IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

RONALD PORTIS, MADRIC E. LANCE, AND 

EMMETT LYNCH, individually and on behalf of 

a class, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 vs. 

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 02 C 3139 

Judge Gettleman 

Magistrate Judge Nolan 

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED 

FACTS AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS 

Dated: February 9, 2007 June K. Ghezzi, Bar No. 6185506 

 jkghezzi@jonesday.com 

Brian J. Murray, Bar No. 6272767 

 bjmurray@jonesday.com 

Morgan R. Hirst, Bar No. 6275128 

 mhirst@jonesday.com 

JONES DAY 

77 West Wacker Drive 

Chicago, Illinois 60601-1692 

(312) 782-3939 

Attorneys for Defendants 

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RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ STATEMENT OF FACTS1

1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343, and 42 U.S.C. 

§§1983 and 1988. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b).

Response: Not controverted, but immaterial. 

2. On August 20, 2001, the City of Chicago charged plaintiff Ronald Portis with 

violating a municipal ordinance by peddling without a license and by failing to display a 

peddler's badge. Ordinance §4-244-030, §4-244-100; Exh. 1 (Portis arrest report). Violations of 

this ordinance are punishable only by a fine, i.e., no jail time may be imposed. Exh. 2 

(ordinance). 

Response: Unsupported,2

 immaterial, misleading and objectionable. Further, ¶ 2 violates 

Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph.3

 Immaterial 

in that plaintiffs are not challenging the propriety of Mr. Portis’s arrest, only the length of his 

detention. Misleading in that plaintiffs’ implication in the second sentence that individuals 

arrested for violation of municipal ordinances that are punishable by fine only should not be 

 

1

 Plaintiffs include a number of unsupported and argumentative headings throughout their Rule 56.1 

Statement. The City has not restated these headings in its Response, nor responded to them here, and 

respectfully requests that this Court either strike or disregard these headings in ruling on plaintiffs’ 

motion for summary judgment. See LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) (requiring statements be supported by “references 

to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon”). 

2

 Assertions without specific reference to the record violate LR 56.1(b)(3)(B), which requires “references 

to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” See Malec v. Sanford, 

191 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Factual allegations not properly supported by citation to the record 

are nullities.”); see also Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994) (“district 

courts are not obliged in our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes”); id. at 923 

(Rule 56.1 statements are “roadmaps, and without them the court should not have to proceed further, 

regardless of how readily it might be able to distill the relevant information from the record on its own.”). 

Consequently, each time that defendants point out that one of plaintiffs’ facts is unsupported, defendants 

respectfully request that this Court either strike or disregard that fact in ruling on plaintiffs’ summary 

judgment motion. 

3

 Courts in this district have ordered strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1, and held that the 

“compounding of facts into an amalgamated paragraph is not permissible.” Maclin v. A.M. Bus Co., Inc., 

No. 04 C 4176, 2006 WL 463370, *2 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 22, 2006) (disregarding all paragraphs including more 

than one statement of fact); Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 583 (“it is inappropriate to confuse the issues by 

alleging multiple facts in a single paragraph in hopes of one’s opponent missing one”). Consequently, 

each time that defendants point out that one of plaintiffs’ paragraphs includes multiple statements of fact 

in violation of Local Rule 56.1, they respectfully request that this Court either strike or disregard that fact 

in ruling on plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion. 

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detained or placed in a jail cell at the time of processing has been specifically rejected by the 

United States Supreme Court. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 

3. Chicago's municipal code provides a ticketing procedure for violation of fine-only 

city ordinances. Section 2-14-010 et seq., of Chicago Municipal Code. Under the procedure 

adopted by the Chicago Police Department ("CPD"), alleged violators of an ordinance for which 

jail time is not the only penalty but which carry a penalty of a fine or both a fine and a jail 

sentence may be stopped by police and issued a ticket (called an Administrative Notice of 

Ordinance Violation, or "ANOV"), and released, in much the same manner as with minor traffic 

violations. Group Exh. 3 (General Order ("GO") 99-02, at 5-6; GO 01-07, at 5; Department 

Special Order ("DSO") 03-12, at 3-4); Exh. X, Obuchowski dep. II, at 113:18-24. These GOs 

and DSO "encourage[]" the use of tickets in lieu of officers making actual physical arrests. 

Group Exh. 3 (DSO 03-12, at 1-2; GO 01-07, at 1-2; GO 99-02, at 1-2). The ticket requires the 

alleged violator to appear at an administrative hearing to adjudicate whether the violation 

occurred and, if so, the appropriate fine. Group Exh. 3 (DSO 03-12 at 2; GO 01-07, at 2; GO 99-

02, at 6). 

Response: Controverted, misleading, unsupported and objectionable. Further, ¶ 3 violates 

Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. Section 2-

14-010 addresses administrative hearings and does not, in any way, provide a ticketing procedure 

for violations of a fine-only offense. A review of G.O. 99-02 at 7-9, G.O. 01-07 at 8-9, and 

D.S.O. 03-12 at 8-9 shows the different procedures for dealing with minor traffic violations and 

violations of ordinances that carry a penalty of a fine or both a fine and a jail sentence, and thus 

the two are not “issued a ticket” and “released” in “much the same manner.” The testimony that 

plaintiffs refer to in Pls. Ex. X at 113:18-244 was taken over objection and only refers to whether 

“name checks” are performed when “issuing a ticket” without reference to when such name 

checks are performed. Whether the ticket “requires” an alleged violator to appear states a legal 

conclusion and therefore should be disregarded.5

 Finally, ¶ 3 is incomplete in violation of Fed. 

 

4

 Citations to Exhibits are as follows: Exhibits to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Pls. Ex. 

__”); Exhibits to Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts and Statement of 

Additional Material Facts (“Def. Ex. __”). 

5

 It is inappropriate to allege legal conclusions in a Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts. See Malec, 191 

F.R.D. at 583, 584. Consequently, each time that the City points out that one of plaintiffs’ facts is a legal 

conclusion, the City respectfully requests that this Court either strike or disregard that fact in ruling on 

plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion. 

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R. Evid. 106, since D.S.O. 03-12-01 provides that a ticket may not be issued and a physical 

arrest must be made in cases where: (1) the violator is less than 17 years of age; (2) the violator 

cannot or will not produce a valid picture identification card; (3) the violator exhibits behavior 

which requires an officer to exert physical force to effect the arrest; (4) there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the offense will continue, or recur, or that life or property will be endangered if 

the violator is not arrested and removed from the scene of the occurrence; (5) there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the violator will fail to appear at the hearing; (6) there is reason to 

believe that a warrant may be outstanding against the violator; or (7) the violator refuses to sign 

the ANOV citation. Def. Ex. 1, G.O. 03-12-01 at 2. 

4. The CPD also gives its officers "discretionary authority" to make arrests for 

violating fine-only ordinances. Group Exh. 3 (GO 99-02, at 1-2; GO 01-07, at 1-2; DSO 03-12, 

at 1-2); Exh. G, Obuchowski dep., at 106-11. 

Response: Controverted, misleading, unsupported and objectionable. Plaintiffs’ Ex. G does 

not contain pages 106-11. To the extent the plaintiffs instead are referring to Pls. Ex. X at 106-

11, that testimony was taken subject to objection as beyond the scope of the deposition, as 

ordered by Magistrate Judge Nolan. Further, plaintiffs mischaracterize Officer Obuchowski’s 

testimony in that he does not identify “discretionary acts,” but rather responds to a series of 

hypothetical questions posed by plaintiffs’ counsel regarding what factors impact his actions. 

Pls. Ex. X at 106-111. Misleading in that officers actually have no discretion but to make a 

physical arrest of individuals violating fine-only ordinances under D.S.O. 03-12-01 in cases 

where: (1) the violator is less than 17 years of age; (2) the violator cannot or will not produce a 

valid picture identification card; (3) the violator exhibits behavior which requires an officer to 

exert physical force to effect the arrest; (4) there is a reasonable likelihood that the offense will 

continue or recur, or that life or property will be endangered if the violator is not arrested and 

removed from the scene of the occurrence; (5) there is a reasonable likelihood that the violator 

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will fail to appear at the hearing; (6) there is reason to believe that a warrant may be outstanding 

against the violator; or (7) the violator refuses to sign the ANOV citation. Def. Ex. 1, G.O. 03-

12-01 at 2. 

5. Mr. Portis was arrested pursuant to that provision on August 20, 2001 at 

approximately 8:40 p.m. Exh. 1 (Portis arrest report). He was taken to the 18th district CPD 

police station, processed, given a central booking ("CB") number at 10:52 p.m. (Exh. 4, 

affidavit), and then detained in a CPD lockup cell (Exh. 1, Portis arrest report). He was not 

released until 7:15 a.m. the next day (id.), or almost 11 hours following his arrest and almost 8.5 

hours after he was given a CB number on the fine-only ordinance violation. The charges against 

him were eventually dismissed by the prosecution. Exh. 4, affidavit. 

Response: Controverted, misleading, unsupported and objectionable. Multiple officers have 

testified that arrestees are not necessarily “processed,” “given a central booking number” and 

“then detained in CPD lockup cell” in any particular order. Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 84:9-

84:20 (issuance of a CB number can occur when an arrestee is in a cell or before the arrestee is 

placed in a cell); Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 60:16-21, 61:9-14 (same). Multiple officers 

have also testified that “processing” is not completed before an arrestee is “given a central 

booking number” or “detained in a CPD lockup cell.” Def. Ex. 4, Defendants’ Answers and 

Objections to Plaintiffs Twelfth (Thirteenth) Set of Interrogatories at ¶ 2; Def. Ex. 5, Defendant 

City of Chicago’s Amended Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories at ¶ 14; Def. 

Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 56:7-66:14 (describing steps of processing arrestee under 

departmental control, including numerous steps in processing after the arrestee is given a CB 

number); Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 54:22-55:4 (describing the steps in processing an arrestee); 

Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05; Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03. Further, ¶ 5 violates Local Rule 56.1 by 

including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. It also relies on the affidavit of 

Whitman T. Soule, which is inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 802 because his declaration lacks 

foundation and relies on hearsay.6

 The statement that Mr. Portis’s “processing” occurred 

 

6

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires that facts opposing summary judgment be admissible in evidence. See 

Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Thus, courts have refused to consider such 

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between when he “arrived at the police station” and when he was “given a central booking 

number,” and the statement that Mr. Portis was “given a central booking number at 10:52 p.m. 

and then detained in a CPD lockup cell,” are not supported by any citation to the record. Finally, 

the statement that the “charges” against Mr. Portis were “eventually dismissed” is unsupported as 

the record only identifies whether cases were “non-suited” by an administrative law judge. 

6. Defendants have offered no testimony or documented explanation for Mr. Portis' 

8.5- hour detention after he was processed and issued a CB number. Exh. G, Obuchowski dep., 

at 8:9-17; Exh. P, Serpe dep., at 21:1-22; Exh. Z, Wedster dep., at 104:11-24; Exh. Q, Griffin 

dep., at 28:17-22; Exh. C, Richmond dep., at 104:11-14; Exh. H, Malinowski dep., at 15:12-14; 

Group Exh. 18, defs.' responses concerning named plaintiffs; Exh. 20, defendants' answers and 

objections to plaintiffs' seventh set of interrogatories. 

Response: Move to strike this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1.7

Controverted, misleading, unsupported, and objectionable. The statement that defendants have 

“offered no testimony or documented explanation” for the length of Mr. Portis’s detention is 

argumentative and a legal conclusion as to what constitutes “testimony” or a “documented 

explanation,” and has no place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should therefore be stricken. 

Plaintiffs’ statement that Mr. Portis was detained for 8.5 hours “after he was processed and 

(continued...) 

evidence as unauthenticated documents and hearsay evidence when ruling on summary judgment 

motions. See Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979 (7th Cir. 2000) (courts generally cannot consider 

unauthenticated documents); Toney v. St. Francis Hosp., No. 00 C 5298, 2001 WL 428154, at *2 (N.D. 

Ill. Apr. 26, 2001) (“[A] party may not rely upon inadmissible hearsay in an affidavit or deposition to 

oppose a motion for summary judgment.”) (citing Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 

1995). Consequently, each time that the City raises the inadmissibility of evidence, it respectfully 

requests that this Court either strike or disregard that evidence in ruling on plaintiffs’ summary judgment 

motion. 

7

 It is inappropriate to make argumentative statements in a Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts. See Cady 

v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057,1060 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming District Court’s striking and disregarding the 

plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 statement because it “did not comply with Rule 56.1 as it failed to adequately cite the 

record and was filled with irrelevant information, legal arguments, and conjecture.”); see also Greer v. 

Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, Ill., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001) (“generalized self-serving legal 

conclusions, rather than particularized statements of fact” are improper and have no place in a Rule 56.1 

statement). Consequently, each time that the City points out that one of plaintiffs’ facts is argumentative, 

the City respectfully requests that this Court either strike or disregard that fact in ruling on plaintiffs’ 

summary judgment motion. 

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issued a CB number” is unsupported by any citation to the record, as plaintiffs have provided no 

citation establishing when Mr. Portis’s processing was completed. Plaintiffs’ Exs. G, P, and Z 

only establish the deponent’s lack of knowledge regarding this topic and therefore any inference 

that this constitutes a lack of “explanation” would require an improper inference against the nonmovant. The City has offered both testimony and documentation explaining the length of Mr. 

Portis’s detention after he was issued a CB number. Def. Ex. 8, Defendants’ Answers and 

Objections to Plaintiffs’ Third Supplemental Interrogatories at 4-5 (explanations listed in ¶ 35 of 

Defendants’ Additional Material Facts infra);8 see also Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 115:20-117:12. 

Multiple officers have also testified that arrestees, like Mr. Portis, are not fully “processed” at the 

time they are given a CB number, and therefore, the fact that Mr. Portis was held in police 

custody for 8.5 hours after he was given a CB number is not evidence that he was held in police 

custody for 8.5 hours after his processing was completed. Def. Ex. 4, Defendants’ Answers and 

Objections to Plaintiffs Twelfth (Thirteenth) Set of Interrogatories at ¶ 2; Def. Ex. 5, Defendant 

City of Chicago’s Amended Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories at ¶ 14; Def. 

Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 56:7-66:14 (describing steps of processing arrestee under 

departmental control, including numerous steps in processing after the arrestee is given a CB 

number); Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 54:22-55:4 (describing the steps in processing an arrestee); 

Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05; Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03. 

7. On May 6, 2002, the City of Chicago charged plaintiff Emmett F. Lynch with 

violating a municipal ordinance (§10-8-505) by scalping a ticket outside Wrigley Field. Exh. 5, 

Lynch arrest report. Violations of this ordinance are punishable only by a fine. Exh. 6, 

ordinance. 

 

8

 Defendants subsequently informed plaintiffs that they had determined after further investigation that the 

shooting death of on-duty Chicago Police officer Eric Lee, originally identified as one of the possible 

reasons for the length of Mr. Portis detention in subpart (c) of its Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs 

Third Supplemental Interrogatories, did not in fact contribute to the length of his detention. 

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Response: Unsupported, immaterial, misleading and objectionable. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 6 does 

not contain § 10-8-505 or any provision regarding the potential punishment for violating such 

section or for scalping tickets in violation of a municipal ordinance. Further, ¶ 7 also violates 

Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. Immaterial 

in that plaintiffs are not challenging the propriety of Mr. Lynch’s arrest, only the length of his 

detention. Misleading in that plaintiffs’ implication in the second sentence that individuals 

arrested for violation of municipal ordinances that are punishable by fine only should not be 

detained or placed in a jail cell in connection with processing has been specifically rejected by 

the United States Supreme Court. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 

8. As with Mr. Portis, CPD officers chose to arrest Mr. Lynch rather than ticket him. 

Exh. 5, Lynch arrest report. Mr. Lynch was arrested at 5:59 p.m. and then transported to the 19th

district police station, processed, given a CB number at 8:28 p.m. (Exh. 4, affidavit), and then 

detained in a CPD lockup cell (Exh. 5, Lynch arrest report). He was not released until 2:00 a.m. 

Id. Accordingly, he spent approximately eight hours in custody (5.5 hours after he received his 

CB number) due to the alleged violation of a fine-only ordinance. The charges against him were 

eventually dismissed by the prosecution. Exh. 4, affidavit. 

Response: Controverted, misleading, immaterial, unsupported and objectionable. Paragraph 

8 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. 

The first sentence is immaterial in that plaintiffs are not challenging the propriety of Mr. Lynch’s 

arrest, only the length of his detention. The first sentence is also not supported by any citation to 

the record, as there is no evidence that CPD officers “chose” to arrest Mr. Lynch, rather than 

were compelled to place Mr. Lynch under arrest pursuant to the provisions D.S.O. 03-12-01. 

Further, it relies on the affidavit of Whitman T. Soule, which is inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 

802 because his declaration lacks foundation and relies only on hearsay. The statement that Mr. 

Lynch’s “processing” occurred between when he arrived at the “police station” and when he was 

“given a CB number” and the statement that Mr. Lynch was “given a central booking number at 

8:28 p.m. and then detained in a CPD lockup cell,” are not supported by any citation to the 

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record. Multiple officers have testified that arrestees are not necessarily “processed,” “given a 

central booking number” and “then detained in CPD lockup cell” in any particular order. Def. 

Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 84:9-84:20 (issuance of a CB number can occur when an arrestee is in a 

cell or before the arrestee is placed in a cell); Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 60:16-21, 61:9-

14 (same). Multiple officers have also testified that “processing” is not completed when an 

arrestee is “given a central booking number” or “detained in a CPD lockup cell.” Def. Ex. 4, 

Defendants’ Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs Twelfth (Thirteenth) Set of Interrogatories at 

¶ 2; Def. Ex. 5, Defendant City of Chicago’s Amended Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ 

Interrogatories at ¶ 14; Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 56:7-66:14 (describing steps of 

processing arrestee under departmental control, including numerous steps in processing after the 

arrestee is given a CB number); Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 54:22-55:4 (describing the steps in 

processing an arrestee); Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05; Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03. The statement that the 

“charges” against Mr. Lynch were “eventually dismissed” is unsupported, as the record only 

identifies whether cases were “non-suited” by an administrative law judge. 

9. Defendants have offered no testimony or documented explanation for Mr. Lynch's 

5.5-hour detention after he was processed and issued a CB number. Exh. N, Bay dep., at 6:5-16; 

Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 63:12-19; Group Exh. 18, defendants' responses concerning named 

plaintiffs; Exh. 20, defendants' answers and objections to plaintiffs' seventh set of interrogatories. 

Response: Move to strike this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Controverted, misleading, unsupported and objectionable. The statement that defendants have 

“offered no testimony or documented explanation” for the length of Mr. Lynch’s detention is 

argumentative and a legal conclusion as to what constitutes “testimony” or a “documented 

explanation,” and has no place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should therefore be stricken. 

Plaintiffs’ statement that Mr. Lynch was detained for 5.5 hours “after he was processed and 

issued a CB number” is unsupported by any citation to the record, as plaintiffs have provided no 

evidence of when Mr. Lynch’s processing was completed. Plaintiffs’ Ex. N does not contain 

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page 6 and therefore any reliance on it for any fact, let alone one the non-movant controverts (as 

stated below), is improper. Plaintiffs’ Ex. D only establishes the deponent’s lack of knowledge 

regarding Mr. Lynch’s detention and therefore any inference that this constitutes a lack of 

“explanation” would require an improper inference against the non-movant. Defendants have 

offered both testimony and documentation explaining the length of Mr. Lynch’s detention after 

he was issued a CB number. Def. Ex. 8, Defendants’ Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ 

Third Supplemental Interrogatories at 4 (explanations listed in ¶ 33 of Defendants’ Additional 

Material Facts infra) Multiple officers have testified that arrestees, like Mr. Lynch, are not fully 

“processed” at the time they are given a CB number, and therefore, the fact that Mr. Lynch was 

held in police custody for 5.5 hours after he was given a CB number is not evidence that he was 

held in police custody for 5.5 hours after he was “processed.” Def. Ex. 4, Defendants’ Answers 

and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Twelfth (Thirteenth) Set of Interrogatories at ¶ 2; Def. Ex. 5, 

Defendant City of Chicago’s Amended Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories at ¶ 

30; Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 56:7-66:14 (describing steps of processing arrestee under 

departmental control, including numerous steps in processing after the arrestee is given a CB 

number); Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 54:22-55:4 (describing the steps in processing an arrestee); 

Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05; Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03. 

10. On February 27, 2002, the City of Chicago charged plaintiff Madric E. Lance 

with violating a municipal ordinance by soliciting donations for his church on the CTA in 

violation of §98-126-12 of the CTA rules, pursuant to §10-8-526 of the Chicago municipal code. 

Violations of this ordinance are punishable only by a fine. Exh. 7, ordinance. 

Response: Unsupported, immaterial, misleading and objectionable. Further, ¶ 10 violates 

Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. 

Unsupported in that none of plaintiffs’ exhibits contains § 98-126-12 or any provision regarding 

the potential punishment for violating such section or for soliciting donations for his “church” on 

the CTA in violation of a municipal ordinance. Immaterial in that plaintiffs are not challenging 

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the propriety of Mr. Lance’s arrest, only the length of his detention. Misleading in that 

plaintiffs’ implication in the second sentence that individuals arrested for violation of municipal 

ordinances that are punishable by fine only should not be detained or placed in a jail cell during 

processing has been specifically rejected by the United States Supreme Court. See Atwater v. 

City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 

11. As with Mr. Portis and Mr. Lynch, CPD officers chose to arrest Mr. Lance rather 

than ticket him. Exh. 8, Lance arrest report. Mr. Lance was arrested at approximately 1:00 p.m. 

and then transported to the sixth district police station, processed, given a CB number at 2:36 

p.m. (Exh. 4, affidavit), and then detained in a CPD lockup cell (Exh. 8, Lance arrest report). 

He was not released until 5:15 a.m. the next morning. Id. Accordingly, he spent more than 16 

hours in custody (14.5 hours after he was issued a CB number) due to the alleged violation of a 

fine only ordinance. Exh. 7, ordinance. The charges against him were eventually dismissed by 

the prosecution. Exh. 4, affidavit. 

Response: Controverted, misleading, immaterial, unsupported and objectionable. Paragraph 

11 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. 

The first sentence is controverted, as the officer arresting Mr. Lance testified that Mr. Lance was 

arrested because he did not meet the criteria to qualify for a ticket. Def. Ex 9, Smith Dep. at 

13:9-11. The first sentence is also immaterial in that plaintiffs are not challenging the propriety 

of Mr. Lance’s arrest, only the length of his detention. The first sentence is also not supported 

by any citation to the record, as there is no evidence that CPD officers “chose” to arrest Mr. 

