United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 96-3841EA

_____________

Katherine Knight; North Little *

Rock Classroom Teachers *

Association; Pulaski *

Association of Classroom *

Teachers; Little Rock Classroom *

Teachers Association; Ed *

Bullington; and John Harrison, * On Appeal from the United

* States District Court

Appellants, * for the Eastern District

* of Arkansas.

v. *

*

*

Pulaski County Special *

School District, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: February 25, 1997

 Filed: May 1, 1997

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HEANEY and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

In 1992, the long-running desegregation case involving the three

school districts in Pulaski County, Arkansas, was settled. A consent

decree, embodying the agreement of all the parties, was entered on April

29, 1992. Under this Court’s opinion in Little Rock School District v.

Pulaski County Special School District, 921
-2-

 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1990), the District Court was given the job of

monitoring the settlement agreement to ensure that all parties complied

with it. The question presented in this case is whether the District Court

had the authority, as an aspect of this enforcement responsibility, to

forbid a strike by the teachers of the Pulaski County Special School

District.

On August 19, 1996, the District’s teachers, represented by the

Pulaski Association of Classroom Teachers, went on strike. Three days

later, on August 22, certain parents of PCSSD students filed suit in the

Chancery Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, and sought a preliminary

injunction against the strike, alleging state-law grounds in support of

their request. The next day, after a hearing on the motion, the Chancery

Court denied injunctive relief on the ground that no showing of irreparable

harm had been made. Wilson v. Pulaski Ass’n of Classroom Teachers, No.

IJ96-5788 (slip op. Ark. Ch. Ct. Aug., 23, 1996). Another hearing was

scheduled for September 19. This state-court case is now pending before

the Supreme Court of Arkansas on PCSSD’s appeal.

In the meantime, on August 27, the District itself made a motion in

the federal district court for injunctive relief against the strike.

School opened on August 28. The District used teachers who were willing

to cross the picket line and others to staff its classrooms. On that same

day, the District Court held a hearing on PCSSD’s motion. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the Court ordered the teachers to return to work

on September 3. The teachers complied with this order, and PCSSD’s schools

have been open ever since.

At the heart of this case lies the question of the District Court’s

authority to enjoin the strike. The teachers and their Union were parties

to the school-desegregation case, having been
-3-

allowed to intervene. See Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County

Special School District, 839 F.2d 1296, 1314-15 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 869 (1988). Like all other parties, they agreed to the settlement

agreement embodied in the consent decree entered in 1992. The difficulty

is that the settlement agreement says nothing about the teachers’ right to

strike. The job of the District Court is to enforce the settlement

agreement. But since the agreement is silent on the subject of a strike

by the teachers, the authority of the District Court to issue its order

must be found elsewhere, if at all.

The fact that the case has been settled does not make the three

school districts involved wards of the Court. They are not in

receivership. Except as provided in the settlement agreement, or by

reasonable implication therefrom, the rights and duties of the three school

districts and those with whom they do business, including employees and

organizations of employees, are governed by other applicable law, primarily

state law. As we explained in 1988, a federal district court does have

remedial authority, in necessary cases, to modify or even abrogate

agreements that perpetuate segregation or impede a desegregation plan.

Such action, however, can be taken only “after an evidentiary hearing and

upon a finding that the change is essential to the desegregation remedy,”

839 F.2d at 1315, unless, of course, the parties have agreed otherwise, an

event which, as we have explained, has not occurred in this case.

It is suggested, though without much force, that the failure of PCSSD

to increase teachers’ salaries may be a violation of state law, Act 917 of

1995, Ark. Code. Ann. § 6-17-1001 (Michie 1995). It is also suggested that

the collective-bargaining agreement between the teachers and PCSSD may, by

implication, forbid a strike, because the agreement contains certain

procedures for
-4-

resolving disputes, including declaration of an impasse and factfinding by

some neutral person. These arguments have nothing to do with the

settlement agreement and depend on state law. Likewise, the suggestion on

the other side that state law forbids strikes by public employees raises

no issue within the particular competence of the federal courts. Because

this case has been settled, the settlement agreement becomes, in a sense,

a particularization of federal law applicable to these parties. The

jurisdiction of the District Court to enforce that agreement does not

include the authority to resolve other disputes among the parties or to

adjust their legal rights and responsibilities arising from other sources.

No independent basis of jurisdiction has been suggested. In these

circumstances, and especially in view of the fact that an earlier-filed

case is now pending in the state courts, we think it best to leave issues

of state law and contract interpretation to those courts.

PCSSD argues that if it cannot hold school at all, it cannot carry

out the desegregation plan, and this is perhaps the most appealing argument

the school district has. The trouble with the argument is that it proves

too much. If, for example, the school district’s water bill were raised

to an exorbitant level, making it financially difficult or impossible to

operate, we do not think that the District Court, as an aspect of its

authority to monitor the settlement agreement, would have power to order

the utility furnishing the water ro reduce its rates. No doubt the example

is an extreme one, but it makes the point. The teachers, unlike the

putative water utility, are parties to the settlement agreement, but the

agreement does not address their right to strike. Indeed, it refers to

existing collective-bargaining arrangements in such a way as to reinforce,

rather than abrogate, their effectiveness. In addition, as a matter of

fact, the school district was not rendered inoperable by the strike, and

was making plans to open its doors
-5-

without the help of the striking teachers when the District Court issued

its injunction. The operation of the schools would unquestionably have

been impaired to some extent, but we do not think that the proof was

sufficiently striking to justify the action taken. So long as the

settlement agreement is complied with, the school district must make its

own way through the ordinary difficulties of life as an employer. Another

case would be presented if the teachers were to take action pointedly aimed

at interfering with desegregation as such (to use another extreme example

in order to make a point).

Finally, and perhaps as an afterthought, the school district asserts

that the injunction against the strike can be upheld as a modification of

the settlement agreement. The District Court of course has power, after

a proper showing, to modify the settlement agreement. In theory, such

power could be exercised in such a way as to affect the rights of the

teachers. This suggestion, however, is wholly foreign to the present case.

No one asked the District Court to modify the settlement agreement, it did

not say that it was modifying the agreement, and the agreement in fact

stands unmodified to this day.

We understand the concerns that led the District Court to protect

PCSSD and its school children from the effects of a teachers’ strike. But

we cannot agree that the settlement agreement, even by implication, took

away the right to strike, assuming such a right exists under state law, nor

can we find any other source of authority for the action the District Court

took. The order granting an injunction against the teachers’ strike is

therefore

Reversed.
-6-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.