I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The PLRA dictates that “[nJo action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title ... by a prisoner . . . until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The
PLRA helps to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits,” by
“afford[ing] corrections officials time to address complaints internally.” Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988 (2002). The PLRA also works to
“limit judicial intervention in the management of state and federal prisons.” McCoy
vy. Gilbert, 270 F.3d 503, 509-510 (7th Cir, 2001). The Supreme Court has recently
held that this requirement applies to every suit filed by a prisoner regarding events
occurring during his or her incarceration, whether ongoing or isolated. Porter, 534
US. at 524, 122 S. Ct. at 988. For these reasons Congress requires prisoners to
exhaust their administrative remedies. [f a prison has an internal administrative
grievance system through which a prisoner can seek to correct a problem, “then the
prisoner must utilize that administrative system before filing a claim.” Massey v.
Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1999). If a prisoner plaintiff fails to exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing suit, the district court must dismiss the complaint
without reaching the merits. Perez v. Wis. Dept. of Corr,, 182 F.3d 532, 535-36 (7th

Cir. 1999).


ability to respond to problems uniquely within their purview, and the opportunity for
them to carry out their duties is short-circuited,

In short, Poole has impermissibly jumped the gun in filing the instant suit, As such,
we cannot consider the merits of his claims.

H. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Jn light of the foregoing, we can discern no basis to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Poole’s remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Generally,
when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, supplemental jurisdiction over any
state law claim is relinquished as well. Bowman vy. City of Franklin, 980 F.2d 1104,
1109 (7th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, we will not retain jurisdiction over his state law
claims, They are also dismissed.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Leon and Foster’s motion is granted and Poole’s

complaint is dismissed. in its entirety without prejudice.

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
MAR 41-2004 United States District Court

Dated:

1


and went with no appeal filed. According to Poole, he missed the deadline because
unidentified investigators told him to await the results of his rape kit before appealing.’

After two weeks, Poole had not yet been given the results of his rape kit, so he
took legal action. The complaint does not specify what type of legal action he took;
his original complaint was not filed until September 3, 2002, The complaint has been
twice amended, the second time with the aid of appointed counsel. The current
complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C, § 1983 against Leon and Foster in their
individual capacities for the failure to anticipate, prevent, or stop the attack, as well as
claims against each that appear to be grounded in state law.

DISCUSSION

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the entirety of the complaint on
several grounds, including the exhaustion requirement of the Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is a necessary
prerequisite to any prisoner suit and therefore potentially dispositive of the motion

before us, we consider this issue first.

' It is not clear from the materials Poole has submitted when this event allegedly
occurred, but we assume for purposes of this motion that it was before May 11.

3.


Defendants contend that Poole failed to exhaust the administrative remedies set
forth in the Cook County Department of Corrections Detainee Grievance Procedure
(“grievance procedure”),? As such, Defendants claim that Poole’s complaint should
be dismissed.

Poole argues that the advice of the investigators to delay filing his appeal until he
received the results of the rape kit absolved him of the obligation to continue to pursue
the administrative course he had begun. In support of his argument, Poole points to a
case from the Eleventh Circuit, Millerv. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 1999). In
Miller, an inmate filed a grievance against multiple guards, which was denied because
he failed to sign and date the grievance form. Id. at 1192. The written denial, issued
by the prison grievance clerk, included the statement: “[w]Jhen any grievance is
terminated at the institutional level you do not have the right to appeal.” Id, at 1194,

The court concluded that this unequivocal statement to Miller that appeal was

2? Under the grievance procedure, a detainee may file a grievance at any time
related to: (1) alleged violations of civil, constitutional or statutory rights; (2) alleged
criminal or prohibited acts by staff members; (3) and to resolve concerns within the
facility that create unsafe or unsanitary living conditions. Grievances must be filed on
a specified form and placed within designated locked boxes within 15 days of the
alleged event. Within five days after the grievance is filed, the institution will provide
the detainee with resolution of his grievance. A detainee may appeal the grievance
decision within five working days from receipt of the decision, Such requests are
placed in the same boxes as the initial grievance. The institution has 10 working days
thereafter to review the appeal and reply to the detainee. All decisions rendered by the
appellate authority are final.

5.