Lance, rather than were compelled to place Mr. Lance under arrest pursuant to the provisions 

D.S.O. 03-12-01. Further it relies on the affidavit of Whitman T. Soule, which is inadmissible 

under Fed. R. Evid. 802 because his declaration lacks foundation and relies only on hearsay. The 

statement that Mr. Lance’s “processing” occurred between when he “was transported to the sixth 

district police station” and when he was “given a CB number,” and the statement that Mr. Lance 

was “given a central booking number at 2:36 p.m. and then detained in a CPD lockup cell,” are 

not supported by any citation to the record. Multiple officers have testified that arrestees are not 

necessarily “processed,” “given a central booking number” and “then detained in CPD lockup 

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cell” in any particular order. Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 84:9-84:20 (issuance of a CB number 

can occur when an arrestee is in a cell or before the arrestee is placed in a cell); Def. Ex. 3, 

Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 60:16-21, 61:9-14 (same). Multiple officers have also testified that 

“processing” is not completed when an arrestee is “given a central booking number” or “detained 

in a CPD lockup cell.” Def. Ex. 4, Defendants’ Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs Twelfth 

(Thirteenth) Set of Interrogatories at ¶ 2; Def. Ex. 5, Defendant City of Chicago’s Amended 

Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories at ¶ 14; Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 

56:7-66:14 (describing steps of processing arrestee under departmental control, including 

numerous steps in processing after the arrestee is given a CB number); Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 

54:22-55:4 (describing the steps in processing an arrestee); Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05; Pls. Ex. 17, 

G.O. 02-03. The statement that the “charges” against Mr. Lance were “eventually dismissed” is 

unsupported as the record only identifies whether cases were “non-suited” by an administrative 

law judge.

12. Defendants have offered no testimony or documented explanation for Mr. Lance's 

14.5-hour detention after he was processed and issued a CB number. Exh. Y, Hughes dep., at 

11:15-12:5; Exh. M, Mitchell dep., at 9:15-10:3; Exh. T, Johnson dep., at 39:21-23; Exh. R, 

Caver-Elder dep., at 115:13-17; Exh. J, Cobb dep., at 14:12-18; Group Exh. 18, defendants' 

responses concerning named plaintiffs; Exh. 20, defendants' answers and objections to plaintiffs' 

seventh set of interrogatories. 

Response: Move to strike this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Controverted, misleading, unsupported and objectionable. The statement that defendants have 

“offered no testimony or documented explanation” for the length of Mr. Lance’s detention is 

argumentative and states a legal conclusion as to what constitutes “testimony” or a “documented 

explanation.” It has no place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should therefore be stricken. 

Plaintiffs’ statement that Mr. Lance was detained for 14.5 hours “after he was processed and 

issued a CB number” is unsupported by any citation to the record, as plaintiffs have failed to 

provide any evidence establishing when Mr. Lance’s processing was completed. Objectionable 

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in that the testimony from Pls. Exs. J, T, R, Y and M was all taken subject to objection, lacks 

proper foundation, and only establishes the deponent’s lack of knowledge regarding this topic. 

Defendants have offered both testimony and documentation explaining the length of Mr. Lance’s 

detention after he was issued a CB number. Def. Ex. 8, Defendants’ Answers and Objections to 

Plaintiffs’ Third Supplemental Interrogatories at 5-6 (explanations listed in ¶ 37 of Defendants’ 

Additional Material Facts infra)

9

; see also Def. Ex. 10, Caver-Elder Dep. at 113:2-22 (explaining 

that it appeared that officers were mistakenly awaiting fingerprint results from Mr. Lance, when 

he had not been fingerprinted); Def. Ex. 11, R. Johnson Dep. at 54:6-22 (explaining that one 

cause for the length of Mr. Lance’s detention may have been that he was fingerprinted). 

Multiple officers have testified that arrestees, like Mr. Lance, are not “processed” at the time 

they are given a CB number, and therefore, the fact that Mr. Lance was held in police custody for 

14.5 hours after he was given a CB number is not evidence that he was held in police custody for 

14.5 hours after he was “processed.” Def. Ex. 4, Defendants’ Answers and Objections to 

Plaintiffs Twelfth (Thirteenth) Set of Interrogatories at ¶ 2; Def. Ex. 5, Defendant City of 

Chicago’s Amended Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories at ¶ 30; Def. Ex. 6, 

Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 56:7-66:14 (describing steps of processing arrestee under departmental 

control, including numerous steps in processing after the arrestee is given a CB number); Def. 

Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 54:22-55:4 (describing the steps in processing an arrestee); Pls. Ex. 16, 

G.O. 92-05; Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03. 

13. Each of the named plaintiffs was eligible for, and each was eventually 

released pursuant to a personal recognizance bond ("I-bond"). Group Exh. 9, I-bonds. 

 

9

 Defendants subsequently informed plaintiffs that they had determined after further investigation that the 

bomb threat, identified as one of the possible reasons for the length of Mr. Lance’s detention in subpart 

(c) of its Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Third Supplemental Interrogatories, did not in fact 

contribute to the length of his detention. 

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Response: Unsupported and objectionable. Plaintiffs’ Group Ex. 9 is unauthenticated. There 

is no citation to the record establishing that Mr. Lynch received an I-Bond and thus any finding 

based on this exhibit would require that impermissible inferences be made against the nonmovant. While it is not controverted that Mr. Lance and Mr. Portis were at some point 

determined to be eligible for, and subsequently released on, an I-Bond, there is no evidence 

supporting at what point this occurred. 

14. The named plaintiffs represent a class of: 

all persons who, from May 1, 2000 through September 3, 2004, 

were arrested on ordinance violations which carry no jail time in 

the City of Chicago and who were detained for more than two 

hours after all administrative steps incident to the arrest, except 

non-discretionary ministerial acts, were completed. The class is 

further limited to those persons who (1) were not fingerprinted by 

defendants after being brought into custody; and (2) were eligible 

for release on personal recognizance bond pursuant to Rule 553(d) 

of the Illinois Supreme Court.

Order, Dkt. No. 380; Dkt. No. 378-1, at 4. 

Response: Controverted and objectionable. The City disputes that this class action should 

have been certified (see Dkt. No. 95), disputes that two hours has any constitutional significance 

and disputes that plaintiffs’ characterization of administrative steps has any legal basis. 

Paragraph 14 states a legal conclusion as to whether the named plaintiffs “represent” the class 

certified in this lawsuit. 

15. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 528 sets the amount of bail for persons charged with 

fine-only ordinance violations. Exh. 10, S.Ct.R. 528. 

Response: Immaterial and irrelevant because there is no allegation concerning bail in this 

lawsuit. 

16. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 553(d) further provides that: 

Persons arrested for or charged with an offense covered by Rules 

526, 527 and 528 who are unable to secure release from custody 

under these rules may be released by giving individual bond (in the 

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amount required by this article) by those law enforcement officers 

designated by name or office by the chief judge of the circuit, 

except when the accused is (1) unable or unwilling to establish his 

identity or submit to being fingerprinted as required by law, (2) is 

charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment and will pose 

a danger to any person or to the community, or (3) elects release on 

separate bail under Rule 503(a)(3) or 503(a)(4). Persons required 

to deposit both bail and driver's license under Rule 526(e) may be 

released on $1,000 individual bond and their current Illinois 

driver's license. If authorized by the chief judge of the circuit, 

individual bonds under this paragraph (d) may be executed by 

signing the citation or complaint agreeing to comply with its 

conditions. 

Exh. 11, S.Ct.R. 553(d). 

Response: Immaterial and irrelevant. To the extent plaintiffs purport to allege a violation of 

this rule to support their § 1983 claims, “the violation of ... a state law is completely immaterial 

as to the question of whether a violation of the federal constitution has been established.” 

Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006). 

17. For all law enforcement agencies in Cook County (including the CPD), the Chief 

Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court has authorized inter alia "[a]ny police officer or watch 

commander designated by the commanding officer of a police department of any village, city, 

town or other municipality" to issue I-bonds. Exh. 12, Cook County Circuit GO No. 8 ("Pretrial 

Release"). 

Response: Immaterial and objectionable. Incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 in that 

it does not provide the complete language of the county general order, which actually provides 

that these individuals “may release on bail any persons arrested or charged with violations where 

bail has been preset under Supreme Court Rules 526, 527 and 528 and may be released from 

custody on cash bail or Individual Recognizance in the amount required by that article.” Pls. Ex. 

12, Cook County Circuit G.O. 8. To the extent plaintiffs purport to allege a violation of this rule 

to support their § 1983 claims, “the violation of ... a state law is completely immaterial as to the 

question of whether a violation of the federal constitution has been established.” Thompson v. 

City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006). 

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18. Under S.Ct.R. 553(d), the only requirement for a person "arrested for or charged 

with" a fine-only ordinance violation to receive an I-bond is that the person must be able to 

establish his identity or submit to being fingerprinted. Exh. 11, S.Ct.R. 553(d). 

Response: Controverted, immaterial and unsupported. Ill. S. Ct. R. 553(d) addresses all the 

offenses “covered by 526, 527, and 528” and the plaintiffs have made no effort to prove or 

explain what constitutes a “fine-only ordinance violation” that would entitle one to an I-bond. 

Ill. S. Ct. R. 553(d) also states that the person must also be “unable to secure release from 

custody under these rules,” but the plaintiffs make no effort to show what factual scenario would 

satisfy this provision. To the extent plaintiffs purport to allege a violation of this rule to support 

their § 1983 claims, “the violation of ... a state law is completely immaterial as to the question of 

whether a violation of the federal constitution has been established.” Thompson v. City of 

Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006). 

19. Prior to the commencement of the class period, the superintendent of police, the 

highest-ranking official of the CPD, issued DSO 94-09, entitled "Bond Procedures." That order 

provides that CPD watch commanders "will" issue I-bonds to persons arrested for fine-only 

ordinance violations "after concluding on the basis of available information that the offender has 

established identity and is not wanted on an outstanding warrant." Exh. 13, DSO 94-09, at §V. 

Response: Unsupported, incomplete, misleading and objectionable. Paragraph 19 violates 

Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. Paragraph 

19 is also incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 in that it does not provide the complete 

language of the D.S.O. 94-09 at § V(A), which states “the watch commander will, as soon as 

reasonably possible, authorize the release of such person [charged with a non-felony offense who 

cannot post bond].” Misleading in that plaintiffs have not even attempted to show what 

constitutes “as soon as reasonably possible” or what scenario would be unreasonable; and to the 

extent plaintiffs suggest that the superintendent of police is the City’s policymaker, Seventh 

Circuit precedent holds that he is not. See Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400-401 (7th Cir. 

1992) (establishing that the Superintendent of Police in Chicago is not the final policy maker to 

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establish municipal liability because he has “no power to countermand the statutes regulating the 

operation of the department”); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir. 1993) 

(noting City's error in conceding prematurely, in light of Auriemma, that the Superintendent of 

Police is responsible for formulating City policy regarding treatment of suspects). 

20. All class members were eligible for release on an I-bond. Order, docket no. 380; 

docket no. 378-1, at 4; Exh. 11, S.Ct. Rule 553(d); Exh. S, McMahon dep. II, at 116-17. 

Response: Unsupported, misleading and objectionable. States a legal conclusion and not a 

statement of fact. Plaintiffs’ Ex. S only shows the deponents’ knowledge regarding whether or 

not I-bonds issue and in what circumstances they might not, and does not support any contention 

regarding the class members. Misleading and unsupported to the extent the plaintiffs assert any 

facts regarding “all class members,” as plaintiffs have cited no evidence to support this 

statement. 

21. Upon being arrested and searched, arrestees are brought to the police station, 

searched a second time, and then taken to a processing area where an arresting officer prepares 

portions of two forms: (a) a two-page arrest report; and (b) a one-page court complaint form. 

Exh. 16, GO 92-05, at §IV.D.2; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, at §IV.A.2; Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 56:22-2, 

57:9, 58:19. 

Response: Controverted, misleading, unsupported and objectionable. Nothing in the cited 

evidence indicates that these procedures occur in the order described in all arrests, let alone the 

arrests of the class members, and any application to all arrests requires an impermissible 

inference to be made against the non-movant. Nothing in the cited provisions of Pls. Exs. 16 or 

17 identifies the number of pages of paperwork an arresting officer must prepare. In Pls. Ex. B, 

the deponent testifies only to the procedures he can personally remember from memory, Pls. Ex. 

B at 56:11-15. Incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106; while defendants do not dispute that 

Commander Sodini testified that those steps listed above take place, he also testified that 

additionally, an arresting officer may be required to: (a) complete a case report; (b) complete a 

felony minute sheet in cases where an ordinance violator is arrested with someone else who is 

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charged with a felony; (c) take a complete inventory of the arrestees’ personal property or 

evidence; and (d) involve follow-up investigators, detectives, or notify various specialized units. 

Pls. Ex. B at 57:8-12, 58:5-18, 115:21-116:6. Misleading in that it fails to take into account what 

else is going on in the police station or with the arrestee that may require additional tasks for the 

arresting officer to perform. Multiple officers have testified that the “second search” taking 

place inside a police station is generally more thorough than the initial search, based on the 

ability to do a better search in the controlled environment of the police station. Def. Ex. 12, 

Cobb Dep. at 21:2-24; Def. Ex. 13, Coleman Dep. at 61:14-62:20. 

22. The arresting officer completes the arrest report by filling in biographical 

information about the arrestee, a narrative describing the offense, and a listing of the legal 

citation(s) with which the arrestee is charged. Exh. 17, GO 02-03, §§IV.A.2, 3; Exh. 16, GO 92-

05, §IV.D.2. A copy of the arrest report with the portions completed by the arresting officer 

(boxes 1-5, 7-46, 59-61) highlighted, is attached as Exh. 14. 

Response: Controverted, misleading, unsupported and objectionable. None of these citations 

offers adequate authentication of Pls. Ex. 14, and it also contains inadmissible hearsay. 

Unsupported and misleading in that nothing in the cited evidence indicates that these procedures 

occur in all arrests, let alone the arrests of the class members, and any application to all arrests 

requires an impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. Nothing in the cited 

provisions of Pls. Exs. 16 or 17 identifies the portions of an arrest report an arresting officer 

must prepare. The highlighted portions of the arrest report in Pls. Ex. 14 that plaintiffs allege 

constitute those portions of the arrest report completed by the arresting officer include numerous 

additional categories of information beyond the biographical information about the arrestee, a 

narrative describing the offense, and a listing of the legal citations with which the arrestee is 

charged. 

23. The complaint form lists the legal elements of the offense on the arrest report. 

Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 74:12-75:13. A copy of the complaint form is attached as Group Exh. 

15 (complaints for the three named plaintiffs Portis, Lynch, and Lance). 

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Response: Controverted in that it is misleading, unsupported, and objectionable. Plaintiffs’ 

Ex. 15 is unauthenticated and contains inadmissible hearsay. Misleading in giving the 

impression that the legal elements of an offense are already present on a blank complaint form. 

The testimony relied on in Pls. Ex. A was taken subject to objection and lacks proper foundation. 

Incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106, as the complaint form also includes other 

categories of information to be obtained, including: (1) biographical information about the 

arrestee; (2) information about the incident causing the arrest; and (3) information about the 

arrestee’s condition. Pls. Ex. 15. 

24. The arresting officer is responsible for performing a name check on the arrestee to 

confirm the arrestee's identity and to check if there are any outstanding warrants for the person or 

if s/he is otherwise wanted in connection with a crime (the "name/warrant check"). Exh. B, 

Sodini dep., at 72:19-73:13; Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 28:10-29:22, 32:23-33:6; Exh. C, Richmond 

dep., at 58:13-60:21; Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §IV.B.1; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, §IV.A.4.1 

Response: Misleading, unsupported, and objectionable. Uncontroverted to the extent that the 

General Orders provide that one of the many responsibilities of an arresting officer is to perform 

a name check. Unsupported and misleading in that nothing in the cited evidence indicates that it 

was the arresting officer, and not another CPD member, who performed all of these procedures 

in all arrests, let alone in all the arrests of the class members, and any application to all arrests 

requires an impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. Further misleading in 

giving the impression that the arresting officer is the only person responsible for confirming the 

arrestee’s identity. Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03-07C at 5 (describing role of desk sergeants and watch 

commanders in identification). All of the deposition testimony cited in support of the statement 

was taken subject to objection and lacks proper foundation as to what happened during the 

specific arrests of all class members. Incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 because it 

fails to include obstacles to performing a name check, such as when the arrestee has no form of 

identification and refuses or is unwilling to provide a name. Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 141:15-

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22; Def. Ex. 14, Greene 9/26/06 Dep. at 75:7-12 (“John Jones comes in and identified himself as 

John Jones and there are 50 John Joneses that come up on the screen and maybe its Ray Jones. 

So there may be multiple checks through the same system as one begins to challenge the offered 

identity of the person who comes in.”). 

25. The name/warrant check is performed by entering the arrestee's name and/or other 

identifying information into a terminal that can access the CPD's "hot desk" system. Exh. E, 

Maris dep. at 51:1-19; Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 18:20, 24:9-17. The hot desk is linked to three 

computer systems: the CPD's CHRIS system, the Law Enforcement Agency Data System 

("LEADS"), and the National Crime Information Center system ("NCIC"). Exh. E, Maris dep., 

at 61:19-62:1; Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 25:22-26:23. The CHRIS system contains criminal 

history information and information about warrants issued by the CPD. Exh. E, Maris dep., at 

9:22-10:8. LEADS is a statewide system that contains warrant information and is not controlled 

by the CPD. Id., at 16:20-17:2. NCIC is a nationwide system that contains warrant information 

and is not controlled by the CPD. Id., at 60:16-19. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, misleading and objectionable. Mr. Maris testified that 

the CPD’s CHRIS system is a separate system consisting of a different software interface than 

the hot desk system. Def. Ex. 15, Maris Dep. at 57:18-58:5, 58:21-59:1, 59:21-60:1. He also 

testified that officers would run a name/warrant check only on the hot desk system, and not on 

the CHRIS system. Def. Ex. 15, Maris Dep. at 37:21-38:9. Paragraph 25 violates Local Rule 

56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. 

26. The "hot desk" system can be accessed by terminals in police cars (called 

"portable data terminals") (Exh. E, Maris dep., at 141:14-19; Exh. X, Obuchowski dep. II, at 

114:1-8, 114:9-115:2); by terminals in CPD police stations (Exh. E, Maris dep., at 137:12-20); 

and by terminals in the field inquiry section of the CPD's records division (id., at 142:10-143:1; 

Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 9:9-17, 24). The arresting officers can perform the check by accessing 

the terminals on their own or, if the terminals are down or unavailable, by telephoning the 

records division or by radio dispatch to the office of emergency communications. Exh. F, 

Perfetti dep., at 13:15-17:19; Exh. G, Obuchowski dep., at 15:19-17:4; Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 

75. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, misleading and objectionable. Multiple CPD 

employees testified that the “portable data terminals” are not available in all cars and are unable 

to access all of the same information as those terminals in the stationhouse. Def. Ex. 12, Cobb 

Dep. at 16:11-23; Def. Ex. 16, Kehoe Dep. at 34:19-35:5; Def. Ex. 15, Maris Dep. at 135:22-24. 

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Paragraph 26 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same 

paragraph. 

27. All name/warrant checks for individuals arrested for fine-only ordinance 

violations were performed on the hot desk in the police car (Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 34:19-23) or 

the police station, with two exceptions: first, if the hot desk computer in the police station was 

down, the arresting officer can call the records department of the CPD and ask them to do a 

check, or could radio dispatch the office of emergency communications. Second, prior to June 7, 

2002, it was the practice to send by telefax a white copy of the arrest report to the field inquiry 

section to perform a name/warrant check. See ¶¶56-62, infra. Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 46:10-

47:11; Exh. G, Obuchowski dep., at 15:19-17:4. Calls to the records department occur very 

rarely (Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 16:4-10), and radio dispatches normally produce a response in 

"less than a minute" (Exh. G, Obuchowski dep., at 17:3-4). 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, misleading and objectionable. Joseph Perfetti, the 

Manager of the Field Services Section of the Records Division for CPD, testified that the 

response time for inquiries to the Field Inquiry Division “varies” and could take up to 50 minutes 

or longer depending on the variables. Def. Ex. 17, Perfetti Dep. at 19:14-20:20. Incomplete in 

violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 because it fails to include obstacles to performing a name check, 

such as when the arrestee has no form of identification and refuses or is unwilling to provide a 

name. Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 141:15-22; Def. Ex. 14 Greene 9/26/06 Dep. at 75:7-12 (“John 

Jones comes in and identified himself as John Jones and there are 50 John Joneses that come up 

on the screen and maybe its Ray Jones. So there may be multiple checks through the same 

system as one begins to challenge the offered identity of the person who comes in.”). Paragraph 

27 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. 

Objectionable in referencing other paragraphs in a Rule 56.1 statement as evidence in the record 

that supports this statement is as misleading as it is improper (see N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1; see also the 

improper nature of ¶¶ 56-62, infra). The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. D does not, in any 

way, establish what happened for “all” name/warrant checks for individuals arrested for fineonly ordinance violations. The testimony in Pls. Ex. D at 34:19-23 merely states that some 

name/warrant checks “can be done in the field.” Id. at 23. The deposition testimony contained in 

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Pls. Exs. F and G does not contain any proper foundation as to what happens “rarely” and 

“normally.” 

28. If an arrestee has no identification and/or if the arrestee has identification but the 

arresting officer is still unsure of the arrestee's identity, the arresting officer can confirm the 

arrestee's identity through the CHRIS and CHRIS Warehouse systems (or by the ICAM system) 

by pulling up pictures of prior arrests as well as identifying information such as scars, 

complexion, height, weight, etc. Exh. E, Maris dep., at 58:13-59:1; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, at 

§IV.c.12. Moreover, if an arrestee is unable to be satisfactorily identified, the watch commander 

can order that the arrestee be fingerprinted. See ¶¶42-43. 

Response: Controverted in part, unsupported, misleading and objectionable. The last 

sentence of ¶ 28 is not controverted. Multiple CPD officers testified that the ICAM system does 

not “pull up” pictures of arrestees in order to help confirm their identities. Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. 

at 18:14-19:10; Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 73:23-74:2 (“the ICAM system would never 

suffice in conducting a name check”). Multiple witnesses have also testified that arrestees can 

provide incorrect names, aliases, and other identifying information, and plaintiffs provide no 

evidence that these systems are able to confirm the identities of arrestees who do so. Def. Ex. 2, 

Skahill Dep. 141:15-22; Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 93:21-94:4. Paragraph 28 also 

violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. 

