evidence of harassing comments by coworkers not made in supervisor’s presence where the
plaintiff could base its claim only on the supervisor’s conduct); Quinn, 159 F.3d at 766-67
(holding that the district court properly declined to consider allegations tegarding the conduct of
defendant’s coworkers in determining whether hostile work environment existed where
harassment by both supervisors and coworkers was alleged but liability could not be imposed for
coworker conduct).'*

This is such a case. Because precedent teaches that Defendant cannot be held to violate
Title VII for the alleged actions of its employees under the circumstances of this case, the Court’s
hostile work-environment analysis will be focused on the conduct of Plaintiff's supervisors.
Defendant is not liable for the actions of its employees because it took reasonable steps to
discover and correct the acts of sexual harassment by its employees. See Hall, 276 F.3d at 355
(“An employer’s legal duty in co-employee harassment cases ‘will be discharged if it takes
‘reasonable steps to discover and rectify acts of sexual harassment by its employees.) (quoting
Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032). “Title VI neither requires nor expects the management of a
company to be aware of every impropriety committed by every low-level employee. Therefore,
notice or knowledge of the harassment is a prerequisite for liability in coemployee harassment
cases.” Jd. at 356 (internal quotation and citation omitted), “In determining whether an
employer had notice of harassment, we first determine whether the employer has designated a

channel for complaints of harassment.” Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1035.

Of course, if there is a basis for liability for the conduct of both supervisors and
coworkers, then all of the incidents involving both groups should be considered in determining
whether a hostile work environment was created. See Mason, 233 F.3d at 1044-45 (citing
Williams y. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 559, 562-63 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1999).

19



a basis for employer liability.” Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 328-29 (7th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir, 1998), and
citing Hall vy. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002)). “The third prong of the
prima facic case requires both a subjective and objective inquiry, compelling the court to ask
whether a reasonable person would find the environment hostile.” Robinson, 351 F.3d at 329.

As explained below, certain of the incidents of which Plaintiff complains are not
actionable because Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether they were based
on Plaintiff's gender, and one incident is time-barred. Furthermore, undcr applicable precedent,
Defendant cannot be held responsible for the alleged harassment of non-supervisory employees
because Defendant took reasonable steps to remedy any such harassment (again, assuming the
allegations are true, as the Court must) once Defendant was on noticc. As for the incidents of
gender-based harassment for which Defendant’s supervisors are responsible, these were not
sufficiently severe or pervasive, under applicable precedent, to create a hostile or abusive
situation from an objective standpoint. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

A. Harassment Not Based on Gender

“[I]n the context of a sexual discrimination charge based on a hostile work environment,
‘[t]he critical issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or

oo”

conditions of cmployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.’” Berry v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cit. 2001) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Jnc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). “[AJn employer cannot be held liable for creating or condoning a

hostile working environment unless the hostility is motivated by gender.” /d. al 808.

Plaintiff concedes that the incidents involving Ms. Lynch punching Plaintiff in the arm

13



went on disability leave. The Court must disregard such hearsay. See Minor v. Ivy Tech State
College, 174 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Courts must be particularly assiduous to enforce the
hearsay rule in sexual harassment cases... .”).

The Court also respectfully rejects Plaintiff's contention (hat Defendant’s responses were
unreasonable because the department-wide meeting following her complaint to Mr. Kane was
held with only male employecs and three employces were not interviewed as part of Defendant’s
investigation, The Court notes that Ms. Stewart, the only female employee in Plaintiff's
department at the time of the meeting who allegedly sexually harassed Plaintiff, denied making
the comment attributed to her and nonetheless apologized to Plaintiff. As for the three
employees who were allegedly not interviewed, Mr. Carey, Mr. Rachel, and Ms. Nicholls, none

we

were alleged to be harassers. More to the point, the Court does not “‘sit as a super-personnel
department.” Wyninger, 361 F.3d al 978 (quoting Ransom v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 217 F.3d
467, 471 (7th Cir. 2000)). In sum, because it was not negligent in discovering or responding to
the harassment, Defendant cannot be held liable for the acts of its nonsupervisory employees.
Accordingly, for its analysis of whether Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment,
the Court turns to the conduct of Plaintiffs supervisors,

D. Hostile Work Environment

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff subjectively felt that her work environment was
hostile. However, as noted above, Plaintiff must also meet the objective test. “The harassment
must be sufficiently severe that a rational trier of fact could find that it actually changed. the

conditions of the plaintiff's workplace.” Pryor v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 212

F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 2000). This inquiry requires consideration of “the totality of the

23


that it was her and then said, “Oh, no, it is not you. Tt doesn’t have — it has big boobs.” (/d. at
78.) Plaintiff did not report the episode; however, according to Plaintiff, when Wrigley
supervisors nonethelcss became aware of the carvings, the matter was brought up in a
supervisors’ meeting shortly after the incident. According to Plaintiff, at that meeting, the
manager of Wrigley’s Chicago plant instructed the supervisors to put a stop to that kind of
activity. Plaintiff does not assert that any other carvings were made thereafter.

The following month, in January 2002, four of Plaintiff's male coworkers, Joe Gussich,
Dave Paskash, Lou Resendez, and Rudy Resendez, were “pitching money” in the aisle by the
machines in Plaintiff's department. After Rudy Resendez threw a dime near Plaintiff's machine,
Mr. Gussich said “‘don’t throw a dime; that’s only worth a penny,”” and then Mr. Gussich threw
a penny near her. They saw that Plaintiff got upset, but “they were just all laughing and joking
about it.”” (D.E. 19 at 2.) The money pitching stopped after Plaintiff tumed around and went
back to her machine. Plaintiff did not mention this incident to a supervisor until approximately
five months later.

