NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5748-12T4

 A-5749-12T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TIMOTHY ADKINS,

Defendant-Respondent.

___________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TIMOTHY ADKINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________________________

Argued November 13, 2013 – Decided

Before Judges Reisner, Alvarez and Ostrer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County, 

Indictment No. 11-08-0734.

Ronald Susswein, Assistant Attorney General,

and Jenny M. Hsu, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for appellant (A-5748-

12)/respondent (A-5749-12) (John J. Hoffman, 

Acting Attorney General, attorney; Mr. 

Susswein and Ms. Hsu, of counsel and on the 

brief).

December 20, 2013

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

December 20, 2013

APPELLATE DIVISION
2 A-5748-12T4

Richard F. Klineburger, III, argued the 

cause for respondent (A-5748-12)/appellant

(A-5749-12) (Klineburger and Nussey, 

attorneys; Mr. Klineburger, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

REISNER, P.J.A.D.

By leave granted, the State appeals from paragraph one of a 

June 7, 2013 order, suppressing the results of a warrantless 

blood test, and defendant appeals from paragraph two of the same 

order, denying his speedy trial motion. Because we conclude 

that application of the exclusionary rule is not required in the 

unusual circumstances of this case, we reverse on the State's 

appeal. We affirm on defendant's appeal.

1

I

The suppression issue is novel and arises from the 

following scenario. On December 16, 2010, defendant was 

involved in a one-car accident in which his vehicle struck a 

utility pole and his two passengers were injured. After 

defendant failed the roadside sobriety tests, the West Deptford 

police arrested him at about 2:30 a.m., on suspicion of driving 

while intoxicated (DWI). They transported defendant to police 

 

1 These back-to-back appeals have been consolidated for purposes 

of this opinion.
3 A-5748-12T4

headquarters, where they read him his Miranda2 rights and he 

invoked his right to counsel. The police later transported 

defendant to a local hospital. At 4:16 a.m., hospital personnel 

drew a blood sample at the request of the police.3 The 

requesting police officer, defendant, and a hospital nurse each 

signed a Certificate of Request to Withdraw a Specimen, although 

defendant signed the form two minutes after the blood was drawn. 

See N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-11.4

 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 

694 (1966).

3 The record does not indicate the time at which the police took 

defendant to the hospital. Hence, it is not clear whether an 

approximately two-hour hiatus, between the time of defendant's 

arrest and the time the blood was drawn, was attributable to 

delay in taking him to the hospital or delay experienced at the 

hospital. 

4 N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-11 is part of a statute that grants civil and 

criminal immunity to medical personnel who draw blood samples at 

the request of a law enforcement officer. N.J.S.A. 2A:62A10(a), -10(b). The statute further provides, in pertinent part: 

"Any person taking a specimen pursuant to [this statute] shall, 

upon request, furnish to any law enforcement agency a 

certificate stating that the specimen was taken pursuant to 

. . . this act and in a medically acceptable manner." N.J.S.A.

2A:62A-11. After reviewing the certificate in this case, we 

conclude that it was not intended to establish a suspect's 

consent to a warrantless search, but rather was intended to 

satisfy the immunity statute and establish the chain of custody 

of the blood sample. The State has waived any claim of FourthAmendment consent, and for purposes of this opinion it is 

irrelevant that defendant signed the form after the blood was 

drawn. 
4 A-5748-12T4

At the time of the accident in 2010, New Jersey law 

permitted the police to obtain a blood sample without first 

obtaining a warrant, so long as they had probable cause to 

believe that the driver was intoxicated.5 That principle, 

derived from Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct.

