IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-407

No. COA21-796

Filed 21 June 2022

Alamance County, No. 20 JA 88

IN RE: R.J.P.

Appeal by Respondent-Mother from orders entered 17 September 2021 by 

Judge Kathryn W. Overby in Alamance County District Court. Heard in the Court 

of Appeals 10 May 2022.

Jamie L. Hamlett, for Alamance County Department of Social Services, 

Petitioner-Appellee.

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Adam C. Setzer, for Guardian ad 

Litem.

Anné C. Wright, for Mother-Appellant.

WOOD, Judge.

¶ 1 Respondent-Mother (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court’s orders granting 

guardianship of her son Ryan1 to his paternal great aunt and uncle, Maria and Jordan 

 

1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the minor child. See N.C.R. App. P. 

42(b).
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Turner (the “Turners”)2, and granting visitation rights with Ryan to his maternal 

grandparents, Elly and Charles Palmer (the “Palmers”)3. On appeal, Mother argues 

the trial court abused its discretion by 1) denying her visitation with Ryan, and 2) not 

granting co-guardianship of Ryan to the Turners and Palmers. After a careful review 

of the record and applicable law, we affirm in part the orders of the trial court and 

remand in part for an appropriate visitation plan.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 2 Mother and Father began a romantic relationship, and together, the couple 

had Ryan on July 22, 2014. In 2014, the Alamance County Department of Social 

Services (“DSS”) received a report of a domestic violence incident between Mother

and Father while Ryan was present. During the investigation, DSS became 

concerned Father was “aggressive in his behaviors towards . . . Mother[.]” DSS was 

also concerned both parties were engaging in substance abuse. Ultimately, DSS

closed the case as Services Recommended when Mother voluntarily returned to a

residential treatment program. DSS recommended Mother “complete the full 

treatment program; seek counseling for domestic violence; and have no further 

contact with Respondent Father.” 

 

2 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the minor child. See N.C.R. App. P. 

42(b).

3 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the minor child. See N.C.R. App. P. 

42(b).
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¶ 3 Approximately three years later, DSS received another report concerning 

Ryan. The report alleged Ryan was injured during an automobile accident that 

occurred because Mother was driving while under the influence of cocaine, marijuana, 

amphetamines, opiates, and benzos. Mother drove off of a bridge, landing in the 

water below. Ryan and Mother were able to climb up to safety, but Ryan “suffered a 

skull fracture, hematoma to the forehead and abrasion to the left upper shoulder.” 

¶ 4 In response to this report, DSS found the family to be in need of services and 

transferred the case to In-Home Services in New Hanover County on August 11, 2017. 

On August 23, 2017, the New Hanover County Department of Social Services

(“NHCDSS”) received a report regarding Ryan. This report alleged Mother was 

driving under the influence with Ryan in the car and was giving Ryan Benadryl to 

make him sleep. A few days later, NHCDSS created an initial plan for Mother to 

receive Substance Abuse and Mental Health treatment and for Ryan to begin 

receiving therapy services. 

¶ 5 On October 27, 2017, Father notified NHCDSS he was concerned about 

Mother’s behaviors. When NHCDSS spoke with Mother, she admitted to have been 

using cocaine, heroin, and Percocet in Ryan’s presence. Four days later, Mother and 

Father decided to place Ryan with the Palmers. On November 28, 2017, Mother also 

moved into the Palmer’s home. NHCDSS verified the move the next day, and the InHome Services case was then transferred back to Alamance County. On August 16, 
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2018, NHCDSS closed its In-Home Services case.

¶ 6 Eight days later, Alamance County DSS received another report concerning 

Ryan. This report alleged Mother was under the influence of methamphetamines 

and driving with Ryan in the vehicle. The report also alleged Mother had assaulted 

Elly Palmer while Ryan was present. As a result, a safety plan was developed and a 

50-B domestic violence protective order was granted against Mother. Meanwhile, 

Ryan continued to live with the Palmers. After the 50-B protective order expired, 

Mother moved back in with Elly Palmer. Shortly thereafter, DSS closed the case with 

services recommended for mental health and substance abuse treatment. 

