Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

TONI 1 TRUST, by its Trustee 

DONALD TANGWALL, 

Appellant, 

v. 

BARBARA WACKER, individually 

and jointly and severally, WILLIAM 

WACKER, individually and jointly an

severally, and LARRY D. COMPTON

Bankruptcy Trustee, individually and 

jointly and severally, 

Appellees. 

) 

) Supreme Court No. S-16153 

Superior Court No. 4FA-15-01603 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7228 – March 2, 2018 

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Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, 

Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Michael A. MacDonald, 

Judge. 

Appearances: S. Jason Crawford, Layton, Utah, for 

Appellant. Erik LeRoy, Erik LeRoy P.C., Anchorage, for 

Appellees Wacker. Cabot Christianson, Law Offices of 

Cabot Christianson, P.C., Anchorage,for AppelleeCompton. 

Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Bolger, 

and Carney, Justices. 

BOLGER, Justice. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I. INTRODUCTION
 

After a Montana state court issued a series of judgments against Donald 

Tangwall and his family, the family members transferred two pieces of property to the 

“Toni 1 Trust,” a trust allegedly created under Alaska law. A Montana state court and 

an Alaska bankruptcy court found that the transfers were made to avoid the judgments 

and were therefore fraudulent. Tangwall, the trustee of the Trust, then filed this suit, 

arguing that Alaska state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over such fraudulent transfer 

actions under AS 34.40.110(k). But we conclude that this statute cannot unilaterally 

deprive other state and federal courts of jurisdiction. We therefore affirm the superior 

court’s judgment dismissing Tangwall’s complaint. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

In 2007 Donald Tangwall sued William and Barbara Wacker in Montana 

state court. The Wackers counterclaimed against Tangwall; his wife, Barbara Tangwall; 

his mother-in-law, Margaret “Toni” Bertran; and several trusts and businesses owned or 

run by the family. In the ensuing years, several default judgments were entered against 

Tangwall and his family. 

In 2010, before the last of these judgments was issued, Bertran and Barbara 

Tangwall transferred parcels of real property to an Alaska trust called the “Toni 1 Trust” 

(the Trust).1 The Wackers filed a fraudulent transfer action under Montana law in 

Montana state court, alleging that the transfers were made to avoid the judgments. 

1 The appellees argue that (1) the Trust is not an Alaska trust at all and 

(2) even if it is, the Trust is not subject to the Alaska statute because it was not created 

in compliance with applicable statutory requirements. The superior court did not resolve 

these factual questions, and we assume, without deciding, that the Trust is an Alaska trust 

subject to AS 34.40.110. 

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Default judgments in the fraudulent transfer action were entered against Barbara 

Tangwall, the Toni 1 Trust, and Bertran. 

Afterthefraudulenttransferjudgments wereissued, theWackerspurchased 

Barbara Tangwall’s interest in one of the parcels at a sheriff’s sale, as part satisfaction 

of their judgment against Tangwall and family. But before they could purchase the 

remaining half interest, Bertran filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Alaska. Her interest 

in the trust property was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of a federal bankruptcy 

court. 

In December 2012, Donald Tangwall, as trustee of the Trust, filed a 

complaint in the bankruptcy court against the Wackers and bankruptcy trustee Larry 

Compton. Among other things, Tangwall alleged that service on the Trust in the 

Montana fraudulent transfer action was defective, rendering the judgment against the 

Trust void. Rather than litigate whether service in Montana was proper, Compton 

elected to bring a fraudulent transfer claim against Tangwall under the federal 

bankruptcy fraudulent transfer statute. A default judgment in Compton’s action was 

entered against Tangwall. His appeals from this judgment were dismissed. 

