February 5,2000. The continuing violation doctrine allows a plaintiff to sue for a time-barred act by
linking it with an act within the limitations period. Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7" Cir. 1992).
The court considers the combination one continuous act that terminates within the limitations period.
Id. Ratcliffe’s assertion that the actions perpetrated against her constitute a continuing violation must
be supported by factual allegations in the complaint to toll the limitations period. Payne v. Abott
Lab., 999 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Saldana v. City of Chicago, 972 F. Supp. 453, 456
(N.D. Ill. 1997). Ratcliffe does not allege the firemen fund committed a single discriminatory act
within the 300 days preceding the filing of her EEOC charge on April 6, 2000. In fact, the firemen
fund is not even named in Ratcliffe’s charge as a culpable party. The only allegation supporting her
claims of discrimination and retaliation that could link the discriminatory conduct before the 300-day
period is that her requests for reinstatement were repeatedly denied since 1997. This allegation
cannot support her continuing violation theory because repeated requests for reinstatement do not
extend the statute of limitations period. Sharp v. United Airlines. Inc., 236 F.3d 368, 373 (7" Cir.
2001); Graehling v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 296-97 (7" Cir. 1995). Ratcliffe’s ADEA,
ADA, and Title VII claims are untimely.
§ 1981

The statute of limitations for § 1981 claims is two years. Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052,
1056 (7" Cir. 1996). Ratcliffe filed this complaint in March 2001. The firemen fund contends
Ratcliffe’s claim must occur after March 1999, and that she has not alleged any unlawful conduct
after that date. But Ratcliffe alleges continuous discrimination, including repeated denials of
reinstatement since 1997. Under the continuing violation doctrine, the limitations period for § 1981

is tolled ifa plaintiff is unaware after each act that it was discriminatory. Hall v. Burlington N. Santa

-4-


1997) (ADEA & ADA). Ratcliffe did not name the firemen fund in her EEOC charge. In fact, the
charge contains no allegations concerning the firemen fund. Ratcliffe responds that the record
submitted to the EEOC contains a letter showing she did name the firemen fund. Ratcliffe fails to
attach the letter as an exhibit or provide other proof of its existence. Thus, the ADA, ADEA and
Title VII claims must be dismissed.

In addition, the firemen fund is an independent statutory entity created by the Illinois
legislature to administer benefits to Chicago firefighters. 40 ILCS 5/6-101 et seg. It is nota
department of the City of Chicago or of the Chicago Fire Department. Id. Therefore, the firemen
fund argues that it never was Ratcliffe’s employer and is not subject to suit for employment
discrimination under the ADEA, ADA, or Title VII. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et
seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000€ ef seq. Ratcliffe does not allege in her complaint or EEOC charge any facts
to show that the firemen fund was her employer. The ADEA, the ADA, and Title VII all require as
a prerequisite to suit that a plaintiffat one time be employed by the defendant. Jd. Because Ratcliffe
was never employed by the firemen fund, she has no cognizable employment claims against it. See

Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 270-73 (7" Cir. 1986) (ADEA); Johnson v. Equitable

Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., No. 96 C 2418, 1997 WL 417409, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 1997)

(ADA & Title VII). The complaint is therefore fatally defective on this ground as well.

The firemen fund also argues the ADEA, ADA, and Title VII claims are time-barred. To be
timely, Ratcliffe must have filed her charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. Filipovic
v.K &R Exp. Sys., Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 396 (7" Cir, 1999). Ratcliffe filed her charge on April 6,
2000. Thus, all claims based on conduct prior to June 1999 appear untimely. Ratcliffe alleges the

discriminatory conduct she experienced was a continuing violation from February 1, 1998 through

-3-


oe

Fe, 977 F. Supp. 1344, 1345 (N.D. Ill. 1997). The firemen fund does not address Ratcliffe’s
allegation that her § 1981 claim is based on continuous conduct. However, this conduct is the same
that forms the basis of Ratcliffe’s ADEA, ADA, and Title VII claims. As such, Ratcliffe’s § 1981
claim must be dismissed as untimely.
Res Judicata

The doctrine of res judicata is designed to ensure the finality of decisions. The elements of
res judicata are a final judgment on the merits; an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier
and later suit; and an identity of parties in the two suits. Smith v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 916, 917
(7" Cir. 1987). The firemen fund focuses on a page of Ratcliffe’s response to the co-defendants’
motion to dismiss to argue Ratcliffe concedes she previously sought judicial review of the firemen
fund’s conduct in the Circuit Court of Cook County and the Illinois Appellate Court. Def. Resp. Ex.
B, p.3 at 95. Ratcliffe admits the trial court dismissed and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal
based on the fact that she "failed to file for administrative review after being notified by the. . .
[firemen fund] of the time frame to do so." Jd. (emphasis in original). The firemen fund asserts that
all necessary elements of res judicata are present. Although Ratcliffe does not contest that a final
judgment on the merits was reached or that the same parties were involved in the prior action, she
responds that the prior action did not involve the same issues as the present case. Specifically,
Ratcliffe claims that the prior action involved solely the period of 1996 to 1997 when she was found
to no longer be disabled or entitled to benefits. Based on the paucity of evidence presented by the
firemen fund to support its res judicata argument, this court cannot find an identity of causes of
action exist between the administrative review action and this case, arising out of the same operative

facts.


