effort to salvage matters, Spirk then goes on to say in the
Supplemental Response that “{t]he exact detail of all amounts paid
to investors on notes (interest and principal) is in the general
ledger detail provided and evidenced by the canceled checks and
bank statements also provided.” This is impermissible. As
previously discussed, § 727(a) (5) and (7) require Spirk to do far
more than simply refer the Bankruptcy Court to an outside
collection of documents; rather, it is squarely his burden to
compile and analyze those documents and ultimately to explicate the
loss of assets to the Bankruptcy Court’s satisfaction. See
Hermanson, 273 B.R. at 550~51; Mezvinsky, 265 B.R. at 693. Even

beyond the impermissibility of Spirk’s redirection tactic, he was

also utterly unconvincing in any event. Spirk failed to provide
the Bankruptcy Court with any admissible evidence - such as an
affidavit - that any interest was ever paid out in cash to

investors. Worse still, he even failed to furnish the Bankruptcy
Court with the general ledger, canceled checks and bank statements
themselves (to say nothing of a well-analyzed compendium distilling
the information purportedly contained in those documents). (See
Def.’s Mot. for Recons. at 1 (“Regrettably, Spirk failed to file
any parts of the general ledgers, bank check stubs and bank checks
in support of his Response [to the Motion for Summary Judgment] and
explanation of the loss although such records detail and evidence

the substantial payments of interest on investor notes.” )). Spirk

~13-


Judgment and denying Spirk a discharge pursuant to § 727(a) (5) and
(7). On August 8, 2002, Spirk filed a “Motion for Reconsideration
and Leave to File Amended Statement of Facts.” Following two
separate hearings, on November 8, 2002 the Bankruptcy Court denied
the Motion for Reconsideration in an oral ruling.

On November 22, 2002, Spirk timely filed this appeal.

IL. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Standards

Spirk first asks the Court to review the Bankruptcy Court’s
order granting Sullivan’s motion for summary judgment. The Court
reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo.

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made
applicable to these proceedings by Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure, provides that summary judgment is proper
“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fep.R.CIv.P. 56(c); see Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund,
Local 705, 984 F.2d 762, 769 (7th Cir.1993); Chapman, 265 B.R. at
817. A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law; a dispute is “genuine” where the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for


forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing
matters that could have been heard during the pendency of the
previous motion.”). Spirk failed to show that the Bankruptcy Court
made any manifest errors of law or fact in ruling on Sullivan’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, and offered up no newly discovered
evidence that could not have been submitted when he originally
filed his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Accordingly, the Court holds that the Bankruptcy Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Bankruptcy Court’s orders

granting Sullivan’s Motion for Summary Jy¥dgment, and denying

Spirk’s subsequent Motion for Reconsjderatfon, are AFFIRMED,

LJ AI

U/ Haety D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court
Date: Lapestcl. i>

IT IS SO ORDERED.

~17-


Circuit put it, a party “may not simply place tow sacks before the
bankruptcy judge and request the judge to sift through the
documents and attempt to reconstruct the flow of the debtor’s
assets.” Hughes v. Lieberman (In re Hughes), 873 F.2d 262, 264
(11th Cir. 1989). The bankruptcy judge below rightly noted that
offering the court a mass of documents does not meet the standard
of § 727(a) (5) unless the debtor “organizes and compiles them into
a reliable explanation, explains discrepancies and fills in gaps.”
(July 29, 2002 Mem. Op. at 7); see also Hermanson, 273 B.R. at 550~
51; Mezvinsky, 265 B.R. at 693.

Sullivan has properly established a prima facie case under
§ 727(a) (5) and (7). The evidence undisputedly demonstrates that
LASCO (along with Spirk as a guarantor) borrowed $9.033 million
from numerous investors between December 1996 and November 2000.
Spirk filed the Spirk Action in February 2001, less than a year
after the last of these loans was made. Neither Spirk nor LASCO
shows any portion of the Note Proceeds as available in their
bankruptcy schedules, and Sullivan is entitled to a satisfactory
explanation of how these assets were depleted before Spirk is
granted a discharge.