Tangwall next sought relief in Alaska state court, where he filed the 

complaint that led to this appeal. The crux of his argument was that AS 34.40.110 grants 

Alaska courts exclusive jurisdiction over any fraudulent transfer actions against the 

Trust.2 Specifically, he argued that the Trust contains a provision restricting the transfer 

2 Tangwall argued that AS 13.36.035(f) had a similar effect. However, 

AS 13.36.035 concerns the internal affairs of trusts, including “the administration and 

distribution of trusts, the declaration of rights, and the determination of other matters 

involving trustees and beneficiaries of trusts.” AS 13.36.035(a). The judgments that 

Tangwall seeks to avoid concern fraudulent transfers, not the internal affairs or 

management of the Trust. We conclude that AS 13.36.035 does not apply to this case, 

(continued...) 

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of the beneficiary’s interest, and that AS 34.40.110(k) grants Alaska courts “exclusive 

jurisdiction over an action brought under a cause of action or claim for relief that is based 

on a transfer of property to a trust” containing such transfer restrictions. On this basis, 

Tangwall sought a declaratory judgment stating that all judgments against the Trust from 

other jurisdictions are void and that no future actions can be maintained against the Trust 

because the statute of limitations has run.3 

The superior court dismissed the complaint, and Tangwall appeals. Most 

of Tangwall’s arguments on appeal are supported by little or no citation to relevant legal 

authority and are therefore waived.4

 However, he has preserved his argument that the 

state and federal judgments against the Trust are void for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction under AS 34.40.110(k). While reviewing this appeal, we requested 

supplemental briefing on the question whether state or federal courts are required to 

follow a statute that purports to retain exclusive jurisdiction over a fraudulent 

conveyance action.5 

2 (...continued) 

and we decline to address it further. 

3 Tangwall’s complaint also included two “harassment”claims. Theseclaims 

have not been preserved on appeal. 

4 Hagen v. Strobel, 353 P.3d 799, 805 (Alaska 2015). 

5 See Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker, No. S-16153 (Alaska Supreme Court Order, 

July 13, 2017). This case, and the issue referred to the parties, arguably implicates the 

constitutionality of AS 34.40.110. Thus, pursuant to Alaska Appellate Rule 514(e), we 

also notified the Attorney General of Alaska of the case and invited supplemental 

briefing from the State. Id. Tangwall and Compton filed supplemental briefs; the 

Wackers and the State did not. 

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III.	 DISCUSSION 

We review an order granting a motion to dismiss for a failure to state a 

claim de novo.6 We presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true, and draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.7 

A.	 Alaska Statute 34.40.110(k) Purports To Grant Alaska Courts 

Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Fraudulent Transfer Actions Against The 

Trust. 

Alaska Statute 34.40.110 governs Alaska trusts containing a “transfer 

restriction” — a provision stating that trust property may not be transferred before 

payment or delivery of the property to the beneficiary of the trust.8 The statute provides 

that these restrictions, which allow for the creation of so-called “self-settled spendthrift 

trusts,”9 are generally enforceable.10 However, subsection (b)(1) creates a limited cause 

of action for fraudulent transfers: a creditor of the settlor of the trust can reach trust 

property if the creditor can prove that the settlor’s transfer of property to the trust “was 

made with the intent to defraud that creditor.”11 

6	 Kollodge v. State, 757 P.2d 1024, 1026 n.4 (Alaska 1988). 

7 Id. at 1026; see also Linck v. Barokas &Martin, 667 P.2d 171, 173 (Alaska 

1983). 

8	 AS 34.40.110(a). 

9 See Jeremy M. Veit, Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts and the Alaska Trust 

Act: Has Alaska Moved Offshore?, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 269, 279-81 (1999). 

10 See AS 34.40.110(b) (“If a trust contains a transfer restriction . . . , the 

transfer restriction prevents a creditor existing when the trust is created . . . from 

satisfying a claim out of the beneficiary’s interest in the trust . . . .”). 

11 AS 34.40.110(b)(1). Creditors must also satisfy additional criteria 

enumerated in AS 34.40.110(d). 

