WPCA.

Where a collective bargaining agreement establishes a grievance and arbitration procedure
for disputes arising out of the agreement, an employee alleging a violation of the agreement must
attempt to exhaust his or her contractual remedies before secking judicial reliet. See Uehlein v.
Shwachman, 156 Tll. App. 3d 274, 277 (1987). However, the mere dispute between an employee and
an employer is insufficient to make the matter in dispute subject to the arbitration procedures of a
collective bargaining agreement. See Daniels v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 277 lll. App.
3d 968, 972 (1996) (Daniels). Instead, the court must consider whether the claim is one which, on
its face, is governed by the contract. If the claim is governed by the contract, the exclusive remedy
is to follow the grievance and arbitration procedure. Ifthe claim is not covered by the contract, a suit
may be filed, See Daniels, 277 Tl. App. 3d at 972,

In the instant case, Plaintiffs seck compensation for time worked before and after their
official shifts, including training required for their job. The applicable CBA requires that Plaintiffs
be paid one and one-half times the average of the regularly hourly rate for all hours worked in excess
of eight hours in any regular work day, or over eighty hours in any regular pay period. The regular
work day is eight and one-quarter hours of elapsed time, including a thirty-minute paid lunch period,
which is counted as eight hours worked. ‘The CBA also sets forth the Plaintiffs’ work periods.
However, the CBA does not define work and does not indicate whether the work that Plaintiffs seck
compensation for (time worked before and after their official shifts) is or is nol compensable work.
Because the employer and employee did not define compensable work in their CBA, it is not

appropriate to resolve the present dispute through the CBA’s grievance procedures. See Daniels, 277

TU. App. 3d at 972-73 (tinding complaint improperly dismissed because the collective bargaining



ILCS 105/2; Pautlitz v. City of Naperville, 1991 WL 33658 (N.D. Ill. March 8, 1991). A
governmental or quasi-governmental body is included in the definition of an employer under the
IMWL. See 820 ILCS 105/3(c). The IMWL provides that “no employer shall employ any of his
employees for a workweek of more than 40 hours unless such employee receives compensation for
his cmployment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate of 1 1/2 times the regular rate...”
820 ILCS 105/4a(1). However, the overtime compensation section of the IMWL, 820 ILCS 105/4a,
provides that the provision is not applicable to “[a]ny governmental body”. 820 ILCS 105/104a(2)D.

In the instant case, Plaintiffs allege that they were not properly paid for time worked.
Plaintiffs do not dispute the amount of their wages, except as to failurc to pay overtime. However,
as mentioned above, Defendant, as a government body, is exempt from the overtime conipensation
section of the IMWL. Therefore, the instant Plaintiffs’ IMWL claim against Defendant, at a
minimum, is weak. Accordingly, the instant Plaintiffs would not adequately represent the class as
required by Rule 23. See Robinson v. Sheriff of Cook County, 167 F.3d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 1999)
(if class representative’s claim is weak, it is doubtful that his representation will be adequate);
Woodard vy. Tower Auto. Prod. Co., 2002 WL 832572 (N.D. ll. May 1, 2002) (denying class
certification because weak case of the proposed class representatives rendered them inadequate
representatives).

Upon careful reconsideration and based on the Plaintiffs’ inability to adequately represent
the class, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration as to the class certification of Count Il is granted.

Defendant also seeks reconsideration of Count IL based on the new argument that the WPCA

claim is based on the collective bargaining agreement between the parties; therefore, the Plaintiffs

were required to exhaust their contractual remedies via the collective bargaining agreement, not the



agreement did not address plaintiffs’ claims). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ WPCA claim is not weak to
render Plaintiffs inadequate representatives for class certification.

Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ late disclosure of thirty-three witnesses demonstrates
that the named Plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives because Plaintiffs are actually relying
on the undisclosed witnesses, not the named Plaintiffs, to prove their case.

The mere fact that Plaintiffs plan to call additional witnesses to prove their case fails to
establish that the named Plaintiffs are inadequate representatives for class certification. Accordingly,
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the named Plaintiffs are inadequate representatives for class
certification.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration is granted in part and
denied in part. Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration as to the class certification of Count IT is

granted. Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration astaghe class certification of Count Ill is denied.