Ss

Minute Cris Form (08/07)

4 7 Dnited States District Court, Northern District of Dlinois
“amunureme nage | __Charles P. Kocoras | Sie ue fet
CASE NUMBER 02 C 6279 DATE 3/11/2004
CASE Poole vs, Leon et al
TITLE

[ln the following hox (1) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

MOTION;

DOCKET ENTRY:

ay Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due____.. Reply to answer briefdue__

(4) a Ruling/Hearingon____esetfor_ at.

(3) im Status hearing(held/continued to] (set for/re-sct for]on____sset for at.
(6) o Pretrial conference{held/continued to} [sct for/re-set for]on___—_setfor_ at
(7) Q Trial{set for/re-setfor]on_§ at

(8) Q {Bench/Jury trial] {Mearing] held/continued to __ at.

(9) q Chis case is dismissed (with/without} prejudice and without costs(by/agreement/pursuant to}

OOFRCP4(m) CO) Loval Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(ay(t) DO FRCP4I(aX2).

uo «6h (Other docket entry] Ruling held. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: Leon and Foster’s
motion (Doc 41-1) is granted and Poole’s complaint is dismissed in its entirety without prejudice.

(il) (For further detail see order attached 10 the original minute order.J

—

Document
Nutiber

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| no notices required, advised in open court,

No notices required.
umber of votices

Notices mailed by judge's staff R12 704

Notified counsel by telephone,
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v | Mail A0 480 form, _— ere us

Copy to jkgmagistrace judge,

courtroom
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initials

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Date/time received in
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prohibited in his circumstance meant that his prior actions in pursuing his grievance
exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. Id,

Jn the instant case, the investigators did not inform Poole that he could not file
an appeal from the denial of his grievance, making this case immediately
distinguishable from Miller. Poole possessed the right to appeal and elected to delay
his filing until he received the rape kit results. As such, he was not prevented from
filing an appeal after the deadline passed; he affirmatively chose to follow advice that,
as far as we can tell from the complaint, he was free to disregard. Moreover, the
complaint is devoid of any allegation that Poole attempted to appeal at all, let alone that
he was informed he could not. Instead, it appears that Poole assumed that the
Department of Corrections would deny the appeal because of the missed deadline. As

the Seventh Circuit noted in Perez, “[n]o one can know whether administrative requests

will be futile; the only way to find out is to try.” 182 F.3d at 536. Building on this
idea, the court rejected any notion of a futility exception to the PLRA exhaustion
requirement. Id. at 537. There is no room for a court or a plaintiff to speculate whether
exhaustion would be unavailing under the specific circumstances of each case. Id, If
aremedy exists, a plaintiff must allege that he or she pursued it as far as possible before

bringing suit in federal court. Otherwise, administrative personnel are deprived of their


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
DANIEL POOLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) 02 C 6279
) \)
OFFICER LEON; OFFICER FOSTER; et al., ) NY
) v L ww
Defendants. ) we \

MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on the motion of Defendant Emesto Leon
and Defendant Valerie Foster to dismiss Plaintiff Daniel Poole’s complaint. For the
reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

On April 26, 2002, Poole was a pretrial detainee in Division 9, Tier 1-C, a
maximum security section of the Cook County Jail. Between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m.,
Poole and nine to 11 other inmates were released from their cells into a common area
called the day room. The areas occupied by Poole and his fellow inmates—including
cells, the day room, the bathroom, and the shower area—were under the charge and

responsibility of Officers Leon and Foster. These areas were separated by walls and

5


doors, so one officer could not always observe occurrences in every area. After
releasing the inmates into the day room, Leon took a lunch break, leaving Foster as the
lone guard, Foster then left the day room and proceeded to the hallway to supervise
inmates’ use of a commissary cart. She watched inmates acquire personal goods from
the commissary cart for a period of about 20 minutes, While in the hallway, Foster was
unable to see large portions of the day room and bathroom.

During this time, four inmates grabbed Poole from the day room and dragged
him into the bathroom shower area. Once there, they struck Poole repeatedly in the
face and stomach. As two inmates held Poole down, one of the others pulled down his
pants and underwear and sexually assaulted him. Shortly thereafter, another inmate
replaced the first and assaulted Poole. Neither Leon nor Foster prevented or stopped
the attack. After the attack, Poole was examined with the aid of a rape kit.

On April 28, 2002, Poole filed a formal grievance in accordance with the Cook
County Department of Corrections Detainee Grievance Procedure. On May 2, 2002,
the jail determined that Poole had not been raped but noted that the results of the rape
kit had not been received. Poole was notified of the determination on May 5, 2002.

He then had five working days (until May 11) to appeal the decision. May 11 came