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AlaskaStatute34.40.110(k) enumerates two additionallimitsonfraudulent 

transfer claims. First, an action “may not be brought . . . for an attachment or other 

provisional remedy against property of a trust subject to this section or to avoid a transfer 

of property to a trust that is the subject of this section unless the action is brought under 

(b)(1) of this section.”12 In other words, the (b)(1) fraudulent transfer cause of action is 

the exclusive means by which a litigant can prevent a transfer of or reach property in an 

Alaska self-settled spendthrift trust. Second, the statute provides that Alaska courts have 

“exclusive jurisdiction over an action brought under a cause of action or claim for relief 

that is based on a transfer of property to a [self-settled spendthrift] trust” — a class that 

obviously includes fraudulent transfer actions.13 This second limit, Tangwall claims, 

deprived the bankruptcy court and the Montana court of jurisdiction. 

Tangwall’s argument is not frivolous. He is correct that a judgment is void 

if the court that entered the judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case.14 

Furthermore, AS34.40.110(k)purportstograntAlaskacourtsexclusivejurisdiction over 

fraudulent transfer claims against Alaska self-settled spendthrift trusts. And having 

reviewed the legislative history of AS 34.40.110(k), we have no doubt the Alaska 

legislature’s purpose in enacting that statute was to prevent other state and federal courts 

12 AS 34.40.110(k). 

13 Id. 

14 Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C., 307 P.3d 879, 891 (Alaska 2013). 

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from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over fraudulent transfer actions against such 

trusts.15 The question, however, is whether AS 34.40.110(k) can achieve that intended 

result. We conclude that it cannot. 

B.	 Alaska Statute 34.40.110(k) Cannot Limit The Scope Of Other States’ 

Jurisdiction. 

More than 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that 

[e]ach state may, subject to the restrictions of the Federal 

Constitution, determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its 

courts, the character of the controversies which shall be heard 

in them, and, specifically, how far it will, having jurisdiction 

of the parties, entertain in its courts transitory actions where 

the cause of action has arisen outside its borders.[16] 

And just a few years later, the Court held that states are not constitutionally compelled 

to acquiesce to sister states’ attempts to circumscribe their jurisdiction over such 

actions.17 

This latter rule arose from a case much like the one before us now. An 

employee sued his employer in a Georgia court, relying on an Alabama statutory cause 

of action; his employer countered that Alabama state courts retained exclusive 

jurisdiction over the suit under the Alabama Code, and that the Full Faith and Credit 

Clause compelled Georgia courts to respect Alabama’s assertion of exclusive 

15 See Minutes, House Jud. Comm. Hearing on S.B. 344, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 

(Apr. 14, 2004), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/23/M/HJUD2004-04-141345.PDF 

(comment from David G. Shaftel, Attorney at Law, explaining that the purpose of the 

provision is to require a fraudulent transfer action against an Alaska trust to be brought 

in Alaska court). 

16 St. Louis, Iron Mountain &S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 285 (1908). 

17 See Tenn. Coal, Iron, & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914). 

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jurisdiction.18 The Supreme Court found that “Full Faith and Credit” does not require 

states to go quite so far. Instead, “jurisdiction is to be determined by the law of the 

court’s creation, and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a statute of 

another state, even though it created the right of action.”19 

Alaska Statute 34.40.110(k) crosses the limit recognized by Tennessee 

Coal: it purports to grant Alaska courts exclusive jurisdiction over a type of transitory 

action against Alaska trusts.20 We acknowledge that the analogy is imperfect; the 

Montana court’s judgment against Tangwall was based not on a fraudulent transfer cause 

of action created by an Alaska statute, but rather on a cause of action arising under 

Montana law relating to an Alaska trust.21 Nevertheless, Tennessee Coal controls. The 

18 Id. at 358. The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to give “Full 

Faith and Credit” to “the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other 

State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 

19 Tenn. Coal, 233 U.S. at 360. 

20 “If the transaction on which [an] action is founded could have taken place 

anywhere, the action is generally regarded as transitory; but if the transaction could only 

have happened in a particular place . . . the action is local.” Action, BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (omission in original) (quoting 92 C.J.S. Venue § 8 (1955)). 