¶ 7 On February 18, 2020, DSS received a new report regarding Ryan. This report 

alleged Mother was acting erratic, “off her rocker[,]” and was tearing up the house. 

Both Father and Ryan were present during this incident. Because of Mother’s 

behavior, Father and Ryan were forced to vacate the house and “did not have a place 

to stay.” The report further alleged DSS had concerns Ryan may have neurological

problems but that Mother and Father continued to deny or minimize any potential 

mental health needs Ryan may have. 

¶ 8 On April 20, 2020, DSS determined the family was in need of services and 

transferred the case to In-Home Services to address 1) Mother’s and Father’s mental 

health needs and substance abuse, 2) continuing relationship discord between the 

parties, and 3) Ryan’s mental health needs. Sometime afterwards, Father moved to 
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Wilmington, North Carolina.

¶ 9 On May 5, 2020, the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office received a call about a

suspicious person walking in the road, staggering, and flashing a flash light outside 

of the power plant in Graham, North Carolina. Deputy Stone responded to the scene 

and observed Father staggering and holding a flashlight. Deputy Stone transported 

Father back to the couple’s residence. On the way, Father told Deputy Stone there 

was a shotgun inside the residence and that Mother was a felon. Upon arrival,

Deputy Stone received consent to search the residence and discovered on the floor of 

the residence an un-locked, loaded shotgun within Ryan’s access. Corporal T. Ray 

and Detective Wood also responded to the residence. Mother was arrested

subsequent to the search and charged with possession of a weapon by a felon and 

child abuse. DSS received a report of this incident the following day and promptly

conducted a pre-petition child family team meeting. There, it was agreed Ryan would 

stay with the Turners. Due to incarceration and the short notice of the meeting, 

Mother was not present at the meeting.

¶ 10 On May 7, 2020, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging Ryan to be a neglected 

juvenile. The trial court entered a nonsecure custody order the same day, placing 

Ryan with the Turners. The trial court held two additional hearings regarding 

nonsecure custody of Ryan that same month. Mother remained incarcerated at the 

time of each hearing. After these hearings, the trial court entered orders continuing 
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Ryan’s placement with the Turners. In each order, the trial court found “[t]hat it is 

not in the best interest of the juvenile to have visitation/contact with Respondent 

Mother due to her current incarceration.” 

¶ 11 On July 15, 2020, the trial court conducted an adjudication and disposition 

hearing. Mother remained incarcerated as of the date of this hearing. By order 

entered August 4, 2020, the trial court adjudicated Ryan a neglected juvenile and 

continued his placement with the Turners. The order also contained the following 

relevant decrees:

7. That at this time, it is not in the juvenile’s best interest 

to have visitation with the Mother due to her current 

incarceration. However, she may write letters and send 

them to the social worker to review and provide to the 

juvenile.

8. That . . . [Mother] may call between 1:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m. 

twice a week. . . . [Mother] will be responsible for the cost 

of telephone calls. Discussion must be age appropriate. 

Phone contact must be supervised by the . . . [Turners] at a 

high level of supervision (eyes and ears on). If child gets 

distressed or upset, the . . . [Turners] can discontinue the 

telephone calls.

9. That no discussions of the case should take place with 

. . . [Ryan]. That if the phone calls are negatively 

impacting the juvenile’s mental health, the calls will no 

longer be permitted.

¶ 12 Thereafter, Mother was released from incarceration. Meanwhile, Ryan 

continued to reside with the Turners. Maria Turner stated Ryan was “doing better”

at his placement, “learning what ‘no’ means[]”; however, “some days are more difficult 
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than others in regards to his defiance, but he is adjusting well . . . .” 

