Failure to train may serve as a basis for §1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the person with whom the police come in

contact. City of Canton, Ohio y. Harris, 489 U.S. 378. In Board of the County Commissioner of

Bryant County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its

decision in Canton as holding that an inadequate training claim required that the deficient
training program apply over time to multiple employees. Id. (Citing Canton, supra, at 390). In
the instant case, plaintiff has not alleged that there is a lack of training for Sheriff's Officers in
general, and that such a lack of training resulted in a number of constitutional violations. Rather,
plaintiff alleges only that Dunbar, an individual Sheriffs Officer, was not trained or supervised,
as evidenced by failure to investigate the alleged violation.

These allegations are insufficient to properly allege a practice or failure to train that has
become force of law. To properly claim the existence of a custom, plaintiff must allege that a
practice has caused more than the single alleged constitutional violation at issue. See City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 820 (1985). The complaint in the instant case fails to
meet these standards.

INCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Sheahan’s motion to dismiss is granted.

ENTER: June 5, 2002
hgh, Ci

Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge



dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to rule on its merits. See Gibson v. City of
Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION

Sheahan argues that the allegations set forth by plaintiff are insufficient to support a claim
under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
To state a §1983 claim against a government official acting in his official capacity, plaintiff must
sufficiently allege that there is: “1) an express policy that, when enforced, cause[d] a
constitutional depravation; 2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law,
or express municipal policy, [was] so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or
usage with force of the law; 3) . . . that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final
policy making authority.” McTigue y. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995). The
requirement exists so that the municipality will not be liable on the theory of respondeat superior.
Monell, supra, at 694.

Plaintiff does not allege that his injuries were the result of an express policy or were
caused by a person with final policy making authority. What the plaintiff does allege is that his
injuries were the result of Sheahan’s failure to train and supervise Dunbar. The court construes
this allegation as an attempt to plead the second McTigue requirement, that plaintiff's injuries
were the result of a widespread practice so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom
or usage with force of law. Unfortunately for plaintiff, even under the liberal pleading
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, applicable to § 1983 policy claims, Leatherman vy. Tarrant

County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), this claim is

deficient.


-

Minute Order Fort (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

‘amet aeimned wise | Robert W. Gettleman _ | Sine Juss toner
CASE NUMBER 01C 3145 DATE June 5, 2002
CASE Zentner v_ Sheahan, et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motiondue

(3) im Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due

(4) a Ruling/Hearingon___setfor__—at__ ts

(5) a Status hearing

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] {set for/re-set for]on__—ssetfor_ ss at_—

(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for]on__—_at

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at

(9) im) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) General Rule21 CO FRCP41(a)(1) C)FRCP41(a)(2).

qo il [Other docket entry]

Memorandum opinion and order entered.

Accordingly, defendant Sheahan’s motion to dismiss is granted.
The 6/12/02 status hearing date is to stand for the remaining parties.

(e3)) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. stnaties
X_ | Notices mailed by judge’s staff. 6
Notified counsel by telephone. JUN 8 8
Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form, LYNOD LIYLSIO SA arcing dou nti )
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. wast
: am BY
courtroom 84:2 Hd S- NNT cd
GDS deputy’s
initials Po aa
Date/timvrdceveatin J IS
central Clerk’s Office tealling deputy itals



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
HAROLD ZENTNER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 01C3145
v. )
) Judge Robert W. Gettleman
RICHARD DUNBAR, Individually and in his )
official capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of Cook )
County, and MICHAEL SHEAHAN, ) aC we
Sheriff of Cook County, ) DOCKETED
)
Defendants. ) duN 06 2008,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Harold Zentner (“plaintiff”) has filed a first amended complaint pursuant to 42
US.C. § 1983 against, Michael Sheahan (“Sheahan”) in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook
County Illinois, and Cook County Sheriff’s Officer Richard Dunbar (“Dunbar”), alleging that
Dunbar used excessive force in unlawfully arresting him in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Counts H and IV are brought against
Sheahan, alleging that Dunbar’s actions are the result of Sheahan’s policy of failing to train and
supervise Dunbar. Sheahan has moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For reasons stated below, Sheahan’s motion is
granted.

BACKGROUND
When considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the allegations of the complaint

as true as well as reasonable inferences therefrom, and views these both in the light most

a


a

favorable to the plaintiff. Travel All Over the World, Inc v, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d

1423, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996).

The complaint alleges that on January 9, 2001, plaintiff, a 59 year-old electrician, and his
employer drove to the parking lot of Austin High School. Plaintiff was a passenger in the car.
Dunbar informed plaintiff and his employer that they were not allowed to park in the high
school’s parking lot and the two complied by parking on the street. Plaintiff and his employer
then entered the high school and had a conversation with a school engineer. Unaware that
Dunbar was down the hall, plaintiff used profanity in complaining that Dunbar prevented
plaintiff and his employer from parking in the parking lot. The engineer pointed at Dunbar and
asked if he was the person to whom plaintiff was referring. Plaintiff alleges that Dunbar lunged
at him, slammed him into some lockers and struck him over the head repeatedly with a loaded
.38 revolver. Dunbar arrested plaintiff, forcibly removed him from the school and brought
plaintiff to Fifteenth District Chicago Police Station. Dunbar filed charges of battery and
disorderly conduct against plaintiff. Plaintiff was tried on the misdemeanor charges in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, where the judge granted plaintiffs motion for summary
judgement as to the disorderly conduct charge and found plaintiff not guilty of battery.

LEGAL STANDARD

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court considers “whether
relief is possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent with the allegations.”
Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992). A complaint will generally
not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt that under no set of facts would plaintiff's allegations

entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The purpose of a motion to