1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966), was based on the presumed 

exigency created by the dissipation of alcohol levels in the 

bloodstream, and was clearly stated in opinions of our Supreme 

Court. For example, in State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229 (1984), the 

Court observed: "A drunken driver arrested by police with 

probable cause to believe he is intoxicated has no federal 

constitutional right to prevent the involuntary taking of a 

blood sample. Of course, the sample should be taken in a 

medically acceptable manner at a hospital or other suitable 

health care facility." Id. at 238 (citing Schmerber, supra, 384 

U.S. at 771-72, 86 S. Ct. at 1836, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 920). The 

issue in Dyal was whether the police could obtain the results of 

hospital blood tests drawn for purposes of medical treatment;

however, part of the Court's reasoning was that the police had 

 

5 Before the trial court, as on this appeal, defendant did not 

contest that the police had probable cause to seek a blood test. 

Because he was the driver in a one-car accident and failed the 

roadside sobriety tests, probable cause would appear selfevident. 
5 A-5748-12T4

the right to obtain a blood sample from the driver. Dyal, 

supra, 97 N.J. at 231, 238-39.

Several subsequent Appellate Division decisions likewise 

read Schmerber as holding that a warrant was not required. See, 

e.g., State v. Burns, 159 N.J. Super. 539, 544 (App. Div. 1978)

("[C]onsent is not required to the taking of a blood sample, but 

the taking of such sample must be done in a medically acceptable 

manner and environment and without force or violence or the 

threat of same."); State v. Woomer, 196 N.J. Super. 583, 586

(App. Div. 1984) ("[A] blood sample may be taken involuntarily 

[from a suspected drunk driver] and no consent is required.").

In State v. Ravotto, 169 N.J. 227, 231-33 (2001), the Court 

held that the police used excessive force in obtaining a blood 

sample from a drunk driving suspect who was terrified of 

needles. However, the Court reaffirmed that the police did not 

need a warrant to obtain the blood test:

Our holding is not to be understood as 

suggesting that the police had to acquire a 

warrant before obtaining a blood sample from 

defendant or that they acted in an 

unreasonable manner in seeking treatment for 

him at the hospital. Because defendant's 

car was found overturned and his behavior 

demonstrated obvious signs of intoxication, 

probable cause existed for the police to 

seek evidence of defendant's blood alcohol 

content level. Moreover, consistent with 

Schmerber and our analogous case law, the 

dissipating nature of the alcohol content in 

defendant's blood presented an exigency that 
6 A-5748-12T4

required prompt action by the police. Under 

those conditions, a warrantless search was 

justified. 

[Id. at 250 (citation omitted).]

These rulings were also reflected in Guidelines issued by 

the Attorney General to county and municipal prosecutors.6 In 

pertinent part, the Guidelines advised that "[a] defendant has 

no right to refuse to allow blood to be drawn as long as the 

police or law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe 

that the blood sample will contain evidence of alcohol and/or 

drugs." Attorney General Guideline[s]: Prosecution of DWI & 

Refusal Violations, at 9 (Jan. 24, 2005); N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2a 

(requiring the Attorney General to promulgate guidelines).

7

Consequently, when the police obtained the warrantless blood 

sample from Adkins, they acted pursuant to well-established 

legal precedent in this State. 

 

6 In this context, we recall our Court's recent admonition in 

State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114, 136 (2013), that "the prosecutor's 

office is not at liberty to disregard a pronouncement of this 

Court, even if that pronouncement is properly characterized as 

dictum." Likewise, "[a]ppellate and trial courts consider 

themselves bound by this Court's pronouncements, whether 

classified as dicta or not." Id. at 136-37.

7 In citing the Guidelines, we do not suggest that the Attorney 

General can influence our jurisprudence on the exclusionary rule 

by promulgating guidelines and then asserting that the police 

reasonably relied on them. We cite the Guidelines only because 

they rely on clear Supreme Court precedent. 
7 A-5748-12T4

However, years later, the United States Supreme Court 

clarified Schmerber -- and dramatically changed the legal 

landscape in New Jersey and many other states -- by holding that 

there was no per se rule of exigency in drunk driving cases, and 

that the need to obtain a search warrant before taking a blood 

sample was to be determined on a case by case basis. Missouri 

v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1563, 185 L. Ed.

