First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and

finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal

and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. This analysis reflects the premise that due process is “flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id, at 334.

Undoubtedly plaintiff has a substantial interest in receiving a fair hearing. However, the
court is not convinced that any additional procedures would reduce the chances that defendant
would erroneously terminate plaintiff's contract. A full-blown hearing, with cross-examination
and confrontation of adverse witnesses is useful in cases requiring factual determinations, where
there are issues of credibility. It is not useful in a case like this, in which the issue is a legal one:
whether plaintiff's contract complies with the requirements of state law.' Accordingly, plaintiff

is not entitled to any further hearings, if the one she received met the minimum requirements of

pre-termination procedures outlined in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill.

Plaintiff contends that her pre-termination hearing did not meet Loudermill’s minimum
requirements because the decisionmaker at her hearing was not impartial. Plaintiff correctly
notes that, in addition to the requirements that she be provided notice, an explanation of
defendant’s evidence, and an opportunity to present her side of the story, she is also entitled to an

impartial decisionmaker. See Head v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 794,

" In fact, the Seventh Circuit has noted that when the parties “disagree only about the
meaning of state law, then the complaint does not ‘arise under’ federal law” and there is no
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See Shegog v. Board of Educ., 194 F.3d 836, 838 (7" Cir.
1999). Since this court has determined that plaintiff's federal claim is moot, the court need not
address whether, under Shegog, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

4


ORDERED: Count I is dismissed with prejudice, as moot. Count IL is dismissed without

prejudice. Judgment will be set forth on a separate document. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.

ENTER:

. Lindberg
enior United States District Judge

JUL 24 2002
DATED:



testimony of three witnesses, including one current Board member, and an affidavit of the former
superintendent. Plaintiff also testified at the hearing. In addition, another current board member

volunteered during the hearing to testify on plaintiff's behalf. The Board has not made a decision
following the hearing.

Plaintiff makes two arguments in support of her position that her due process claim is not
moot. First, plaintiff contends that her federal claim is not moot because she is still entitled to a
post-termination hearing that is more extensive than the pre-termination hearing she received on
June 26, 2002, and defendant has stated that it does not contemplate holding any additional
hearings. Second, she argues that the pre-termination hearing itself was inadequate because the
decisionmaker at the hearing — the Board — was not impartial.

This court has previously determined that plaintiff could have a property interest in her
continued employment with the school district based on the express provisions of her contract,
despite conflicting state law. Since plaintiff has a constitutionally protected interest in her job,
defendant was required to provide plaintiff, at a minimum, limited pre-termination procedures,
including notice of the charges, an explanation of its evidence, and an opportunity to present her

side of the story. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). The

court first considers whether plaintiff was entitled to more process than the pre-termination
hearing she received.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), supplies the
framework for analyzing whether plaintiff was entitled to more process than she received. Under

the Mathews analysis, the court must balance three factors:


804 (7" Cir. 2000). However, adjudicators are presumed to act honestly and with integrity, and
plaintiff must present substantial evidence of bias, “such as evidence of a pecuniary interest in
the proceeding, personal animosity toward the plaintiff, or actual prejudgment of the plaintiff's
case”, to overcome this presumption. Id. at 804.

Plaintiff argues that the Board prejudged her case, as evidenced by the fact that it was the
Board that initiated actions to terminate her contract in the first place. As further evidence that
the Board prejudged her case, plaintiff offers board member William Jordan’s testimony that
after the new board was installed, the new board president stated that “he’d like to have
everybody on ... one-year contracts straight around. He don’t [sic] like the multiyear contract.”
Jordan further testified that “I think the law firm of Diamond ... allegedly said they could find
some loopholes to get rid of the multiyear contract.”

Plaintiff has not come forward with sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that
the Board was impartial. A decisionmaker should not be disqualified as biased “simply because
he has taken a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, in the absence of a
showing that he is not ‘capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own

circumstances.’” Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482,

493 (1976) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)); see also Wainwright v.

Witt, 469 USS. 412, 424 (1985) (prospective juror in capital case should not be disqualified as
biased where juror expressed objection to capital punishment, unless those views prevent or
substantially impair him from impartially applying the law). Even “[e]vidence of prior
familiarity with the plaintiff or his or her situation, or even of involvement in the particular

matter under consideration, is not adequate by itself to overcome the presumption.” Head, 225


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Nameotaciured udee | George W. Lindberg _| ting Judit Over
CASE NUMBER 02 C 3578 DATE 7/24/2002
CASE Cheryl D. Woods-Clendening vs. Bd of Education, et al.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, c.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) 0 Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) Qo Answer brief to motion due____. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) QO Ruling/Hearingon___setfor__-—sat__.

