The physician who examined plaintiff in connection with the petition was Dr. Giacomin. (Id.
4] 84.) Given the description of the precipitating incident and his own examination of plaintiff,
during which plaintiff evaded his questions and made repeated statements that the doctor
characterized as paranoid, Dr. Giacomin felt that plaintiff needed to be hospitalized for an
evaluation. (Id. {| 85-90.) After Giacomin examined plaintiff, he concluded that plaintiff was
mentally il] and in danger of harming himself or others. (Id. { 93.)

Ultimately, plaintiffwas committed to Alexian Brothers Mental Health Center on September
25, 2001, where he stayed until October 1, 2001. (Id. {{ 4, 96, 108.)

On March 18, 2002, Herdegen filed charges against plaintiff with the Hoffman Estates Board
of Fire and Police Commissioners. Among other things, Herdegen charged that plaintiffs conduct
on September 24, 2001 constituted a battery against Caceres and violated departmental rules and
regulations. (Id. | 8.) On June 24, 2002, after a six-day hearing, the Board sustained Herdegen’s
charges. (Id., Ex. D, Findings & Decision.) In addition, the Board found that plaintiff was unfit for
duty and dismissed him from his position as patrol officer. (Id.)

Plaintiff sought review of the Board’s decision in state court, which upheld the Board’s
decision. (Id. ff 13-14.) Plaintiffhas now filed a complaint with this Court alleging that defendants’

actions violated his federal constitutional rights and various provisions of state law.

The Legal Standard
To prevail on a summary judgment motion, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, [must] show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

4.



Conclusion
For the reasons stated above there is no genuine issue of material fact on the federal claims
plaintiff asserts against defendants in Counts I and II of the complaint. Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on those claims is, therefore, granted. The Court declines to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-law claims, which are dismissed without prejudice
to refiling in state court. This is a final and appealable order.

ENTER:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: oO

-9-


Cir. 2002) (setting forth elements of claim preclusion under Illinois law); Talarico v. Dunlap, 667
N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ill. App. Ct.) (setting forth clements of issues preclusion under Illinois law), aff'd,
168 Ill.2d 627 (1996). Fortunately, we need not decide those questions because, even if neither
preclusion doctrine applies, plaintiff's claims fail on the merits.

As an initial matter, the Fourth Amendment claims that plaintiff asserts against the Village
of Hoffman Estates must be dismissed? To prevail on a section 1983 claim against the Village,
plaintiff must show that he was deprived of his constitutional rights pursuant to one of its policies,
customs or practices. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 US. 658, 694
(1978). Plaintiff has proffered no evidence to suggest that his involuntary commitment was
accomplished pursuant to Village policy. The Village is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on the Fourth Amendment claim plaintiff asserts against it.

The Fourth Amendment claims plaintiff asserts against the individual defendants suffer the
same fate. The individual defendants violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights if they had him
committed without probable cause to believe that he was an immediate danger to himself or others.
Villanova, 972 F.2d at 795 (7" Cir. 1992) (“A civil commitment . . . may be made only upon
probable cause, that is, only if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is
subject to seizure under the governing legal standard... ..”); 405 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/3-601 (aperson
can be involuntarily committed only if he is mentally ill and “immediate hospitalization is necessary
for the protection of such person or others from physical harm”). Probable cause is a “practical,

nontechnical conception” that requires an “evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.” United

3As plaintiff acknowledges in his complaint, the Hoffman Estates Police Department is a
“public service provided by the Village of Hoffman Estates,” not a separate legal entity. (Compl.
42.)

-6-



matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At this stage, we do not weigh evidence or determine the truth
of the matters asserted. Anderson v, Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). We view all

evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Michas v. Health Cost Controls

of IIL, 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record

as a whole establishes that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id.

Discussion

The Federal Claims

In the first two counts of his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant violated his Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they had him involuntarily committed. The latter claims
are easily dispatched. Involuntary commitment is a seizure, governmental action that falls directly
under the Fourth Amendment. Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 795 (7 Cir. 1992).
Consequently, plaintiffs challenge to his commitment “must be analyzed under the [Fourth

Amendment] standard ... , not under the rubric of: substantive due process.” United States v. Lanier,

520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997).? Thus, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
Fourteenth Amendment claims asserted in Count II.