2d 696, 709 (2013); see id. at ___ n.2, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 n.2, 

185 L. Ed. 2d at 704 n.2. Further, under well-settled federal 

precedent, the Supreme Court's construction of the Fourth 

Amendment must be given pipeline retroactivity. Griffith v. 

Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716, 93 L. Ed. 2d 

649, 661 (1987) ("We therefore hold that a new rule for the 

conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively 

to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not 

yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule 

constitutes a 'clear break' with the past."). 

However, when applied in the federal courts, McNeely would 

not result in suppression of the blood evidence obtained here, 

because the United States Supreme Court will not apply the 

exclusionary rule as a remedy where the police conducted a 

search in good faith reliance on binding legal precedent in the 

jurisdiction where the search occurred. See Davis v. United 
8 A-5748-12T4

States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434, 180 L. Ed. 2d 

285, 302 (2011).8

In Davis, the Court clarified that the retroactivity rule 

announced in Griffith did not necessarily require application of 

the exclusionary rule as a remedy where the Court announced a 

new search and seizure rule. Davis, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 

S. Ct. at 2431, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 298-99. "[T]he retroactive 

application of a new rule of substantive Fourth Amendment law 

raises the question whether a suppression remedy applies; it 

does not answer that question." Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2431, 

180 L. Ed. 2d at 298.

Davis addressed searches conducted prior to Arizona v.

Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009), a 

case holding that police could not automatically search the 

passenger compartment of a vehicle whenever an occupant was 

arrested. Davis, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2424-25, 

180 L. Ed. 2d at 291-92. Recognizing that its prior holding in 

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 

 

8 In McNeely, the Supreme Court of Missouri had upheld the 

suppression of the blood evidence, but the suppression remedy 

was not addressed in the United States Supreme Court's opinion. 

See McNeely, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1557, 185 L. 

Ed. 2d at 703. Further, the Missouri Supreme Court had never 

construed Schmerber as allowing warrantless blood tests without 

a case by case showing of exigent circumstances. State v. 

McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 72-74 (Mo. 2012). Therefore, Davis

would not apply to the McNeely search.
9 A-5748-12T4

768 (1981), had been widely understood as permitting such 

searches, the Court concluded that the exclusionary rule was not 

an appropriate remedy for pre-Gant searches. Davis, supra, ___ 

U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 295-97. 

The Court reasoned that, where the police acted in reliance on 

established legal precedent, suppressing evidence would not 

serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule to deter lawless 

police conduct:

The question in this case is whether to 

apply the exclusionary rule when the police 

conduct a search in objectively reasonable 

reliance on binding judicial precedent. .

. . The search incident to Davis's arrest 

in this case followed the Eleventh Circuit's 

[United States v.] Gonzalez[, 71 F.3d 819 

(11th Cir. 1996),] precedent to the letter. 

Although the search turned out to be 

unconstitutional under Gant, all agree that 

the officers' conduct was in strict 

compliance with then-binding Circuit law and 

was not culpable in any way. 

Under our exclusionary-rule precedents, this 

acknowledged absence of police culpability 

dooms Davis's claim. Police practices 

trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only 

when they are deliberate enough to yield 

"meaningfu[l]" deterrence, and culpable 

enough to be "worth the price paid by the 

justice system." The conduct of the 

officers here was neither of these things. 

The officers who conducted the search did 

not violate Davis's Fourth Amendment rights 

deliberately, recklessly, or with gross 

negligence. Nor does this case involve any 

"recurring or systemic negligence" on the 

part of law enforcement. The police acted 

in strict compliance with binding precedent, 
10 A-5748-12T4

and their behavior was not wrongful. Unless 

the exclusionary rule is to become a strictliability regime, it can have no application 

in this case.

. . . .

About all that exclusion would deter in this 

case is conscientious police work. 

Responsible law-enforcement officers will 

take care to learn "what is required of 

them" under Fourth Amendment precedent and 

will conform their conduct to these rules. 

