alleged that he had been discriminated against because he is black. Plaintiff charged that he was
subjected to racial slurs on an ongoing basis since November 29, 1996. He also alleged that he
had been retaliated against because he and his wife had prevailed in a previous lawsuit against
Pace. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit based on this charge in 1998 and has not
attempted to refile this case in any way. On July 19, 2000, plaintiff filed charge No. 210A04016
alleging that after he filed his previous charge, he had been retaliated against and discriminated
against, including the alteration of his medical records, on the basis of his race.

In his Amended Complaint, plaintiff charges that Pace has failed to promote him, that he
was retaliated against for opposing race discrimination at Pace, and was subjected to racial slurs.
Pace argues that plaintiff is procedurally barred from raising these claims because they are not
contained in plaintiffs EEOC charge and certain of the allegations are barred by the statute of
limitations. A Title VII plaintiff must satisfy certain procedural requirements before bringing a
claim in federal court, including filing a charge before the EEOC which encompasses all of the

claims the plaintiff might raise in court. Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins Co., 31 F.3d.

497, 499 (7th Cir. 1994). In addition, the EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days of the
discriminatory actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000¢-5(e). Plaintiff has claimed in his Amended
Complaint that he was retaliated against by Pace after he complained about discrimination. This
claim clearly is stated in his charge and, therefore, we will allow plaintiff to proceed with the
retaliation claim in his Amended Complaint against Pace. However, plaintiff also has claimed
that he was subject to racial slurs, thereby creating a hostile environment, and that Pace has
failed to promote him. These claims are not specifically identified in the EEOC charge.

The court recognizes that the failure to include all aspects of the discrimination in the


F.2d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 1985). Bearing these standards in mind, we turn to plaintiff's Amended
Complaint.

Plaintiff has named three parties as defendants, but has not identified how these parties
relate to each other or to his claims. Pace employed plaintiff. BDA’s role in plaintiff's life is
unclear, but plaintiff accuses it of using his insurance card improperly and referring him to
Friedman, a clinical psychologist who treated plaintiff at some time. The allegations against
Pace, as best the court can discern from plaintiffs Amended Complaint, are that it failed to
promote or interview him for promotion based on his race, retaliated against him for reporting
discrimination in the work place at some time, and harassed him in unspecified ways. The court
also gathers that Pace placed plaintiff on medical leave against his will at some time based on
allegedly false findings about his mental stability made by Friedman. BDA is also accused of
threatening plaintiff. These actions collectively are alleged to have (1) violated Title VII; (2)
breached an unspecified contract and (3) violated the RICO statute.

The Title VII allegations against Friedman and BDA are easily dismissed. Neither
defendant is alleged to be plaintiff's employer, a prerequisite for liability under Title VIL.
Mizwicki v. Helwig, 196 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 1999). And, if that were not enough of an
impediment to suit, neither party is identified in plaintiff's charge filed with the EEOC as the

statute requires. Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.3d 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1989).

Therefore, we dismiss Count One against these defendants.
Pace argues that plaintiff has failed to state a claim against it because plaintiff's EEOC
charge does not include any of the complaints enumerated against it in plaintiff's Amended

Complaint. Plaintiff filed a charge, No. 210971907, with the EEOC in 1997. In this charge, he


EEOC charge can frustrate the EEOC’s conciliatory role. Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., 966 F.2d
1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). In addition, the charged party usually is deprived of notice if the
charge is not complete In this case, however, plaintiff already had informed defendant of these
actions in his earlier charge and lawsuit (which he voluntarily abandoned) and, therefore, this
consideration is less applicable. More importantly, we recognize that a Title VII plaintiff need
not allege in an EEOC charge each and every fact that combines to form the basis of each claim
in the complaint. The test for determining whether an EEOC charge encompasses the claims ina
complaint is whether the claims are “like or reasonably related to the allegations in the charge
and growing out of such allegations” so that the EEOC investigation might have uncovered those
claims. See Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976).

In this case, we find that, to the extent plaintiff has alleged that the harassment and failure
to promote him were part of the alleged retaliation against him, those claims are reasonably
related to the claims contained in his EEOC charge. However, we agree with Pace that the
allegedly discriminatory actions that predate the charge cannot be said to be reasonably related to
his retaliation claim. We also find that plaintiffs broad claim of discrimination in the EEOC
charge, which does not identify any acts except for the alteration of medical records as
discriminatory, is not reasonably related to the discrimination claims in the Amended Complaint.
Further, we agree with Pace that those acts which occurred 300 or more days before the second
filed charge are barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, we hold that plaintiff may
proceed with his claim that Pace retaliated against him after he filed his first charge with the
EEOC, including any alleged failure to promote him after this or subjecting him to racial slurs

which occurred after the charge. All other Title VII claims are barred.


