IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

and

CATHERINE COPELLO and ALLISON

KENNEDY,

 Plaintiffs-Intervenors,

v.

CUSTOM COMPANIES, INC., CUSTOM

EXECUTIVE GROUP, INC. and CDN

LOGISTICS,

 Defendants.

 Case Nos. 02 C 3768

 03 C 2293

 Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter, the

“EEOC”) and Plaintiff-Interveners Catherine Copello (hereinafter,

“Copello”) and Allison Kennedy (hereinafter, “Kennedy”)

(collectively, the “Plaintiff-Interveners”) filed suit against

Defendants Custom Companies Inc. (hereinafter, “Custom”) and Custom

Executive Group (hereinafter, “CEG”) (collectively, the

“Defendants”) alleging sexual harassment and retaliation in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. A jury found for the Plaintiffs on all

but one count (Kimberly Fritkin’s sexual harassment claim). 
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The jury awarded the following damages to PlaintiffIntervenors: 

Compensatory Punitive

Catherine Copello (harassment) $100,000 $1,000,000

(retaliation) $60,000 $300,000

Allison Kennedy (harassment) $50,000 $500,000

(retaliation) $35,000 $150,000

This Court has already decided several post-trial motions, the

briefing of which appeared to have consumed small forests. Now

before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration,

Remittitur, and to Alter and Amend Judgment and PlaintiffIntervenors’ Motion for Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest. 

I. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Defendants argue that this Court has committed manifest errors

of law and fact which must be corrected pursuant to Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 59(e), 52(b), and 60.

A. Standard

Rule 59(e) and 52(b) give a court the power to reconsider and

“rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following the

entry of judgment,” thereby avoiding appeal. White v. New

Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982). A

court may grant a Rule 52(b) or 59(e) motion to alter or amend the

judgment if the movant presents newly discovered evidence that was

not available at the time of trial or points to evidence in the

record that clearly establishes a manifest error of law or fact.”

Sunrise Opportunities, Inc. v. Regier, 2006 WL 581150 at *4 (N.D.
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Ill. Mar. 7, 2006). Neither motion may be used to advance

arguments that could and should have been made before the court

rendered a judgment nor to present evidence that was available

earlier. LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263

(7th Cir. 1995); see also, Anderson v. Flexel, Inc., 47 F.3d 243,

247-48 (7th Cir. 1994); King v. Cooke, 26 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir.

1994). It is within the district court’s discretion to grant a

Rule 59(e) motion. LB Credit, 49 F.3d at 1267.

Under Rule 60(b), a Court may modify an injunction when the

principles of equity require it to do so. V&V Food Products, Inc.

v. Cacique Cheese Co., Inc., 2003 WL 255235 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4,

2003).

B. Defendants’ Motion Generally

In general, Defendants’ motion restates arguments that this

Court has duly considered on at least one occasion (sometimes

several). Although the Court considered these arguments, it will

not again articulate its reasoning. Except as addressed below,

this Court finds that Defendants have identified no newly

discovered evidence or manifest error of law or fact.

This Court believes that it is important to note that

Defendants object that this Court has unfairly penalized Defendants

for vigorously defending this case while at the same time being too

quick to conclude that Defendants’ silence on particular issues has

waived certain arguments. It is true that this Court has
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considered the fact that this case was contested “bitterly” by

Defendants and held that Defendants have waived some arguments by

failing to raise them at the proper times. This is not improper.

This does not place Defendants in a Catch-22; it is possible to

make and preserve all arguments without “bitterly contesting” a

case (especially when this Court has been more than generous in

permitting both parties to file oversized and additional briefs).

C. Compensatory and Punitive Damages

1. Application of Statutory Caps

In its previous ruling, this Court awarded Copello and Kennedy

$400,000 in damages, the equivalent of two $200,000 § 1981a

statutory caps. The basis for this holding was dicta in Smith v.

Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 165 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir.

1999), which this Court interpreted to permit a plaintiff to

benefit from two statutory caps if she brought two separate (and

not claim-precluded) lawsuits alleging different discrimination and

different injuries. This Court has now become aware that although

the EEOC did indeed file two separate cases, Copello and Kennedy

are party only to the ‘02 case. Copello and Kennedy brought two

discrimination claims within the context of a single Title VII suit

and are therefore entitled to only one statutory cap apiece. See

Smith, 165 F.3d 1142 (plaintiff who brought three racial

discrimination counts in the context of one suit was entitled to

only one statutory cap). This Court will not reconsider its
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decision regarding the applicable caps (based on the number of

employees) as Defendants has brought forth no new information or

argument on the subject. As such, Plaintiff-Intervenors are each

entitled to one $200,000 statutory cap.

