1

Tribune’s motion to intervene is granted. See In re Associated Press, 162 F.3d 503, 508

(7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he press [should be] permitted to intervene in order to present arguments

against limitations to the constitutional or common law right of access.”).

2

The jury was deliberating on the second phase of the trial. The deliberations were

regarding whether the Government had proven the murder allegations charged as part of the

racketeering conspiracy. The jury reached a unanimous decision regarding ten of the murders

charged, but deadlocked as to the remaining eight. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

v.

NICHOLAS CALABRESE, et al.

No. 02 CR 1050

Judge James B. Zagel

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On September 26, 2007, Proposed Intervenor Chicago Tribune Company (“Tribune” or

“Intervenor”) moved—on an emergency basis—to intervene1

 and for immediate access to the

jurors’ names upon the return of a verdict. That day, I held a hearing on Tribune’s motion. None

of the defendants in the case took a position, but the Government opposed the motion, citing three

main objections. First, the Government argued that disclosing the jurors’ names could endanger

their physical safety. Second, the Government asserted that to release the jurors’ names now

would be to renege on the promise of anonymity made to them at the outset of their service. 

Finally, the Government expressed concern that the only purpose of releasing the names at this

point would be to inquire about the nature of the deliberations. 

The day after Tribune filed its motion, the jury returned its verdict.2

 That day, I issued an

Order stating that to the extent Tribune sought the jurors’ names on an emergency basis—i.e.,

immediately upon the return of the verdict—its motion was denied. I entered the original Order
2

granting the Government’s motion for an anonymous jury in April. Therefore, Intervenor had

more than five months to file its motion. I denied the emergency nature of the motion because I

concluded that Tribune’s request—and the Government’s opposition thereto—required more

reasoned consideration. However, I stated that I would still consider the request on a highly

expedited basis. And now, eight days after first hearing Intervenor’s motion, I enter this ruling.

The Supreme Court has declared that “the press and general public have a constitutional

right of access to criminal trials.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 

457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)

(plurality opinion). This right, however, is not absolute. The Court has held that the right of

access “may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant's right to a

fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information.” Waller v.

Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984). 

The starting point for assessing whether Intervenor is entitled to the relief it seeks is to

examine whether Tribune has a qualified First Amendment right of access to the jurors’ names. 

In general, I would analyze that question using the two-pronged test the Supreme Court laid out in

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). This involves the

“experience” test and the “logic” test. See United States v. Black, 483 F.Supp.2d 618, 622-30

(N.D.Ill. 2007). I am not convinced that Tribune has carried its burden of establishing a qualified

right of access to this information. See Black, 483 F.Supp.2d at 630; Gannet Co., Inc. v. State,

571 A.2d 735 (Del. 1989) (holding that there is no First Amendment right of public access to

jurors’ names). In particular, Tribune’s claim of a historical underpinning to a First Amendment

right of access is belied by the fact that the federal statute requiring courts to develop a master

plan for random jury selection explicitly permits courts to adopt a plan that does not reveal
3

This Court’s master plan states: “No person shall make public or disclose to any person,

unless so ordered by a judge of this Court, the names drawn from the Qualified Jury Wheel to

serve in this Court until the first day of the jurors' term of service. Any judge of this Court may

order that the names of jurors involved in a trial presided over by that judge remain confidential

if the interests of justice so require.” United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois,

Plan for Random Selection of Jurors (As revised December 2006), ¶ 10(a) (emphasis added). As

I explain more fully below, I conclude that the interests of justice require the jurors’ names to

remain confidential here.

3

prospective juror names at all. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7).3 Nevertheless, for purposes here, I will

assume—without deciding—that some qualified First Amendment right of access does exist. 

It is well established that in certain circumstances, a trial court may decline to release

jurors’ names, even after the trial has concluded. See United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 922

(5th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s post-verdict order maintaining juror confidentiality);

In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 91 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]here could be circumstances

necessitating withholding juror identities after verdict . . . .”); United States v. Harrelson, 713

F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Disclosure of Juror Names and Addresses, 592 N.W.2d 798, 808

(Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (“[W]e hold that the trial court retains the discretion to formulate

restrictions on the time and manner of disclosure of jurors’ names or, in some cases, perhaps,

deny disclosure . . . .”). 

It is true—and Intervenor correctly points out—that the Globe Newspaper court directed

the district court to turn over the jurors’ names and addresses to the intervenor newspaper. 920

F.2d at 91. However, the specific outcome of that case notwithstanding, Globe Newspaper

nevertheless supports the proposition that withholding jurors’ names is appropriate in some

circumstances. The issue here is not whether a broad rule should be established categorically

banning the press from accessing jurors’ names in all cases. The question, rather, is whether in
4

Like the Globe Newspaper court, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d

1348 (3d Cir. 1994), also reversed a trial court’s decision to impose restrictions on the media’s

access to juror information post-verdict. But also like in Globe Newspaper, the Antar court

suggested that, in certain circumstances, such an order could be appropriate. 