_, Minute Ordee Forgn (06197)

United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Wayne R. Andersen

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 00 C 6515 DATE 6/21/2001
CASE Jeffrey Dunn vs. Pace et al
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oOo Brief in support of motion due
@) Qo Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due___.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on setfor at
(5) Oo Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor_ ss at_—
Q) oO Trial{set for/re-set for] on___at
(8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__ at
(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) (General Rule 21 CIFRCP41(a)(1) 1 FRCP41(a)(2). C (965 -/) /N(3f- , )
a0 = [Other docket entry] Enter MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: We dismiss the

amended complaint against defendant BDA and Friedman. We dismiss Counts IJ and III against
Pace, but allow the retaliation claim stated in Count I against Pace to stand. Plaintiff shall have
until 7/19/2001 to file an amended complaint consistent with this opinion. The court cautions
plaintiff not to repeat allegations on which the court already has ruled. It is so ordered.

a) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court. > es
No notices required. SS mes
Notices mailed by judge's staff.
hun 2 2 Gel

Notified counsel by telephone.

wv | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form,

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

ip 37

courtroom

TSA deputy's
AW initials

oi 22 ma

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office



All three defendants claim that plaintiff's breach of contract claim (Count Two) does not
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We agree. Even the most liberal construction of
his Amended Complaint does not yield a cognizable breach of contract claim. Plaintiff has failed
to allege the existence of a contract between himself and each of the defendants, his own
performance, defendants’ breach and the resulting damages. Gallagher Corp. v. Russ, 309 Ill.
App. 3d 192, 199, 721 N.E.2d 605, 611 (Ist Dist. 1999). We, therefore, dismiss Count Two
against all defendants.

As for plaintiffs’ alleged claim under RICO and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, we are as much in the
dark as defendants concerning this claim. Plaintiff merely asserts these statutes against all
defendants without further explanation. Even allowing for plaintiff's pro se status, he must
provide defendants with some factual basis for his claim under these statutes. Therefore, we
dismiss Count Three as well.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we dismiss the Amended Complaint against defendant BDA and Friedman.
We dismiss Counts II and IMI against Pace, but allow the retaliation claim stated in Count I
against Pace to stand. Plaintiff shall have until July 19, 2001 to file an Amended Complaint
consistent with this opinion. The court cautions plaintiff not to repeat allegations on which the
court already has ruled.

It is so ordered.

l)e CA

7 Wayne R. Andersen
United States District Judge

Dated: hat Al aol


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JEFFREY DUNN, )

) ; ra

Plaintiff, ) BEV

v. } No. 00 C 6515 JUN 2 2 2066
)

PACE SUBURBAN BUS SERVICE, ) Honorable Wayne R. Andersen

BENSINGER AND DUPONT AND )
ASSOCIATES, AND ALAN F. y
FRIEDMAN, Ph.D., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Jeffrey Dunn, has sued his employer, Pace Suburban Bus Service (“Pace”),
Bensinger and Dupont Associates (“BDA”) and Alan K. Friedman (“Friedman”) in a three count
Amended Complaint alleging race discrimination, breach of contract, a violation of the
Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
All three defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). For the reasons stated
below, we grant motions filed on behalf of BDA and Friedman and partially grant Pace’s motion
to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Before we turn to the merits of defendants’ motions, we first must address plaintiff's

attempt to file a Second Amended Complaint without leave of court, apparently to correct certain

uf ’

of the deficiencies which defendants identified in their motions to dismiss plaintiffs Amended

Complaint. As defendants note in their joint motion to strike this Second Amended Complaint,


defendants earlier had filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's original Complaint, but plaintiff was
permitted to file the Amended Complaint in lieu of responding to the merits of those motions.
That Amended Complaint is the subject of the pending motions to dismiss, now fully briefed. In
the proposed Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff has reiterated many of the same allegations
subject to the instant motions and has added several state law claims. Because defendants
already have filed and fully briefed their motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint and because
the federal allegations of the proposed Second Amended Complaint substantially overlap those in
the Amended Complaint, we agree that we should decide defendants’ motions to dismiss before
we allow plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.

When deciding a motion to dismiss, we consider all of the allegations of the complaint to
be true and view all well-pleaded facts and any reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sherwin Manor Nursing Center. Inc, v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d

1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1994). Dismissal is proper only if it is clear from the Complaint that no set
of facts consistent with its allegations would entitle plaintiff to relief. Hishon v. King &
Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (a) requires that a complaint includes a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader in entitled to relief. When analyzing a Complaint
filed by a plaintiff acting pro se, we take special care to construe liberally the stated allegations.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, “[{e]ven under the notice pleading of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the liberal interpretation given to pro se pleadings, a
complaint must include allegations respecting all material elements of all claims asserted; bare

legal conclusions attached to narrated facts will not suffice.” Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760

2