¶ 13 On October 6, 2020, the trial court entered a review and permanency planning 

order. The trial court found that Ryan had been diagnosed with “ADHD, Generalized 

Anxiety Disorder, Oppositional Defiance Disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder.” The trial court continued Ryan’s placement with the Turners, ordered a

primary plan of reunification with a secondary plan of guardianship, and granted 

Mother one hour of supervised visitation per week. The Palmers also were granted 

“unsupervised visitation, to include overnight, and the first and third weekend . . . of 

the month from 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 6:00 p.m. on Sundays.” 

¶ 14 On December 23, 2020, the trial court entered another review and permanency 

planning order that continued Ryan’s placement with the Turners, granted the 

Palmers unsupervised visitations every first and third weekend of each month, and 

granted Mother one hour of supervised visitation per week. A few months later, DSS 

filed a report with the trial court stating that Ryan “appears well bonded to each of 

his parents and his placement providers.” Ryan told DSS he enjoyed spending time 

with Elly Palmer and his parents but, at other times, also stated he does not want to 

go on the weekend visits to the Palmers’ residence. 

¶ 15 On June 28, 2021, the trial court entered a review and permanency planning

order changing Ryan’s primary plan to guardianship with a secondary plan of 

reunification. Another review hearing was scheduled for July 28, 2021 but continued 
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until August 11, 2021, and DSS and the guardian ad litem filed reports with the trial 

court on August 11, 2021. DSS reported Ryan stated he “wants to live with his dad 

or the . . . [Turners] and does not wish to live with . . . [Elly Palmer].” Ryan had, 

occasionally, refused to visit Mrs. Palmer’s residence; however, a DSS social worker 

observed that Ryan seems to enjoy his visits when he did attend. Elly Palmer

informed DSS that she was “on disability due to Clinical Depression” and “takes 

medication to assist with her depression but feels that she won’t be sad anymore if 

. . . [Ryan] comes to live with her, as it will give her ‘something to do.’ ” The DSS 

report further detailed various instances during which the Palmers and Turners 

experienced discord regarding Ryan’s visitation, rearing, and transitioning between 

the Palmers’ and Turners’ residences. Notwithstanding, DSS and the guardian ad 

litem both recommended in their reports that the trial court appoint the Palmers and 

the Turners co-guardians of Ryan. 

¶ 16 On August 11, 2021, the trial court held a review and permanency planning 

hearing. At the time of this hearing, Mother remained incarcerated with a projected 

release date of November 22, 2021. Ms. Lambert, the supervising social worker, 

testified at the hearing that there was a lot of animosity between the Palmers and 

Turners. She reported that the day prior, another social worker spoke with Elly 

Palmer to review DSS’s recommendation of the Palmers’ and Turners’ co-guardship

of Ryan. According to Ms. Lambert, when Elly Palmer heard this recommendation, 
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she became “very upset” and stated DSS “was being inappropriate, that this was the 

wrong statements.” Elly Palmer further told the social worker “we’ll just have to pray 

for them to die” so that she could acquire sole guardianship of Ryan. When the social 

worker told Elly Palmer these were inappropriate statements, she responded by 

laughing. Ms. Lambert explained, DSS was “very concerned that was, first of all, an 

inappropriate response. We were also concerned that maybe there was some 

emotional instability there, and then, finally, we were concerned that was a very 

strong indicator that they would not be able to work together as co-parents.” Ms. 

Lambert reported DSS’s recommendation changed from the Palmers and Turners

having co-guardianship of Ryan to granting the Turners sole guardianship of Ryan. 

The guardian ad litem agreed with the change in recommendation. 

¶ 17 The trial court entered a permanency planning order on September 17, 2021, 

decreeing, 

1. That legal and physical guardianship, in accordance 

with N.C.G.S. § 7B-600, of . . . [Ryan] is granted to . . . 

[Maria and Jordan Turner].

. . . 

3. That . . . [Ryan] will primarily reside with the . . . 

[Turners] with visitation with the . . . [Palmers] every other 

weekend.

. . . 