Fraudulent transfer actions are founded on a fraudulent transfer of property, which can 

take place anywhere even if the property being transferred is immovable. See, e.g., 

Tcherepnin v. Franz, 439 F. Supp. 1340, 1345-46 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (“In Illinois, an action 

to set aside a fraudulent conveyance . . . [is] a transitory action properly cognizable 

wherever jurisdiction can be obtained over the defendant.”). 

21 Mont. Code Ann. § 31-2-326 to -342, (outlining provisions of Montana’s 

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act). Tangwall could have argued that the first sentence 

of AS 34.40.110(k) makes the cause of action created in AS 34.40.110(b)(1) the 

exclusive means of attaching Trust property; he may have attempted to do so in his 

supplemental brief. In any case, an Alaska statute cannot prevent Montana courts from 

applying Montana fraudulent transfer law. See Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident 

(continued...) 

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Tennessee Coal court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel states 

to follow another state’s statute claiming exclusive jurisdiction over suits based on a 

cause of action “even though [the other state] created the right of action.”22 The clear 

implication is that the constitutional argument rejected in Tennessee Coal would be even 

less compelling were a state to assert exclusive jurisdiction over suits based on a cause 

of action it did not create. 

In seeking to void the Montana court’s judgment for lack of jurisdiction, 

Tangwall effectively argues that AS 34.40.110(k) can deprive Montana courts of 

jurisdiction over cases arising under Montana law. This is simply a more extreme 

interpretation of the “full faith and credit” principle than the interpretation considered 

and rejected in Tennessee Coal. 

23 

We acknowledge that the Alaska legislature’s attempt to grant Alaska 

courts exclusive jurisdiction over a class of claims in some circumstances is hardly 

unique.24 And we acknowledge that several of our sister states have concluded that 

21 (...continued) 

Comm’n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939) (“[T]he full faith and credit clause does not 

require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within 

it, the conflicting statute of another state, even though that statute is of controlling force 

in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to the same persons and events.”). 

22 Tenn. Coal, 233 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added). 

23 Other courts that have considered attempts to assert exclusive jurisdiction 

over a broad class of claims have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Marine 

Midland Bank v. United Mo. Bank, 643 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“Nor 

can we accept defendant’s argument that the courts of this State are divested of subject 

matter jurisdiction by [a Kansas statute that] grants the Kansas probate court exclusive 

jurisdiction over all controversies involving Kansas estates.”). 

24 See generally Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court 

(continued...) 

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similar statutes do, in fact, restrict their jurisdiction.25 However, those courts have relied 

on reasoning that is not applicable to AS 34.40.110(k). First, “[s]ome state courts have 

applied state-law distinctions between local and transitory actions to make discretionary 

decisions whether to stay or dismiss an action in favor of another forum.”26 Tennessee 

Coal established that “a state cannot create a transitory cause of action and at the same 

time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action in any court having 

jurisdiction”27 — which suggests that states are not barred from asserting exclusive 

jurisdiction when the cause of action is local rather than transitory. However, 

AS 34.40.110(k) grants Alaska courts exclusive jurisdiction over fraudulent transfer 

actions against Alaska trusts, and fraudulent transfer actions are transitory actions.28 

24 (...continued) 

Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 51(2012). See also, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, 

§ 18-305(f) (West 2017); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 145(k), 220(c) (West 2017); Del. 

Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3572(a) (West 2017); Ga. Code Ann. § 33-36-6(g) (West 2017); La. 

Stat. Ann. § 22:2058(C)(1) (2017) (insurance guaranty funds); S.D. Codified Laws 

§ 55-16-13 (2018); Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-502(11)(b) (West 2017) (asset protection 

trusts). 

25 See, e.g., Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No. HHDCV136039761S, 

2013 WL 5781103, at *4-5 (Conn. Super., Oct. 3, 2013); Wilson v. Celestial Greetings, 

Inc., 896 S.W.2d 759, 761-62 (Mo. App. 1995); State ex rel. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. 

Mehan, 581 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Mo. App. 1979); Foti v. W. Sizzlin Corp., No. CH03-862, 

2004 WL 2848398, at *1-2 (Va. Cir. Feb. 6, 2004). 

26 Winship, supra note 24, at 75; see also Wilson, 896 S.W.2d at 761; Mehan, 

581 S.W.2d at 838-39. 

27 Tenn. Coal, 233 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added). 

28 See supra note 20. 

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Other courts have declined to hear cases on the basis of an exclusive 

jurisdiction provision without addressing the Tennessee Coal rule.29 One of these — a 

Virginiacourt —elected torespect anassertion ofexclusivejurisdiction because“comity 

suggests that limitations one state’s legislature places on its own laws be universally 

acknowledged.”30 But comity is not a legal rule; rather it is “a principle under which the 

courts of one state give effect to the laws of another state . . . out of deference or 

respect.”31 In other words, while courts may elect to follow a statute like AS 34.40.110 

out of comity, they are not compelled to do so.32 Furthermore, AS 34.40.110 is more 

than a “limitation[] [Alaska’s] legislature place[d] on its own laws”33 — it purports to 

deprive other states of jurisdiction over all fraudulent transfer actions concerning Alaska 

trusts, even those based on causes of action arising under that state’s own law. 

Tangwall directs our attention to several Delaware statutes that purport to 

grant the Delaware Court of Chancery exclusive jurisdiction over certain suits,34 and he 

correctly asserts that some state courts have concluded that these statutes limit their 

jurisdiction.35 In 2014, however — following these decisions — the Delaware Court of 

29 See e.g., Carbone, 2013 WL 5781103, at *4. 

30 Foti, 2004 WL 2848398, at *1. 

31 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 224 (2017). 

32 See Marine Midland Bank v. United Mo. Bank, 643 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531 

(N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“Comity does not require or suggest that the courts of this State 

should surrender their interest in adjudicating disputes . . . .”). 

33 Foti, 2004 WL 2848398, at *1. 

34 See supra note 24. 

35 SeeCarbonev.NxegenHoldings,Inc.,No.HHDCV136039761S, 2013WL 

(continued...) 

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Chancery reached the opposite conclusion. In IMO Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust, 

36 the 

court noted that “courts outside of Delaware are divided as to whether Delaware can 

establish an exclusive forum for certain state law claims.”37 Citing Tennessee Coal, it 

sided with those courts38 that had “declined to interpret the exclusive jurisdiction 

languagein Delaware’sstatutes as precluding themfromhearing acase,”39 reasoning that 

“Delaware . . . cannot unilaterally preclude a sister state from hearing claims under [that 

state’s] law.”40 

We agree with the Court of Chancery and with those courts that have 

reached similar conclusions.41 The basic principle articulated in Tennessee Coal has not 

changed in the last century.42 As applied to this case, it means that AS 34.40.110(k)’s 

35 (...continued) 

5781103, at *4-5 (Conn. Super., Oct. 3, 2013); Wilson v. Celestial Greetings, Inc., 896 

S.W.2d 759, 761-62 (Mo. App. 1995); Foti, 2004 WL 2848398, at *1. 

36 98 A.3d 924 (Del. Ch. 2014). 

37 Id. at 940 n.6. 

38 Id. at 940. 

39 Id. 

40 Id. at 939; see also id. at 939 n.4. All of the cases that Tangwall cites were 

decided before Kloiber. 

41 See, e.g., Anderson v. Children’s Corner, Inc., No. CV106011812S, 2011 

WL925442, at *3 (Conn. Super., Feb. 15, 2011); Rudebeck v. Paulson, 612 N.W.2d 450, 

454-55 (Minn. App. 2000); Sachs v. Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 

2005). 