Spirk offered two responses to Sullivan’s prima facie case.
First, he contends that the fourteen boxes of documents previously
turned over to Sullivan - boxes which, as previously noted,

contained LASCO’s tax returns, bank statements, computer printouts


2. Analysis
11 U.S.C. § 727(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

The court shall grant the debtor a discharge,
unless . . . (5) the debtor has failed to
explain satisfactorily, before determination
of denial of discharge under this paragraph,
any loss of assets or deficiency of assets to
meet the debtor’s liabilities [or] .. . (7)
the debtor has committed any act specified in
paragraph . .. (5) . . . of this subsection,
on or within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, or during the case, in
connection with another case, under this title
or under the Bankruptcy Act, concerning an

insider.
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5),(7). There is no guestion that Spirk is an
“insider” for purposes of § 727(a)(7) - Spirk admits in his

bankruptcy schedules to owning nearly 100% of American Benefits
Group, Inc., of which LASCO is a wholly~owned subsidiary, see 11
U.S.C. § 101(31) (A) (iv), and LASCO has a concurrently pending
involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.

In keeping with the “fresh start” goal of bankruptcy relief,
objections to discharge under § 727 are to be liberally construed
in favor of debtors and strictly against objectors. In re Juzwiak,
89 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1996); Stathopoulos v. Bostrom (In re
Bostrom), 286 B.R. 352, 359 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002). That said,
§ 727(a)(5) is broadly drawn, and vests the Court with wide
discretion to deny a discharge where the debtor does not adequately
explain a shortage, loss, or disappearance of assets. First

Federated Life Ins. Co. v. Martin (In re Martin), 698 F.2d 883, 886


the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of
articulating the basis for its motion and identifying evidence
which shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The non~movant
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleadings
but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

The Supreme Court has emphasized “that at the summary judgment
stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is
a genuine issue [of material fact] for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249. In performing this task, the Court “must construe all
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw
all reasonable and justifiable inferences in that party’s favor.”
Popovits v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 185 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir.
1999) (citation omitted); see Oest v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrs., 240
F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Chapman, 265 B.R. 796,
817 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001). However, “[s]elf-serving assertions
without factual support in the record will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment.” Jones v. Merchants Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.,

42 F.3d 1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 1994).


“What constitutes a ‘satisfactory’ explanation for § 727 (a) (5)
purposes is left to the discretion of the Court.” Bostrom, 286
B.R. at 364 (citing Baum v. Earl Millikin, Inc. (In re Baum), 359
F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1966)); see also Olson v. Potter (In re
Potter), 88 B.R. 843, 849 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1988). “[T]he focus of
the inquiry is not exclusively on the subjective nature or honesty
of the debtor’s explanation, but is also on the objective adequacy
of such explanation.” Bostrom, 286 B.R. at 365; see In re
D’/Agnese, 86 F.3d 732, 734-735 (7th Cir. 1996); First Commercial
Fin. Group, Inc. v. Hermanson (In re Hermanson), 273 B.R. 538, 546
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002). The debtor’s explanation need not be
exhaustive, but “must consist of more than {a} vague, indefinite,
and uncorroborated hodgepodge of financial transactions.” Baum,
359 F.2d at 814; Madonia v. Hasan (In re Hasan), 245 B.R. 550, 554-
55 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). Indeed, the debtor must “at least
produce sufficient documentation so as to free the Court from the
need to speculate about the veracity of the debtor’s explanations.”
Banner Oil Co., 187 B.R. at 956; Bostrom, 286 B.R. at 364-65; see
also Bay State Milling Co. v. Martin (In re Martin), 145 B.R. 933,
950 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1992) (“[T]he explanation must be good enough
to eliminate the need for the Court to speculate as to what
happened to all the assets.”).

Furthermore, the debtor’s documentation must be presented in

a concise, organized, and perspicuous format. As the Eleventh


Minute Order Fora (00:97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Harry D. Leinenweber than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 9228 DATE 8/28/2003
CASE Terry L. Spirk vs. Thomas B. Sullivan
TITLE
[In the Following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintifl, defendant. 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented]

DOCKET ENTRY:

ql) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}

(2) im) Briel in support of motion due _

6 OG Answer brief to motion due____. Reply to answer brief due__

(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on set for at .

(3) QO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on _____set for | _ _

(6) aq Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for _ i

(7) Go Trial[set for/re-set for]on at

(8) Qa {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OrRCPa(m) CO Local Rule 41.1 OFRCPAI(ay(1) OO FRCPA1(a)(2).