20. That, at this time, due to . . . [Mother’s] incarceration, 

visitation is contrary to the best interest, health and safety 
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of the juvenile. That . . . [Mother] may send cards, letters 

and other forms of written communication to the juvenile 

through Mr. . . . [Turner]. That . . . [Mother] is permitted 

to have a minimum of one telephone call a week with the 

juvenile that is to be highly supervised by his placement 

provider. That . . . [Mother] is responsible for cost 

associated with such communication. These calls shall be 

at reasonable times not past 9:00 p.m. or before 8:00 a.m. 

That the phone calls shall not unduly disrupt the juvenile’s 

daily schedule. That all communication shall be age 

appropriate and the mother shall not make promises to the 

juvenile.

21. That during periods of their incarceration, it would not 

be in the best interest for the juvenile to participate in 

visitations with the parents due to the limitation of jail 

visits and current COVID concerns. 

The same day, the trial court issued a guardianship short order granting 

guardianship of Ryan to the Turners. The guardianship short order, likewise, 

granted guardianship of Ryan to the Turners and allowed the Turners to “disclose 

this order to third parties in order to show their legal authority over the minor child 

or otherwise promote and protect the best interests of the minor child[] . . . .” Mother

filed a timely notice of appeal from both of these orders.

4

II. Standard of Review

¶ 18 This Court reviews a permanency planning order to determine “whether there 

is competent evidence in the record to support the findings and the findings support 

 

4 Father did not appeal these orders.
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the conclusions of law.” In re J.C.S., 164 N.C. App. 96, 106, 595 S.E.2d 155, 161 

(2004) (citing In re Eckard, 148 N.C. App. 541, 544, 559 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2002)). The 

trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if they are supported by 

competent evidence. In re Isenhour, 101 N.C. App. 550, 553, 400 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1991); 

see In re J.C.S., 164 N.C. App. at 106, 595 S.E.2d at 161; In re Weiler, 158 N.C. App. 

473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003). Whether the trial court’s findings of fact support 

its conclusions of law is reviewed de novo. In re A.S., 275 N.C. App. 506, 509, 853 

S.E.2d 908, 911 (2020).

¶ 19 “In choosing an appropriate permanent plan . . . the juvenile’s best interests 

are paramount.” In re J.H., 244 N.C. App. 255, 269, 780 S.E.2d 228, 238 (2015); see

In re L.G., 274 N.C. App. 292, 297, 851 S.E.2d 681, 685 (2020) (“The purpose of a 

permanency planning hearing is to identify the best permanent plans to achieve a 

safe, permanent home for the juvenile consistent with the juvenile’s best interest.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Although “[w]e review a trial court’s 

determination as to the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion[,]” In re 

J.H., 244 N.C. App. at 269, 780 S.E.2d at 238 (quoting In re D.S.A., 181 N.C. App. 

715, 720, 641 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2007)), we have also held the best interest determination 

is a conclusion of law and thus subject to a de novo standard of review. In re Helms, 

127 N.C. App. 505, 510-11, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675-76 (1997). 

¶ 20 A trial court’s order regarding visitation rights is reviewed for an abuse of 
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discretion. In re C.M., 273 N.C. App. 427, 432, 848 S.E.2d 749, 753 (2020); see In re 

I.K., 273 N.C. App. 37, 49, 848 S.E.2d 13, 23 (2020), aff’d, 377 N.C. 417, 2021-NCSC60. “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that 

its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason or upon a showing that the trial 

court’s decision was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned 

decision.” In re C.M., 273 N.C. App. at 432, 848 S.E.2d at 753 (cleaned up) (quoting 

White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)).

III. Discussion

¶ 21 Mother raises several issues on appeal; each will be addressed in turn.

A. Guardianship

¶ 22 Initially, Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion by determining 

it was in Ryan’s best interest to appoint the Turners as his sole guardians. We

disagree.

