NUMBER 13-23-00410-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE JUSTIN GUILLORY

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides1

By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Justin Guillory seeks to compel the trial 

court2to vacate its order granting his presuit deposition under Texas Rule of Civil 

Procedure 202. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202. We conditionally grant relief.

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not 

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 

47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).

2 This cause arises from trial court cause number 23-06-89908-B in the 135th District Court of 

Victoria County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Kemper Stephen Williams III. See id. R. 52.2.
2

I. BACKGROUND

Real party in interest Oil Patch Group, Inc. (OPG) filed a verified Rule 202 petition 

seeking to take the presuit deposition of Guillory “to investigate potential claims against”

him. According to OPG’s petition, OPG is “a leader in the oilfield housing, rental, products, 

and services industry,” and has spent “significant time and resources” in attaining that 

position and “in developing relationships and goodwill with its customers and employees.”

OPG alleged that a group of its former employees, including Guillory, had started a 

competing business using OPG’s trade secrets and confidential information. Specifically, 

OPG alleged that its former president, Derek Elzner, started a new company, Titan 

Accommodations, LLC (Titan), and was operating it, along with other OPG former 

employees, in “full-fledged competition . . . in the oilfield housing, rental, products, and 

services industry,” and “[was] now targeting and raiding OPG’s valued customers and 

employees.” OPG stated that it was seeking to take Guillory’s presuit deposition in order 

“to explore [Guillory’s] role in the Former OPG Employee’s coordinated resignations, and 

their campaign to . . . start a competing business . . . using OPG’s misappropriated trade 

secrets, confidential information, and property . . . [and to] explore whether it has potential 

legal claims arising from those events against [Guillory] individually.” In relevant part, 

OPG’s verified Rule 202 deposition stated:

28. Rule 202 allows a party to petition for [presuit] discovery to 

investigate potential claims it may have against another party. [Id. R.] 

202.2(d).

29. Based on the facts set forth above, which include: (i) the suspicious 

and simultaneous resignations of seven OPG managers and 

employees, including [Guillory], just days after the resignation of 

OPG’s former President, Elzner, who had just months prior 

registered a company, Titan, that would compete with OPG; (ii) the 
3

subsequent employment of those employees by Titan; and (iii) 

[former employee Lenae Beran’s] June 1, 2023 e-mail providing 

irrefutable evidence that Titan (or employees of Titan) is in 

possession of and is currently using for its benefit, confidential and 

proprietary information and documents belonging to OPG, including 

but not limited to OPG’s expense report form—OPG seeks to 

investigate potential claims it may have against [Guillory] for, 

including but not limited to: (1) violation of the Defend Trade Secrets 

Act of 2016; (2) violation of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act; 

(3) a breach of fiduciary duty to OPG related to the theft of OPG’s 

confidential and proprietary information; and (4) civil conspiracy. 

Instead of rushing to the courthouse to file a lawsuit against 

[Guillory], [OPG] seeks a Rule 202 deposition to explore and 

investigate whether OPG has any claims against [Guillory] directly.

. . . .

30. Under Rule 202, a court may grant a petitioner’s request for pre-trial 

discovery if ‘the likely benefit of allowing the petitioner to take the 

requested deposition to investigate a potential claim outweighs the 

burden or expense of the procedure.’ [Id. R.] 202.4(a). The benefit of 

allowing OPG to conduct the requested oral deposition duces tecum 

to investigate potential claims outweighs the burden or expense of 

authorizing the deposition of [Guillory], who will have specific 

knowledge regarding OPG’s specific and potential claims against 

[him].

31. Here, the burden or expense of allowing the requested Rule 202 

deposition to take place and production of documents is low, as 

[Guillory] resides in Victoria County and OPG’s counsel will work with 

[him] to schedule the deposition at a mutually convenient time and 

place. In addition, OPG will conduct the requested deposition within 

the time and other limitations as set forth in the Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure.

OPG further included a subpoena duces tecum seeking the production of documents at 

the deposition. OPG’s petition was supported by the verification of the president of OPG 

and included, as an exhibit, the emails sent by Beran.

