stating he wanted to end the review of his application. Greer stated: “I 10 longer feel comfortable
with the processing of my application for a new construction loan.” Pl. 56.1 Resp. at | 72; Def. 56.1
Facts, Ex. 25. Based on that correspondence, Warner considered the application withdrawn. At that
time, Greer had not submitted all requested information on NLD’s checklist.
DISCUSSION

L Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); King v. National Human Res. Comm.,
218 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2000). Once a moving party has met its burden, the non-movant must
go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 1999). The court considers the
record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Bay v. Cassens Transp., Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000). A genuine issue of material
fact exists when the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable jury verdict in favor of the
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000).
Il. Disparate Treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 3605

Greer asserts Bank One engaged in race discrimination in the loan application process.
Specifically, Greer contends Bank One sent his loan application to NLD instead of the construction
department to facilitate the denial ofhis loan. Greer alleges Bank One failed to provide professional

service in a manner similar to other non-African-American applicants. In addition, Greer claims


items in an applicant’s file. Warner invites all applicants for a phone conference or a meeting if they
have questions. Finally, Greer’s own letter was sent by overnight mail, and at least one African-
American applicant letter was hand-delivered. See Pl. 56.1 Resp., Ex. 9B46. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Greer, the checklist letters fail to raise a genuine issue that similar
white applicants were treated more favorably.

With respect to Greer’s remaining allegations, Greer conceded at his deposition he does not
have evidence that similar non-A frican-American applicants had their construction loan applications
sent to other departments. Def. 56.1 Facts at § 76; Ex A at 58. In addition, Greer admits he is
unaware of any incident where Bank One provided more courteous service to non-A frican-American
customers. /d. at Ex. at 70. Furthermore, Greer cannot show Bank One used different procedures
to calculate his loan than for white applicants. See Latimore, 979 F. Supp. at 666 (no prima facie
case when plaintiff failed to show different procedures were used on non-minority applicants).
Indeed, it is undisputed Warner followed standard NLD practices in calculating the loan amount.
Warner even included Greer’s projected rental income as requested. Def. 56.1 Facts at 1 68.

Finally, Greer fails to advance evidence that race was a motivating factor in Bank One’s
transactions with Greer. Greer offers Warner’s letters to other applicants as evidence of race
discrimination. As noted above, those letters are immaterial. “[T]he prima facie case must allow a
factfinder to infer that the defendants acted because of racial considerations.” Latimore, 979 F.
Supp. at 667. No reasonable inference of discrimination can be drawn from Warner’s letters.
Without more, Greer’s claim cannot survive summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Silk, 194

F.3d at 798.


February 16, 1995, Warner met with Greer and obtained preliminary financial information. Warner
discussed NLD’s program and procedures, and handed Greer a NLD application package. Greer
returned the new loan application to NLD on February 22, 1995. Although Greer had failed to enter
a loan amount on the application, Warner accepted the application for processing. Relying on
Greer’s prior loan application, Warner instructed his assistant to use $99,900.00 as the requested loan
amount. Warner sent Greer a Federal Truth in Lending form and a Good Faith Estimate of
Settlement Charges form on February 24, 1995, Warner’s cover letter expressly stated he would
inform Greer of Bank One’s decision on the loan. Greer returned those forms on March 1, 1995.

Meanwhile, Warner instructed his assistant to complete a “single-family application
checklist,” which outlined information a new applicant was required to submit. NLD’s procedures
provided the loan could not be completed until the applicant submitted all information on the
checklist. On March 21, 1995, Warner performed a preliminary underwriting review to calculate
Greer’s qualified loan. Under NLD standards, Warner determined Greer was qualified for
$72,375.00. At that time, Warner was uncertain whether to include Greer’s projected rental income
from the second unit of the building. Warner decided to leave the projected income out.

