available remedy in the Bankruptcy Court, reasoning that where two
federal laws appear to cover the same ground, it is preferable to
give effect to both. Peeples v. Blatt, No. 00-7028, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11869, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2001) (Gottschall, J.);
order denying summary judgment, Hyman v. Tate & Kirlin, No, 02-242
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2002) (Kennelly, J.). But I am persuaded by the
reasoning of Judge Lefkow in Bolen v. Bass, No. 97-3944, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16964 (N,D, Til. Oct. 17, 2002). One goal of the
Bankruptcy Code, expressed in Cox, is to consolidate related issues
in one proceeding, Recognizing a right of action under the FDCPA in
cases where the Bankruptcy Court offers an adequate remedy would
“interfere with the Bankruptcy Code’s comprehensive bankruptcy
scheme.” Bolen, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16964 at *15. See also
Wehrheim v. Secrest, No. 00-1328, 2002 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 19020, at
*19 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2002) (Tinder, J.) (holding that Cox
precludes private suits under the FDCPA that might be pursued in
the Bankruptcy Court).
Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

ENTER ORDER:

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: February 3, 2003



Minute Order Horm (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Lilinois

Name of Assigned Judge

Sitting Judge if Other

Elaine E. Bucklo than Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

CA

SE NUMBER 02 C 6368 DATE 2/3/2003

CASE Randolph vs. IMBS, Inc.
TITLE .
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented]
DOCKET ENTRY:
ql) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Q Brief in support of motion due
Q) Oo Answet brief to motion due. _ Reply to answer brief duc _
(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on_____ set for al
(5) iva Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) Qo Trialfset for/re-set for] on _ at.
(8) o {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to ___at _.
(9) dg This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agrecment/pursuant to}
OOFRCP4(m) [Local Rule 41.1 OOF RCP41(a)\(1) 0 FRCP41(a)(2).

qo [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order granting defendant’s motion to

dismiss complaint. The casc is therefore dismissed and any pending motion in this case is terminated as

moot.
(1) @ [For further detail sec order attached to the original minute order.|

No notices required, advised in open court. Q- Dodameht::

No notices required. ,
number ol’ notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

EB 04 2003

ate dacketed

Notified counsel by telephione. j

Docketing to muil notices,

Mail AQ 430 form.

fe dey ty initials

Copy to judge/magistrate jude

a/sps

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courtroom ti
MPI deputy's : ye
initials
Date/time received in yi 4 ?

railing depaty initials

central Clerk's OMice “7



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION QOCKETED

FEB 04 2003
JEANETTE RANDOLPH, )
Plaintiff,
v No. 02 C 6368
IMBS, Inc.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jeanette Randolph filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy

petition on May 2, 2002. Among the debts listed on Ms. Randolph's
bankruptcy petition was a debt allegedly owed to a creditor called
PESI Emergency Physicians (“PESI”). Both PESI and defendant. IMBS,
Inc. (“IMBS”), a debt collector, were notified of the bankruptcy
petition.

On July 30, 2002, IMBS sent Ms. Randolph a form debt
collection letter seeking payment on the PESI debt. On August 20,
2002, the PESI debt was discharged in bankruptcy, and on September

9, 2002, Ms. Randolph filed the present suit, alleging that IMBS

violated the Fair Debt Collection Pract

ces Act (“FPDCPA”’) hy
sending the collection letter. IMBS has moved to dismiss the claim
on the grounds that the Bankruptcy Code precludes a private action
under FDCPA. I grant the motion.

There is no question that the collection activity Ms. Randolph

complains of was a violation of the automatic stay issued by the



Bankruptcy Court, and that she might have pursued a contempt action
in that court. Yet, Ms. Randolph has chosen instead to bring suit
under the FDCPA, a federal statute which governs debt collection
practices generally. The Seventh Circuit has not specifically ruled
on whether FDCPA suits for post-bankruptcy collection activity are
allowable, and district court authority in the circuit is strongly
divided on the question.

The most informative Seventh Circuit opinion in this area is
Cox v. Zale Delaware Inc., 239 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2001). There, the
plaintiff debtor sought relief in district court for alleged
violations of section 524(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires
debt reaffirmation agreements to be filed with the Bankruptcy Court
in order to be enforceable. The court held that “a suit for
violation of section 524(c) can be brought only as a contempt
action ... since the debtor would be seeking to enforce the order
of discharge issued in that [bankruptcy] proceeding.” Id. at 917.
Thus, the court appeared to express a preference for resolving
discharge-related issues in the Bankruptcy Court. However, as the
FDCPA is a federal law which appears to independently grant a right
of action to debtors who are subjected to inappropriate collection
activity, Cox does not provide a definitive answer in the instant
case.

Since the Cox decision was issued, at least two district court

judges have permitted FDCPA claims where the plaintiff had an