by Mr. Jenkins’ girlfriend. The hearsay evidence was allowed only
to provide context after Mr. Jenkins’ own counsel elicited a
partial version of the girlfriend’s statements from a government
witness. Third, Mr. Jenkins claims that “numerous statements” were
introduced that were irrelevant and prejudicial hearsay. As Mr.
Jenkins makes no attempt to identify these statements, or even the
individual who allegedly made them, I do not find this a persuasive
argument. Finally, Mr. Jenkins makes various arguments that the
jury instructions were erroneous. These arguments were fully
discussed at the jury instructions conference. Mr. Jenkins’ motion
for a new trial is DENIED.

Defendant Coleman’s motions for a new trial and for arrest of
judgment, are, to put it mildly, cursory. Motions for arrest of
judgment are appropriate in cases where the indictment does not
charge an offense, or the court has no jurisdiction of the charged
offense. FsD. R. Crim. P. 34. Notwithstanding Mr. Coleman’s bare
allegation to the contrary, neither circumstance is present here.
The motion for arrest of judgment is DENIED.

The motion for a new trial includes no argument whatsoever; it
is simply a list of ten alleged court errors with no attempt made
to explain why those errors justify a new trial. None of the ten
statements suggests that the conviction was a miscarriage of
justice. Like Mr. Jenkins’ verdict, the verdict against Mr. Coleman

was entirely consistent with the weight of the evidence, which


Jenkins was not present, and that the government failed to prove
intent to distribute, which cannot be presumed merely from the
amount of drugs seized. The government responds that the cocaine
was found in the 111th Street apartment of Mr. Jenkins’ girlfriend,
and Mr. Jenkins confessed to DEA officers that it was his cocaine
and that he was engaged in cocaine distribution. Once again, it was
rational to convict Mr. Jenkins on this count. The motion for a
judgment of acquittal is Denrep on all counts.

Rule 33 allows motions for a new trial where it is required by
the interests of justice. FED. R. Crim. P. 33. The court may order
a new trial only where the verdict is against the manifest weight
of the evidence, and a guilty verdict would result in a miscarriage
of justice. United States v. Welch, No. 02-CR818, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9697, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 11, 2003) (Manning, J.). Such
motions are disfavored, and properly granted only in the most
extreme cases. United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 422 (7th
Cir. 1998). Mr. Jenkins points to six alleged errors, but none
justifies the extraordinary remedy of a new trial.

Mr. Jenkins argues first that the court was wrong in holding
that the identity of an informant was privileged, but offers no new
arguments on the matter, and does not explain why this alleged
error was so important that the conviction was a miscarriage of
justice. Second, he argues that the court erred in allowing the

government to introduce hearsay evidence regarding statements made


included numerous tape-recorded conversations between Mr. Coleman
and co-defendant Kevin Reed, the testimony of a co-conspirator who
received cocaine from Mr. Coleman, and the testimony of an FBI
agent regarding Mr. Coleman’s incriminating statements. Mr.

Coleman’s motion for a new trial is DENtTED

ENTER ORDER:

WZ, 2 wk

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: November aus 2003


Minute Order Zorm (08/97) ¢

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

‘Name of Assigned Judge Elaine E. Bucklo Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge . than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 CR 236-3 &5 DATE 11/24/2003
CASE USA vs. Jenkins and Coleman
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presertted.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
@G) o Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) go Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at __
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(ea) im Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) o {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
CFRCP4@m) O Local Rule 41.1 OO FRCP41(a\(1) 1 FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order denying motions for new trial by
defendants.
dl) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. suanber of noeos
Y | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
RIA
Notified counsel by telephone. bone as +a
Docketing to mail notices. -
Mail AO 450 form. _
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
os io a
courtroom arcs
MPY deputy’s
initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
No. 02 CR 236

Vv.

ZACHARY JENKINS and MERLIN COLEMAN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants Zachary Jenkins and Merlin Coleman were convicted
of multiple charges in connection with a conspiracy to distribute
cocaine. Mr. Jenkins moves for judgment of acquittal or in the
alternative for a new trial. Mr. Coleman also moves for a new
trial and in arrest of judgment. I deny the motions.

Rule 29 permits motions for judgment of acquittal on the
ground that the evidence is “insufficient to sustain a conviction.”
FeD. R. CRIM. P. 29(a). A court evaluating such a motion evaluates
the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, and should grant the motion only where no rational jury
could have returned a guilty verdict. United States v. Hausmann,
345 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 2003). None of Mr. Jenkins’ arguments
meets this exacting standard.

Mr. Jenkins states that the government’s evidence was
insufficient to convict him of Count One, conspiracy, but that the
jury found him guilty partly because of the “erroneous and

confusing” jury instructions on that count. Mr. Jenkins provides

DS9


no further detail or argument on this point. The evidence at trial
included Mr. Jenkins’ confession to FBI agents that he was a
cocaine dealer and distributed large amounts of cocaine to his co-
defendants and numerous incriminating tape recorded conversations
involving Mr. Jenkins. I find that the jury was not irrational to
convict him on this count.

Mr. Jenkins was convicted of four counts of using the
telephone to facilitate other offenses and complains that no
witness specifically testified that the particular conversations
which led to the convictions concerned drugs. However, several
cooperating defendants testified at trial about the slang terms
used in cocaine distribution, and the jury heard recorded telephone
conversations which seemed to discuss drug distribution. A rational
jury could convict on this basis.

Mr. Jenkins argues that the introduction of conversations
about distribution was inadequate proof that such distribution
actually took place, and thus that there is insufficient evidence
to support his conviction under Count Eight. Even without Mr.
Jenkins’ confession that he distributed cocaine, the conversations
support a rational inference that Mr. Jenkins distributed cocaine.

Mr. Jenkins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to
Count Ten, possession with intent to distribute, on the grounds
that Mr. Jenkins was not in possession or control of the cocaine in

question, which was found in someone else’s apartment when Mr.