Dated: 1 3 ZOOR 10 ae

United States District Judge



, MinateYeder Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judy Sitting Judge if Oth
_ Magistrate Judge John W. Darrah than Assigned Sudge
CASE NUMBER 01C 6119 DATE 1/23/2003
CASE MARIA BELBIS vs, COUNTY OF COOK
TITLE

{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, c.g. plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:
(eb) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) Oo Answer brief'to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__
(4) QO Ruling/Hearingon set for at.
(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [sct for/re-set for]on__——sset for___ at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] {sct for/re-set for]on__——set for at.
(ea) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) im} {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) O This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) O Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) [0 FRCP41(a)(2).
(io) =o [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. Defendant’s motion for

reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part. Defendant’s motion for reconsideration as to the
class certification of Count Il is granted. Defcndant’s motion for reconsideration as to the class
certification of Count II is denied.

(il) @f [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required, number of notices

Notices maited by judge’s staff.

“7 2908

Notified counsel by telephone. dyte docketed

WY | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. LUNOG Pomtrotes ‘on

pity iniins

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

Coe M4 Ae

courtroom
LG deputy's
initials

rot
ime received in

central Clerk's Office rwailin deputy initials



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARIA BELBIS and TINA WARREN,
individually and on behalf of a class of employees
similarly situated; and MARIA BELBIS, TINA
WARREN, TIFFANY TAYLOR, DOROTHEA
PURNELL, SHERYL NELLA, and all others who
have had a consent to join filed in this case,

ait t

No. 01.C 6119: *
Plaintiffs,
Judge John Darrah

Vv.

COUNTY OF COOK,

Defendant.

wee Se SS Se eS SS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, Maria Belbis (“Belbis”) and Tina Warren (“Warren”), filed a class action suit
against Defendant, County of Cook (“Cook County”), alleging violations of the Illinois Minimum
Wage Law (“TMWL”), 820 ILCS 105/I et seg. (Count II), and the Wage Payment and Collection Act
(“WPCA”), 820 TLCS 115/1 et seg. (Count MM), Plaintiffs, Belbis, Warren, Tiffany Taylor
(“Taylor”), Dorothea Purnell (“Purnell”), and Sheryl Nella (“Nella”), and all others that have had
a consent to join in this casc, also allege Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),
29 U.S.C.§ 201 et seq (Count TV). In November 2002, this Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Facilitate Section 216(b) Notice and granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification for Counts
Hand LL. Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider the Class Certification

of Counts II and II.

Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or

4
case



fact or presenting newly discovered evidence or an intervening change in the law. Cosgrove v.
Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1998). Reconsideration is appropriate when “the Court has
patently misunderstood a party or has made a decision outside the adversarial issucs presented to the
Court by the parties or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.” Spearman Indus.,
ine. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins, Co., 139 F, Supp. 2d 943, 945 (N.D. II. 2001), quoting Bank af
Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 119+ (7th Cir. 1990). A motion for
reconsideration cannot be used to introduce new legal theories for the first time, to raise legal
arguments that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion, or to present
evidence that could have been adduced during the pendency of the original motion. Publishers Res.,
Ing. v. Walker-Davis Publ ns, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985).

Defendant first argues that Plaintiffs’ IMWL claim should not have been class certified
because Plaintiffs’ claim cannot be brought against the Defendant, a government body, Defendant
did not present this argument in its previous response to the motion for class certification. While
such new arguments are generally disfavored in a motion to reconsider, the court’s duty to ensure
compliance with Rule 23 lasts throughout the entire case. See General Tel. Co. af Southwest v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (modification of class certification order appropriate to insure
“actual, not presumed conformance with Rule 23”); Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223,
1227 (8th Cir. 1986) (court’s duty to insure compliance with Rule 23 continues after certification);
Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers, Etc., 657 F.2d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 1981) (court may act
to change previously certified class if later events prove original certification was improvident).

Accordingly, the Court addresses Defendant’s new argument.

The purpose of the IMWL is to ensure that employces are paid an adequate wage. See 820