NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

EDGAR ANTONIO CASAHONDA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-10236 

D.C. No. 

4:17-cr-01904-CKJ-LCK-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 1, 2024**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, BADE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Edgar Antonio Casahonda was convicted in a federal bench trial of aiding and 

abetting, making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, 

smuggling goods from the United States, making false statements, and conspiracy 

to make false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm. Before he 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 10 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

was indicted for these crimes, and while he was still under investigation by the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), Casahonda was the 

subject of an unrelated traffic stop. During the stop, which Casahonda claims 

violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, officers seized from the car 

$8,500 in cash and two receipts for firearm purchases. Officers shared information 

from the traffic stop with ATF and, at some point thereafter, Casahonda and his 

codefendants were charged in a thirty-count indictment. The indictment did not cite 

the traffic stop or reference the evidence seized during the stop.

Prior to trial, Casahonda moved to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop 

on Fourth Amendment grounds and moved to dismiss the indictment on Fourteenth 

Amendment equal protection grounds. The district court granted Casahonda’s 

motion to suppress in part and excluded all the evidence seized during the stop. The 

district court denied Casahonda’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The government 

moved to admit evidence that was otherwise subject to the district court’s 

suppression order, arguing that the government had an independent source for the 

evidence. The district court granted the motion in part. Casahonda moved for 

reconsideration, but the court denied the motion. Casahonda does not appeal these 

rulings. Rather, he appeals the district court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress 

and its denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. We review both rulings de 
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novo. United States v. Hylton, 30 F.4th 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2022); United States v. 

Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm. 

1. Casahonda’s Fourth Amendment claim is moot because the district court 

granted Casahonda’s motion to suppress in part and ordered that the evidence from 

the stop be suppressed. See United States v. Kahre, 737 F.3d 554, 565 (9th Cir. 2013)

(per curiam) (“The record confirms the district court’s conclusion that the seized

evidence was not introduced at trial, thereby rendering the motion to suppress

moot.”). Even if he proved a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, Casahonda 

could obtain no relief. His claim thus fails.

2. Likewise, Casahonda cannot obtain the relief he seeks—dismissal of the 

indictment—even if he proved that officers violated his Fourteenth Amendment 

right to equal protection by engaging in racially discriminatory traffic stops. The

indictment is based on evidence independent of the traffic stop, and Casahonda does 

not appeal the district court’s grant of the government’s independent source motion 

or its denial of his motion to reconsider. Absent a challenge to the independent 

source determination, Casahonda cannot attack the indictment by claiming that the 

traffic stop violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

AFFIRMED.