Guillory filed an objection to OPG’s verified Rule 202 petition. Guillory alleged, inter 

alia, that OPG had filed three federal lawsuits and four other Rule 202 petitions arising 
4

from “the same set of facts.” Guillory alleged that OPG’s request to depose Guillory 

presuit was “nothing more than harassment and an attempt to circumvent federal 

discovery rules,” and that “the purported benefits of a [presuit] deposition” were 

outweighed by the burden imposed by an “intrusive, expensive, and time-consuming”

procedure. Guillory further alleged that the presuit deposition should be denied because 

“(1) OPG seeks third-party discovery that will be available to OPG in its other pending 

lawsuits, and (2) OPG’s request for documents is not authorized by Rule 202.”

The parties furnished the trial court with additional briefing regarding their 

positions. Specifically, OPG filed a response to Guillory’s objection to the Rule 202 

deposition, and Guillory filed a reply in support of his objection. The trial court then held 

a non-evidentiary hearing on OPG’s petition for a presuit deposition. In support of its 

contention that the trial court should allow Guillory’s presuit deposition, OPG’s counsel

asserted that the email sent by Beran was evidence that Titan had taken confidential 

trade secret information, and OPG displayed the email to the trial court. OPG’s counsel

noted that it currently had an action pending against Beran in state court, and informed 

the trial court that:

They’ll argue that . . . we don’t need these rule 202s because this is all about 

a lawsuit that we filed against [Elzner] and Titan in federal court and that we 

can obtain discovery through third-party discovery in that case. We think 

they missed the point here in that we’re trying to find out what claims we 

can bring against [Guillory] in his individual capacity.

We have no reason to know or believe that we can bring him into the 

federal lawsuit. Maybe we could; maybe we couldn’t. We don’t know but at 

this time we would intend to file our claims against him in this court for any 

actions that he did with respect to taking documents or misappropriating 

trade secrets.
5

Like I said, we filed suit against [Beran] in state court in addition to 

the federal court lawsuit we have. If this deposition were to yield evidence 

that [Guillory] had himself engaged in conduct similar to [Beran,] we would 

file that claim here in state court against him as well.

Counsel further argued that Guillory’s counsel had agreed to the presuit deposition with 

the exception of the deposition’s timing. In contrast to these arguments, Guillory’s counsel

informed the trial court that he opposed the presuit deposition because: (1) OPG had not 

met its burden under Rule 202 regarding the investigation of potential claims to show that 

the benefit outweighed the burden; (2) OPG had other discovery tools available to it given 

three pending cases and several other Rule 202 petitions; and (3) the production of 

documents was not allowed in a Rule 202 proceeding. Guillory’s counsel further expressly 

denied having reached any agreement regarding the deposition. OPG’s counsel asserted 

that it could “theoretically take third-party discovery at some point,” but that “had nothing 

to do with” any claims against Guillory, and that there was no case law prohibiting presuit 

depositions when there is a related legal proceeding. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 

trial court took the matter under submission.

By order signed on September 1, 2023, the trial court granted OPG’s petition. The 

trial court concluded that the likely benefit of allowing OPG to depose Guillory outweighed 

the burden or expense of the procedure, ordered the deposition to take place at a mutually 

agreeable time and place on or before September 30, 2023, and limited the deposition to 

a two-hour period. The trial court’s order further provides that the time elapsed during the 

deposition “will be subtracted from the time limit under the Federal Rules of Civil 
6

Procedure for any subsequent deposition of [Guillory] in the lawsuit currently pending in 

federal court between [OPG] and [Elzner], Dwayne Beran, and [Titan].”

3

This original proceeding ensued. Guillory asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion in granting his presuit deposition because (1) OPG failed to introduce any 

competent evidence to support his request; and (2) even considering OPG’s Rule 202 

petition and attached exhibit, OPG failed to demonstrate its entitlement to a presuit 

deposition.4 Guillory further sought temporary relief to stay the deposition pending this 

Court’s consideration of his petition for writ of mandamus. We granted Guillory’s request 

for temporary relief and requested OPG to file a response to the petition. OPG’s response 

asserts that the trial court’s order was supported by evidence because it considered 

OPG’s verified petition and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 

that the deposition was warranted.5 Relator has filed a reply in support of his request for 

mandamus relief.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate Indem. 

3 According to the briefing, Lenae Beran, who sent the email at issue in OPG’s Rule 202 petition, 

is married to Dwayne Beran, who is one of the defendants in one of the lawsuits filed by OPG.

