1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable John

T. Maughmer, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2993

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Mark A. Gannon, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 17, 2008

Filed: July 7, 2008

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Mark A. Gannon pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess and

distribute pseudoephedrine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(2) and 846. Gannon

reserved his right to appeal the district court's1

 denial of his motion to suppress.

Gannon now appeals the denial. He argues that the police violated his Fourth

Amendment rights because they lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him.
-2-

Gannon also contends that his confession and other statements made to police were

involuntarily made. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 8, 2002, Detective John Howe, of the Independence, Missouri,

police department, received a telephone call from David Akers, a loss prevention

officer employed by Wal-Mart in Independence. Akers was responsible for security

and had training in monitoring customers who may be purchasing precursors to the

manufacture of methamphetamine, such as pseudoephedrine pills. 

Akers informed Howe of the following. A white female purchased two packs

of Equate Antihistabs. She exited the store and got into a white Pontiac Bonneville.

Already inside the Bonneville, was a white man who had a Wal-Mart shopping bag

filled with unknown items. In a second call made by Akers to Howe a few minutes

later, Akers reported that a white man (later identified as Gannon), who had been in

a brown Oldsmobile Sierra, approached the Bonneville and began talking with the

occupants. During the conversation, Gannon and the man inside the Bonneville

exchanged money.

While en route to Wal-Mart, Howe ran a computer check on the Bonneville and

learned that it was registered to Clifford Swann and Betty Heim, both of Carthage,

Missouri. When Howe arrived at the Wal-Mart, he saw Gannon standing next to the

Bonneville. The Bonneville drove off before Howe approached the car, but Howe

ordered another officer to stop it. While the other officer stopped the Bonneville,

Howe and Detective Brian Graham approached Gannon, who had returned to his car.

The detectives, who were in plain clothes, asked Gannon if he would exit the car so

that they could speak to him. He did. The detectives then informed Gannon that they

had stopped him because of suspicious purchases and activity. They then sought

Gannon's consent to search the Oldsmobile. Gannon agreed to a search of the car,
-3-

which resulted in the detectives finding two packs of Equate Antihistab inside a WalMart shopping bag.

After Howe and Graham searched the Oldsmobile, Howe went to search the

Bonneville and Graham stayed with Gannon. A search of the Bonneville revealed

four packs of Equate Antihistabs. Swann, the passenger in the Bonneville, told Howe

that another individual planned to use the pills to manufacture methamphetamine.

While Howe searched the Bonneville, Graham observed Gannon waive off a white

female who was approaching. Graham stopped the woman; identified her as Patricia

Gannon, Gannon's ex-wife; and found two boxes of Equate Antihistabs on her.

The detectives placed Gannon under arrest and advised him of his Miranda

rights. Gannon, however, wanted to make a statement to police. Gannon told police

that the pills were going to be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Gannon also

tried to clear Patricia's involvement. Nonetheless, the detectives also arrested Patricia

and took her and Gannon to the Independence Police Department.

At the police station, Gannon signed a written Miranda rights waiver. He also

initialed each right. Before, however, Gannon signed the form, Howe informed

Gannon that he did not have to sign the form and did not have to talk with Howe or

Detective Joe Fanara, the other detective at the station. After Gannon signed and

initialed the waiver, he read the form to the detectives, which was standard procedure.

The detectives then interviewed Gannon and prepared a written statement, which

Gannon also signed. 

Gannon later moved to suppress the Equate pills and his confession and other

statements made to police. Gannon claimed that the evidence was obtained in

violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures, because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. He also alleged

that all the statements, including his confession, were made involuntarily after the
2

Neither the district court below, nor the government raised the issue of whether

the detectives' actions even needed to rise to the level of a Terry stop. Indeed, the

police may approach an individual and ask him a few questions, even if the police lack

reasonable suspicion, so long as the encounter is consensual and "a reasonable person

would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about his business.'" Florida v. Bostick,

501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)).

-4-

police threatened that Patricia would go to jail if he did not cooperate. Howe,

however, testified that neither he nor any other officer threatened Gannon or told

Gannon that if he did not cooperate, Patricia would go to jail. The magistrate judge,

who conducted the hearing, found Gannon's contention of threats incredulous and

concluded that no such threats were made. The magistrate judge also ruled that the

detectives' experience in dealing with the sale of methamphetamine precursors,

particularly in Independence, coupled with Akers' report, created reasonable suspicion

to stop Gannon. Gannon now challenges both conclusions.