(5) a Status hearing held.

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—setfor__—sat__
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on at

(8) im) (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued toa

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule 21 OFRCP41(a)(1) © FRCP41(a)(2).

a0) «xf {Other docket entry] Count ] is dismissed with prejudice, as moot. Count II is dismissed without
prejudice. Enter memorandum opinion and order.

(1) ff {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document

Number

No notices required,
umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff. NUL 25 2002
—_ dts So

Notified counsel by telephone.

v | Docketing to mail notices.

v Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom 2nd He He Eg
SLB deputy’s
initials =

=
Dateltime Gee US W3

central Clerk's Office cmaiting deputy initials



RR A ne LS

F.3d at 804; see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (noting that “[iJt has long

been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit
in successive trials involving the same defendant”); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984)
(prospective juror should not be disqualified as biased, despite his knowledge of case from
pretrial publicity, unless his opinion of case is so fixed that he would be unable to judge
impartially). Thus, in this case, the mere fact that the Board had commenced an action to
terminate plaintiff's contract, without more, does not mandate a finding of impartiality.

Nor is the court persuaded by the testimony of William Jordan. The statement he
attributes to the Board’s president, that the president did not like multi-year contracts and would
prefer all the employees to have one-year contracts, does not reveal any bias against plaintiff, but
only a general position on multi-year contracts. Jordan’s testimony regarding a law firm’s
“alleged” statement suggesting that loopholes could be found to get rid of the multi-year contract
is similarly vague, and again does not demonstrate that the Board was biased against plaintiff.
Plaintiff has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board acted as an impartial
decisionmaker.

Since plaintiff has now received adequate process, her sole federal claim is moot.
Accordingly, Count I is dismissed with prejudice. The court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claim in Count II. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Groce v. Eli Lilly

&Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7" Cir. 1999).


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETED

CHERYL D. WOODS-CLENDENING, JUL 25 2002

Plaintiff,
02 C 3578
ve
Judge George W. Lindberg
BOARD OF EDUCATION, SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 89, COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS,

Defendant.

SSS SSS SS SS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On May 20, 2002, plaintiff Chery! Woods-Clendening filed this federal action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that defendant Board of Education had violated her procedural due
process rights when it notified her that it would be terminating her multi-year contract after one
year, without providing plaintiff with a pre-termination hearing. After plaintiff filed this action,
defendant held a hearing. The court now considers whether defendant’s action has rendered
plaintiff's federal claim moot.

On July 12, 2001, plaintiff and defendant entered into an employment contract, which
provided that plaintiff would serve as the school district’s personnel director from July 1, 2001
through June 30, 2006. Under its terms, the contract could be terminated only by mutual
agreement of the parties, plaintiff's retirement or resignation, or for cause.

Defendant subsequently determined that plaintiff's multi-year contract failed to meet the
statutory requirements of the Illinois School Code. The Illinois School Code provides, in

relevant part, that “school districts may only employ principals and other school administrators


under either a contract for a period not to exceed one year or a performance-based contract for a
period not to exceed 5 years.” 105 ILCS 5/10-23.8a. The Code defines the requirements of such
a “performance-based contract” as follows:
Performance-based contracts shall be linked to student performance and
academic improvement attributable to the responsibilities and duties of the

principal or administrator...Each performance-based contract shall include the

goals and indicators of student performance and academic improvement

determined and used by the local school board to measure the performance and

effectiveness of the principal or other administrator and such other information as

the local school board may determine.

Id. Plaintiff's contract incorporated the job description for personnel director contained in
defendant’s policies, but neither the contract itself nor the job description explicitly contained
goals linked to student performance and academic improvement.

Based on its determination that plaintiff's contract failed to meet the statutory
requirements for multi-year contracts, defendant decided to treat the contract as a one-year
contract ending July 1, 2002, On April 23, 2002, defendant offered plaintiff an additional one-
year contract as personnel director for the 2002-2003 school year, which plaintiff declined. On
May 5, 2002, defendant notified plaintiff that her position would be posted as vacant beginning
July 1, 2002 and that she would need to reapply if she wished to be considered for it. If plaintiff
was not reappointed to the personnel director’s position, she would remain employed by the
school district as a teacher, at a reduced salary, under her retained tenure rights.

On June 26, 2002, defendant held a hearing for the purpose of allowing plaintiff to
respond to defendant’s determination that her multi-year contract was invalid. The Board

presided over the hearing. At the hearing, the Board stated its reasons for believing the contract

was invalid. After plaintiff's attorney made an opening statement, plaintiff presented the