But by the same token, when binding 

appellate precedent specifically authorizes

a particular police practice, well-trained 

officers will and should use that tool to 

fulfill their crime-detection and publicsafety responsibilities. An officer who 

conducts a search in reliance on binding 

appellate precedent does no more than

"'ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and 

should act'" under the circumstances. The 

deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case 

can only be to discourage the officer from 

"'do[ing] his duty.'" 

That is not the kind of deterrence the 

exclusionary rule seeks to foster. . . . 

Evidence obtained during a search conducted 

in reasonable reliance on binding precedent 

is not subject to the exclusionary rule.

[Ibid. (citations omitted).]

In New Jersey, new State constitutional search and seizure 

rules ordinarily are applied prospectively. "In cases where the 

new rule is an exclusionary rule, meant solely to deter illegal 

police conduct, the new rule is virtually never given 

retroactive effect. The reason is that the deterrent purposes 

of such a rule would not be advanced by applying it to past 
11 A-5748-12T4

misconduct." State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 406 (1981); see

also State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 590 (2013); State v. Purnell, 

161 N.J. 44, 54 (1999); State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 251 

(1996); State v. Young, 87 N.J. 132, 140-41 (1981); State v. 

McCann, 391 N.J. Super. 542, 555 (App. Div. 2007); State v. 

Skidmore, 253 N.J. Super. 227, 236 (App. Div. 1992). Had 

McNeely been decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 

construing our State Constitution, it would not have been 

applied retroactively -- thus reaching the same result as in the 

federal system but by a different route.

The Court's recent decision in State v. Earls does not 

compel a different result here. In Earls, the Court gave the 

defendant the benefit of its ruling that, under the New Jersey 

Constitution, "police must obtain a warrant based on a showing 

of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrant 

requirement, to obtain tracking information through the use of a 

cell phone." Earls, supra, 214 N.J. at 588. The Court 

recognized that the holding was novel and law enforcement 

officers could not have anticipated it. Id. at 589. The Court 

also acknowledged that "deterrence is rarely a basis to apply a 

new rule retroactively," id. at 590 (citing Knight, supra), and 

that retroactive application would substantially disrupt the 

administration of justice. Id. at 591. In that context, the 
12 A-5748-12T4

Court applied the rule "to defendant Earls and future cases 

only."9 Ibid.; see also State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 302 

(2011). Unlike Earls, in this case defendant's appeal did not 

result in a new interpretation of our State Constitution, which 

might justify giving him the benefit of the new rule; rather, he 

simply invoked newly-decided federal case law which, in the 

federal court system, would not benefit him.10

In our view, the real issue here is whether, given the 

federal retroactivity requirement, we should, as the State 

argues, apply an approach analogous to that set forth in Davis, 

 

9 The Court also held that the warrant requirement would take 

effect thirty days after its decision to give the Attorney 

General time to issue guidance to state and local law 

enforcement. Ibid.

10 Defendant's reliance on State v. Wessells, 209 N.J. 395 

(2012), is not persuasive. Wessells was not a Fourth Amendment 

search-and–seizure case and, not surprisingly, the opinion does 

not mention Davis. In Wessells, our Court applied a new Fifth 

Amendment ruling of the United States Supreme Court and 

determined, using "the ordinary federal retroactivity analysis," 

id. at 413, that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of 

the federal ruling because he had not yet been tried. Under 

federal Fifth Amendment principles, "the coercive taint of the 

initial interrogation had not dissipated" when defendant made 

his later incriminating statements to the police, and, 

therefore, those statements were deemed "not voluntary." Ibid. 

No such considerations apply to the blood evidence here, which 

cannot be regarded as tainted or unreliable by virtue of the 

warrantless manner in which the police obtained it. See

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 349, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 

2681, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557, 578 (2006) (noting that coerced 

confessions "tend to be unreliable"). 
13 A-5748-12T4

or whether, as defendant argues, the result here is dictated by 

State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-59 (1987), which rejected 

a "good faith" exception to the application of the exclusionary 

rule. 

