[J-48-2021] [MO: Todd, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF 

PENNSYLVANIA AND LORRAINE HAW

v.

VERONICA DEGRAFFENREID AS 

ACTING SECRETARY OF THE 

COMMONWEALTH

APPEAL OF: SHAMEEKAH MOORE, 

MARTIN VICKLESS, KRISTIN JUNE IRWIN 

AND KELLY WILLIAMS

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No. 4 MAP 2021

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court No. 578 MD 

2019 dated January 7, 2021.

ARGUED: September 21, 2021

DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: December 21, 2021

Before this Court is a direct appeal from the January 7, 2021 order of the 

Commonwealth Court, which permanently enjoined the Secretary of the Commonwealth 

from certifying the votes of the public electorate with regards to a proposed amendment 

to Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Commonwealth Court entered the 

injunction on the basis that the submission of the proposed amendment to the electorate 

as a single ballot question violated the requirement of Article XI, Section 1 of the 

Constitution that “[w]hen two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted 

upon separately.” PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Upon review, I would hold that the submission 

of the proposed amendment to the electorate as a single ballot question was proper. The 

changes in the proposed amendment are specifically and narrowly tailored to fulfill the 

singular common objective of establishing for victims of crime justice and due process in 
[J-48-2021] [MO: Todd, J.] - 2

the criminal and juvenile justice systems, and do not substantively change any other

existing provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from the 

Opinion of the Majority which holds otherwise. 

By way of background, in June 2019 the General Assembly adopted Joint 

Resolution 1 of 2019. The Joint Resolution resolves to amend Article I of the Constitution, 

which sets forth a “Declaration of Rights,” by adding the following wholly new section:

§ 9.1. Rights of victims of crime. 

(a) To secure for victims justice and due process throughout the criminal 

and juvenile justice systems, a victim shall have the following rights, as 

further provided and as defined by the General Assembly, which shall be 

protected in a manner no less vigorous than the rights afforded to the 

accused: to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety, 

dignity and privacy; to have the safety of the victim and the victim’s family 

considered in fixing the amount of bail and release conditions for the 

accused; to reasonable and timely notice of and to be present at all public 

proceedings involving the criminal or delinquent conduct; to be notified of 

any pretrial disposition of the case; with the exception of grand jury 

proceedings, to be heard in any proceeding where a right of the victim is 

implicated, including, but not limited to, release, plea, sentencing, 

disposition, parole and pardon; to be notified of all parole procedures, to 

participate in the parole process, to provide information to be considered 

before the parole of the offender, and to be notified of the parole of the 

offender; to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting 

on behalf of the accused; to refuse an interview, deposition or other 

discovery request made by the accused or any person acting on behalf of 

the accused; full and timely restitution from the person or entirely convicted 

for the unlawful conduct; full and timely restitution as determined by the 

court in a juvenile delinquency proceeding; to the prompt return of property 

when no longer needed as evidence; to proceedings free from 

unreasonable delay and a prompt and final conclusion of the case and any 

related postconviction proceedings; to confer with the attorney for the 

government; and to be informed of all rights enumerated in this section. 

(b) The victim or the attorney for the government upon request of the victim 

may assert in any trial or appellate court, or before any other authority, with 

jurisdiction over the case, and have enforced, the rights enumerated in this 

section and any other right afforded to the victim by law. This section does 
[J-48-2021] [MO: Todd, J.] - 3

not grant the victim party status or create any cause of action for 

compensation or damages against the Commonwealth or any political 

subdivision, nor any officer, employee or agent of the Commonwealth or 

any political subdivision, or any officer or employee of the court. 

(c) As used in this section and as further defined by the General Assembly, 

the term “victim” includes any person against whom the criminal offense or 

delinquent act is committed or who is directly harmed by the commission of 

the offense or act. The term “victim” does not include the accused or a 

person whom the court finds would not act in the best interests of a 

deceased, incompetent, minor or incapacitated victim. 

Joint Resolution 1 of 2019; Reproduced Record at 304a-05a. 

The proposed amendment was submitted to the electorate as a single ballot 

question on the ballot for the November 5, 2019 election. Below, the Commonwealth

Court permanently enjoined the Secretary of the Commonwealth from certifying these 

votes on the basis that the proposed amendment was not properly submitted to the 

electorate. Appellants1 argue to this Court that the Commonwealth Court committed an 

error of law in concluding that submission of the proposed amendment to the electorate 

as a single ballot question was violative of the separate vote requirement set forth in 

Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution.