4 The trial court’s order does not address that part of OPG’s petition in which it requests Guillory to

produce documents in connection with his requested deposition. We note that the intermediate appellate 

courts are split on the propriety of conjoining other forms of discovery with a Rule 202 deposition. Compare 

In re City of Tatum, 567 S.W.3d 800, 808 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2018, orig. proceeding) (allowing the production 

of documents in a Rule 202 deposition), with DeAngelis v. Protective Parents Coal., 556 S.W.3d 836, 858 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.) (concluding that a request for the production of documents in a Rule 

202 petition was “improper”), and In re Akzo Nobel Chem., Inc., 24 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 

2000, orig. proceeding) (holding that Rule 202 does not expressly authorize any form of discovery other 

than depositions.). We need not address this issue here. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

5 On September 25, 2023, OPG filed an “Unopposed Motion for Expedited Consideration” of this 

petition for writ of mandamus. We deny OPG’s motion.
7

Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 

840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 

S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator must show that (1) the trial 

court abused its discretion, and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re 

USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re 

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 

839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts with 

disregard for guiding rules or principles or when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable 

manner. In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d at 840. We determine the adequacy of an appellate 

remedy by balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re 

Acad., Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 32 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Essex Ins., 450 

S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 

Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136.

“An improper order under Rule 202 may be set aside by mandamus.” In re Wolfe, 

341 S.W.3d 932, 933 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Jorden, 249 

S.W.3d 416, 420 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); In re City of Tatum, 567 S.W.3d 800, 

804 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2018, orig. proceeding); In re East, 476 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2014, orig. proceeding). The Texas Supreme Court has 

“consistently held” that “parties lack an adequate appellate remedy from orders 

compelling discovery beyond what the rules allow.” In re Millwork, 631 S.W.3d 706, 714 

(Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 

713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Further, a deposition, once taken, 

“cannot be untaken.” In re Millwork, 631 S.W.3d at 715 (quoting In re Liberty Cnty. Mut. 
8

Ins., 557 S.W.3d 851, 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, orig. proceeding)); see 

In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 419; Rodriguez v. Cantu, 581 S.W.3d 859, 866 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2019, no pet.) (combined app. & orig. proceeding).

III. RULE 202 DEPOSITIONS

In relevant part, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 allows a party to “petition the 

court for an order authorizing the taking of a deposition” before suit is filed “to investigate 

a potential claim or suit.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1(b); see In re East, 476 S.W.3d at 65. The 

trial court “must order a deposition to be taken if, but only if,” it finds that “the likely benefit 

of allowing the petitioner to take the requested deposition to investigate a potential claim 

outweighs the burden or expense of the procedure.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4(a)(2); see In re 

Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 423. This finding is mandatory and may not be implied from the 

record. See In re Does, 337 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); 

Rodriguez, 581 S.W.3d at 867; In re City of Tatum, 567 S.W.3d at 807. To obtain an order 

authorizing a presuit deposition, the petitioner is required to present the trial court with a 

“basis” for this finding. In re Does, 337 S.W.3d at 865; see Gordon Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 

Hinkson, 661 S.W.3d 922, 928 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). “The law is clear that 

a petitioner seeking a presuit deposition must present evidence to meet its burden to 

establish the facts necessary to obtain the deposition.” In re East, 476 S.W.3d at 68.

“Rule 202 depositions are not now and never have been intended for routine use.”

In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 423; see Gordon Indep. Sch. Dist., 661 S.W.3d at 929; 

Rodriguez, 581 S.W.3d at 868. Seeking discovery from a deponent before filling suit 

presents practical and due process problems. See In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 423; In re 

City of Tatum, 567 S.W.3d at 804; In re Elliott, 504 S.W.3d 455, 460 (Tex. App.—Austin 
9

2016, orig. proceeding). “The intrusion into otherwise private matters authorized by Rule 

202 outside a lawsuit is not to be taken lightly.” In re Does, 337 S.W.3d at 865. Therefore, 

“[c]ourts must strictly limit and carefully supervise [presuit] discovery to prevent abuse” of 

Rule 202. In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d at 933; see Gordon Indep. Sch. Dist., 661 S.W.3d at 

929; see also In re Hernandez, No. 13-21-00244-CV, 2022 WL 627232, at *9 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 3, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Further, Rule 202 

may not be used as a method to acquire otherwise unobtainable discovery; thus, the 

scope of discovery in a presuit deposition “is the same as if the anticipated suit or potential 

claim had been filed.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.5; see In re DePinho, 505 S.W.3d 621, 625 

(Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Durrell, 547 S.W.3d 

299, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

IV. ANALYSIS

Guillory contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Rule 202 

deposition because OPG failed to introduce competent evidence to support its request 

and, even considering OPG’s Rule 202 petition and attached exhibit, OPG failed to 

demonstrate its entitlement to a presuit deposition. OPG argues, in contrast, that the trial 

court relied on its verified petition and exhibit in granting its request, and that this evidence 

“was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that the benefit of allowing the Rule 202 

deposition outweighed the minimal burden to Guillory.”

