by

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS )
EASTERN DIVISION Gi
Us 2 “iy
GALINA BUSNOVETSKY, 8»
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Plaintiff,
v. No. 01 C5127

Judge James B. Zagel
OFFICER KOOYUMIIAN, in his individual
capacity, LAURA ALEXANDER, FIRST
CHICAGO COMPANY under Deed in
Trust dated January 19, 1995, as Trust No.
1516,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Galina Busnovetsky filed a six-count First Amended Complaint, three of which (false
arrest, false imprisonment and excessive force) pertain to defendant Officer Gregory Kooyumjian. Ms.
Busnovetsky alleges that Officer Kooyumjian violated her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when he arrested her, handcuffed her and detained her in
connection with an alleged criminal trespass at a building managed by Laura Alexander. Before me is
Officer Kooyumjian’s motion to dismiss Counts II (false arrest) and II (false imprisonment) against him
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, I accept all well-pleaded facts as true and
draw ail reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. I turn first to the false arrest and false
imprisonment claims under the Fourth Amendment. Ms. Busnovetsky alleges that Officer Kooyumjian
was unreasonable in relying on the statement of Laura Alexander when he knew or should have known
that Ms. Alexander’s allegations were insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Ms. Busnovetsky
for criminal trespass. The existence of probable cause to arrest presents an absolute bar to a Section

1983 claim based on the Fourth Amendment. See Jones by Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178, 181 (7" Cir.


1995). Probable cause in a warrantless arrest, as here, must be evaluated based “on the facts as they
would have appeared to a reasonable person in the position of the arresting officer.” Sheik-Abdi v.
McClellen, 37 F.3d 1240, 1246 (citations omitted).

Although Ms. Busnovetsky charges that “there were no facts or circumstances that could warrant
[Officer Kooyumjian] to believe that an offense had been committed” she also alleges in her First
Amended Complaint that, at the scene, Ms. Alexander signed a complaint against her for criminal
trespass to land. Ms. Alexander’s complaint,' the existence of which Ms. Busnovetsky herself discusses
in her First Amended Complaint, establishes probable cause for her arrest. Of course, it is possible that
Ms. Alexander was not a “reasonably credible witness or victim” and therefore Officer Kooyumjian’s
reliance on her statements and her complaint might be considered unreasonable. See Jenkins v. Keating,
147 F.3d 577, 585 (7" Cir. 1998). Unfortunately, for Ms. Busnovetsky, she does not allege this in her
First Amended Complaint nor is it even a reasonable inference to draw from the facts she pleads.” Since
her false imprisonment claim necessarily flows from her false arrest claim, Ms. Busnovetsky’s false
imprisonment claim must fail as well.

Inow turn to an analysis of the false arrest and false imprisonment claims under the Fourteenth

Amendment. To the extent that Ms. Busnovetsky has alleged a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment

' With a few exceptions, I am required to confine my analysis to the “four comers of the

complaint” in reviewing a motion to dismiss. Here, I am permitted to consider Ms. Alexander’s
complaint because Ms. Busnovetsky referred to it in her First Amended Complaint. See Venture
Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7" Cir. 1993) (“{d]ocuments that a
defendant attached to the motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in
the plaintiffs complaint and are central to her claim”).

2 Ms. Busnovetsky seems to believe that Ms. Alexander’s allegedly selective enforcement
of the “no dogs allowed” policy of her building should somehow be relevant in evaluating whether
Officer Kooyumjian had probable cause to arrest Ms. Busnovetsky. Ms. Busnovetsky’s statement that
she “witnessed dogs going in and out of the building with tenants and visitors many times before” has
little if anything to do with Officer Kooyumjian’s probable cause assessment in the face of Ms.
Alexander’s complaint.


for false arrest or false imprisonment, that claim must also fail because Ms. Busnovetsky fails to allege,
in more than a conclusory fashion, a deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986). Moreover, the availability of adequate state tort
remedies to redress alleged violation of procedural due process fulfills the requirements of due process.
See Gunther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879 (7" Cir. 1984).

Defendant Officer Kooyumjian’s motion to dismiss portions of plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim is GRANTED. Counts II and Ill of the First Amended Complaint

are dismissed.

ENTER:

\\ or B Ral

James|B. Zagel C2 8
United States District Judge
DATE: 2\ A 4 2001