That leaves the Fourth Amendment claims. Defendants says that these claims were, in
essence, adjudicated against plaintiff in the state administrative review proceeding. Thus, they say,
the state-law doctrines of claim and/or issue preclusion bar their relitigation in this suit. Determining
whether plaintiff's claims are precluded requires the resolution of a number of thorny questions

about, for example, the limitations of privity. See Licari v. City of Chicago, 298 F.3d 664, 666 (7"

2Plaintiff does not challenge the commitment procedures themselves.

-5-


Given those undisputed facts, defendants had probable cause to have plaintiff involuntarily
committed.

Moreover, even if defendants did not have probable cause for the commitment, they would
still be shielded from plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims by qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity would protect defendants ifa reasonable officer in their position could have believed there
was probable cause for the commitment. Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Faced with the undisputed facts set forth above, a
reasonable police officer could easily have believed that plaintiff was mentally ill and a danger to
himself or others. Consequently, defendants would be qualifiedly immune from liability on
plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims, even if they did not have probable cause to commit him.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claims asserted in Count I is, therefore, granted.

The State Law Claims
Having dismissed the only federal claims in this suit, the Court declines to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).


‘Mipute Order Form (06/97)
*K X, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Paul E. Plunkett Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 3056 DATE 1/6/2004
CASE GERALD CHAPALA vs. HOFFMAN ESTATES POLICE DEPT..,et al
TITLE

[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qa oa Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

GB) oOo Answer brief to motion due___- Reply to answer brief due.

(4) QO Ruling/Hearingon___setfor__at

(5) Q Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for}on__——ssetfor__—— at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_—setfor___——at__—.
{7) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on___at

(8) a (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) (CLocai Rule 41.1 CIFRCP41(a)(1) CFRCP41(a)(2).

do {Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: there is no genuine
issue of material fact on the federal claims plaintiff asserts against defendants in Count I and II of the
complaint. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on those claims is, therefore, granted. The Court
declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state-law claims, which are dismissed
without prejudice to refiling in state court. This is a final and appealable order. Ruling date of 1/21/04
is stricken.

(qj) & [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court,

No notices required.

aber of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff. . ‘Weg *"

Notified counsel by telephone.

wv | Docketing to mail notices.

LSId “sn

Lynog galt

v | Mail AO 450 form.

MEAT
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
El :tid 9= AE Wu
courtroom on
TBK depuys ot os0714

initials = =
Date/time received in .
central Clerk’s Office. tnailing deputy initials



States v. Rucker, 138 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Defendants had probable cause to commit plaintiff if, “at the moment the decision [was] made, the
facts and circumstances within [their] knowledge and of which [they had] reasonably trustworthy
information would warrant a prudent person in believing” that plaintiff met the standard for
commitment. Qian v. Kautz,168 F.3d 949, 953 (7" Cir. 1999).

The undisputed facts establish that defendants had probable cause to believe that plaintiff
was mentally ill and was a danger to himself or others when they had him committed. Herdegen and
Richardson had received a report from Caceres, whom they had no reason to disbelieve, that plaintiff
had assaulted Caceres in the locker room, while making nonsensical comments like “the Giant is
coming.” (Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ff 7, 16-18, 25-26); Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d
432, 439 (7"" Cir. 1986) (“When an officer has received his information from some person —
normally the putative victim or an eye witness — who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the
truth, he has probable cause.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). They also knew that
plaintiff had carried a concealed and unauthorized weapon into the meeting he had the following day
with Herdegen and Richardson and told the two men that other members of the Department were
plotting against him. (Id. {| 32-37, 49-50, 53.) Further, they knew that Paez had found 145 rounds
of bullets commonly used in an AK-47 assault rifle, another weapon that plaintiff had no authority
to carry, in plaintiff's backpack. (Id. 4 62-66, 73.) They also knew that the case worker at the
emergency room and defendant Jones, both medical professionals, recommended that plaintiff be
committed. (id. 4 55-60, 70.) Finally, Herdegen knew that plaintiff was recently alleged to have
made several inappropriate comments to citizens, including, “I could blow you away tonight and not

lose a wink of sleep over it” and “Shut up or I’m gonna smoke you right here.” (Id. {| 78-81.)

T-


Plaintiff then went to Herdegen’s office where he met with Herdegen and Richardson. (Id.
4 34.) Herdegen told plaintiff that they were launching an investigation into the incident that
occurred the previous evening and that he was being placed on administrative leave. (Id. 1] 38-39.)
Herdegen also asked plaintiff to go to the hospital for an evaluation, a request which plaintiff
refused. (Id. {| 43.) Herdegen asked plaintiff to reconsider, and told him he would order to plaintiff
to go, if necessary, and discipline plaintiff if he refused to obey the order. (Id. { 44.)