Tn April 2002, Plaintiff asked Mr. Paskash why he and Mr. Gussich, who normally got
along, seemed to be at odds. In response to Plaintiff’s question, Mr. Paskash said that Mr.
Gussich told him that Mr. Gussich engaged in sex acts with a female employee in the elevator
during breaks and that when someone else confronted Mr. Gussich about what he was saying
about this female employee, Mr. Gussich figured that Mr, Paskash must have leaked the
information. (See D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 56.) If Plaintiff reported this incident to her employer, she

didn’t do so until August 1, 2002, or some three to four months later. (See id.; see also id. at

137-38.)



It is undisputed that in approximately August of 2001, Defendant held a meeting of all the

employees at its Chicago plant, including Plaintiff, and that Ms. Turner, the person running the
meeting, made it clear to employees that they should report any harassment to their supervisors.
Also evident from the record is that Plaintiff understood (hat this avenue was open to her.
Indeed, the expressed basis for her delay in reporting the conduct of her coworkers—that she
“didn’t want anybody to get fired”--demonstrates that she believed that Wrigley would treat her
complaints seriously and that the channel would be effective. Not having taken advantage of the
available reporting mechanism until June of 2002, Plaintiff is ill-positioned to assert that
Defendant was derelict in not having notice before that time. See Hall, 276 F.3d at 356-57
(holding that defendant could not be held liable for harassment that occurred before June of 1999
when the plaintiff could have reported the harassment to a supervisor but did not do so until that
time); accord Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1038 (similar). Moreover, the reasonablencss of Defendant’s
efforts to discover sexual harassment is further evidenced by the fact that it discovered (and
instructed its supervisors to put a stop to) the gum tray carvings even though Plaintiff never
reported them.

Nor can Plaintiff successfully claim that Defendant’s responses to her complaints were
unreasonable.

Tf an employer takes reasonable steps to discover and rectify the harassment of its

employees . .. it has discharged its legal duty... We are not to focus solely upon

whether the remedial activity ultimately succecded, but instead should determine

whether the employcr’s total response was reasonable under the circumstances as

then cxisted. The reasonableness of an employer’s response depends, in part, on

the gravity of thc harassment alleged.

Berry y. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh Circuit’s recent

20


where plaintiff's supervisor “called her a ‘dumb blond,’ put his hand on her shoulder several
times, placed ‘I love you’ signs in her work area”; and repeatedly tried to kiss plaintiff); Saxton v.
Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant where plaintiff's supervisor placed his hand on her knee several times, rubbed his hand
along her upper thigh, pulled her into a doorway and kissed her, and lurched at her from behind
some bushes as if to grab her).

The following statement by the Court in Baskerville could also be said of Mr. Hassan:
“[h]e never touched the plaintiff. He did not invite her, explicitly or by implication, to have sex
with him, or to go out on a date with him. He made no threats. He did not expose himself, or
show her dirty pictures. He never said anything to her that could not be rcpeated on primetime
television.” Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431. Hence, under Baskerville, Rogers, and related authority,
Plaintiff cannot establish an objectively hostile work environment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Wh. tee

Mark Filip U
United States Distriét Judge
Northern District of Illinois

Enter: MAY 6.2004

26



incident even in the absence of any complaint.

The reasoning of another recent Seventh Circuit opinion, Wyninger v. New Venture Gear,
Ine., 361 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2004), confirms the conclusion that Defendant’s responses were
reasonable, In response to Plaintiffs complaint that she received harassing phone calls and was
subjected to an “intimidating meeting,” the defendant investigated the incidents but did not
discipline any employees, See id. at 977-78. In holding that the defendant’s response was
reasonable, the Court noted that “[o]ur determination in this regard could have been made easier
had [defendant] reminded its employces of the company’s written sexual harassment policy,
offered [defendant] an alternative to dealing directly with [the harasscr], and ordered the men to
offer an apology to [plaintiff] for causing her grief.” /d. at 978. In this case, Defendant
effectively did all of the things Wyninger recommended.

Plaintiff's contention that “the record does not clearly establish that the harassment was
remedied,” (see D.E, 20 at 22-23), is unavailing. As mentioned above, the Seventh Circuit has
directed that ““[w]c are not to focus solely upon whether the remedial activity ultimately
succeeded, but instead should determine whether the employer's total response was reasonable
under the circumstances as then existed.” Berry, 260 F.3d at 811 (quoting McKenzie v. Ill.
Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir, 1996)). As discussed, Defendant has met this
standard. Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented any competent evidence thal Defendant’s
remedial measures were not effective. Plaintiff's only support for her contention is her testimony
that her husband was told that Mr. Hassan, sometime during the year or so after Plaintiff stopped
working, made “negative comments” lo a mechanic about two female employees and that Mr.

Gussich “put a nasty note” on a female employee’s posterior about ten months after Plaintiff

22



involving the rumor that Plaintiff's coworker is the father of her child hardly constitutes the kind
of clear evidence of a substantial pattern of discrimination that was found in Shanoff and Cortes.
Indeed, in a casc where the plaintiff alleged that rumors that he was having an affair with a
coworker constituted sexual harassment, the Scventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant on grounds that the harassment was not gender-based. See Pasqua v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Such rumors spread, irrespective of the truth, for any
number of reasons having nothing to do with gender discrimination.”).

Therefore, it is questionable whether the August 2000 episode is cven relevant to the
issue of discriminatory motive in this casc. Moreover, any relevance the August 2000 events
might otherwise have is largely mooted by the fact that, other than the conduct towards Plaintiff
which she has conceded was not based on gender, the “tea time” incidents which were imposed
on male and female employees alike, and Plaintiff's testimony that she knew Mr. Hassan “was
picking on” Ms. Stewart,’* the Court will assumc for purposes of considering Defendant’s
motion that @// of the incidents of harassment were gender-based.

