unjust enrichment claim (Count V). Comcast’s request for a constructive trust is

properly deemed a request for relief and not a separate claim in this action.

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan j 2 q

United States District Court Judge

Dated: July 28, 2004

19



Electronics, Inc., the plaintiff was a cable provider bringing suit against defendants
under the DMCA for selling and distributing pirate cable descrambling equipment.
Id. The Court held that the plaintiff cable provider was authorized to bring suit
under 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a), as it was a person injured by a violation of the DMCA.
Id. Therefore, it is appropriate for Comcast to bring the current DMCA claim.
Regarding the sufficiency of Comcast’s claim in 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), the
DMCA explicitly states that a violation of the statute occurs when descrambling
equipment circumvents a measure that “effectively controls access” to a protected
work. Measures based on encryption or scrambling effectively control access to
copyrighted works. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294,
318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Comcast is undisputedly not the copyright holder of the
programs on the networks which it provides to its subscribers. However, those
programs are copyrighted material, and Comcast controls access to such protected
material through the descrambling method described in its complaint. Similarly,
under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1), although the “controlled access” language of 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) is not stated, a violation of the statute also occurs when a
technological measure that effectively protects the right of a copyright owner is
circumvented. Comcast does control the technological measure that protects the
copyrighted material. Moreover, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a) “any person
injured by a violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action in an

appropriate United States district court for such violation.” The civil remedies

13



state constructive trust claim (Count VI). All Defendants other than Net Results
filed a motion to dismiss. Net Results subsequently filed its own motion to dismiss

and adopted the arguments of the other defendants.

LEGAL STANDARD

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must draw all reasonable inferences
that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in
the complaint. Thompson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th
Cir. 2002); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7thCir. 1991). Under the
principle of notice pleading, espoused by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
complaint need only state “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint should not be
dismissed as long as plaintiff’s allegations put the defendant on fair notice as to the
nature and grounds of the claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
Plaintiffs can plead conclusions. McCormick v. City of Chi. 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th
Cir. 2000). A claim should not be dismissed for a failure to state a claim “unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Additionally,
“pro se complaints are to be liberally construed and not held to the stringent

standards expected of pleadings drafted by lawyers.” McCormick, 230 F.3d at 325.


an equitable doctrine. It does not call for decisions based on rigid technical
distinctions, Rather, as an equitable doctrine, it is based upon notions of fairness and
justice. It is alleged that consumers purchased illegal cable devices from pirating
companies and the companies then used the consumers’ funds to pay Defendants for
the inclusion of the hyper-links on Defendants’ websites. Defendants’ alleged
participation is sufficient to state a claim for unjust enrichment.

Comcast has not contended that Net Results benefitted as the domain server
for websites that sell illicit cable equipment. However, in ruling on a motion to
dismiss, we grant the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from the allegations within the complaint. Palay v. U.S., 349 F.3d 418, 425
(7th Cir. 2003). We find it a reasonable inference that Net Results has retained a
monetary benefit as the domain server for websites that sell cable pirating devices.
Therefore, Comcast has met the minimum pleading requirements against the

Defendants and we deny the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count V.

V._ Imposition of a Constructive Trust

Comcast seeks an imposition of a constructive trust against Defendants.
Defendants move to dismiss this count contending that a constructive trust is not a
cause of action, but rather a remedy. The imposition of a constructive trust is
commonly used as relief for an unjust enrichment.May Dept. Stores Co. v. Fed. Ins.

Co., 305 F.3d 597, 603 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, a constructive trust is not a separate

17



Defendants also contend that Comcast has not alleged facts sufficient to show
intent as required by 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). In reviewing a complaint on a motion to
dismiss, the plaintiff's allegations of intent are sufficient if they would satisfy Rule
8's notice pleading minimum requirement and Rule 9(b)’s requirement that the
plaintiff plead motive and intent generally. Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651
(7th Cir. 2001). Comcast alleges that Garcia, Hightech, and Traffic Pros, through
their operation by Garcia, and Net Results have been implicated in prior suits
involving illegal cable pirating devices. Comcast further contends that Defendants
are all aware of the illegal activities taking place within the companies which they
are assisting. Comcast thus claims that such facts in its complaint indicate
Defendants had intent to assist in the distribution of illegal pirating devices. We

agree that intent is sufficiently pled under the notice pleading standard.

