# FILED
May 19, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON JANUARY 1997 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) APPELLEE, ) ) No. 02-C-01-9604-CR-0 0112 ) ) Shelby County v. ) ) Joseph B. Brown, J r., Judge ) ) (Sentencing) CHRISTOPHER A. PRENTISS, ) ) APPELLANT. )

FOR THE APPE LLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: Terry D. Smart John Knox Walkup Attorney at Law Attorney General & Repor ter 371 Carroll Avenue 500 Charlotte Avenue Memphis, TN 38105 Nashville, TN 37243-0497 Clinton J. Morgan Assistant Attorney Gener al 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Nashville, TN 37243-0493 William L. Gibbons District Attorney General 201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01 Memphis, TN 38103 John W. Campbell Assistant District A

ttorney General 201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01 Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED:_______________________________

______ AFFIRMED Joe B. Jones, Pre siding Judge 

## O P I N I O N2 The appellant, Christopher A. Prentiss, (d efendant ), was convicted of v ehicular homic ide, a Class C felony, leav ing the scene of an accident inv olving death, a Class E felony, and driving a motor vehicle after revocation of license, following his pleasof guilty to these offenses. The trial court i mposed the following sentence s pursuant

to the pl ea bargain agreement between the State of Tenness ee and the defendant: a fine of $500 and confinementfor three (3) years in the Shelby County Correctional Center for v ehicul ar homicide; confinement for one (1) year in the Shelb y County Correctional Center for leaving the scene of an accident invol ving death; and a fine of$150 for driving after the revocatio n of drive r's licens e. The se ntences are to be s erved con currentl y. There was no agreement regardingalternative sentencing . A sentencing hearing
was conducted. The trial court refused to impose an alte rnative sentence . Thus, the defend ant raise s the fol lowing issu es for revi ew:

I. The trial judge erred in not consi dering sentencing pri nciples and all relevant facts and ci rcumstances in determining the manner of service of defendant's sentenc e[s]. II. Whether the manner of service of the sentence[ s] imposed by the trial court [ar

e] appropriate.
After a thorough review

of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, an d t he law governingthe issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The defendant was 28 years of age when he was sentenced. He left s chool in the ninth grade. He made an effort to obtain a GED, but he failedthe test. He was liv ing with his parents. He was employed by a farm e quipment company in the parts department. He has a prior convicti on for driving wi thout a license. On th e evening of September 24, 1993, the defendant visited his gir lfriend in a trailer park in Millingto n. When an ar gument ensued between the defendant and his girlfriend, the defendant left the trailer at a hi gh rate of speed. Witnes ses est imated the defendant reached a speed of sixty miles per hour in a thirt y mile per hour speed z one. The defendant struck the victim, a child three and one-half years of age. The impact3

knocked t he child approximately 168 feet. The defendant did n ot stop after striking the child. The defendant went to the Mi llington Police Department approximately two hours afterstriking the child.The officers observed that the defendant had been drinking. The defendant refused to submit to a chemical breath test or field sobriety tests. Two officers expressed the view

the defendant's ability to oper ate a motor vehicle wa s not impaired. The trial court refused to impos e an alternative s ente nce. The court found the def enda nt was less than candid w hen he testified at the sentencing hearing, and confinementwas necessary to av oi d dep reciating the seriousn ess of the offenses. The court also noted the defendant was not se rious regarding the remorse heexpressed. The defendant testified how the incident had affected him. The defendant did not off er to make restitution. This Court has conducted a de novo review of the record with a presumption that the determinations made by the tr ial court are correct. Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-35-401(d). Before an accused is entitled to r elief, the accused ha s the burden of overcoming th e presumption of correctness.In this case, t he defendant has fa iled to overcome the findings of the trial court. The defendant's lack of candor at the sentencing hearing is sufficient

to justify the denial of an alternative sentence. State v. Chrisman , 885 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Crim. App.) per . app . denied (Tenn. 1994); State v. Smith , 735 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). In vehicular homicide cases, the avoidance of depreciating the seriousness of the offenses is a valid consideration. Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its discretion properly refused to gr

ant an alternative sentence.

___ ________________________________ _________

_ JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE4

CONCUR:

______________________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUD GE

______________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, JU DGE