RENDERED: JULY 15, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0457-MR

RONNIE MEADOWS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE JAMES T. JAMESON, SPECIAL JUDGE

ACTION NO. 75-CR-11751

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: GOODWINE, JONES, AND MAZE, JUDGES.

MAZE, JUDGE: Ronnie Meadows (Appellant) appeals the denial of his motion 

for postconviction relief in which he alleged that he is currently serving a sentence 

which is invalid by law. For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm the opinion of 

the McCracken Circuit Court. 
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I. Background 

On May 23, 1975, Appellant was released on parole from a four-year 

sentence at the Kentucky State Penitentiary for breaking and entering. Meadows v. 

Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1977). Appellant was given a bus ticket to 

Cincinnati, Ohio, where a job had been procured for him. Instead of traveling to 

Ohio, Appellant exchanged the bus ticket for cash in Paducah. The following day, 

Appellant broke into an unoccupied mobile home, where he took various items 

including a 20-gauge shotgun and shells. This burglary led to indictment No. 75-

CR-11752. 

Appellant then stole a truck and abandoned it when it developed 

mechanical trouble, then stole another truck. These thefts led to counts one and 

two of indictment No. 75-CR-11753. The second stolen vehicle stopped running at 

about 5:15 A.M. on May 25, 1975, in a rural area near Paducah. After abandoning 

the truck, Appellant saw a light come on in the home of Charles Grief and his wife, 

Mary Eloise. According to his testimony, Appellant decided to go up and see if he 

could get a car and some money. Appellant was carrying the loaded shotgun and a 

lunchbox with some clothes in it. He went to the door and rang the bell and was 

answered by Mrs. Grief. Appellant says he asked Mrs. Grief to use her phone, but 

for a reason unknown to him, she threw her hands up to her mouth and screamed 

whereupon he “brought the gun up and it just went off . . . . I didn’t shoot her on 
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purpose. It was an accident. Accidental. I just brought the gun up and it went 

off.” At this point, Mrs. Grief’s husband appeared in the hallway with a pistol and 

Appellant fled the scene, leaving the lunchbox and its contents, including his 

parole papers, behind. Mrs. Grief died from the gunshot wound which led to 

indictment No. 75-CR-11751. 

Appellant was tried by jury for murder in indictment No. 75-CR11751 on September 18, 1975. Appellant was convicted and the jury fixed his 

sentence at death. On September 19, 1975, Appellant was sentenced after pleading 

guilty to three counts of theft by unlawful taking in No. 75-CR-11753 to serve five 

years on each count for a total of fifteen years and was sentenced to death in No. 

75-CR-11751 on the same day. The judgment in No. 75-CR-11753 stated, “Counts 

2 and 3 are to run consecutively with each other and consecutively with Count 1 

and consecutively with any count he is now serving.” On May 21, 1976, Appellant

was sentenced following a jury trial to ten years’ imprisonment for indictment No. 

75-CR-11752. 

Appellant appealed the convictions of Nos. 75-CR-11751 and 75-CR11752. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but held 

Appellant’s sentence of death to be unconstitutional under Boyd v. Commonwealth, 

550 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1977). Meadows, 550 S.W.2d at 511. Appellant was 

resentenced in No. 75-CR-11751 on June 24, 1977, to a life sentence. The circuit 
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court ordered the sentences in Nos. 75-CR-11751, 75-CR-11752, and 75-CR11753 to be served consecutively to one another. On May 5, 1988, Appellant filed 

RCr1 11.42 motions in all three actions, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. 

All three of Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motions were denied by the circuit court

without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant appealed that decision to the Kentucky 

Court of Appeals wherein this Court affirmed the summary denial of relief per RCr 

11.42 in all three actions (Nos. 88-CA-1282-MR, 88-CA-1283-MR, and 88-CA1470-MR), citing a lack of merit in Appellant’s arguments. In 1990, Appellant 

brought a Habeas Corpus action in federal court which was denied. According to 

Appellant, he has come before the Parole Board on five occasions and the Board 

imposed a serve-out at his last appearance before the Board on September 11, 

2003. 