1. Findings of Fact

¶ 23 Mother first argues finding of fact number 106 is not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. This finding states, Ms. Palmer “is not a safe and appropriate 

person to have fulltime care and/or decision-making responsibility over the juvenile.” 

At the hearing, Ms. Lambert testified as to Ms. Palmer’s reaction and comments after 

being notified of DSS’s recommendation for co-guardianship. “She made statements 

. . . that the Department was being inappropriate, that this was the wrong 
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statements.” Ms. Lambert further testified Ms. Palmer “also made statements that 

the . . . [Turners] were old and idiots, and . . . we’ll just have to pray for them to die 

so that she can get . . . [Ryan].” Ms. Lambert explained DSS was “very concerned 

that was, first of all, an inappropriate response. We were also concerned that maybe 

there was some emotional instability there, and then, finally, we were concerned that 

that was a very strong indicator that they would not be able to work together as coparents.” 

¶ 24 The trial court made the following unchallenged findings of fact relevant to 

finding of fact number 106:

48. . . . [Mrs. Turner] has shared that when . . . [Ryan] was 

around two years old, she was changing his diaper and 

Mrs. . . . [Palmer] was at her home and came over and 

placed her hand over his mouth and nose when he was 

wiggling around. There is no documentation of this 

concern being shared with law enforcement or CPS at the 

time of the incident.

. . . 

50. Recently[] . . . [Ryan] refused to go to Mrs. . . . 

[Palmer’s] home and did not visit during the week of July 

10. It was reported that during the recent attempted 

transition, . . . [Ryan] refused to go to Mrs. . . . [Palmer’s] 

home and ran around the house, having the adults chase 

him. Both parties had varying views of the events that took 

place, but both maintain that . . . [Ryan] refused to go with 

the . . . [Palmers] and remained at the . . . [Turner’s] home. 

Mrs. . . . [Palmer] stated that Mrs. . . . [Turner] yelled at 

her that . . . [Ryan] was not going with her. Mrs. . . . 

[Turner] reported that Mrs. . . . [Palmer] was pulling . . . 
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[Ryan] and trying to physically force him to go with her.

. . . 

60. On July 22, 2021, SW observed . . . [Ryan’s] transition 

back to the . . . [Turner’s] home. When Mrs. . . . [Palmer] 

exited the car, Mrs. . . . [Palmer] stated to SW, “early 

morning for you”! [sic] SW replied, “I’m just working!” 

Mrs. . . . [Palmer] asked SW where she worked. This 

interaction was concerning as Mrs. . . . [Palmer] did not 

appear to recognize SW, although Mrs. . . . [Palmer] has 

met with SW multiple times and talks frequently on the 

phone to SW.

. . . 

65. Mrs. . . . [Palmer] informed SW that she was on 

disability due to Clinical Depression, stemming from the 

loss of her two sons. Mrs. . . . [Palmer] stated that she 

takes medication to assist with her depression but feels 

that she won’t be sad anymore if . . . [Ryan] comes to live 

with her, as it will give her “something to do.” This is an 

inappropriate reason for a child to live with someone.

Because none of these findings were challenged by Mother, they are binding on 

appeal. Isom v. Duncan, 279 N.C. App. 171, 2021-NCCOA-453, ¶ 1. Therefore, based 

upon Ms. Lambert’s testimony at the hearing, along with the additional findings of 

fact within the permanency planning order, we conclude competent evidence was 

presented to support finding of fact number 106.

¶ 25 To the extent Mother attempts to support her argument finding of fact number 

106 is not supported by competent evidence by offering alternative evidence, “[f]acts 

found by the judge are binding upon this court if they are supported by any competent 
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evidence notwithstanding the fact that the appellant has offered evidence to the 

contrary.” Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 56, 134 S.E.2d 227, 233 (1964) (first 

citing Mercer v. Mercer, 253 N.C. 164, 116 S.E.2d 443 (1960); then citing Briggs v. 

Briggs, 234 N.C. 450, 67 S.E.2d 349 (1951)); see Heatzig v. MacLean, 191 N.C. App. 