Objectionable in referencing other paragraphs in a Rule 56.1 statement as evidence in the record 

that supports this statement is as misleading as it is improper (see N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1; see also the 

improper nature of ¶¶ 42-43, infra). Further, the evidence cited from Pls. Exs. E and 17 does not 

directly support plaintiffs’ assertion that an arresting officer “can” indeed confirm the arrestee’s 

identity through the CHRIS and CHRIS Warehouse systems. 

29. Once the arresting officer is satisfied that the arrestee is properly identified and 

that there are no outstanding warrants, the arresting officer generally indicates in the narrative 

section of the arrest report that the name check is "clear." Exh. H, Malinowski dep., at 21-22; 

Exh. C, Richmond dep., at 58:13-60:21; Exh. I, Miceli dep., at 37, 86. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, misleading and objectionable. Deputy Chief Francis 

Kehoe testified that the indication in the narrative section that a name check is “clear” could be 

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entered at any time while an arrestee is in custody, and does not necessarily occur “once the 

arresting officer is satisfied that the arrestee is properly identified and that there are no 

outstanding warrants.” Def. Ex. 16, Kehoe Dep. at 31:4-10. The deposition testimony cited in 

Pls. Ex. H lacks proper foundation, and is explicitly limited to the deponent’s personal 

experience. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. I was taken subject to objection, lacks 

proper foundation, and, in fact, the deponent states “you are asking me to draw conclusions I 

can’t draw” when asked the general application of the deponent’s cited testimony to 

“everybody,” Pls. Ex. C at 86:19-21; and thus the deposition testimony does not support the 

plaintiffs’ assertion as to what “generally” occurs. 

30. It is the responsibility of the arresting officer to ensure that "there is a valid basis 

for charges placed" (Exh. 16, GO 92-05, at §IV.D.1; GO 02-03, at §IV.A.1) and that the arrestee 

is not charged until a name check has been completed. Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 76:17-21; Exh. D, 

Kehoe dep., at 41; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, §IV.A.4. 

Response: Objectionable and misleading. Paragraph 30 violates Local Rule 56.1 by 

including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph and the deposition testimony 

cited lacks proper foundation in the record. Misleading in giving the impression that the 

arresting officer is the only person responsible for confirming the arrestee’s identity. Pls. Ex. 17, 

G.O. 02-03-07C at 5 (describing role of desk sergeants and watch commanders in identification). 

Incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 because it fails to refer to the remainder of G.O. 02-

03, § IV.B and § IV.C showing that watch commanders and desk sergeants have responsibilities 

in these areas as well. See Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03, § IV.B, § IV.C; Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 

143:9-19 (describing role of other officers in determining that arrestee sufficiently identified); 

Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 140:8-14 (same). Uncontroverted that the General Orders 

provide that one of the many responsibilities of an arresting officer is to ensure these things take 

place. 

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31. If the arresting officer is satisfied with the identification and the absence of any 

warrant, s/he could issue a ticket and release the arrestee. Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 46; Group Exh. 

3 (GO 99-02, at §IV.A). 

Response: Controverted, misleading, unsupported and objectionable. CPD officers have 

testified that there is no procedure by which a ticket could be issued to an individual after a 

custodial arrest has already taken place. Def. Ex. 9, Smith Dep. at 51:11-20. The deposition 

testimony in Pls. Ex. D was taken subject to objection, lacks proper foundation, and calls for a 

legal conclusion. Incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 as it relies on Pls. Ex. D, in that 

Deputy Chief Kehoe testified that he “suppose[d]” this procedure could take place “if all the 

other conditions for a citation were met.” See Pls. Ex. D at 46. Unsupported in that Pls. Ex. 3 

does not support the statement that officers have any authority under the CPD’s general orders to 

issue a ticket after executing a custodial arrest and any application of the cited evidence to a 

class member, if any, requires an impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. 

Further disputed in that there is no provision within the general orders for processing persons 

under departmental control which would warrant issuing a ticket to an individual already arrested 

and taken into custody. See generally Pls. Exs. 16 and 17. Additionally, Deputy Chief Kehoe 

later testified in his deposition that no police officer had the authority to issue a ticket and release 

the arrestee if the arrestee were awaiting final approval of charges from the watch commander. 

Def. Ex. 16, Kehoe Dep. at 168:3-169:1. 

32. After the arresting officer has completed the pertinent portions of the arrest report 

(boxes 1-5, 7-46, and 59-61) and the complaint (Exh. 14, arrest report; Exh. 15, complaint form) 

and has verified the arrestee's identity and completed the warrant check (Exh. 17, GO 02-03, at 

§IV.A.4), the arresting officer presents the arrest report and the complaint to the desk sergeant 

for review and signature. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, at §IV.D.5; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, at §IV.A.8; Exh. 

B, Sodini dep., at 58:19-59:13, 109:19-24; Exh. J, Cobb dep., at 25:9-26:5; Exh. N, Bay dep., at 

12:16-14:19; Exh. G, Obuchowski dep., at 12:1-17:12. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, misleading and objectionable. Multiple officers have 

testified that the arrestee’s identity or the absence of any warrants has not necessarily been 

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verified at the time the arrest report is brought to the desk sergeant. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 

Dep. at 103:13-16; Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 67:8-16; Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 

Dep. at 129:20-130:6; Def. Ex. 10, Caver-Elder Dep. at 65:7-14. Multiple officers have also 

testified that many of these tasks performed by the arresting officer may not be completed until 

after he has handed control of the arrestee over to lockup personnel. Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 

57:24-58:8 (completion of criminal complaints and “plethora of other documents” may be taken 

care of after arrestee is placed in lockup); Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 71:19-23 (criminal 

complaint form may be completed after the issuance of a CB number); Def. Ex. 9, Smith Dep. at 

24:8-12 (in effort to “expedite,” name check may be performed after the desk officer has clerked 

the arrest report). None of these citations adequately authenticates either of Pls. Exs. 14 and 15, 

and both contain inadmissible hearsay. The deposition testimony cited was taken subject to 

objection and lacks proper foundation. Unsupported and misleading in that nothing in the cited 

evidence indicates that these procedures always occur in the order described with respect to all 

arrests, let alone the class members’ arrests, and any application of the cited evidence to establish 

the statement requires impermissible inferences to be made against the non-movant. 

33. As a part of this review, the desk sergeant is required to check: (a) that the name 

check has been performed; (b) that the court complaint and arrest report are properly completed 

and the case assigned to the proper court; (c) that the court complaint is properly sworn to by the 

arresting officer and witnessed by a member of the police department (generally a sergeant) 

sworn as a deputy clerk of the circuit court; and (d) that the legal citation for the alleged 

offense(s) in the signed complaint is on all copies of the arrest report. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, 

§§IV.B.1-6; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, §§IV.C.1-3; Exh. C, Richmond dep., at 60:3-21; Exh. B, Sodini 

dep., at 58:19-59:13; 103:13-104:21. 

Response: Objectionable in that the deposition testimony cited was taken subject to 

objection, and lacks proper foundation. Otherwise not controverted to the extent it accurately 

quotes the general orders, but unsupported and misleading because nothing in the cited evidence 

indicates when these procedures occur or in what order they occur in all arrests, let alone in all 

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the arrests of the class members, and any application to all arrests requires an impermissible 

inference to be made against the non-movant. 

34. According to the CPDs GOs, "charging" is defined as "the formal recording on an 

arrest report . . .of the citation of offenses alleged in signed complaint." Exh. 16, GO 92-05, 

§II.F; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, §III.F. 

Response: Misleading and unsupported. Plaintiffs’ Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03, § III.F does not 

define “charging.” Plaintiffs inaccurately quote Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05, § II.F, which actually 

defines “charging” as “the formal recording on an Arrest Report (CPD-11.420) of the legal 

citation of offenses alleged in signed complaints.” Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05, § II.F. Otherwise not 

controverted to the extent it accurately quotes the general orders, but unsupported and misleading 

because nothing in the cited evidence indicates when “charging” occurs with respect to other 

processing steps in all arrests, let alone in all the arrests of the class members, and any 

application to all arrests requires an impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. 

35. According to GO 02-03, §IV.C.11, the desk sergeant is also responsible for 

ensur[ing] that "criminal complaints are prepared when charges are upgraded." However, 

municipal ordinance violations are not subject to upgrading. Exh. L, Sodini dep. II, at 30:6-11; 

69:17-70:11; Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 130:19-131:8; Exh. S, McMahon dep. II, at 103:10-21. 

Therefore, the only circumstance that would necessitate an upgrade or change in the charge(s) 

would be if a name check reveals an outstanding warrant for another crime. Exh. A, Sodini dep. 

III, at 126:13-127:14; Exh. C, Richmond dep., at 70:5-24; Exh. J, Cobb dep., 81:24-82:3. 

Response: Controverted, misleading, unsupported and objectionable. Multiple CPD officers 

have testified that new charges can be brought against fine-only ordinance violators after their 

initial arrests for a variety of reasons. Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 111:15-112:11; Def. Ex. 13, 

Coleman Dep. at 106:3-9, 120:1-10; Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 126:13-127:14; Def. Ex. 

6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 143:10-144:9; Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 131:11-132:5. 

States a legal conclusion as to whether municipal ordinance violations are subject to upgrading 

and not a statement of fact. Paragraph 35 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple 

statements of fact within the same paragraph. The deposition testimony cited was taken subject 

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to objection and lacks proper foundation. The cited testimony in Pls. Ex. L only refers to charges 

“upgradeable to felonies,” and thus does not support the proposition that municipal ordinance 

violations are not subject to upgrading. Pls. Ex. L p. 30:10-11. The cited testimony in Pls. Ex. D 

does not mention the word “upgradeable,” let alone define the term’s application to this case, and 

thus does not support the proposition that municipal ordinance violations are not subject to 

upgrading. The citation to Pls. Ex. S is incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 in that the 

answer to plaintiffs’ counsel’s question “so nothing could change in the charge of that 

individual” is not submitted to Court, Pls. Ex. S p. 103:24. Unsupported in that the exhibits cited 

do not support the statement regarding “the only circumstance that would necessitate an upgrade 

or change in the charge(s).” Plaintiffs’ statement is also disputed by the law itself, which 

provides that false statements made on an I-Bond application, if discovered prior to issuing the Ibond, could constitute a felony. See 720 ILCS § 540 (making false statement constitutes perjury 

or subornation of perjury); 720 ILCS § 5/32-2 (perjury a class 3 felony); and 720 ILCS § 5/32-3 

(subornation of perjury a class 4 felony). 

36. The name check for each named plaintiff did not reveal any warrants. Docket no. 

44, defendants' answer and affirmative defenses to second amended complaint, at 15, ¶46; 12, 

¶36, 8,¶25. 

Response: Unsupported and misleading. The cited material only shows that it was 

determined “prior to [each named plaintiff’s] release” that he was “not wanted for any 

outstanding warrants.” (Dkt. Nos. 44 at 15, ¶ 46; id. at 12, ¶ 36, id. at 8,¶ 25). The cited material 

does not demonstrate that only one name check was performed during the processing of each 

named plaintiff, nor does it demonstrate that warrants were not initially revealed during the 

named plaintiffs’ processing, and any request for such a finding requires an impermissible 

inference to be made against the non-movant. 

37. After the desk sergeant has confirmed that the arrest report and the complaint 

have been completely filled out, the desk sergeant or any sergeant deputized as a clerk of the 

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Circuit Court of Cook County witnesses the arresting officer sign the affirmation statement on 

the complaint and signs the arrest report in the box captioned "deputy clerk's signature." This 

process is known as "clerking" the arrest report and the complaint. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §IV.B; 

Exh. 17, GO 02-03, §IV.C; Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 58:19-59:13; Exhs. 1, 5, 8, and 15, arrest 

reports and complaint. 

Response: Objectionable, unsupported and misleading. None of these citations offers 

adequate authentication of Pls. Ex. 15, and it also contains inadmissible hearsay. None of the 

deposition testimony contains the word “clerking.” Otherwise not controverted to the extent it 

accurately quotes the general orders, but unsupported and misleading because nothing in the 

citations to the record indicates that these procedures occur in the order described in all arrests, 

let alone in all the arrests of the class members, and any application of this testimony to establish 

“clerking” or what occurred during all arrests requires an impermissible inference to be made 

against the non-movant. 

38. The arresting officer then takes the arrest report and the complaint to the watch 

commander. Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 59:14-16; 102:19-103:4; Exh. G, Obuchowski dep., at 17:9-

12, 19:2-8. 

Response: Unsupported and misleading. The deposition testimony cited at p. 102:19-103:4 

of Pls. Ex. B was taken subject to objection, and lacks proper foundation. Unsupported and 

misleading in that nothing in the citations to the record indicates that these procedures occur in 

the order described in all arrests, let alone in the arrests of the class members, and thus any 

application of this testimony as to what occurred during all arrests, let alone the class members’ 

arrests, requires an impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. 

39. The watch commander is responsible for confirming that the arrestee has been 

adequately identified and that there are no outstanding warrants. Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 146:3-5; 

Exh. H, Malinowski dep., at 24:22-25; Exh. K, McMahon dep., at 46:18-47:6. 

Response: Unsupported and misleading. The deposition testimony cited at Pls. Ex. B at 

146:3-5 refers to determining whether or not to fingerprint an individual, and indicates that the 

watch commander could make that determination to fingerprint, before, at, or after the time the 

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watch commander reviews the arrest report for probable cause. The deposition testimony cited 

at Pls. Ex. K, at 46:18-47:6 actually provides that the watch commander has the responsibility to 

review the arrest report “to make sure everything was correctly prepared by the arresting 

officer,” and that, among those tasks is for the watch commander to ensure, “to the best of his 

ability,” that the arrestee has been properly identified, and thus to establish the statement would 

require impermissible inferences be made against the non-movant. Otherwise uncontroverted to 

the extent it is consistent with the language of the general orders. 

40. Prior to September 3, 2004, the policy of the CPD was that "fingerprints need not 

be taken of persons arrested for violations of city ordinances punishable by fine only." Exh. 16, 

GO 92-05, §VII.A.2.a; Exh. 17, GO 02-03-07, §II.A; Exh. L, Sodini dep. II, at 27; Exh. A, 

Sodini dep. III, at 31:9-32:22. All other adult arrestees (other than those who will not be charged 

and certain traffic offenders under Chapter 625 ILCS) are fingerprinted. Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, 

at 33:23-35:21; Exh. 17, GO 02-03-07, §II.B. 

Response: Controverted in that it is objectionable, misleading and unsupported. Paragraph 

40 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. 

Unsupported because the deposition testimony relied upon was taken subject to objection, lacks 

proper foundation, and the citations are misleading in that the deponent first answered he “wasn’t 

sure,” Pls. Ex. A p. 34:6, and answered questions explicitly without the above clarifications as to 

who was or was not fingerprinted. Id. at 35:1-7. Misleading and incomplete in violation of Fed. 

R. Evid. 106, as Pls. Exs. 16 and 17 further provide that “an arresting officer may request that the 

watch commander in charge of the detention facility authorize fingerprinting of an arrestee by 

articulating sufficient cause to justify the request.” Pls. Ex. 16 G.O. 92-05, §VII.A.2.a; Pls. Ex. 

17, G.O. 02-03-07; see also Def. Ex. 20, Garrity 7/29/05 Dep. at 13:17-14:5 (noting that this 

language must be read in conjunction with the other language). Unsupported in that the citations 

to the record do not demonstrate that “all other adult arrestees” (other than the exceptions 

identified by plaintiffs) were actually fingerprinted prior to September 3, 2004, and thus to 

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movant. The first sentence of ¶ 40 is otherwise uncontroverted to the extent it is consistent with 

the language of the general orders. 

41. Since September 3, 2004, all persons arrested for city ordinance violations are 

fingerprinted. Exh. 17, GO 02-03-07.C. 

Response: Immaterial and unsupported. Immaterial because the class period ends prior to 

September 3, 2004. See Dkt. No. 380. Unsupported because the exhibit cited does not 

demonstrate that all persons arrested for city ordinance violations since September 3, 2004 were 

actually fingerprinted, and thus to establish the statement would require an impermissible 

inference be made against the non-movant. 

42. Prior to September 3, 2004, if the watch commander was not satisfied that the 

persons arrested for fine-only ordinance violations were sufficiently identified, he could order 

that the arrestee be fingerprinted. Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 145-46; Exh. L, Sodini dep. II, at 29-

30, 48-49; Exh. S, McMahon dep. II, at 69:2-6; Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §VII.A.2; Exh. 17, GO 02-

03-07, §II. Most fine-only ordinance violators were not fingerprinted. Exh. 21, DiPrete expert 

report, at Appendix B. 

Response: Objectionable, misleading and unsupported. Paragraph 42 violates Local Rule 

56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. The first sentence of ¶ 

42 is not controverted to the extent it is consistent with the language of the general orders. The 

second sentence is objectionable, misleading and unsupported. Plaintiffs’ Ex. 21 is the unsworn 

expert report of Dr. Thomas DiPrete, which is not admissible evidence and should not be 

considered.10 All of the deposition testimony cited was taken subject to objection, lacks proper 

foundation, and thus cannot not adequately support the plaintiffs’ statement. Unsupported in that 

Pls. Ex. 21 does not define “most” in the context of this statement, and thus any inference as to 

what constitutes “most” that could be made against the non-movant would be impermissible. 

 

10 Unsworn expert reports are not admissible in support of summary judgment motions under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(e). See Loeffel Steel Products Inc. v. Delta Brands Inc., 379 F.Supp.2d 968, 984 (N.D.Ill. 2005) 

citing Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 917 (7thCir, 1996). Consequently, each time that the City points 

out that one of plaintiffs’ facts is based on an unsworn expert report, the City respectfully requests that 

this Court either strike or disregard that fact in ruling on plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion. 

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Misleading in that Pls. Ex. 21 also fails take into account those fine-only ordinance violators who 

were fingerprinted, and, based on those fingerprint results, were found to have an outstanding 

warrant. 

43. The watch commander's decision to fingerprint an individual arrested for a 

nonjailable ordinance offense was based on whether the watch commander was satisfied that the 

arrestee was identified, and this determination was based on the information contained in the 

arrest report and any information provided from the arresting officer, including whether the 

arrestee possessed identification and/or had identification confirmed through computer checks 

and verifications. Exh. L, Sodini dep. II, at 40, 49. 

Response: Controverted, objectionable, misleading and unsupported. CPD watch 

commanders have testified that a watch commander’s decision to fingerprint an individual 

arrested for an ordinance violation also rested on whether the arrestee had been deceptive in his 

statements, or whether there was an unusual circumstance regarding the arrest, such that the 

arrestee tried to flee, conceal themselves, or destroy evidence. Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 52:9-22. 

The deposition testimony relied upon in Pls. Ex. L lacks proper foundation and is outside the 

scope of the deponent’s knowledge. The citation to Pls. Ex. L is incomplete in violation of Fed. 

R. Evid. 106 in that it does not provide the deponent’s entire answer, where he repeatedly 

indicates that the factors impacting the decision to fingerprint changed on a “case by case basis.” 

Unsupported and misleading in that nothing in the citations to the record indicates that a watch 

commander’s decision to fingerprint was based on these facts in all cases where fingerprints 

were ordered, and any application to all such occasions requires an impermissible inference to be 

made against the non-movant. 

44. None of the named plaintiffs and none of the class members were fingerprinted. 

Order, docket no. 380; docket no. 378-1, at 4; Exh. M, Mitchell dep., at 65:4-5; Exh. N, Bay 

dep., at 54:23-55:8; Exh. I, Miceli dep., at 34:2-4. 

Response: Objectionable and misleading. It is uncontroverted that the class definition 

excludes individuals who were fingerprinted. This paragraph, however, is unsupported as Dkt. 

No. 378-1 is nothing more than the plaintiffs’ pleading, which does not constitute evidence and 

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Dkt. No. 380 does not make reference to this issue at all. The deposition testimony relied upon 

was taken subject to objection, lacks proper foundation, and in each circumstance the deponent 

stated the question was outside the scope of their personal knowledge. Plaintiffs’ Ex. I at 34:2-4 

does not even address the issue of fingerprinting, but rather the location of 18th District. 

45. The watch commander can also order that the arrestee be fingerprinted, but 

"waive the results of the fingerprint check" (i.e., the arrestee is not to be detained until the results 

are returned) and the arrestee is considered "charged" when the decision to waive is made. Exh. 

17, GO 02-03, at 6. 

Response: Controverted in part as objectionable and misleading and immaterial. Incomplete 

in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 because it fails to note that Pls. Ex. 17 at 02-03, addendum 03, 

provides the grounds necessary for a watch commander to waive the results of the fingerprint 

check. Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03-03 at 1-2 (indicating that arrestee must: (1) not have been 

arrested for an offense that is, or can be upgraded, to a felony, or voluntarily surrendered on a 

misdemeanor warrant; (2) be ready to post bond; (3) possess sufficient personal identification; 

and (4) not be wanted on another offense or investigative alert). Otherwise uncontroverted to the 

extent it is consistent with the language of the general orders. 

46. In addition to assuring the adequacy of the identification, the watch commander 

also confirms that the name check revealed no warrants for the arrestee, and that there is 

probable cause in that the charges are appropriate based on the narrative on the arrest report. 

Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 112:14-19; Exh. L, Sodini dep. II, at 59:14-60:5; Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 

63-64; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, at §IV.B.3. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. Multiple officers have 

testified that at the time the watch commander confirms that probable cause exists, the name 

check has not necessarily confirmed the absence of any warrants for the arrestee. Def. Ex. 3, 

Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 103:13-16; Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 67:8-16; Def. Ex. 19, 

Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 129:20-130:6; Def. Ex. 10, Caver-Elder Dep. at 65:7-14. Further, 

watch commanders have testified that the watch commander confirms that there is probable 

cause based not only on the narrative in the arrest report, but on additional pieces of information 

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in the report, and possibly information from other documents. Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 42:17-

43:1, 47:3-4. Unsupported in that the portion of the transcript cited in Pls. Ex. B is nothing more 

than an objection made by the City. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Exs. L and D was 

taken subject to objection, lacks proper foundation, is outside the scope of the deponents’ 

personal knowledge, or does not directly support the plaintiffs’ statement. Unsupported and 

misleading in that nothing in the citations to the record indicates that these procedures always 

occur in the order described with respect to the all arrests, and any application of the cited 

evidence to establish the statement requires impermissible inferences to be made against the nonmovant. 

47. The watch commander then signs the box number 47 on the arrest report, entitled 

"initial approval of probable cause." Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §VII.C.1; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, 

§§IV.B.1-3 and IV.A.3; Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 146 ; Exh. O, Garrity dep., at 57; Exh. K, 

McMahon dep., at 46-47, 65-66; Exh. H, Malinowski dep., at 25; Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 63:20-

64:2. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. Multiple officers have 

testified that it is not necessary that the watch commander has confirmed that the name check 

revealed no warrants for the arrestee prior to approving probable cause. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 

8/22/05 Dep. at 103:13-16; Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 67:8-16; Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 

9/20/05 Dep. at 129:20-130:6; Def. Ex. 10, Caver-Elder Dep. at 65:7-14. The deposition 

testimony cited in Pls. Ex. B is incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 in that it does not 

provide the previous testimony, which states the watch commander could sign the box “at that 

time, it could be after that time, it could be before that time.” Pls. Ex. B at 146:2-4. Further, the 

deposition testimony in Pls. Ex. B and was taken subject to objection and lacks proper 

foundation. The deposition testimony in Pls. Ex. O lacks proper foundation and does not support 

the plaintiffs’ statement. The deposition testimony in Pls. Ex. K lacks proper foundation, was 

taken subject to objection, and makes no mention of signing any box on the arrest report. The 

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deposition testimony in Pls. Ex. H lacks proper foundation, was taken subject to objection, and 

makes no mention of signing any box on the arrest report. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. 

Ex. D lacks proper foundation, was taken subject to objection as to establishing a particular time 

frame, and makes no mention of signing any box on the arrest report. Unsupported and 

misleading in that nothing in the citations to the record indicates that these procedures always 

occur in the order described with respect to all arrests, and any application to all arrests requires 

an impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. 

48. At the initial determination of probable cause, the arrestee has been charged. Exh. 

D, Kehoe dep., at 175; see ¶¶30, 33-37; Exh. Q, Griffin dep., at 79:15-17. 

Response: Unsupported, objectionable and misleading. States a legal conclusion as to when 

an arrestee is deemed charged. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. D lacks proper 

foundation, was taken subject to objection as to what the deponent actually testified to, and does 

not support the statement because the deponent testified only as to what the term “charged” 

meant as the term was used in G.O. 02-03. See Pls. Ex. D at 175:5-6. The deposition testimony 

cited in Pls. Ex. Q lacks proper foundation and does not support the statement because the 

deponent testified only as to what happened at the “old 18th District” and so any inferences as to 

what happened in other instances that would be made against the non-movant would be 

impermissible. Nothing in the citations to the record indicates that these procedures always 

occur in the order described with respect to all arrests, and any application to all arrests requires 

an impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. 

49. The watch commander then returns all copies of the arrest report and the 

complaint to the arresting officer (Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 59:14-60:5) and the officer takes the 

arrestee (and the arrest reports) to lockup to be booked, and returns to the street. Exh. B, Sodini 

dep., at 105; Exh. X, Obuchowski dep. II, at 52:6-55:20; Exh. Y, Hughes dep., at 30:7-14. 

Response: Unsupported, objectionable and misleading. Unsupported and misleading in that 

nothing in the citations to the record indicates that these procedures always occur in the order 

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described with respect to all arrests, let alone the class members’ arrests, and any application to 

all arrests requires an impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. The 

deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. B lacks proper foundation, is outside the scope of the 

deponent’s knowledge at to what actually happened with respect to the plaintiffs’ actual arrests, 

and was taken subject to objection as to what the deponent actually testified to (Pls. Ex. B at 

57:19-21, 105:22-24). The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. X does not contain pages 52 

through 55 and therefore any reliance on it for any fact is improper. The deposition testimony 

cited in Pls. Ex. Y lacks proper foundation and is explicitly limited to his personal knowledge, 

and thus to establish this statement would require impermissible inferences be made against the 

non-movant. 

50. The watch commander could authorize the arresting officer to issue a ticket for 

class members at the time the probable cause determination is made, and release them. Exh. S, 

McMahon dep. II, at 83; Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 70-71. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, misleading, and argumentative. This 

statement blatantly mischaracterizes the deponents’ testimony and is incomplete in violation of 

Fed. R. Evid. 106 in that the deposition testimony cited in Pls. Exs. D and S actually shows that 

the deponents testified that they had “never heard” of the circumstances described in this 

statement ever happening. Pls. Ex. S at 83:17-18; Pls. Ex. D at 70:11-12. Multiple officers 

(including Deputy Chief Kehoe, whose testimony plaintiffs cite in Pls. Ex. D) testified that the 

watch commander has no authority to order the issuance of a ticket once a custodial arrest has 

been made. Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 101:15-22; Def. Ex. 16, Kehoe Dep. at 77:22-

78:10, 168:3-169:1; Def. Ex. 20, Garrity 7/29/05 Dep. at 63:22-64:22. According to one CPD 

watch commander, in order for a watch commander to authorize the arresting officer to issue a 

ticket for class members at the time the probable cause determination is made, the watch 

commander would have to re-investigate what the arresting officer did in order to determine that 

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the arrestee did not meet the criteria under General Order 03-12-01 to receive a ticket in the first 

place, which is neither provided for by the general orders, nor is practical for a watch 

commander to perform given the scope of his duties. Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 173:20-175:3; 

Def. Ex. 1, D.S.O. 03-12-01. Further disputed in that there is no provision within the general 

orders for processing persons under departmental control which would warrant issuing a ticket to 

an individual already arrested and taken into custody. See generally Pls. Exs. 16 and 17. The 

deposition testimony cited both Pls. Exs. S and D was taken subject to objection and lacks 

foundation. Unsupported and misleading in that nothing in the citations to the record indicates 

that these procedures could or did occur during any of the class members’ particular detentions. 

51. Even though the watch commander has approved the adequacy of the 

identification, confirmed the absence of warrants, and confirmed that the narrative supports the 

charges, s/he does not initial the "final approval of charges" box on the arrest report or authorize 

the I-bond at that time. Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 110:10-114:13; Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 73:23-

74:13; Exh. W, Wedster dep., at 40:16-19, 42:2-45:13; 100:21-103:11. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. Multiple deponents 

testified that at the time the watch commander confirms that probable cause exists, the name 

check has not necessarily confirmed the absence of any warrants for the arrestee. Def. Ex. 3, 

Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 103:13-16; Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 67:8-16; Def. Ex. 19, 

Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 129:20-130:6; Def. Ex. 10, Caver-Elder Dep. at 65:7-14; Def. Ex. 14, 

Greene 9/26/06 Dep. at 167:11-15. Multiple witnesses also testified that there are additional 

steps (such as completion of case reports, inventorying of evidence, and completion of the 

bonding documents) which must take place between the initial approval of probable cause and 

the final approval of charges that prevent the watch commander from making those 

determinations at the same time. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 113:11-114:23; Def. Ex. 19, 

Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 84:6-14. Under the CPD General Orders, an arrestee cannot be made 

eligible for bond until he is both booked and charged, neither of which has occurred under the 

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scenario detailed in ¶ 51. Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 69:11-70:1; Def. Ex. 16, Kehoe 

Dep. at 74:6-13 (at the time of the initial approval of probable cause an arrestee is “not eligible 

for bond at that point”); Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03 at 2 (“arrested persons will be booked, charged 

and made eligible for bond in that order”). The deposition testimony cited to in Ex. A was taken 

subject to numerous objections, is speculative, lacks proper foundation, does not directly support 

the statement, and is incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 because plaintiffs’ counsel asks 

“for a few clarifications” without providing what those clarifications ended up clarifying. See

Pls. Ex. A at 114:14-24. The deposition testimony in Pls. Ex. D was likewise taken subject to 

numerous objections, is speculative, lacks proper foundation, and does not directly support the 

statement. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. W was taken subject to objection, lacks 

proper foundation, and violates Fed. R. Evid. 106 in that the deponent testified that she “did not 

understand” the question, Pls. Ex. W at 40:22-23, and because Pls. Ex. W does not contain pages 

43-45 or 100. Unsupported and misleading in that nothing in the cited material indicates that 

these procedures always occur in the order described with respect to all arrests, let alone the class 

members’ arrests, and any application to all arrests requires an impermissible inference to be 

made against the non-movant. 

52. Rather, almost all arrestees, even those who will not be fingerprinted, must be 

taken to lockup, issued a CB number, and placed into a jail cell. Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 60:2-

61:14; Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 76:8-14; Exh. W, Wedster dep., at 41-46, 101-03. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, and objectionable. While the City does not dispute 

that the general orders provide that these procedures take place for adult arrestees, multiple 

officers have testified that the sequence of these events varies from arrest to arrest. Def. Ex. 2, 

Skahill Dep. at 84:9-84:20 (issuance of a CB number can occur when an arrestee is in a cell or 

before the arrestee is placed in a cell); Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 60:16-21, 61:9-14 

(same); Def. Ex. 21, Sodini 4/21/05 Dep. at 58:1-7, 63:9-64:8 (decision to fingerprint an arrestee 

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could be made after that arrestee is placed in a jail cell); Def. Ex. 16, Kehoe Dep. at 65:11-18 

(same); Def. Ex. 22, Bradshaw Dep. at 45:1-17 (identification of arrestees who are not being 

fingerprinted has not necessarily been established at the time they are taken to lockup); Def. Ex. 

23, Garrity 10/23/02 Dep. at 73:15-74:12 (same). The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Exs. A, 

D, and W was taken subject to objection, lacks proper foundation, and is outside the scope of the 

deponents’ personal knowledge as to what happens to “almost all arrestees.” The deposition 

testimony cited in Pls. Ex. W does not contain pages 41 or 43-45. 

53. One exception is for women arrestees held in a police district that lacks a female 

lockup. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §V.B; Exh. 17, GO 02-03-01, §IV. For these arrestees, the CPD 

obtains a CB number generated by a computer and furnishes the I-bond without placing the 

arrestees into lockup. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §V.B.a.1; Exh. 17, GO 02-03. See also Exh. 17, GO 

02-03-03, §III.B.I. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. Incomplete in 

violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 because Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05, §V.B and Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-

03-01, §IV actually provide that if “after a reasonable amount of time, the [female] arrestee 

cannot be let to bail or the number of arrestees being detained in the desk area presents an 

imminent danger or is disruptive to the police personnel assigned to desk duties, the watch 

commander will arrange for a transfer to the designated female detention facility.” Pls. Ex. 16, 

G.O. 92-05, §V.B.2; Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03-01, §IV.A.2. Multiple officers testified that women 

arrested in police districts lacking a female lockup are generally transported to districts with 

female lockups for normal processing, as opposed to the procedures plaintiffs suggest. Def. Ex. 

12, Cobb Dep. at 69:15-23; Def. Ex. 24, McMahon 8/2/05 Dep. at 29:3-30:4; Def. Ex. 20, 

Garrity 7/29/05 Dep. at 55:6-11. CPD officers have also testified that for those women who are 

held in a police district that lacks a female lockup and not transported to a district with a female 

lockup, those females are still detained in a secure area, such as a holding cell, located in the 

desk area. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 51:22-52:4. Paragraph 53 also violates Local Rule 

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56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. Unsupported and 

misleading because there is no cited material that provides what happens or happened with 

respect to how the CPD obtains or obtained a CB number or an I-bond when dealing with “these 

arrestees,” and thus it would require an impermissible inference be made against the nonmovant. 

54. Women class members who were brought to police districts without a lockup 

facility for women were released 1.5 hours more quickly than women class members brought to 

police districts that had female lockup facilities. 

Response: Controverted in that it is unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. Paragraph 

54 is not supported by any citation to the record, let alone evidence that could (and would) be 

disputed. 

55. A second exception is individuals arrested for certain moving violations for traffic 

offenses under Chapter 625 ILCS who, pursuant to the city's GOs, are generally not to be placed 

in lockup prior to issuance of their bonds. Group Exh. 8 (GO 99-12-05, §§III.B and C; DSO 04-

17-05, §§III.B and C); Exh. X, Obuchowski dep. II, at 155:8-156:16. 

Response: Unsupported, misleading, objectionable and immaterial. Unsupported in that Pls. 

Ex. 8 contains none of the sections indicated by the statement. The deposition testimony cited in 

Pls. Ex. X lacks proper foundation, is outside the scope of the deponent’s knowledge as to what 

happens or happened to “individuals arrested for certain moving violations” and as to what 

happens “generally” with respect to the procedures of their arrests. See Pls. Ex. X at 156:13-16. 

Thus to establish the statement requires an impermissible inference be made against the nonmovant. Immaterial in that none of the individuals arrested for traffic offenses under Chapter 

625 ILCS are members of the class. 

56. After being placed into lockup, most arrestees, particularly those arrested before 

June 7, 2002, underwent one or more additional name checks. 

Response: Unsupported in that paragraph 56 is not supported by any citation to evidence in 

the record. 

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57. Those who will be fingerprinted are checked against a national database called 

AFIS. Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 10:5-10. The AFIS system uses a unique identification number 

for each person in the fingerprint database. At the time of the check, the AFIS system takes a 

digital scan of the arrestee's fingerprints. The AFIS system reports if the person's fingerprints are 

contained in the AFIS database and, if so, whether there are any outstanding warrants associated 

with the person. 

Response: Unsupported, objectionable and immaterial. Immaterial because it is 

uncontroverted that the class definition excludes individuals who were fingerprinted. See Dkt. 

No. 380. The deposition testimony cited in support of the first sentence was taken subject to 

objection, lacks proper foundation, and is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal 

knowledge as to who the question refers to as “those who will be fingerprinted.” The remaining 

portion of this statement is not supported by any record citation, let alone evidence that could 

(and would) be disputed. 

58. For persons who will be fingerprinted, a white copy of the arrest report was sent 

to the identification section of the permanent records division. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §VII.B.2. 

The identification section is responsible for all fingerprinting. Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 9:12-19. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, misleading and immaterial. CPD 

personnel testified that lockup personnel in the stationhouse, rather than officers in the 

identification section, are responsible for fingerprinting arrestees. Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. 70:21-

22; Def. Ex. 20, Garrity 7/29/05 Dep. at 28:3-8. Immaterial because it is uncontroverted that the 

class definition excludes individuals who were fingerprinted. See Dkt. No. 380. The deposition 

testimony cited in Pls. Ex. F lacks proper foundation, does not directly support the statement, and 

therefore requires an impermissible inference be made against the non-movant. 

59. Prior to June 7, 2002, for ordinance arrestees who were not to be fingerprinted 

(i.e., the members of our class), the only required name check that was performed while they are 

being detained in lockup after a CB number has been issued was a second name check against 

the hot desk, performed at the field inquiry section of the permanent records division. Exh. 16, 

GO 92-05, §VII.B.2. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported and misleading. CPD officers have testified that name 

checks are required to be conducted until the point where either: (1) the arrestee’s identity had 

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been sufficiently established or (2) the watch commander ordered that the arrestee be 

fingerprinted. Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 87:19-24; Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 137:17-22 

(“the policy is to ensure [the arrestee’s identity] and the practice is to do that by taking all 

reasonable measures, all substantial - all significant steps we can. Constantly doing [name] 

checks as repeatedly and as often as possible in that process to accomplish that goal.”). 

Unsupported because ¶ 59 does not define “hot desk” or cite to evidence to establish what such a 

term means in the context of this statement. The material cited does not directly support the 

assertion that the second name check described was “the only required name check that was 

performed while [the arrestees] are being detained in lockup,” and therefore requires an 

impermissible inference be made against the non-movant. 

60. To perform this second name check on class members, the biographical 

information from the arrest report (i.e., the same document created by the arresting officer who 

obtained the first hot desk name check) was transmitted to the field inquiry section after the 

arrestee was placed in lockup. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §VII.B.2; Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 79. 

Response: Unsupported and misleading. Unsupported because ¶ 60 does not define “hot 

desk” nor cite to evidence to establish what such a term means in the context of this statement. 

Unsupported and misleading in that nothing in the cited material indicates that these procedures 

occurred in the order described with respect to the all arrests, let alone the class members’ 

arrests, and any application to all arrests requires an impermissible inference to be made against 

the non-movant. 

61. The field inquiry section then ran this information through the same hot desk 

system used by the arresting officer when s/he performed the name check. Exh. F, Perfetti dep., 

at 24:9-17. Accordingly, if the inquiry section personnel enter the same identifying information 

from the arrest report that was entered in the first hot desk name check, they will receive the 

exact same information back from the system. Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 24:18-22; Exh. E, Maris 

dep., at 142:10-143:1. The only information that the inquiry section had was the white copy of 

the arrest report. Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 24:23-25:8. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. Multiple witnesses 

testified that name checks performed by the identification section may be based on new or 

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different information than the initial name checks. Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 142:1-8; Def. Ex. 

14, Greene 9/26/06 Dep. at 75:7-12 (“John Jones comes in and identified himself as John Jones 

and there are 50 John Joneses that come up on the screen and maybe its Ray Jones. So there may 

be multiple checks through the same system as one begins to challenge the offered identity of the 

person who comes in.”); Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 68:5-11 (“[s]omebody gives you a 

name, you run the name, they spell the name differently, your boss looks at it and says ‘no you 

typed it wrong, I want you to type it again.’ There are reasons why people may go back to the 

same database is what I am suggesting.”). Unsupported and misleading in that nothing in the 

cited material indicates that these procedures occurred in the order described with respect to the 

all arrests, let alone the class members’ arrests, and any application to all arrests requires an 

impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. Unsupported because ¶ 61 does not 

define “hot desk” system as such term is used in this statement nor does it indicate what system 

or method was used “by the arresting officer” with respect to a particular plaintiff. The 

deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. F lacks proper foundation, does not directly support the 

statement, and is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal knowledge regarding what 

constituted the “only information” the inquiry section possessed with respect to the arrests in 

question. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. E was taken subject to objection, lacks 

proper foundation, and is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal knowledge. 

62. The records division contacted the police station with the name check results only 

if the results are positive, i.e., a warrant is found. If the results of that name check were negative, 

that fact was not communicated back to the station, no matter how quickly it was learned. Exh. 

F, Perfetti dep., at 25:9-19. 

Response: Unsupported, objectionable and misleading. Unsupported and misleading in that 

nothing in the cited evidence indicates that these procedures occurred in the order described with 

respect to all arrests, let alone the class members’ arrests, and any application to all arrests 

requires an impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. The deposition 

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testimony cited in Pls. Ex. F lacks proper foundation, does not directly support the statement, and 

is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal knowledge with respect to what happened with 

respect to the arrests in question. 

63. Accordingly, the police station waited for 45 minutes after the white copy of the 

arrest report was sent to the field inquiry section and, if nothing was sent back in that time, it was 

presumed that the check was negative. See Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §VII.B.3. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported and misleading. According to the testimony of 12th

District Commander, in certain situations, the district station may wait beyond the 45 minutes 

after the faxing of the arrest report to the field inquiry section prior to presuming that the warrant 

check was negative. Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 85:24-87:2. Unsupported and 

misleading in that nothing in the cited material indicates that these procedures always occur in 

the order described with respect to all arrests, let alone the class members’ arrests, and any 

application to all arrests requires an impermissible inference to be made against the non-movant. 

The statement is misleading in that it does not indicate the method of contacting, who at the 

police station was or would have been contacted, or which “station” the statement refers to. 

64. The 45-minute waiting period could be waived. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, at §VII.B.3. 

Response: Incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 because Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05 

§VII.B.3 actually provides that the waiting period may only be waived “if the name check has 

been completed on the district land-based computer terminal and he returns clear of any 

warrants, stops, etc.” See Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05 §VII.B.3. 

65. For class members (i.e., persons arrested for fine-only ordinance violations who 

are not fingerprinted), any name/warrant checks performed after the class member had been 

placed in lockup were based on the information contained on the arrest report that was used for 

the initial name check, were performed on a computer terminal that accessed the same hot desk 

system, and would produce the same output as the name/warrant check conducted by the 

arresting officer. Exh. E, Maris dep., at 51:1-19, 142:10-143:1; Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 24:18-22. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable and misleading. Multiple witnesses 

testified that name checks performed after an arrestee is placed in lockup may be based on new 

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or different information than the initial name checks. Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 142:1-8; Def. 

Ex. 14, Greene 9/26/06 Dep. at 75:7-12 (“John Jones comes in and identified himself as John 

Jones and there are 50 John Joneses that come up on the screen and maybe its Ray Jones. So 

there may be multiple checks through the same system as one begins to challenge the offered 

identity of the person who comes in.”); Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 68:5-11 

(“[s]omebody gives you a name, you run the name, they spell the name differently, your boss 

looks at it and says ‘no you typed it wrong, I want you to type it again.’ There are reasons why 

people may go back to the same database is what I am suggesting.”). Multiple witnesses also 

testified of instances where a second name check provided a different output than the initial 

name/warrant check, either in the form of additional information or the presence of a warrant that 

was not revealed by the first name check. Def. Ex. 10, Caver-Elder Dep. at 103:4-13; Def. Ex. 

13, Coleman Dep. at 120:1-10; Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 131:11-132:5, 133:5-14; 

Def. Ex. 25, Greene Dep. 10/24/06 at 90:2-91:22, 94:24-96:8; Def. Ex. 26, Greene Report at 7. 

Unsupported and misleading in that nothing in cited material demonstrates that all name and 

warrant checks of class members that took place after those class members placement in lockup 

were based on the same information contained in the initial name check and would produce the 

same output, and any application to all arrests requires an impermissible inference to be made 

against the non-movant. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. E was taken subject to 

objection, lacks proper foundation, is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal knowledge as 

to what happened with “any name/warrant checks.” The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. F 

lacks proper foundation, does not directly support the statement, is outside the scope of the 

deponent’s personal knowledge with respect to what happened with “any name/warrant checks.” 

66. Chicago police officers are trained in the use of the CPD hot desk system for 

making name and warrant checks (Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 83:14-22; Exh. N, Bay dep., at 

13:21-14:4), and there is no evidence that the name check performed by the arresting officer are 

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unreliable, or any studies that show that subsequent name checks of class members produce new 

information about the arrestee. Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 83:14-22. 

Response: Move to strike this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. The statement that there is “no 

evidence” or “studies that show” that a subsequent name check produces any “new information” 

is argumentative and a legal conclusion as to what constitutes “evidence” and has no place in a 

Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should therefore be stricken. Multiple witnesses testified of 

instances where a second name check provided additional information or indicated the presence 

of a warrant that was not revealed by the first name check. Def. Ex. 10, Caver-Elder Dep. at 

103:4-13; Def. Ex. 13, Coleman Dep. at 120:1-10; Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 131:11-

132:5, 133:5-14; Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 90:2-91:22; 94:24-96:8; Def. Ex. 26, 

Greene Report at 7. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Exs. A and N was taken subject to 

objection, lacks proper foundation, is beyond the scope of the deponents’ personal knowledge as 

to what all the police officers are trained in, whether there is evidence of the unreliability of the 

name checks, or the existence of any studies of subsequent name checks. 