Cc. Employer Liability

The issue of which incidents may be attributed to a defendant for purposes of liability

may properly be decided before the hostile working environment analysis. See Wyninger v. New

“The August 2000 episode cannot illuminate the question of whether Mr. Hassan
sexually harassed Ms. Stewart since neither Mr. Hassan nor Ms. Stewart were alleged to be
involved in that incident. Moreover, as it regards Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs sexual harassment claim, cven if it could be established that Mr. Hassan sexually
harassed Ms. Stewart, that harassment would be relevant only insofar as Plaintiff's knowledge of
such harassment of Ms. Stewart was itself was a form of second-hand sexual harassment on
Plaintiff. Thus, to establish that these incidents constituted second hand harassment, Plaintiff
would need to present evidence that she knew they were gender-based. Plaintiff has provided no
such evidence,

17



didn’t want him to losc his job.” (/d. at 104.) Plaintiff was then asked, “So you told Rich that
Grant had been making sexual comments without giving the details?” and Plaintiff responded,
“Um-hmm.” fd, Mr. Kanc spoke with Mr. Hassan about Mr. Hassan’s comments to Plaintiff.
Mr. Hassan then called Plaintiff into his office and apologized, explaining that he did not mean
for his remarks to be taken as Plaintiff had interpreted them.

The following day, Mr. Kanc held a meeting with all the male employees of the
department and reminded them of Wrigley’s sexual harassment policy. In that mecting,
according to Plaintiff, Mr. Kanc told the employees that a harassment complaint had been made
and that such things would not be taken lightly by the company. Mr. Kane also instructed the
attendees that Wrigley expected all of its employecs to adhere to Wrigley’s policy against sexual
harassment, and that the men should treat their female coworkers like they would treat their
mothers. Plaintiff does not allege thal she was subjected to any sexually harassing or sexually
offensive conduct after she spoke to Ms. Stewart and Mr. Kane.”

On August 1, 2002, Plaintiff alleges that she was involved in an incident with Mr.
Browne and Mr, Hassan that was upsetting but did not involve sexual references or sexual
harassment. (D.E. 19 at 12.)* More specifically, Plaintiff testified that when Mr. Hassan and Mr.
Browne walked up to Plaintiff as she was standing by her machine, Plaintiff reported to Mr.

Hassan that someone from the previous shift had inappropriately left paper refuse in some of the

’The record is unclear as to whcther Mr. Kane met with the male employees during the
third week of June or the last week of July 2002. (Compare D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 105 with id. at 64.)

® Plaintiff contends that this incident, like the Ashley Lynch incident (see Note 6, supra)
was evidence of a pervasive mood at Wrigley that it was “alright to taunt Plaintiff.” (D.E. 19 at
13 n.2.)



Uncle Frank will tell you’ or just kind of laughed it off and walked away.’” (D.E. 20 at Ex. A,
92.) Plaintiff interpreted Mr. Hassan’s comments as suggestions that she was a prostitute and
Frank Molina was her pimp because it is Plaintiff's understanding that “uncle” is a commonly
used term to describe a pimp or “sugar daddy.”

Also in May 2002, Ashley Lynch, Plaintiff's coworker, and Ashlcy’s fathcr Mike Lynch,
also Plaintiff's coworker, sometimes would ask Plaintiff “How’s business?” as they passed by
Plaintiff's machine. On one occasion, when Ashley and Mr. Lynch werc talking by Plaintiff's
machine, Mr. Hassan came by and said, “Oh, get out of there. That’s a bad influence over there.”
(D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 92.) Mr. Hassan then said to Plaintiff “Oh, why do you want to be hanging
around with a college student? You will be teaching her bad habits.” (D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 95.)°

Another of Plaintiff's coworkers, Martin (a/k/a “Marcel”) Rachel, told Plaintiff in May
that Mr. Hassan and Plaintiff’s supervisor, Brenda Stewart, told Mr. Rachel not to talk to
Plaintiff, that she would ruin his marriage. (See D.E. 19 at 6.) Plaintiff took this to mean that
Mr. Hassan and Ms. Stewart were suggesting to Mr. Rachel that Plaintiff would have an affair
with him. (See id.) Plaintiff asked Ms. Stewart whether she had made that statement. (See D.E.

20 at Ex. A, 117.) Ms. Stewart said “no, that Marcel must have t[aken] her comments the wrong

® As stated by Plaintiff, Ashley Lynch also “got a little comfortable in the way she would
talk to me, or like she started punching me in the arm. She would just walk up and slug me real
hard. . . and T asked her to stop because it hurt, and she said “Come on. You can takc it, bro.””
Td, at 43. After Plaintiff complaincd to her supervisor, Brenda Stewart, Ms. Stewart promptly
transferred Ms. Lynch out of Plaintiff's department. Plaintiff does not contend that Ms.
Stewart’s punching her in the arm “serves as a basis for Plaintiffs sexual harassment claim.”
(D.E. 20 at 12.) At most (Plaintiff's brief is somewhat ambiguous on this score), Plaintiff
contends (hat Ms. Lynch’s punching her in the arm “is evidence of a pervasive mood at Wrigley
that it was alright to taunt Plaintiff” (/d. At 13 n.2.) Plaintiff does not reconcile her position
that Lynch’s alleged punching of her prompted Lynch’s transfer after Plaintiff complained with
Plaintiffs assertion that Wrigley was signaling that it was acceptable to taunt Plaintiff.