451, 454, 664 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2008). Thus, because we are holding today finding of 

fact number 106 is supported by competent evidence, we need not address Mother’s 

alternative evidence.

2. Conclusions of Law

¶ 26 Because we hold finding of fact number 106 is supported by competent 

evidence, and Mother has not challenged any other finding of fact, we must determine 

whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion of law. Specifically, 

Mother contends the trial court’s conclusions of law numbers 20 and 24 are not 

supported by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” Conclusion of law number 20 

provides, “[t]he current placement is appropriate and in the best interest of the 

juvenile.” Similarly, conclusion of law number 24 states, “[t]hat this Order is in the 

best interest of the juvenile and consistent with the juvenile’s health and safety.”

¶ 27 Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1,

[t]he court may maintain the juvenile’s placement under 

review or order a different placement, appoint a guardian 

of the person for the juvenile pursuant to G.S. 7B-600, or 

order any disposition authorized by G.S. 7B-903, including 

the authority to place the child in the custody of either 
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parent or any relative found by the court to be suitable and 

found by the court to be in the best interests of the juvenile.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(i) (2021) (emphasis added). “[T]he fundamental principle 

underlying North Carolina’s approach to controversies involving child neglect and 

custody, to wit, [is] that the best interest of the child is the polar star.” In re 

Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1984). 

¶ 28 As we stated supra, we review a permanency planning order’s conclusions of 

law to determine whether they are supported by its findings of fact. In re J.T.S., 268 

N.C. App. 61, 67, 834 S.E.2d 637, 642 (2019); In re J.C.S., 164 N.C. App. at 106, 595 

S.E.2d at 161. Any unchallenged finding of fact is presumed to be supported by 

competent evidence and, thus, binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 

97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). In addition to the findings of fact stated supra, the

trial court made the following findings of fact:

14. Freddie Omotosho5 testified and verbally amended the 

recommendations in the written report to reflect a 

recommendation of guardianship to the . . . [Turners] only 

and visitation for the . . . [Palmers]. The change in the 

recommendation is based [sic] the fact that . . . [Ryan] has 

been with the . . . [Turners] for over one year, the . . . 

[Turners] were hesitant to take on permanent care of . . . 

[Ryan] due to their age but are now willing to provide 

longer term care and on Ms. . . . [Palmer’s] inappropriate 

reaction to the recommendation that she work with the . . . 

[Turners], which makes it unlikely the . . . [Turners and 

 

5 Social Worker Freddie Omotosho was not present at the hearing. Ms. Lambert 

supervises Mr. Omotosho and assisted with the preparation of DSS’s report.
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Palmers] would be able to work together for the best 

interest of the juvenile.

. . . 

16. The Guardian ad litem testified and orally amended her 

recommendations to be in alignment with the revised, oral 

recommendations of the social worker.

. . . 

33. . . . [Ryan] has continued to reside in the home of his 

paternal relatives, Mr. and Mrs. . . . [Turner], since coming 

into care in May 2020.

34. Apart from . . . [Ryan’s] reluctant behavior in visiting 

Mrs. . . . [Palmer], the placement providers report no 

concerns in the placement home and SW has observed a 

loving and warm bond between . . . [Ryan] and the 

placement providers.

. . . 

42. SW has been able to observe . . . [Ryan] with his 

parents, individually, as well as with the placement 

providers during the life of the case. . . . [Ryan] appears 

bonded to each of his parents and his placement providers.

43. . . . [Ryan] reports that he enjoys spending time with 

his parents and with the placement providers.

44. . . . [Ryan] stated that he wants to live with his dad or 

the . . . [Turners] and does not wish to live with Mrs. . . . 

[Palmer].

45. Previously, Mrs. . . . [Turner] has stated that given the 

ages of her and her husband that they cannot commit to 

permanent placement of . . . [Ryan]. More recently, the . . . 

[Turners] have stated that they are committed to providing 

permanence for . . . [Ryan] and wish to be considered as 

legal guardians.
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. . . 

