F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2001). By suing the SCC officials, Ms. Collins is really suing
the state, and “section 1983 does not authorize suits against the states.” Id. at 732-33
(dismissing section 1983 claims against Wisconsin state prison officials in their official
capacity). The section 1983 claims against Seeman and Bucalo in their official
capacities are, therefore, dismissed.

In Counts I and I, Ms. Collins also asserts section 1983 claims against Captain
Seeman in her individual capacity. (Complaint § 9). To recover damages under
section 1983, Ms. Collins must establish that Captain Seeman “was personally
responsible for the deprivation ofa constitutional right.” Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d
555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). According to the Complaint, upon notification of Ricky’s
mental state, Seeman instructed the correctional officers in the cell block to check on
him every 15-20 minutes. (Complaint {{f 28-29.) Ms. Collins argues that this decision
to put Ricky on “suicide check” was not sufficient under the circumstances and led to
Ricky’s suicide. She further alleges that her son’s Eighth Amendment right to be free
of cruel and unusual punishment was violated, in part, by Seeman’s failure to
adequately satisfy Ricky’s need for immediate medical attention. In Sellers v. Henman,
the Seventh Circuit held that “[nJeglect of a prisoner's health becomes a violation of
the Eighth Amendment only if the prison official named as defendant is deliberately

indifferent to the prisoner's health — that is, only if he ‘knows of and disregards an

-4.



CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part. The section 1983 claims against Seeman and Bucalo are dismissed
except those against Seeman in her individual capacity. All of the state law claims

against Seeman and Bucalo are dismissed.

fare Peeree

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Dated: APR2 © 2003

-7-


IV are tort actions pursuant to Illinois state law. Defendants Seeman and Bucalo move
to dismiss all counts against them.
LEGAL STANDARD

"The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint,
not to decide the merits." Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.
1990) (quoting Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir.
1989)). A complaint need only specify “the bare minimum facts necessary to put the
defendant on notice of the claim so that he can file an answer.” Higgs v. Carver, 286
F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283
F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir. 2002)). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46 (1957). With these principles in mind, we now address the motion before us.

DISCUSSION

1 Section 1983

Counts I and II are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Captain
Seeman in her official and individual capacities and against Officer Bucalo in his
official capacity. (Complaint {] 9-10). A suit against an official in her official capacity

is a suit against the government entity that she represents. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266

3-



excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”’ 41 F.3d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 1148S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994)). This is what Ms. Collins
alleges happened — Seeman was aware of the situation, but nevertheless acted with
deliberate indifference to Ricky’s safety. Accordingly, the section 1983 claims against
Seeman in her individual capacity cannot be dismissed.
II. State Law Claims

Counts III and IV are Illinois statutory tort actions against Captain Seeman in
her official and individual capacities and against Officer Bucalo in his official capacity.
(Complaint {J 9-10). Count III is a Survival Act claim under 755 ILCS § 5/27-6.
Count IV is a Family Expense Act claim under 740 ILCS § 1015.' To the extent that
these counts are against Seeman and Bucalo in their official capacities, they are against
the state and barred from adjudication in this court. The Illinois Court of Claims Act
only waives the State’s sovereign immunity in tort actions against it to the extent that
such claims are pursued in the Illinois Court of Claims. 705 ILCS § 505/8(d). The
state tort claims against Seeman and Bucalo in their official capacities are, therefore,

dismissed.

' 740 ILCS § 1015 is anon-existent statute in Illinois. Ms. Collins presumably
intended to cite the Family Expense Act as 750 ILCS § 65/15.

-5-



Minute Order Form (06/97)
y

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Charles P. Kocoras Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 4493 DATE 4/22/2003
CASE Collins vs. Snyder et al
TITLE

[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

q) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im Brief in support of motion due

(3) im Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) o Ruling/Hearingon__setfor__— se at__

(3) a Status hearing set for 5/21/2003 at 9:30 A.M..