2. Compensatory and Punitive Damages

Compensatory and punitive damages must comply with the § 1981a

caps. The Seventh Circuit suggests that the preferred method for

reducing awards is to leave compensatory damages intact and lower

punitive damages to bring the total under the cap. See Lust v.

Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 589 (7th Cir. 2004). This Court need

not reduce the compensatory damages, as each award is less than the

applicable § 1981a statutory caps. However, punitive damages

awards must be reduced:

Compensatory Punitive Cap

Copello

(Harassment) $100,000 $25,000

(Retaliation) $ 60,000 $15,000

(Total) $160,000 $40,000 $200,000

Kennedy

(Harassment) $50,000 $ 67,647

(Retaliation) $35,000 $ 47,353

(Total) $85,000 $115,000 $200,000

(The Court has allocated the punitive damages proportionately

between each Plaintiff-Intervenor’s two claims, based on the juryawarded compensatory damages.)

The Court evaluated the originally granted compensatory and

punitive damage awards for excessiveness and deemed them to be

rationally related to the evidence presented. As such, this Court
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will not revisit this inquiry when awarding identical compensatory

damages and smaller punitive damages.

D. Back Pay

1. Kennedy - Proof of Comparable Jobs

Defendants argue that this Court erred in concluding that

Kennedy sufficiently mitigated her damages by using reasonable and

diligent efforts to secure other employment. The affirmative

defense of failure to mitigate requires that the Defendants prove

that (1) Kennedy lacked diligence in mitigating her damages and (2)

that with reasonable diligence, there was a reasonable chance that

Kennedy might have found a comparable job. U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Gurnee

Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1990). This Court concluded

that Kennedy was reasonably diligent in seeking a job, and this

Court will not revisit that decision. As such, Defendants cannot

satisfy the two-prong failure to mitigate test.

As noted in the earlier opinion, this Court cannot presume the

availability of jobs after having found that Kennedy’s job search

was reasonably diligent. However, Defendants have pointed out that

this Court incorrectly stated that “Defendants offer no evidence

whatsoever that comparable jobs existed.” Defendants provided this

court with copies of 1998 and 1999 Chicago Tribune want ads. These

ads were unaccompanied by any affidavit or argument. No attempt

was made to identify the relevant ads. The copies included ads for

a “regional sales manager,” “seamstress,” “national field service
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manager,” “house parents,” and “word processing.” There were also

relevant sales positions advertised. Considering the sheer volume

of the briefing and exhibits before the Court, some direction would

have been helpful.

2. Copello - Base Salary

Defendants argue that this Court erred by basing Copello’s

back pay calculations on a $45,000 salary. This Court awarded

Copello $18,066.00 in lost pay, which reflects the six-month period

between February 1, 2000 and July 31, 2000. This value is based on

the following formula: 1/2 Copello’s 1999 salary of $36,362.33

less Copello’s interim earnings of $2,760. Because this Court did

not base its lost pay calculation on a base salary of $45,000, the

Court’s reference to “basing Copello’s back pay award on her

$45,000 salary” was in error. Defendants did not object to the

calculation method used by Copello and thus may not do so now.

Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rule 59(e)

“does not allow a party to . . . advance arguments that could

. . . have been presented to the district court prior to the

judgment”). 

Additionally, Defendants now argue that Copello’s lost pay

award ought to have been calculated with reference to a base salary

of $30,000. This argument was likewise not previously articulated,

and cannot therefore be raised now. Id. Defendants point to

Copello’s 1999 W-2 as proof of a base salary of $30,000 when it
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shows that Copello earned $36,362.33 in 1998, and fail to

articulate from whence the $30,000 value comes. As such, this

Court will not disturb the back pay award granted to Copello.

After all, the back pay process is necessarily speculative, and

calculations need not be precise. Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of

Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 1985).

“Ambiguities in what an employee . . . would have earned but for

the discrimination should be resolved against the discriminating

employer.” Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 452 (7th

Cir. 1976). 

E. Injunctive Relief

This Court ordered Defendants to give notice to their

customers advising them of the jury verdict and the Court’s

judgment and reaffirming Defendants’ commitment to equal employment

opportunity in the workplace. Although Defendants did not question

this potential provision during the briefing of the post trial

motions, they now claim that it is unprecedented, unjustified, and

punitive. Rules 52 and 59 are not an opportunity for a party to

raise arguments that they have hitherto neglected to raise. Moro,

91 F.3d at 876. If Defendants believed that the potential

injunction was inappropriate, they should have objected. While

Defendants made general objections to the imposition of injunctive

relief, they were not prohibited from objecting to the specific

provisions in case injunctive relief was imposed. As such, this
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Court will not revisit this injunction. Furthermore, this Court

believes that Plaintiffs are correct that the injunction will serve

as a deterrent and is relevant as Defendants have spent years

dangling adult entertainment as a carrot before customers. 