67. For class members (i.e., persons arrested for fine-only ordinance violations who 

are not fingerprinted), there is no documentary evidence of charges being changed or upgraded 

based on the second name check. Exh. L, Sodini dep. II, at 69-70; see ¶35, supra. 

Response: Move to strike this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, immaterial, and misleading. The statement that there 

is “no documentary evidence of charges being changed or upgraded based on a second name 

check” is argumentative and a legal conclusion as to what constitutes “documentary evidence” 

and has no place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should therefore be stricken. Multiple 

witnesses testified of instances where a second name check provided additional information or 

indicated the presence of a warrant that was not revealed by the first name check. Def. Ex. 10, 

Caver-Elder Dep. at 103:4-13; Def. Ex. 13, Coleman Dep. at 120:1-10; Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 

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9/20/05 Dep. at 131:11-132:5, 133:5-14; Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 90:2-91:22; 

94:24-96:8; De.f Ex. 26, Greene Report at 7. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. L was 

taken subject to objection, is beyond the scope of the deponent’s personal knowledge as to the 

existence of documents, and does not directly support the statement. It is immaterial given that 

an individual arrested for violation of a municipal ordinance violation punishable by fine only 

whose charges were upgraded would, by virtue of that upgrade, fail to meet the class definition, 

and thus it is hardly surprising that there is no documentary evidence of class members’ charges 

being upgraded. Objectionable in referencing other paragraphs in a Rule 56.1 statement as 

evidence in the record that supports this statement is as misleading as it is improper (see N.D. Ill. 

L.R. 56.1; see also the improper nature of ¶ 35, supra). 

68. Defendant City of Chicago has failed to make a showing that a second name 

check for class members is ever necessary. See ¶¶65-67. 

Response: Move to strike this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. Numerous witnesses have explained 

the necessity of a second name check for arrestees who will not be fingerprinted and why it is a 

good practice. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 134:9-135:3, 136:14-25, 137:3-22; Def. Ex. 7, 

Miceli Dep. at 87:19-24; Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 131:11-132:5, 133:5-14; Def. Ex. 

20, Garrity 7/29/05 Dep. at 97:3-99:8; Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 67:22-68:11, 90:2-

91:22; 94:24-96:8; Def. Ex. 26, Greene Report at 7. The statement that the City has “failed to 

make a showing that a second name check for class members is ever necessary” is argumentative 

and a legal conclusion as to what constitutes “a showing” that has no place in a Local Rule 56.1 

statement, and should therefore be stricken. Unsupported in that it fails to cite any section of the 

record concerning what is “ever necessary” in processing of class members. Objectionable in 

referencing other paragraphs in a Rule 56.1 statement as “evidence” to support this statement is 

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as misleading as it is improper (see N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1; see also the improper nature of ¶¶ 65-67, 

supra). 

69. Effective June 7, 2002, the CPD GOs no longer required, and CPD personnel 

rarely performed, a second name check at the field inquiry section of the permanent records 

division for arrestees who were not to be fingerprinted and, if performed, it was done after the 

arrestee was released. Exh. F, Perfetti dep., at 40:6-9, 40:21-41:1, 43:24-44:15, 45:19-24. 

Nevertheless, defendants continued to place arrestees in lockup. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. The deposition 

testimony cited in Pls. Ex. F does not directly support the statement, the testimony was given 

subject to objection, lacks proper foundation, is beyond the scope of the deponent’s knowledge 

of what happened with respect to the arrests at issue, and provides no evidence of if, when, 

where, or why the “defendants continued to place arrestees in lockup.” Misleading to the extent 

that plaintiffs imply that the only valid reason to place arrestees in lockup was to perform a 

second name check at the field inquiry section, given that multiple witnesses have testified that 

there are multiple other reasons why arrestees are placed in lockup. Def. Ex. 24, McMahon 

8/2/05 Dep. at 31:23-32:10, 89:2-5 (“booking process,” one part of which is where a CB number 

is assigned, takes place in the lockup area, and therefore entry into lockup is a necessary aspect 

of obtaining a CB number for arrestees who are charged); Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 

113:11-114:1 (explaining reasons behind placing arrestees in lockup). 

70. All arrestees must receive a CB number. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §IV.C.1; Exh. 17, 

GO 02-03, §IV.D.1. The CB number allows the records division to track all the documents 

associated with the arrest (e.g., the arrest report). Exh. I, Miceli dep., at 57:12-58:4. 

Response: Not controverted, but unsupported and objectionable. The deposition testimony 

cited to in Pls. Ex. I was taken subject to objection, lacks foundation, and does not directly 

support the statement. 

71. For most arrestees, the CB number is assigned while they are in the lockup area 

prior to being placed in a cell. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §IV.C.1; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, §IV.D.1. 

However, that is not a necessary aspect of receiving a CB number. Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 

43:21-45:01, 46:4-13; Exh. S, McMahon dep. II, at 89; Exh. C, Richmond dep., at 93; Exh. 17, 

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GO 02-03-03, at §III.B.1. For example, women who are arrested in districts that do not have a 

separate lockup facility for women and who do not require fingerprinting do not go to lockup. 

Exh. 16, GO 92-05, §V.B.a; Exh. 17, GO 02-03-01, at §IV.A. Instead, a CB number is obtained 

and the booking process is completed without placing them into lockup. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, 

§V.B; Exh. 17, GO 02-03-01, §IV.1; Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 46:4-17. In addition, it is the 

responsibility of the watch commander to ensure that all arrestees receive a CB number, 

including persons arrested, not charged, and released before they were placed in lockup. Exh. 17, 

GO 02-03-03, §III.B.1. When an arrestee is taken to a hospital, or when lockup is very busy, CB 

numbers are assigned before the arrestee is received into lockup (Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 44:16-

18) and CB numbers can even be obtained via a telephone call (Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 62:8-

9; Exh. P, Serpe dep., at 61:12-22). 

Response: Move to strike as narrative argument in violation of Local Rule 56.1 by including 

six different statements of “fact” within the same paragraph. Controverted, unsupported, 

objectionable, and misleading. CPD watch commanders testified that the “booking process,” 

which is the part of the process where a CB number is assigned, takes place in the lockup area, 

and therefore entry into lockup is a necessary aspect of obtaining a CB number for arrestees who 

are charged. Def. Ex. 24, McMahon 8/2/05 Dep. at 31:23-32:10, 89:2-5. Multiple CPD officers 

testified that women arrested in police districts lacking a female lockup are generally transported 

to districts with female lockups for processing. Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 69:15-23; Def. Ex. 24, 

McMahon 8/2/05 Dep. at 29:3-30:4; Def. Ex. 20, Garrity 7/29/05 Dep. at 55:6-11. CPD officers 

have also testified that for those women who are held in a police district that lacks a female 

lockup and not transported to a district with a female lockup, those females are still detained in a 

secure area, such as a holding cell, located in the desk area. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 

51:22-52:4. Misleading and incomplete in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 106 in that, for detention 

facilities without a female lockup, Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05, §V.B and Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03-01, 

§IV actually provide that if “after a reasonable amount of time, the [female] arrestee cannot be 

let to bail or the number of arrestees being detained in the desk area presents an imminent danger 

or is disruptive to the police personnel assigned to desk duties, the watch commander will 

arrange for a transfer to the designated female detention facility.” Pls. Ex. 16 at G.O. 92-05, 

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§V.B.2; Pls. Ex. 17 at G.O. 02-03-01, §IV.A.2. Unsupported as nothing in the cited material 

indicates that these procedures occur or occurred in the order described with respect to “most 

arrestees” and any application to all arrests requires an impermissible inference to be made 

against the non-movant. Unsupported as nothing in the cited testimony directly supports the 

“example” given with respect to “women who are arrested in districts that do not have a separate 

lockup facility for women.” The deposition testimony cited in support of these compound 

statements was taken subject to objection and lacks proper foundation. 

72. The CB number is issued by a "booking computer." Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 129. 

The booking computer is a terminal linked to the CHRIS system and programmed to issue CB 

numbers. Exh. E, Maris dep., at 153:15-154:2. A CB number is obtained by entering into the 

booking computer the arrestee's name, identifying information, and the charges as delineated in 

the arrest report. Exh. 17, GO 02-03-04, §III.I; Exh. P, Serpe dep., at 53; Exh. I, Miceli dep., at 

69; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, §IV.D.4. The time the CB number issues is recorded automatically in the 

CPD's CHRIS system. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. CPD lockup keepers 

have testified that for individuals whose identities have not yet been established, a CB number is 

obtained by entering information as a “John Doe.” Def. Ex. 22, Bradshaw Dep. at 46:5-15. 

Unsupported because the deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. B does not directly address the 

statement that the CB number is issued by a booking computer. The deposition testimony cited 

in Pls. Ex. E was taken subject to objection, lacks proper foundation, and is outside the scope of 

the deponent’s personal knowledge. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. P does not 

directly address this statement of how a CB number is obtained. The deposition testimony cited 

in Pls. Ex. I was taken subject to objection, lacks foundation, and does not directly support the 

statement of how a CB number is obtained. The last sentence of ¶ 72 is totally unsupported by 

any citation to the record. Further unsupported in that plaintiffs fail to cite evidence as to what 

constitutes the “booking computer,” the CHRIS system, and how the CB is treated by either and 

so the statement requires impermissible inferences to be made. 

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73. After all class members (except women identified supra, at ¶53) were issued CB 

numbers, it was the policy of the CPD to place them in a cell even though they will not be 

fingerprinted. Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 60:2-61:14; Exh. W, Wedster dep., at 41-46, 101-03. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. Plaintiffs’ Ex. 16, 

G.O. 92-05, §V.B and Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03-01, §IV provides that if “after a reasonable 

amount of time, the [female] arrestee cannot be let to bail or the number of arrestees being 

detained in the desk area presents an imminent danger or is disruptive to the police personnel 

assigned to desk duties, the watch commander will arrange for a transfer to the designated female 

detention facility.” Pls. Ex. 16 at G.O. 92-05, §V.B.2; Pls. Ex. 17 at G.O. 02-03-01, §IV.A.2. 

Multiple officers have testified that women arrested in police districts lacking a female lockup 

(as identified in ¶ 53) are generally transported to districts with female lockups for processing. 

Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 69:15-23; Def. Ex. 24, McMahon 8/2/05 Dep. at 29:3-30:4. CPD 

officers have also testified that for those women who are held in a police district that lacks a 

female lockup and not transported to a district with a female lockup, those females are still 

detained in a secure area, such as a holding cell, located in the desk area. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 

8/22/05 Dep. at 51:22-52:4. Multiple officers have testified that the decision to fingerprint an 

arrestee could be made after that arrestee has been placed in a jail cell. Def. Ex. 21, Sodini 

4/21/05 Dep. at 58:1-7, 63:9-64:8; Def. Ex. 16, Kehoe Dep. at 65:11-18 (same). Unsupported 

and misleading in that nothing in the cited material supports a showing as to what happened with 

respect to “all class members,” or women, nor does it indicate that the procedures occurred in the 

order described with respect to “all class members.” The cited deposition testimony in Pls. Ex. 

A was taken subject to objection, lacks foundation, is outside the scope of the personal 

knowledge of the deponent as to what happened during the detention of “all class members,” and 

directly contradicts the statement in that the deponent explicitly stated the events described in the 

statement may not have occurred in that order, Pls. Ex. A at 61:6-24. The deposition testimony 

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cited in Pls. Ex. W does not contain pages 41 or 43-45, and therefore any reliance on it for any 

fact, let alone one the non-movant controverts is improper. Further, the testimony from the 

pages of Pls. Ex. W that actually were included was taken subject to objection, lacks proper 

foundation, and does not directly support the statement thus requiring an impermissible inference 

be made. 

74. The lockup keeper confirms that all paperwork is complete and accepts custody of 

the arrestee. Exh. M, Mitchell dep., at 31:9-23. Prior to placing an arrestee into a lockup cell, 

there are a number of measures which the lockup personnel must take. Exh. 16, GO 92-05, 

§IV.C; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, §IV.D. 

Response: Controverted that the paperwork is “complete” in every instance that the lockup 

keeper accepts custody of an arrestee, as all information might not be available at that time for a 

number of reasons. CPD watch commanders have testified to this fact. Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 

57:24-58:8. Under the CPD general orders, the tasks performed by lockup personnel must be 

performed for all arrestees taken into custody, regardless of whether or not the arrestee will be 

placed in a jail cell. Def. Ex. 24, McMahon 8/2/05 Dep. at 37:1-38:8; Def. Ex. 27, G.O. 02-03-

05. Objectionable, and misleading in that the deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. M was taken 

subject to objection, lacks proper foundation, and is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal 

knowledge as to who the lockup keeper was, what they did or did not confirm, and whether they 

did or did not accept custody of a particular plaintiff or class member in this case. 

75. First, the lockup personnel subject the arrestee to a custodial search (similar to the 

search performed at the time of arrest and earlier at the police station) to check for weapons and 

contraband. Exh. P, Serpe dep., at 91; arrest report box no. 50. 

Response: Controverted in part, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. CPD lockup 

keepers have testified that the order of procedures occurring in lockup can vary. Def. Ex. 12, 

Cobb Dep. at 74:14-18. Multiple CPD officers testified that the search performed by lockup 

personnel is far more detailed and thorough than the searches performed at arrest and earlier at 

the police station. Def. Ex. 22, Bradshaw Dep. at 39:18-40:17; Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 46:7-

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24; Def. Ex. 13, Coleman Dep. at 83:21-84:8; Def. Ex. 20, Garrity 7/29/05 Dep. at 85:16-86:4. 

The arrest report on which this statement relies is unauthenticated and inadmissible hearsay. 

Unsupported and misleading in that nothing in the cited material indicates that these procedures 

always occur in the order described for all arrests, let alone the class members’ arrests, and 

require the drawing of impermissible inferences. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. P 

was taken subject to objection, lacks foundation, and is outside the scope of the deponent’s 

personal knowledge as to who the lockup personnel was, what type of search was conducted, and 

whether that search was similar to earlier searches. 

76. Second, the arrestee's personal property must be seized and inventoried and a 

record of the property created. Exh. M, Mitchell dep., at 34, 44; Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 

54:12-57:5. This includes safety measures such as taking shoelaces and belts from the arrestee. 

Exh. M, Mitchell dep., at 45:1-8. The property must also be returned before the arrestee can be 

released. Exh. D, Kehoe dep., at 127:17-128:11. 

Response: Uncontroverted that these steps are performed, but unsupported and misleading 

that they are performed “second” or in any particular order for each arrest. CPD lockup keepers 

have testified that the order of procedures occurring in lockup can vary. Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. 

at 74:14-18. The record cited does not indicate that these procedures always occur in the order 

described for all arrests, let alone the class members’ arrests, and to find so would require 

impermissible inferences. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. M was taken subject to 

objection, lacks foundation, and is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal knowledge as to 

what happened or did not happen with respect to a particular plaintiff. Plaintiffs’ Ex. D does not 

contain pages 127-28. 

77. Third, the lockup personnel must ensure that the arrestee is in good physical 

condition and not in need of medical care and complete a health questionnaire regarding the 

arrestee. Exh. Q, Griffin dep., at 55:2-11. The lockup keeper's observations and interview 

include: 

(a) obvious pain or injury; 

(b) obvious signs of infection; 

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(c) appears under the influence of alcohol or drugs; 

(d) visible signs of alcohol/drug withdrawal; 

(e) appears to be despondent; 

(f) appears to be irrational; 

(g) carrying medication; 

(h) presently taking medication; 

(i) (if female) pregnant; 

(j) first time arrested; 

(k) ever tried to kill or do harm to self; 

(l) any serious medical/mental problems; and 

(m) currently receiving any treatment. 

Exh. 14, arrest report. The lockup personnel then complete the portion of the arrest report on 

page two captioned "receiving screening record for arrestee to be held in lockup." Exh. A, Sodini 

dep. III, at 54:12-56:2. 

Response: Uncontroverted that these steps are performed, but unsupported and misleading 

that they are performed “third” or in any particular order for each arrest. CPD lockup keepers 

have testified that the order of procedures in lockup can vary. Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 74:14-

18. The record cited does not indicate that these procedures always occur in the order described 

for all arrests, let alone the class members’ arrests, and to find so would require impermissible 

inferences. None of these citations offers adequate authentication of Pls. Ex. 14, and it also 

contains inadmissible hearsay. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. Q lacks proper 

foundation, is outside the scope of the deponent’s knowledge with respect to what happened 

during each arrestees’ detention, and does not directly address the statement. The deposition 

testimony cited in Pls. Ex. A was taken subject to objection, is out of the deponent’s personal 

knowledge with respect to what happened during each plaintiff’s detention, lacks foundation, and 

does not directly address the statement. 

78. Fourth, the lockup personnel must permit the arrestee to make a telephone call. 

Exh. M, Mitchell dep., at 43. 

Response: Uncontroverted that these steps are performed, but unsupported and misleading 

that they are performed “fourth” or in any particular order for each arrest. CPD lockup keepers 

have testified that the order of procedures in lockup can vary. Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 74:14-

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18. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. M does not directly address the statement, lacks 

proper foundation, and is outside the scope of the deponent with respect to what happens or 

happened during the plaintiffs’ detentions. 

79. Fifth, the lockup personnel must assign the arrestee to a cell and record his or her 

name on the "roster of persons in custody" form. Exh. P, Serpe dep., at 68; Exh. 16, GO 92-05, 

§§IV.D.1-8; Exh. 17, GO 02-03, §IV.6. 

Response: Uncontroverted that these steps are performed, but unsupported and misleading 

that they are performed “fifth” or in any particular order for each arrest. CPD lockup keepers 

have testified that the order of procedures in lockup can vary. Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 74:14-

18. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. P makes no reference whatsoever to whether 

lockup personnel must assign an arrestee to a cell or whether an arrestee’s name would have to 

be placed on a “roster.” 

80. After the lockup keeper has completed his tasks (i.e., searched the arrestee and 

inventoried any property; booked the arrestee; entered the CB number on the arrest report; and 

completed the interview/observation portion of page two of the arrest report), the arrestee is 

placed in a jail cell and the lockup keeper takes the arrest report to the front desk. Exh. B, Sodini 

dep., at 136; Exh. R, Caver-Elder dep., at 43; Exh. T, Johnson dep., at 37. 

Response: Controverted in part, unsupported, misleading and objectionable. Uncontroverted 

that these steps are performed, but unsupported and misleading that they are performed in any 

particular order for each arrest. According to 12th District Commander Ronald Sodini, the 

completion of the listed tasks does not necessarily indicate that the “lockup keeper has completed 

his tasks.” Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 141:18-24. CPD lockup keepers have testified 

that the order of procedures in lockup can vary. Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 74:14-18. The 

deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. B and T was taken subject to objection, lacks proper 

foundation, and is outside the scope of the deponent’s knowledge with respect to what happens 

or happened during the plaintiffs’ detentions. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. R lacks 

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proper foundation and is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal knowledge with respect to 

what happens or happened during the plaintiffs’ detentions. 

81. After the arrest report is returned to the front desk by the lockup keeper, the desk 

sergeant's duties include making sure that (a) the arrest report is presented to the watch 

commander for "final approval" of charges and approval of bond; and (b) the bond is prepared. 

Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 167; Exh. I, Miceli dep., at 85; Exh. T, Johnson dep., at 38. 

Response: Controverted in part, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. 

Uncontroverted that these are some of the duties of a desk sergeant, but unsupported and 

misleading that they are performed in any particular order for each arrest, or specifically for 

these plaintiffs or all class members. According to CPD officers, after the arrest report is 

returned to the front desk, the desk officers typically conduct another name check via the 

computer, and, if anything appeared to have been missed in the previous check or checks, would 

re-contact the arresting officers. Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 81:1-10. Paragraph 81 violates Local 

Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph. The deposition 

testimony cited in Pls. Exs. B, I, and T lacks proper foundation and does not address this 

statement. 

82. For fine-only ordinance violators who are not fingerprinted, the charges approved 

by the watch commander at the initial approval of probable cause, prior to placing the arrestee 

into lockup, will be the same as the charges presented for "final" approval. Exh. C, Richmond 

dep., at 70-71. They will be based on the same arrest report with the same narrative. Ordinance 

violations are not potentially upgradeable to felonies (Exh. L, Sodini dep. II, at 30:6-11, 69:17-

70:5; Exh. S, McMahon dep. II, at 103), and there will be no new charges. Exh. C, Richmond 

dep., at 70. See also Exh. S, McMahon dep. II, at 103:6-104:18 ("no law enforcement reason" for 

not initialing "final charge box" when initial probable-cause determination is made). 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. Paragraph 82 violates 

Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements of fact within the same paragraph, and should 

be stricken. Multiple CPD officers testified that new charges or an upgrade in charges can be 

brought against fine-only ordinance violators after the initial approval of charges, but prior to the 

final approval. Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. 111:15-112:11; Def. Ex. 13, Coleman Dep. at 106:3-9, 

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120:1-10; Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 126:13-127:14; Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 

143:10-144:9; Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 131:11-132:5. Multiple deponents testified 

that at the time the watch commander confirms that probable cause exists, the name check has 

not necessarily confirmed the absence of any warrants for the arrestee. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 

8/22/05 Dep. at 103:13-16; Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 67:8-16; Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 

9/20/05 Dep. at 129:20-130:6; Def. Ex. 10, Caver-Elder Dep. at 65:7-14; Def. Ex. 14, Greene 

9/26/06 Dep. at 167:11-15. Multiple witnesses also testified that there are additional steps (such 

as completion of case reports, inventorying of evidence, and completion of the bonding 

documents) which must take place between the initial approval of probable cause and the final 

approval of charges that prevent the watch commander from making those determinations at the 

same time. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 113:11-114:23; Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 

Dep. at 84:6-14. Unsupported and misleading in suggesting that the approvals are the same, 

when the initial review by the watch commander is for approval of probable cause for arrest, 

while the latter is for final approval of charges. Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03 at 2-3 (defining 

“approval of charges” and “initial approval of probable cause”). The deposition testimony cited 

in Pls. Ex. C was taken subject to objection, lacks foundation, is outside the scope of the 

deponent’s personal knowledge with respect to all “fine-only ordinance violators who are not 

fingerprinted,” and does not support the statement that the charges approved at the initial 

approval of probable cause will be the same as those approved at the final approval of charges. 

The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. L does not support the statement in that there is no 

mention of what constitutes an “upgradeable” offense. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. 

S does not contain the quote “no law enforcement reason” for not initialing “final charge box” 

when initial probable-cause determination is made and thus the citation is incorrect and 

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misleading. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. C was taken subject to objection, lacks 

proper foundation, and does not directly address the statement. 

83. While discovery of a warrant following the initial approval may result in 

additional charges, the second hot desk name check is run against the same databases as the 

name check that was conducted before the watch commander initially approved the charges. See 

¶61. Chicago has not produced a study, analysis, or report that shows a second hot desk name 

check produces a warrant that was not discovered by the hot desk name check conducted before 

the watch commander first approved charges. 

Response: Move to strike this paragraph as improper argument and containing multiple 

arguments in one paragraph, both in violation of LR 56.1. Controverted, unsupported, 

objectionable, immaterial and irrelevant. The statements in this paragraph are unsupported with 

proper record citation. Numerous witnesses have explained why a second name check for 

arrestees who will not be fingerprinted is a good practice and may be necessary. Def. Ex. 3, 

Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 134:9-135:3, 136:14-25, 137:3-22; Def. Ex. 6, Miceli Dep. at 87:19-24; 

Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 131:11-132:5, 133:5-14; Def. Ex. 20, Garrity 7/29/05 Dep. 

at 97:3-99:8; Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 67:22-68:11, 89:21-91:22, 94:24-96:8. 

Immaterial and irrelevant because the Seventh Circuit has recently held that double checking 

names of arrestees during processing is a valid, constitutional step (see Hernandez v. Sheahan, 

455 F.3d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting with approval that “the City requires . . . double 

checking” of arrestee identity to make sure the right person is charged), and plaintiffs’ own 

database shows that for the 36,000 fine-only offenders, one in 20 arrests disclosed the presence 

of a warrant. Pls. Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56 at ¶ 95; Def. Ex. 28, 

LaLonde Report at 17; Def. Ex. 26, Greene Report at 2. When that occurs in the process is 

irrelevant, because once the warrant is revealed, the arrestee is not eligible for release on an IBond in any event. This argument also fails to account for the importance of proper 

identification alone, particularly given the prevalence of identity theft. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 

8/22/05 Dep. at 136:14-24, 137:3-22. 

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84. Approval of an I-bond for class members is a non-discretionary determination. 

Exh. S, McMahon dep. II, at 116-17; see ¶19. 

Response: Controverted, unsupported, objectionable, and misleading. The deposition 

testimony cited in Pls. Ex. S. does not directly address this statement, was taken subject to 

objection, calls for speculation, lacks proper foundation, and is not within the deponent’s 

personal knowledge. Objectionable as argumentative and in referencing other paragraphs in a 

Rule 56.1 statement as evidence to support the statement in this paragraph (see N.D. Ill. L.R. 

56.1; see also the improper nature of ¶ 19, supra). Further, the statement is disputed to the extent 

it implies, incorrectly, that the granting of an I-Bond does not involve critical analysis, 

investigation, review of probable cause for arrest, proper identification of the arrestee, analysis of 

the outcome of a warrant search, and analysis of final approval of charges, all of which must 

occur before the watch commander will make the decision to release on an I-Bond. Def. Ex. 18, 

Bay Dep. at 79:14-18; Def. Ex. 23, Garrity 10/23/02 Dep. at 85:23-86:9; Def. Ex. 20, Garrity 

7/29/05 Dep. at 59:19-60:1. Thus, to state “approval of an I-Bond” is non-discretionary makes 

no real sense. 

85. Any desk officer can write an I-bond. Exh. R, Caver-Elder dep., at 20. There is no 

difference in the processing of arrestees who are released on cash bonds and those released on Ibonds. Exh. P, Serpe dep., at 101; Exh. B, Sodini dep., at 180. The procedures for releasing an 

arrestee on an I-bond are the same as the procedures for releasing an arrestee on a cash bond. 

Exh. R, Caver-Elder dep., at 106; Exh. M, Mitchell dep., at 70. There should be no difference in 

the time it takes for releasing an arrestee on a cash bond than the time it takes for releasing an 

arrestee on an I-bond. Exh. R, Caver-Elder dep., at 106. 

Response: Move to strike this paragraph as improper argument and containing multiple 

arguments in one paragraph, both in violation of LR 56.1. Controverted, unsupported, 

objectionable, and misleading. The statement that “there should be no difference in the time it 

takes for releasing an arrestee on a cash bond than the time it takes for releasing an arrestee on an 

I-Bond” is argumentative and has no place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should be 

stricken. Multiple CPD officers testified that it is the watch commander who makes the decision 

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to release on an I-Bond, and it is the desk sergeant who normally prepares or is responsible for 

preparing the I-bond. Def. Ex. 29, Griffin Dep. at 101:19-23; Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 34:9-18. 

Unsupported in that none of the citations directly addresses the statement. The deposition 

testimony cited to in Pls. Ex. R does not contain a page 20 and therefore any reliance on it for 

any fact, let alone one the non-movant controverts is improper. Further, the testimony cited from 

Ex. R that was included was taken subject to objection, lacks proper foundation, and is outside 

the scope of the deponent’s knowledge with respect to what happened not “on [his] watch.” Pls. 

Ex. R p. 106:14. The deposition testimony cited to in Pls. Exs. P and B was taken subject to 

objection, lacks proper foundation, and is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal 

knowledge. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. M lacks foundation and is as misleading 

as it is false because the deponent repeatedly informed the plaintiffs’ attorney that he “didn’t 

know” the answer to the questions posed to him. Pls. Ex. M at 70:14-23. 

86. The I-bond (attached as Exh. 9) is a one-page document that takes a few minutes 

to complete. Exh. R, Caver-Elder dep., at 55:7-17. 

Response: Controverted, objectionable and misleading and immaterial. Other CPD officers 

have testified that tasks associated with completing the I-Bond take more than “a few minutes.” 

Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 146:18-149:8; Def. Ex. 20, Garrity 7/29/05 Dep. at 66:19:67:5. 

Moreover, the deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. R lacks proper foundation, does not directly 

address the statement, and is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal knowledge with 

respect to how long it takes other officers to complete an I-Bond. Further, the statement is 

misleading and immaterial because the length of time it takes “to complete” an I-Bond ignores 

all of the investigation and work on the arrest and processing that occurs before the I-Bond can 

even be issued, as well as the condition of the arrestee, including his cooperation with the 

process, and the tasks and duties that station personnel are undertaking at the time of any given 

arrest and concomitant processing. 

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87. An I-bond can be approved and issued without bringing an arrestee to lockup. 

Group Exh. 28 (GO 99-12-05, at §§III.B and III.C; DSO 04-17-05, at §§III.B and III.C). 

Response: Controverted, unsupported and misleading. Unsupported because there is no Pls. 

Group Ex. 28. Further unsupported and misleading in that Pls. Ex. 27 (which appears to be what 

was meant) only concerns individuals arrested on certain traffic offenses in violation of state law, 

and does not support the statement that an I-bond could have been approved and issued to the 

class members without bringing them to lockup. Under the CPD general orders, the tasks 

performed in lockup must be performed for all arrestees taken into custody, regardless of 

whether or not the arrestee will be placed in a jail cell. Def. Ex. 24, McMahon 8/2/05 Dep. at 

37:1-38:8, Def. Ex. 27, G.O. 02-03-05. 

88. Class members who were able to post a cash bond were released 1.2 hours faster 

than were class members who were released on an I-bond. Exh. 21, DiPrete expert report, p. 8, at 

40. 

Response: Controverted as it relies on objectionable material; misleading, unsupported and 

immaterial. Plaintiffs’ Ex. 21 is the unsworn expert report of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. DiPrete, 

which is not admissible evidence and should not be considered. Incomplete in violation of Fed. 

R. Evid. 106 because the expert report actually reads “Arrestees who were released on a cash 

bond were detained for an average of approximately 1.2 hours less than those who were released 

on an I-bond. This effect was statistically significant at the 0.01 level or better in the presence of 

the full set of controls (see Table 1).” Pls. Ex. 21 at 8. Immaterial because it purportedly 

includes class members who are making the same claims as those released on I-Bonds. 

89. During discovery in this case, plaintiffs propounded interrogatories on defendants 

asking if they would offer any classwide explanation for why the class members were detained 

more than two hours following their arrests. See Exh. 22, pls.' fifth set of interrogatories, 

interrogatory no. 6. Plaintiffs also asked the same question with regard to detentions of more 

than four hours. Id., interrogatory no. 5. The same interrogatories required defendants to list all 

documents and witnesses supporting their answer. Id. 

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Response: Move to strike the this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Objectionable and immaterial. Paragraph 89 is not a statement of material fact that has any place 

in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, but rather is argument containing immaterial allegations and 

assertions regarding the discovery practice between the parties in this lawsuit, and should be 

stricken. Defendants have, since the beginning of discovery on this class action, objected to the 

certification of the class because it was impossible for defendants to present the individualized 

facts and circumstances surrounding more than 18,000 “class member” arrests that would be 

necessary in an individualized showing for each arrestee. This made the management of the case 

as a class action impracticable. Although defendants sought to depose additional class members, 

(see Dkt. No. 178), that effort was denied by the Magistrate Judge. Plaintiffs failed to provide a 

single response to interrogatories directed to the class members, other than plaintiffs, and 

provided no documents to support their claims at all. As all of the Fourth Amendment case law 

precedent establishes that the reasonableness of any individual arrest like those at issue here is to 

be decided on the facts and circumstances of its own case, plaintiffs have failed in their burden of 

proof for each individual class member. Defendants, thus, took the position that since plaintiffs 

were not going to prove that each class member’s arrest was unreasonable on its own facts and 

circumstances, defendants did the next best thing: they garnered proof of the myriad facts and 

circumstances that can and do occur at the stations while people are being processed, located an 

expert to give his opinion (based on his 25 years of experience in evaluating police departments) 

on whether the CPD comported with national standards, and offered evidence to debunk 

plaintiffs’ classwide argument on which their whole case is based, namely, that there exists a 

two-hour time limit from when the arrestee received a CB number to when he is released. See 

generally, Defendants’ Additional Material Facts and support for same, infra. 

90. After defendants initially served ill-founded objections and improper responses, 

Judge Nolan entered an order on January 11, 2005, stating: 

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Regarding interrogatories 5 and 6 from plaintiffs' fifth set of 

interrogatories, defendants must supplement their answers by 

Friday, 1/4/05; specifically, if the defendants intend to offer a 

classwide explanation for the length of the class members' 

detentions, they must disclose that explanation. 

Exh. 23, 01/11/05 minute order. Plaintiffs again sought the Court's assistance for a more definite 

answer, and the Court cautioned the city that "in the event defendants intend to offer an analysis, 

report, or study in support of their classwide explanation, defendants must disclose any such 

analysis, report or study in time for plaintiffs to take necessary discovery." Docket no. 235, at 12 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2) (requiring supplemental disclosures to interrogatories when 

warranted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (barring parties from using evidence at trial that is 

responsive to discovery requests but has not been disclosed, unless the failure to disclose is 

harmless)). 

Response: Move to strike the this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Objectionable, unsupported, and immaterial. The City repeats and incorporates by reference its 

response to paragraph 89 as though fully set forth here. Uncontroverted that Magistrate Judge 

Nolan entered an order on January 11, 2005 that included the quoted material. Nevertheless, 

paragraph 90 is not a statement of material fact that has any place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, 

but is rather an argument containing a series of unsupported and immaterial allegations and 

assertions regarding the discovery practice between the parties in this lawsuit, and should be 

stricken. Paragraph 90 also violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements within the 

same paragraph. 

91. Defendants' explanation and identification of evidence, in its entirety, is attached 

as Exh. 24. A slew of objections aside, defendants answered as follows: 

(1) There is no unlawful municipal policy, custom or practice as 

alleged in the complaint regarding such detentions, or to detain 

persons in excess of four hours, and the evidence establishes that 

the lengths of the class member representatives' detentions were 

not the result of any official municipal policy or custom on the part 

of the city. Therefore, under Monell v. Department of Social 

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), there can be no liability against the 

city. 

(2) The evidence shows that the length of the detentions was 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. There is a natural and 

widespread backlog within the Chicago Police District stations that 

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existed during the class period, and that exists where there is a 

ratio of arrestees to total police force of approximately 20:1, let 

alone a ratio of arrestees to the personnel working intake, 

processing and release at the district stations, which far outstrips 

20:1. Similarly, unavoidable delays can be caused by there being a 

large number of arrestees on a given night in a given district, there 

being are arrested [sic] in large groups, transporting arrested 

persons from one facility to another, personnel shortages, 

personnel deployment, unusual circumstances in a district, and 

myriad other practical realities. The unavoidable delays that occur, 

combined with the total lack of any evidence of improper purpose 

creating such delay, establishes that the length of detentions was 

reasonable. 

(3) As shown even in connection with just the class plaintiff 

representatives, the individualized nature of the reasons behind 

each detention belies the existence of any municipal policy or 

custom. Defendants have already set out various facts concerning 

the named class members' detentions, and why they were entirely 

reasonable, in other filings. See, e.g., memorandum in support of 

defendants' motion to decertify the Rule 23(b)(3) class at 9-10; 

defendants' reply brief in support of their motion to decertify the 

Rule 23(b)(3) class at 7-8; defendants' memorandum in opposition 

to class certification at 3. 

(4) Defendants note that in their reply in support of their motion to 

compel, plaintiffs claim that various "facts," including various 

statistics that plaintiffs repeatedly cite, "show a persistent citywide 

practice of unreasonable detentions that demand a classwide 

explanation. "Plaintiffs, however, have failed to produce the 

documents reflecting such statistics, and refuse to share with 

defendants any methodology or criteria used to determine the 

"facts" they rely on to justify such a demand. Until such 

information is disclosed, defendants are precluded from responding 

more particularly. 

(5) Plaintiffs have provided no information or proof that any of the 

individual defendants even knew of any of the plaintiff 

representatives, or any other class member, or that there was any 

improper purpose on the part of any, identified member of the 

Chicago Police Department regarding any individual's detention. 

b. The witnesses include all members of the class certified by Judge 

Gettleman on March 5, 2003, and members of the Chicago Police 

Department who were involved in the arrests and detentions and who 

might appear on the arrest records produced to plaintiffs, including 

arresting officers, watch commanders, desk sergeants, and lockup 

personnel, many of whom have already been deposed in this action, 

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including but not limited to all witnesses produced for deposition pursuant 

to Rule 30(b)(6) notice. 

c. The documents that relate directly or indirectly include: i) the arrest 

reports of the members of the class certified by Judge Gettleman on March 

5, 2003; ii) watch commander logs, rosters of persons in custody, and 

detention reports for the dates of the arrests of the members of the class 

certified by Judge Gettleman on March 5, 2003; iii) the general orders 

previously produced in this case; iv) any statistical analysis of any of the 

above; and v) annual reports of the Chicago Police Department. 

Exh. 24, defendants' court-ordered supplemental answers and objections to interrogatories 5 and 

6 of plaintiffs' fifth set of interrogatories, 01/14/05, at 5-7. 

Response: Move to strike the this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Incomplete, unsupported, objectionable, immaterial. Uncontroverted that pages 5-7 of 

defendants’ court-ordered supplemental answers and objections to interrogatories 5 and 6 of 

plaintiffs’ fifth set of interrogatories included the above quoted language. Incomplete in that the 

paragraph improperly omits the well-founded objections to the discovery. See Pls. Ex. 24. 

However, ¶ 91 is not a statement of material fact that has any place in a Local Rule 56.1 

statement, but is rather a legal argument containing immaterial allegations and assertions 

regarding the discovery practice between the parties in this lawsuit, and should be stricken. 

Paragraph 91 also violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements within the same 

paragraph. Further, the responses cited were provided before the end of discovery and before 

experts were named. Subsequently, defendants provided their expert report to plaintiffs which 

refuted plaintiffs’ statistical theory of the case, and their expert for two sessions of deposition, 

which also refuted plaintiffs’ expert’s work. Def. Ex. 28, LaLonde Report. 

92. Defendants produced a reduced list of witnesses, but did not otherwise 

supplement the foregoing response during discovery with any analysis or report or other 

documentary evidence in support of any statement in ¶91(2) and to demonstrate, on a classwide 

basis, that any of those events occurred and explained the lengthy detention of class members. 

Group Exh. 19, court orders and defendants' responses to plaintiffs' discovery regarding 

classwide defenses. 

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Response: Move to strike the this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Controverted, objectionable, unsupported, misleading and immaterial. Paragraph 92 is not a 

statement of material fact in violation of Local Rule 56.1 statement, but is rather an argument 

containing immaterial allegations and assertions regarding the discovery practice between the 

parties in this lawsuit, and should be stricken. Paragraph 92 also violates Local Rule 56.1 by 

including multiple statements within the same paragraph. Plaintiffs’ misleading allegations fail 

to note that defendants produced more than 30 witnesses in the case that provided ample 

evidence of the facts in support of their written discovery responses. Subsequently, defendants 

provided their expert report to plaintiffs which refuted plaintiffs’ statistical theory of the case, 

and their expert for two sessions of deposition, which also refuted plaintiffs’ expert’s work. Def. 

Ex. 28, LaLonde Report. 

93. Plaintiffs retained Dr. Thomas A. DiPrete, Professor and Chair, Department of 

Sociology, Columbia University, to (a) identify the class; (b) calculate their length of detention 

from time of arrest and from time CB number was issued, to the time of release; and (c) analyze 

the evidence defendants relied upon to support their purported classwide explanation of the 

delays, and he has determined that it cannot explain the delays. Exh. 21, DiPrete expert report. 

Dr. DiPrete prepared a database that includes (id., at 30-32): 

(a) the CPD CHRIS system data (in computer-readable form) for all fine-only 

ordinance violations from 05/02/00 through 5/31/04. The data included the 

ordinance violated, the "booking posted date" (date of CB number), CPD 

district, demographic characteristics of the arrestee, and whether the 

arrestee was fingerprinted; 

(b) additional data keypunched from the hard-copy arrest reports, including 

date and time of arrest and release, type of bond, whether there was an 

outstanding warrant, and 13 items listed by the lockup keeper. This 

information was entered by paralegals, and then it was reentered by a 

private firm and verified ("form of double entry, where the keypuncher 

enters the data and then enters it again and the computer verifies that it is 

the same"), and the differences in the two entries were reconciled (Exh. U, 

DiPrete dep., at 44-47; Appendix B; data dictionary that accompanied 

database); 

(c) data from a computer-readable database produced by the Clerk of the 

Circuit Court of Cook County for all arrests on CPD database (including 

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statute violated, type of bond, and the most recent disposition of the case) 

(Exh. U, DiPrete dep., at 48); 

(d) data from lockup population reports (men and women locked up on each 

watch, at each district, on each day) was keypunched and then were 

algorithmically compared with other computerized lockup population 

report data (Exh. U, DiPrete dep., at 70-71); 

(e) data from a sample of watch commander logs by district and month was 

keypunched (the logs recorded whether or not 26 types of events occurred 

during the watch, e.g., unusual events in lockup, computer systems down, 

unusual events occurred in the district) (Exh. U, DiPrete dep., at 51-52); 

and 

(f) data from the CPD annual reports for the years 2000-2004 (including 

demographic and index crime data by CPD district). 

Response: Move to strike the this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Controverted, objectionable, unsupported, and immaterial. Plaintiffs’ Ex. 21 is the unsworn 

expert report of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. DiPrete, which is not admissible evidence and should not 

be considered. Paragraph 93 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements within 

the same paragraph, and by containing argument. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. U 

was taken subject to objection, and violates Fed. R. Evid. 106 as it does not include relevant 

testimony of the deponent with respect to the expert report identified above, and thus to rely on 

this testimony requires impermissible inferences be made against the non-movant. Furthermore, 

the defendants’ statistical expert, Dr. Robert LaLonde, Professor of Public Policy at the Irving 

Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago, refuted the claims 

made in DiPrete’s report and testimony, which was based on assumptions provided solely by 

plaintiffs’ counsel and relied on material cherry-picked for him by plaintiffs’ counsel. Def. Ex. 

30, DiPrete 6/7/06 Dep. at 64:12-19, 74:19-21. The deficiencies in DiPrete’s work are fully 

revealed in the report of Dr. LaLonde. Def. Ex. 28, LaLonde Report. 

94. Defendants were invited to work with plaintiffs to develop a joint database but 

declined to do so (docket no. 115, at p. 2) and while they began the process of creating their own 

database (Exh. 25), they refused to produce it and claimed that the project was not completed. 

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Furthermore, defendants performed no tests or analysis of plaintiffs' database that permit them to 

question the accuracy or reliability of the data. Exh. V, LaLonde dep., at 17:12-18:2. 

Response: Move to strike the this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Controverted, objectionable, unsupported, and immaterial. Paragraph 94 is not a statement of 

material fact that has any place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, but is rather a legal argument 

containing immaterial allegations and assertions, purportedly supported by plaintiffs’ counsel’s 

earlier arguments only, in connection with the discovery practice between the parties in this 

lawsuit, and should be stricken. Plaintiffs’ Ex. 25 is an unauthenticated (and inadvertently 

produced) e-mail that depends entirely on hearsay in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 802, and does not 

support the statement in any way. Plaintiffs’ counsel believed, wrongly, that the Defendants had 

created a sort of dueling database to rival theirs. This is simply wrong, and it is therefore hardly 

surprising that there is no support for it. Defendants in fact provided to plaintiffs the entire 

database of the CPD for those arrested on municipal ordinance violations alleged in the 

complaint. Moreover, there is no requirement that the parties agree on a database that the 

plaintiffs manipulated and added to on their own, and concerning which they concealed the true 

cost of production of such database. Further, the deposition testimony cited in Pls. Ex. V does 

not support the assertions in paragraph 94. See Pls. Ex. V at 17:12-23 (defendants’ expert 

testifies that his assistant performed diagnostic checks on plaintiffs’ database, which revealed 

“that there were errors, particularly in things like whether a person had an ID or not when they 

were arrested.”). Defendants’ expert found otherwise: “we know holding times are measured 

with some error. Moreover, random spot-checking also indicates the potential for error in other 

variables.” Def. Ex. 28, LaLonde Report at 2, 13-14. 

95. Based on the data set forth in ¶93, Dr. DiPrete found that: 

(a) in 18,031 arrests (the "analysis population") in which the arrestee was not 

fingerprinted, there was no evidence of a warrant, and there was sufficient 

information to compute the detention time; 

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(b) 80% of the arrests of the analysis population resulted in a detention of two 

hours or more from the time that a CB number was assigned; 

approximately 95% were detained for one hour or more; 10% are held for 

longer than eight hours the mean detention time (from the time the CB 

number was assigned) was 4.42 hours and the median detention time was 

3.75 hours; 

(c) 75% of the arrests of the analysis population resulted in the arrestee being 

held for four hours or more from the time of arrest to the time of release; 

and the mean time from arrest to release on bond was 6.27 hours; 

(d) the final disposition for 85% of the arrestees in the analysis population 

was a "non-suit" according to the computerized data from the Clerk of the 

Circuit Court of Cook County; 

(e) the probability of being detained for two or more hours in the analysis 

population varied by district, but was always over 53%; and in 24 of the 

25 districts it was over 60%, in 20 of the 25 districts it was over 70%, and 

in three districts the probability of being detained for two or more hours 

was over 90%; 

(f) arrestees in the analysis population who posted cash bonds were released 

approximately 1.2 hours faster than were arrestees who were released on 

personal recognizance bonds; 

(g) the mean and median detention times for women were more than one halfhour shorter than for men in the analysis population. Women in the 

analysis population who were arrested and brought to a district without a 

lockup facility for women were released 1.5 hours more quickly than 

women arrested who were arrested in and brought to a district with a 

lockup facility; 

(h) the probability of being detained for two or more hours in the analysis 

population varied by the ordinance violated. For the 20 ordinances that 

were most commonly violated, the probability of being detained for two 

hours or more was always greater than 50% and for park district offenses, 

peddling in a prohibited district, and disorderly conduct -- panhandling -- 

it was over 90%; 

(i) mean and median detention times for African-Americans were longer than 

for whites; 

(j) detention times in the analysis population were only slightly affected by 

the conditions of the arrestee as recorded in the lockup keeper's visual 

check and questionnaire; 

(k) detention times in the analysis population were not obviously related to 

the level of activity in the district as represented by the number of people 

in lockup during the watch or by the occurrence of unexpected events 

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during the watch. Net of controls, the more same-sex individuals in 

lockup, the shorter the time to release; and 

(l) the length of the detention for members of the analysis population varied 

by the arresting police officer. 

Def. Ex. 21, DiPrete expert report, at 2, 3. 

Response: Controverted, objectionable, unsupported, and misleading. Plaintiffs’ Ex. 21 is 

the unsworn expert report of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. DiPrete, which is not admissible evidence and 

should not be considered. The assertions in this paragraph are merely a recitation of Dr. 

DiPrete’s conclusions; to the extent plaintiffs are actually asserting the truth of those conclusions 

as well, the assertions require an impermissible weighing of the credibility of the expert. Paz v. 

Wauconda Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 2006) (making 

credibility determinations at summary judgment stage improper); Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 

770 (7th Cir. 2003) (movant may not ask the Court to “make credibility determinations, weigh 

the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.”). 

Paragraph 95 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements within the same 

paragraph. Unsupported and misleading in that the cited material does not support the 

statements made in subsections (a), (c), (f) and (g). Furthermore, DiPrete’s report suffers from 

numerous methodological and logical deficiencies as set forth in the report of Dr. Robert 

LaLonde. Def. Ex. 28, Lalonde Report. 

96. The lockup keeper records various characteristics concerning the current 

conditions of the arrestees (see ¶77, supra), but these factors are relatively rare. Only 1% or less 

are recorded as being in obvious pain or injury; having obvious signs of infection; showing 

visible signs of alcohol or drug withdrawal; appearing to be despondent, irrational, or carrying 

medication; being a pregnant female; or being someone who has tried to kill oneself. Two 

percent or fewer are recorded as having serious medical problems or are receiving treatment. 

Five percent are recorded as currently taking medication, while 10% appear to be under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs. Taken together, these factors are much too rare to account for the 

fact that 80% of arrestees are detained for two hours or more following issuance of their CB 

number. Exh. 21, DiPrete expert report, at 8. 

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Response: Move to strike the this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Controverted, objectionable, unsupported, misleading, and immaterial. The first sentence of this 

paragraph is completely unsupported by any record citation. The allegations are also 

argumentative, and state a legal conclusion as to the ultimate issue of whether these factors 

“account for” the length of detentions, and they have no place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement. 

To the extent that plaintiffs are asserting that “these factors are relatively rare” based solely on 

the cases documented of such conditions, the allegations fail to take into account the numerous 

conditions of the arrestee that are not contained on a form, and thus such assertions are 

misleading and controverted. Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 105:12-106:5 (drunkenness); Def. Ex. 18, 

Bay Dep. at 112:12-17, 113:17-24, 144:13-23 (prisoner being taken to the hospital); Def. Ex. 12, 

Cobb Dep. at 110:19-111:5 (uncooperative arrestees); Def. Ex. 13, Coleman Dep. at 138:12-23 

(ambulance coming to take sick detainees); Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 103:17-18 (arrestee 

sleeping in lockup); Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 101:11-14 (“again, the documentation would not 

be the whole story because there could have been events that occurred that also impacted that 

were not documented”); Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 28:4-21 (police logs do not 

capture all activity). Plaintiffs’ Ex. 21 is the unsworn expert report of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. 

DiPrete, which is not admissible evidence and should not be considered. The assertions in this 

paragraph are merely a recitation of Dr. DiPrete’s conclusions; to the extent plaintiffs are 

actually asserting the truth of those conclusions, it requires an impermissible weighing of the 

credibility of the expert. Paragraph 96 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements 

within the same paragraph. Objectionable in referencing other paragraphs in a Rule 56.1 

statement as evidence in the record to support this statement is misleading and improper (see

N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1; see also the improper nature of ¶ 19, supra). Unsupported and misleading in 

that nothing in the cited material indicates that these procedures always occur in the order 

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described with respect to all arrests, let alone the class members’ arrests, and to establish the 

statement based on the evidence cited requires impermissible inferences be made against the 

non-movant. 

97. The watch commander maintains a log for each watch and is to record significant 

events that occurred during the watch. Exh. 26, watch commander log. There are 26 types of 

occurrences, including, e.g., (a) unusual occurrences -- lockup; (b) major incidents within the 

district that might require the attention of the watch commander or desk sergeant (police officer 

injured or killed; major potential media incidents; battery/resisting arrest incidents; shots fired at 

or by a police officer; demonstrations/strikes; incidents involving prominent citizens; CAPS 

meetings); and (c) occurrences that indicate the malfunctioning of computer equipment. Dr. 

DiPrete examined whether there was a statistical relationship between the occurrence of 

unexpected or unusual events that may occur during lockup and the length of detention time. 

3,038 watch commander logs were selected by district and month to get a representative sample 

of districts and times of year, given the restrictions imposed by the availability of the hard-copy 

watch commander logs, which varied by district. Id., at 9. 

Response: Move to strike the this paragraph because it violates LR 56.1. Controverted, 

objectionable, unsupported, and misleading. Paragraph 97 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including 

multiple statements within the same paragraph. Paragraph 97 is unsupported in that it purports to 

argue that there are only a discrete number of events or happenings that can occur in a station 

house or in connection with an arrestee. This has been refuted by numerous witnesses. Def. Ex. 

2, Skahill Dep. at 76:1-18 (describing “an infinite amount” of possibilities); Def. Ex. 29, Griffin 

Dep. at 139:7-15 (“there are so many different variables. We just scratched the surface”); see 

also Defendants’ Additional Material Facts at ¶¶ 28-30 and citations therein. Moreover, there is 

nothing cited to prove that these logs capture all of the events that did in fact occur, that may 

have affected the length of arrestees’ detentions, as may such events are simply not always 

documented. Def. Ex. 23, Garrity 10/23/02 Dep. at 29:15-20 (computer system failures); Def. 

Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 89:5-13 (large numbers of prisoners awaiting entrance into the 

lockup); Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 105:12-106:5 (drunkenness); Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 112:12-

17, 113:17-24, 144:13-23 (prisoner being taken to the hospital); Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 

110:19-111:5 (uncooperative arrestees); Def. Ex. 13, Coleman Dep. at 138:12-23 (ambulance 

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coming to take sick detainees); Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 103:17-18 (arrestee sleeping in 

lockup); Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 101:11-14 (“again, the documentation would not be the 

whole story because there could have been events that occurred that also impacted that were not 

documented”); Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 28:4-21 (police logs do not capture all 

activity). Further, the citations given do not directly support the statements with respect to the 

types of “occurrences” listed on Pls. Ex. 26. The second two sentences are equally unsupported 

insofar as plaintiffs contend that DiPrete examined all “unexpected or unusual events that may 

occur during lockup.” Plaintiffs themselves provided Dr. DiPrete only a small sampling of 

watch commander logs, ignoring some districts altogether (Def. Ex. 30, DiPrete 6/7/06 Dep. at 

53:21-54:10), and there is no evidence that the events logged on such forms were the only events 

that occurred with respect to all the arrestees in question or to any other group. 

98. Dr. DiPrete first looked at the frequency with which events occurred to see if it 

was plausible that such events occurred frequently enough to account for delays in release. He 

paid particular attention to the events that were most likely to explain lengthy detention because 

they occupied the time and attention either of lockup personnel or watch commanders and desk 

sergeants and thereby might delay the completion of processing of members of the analysis 

population ("unexpected events"). The sample of watch commander logs shows that the events in 

question are relatively rare. Unusual occurrences in lockup (item F in the watch commander log) 

only occurred on 1% of the watches in the sample, or only about once a month. Events that might 

occupy watch commanders or desk sergeants are also rare relative to the frequency of long 

detentions. Major or potential media events (item B) occurred in 18% of the watches. Police 

officer injuries (item A) occurred in 5% of the watches. Battery or resisting arrest incidents (item 

C) occurred in 6% of the watches. Demonstrations or strikes (item G) occurred in 3% of the 

watches. There were no incidents involving prominent persons (item J) in the watch commander 

log sample. Taken together, one or another of these unexpected events occurred in only 28.5% of 

the watches in the watch commander sample. In contrast, Dr. DiPrete's analysis of the analysis 

population shows that detentions for periods greater than two hours are much more common than 

this. In district 1, for example, detentions of arrestees for two hours or longer occurred on 90% or 

more of the watches during which people were brought to the station for fine-only ordinance 

violations. But in only a third of the time or less (depending on the watch) did unexpected events 

during the watch occur. A similar discrepancy existed in districts 2, 6, 12, 15 (in watches 2 and 

3), 18 (in watches 2 and 3), 19, 23, and 25 (these constitute all the districts that were in the watch 

commander log sample). In other words, as a rule it was much more common for arrestees to be 

detained for two hours or longer in a watch than it was for unexpected events to occur. Id., at 9, 

10. 

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Response: Move to strike the this paragraph as argumentative and in clear violation of Local 

Rule 56.1. Controverted, objectionable, unsupported, misleading, and immaterial. Plaintiffs’ 

statement that “as a rule it was much more common for arrestees to be detained for two hours or 

longer in a watch than it was for unexpected events to occur” is argumentative and conclusory, 

has no place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should therefore be stricken. Plaintiffs rely on 

the unsworn expert report of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. DiPrete, which is not admissible evidence and 

should not be considered. The assertions in this paragraph are merely a recitation of Dr. 

DiPrete’s conclusions; to the extent plaintiffs are actually asserting the truth of those conclusions 

as well, the assertion requires an impermissible weighing of the credibility of the expert. 

Paragraph 98 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements within the same 

paragraph. Unsupported insofar as plaintiffs contend that “unexpected events” were not very 

common based solely on the “unexpected events” listed on the watch commander logs, given 

that many of the events which may affect the length of arrestees’ detentions are not always 

documented. Def. Ex. 23, Garrity 10/23/02 Dep. at 29:15-20 (computer system failures); Def. 

Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 89:5-13 (large numbers of prisoners awaiting entrance into the 

lockup); Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 101:11-14 (“again, the documentation would not be the 

whole story because there could have been events that occurred that also impacted that were not 

documented”); Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 28:4-21 (police logs do not capture all 

activity). The second sentence is further disputed in that the report recites only that Dr. DiPrete 

looked at what he “was told were potentially most likely to explain lengthy detention,” and it 

was plaintiffs’ counsel who told him what to look at. Def. Ex. 30, DiPrete 6/7/06 Dep. at 129:3-

7, 194:8-13 (“Q. All you are trying to do is analyze a set of factors posited by Mr. Miner on this 

population of people? . . . A. That's right.”); Def. Ex. 31, DiPrete 11/17/06 Dep. at 112:11-113:9, 

118:7-9 (“As of this moment, the information that I have comes from Mr. Miner and I have no 

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reason to believe that it is inaccurate”), 118:15-22 (“Q. And you hadn’t seen documents, court 

pleadings in this case in advance of completing your report? A. That’s correct. Q. So, at that 

point you really are limited as to what Mr. Miner has told you is true? A. At that point”); 119:3-

11 (“Q. Did you ask before you turned in your report to see any of those things, court pleadings 

or depositions or any of those things? A. I asked for [Mr. Miner’s] understanding of the process. 

Q. So, you didn’t ask for court pleadings or depositions on their own, you asked for Mr. Miner’s 

take on them? A. Yes, I asked for his understanding.”). 

99. Next, Dr. DiPrete examined whether occurrences of events during lockup had a 

statistical relationship to the booking-to-bond times of arrestees. To do this, he estimated the 

probability of a detention of two hours or more for the 516 arrests in the analysis population that 

occurred at a district, day, and watch that overlapped with the computerized watch commander 

logs. First, Dr. DiPrete looked at whether the unexpected events explained the duration of these 

detentions (see Table 4). He found no statistically-significant effect of the occurrence of these 

events on the duration of the detention. After controlling for age, sex, race, the day of the week, 

the time of the day, the year and quarter of the arrest, the bond type, the presence of female 

lockup facilities, the description of the arrestee from the lockup keeper report, and the statute 

corresponding to the fine-only ordinance violation, there was only a statistically-significant 

effect of demonstrations and strikes, and in this case the effect was negative; the presence of 

demonstrations and strikes was associated with a reduction of the detention time of 1.5 hours. 

Next, he looked at all of the events on the watch commander log (see Table 5). With all the 

watch commander items included in the analysis, there was a statistically-significant positive 

effect of only the discharge of an aerosol and of a non-functional LAN on the detention time. 

Shots fired at or by police was associated with a significantly shorter detention time. The 

presence of high-risk missing persons was also associated with a significantly shorter detention 

time. Id., at 11. 

Response: Move to strike the fourth sentence of this paragraph as argumentative in clear 

violation of Local Rule 56.1. Controverted, objectionable, unsupported, misleading, and 

immaterial. Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding what Dr. DiPrete may have “found” are 

argumentative and conclusory and have no place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should 

therefore be stricken. Plaintiffs rely on the unsworn expert report of Dr. DiPrete, which is not 

admissible evidence and should not be considered. The assertions in this paragraph are merely a 

recitation of Dr. DiPrete’s opinions, which are not fact, and to the extent plaintiffs are actually 

asserting the truth of his opinions, they require impermissible inferences and an impermissible 

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weighing of the credibility of the expert. Paragraph 99 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including 

multiple statements within the same paragraph. Unsupported insofar as plaintiffs contend that 

“unexpected events” were not very common based solely on the “unexpected events” listed on 

the watch commander logs, given that many of the events which may affect the length of 

arrestees’ detentions are not documented. Def. Ex. 23, Garrity 10/23/02 Dep. at 29:15-20; Def. 

Ex. 19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 89:5-13 (large numbers of prisoners awaiting entrance into the 

lockup); Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 101:11-14 (“again, the documentation would not be the 

whole story because there could have been events that occurred that also impacted that were not 

documented”); Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 28:4-21 (police logs do not capture all 

activity). Further disputed to the extent that plaintiffs contend that controlling for other factors 

should emphasize the impact of watch commander log events; indeed, it is expected that, to the 

extent those factors are correlated with watch commander log events, such controlling will 

actually decrease the explanatory power of the watch commander log events. Def. Ex. 32, 

LaLonde Dep. at 262:15 – 266:16. Further disputed to the extent that, by using the word 

“effect,” plaintiffs are attempting to imply a causal relationship between an event and the length 

of detentions; both Dr. DiPrete and Dr. LaLonde testified that Dr. DiPrete’s work does not show 

causation. Def. Ex. 32, LaLonde Dep. at 286:20 – 287:1 (“Q. So as a social scientist, it’s your 

opinion of Dr. DiPrete’s work that we cannot say that any of the factors he analyzed is causally 

related to hold times? He has not established that in his work? A. Correct.”); Def. Ex. 31, 

DiPrete 11/17/06 Dep. at 70:6-13. 

100. As a further check, Dr. DiPrete then used the full watch commander log sample to 

estimate the probability that an unexpected event occurred as a function of district and watch. 

He estimated a logistic regression to establish whether there was any relationship between the 

probability of such events occurring and the detention time (see Table 6). He found that there 

was no statistically-significant effect of this probability on the probability that the detention time 

would be greater than two hours. Id., at 10. 

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Response: Move to strike the last sentence of this paragraph as argumentative in violation of 

LR 56.1. Controverted, objectionable, unsupported, and misleading. Paragraph 100 violates 

Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements within the same paragraph. Plaintiffs’ 

allegations regarding what Dr. DiPrete “found” based on a minute sample of logs is 

argumentative and conclusory and has no place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should 

therefore be stricken. The assertions in this paragraph are merely a recitation of Dr. DiPrete’s 

opinions, which are not fact, and to the extent plaintiffs are actually asserting the truth of those 

opinions, they require an impermissible weighing of the credibility of the expert. Further, the 

unsworn expert report of Dr. DiPrete is not admissible evidence and should not be considered. 

Also disputed is plaintiffs’ contention that controlling for other factors should emphasize the 

impact of watch commander log events; indeed, it is expected that, to the extent those factors are 

correlated with watch commander log events, such controlling will actually decrease the 

explanatory power of the watch commander log events. Def. Ex. 32, LaLonde Dep. at 262:15 – 

266:16. Further disputed to the extent that, by using the words “function” and “effect,” plaintiffs 

are attempting to imply a causal relationship between an event and the length of detentions; both 

Dr. DiPrete and Dr. LaLonde testified that Dr. DiPrete’s work does not show causation. Def. Ex. 

32, LaLonde Dep. 286:20 – 287:1 (“Q. So as a social scientist, it’s your opinion of Dr. DiPrete’s 

work that we cannot say that any of the factors he analyzed is causally related to hold times? He 

has not established that in his work? A. Correct.”); Def. Ex. 31, DiPrete 11/17/06 Dep. at 70:6-

13. 

101. Next, Dr. DiPrete examined whether the number of individuals in lockup has an 

effect on the length of detention. Both the proportion of arrestees who are detained for two hours 

or longer and the mean detention time rises with the number of same-sex individuals in detention 

in the same watch that the arrestee is brought into the station. However, this positive relationship 

is fully explained by the controls. Net of the full set of controls, arrestees actually had a predicted 

0.17 hour shorter detention when the jail had more than 15 same-sex inhabitants than when it had 

five or fewer arrestees in detention (see Table 1). Net of controls, Dr. DiPrete found that the 

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more arrestees in lockup, the shorter the detention time from issuance of a CB number to release. 

Id., at 11. 

Response: Move to strike the this paragraph as argumentative in violation of LR 56.1. 

Paragraph 101 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements within the same 

paragraph. Controverted, objectionable, unsupported, misleading, and immaterial. Plaintiffs’ 

allegations concerning what Dr. DiPrete “found” are argumentative and conclusory and have no 

place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should therefore be stricken. Plaintiffs rely on the 

unsworn expert report of Dr. DiPrete, which is not admissible evidence and should not be 

considered. The assertions in this paragraph are merely a recitation of Dr. DiPrete’s opinions, 

not fact, and to the extent plaintiffs are actually asserting the truth of his opinions, they require 

an impermissible weighing of the credibility of the expert. Further disputed, by the City’s 

expert, in that in “trying to take into account the number of other people in the lockup,” Dr. 

DiPrete merely took “into account the total number of people that were in the lockup over the 

period, but [did not] take into account” variance “with time over the watch.” Def. Ex. 32, 

LaLonde Dep. at 113:18 – 114:3, 116:6-11 (“That would be one factor that would be time 

varying, and you wouldn’t want to model it simply as a single constant which would be modeled 

by, say, the total number of people that came in over an eight-hour period.”); Def. Ex. 28, 

LaLonde Report at 10 (noting that DiPrete took into account “the number of persons in lockup as 

recorded in the lockup population reports,” but that “measure might not do a good job capturing 

the timing of activity in the district . . . . A key point to recognize is that the holding times for 

one arrestee should be related to the timing of bookings for all arrestees – not just municipal 

ordinance violators – who were brought into the district,” and that “measure of the timing of 

activity at the district can not be constructed using plaintiffs’ data base.”). In addition, Dr. 

DiPrete did not account for activity going on the area “outside the lockup,” which “would be an 

example of a variable you’d want to take into account.” Def. Ex. 32, LaLonde Dep. at 115:11-23 

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(“How long someone is being held in lockup would depend on what’s going on just outside the 

lockup ...”). Further disputed to the extent it implies that Dr. DiPrete controlled for all 

potentially relevant factors. See Def. Ex. 28, LaLonde Report at 8 (“I do not expect the level of 

activity [in a police district] to be captured very well in the statistical analysis by controlling for 

the district, booking hour, watch, day of the week and violation. The reason is that these variable 

control for average differences in holding times across these variables over the entire sample 

period.”). 

102. Finally, Dr. DiPrete examined whether the number of index crimes per year in the 

district has an effect on the length of detention. The number of index crimes per year in the 

district (based on the CPD annual report) has no statistically-significant relationship to the length 

of detention across districts after controlling for other factors (see Table 7). Group Exh. 3, 

General Orders ("GO") 99-02, 10-07, 03-12; Exh. 18, DiPrete expert report, at 11. 

Response: Move to strike the last sentence of this paragraph as argumentative in violation of 

LR 56.1. Paragraph 102 violates Local Rule 56.1 by including multiple statements within the 

same paragraph. Controverted, objectionable, unsupported, misleading, and immaterial. 

Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning what Dr. DiPrete “found” are argumentative and conclusory 

and have no place in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and should therefore be stricken. Plaintiffs 

rely on the unsworn expert report of Dr. DiPrete, which is not admissible evidence and should 

not be considered. The assertions in this paragraph are merely a recitation of Dr. DiPrete’s 

opinions, not fact, and to the extent plaintiffs are actually asserting the truth of those opinions as 

well, they require an impermissible weighing of the credibility of the expert. Disputed because 

Pls. Ex. 3 does not support any of the statement. To the extent it implies that Dr. DiPrete 

controlled for all potentially relevant factors, that implication is refuted by the evidence. See

Def. Ex. 28, LaLonde Report at 8 (“I do not expect the level of activity [in a police district] to be 

captured very well in the statistical analysis by controlling for the district, booking hour, watch, 

day of the week and violation. The reason is that these variable control for average differences 

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in holding times across these variables over the entire sample period.”). Further disputed to the 

extent it indicates index crimes are a relevant measure of police activity, especially in connection 

with the fine-only ordinance violations at issue here: Plaintiffs’ own expert testified he did not 

know if that was true, and further testified that the fine-only ordinances at issue here are not 

index crimes. Def. Ex. 30, DiPrete 6/7/06 Dep. at 208:5-7 (“Q. Do you know if index crime is a 

good predictor of level of police activity in a district? A. No.”), 207:2-4 (“Q. Are non-jailable 

municipal ordinances index crimes? A. I don't believe so.”). 

103. Defendants have adopted no directives or orders or implemented any procedure to 

ensure that ordinance violators are not detained for four hours or more or that explanations for 

longer delays be recorded. Exh. A, Sodini dep. III, at 143:11-145:6; Exh. N, Bay dep., 102:2-16; 

see Exh. 16, GO 92-05; Exh. 17, GO 02-03; cf., Exh. 17, GO 02-03, at §IV.R.C ("no arrestee is 

held longer than 48 hours after the time of his or her arrest without approval of charges or a 

finding of probable cause by an appropriate court authorizing continued detention). 

Response: Controverted, argumentative, objectionable, misleading, irrelevant and 

immaterial. Disputed in that the policy of the CPD, which plaintiffs concede they are not 

challenging, is that the processing of arrestees will be performed without unreasonable delay. 

Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05 at 4; Pls. Ex 17, G.O. 02-03 at 1. It is plaintiffs’ burden under the law to 

show that such a detention was unreasonable based on the facts and circumstances in each case. 

See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 

(1991). Disputed, misleading, immaterial and irrelevant to the extent the allegations purport to 

suggest there was an affirmative duty under federal law for the CPD to record reasons why 

violators are detained for four or more hours, when no such law exists, and plaintiffs have 

provided no proof of such duty. Lacking any direct evidence that such detentions were 

unreasonable, the allegations in this paragraph require impermissible inferences to be drawn 

against the non-movant; and disputed that, without any proof of the facts and circumstances for 

each arrest, an inference of unreasonableness can be made in any event. Further, in connection 

with the named plaintiffs, the City has provided fulsome explanations based on the facts and 

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circumstances surrounding their arrests, detention and release for the length of their detentions. 

See Defs. Additional Material Facts and citations therein at ¶¶ 33, 35, 37. Objectionable in that 

the paragraph contains pure argument, and calls for speculation without citation to evidence to 

support what the defendants have or have not adopted. The deposition testimony cited in Pls. 

Ex. A and N was taken subject to objection, lacks proper foundation, calls for a legal conclusion, 

and is outside the scope of the deponent’s personal knowledge with respect to whether any 

directives, orders, or procedures exist or existed. 

DEFENDANTS’ ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS

1. In 2004, the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) made 244,193 arrests. Def. Ex. 

33, 2004 Chicago Police Department Annual Report at 26. 

2. In 2003, the CPD made 238,961 arrests. Def. Ex. 34, 2003 Chicago Police 

Department Annual Report at 26. 

3. In 2002 CPD made 237,706 arrests. Def. Ex. 34, 2003 Chicago Police 

Department Annual Report at 26. 

4. In 2001, CPD made 233,455 arrests. Def. Ex. 35, 2001 Chicago Police 

Department Annual Report at 26. 

5. In 2000, CPD made 275,745 arrests. Def. Ex. 35, 2001 Chicago Police 

Department Annual Report at 26. 

6. In 2004, the CPD received a total of 5,271,469 emergency calls for service to 911, 

along with an additional 308,598 non-emergency 311 calls for service, 325,319 administrative 

calls for service and 100,749 automatic calls for service from triggered burglar alarms. Def. Ex. 

33, 2004 Chicago Police Department Annual Report at 40. 

7. In 2003, the CPD received a total of 5,054,817 emergency calls for service to 911, 

along with an additional 332,609 non-emergency 311 calls for service, 340,779 administrative 

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calls for service and 106,514 automatic calls for service from triggered burglar alarms. Def. Ex. 

34, 2003 Chicago Police Department Annual Report at 40. 

8. In 2002, the CPD received a total of 4,937,360 emergency calls for service to 911, 

along with an additional 345,130 non-emergency 311 calls for service, 339,612 administrative 

calls for service and 109,942 automatic calls for service from triggered burglar alarms. Def. Ex. 

34, 2003 Chicago Police Department Annual Report at 40. 

9. In 2001, the CPD received a total of 5,144,617 emergency calls for service to 911, 

along with an additional 479,440 non-emergency 311 calls for service, 242,848 administrative 

calls for service and 197,949 automatic calls for service from triggered burglar alarms. Def. Ex. 

35, 2001 Chicago Police Department Annual Report at 38. 

10. In 2000, the CPD received a total of 4,396,615 emergency calls for service to 911, 

along with an additional 620,307 non-emergency 311 calls for service, 188,254 administrative 

calls for service and 246,056 automatic calls for service from triggered burglar alarms. Def. Ex. 

35, 2001 Chicago Police Department Annual Report at 38. 

11. According to their own database, the arrestees that plaintiffs claim make up the 

certified class constitute less than 2% of total arrests that took place in the City of Chicago 

during the class period. Pls. Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56 at ¶95; 

Def. Ex. 28, LaLonde Report at 18. 

12. In 2004, there were 13,423 sworn officers in the Chicago Police Department and 

1186 additional civilian members. Def. Ex. 33, 2004 Chicago Police Department Annual Report 

at 39. 

13. Not all of these officers serve in the field or are involved in the arrest process. 

Def. Ex. 36, Johnston Dep. at 172:22-173:22. 

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14. During the class period, CPD General Orders 92-05 and 02-03, and their 

addendums, provided the CPD’s procedures for processing persons under departmental control. 

Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05; Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03. 

15. These CPD’s General Orders for processing persons under departmental control 

provide a standardized framework for the processing of all adult arrestees, regardless of what 

offenses committed. Pls. Ex. 16, G.O. 92-05; Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03; Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 

Dep. at 29:23-30:13. 

16. Like the CPD’s general orders, the national standards governing police practices 

calls for a standardized framework for the processing of all adult arrestees in the same manner, 

without any special processing procedures for individuals arrested for fine-only offenses. Def. 

Ex. 37, Klotz Dep. at 111:7-16 (discussing national standards promulgated by National Advisory 

Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (“NACCJSG”)); Def. Ex. 25, Greene Dep. 

10/24/06 at 81:6-22 (same), 78:9-17, 81:23-82:6 (discussing national standards promulgated by 

Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA)). 

17. Similarly, there is no national standard indicating how many hours an individual 

arrested for a municipal ordinance violation punishable by fine only may be detained prior to 

release before the length of that detention becomes unreasonable. Def. Ex. 37, Klotz Dep. at 

111:7-112:5, 140; Def. Ex. 26, Greene Report at 4-5; Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 

39:19-40:22; Def. Ex. 38, Standards of National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 

Standards and Goals at 313; Def. Ex. 39, Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies published by 

the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies at Chapter 72. 

18. In Chicago, the amount of time it takes, from arrest to release, to process 

individuals arrested for violation of fine-only municipal ordinance violations varies among 

districts. Def. Ex. 31, DiPrete 11/17/06 Dep. at 143:17-23, 145:11-12 (“the pattern across the 

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City varies”). Plaintiffs’ expert, Thomas DiPrete, could not explain this variance. Id. at 143:24-

144:2. 

19. The General Orders prescribe the procedures for processing adult arrestees under 

departmental control. According to these procedures, the arrestee: 

• Is arrested and undergoes a search; 

• Is transported to a police station; 

• Is placed in a holding room until the arresting officer(s) arrive; 

• Has an arrest report completed for him; 

• Has a quasi-criminal complaint filled out for him; 

• Has his personal property and/or evidence inventoried; 

• Has his paperwork (including his arrest report, quasi-criminal complaint, and any 

other reports) reviewed by a desk sergeant; 

• Has his paperwork reviewed by a watch commander; 

• Is taken to lockup, where the lockup keeper reviews his paperwork, and inspects and 

accepts the arrestee; 

• Is searched again to ensure that he does not possess anything that could be used to 

hurt himself, others, or police department property, and even may be (though not 

usually) strip searched; 

• Has a medical screening form filled out for him; 

• Is permitted to make phone calls; 

• May be fingerprinted or photographed; 

• Is placed in a cell; 

• Has paperwork completed by the lockup keeper; 

• Has information from his arrest report entered into a computer system to obtain a 

central booking number, and has a clearance completed for him -- which includes a 

check for outstanding warrants and positive identification; 

• Has his arrest report reviewed by a watch commander for final approval of charging; 

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• Has a desk officer prepare an I-Bond slip prepared for him and presented to the 

lockup; 

• Is given his I-Bond slip to sign; and, 

• Has his belongings returned to him and is released. 

Def. Ex. 6, Sodini 10/29/03 Dep. at 56:7-67:17; Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 108:21-23; Pls. Ex. 

16, G.O. 92-05; Pls. Ex. 17, G.O. 02-03. 

20. The sequence that these steps are completed may vary from arrestee to arrestee. 

Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 61:6-14. 

21. By placing arrestees in lockup, the arresting officer is free to get back on the 

street. Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 77:13-78:12 (“we would have individual arresting officers baby 

sitting prisoners instead of the lockup personnel that is the reason, one of the reasons, for having 

a lockup”); Def. Ex. 9, Smith Dep. at 29:13-17 (once lockup accepts the arrestee, arresting 

officer free to return to the streets). 

22. One of the most important steps CPD must take is identifying arrestees, and one 

method used to identify arrestees under departmental control is performing a name check. Def. 

Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 136:14-24. 

23. Multiple name checks of the same arrestee are often performed at various points 

during the arrestee’s detention to ensure that the arrestee has been properly identified. Def. Ex. 

3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 80:16-81:6. 

24. Multiple name checks of individuals arrested for fine-only ordinance violations 

serve two purposes: (1) ensuring that an arrestee whose initial name check reveals the existence 

of a warrant is in fact the individual identified by that warrant; and (2) ensuring that an arrestee 

whose initial name check reveals the lack of any warrants is indeed not wanted on any warrants, 

thus providing a sufficient basis to let the arrestee to bond. Def. Ex. 3, Sodini 8/22/05 Dep. at 

134:9-135:3; Def. Ex. 26 Greene Report at 7. 

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25. Among the issues police officers are attempting to resolve through the use of 

these additional name checks are: (1) to check a different spelling of the individual’s name; (2) 

to check additional information about the arrestee’s name, such as a middle name or initial; (3) to 

help ensure positive identification of individuals with more common names that may appear 

multiple times within a database; (4) to check possible aliases of an arrestee that are discovered; 

and (5) as a double-check ordered by more senior officers to ensure that the individual has been 

properly identified. Def. Ex. 2, Skahill Dep. at 142:1-8; Def. Ex. 14 Greene 9/26/06 Dep. at 

75:7-12 (“John Jones comes in and identified himself as John Jones and there are 50 John 

Joneses that come up on the screen and maybe its Ray Jones. So there may be multiple checks 

through the same system as one begins to challenge the offered identity of the person who comes 

in.”); Def. Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 68:5-11 (“somebody gives you a name, you run the 

name, they spell the name differently, your boss looks at it and says ‘no you typed it wrong, I 

want you to type it again.’ There are reasons why people may go back to the same database is 

what I am suggesting.”). 

26. Of the approximately 36,000 people in plaintiffs’ database arrested for fine-only 

ordinance violations, there was an outstanding warrant on a more serious offense for about 5% (1 

in 20 arrestees) of the cases – or about 500 persons per each year of the class period. Def. Ex. 

28, LaLonde Report at 18; Def. Ex. 25 Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 67:13-19. 

27. Events, both unusual and routine, occur in the lockup area that require the 

attention of the officers in lockup, and lengthen the time it takes to complete the processing and 

ultimate release of individuals arrested and detained for violation of fine-only offenses. Def. Ex. 

29, Griffin Dep. at 48:15-49:14, 55:17-56:24, 60:10-14, 60:20-61:7, 66:2-67:24, 72:2-13, 76:5-

77:4, 83:10-84:4, 86:17-88:20 (collecting examples); Def. Ex. 26, Greene Report at 8 (“[W]hile 

the Chicago Police Department is committed to the release of . . . offenders in a ‘reasonable’ 

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time frame, reasonable is a time dimension, which is often conditioned by interruption; an hour 

or two of processing time, may be expanded by several interruptions, which collectively add time 

to any individual's processing. And, while these tasks take time, the police, including the 

Chicago Police, are mindful to process arrestees of all sorts as expeditiously as possible”). 

28. These scenarios include: 

• Cases where a detainee in the lockup becomes sick or injured. Def. Ex. 29, Griffin 

Dep. at 48:15-49:14; 

• Cases where a detainee in the lockup has in his possession or is need of receiving 

medicine. Def. Ex. 29, Griffin Dep. at 55:17-56:24; 

• Cases where a detainee in the lockup threatens suicide. Def. Ex. 29, Griffin Dep. at 

60:10-14; 

• Requests from the detective division for detainees who can take part in a lineup. Def. 

Ex. 29, Griffin Dep. at 60:20-61:7; 

• Shift changes. Def. Ex. 29, Griffin Dep. at 66:2-66:5; 

• Arrival of the bus to criminal courts, requiring that the lockup keepers turn their 

attention to getting those prisoners onto the bus. Def. Ex. 29, Griffin Dep. at 66:8-

67:24; 

• Rush transport of prisoners from lockup to the criminal courts at separate times other 

than the morning bus run. Def. Ex. 29, Griffin Dep. at 72:2-13; 

• Cases where a detainee in the lockup has been arrested for either resisting arrest or 

battering a police officer, requiring the watch commander to interview that individual 

in the lockup area. Def. Ex. 29, Griffin Dep. at 76:5-77:4; 83:10-84:4; and 

• Cases where multiple arrestees are brought into the lockup at the same time. Def. Ex. 

29, Griffin Dep. at 86:17-88:20. 

29. Events, both unusual and routine, also occur at the desk area that require the 

attention of officers working the desk area and may affect the time it takes to complete the 

processing and ultimate release of individuals arrested and detained for violation of fine-only 

offenses. Def. Ex. 29, Griffin Dep. at 107:24-116:3 (collecting events); Def. Ex. 26, Greene 

Report at 8. 

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30. Finally, events, both unusual and routine, also occur that require the attention of 

the watch commander and may affect the time it takes to complete the processing and ultimate 

release of individuals arrested for violation of fine-only offenses. Def. Ex. 29, Griffin Dep. at 

127:4-131:20 (collecting events); Def. Ex. 26, Greene Report at 8. 

31. Many of the events listed above are not always documented on forms. Def. Ex. 

19, Wedster 9/20/05 Dep. at 89:5-13 (large numbers of prisoners awaiting entrance into the 

lockup); Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 105:12-106:5 (drunkenness); Def. Ex. 18, Bay Dep. at 112:12-

17, 113:17-24, 144:13-23 (prisoner being taken to the hospital); Def. Ex. 12, Cobb Dep. at 

110:19-111:5 (uncooperative arrestees); Def. Ex. 13, Coleman Dep. at 138:12-23 (ambulance 

coming to take sick detainees); Def. Ex. 23, Garrity 10/23/02 Dep. at 29:15-20 (computer system 

failure); Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 103:17-18 (arrestee sleeping in lockup); Def. Ex. 19, Wedster 

9/20/05 Dep. at 89:5-13 (large numbers of prisoners awaiting entrance into the lockup); Def. Ex. 

2, Skahill Dep. at 101:11-14 (“again, the documentation would not be the whole story because 

there could have been events that occurred that also impacted that were not documented”); Def. 

Ex. 25, Greene 10/24/06 Dep. at 28:4-21 (police logs do not capture all activity). 

32. According to his arrest report, named plaintiff Emmett Lynch was arrested at 5:59 

p.m. on May 6, 2002 and released on an I-bond at 2:00 a.m. on May 7, 2002. Pls. Ex. 5, Arrest 

Report of Emmett Lynch. 

33. The length of Mr. Lynch’s detention resulted from any one or more of the 

following events: (a) backlog within the 19th District resulting from arrests and patrols in and 

around Wrigley Field before, during, and after the Chicago Cubs game on the evening of May 6, 

2002; (b) backlog within the 19th District resulting from the influx of prisoners during the 2nd

watch on May 6, 2002 from the neighboring 23rd District Station, where an individual was shot 

and killed inside that district station on May 6, 2002, causing the 23rd District to transfer all of its 

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prisoners to the 19th District and causing the 19th District to process all those arrested within the 

23rd District during that time period; (c) backlog in the 19th district caused by the processing of 

six other arrestees who were transported into the 19th district station with Mr. Lynch on May 6, 

2002; (d) backlog in the 19th District caused by the processing of at least 15 individuals arrested 

and brought into the 19th District within two hours of Mr. Lynch’s arrival in the 19th District 

station; (e) backlog in the 19th District as a result of the presence of no fewer than 30 individuals 

in custody within the district during the 1st Watch (from 10:00 May 6, 2002 until 6:00 a.m. May 

7, 2002); (f) the time it took to complete all of the administrative steps incident to Mr. Lynch’s 

arrest. Def. Ex. 8, Defendants’ Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Third Supplemental 

Interrogatories at 4.

34. According to his arrest report, named plaintiff Ronald Portis was arrested at 8:40 

p.m. on August 20, 2001, and released on an I-bond at 7:15 a.m. on August 21, 2001. Pls. Ex. 1, 

Arrest Report of Ronald Portis. 

35. The length of Mr. Portis's detention resulted from any one or more of the 

following events: (a) Mr. Portis’s deposition testimony that he was asleep during a portion of his 

detention, and testimony of numerous officers, including Sgt. Mary Miceli and Sgt. Eugene 

Richmond, that detainees are often permitted to sleep in their cells in the late night and early 

morning prior to release, particularly if they will not or refuse to wake up; (b) the fact that Mr. 

Portis was without any state identification; (c) ordinary backlog on the 1st watch resulting from 

preparing detainees for morning court appearances; (d) Sgt. Miceli’s deposition testimony that 

there was extraordinary backlog within the 18th District on August 20-21, 2001, (e) the time it 

took to complete all of the administrative steps incident to Mr. Portis’s arrest. Def. Ex. 8, 

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Defendants’ Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Third Supplemental Interrogatories at 4-5;11 

see also Def. Ex. 7, Miceli Dep. at 115:20-117:12. 

36. According to the arrest report, named plaintiff Madric Lance was arrested at 1:00 

p.m. on February 27, 2002, and released on an I-bond at 5:15 a.m. on February 28, 2002. Pls. 

Ex. 7, Arrest Report of Madric Lance. 

37. The length of Mr. Lance’s detention resulted from any one or more of the 

following events: (a) an erroneous entry of a “time fingerprinted” on the arrest report, indicating 

that the CPD was mistakenly awaiting fingerprint results for Mr. Lance, which never came 

through because as it turned out he had not been fingerprinted; (b) Mr. Lance’s deposition 

testimony that he was brought into lockup behind “two or three” other detainees who would have 

required processing concomitantly to Mr. Lance; (c) the arrest and processing of four juveniles 

shortly after Mr. Lance’s entry into the 6th District lockup, which according to the deposition 

testimony of Officer Marlon Mitchell, took precedence over any further processing of adult 

arrestees; (d) the fact that 6th District Watch Commander Robert Johnson’s was away from the 

6th District station during the early morning hours on February 28, 2002; (e) Mr. Lance’s 

deposition testimony that he was asleep during at least a portion of his detention, and testimony 

of numerous officers, including Sgt. Mary Miceli and Sgt. Eugene Richmond, that detainees are 

often permitted to sleep in their cells prior to release in the late night and early morning, 

particularly if they will not or refuse to wake up; (f) ordinary backlog on the 1st watch resulting 

from preparing detainees for morning court appearances; (g) the time it took to complete all of 

the administrative steps incident to Mr. Lance’s arrest. Def. Ex. 8, Defendants’ Answers and 

 

11 Defendants subsequently informed plaintiffs that they had determined after further investigation that the 

shooting death of on-duty Chicago Police officer Eric Lee, originally identified as one of the possible 

reasons for the length of Mr. Portis detention in subpart (c) of its Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs 

Third Supplemental Interrogatories, did not in fact contribute to the length of his detention. 

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Objections to Plaintiffs’ Third Supplemental Interrogatories at 5-612; see also Def. Ex. 10, CaverElder Dep. at 113:2-22 (explaining that it appeared that officers were mistakenly awaiting 

fingerprint results from Mr. Lance, despite the fact that he was not fingerprinted); Def. Ex. 9, R. 

Johnson Dep. at 54:6-22 (explaining that one cause for the length of Mr. Lance’s detention may 

have been that he was fingerprinted). 

Dated: February 9, 2007 Respectfully submitted, 

s/ June K. Ghezzi 

June K. Ghezzi, Bar No. 6185506 

 jkghezzi@jonesday.com 

Brian J. Murray, Bar No. 6272767 

 bjmurray@jonesday.com 

Morgan R. Hirst, Bar No. 6275128 

 mhirst@jonesday.com 

JONES DAY 

77 West Wacker Drive 

Chicago, Illinois 60601-1692 

(312) 782-3939 

Attorneys for Defendants 

 

12 Defendants subsequently informed plaintiffs that they had determined after further investigation that the 

bomb threat, identified as one of the possible reasons for the length of Mr. Lance’s detention in subpart 

(c) of its Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Third Supplemental Interrogatories, did not in fact 

contribute to the length of his detention. 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 9, 2007, I electronically filed the foregoing 

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED 

FACTS AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS with the Clerk of the 

Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following at 

their e-mail address on file with the Court:

Thomas G. Morrissey 

10249 S. Western Avenue 

Chicago, Illinois 60643 

(773) 239-0387 

Mark G. Weinberg 

3612 N. Tripp Avenue 

Chicago, Illinois 60641 

(773) 283-4878 

Robert H. Farley, Jr. 

1155 S. Washington Street 

Naperville, Illinois 60540 

(630) 369-0195 

Judson H. Miner 

Miner, Barnhill & Galland 

14 West Erie Street 

Chicago, IL 60610 

(312) 751-0438 

Michael Kanovitz 

Loevy & Loevy 

312 N. May St. 

Suite 100 

Chicago, IL 60607 

(312) 243-5902 

 s/ Brian J. Murray 

Case: 1:02-cv-03139 Document #: 436 Filed: 02/09/07 Page 91 of 91 PageID #:7107