Warner informed Greer of the loan amount by letter, and asked him to submit 29 additional
items on the checklist. Warner included “a 10-day letter,” which advised Greer his response was
needed in 10 days to continue processing the loan. In response, Greer sent Warner several items on
the checklist. Warner learned he could include 75% of Greer’s anticipated rental income in
calculating the loan amount. After recalculation, Greer qualified for a loan of $84,466.40. Warner
telephoned Greer, informed him of the revised loan amount, and scheduled a meeting on April 3,

1995. Greer failed to keep the appointment. On April 5, 1999, Warner received a letter from Greer


Bank One lowered his application amount from $99,900 to $72,375 because of his race. Finally,
Greer asserts the “10-day letter” was sent to him because he was African-American, and similarly
qualified white applicants did not receive these letters.

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in a loan application under § 3605,
Greer must prove (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for
the loan; (3) the loan was rejected despite his qualifications: and (4) Bank One continued to approve
loans for applicants with similar qualifications. Latimore v. Citibank, F.S.B.,979 F. Supp. 662, 665
(ND. IIL 1997). Greer must show “race was a motivating consideration in [Bank One’s] decision
not to make the loan.” Jd. at 664 (quoting Thomas v. First Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 F. Supp. 1330, 1338-
39 (N.D. Ind. 1987)); Kaplan v. 422 Wellington Coop. Bldg. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 53, 57 (N.D. Ill.
1983).

It is undisputed Greer, an African-American, is a member of a protected class. Bank One
claims Greer cannot satisfy the remaining three elements of a disparate treatment claim. Bank One
argues Greer is unable to demonstrate he qualified for the loan because Greer voluntarily terminated
the loan application process before completion. Def. 56.1 Facts at 973; Ex. 25. Bank One’s
argument is in error. If Bank One’s approval of the loan is necessary for Greer to qualify under the
second element, then no plaintiff would be able to demonstrate disparate treatment. The heart of a
disparate treatment claim involves a lender’s rejection of a loan. Indeed, the third element of a
disparate treatment claim requires Greer to demonstrate Bank One rejected his application. Thus,
Bank One’s interpretation of the second element renders a disparate treatment claim meaningless.

In fact, it is undisputed Warner determined Greer qualified initially for a $72,375 loan, and

then a $84,466.40 loan. Def. 56.1 Facts at { 53, 68. That evidence is sufficient for Greer to raise a


CONCLUSION
Bank One’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Greer’s motion for summary

judgment is moot.

October 1, 2001 ENTER:

(2.
uzanne B. Conion
United States District Judge


‘Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Hlinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Suzanne B. Conlon

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 01 C 693 DATE 10/1/2001
CASE TYRONE JUSTIN GREER vs. BANK ONE, et al.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
IN:
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due
@) Oo Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due. _
(4) o Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) o Status hearingfheid/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) im Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo ({Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) (General Rule21 [/FRCP41(a)(1) 1 FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) HH [Other docket entry] Bank One’s motion for summary judgment [29-1] is granted. Greer’s motion
for summary judgment [30-1] is moot. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.

di) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. + umber of notices

Y | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

OCT 0 5, 7001

Notified counsel by telephone. 5.2

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. @ docketing deputy initials

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

10/2/2001

date mailed notice

courtroom  ooT bk ig OT
1. Gh iS)
SB deputy’s i. Gui -4 e ce
initials

Date/time received in

central Clerk’s Office ‘mailing deputy initials



genuine issue on the second element. In addition, Greer alleges disparate treatment because he was
denied the $99,900 loan. To the extent Greer contends he qualified for that loan, Greer raises a
genuine dispute of fact. Bank One completed the Federal Truth in Lending form and entered, under
“Amount Financed,” the loan amount of $97,115.00. Def. 56.1 Facts, Ex. 12. Presumably, the
difference between $99,115 and $99,900 is Bank One’s loan fees. Jd. A reasonable jury could
conclude Greer qualified for the $99,900 loan.

