$105 for the paralegals), plus other costs, if any. Further, because there is no need for discovery
regarding the salaries paid to Mr. Soule and the paralegals, the document requests and deposition
notices relating to their salaries are quashed.

ENTERED:

How R hater

NAN R. NOLAN
Dated: December 6, 2004 United States Magistrate Judge


formula, contending that the order of July 6, 2004 “clearly contemplates out of pocket expenses,”
not the equivalent of costs that might be assessed after a case ended. (Def.’s Resp. 4 8.) In other
words, the City believes its fair share should be based on the hourly rate plaintiffs’ counsel paid
Mr. Soule and the paralegals (i.e., a proportion of their respective salaries), not on their billing
rates.’ Thus, on October 12, 2004, the City served plaintiffs with document requests seeking
invoices, pay stubs, payroll records, time records, etc. relating to (i) the hours worked by Mr.
Soule and the paralegals, and (ii) their respective salaries. In a letter dated October 15, 2004,
defense counsel further informed plaintiffs’ counsel that they intended to take depositions
regarding the expenses incurred to compile the database. On November 12, 2004, plaintiffs filed
the pending motion, asking the court to quash those discovery requests and advise the parties
what it meant by “expenses.”
Discussion

A. The Meaning of “Expenses” in the Order of July 6, 2004

When the court issued the July 6, 2004 order requiring the City to pay its fair share of the
expenses plaintiffs incurred to compile the database, the court meant for the bill to be calculated

based on the number of hours Mr. Soule and the paralegals spent on the project, multiplied by

calculated based on the hours spent multiplied by the hourly billing rate. According to the City,
plaintiffs’ counsel failed to provide adequate substantiation for the expenses incurred in creating
the database. On October 26, 2004, plaintiffs’ counsel provided redacted billing records relating
to the consultant’s and paralegals’ work on the database. According to plaintiffs’ counsel, the
billing records were not produced earlier because it was their understanding that the City did not
want the database if it had to pay.

“The City further argues that it should not be required to pay for the database at all. That
argument is addressed below,


B. Challenges Regarding the Work Performed on the Database

In addition to challenging the method for calculating paralegal services, the City also
questions whether the work was actually done by paralegals. Plaintiffs’ counsel has clarified
through an affidavit that the work was done by 3 full-time paralegals, 2 part-time paralegals, and
3 law students who performed paralegal work during the spring and summer of 2004. Counsel’s
representation satisfies the court on this issue.

The City further argues that the paralegals did not perform paralegal work. According to
the City, “[i}t is data entry work, for which plaintiffs’ counsel could go out into the market place
and presumably hire someone for under $20 per hour to perform the work on a temporary basis.”
(Wef.’s Resp. § 11.) Plaintiffs counter that it was necessary to use careful, skilled workers for the
work, in part because the City produced boxes of arrest records in no particular order, which
complicated the task of creating the database. The City that had the opportunity to be involved in
creating the database from its inception, but declined to do so. Had the City chosen to work with
plaintiffs to create the database, the City could have had input regarding how to create the
database most efficiently and cost-effectively. It was the City’s prerogative to decline plaintiffs’
offer. But one ramification of that decision is that the City’s complaints about what could have
been done differently are not well-taken.

The City has raised no specific challenges to the number of hours that Mr. Soule or the
paralegals spent to create the database, and declined the court’s offer to review the billing records
in camera for reasonableness. Regarding the paralegals’ billing rate of $125 per hour, at the
hearing on November 22, 2004, defense counsel represented that it charges the City less for

paralegal time, but did not reveal its rate. A specific rate suggestion from the City would have


defendant for 50% of compilation costs.” Fauteck, 91 F.R.D. at 399. Likewise, in Williams, the
court ordered the defendant to pay its “‘fair portion of the fees and expenses incurred’ in the past
by the [EEOC] for the work of the [EEOC’s] expert in encoding the requested data and
formulating the database.” Williams, 119 F.R.D. at 651. Neither the Williams court nor the
Fauteck court found it necessary to explain what “costs” or “fees and expenses” meant. In this
case, however, the parties have requested further explanation.

