-4-
collapses into two constitutional inquiries--one state and one
federal--and we need not consider whether defendants engaged in any
of the acts enumerated in the Illinois long-arm statute. See RAR,
107 F.3d at 1276. Typically, the courts look to the federal due
process clause to construe the Illinois due process clause. See
McMurray v. ImproveNet, Inc., No. 00 C 7137, 2001 WL 561376, at *1
(N.D. Ill. May 22, 2001) (Grady, J.).

“General jurisdiction . . . is for suits neither arising out
of nor related to the defendant’s contacts [with the forum], and it
is permitted only where the defendant has ‘continuous and
systematic general business contacts’ with the forum.” RAR, 107
F.3d at 1277. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related
to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. See id. Plaintiff
limits its jurisdictional argument to the question of specific
jurisdiction.? In failing to argue general jurisdiction over
defendant Krieg DeVault, plaintiff waives that ground for personal

jurisdiction. See id. (citing Giotis _v. Apollo of the Ozarks

Inc., 800 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 1986}). Thus, we focus

exclusively on the question of specific jurisdiction.

¥ Moreover, plaintiff does not dispute the following statements contained
in the affidavit of Michael E., Williams: Krieg DeVault is an Indiana limited
liability partnership, and all of its partners are citizens of Indiana.
(Affidavit of Michael E. Williams, (47 2-3.) Krieg DeVault is not registered to
do business in Illinois, has not appointed a resident agent to accept service of
process in Illinois, does not have an office or any other place of business in
Tllinois, does not have any bank accounts or other assets in Illinois, and does
not have any attorneys or employees residing in Illinois. (Id., I 4.)


~7-
with the State of Illinois) in connection with this dispute were
telephone calls, letters, and facsimile transmissions.* There is
no allegation that anyone from Krieg DeVault ever set foot in
Illinois in connection with the Lundy matter. Moreover, Juristech
initiated the relationship by “cold calling” Krieg DeVault and
sending materials regarding Lundy. Under these circumstances, we
cannot say that Krieg DeVault purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in Illinois such that it could
reasonably anticipate being required to defend itself here. See,

e.g., Cobra Capital, LLC, v. RF Nitro Communications, Inc., No. 02

C 493, 2002 WL 1263985, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2002) (Kennelly,
J.) (no specific jurisdiction where defendant’s only contacts with
the state were telephone calls, facsimile, e-mail, and regular
mail, and where plaintiff initiated the parties’ relationship)

Furthermore, the case cited by plaintiff in support of its

argument, Cook Associates, Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Machine Co.,

304 N.E.2d 27 (I11. App. Ct. 1973), is no longer considered viable

authority.? See Weiser Group, Ltd. v. Arnett & Foster, No. 89 C

3530, 1989 WL 84381, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 1989) (Grady, J.)

2 In addition, it appears that Krieg DeVault’s position is not merely that
there was no breach, but that it never entered into a contract with Juristech.
(Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, Ex. 9, Letter from Michael E. Williams to
Nicholas Kokoris.)

¥ Cook is also distinguishable because the defendant in that case
initiated the relationship between the parties. 304 N.E.2d at 29.


-~3-
Defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the

plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that

jurisdiction over the defendant is proper. See RAR, Inc. v. Turner
Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir. 1997). The court, in
deciding such a motion, may receive and consider affidavits from

both parties, see Nelson by Carson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717

F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1983), and will resolve all factual

conflicts in favor of the plaintiff, see Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v.

R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1984).

A federal district court sitting in diversity in Illinois has
jurisdiction over a non-consenting, non-resident defendant if an
Illinois state court would have jurisdiction. See McIlwee v. ADM
Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 222, 223 (7th Cir. 1994). “Three distinct
obstacles to personal jurisdiction must generally be examined: (1)
state statutory law, (2) state constitutional law, and (3) federal

constitutional law.” RAR, 107 F.3d at 1276. As for state

statutory law, the Illinois long-arm statute provides that an
Illinois state court also may exercise jurisdiction “on any other
basis now or hereafter permitted” by the state and federal
constitutions. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c). Because § 2-209(c) authorizes

personal jurisdiction to the constitutional limit, the analysis


-5-

The Constitution permits the court to exercise jurisdiction
over defendants who have certain “minimum contacts” with the forum
state, such that jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Even defendants not
physically present in the jurisdiction have sufficient “minimum
contacts” if they do some act by which they purposefully avail
themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum

state, see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-53 (1958), and if

they “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
Due process also requires that the action arise from or relate to
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. See Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). The court should
decide whether it is reasonable to require the non-resident
defendant to litigate in the forum state, considering factors such
as the relative interests of the litigants, the forum’s interest in
litigating the dispute, and “the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).