42 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 314 (2006) (quoting Tennessee 

Coal in a more recent Supreme Court opinion); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 91 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“A State may entertain an action even 

(continued...) 

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assertion of exclusive jurisdiction does not render a fraudulent transfer judgment against 

an Alaska trust from a Montana court void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We 

therefore cannot grant Tangwall the relief that he seeks from the Montana judgment. 

C.	 Alaska Statute 34.40.110(k) Cannot Limit The Scope Of A Federal 

Court’s Jurisdiction. 

Nor can we grant Tangwall relief from the federal judgment. While 

Tennessee Coal addressed only a state’s ability to restrict the jurisdiction of its sister 

states, a more recent United States Supreme Court case confirmed that the Tennessee 

Coal rule also applies to claims of exclusive jurisdiction asserted against federal courts. 

In Marshall v. Marshall, the United States Supreme Court considered whether Texas 

probate courts could retain exclusive jurisdiction over a transitory tort arising under 

Texas law.43 Relying on Tennessee Coal, the Court concluded that they could not: state 

efforts to limit federal jurisdiction were invalid, “even though [the state] created the right 

of action” giving rise to the suit.44 

42 (...continued) 

though the state of the applicable law has provided that action on the particular claim 

shall not be brought outside its territory.”). 

43 Marshall, 547 U.S. at 300-05. Specifically, the Court analyzed a Texas 

probate court’s ruling that Texas probate courts retained exclusive jurisdiction. The 

basis for the probate court’s ruling is not discussed in Marshall, but the Ninth Circuit 

opinion from which appeal was taken suggests that the probate court relied on a statute 

with an exclusive jurisdiction provision. See In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (“[A]ny cause of action appertaining to estates or incident to an estate shall 

be brought in a statutory probate court . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Tex. Prob. 

Code Ann. § 5A(b)). 

44 Marshall, 547 U.S. at 314 (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron, &R.R. Co. v. George, 

233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914)). The Court’s reasoning in Marshall echoed a similar holding 

in Railway Co. v. Whitton’s Administrator, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 270 (1871). The Whitton 

(continued...) 

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Marshall — like Tennessee Coal — is not perfectly analogous to this case; 

the Marshall Court concluded that Texas could not retain exclusive jurisdiction over 

suits based on a tort cause of action arising under Texas law,45 whereas the federal 

bankruptcy court’s judgment against Tangwall was based on a cause of action arising 

under federal law.46 But just as Tennessee Coal should control whether AS 34.40.110(k) 

can restrict state court jurisdiction, Marshall controls whether AS 34.40.110(k) can 

restrict federal court jurisdiction. The fact that a state cannot restrict federal courts’ 

jurisdiction “even though [the state] created the right of action”47 implies that a state also 

cannot restrict federal jurisdiction over suits based on a cause of action it did not create. 

Tangwall notes that some federal courts have concluded that state law 

“exclusivejurisdiction”provisions do in fact deprive themof jurisdiction.48 But only one 

of the cases he cites is reported, and none address Marshall or Tennessee Coal. And 

other federal courts have reached the opposite conclusion. The Sixth Circuit, for 

instance, has held that “a state may not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction merely by 

44 (...continued) 

court held that when a federal court has jurisdiction over a right of action, that right of 

action cannot “be withdrawn from the cognizance of [a] Federal court by any provision 

of State legislation that it shall only be enforced in a State court.” Id. at 286. 

45 Marshall, 547 U.S. at 314. 

46 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2012). 