Nevertheless, Greer cannot demonstrate Bank One rejected his loan or refused to conduct
business with him. In a letter dated April 1, 1995, Greer stated he no longer felt comfortable with
the loan process. Def. 56.1 Facts at { 72, Ex. 25. Greer concluded he wanted to end “all processing
of [his application].” Jd. He asked for a refund of the $200 loan application fee. There is no
evidence that Bank One rejected Greer’s loan. Instead, the undisputed evidence demonstrates Greer
voluntarily withdrew his application.

Bank One asserts Greer cannot show it approved loans for non-A frican-American applicants
with similar qualifications. In response, Greer claims numerous letters from Warner demonstrate
he treated non-African-American applicants more favorably. Greer claims white applicants: (1)
received hand delivered letters; (2) did not receive 10-day letters; and (3) were sent more cooperative
letters. See Pl. 56.1 Resp., Ex. 9W1-9B55. Greer’s arguments are without merit. There is no
evidence Warner approved loans for any of these applicants. Nor is there evidence demonstrating
these applicants’ race. Greer’s naked assertions of the applicants’ race in his summary judgment
response brief do not suffice. In addition, a review of Warner’s letters show they are devoid of any
material difference in the treatment of white or black applicants. Warner’s form letters contain a

request for information within 10 days. Jd. Those letters include a detailed checklist of missing


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS DOCKETED

EASTERN DIVISION OCT 65 299)
TYRONE JUSTIN GREER )
Plaintiff, } No. 01 € 693
v. } Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
BANK ONE, et al.
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Tyrone Justin Greer, pro se, sues Bank One, formerly known as the First National Bank of
Chicago and First Chicago (“FNBC”) for race discrimination under Section 805 of the Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605. Greer and Bank One move for summary judgment. Bank One’s motion for
summary judgment is addressed first.

BACKGROUND

I. Greer’s Rule 56.1 Responses

Although pro se plaintiffs are entitled to more lenient standards in some circumstances, the
standards do not diminish when it comes to complying with procedural rules. Jones v. Phipps, 39
F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994). Greer's Rule 56.1 responses to Bank One’s statement of material facts
include a vast number of denials without citation to any affidavits or documents. All relevant facts
denied without supporting documentation must be accepted as true. Schulz v. Serfilco, Ltd.,965 F.2d
516, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1992); Local Rule 56.1, 56.2. Accordingly, the following paragraphs are
treated as admissions: ff 9-14, 16, 19, 22, 27-30, 36, 39, 42, 44, 58, 65, and 73. In addition, Greer’s

1


denials often cite to documentation that do not support the conclusion asserted. On that basis, the
following paragraphs are treated as admissions: {f 8, 20, 21, 37, 38, 40, 43, 45, 47, 50, 52-54, 57,
59-64, 66-69, and 74. Finally, the following paragraphs are deemed admissions because the
supporting documentation (Pl. Ex. 2-4) is unauthenticated: 9] 17 and 34. See Woods v. City of
Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir. 2000) (evidence submitted at summary judgment must be
admissible at trial under Federal Rules of Evidence).

IL. The Facts

All facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Greer is an African-American male residing
in Chicago, Illinois. Bank One is a national banking association with its principal place of business
in Chicago. In August 1994, Greer met with Turner James at a FNBC branch and submitted a loan
application for a home mortgage loan. Greer sought to purchase a residence at 7200 South Euclid
Avenue in Chicago. Greer informed James he wanted the maximum loan possible. Accordingly,
James entered $99,900 on the loan application.

Valarie Pearson, a loan processor, received Greer’s application. Inreviewing the application,
Pearson learned Greer wanted the loan to build a two-flat residential building. However, Pearson’s
unit considered applications for purchases of existing homes only. After conferring with Dennis J.
Godfrey, her supervisor, Godfrey instructed Pearson to transfer Greer’s application to the
Neighborhood Lending Division (“NLD”). NLD was the only FNBC lending unit authorized to
consider applications for funding construction of residential housing in the low to moderate income
areas of Chicago. Through correspondence in December 1994 and January 1995, Pearson informed
Greer his loan application was transferred to NLD.

Tn January 1995, David Warner, a loan officer, received Greer’s loan application. On