In this inquiry we are guided by Grimaud v. Commonwealth, 865 A.2d 835 (Pa. 

2005), our most recent decision in this area. In Grimaud, this Court articulated two 

separate and distinct tests that must be applied when determining whether it was violative 

of the separate vote requirement for a proposed amendment to be submitted to the 

electorate as a single ballot question. The failure of either of these tests renders a 

proposed amendment void under the separate vote requirement set forth in Article XI, 

Section 1 of the Constitution. 

 

1 Appellants in this matter are Shameekah Moore, Martin Vickless, Kristin June Irwin, and 

Kelly Williams. 
[J-48-2021] [MO: Todd, J.] - 4

The first test articulated in Grimaud is a “subject matter test.” The subject matter 

test requires us to examine whether the changes in a proposed amendment “are 

sufficiently interrelated to justify their presentation to the electorate in a single [ballot] 

question.” Id. at 841 (quoting Pa. Prison Soc. v. Commonwealth, 776 A.2d 971, 984 (Pa. 

2001) (Saylor, J., concurring)). This necessitates an examination of whether the changes

in a proposed amendment all relate to a singular common objective, such that each 

change is dependent upon the others to fulfill the singular common objective. See id.

(citing Pa. Prison Soc, 776 A.2d at 984 n.1 (discussing authority from other jurisdictions

that apply a subject matter test)). 

The second test articulated in Grimaud is an effects test. This test requires us to 

examine a proposed amendment’s “substantive affect on the Constitution [by] examining 

the content, purpose, and effect” of the proposed amendment to determine whether the 

changes in the proposed amendment would, in actuality, make multiple amendments of 

the Constitution such that the proposed amendment must be submitted to the electorate 

as multiple ballot questions. Id. at 842. This test is not merely an analysis of “whether 

the [proposed] amendment[] might touch other parts of the Constitution,” or whether the 

proposed amendment “may possibly impact” other existing provisions of the Constitution. 

Id. (citation omitted). After all, “it is hard to imagine an amendment that would not have 

some arguable effect on” existing provisions of the Constitution. Id. Instead, this test 

requires an analysis of whether the proposed amendment “facially” or “patently affects”

other existing provisions of the Constitution. Id. 

Turning to the proposed amendment at issue here, I cannot agree with the Majority 

that the proposed amendment fails both the subject matter test and the effects test. I 

begin, as the Majority does, with the subject matter test. Again, this test concerns the 

interrelatedness of the changes in the proposed amendment and necessitates an 
[J-48-2021] [MO: Todd, J.] - 5

examination of whether the changes all relate to a singular common objective, such that 

each change is dependent upon the others to fulfill the common singular objective. Upon 

review of the proposed amendment, the singular common objective is readily apparent –

“Rights of victims of crime.” The first provision of the proposed amendment sets forth in 

clear and express terms that the objective of the amendment is “[t]o secure for victims 

justice and due process throughout the criminal and juvenile justice systems.” Joint 

Resolution 1 of 2019. A review of the changes in the proposed amendment reflects that 

each change is specifically and narrowly tailored to fulfill the foregoing singular common 

objective of establishing a constitutional amendment tailored to set forth rights for victims 

of crime. As such, I believe the changes in the proposed amendment “are sufficiently 

interrelated to justify their presentation to the electorate in a single [ballot] question.” 

Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 841 (quoting Pa. Prison Soc. v. Commonwealth, 776 A.2d 971, 984 

(Pa. 2001) (Saylor, J., concurring)).

In its application of the subject matter test, the Majority looks at the different facets 

of victims’ rights individually rather than, as the subject matter test requires, examining 

the commonality of the different facets; thus, the Majority entirely skips the required 

examination of whether the changes in the proposed amendment all relate to a singular 

common objective. See Majority Op. at 53-54. The Majority concludes the proposed 

amendment manifests multiple separate new rights which “are not dependent on each 

other to be effective.” Id. at 53. This is not the correct test. The subject matter test is not 

an examination of whether each change is dependent upon the others for each individual 

change to be effective. Such a test would give no weight to the context in which the 

changes appear. Rather, the test is whether each change is dependent upon the others 

to effectuate the common singular objective. As the Supreme Court of Arizona articulated 

in McLaughlin v. Bennett, 238 P.3d 619, 622 (Ariz. 2010), “[i]n a separate amendment 
[J-48-2021] [MO: Todd, J.] - 6

challenge, we examine whether provisions of a proposed amendment are sufficiently 

related to a common purpose or principle that the proposal can be said to constitute a 

consistent and workable whole on the general topic embraced.” (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). In sum, contrary to our clear pronouncement in Grimaud, the 

Majority fails to undertake any analysis of whether the changes in the proposed 

amendment “are sufficiently interrelated to justify their presentation to the electorate in a 

single [ballot] question.” Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 841 (quoting Pa. Prison Soc. v. 