In Novembrino, our Court, in construing the State 

Constitution, declined to follow the rule announced in United 

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 

(1984). Leon held that the exclusionary rule would not apply 

where the police acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a 

facially valid search warrant, which was issued by a judge but

was "ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." Id.

at 900, 922, 104 S. Ct. at 3409, 3420, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 684, 

698.11 In adopting what it characterized as a "good-faith 

exception for searches conducted pursuant to warrants," the Leon

Court reasoned that "the marginal or nonexistent benefits 

produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively 

reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant 

cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Id. at 924, 

922, 104 S. Ct. at 3420-21, 82 L. Ed. at 698-99.

 

11 In Leon, the Court of Appeals held that the warrant was 

invalid because it was based on stale information from an 

informant, and did not sufficiently establish the informant's 

credibility. Id. at 904-05, 104 S. Ct. at 3411, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 

686-87. The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the 

warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause. Ibid.
14 A-5748-12T4

In declining to adopt the good faith rule, under the 

auspices of the New Jersey Constitution,

12 our Court 

characterized Leon as solely concerned with deterring unlawful 

police conduct:

The major premise of the Court's holding in 

Leon is that the exclusionary rule is not 

required by the fourth amendment but rather 

operates as "'a judicially created remedy 

designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 

rights generally through its deterrent 

effect, rather than a personal 

constitutional right of the person 

aggrieved.'" The opinion observes that in 

view of the rule's function as a deterrent 

of police misconduct, its application in 

particular cases "must be resolved by 

weighing the costs and benefits of 

preventing the use in the prosecution's 

case-in-chief of inherently trustworthy 

tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a 

search warrant issued by a detached and 

neutral magistrate that ultimately is found 

to be defective." 

The majority, after citing examples of the 

Court's prior application of the costbenefit analysis to the exclusionary rule, 

concluded that there is little likelihood 

that the exclusion of evidence obtained 

pursuant to a subsequently invalidated 

search warrant will have a deterrent effect 

on law-enforcement officers.

[Novembrino, supra, 105 N.J. at 140-41 

(citations omitted).]

Our Court disagreed with Leon, emphasizing the critical 

constitutional significance of the probable cause standard. Id.

 

12 N.J. Const., art. I, ¶ 7.
15 A-5748-12T4

at 107-08. Indeed, much of the opinion is devoted to a 

discussion of the probable cause standard and its central 

importance to the warrant requirement. Id. at 105-22. The 

Court also observed that the defects in the Novembrino warrant 

probably resulted from the hurried actions of an inexperienced

police officer. Id. at 129. The Court concluded that 

suppressing evidence seized pursuant to invalid warrants would 

safeguard the integrity of the process by which warrants are 

sought and issued. "Our view that the good-faith exception will 

ultimately reduce respect for and compliance with the probablecause standard that we have steadfastly enforced persuades us 

that there is a strong state interest that would be disserved by 

adopting the Leon rule." Id. at 154. 

Our Court also took a broader view of the purpose of the 

exclusionary rule:

Our concern . . . is with the Constitution 

and with the basic and fundamental 

guarantees that that document was intended 

to afford to all our citizens, particularly 

in times of public ferment. In our view, 

the citizen's right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures conducted 

without probable cause is just such a 

fundamental principle, to be preserved and

protected with vigilance. In our tripartite 

system of separate governmental powers, the 

primary responsibility for its preservation 

is that of the judiciary. 

The exclusionary rule, by virtue of its 

consistent application over the past twenty-
16 A-5748-12T4

five years, has become an integral element 

of our state-constitutional guarantee that 

search warrants will not issue without 

probable cause. Its function is not merely 

to deter police misconduct. The rule also 

serves as the indispensable mechanism for 

vindicating the constitutional right to be 

free from unreasonable searches. Because we 

believe that the good-faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule adopted in Leon would tend 

to undermine the constitutionally-guaranteed 

standard of probable cause, and in the 

process disrupt the highly effective 

procedures employed by our criminal justice 

system to accommodate that constitutional 

guarantee without impairing law enforcement, 

we decline to recognize a good-faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule. 