6



Plaintiff was also occasionally cxposed to a juvenile stunt of Mr. Gussich and Mr.
Paskash (which stunt thcy did to various others, including both male and female employces, and
each other) that involved them imitating a dog urinating. More specifically, on occasion, when
Plaintiff would squat down to fix her machine, Mr. Gussich and Mr, Paskash, as if to imitate a
dog urinating,’ “would come over, raise one leg, pu[t] their crotch near [her] face and say tea
time.” (id. at 109.) Mr. Gussich and Mr. Paskash did this to both male and female employees,
and Plaintiff saw the two do this same thing to Plaintiff's former supervisor, Lori Karpiel. (See
id.) According to Plaintiff, “[i]t was just a thing the guys would do all the time. They would
even do it to cach other.” (/d.) Plaintiff did not complain to anyone about this behavior. (See id.
at 110.)

In May 2002, certain comments were made to Plaintiff by Yaser Hassan, her supervisor’s
supervisor, about Plaintiff and Frank Molina, a mechanic assigned to maintain Plaintiff's
machine. Plaintiff describes the first of such incidents as follows,

Well, Yaser came by my machine when I had a day off and he said, “Oh, 1 thought

you had a second job or something,” and then he was saying, “pretty soon you will

be calling Frank ‘Uncle Frank’.” And T asked him, “what does that mean?” and

he just laughed and patted Frank Molina on the shoulder and walked away.

(D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 56.) A week or two later, after Plaintiff was asked to work overtime, Mr.
Hassan said to Plaintiff: “You don’t need to work overtime. J am sure you are making a lot of

money on your second job.” When Plaintiff asked what kind of job Mr. Hassan meant, he said

“You know.” After Plaintiff said she didn’t know what he meant, Mr. Hassan either said “‘Oh,

‘In her response to Defendant’s Statement, “Plaintiff denies the implication that Gussich
and Paskash were trying to imitate a dog urinating.” (D.E. 19 at 3.) However, Plaintiff testified
as follows at her deposition, “Q. Were they trying to look like a dog urinating? A. Kind
of in that position, yes.” (D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 56.)

5



Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 977 (7th Cir. 2004) (“We need not decide whether Slaven’s
behavior constitutes an objectively abusive working environment, however, because ‘the
question whether [defendant] took prompt and effective remedial action is dispositive here.””)
(quoting Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also
Quinn, 159 F.3d at 768 n.8 (“Although in this case, we first decide which alleged incidents can
be attributed to the defendant and only then consider whether this conduct rises to the level of
actionable Title VII harassment, we do not mcan to suggest that these steps of the inquiry must
proceed in this order.”).

Where, as here, harassment by both supervisors and coworkers is at issuc, it may be
preferable to decide the liability issue first because “[a]n employer’s liability for hostile
environment sexual harassment hinges on whether the harasser is the victim’s supervisor or
merely a co-employee.” Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing
Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032. “‘An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee.’” Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032 (quoting
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998)). On the other hand, “employers are
liable for a co-employee’s harassment only when they have been negligent either in discovering
or remedying the harassment.” /d, (internal quotation omitted),

Thus, if it becomes clear that the actions of either supervisors or coworkers cannot form
the basis of liability, while the actions of the other group can, the analysis of whether a hostile
work environment was created can be appropriately focused. See Mason v. S. Hil. Univ. at

Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s decision to exclude

18



Yaser just jokes around a lot, you know. He is not mad at you or thinking anything different.”
(/d.) Plaintiff asked whether she should report Mr. Hassan’s comments to her supervisor, Ms.
Stewart. (/d.) Mr. Browne said “no, that there was nothing to worry about.” (/d.)

Plaintiff did, however, report Mr. Hassan’s comments to Ms. Stewart in the third week of
June 2002. At that time, Plaintiff also reported to Ms, Stewart the “pitching money” incident
involving Mr. Gussich and Mr. Paskash. Ms. Stewart explained that she had not heard of the
“pitching money” incident but would look into it. Ms, Stewart also said that “she knows how
Yaser is because she had to turn him in to personnel herself for harassment when she first
became a supervisor.” (/d. at 98.) Ms. Stewart did not further explain the nature of the previous
report about Mr, Hassan that she mentioned. Plaintiff “had known from being in the office that
(Mr. Hassan] was picking on [Ms. Stewart] quite often. She [Ms. Stewart] was reporting him to
Rich Kane, and several times Rich Kane came down and got Yaser and went to talk to him.”
Ud.) Ms. Stewart told Plaintiff that Ms. Stewart would talk to Rich Kane, who was Mr. Hassan’s
supervisor and in charge of all production at the plant, about Mr. Hassan.

The next day, however, Plaintiff felt that Mr. Hassan was giving her “dirty looks” when
he walked by, so Plaintiff went back to Ms. Stewart and said that if Mr. Hassan was going to
treat her “nasty” because she reported his comments, then Plaintiff would go to personnel. At
that point, Ms. Stewart called Mr. Kane, who came to the department to talk to Plaintiff that
same day. (See id. at 102.)

Plaintiff told Mr. Kane about Mr. Hassan’s comments, the “pitching moncy” incident,

and, with regard to Mr. Giessert, as Plaintiff testified at her deposition, “I told [Mr. Kane] that

[Mr. Giessert] was making sexual comments. | didn’t explain cxactly what they were because I



circumstances, including but not limited to the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employec’s work performance.” Murray v. Chicago
Transit Auth,, 252 F.3d 880, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).

