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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

BOBBY SIMS and PHILLIP WISEMAN ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Court No. 03 C 00381 & 03 C 00382 

 ) 

JEROME SCHULTZ, individually and ) Judge Joan Gottschall 

in his official capacity as Chief of ) 

Police of the Willow Springs Police ) 

Department, the VILLAGE OF ) 

WILLOW SPRINGS, a municipal ) 

corporation, JOHN LYNN, ) 

individually and in his official ) 

capacity as Lieutenant f the Willow ) 

Springs Police Department, ) 

CHRISTOPHER LIMAS, individually ) 

and in his official capacity as Village ) 

Administrator of the Village of ) 

Willow Springs, TERRANCE CARR, ) 

individually and in his official ) 

capacity as President of the Village ) 

of Willow Springs, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

AS TO DEFENDANT JOHN LYNN

NOW COMES the Defendant, JOHN LYNN (“Lynn”), by and through his attorneys, 

CHILTON YAMBERT PORTER & YOUNG, LLC, and moves this Court for entry of Judgment 

as a Matter of Law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at the close of all 

the evidence, and in support of said motion, states as follows: 

Plaintiff Sims failed to offer legally sufficient evidence that Defendant Lynn violated his 

First Amendment Rights (Count I), conspired to violate his First Amendment Rights (Count II), 

violated his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (Count III), or violated his due process 

rights (Count IV). Likewise, Plaintiff Wiseman failed to prove that Defendant Lynn violated his 
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First Amendment rights (Count I), conspired to do so (Count II) or violated his due process 

rights (Count III). 

No Evidence Shows That Defendant Lynn Played Any Role In Plaintiffs’ Terminations

The evidence presented during Plaintiffs’ cases fails to establish that Defendant Lynn 

played any role in the decisions to terminate Plaintiffs. Rather, Defendants Limas and Schultz 

admitted that they, in consultation with the Village Attorney, made the decision to terminate 

Sims. (Trial Tr. Vol. 4 p. 506). Likewise, Defendants Limas and Schultz admitted that they, in 

consult with the Village Attorney, made the decision to terminate Plaintiff Wiseman. (Trial Tr. 

Vol. 4 p. 424). Based on the evidence presented, it is clear that Defendant Lynn had nothing to 

do with Plaintiffs’ terminations. 

Plaintiffs offered no evidence to demonstrate that Defendant Lynn tried to stop Plaintiffs 

from complaining to the State’s Attorney or that Defendant Lynn was even aware of their alleged 

complaints to the State’s Attorney about the Slouber incident. Witness Stratton indicated that 

she was informed of the Slouber incident by Plaintiff Wiseman and Witness Kaczmarek; 

however, both Plaintiff Wiseman and Witness Kaczmarek admitted that they had no personal 

knowledge of the incident. Further, Witness Stratton reviewed the police report, indicating 

Defendant Lynn received felony approval from State’s Attorney Mr. Granderson. (Trial Tr. Vol. 

4 p. 517). However, Plaintiffs Witness Stratton never bothered to contact Mr. Granderson who 

was a fellow State’s Attorney to find out why felony approval was given. (Trial Tr. Vol. 4 p. 

517). Further, Witness Stratton presented no testimony that she contacted Defendant Lynn about 

the alleged complaint, but rather testified that she contacted Defendant Schultz. (Trial Tr. Vol. 4 

p. 512). However, the incident which Witness Stratton contacted Defendant Schultz about 

involving a “young lady” was a different incident concerning Jennifer Walsh and was the subject 

of a motion in limine – already granted by this Court. 
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Regardless, Witness Stratton admitted that she opens a file for all complaints. (Trial Tr. 

Vol. 4 p. 513). However, Witness Stratton testified that she did not proceed with an 

investigation and at the time she called the file was already closed or was in the process of being 

closed. (Trial Tr. Vol. 4 p. 514). Moreover, any alleged conversation between Plaintiff 

Wiseman and Defendant Lynn did not prevent Plaintiffs from contacting the State’s Attorney’s 

Office as Plaintiff Wiseman testified that Defendant Lynn approached him before he even went 

to complain. (Trial Tr. Vol 1 p. 61). 