At that point, plaintiff asked to speak to a lawyer. (Id. | 45.) After doing so, plaintiff told
Herdegen that, though he did not agree to go to the hospital, he would do so cooperatively. (Id.)

Herdegen, Richardson and plaintiff went to the hospital together. (Id. 47.) At the hospital,
plaintiff surrendered the concealed semi-automatic weapon to Herdegen. (Id. ff] 49-50.)

Upon their arrival, a caseworker named Maria interviewed plaintiff. When she finished, she
told Herdegen that plaintiff should be signed into the hospital. (Id, {| 55-57.) When Herdegen
expressed surprise, Maria said that she thou; ght committing plaintiff was the appropriate thing to do,
given the previous evening’s incident and the comments plaintiffmade during his interview with her.
(Id. J] 58-60.)

At about the same time, Paez called Richardson at the hospital. (id, | 62.) Paez told
Richardson that he had found five magazines, each with a thirty-round capacity, and 145 rounds of
bullets commonly used in an AK-47 assault rifle in a backpack plaintiff had left in Paez’s office.
(id. {{ 64-65.) Richardson reported Paez’s discovery to Herdegen. (Id. { 66.) Based on all of the
information he had received, Herdegen decided to sign the petition to commit plaintiff. (1d. f] 70-

711,77)

3.



you.” (Id. 46.) Caceres denies that he taunted plaintiff. Instead, he says, plaintiff was agitated when
Caceres arrived in the locker room and attacked Caceres without provocation while making
statements like “the end is near” and “the Giant is coming.” (Id. 7.)

Immediately afterwards, Caceres reported the incident to Lieutenant Hish. (Id. 4/16.) Hish,
in tum, called defendant Richardson at home to relay the story. (Id.) The next morning, Richardson
told defendant Herdegen, the Chief of Police, what had happened. (Id. 4 17.) Herdegen then.
scheduled a meeting with the Village Manager, the Village Attorney and defendant Jones, Director
of the Village Department of Health and Human Services, to discuss the situation. (Id. § 18.) The
three decided to place plaintiff on paid administrative leave pending his completion of a fitness for
duty evaluation. (Id. { 19.)

When Herdegen called to schedule the fitness evaluation, he discussed the proposed plan of
action with Dr, Selvig. (Id. {| 20-21.) Selvig suggested that plaintiff be stripped of his weapons
before speaking with Herdegen and that he be taken to an emergency room for an evaluation. (Id.
9 22-23.)

Herdegen told defendant Paez to meet plaintiff at the department’s entrance and take his
weapons. (Id. 127.) Paez met plaintiff and told him that Herdegen wanted to speak with him about
the events of the previous night. (Id. {{| 28-30.) Paez asked plaintiff for his off-duty weapon and
plaintiff surrendered to him a gun known as a K-40. (Id. $31.) Unbeknownst to Paez, plaintiff also
had high-powered, 9mm, semi-automatic pistol concealed in his waistband, which he did not
surrender. (Id. {] 32-33.) The Department had not authorized plaintiff to carry that weapon. (Id.

133.)

-2-



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
GERALD CHAPALA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 02 C 3056
y Paul E. Plunkett, Senior Judge
HOFFMAN ESTATES POLICE )
DEPARTMENT, et al., ) %
)
Defendant. ) ee

yw gt es
ys

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Gerald Chapala has sued Hoffman Estates and various of its officials for their alleged
violations of his federal constitutional rights and state law. The case is before the Court on
defendants’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56(c) motion for summary judgment. For the
reasons set forth below, the motion is granted as to the federal claims and the Court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

Facts!

On September 24, 2001, plaintiff was employed as a patrol officer by the Hoffman Estates

Police Department. (Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ff] 1, 5.) At the end of his shift, sometime between
11:00 p.m. and midnight, plaintiff encountered defendant Caceres in the locker room. (Id. { 5.)

Plaintiff says that Caceres repeatedly taunted him saying, “Gerry, Gerry, your shotgun is talking to

'Plaintiff did not file a response to defendants’ LR 56.1(a)(3) statement of uncontested facts.
Thus, he is deemed to have admitted all of them. See LR 56.1(b)(3)(B).