52. During this . . . [Child and Family Team meeting], all 

parties were difficult to keep on track and often focused 

topics on their indifferences with one another. The 

facilitator had to redirect multiple times during the 

meeting.

. . . 

58. Mrs. . . . [Palmer] has stated that sometimes . . . [Ryan] 

does refuse to come to her home but that after he is there, 

they always have a great time.

. . . 

67. In the fall of 2020, Mrs. . . . [Palmer] was struggling 

with managing her depression but as of the spring of 2021, 

has since become more stable and able to manage her 

symptoms more effectively. The Department was able to 

review her records and confirm compliance.

. . . 

98. The . . . [Turners] have demonstrated for over one year 

the ability to meet the needs of . . . [Ryan], financially, 

emotionally and otherwise.

99. The . . . [Turners] express an understanding of the role 

and responsibility of guardians and willingness to take on 

that role.

100. The . . . [Turners and Palmers] have attempted to 

work together but appear to have difficulty with 

interactions. This will make it difficult for them to work 

together to make decisions in the best interests of the 

juvenile.

. . . 

104. When the Department informed Ms. . . . [Palmer] 
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about a change in recommendation to grant joint 

guardianship, the day prior to this hearing, Ms. . . . 

[Palmer] stated that she would just have to pray that the 

. . . [Turners] die. There have been some ongoing concerns 

about Ms. . . . [Palmer’s] mental health. SW Omotosho 

testified, that her actions regarding the recommendation 

change appears to be a ‘clear indicator’ that she would not 

be able to co-parent with the . . . [Turners] successfully.

¶ 29 We conclude these findings of fact support conclusions of law numbers 20 and 

24. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting sole 

guardianship to the Turners and granting visitation only to the Palmers.

B. Visitation

¶ 30 Mother next contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her 

visitation with Ryan. We agree.

¶ 31 As a general rule, a parent has a “natural” and “legal” right to visit with his or 

her child and this should not be disturbed when awarding custody to another unless 

the parent’s conduct is such that this right is forfeited, or the exercise of this right 

“would be detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the child.” In re Custody of 

Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 551, 179 S.E.2d 844, 849 (1971). Thus, when an order

“removes custody of a juvenile from a parent, guardian, or custodian or that continues 

the juvenile’s placement outside the home[, the order] shall provide for visitation that 

is in the best interests of the juvenile consistent with the juvenile’s health and safety, 

including no visitation.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(a) (2021) (emphasis added); see 
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also Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 578, 843 S.E.2d 154, 159 (2020) (“[T]he trial 

court must apply the ‘best interest of the child’ standard to determine custody and 

visitation questions . . . .”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2020); In 

re Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C. App. at 552, 179 S.E.2d at 849.

¶ 32 “When the question of visitation rights of a parent arises, the court should 

determine from the evidence presented whether the parent by some conduct has 

forfeited the right or whether the exercise of the right would be detrimental to the 

best interest and welfare of the child.” In re Custody of Council, 10 N.C. App. at 552, 

179 S.E.2d at 849. If the trial court does not find the parent’s conduct has forfeited 

his or her visitation right, or that such right is detrimental to the child’s welfare and 

best interest, it “should safeguard the parent’s visitation rights by a provision in the 

order defining and establishing the time, place and conditions under which such 

visitation rights may be exercised.” Id.