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——_eset fort;
(7) Qo Trial[set for/re-set for]on_—at_—

(8) a (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 CHFRCP41(a)(1) C1 FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Wl — [Otherdocket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: Defendants Seeman’s and Bucalo’s
motion (Doc 16-1) to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The section 1983 claims against
Seeman and Bucalo are dismissed except those against Seeman in her individual capacity. All of the state
law claims against Seeman and Bucalo are dismissed.

(1) ff {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. number of notices

APR 23 2003

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. .

Y | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to uhm judge.

j«e ¢ ‘ way
\ Bo €¢ cd} ey
\ courtroom
scT deputy's ay
initials “

SOLE
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office

mailing deputy initials



In Counts III and IV, Ms. Collins also asserts state tort claims against Captain
Seeman in her individual capacity. (Complaint J 9). Because the tort charges arise out
her breach of a duty imposed upon her solely because of her job at the SCC, sovereign
immunity bars them from adjudication in any court other than the Illinois Court of
Claims. See Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Where a charged act
of negligence ‘arose out of the State employee's breach of a duty that is imposed on
him solely by virtue of his State employment, sovereign immunity will bar maintenance
of the action’ in any court other than the Illinois Court of Claims.”) (quoting Currie v.
Lao, 592 N.E.2d 977, 980 (Il. 1992)). In Turner, an inmate at Stateville Correctional
Center sued prison officials in federal court on account of his being shocked by
exposed electrical wires while showering. Jd. at 600-01. The inmate sued for violation
of the Eighth Amendment under section 1983 and for negligence under state law. Id.
at 600. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the state law negligence claim on
sovereign immunity grounds, noting that “the relationship between [the plaintiff] and
the defendants would not have had a source outside the employment status of the
defendants, and whatever duty was owed by the defendants to [the plaintiff] existed
because of [his] status as a prisoner and his presence at Stateville Correctional Center.”
Id at 602. Under the controlling law and analogous facts of Turner, Ms. Collins’ state

law claims against Seeman in her individual capacity cannot be pursued in this court.

-6-



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS DOG ETED
EASTERN DIVISION —

APR 2 3 2003
DENISE COLLINS, individually and as personal )
representative of the State of Ricky Collins, )
deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)

vs. ) 02 C 4493
)
DONALD SNYDER, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on Defendants Deborah Seeman’s and Sam
Bucalo’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the motion
is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Because this is a motion to dismiss, we accept all well pleaded facts and
allegations in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff Denise Collins. See Bontkowski v. First Nat’l Bank of Cicero,
998 F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993). Ms. Collins, individually and as personal

representative of her son Ricky Collins’ estate, is suing Defendants Captain Deborah

2D



Seeman, Officer Steven Schuck, and Officer Sam Bucalo, with respect to alleged
actions and inactions involving Ricky’s suicide death at the Sheridan Correctional
Center (the “SCC”). All three defendants were SCC personnel during the relevant time
period. Ms. Collins claims that, while incarcerated, Ricky Collins underwent
psychiatric treatment, received counseling, and took psychotropic medications.
According to the Complaint, Ricky was diagnosed with major depression as recently
as May 2000. Ricky allegedly slashed his wrists with his own glasses and was
eventually separated from other prisoners. On the evening of September 27, 2000,
Officer Schuck observed Ricky sitting on the edge of his bed shaking back and forth.
Ricky allegedly told him that he felt suicidal and wanted to talk to a counselor. Officer
Schuck told Ricky that the crisis counselor would not be available for twenty minutes.
Schuck notified the counselor that Ricky needed help and informed Captain Seeman
of the situation. Captain Seeman instructed the correctional officers in Ricky’s cell
block to keep Ricky on “suicide check.” The Illinois Department of Corrections
(‘IDOC”) and SCC policy requires guards to make a suicide check every 15-20
minutes. Later that evening, Officer Bucalo responded to cries from prisoners near
Ricky’s cell only to find him hanging by his neck from a bed sheet. The Complaint

asserts four counts. Counts I and II are pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count III and