I. Ilinois Cable Piracy Act Claim

Defendants move to dismiss Count II of Comcast’s complaint, which alleges
that Defendants violated the ICPA. Pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/16-21(a) “any person
aggrieved by a violation of Section 16-19 may bring a civil action in any court of
competent jurisdiction.” Furthermore, 720 ILCS 5/16-19 provides that, “a person
commits an offense if he or she knowingly obtains or uses a communication service
without the authorization of, or compensation paid to, the communication service

provider, or assists or instructs any other person in doing so with intent to defraud


person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receivingany
communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized
to do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law.”
47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)(emphasis added). Defendants argue that creating and
maintaining websites that have hyper-links to other websites which sell illegal cable
descramblers does not fall within the meaning of “assist in intercepting or receiving”
in 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). Furthermore, Defendants argue that Comcast has not
provided sufficient facts to show intent which is required for a 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)

claim.

A. Sco} “Assist in Inte: in, iving”

The phrase “assist in intercepting or receiving” is defined in 47 U.S.C. §
553(a)(2) as “the manufacture or distribution of equipment intended by the
manufacturer or distributor (as the case may be) for unauthorized reception of any
communications service offered over a cable system in violation of subparagraph
(1).” 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2). Thus, 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) indicates that in order to
“assist in intercepting or receiving” the defendant must have manufactured or
distributed a device and intended that the device would be used for the unauthorized
reception of cable services.

In the instant case, many of the allegations against the Defendants involve

merely maintaining a website that contained hyper-links to illegal pirating websites.



DISCUSSION

I Consent Judgment

Comcast claims that its predecessor AT&T entered into a consent judgment
agreement with Garcia on January 8, 2002, in a previous, unrelated case. Comcast
argues in its answer to the instant motion that Garcia is prohibited under the consent
judgment from engaging in the conduct alleged in the complaint. However,
Defendants correctly point out that a violation of the consent judgment does not
prove a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553(a). Also, the consent judgment concerned all
claims against Garcia relating to “Decoder Devices” and the consent judgment did
not even cover all claims regarding decoder devices. Rather, the judgment
specifically concerns operations through Galaxy Electronics, Inc. and Viper
Electronics, Inc., which are wholly unrelated to this case. Also, Comcast raises this
argument in passing in their memorandum in opposition to the instant motion and
Comcast does not seek to enforce the consent judgment in the complaint. It is not

clear that we would be the proper tribunal for such a remedy in any case.

I, Cable Communications Act Claii
Count I of Comcast’s complaint alleges that Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. §

553(a){1) under the Cable Communications Act. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 553, “no



cause of action but rather an equitable remedy. ZCM Asset Holding Co. v. Allamain,
2003 WL 732753, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Accordingly, an imposition of a
Constructive trust cannot stand as a separate claim. Id.

Although a constructive trust claim is superfluous, a plaintiff still has the
option to prove that a constructive trust is an appropriate equitable remedy if it
prevails on other claims. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, 16 F. Supp. 2d 941,
952 (N.D. Ill. 1998). To prove such a remedy, a plaintiff must establish grounds for
imposing a constructive trust that are so clear and convincing that it leads to only
one conclusion. Davis v. Combes, 294 F.3d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, although
the burden is heavy, Comcast could still attempt to prove a constructive trust as an

appropriate remedy, but cannot state it as a separate claim.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
Cable Communications Act claim (Count I). We grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the ICPA claim (Count II) to the extent that it is based upon wrongful
conduct that occurred prior to January 1, 2003. We deny Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the ICPA claim (Count II), We deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
DMCA claims (Counts III and IV). We deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

18



second amended complaint Comcast also makes general allegations that Net Results
provides services to “over thirty (30) other websites which are linked to [Hightech’s
website] which are selling illegal cable descramblers.” (SA Compl. 29). However,
this vague reference to “services” provided to “other websites” is insufficient to even
meet the notice pleading standard.

Unlike the other Defendants, Garcia, allegedly through Traffic Pros, did have
a more direct relationship to companies that distribute illegal cable equipment by
allegedly selling companies sales leads to potential buyers of such illicit equipment.
(SA Compl. 30). Comcast further alleged that Garcia, through Traffic Pros, also
provided these companies with organizational charts and taught them how to run a
pirate descrambler business. (SA Compl. 30). Garcia assisted the pirating
companies in their initial stages and Garcia profited off of the pirating companies’
increase of their customer base. However, such activity does not constitute the
“manufacture or distribution” of illegal pirating equipment. 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2).
See also CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Greenleaf Electronics, Inc,2000 WL 715601, at *5
(N.D. Ill. 2000)(indicating that the legislative history for § 553(a)(2) “was ‘primarily
aimed at preventing the manufacture and distribution of so-called black boxes and
other unauthorized converters. ...”). Therefore we grant Garcia’s and Traffic Pros’

motion to dismiss the Cable Communications Act claims brought against them.

