Plaintiff seems to contend that the alleged unauthorized practice of law was what
constituted a false representation under the FDCPA, although the exact link between
defendants’ described conduct and the purported FDCPA violation is unclear.

Under Count II, plaintiff claims that the defendants violated the CFA insofar as
Martin failed to disclose his association with Arrow. This purportedly deceptive practice,
according to plaintiff, was intended to mislead people into believing that Martin was
acting as a private practitioner, as opposed to Arrow’s in-house counsel. Plaintiff
contends that people were disadvantaged as a result, because they would have acted
differently had they known the truth. Plaintiff also contends that default judgments were
entered on the basis of Martin’s action and that they are void as a matter of law.

Il. ANALYSIS

A complaint will not be dismissed unless it appears beyond a doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief.
Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 327 (7" Cir. 1998). We must read the complaint liberally
and accept as true the well-pleaded allegations and the inferences that may reasonably be
drawn from those allegations. Saperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 855 (7" Cir. 1999).
“The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether [s]he is entitled
to offer evidence to support the claims.” Id.

Defendants first argue that this court has no jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that lower


Plaintiff's allegations regarding Arrow and, especially, Martin are serious. Based
on the allegations, the defendants would appear to have engaged in some abusive debt
collection, and Martin would appear to have committed some ethical violations. But in
attempting to fashion her allegations into a claim for relief in federal district court,
plaintiff has run afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.' It is also unclear whether her
grievances, as alleged, make up a claim cognizable under the FDCPA. Accordingly, we
are constrained to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Given the nature of her allegations,
however, we do not find it improbable that plaintiff could amend her pleadings so as to
not inveigle Rooker-Feldman. Accordingly, dismissal of plaintiff's complaint shall be
without prejudice.

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint is

GRANTED without prejudice to plaintiff filing an amended complaint.

ENTERED: Choe 4 Bobi

EDWARD A. BOBRICK
United States Magistrate Judge

DATE: July 15, 2002

' Because we find the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applicable in this case, we do

not address the defendants’ remaining arguments.

7


Martin set the process in motion once again, despite the fact that he now knew that
plaintiff was not responsible for the ten-year-old debt. This time, the process server filed
an affidavit claiming to have served plaintiff through her brother, John, on Easter Sunday
morning, purportedly at plaintiffs home. Plaintiff was home at that time, preparing to
go to services; no one attempted to serve her. Of course, she has no brother John. Her
only brother has been dead for twenty-five years. Nevertheless, plaintiff was yet again
forced to institute legal proceedings to quash this supposed “service.”

To seek relief for this ordeal, plaintiff resorts to the FDCPA and the CFA. Under
Count I of her complaint, plaintiff claims that, throughout the debt collection process,
Martin failed to disclose his affiliation with Arrow, and proceeded as though he were an
independent attorney collecting debts under his own name. According to plaintiff, this
constituted the unauthorized practice of law because attorneys may not practice as
partners of a non-legal corporation. According to plaintiff, the defendants’ conduct
violated Section 1692e of the FDCPA, which provides:

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading

representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.

Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following
conduct is a violation of this section...

Pn

(3) The false representation that an individual is an attorney or that any
communication is from an attorney.

* oe ok

(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a customer.

3


federal courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over claims that would require
them to review a final judgment of a state court. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303
(1983). Recently, in Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705 (7" Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit
outlined the appropriate inquiry under the doctrine:

In order to determine the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the

fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the injury alleged

by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is

distinct from that judgment. If the injury alleged resulted from the state

court judgment itself, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine dictates that the federal

courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, even if the state court judgment was

erroneous or unconstitutional. If, however, the injury alleged is distinct

from that judgment, i.e., the party maintains an injury apart from the loss in

state court and not ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state judgment ... res

judicata may apply, but Rooker-Feldman does not. Thus, the pivotal inquiry

is whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or

whether [she] is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.
266 F.3d at 713. In this case, on one hand, the judgments against plaintiff that are
mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were those quashing service and wage garnishment.
As plaintiff “won” those judgments, we do not interpret her complaint as a claim she was
injured by them. On the other hand, plaintiff also complains of “default judgments that
may be and were entered.” This would certainly appear to be an allegation of an injury
from a state court judgment, which would violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Beyond that, we are also troubled by plaintiff's allegations regarding the

“unauthorized practice of Jaw.” The portion of the FDCPA upon which plaintiff relies


‘Minute, Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of HMlinois

Name of Assigned Jud i Sitting Judge if Oth
vor Magistrate Judge Edward A. Bobrick than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 8595 DATE 7/15/2002
CASE Lenore Bass vs. Arrow Financial Services, L.L.C., and Lance Martin
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented]

a)

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) a Brief in support of motiondue__.
(3) oO Answer brief to motion due__. Reply to answer briefdue___.
(4) a Ruling/Hearingon___setfor___at__
(5) | Status hearing set for 8/15/02 at 10:00 A.M.
(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on ss setfor_ at.
(7) oO Trial{set for/re-set for]on saat
(8) a (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto ss aat__ =.
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) General Rule 21 CIFRCP41(a)(1) ( FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) | [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Order. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff's

complaint is granted without prejudice to plaintiff filing an amended complaint by 8/15/02.