(10) =H [Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Bankruptcy Court’s
orders granting Sullivan’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and denying Spirk’s subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

aly [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.|

No notices requited, advised in open court Document
. Number
No notives required vumor of wtces
Notices mailed by judge's staff,
Notified counsel by telephone. AUG 2 9 2608
UY | Docketing to mail notices,
oY | Mail AO 450 form,
Copy to judge/magistrne judge
diye mnited notiee
courtroom
wap deputy’s
nang pny iis



checks, deposit slips, bank statements, and income tax returns —-
will not by itself create a satisfactory explanation for the
disappearance of assets, unless an accountant transforms them into
a complete and credible explanation, obtains missing information,
explains discrepancies, and does whatever else is necessary to make
the explanation intelligible.”); see FeD.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Banner Oil
Co., 187 B.R. at 956; Bostrom, 286 B.R. at 364-65; Bay State
Milling Co., 145 B.R. at 950 (“[T]he explanation must be good
enough to eliminate the need for the Court to speculate as to what
happened to all the assets.”). Spirk failed to carry this burden;
in fact, he outright shirked the burden, urging the Bankruptcy
Court itself (as well as Sullivan) to go wading through fourteen
boxes of documents to find the answers that 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (5)
makes it his duty to provide.

Spirk’s second, and more detailed, response came in the form
of a document entitled “Terry L. Spirk’s Explanation and Exhibits”
(the “Explanation”). (Spirk initially filed the Explanation as his
formal response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, but later
supplemented it following protest by Sullivan that the Explanation
did not comply with local rules.) As the Bankruptcy Court noted,
the Explanation reveals that, of the $9.033 million that LASCO
borrowed, $.796 million in principal had been repaid. That means
that, to have survived summary judgment, Spirk needed to account

satisfactorily for the remaining $8.237 million.

-1l1l-


of check registers, cancelled checks, accounts payable listings,
investor files, correspondence, and vendor files - provide a
Satisfactory explanation. Spirk pursues the same essential
argument in this appeal, laying fault with Sullivan for being
unwilling “to review the Ledger Detail (which contains the
information) or the supporting documents to decide whether there
are facts to support [Spirk’s] explanation. . . .” (Appellant’s
Reply at 4.)

Spirk’s position is meritless. It is not the Court’s duty to
act as sleuth, ferreting through a debtor’s books and records in an
attempt to trace the loss of assets or reconstruct the debtor’s
financial history. Bostrom, 286 B.R. at 365 (“It is not the role
of the Court to sift through the Debtors’ bank records and credit
card statements in an attempt to determine the loss of assets or
categorize how they spent more than they earned.”). Nor was it
Sullivan’s duty. Rather, once Sullivan made out a § 727(a) (5)
prima facie case in his Motion for Summary Judgment, it became
Spirk’s burden to compile the mass of relevant documents into a
concise explanation that explained discrepancies and filled in gaps
such that the Bankruptcy Court was free of any need to speculate
about the fate of the Note Proceeds. Hermanson, 273 B.R. at 550
(“In complex cases involving substantial assets and funds, even
producing for creditors a ream of potentially relevant documents -

including evidence such as checking account ledgers, canceled

- 10-


(7th Cir. 1983). In reviewing the proffered explanation of a
debtor, “(t]he Court is not concerned with the wisdom of [the]
debtor’s disposition of assets, but is concerned with the truth,
detail and completeness of the debtor’s explanation of the loss.”
Bostrom, 286 B.R. at 364 (citing In re D’Agnese, 86 F.3d 732, 735
(7th Cir. 1996)).

Although the party moving the Bankruptcy Court to deny
discharge bears the ultimate burden of proof under § 727(a) (5),
FeD.R.BaANKR.P. 4005 (“At a trial on a complaint objecting to a
discharge, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the
objection.”), there are shifting burdens of production along the
way. Bostrom, 286 B.R. at 364; Banner Oil Co. v. Bryson (In re
Bryson), 187 B.R. 939, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995). Initially, the
party objecting to the discharge must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the debtor at one time owned
substantial and identifiable assets that are no longer available
for distribution to his creditors. Bostrom, 286 B.R. at 364;
Sonders v. Mezvinsky (In re Mezvinsky), 265 B.R. 681, 689 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2001); Bryson, 187 B.R. at 955. If the party objecting to
the discharge carries this burden, then the debtor must provide a
satisfactory explanation for the loss of assets. Banner Oil Co.,
187 B.R. at 955; 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (5); see Mezvinsky, 265 B.R. at

690.