B. Intent



eis ir Fora 067)
United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

Sepsigiratege | Samuel Der-Yephinyan | Syed
CASE NUMBER 03 C 3231 DATE 7128/2004
CASE Comcast IL vs. Hightech Elec
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: ofthe motion being presented]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due ___
@) Oo Answer brief to motion due__. Reply to answer brief due___.
(4) Qo Ruling/Hearingon____setfor__at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for] on setfor_ ___at
(6) Qa Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]}on___setfor__—sat_—.
) Q Trial[set for/re-set for]on__—_at
(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued tot
(9) Q This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4{m) CLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(aX1) OO FRCP41(a){2).

7) ae _| (Other docket entry] Status hearing held and continued to 11/09/04 at 9:00 a.m. For the reasons
stated in the attached memorandum opinion, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff's second amended
complaint is granted in part and denied in part. All discovery is to be noticed in time to be completed by
10/28/04. Dispositive motions with supporting memoranda are to be filed by 11/29/04. Responses to the
dispositive motions, if any, are to be filed by 12/13/04 and replies, if any, are to be filed by 12/20/04.
Enter Memorandum Opinion.

ay a [For further detail see order (on reverse side offattached to) the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. number of notices
Notices mailed by judge’s staff, JUL 2 9 2004
Notified counsel by telephone. | date dockcted
wv | Docketing to mail notices. J x ay
Mail AO 450 form. : docketing initials
Copy to judgemagistrate judge. tenga Agizisia ‘sn
dae mai police
Mw inne nO:8 WY 62 Tor hoz
initials =a wan
Luss Office malig deputy nila



720 ILCS 5/16-21, as it brings the action pursuant to the section that provides for the
private cause of action for a violation of 720 ILCS 5/16-19, the section that
Defendants have allegedly violated. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the ICPA claim (Count II) to the extent that it is based upon wrongful
conduct that occurred prior to January 1, 2003. We deny Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the ICPA Count to the extent that it is based upon wrongful conduct that

occurred on or after January 1, 2003.

IV._Digital Millennium Copyright Act Claim
Comcast further alleges that Defendants violated the DMCA. The DMCA

provides:

No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that-

(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title;

(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title; or

(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person
with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title. . .
(b) Additional violations.--(1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to
the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service,
device, component, or part thereof, that--

11



the communication service provider.” On its face, Comcast’s complaint establishes
facts that could prove a violation of the ICPA, namely that Defendants assisted
others in using illicit communication services. The ICPA does not define the term
“assist,” as does the Cable Communications Act. Thus, Defendants’ actions as the
domain server for websites selling pirating cable devices, maintaining web links to
such sites, or selling sales leads to companies selling such illicit equipment, could
possibly violate the ICPA.

Defendants further argue that 720 ILCS 5/16-19 was not enacted until January
1, 2003, and all of Comcast’s exhibits display conduct taking place prior to 2003.
Thus, Defendants contend that Comcast does not have a cause of action under the
ICPA. We agree that Defendants should not have to defend themselves for actions
taken place before the enactment of 720 ILCS 5/16-19. In Comcast’s reply, Comcast
states that Defendants’ conduct continued at least until the time the suit was filed in
May of 2003, after the enactment of the statute.See McCormick, 230 F.3d at 324
(stating that a plaintiff can plead conclusions). Therefore, Comcast does not need to
provide detailed evidence of Defendants’ activities from January 1, 2003 until May
14, 2003, and Comcast has sufficiently stated a cause of action for a violation of this
statute during that period.

Defendants also argue that Comcast cannot sue under 720 ILCS 5/16-21
because the cause of action is created under 720 ILCS 5/16-19. Defendants’

contention here is wholly incorrect. Comcast adequately pleads Defendants violated

10



(SA Compl. 28). Such conduct does not constitute manufacturing the pirating
devices. Neither does it constitute the distribution of the pirating devices.
Defendants did not sell the pirating devices through the hyper-links. The hyper-links
merely provided an avenue for webusers to proceed to webpages that sold the
pirating devices. There is no indication that webusers could not access the pirating
webpages without the hyper-links. The links on Defendants’ websites merely
provided a separate avenue to the pirating websites. Comcast argues that Defendants
increased the internet traffic to the websites that sold the illegal pirating equipment.
However, Comcast does not allege that the website at issue in this case did not have
links to lawful websites. Defendants correctly point out that under Comcast’s theory
of increased internet traffic all major search engines such as Yahoo and Google
could be named as defendants as well. Such a broad interpretation of the assist
provision in the Cable Communications Act is clearly unwarranted, particularly
since there is a specific limiting definition provided in the Act. Under the plain
language of the statute a dismissal is warranted against all Defendants to the extent
that Comcast’s claims are based upon each Defendant’s maintenance of a website
with hyper-links to illegal pirating websites.