The present appeal before us is a motion for relief pursuant to CR2

60.02. In pertinent part, Appellant asserted: (1) his sentences in Nos. 75-CR11751, 75-CR-11752, and 75-CR-11753 were improperly ordered to be served 

consecutively to one another; and (2) his motion was not barred by time of filing as 

allowing the invalid sentence to stand is a constitutional violation. The circuit 

court permitted Appellant’s claims to proceed via RCr 11.42 as well as CR 60.02, 

1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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despite Appellant only citing CR 60.02 as a means of relief. This was done in the 

interest of fairness and because the incomplete record complicated the 

determination of whether Appellant had sought relief in a previous RCr 11.42 or 

CR 60.02 motion. After reviewing the record and holding hearings, the circuit 

court concluded that Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief must be denied 

due to: (1) the failure of Appellant to move for relief via CR 60.02 within a 

reasonable time; (2) the inability of the circuit court to apply a change in law 

retroactively to Appellant’s sentencing; and (3) the inability of the circuit court to 

exercise jurisdiction over the decisions of the Parole Board. Appellant is now 

arguing to this Court that the circuit court failed to apply the holding of Bedell v. 

Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1993), as modified on denial of rehearing

(Jan. 31, 1994), retroactively and argues that the motion was not barred by time of 

filing as allowing the sentence is a constitutional violation of separation of powers. 

II. Analysis 

a. Standard of Review 

“Given the high standard for granting a CR 60.02 motion, a trial 

court’s ruling on the motion receives great deference on appeal. . . .” Barnett v. 

Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Ky. 1998). A defendant’s entitlement to 

extraordinary postconviction relief “is a matter left to the sound discretion of the 

court and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except for 
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abuse.” Meece v. Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Ky. 2017) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 

(Ky. 1996)). To amount to an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s decision must 

be “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” 

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). While giving 

deference to the findings of the circuit court, we analyze (1) whether this motion 

adheres to proper postconviction relief procedure and (2) whether a retroactive 

application of the holding of Bedell is appropriate in this case. 

b. Postconviction Relief Procedure

Appellant has made previous challenges to his convictions and 

sentences beginning with direct appeals filed in Nos. 11-CR-11751 and 11-CR11753. There are two legal mechanisms that can provide relief from a conviction 

or improper sentence post-appeal: RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02. Though Appellant 

has filed a CR 60.02 motion, the circuit court permitted his claims to proceed via 

RCr 11.42 as well, “to make the proceedings as fair to the [Appellant] as 

possible[.]” However, “[t]he structure provided in Kentucky for attacking the final 

judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not haphazard and overlapping, but is 

organized and complete.” Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 

1983). The Kentucky Supreme Court established the structure for postconviction 

relief, providing first for a motion under RCr 11.42 and thereafter in CR 60.02. Id.
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RCr 11.42 provides an avenue to proceed directly by motion in the 

court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence that is 

subject to collateral attack. Any motions filed under this method must be filed 

within three years after final judgment, unless the motion alleges and the movant 

proves either: (a) “that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the movant and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence;” or (b) “that the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not 

established within the period provided for herein and has been held to apply 

retroactively.” RCr 11.42 (10). While the circuit court permitted the motion “to 

proceed via RCr 11.42,” this Court notes that Appellant brought this motion for 

postconviction relief under CR 60.02. Specifically, the Appellant is challenging an 

allegedly illegal sentence, pursuant to CR 60.02(e).

CR 60.02 provides for extraordinary relief and the motion must be 

filed within a reasonable time. It is for relief that is not available by direct appeal 

and the movant must demonstrate why he is entitled to this extraordinary relief. 

Gross, 648 S.W.2d 853. Appellant in this case asserts that his sentence is invalid 

under a retroactive application of Bedell, in which the Kentucky Supreme Court 

reinterpreted KRS3 532.110 and KRS 532.080 and concluded that a term sentence 

3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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cannot be required to be served consecutively to a life sentence if the sentences 

were part of the same incident. Bedell, 870 S.W.2d 779. 