LACK v——

| (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
4

No notices required. number of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. 4YNGd Loyterg sq
LUIS
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. ) 3
ROrl Md Ob ann
y courtroom S'6 id SI ing zo
TH deputy’ .
initials Oi go gant
Bardrilleteceived in ; -
central Clerk’s Office naling depuly inials



addresses situations where a collection agency uses an attorney’s name and letterhead to
“strike fear in the heart” of the recipient. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 228 (7" Cir. 1996).
While courts have found the FDCPA applicable to situations similar to that described in
plaintiff's complaint, see, e.g.,Laws v. Cheslock, No. 98 C 6403 (N.D.IIl. Mar. 9, 1999)
1999 WL 160236 (in-house counsel implying that he was collecting debt as an
independent attorney); Wells v. McDonough, No.97 C 3288 (N.D.III. Sept. 29, 1999) 1999
WL 966431 (collection agency using attorney's name and letterhead in a demand letter
and improperly indicating that the attorney is attempting to collect the debt), they have
not addressed such matters as the unauthorized practice of law. That is the province of
state bar associations and state courts. Plaintiff’s allegations in this matter certainly might
interest Illinois’ Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee, but they do not
appear to be cognizable under the FDCPA. Furthermore, plaintiff expects that the
judgments stemming from defendants’ conduct will be voided. Again, this would involve
the federal court in the review of state court judgments, and violate the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See, Clark v. Pollard, No. IP-99-1414-CH/G (S.D.Ind. Dec. 28, 2000) 2000 WL
1902183, *4 (plaintiff claimed to not challenge the validity of the state court judgment
against her, but she could prevail on her FDCPA claim only by showing that actions taken
in state court and with the approval of the state court violated state law).

Ill. CONCLUSION


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
)
LENORE BASS, individually and on behalf )
of similarly situated plaintiffs, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 01 C 8595
) Edward A. Bobrick,
ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, L.L.C. and ) Magistrate Judge.
LANCE S. MARTIN, POCKETED
) 6 2002
Defendants. ) JUN 1
MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court is the motion of defendants Arrow Financial Services (“Arrow”)
and Lance Martin (“Martin”) to dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Lenore Bass.

Plaintiff brings this suit against Arrow and its vice president and general counsel,
Martin, alleging that they violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (““FDCPA”), 15
U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act (“CFA”), 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. The defendants now seek an order dismissing the
plaintiffs complaint under several theories. Specifically, defendants argue that: (1) this
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) the claims
are barred due to plaintiff's failure to bring a Supreme Court Rule 137 petition in the state
court; (3) defendant Martin’s conduct is not actionable pursuant to litigation privilege; (4)

the CFA does not apply where allegations of lawyer misconduct arise in the actual


practice of law; (5) plaintiff lacks standing to represent the alleged class members; and
(6) plaintiff has no viable claim against Martin based on the unauthorized practice of law
as Martin is a licensed attorney.

I, PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Arrow is a corporation regularly engaged in the collection of debts, while Martin
is its employee and in-house counsel. Plaintiff's difficulties with defendants stem from
an April 1990 lawsuit that Aronson Furniture filed against one Leona Bass, whom
plaintiff did not, and does not, know. The suit resulted in a default judgment against
Leona Bass, Ten years later, Martin substituted in as attorney in an attempt to revive the
judgment and collect. For whatever reason, Martin engaged a process server to serve the
plaintiff, instead of Leona Bass. On November 17, 2000, the process server filed a false
affidavit of service in the Circuit Court of Cook County, claiming to have served plaintiff
through Tina Bass, purportedly plaintiffs cousin. Plaintiff and Tina Bass, as one might
have guessed, are not cousins.

Plaintiff finally became aware of these ill-conceived legal machinations in
December of 2000,when Martin moved to garnish her wages. She was forced to hire an
attorney to stop the garnishment. The Circuit Court of Cook County quashed the
garnishment on February 13,2001. The court also ordered Martin to refund to plaintiff
all proceeds of the garnishment to date. Martin stated he would not do so and, instead,

indicated he would have plaintiff served again.