Comcast also alleges that Net Results is the domain server of Hightech’s
website and of other websites actually selling illegal cable equipment. (SA Comp.
29). For the reasons stated above in regards to hyper-links, no claim against Net

Results can be based on Net Results’ involvement with Hightech’s website. In the


website named direct-hosts.com, that purportedly provides web hosting to cable-
descramblers-direct.com and to numerous other illegal pirating device websites.

Comcast further alleges that numerous other cable companies have previously
sued Garcia for his operation of two companies, not named in the present suit, that
sold illegal cable pirating devices. In January of 2002, as a result of one of these
suits, Garcia allegedly signed a Consent Judgment enjoining him from assisting
others in any way in distributing any illegal cable equipment.

According to Comcast, Defendants’ activities described above have
financially injured Comcast, have created an adverse impact on Comcast’s ability to
maintain a high quality of programming services for its subscribers, and have
increased the risk of signal leakage which could potentially violate FCC regulations.
Comcast also alleges that the state of Illinois could suffer from decreased franchise
fees Comcast pays to the state.

On May 14, 2003, Comcast initiated this lawsuit. Comcast filed its final six
count complaint, the second amended complaint, on October 14, 2003, against
Hightech, Traffic Pros, Garcia, Net Results, and William S. Reed (not joining in
Defendants’ motion to dismiss). Comcast brought this complaint against Defendants
pursuant to the Cable Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 553et seq. (Count I), the
Illinois Cable Piracy Act (“ICPA”), 720 ILCS 5/16-21 (Count IN), and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) (Counts

II and IV). Comcast also brought a state unjust enrichment claim (Count V) and a



provided in the statute do not explicitly state that recovery is limited to the copyright
holder. Therefore, as Comcast controls access to copyrighted material and is a
person injured from a violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1201, we conclude that it can bring
suit pursuant to the DMCA.

Furthermore, in regards to the allegations that Defendants maintained a
website with hyper-links to websites that sold illegal pirating devices, Comcast has
alleged facts sufficient to state a claim under 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a). Courts have held
defendants in violation of the DMCA for maintaining links to other websites that
contain access to or information regarding circumvention technology.See
Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp. 2d at 345 (enjoining defendants from linking to other
websites that made unauthorized DeCSS software available pursuant to the DMCA);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley 273 F.3d 429, 447 (24 Cir. 2001)(holding
defendants were in violation of the DMCA for linking to websites containing access
to copyrighted movies on DVDs). InJntellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry, Inc., the Court held that the website operator that posted links to infringing
websites did not contribute to such infringement. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293 (D.
Utah 1999). However, the rationale for this finding was that there was no direct
relationship between the defendant and the people who operated the websites
containing the infringing material. /d. Specifically, the defendants were not
receiving any kind of compensation from the linked websites./d.

Such evidence is clearly contrary to the case at hand, as Comcast alleges that

14



instead been paid to or belong to Comcast. 477 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984). In Premier Electrical Construction Co, the Court held that to prove unjust
enrichment a defendant must have accepted a benefit which would be inequitable for
him to retain because payment was not made for the service./d. Defendants also

cite National American Insurance Co. v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co.
to support this contention, in which the Court held that unjust enrichment occurs
when a third party transfers a benefit to the defendant which belongs to the plaintiff.
2000 WL 975176, at *2 (7thCir. 2000).

However, the holdings in Premier Electrical Construction Co. and National
American Insurance Co. do not support Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Comcast did
allege in its second amended complaint that revenue gained from assisting in the
distribution of pirate cable devices that illegally benefit from Comcast’s services are
property rights which belong to Comcast. Furthermore, Comcast alleges that
Defendants received revenue from assisting others in selling illegal pirating devices,
and those are benefits received that would be unfair to retain. The revenue
Defendants Garcia, Hightech, and Traffic Pros allegedly received from the third
party companies selling illegal cable equipment, is sufficient to state a claim for
unjust enrichment because that monetary benefit belongs to Comcast, in the form of
legal cable service. Although Defendants are not alleged to have directly assisted
cable consumers in unlawfully obtaining Comcast’s broadcasts, the money paid by

consumers is indirectly routed to Defendants. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is

16



named Hightech, which set up a website named 1-satellite-dish.com. According to
Comcast, 1-satellite-dish.com contains links to over thirty other websites which are
selling illegal cable pirating devices. Comcast alleges that, by setting up 1-satellite-
dish.com, Garcia and Hightech assisted in the distribution of cable pirating devices
by driving internet traffic to these other websites that sell cable pirating devices.
Comcast alleges that in return for such services, those websites selling cable pirating
devices that are linked to 1-satellite-dish.com provide Garcia with substantial
compensation.