According to defendant, its only contacts with Illinois
concerning the matters alleged in the complaint were by telephone

and mail, and to the extent that the firm performed any acts


-~g-
(citing Afirm, Inc. v. Frazee Paint & Wallcovering Co., 624 F.
Supp. 973, 977 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Aspen, J.)).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, defendant Krieg DeVault’s
motion to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction is

granted.

DATE: June 14, 2002

John ¥. Grady, United States District Ju



Minote Order Form (06/97)

( 7

lame of Assign’d Judge Sitting Judge if Other
or tase Judge John F. Grady than Assigned Judge

ited States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

BER 02 C 620 DATE 6/14/2002

chest Juristech Associates, Ltd. Vs. Krieg Devault Alexander & Capehart, LLP
TLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) im} Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on setfor_ sat
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—sset for__ at
(6) im Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____setfor__—ssat__—
(7) Oo Trial{set for/re-set for]on_ ss at_
(8) o {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule21 CIFRCP41(a)(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).

ao) «xf [Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: Defendant’s motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) is granted.
This cause is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

di) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court,

No notices required,

number of notices,
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone. UN 4,8,2002
vw | Docketing to mail notices,
s.&.

docketing deputy initials

| Mail A0 450 form. Lynod LOINLSia ‘s'n
MYaT9

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice

courtroom 12:h Wd LINN 20

AMM deputy's



-6-
related to this matter (such as meeting and negotiating with
Lundy), such acts occurred entirely in Indiana. Krieg DeVault
contends that it “took no affirmative action by which it submitted
itself to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, and it has not taken
advantage or sought to take advantage of Illinois law or the
opportunity to transact business in Illinois.” (Defendant’s
Memorandum at 7.)

Plaintiff argues that the facts “clearly show that Defendant
has availed itself of the jurisdiction of Illinois.” (Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition at 6.) Plaintiff states: “It is clear
that the defendant in our case did much more than just return phone
calls. Defendant actively engaged in negotiations for placement of
Mr. Lundy as well as for a lower fee arrangement. Defendant not
only returned phone calls but initiated some to Plaintiff to
further along the placement of Mr. Lundy. Defendant even sent
plaintiff a letter to further the placement of Mr. Lundy.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s brief also contains many statements regarding its
own communications with Lundy. Plaintiff's activities, however,
are irrelevant to the issue of personal jurisdiction over
defendant; only the defendant’s conduct is considered in

determining the reach of our jurisdiction. See Dehmlow v. Austin

Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1992). Even after resolving
all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, it is clear that

the only contacts that Krieg DeVault had with Juristech (and thus


02-620.021-JCD June 14, 2002

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JURISTECH ASSOCIATES, LTD., DOCKETED

YUN 2 8 2092

No. 02 C 620

Plaintiff,
Vv.

KRIEG DEVAULT ALEXANDER &
CAPEHART, LLP,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (2). For the reasons stated below,
the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2001, plaintiff Juristech Associates, Ltd.
(“duristech”), an Illinois corporation, brought this breach of
contract action against defendant Krieg DeVault Alexander &
Capehart, LLP (“Krieg DeVault”). Plaintiff, a legal employment
firm, seeks to recover $85,000 plus “late fee” charges for the
alleged breach.

Plaintiff’s allegations are summarized as follows. In October
1996, Nicholas P. Kokoris of Juristech “cold called” Krieg DeVault,

a law firm in Indiana, and spoke with Michael E. Williams, Krieg


-~-2-
DeVault’s managing partner. Kokoris asked whether Krieg DeVault
would be interested in exploring the possibility of Krieg DeVault’s
employing a patent attorney. Williams said yes; Kokoris told
Williams that Juristech’s fee for placement would be 19% of the the
base compensation of the referred candidate.

Thereafter, Kokoris sent Williams the resume of David A.
Lundy, an attorney who practiced in Indiana. Williams then called
Kokoris and requested that Kokoris arrange a luncheon meeting for
Lundy and Krieg DeVault in Indianapolis. Lundy subsequently had
meetings and discussions with Krieg DeVault regarding Lundy’s
potential employment at the firm. Kokoris and Krieg DeVault had
telephone calls and correspondence regarding Lundy’s potential
employment as well. These communications occurred in 1996, 1997,
and 1998. Apparently, Krieg DeVault and Kokoris stopped
communicating in mid-1998. According to Krieg DeVault, its
discussions with Lundy also ceased, and Krieg DeVault began
communicating with Lundy again in the spring of 2000. On October
1, 2000, Lundy joined Krieg DeVault. Juristech then brought this
action in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, seeking to
recover its fee for Lundy’s placement at Krieg DeVault. Defendant
thereafter removed the action to this court, asserting the
existence of federal diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332.