OPG had the burden of showing that the likely benefit of allowing it to take 

Guillory’s deposition to investigate a potential claim outweighs the burden or expense of

the procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4(a)(2). We conclude that it failed to meet this 

burden. At the outset, we note that OPG offered and introduced no evidence in support 
10

of its position. See DeAngelis v. Protective Parents Coal., 556 S.W.3d 836, 855–56 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.) (“A petitioner seeking [presuit] discovery under Rule 202 

must present evidence to meet its burden to establish the facts necessary to obtain such 

discovery.”); In re East, 476 S.W.3d at 68 (“The law is clear that a petitioner seeking a 

presuit deposition must present evidence to meet its burden to establish the facts 

necessary to obtain the deposition.”). And while OPG maintains that the trial court relied 

on its verified petition, the exhibit attached thereto, and argument as evidence—a 

proposition which is generally untenable6—the conclusory allegations in OPG’s petition 

fail to provide a sufficient basis for the trial court to conclude that the benefit of the 

deposition outweighs its burden. Stated differently, we conclude that even if all of the 

allegations in OPG’s verified Rule 202 petition are taken as true and accorded evidentiary 

value, the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion in granting discovery under Rule 

202.

Here, OPG asserted in its petition that the benefit of the deposition would outweigh 

the burden or expense of the procedure. OPG asserted that “the burden or expense” of 

the presuit deposition “is low” because: Guillory resides in the county where the 

6

“Generally, a Rule 202 petitioner may not rely upon its verified pleading to prove the facts asserted 

in its petition.” DeAngelis, 556 S.W.3d at 855; see In re Krause Landscape Contractors, Inc., 595 S.W.3d 

831, 838 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, orig. proceeding) (“A Rule 202 petitioner cannot generally rely on its 

verified pleadings to prove the facts asserted in its petition.”); see also In re Josefsberg, No. 01-22-00604-

CV, 2022 WL 17981852, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2022, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) 

(mem. op.) (stating that the verified petition is not competent evidence in support of a presuit deposition); 

In re Pickrell, No. 10-17-00091-CV, 2017 WL 1452851, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 19, 2017, orig. 

proceeding) (mem. op.) (“We, too, hold that a petitioner under Rule 202 cannot rely solely on its verified 

petition and/or the argument of counsel to establish the evidentiary requirements under Rule 202.”); In re 

Noriega, No. 05-14-00307-CV, 2014 WL 1415109, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 28, 2014, orig. 

proceeding) (mem. op.) (“[E]ven if real party had been able to overcome relator’s objection to the verification 

on the petition that it was not based on personal knowledge of real party’s counsel, the verified petition 

would not have been admissible evidence in support of the Rule 202 petition.”).
11

deposition would take place; “OPG’s counsel will work with [Guillory] to schedule the 

deposition at a mutually convenient time and place”; and “OPG will conduct the requested 

deposition within the time and other limitations as set forth in the Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure.” OPG offers little to nothing more than it would be required to do under the 

rules of discovery to alleviate the burden of the deposition. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.2(b)(2) 

(governing the time and place for depositions); id. R. 202.5 (stating in relevant part that 

presuit depositions “are governed by the rules applicable to depositions of nonparties in 

a pending suit”). OPG’s allegations have little bearing on the benefit and burden analysis

applicable to presuit depositions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4(a)(2); In re Jorden, 249 

S.W.3d at 423. Moreover, these assertions are not “evidence” and do not “establish the 

facts necessary to obtain the deposition.” See In re East, 476 S.W.3d at 68. 