Here, to avoid prejudicing plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ expenses must include the value of Mr.
Soule’s and the paralegals’ time, calculated based on the number of hours they worked on the
database, multiplied by their respective billing rates. Regarding Mr. Soule, this is a non-issue.
He works as a consultant for plaintiffs’ counsel at a given hourly rate. Prior to July 2004, Mr.
Soule charged plaintiffs’ counsel $150/hour; since July 2004, he charges plaintiffs’ counsel
$190/hour. Plaintiffs’ counsel pays Mr. Soule for every hour he works at the designated billing
rate.© Unlike the paralegals, he is not an employee who is paid one rate and billed at another.
Thus, under either parties’ interpretation of the July 6" order, the cost of Mr. Soule’s time spent
working on the database is unquestionably an expense incurred to compile the database.

As for the paralegals, a fair resolution requires calculation of paralegal expenses based on

SAlthough plaintiffs’ counsel explained this practice to the City, the City challenges that
“there has been no substantiation that plaintiffs’ counsel ever actually paid Mr. Soule at the rate
of $150-$190 per hour, nor is there any substantiation or documentation that Mr. Soule should
command such an amount for what he did in this case, which has not been properly disclosed nor
yet discovered.” (Def.’s Resp. 47.) Regarding whether plaintiffs’ counsel pays Mr. Soule,
plaintiffs’ counsel submitted an affidavit that they pay Mr. Soule for every hour he bills them at
the rate he bills them; this representation satisfies the court. Additionally, the City’s argument
that plaintiffs have failed to disclose the work Mr. Soule did on the database is belied by the
redacted time records plaintiffs sent to the City on October 26, 2004, which provide the dates on
which Mr. Soule worked, the amount of time he worked, and a description of his work.

6



their hourly billing rates, plus other costs, if any.’ In deciding to order the parties to split the
expenses—i.e., the costs—incurred to compile the database, the court found Fauteck v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 91 F. R.D. 393, 399 (N.D. Ill. 1980) and Williams v. E.1, duPont
de Nemours & Co., 119 F.R.D. 648, 651 (W.D. Ky. 1987) instructive. Portis, 2004 WL
1535854, at * 5. Both Fauteck and Williams involved compilations of facts in computer
databases that were prepared for trial. Fauteck, 91 F.R.D. at 398 (employment discrimination
case in which defendant created a database compiling facts selected from its personnel records);
Williams, 119 F.R.D. at 650 (employment discrimination case in which EEOC created a database
of facts gleaned from defendant’s employment records). As in the case at bar, in both Fauteck
and Williams, the party seeking its opponent’s database had access to all of the underlying
records that were used to create the database, so the party had the ability to create its own
database. Fauteck, 91 F.R.D. at 398; Williams, 119 F.R.D. at 649-50. Like this court, the
Fauteck and Williams courts compelled production of the databases because creating a similar
database from scratch would have been a “time-consuming, duplicative and expensive effort.”
Williams, 119 F.R.D, at 650; Fauteck, 91 F.R.D. at 398. Regarding cost-sharing, in Fauteck, the

court compelled production of the database “contingent on plaintiffs’ willingness to reimburse

‘According to the City, plaintiffs’ counsel misled both the court and the City during
briefing on the motion to compel by failing to disclose “that when they claimed they were
reporting ‘expenses’ in their Opposition brief,” they were really seeking “costs” that they might
recover in an attorneys’ fee petition if plaintiffs prevail on the merits. (Def.’s Resp. J 6a.) To be
clear, the court was not misled. During the briefing on the motions to compel, neither party used
the term “expenses”—both parties argued about “costs” and whether the City should have to
contribute, Further, when plaintiffs represented that they had spent “$72,200.00 in paralegal time
for data entry[,]” (Pls.” Mem. Opp. Mot. Compel at 3), the court presumed that number was
based on an hours-times-billing-rate calculation.


hour.* When plaintiffs’ paralegals were working on the database, they were unavailable to do
other billable work, whereas defense counsel’s paralegals were free to do other work, billing their
an hourly rate. Whether defense counsel’s paralegals were free to do other work for the City or
for other clients makes no difference. If defense counsel had to create their own database, the
City would have to pay for 100% of the paralegal time based on defense counsel’s hourly billing
rate for paralegals. Compensating plaintiffs for 50% of the paralegal time, based on the hourly
billing rate, simply levels the playing field.