No Evidence Shows that Defendant Lynn Violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Rights

Plaintiffs failed to show how Defendant Lynn violated their First Amendment rights. 

Based on the facts presented, no evidence indicates that Defendant Lynn prevented them from 

preparing or distributing the petition regarding Officer Bermejos’ alleged drug use, and Plaintiffs 

never testified that Defendant Lynn conspired with anyone regarding the petition or ordered 

anyone to remove their signature from the petition. The only testimony provided concerning 

Defendant Lynn’s involvement in the petition is that he refused to sign it because he: (i) did not 

know whether Officer Bermejo tested positive; (ii) did not know whether the Village failed to 

take any action; and (iii) did not agree with the petition becoming public. (Trial Tr. Vol. ) In fact, 

Defendant Lynn testified that he knew nothing about whether Bermejo had come forward 

voluntarily – the only information Defendant Lynn had was that he was not to be placed on the 

schedule after May 7, 2002. Simply refusing to sign the petition, which was Defendant Lynn’s 

First Amendment right, and being told not to put Officer Bermejo on the schedule, does not 

prove that Defendant Lynn violated or conspired to violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. 

Plaintiffs created a petition advocating a drug free work environment “to show solidarity, 

not only to our fellow officer, but ultimately the village administrators, the trustees, the mayor, 

and the like”. (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 p. 85). Moreover, the reason Plaintiff Wiseman testified 
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Plaintiffs created the petition was for his and his fellow officers’ safety. (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 p. 87). 

Based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 

(May 30, 2006) and the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Spiegla v. Hull, 2007 WL 937081 

(7th Cir. March 30, 2007), no evidence supports the argument that Plaintiffs’ speech is even 

protected by the First Amendment. Plaintiffs’ speech was related to and part of their job duties 

as police officers in Willow Springs. Plaintiffs’ speech was related to and part of their job duties 

as police officers in Willow Springs. The petition was crafted by Plaintiffs in their capacity as 

police officers with the Village of Willow Springs. Plaintiffs’ alleged actions in complaining to 

Village officials about Officer Bermejo, conducting surveillance, drafting the petition, promoting 

other officers to join in and presenting the petition to Village administrators was related to their 

official job duties. Therefore, under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti, it is 

clear that Plaintiffs’ speech was part of their job duties and was not protected by the First 

Amendment. 

No Evidence Exists Showing John Lynn Ordered the Arrest of Sims

The only evidence Plaintiffs offered as to Defendant Lynn was that he was called to the 

police station when Plaintiff Sims was arrested, pursuant to a complaint issued by Chief Schultz. 

Plaintiff Sims’ arrest occurred several weeks after he had already been terminated - a decision in 

which Defendant Lynn did not participate. Rather, as Plaintiff Wiseman testified, Defendant 

Lynn was on the telephone with Chief Schultz during the arrest and simply relayed orders issued. 

(Trial Tr. Vol 2 p. 120-121). Defendant Lynn’s participation in the arrest was simply to make 

certain that the Chief’s orders were followed during the arrest procedure. Indeed, Plaintiffs 

failed to establish that the conduct of the Defendant Lynn was malicious or with a reckless 

disregard of his rights. 

WHEREFORE, the Defendant, John Lynn, respectfully requests that this Court enter 
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judgment as a matter of law, at the close of all the evidence, and against the Plaintiffs. 

 s/Kenneth T. Garvey 

 Attorney Bar No. 0920827 

 Chilton Yambert Porter & Young LLP 

 150 South Wacker Drive, Suite 2400 

 Chicago, Illinois 60606 

 Telephone: (312) 460-8000 

 Facsimile: (312) 460-8299 

 Email: kgarvey@cypylaw.com