Appellant’s current motion seeks relief via CR 60.02 and was brought 

over twenty-five years after the Bedell decision was published. We agree with the 

circuit court that a twenty-five-year delay is not reasonable. But for the reasons 

that follow, Appellant may challenge an allegedly illegal sentence under CR 

60.02(e) without regard to timeliness. 

c. Retroactive Application of Bedell and its Exception

Appellant is currently serving three sentences imposed by the 

McCracken Circuit Court, consisting of life imprisonment in addition to a ten-year 

sentence and fifteen-year sentence, to be served consecutively. In 1993, the 

Kentucky Supreme Court held that no sentence can be ordered to run consecutively 

with such a life sentence in any case, capital or noncapital. Bedell, 870 S.W.2d 

779. Appellant seeks to retroactively apply this holding to his own case, citing 

Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284 (Ky. App. 2018), in support of this 

contention. The Phon Court noted that the Court was bound to retroactively apply 

a ruling when it consists of merely a clarification of an already existing sentencing 

statute. Id. at 301. See also Duncan v. Commonwealth, 640 S.W.3d 84 (Ky. App. 

2021). 
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Based upon the holdings in Phon and Duncan, Appellant is entitled to 

challenge the allegedly illegal sentence under CR 60.02 even though he did not file 

the motion within a reasonable time. Applying the principles of Bedell and Phon

to Appellant, the holding of Bedell would appear to be retroactive. The relevant 

portion of the statute in question in Appellant’s case, KRS 532.110, is unchanged 

since the time of Appellant’s sentencing in 1977. The clarification of the statute’s 

application via Bedell did not adopt a new rule of constitutional law or procedure 

but was merely a new interpretation of the same statute. Appellant is correct in the 

assertion that this case is governed retroactively by Bedell; however, Appellant 

fails to recognize an exception to this new interpretation.

The Kentucky Supreme Court limited the Bedell holding in a 2005 

case, in which the Court distinguished situations where the defendant had been 

improperly convicted at the same trial to a life sentence and term of years to be run 

consecutively to situations where the court could impose a term of years sentence 

to be served consecutively to a life sentence when imposed at separate trials. 

Stewart v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 789 (Ky. 2005). Specifically, the 

Kentucky Supreme Court found that the Bedell holding does not preclude running 

a life sentence consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. 153 S.W.3d at 792. 

The Bedell holding was further distinguished in two unpublished

opinions in which the Kentucky Supreme Court clarified the application of the 
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holding, specifically stating that judgment ordering a term of years to run 

consecutively with a life sentence is not invalid if rendered in a prior, separate 

case. Clay v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-SC-000012-MR, 2010 WL 2471862 (Ky. 

Jun. 17, 2010). The Kentucky Supreme Court indicated that the distinction hinges 

not on the order in which the sentences were rendered, but rather on whether the 

sentences are based on convictions arising from the same set of facts or separate 

facts. Id. at *3-4. Here, as in Clay and in Higgins v. Commonwealth, No. 2014-

SC-000466-MR, 2016 WL 671150, at *8 (Ky. Feb. 18, 2016), the indictments 

arose from separate offenses and distinct crimes.4 

While the holding of Bedell must be applied retroactively, the 

exceptions to the rule announced in Stewart are likewise retroactive. Observing 

the retroactive mandate from Bedell, in addition to the exception to cases involving 

sentences imposed at separate trials, it is apparent that the circuit court has not 

abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s CR 60.02 motion for postconviction 

relief. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of that relief by the McCracken Circuit 

Court. 

ALL CONCUR.

4 We note that both Clay, 2010 WL 2471862, and Higgins, 2016 WL 671150, at *8, are 

unpublished and were used by this Court as persuasive materials. Pursuant to CR 76.28(4)(c), 

this Court used these unpublished cases for guidance as there is no published opinion that would 

adequately address the issue before the Court.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Kara Stinson Lewis 

La Grange, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron 

Attorney General of Kentucky

Todd D. Ferguson 

Assistant Attorney General 

Frankfort, Kentucky