§ 727(a) (2), alleged that Spirk concealed his property within one
year of his individual bankruptcy petition with the intent to
hinder creditors. Count Two, under § 727(a) (3), alleged that Spirk
failed to (i) turn over certain bank documents for LASCO and its
affiliated entities, (ii) file schedules in the LASCO Chapter 7
action, and (iii) provide certain narrative descriptions of, and
documentation for, transactions with individual LASCO investors.
Count Three, under § 727(a) (4), alleged that Spirk knowingly gave
a false oath by failing to reveal the existence or transfer of the
Note Proceeds in the schedules and statement of affairs filed in
the Spirk Action. Count Four, under § 727(a)(5), alleged that
Spirk had failed to explain satisfactorily the loss of the Note
Proceeds. Count Five, under § 727(a)(7), alleged that Spirk
committed these acts on behalf of LASCO, an “insider” in a
concurrent pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Spirk answered the
Sullivan Complaint on November 19, 2001.

On February 12, 2002, Sullivan moved for summary judgment on
Counts Four and Five of the Sullivan Complaint, arguing that there
was no dispute about the nature of the “voluminous documents”
turned over by Spirk and yet still Spirk had failed to explain
satisfactorily the dissipation of the Note Proceeds. Spirk filed
a Response on May 10, 2002.

On July 29, 2002, the Bankruptcy Court issued a 13-page

memorandum opinion and order granting Sullivan’s Motion for Summary


left the Bankruptcy Court to rely on his ipse dixit assertion that
certain amounts of interest were paid out in cash. That is
certainly not good enough under § 727(a) (5) and (7).

The Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court that Spirk has
provided “no admissible evidence to support the allegation that any
of the four corporate entities paid any interest out in cash.” As
a consequence, the entire $3.796 million interest expense reported
in the Explanation must be excluded from the $10.166 million in
operating expenses incurred by the LASCO affiliated entities
between 1997 and 2000, leaving a maximum of $6.37 million that
could have been paid out in cash to meet expenses. Spirk, however,
needed to explain the loss of $8.237 million in note proceeds. He
has therefore failed to account satisfactorily for at least $1.867
million and the Bankruptcy Court properly denied him a discharge on
that basis. Couched in the familiar language of summary judgment,
the Court holds that no reasonable jury could find that Spirk has
satisfactorily explained the loss or deficiency of the Note
Proceeds under the standards of 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) and (7).

III. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

A. Standards
Spirk next asks the Court to review the Bankruptcy Court’s
order denying his Motion for Reconsideration. The decision to
grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is left to the sound

discretion of the lower court. LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust

- 14 -


Gleason, 01 B 14730, 20012 WL 1844656, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Dec. 20, 2001).
B. Analysis

The basis of Spirk’s Motion for Reconsideration was his
argument that the Bankruptcy Court improperly “inferred... that
no actual cash payments of interest” were made by any of the LASCO
affiliated entities. (Mot. for Recons. at 2.) To support his
argument, Spirk submitted with his Motion for Reconsideration
selected documents copied from the fourteen boxes previously turned
over to Sullivan, as well as the general ledgers, bank check stubs
and bank checks which he had failed to provide as part of his
Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. He also included an
affidavit from Paul Du Val, LASCO’s former accountant, that
purported to confirm that some $1.997 million in interest payments
had been made on the LASCO notes during 1997 to 2000. Spirk did
not, however, present any previously unavailable or newly-
discovered evidence.

The Bankruptcy Court correctly determined that the additional
documents submitted in Spirk’s Motion for Reconsideration came too
late; Spirk could and should have provided them as part of a
coherent, well-documented synopsis in response to Sullivan’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Nov. 8, 2002 Hr’g. Tr. at 10-11); see
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d

1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Reconsideration is not an appropriate

-~ 16 ~


Between December 1996 and November 2000, LASCO issued more
than 300 promissory notes (the “LASCO Notes”) to some 200
investors, borrowing $9.033 million (an amount which reflects both
principal and certain sums of capitalized interest) (the “Note
Proceeds”). Spirk was a cosigner on all of the LASCO Notes,
personally guaranteeing their repayment. Indeed, Spirk listed more
than $9,000,000 owing to 204 LASCO investors in the schedules of
debt he filed in the Spirk Action. On March 13, 2001, a group of
LASCO’s creditors filed an involuntary petition for relief against
it under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code based on LASCO’s failure
to repay the LASCO Notes. On March 22, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court
granted the petition and entered an order for relief against LASCO.