[Id. at 156-58 (footnote omitted).]

As an intermediate appellate court we are, of course, bound 

by Novembrino. However, we do not believe that Novembrino

applies to the very different circumstances of this case, which 

has nothing to do with invalid warrants or unlawful police 

activity. In reaching that conclusion, we note that in very 

limited circumstances, the Court has signaled that application 

of the exclusionary rule may not always be appropriate where 

applying the rule would not serve its well-understood purposes. 

In State v. Harris, 211 N.J. 566 (2012), the Court declined 

to order the suppression of an illegal handgun seized during a 

search authorized by a warrant properly issued pursuant to the 

Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. 

Unlike a warrant issued for a criminal investigation, a domestic 
17 A-5748-12T4

violence warrant need not be issued on probable cause. However, 

the Court reasoned that the gun was discovered and seized during 

a "special needs search," conducted to protect a victim of 

domestic violence and not for the purpose of uncovering evidence 

of crime. Id. at 584. Ordinarily, the fruits of such a search 

may be admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution, so long 

as the search was conducted pursuant to a valid domestic 

violence warrant and was not a mere pretext to uncover criminal 

evidence. Id. at 585-86 (citing State v. Dispoto, 189 N.J. 108, 

123 (2007)). 

In declining to apply the exclusionary rule, however, the 

Court further stated: 

It is also appropriate to consider the 

purpose that undergirds the exclusionary 

rule. Almost inevitably, whether as the 

result of mistake, inadvertence, ignorance, 

or overzealousness, police can come into 

possession of evidence bearing on criminal 

activity without having complied perfectly 

with the constitutional requirement of 

probable cause. In response to this 

reality, courts have crafted the 

exclusionary rule, under which evidence 

seized illegally is suppressed. United 

States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48, 94 

S. Ct. 613, 619-20, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 571 

(1974); Handy, supra, 206 N.J. at 45-46. 

The purpose of the rule is two-fold: 1) to 

assure that the law does not provide an 

incentive for police misconduct and 2) to 

protect judicial integrity. Mapp v. Ohio, 

367 U.S. 643, 655-59, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1692-

94, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090-92 (1961); Elkins 

v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216-17, 80 
18 A-5748-12T4

S. Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1677 

(1960). Here, there was no misconduct of 

any sort, no mistake in executing the 

warrant, and no disregard of its 

requirements. Consequently, to apply the 

exclusionary rule in this context would not 

further any of its purposes. We reach this 

conclusion in this limited, particular 

context, and we should not be understood at 

this juncture as retreating from our earlier 

rejection of the good faith exception. 

State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-58 

(1987).

[Harris, supra, 211 N.J. at 590 (emphasis 

added) (citing State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 

45-46 (2011)).]

The above-quoted language is readily applicable to this 

case. Like Harris, and unlike Novembrino, here there was no 

mistake by the police, good faith or otherwise. At the time of 

the search, their conduct was lawful under well-established case 

law in this State. See also State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 295-

96 (2006) (declining to characterize a thermal scan as "unlawful 

conduct" by the police, when at the time of the scan, most 

courts that had considered the issue had held that a thermal

scan was not a "search"). The police were not acting pursuant 

to an invalidly-issued warrant which they mistakenly thought was 

valid. Nor was there any unreasonable or improper conduct by 

another State law enforcement employee involved in the search. 

This case is not like State v. Handy, where a police 

dispatcher negligently and inaccurately informed an officer that 
19 A-5748-12T4

there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant. Handy, 

supra, 206 N.J. at 41-42. Handy was arrested, and a search 

incident to the arrest yielded contraband. Id. at 42. The 

Court distinguished prior federal cases involving "an attenuated 

clerical error in a database upon which police officials

reasonably relied." Id. at 52. Instead, the Court found that 

the dispatcher was "an active participant" in the chain of 

events leading to the defendant's arrest. Id. at 47-48. The 

Court concluded that suppression "would have important deterrent 

value, would underscore the need for training of officers and 

dispatchers to focus on detail, and would serve to assure that 

our own constitutional guarantees are given full effect." Id.

at 52. Cf. State v. Pitcher, 379 N.J. Super. 308, 311 (App. 