For these reasons, when the court ordered the City to share the expenses incurred to create
the database, the court expected the expense of the services provided by Mr. Soule and the

paralegals to be calculated based on hourly billing rates.”

®As explained in section B of this opinion, the court is reducing this rate for purposes of
calculating the expenses incurred to create the database.

*Even if the court were to reconsider what it meant by “expenses” in the July 6, 2004
order (which it was not asked to do), the City’s position is unpersuasive. In support of its
argument that paralegal services should be reimbursed based on plaintiffs’ “actual outlays” (i.e.,
a proportionate share of the paralegals’ salaries), the City relies on Wisconsin v. Hotline
Industries, Inc., 236 F.3d 363, 364-67 (7" Cir. 2000). In Hotline Industries, the issue was
whether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the fee shifting provision applicable to improper removal
proceedings, “permits salaried government employees to recover at prevailing market rates.” Id.
at 364. The Seventh Circuit ruled that because the statute expressly limits recovery to “payment
of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees,” the district erred by awarding
attorney’s fees based on prevailing market rates rather than the attorney’s fees that were actually
incurred by the government in defending the removal action (i.e., a proportional share of the
government attorneys’ salaries plus related overhead). Jd. at 366-68. Given the unique facts
presented in Hotline Industries, the City’s reliance on the case is misplaced. Hotline Industries
involved an unusual statute: one of the “few fee-shifting statutes [that] explicitly limit recoveries
to actual outlays.” Jd. at 367. Additionally, the case involved government attorneys who do not
bill at an hourly rate in the course of performing their jobs. Significantly, unlike salaried
government attorneys, private attorneys may recover attorney’s fees based on their reasonable
hourly rates under § 1447 (c). Vyshnevsky v. Park Ridge Oldsmobile, No. 02 C 6173, 2003 WL
21518568, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2003).


United States District Court, Northern District of Iinois

| Name of Asyigned Jud Robert W. Gettleman Sitting Judge if Other Nan R. Nolan
| or Magistrate Judge . than Assigned Judge
|
CASE NUMBER 02 C3139 DATE 12/6/2004
few _
CASE Ronald Portis vs, City of Chicago, et al.
TITLE

{In the following bos (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g.. plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintitY, and th) stine

of the motion being presented. |

MOTION:

Ny the mature

DOCKET

ENTRY:
f
a) a Filed motion of [ use fisting in“Motion” box above.]
iu g Brief in support of motion due _

hiss Oo Answer brief to motion due. Reply to answer brief due

th ia Ruling Hearing on set for at

in o Staus hearing[held'continued to] [set for/re-set for] on selfor ak

i fo) o Pretrial conlerence[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor al
> Oo Vrialfset for're-set for} on at

| na) : [Beneh Jury tial] ([earing] held/continued to al

fo) im} This case is dismissed [with’without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreemeny/ pursuant to]

OERCP40m) OG Local Rule 41.1 OOPRCP4i ay) TC PRCP41(a)(2).

(10; [Other docket entry}

| Plainofts’ Motion lo (a) Quash Defendants’ (1) Notices to Depose Plaintiffs’ Computer Consulrant and Paralegals. and (2) Requests
ror their Invoices and Salary Information; and (b) Advise the Parties How it Intended Plainuiffs* Costs for the Creation of Plaintilts”
Dutabuse t be Calculated [164-1] is granted, The expenses incurred to create the database shall be calculaied based an the

manber of hours Mr. Soule and the paralegals spent on the project, multiplied by their respective hourly billing rates ($150°S190 for
Mir Soule. $105 for the paralegals), Further, because there is no need for discovery regarding the salaries paid to Mr, Soule and the

paralegals. the doctunent requests and deposilon notices relating to their salaries are quashed.

e j¥or further detail see order (on reverse side offatiached to

¢ original minute ordce.]