4

the narrow context of this case, the circumstances favor withholding that information. The Globe

Newspaper court premised its ruling on the fact that the trial court did not make specific findings

to support the determination that the interests of justice required the post-verdict withholding of

jurors’ names. Id. at 92-93.4

 Thus, to the extent that I find that the interests of justice here

require denying Tribune’s request, Globe Newspaper poses no barrier. 

The interests of justice are best served by maintaining the anonymity of the jurors. 

Tribune relies primarily—though by no means exclusively—on the Globe Newspaper case. 

However, the language in the Globe Newspaper opinion actually counsels in favor of withholding

the jurors’ names here. First, the panel in Globe Newspaper held that it would be appropriate to

withhold jurors’ names “when there is some special risk of personal harm to the jurors.” 920 F.2d

at 91. Releasing the jurors’ names here could pose just such risks to these jurors. A great deal of

evidence was adduced at trial establishing that these defendants—and the criminal organization to

which they belong—would go to great lengths to obstruct the judicial process. In fact, this very

jury just found that one of the defendants committed a homicide, the motive for which was to

prevent the victim from providing damaging testimony about the perpetrator. The risk that

associates of these defendants would seek to retaliate against this jury is real. The Brown court

noted that “[t]hreats of intimidation and harassment do not necessarily end with the conclusion of

trial . . . without continuing anonymity, jurors would remain vulnerable to abuse by those acting

for the defendants.” 250 F.3d at 921-22. The same is true of the jurors here. In addition, it is

entirely conceivable that criminal associates of these defendants who fear that they may face trial
5

Taken to its logical extreme, one could use this principle to argue that all jurors should

remain anonymous in all cases. I reject such an extension. As I explain below, this case is an

outlier. The fact that it is both highly publicized and involves dangerous individuals makes even

post-verdict anonymity important. 

5

at some point in the future could threaten these jurors in an effort to intimidate future jurors.5 The

risk that releasing the jurors’ names could subject them to physical harm is, in and of itself,

enough to warrant denial of Tribune’s request.

The Globe Newspaper case supports the result here in other ways as well. Tribune cites

the same passage in both its opening and its supplemental briefs:

Jurors, after all, are citizen soldiers; unlike judges and court personnel, they are not

full-time professionals. At first glance it will seem unfair that, in addition to giving

of their time and talent, they may, in publicized cases, be forced to run a press

gauntlet and have their identities exposed to a public which they might fear will

contain a few vengeful or unbalanced persons. But there are several answers to

this: first, jurors may avoid many problems by flatly refusing press interviews when

approached. Second, while privacy concerns following a publicized trial are

real—and may understandably include some nervousness about personal security—

these unfocused fears must be balanced against the loss of public confidence in our

justice system that could arise if criminal juries very often consisted of anonymous

persons. While anonymity is acceptable in the exceptional case where there is a

particular need for it, the prospect of criminal justice being routinely meted out by

unknown persons does not comport with democratic values of accountability and

openness. Jurors may be citizen soldiers, but they are soldiers nonetheless, and like

soldiers of any sort, they may be asked to perform distasteful duties. Their

participation in publicized trials may sometimes force them into the limelight

against their wishes. We cannot accept the mere generalized privacy concerns of

jurors, no matter how sincerely felt, as a sufficient reason for withholding their

identities under the interests-of-justice standard.

Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d at 97-98. 

Although relied upon by Tribune, this passage effectively illustrates why the jurors’

names should be withheld here. First, the court states that “jurors may avoid many problems by

flatly refusing press interviews when approached.” Id. at 97. This observation may have been

true in 1990 when the Globe Newspaper case was decided, but it is patently untrue today. Even if
6

a juror declines to be interviewed, the news media can nonetheless force that reluctant juror into

the spotlight. The recent trial in this building of United States v. Warner, et al., 02 CR 506,

demonstrates this point. In that case, a newspaper owned by Intervenor gathered and published a

great deal of information about the jurors, without actually having to interview the jurors. The

events in that case illustrate that the news media can, and unhesitatingly will, investigate jurors’

lives without necessarily ever speaking to the juror. The media may examine all aspects of a

juror’s background and could, in theory, even wait outside a juror’s home to take photographs or

request interviews. Today, even a photograph or video of a juror declining an interview or

evading a reporter is newsworthy. This is so despite the fact that some might fail to see how it

advances the public’s understanding of how well our courts do the government’s business. The

Globe Newspaper panel likely envisioned a more-or-less polite request from the media seeking

comment, followed by a similarly polite media retreat in the face of a flat “no.” It is unlikely that

this would be the court’s vision now. This both strengthens juror preference as a reason to

continue anonymity and poses another potential “harm” (besides physical harm) that could befall

jurors if their identities are released. 

