UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ROSALIN S. LYKINS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 15-5081 

(D.C. No. 4:14-CV-00248-GKF-FHM) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Rosalin S. Lykins appeals a decision by the district court affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for benefits. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I 

Lykins injured her lower back in April 2010. She applied for disability 

insurance benefits and supplemental social security income shortly thereafter, 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

July 1, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

claiming her back pain and history of congestive heart failure left her unable to work. 

While her application was pending, medication and epidural injections failed to 

relieve her pain, and she underwent back surgery in January 2012. Later that year, an 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied her application for benefits. 

The ALJ followed the five-step disability analysis. See Wall v. Astrue, 

561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (summarizing the five-step process). He found 

that Lykins had severe impairments, but determined that Lykins: 

has the residual functional capacity [(“RFC”)] to lift and/or carry 

no more than 10 pounds occasionally or less than 10 pounds 

frequently; pushing and/or pulling consistent with the lifting and 

carrying limitations; stand and/or walk for 2 hours out of an 8-

hour workday and 15 minutes at one time; sit for up to 6 hours 

out of an 8-hour workday; occasionally climb stairs, balance, 

bend or stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl, but cannot climb ladders, 

ropes or scaffolding. She would be limited to occasional use of 

foot controls due to her back condition, extremes of cold and 

heat, driving, and avoid all exposure to hazardous or fast 

machinery and unprotected heights. 

The ALJ then asked a vocational expert (“VE”) if occupations existed for a 

hypothetical person with these impairments. In the VE’s opinion, the hypothetical 

individual could perform a number of unskilled, sedentary occupations. The ALJ then 

found Lykins unable to perform her past relevant work, but able to perform jobs that 

exist in significant numbers in the national economy. He therefore concluded she 

was not disabled and denied her application. The appeals council denied review and 

the district court affirmed. This appeal followed. 

 
3 

II 

We review the district court’s decision in a social security case de novo. Id. 

“[W]e independently determine whether the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error 

and supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Although we will 

not reweigh the evidence or retry the case, we meticulously examine the record as a 

whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings in 

order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). Moreover, the record must show the ALJ 

considered all the evidence, but he need only discuss the evidence supporting his 

decision, along with any “uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as 

well as significantly probative evidence he rejects.” Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 

576 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). 

A 

Lykins argues the ALJ’s RFC finding failed to incorporate a doctor’s opinion 

that Lykins could only occasionally grasp tools. In particular, Dr. Ashok Kache 

examined Lykins in 2010. Dr. Kache determined that Lykins could “effectively 

grasp tools such as a hammer . . . on occasion.” Based on this observation, Lykins 

contends “a claimant limited to only occasional use of the hands cannot perform the 

jobs the VE and the ALJ found for her.” We reject her argument that failure to 
4 

mention the limitation undermines the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s 

decision. 

Lykins overstates Dr. Kache’s report. In addition to noting that she can grasp 

tools “on occasion,” Kache determined that Lykins had a full range of motion in her 

wrists and hands, could pick up small objects and coins, effectively oppose her thumb 

to her fingertips, and manipulate small objects. Moreover, the ALJ accurately 

summarized the opinion aside from the brief mention that she could grasp tools on 

occasion. 

The ALJ’s omission of the “grasp tools” finding is not dispositive, because the 

limitation on her grasp was neither uncontroverted nor significantly probative. Cf. 

id. And nothing in the medical evidence—including records from several physicians 

who treated or examined Lykins—corroborated Dr. Kache’s assessment. To the 

contrary, Dr. Beau Jennings also assessed Lykins’ hand and wrist functioning, noting 

no limitation on her ability to “effectively grasp tools such as a hammer.” Nor did 