Commonwealth, 776 A.2d 971, 984 (Pa. 2001) (Saylor, J., concurring)). 

With regards to the effects test, that test, again requires an examination of whether 

a proposed amendment would substantially change multiple existing provisions of the 

Constitution such that the single proposed amendment, in actuality, makes multiple 

amendments to the Constitution. Initially, I observe that the proposed amendment at 

issue here does not facially alter the text of any other existing provision of the Constitution. 

Continuing to the question of whether the proposed amendment patently affects other 

existing provisions of the Constitution, unlike the Majority, I do not agree with the position 

taken by the Appellees2that it does. 

Appellees submit to this Court that the proposed amendment patently affects the 

following existing provisions of the Constitution: (1) Article V, Section 10(c),

3 which grants 

this Court “the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the 

conduct of all courts;” (2) Article I, Section 9,4 which grants a criminal defendant the right 

“to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor;” (3) Article I, Section 

 

2 Appellees in this matter are the League of Women Voters, Lorraine Haw, and Ronald 

Greenblat. 

3 PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c). 

4 PA. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
[J-48-2021] [MO: Todd, J.] - 7

14,5 which provides that “[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties;” and (4) 

Article IV, Section 9,6 which provides the Governor with the power to issue pardons “on 

the recommendation . . . of the Board of Pardons.” However, any impact the proposed 

amendment would have on the foregoing provisions is not substantive as each of the 

powers and rights set forth in the foregoing provisions of the Constitution would remain 

the same if the proposed amendment took effect. The proposed amendment does not 

substantively change, alter, expand, contract, or qualify this Court’s exclusive rulemaking 

power, the right of a criminal defendant to seek compulsory process from a court to obtain 

a witness, the right of a prisoner to be bailable, or the power of the Governor to issue 

pardons on the recommendation of the Board of Pardons.7

That is not to say the proposed amendment would not have some arguable impact 

on the foregoing provisions of the Constitution. After all, “it is hard to imagine an 

amendment that would not have some arguable effect on” an existing provision of the 

 

5 PA. CONST. art. I, § 14. 

6 PA. CONST. art. IV, § 9. 

7 The Majority suggests that I am of the opinion that “in order for a proposed amendment 

to have a substantive effect on existing provisions of the Constitution, it must facially 

change the actual text of those provisions, or specifically refer to them.” Majority Op. at 

47 n.29. Respectfully, that is not an accurate reflection of my views. 

My view is that under Grimaud, a proposed amendment substantively changes an existing 

provision of the Constitution if the proposed amendment, in effect, would alter the 

substance of the existing provision. Upon review of the proposed amendment, I do not 

believe it alters the substance of any other existing constitutional provision. Take, for 

example, the Governor’s power to issue pardons. The proposed amendment would 

qualify the pardon procedure by constitutionally mandating that victims of crime be 

notified of, and be allowed to participate in, pardon proceedings. The impact the proposed 

amendment would have on the existing pardon procedure, in my opinion, is not 

substantive as it does not change the heart of Article IV, Section 9 of the Constitution, 

which grants the Governor the power to issue pardons on the recommendation of the 

Board of Pardons. Therefore, I conclude the proposed amendment does not facially or 

patently affect the substance of Article IV, Section 9 of the Construction. 
[J-48-2021] [MO: Todd, J.] - 8

Constitution. Grimaud, 865 A.2d at 842. However, as we made clear in Grimaud, the 

effects test is not an examination of “whether the [proposed] amendment[] might touch 

other parts of the Constitution,” or whether the proposed amendment “may possibly 

impact,” other existing provisions of the Constitution, but rather the focus is whether the 

proposed amendment substantively changes existing provisions of the Constitution. Id

(citation omitted). 

I conclude by repeating that Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that 

“[w]hen two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted upon separately.” 

PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. The changes in the proposed amendment are specifically and 

narrowly tailored to fulfill the singular common objective of establishing for victims of crime 

justice and due process in the criminal and juvenile justice systems, and do not 

substantively change any other existing provisions of the Constitution. As such, I would 

hold the submission of the proposed amendment to the electorate as a single ballot 

question was not violative of the separate vote requirement of Article XI, Section 1. Thus, 

I would reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court.