The passage Tribune cites supports the result here in another way as well. The court

stated: “While anonymity is acceptable in the exceptional case where there is a particular need for

it, the prospect of criminal justice being routinely meted out by unknown persons does not

comport with democratic values of accountability and openness.” Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d at

97-98. This is the “exceptional” case. Reading Tribune’s motion, one might think that we are on

the precipice, perilously close to holding all criminal trials in a secluded room, wholly outside the

public’s view. That is, quite clearly, not so. First, this case is anomalous. I have presided over

criminal trials on this Court for more than two decades, yet this is only the second time that I have
6

The Michigan Court of Appeals specifically endorsed the method I employed here. The

trial court in that case made similar arrangements, and the appeals court called it “an example of a

reasonable compromise trial courts can employ once it has been determined that jurors' names

should be sealed to protect their safety.” In re Disclosure of Juror Names, 592 N.W.2d at 808

7

seated an anonymous jury. Here, there was an unusual combination of dangerous individuals and

dense media coverage focused on popular notions of organized crime, its allegedly colorful

leaders, and its allegedly colorful ways. It was this mixture that compelled me to take the

extraordinary step of seating an anonymous jury. Second, this trial has been remarkably open. 

Reporters were present throughout all phases of the trial, including voir dire. Also, to the extent

that some matters were heard at sidebar, outside the presence of reporters, nearly all of those

transcripts are set to be released now that a verdict has been reached. Moreover, in response to an

early request by Tribune, I ordered the Government to release a redacted version of its Santiago

proffer. As a result, the media was able to see evidence before it was ever offered and before

determinations were made as to its admissibility. In short, the news media thoroughly covered this

trial from start to finish. It is simply wrong to suggest that withholding the jurors’ names

somehow deprives the public of meaningful access to these proceedings or threatens to undermine

the public’s confidence in the criminal justice system. 

Another factor supporting continued anonymity is the fact that efforts have been made to

accommodate both the media’s desire to gather news and the jurors’ interest in remaining

anonymous. Immediately after the jury concluded its deliberations, courthouse personnel set aside

a room where the news media could interview any juror who wished to speak. Also, when I

addressed the jury to thank the members for their service, I informed them that the media wished

to speak to them, that this room was being set up to accommodate such a meeting, and that any

juror who wished to speak to the press had an absolute right to do so.6

 I further informed the jurors
n.8. 

7

One news outlet noted that a reporter attempted to interview the jurors as they left the

building on their final day. Mark Konkol, Jury: ‘We thought we did a very fair job’; Some

members of panel use tunnel to avoid media, Chicago Sun Times, September 28, 2007, at 11. The

story notes that “[w]hen a reporter approached with questions one [male juror] put his arm around

a female juror and raised his voice a bit. ‘Just get away,’ he said . . . .” Id. The story also says

that “[t]wo female jurors walked away quickly, heading west toward the river, not saying a word

to a trailing reporter.” Id. The piece continues: “When no comment didn’t stop the chase, one

woman relented on the condition she wouldn’t be identified.” Id. (Emphasis added). 

8

that should they opt not to talk to the press then, that they remained free to speak to the media later

if they changed their minds. No juror chose to be interviewed in the room that was set aside, and

to my knowledge, no juror has contacted the press since.7

 The import of all this is that the Globe

Newspaper court—by stating jurors could simply avoid problems by refusing press

interviews—suggested that the district court’s order in that case was infirm, at least in part,

because it wholly deprived the media of an opportunity to interview the jurors. That is not the case

here. Efforts were made to ensure that the media would have access to any juror who acquiesced

to an interview. The fact that the jurors have already expressed such fervent reluctance to speak to

the media, see supra note 7, strengthens my resolve that continued anonymity is appropriate. To

be clear, my ruling does not mandate anonymity, it merely permits it. See Brown, 250 F.3d at 920

n.20. 

Finally, releasing the jurors’ names now would undermine the ability of judges in the

future to use anonymous juries to ensure fair trials. Seating an anonymous jury is a powerful

arrow in a district court’s quiver. It can be used, in extreme circumstances, to create an

environment wherein jurors can deliberate without fear of outside influences. See U.S. v.

Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 650 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Empaneling an anonymous jury is an extreme

measure that is warranted only where there is strong reason to believe the jury needs protection.”)
9

(internal quotation omitted). In cases like this one, however, the tool is an invaluable part of a

judge’s effort to seat impartial juries than can deliberate in a reasoned fashion. Granting the relief

Tribune requests could threaten the viability of this tool on a going-forward basis. It is not

difficult to imagine a future juror reacting incredulously—perhaps with good reason—to a judge’s

promise of anonymity if it becomes clear that it is merely a fleeting promise, revokable upon the

conclusion of the trial. In order to ensure that judges are able to use anonymous juries to promote

fairness, anonymity must not be illusory. It is essential that jurors have confidence in a judge’s

promise of anonymity. 

In sum, I conclude that, due to the exceptional circumstances of this case, the interests of

justice require me to keep the jurors’ names confidential. Above all, I do so in order to protect the

jurors’ safety. In addition, intense media scrutiny could impose other, non-physical harms on

these jurors. Third, the public had very broad access to these proceedings, and I do not believe

that this ruling curtails that in any meaningful way. Lastly, I am satisfied with the sufficiency of

the efforts that were undertaken to facilitate interaction between the media and any willing jurors. 

For the aforementioned reasons, Tribune’s motion for access to jurors’ names is DENIED.

ENTER:

James B. Zagel

United States District Judge

DATE: October 4, 2007