After setting aside the nonactionable incidents discussed above, the only remaining
conduct at issue is (1) the alleged comment to Mr, Rachel by Ms. Stewart and Mr. Hassan (as
reported to Plaintiff by Mr. Rachel in May) that Mr. Rachel should not talk to Plaintiff, that she
would ruin his marriage,'® (2) two occasions in May on which Mr. Hassan referred to Plaintiff's
“second job” and suggested that she should call Frank Molina, her mechanic, “Uncle Frank,” and
(3) one incident in May when Mr. Hassan told Plaintiff that she would teach Ms. Lynch bad
habits. Under Seventh Circuit precedent, such conduct does not constitute an actionable hostile
work environment.'7

The facts of Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2003), are instructive in
that regard. In that case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the
defendant, notwithstanding that plaintiff, a female police officer, alleged that a sergeant told her
“[y]our breasts looks nice in that turtleneck, that red turtleneck”; ordered her to walk a document

actoss the room “so J can watch you walk over and put it in’; caught ahold of the plaintiff when

lPrecedent teaches that “the impact of such ‘second hand’ harassment is obviously not as
great as harassment directed toward [Plaintiff] herself.” Patt v. Family Health Systs., Inc., 280
F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2002); accord, e.g., Russell v. Bd. Of Trustees of Univ. of Ilinois-
Chicago, 243 F.3d 336, 343 (7th Cir. 2001).

"This conclusion would not change if the incidents involving Plaintiff's coworkers
Ashley and Mr. Lynch asking her “How’s business” are considered part of the hostile working
environment analysis under the theory that Mr. Hassan directed them to make these comments
(evidence of which has not been presented).

24



Minute Order Porm (06/97)

oy \ United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

naa Magistrate Judge Mark Filip Thum Asigaed Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 7849 DATE 5/6/2004
CASE KAREN R. COUGHLIN vs. WRIGLEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY, LLC
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the purty filing the motion, c.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaiutift, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented, |

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY;

dd) Oo Filed motion of | use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer bricfto motion due___._ Reply to answer brief due__

(4) 0 Ruling/Hearingon_ sector

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on__—_set for at
(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to) [set for/re-set for]on__, set for___at
(1) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on_ al

(8) oO (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to. al

@) im This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 OERCP4I(a\1) 0 FRCPAI(ax2).

qo) «il [Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT
WRIGLEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY, LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

al ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document

. Number

No notices requited umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff, 07 2004

Notified counsel by telephone. Ray date dock
wv | Docketing to mail notices, a
oY | Mail AO 450 form. Acketing Stuy initials

Copy to judge/magistrate judge,

courtroom Une mailed notiee

TBK deputy’s
initials

Date/time reccived in
central Clerk's Office mailing deputy initials



department telephoned Plaintiff and told her that they had finished investigating her allegations
and had intervicwed the individuals involved. The personnel department representatives told
Plaintiff that her allegations were not corroborated,’ and that some of the other employees gave
different versions of some of the cvents she alleged. The representatives discussed with Plaintiff
the option of moving her to another department, but Plaintiff was not interested in such a move
because she felt she would become the subject of gossip. (See D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 198-99.)
Plaintiff testificd that the representatives “were very nice to me,” even if she was not pleased
with the outcome of their investigations.

Plaintiff testified that Martin Rachel told her that neither he nor Tom Carey were
interviewed during Wriglcy’s investigation. (See D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 171.) Plaintiff also testified
that she got an undefined “report” that Terri Nicholls was not intervicwed. (See id.) Plaintiff
believes Ms. Nicholls should have been interviewed because “there has been things that she has
told me that the guys have said to her, so T just thought that they should have called her in also.”
Ud.) Plaintiff further testified that her husband was told that, sometime during the year or so
after Plaintiff’s last day at work, Mr. Hassan made “negative comments” about two female
employees to a mechanic and that Mr. Gussich “put a nasty notc” on a female employce’s
postcrior about ten months after Plaintiff went on disability leave. (7d. at 160-61.)

Plaintiff has been “depressed, anxious, and is not functioning well,” and shc has not

returned to work sincc August 1, 2002. /d. Plaintiff believes her condition was prompted by her

Plaintiff denies the allegation that the [personnel department] representatives told
Plaintiff that her allegations were not corroborated.” (D.E. 19 at 4.) However, Plaintiff does not
cite any evidentiary support for her denial. Moreover, Plaintiff testified that the personnel
department representatives “told me that my reports were unfounded.” (D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 167.)

11



gum boxes. (Leaving such refuse in the gum boxes is against Wrigley policy because the paper
could gct in with the gum product and contaminate a shipment.) Mr. Hassan responded, “Yes,
we need to get some younger workers in here,” and Mr. Browne then said “Yes, some young
whackers, get it, whack hers.” Mr. Hassan told Mr, Browne to shut up, and both left the area.

Plaintiff was upset by Mr. Brown’s “whack hers” comment, but she did not feel it was a
sexual reference. The comment upset Plaintiff because she “took it that they were making fun of
the idea that I had reported Ashley Lynch for hitting me, like making it like it was just this light
situation.” (Jd. at 60.) Minutes later, Mr. Kane came by Plaintiff’s machine, saw that Plaintiff
seemed upset, and asked her what was wrong. Plaintiff told Mr. Kane of her encounter that
morning with Mr. Hassan and Mr. Browne, and indicated that she felt it showed that Mr, Kane’s
earlier meeting with the male employces had not been effective. Mr. Kane said that he would
speak with Mr. Hassan and Mr. Browne.

Plaintiff then met with Ms, Turner in personnel. Plaintiff told Ms. Tumer as much as she
could remembcr about the various incidents described above. Plaintiff talked with Ms Tumer for
twenty to twenty-five minutes, Because Plaintiff was upset, Ms. Turner requested and obtaincd
permission to call and ask Plaintiff's mother to attend the mecting. Consequently, Plaintiff's
mother was present for part of the meeting. (See id. at 139.) At the end of the meeting, Ms.
Turner and Plaintiff agreed that it would be best for Plaintiff to go home while the personnel
department started an investigation of Plaintiff's allegations.