Defendants also argue, in a footnote, that the injunction

regarding annual sexual harassment training is improper because it

requires that the harassment training not be given by Defendants’

law firms. Again, Defendants did not object to this potential

injunctive relief when briefing the post-trial motions and have

thus waived this argument. Id. Additionally, arguments in

footnotes are waived. Moriarty ex rel. Local Union No. 727, I.B.T.

Pension Trust, and the Teamsters Local No. 727 Health and Welfare

Trust v. Svec, 429 F.3d 710, 722 (7th Cir. 2005).

F. Fair Trial

Lastly, Defendants argue that this Court should grant a new

trial under Rule 59(b). A new trial should not be granted unless

the jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence or

the trial involved clearly prejudicial error. Romero v. Cincinnati

Inc., 171 F.3d 1091, 1096 (7th Cir. 1999). The claimed prejudice

must impact a litigant’s substantial rights; the errors must have

been sufficiently substantial to have amounted to the denial of a

fair trial. Wilson v. Groaning, 25 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 1994);

Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 357 (7th Cir. 1993). As is

explained below, none of the purported errors are in fact error,
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and even if they were, none amount to substantial error so as to

require a new trial.

1. Failure to Sever Each Plaintiff’s Trial

Defendants argue that this Court committed reversible error by

refusing to sever each plaintiff’s trial. According to Defendants,

trying the three cases together created an “echo-chamber effect”

where the jury gave each plaintiff the benefit of the others’

testimony. 

Defendants’ motion to sever was properly denied. Federal

policy favors joinder. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). Unlike the cases cited by Defendants,

the Plaintiffs’ alleged sexual harassment and retaliation involved

many of the same employee-wrongdoers and there was substantial

overlap of both legal and factual issues. Furthermore, Defendants’

contention that an “echo-chamber effect” existed is belied by the

jury’s finding that Fritkin did not suffer sexual harassment, as

well as by the fact that jury instructions informed the jury that

it must consider each plaintiff’s claims separately. O’Sullivan v.

City of Chicago, 2007 WL 671040 at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007)

(jury is presumed to abide by given instructions). 

2. The EEOC Investigator

Defendants argue that this Court committed reversible error by

limiting Defendants’ right to call the EEOC investigator as a

witness to impeachment purposes only. Although administrative
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findings of discrimination are generally admissible, a court has

“significant discretion” as to whether EEOC investigatory findings

ought to be admitted. Halloway v. Milwaukee County, 180 F.3d 820,

827 n. 9 (7th Cir. 1999); Tulloss v. Near North Montessori School,

Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 153 (7th Cir. 1985). In deciding to limit the

Defendant’s ability to call the EEOC investigator as a witness,

this Court considered the fact that the EEOC has no adjudicatory

power, that statements made to the investigator were not under

oath, and that evidence on matters investigated by the EEOC was

available from other sources. Disallowing the EEOC investigator to

testify except for the purposes of impeachment was not error. 

3. Wilki and Anguiano’s Deposition Testimony

Defendants argue that a new trial should be granted because

the deposition testimony of two former Custom employees, Ms. Wilki

and Mr. Anguiano, was read into the record. First, Defendants

argue that the use of deposition testimony was improper because the

EEOC claimed that they could not be served even though Ms. Wilki

and Mr. Anguiano reside in Chicago. This argument was posed solely

in a footnote and is therefore waived. Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 722.

Second, Defendants argue that Ms. Wilki’s testimony was

improperly admitted because it concerned her own complaints of

sexual harassment rather than the harassment of Copello. This

Court had ruled that the only evidence of harassment not in the

presence of Copello, Kennedy, or Fritkin that was admissible was
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harassment that had been reported to Defendants. Ms. Wilki’s

testimony of her harassment and reports of harassment was thus

relevant to Custom’s notice of harassment. 

Lastly, Defendants argue that Mr. Anguiano’s testimony was

improper for several reasons. Mr. Anguiano’s testimony was

properly admitted because it involved sexual harassment committed

in Copello’s presence. The fact that Mr. Anguiano was less than

specific as to the content of certain jokes seems to this Court a

matter of the proper weight to be given to testimony rather than a

reason to exclude it. This Court finds that the testimony of Ms.

Wilki and Mr. Anguiano was properly admitted.