x
Minute Qfder Fora (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

_JPromesinatoasase| Suzanne B. Conlon | Shae ue
CASE NUMBER 01 C 1615 DATE 6/5/2001
CASE Sherry Ratcliffe vs. City of Chicago, et al.
TITLE

[in the following box (a) indicate the party fifing the motion, eg. plaintiff defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the mature

the motion being presented]
MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) im) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

Q) Qo Brief in support of motion due

G) Qo ‘Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due

(4) o Ruling/Hearing on __set fora

(5) im) Status hearing[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for]on____set for__at_____-

(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set forjon___setfor__at____.
(7) im Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to sat

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(¢m) General Rule 21 OOFRCP4i(aX(1) © FRCP41(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.

ay a [For further detail see order (on reverse side offattached to) the original minute order.]

(ao) [Other docket entry] The motion of defendant Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago to
dismiss [22-1] is granted. All claims against defendant are dismissed with prejudice.

ENTER

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
quire umber of notioes

Y_| Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices

v Mail AO 450 form.

FILED F 46
O1 JUN -6 PM 6: 05

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
6/5/2001

courtroom date mailed notice

SB deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office ailing deputy initials

g


CONCLUSION

All claims against the Fireman Fund are dismissed with prejudice.

ENTER:

Gee [2 Onkne

Suzanne B. Conlon

United States District Judge
June 5, 2001


a,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SHERRY RATCLIFFE,
Plaintiff,

Vv.
CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation,
CITY OF CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT,
MAYOR RICHARD J. DALEY, FIRE
COMMISSIONER JAMES JOYCE,
PERSONNEL DIRECTOR CHARLES
STEWART AND CITY OF CHICAGO
FIREMAN’S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND,

Defendants.

wee SSS SSS SS SD

No. 01 C 1615

Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Sherry Ratcliffe sues the City of Chicago, the Chicago Fire Department, Mayor

Richard M. Daley, Personnel Director Charles Stewart, Fire Commissioner James Joyce Jr., and the

City of Chicago Fireman’s Annuity & Benefit Fund (“the firemen fund”) for age, disability, race, and

sex discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.

§ 621 et seq., the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1201 er seq., and Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000¢ et seg. Ratcliffe also sues for race discrimination under

§ 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and retaliation under Title VII. All defendants except the firemen fund

have been dismissed from this action. The firemen fund moves to dismiss.

Although Ratcliffe’s form complaint is difficult to decipher, the court accepts well-pleaded

allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor. Stachon v. United Consumers

Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673, 675 (7" Cir. 2000). Ratcliffe is a 46 year old African-American woman.

25°


Since 1989, she worked for the Chicago Fire Department as a firefighter. In 1993, Ratcliffe allegedly

opposed race discrimination. During the same year, she suffered an on-duty injury, resulting in a
disability that required medical leave. Ratcliffe contends she has been continuously discriminated
against since March 1994. The Chicago Fire Department allegedly refused to accommodate her
disabilities and then discharged her. The firemen fund denied her pension benefits request after failing
to provide her with essential information. Starting in 1997, Ratcliffe has repeatedly been denied
reinstatement. She filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
on April 6, 2000. The charge does not name the firemen fund as a defendant and does not contain
any allegations of misconduct on the firemen fund’s part. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter and
Ratcliffe filed her complaint in March 2001.

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court considers whether relief is possible under any set

of facts consistent with the complaint’s allegations. Pokuta v. TWA, 191 F.3d 834, 839 (7" Cir.
1999). A motion to dismiss will be granted only ifno set of facts would warrant relief. Frieri v. City
of Chicago, 127 F. Supp.2d 992, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2001). A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of
the complaint, not its merits. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7% Cir. 1990).
ADEA, ADA, and Title VII

Under the ADEA, the ADA, and Title VII, Ratcliffe’s right to sue in this court depends on
filing a timely discrimination charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), ()(1); 42 U.S.C.

§ 12117(a); Alexander _v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1994); Hamilton v. Komatsu

Dresser Indus., 964 F.2d 600, 603 (7" Cir. 1992). The suit may be brought only against parties

named in the charge. Cheek v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7" Cir. 1994) (Title

VII); Moore v. Cook County Hosp., No. 96 C 6985, 1997 WL 779067, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12,

2.