No notiees required, advised in open court

No notices required
. nymber of notices

Document
Namber

Notices mailed by judge's staf DEC 7 2004

Nouied couisel by telephone:

dary dchyteil

Docket to mart notices

Mio VO 480 fosin

Cops tu guslgg magistrate judge mS 9
Va 02on4
date sel yotice
courtroom a re
hina dyputy's ae ‘ TH8C2 rns

i inivals
i Date:time received jn
| central Clerk's Offieg nding sepety ats



within ten days as required by Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

As for the court’s decision to shift costs, under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a court has authority to “make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from . . . undue burden or expense ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). As the Seventh Circuit
has explained, Rule 26(c) gives “trial courts considerable discretion in determining whether
expense-shifting in discovery production is appropriate in a given case.” Spears v. City of
Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 158 (7" Cir. 1996); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, Advisory Committee Notes,
1970 amendment (“[T]he courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent
against undue burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering
party pay costs.”). And despite the City’s belief to the contrary, courts have required parties to
share the costs of creating computer databases that will be part of their opponent’s evidence
against them.'° For example, in Fauteck, the court required the plaintiffs to share the costs of a
database that was expected to serve as the foundation for the defendant’s expert trial testimony.
Fauteck, 91 F.R.D. at 398.

Similarly, in Williams, the plaintiff's expert compiled facts from the defendant’ s records

‘Despite the general presumption that the responding party bears the costs of responding
to discovery requests, Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 358 (1978), cost-shifting
is not that unusual, particularly in cases involving discovery of electronic evidence. For
example, when a party seeks discovery of electronic data that is not readily accessible, courts
often require the parties to share the costs of production. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis,
Inc., No, 02 C 6832, 2004 WL 1895122, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004); Byers v. Mlinois State
Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002); see generally,
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, No. 02 Civ. 1243, 2003 WL 21087884, at *5-13 (S.D.N.Y. May
13, 2003). Courts utilize cost-shifting in other contexts as well. If a party establishes a need for
discovery from its opponent’s non-testifying expert, the party must pay its opponent “a fair
portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and
opinions from the expert.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C).

11


been helpful. Nevertheless, the court’s research shows that the district court recently approved a
rate of $105.00 per hour for paralegal services. Zaghloul v. DaimlerChrysler Services, LLC, 03
C 4499, 2004 WL 2203427, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2004) (Gettleman, J.). Following
Zaghloul, the court orders paralegal expenses to be calculated at a rate of $105 per hour.

Cc. The Discovery Served by the City is Unnecessary

The purpose of the document requests and deposition notices the City served is to
ascertain how much plaintiffs’ counsel paid Mr. Soule and their paralegals. This discovery is
unnecessary. Paralegal services shall be reimbursed at a rate of $105 per hour, and Mr. Soule’s
services shall be reimbursed at his applicable hourly rate, Plaintiffs’ counsel has provided
redacted billing records that explain the dates each person worked, the amount of time worked,
and the work performed. No further information is necessary. Accordingly, the document
requests relating to the amounts paid to Mr. Soule and the paralegals are quashed. Likewise, the
City is barred from deposing the paralegals and Mr. Soule on this issue.

D. The City Argues Against Cost-Shifting in Any Form

The City also argues that there is no basis for cost-shifting, regardless of the method of
calculation, because plaintiffs intend to use the information in the database as substantive
evidence. In the City’s view, such cost-shifting—which is tantamount to requiring the City to
pay plaintiffs to create evidence against it—is unprecedented. The court disagrees.

As an initial matter, the City’s argument is untimely. Regardless whether there was room
for disagreement regarding how the court intended the expenses to be calculated, the order of
July 6, 2004 clearly stated that the court was requiring the City to pay for the database. If the

City wanted to challenge that ruling, it should have appealed the court’s order of July 6, 2004

10


a reasonable hourly billing rate. In the context of petitions for attorneys’ fees and costs after a
party succeeds on the merits, paralegal services are compensated at the market rate—i.e., an
hourly billing rate, See In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig. 962 F.2d 566, 569 (7" Cir. 1992) (error
not to compensate paralegal expenses based on market value of paralegal services).’ The City
argues that cases involving fee petitions are not instructive here because no party has succeeded
on the merits, The court disagrees.

Requiring the City to pay for half of the paralegal services based on an hourly billing rate
effectively puts the parties in the position as if each side had contributed to the development of
the database from its inception. Had the City agreed to undertake a collaborative effort to create
the database, it is reasonable to assume that the parties would have contributed equal resources
toward the project. For example, if four paralegals were needed, counsel for each side could
have assigned two paralegals to the project (or worked out some other equitable arrangement).

Instead, plaintiffs provided all of the paralegal services. The paralegals’ billing rate is $125 per

"The City contends that in Jn re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, the Seventh
Circuit made a “distinction between the ‘expenses’ ordered by this Court and the ‘fees’ claimed
by plaintiffs, a distinction that plaintiffs refuse to recognize.” (Def.’s Surreply { 5.) This
contention is not based on a fair reading of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion. The Seventh Circuit
did not discuss paralegal “fees.” Nor did the court make the distinction between expenses and
costs that the City urges. Rather, the court held that paralegal services should be compensated at
market rates, not the “hourly expense of each paralegal, consisting of the paralegal’s salary
divided by 40 plus overhead directly attributable to that paralegal ....” In re Continental Ill.
See. Litig., 962 F.2d at 569 (emphasis in original). The court went on to state: “The Supreme
Court has disapproved the approach of basing reimbursement for paralegal expenses on the ‘cost’
of the paralegal, as distinct from the market value of his services, when it is customary to bill
separately for the value of those services.” Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 287-89
(1989) (emphasis added)). And later in the opinion, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that paralegal
expenses are reimbursed at market rates. Id. at 570.

7


considerably[;|” (iii) “plaintiffs will not be unduly prejudiced by sharing [the database] with the
City now, provided they are fairly compensated for their extensive work[;]” and (iv) even though
the City had all the information necessary to create a similar database, requiring the City to
duplicate plaintiffs’ effort “would be a complete waste of time and money.” Jd. at *4. In order to
avoid seriously prejudicing plaintiffs, who had expended considerable resources to create the
database, the court further ordered the City to pay its fair share of the expenses incurred to create
the database. Specifically, the order of July 6, 2004 stated:

The parties are each ordered to pay half of the total expenses plaintiffs have

incurred to date to compile the database; the defendants’ half shall be reduced by

$5,000.00 as compensation toward special programming expenses defendants may

have incurred. As for any future expenses incurred to complete the database,

those expenses shall be split evenly. Such future expenses shall include not only

plaintiffs’ expenses, but any special programming expenses incurred by

defendants to provide the necessary data to plaintiffs.
Id, at *6 (footnote omitted). Neither side appealed the court’s order compelling production of the
database and ordering the City to split the expense of the database. Now, more than four months
after the opinion was issued, it has come to the court’s attention that the parties disagree about
what the court meant by “expenses” in the July 6th order.

Plaintiffs’ counsel have calculated their expenses based on the number of hours their

computer consultant, Mr. Soule, and their paralegals spent creating the database, multiplied by

the consultant’s and the paralegals’ respective billing rates.’ Defense counsel objects to that

*Evidently after the order was issued, plaintiffs’ counsel provided the City with a
summary of the time plaintiffs’ computer consultant and paralegals had spent on the project,
together with a statement of their hourly billing rates. According to plaintiffs’ counsel, the City
did not challenge plaintiffs’ method of calculating the expenses. Rather, defense counsel
informed plaintiffs that if it had to pay for the database, the City no longer wanted it. Defense
counsel does not deny making that representation. When the City renewed its interest in the
database some time later, the City raised for the first time its position that expenses should not be

3


Calculated (“plaintiffs’ motion”). To understand plaintiffs’ motion, some background
information is necessary.
Background