4. Testimony Regarding Non-Sponsored Events

Defendants also argue that this Court should not have admitted

testimony regarding non-sponsored events. This Court carefully

considered Defendants’ motions in limine on these points and denied

them. District courts have broad discretion when ruling on motions

in limine. Gage v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater

Chi., 365 F.Supp. 2d 919, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2004). Wiszowaty’s

indecent exposure was relevant to Defendants’ Ellerth defense and

to the general atmosphere at Custom. Likewise, Mandera’s ownership

interest in the Crazy Horse gentleman’s club was relevant, at

minimum, because Defendants’ salespersons were encouraged to

entertain at the Crazy Horse. 
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5. Defendants’ Human Resources Expert

Defendants contend that this Court erred by excluding

Defendants’ human resources expert’s testimony. A court has broad

discretion regarding expert testimony. Olympia Exp., Inc. v. Linee

Aeree Italiane S.P.A., 2007 WL 641557 (N.D. Ill. 2007). The expert

in question offered legal conclusions based on Defendants’ version

of the facts. Courts have properly excluded expert testimony where

it offers legal conclusions. See, e.g., Good Shepard Manor

Foundation, Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir.

2003). This Court instructed the jury as to the appropriate EEOC

guidelines on harassment policies; the jury could evaluate

Defendants’ compliance without expert testimony. In short, this

Court does not believe that the jury would have been aided by the

expert’s testimony, and therefore will not grant a new trial.

6. Jury Instructions

In order for a Court to order a new trial on the basis of

faulty jury instructions, it must find that the given instructions

did not adequately state the law and that the error was prejudicial

because the jury was likely to be confused and misled. Jackson v.

Lake County, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16697 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2005).

This Court gave the Seventh Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instructions for

use in Title VII cases, and included an instruction that simple

teasings, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless

extremely serious) do not amount to discriminatory changes in the
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terms and conditions of employment. Defendants’ motion fails to

explain how this Court erred by denying Defendants’ requested

retaliation and undue delay instructions, but merely lists the

instructions. As such, this Court will not address this issue.

7. Plaintiffs’ Closing

Lastly, Defendants argue that the Court erred by allowing

Plaintiffs’ Counsel to make falsehoods during closing arguments.

It appears that Defendants have waived this argument by failing to

make a timely objection during the closing argument. Even if they

had, however, a new trial is not necessitated. “Improper comments

during closing arguments rarely rise to the level of reversible

error.” Littlefield v. McGuffey, 954 F.2d 1337, 1346 (7th Cir.

1992). Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenors correctly stated that Ms.

Wilke and Mr. Anguiano had “no interest in this litigation.” Ms.

Wilke and Mr. Anguiano were not party to the suit at time of trial

and thus stood to gain nothing from the jury’s verdict. If

Defendants believed that this statement implied that Ms. Wilke and

Mr. Anguiano were not biased, they could have pointed out their

interpretation during their own closing arguments. PlaintiffIntervenors appear to admit that they mischaracterized the

Wiszowaty incident as having happened at a company-sponsored event;

however, this does not rise to the level of a prejudicial error. 
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II. PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR’S MOTION 

FOR PRE- AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST

A. Pre-Judgment Interest

Pre-judgment interest is a normal incident of relief in

Title VII suits and is considered an “element of complete

compensation.” Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 557 (1988); U.S.

E.E.O.C. v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 1990). 

1. Is Pre-Judgment Interest Appropriate?

Plaintiff-Intervenors request pre-judgment interest on their

back pay awards. Defendants argue that pre-judgment interest is

inappropriate where significant punitive damages are awarded.

In Fortino v. Quasar Co., a Div. of Matsushita Elec. Corp. of

America, 950 F.2d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 1991), an age discrimination

case, the Seventh Circuit held that pre-judgment interest was

inappropriate where the compensatory damages had already been

doubled due to willful conduct. The Court based this decision on

several rationales: (1) the Seventh Circuit (and other circuits)

had held that “if double damages are awarded pre-judgment interest

may not be awarded”; (2) these doubled damages were effectively

punitive, and thus, the addition of pre-judgment interest on the

total award “becomes an unauthorized form of punitive damages”; and

(3) because significant “punitive” damages had already been

awarded, there is no real danger that the judgment “inadvertently

undercompensate[s] the plaintiff.” In Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling
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Co. of Chicago, Inc., 904 F.Supp. 723, 736 (N.D. Ill. 1995), a

district court declined to enter pre-judgment interest on a back

pay award in a Title VII case, relying on Fortino.