II. DISCUSSION

Gannon challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress on two

grounds. The police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, and his statements and

confession were made involuntarily. We review a district court's denial of a motion

to suppress de novo, but review its underlying factual determinations for clear error,

giving due weight to the inferences of the district court and law-enforcement officials.

United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1083 (8th Cir. 2003). We also accord a

district court's credibility determinations great deference. United States v. Gregory,

302 F.3d 805, 811 (8th Cir. 2002).

A. Fourth Amendment

Gannon first contends that the district court erred by ruling that the detectives'

stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.2

 The Fourth Amendment provides that
Furthermore, the police may, even if they lack a basis to suspect a particular

individual committed a crime, request consent to search the individual's property, "as

long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is

required." Id. at 434-35. Because we conclude that the detectives had reasonable

suspicion to stop Gannon, we need not decide the precedent question of whether the

police's conduct even constituted a Terry stop.

-5-

"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend.

IV. This protection extends to one's automobile. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.

648, 662-63 (1979). 

The law distinguishes between a seizure and a stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

10 (1968). While police must have probable cause in order to arrest (or seize) a

person, they need only have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to stop

someone. Id. at 27. There is no "neat set of legal rules" that governs the determination

whether the police had reasonable suspicion. United States v. Barker, 437 F.3d 787,

789 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). An officer's suspicion is reasonable

if he "knows particularized, objective facts that lead to a rational inference that a

crime is being or has been committed." United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 327

F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 2003). But reasonable suspicion is more than an inarticulable

hunch, it must instead be based on specific and articuable facts, which taken together

with rational inferences, support the stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. To determine

whether the police had reasonable suspicion, we must examine the totality of the

circumstances. Barker, 437 F.3d at 790. We must consider these circumstances

"through the eyes of the officers, because they are trained to cull significance from

behavior that would appear innocent to the untrained observer." Id. (internal

quotations omitted).

Here, a reasonable view of the evidence supports the district court's conclusion

that the detectives had reasonable suspicion sufficient to conduct a Terry stop of
-6-

Gannon. Indeed, the evidence shows that before Howe arrived at the Wal-Mart, Akers

reported the following: that a female had purchased two packages of pseudoephedrine;

left the store and met a man in a white Pontiac Bonneville; another man in a brown

Oldsmobile exited his car and started talking with the female and man in the

Bonneville; and during the conversation, the two men exchanged money. Not only

had the detectives received this report, but each detective also had considerable

experience in dealing with the sale of methamphetamine precursors, specifically their

sale in Independence. In short, the district court did not err by ruling that the

detectives had reasonable suspicion to stop Gannon.

B. Involuntary Statements and Confession

Gannon also contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to

suppress because both his statements and confession were involuntarily made. More

specifically, Gannon argues that his statements and confession were involuntary

because the detectives threatened to imprison Gannon's ex-wife if he did not confess.

The test for determining the voluntariness of a confession is whether the police

extracted the confession by threats, violence, or direct or implied promises, such that

the "defendant's will [was] overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically

impaired." United States v. Kilgore, 58 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 1995) (alteration in

original) (internal quotations omitted). In applying this test, we must consider the

totality of the circumstances, including law-enforcement officials' conduct and the

defendant's capacity to resist pressure. Id.

Gannon's claim that his statements and confession resulted from the detectives'

threat that Gannon's ex-wife would be charged is without merit. Below, the district

court concluded that no credible evidence suggested that Gannon's statements were

involuntary. Specifically, the district court found Gannon's testimony that the officers

threatened him incredulous. This was not clear error. And even if we take Gannon's
-7-

testimony before the magistrate judge as true, there is no evidence, as the test for

involuntariness requires, that Gannon's "will was overborne and his capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired;" rather, Gannon only testified that his statements

were not voluntary because the "detectives repeatedly told [him] that unless he

confessed, his wife would be charged." In short, Gannon's involuntary-statementsand-confession argument fails.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of Gannon's

motion to suppress.

______________________________