In an effort to determine whether Spirk or LASCO owned any
property which could be administered for the benefit of their
creditors, Thomas B. Sullivan (“Sullivan”), the appointed trustee
in both bankruptcy actions, asked that Spirk turn over LASCO’s
books and records. In response, in May 2001 Spirk submitted to
Sullivan fourteen boxes containing the requested documents,
including tax returns, bank statements, computer printouts of check
registers, cancelled checks, accounts payable listings, investor
files, correspondence, and vendor files.

On October 15, 2001, Sullivan filed a five-count Complaint
(the “Sullivan Complaint”) objecting, under 11 U.S.C. § 727, to

Spirk’s discharge in the Spirk Action. Count One, under


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINGES i lL E D
EASTERN DIVISION

TERRY L. SPIRK, . ; AUG 2 8 2003
J JUDGE HARRY 0. LEINENWI
Debtor-Appellant o . a -NWEBER
or-Appeltant, Nic 2 9 2093 US. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
v. Case No. 02 C 9228
THOMAS B. SULLIVAN, Chapter 7 Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

Trustee,

Plaintiff-Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Appellant Terry L. Spirk’s (“Spirk”)
appeal of two Bankruptcy Court orders, one granting a Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by the appointed trustee in this case, and
the other denying Spirk’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158. For the
following reasons, the Court affirms.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal arises out of Spirk’s individual Chapter 7
bankruptcy action, which he voluntarily filed on February 6, 2001
(the “Spirk Action”). At the time, Spirk was the chief executive
officer and a 98.6% stockholder of American Benefits Group, Inc.,
a holding company for four affiliated entities. One of those
entities was a wholly-owned subsidiary known as Lancaster Annuities
Services Co., Inc. (“LASCO”), a company that sold annuities and

insurance products through a network of independent agents.

A


As the bankruptcy judge observed, the Explanation discloses
that LASCO and its affiliated entities had operating expenses of
roughly $10.166 million between 1997 and 2000, a sum which would
appear more than sufficient to explain the disappearance of the
$8,237 million principal amount at issue. However, as discussed by
the bankruptcy judge, $3.796 million of the $10.166 million figure
consists of interest expense that Spirk has failed to show was ever
paid out in cash to any investor. This failure of proof is a
result of Spirk’s choice of an accrual, rather than cash,
accounting methodology for LASCO and its affiliated entities
between 1997 and 2000. As noted in the lower court opinion, “if
the accrual method is used, something more than an expense entry is
required to show how much interest was actually paid.” (July 29,
2002 Mem. Op. at 11 n.3.) Here, the Explanation discloses nothing
more than expense entries.

Spirk expressly acknowledges the ambiguity this creates in his
explanation. In Spirk’s sur-reply (entitled “Supplemental
Response”) to the Motion for Summary Judgment, after conceding that
the LASCO entities used accrual accounting between 1997 and 2000,
he states that “‘interest expense’ reflects the amount of interest
which accrued during a particular time period whether it was
accrued not paid, accrued and paid or accrued and capitalized.”
This, of course, is no explanation at all - it merely begs the

question of how much interest was actually paid out in cash. In an

-12-


Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the Court
reviews the Bankruptcy Court’s decision on a motion for
reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See Popovits, 185 F.3d at
730. “Such abuse exists only in situations in which no reasonable
person could agree with the [lower] court.” Talano v. Northwestern
Med. Faculty Found., Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d
1140, 1144 (7th Cir. 1994).

A motion for reconsideration, authorized by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59 and made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings
through Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9023, serves the
limited function of allowing a court to correct manifest errors of
law or fact, or to consider newly discovered evidence that could
not have been adduced during pendency of the prior motion.
Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir.
1987); Whitten v. ARS National Services, 00 C 6080, 2002 WL
1332001, at *1 (N.D. Tll. June 18, 2002); Kohl v. Murphy, 767
F.Supp. 895, 904 (N.D. Ill. 1991). However, “{t]he rule does not
provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures,
and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence
or advance arguments that could or should have been presented to
the district court prior to judgment.” Popovits, 185 F.3d at 730
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Russell v. Delco Remy Div.

of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995); In re

~15 -