¶ 33 We pause to note Mother, in her brief, specifically challenges finding of fact 

number 19, stating “[t]he trial court found that it was contrary to Ryan’s best interest 

and inconsistent with his health and safety to have visitation with Mother. (R p 385, 

FOF #19). The finding of fact is not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing 

evidence.” Our review of the record reveals finding of fact number 19 does not address 
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visitation as cited by Mother’s brief.6 Rather, conclusion of law number 19 states,

“[t]hat it is contrary to the best interest of the juvenile and inconsistent with the 

juvenile’s health and safety to have visitation with the Respondent Mother.” Thus, 

we presume Mother intended to challenge conclusion of law number 19 and, as such, 

shall review whether the trial court’s order findings of fact support its conclusion of 

law number 19. Accord State v. Holland, 230 N.C. App. 337, 344, 749 S.E.2d 464, 468

(2013)

¶ 34 Here, the trial court found Mother does not remain available to the court, DSS, 

and guardian ad litem; is not actively participating in or cooperating with the plan, 

DSS, and guardian ad litem; and is “acting in a manner inconsistent with the health 

and safety of the juvenile.” It furthered that during the review period, the social 

worker “had very limited contact with . . . [Mother] due to her unknown whereabouts 

and incarceration[,]” and Mother was “sentenced to 9-20 months for . . . [a] probation 

revocation.” Based upon these findings of fact, we conclude conclusion of law number 

19 is supported by the findings of fact.

¶ 35 Here, the trial court ordered the following visitation plan between Mother and 

Ryan:

 

6 Finding of fact number 19 states, “[t]he court has inquired and no one presents 

information that the juvenile is a Mexican Minor or American Minor as defined in the 

Memorandum of Agreement between the Consulate general of Mexico in Raleigh and the 

Government of the State of North Carolina.” 
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20. That, at this time, due to . . . [Mother’s] incarceration, 

visitation is contrary to the best interest, health and safety 

of the juvenile. That . . . [Mother] may send cards, letters

and other forms of written communication to the juvenile 

through Mrs. . . . [Turner]. That . . . [Mother] is permitted 

to have a minimum of one telephone call a week with the 

juvenile that is to be highly supervised by his placement 

provider. That . . . [Mother] is responsible for cost 

associated with such communication. These calls shall be 

at reasonable times not past 9:00 p.m. or before 8:00 a.m. 

That the phone calls shall not unduly disrupt the juvenile’s 

daily schedule. That all communication shall be age 

appropriate and the mother shall not make promises to the 

juvenile.

21. That during periods of their incarceration, it would not 

be in the best interest for the juvenile to participate in 

visitations with the parents due to the limitation of jail 

visits and current COVID concerns.

Mother does not argue that her visitation should be not suspended while she is 

incarcerated; rather, she asserts the trial court made no findings regarding her 

visitation rights after she is released from prison. We agree. 

¶ 36 Section 7B-905.1 provides the trial court “shall provide for visitation that is in 

the best interests of the juvenile . . . .” § 7B-905.1(a)(1). Our General Assembly’s use 

of the language “ ‘shall’ is a mandate to trial judges, and that failure to comply with 

the statutory mandate is reversible error.” In re Eades, 143 N.C. App. 712, 713, 547 

S.E.2d 146, 147 (2001) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court provided no guidance 

as to what visitation rights, if any, Mother has with Ryan upon her release from 

prison. 
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¶ 37 Indeed, the trial court was aware of Mother’s pending release as it found, 

Mother “was transferred to the NC Women’s Correctional Institution and anticipated 

to be released November 24, 2021.” The permanency planning order was entered 

approximately two months prior to November 24, 2021. Because Mother’s release 

from prison was imminent, the trial court should have provided for a visitation plan 

after her release that was in Ryan’s best interest. We are mindful of that fact that 

Mother’s projected release date will have long passed by the date of this opinion. 

Therefore, we remand to the trial court for further findings of fact regarding visitation 

between Mother and Ryan and an appropriate visitation schedule. In making the 

determination regarding an appropriate visitation schedule, the trial court may 

conduct a new hearing in order to examine the current circumstances of Ryan and 

Mother to determine what schedule is in the best interests of Ryan. 

IV. Conclusion

¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the trial court granting 

guardianship to the Turners. However, we remand the September 17, 2021 

permanency planning order to the trial court for further findings of fact and a

determination of an appropriate visitation schedule between Mother and Ryan. It is 

so ordered.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART.

Judges INMAN and ARROWOOD concur.