Leaving this aside, OPG seeks to depose Guillory, a former employee, to glean 

information related to its potential claims against him regarding the misappropriation of 

trade secrets and the theft of confidential and proprietary information. Deposing a former 

employee regarding these matters is “intrusive, expensive, and time-consuming” and 

imposes a “substantial” burden on the proposed deponent. In re Hewlett Packard, 212 

S.W.3d 356, 362 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); see In re 

PrairieSmarts LLC, 421 S.W.3d 296, 306 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, orig. proceeding)

(applying rules regarding the discovery of trade secret information to presuit depositions); 

see also In re Hernandez, 2022 WL 627232, at *10. OPG’s argument that the benefit of 

deposing Guillory might allow it to determine whether it has legitimate claims against him, 

standing alone, “does not outweigh the burden imposed on [Guillory], particularly where 

valuable trade secrets are involved.” In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d at 362. To hold 
12

otherwise “would allow individuals or companies to take [presuit] depositions of business 

competitors in a broad range of circumstances because the expense of taking a limited 

number of depositions can almost always be argued to be less than the expense of filing 

and prosecuting a lawsuit.” Id.

Finally, OPG has not shown that the benefit of a presuit deposition outweighs the 

burden imposed on Guillory given that OPG, represented by the same counsel appearing 

in this proceeding, has filed at least two lawsuits against former employees arising from 

the same facts at issue here and presenting the same and similar causes of action. OPG 

neither discusses the viability of deposing Guillory in these cases nor argues that any 

such deposition in these actions would be insufficient. Rather, OPG asserts that there is 

no persuasive legal support for the position that OPG should be forced to depose Guillory 

in a separate lawsuit to determine if it has a good faith basis to file claims against Guillory 

directly. According to OPG:

Guillory’s argument fails on a more basic level as well. If the existence of a 

third-party lawsuit (that does not name the 202-deponent as a party) served 

a per-se bar to a Rule 202 deposition, an aggrieved victim could not use the 

procedure to investigate potential claims against other wrongdoers if it 

previously sued a responsible party that, for example, had disappeared, 

went insolvent, or refused to file an answer to the lawsuit. An aggrieved 

victim would be forced to sue every conceivable wrongdoer all in one single 

lawsuit, and then decide later whether it had a good-faith basis to sue each 

and every party in that lawsuit ab initio. That cannot be the intended purpose 

or practical result of Rule 202. Especially since it ignores potential 

jurisdictional, forum and/or venue considerations.

We express no bright-line rule suggesting that the pendency of related litigation serves 

as an automatic bar to a Rule 202 deposition. However, the fact that there is pending 

litigation involving the same parties and similar allegations suggests that the requested 

presuit discovery is unnecessary because OPG has already investigated its potential 
13

claims, or, alternatively, that the discovery at issue could occur in the ongoing litigation. 

See In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d at 933; DeAngelis, 556 S.W.3d at 857; see also In re 

Hanover Ins., No. 01-13-01066-CV, 2014 WL 7474203, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] Dec. 30, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op) (“KAI is already a party in the underlying 

litigation, and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide a mechanism by which a party 

in KAI’s position may obtain discovery from a third party like Hanover.”). Allowing a presuit 

deposition when the petitioner fails to show that the presuit discovery is necessary 

irrespective of pending litigation fails to comport with the supreme court’s admonition to 

“strictly limit and carefully supervise” presuit discovery. In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d at 933; 

see Gordon Indep. Sch. Dist., 661 S.W.3d at 929; see also In re Hernandez, 2022 WL 

627232, at *9. In other words, OPG did not meet its burden to show why Guillory’s 

deposition must occur in a Rule 202 proceeding. See DeAngelis, 556 S.W.3d at 857–58.

In summary, the trial court’s September 1, 2023 order granting OPG’s petition for 

Guillory’s presuit deposition constituted an abuse of discretion because OPG failed to 

meet the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202. See TEX. R. APP. P. 202; In 

re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d at 363–64. Moreover, Guillory lacks an adequate remedy 

by appeal. See In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d at 933. Having concluded that OPG failed to meet 

its burden under Rule 202 to obtain the presuit deposition, we sustain the sole issue that 

Guillory presents in this original proceeding.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court, having examined and fully considered Guillory’s petition for writ of 

mandamus, OPG’s response, Guillory’s reply, and the applicable law, is of the opinion 

that Guillory has met his burden to obtain mandamus relief. Accordingly, we lift the stay 
14

previously imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10. We conditionally grant 

Guillory’s petition for writ of mandamus, and we direct the trial court to promptly vacate 

its September 1, 2023 order granting OPG’s Rule 202 petition. Our writ will issue only if 

the trial court fails to comply.

GINA M. BENAVIDES

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

8th day of May, 2024.