Plaintiff drove herself home when she left Wriglcy. Later that day she felt suicidal and
drove herself to a hospital where she was admitted to the psychiatric ward and stayed for five

days. (See D.E. 19 at 7.) After Plaintiff left the hospital, representatives of Wrigley’s personnel

10



way,” and Ms. Stewart expressed her denial to Mr. Rachel. (See id. at 117-18.) Nonetheless,
Ms. Stewart apologized to Plaintiff. (See id.)

At some point in 2002 prior to the third weck of June, Grant Giessert, a male co-worker
and mechanic, made offensive gestures and an improper comment to Plaintiff. On one day, Mr.
Giessert held a grease gun and, as described by Plaintiff, “he had it by his groin and he pumped
the grease out of it real slow and then he wiped it on my sweatshirt, and I told him he was nasty,
and Marcel started laughing, and then I just like punched him and I walked away.” (/d. at 100.)
The following weekend, when Plaintiff and Mr. Giessert were working overtime, Plaintiff asked
Mr. Giessert to get her sweatshirt ftom another department. When he returned, Mr. Giessert said
“{oJh, sorry it took me so long. I had to stop off and take care of myself since you wouldn’t.”

(id. at 100-101.) Plaintiff became upset and scolded Mr. Giessert. He apologized.

After Plaintiff told a coworker about Mr. Giessert’s comment, the coworker told Plaintiff
“to go to personmel.” (/d. at 101.) Plaintiff, however, did not report the conduct at that time
becausc she “didn’t want anybody to get fired.” (Jd.) Instead, Plaintiff talked to her friend,
coworker Mr. Carey, about it and he “confronted Grant himself and told him, ‘Do you know you
can get fired for that?’” (/d. at 101.) According to Plaintiff, Mr. Giessert then “confronted me
and said, ‘Why are you telling everybody about it? I said I was sorry. I don’t want to Jose my job
over this.’ He asked me not to say anything and I agreed.” (/d.)

Plaintiff asked supervisory employee Jim Browne why Mr. Hassan made the “second job”
and “Uncle Frank” type of comments. (See id. at 93.) She asked him “did 1 do something to

make Yaser think anything different about mc; you know, sexually, did I do something to make

him think that I had a side job as a hooker or anything.” (/d.) Mr. Browne responded “Oh, no.



opinion in Cooper-Schut v. Visteon Automotive Systems, 361 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2004) is
instructive regarding what constitutes reasonable steps to rectify harassment. In that case, the
plaintiff alleged “serious and disturbing” incidents of racial and sexual harassment, including that
she was taken to the hospital to receive medical attention for an injury from a tray thrown at her
from above, had another tray thrown at her days later, and that she feared for her personal safety.
See Cooper-Schut, 361 F.3d at 425-26. The defendant investigated the incidents, conducted
interviews, met individually with alleged harassers, and “[i]nstead of disciplining employees, it
reviewed its zero tolerance policy conceming racial and sexual harassment with all employees at
the plant.” /d. at 427-28. The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, stating that the defendant “took reasonable actions to remedy the
violations.” Jd. at 428.

Tn this casc, which does not involve any allegations that Plaintiff's safety was
compromised, Defendant took similar remedial measures to those in Cooper-Schut. Defendant
conducted an investigation, met with all the male employees of Plaintiff's department, reminding
them of Defendant’s policy against sexual harassment, and met individually with Mr. Hassan,
prompting him to apologize to Plaintiff. (Precedent teaches that requiring such apologics
militates against a finding that a workplace is a hostile one. See, ¢.g., Wyninger v. New Venture
Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 978 (7th Cir. 2004); Tutman, 209 F.3d at 1049.) In addition, Ms.
Lynch was transferred to another department (when Plaintiff reported Lynch’s punching her),
Ms. Stewart apologized to Plaintiff, and the option of transferring Plaintiff to another department
was discussed with her. In addition, Defendant, as mentioned above, promptly instructed its

supervisors to put a slop to the gum tray carvings, having learned about and responded to the

21



complain to her employer about these circumstances.’ (See id. at 116-17.)

In approximately August of 2001, Wrigley held a meeting of all the employees at its
Chicago plant to discuss sexual harassment and the company’s policy forbidding such
harassment. This meeting appears to be part of an overall workplace scnsitivity program at
Wrigley and not directed to Plaintiff in particular. Plaintiff attended the meeting and signed a
document verifying that she had done so. The meeting was conducted by Marilyn Tumer of the
Wrigley personnel department. Ms. Turner informed employees that Wrigley had a zero
tolerance policy for sexual harassment and showed them a videotape that depicted cxamples of
prohibited conduct. Plaintiff testified that Ms. Turner made it clear to employees that they
should report any harassment to their supervisors. As a result of the meeting, Plaintiff
understood that comments of a sexual nature are among the things prohibited by Wrigley’s
harassment policy,

In about December 2001, Plaintiff observed three gum trays that contained carvings of
graphic sexual scenes in the sugar compounds that stick to the bottom of the trays. (See D.E. 20
at Ex. A, 74-78.) Another employee named Adam passed around the three trays on that day and
he told Plaintiff that an employee in another department carved the images. (See id. at 77.)