47 Marshall, 547 U.S. at 314 (quoting Tenn. Coal, 233 U.S. at 360). 

48 See Lynch v. Basinger, No. 12-637, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5 (D.N.J. 

Dec. 12, 2012); Yale S. Corp. v. Eclipse Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0337-CVE-FHM, 2010
 

WL 2854687, at *3-4 (N.D. Okla. July 19, 2010); Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438
 

F. Supp. 2d 280, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 

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declaring in a statute that it holds exclusive jurisdiction.”49 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit 

has held that “states . . . ‘have no power to enlarge or contract the federal 

jurisdiction.’ ”50 The reasoning in these latter cases is both persuasive and consistent 

with the approach set out in Marshall. 

Lastly, we note that if AS 34.40.110(k) were “interpreted to deny parties 

access to the [federal courts] without [those courts’] consent,” the statute “might well run 

afoul of the Supremacy Clause.”51 The Marshall court did not invoke the preemption 

doctrine or cite the Supremacy Clause from which the doctrine is derived; it relied 

instead on the general principle that the jurisdiction of a sovereign nation’s courts “is 

determined ‘by the law of the court’s creation.’ ”52 However, several federal courts have 

concluded that it is the Supremacy Clause that ultimately precludes state courts from 

49 Superior Beverage Co. v. Schieffelin & Co., 448 F.3d 910, 917 (6th Cir. 

2006). 

50 Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting 

Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 716 (4th Cir. 1961)); see also Duchek 

v. Jacobi, 646 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1981) (same). 

51 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gammon, 838 F.2d 73, 77 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988) (analyzing 

Pennsylvania insurance statute with similar provision). 

52 Marshall, 547 U.S. at 314 (quoting Tenn. Coal, 233 U.S. at 360). For 

similar approaches, see Ry. Co. v. Whitton’s Adm’r., 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 270, 286 (1871), 

and Markham, 292 F.2d at 716. 

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limiting federal jurisdiction.53 And in Kloiber, the Delaware Chancery Court reached the 

same conclusion when contemplating a situation much like the one before us now: 

Assume that [a] non-Delawarean sued [a] Delaware 

corporation in federal district court and sought to be 

indemnified for $1 million [as permitted under Section 145 of 

Delaware’s General Corporation Law]. Any challenge to the 

federal court’s jurisdiction based on Section 145(k) 

conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery 

would fail, defeated by the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331, and the Supremacy Clause of the United States 

Constitution.[54] 

This case implicates a different federal jurisdictional statute, but our 

reasoning is much the same. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) grants federal district courts “original 

and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.”55 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), the 

federal bankruptcy fraudulent conveyance statute, permits trustees to avoid fraudulent 

transfers. Because AS 34.40.110(k) purports to grant Alaska courts exclusive 

jurisdiction over all fraudulent transfer claims against Alaska trusts, and because 

28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) grants federal courts jurisdiction over some of these claims, the 

Alaska law “conflicts with . . . federal law to the extent that . . . it is impossible to comply 

53 See, e.g., Allstate, 838 F.2d at 77 n.7; Begay, 682 F.2d at 1315; U.S. ex rel. 

Galmines v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 06-3213, 2013 WL 5924962, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 

Nov. 5, 2013). Under federal preemption doctrine —which derives fromthe Supremacy 

Clause — state law is preempted when it “conflicts with . . . federal law to the extent that 

(a) it is impossible to comply simultaneously with both or (b) the state regulation 

obstructs the execution of the purpose of the federal regulation.” Interior Reg’l Hous. 

Auth. v. James, 989 P.2d 145, 149 (Alaska 1999) (quoting In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170, 

1172 (Alaska 1986)). 

54 IMO Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust, 98 A.3d 924, 939 (Del. Ch. 2014). 

55 28 U.S.C. § 157 allows district courts to refer title 11 cases and proceedings 

to bankruptcy court. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 474 (2011). 

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simultaneously with both.”56 We therefore cannot grant Tangwall the relief that he seeks 

from the federal judgment. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons we have explained above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

superior court. 

Interior Reg’l Hous. Auth., 949 P.2d at 149 (quoting J.R.B., 715 P.2d at 

1172). 

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56