Defendant Net Results is the named domain server for the 1-satellite-dish.com
website, as well as for the other websites selling cable pirating devices that are
linked to 1-satellite-dish.com. According to Comcast, Net Results has knowledge of
the illegal activity occurring on these websites because it was subpoenaed in two
other lawsuits regarding such illegal activities. Net Results continues to provide
internet service to 1-satellite-dish.com, as well as to the other websites linked to that
page which are selling cable pirating devices.

Garcia is also allegedly the president of a company named Traffic Pros.
Comcast alleges that Garcia, acting on behalf of Traffic Pros, assisted other
companies in distributing cable pirating devices by selling customer sales leads to
these companies. Comcast further alleges that Garcia, through Traffic Pros, also
provided such companies with organizational charts teaching them how to run an

illegal pirating device business. Comcast also contends that Traffic Pros operates a



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
COMCAST OF ILLINOIS X, LLC., ) DOCKETED
an Illinois Limited Liability Company, } 2 9 2004
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 03 C 3231
)
HIGHTECH ELECTRONICS, INC., )
etc., et al, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Defendants Hightech Electronics, Inc., a/k/a
Hitech Electronics, Inc.’s, (“Hightech”), Internet Traffic Pros, Inc.’s, (“Traffic
Pros”), Carlos Garcia’s, (“Garcia”) and Net Results, Inc.’s (“Net Results”) motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Comcast of Illinois X, LLC’s (“Comcast”) second amended
complaint. For the reasons stated below, we grant the motion in part and deny the

motion in part.

BACKGROUND

In February of 2002, Garcia worked for a company he created and operates


(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right
of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof;

(B) bas only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof; or

(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person
with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by
a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner
under this title in a work or a portion thereof.

17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(2);(b)(1). Defendants argue that only copyright holders can
bring suit under the statute, and Comcast, in regards to the cable signals at issue, is
not a copyright owner. Defendants further contend that Comcast does not state facts
in its complaint that could support a violation of the statute.

Comcast cited in support of its DMCA claimRealnetworks, Inc. v. Streambox,
Inc., in which the Washington District Court noted that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 is distinct
from copyright infringement. 2000 WL 127311, at *6 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
However, Realnetworks, Inc. is not controlling precedent and is distinguishable from
the case at hand because unlike the instant case a copyright holder brought suit in
Realnetworks, Inc. Id. Furthermore, the Court in Realnetworks, Inc. was not
determining whether 17 U.S.C. § 1201 applied to non-copyright holders, but rather
whether it applied to copyright infringement claims. /d.

Comcast also cites CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Greenleaf Electronics, Inc, 2000

WL 715601, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2000) in support of its position. InGreenleaf

12


Garcia and Hightech receive compensation from the website operators that link to 1-
satellite-dish.com. Furthermore, Net Results, as the domain server of websites
selling illegal cable equipment, and Garcia, through Traffic Pros, selling other
companies sales leads for potential purchasers of illegal cable equipment and
teaching those companies how to set up such a business, could possibly be engaging
in trafficking under the DMCA because they are allegedly assisting sellers of illegal
cable equipment in distributing such equipment. Therefore, Comcast sufficiently
stated a claim against Defendants under the DMCA in trafficking or acting in
concert with a person who has manufactured or distributed illicit circumvention

equipment, and we deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts IH and IV.

IV._ Unjust Enrichment

Defendants further contest Comcast’s unjust enrichment claim. Unjust
enrichment is a quasi-contractual theory available when one party has benefitted
from the services of another, and according to the principle of equity, it would be
unfair to allow that party to retain such a benefit. Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc.
vy. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 397 (7th Cir. 2003).

Defendants cite two cases to support their theory that the court should dismiss
Comcast’s unjust enrichment claim. Citing Premier Electrical Construction Co. v.
LaSalle National Bank, Defendants contend that Comcast has not alleged that the

fees Defendants received for assisting in the sale of pirate cable devices should have

15