Lykins claim she had such limitations in her application, even when specifically 

asked. Instead, when Lykins was asked what caused weakness in her grip, she 

testified, “lift[ing] something that’s too heavy,” but clarified that lifting ten pounds 

was not a problem. In sum, Dr. Kache’s opinion regarding Lykins’ ability to grasp 

tools only occasionally was controverted by every other relevant medical opinion and 

by Lykins herself. In light of this other evidence, Dr. Kache’s observation was not 

significantly probative. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions, and 
5 

the ALJ was not required to discuss Dr. Kache’s grip-related findings in greater 

detail.1

B 

Lykins challenges the ALJ’s finding that her “statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not credible to the 

extent they are inconsistent with [the] RFC.” Credibility determinations are the 

province of the factfinder, and we will not upset them if they are supported by 

substantial evidence. Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010). But 

credibility findings “should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial 

evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

To determine whether the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain are credible, the 

ALJ should consider a variety of factors, such as 

the levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of the 

attempts . . . to obtain relief, the frequency of medical contacts, the 

nature of daily activities, subjective measures of credibility that are 

peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and 

relationship between the claimant and other witnesses, and the 

consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony with objective 

medical evidence. 

Id. at 1145 (quotation omitted). However, “so long as the ALJ sets forth the specific 

evidence he relies on in evaluating the claimant’s credibility, he need not make a 

 1

 Because we conclude the ALJ was not required to include specific hand 

limitations in his RFC assessment, we also reject Lykins’ claim that the ALJ should 

have included such a limitation in his hypothetical question to the VE. See Qualls v. 

Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1373 (10th Cir. 2000) (hypothetical questions are generally 

sufficient if they include all of the limitations the ALJ found in his assessment of the 

claimant’s RFC). 
6 

formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence.” Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 

695 F.3d 1156, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). 

The ALJ applied the correct legal standard, discussed several of the suggested 

factors, and tied his findings to the evidence. He noted that Lykins’ claims of 

disabling pain were inconsistent with her daily activities, noting she was able to care 

for herself and her two young children, prepare meals, clean, go outside, walk, drive 

a car, and go shopping. Lykins’ ability to consistently perform this wide range of 

activities on a regular basis supports the ALJ’s finding. Cf. Broadbent v. Harris, 

698 F.2d 407, 413 (10th Cir. 1983) (activities not conducted on a daily basis do not 

“establish, without more evidence, that a person is able to engage in substantial 

gainful activity” (quotation omitted)). 

The ALJ noted Lykins’ allegations were inconsistent with objective medical 

evidence. Accord Newbold v. Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 2013). He 

noted the absence of medical findings that “would establish the existence of a pattern 

of pain of such severity as to prevent [Lykins] from engaging in any work on a 

sustained basis,” and cited the results of an X-ray revealing only “mild to moderate 

facet degenerative changes” in Lykins’ lumbar spine. The ALJ also cited reports 

from Lykins’ treating physician, which documented improvement in her symptoms 

after surgery and predicted continued improvement with physical therapy. And the 

ALJ noted that no physician had opined that Lykins was completely disabled. See

Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1995) (“To establish disabling pain 

without the explicit confirmation of treating physicians may be difficult.”). 
7 

The ALJ observed Lykins’ inconsistent description of her symptoms. For 

example, Lykins told her treating physician on several occasions that surgery had 

improved her symptoms significantly, but told another doctor during an examination 

related to her application for benefits that her back pain was worsening. 

Finally, the ALJ discussed Lykins’ medical care. He concluded she had not 

“received the type of medical treatment one would expect for a totally disabled 

individual,” and characterized her treatment as “routine and conservative.” The ALJ 

cited medical reports describing Lykins’ improvement after surgery, treatment notes 

showing her medications had “been discontinued or otherwise adjusted as needed,” 

and the lack of any side effects from her medications. Although we agree with 

Lykins that some of her treatment was not “routine and conservative,” the ALJ’s 

detailed summary of Lykins’ medical records shows he understood the nature and 

effectiveness of her treatment. That the ALJ could have characterized her treatment 

differently does not undermine his conclusion that Lykins’ pain did not preclude all 

types of work. The ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by substantial 

evidence. 

III 

 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge