UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4111

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JABARA L. THREAT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:10-cr-00202-HEH-1)

Submitted: August 25, 2011 Decided: September 1, 2011

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. 

Pratt, Amy L. Austin, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, 

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United 

States Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Michael A. Jagels, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jabara L. Threat entered a conditional guilty plea to 

unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Threat preserved his right to 

challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence seized as a result of an investigative stop. On 

appeal, Threat argues that the district court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress because the officers did not have 

reasonable articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal 

activity. Finding no error, we affirm.

In reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion 

to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for 

clear error and its determination of reasonable suspicion de 

novo. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 

2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1104 (2010). We accord 

particular deference to the district court’s credibility 

determinations. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 

(4th Cir. 2008). When the district court has denied a motion to 

suppress, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the government. United States v. Black

Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an officer may 

conduct a brief investigatory stop when there is reasonable 

suspicion based on articulable facts that criminal activity is

, 525 F.3d 359, 364 

(4th Cir. 2008).
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afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Whether 

there is reasonable suspicion to justify the stop depends on the 

totality of the circumstances, including the information known 

to the officers and any reasonable inferences to be drawn at the 

time of the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 

(1989). Reasonable suspicion may exist even if each individual 

factor alone is susceptible of innocent explanation. Black, 525 

F.3d at 365. The reasonable suspicion determination is a 

“commonsensical proposition,” and deference should be accorded 

to police officers’ determinations based on their practical 

experience. United States v. Foreman

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

, 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th 

Cir. 2004). Our review of the record, construed in the light 

most favorable to the government, leads us to conclude that the 

district court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion justified 

the stop of Threat is sound. The district court thus properly 

denied Threat’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED