12‐2619‐cv

Export‐Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada   

                                                                                                                                               

1 United States Court of Appeals 

2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3 

4 _______________

5                           

6 August Term, 2012

7 

8 (Argued: March 6, 2013          Decided: September 12, 2014)

9 

10 Docket No. 12‐2619‐cv

11                      

12 _______________      

13 

14 EXPORT‐IMPORT BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA,

15 

16          Plaintiff‐Appellant,

17 –v.–  

18 

19 GRENADA,

20 

21          Defendant‐Appellee,

22 

23 THE GRENADA AIRPORTS AUTHORITY,

24 THE GRENADA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY,

25 THE NATIONAL WATER AND SEWAGE AUTHORITY OF GRENADA,

26 THE GRENADA PORTS AUTHORITY,

27 AVIATION SERVICES OF GRENADA LTD.,

28 

29      Interested‐Third‐Party‐Appellees.

30 

31 _______________

32 

33 

34                          
2

1 B e f o r e:  

2 

3     LYNCH, LOHIER, AND CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

4        

5 This action arises out of the efforts of Appellant Export‐Import Bank of the

6 Republic of China (“Ex‐Im Bank”) to recover on a $21 million judgment entered

7 in its favor against Appellee Grenada by the United States District Court for the

8 Southern District of New York (Harold Baer, Jr., Judge).  Ex‐Im Bank appeals

9 from the District Court’s order (1) granting Grenada’s motion to declare certain

10 funds, once deposited with the District Court, and consisting of money owed by

11 Grenada to a law firm that represented it in connection with an unrelated

12 arbitration, immune from attachment pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign

13 Immunities Act; (2) granting Grenada’s motion to vacate restraining notices

14 served by Ex‐Im Bank upon certain entities that owe money to several statutory

15 corporations formed by Grenada; and (3) denying Ex‐Im Bank’s request for post‐

16 judgment discovery to identify assets of Grenada that are potentially subject to

17 attachment in satisfaction of the judgment.  The District Court determined that

18 neither the funds owed by Grenada to the law firm nor the funds owed to

19 Grenada’s statutory corporations fall within the “commercial activity” exception

20 to immunity from execution of judgment set forth in the Foreign Sovereign

21 Immunities Act.  We conclude that: (1) we cannot consider whether the funds

22 owed by Grenada to the law firm are subject to execution by Ex‐Im Bank because

23 that issue became moot when those funds were disbursed to Grenada; and (2)

24 with the possible exception of certain funds used to service bonds issued to

25 finance Grenada’s main airport, the funds owed to Grenada’s statutory

26 corporations are not subject to execution because they are not used for

27 commercial activity in the United States.  Because the record before us provides

28 an inadequate basis for determining whether the bond‐related funds belong to

29 Grenada or are used for commercial activity in the United States—and in light of

30 the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.,

31 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014)—we vacate the denial of Ex‐Im Bank’s request for post‐

32 judgment discovery and remand for the District Court to consider the request

33 anew.  The appeal is DISMISSED in part; the judgment of the District Court is

34 AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part; and the cause is REMANDED.

35 __________________
3

1 

2 PAUL E. SUMMIT (Andrew T. Solomon, on the

3 brief), Sullivan & Worcester LLP, New York, NY,

4 for Plaintiff‐Appellant.

5 

6 BRIAN E. MAAS (Khianna N. Bartholomew, on the

7 brief), Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz, P.C., New

8 York, NY, for Defendant‐Appellee.

9 

10 STEVEN D. GREENBLATT, The Law Office of Steven

11 D. Greenblatt, Saratoga Springs, NY, for Interested‐

12 Third‐Party Appellees.

13 

14 __________________

15 

16 SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judge:

17 

18 This case involves the protracted efforts of Export‐Import Bank of the

19 Republic of China (“Ex‐Im Bank”) to execute on a $21 million judgment in its

20 favor against the country of Grenada.  The judgment, entered in 2007 by the

21 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Harold Baer,

22 Jr., Judge), arose from four loans made by Ex‐Im Bank to Grenada between 1990

23 and 2000.    

24 In the loan documents, Grenada waived its sovereign immunity from suit

25 in federal court in New York in connection with the transactions, and thus the

26 District Court was able to enter a valid judgment against Grenada for the
4

1 amounts owed.  Nonetheless, Ex‐Im Bank has encountered obstacles in

2 attempting to enforce the judgment in the United States, largely because the

3 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602‐1611,

4 protects the assets of a sovereign in the United States from attachment or

5 execution in satisfaction of the judgment.  Only if one of the narrow exceptions

6 set out by the FSIA in section 1610 of title 28 applies will Ex‐Im Bank be able to

7 pursue satisfaction of its judgment on such assets.   

8 On appeal, we are asked to review the District Court’s decision denying

9 attachment of two sets of assets:  first, funds Grenada owes to a private law firm

10 doing business in New York for legal services rendered to Grenada in an

11 unrelated arbitration; and, second, funds that commercial third parties (primarily

12 airlines and cruise lines having some United States‐based operations) owe to

13 several Grenadian statutory corporations.   Export‐Import Bank of Republic of China

14 v. Grenada, 876 F. Supp. 2d 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).   We are also asked to review the

15 District Court’s denial of certain discovery requested by Ex‐Im Bank in relation

16 to its attachment and execution efforts.  

17 As to the first set of funds, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to

18 consider whether it is subject to attachment, and we therefore DISMISS the
5

1 appeal in that respect.  As to the second set, we decide that, with one possible

2 exception, the funds are not subject to attachment because they are not “used for

3 commercial activity in the United States” within the meaning of the FSIA.  We

4 therefore AFFIRM that aspect of the District Court’s ruling.   Certain funds

5 remitted by various airlines through an international air transport industry

6 organization with U.S. operations, however, are allegedly used to service bonds

7 issued to finance Grenada’s main airport.  As to that subset, we conclude that the

8 record before us provides an inadequate basis for determining whether the funds

9 either belong to Grenada or are used for commercial activity in the United States.  

10 For this reason, and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Republic of

11 Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014), which rejected any

12 perceived FSIA‐based restrictions on discovery related to a foreign sovereign’s

13 assets in the United States, we VACATE the District Court’s order insofar as it

14 denied Ex‐Im Bank’s request for post‐judgment discovery as to the bond‐related

15 funds.  We therefore REMAND the cause to enable the District Court to address

16 that request anew.

17 

18 
6

1 BACKGROUND

2 Between 1990 and 2000, Ex‐Im Bank extended four loans, with principal

3 totaling approximately $28 million, to Grenada.  In the loan documents, Grenada

4 agreed to repay the loans in United States currency deposited into New York

5 City bank accounts.  It also warranted that the loans were “commercial acts,” and

6 waived its sovereign immunity from suits in the United States related to the

loans and from attachment of related property.1 7     

8 Grenada defaulted on the loans.  In March 2007, the United States District

9 Court for the Southern District of New York (Harold Baer, Jr., Judge) granted

10 summary judgment against Grenada in the amount of the approximately $21

11 million then owed to Ex‐Im Bank in principal, plus pre‐judgment interest,

 

1 The waiver provision in the loan agreements states in relevant part:  

[Grenada] represents and warrants that this Agreement and the Loan being

made hereunder is a commercial . . . act and that the Borrower is not entitled to

claim immunity from legal process with respect to itself or any property owned

by it . . . on the ground of sovereignty . . . [and] [t]o the extent that [Grenada] or

any property owned by it . . . has or hereafter may acquire any right of immunity

from . . .  attachments or execution of judgment . . . [Grenada] hereby irrevocably

waives such right to immunity for itself and such property . . . .  

Loan Agreement § 9.06, Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 9, Ex. 4.   
7

attorneys’ fees, and statutory interest.2 1   Since 2007, Ex‐Im Bank has tried, without

2 success, to recover the judgment.   

3 The FSIA protects foreign sovereigns from suit in United States courts.  It

4 protects the property of foreign sovereigns in the United States as well:  it directs

5 that, subject only to several narrow exceptions, “the property in the United States

6 of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment[,] arrest and execution.”  28

7 U.S.C. § 1609.   Only one such exception is relevant here:  under some

8 circumstances, the FSIA permits a creditor to execute a judgment against assets

9 of a foreign sovereign if the assets are in the United States when attached and are

10 “used for a commercial activity in the United States.”  Id. § 1610(a).  At issue in

11 this case are Ex‐Im Bank’s efforts under New York law to attach and execute the

12 judgment against two separate sets of Grenada‐related assets located in the

13 United States: the “Grynberg Funds” and the “Restrained Funds.

14 

15 

 

2 The District Court entered an initial judgment in February 2007, granting Ex‐Im Bank’s motion

for summary judgment.  Shortly thereafter, Ex‐Im Bank moved the court to amend the

judgment on the ground that it did not set forth the particularized amounts to which Ex‐Im

Bank was entitled.  The March 2007 amended judgment entered in response to that motion

grants Ex‐Im Bank the following amounts: $21,586,057.38 owed from the default, $3,323,586.90

in prejudgment interest, $82,225.00 for attorneys’ fees, and post‐judgment statutory interest and

costs.   
8

1 I.   The “Grynberg Funds”   

2 In early 2010, RSM Production Corporation (“RSM”) and its individual

3 shareholders—three members of the Colorado‐based Grynberg family—brought

4 claims against the government of Grenada before an international arbitration

5 panel.  RSM and the Grynbergs alleged, inter alia, that Grenada breached an

6 agreement between RSM and Grenada when it declined to grant RSM a

7 petroleum exploration license.  During the arbitration, the international law firm

8 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP (“Freshfields”) represented Grenada.  In late

9 2010, the arbitration panel found for Grenada on the merits, dismissed the

10 claims, and ordered the Grynbergs and RSM to pay Grenada’s fees and costs,

11 plus prejudgment interests, in the amount of approximately $298,000, plus

12 interest (the “Grynberg Arbitration Award”).   

13 In February 2011, Grenada filed suit against RSM and the Grynbergs in the

14 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking

15 confirmation of the international arbitration award.  In April 2011, the District

16 Court (Deborah A. Batts, Judge) entered judgment in Grenada’s favor (the

17 “Grynberg Judgment”).   Soon after, Grenada filed a separate action in the

18 United States District Court for the District of Colorado, seeking registration of
9

1 the Grynberg Judgment and recovery on the Grynberg Arbitration Award.

2 Grenada then moved in Colorado to have writs of garnishment issued against

3 RSM, the Grynbergs, and US Bank and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JP Morgan

4 Chase”), each of which held funds belonging to one of the Grynbergs.  

5 In July 2011, after learning of Grenada’s New York and Colorado lawsuits,

6 Ex‐Im Bank served restraining notices issued under New York law on US Bank

7 and JP Morgan Chase.  It also served restraining notices on Freshfields and

8 Grenada’s Colorado counsel.  The effect of the notices was to restrain these

9 entities from taking any action to disburse the funds owed to Grenada in

connection with the Grynberg Judgment.3 10    

11 The following month, Ex‐Im Bank and Grenada entered into a stipulation

12 (the “Stipulation”) lifting the restraining notices but requiring Grenada to

13 deposit any funds previously subject to those notices with the United States

14 District Court for the Southern District of New York, pending Judge Baer’s

15 determination of Ex‐Im Bank’s rights to the funds in connection with the

 

3  Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222, a “restraining notice” may be issued by the clerk of court or the

attorney for the judgment creditor and served upon, with one exception, “any person,” id. at

5222(a), including parties who “owe[ ] a debt to the judgment debtor or obligor,” id. at 5222(b).  

Parties subject to a restraining notice issued and served under New York law are “forbidden to

make . . . any sale, assignment, transfer or interference with any property” subject to the notice,

with certain exceptions.  Id.
10

1 judgment entered in 2007 in Ex‐Im Bank’s favor.  In November, 2011, Grenada—

2 which in the meantime had recovered approximately $300,000 from the

3 Grynbergs and RSM—deposited this sum (the “Grynberg Funds”) with the

District Court.4 4    

5 In February 2012, Grenada moved for an order declaring the Grynberg

6 Funds immune from attachment under the FSIA, and Ex‐Im Bank moved for

7 turnover of the Grynberg Funds. Grenada argued principally that, under the

8 FSIA, the funds were immune from attachment.  Ex‐Im Bank argued that the

9 funds fell within the FSIA’s “commercial use” exception to immunity.  

10 II. The “Restrained Funds”

11 Ex‐Im Bank concurrently sought to collect on its judgment against

12 Grenada by restraining several airlines and cruise lines, a shipping company,

13 and the International Air Transport Association (“IATA”) (collectively the

14 “Restrained Entities”) from making certain ongoing payments related to their

 

4  The bulk of the Grynberg Funds which were owed to Freshfields was held in the District

Court.  When Grenada’s Colorado counsel demanded that it be paid $3,500 from the Grynberg

Funds for services rendered in connection with the Colorado action, however, Ex‐Im Bank

consented to the requested payment and that sum was disbursed.    
11

use of facilities located in Grenada. 1 5 The payments, comprised primarily of

2 taxes, fees, and other charges, were owed to certain corporate entities (the

3 “Statutory Corporations”), which Grenada created to perform various civic

functions, such as managing Grenada’s airports, seaports, and similar facilities.6 4   

5 Charges associated with the use of certain air transport facilities in Grenada are

6 payable not to a Grenada statutory corporation, however, but to the IATA, with

7 operations in the United States, as we discuss further below.  

8 In its restraining notices—served in November 2011 pursuant to New York

9 law—Ex‐Im Bank asserted that the Restrained Entities “may owe a debt to the

10 judgment debtor, Grenada, or may be in possession or in custody of property in

11 which the judgment debtor has an interest.”  See, e.g., Restraining Notice to

12 Virgin Atlantic Airways, Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 472‐74 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R.

13 5222(b)).  By virtue of the notices, Ex‐Im Bank laid claim to the stream of funds

 

5  The “Restrained Entities” are Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., Cunard Cruise Line, MSC Cruises,

Disney Cruise Line, Virgin Atlantic Airways, Delta Airlines, Inc., Caribbean Airlines Ltd., the

International Air Transport Association (served at two addresses, one in New York and one in

Washington, D.C.), BWIA International Airways Ltd., British Airways PLC, and the

Mediterranean Shipping Company (USA) Inc.

6  The “Statutory Corporations” are the Grenada Airports Authority (“GAA”), the Grenada

Solid Waste Management Authority, the National Water and Sewage Authority of Grenada, the

Grenada Ports Authority, and Aviation Services of Grenada Ltd., which is a wholly‐owned

subsidiary of the GAA.   
12

1 normally paid by the Restrained Entities to the Statutory Corporations (the

2 “Restrained Funds”).  

3 In response, all but one of the Restrained Entities withheld the payments

4 owed to the Statutory Corporations.  Virgin Atlantic Airlines instead chose to

5 deposit with the District Court, pending resolution of Ex‐Im Bank’s rights, funds

6 it would ordinarily pay to the Statutory Corporations, directly or through IATA.   

7 In March 2012, Grenada and the Statutory Corporations moved in the

District Court to vacate the restraining notices.7 8   They asserted that the

9 Restrained Funds are not subject to attachment, arguing that: the Statutory

10 Corporations are juridical entities separate from Grenada that cannot be held

11 responsible for Grenada’s debts; and that, in any event, the FSIA immunizes the

12 Restrained Funds from attachment.  In support of their motions, Grenada and

13 the Statutory Corporations submitted affidavits made by various executives in

14 the Statutory Corporations, describing the structure and purpose of each of those

15 entities, on what basis each charged fees, and how each planned to use the

16 Restrained Funds.  Ex‐Im Bank opposed the motions and cross‐moved for

 

7  Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240, the Statutory Corporations are “interested parties,” with

independent standing to challenge the restraining notices.  For this reason, they are identified in

the caption of this matter as Interested‐Third‐Party‐Appellees.   
13

1 discovery related to the operations of the Statutory Corporations and their

2 planned use of the Restrained Funds.  

3 III. District Court Decision

4 In an Opinion and Order issued on June 22, 2012, the District Court

5 granted Grenada’s motion for a declaration that the Grynberg Funds are immune

6 from attachment; granted Grenada’s and the Statutory Corporations’ motions to

7 vacate the restraining notices; and denied Ex‐Im Bank’s motion for discovery

8 related to the Restrained Funds.  Exp.‐Imp. Bank of Republic of China v. Grenada,

9 876 F. Supp. 2d 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Grenada”).  

10 The court held that neither set of funds, in the FSIA’s words, was

11 “property in the United States of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial

12 activity in the United States,” and that they were therefore immune from

13 attachment, notwithstanding Grenada’s various waivers.  See id. at 264‐65

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)).8 14   With respect to the Grynberg Funds, it reasoned

15 that because Grenada had not yet transferred the Grynberg Funds to Freshfields,

16 the funds had yet to be “used” for any commercial activity in the United States.   

17 Id. at 265.  With respect to the Restrained Funds, the District Court declined to

 

8  The District Court observed that Grenada waived sovereign immunity from attachment and

execution in the loan agreement with Ex‐Im Bank.  Grenada, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
14

1 address whether the Statutory Corporations are liable for the judgment against

2 Grenada on the theory that they are alter egos of Grenada.  Id. at 267.  Rather, the

3 court determined that, even assuming them to be Grenada’s alter egos, the FSIA

4 bars the notices, because the Restrained Funds were not “used for commercial

5 activity” since “[t]he payments that the Corporations receive from the[]

6 Restrained Entities are used as a source of revenue for carrying out public

7 functions in Grenada.”  Id.  In reaching this conclusion, the court focused both on

8 their source and the use to which the Restrained Funds were put.  The court

9 observed, for example, that “the Restrained Funds are not involved in regular

10 commercial transactions, but rather are collected as part of the Corporations[’]

11 regulation of and provision of access to Grenada’s public facilities and services.”  

12 Id.

13 Finally, the District Court denied Ex‐Im Bank’s request for further post‐

14 judgment discovery.  After reviewing the parties’ “supplemental submissions

15 regarding the extent of discovery and what Ex‐Im Bank needed to show to obtain

16 discovery,” the court concluded simply that “discovery [wa]s not warranted.”   

17 Id. at 267 n.5.   

18 
15

1 IV.   Subsequent Procedural History

2 After the District Court issued its decision, Ex‐Im Bank sought to stay

3 vacatur of the restraining notices and disbursement of the Grynberg Funds

4 pending appeal.  On August 17, 2012, the District Court denied the motion, but

5 granted a temporary stay until August 31, 2012.  Ex‐Im Bank then moved this

6 Court for a stay, and on October 3, 2012, the motion was denied. Shortly

7 thereafter, all restraining notices were lifted, and the Grynberg Funds were

8 disbursed.  

9 DISCUSSION

10 On appeal, we are asked to consider whether the District Court erred in

11 concluding that the Grynberg Funds and the Restrained Funds are immune from

12 attachment under the FSIA and whether the District Court exceeded its

13 discretion in denying Ex‐Im Bank’s request for certain post‐judgment discovery.   

14 With regard to the Grynberg Funds, we conclude that Ex‐Im Bank’s appeal

15 is moot because the funds have already been released to Grenada.  With regard

16 to most of the Restrained Funds, we conclude that the FSIA does not permit Ex‐

17 Im Bank to attach them because they are not “used for a commercial activity in

18 the United States.”  As to a certain subset of the Restrained Funds, however, the
16

1 factual record before us provides an inadequate basis to determine whether the

2 funds may be attachable.  For this reason, and in light of recent Supreme Court

3 precedent interpreting the FSIA not to bar broad discovery in aid of executing a

4 judgment against a sovereign, we vacate the District Court’s order insofar as it

5 denied Ex‐Im Bank post‐judgment discovery.  We therefore remand for further

6 proceedings with respect to that issue.  

7 I.   Legal Framework  

8 As a matter of common law, foreign sovereigns have long been recognized

9 as presumptively immune from suit in United States courts.  See Samantar v.

10 Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311‐12 (2010).  Implementing this presumption, the practice

11 for many years was for the State Department to file a “suggestion of immunity”

12 in cases regarding particular foreign sovereigns.  See id. at 311‐13.  Over time,

13 inconsistency and unpredictability came to characterize the government’s

14 practice in applying the immunity doctrine.  See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of

15 Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487‐88 (1983).  With a goal of regularizing that practice and

16 establishing the jurisdiction of United States courts in certain circumstances to

17 hear claims against foreign nations, Congress in 1976 enacted the FSIA.  Id. at

18 488.    
17

1 The FSIA strongly reflects the presumption of immunity:  except in few

2 limited circumstances, it provides that “a foreign state shall be immune from the

3 jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1604

4 (emphasis added).  As a further element of immunity, it provides that—also

5 subject to certain exceptions—“the property in the United States of a foreign state

6 shall be immune from attachment[,] arrest and execution.”  28 U.S.C. § 1609.  

7 Thus, to sue successfully and enforce an award against a foreign state in a United

8 States court, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that the foreign state is not

9 immune from suit and that its assets in the United States are not immune from

10 attachment or execution.   

11 In this case, Grenada waived its immunity from suits arising out of the

12 loans on which it defaulted.  It also waived sovereign immunity from attachment

13 and execution.  See Loan Agreement § 9.06, Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 9, Ex. 4; supra note

14 1.  Notwithstanding these waivers, it argues that its assets in the United States

15 are immune from attachment to satisfy the judgment against it.  Our task is to

16 determine whether, as Ex‐Im Bank contends, any one of the assets at issue falls

17 within one of the exceptions to the FSIA’s grant of immunity.   
18

1 The relevant exceptions appear in two subsections of the Act:

2 section 1610(a), which deals with property belonging to a foreign state, and

3 section 1610(b), which deals with property belonging to an agency or

4 instrumentality of a foreign state.  Under the former provision—which lies at the

5 core of this appeal—a party may execute against “[t]he property in the United

6 States of a foreign state,” even when the state has waived its immunity to

7 attachment or execution, only to the extent that such property is “used for a

commercial activity in the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).9 8 

9 In interpreting these provisions, we are mindful of the historical context

10 (referenced above) within which the FSIA was enacted.  Common law extended

 

9 As relevant here, section 1610 provides:   

(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section

1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall

not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a

judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effective

date of this Act, if . . . (1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from

attachment in aid of execution or from execution either explicitly or by

implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may

purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver . . . .    

   

28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1).  This provision is far narrower than that applicable to property belonging

to an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.”  28 U.S.C. § 1610(b).  Under section 1610(b),

a party may execute against “any property” belonging to the agency or instrumentality,

regardless of its use, as long as the agency or instrumentality is “engaged in commercial activity

in the United States.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Neither party argues that section 1610(b) applies to

any of the Statutory Corporations here.   
19

1 virtually absolute immunity from suit to sovereign nations.  See Samantar, 560

2 U.S. at 311‐12 (citing Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812)).  This

3 doctrine of “complete” sovereign immunity, adopted and applied by our own

4 courts through the mid‐twentieth century, carried a number of unintended

5 consequences, including that it “deprived private citizens [and corporations]

6 conducting business with foreign governments of a legal remedy in court.”  M.

7 Mofidi, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the “Commercial Activity”

8 Exception: The Gulf Between Theory and Practice, 5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 95, 98 (1999).  

9 In 1952, the State Department responded to such concerns by adopting a new

10 rule in a document that later became known as the “Tate Letter,” which

proposed limiting the doctrine of complete sovereign immunity.10 11    See

12 Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 251‐52 (5th Cir.

13 2002) (“Connecticut Bank”).  In the Tate Letter, the State Department announced

14 that it would “recommend denying immunity in suits based on a foreign

15 sovereign’s strictly commercial activities.”  Id. at 252.  But the Letter also

 

10  The letter was transmitted by Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser at the State Department, to

Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General.  See Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser,

Department of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in

26 Dep’t State Bull. 984‐85 (1952); see also Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312‐13; App’x 2 to Opinion of the

Court in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711‐15 (1976)

(reproducing text of Tate Letter).    
20

1 recognized a distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from

2 execution of judgment.  Thus, even “[i]f a plaintiff successfully obtained a final

3 judgment against a foreign sovereign, he still had to rely on the foreign state to

4 pay the judgment voluntarily.”  Id.  

5 The FSIA shifted the responsibility for making determinations about

6 foreign sovereign immunity from the Executive Branch to the Judiciary.  Id.  Like

7 the Tate Letter, the Act ended blanket immunity from suit on claims arising from

8 the commercial conduct of foreign sovereigns in the United States.  Id.  But,

9 unlike the Tate Letter, it also provided private litigants with a mechanism—albeit

10 a circumscribed one—for executing on the property in the United States of a

11 foreign state.  Id.   The limitations of that mechanism can, in some cases, still

12 render the grant of jurisdiction under the FSIA entirely ineffectual, essentially

13 providing a “right without a remedy.”  De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d

14 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1984).   The potential for this anomaly was recognized and

15 tolerated by Congress, however, in enacting the FSIA, id. at 798‐99, and so cannot

bear heavily on our analysis.11 16 

 

11 This feature was also consistent with the international legal backdrop for Congress’s

enactment of the FSIA:  
21

1 In this case, to find that Ex‐Im Bank may attach either set of funds, we

2 must conclude that those funds are: (1) “property in the United States”; (2) “of a

3 foreign state,” i.e., that they belong to Grenada; and (3) that they are “used for a

4 commercial activity in the United States” when the writ of attachment or

5 execution issues.  Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d

6 120, 130 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Conn. Bank, 309 F.3d at 253‐54.   

7 We review a district court’s ruling on a request for an order of attachment  

8 for abuse of discretion.  See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 680 F.3d

9 254, 257 (2d Cir. 2012).  We similarly review a district court’s discovery rulings

10 for abuse of discretion.  See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 207 (2d

11 Cir. 2012) (“EM II”).  A district court is said to have abused its discretion if it has

12 based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, made a clearly erroneous

 

[In passing the FSIA,] Congress sharply restricted immunity from execution

against agencies and instrumentalities, but was more cautious when lifting

immunity from execution against property owned by the State itself. Congress

passed the FSIA on the background of the views of sovereignty expressed in the

1945 charter of the United Nations and the 1972 enactment of the European

Convention, which left the availability of execution totally up to the debtor state,

and its own understanding as the legislative history demonstrates, that prior to

1976 property of foreign states was absolutely immune from execution. . . .  It is

plain then that Congress planned to and did lift execution immunity [only] “in

part.” . . . [S]ince it was not Congressʹ purpose to lift execution immunity wholly

and completely, a right without a remedy does exist [in certain contexts].  

De Letelier, 748 F.2d at 799.
22

1 assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within

2 the range of permissible decisions. NML Capital, Ltd., 680 F.3d at 257.       

3 II. The Grynberg Funds  

4 We do not have jurisdiction to consider whether the Grynberg Funds are

5 attachable because that question has been mooted by the release of those funds

6 from the District Court.  As we have stated in other contexts, to have jurisdiction

7 over a dispute, “at all times, the dispute before the court must be real and live,

8 not feigned, academic, or conjectural.  When the issues in dispute between the

9 parties are no longer live, a case becomes moot.”  Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn.

10 Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotation marks

11 omitted).  In this case, put simply, the Grynberg Funds no longer exist in the

12 United States as potentially attachable property of Grenada.  The dispute as to

13 these funds is therefore moot.  

14 Ex‐Im Bank presents two arguments to the contrary.  First, it asserts that

15 another, similar arbitration brought by RSM against Grenada in 2004 resulted in

16 an award of arbitration fees and costs against RSM, and contends that the

17 amenability to attachment of any recovery on that award depends on our

18 resolution of the Grynberg Funds question.  Second, it maintains that, because
23

1 Ex‐Im Bank still might be able to recover the Grynberg funds from Grenada or

2 “their ultimate destination” (presumably, Freshfields), their amenability to

3 attachment presents a live case or controversy.  Appellant’s Br. 25 n.12.   Neither

4 of these circumstances, however, suffices to revive the dispute.

5 A. The RSM Arbitration  

6 In 2004, the Grynbergs’ company—RSM—initiated arbitration with

7 Grenada, alleging claims against the country related to those the family members

8 brought in the Grynberg Arbitration six years later.  In March 2009, an arbitration

9 panel found for Grenada after determining that Grenada had not breached any

10 obligation to RSM.  The panel also concluded that each party should bear its own

11 arbitration costs.  

12 In June 2009, RSM moved the arbitrators to annul the March arbitration

13 judgment.  Pursuant to regulations of the International Centre for Settlement of

14 Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), which governed the arbitration, RSM was

15 responsible for financing the annulment proceeding.  In 2010, however, after

16 RSM and the Grynbergs initiated the separate Grynberg Arbitration, RSM (as

17 alleged by Grenada) “stopped complying with its obligation to finance the

18 annulment proceedings.”  Application and Mem. of Law for Recognition and
24

1 Entry of ICSID Award as Judgment at 5, In re Application of Grenada v. RSM Prod.

2 Corp., No. 1:11 Misc. 188 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2011), ECF No. 1.      

3 In early 2011, an ad hoc committee of arbitrators for the ICSID issued an

4 order discontinuing the annulment proceedings for lack of payment.  In

5 conjunction with that order, the ad hoc committee ordered RSM to pay Grenada’s

6 legal fees and costs of arbitration, amounting to $186,072.81 (the “RSM

7 Arbitration Award”).  See id. at 7.  Shortly thereafter, Grenada moved in the

8 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for

9 confirmation of the RSM Award and for judgment against RSM.  Id. at 1.  

10 In August 2011, Ex‐Im Bank and Grenada entered into the Stipulation that

11 we have described above with respect to the Grynberg Funds (and whose terms

12 apply also to the RSM Award).  See J.A. 85‐87.  In it, Grenada undertook to

13 attempt to collect the RSM Award and agreed that “[a]ny funds collected by

14 Grenada in connection with collection efforts . . . shall be deposited with the

15 [District] Court.”  Id. at 87.   

16 According to Ex‐Im Bank’s brief on appeal, Grenada has yet to collect any

17 funds in satisfaction of the RSM Award, let alone deposit them with the District

18 Court.  Nevertheless, Ex‐Im Bank argues that our determination of the status of
25

1 the Grynberg Funds will necessarily resolve the status of the RSM Funds, and

2 that therefore the legal question regarding the Grynberg Funds is not moot,

3 notwithstanding their disbursement to Grenada.  We are not persuaded.

4     As an initial matter, it is simply not apparent that any resolution of the

5 status of the Grynberg Funds will necessarily resolve the status of the RSM

6 Funds.  Nothing in the August 2011 Stipulation suggests that the District Court’s

7 determination of Ex‐Im Bank’s rights to the Grynberg Funds would govern the

8 Bank’s rights to the RSM Funds, or vice versa.  Nor have we been directed to any

9 agreement between the parties that would require release to Ex‐Im Bank of the

10 RSM Funds were we to order repayment to Ex‐Im Bank of the Grynberg Funds.   

11 Further, even if our decision regarding the Grynberg Funds bore in some

12 direct way on the proper treatment of the RSM Funds, the Grynberg Funds issue

13 would still be moot.  Ex‐Im Bank has pointed to no evidence that the Grynberg

14 Funds remain in Grenada’s possession in the United States.  No matter how

15 helpful a decision on the merits may be in also resolving the Bank’s rights to the

16 RSM Funds, such a decision would be merely advisory.  See Cnty. of Suffolk, N.Y.

17 v. Sebelius, 605 F.3d 135, 137‐38 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that plaintiff’s claims to
26

1 recover grant funding from the federal government were moot because the

2 funding had already been disbursed to other grant applicants).   

3     B.    Recovery from Grenada or Freshfields   

4 Ex‐Im Bank further disputes the mootness of the Grynberg Funds issue on

5 the theory that “an order of this Court to the effect that the Grynberg Funds

6 belong to Ex‐Im Bank would then require Grenada to return those funds

7 forthwith to Ex‐Im Bank.”  Appellant’s Br. 25 n.12.  This contention ignores that,

8 under the FSIA, the Grynberg Funds were arguably subject to attachment only

9 after they were deposited with the District Court and—according to Ex‐Im Bank,

10 at least—“designat[ed]” for commercial use in the United States:  namely,

11 payment to Freshfields.  See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 484 (2d

12 Cir. 2007) (“EM I”) (holding that funds were unavailable for attachment under

13 section 1610 because they were never used for, or designated for use in,

14 commercial activity).  The withdrawal of the funds from deposit with the District

15 Court has fundamentally altered their status.  The funds no longer exist as

16 discrete property of Grenada held in the United States and arguably designated

17 for a commercial use in the United States.  Once the Grynberg Funds were

18 transferred to Grenada, they became part of the undifferentiated property of the
27

1 sovereign.  In these circumstances, we do not have jurisdiction to consider

2 whether, in retrospect, those funds might have been attachable when they were

on deposit in the District Court. 12 3    Cf. Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. First Trust Co. of

4 N.Y., 142 F.3d 560, 564‐66 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that an “attachment . . .

5 proceeding” is moot where the property the judgment creditor seeks to attach

6 “no longer exists”).  

7 Even if Grenada paid the Grynberg Funds directly to Freshfields in the

8 United States, and this payment constituted “commercial activity in the United

9 States,” the Grynberg Funds issue would still be moot.  Under Federal Rule of

10 Civil Procedure 69, the “procedure on execution” in federal court upon a money

11 judgment “must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is

12 located.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1).  We thus look to New York law to determine

13 what property might be attachable in execution of Ex‐Im Bank’s judgment

14 against Grenada.  Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b)—which identifies the

 

12  Like the District Court, our Court declined to stay vacatur of the restraining notices and thus

allowed Grenada to re‐acquire and then disburse the Grynberg Funds to Freshfields.  It may

seem unfair to show litigants to the exit because we tore up their entry ticket, but such

considerations cannot alter our conclusion here.  As a jurisdictional matter, we cannot hear a

case that does not present a live case or controversy.  We note our concern, however, about

treating as purely “commercial use” the expenditure of funds for securing representation in

legal proceedings.  This concern, among others, might have weighed here in favor of denying

the motion to stay disbursement, as to which Ex‐Im Bank bore the burden.
28

1 “[p]roperty against which a money judgment may be enforced”—a judgment

2 creditor may execute against the property of a judgment debtor “whether [that

3 property] consists of a present or future right or interest and whether or not it is

4 vested.”  The statute does not, however, contemplate execution against property

5 that once belonged to the judgment creditor but now lawfully belongs to a third

6 party.  In other words, even if Grenada actually used the Grynberg Funds for the

7 purpose Ex‐Im Bank argued those funds were designated for when they were

8 deposited in the District Court, the payment of the funds to Freshfields would

9 render the question of their attachability moot.  We therefore dismiss the appeal

10 with respect to the Grynberg Funds.    

III.   The Restrained Funds13 11 

12 The District Court dedicated only a brief segment of its opinion to

13 considering whether the streams of payments made by the Restrained Entities to

14 the Grenadian Statutory Corporations are immune from attachment.  It

15 concluded that the funds are not used for commercial activity in the United

 

13  Although the restraining notices were lifted when we denied Ex‐Im Bank’s stay request, the

attachability of the Restrained Funds, unlike the dispute regarding the Grynberg Funds, is not

moot.  The Restrained Funds are part of several streams of payments made to the Statutory

Corporations by the Restrained Entities.  Were we to conclude that these funds are not immune

from execution under the FSIA, the funds from this stream would be as amenable to attachment

as they were before we denied the stay, and Ex‐Im Bank could still seek to attach them.   
29

1 States, but rather are of a fundamentally public character, and thus do not fall

2 within the FSIA’s “commercial activity” exception.  See Grenada, 876 F. Supp. 2d

3 at 267.    

4 The District Court relied in its analysis on Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,

5 Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992), the seminal Supreme Court case interpreting the phrase

“commercial activity,” as defined by the FSIA,14 6 for purposes of assessing a

foreign sovereign’s jurisdictional immunity from suit under section 1605(a)(2).15 7   

8 In Weltover, the Supreme Court considered whether Argentina was engaged in a

9 “commercial activity” when, in the 1980s, it issued bonds to raise United States

10 dollars for the purpose of stabilizing Argentina’s currency.  Id. at 609‐14.  The

11 Court held that, although Argentina’s purpose in issuing the bonds was

12 undoubtedly of a public or governmental character, the proper focus of the

 

14 The FSIA defines “commercial activity” as “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a

particular commercial transaction or act.”  28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).  It instructs that “[t]he

commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course

of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”  Id.  The

phrase “commercial activity” is used in several of the Act’s sections, including sections 1605 (the

jurisdictional‐immunity provision at issue in Weltover) and 1610 (the attachment‐immunity

provision at issue here).   

15 Notably, the Weltover Court did not have occasion to address immunities from attachment

and execution under section 1610.  Rather, its analysis was directed at the FSIA’s jurisdictional‐

immunity provision, section 1605(a)(2).  We nonetheless find the Weltover Court’s analysis

helpful in construing section 1610.         
30

1 “commercial activity” inquiry under the plain language of the FSIA is the

2 “nature,” not the “purpose,” of the sovereign’s conduct.  Id. at 614 (quoting 28

3 U.S.C. § 1603(d)).  Because Argentina acted “not as regulator of a market, but in

4 the manner of a private player within it,” its conduct was “commercial” under

5 the FSIA.  Id. at 614.   

6 Applying the general framework established in Weltover, the District Court

7 concluded that “the Restrained Funds are not involved in regular commercial

8 transactions, but rather are collected as part of the [Statutory Corporations’]

9 regulation of and provision of access to Grenada’s public facilities and services.”  

10 Grenada, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 267.  In support of this conclusion, the court relied

11 primarily on a district court case holding that taxes owed by various airlines to

12 the Republic of Nicaragua were immune from attachment under the FSIA.  See id.

13 (citing LNC Invs., Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua, No. 96 Civ. 6360 (JFK), 2000 WL

14 745550, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000)).  According to the District Court, the

15 Restrained Funds, like taxes, “are used as a source of revenue for carrying out

16 public functions in Grenada.”  Id.    

17 On appeal, the parties’ arguments largely respond to the District Court’s

18 focus on the nature of the services provided in Grenada by the Statutory
31

1 Corporations in exchange for payment by the Restrained Entities.  Ex‐Im Bank

2 asserts that the affidavits provided by Grenada reflect the private character of the

3 fees and other charges collected by the Statutory Corporations.  For example, the

4 Chairman of the Grenada Airports Authority (“GAA”) explained in his affidavit

5 that among the “Usage Fees” the GAA collects from the airlines are a “Parking

6 Fee,” a “Baggage Screening” fee, and “Overtime Charges.”  J.A. 526‐27.   These,

7 according to Ex‐Im Bank, are “precisely the kinds of services purchased from

8 private vendors around the world.”  Appellant’s Br. at 30.  Grenada counters that

9 these payments from the Restrained Entities are of a governmental and

10 “exclusively public” nature: “the payment of the Restrained Funds to the

11 Statutory Corporations is compelled by Grenadian law and mandatory to the

12 users of facilities and services for which there is no privately available

13 alternative.”  Appellee’s Br. at 21‐22.  

14 In our view, the District Court erred to the limited extent that it focused its

15 analysis (as did the parties) on how Grenada generated the Restrained Funds

16 rather than on how Grenada uses them.  We agree with the District Court’s

17 ultimate conclusion, however, that the Restrained Funds are not attachable
32

1 because, once generated, they are used to serve public purposes, and that use

2 takes place in Grenada.    

3 A. Funds Paid to Grenadian Statutory Corporations for Use of

4 Seaports and Airports  

5 

6 Our Court does not appear to have addressed whether property held in

7 the United States by third parties and owed to a foreign sovereign may be “used

8 for a commercial activity in the United States” and thus subject to attachment

9 under section 1610(a) of the FSIA.  But both the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth

10 Circuit have, and we adopt their shared approach here. See Conn. Bank, 309 F.3d

11 240; Af‐Cap Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007).

12 In Connecticut Bank, the Fifth Circuit considered whether assets held by

13 Texas oil companies and owed to the Republic of Congo as royalties and taxes

14 were attachable to satisfy a judgment against the Congo.  See 309 F.3d at 246‐247.  

15 In determining whether the assets were attachable, the parties and the district

16 court focused on whether the services provided by the Congo in exchange for

17 payment from the oil companies were commercial in nature.  According to the

18 Fifth Circuit, this “was the wrong question to consider.”  Id. at 251.  “What

19 matters under the statute is not how the Congo made its money, but how it
33

1 spends it.  The amenability of these royalties and taxes to garnishment depends

2 on what they are ‘used for,’ not on how they were raised.”  Id.  The court

3 remanded the case and instructed that, “[i]f it turns out that the royalties and tax

4 obligations are not used for any commercial activity in the United States, the

5 district court should dissolve the writs of garnishment and dismiss the action.”  

6 Id. at 260‐61.  

7 In Af‐Cap, the Ninth Circuit considered a judgment‐creditor’s efforts to

8 recover a judgment against the Republic of Congo by attaching assets held by

9 third parties and owed to the Congo pursuant to oil‐and‐gas drilling agreements.  

10 See 475 F.3d at 1084.  The Ninth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s test, agreeing

11 that “the phrase ‘used for’ in § 1610(a) is not a mere syntactical infelicity that

12 permits courts to look beyond the ‘use’ of property, and instead try to find any

13 kind of nexus or connection to a commercial activity in the United States.”  Id. at

14 1087 (quoting Conn. Bank., 309 F.3d at 234).   Rather, the court explained, the

15 word “used” should be given its ordinary, conversational meaning, so that

16 property is “used for” commercial activity under section 1610(a) “when the

17 property in question is put into action, put into service, availed or employed for a

18 commercial activity,” and not merely when it is used “in connection with a
34

1 commercial activity or in relation to a commercial activity.”  Id. at 1091 (emphases

2 in original).   

3 Applying this framework, the Af‐Cap court determined that the specific

4 assets identified as attachable by the judgment‐creditor there—including money

5 owed to the Congo by U.S. oil‐and‐gas companies as consideration for rights to

6 drill and distribute oil in the Congo—were not “used for a commercial activity in

7 the United States” because, among other things, the relevant ventures occurred

8 abroad and, in any event, even if the funds were generated in connection with that

9 commercial activity, they were not necessarily used commercially in the United

10 States.  See id. at 1094.  Accordingly, the court concluded that the assets were

11 immune from attachment.  Id. at 1096.  

12 We agree with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation.  First, we

13 understand the word “used,” read literally, to require not merely that the

14 property at issue relate to commercial activity in the United States, but that the

15 sovereign actively utilize that property in service of that commercial activity.  See

16 Conn. Bank, 309 F.3d at 254; Af‐Cap, 475 F.3d at 1087‐88.  Second, we find this

17 interpretation of the statutory language—one narrower than a general “relation

18 to” requirement—to be more consistent with the structure and purpose of the
35

1 FSIA.  As described above, the statute was intended to reduce the scope of

2 immunity from suit previously extended to foreign sovereigns engaging in

3 commercial activity in the United States.  See Conn. Bank, 309 F.3d at 252; Af‐Cap,

4 475 F.3d at 1088‐89; see also H.R. Rep. No. 94‐1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976

5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605 (noting that the FSIA codifies the “restrictive principle”

6 of sovereign immunity, under which “the immunity of a foreign state is

7 ‘restricted‘ to suits involving a foreign stateʹs public acts (jure imperii) and does

8 not extend to suits based on its commercial or private acts (jure gestionis)”).   But

9 it was also designed to maintain broad immunity from attachment of a

10 sovereign’s property in the United States.  See H.R. Rep. No. 94‐1487, at 27

11 (noting that the FSIA modified the rule precluding execution against a foreign

12 state’s property by “partially lowering the barrier of immunity from execution”

13 (emphasis added)).  

14 The various exceptions set forth in the FSIA itself make apparent the

15 statute’s dual approach:  to foreign sovereign immunity from suit (on the one

16 hand), and to immunity of foreign assets from attachment and execution (on the

17 other).  Section 1605(a)(2), for example, eliminates immunity from suit in the

18 United States for a foreign sovereign in any case “in which the action is based
36

1 upon . . . an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial

2 activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the

3 United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state

4 elsewhere” that causes a “direct effect in the United States.”  28 U.S.C. §

5 1605(a)(2) (emphases added).  The “in connection with” language allows for suits

6 against a foreign sovereign that merely relate to commercial activity.  The breadth

7 of this provision stands in contrast to the more limited scope of section 1610(a),

8 which, as explained above, allows execution upon the property of a foreign

9 sovereign only to the extent that the property is “used for a commercial activity in

10 the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (emphasis added); see also Conn. Bank, 309

11 F.3d at 255 (noting “an obvious difference in the way these two different

12 immunities have been crafted”).   

13 For the most part, the application of this framework to the facts presented

here is relatively straightforward.16 14   We do not consider the nature of the services

15 provided in Grenada by the Statutory Corporations in exchange for the

 

16  As did the District Court, we assume for the purpose of this analysis that the Statutory

Corporations are Grenada’s alter egos, and therefore are liable for the judgment against

Grenada even though they were not themselves signatories to the loan agreements.  See Grenada,

876 F. Supp. 2d at 267.  The validity of this assumption need not be addressed here—we find the

bulk of the Restrained Funds immune in any event.     
37

1 Restrained Funds, because the source of the property is irrelevant to the section

2 1610(a) analysis.  Instead, we focus on the use to which Grenada puts—or clearly

3 intends to put, by virtue of some formal designation or other specific means—the

funds at issue.17 4   Even if, as Ex‐Im Bank argues, the services provided by the

5 Statutory Corporations are “precisely the kinds of services purchased from

6 private vendors around the world,” Appellant’s Br. at 30, funds that the

7 Restrained Entities pay to the Statutory Corporations for those services in

8 Grenada are immune from attachment because they are not used by the Statutory

9 Corporations for commercial activity that takes place in the United States.   As

10 the District Court found and the record supports, the Restrained Funds (with the

11 possible exception of the IATA Funds, as discussed below), are devoted to

12 “carrying out public functions in Grenada,” and “used for the maintenance of

13 facilities and services in Grenada.”  Grenada, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 267 & n.6.  They

14 fail both the “commercial use” and the “in the United States” prongs.  They

 

17 We need not decide today the exact contours of the phrase “used for a commercial activity”

under the FSIA.  But our Court has previously opined that “[e]ven if actual use were not

required” for attachment under section 1610(a), “at least specific designation . . . would be

necessary.”  EM I, 473 F.3d at 485.     
38

1 therefore do not meet the “commercial activity” exception to attachment

provided by section 1610(a).18 2 

3     B.    The IATA Funds & Post‐Judgment Discovery

4 According to Ex‐Im Bank, one subset of the Restrained Funds calls for a

5 different analysis.  Ex‐Im Bank points to the affidavit of the Chairman of the

6 GAA, Rodney George, in which George states that the GAA is empowered to

7 collect various taxes, fees, and charges from all airlines flying into Grenada.  J.A.

8 526.  GAA does not collect these fees from non‐Grenadian airlines, however.  

9 Rather, it directs those airlines to “remit their Usage Fees through the

10 International Air Transport Association,” an international industry organization

11 that “provides a variety of functions to the international air transport

community.”  Id. at 527‐28.19 12   In the past, according to the George Affidavit,

13 IATA disbursed the funds received from non‐Grenadian airlines (the “IATA

14 Funds”) directly to the GAA; however, beginning in April 2010 and lasting at

 

18  Because we conclude that the Restrained Funds are not subject to attachment, we need not

reach Grenada’s argument that the restraining notices should have been lifted because they

were issued before Ex‐Im Bank obtained court approval to impose them.  Grenada argues that

the notices were issued in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c), which provides that no “attachment

[of] or execution [on the property of a foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities] . . . shall

be permitted until the court has ordered such attachment and execution.”   

19 IATA is incorporated in Canada, but apparently has U.S.‐based operations: as noted above,

Ex‐Im Bank served its restraining notices on IATA at its offices in New York and Washington,

D.C.  See J.A. 506‐13.         
39

1 least until George signed his affidavit in March 2012, IATA has instead

2 forwarded the funds to an entity called First Citizens Trustee Services Limited

3 (“First Citizens”).  See id. at 528.  First Citizens acts as a trustee responsible for

4 servicing certain bonds issued by or on behalf of the GAA (the “GAA Bonds”),

5 and the proceeds of the bonds are used to finance the operations of Grenada’s

6 main airport.   

7 Ex‐Im Bank argues that, under Weltover, the IATA Funds may be

8 attachable assets.  As described above, the Weltover Court held that Argentina

9 engaged in conduct of a commercial, not governmental, nature when it issued

10 bonds that were “in almost all respects garden‐variety debt instruments:  They

11 may be held by private parties; they are negotiable and may be traded on the

12 international market . . . ; and they promise a future stream of cash income.”  504

13 U.S. at 615.   The Court there explained that participation “in the bond market in

14 the manner of a private actor” constitutes “commercial activity” under the FSIA.  

15 Id. at 617.  Ex‐Im Bank urges us to hold that (1) transactions relating to the GAA

16 Bonds “fall squarely in the Weltover doctrine,” and (2) any portion of the IATA

17 Funds directed to pay United States‐based holders of these bonds is “used for a

18 commercial activity in the United States.”  Appellant’s Br. at 33.   
40

1 In our view, the record before us does not provide a sufficient basis to

2 make such determinations.  As Ex‐Im Bank observes in its briefing before the

Court, the factual record as to the GAA Bonds and the IATA Funds is sparse.20 3   

4 The record does not disclose many facts that would bear on a careful

5 determination of immunity from attachment.  These include:  the manner or

6 location in which the bonds were issued; the location of First Citizens (the

7 Trustee responsible for servicing the bonds); the locations or identities of the

8 bondholders (including whether they are private or public); the manner or

9 location in which the bonds are traded; and the method by which the

10 bondholders receive payments.  Without this information, we are unable to

11 adequately evaluate Weltover’s applicability to the present action, or to discern

12 whether the IATA Funds are “used for” commercial activity in the United States.

13 We note that the record is also unclear as to a separate prong of our

14 attachability inquiry: whether the IATA Funds even belong to Grenada or one of

15 its alleged alter egos.  In his affidavit, GAA’s George alludes to an “Airport

16 Enhancement and Financing Service Agreement” to which IATA and the GAA

17 are parties.  J.A. 528.  According to George, “The Agreement acknowledges that

 

20 It appears that Ex‐Im Bank was not permitted to depose GAA’s George.   
41

1 the GAA has ‘definitively and irrevocably transferred, assigned, setover and

2 otherwise conveyed to the Trustee . . . all of its right, title and interest in, to and

3 under . . . all [Usage Fees] and all rights to receive any payments relating to the

4 [Usage Fees].”  Id. (alterations in the original).  The agreement itself, however, is

5 not contained in the record before us and the language quoted is unaccompanied

6 by any citation; we are presented only with the recited sentence itself.  In our

7 view, this is too thin a reed upon which to base a definitive legal judgment as to

8 whether the IATA Funds are the property of the GAA or, if so, whether the

9 GAA’s property is also Grenada’s.  We therefore decline to rule now on whether

10 Ex‐Im Bank may attach the IATA funds.  Instead, we remand to the District

11 Court to consider anew the possibility of further discovery as to these issues.   

12 Our conclusion in this regard is reinforced by the disposition and tenor of

13 the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.,

14 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014), which in turn affirmed our decision in EM II, 695 F.3d 201

(2d Cir. 2012).21 15   In EM II, we upheld the district court’s grant of post‐judgment

16 discovery related to assets held at third‐party banks in the United States by

17 judgment‐debtor Argentina.  695 F.3d at 204‐05.  In so doing, we concluded that

 

21 Both of these decisions issued after the District Court’s discovery ruling in the present case.

 
42

1 judgment creditors need not satisfy the “stringent requirements for attachment”

2 under the FSIA “to simply receive information about [a sovereign’s] assets.”  Id.

at 209.22 3    We also noted that discovery of information related to assets held by

4 third‐party banks did not infringe Argentina’s sovereignty even if those assets

5 ultimately proved immune from attachment:  “Once the district court had subject

6 matter and personal jurisdiction over Argentina, it could exercise its judicial

7 power over Argentina as over any other party, including ordering third‐party

8 compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Federal Rules.”  Id..  The

9 Supreme Court later granted certiorari in EM II, and affirmed.  See NML Capital,

10 134 S. Ct. at 2258.  The Court emphasized the absence of any FSIA provision

11 “forbidding or limiting discovery in aid of execution of a foreign‐sovereign

12 judgment debtor’s assets,” and endorsed an approach to discovery—once

13 jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign has been established, as it has here—more

generally consonant with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.23 14   Id. at 2256‐57.     

 

22 In arriving at this conclusion, we expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s requirement that a

judgment creditor identify specific non‐immune assets before it is entitled to further discovery

about those assets.  See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 796 (7th Cir. 2011).

23 Indeed, as we observed in EM II, although a district court “has broad discretion to limit

discovery in a prudential and proportionate way,” discovery in aid of execution “is the norm in

federal and New York state courts.” 695 F.3d at 207.
43

1 In light of the Supreme Court’s decision, and given the circumstances

2 before us, we think it prudent to vacate the District Court’s decision denying

3 discovery, and remand for the District Court’s reconsideration in light of the

4 altered legal landscape.  As explained above, Ex‐Im Bank has had no opportunity

5 to examine the circumstances relevant to the FSIA’s application to the IATA

6 Funds, and in particular, the uses to which those funds may be put in service of

the GAA Bonds.24 7   The strictures of Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 will still govern the District

8 Court’s assessment of the requested discovery, but any lingering concern that the

9 FSIA alone might presumptively bar further discovery has been eliminated by

10 the Supreme Court in NML Capital.

11 CONCLUSION

12 In sum, we conclude that: (1) the question whether the Grynberg Funds

13 may be attached is moot, because those funds have already been disbursed; (2)

14 the District Court properly vacated the restraining notices against the Restrained

15 Entities because, with one possible exception, the Restrained Funds are not “used

 

24   In this regard, we note that IATA, like the third‐party banks subject to the subpoenas duces

tecum in NML, is acting in connection with its relationship to the GAA, but is entirely distinct

from the sovereign itself.  Thus, as we stated in EM II, the discovery was directed against

entities “that ha[d] no claim to sovereign immunity, or to any other sort of immunity or

privilege.”  695 F.3d at 210.  The FSIA immunity concerns that, pre‐NML, might have

contributed to the District Court’s denial of discovery, are therefore now even more attenuated.  
44

1 for commercial activity in the United States”; and (3) because the record does not

2 provide an adequate basis to determine whether the IATA Funds are used for

3 commercial activity in the United States and whether they belong to Grenada, we

4 vacate the District Court’s denial of post‐judgment discovery as to these funds,

5 and remand for the District Court to reassess whether to permit further

6 discovery, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in NML Capital and our

7 decision today.  If, upon remand, the District Court decides to allow discovery,

8 and discovery reveals that the IATA Funds are indeed attachable under the FSIA,

9 the District Court may then assess, in the first instance, whether and to what

10 extent Ex‐Im Bank may properly restrain those funds going forward.   

11 This appeal is DISMISSED in part, the judgment and order of the District

12 Court is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part, and the cause

13 REMANDED.  

14