the repair and restoration work properly. Henderson’s claims against JC include negligent
Testoration, breach of contract, IED, and NIED. Henderson’s claims against Environmental
include negligent inspecting and testing of her home, IED, and NIED.

JC argues that this Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the third-party claims.

Section 1367 provides that “district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy...” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This section allows district
courts to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims, whether compulsory or
permissive, so long as the counterclaims “are so related to” the original claims that they form the
same case or controversy. Channell v. Citicorp Nat'l Serv., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 385-87 (7th Cir.
1996) (Channel). A “loose factual connection between the claims” is sufficient to allow
supplemental jurisdiction. See Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1995).

In the original action, Amica seeks a declaration concerning insurance coverage
stemming from a nearby fire and storm damage to Henderson’s home. As part of the original
action, Amica includes the denial of benefits for personal injury, pain and suffering, medical
care, lost income, and increased succeeding insurance coverage. Henderson seeks compensation
for these matters based on her belief that Amica and/or its contractors are the cause of the
damages.

In Henderson’s counterclaim and third-party action, Henderson alleges that Amica and its
contractors caused damages to her and her children after their negligent repair of her home
following the same nearby fire and storm.

The above facts demonstrate that the series of events from the September 1998 fire to the



:

te

Amica seeks a declaration that the insurance policies do not provide coverage for certain
claims by Henderson and a determination by this Court of which damages claimed by Henderson
are covered under the insurance policies and the amount of loss recoverable by Henderson under
the policies.

Subsequently, Henderson filed a counterclaim/third-party complaint. A reading of
Henderson’s Amended Counterclaim/Third-Party Complaint supports the following summary of the
alleged conduct of the parties as to her and her sons’ claims.

On three occasions - September 1998, June 1999, and August 2001 - Amica assumed
responsibility for repairing damage to Henderson’s home. On each occasion, the contractors
hired by Amica - Servicemaster, O’Brien, JC, and Environmental - performed the repair work
negligently. As a result, water was able to seep into Henderson’s home, causing toxic mold to
grow and spread throughout the home.

The toxic mold contamination caused Henderson and her two sons to develop respiratory
problems, asthma, allergies, and compromised their immune systems. Their home is still
infested with mold and must be razed and rebuilt.

Henderson’s claims against Amica include negligence in connection with the September
1998 fire, a June 1999 water leak, and the July 2001 water leak and mold contamination;
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“ITED”) by allowing Henderson and her family to
reside in the home knowing the toxicity of the mold in the home; negligent infliction of
emotional distress (“NIED”) for not warning Henderson of the dangers of mold contamination
and remediation; violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act; and declaratory judgment.

Henderson's claims against Servicemaster and O’Brien include negligence by failing to complete



mold contamination will be issues in the declaratory judgment and Henderson's counterclaims
and third-party claims, Furthermore, Amica’s relationship with the contractors will also be at
issue in both Amica’s and Henderson’s claims. At the minimum, Henderson's allegations
establishes that there is a “loose factual connection” between the claims sufficient to allow
supplemental jurisdiction.

JC also argues that even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, the Court should decline to
hear the third-party claims because such claims would predominate over Amica’s declaratory
action.

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the claims, including
counterclaims, would substantially predominate over the claims over which the court has original
jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2); Channell, 89 F.3d at 387.

As found above, the allegations in Amica’s claims and Henderson’s counterclaims
against Amica involve factual disputes arising after the September 1998 nearby fire. The factual
issues raised in these claims are also part of the claims against the other Defendants now seeking
dismissal. Henderson’s claims are clearly subsumed within the issues raised by the declaratory
action and counterclaims against Amica. Accordingly, the third-party claims will not
substantially predominate over the original action to mandate the denial of supplemental
jurisdiction.

For the reasons stated above, JC’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.

Dated: 9 2023

JOHN W, DARRAH
inited States District Judge



PP viinate Orig Form (0697)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned J Sitting Judge if O1
enor Maglecrate jade John W. Darrah than Assigned Sudge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 5193 DATE 1/9/2003
CASE AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY vs. PATRICIA HENDERSON
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) ao Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due :
(4) Q Ruling/Hearing on set for at :
(5) Q Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
”) Oo Trial{set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to)
OFRCP4(m) O Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a){(1) (1 FRCP41(a)(2).
ao 4 [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. JC’s motion to dismiss is denied.
Response to motion to dismiss to be filed by January 30, 2003. Third-party defendant Environmental
Diagnostic Inc.’s motion to strike discovery is denied, Status hearing held and continued to 2/25/03 at
9:00 a.m.
ail) @ [For further detail see order (on reverse side of/attached to) the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.
Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
a | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom
Le deputy’s
‘ initials



wee,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DOCKETED

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, aan 10 2003

Plaintiff,
v.
PATRICIA HENDERSON,

No. 02 C 5193
Defendant.

Judge John W. Darrah

PATRICIA HENDERSON, individually and as
Guardian of LAN HENDERSON and ALEX
HENDERSON,

eed

Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

ve

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY;
SERVICEMASTER COMPANY; O’BRIEN
PLUMBING & SEWER; JC RESTORATION, INC.;
and ENVIRONMENTAL DIAGNOSTICS, INC.;

Counterclaim-Defendants and
Third-Party Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Amica Mutual Insurance Company “(Amica”), filed a Complaint for

werner eee

Declaratory Judgment against Defendant, Patricia Henderson (“Henderson”). Subsequently,
Henderson filed a Counterclaim against Amica and a Third-Party Complaint against
Servicemaster Company (“Servicemaster”); O’Brien Plumbing & Sewer (“O’Brien”); JC
Restoration, Inc. (“JC”); and Environmental Diagnostics, Inc. (“Environmental”). Presently

pending before the Court is JC’s Motion to Dismiss to which Servicemaster and Environmental



~

have joined.

A reading of Amica’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment supports the following summary
of the alleged conduct of the parties as to its claims.

Amica issued homeowners insurance to Henderson for her residence in Chicago, Illinois.
The Amica/Henderson policies provide coverage for dwelling, other structures, personal property,
loss of use, and personal liability. The policies do not provide coverage for the insured’s personal
injury, pain and suffering, medical care, lost income, or increased cost of succeeding insurance,

On September 9, 1998, Henderson sustained loss to her residence resulting from a fire which
occurred at an adjacent residence. Henderson reported the occurrence to Amica, and Amica began
adjustment of the losses.

On July 22, 2001, Henderson sustained losses to her residence resulting from a windstorm
that damaged the siding to her home. Henderson reported the occurrence to Amica, and Amica
began adjustment of the losses under this claim. In the course of the investigation of the second
claim, water and mold damage to Henderson’s property was discovered, some of which allegedly
resulted from the fire loss of September 9, 1998. After notification of the alleged mold damage,
Amica retained specialized service companies to perform investigations and microbial toxin testing
at the Henderson property. Amica also retained service companies to repair and remediate the
damage to the Henderson property. Amica has issued payment to Henderson and on Henderson’s
behalf, under both claims.

On April 26, 20002, Amica received correspondence from Henderson’s legal counsel
requesting that Amica pay for her residence to be razed and rebuilt. On July 9, 2002, Amica
received another correspondence from Henderson’s legal counsel requesting settlement in the

amount of $2,375,000 for specified claims set forth in the correspondence.

2