There are significant distinctions between this case and

Fortino. First, Fortino involved the mandatory doubling of

compensatory damages according to statute; this case does not. Due

to the statutory caps in this case, the punitive damages are

significantly less than double the compensatory awards. Second,

the Fortino plaintiff apparently sought pre-judgment interest on

the entire judgment, whereas plaintiff-intervenors here seek prejudgment interest only in regards to their back pay awards. See

Fine v. Ryan Intern. Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 757 (7th Cir. 2002).

This Court is not persuaded by Fortino and Emmel. Title VII

authorizes pre-judgment interest as part of a back pay remedy.

Loeffler, 486 U.S. 549, 557 (1988); U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Gurnee Inn

Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 1990). Courts have awarded prejudgment interest in cases involving significant punitive damages.

See, e.g., Fine, 305 F.3d at 757; Hathaway v. New Dimension Center

for Cosmetic Surgery, 2006 WL 1594060 at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 6,

2006). As the Hathaway court noted, “the Seventh Circuit has

. . . stated . . . that ‘if a district court does have discretion

in whether to grant or deny prejudgment interest, that discretion

is very limited and . . . prejudgment interest should be

presumptively available to victims of federal law violation.’”
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Hathaway, 2006 WL 1594060 at *5. Although Emmel has made the leap

of applying Fortino to Title VII cases, this Court will follow

Hathaway and will not do so. Thus, this Court finds that prejudgment interest on Plaintiff-Intervenors’ back pay awards is

proper.

Defendants also argue that a request for pre-judgment interest

is premature at this time because Defendants have filed a motion to

reconsider. A motion for pre-judgment interest became timely upon

the Court entering a back pay award. This Court evaluated

Defendants’ motion to reconsider; no alterations were made to

Plaintiff-Intervenors’ back pay awards. 

2. Amount of Pre-Judgment Interest

Copello requests $16,489.60 in pre-judgment interest and

Kennedy requests $72,024.82 in pre-judgment interest. Defendants

have not challenged the methods used to calculate pre-judgment

interest, and as nothing is apparently wrong with the calculations

(compounding annually and using the prime rate of interest), this

Court will award the requested amounts. 

B. Post-Judgment Interest

Plaintiff-Intervenors also request post-judgment interest.

Post-judgment interest is allowed on any money judgment in a civil

case. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Defendants contend that a motion for

post-judgment interest is premature because Defendants have filed

a motion for reconsideration. This Court has granted in part
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Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, and this request is

therefore timely (assuming that the proper adjustments to the

calculations are made). As this Court has corrected its error

regarding the statutory caps, Plaintiff-Intervenors’ post-judgment

interest calculations have been reworked according to the proper

awards. Although neither party has addressed the date from which

post-judgment interest ought to accrue in the event that this Court

made any changes to the original judgment (which it did), the Court

will calculate it from March 8, 2007, when the original entry of

judgment occurred. See, generally, Black Grievance Committee v.

Philadelphia Elec. Co., 690 F.Supp. 1393 (E.D.Pa. 1988) (where

appellate court remanded to district court for recalculation of

attorneys’ fees award, post-judgment interest properly accrued from

date of original judgment); Institutionalized Juveniles v.

Secretary of Public Welfare, 758 F.2d 897 (3d Cir. 1985).

Interest pursuant to §1961(a) is calculated “at a rate equal

to the weekly average one-year constant maturity Treasury yield for

the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment, as published

by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.”

Chemetall GmbH v. ZR Energy, Inc., 2001 WL 1104604 at *21 (N.D.

Ill. Sept. 18, 2001); 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). The interest should be

computed daily until the date of payment, and should be compounded

annually. Id. 
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The weekly average one-year constant maturity Treasury yield

for the calendar week ending March 2, 2007 was 4.96 percent. 

Accordingly, the daily rate of post-judgment interest on fees and

expenses incurred before judgment amounts to 0.0496/365. Copello’s

daily post-judgment interest is thus $246,584.60 *(0.0496/365), or

$33.49. Kennedy’s daily post-judgment interest is $462,098.55

*(0.0496/365), or $62.79. As of June 20, 2007, 104 days have

accrued. Thus, Copello has accrued $3,483.56 in post-judgment

interest and Kennedy has accrued $6,526.31 in post-judgment

interest (calculated based on the formula P(r/365*d), P being the

principal, r being the interest rate, and d being the number of

days). See Chemetall, 2001 WL 1104604 at *21 (noting that using

the formula gives a slightly different answer than if the per diem

rate were used to calculate the total interest).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court Grants in Part and

Denies in Part Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration. The Court

also Grants in Part and Denies in Part Plaintiff-Intervenors’

Motion for Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court

June 21, 2007

Dated: