § 1964. Gagan, 77 F.3d at 959. Evans claims he
has done this in two ways. First, he claims that because
he was the target of an illegal campaign to persecute and


16 No. 03-3844

standing under the Clayton Act, “Congress must have
intended to exclude some class of injuries by the phrase
‘business or property,” and the Act “would, for example,
exclude personal injuries suffered.” Id.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Reiter, this
court has gone on to hold, not only that personal injuries
do not provide standing in civil RICO actions, see Rylewicz,
888 F.2d at 1180, but also that pecuniary losses flowing
from those personal injuries are insufficient to confer
standing under § 1964(c). Roe, 958 F.2d at 767. In the
civil RICO context, personal injuries which may result
in pecuniary losses, but are nonetheless insufficient
to provide standing under § 1964(c) have been found to
include injury to mental health or emotional distress;
see Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918 (3d
Cir, 1991); sickness, poisoning and emotional distress,
Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 782 F.2d 638, 643-44 (6th Cir.
1986); emotional distress due to loss of security and peace,
Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.
1990); injury stemming from the harassment and intimida-
tion of federal witneases, Rylewicz, 888 F.2d at 1180; logs
of income due to wrongful death of a family member/source
of support, Gorogan v, Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 846-47 (11th
Cir. 1988), and inability to pursue or obtain meaningful
employment, id.

Applying the concept that personal injuries and atten-
dant pecuniary losses flowing from thoae injuries do not
satisfy the standing requirements of § 1964,we now turn to
Evans’ claims.

i. Loss of Employment Income

Evans initially claims—most creatively we must admit
but nevertheless without merit—that he has established
RICO standing ae evinced by his loss of income during the