Plaintiff asked coworker Mike Lynch who was depicted in one of the carvings. He responded

‘Plaintiff's Statement, which again cites to Plaintiffs deposition testimony as support,
states that “Plaintiff complained only to her husband because one of the individuals who made
such a statement was Lori Karpiel, a supervisory employee.” (D.E. 19 at 6.) However, in regard
to whether she complained to her employer, Plaintiff testified as follows:

“Q. Did you complain to anybody about those comments? A. No. I didn’t. Just my
husband.” (D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 117.) Additionally, Plaintiff never testified that Ms. Karpiel said
that Mr. Carey was the father of Plaintiff's child or that Ms. Karpiel was aware of such rumors.
In fact, Plaintiff testified no supervisors were present when Plaintiff confronted her coemployees
about the rumors. (See id. at 115-16.)



and Mr. Browne’s “whack hers” comment, which were not motivated by gender, cannot form the
basis of her suit. See (D.E. 20 at 12). Plaintiff argues, however, that the conduct of Mr. Gussich
and Mr. Paskash raising one leg and “putting their crotch near [Plaintiff's] face” and saying “tea
time” when she squatted down to fix her machine is actionable as sexual harassment even though
it is undisputed that Mr. Gussich and Mr. Paskash did this to both malc and female employees
and “They would even do it to cach other.” (D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 109.)

The Court respectfully disagrees. The Scventh Circuit has taught that “inappropriate
conduct that is inflicted on both sexes, or is inflicted regardless of sex, is outside the statute’s
ambit.” See Loldman vy. State of Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing claims
of husband and wife who alleged that their supervisor sexually harassed both of them by
requesting sexual favors). Put another way, precedent tcaches that the key question is not how
Plaintiff perceived the conduct as compared with male employccs who were subject to the same
harassment, but rather whether the harasser’s behavior “is motivated by gender.” Berry, 260
F.3d at 808 (finding incidents “are not actionable as scxual harassment under Title VII (either
collectively or individually) because Berry has presented no evidence suggesting that any of these
incidents were motivated by her gender”); see also Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361
F.3d 965, 976 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that plaintiff could not “base a hostile environment claim
upon {employees’] vulgar language because, at most, they arc crude individuals who treated
everyone poorly”); Holdman, 211 F.3d at 403 (“Title VII does not cover the ‘equal opportunity’ .
. . harasser, then, because such a person is not discriminating on the basis of sex.”) (emphasis in
original), Therefore, because Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Mr. Gussich’s and Mr.

Paskach’s juvenile “tea time” actions, which they did to male and female employees alike, and

14



While recognizing that the August 2000 rumor incident is “outside the time frame of
Plaintiff's EEOC complaint” and cannot form the basis of her complaint, Plaintiff contends that
her testimony about this episode “is relevant to the existence of a hostile environment in the
workplace.” (D.E. 20 at 14 n.3.) It is true, as Plaintiff suggests, that harassment which occurs
outside the limitations period may be relevant to whether incidents within the period were driven
by a discriminatory motive. See Shanoff v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 258 F.3d 696, 705 (7th
Cir, 2001) (stating that time-barred conduct may be considered “to illuminate the nature of the
hostility involved in the actionable conduct”) (citing Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d
195, 199-200 (Sth Cir. 1992) (finding that time-barred conduct could be used to illuminate
discriminatory motives behind current practices)).

Thus, in circumstances where a Plaintiff has clear evidence of a substantial pattern of
discrimination that cannot form the basis of a suit because it is time-barred, such evidence has
been considered relevant to the discriminatory nature of practices occurring within the limitations
period. See Shanoff, 258 F.3d at 705 (finding it proper to consider evidence of time-barred
harassment that plaintiff's supervisor, among other things, called plaintiff a “haughty Jew,” then
lunged at him with a pen, told plaintiff that she knew how to handle white Jewish males like him,
and denied him leave for Yom Kippur by stating “I don’t give a damn about your holidays”); see
also Cortes, 977 F.2d at 199-200 (finding it proper to consider time-barred evidence that
plaintiffs supervisor, among other things, “repeatedly asked [plaintiff] to have sexual relations
with him, sometimes threatening to demote or fire her if she refused . . . made lewd remarks
about her body, told her vulgar jokes on a daily basis, showed her pornographic photographs .. .

and frequently brushed up against her legs and breasts”). However, the August 2000 incident

16



Plaintiff's uncle and current husband work at Wrigley’s Chicago plant. Plaintiff's mother, a
supervisor at the Wrigley plant, has worked there for thirty-three years. As explained, Plaintiff
began at the Wrigley plant in 1990, and she does not allege any harassing acts occurred during
her first ten years of cmployment there.

The first incident at Wrigley about which Plaintiff complains took place in July or August
of 2000, when she returned to work after being on maternity leave for the birth of her third child.
(See D.E. 20 at 9; see also id. at Ex A, 34-35, 37.) Her coworker, Tom Carey, related that other
employees had been saying that Mr. Carey, rather (hat Plaintiff's husband, was the father of her
third child. (See D.E. 19 at 5.) Plaintiff got along very well with Mr. Carey, (see D.E. 20 at Ex.
A, 57, 115), but he would not tell Plaintiff who was making the statements. (See id, at 115.) No
employees admitted making such statements. (See D.E. 19 at 5), and Plaintiff has not presented
evidence that any employees made such comments to her. (See D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 57, 114-16.)
Several employees,’ including Plaintiff's supervisor at the time, Lori Karpiel (with whom
Plaintiff got along well, (see id. at 57, 115)) stated upon seeing the child that it did not resemble

Plaintiff’s previous child that Plaintiff also had with her current husband.? Plaintiff did not

*Unless otherwise specificd, the denomination “coworker” or “employee” means a
nonsupervisor.

3Plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) statement (“Plaintiff's Statement”), which cites to
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony as support, states that “several employees, upon seeing the child,
stated he did not look like Plaintiff or her husband.” (D.E. 19 at 6.) However, Plaintiff testified
at her deposition that the other employees said “Oh, he doesn’t look like Kevin. He doesn’t look,
you know, nothing like Kevin.” (D.E. 20 at Ex. A, 57, 115.) Kevin is the name of the previous
child Plaintiff had with her current husband, William. (See id. at 13, 34.)

