J.). Thus, affirmative defenses 3-11 are inadequately pleaded under
Rule 8(a), and are stricken. See Stafford v. Conn, Gen. Life Ins.
Co., No. 95-C7152, 1996 U.S, Dist. LEXIS 5307, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 19, 1996) (Kocoras, J.}).

The motion to strike affirmative defenses is GRantsp.

ENTER ORDER:
“Pg

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: February 2] _, 2003

4



allegation is not an affirmative defense which adds substance to
the litigation; it is clutter. Imperial Constr. Momt. Corp. v.
Laborers’ Int’l Union, 818 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1186) (Alesia,
J.) (striking an affirmative defense with nearly identical
language).

Affirmative defenses 3-11 may all be characterized as “bare
bones conclusory allegations” under Heller. Poly-Tak states as its
defenses the doctrine of unclean hands, the doctrine of laches, the
intervening acts of other parties, the plaintiff’s failure to
mitigate its losses, the statute of limitations, the plaintiff's
comparative negligence, the plaintiff's denial of an opportunily to
cure, and the plaintiff's failure to act in good faith. But in no
instance does it attempt to explain why these doctrines or actions
would provide it with a defense. In no instance does it allege any
specific facts which might support its conclusions, Poly-Tak argues
in its brief that it has no duty to allege facts that will show how
the affirmative defenses will be applicable, but it is incorrect.
Rule 8(a) and the Seventh Circuit agree that a defendant does have
a duty to allege “the necessary elements” of its defenses in order
to conform with the Federal Rules. Heller, 883 F.2d at 1295, The
defendant must provide enough facts so that, at a minimum,
plaintiff is put on notice as to which of its actions are
complained of. See Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 95 © 7152, 1995

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5532, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 1995) (Nordberg,



Dn

ina Onder Hore (06387)

United States District Court, Northern District of Minois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Elaine £, Bucklo

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned udge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 7228 DATE 2/21/2003
CASE Surface Shiclds, Inc. vs. Poly-Tak Protection
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicute the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plamtitf, und (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented]

DOCKET ENTRY:

a5) q Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due.

(3) o Answer briefto motion due____. Reply to answer brief due

(4) B Ruling/Hearmgon___ set for_ at

(5) q Status hearing|held/continued to] {set for/re-set for}on__s set for_ at

(6) im Protrial conference/hcld/continued to} [set for/re-sct forJon set for al

(7) a Trial(sct for/re-set for]on at,

(8) Oo JBenclyJury trial) [Hearing] held/continued to ak

(9) im) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to)
COFRCPa(m) CO Local Rule 41} FA PRCP41(ay1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).

cn | [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order granting plaintiff’ s motion to strike

(6-1) twelve of defendant’s affirmative defenses.

(i)

No notices required, advised in open court.

{For further detail sec order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required,

Y | Noticos maited by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing, to mail notices

Mail AQ 450 form. i dycketing deputypnilials

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

2rairons
fis : Jore mail nee
courtroom:
MP3 deputy's ot

initiuls

Date/time received in
contral Clork’s Office,

runing dejnty initia



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SURFACE SHIELDS, INC.
Plaintiff,
Vv.

No, 02 C 7228
POLY-TAK PROTECTION SYSTEMS, INC.

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Surface Shields, Inc. (“Shields”), an ITllinois
corporation, and defendant Poly~Tak Protection Systems, Inc.
(“Poly-Tak”), a California corporation, are competitors jin the
business of making adhesive films. Shields alleges that Poly-Tak
engaged a corporate spy to steal documents from a Dumpster outside
Shields headquarters for the purpose of interfering with Shield’s
relationships with its customers. Shields filed this suit seeking
damages for tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage and unfair competition. Poly-Tak’s answer to that
complaint included thirteen affirmative defenses, twelve of which
Shields now moves to strike. [T grant the motion,

As a rule, courts disfavor motions to strike because they may
serve only to cause delay. Renalds v. S.R.G. Restaurant Group, 119
F. Supp. 2d 800, 801 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (Alesia, J.). However, where
motions to strike “remove unnecessary clutter from the case, they

serve to expedite, not delay.” Heller v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc.,

0


883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir, 1989). Affirmative defenses are
pleadings, and thus must set forth a “short plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Trp. R. Civ.
P, 8(a). “An allegation must include either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all material elements of the claim
asserted.” MAN Roland v. Quantum Color Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 576,
579 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (Alesia, J.). Affirmative defenses that are
simply “bare bones conclusory allegations” do not meet this
standard and must be stricken. Heller, 883 F.2d at 1295.

A three-part test determines the fate of an affirmative
defense subject to a motion to strike. (1) The matter must be
properly pleaded as an affirmative defense; (2) the matter must be
adequately pleaded under the requirements of Rules 8 and 9; and (3)
the matter must withstand a Rule 12(b)6 challenge — that is, if the
defendant could prove no set of facts in support of the affirmative
defense that would defeat the complaint, the defense must be
stricken as legally inadequate. Renalds, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 802-03.
Poly-Tak concedes the inadequacy of its redundant twelfth
affirmative defense. Each of Poly-Tak’s remaining affirmative
defenses fails under this three-part test.

The First and Thirteenth affirmative defenses are legally
inadequate because they allege only that Shields has failed to
state a sufficient claim to merit relief, rephrasing the standard

for evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)6. This type of