Div. 2005) (declining to suppress evidence where the police 

officer stopped defendant's car based on a computer check of 

Motor Vehicle records, which inaccurately indicated that the 

car's owner had a suspended license). 

Handy is not on point because, at the time the police 

obtained the blood sample in this case, they were conducting 

themselves in a manner sanctioned by decades of precedent from 

our Supreme Court. No amount of additional police training 

would have deterred the search in this case, because the police 

were following the law as it existed at the time. As in Harris, 
20 A-5748-12T4

suppressing the evidence would not serve the purpose of the 

exclusionary rule to prevent illegal police conduct. Nor would 

admitting the evidence involve the judiciary in what Handy

described as "'the taint of partnership in official 

lawlessness.'" Handy, supra, 206 N.J. at 45 (citation omitted). 

While it could be argued that suppression would, in some 

abstract sense, vindicate defendant's state and federal 

constitutional right against illegal searches, it would do so at 

a cost our Court has not always found justifiable. 

Retroactivity analysis implicitly recognizes that, where 

retrospective application of a new rule of law will inflict 

major disruption on the criminal justice system, some defendants 

will not get the benefit of the new rule even if it implicates 

constitutional rights. Thus, in declining to give retroactive 

application to new search and seizure rulings -- and to various 

other criminal law rulings, see, e.g., Henderson, supra, 208 

N.J. at 302, -- the Court necessarily deprives some defendants 

of an avenue to vindicate newly-recognized rights. 

In the very narrow circumstances presented here, we 

conclude that Harris and by analogy, Davis, signal the correct 

path to our decision. We recognize that there are doctrinal 

differences between the reasoning in Davis and in Harris. For 

example, Davis rested in part on the good faith exception 
21 A-5748-12T4

articulated in Leon, which our Court rejected in Novembrino. 

But at the heart of both opinions is the same core of common 

sense. 

"In this case, the State does not seek to admit the fruits 

of unlawful police conduct since the police fully complied with 

the law in effect at the time they acted." Skidmore, supra, 253 

N.J. Super. at 237.13 Consequently, application of the 

exclusionary rule here would not serve the rule's principal 

purposes articulated by our Court. It would not deter unlawful 

police conduct, and it would not meaningfully safeguard the 

integrity of our judicial process. It is one thing for our 

courts to eschew involvement in admitting evidence seized 

unlawfully. It is another thing entirely to exclude evidence 

seized in conformity with the law as it existed at the time of

the seizure. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's order 

suppressing the blood evidence.

In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize the unusual 

circumstances of this case, where (a) the United States Supreme 

Court issued a new search and seizure rule that was more 

 

13 Skidmore involved a retroactivity analysis of State v. 

Hempele, 120 N.J. 182 (1990), which held that police searches of 

curbside garbage required a warrant. Skidmore concluded that 

because Hempele represented a dramatic break with prior law, it 

would not be applied retroactively. Id. at 238. Skidmore, 

therefore, did not reach the issue of whether the exclusionary 

rule would apply if the Hempele ruling were retroactive. 
22 A-5748-12T4

restrictive than existing precedent from our Supreme Court; (b) 

at the time the search was conducted, it was authorized by 

settled precedent from our Supreme Court; and (c) had the new 

rule been issued by our Supreme Court as an interpretation of 

the New Jersey Constitution, it would not have been applied 

retroactively. 

[At the direction of the court pursuant to 

R. 1:36-2(a), the discussion addressing the 

defendant's appeal in Part II has been 

omitted from the published version of the 

opinion.]

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for trial.