2



she appeared to fall and asked her “whether she had a boyfriend or needed one”; and told the
officer that he would “like to be that FOP [Fraternal Order of Police book] in [her] back pocket.”
Rogers, 320 F.3d at 750, Rogers affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the City on the
hostile workplace claim, concluding that plaintiff could “prove little more than that she
encountered a number of offensive comments over a period of several months.” Jd. at 752-53.
Accord, e.g, Patt, 280 F.3d at 754 (affirming summary judgment for defendant where male chief
surgeon made scveral offensive comments either to Plaintiff, a junior surgeon, or within her
hearing, including “the only valuable thing to a woman is that she has breasts and a vagina”);
Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant where coworkers engaged in a varicty of conduct including telling
plaintiff that “she should not wave at squad cars in front of the police station because people
would think she was a prostitute,” “ambiguous comments about bananas, rubber bands, and low-
neck tops, staring and attempts to make cye contact, and four isolated incidents in which a co-
worker briefly touched her arm, fingers, or buttocks.”); Baskerville v. Culligan Int 1 Co., 50 F.3d
428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff could not establish an objectively hostile work
environment where the plaintiff's supervisor, over a seven-month period, called her a “pretty
girl,” grunted “um um um” when plaintiff wore a leather skirt to the office, told plaintiff that her
presence made the office “hot,” suggested that all “pretty girls,” presumably including plaintiff,
“run around naked,” told (he plaintiff that he left the Christmas purty early because he “didn’t
want to lose control” at the sight of “so many pretty girls,” and suggested to the plaintiff that
masturbation was his chief consolation in his wife’s absence); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.

of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment for defendant

25



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
KAREN R. COUGHLIN, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 02 C 7849
)
v. ) Judge Mark Filip oe
) . y
WRIGLEY MANUFACTURING ) ge “®
COMPANY, LLC., } a »
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT WRIGLEY MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff has sued her employer, Defendant Wrigley Manufacturing Company, LLC
(‘Defendant” or “Wrigley”), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 20006, et seg. (“Title VII’), alleging that she was subjected to a gender-based hostile
work environment. Defendant has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below,
Defendant’s motion is granted.

RELEVANT FACTS

Defendant is in the business of manufacturing chewing gum.' Plaintiff is a woman in her
early thirties who began work at Defendant’s Chicago plant in 1990. Plaintiff started out as a
“helper” and then became an operator of gum wrapping machines. Plaintiff's grandmother

worked at the plant years ago and Plaintiff's former husband worked there for ten years.

‘Plaintiff has admitted without qualification most of the facts set forth in Defendant's
Local Rule 56.1 (3) statement (“Defendant's Statement”) (D.E. 16). For the sake of simplicity,
except as otherwise indicated, the facts included herein have been taken from Defendant’s
Statement, though citations to that statement have been omitted.



expericnces at Wrigley. Since August 1, 2002, Plaintiff has been on a disability leave of absence,
during which time she has been receiving short-term wage loss benefits under Wrigley’s
disability benefils plan.’

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether there is a genuine issue of fact, the
court “must construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Foley v. City of Lafayette, 359 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2004)."" To avoid
summary judgment, the opposing party must go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250 (1986).

To survive a summary judgment motion, an employee alleging a gender-based hostile
work environment must show: “(1) she was subjected to unwelcome scxual harassment; (2) the
harassment was based on sex; (3) ‘the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with
the plaintiff's work performance in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working

environment that affected seriously the psychological well-being of the plaintiff’; and; (4) there is

Defendant’s insurance carrier called Plaintiff in October 2002 and told her that they
were going to discontinue coverage, but there is no dispute that Plaintiff has continued receiving
coverage.

"For purposes of this summary judgment opinion, the Court treats all of Plaintiff's
allegations as truc, resolves all conflicts in testimony in Plaintiff's favor, and draws all
reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor.

12



even to each other, were motivated by Plaintiff's gender, liability cannot be imposed under Title
VI for this conduct.”

B. Time-Barred Incident

Plaintiff admits that the circumstances surrounding her return to work in about August of
2000 from maternity leave for the birth of her youngest child (when she heard that there were
rumors that the child was her coworker’s rather than her husband’s), cannot serve as the basis of
her complaint."? These events took place more than 300 days before she filed her EEOC
complaint, 300 days being the relevant Title VII limitations period. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1)). In addition, the sixteen-month gap between the August 2000 incident and the next
episode of harassment would likely preclude Plaintiff from drawing the carlicr incident in for
liability purposes under a continuing violation theory. See Garrison v. Burke, 165 F.3d 565,
570-71 (7th Cir, 1999) (act of harassment outside of limitations period could not be linked with
acts within limitations period where there was a two-year gap between them); see also Quinn v.
Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that one-year gap between
incidents “br[oke] the asserted continuum of discrimination”). In any event, Plaintiff has not

argued or alleged a continuing violation theory.

"Plaintiff has not suggested, and there is no evidence, that Mr. Gussich and Mr. Paskash
engaged in their immature “tea time” conduct with respect to other male employees, including
each other, so that they could avoid liability for harassing females in this way. See Holdman, 211
F.3d at 404 (“[I]f attorneys were actually to dispense such incredible advice {to harass members
of both sexes in order to disguise their real intent], and their clients were to follow it, the clients
would still be subject to Title VII liability.”).

8See (D.E. 20 at 9) (“Plaintiff first felt the sting of sexual harassment in 2000 when she
teturned from maternity lcave .. .. However, the harassment which is the subject of this
complaint did not commence until December 2001.”),

15