Plaintiffs’ motion is related to a ruling issued by this court on July 6, 2004 regarding
defendant City of Chicago’s motion to compel discovery. In its motion to compel, the City
sought production of a database that was compiled at the direction of plaintiffs’ attorneys.
Plaintiffs’ database is a compilation of factual information selected from “computer databases
and hard copies of arrest reports produced by the City in response to plaintiffs’ discovery
requests.” Portis v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 3139, 2004 WL 1535854, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 7,
2004)? The City produced records regarding 15,000 to 20,000 arrestees. Early in the litigation,
plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that the parties work together on the time-consuming and expensive
project and produce a joint database, but defendants declined to do so. Id. The City
subsequently filed a motion to compel production of the database. As explained more fully in the
court’s order of July 6, 2004, over plaintiffs’ objections, the court found that although the
database was entitled to fact work product protection, the City had demonstrated “a substantial
need for access to the database and that the City could not obtain the substantial equivalent of the
database without the undue hardship of expending extensive, duplicative resources.” Id. at *5.
The court therefore granted the motion to compel in part, finding that: (i) “such a consolidated
compilation of relevant data is an invaluable tool for both sides to assess the merits of the

litigation[;]” (ii) “giving the City access to the database should expedite the class-notice process
ig

°The opinion was issued on July 6, 2004; Westlaw’s date of July 7, 2004 reflects the date
the opinion was docketed.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
RONALD PORTIS, MADRIC LANCE, and )
EMMETT LYNCH, individually and on behalf ) rat
of a class, ) poreered
) yee 7 10h
Plaintiffs, ) gs
) No. 02 C 3139
Vv. )
) Judge Robert W. Gettleman
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al. )
) Magistrate Judge Nan R. Nolan
Defendants, y

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiffs Ronald Portis, Mardric Lance and Emmett Lynch have brought this class action
lawsuit against defendants City of Chicago, Terry Hillard, Joseph Griffin, John Risley, Francis
Kehoe, Evert Johnson and Robert Johnson asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations
of their federal civil rights. Plaintiffs, who were arrested for nonviolent ordinance violations
which impose only a fine, allege they were “unlawfully detained for prolonged periods of time
after completion of all administrative steps incident to their arrests for non-custodial ordinance
violations,” in violation of their civil rights. Portis v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 3139, 2004 WL
1284010, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2004),' This matter is before the court for ruling on Plaintiffs’
Motion to (a) Quash Defendants’ (1) Notices to Depose Plaintiffs’ Computer Consultant and
Paralegals, and (2) Requests for their Invoices and Salary Information; and (b) Advise the

Parties How it Intended Plaintiffs’ Costs for the Creation of Plaintiffs’ Database to be

'The district court has certified a class defined as “all persons who, during the class
period, were arrested on ordinance violations which carry no jail time in the City of Chicago and
who were detained for more than two hours after all administrative steps incident to the arrest,
except non-discretionary ministerial acts, were completed.” /d.

71


into a computer database, which the expert used as a tool to analyze the facts. 119 F.R.D. at 649.
The expert’s final report included his statistical analysis, opinion, and aggregate factual data.

The plaintiff resisted turning over the underlying database, however, because it had expended
considerable resources to create the database and all of the raw data that went into the database
came from defendant’s own records. Id. at 649-50. The defendant argued that it required access
to the database in order to effectively cross-examine the expert, examine the accuracy of the
database, and properly assess the aggregate factual data. Jd. at 650. The court agreed that it
would be wasteful and duplicative to require defendant to create its own database. Accordingly,
the court compelled production of the database, but required the defendant to pay a fair portion of
the fees and expenses incurred to create the database. Id. at 651.

The Williams case is factually analogous to the case at bar, regardless whether plaintiffs
intend to introduce their facts through an expert or a lay witness. At trial, plaintiffs will
introduce their aggregate factual data regarding the length of the arrestee’s detentions. As in
Williams, plaintiffs will have to provide that aggregate factual data to the City during discovery
when it is in final, or close to final, form. But if the City wants the database in order to check the
accuracy of plaintiffs’ facts without going through the underlying records (i.e., the City’s own
records), then pursuant to the court’s authority under Rule 26(c), the City must pay its fair
portion of the expenses incurred to create the database.

Conclusion

Plaintiffs’ motion is granted. As explained in more detail above, the expenses incurred to

create the database shall be calculated based on the number of hours Mr. Soule and the paralegals

spent on the project, multiplied by their respective hourly billing rates ($150/$190 for Mr. Soule,

12